SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume I

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OF
MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume I

FROM MARX
TO MAO

NOT FOR
COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

毛澤东

From Marx to Mao

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Volume I

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The present volume is an English translation of the second Chinese edition of the first volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, published by the People's Publishing House, Peking, in April 1960.

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PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* includes important articles he wrote in the different periods of the Chinese revolution. A number of Chinese editions of his works have appeared in various places, but none of them had been gone over by the author; their arrangement was haphazard, there were errors in the text, and certain important writings were omitted. The contents of the present edition are arranged in chronological order and according to the main periods in the history of the Communist Party of China since its foundation in 1921. The present edition includes a number of important writings not included in the earlier editions. The author has read all the articles, made certain verbal changes and, in isolated cases, revised the text.

The following points need to be made clear in connection with the publication:

1. The present selection remains incomplete. As revolutionary records were destroyed by the Kuomintang reactionaries or dispersed and lost over the long years of war, we cannot collect all the writings of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, and particularly his numerous letters and telegrams which form a considerable part of his writings.
2. Some articles which have been widely circulated (*e.g.*, *Rural Surveys*) were omitted in compliance with the author's wishes, and for the same reason only Chapter I of *Economic and Financial Problems* ("A Basic Summing-Up of Our Past Work") was included.
3. Explanatory notes are added to this selection. Some explaining the titles are placed at the bottom of the first page of each article, while the rest, political or otherwise, come at the end of each article.
4. The present Chinese edition is available in a single volume or in a set of four volumes. The first volume of the set covers the periods of the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27) and of the

Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-37); the second and third volumes cover the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45); and the fourth volume covers that of the Third Revolutionary Civil War (1945-49).

Committee for the Publication of the
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,
Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China

August 25, 1951

FROM MARX TO MAO

CONTENTS

THE FIRST REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR PERIOD

ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSES IN CHINESE SOCIETY 13

REPORT ON AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT IN HUNAN 23

- The Importance of the Peasant Problem 23
- Get Organized 24
- Down with the Local Tyrants and Evil Gentry! All Power to the Peasant Associations! 25
- "It's Terrible!" or "It's Fine!" 26
- The Question of "Going Too Far" 27
- The "Movement of the Riffraff" 29
- Vanguards of the Revolution 30
- Fourteen Great Achievements 34
  1. Organizing the Peasants into Peasant Associations 34
  2. Hitting the Landlords Politically 35
  3. Hitting the Landlords Economically 39
  4. Overthrowing the Feudal Rule of the Local Tyrants and Evil Gentry — Smashing the *Tu* and *Tuan* 40
  5. Overthrowing the Armed Forces of the Landlords and Establishing Those of the Peasants 41
  6. Overthrowing the Political Power of the County Magistrate and His Bailiffs 42
  7. Overthrowing the Clan Authority of the Ancestral Temples and Clan Elders, the Religious Authority of the Town and Village Gods, and the Masculine Authority of Husbands 44
  8. Spreading Political Propaganda 47
  9. Peasant Bans and Prohibitions 49
  10. Eliminating Banditry 52
  11. Abolishing Exorbitance Levies 53
  12. The Movement for Education 53
  13. The Co-operative Movement 54
  14. Building Roads and Repairing Embankments 55

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THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR PERIOD

WHY IS IT THAT RED POLITICAL POWER CAN EXIST IN CHINA? 63
- I. The Internal Political Situation 63
- II. Reasons for the Emergence and Survival of Red Political Power in China 64
- III. The Independent Regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area and the August Defeat 67
- IV. The Role of the Independent Regime of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi 68
- V. Economic Problems 69
- VI. The Problem of Military Bases 70

THE STRUGGLE IN THE CHINGKANG MOUNTAINS 73
- The Independent Regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area and the August Defeat 73
- The Current Situation in the Area Under the Independent Regime 79
  - Military Questions 80
  - Land Questions 87
  - Questions of Political Power 90
  - Questions of Party Organization 92
  - The Question of the Character of the Revolution 97
  - The Question of the Location of Our Independent Regime 99

ON CORRECTING MISTAKEN IDEAS IN THE PARTY 105
- On the Purely Military Viewpoint 105
- On Ultra-Democracy 108
- On the Disregard of Organizational Discipline 109
- On Absolute Equalitarianism 110
- On Subjectivism 111
- On Individualism 112
- On the Ideology of Roving Rebel Bands 114
- On the Remnants of Putschism 114

A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE 117

PAY ATTENTION TO ECONOMIC WORK 129

HOW TO DIFFERENTIATE THE CLASSES IN THE RURAL AREAS 137

OUR ECONOMIC POLICY 141

BE CONCERNED WITH THE WELL-BEING OF THE MASSES, PAY ATTENTION TO METHODS OF WORK 147

ON TACTICS AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM 153

The Characteristics of the Present Political Situation 153
The National United Front 162
The People's Republic 165
International Support 170

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR 179

Chapter I
How to Study War 179
1. The Laws of War are Developmental 179
2. The Aim of War Is to Eliminate War 182
3. Strategy Is the Study of the Laws of a War Situation as a Whole 183
4. The Important Thing Is to Be Good at Learning 186

Chapter II
The Chinese Communist Party and China's Revolutionary War 191

Chapter III
Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War 194
1. The Importance of the Subject 194
2. What Are the Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War? 196
3. Our Strategy and Tactics Ensuing from These Characteristics 199

Chapter IV
"Encirclement and Suppression" and Counter-Campaigns Against It — the Main Pattern of China's Civil War 200

Chapter V
The Strategic Defensive 205
1. Active and Passive Defense 205
2. Preparations for Combating "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaigns 208
3. Strategic Retreat 211
4. Strategic Counter-Offensive 223
5. Starting the Counter-Offensive 225
6. Concentration of Troops 233
7. Mobile Warfare 239
8. War of Quick Decision 244
9. War of Annihilation 248

A STATEMENT ON CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S STATEMENT 255

THE TASKS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF RESISTANCE TO JAPAN 263

The Present Stage of Development of China's External and Internal Contradictions 263

The Struggle for Democracy and Freedom 267

Our Responsibility to Lead 273

WIN THE MASSES IN THEIR MILLIONS FOR THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT 285

The Question of Peace 285

The Question of Democracy 288

The Question of the Future of the Revolution 290

The Question of Cadres 291

The Question of Democracy Within the Party 292

Unity in the Conference and in the Whole Party 292

Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front 292

ON PRACTICE 295

ON CONTRADICTION 311

I. The Two World Outlooks 311

II. The Universality of Contradiction 315

III. The Particularity of Contradiction 319

IV. The Principle Contradiction and the Principle Aspect of a Contradiction 331

V. The Identity and Struggle of the Aspects of a Contradiction 337

VI. The Place of Antagonism in Contradiction 343

VI. Conclusion 345

THE FIRST
REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR
PERIOD

ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSES IN CHINESE SOCIETY

March 1926

Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little was their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies. A revolutionary party is the guide of the masses, and no revolution ever succeeds when the revolutionary party leads them astray. To ensure that we will definitely achieve success in our revolution and will not lead the masses astray, we must pay attention to uniting with our real friends in order to attack our real enemies. To distinguish real friends from real enemies, we must make a general analysis of the economic status of the various classes in Chinese society and of their respective attitudes towards the revolution.

What is the condition of each of the classes in Chinese society?

The landlord class and the comprador class.[1] In economically backward and semi-colonial China the landlord class and the comprador class are wholly appendages of the international bourgeoisie, depending upon imperialism for their survival and growth. These classes represent the most backward and most reactionary relations of production in China and hinder the development of the productive forces. Their existence is utterly incompatible with the aims of the Chinese revolution. The big landlord and big comprador classes in particular always side with imperialism and constitute an extreme counter-

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This article was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to combat two deviations then to be found in the Party. The exponents of the first deviation, represented by Chen Tu-hsiu, were concerned only with co-operation with the Kuomintang and forgot about the peasants; this was Right opportunism. The exponents of the second deviation, represented by Chang Kuo-tao, were concerned only with the labour movement, and likewise forgot about the peasants; this was "Left" opportunism. Both were aware that their own strength was inadequate, but revolutionary group. Their political representatives are the *Étatistes*[2] and the right-wing of the Kuomintang.

The middle bourgeoisie. This class represents the capitalist relations of production in China in town and country. The middle bourgeoisie, by which is meant chiefly the national bourgeoisie,[3] is inconsistent in its attitude towards the Chinese revolution: they feel the need for revolution and favour the revolutionary movement against imperialism and the warlords when they are smarting under the blows of foreign capital and the oppression of the warlords, but become suspicious of the revolution when they sense that, with the militant participation of the proletariat at home and the active support of the international proletariat abroad, the revolution is threatening the hope of their class to attain the status of a big bourgeoisie. Politically, they stand for the establishment of a state under the rule of a single class, the national bourgeoisie. A self-styled true disciple of Tai Chi-tao[4] wrote in the *Chen Pao*,[5] Peking, "Raise your left fist to knock down the imperialists and your right to knock down the Communists." These words depict the dilemma and anxiety of this class. It is against interpreting the Kuomintang's Principle of the People's Livelihood according to the theory of class struggle, and it opposes the Kuomintang's alliance with Russia and the admission of Communists[6] and left-wingers. But its attempt to establish a state under the rule of the national bourgeoisie is quite impracticable, because the present world situation is such that the two major forces, revolution and counter-revolution, are locked in final struggle. Each has hoisted a huge banner: one is the red banner of revolution held aloft by the Third International as the rallying point for all the oppressed classes of the world, the other is the white banner of counter-revolution held aloft by the League of Nations as the rallying point for all the counter-revolutionaries of the world. The intermediate classes are bound to disintegrate quickly, some sections turning left to join the revolution, others turning right to join the counter-revolution; there is no room for them to remain "independent". Therefore

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neither of them knew where to seek reinforcements or where to obtain allies on a mass scale. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the peasantry was the staunchest and numerically the largest ally of the Chinese proletariat, and thus solved the problem of who was the chief ally in the Chinese revolution. Moreover, he saw that the national bourgeoisie was a vacillating class and predicted that it would disintegrate during the upsurge of the revolution, with its right-wing going over to the side of imperialism. This was borne out by the events of 1927.

the idea cherished by China's middle bourgeoisie of an "independent" revolution in which it would play the primary role is a mere illusion.

The petty bourgeoisie. Included in this category are the owner-peasants,[7] the master handicraftsmen, the lower levels of the intellectuals — students, primary and secondary school teachers, lower government functionaries, office clerks, small lawyers and the small traders. Both because of its size and class character, this class deserves very close attention. The owner-peasants and the master handicraftsmen are both engaged in small-scale production. Although all strata of this class have the same petty-bourgeois economic status, they fall into three different sections. The first section consists of those who have some surplus money or grain, that is, those who, by manual or mental labour, earn more each year than they consume for their own support. Such people very much want to get rich and are devout worshippers of Marshal Chao;[8] while they have no illusions about amassing great fortunes, they invariably desire to climb up into the middle bourgeoisie. Their mouths water copiously when they see the respect in which those small moneybags are held. People of this sort are timid, afraid of government officials, and also a little afraid of the revolution. Since they are quite close to the middle bourgeoisie in economic status, they have a lot of faith in its propaganda and are suspicious of the revolution. This section is a minority among the petty bourgeoisie and constitutes its right-wing. The second section consists of those who in the main are economically self-supporting. They are quite different from the people in the first section; they also want to get rich, but Marshal Chao never lets them. In recent years, moreover, suffering from the oppression and exploitation of the imperialists, the warlords, the feudal landlords and the big comprador-bourgeoisie, they have become aware that the world is no longer what it was. They feel they cannot earn enough to live on by just putting in as much work as before. To make both ends meet they have to work longer hours, get up earlier, leave off later, and be doubly careful at their work. They become rather abusive, denouncing the foreigners as "foreign devils", the warlords as "robber generals" and the local tyrants and evil gentry as "the heartless rich". As for the movement against the imperialists and the warlords, they merely doubt whether it can succeed (on the ground that the foreigners and the warlords seem so powerful), hesitate to join it and prefer to be neutral, but they never oppose the revolution. This section is very numerous, making up about one-half of the petty bourgeoisie.

The third section consists of those whose standard of living is falling. Many in this section, who originally belonged to better-off families, are undergoing a gradual change from a position of being barely able to manage to one of living in more and more reduced circumstances. When they come to settle their accounts at the end of each year, they are shocked, exclaiming, "What? Another deficit!" As such people have seen better days and are now going downhill with every passing year, their debts mounting and their life becoming more and more miserable, they "shudder at the thought of the future". They are in great mental distress because there is such a contrast between their past and their present. Such people are quite important for the revolutionary movement; they form a mass of no small proportions and are the left-wing of the petty bourgeoisie. In normal times these three sections of the petty bourgeoisie differ in their attitude to the revolution. But in times of war, that is, when the tide of the revolution runs high and the dawn of victory is in sight, not only will the left-wing of the petty bourgeoisie join the revolution, but the middle section too may join, and even right-wingers, swept forward by the great revolutionary tide of the proletariat and of the left-wing of the petty bourgeoisie, will have to go along with the revolution. We can see from the experience of the May 30th Movement[9] of 1925 and the peasant movement in various places that this conclusion is correct.

The semi-proletariat. What is here called the semi-proletariat consists of five categories: (1) the overwhelming majority of the semi-owner peasants,[10] (2) the poor peasants, (3) the small handicraftsmen, (4) the shop assistants,[11] and (5) the peddlers. The overwhelming majority of the semi-owner peasants together with the poor peasants constitute a very large part of the rural masses. The peasant problem is essentially their problem. The semi-owner peasants, the poor peasants and the small handicraftsmen are engaged in production on a still smaller scale than the owner-peasants and the master handicraftsmen. Although both the overwhelming majority of the semi-owner peasants and the poor peasants belong to the semi-proletariat, they may be further divided into three smaller categories, upper, middle and lower, according to their economic condition. The semi-owner peasants are worse off than the owner-peasants because every year they are short of about half the food they need, and have to make up this deficit by renting land from others, selling part of their labour power, or engaging in petty trading. In late spring and early summer when the crop is still in the blade and the old stock is consumed, they borrow at exorbitant rates of interest and buy grain at high prices; their plight is naturally harder than that of the owner-peasants who need no help from others, but they are better off than the poor peasants. For the poor peasants own no land, and receive only half the harvest or even less for their year's toil, while the semi-owner peasants, though receiving only half or less than half the harvest of land rented from others, can keep the entire crop from the land they own. The semi-owner peasants are therefore more revolutionary than the owner-peasants, but less revolutionary than the poor peasants. The poor peasants are tenant-peasants who are exploited by the landlords. They may again be divided into two categories according to their economic status. One category has comparatively adequate farm implements and some funds. Such peasants may retain half the product their year's toil. To make up their deficit they cultivate side-crops, catch fish or shrimps, raise poultry or pigs, or sell part of their labour power, and thus eke out a living, hoping in the midst of hardship and destitution to tide over the year. Thus their life is harder than that of the semi-owner peasants, but they are better off than the other category of poor peasants. They are more revolutionary than the semi-owner peasants, but less revolutionary than the other category of poor peasants. As for the latter, they have neither adequate farm implements nor funds nor enough manure, their crops are poor, and, with little left after paying rent, they have even greater need to sell part of their labour power. In hard times they piteously beg help from relatives and friends, borrowing a few *tou* or *sheng* of grain to last them a few days, and their debts pile up like loads on the backs of oxen. They are the worst off among the peasants and are highly receptive to revolutionary propaganda. The small handicraftsmen are called semi-proletarians because, though they own some simple means of production and moreover are self-employed, they too are often forced to sell part of their labour power and are somewhat similar to the poor peasants in economic status. They feel the constant pinch of poverty and dread of unemployment, because of heavy family burdens and the gap between their earnings and the cost of living; in this respect too they largely resemble the poor peasants. The shop assistants are employees of shops and stores, supporting their families on meagre pay and getting an increase perhaps only once in several years while prices rise every year. If by chance you get into intimate conversation with them, they invariably pour out their endless grievances. Roughly the same in status as the poor peasants and the small handicraftsmen, they are highly receptive to revolutionary propaganda. The pedlars, whether they carry their wares around on a pole or set up stalls along the street, have tiny funds and very small earnings, and do not make enough to feed and clothe themselves. Their status is roughly the same as that of the poor peasants, and like the poor peasants, they need a revolution to change the existing state of affairs.

The proletariat. The modern industrial proletariat numbers about two million. It is not large because China is economically backward. These two million industrial workers are mainly employed in five industries — railways, mining, maritime transport, textiles and shipbuilding — and a great number are enslaved in enterprises owned by foreign capitalists. Though not very numerous, the industrial proletariat represents China's new productive forces, is the most progressive class in modern China and has become the leading force in the revolutionary movement. We can see the important position of the industrial proletariat in the Chinese revolution from the strength it has displayed in the strikes of the last four years, such as the seamen's strikes,[12] the railway strike,[13] the strikes in the Kailan and Tsiaotso coal mines,[14] the Shameen strike[15] and the general strikes in Shanghai and Hongkong[16] after the May 30th Incident. The first reason why the industrial workers hold this position is their concentration. No other section of the people is so concentrated. The second reason is their low economic status. They have been deprived of all means of production, have nothing left but their hands, have no hope of ever becoming rich and, moreover, are subjected to the most ruthless treatment by the imperialists, the warlords and the bourgeoisie. That is why they are particularly good fighters. The coolies in the cities are also a force meriting attention. They are mostly dockers and rickshawmen, and among them, too, are sewage carters and street cleaners. Possessing nothing but their hands, they are similar in economic status to the industrial workers but are less concentrated and play a less important role in production. There is as yet little modern capitalist farming in China. By rural proletariat we mean farm labourers hired by the year, the month or the day. Having neither land, farm implements nor funds, they can live only by selling their labour power. Of all the workers they work the longest hours, for the lowest wages, under the worst conditions, and with the least security of employment. They are the most hard-pressed people in the villages, and their position in the peasant movement is as important as that of the poor peasants.

Apart from all these, there is the fairly large *lumpen*-proletariat, made up of peasants who have lost their land and handicraftsmen who cannot get work. They lead the most precarious existence of all. In every part of the country they have their secret societies, which were originally their mutual-aid organizations for political and economic struggle, for instance, the Triad Society in Fukien and Kwangtung, the Society of Brothers in Hunan, Hupeh, Kweichow and Szechuan, the Big Sword Society in Anhwei, Honan and Shantung, the Rational Life Society in Chihli[17] and the three northeastern provinces, and the Green Band in Shanghai and elsewhere.[18] One of China's difficult problems is how to handle these people. Brave fighters but apt to be destructive, they can become a revolutionary force if given proper guidance.

To sum up, it can be seen that our enemies are all those in league with imperialism — the warlords, the bureaucrats, the comprador class, the big landlord class and the reactionary section of the intelligentsia attached to them. The leading force in our revolution is the industrial proletariat. Our closest friends are the entire semi-proletariat and petty bourgeoisie. As for the vacillating middle bourgeoisie, their right-wing may become our enemy and their left-wing may become our friend — but we must be constantly on our guard and not let them create confusion within our ranks.

NOTES

[1] A comprador, in the original sense of the word, was the Chinese manager or the senior Chinese employee in a foreign commercial establishment. The compradors served foreign economic interests and had close connection with imperialism and foreign capital.

[2] The *Étatistes* were a handful of shameless fascist politicians who at that time formed the Chinese *Étatiste* Youth League, later renamed the Chinese Youth Party. They made counter-revolutionary careers for themselves by opposing the Communist Party and the Soviet Union and received subsidies from the various groups of reactionaries in power and from the imperialists.

[3] For further discussion of the role of the national bourgeoisie, see "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", Chapter 2, Section 4, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II.

[4] Tai Chi-tao joined the Kuomintang in his youth and for a time was Chiang Kai-shek's partner in stock exchange speculation. After Sun Yat-sen's death in 1925 he carried on anti-Communist agitation and prepared the ground ideologically for

Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary coup d'état in 1927. For years he was a faithful running dog to Chiang Kai-shek in the counter-revolution. He committed suicide in February 1949, driven to despair by the imminent doom of Chiang Kai-shek's regime.

[5] The *Chen Pao* was the organ of the Association for the Study of Constitutional Government, a political group which supported the rule of the Northern warlords.

[6] In 1923 Sun Yat-sen, with the help of the Chinese Communist Party, decided to reorganize the Kuomintang, bring about Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and admit members of the Communist Party into the Kuomintang. In January 1924, he convened in Canton the Kuomintang's First National Congress at which he laid down the Three Great Policies — alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. Mao Tse-tung, Li Ta-chao, Lin Po-chu, Chu Chiu-pai and other comrades attended the Congress and played an important part in helping the Kuomintang to take the road of revolution. Some of these comrades were elected members, and others alternate members, of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

[7] By owner-peasants Comrade Mao Tse-tung means the middle peasants.

[8] Marshal Chao is Chao Kung-ming, God of Wealth in Chinese folklore.

[9] The May 30th Movement was the nation-wide anti-imperialist movement in protest against the massacre of the Chinese people by the British police in Shanghai on May 30, 1925. Earlier that month, major strikes had broken out in Japanese-owned textile mills in Tsingtao and Shanghai, which the Japanese imperialists and the Northern warlords who were their running dogs proceeded to suppress. On May 15 the Japanese textile mill-owners in Shanghai shot and killed the worker Ku Cheng-hung and wounded a dozen others. On May 28 eight workers were slaughtered by the reactionary government in Tsingtao. On May 30 more than two thousand students in Shanghai agitated in the foreign concessions in support of the workers and for the recovery of the foreign concessions. They rallied more than ten thousand people before the British police headquarters, shouting such slogans as "Down with imperialism!" and "People of China, unite!" The British imperialist police opened fire, killing and wounding many students. This became known as the May 30th Massacre. It immediately aroused country-wide indignation, and demonstrations and strikes of workers, students and shopkeepers were held everywhere, forming a tremendous anti-imperialist movement.

[10] By "the overwhelming majority of the semi-owner peasants", Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here referring to the impoverished peasants who worked partly on their own land and partly on landed rented from others.

[11] There were several strata of shop assistants in old China. Here Comrade Mao Tse-tung is referring to the largest. There was also the lower stratum of shop assistants who led the life of proletarians.

[12] The seamen's strikes were staged by the seamen at Hongkong and by the crews of the Yangtse River steamers early in 1922. The Hongkong seamen held out for eight weeks. After a bitter and bloody struggle, the British imperialist authorities in Hongkong were finally forced to raise wages, lift the ban on the Seamen's Union, release the arrested workers and indemnify the families of the martyrs. The crews of the Yangtse steamers went on strike soon afterwards, carried on the struggle for two weeks and also won victory.

[13] Immediately after its founding in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party set about organizing the railway workers. In 1922-23 strikes took place under the Party's leadership on all the trunk lines. The best known was the general strike on the Peking-Hankow Railway which began on February 4, 1923. It was a fight for the freedom to organize a general trade union. On February 7 the Northern warlords Wu Pei-fu and Hsiao Yao-nan, who were backed by British imperialism, butchered the strikers. This became known as the February 7th Massacre.

[14] The Kailan Coal Mines was an inclusive name for the large contiguous Kaiping and Luanchow coalfields in Hopei Province, then employing over fifty thousand workers. During the Yi Ho Tuan Movement of 1900 the British imperialists seized the Kaiping mines. Subsequently the Chinese organized the Luanchow Coal Mining Company, which was later incorporated into the Kailan Mining Administration. Both coalfields thus came under the exclusive control of British imperialism. The Kailan strike took place in October 1922. The Tsiaotso Coal Mines, situated in Honan Province, are also well known in China. The Tsiaotso strike lasted from July 1 to August 9, 1925.

[15] Shameen, a section of the city of Canton, was held on lease by British imperialism. In July 1924 the British imperialists who ruled it issued a new police regulation requiring all Chinese to produce passes with photos on leaving or entering the area. But foreigners were exempt. On July 15 the workers in Shameen went on strike to protest against this preposterous measure, which the British imperialists were finally forced to cancel.

[16] Following the May 30th Incident in Shanghai, general strikes broke out on June 1, 1925 in Shanghai and on June 19 in Hongkong. More than 200,000 workers took part in Shanghai and 250,000 in Hongkong. The big Hongkong strike, with the support of the people throughout the country, lasted sixteen months. It was the longest strike in the history of the world labour movement.

[17] Chihli was the old name for Hopei Province.

[18] The Triad Society, the Society of Brothers, the Big Sword Society, the Rational Life Society and the Green Band were primitive secret organizations among the people. The members were mainly bankrupt peasants, unemployed handicraftsmen and other *lumpen*-proletarians. In feudal China these elements were often drawn together by some religion or superstition to form organizations of a patriarchal pattern and bearing different names, and some possessed arms. Through these organizations the *lumpen*-proletarians sought to help each other socially and economically, and sometimes fought the bureaucrats and landlords who oppressed them. Of course, such backward organizations could not provide a way out for the peasants and handicraftsmen. Furthermore, they could easily be controlled and utilized by the landlords and local tyrants and, because of this and of their blind destructiveness, some turned into reactionary forces. In his counter-revolutionary coup d'état of 1927, Chiang Kai-shek made use of them to disrupt the unity of the labouring people and destroy the revolution. As the modern industrial proletariat arose and grew from strength to strength, the peasants, under the leadership of the working class, gradually formed themselves into organizations of an entirely new type, and these primitive, backward societies lost their *raison d'être.*

REPORT ON AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT IN HUNAN

March 1927

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PEASANT PROBLEM

During my recent visit to Hunan[1] I made a first-hand investigation of conditions in the five counties of Hsiangtan, Hsianghsiang, Hengshan, Liling and Changsha. In the thirty-two days from January 4 to February 5, I called together fact-finding conferences in villages and county towns, which were attended by experienced peasants and by comrades working in the peasant movement, and I listened attentively to their reports and collected a great deal of material. Many of the hows and whys of the peasant movement were the exact opposite of what the gentry in Hankow and Changsha are saying. I saw and heard of many strange things of which I had hitherto been unaware. I believe the same is true of many other places, too. All talk directed against the peasant movement must be speedily set right. All the wrong measures taken by the revolutionary authorities concerning the peasant movement must be speedily changed. Only thus can the future of the revolution be benefited. For the present upsurge of the peasant movement is a colossal event. In a very short time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back. They will smash all the trammels that

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This article was written as a reply to the carping criticisms both inside and outside the Party then being levelled at the peasants' revolutionary struggle. Comrade Mao Tse-tung spent thirty-two days in Hunan Province making an investigation and wrote this report in order to answer these criticisms. The Right opportunists in the Party, headed by Chen Tu-hsiu, would not accept his views and stuck to their own wrong ideas. Their chief error was that, frightened by the reactionary trend in the Kuomintang, they dared not support the great revolutionary struggles bind them and rush forward along the road to liberation. They will sweep all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local tyrants and evil gentry into their graves. Every revolutionary party and every revolutionary comrade will be put to the test, to be accepted or rejected as they decide. There are three alternatives. To march at their head and lead them? To trail behind them, gesticulating and criticizing? Or to stand in their way and oppose them? Every Chinese is free to choose, but events will force you to make the choice quickly.

GET ORGANIZED!

The development of the peasant movement in Hunan may be divided roughly into two periods with respect to the counties in the province's central and southern parts where the movement has already made much headway. The first, from January to September of last year, was one of organization. In this period, January to June was a time of underground activity, and July to September, when the revolutionary army was driving out Chao Heng-ti,[2] one of open activity. During this period, the membership of the peasant associations did not exceed 300,000-400,000, the masses directly under their leadership numbered little more than a million, there was as yet hardly any struggle in the rural areas, and consequently there was very little criticism of the associations in other circles. Since its members served as guides, scouts and carriers of the Northern Expeditionary Army, even some of the officers had a good word to say for the peasant associations. The second period, from last October to January of this year, was one of revolutionary action. The membership of the associations jumped to two million and the masses directly under their leadership increased to ten million. Since the peasants generally enter only one name for the whole family on joining a peasant association, a membership of two million means a mass following of about ten million. Almost half the peasants in Hunan are now organized. In counties like Hsiangtan, Hsianghsiang, Liuyang, Changsha, Liling,

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of the peasants which had erupted or were erupting. To appease the Kuomintang they preferred to desert the peasantry, the chief ally in the revolution, and thus left the working class and the Communist Party isolated and without help. It was mainly because it was able to exploit this weakness within the Communist Party that the Kuomintang dared to betray the revolution, launch its "party purge" and make war on the people in the summer of 1927.

Ninghsiang, Pingkiang, Hsiangyin, Hengshan, Hengyang, Leiyang, Chenhsien and Anhua, nearly all the peasants have combined in the peasant associations or have come under their leadership. It was on the strength of their extensive organization that the peasants went into action and within four months brought about a great revolution in the countryside, a revolution without parallel in history.

DOWN WITH THE LOCAL TYRANTS AND EVIL GENTRY! ALL POWER TO THE PEASANT ASSOCIATIONS!

The main targets of attack by the peasants are the local tyrants, the evil gentry and the lawless landlords, but in passing they also hit out against patriarchal ideas and institutions, against the corrupt officials in the cities and against bad practices and customs in the rural areas. In force and momentum the attack is tempestuous; those who bow before it survive and those who resist perish. As a result, the privileges which the feudal landlords enjoyed for thousands of years are being shattered to pieces. Every bit of the dignity and prestige built up by the landlords is being swept into the dust. With the collapse of the power of the landlords, the peasant associations have now become the sole organs of authority and the popular slogan "All power to the peasant associations" has become a reality. Even trifles such as a quarrel between husband and wife are brought to the peasant association. Nothing can be settled unless someone from the peasant association is present. The association actually dictates all rural affairs, and, quite literally, "whatever it says, goes". Those who are outside the associations can only speak well of them and cannot say anything against them. The local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords have been deprived of all right to speak, and none of them dares even mutter dissent. In the face of the peasant associations' power and pressure, the top local tyrants and evil gentry have fled to Shanghai, those of the second rank to Hankow, those of the third to Changsha and those of the fourth to the county towns, while the fifth rank and the still lesser fry surrender to the peasant associations in the villages.

"Here's ten yuan. Please let me join the peasant association," one of the smaller of the evil gentry will say.

"Ugh! Who wants your filthy money?" the peasants reply.

Many middle and small landlords and rich peasants and even some middle peasants, who were all formerly opposed to the peasant associations, are now vainly seeking admission. Visiting various places, I often came across such people who pleaded with me, "Mr. Committeeman from the provincial capital, please be my sponsor!"

In the Ching Dynasty, the household census compiled by the local authorities consisted of a regular register and "the other" register, the former for honest people and the latter for burglars, bandits and similar undesirables. In some places the peasants now use this method to scare those who formerly opposed the associations. They say, "Put their names down in the other register!"

Afraid of being entered in the other register, such people try various devices to gain admission into the peasant associations, on which their minds are so set that they do not feel safe until their names are entered. But more often than not they are turned down flat, and so they are always on tenterhooks; with the doors of the association barred to them, they are like tramps without a home or, in rural parlance, "mere trash". In short, what was looked down upon four months ago as a "gang of peasants" has now become a most honourable institution. Those who formerly prostrated themselves before the power of the gentry now bow before the power of the peasants. No matter what their identity, all admit that the world since last October is a different one.

"IT'S TERRIBLE!" OR "IT'S FINE!"

The peasants' revolt disturbed the gentry's sweet dreams. When the news from the countryside reached the cities, it caused immediate uproar among the gentry. Soon after my arrival in Changsha, I met all sorts of people and picked up a good deal of gossip. From the middle social strata upwards to the Kuomintang right-wingers, there was not a single person who did not sum up the whole business in the phrase, "It's terrible!" Under the impact of the views of the "It's terrible!" school then flooding the city, even quite revolutionary-minded people became down-hearted as they pictured the events in the countryside in their mind's eye; and they were unable to deny the word "terrible". Even quite progressive people said, "Though terrible, it is inevitable in a revolution." In short, nobody could altogether deny the word "terrible". But, as already mentioned, the fact is that the great peasant masses have risen to fulfil their historic mission and that the forces of rural democracy have risen to overthrow the forces of rural feudalism. The patriarchal-feudal class of local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords has formed the basis of autocratic government for thousands of years and is the cornerstone of imperialism, warlordism and corrupt officialdom. To overthrow these feudal forces is the real objective of the national revolution. In a few months the peasants have accomplished what Dr. Sun Yat-sen wanted, but failed, to accomplish in the forty years he devoted to the national revolution. This is a marvellous feat never before achieved, not just in forty, but in thousands of years. It's fine. It is not "terrible" at all. It is anything but "terrible". "It's terrible!" is obviously a theory for combating the rise of the peasants in the interests of the landlords; it is obviously a theory of the landlord class for preserving the old order of feudalism and obstructing the establishment of the new order of democracy, it is obviously a counter-revolutionary theory. No revolutionary comrade should echo this nonsense. If your revolutionary viewpoint is firmly established and if you have been to the villages and looked around, you will undoubtedly feel thrilled as never before. Countless thousands of the enslaved — the peasants — are striking down the enemies who battened on their flesh. What the peasants are doing is absolutely right; what they are doing is fine! "It's fine!" is the theory of the peasants and of all other revolutionaries. Every revolutionary comrade should know that the national revolution requires a great change in the countryside. The Revolution of 1911[3] did not bring about this change, hence its failure. This change is now taking place, and it is an important factor for the completion of the revolution. Every revolutionary comrade must support it, or he will be taking the stand of counter-revolution.

THE QUESTION OF "GOING TOO FAR"

Then there is another section of people who say, "Yes, peasant associations are necessary, but they are going rather too far." This is the opinion of the middle-of-the-roaders. But what is the actual situation? True, the peasants are in a sense "unruly" in the countryside. Supreme in authority, the peasant association allows the landlord no say and sweeps away his prestige. This amounts to striking the landlord down to the dust and keeping him there. The peasants threaten, "We will put you in the other register!" They fine the local tyrants and evil gentry, they demand contributions from them, and they smash their sedan-chairs. People swarm into the houses of local tyrants and evil gentry who are against the peasant association, slaughter their pigs and consume their grain. They even loll for a minute or two on the ivory-inlaid beds belonging to the young ladies in the households of the local tyrants and evil gentry. At the slightest provocation they make arrests, crown the arrested with tall paper-hats, and parade them through the villages, saying, "You dirty landlords, now you know who we are!" Doing whatever they like and turning everything upside down, they have created a kind of terror in the countryside. This is what some people call "going too far", or "exceeding the proper limits in righting a wrong", or "really too much". Such talk may seem plausible, but in fact it is wrong. First, the local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords have themselves driven the peasants to this. For ages they have used their power to tyrannize over the peasants and trample them underfoot; that is why the peasants have reacted so strongly. The most violent revolts and the most serious disorders have invariably occurred in places where the local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords perpetrated the worst outrages. The peasants are clear-sighted. Who is bad and who is not, who is the worst and who is not quite so vicious, who deserves severe punishment and who deserves to be let off lightly — the peasants keep clear accounts, and very seldom has the punishment exceeded the crime. Secondly, a revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous.[4] A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another. A rural revolution is a revolution by which the peasantry overthrows the power of the feudal landlord class. Without using the greatest force, the peasants cannot possibly overthrow the deep-rooted authority of the landlords which has lasted for thousands of years. The rural areas need a mighty revolutionary upsurge, for it alone can rouse the people in their millions to become a powerful force. All the actions mentioned here which have been labelled as "going too far" flow from the power of the peasants, which has been called forth by the mighty revolutionary upsurge in the countryside. It was highly necessary for such things to be done in the second period of the peasant movement, the period of revolutionary action. In this period it was necessary to establish the absolute authority of the peasants. It was necessary to forbid malicious criticism of the peasant associations. It was necessary to overthrow the whole authority of the gentry, to strike them to the ground and keep them there. There is revolutionary significance in all the actions which were labelled as "going too far" in this period. To put it bluntly, it is necessary to create terror for a while in every rural area, or otherwise it would be impossible to suppress the activities of the counter-revolutionaries in the countryside or overthrow the authority of the gentry. Proper limits have to be exceeded in order to right a wrong, or else the wrong cannot be righted.[5] Those who talk about the peasants "going too far" seem at first sight to be different from those who say "It's terrible!" as mentioned earlier, but in essence they proceed from the same standpoint and likewise voice a landlord theory that upholds the interests of the privileged classes. Since this theory impedes the rise of the peasant movement and so disrupts the revolution, we must firmly oppose it.

THE "MOVEMENT OF THE RIFFRAFF"

The right-wing of the Kuomintang says, "The peasant movement is a movement of the riffraff, of the lazy peasants." This view is current in Changsha. When I was in the countryside, I heard the gentry say, "It is all right to set up peasant associations, but the people now running them are no good. They ought to be replaced!" This opinion comes to the same thing as what the right-wingers are saying; according to both it is all right to have a peasant movement (the movement is already in being and no one dare say otherwise), but they say that the people running it are no good and they particularly hate those in charge of the associations at the lower levels, calling them "riffraff". In short, all those whom the gentry had despised, those whom they had trodden into the dirt, people with no place in society, people with no right to speak, have now audaciously lifted up their heads. They have not only lifted up their heads but taken power into their hands. They are now running the township peasant associations (at the lowest level), which they have turned into something fierce and formidable. They have raised their rough, work-soiled hands and laid them on the gentry. They tether the evil gentry with ropes, crown them with tall paper-hats and parade them through the villages. (In Hsiangtan and Hsianghsiang they call this "parading through the township" and in Liling "parading through the fields".) Not a day passes but they drum some harsh, pitiless words of denunciation into these gentry's ears. They are issuing orders and are running everything. Those who used to rank lowest now rank above everybody else; and so this is called "turning things upside down".

VANGUARDS OF THE REVOLUTION

Where there are two opposite approaches to things and people, two opposite views emerge. "It's terrible!" and "It's fine!", "riffraff" and "vanguards of the revolution" — here are apt examples.

We said above that the peasants have accomplished a revolutionary task which had been left unaccomplished for many years and have done an important job for the national revolution. But has this great revolutionary task, this important revolutionary work, been performed by all the peasants? No. There are three kinds of peasants, the rich, the middle and the poor peasants. The three live in different circumstances and so have different views about the revolution. In the first period, what appealed to the rich peasants was the talk about the Northern Expeditionary Army's sustaining a crushing defeat in Kiangsi, about Chiang Kai-shek's being wounded in the leg[6] and flying back to Kwangtung,[7] and about Wu Pei-fu's[8] recapturing Yuehchow. The peasant associations would certainly not last and the Three People's Principles[9] could never prevail, because they had never been heard of before. Thus an official of the township peasant association (generally one of the "riffraff" type) would walk into the house of a rich peasant, register in hand, and say, "Will you please join the peasant association?" How would the rich peasant answer? A tolerably well-behaved one would say, "Peasant association? I have lived here for decades, tilling my land. I never heard of such a thing before, yet I've managed to live all right. I advise you to give it up!" A really vicious rich peasant would say, "Peasant association! Nonsense! Association for getting your head chopped off! Don't get people into trouble!" Yet, surprisingly enough, the peasant associations have now been established several months, and have even dared to stand up to the gentry. The gentry of the neighbourhood who refused to surrender their opium pipes were arrested by the associations and paraded through the villages. In the county towns, moreover, some big landlords were put to death, like Yen Jung-chiu of Hsiangtan and Yang Chih-tse of Ninghsiang. On the anniversary of the October Revolution, at the time of the anti-British rally and of the great celebrations of the victory of the Northern Expedition, tens of thousands of peasants in every township, holding high their banners, big and small, along with their carrying-poles and hoes, demonstrated in massive, streaming columns. It was only then that the rich peasants began to get perplexed and alarmed. During the great victory celebrations of the Northern Expedition, they learned that Kiukiang had been taken, that Chiang Kai-shek had not been wounded in the leg and that Wu Pei-fu had been defeated after all. What is more, they saw such slogans as "Long live the Three People's Principles!" "Long live the peasant associations!" and "Long live the peasants!" clearly written on the "red and green proclamations". "What?" wondered the rich peasants, greatly perplexed and alarmed, "'Long live the peasants!' Are these people now to be regarded as emperors[10]?" So the peasant associations are putting on grand airs. People from the associations say to the rich peasants, "We'll enter you in the other register," or, "In another month, the admission fee will be ten yuan a head!" Only under the impact of all this are the rich peasants tardily joining the associations,[11] some paying fifty cents or a yuan for admission (the regular fee being a mere ten coppers), some securing admission only after asking other people to put in a good word for them. But there are quite a number of die-hards who have not joined to this day. When the rich peasants join the associations, they generally enter the name of some sixty or seventy year-old member of the family, for they are in constant dread of "conscription". After joining, the rich peasants are not keen on doing any work for the associations. They remain inactive throughout.

How about the middle peasants? Theirs is a vacillating attitude. They think that the revolution will not bring them much good. They have rice cooking in their pots and no creditors knocking on their doors at midnight. They, too, judging a thing by whether it ever existed before, knit their brows and think to themselves, "Can the peasant association really last?" "Can the Three People's Principles prevail?" Their conclusion is, "Afraid not!" They imagine it all depends on the will of Heaven and think, "A peasant association? Who knows if Heaven wills it or not?" In the first period, people from the association would call on a middle peasant, register in hand, and say, "Will you please join the peasant association?" The middle peasant would reply, "There's no hurry!" It was not until the second period, when the peasant associations were already exercising great power, that the middle peasants came in. They show up better in the associations than the rich peasants but are not as yet very enthusiastic; they still want to wait and see. It is essential for the peasant associations to get the middle peasants to join and to do a good deal more explanatory work among them.

The poor peasants have always been the main force in the bitter fight in the countryside. They have fought militantly through the two periods of underground work and of open activity. They are the most responsive to Communist Party leadership. They are deadly enemies of the camp of the local tyrants and evil gentry and attack it without the slightest hesitation. "We joined the peasant association long ago," they say to the rich peasants, "why are you still hesitating?" The rich peasants answer mockingly, "What is there to keep you from joining? You people have neither a tile over your heads nor a speck of land under your feet!" It is true the poor peasants are not afraid of losing anything. Many of them really have "neither a tile over their heads nor a speck of land under their feet". What, indeed, is there to keep them from joining the associations? According to the survey of Changsha County, the poor peasants comprise 70 per cent, the middle peasants 20 per cent, and the landlords and the rich peasants 10 per cent of the population in the rural areas. The 70 per cent, the poor peasants, may be sub-divided into two categories, the utterly destitute and the less destitute. The utterly destitute,[12] comprising 20 per cent, are the completely dispossessed, that is, people who have neither land nor money, are without any means of livelihood, and are forced to leave home and become mercenaries or hired labourers or wandering beggars. The less destitute,[13] the other 50 per cent, are the partially dispossessed, that is, people with just a little land or a little money who eat up more than they earn and live in toil and distress the year round, such as the handicraftsmen, the tenant-peasants (not including the rich tenant-peasants) and the semi-owner-peasants. This great mass of poor peasants, or altogether 70 per cent of the rural population, are the backbone of the peasant associations, the vanguard in the overthrow of the feudal forces and the heroes who have performed the great revolutionary task which for long years was left undone. Without the poor peasant class (the "riffraff", as the gentry call them), it would have been impossible to bring about the present revolutionary situation in the countryside, or to overthrow the local tyrants and evil gentry and complete the democratic revolution. The poor peasants, being the most revolutionary group, have gained the leadership of the peasant associations. In both the first and second periods almost all the chairmen and committee members in the peasant associations at the lowest level were poor peasants (of the officials in the township associations in Hengshan County the utterly destitute comprise 50 per cent, the less destitute 40 per cent, and poverty-stricken intellectuals 10 per cent). Leadership by the poor peasants is absolutely necessary. Without the poor peasants there would be no revolution. To deny their role is to deny the revolution. To attack them is to attack the revolution. They have never been wrong on the general direction of the revolution. They have discredited the local tyrants and evil gentry. They have beaten down the local tyrants and evil gentry, big and small, and kept them underfoot. Many of their deeds in the period of revolutionary action, which were labelled as "going too far", were in fact the very things the revolution required. Some county governments, county headquarters of the Kuomintang and county peasant associations in Hunan have already made a number of mistakes; some have even sent soldiers to arrest officials of the lower-level associations at the landlords' request. A good many chairmen and committee members of township associations in Hengshan and Hsianghsiang Counties have been thrown in jail. This mistake is very serious and feeds the arrogance of the reactionaries. To judge whether or not it is a mistake, you have only to see how joyful the lawless landlords become and how reactionary sentiments grow, wherever the chairmen or committee members of local peasant associations are arrested. We must combat the counter-revolutionary talk of a "movement of riffraff" and a "movement of lazy peasants" and must be especially careful not to commit the error of helping the local tyrants and evil gentry in their attacks on the poor peasant class. Though a few of the poor peasant leaders undoubtedly did have shortcomings, most of them have changed by now. They themselves are energetically prohibiting gambling and suppressing banditry. Where the peasant association is powerful, gambling has stopped altogether and banditry has vanished. In some places it is literally true that people do not take any articles left by the wayside and that doors are not bolted at night. According to the Hengshan survey, 85 per cent of the poor peasant leaders have made great progress and have proved themselves capable and hard-working. Only 15 per cent retain some bad habits. The most one can call these is "an unhealthy minority", and we must not echo the local tyrants and evil gentry in undiscriminatingly condemning them as "riffraff". This problem of the "unhealthy minority" can be tackled only under the peasant associations' own slogan of "strengthen discipline", by carrying on propaganda among the masses, by educating the "unhealthy minority", and by tightening the associations' discipline; in no circumstances should soldiers be arbitrarily sent to make such arrests as would damage the prestige of the poor peasants and feed the arrogance of the local tyrants and evil gentry. This point requires particular attention.

FOURTEEN GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS

Most critics of the peasant associations allege that they have done a great many bad things. I have already pointed out that the peasants' attack on the local tyrants and evil gentry is entirely revolutionary behaviour and in no way blameworthy. The peasants have done a great many things, and in order to answer people's criticism we must closely examine all their activities, one by one, to see what they have actually done. I have classified and summed up their activities of the last few months; in all, the peasants under the leadership of the peasant associations have the following fourteen great achievements to their credit.

1. ORGANIZING THE PEASANTS INTO PEASANT ASSOCIATIONS

This is the first great achievement of the peasants. In counties like Hsiangtan, Hsianghsiang and Hengshan, nearly all the peasants are organized and there is hardly a remote corner where they are not on the move, these are the best places. In some counties, like Yiyang and Huajung, the bulk of the peasants are organized, with only a small section remaining unorganized; these places are in the second grade. In other counties, like Chengpu and Lingling, while a small section is organized, the bulk of the peasants remain unorganized; these places are in the third grade. Western Hunan, which is under the control of Yuan Tsu-ming,[14] has not yet been reached by the associations' propaganda, and in many of its counties the peasants are completely unorganized; these form a fourth grade. Roughly speaking, the counties in central Hunan, with Changsha as the centre, are the most advanced, those in southern Hunan come second, and western Hunan is only just beginning to organize. According to the figures compiled by the provincial peasant association last November, organizations with a total membership of 1,367,727 have been set up in thirty-seven of the province's seventy-five counties. Of these members about one million were organized during October and November when the power of the associations rose high, while up to September the membership had only been 300,000-400,000. Then came the two months of December and January, and the peasant movement continued its brisk growth. By the end of January the membership must have reached at least two million. As a family generally enters only one name when joining and has an average of five members, the mass following must be about ten million. This astonishing and accelerating rate of expansion explains why the local tyrants, evil gentry and corrupt officials have been isolated, why the public has been amazed at how completely the world has changed since the peasant movement, and why a great revolution has been wrought in the countryside. This is the first great achievement of the peasants under the leadership of their associations.

2. HITTING THE LANDLORDS POLITICALLY

Once the peasants have their organization, the first thing they do is to smash the political prestige and power of the landlord class, and especially of the local tyrants and evil gentry, that is, to pull down landlord authority and build up peasant authority in rural society. This is a most serious and vital struggle. It is the pivotal struggle in the second period, the period of revolutionary action. Without victory in this struggle, no victory is possible in the economic struggle to reduce rent and interest, to secure land and other means of production, and so on. In many places in Hunan like Hsianghsiang, Hengshan and Hsiangtan Counties, this is of course no problem since the authority of the landlords has been overturned and the peasants constitute the sole authority. But in counties like Liling there are still some places (such as Liling's western and southern districts) where the authority of the landlords seems weaker than that of the peasants but, because the political struggle has not been sharp, is in fact surreptitiously competing with it. In such places it is still too early to say that the peasants have gained political victory; they must wage the political struggle more vigorously until the landlords' authority is completely smashed. All in all, the methods used by the peasants to hit the landlords politically are as follows:

Checking the accounts. More often than not the local tyrants and evil gentry have helped themselves to public money passing through their hands, and their books are not in order. Now the peasants are using the checking of accounts as an occasion to bring down a great many of the local tyrants and evil gentry. In many places committees for checking accounts have been established for the express purpose of settling financial scores with them, and the first sign of such a committee makes them shudder. Campaigns of this kind have been carried out in all the counties where the peasant movement is active; they are important not so much for recovering money as for publicizing the crimes of the local tyrants and evil gentry and for knocking them down from their political and social positions.

Imposing fines. The peasants work out fines for such offences as irregularities revealed by the checking of accounts, past outrages against the peasants, current activities which undermine the peasant associations, violations of the ban on gambling and refusal to surrender opium pipes. This local tyrant must pay so much, that member of the evil gentry so much, the sums ranging from tens to thousands of yuan. Naturally, a man who has been fined by the peasants completely loses face.

Levying contributions. The unscrupulous rich landlords are made to contribute for poor relief, for the organization of co-operatives or peasant credit societies, or for other purposes. Though milder than fines, these contributions are also a form of punishment. To avoid trouble, quite a number of landlords make voluntary contributions to the peasant associations.

Minor protests. When someone harms a peasant association by word or deed and the offence is a minor one, the peasants collect in a crowd and swarm into the offender's house to remonstrate with him. He is usually let off after writing a pledge to "cease and desist", in which he explicitly undertakes to stop defaming the peasant association in the future.

Major demonstrations. A big crowd is rallied to demonstrate against a local tyrant or one of the evil gentry who is an enemy of the association. The demonstrators eat at the offender's house, slaughtering his pigs and consuming his grain as a matter of course. Quite a few such cases have occurred. There was a case recently at Machiaho, Hsiangtan County, where a crowd of fifteen thousand peasants went to the houses of six of the evil gentry and demonstrated; the whole affair lasted four days during which more than 130 pigs were killed and eaten. After such demonstrations, the peasants usually impose fines.

"*Crowning*" *the landlords and parading them through the villages*. This sort of thing is very common. A tall paper-hat is stuck on the head of one of the local tyrants or evil gentry, bearing the words "Local tyrant so-and-so" or "So-and-so of the evil gentry". He is led by a rope and escorted with big crowds in front and behind. Sometimes brass gongs are beaten and flags waved to attract people's attention. This form of punishment more than any other makes the local tyrants and evil gentry tremble. Anyone who has once been crowned with a tall paper-hat loses face altogether and can never again hold up his head. Hence many of the rich prefer being fined to wearing the tall hat. But wear it they must, if the peasants insist. One ingenious township peasant association arrested an obnoxious member of the gentry and announced that he was to be crowned that very day. The man turned blue with fear. Then the association decided not to crown him that day. They argued that if he were crowned right away, he would become case-hardened and no longer afraid, and that it would be better to let him go home and crown him some other day. Not knowing when he would be crowned, the man was in daily suspense, unable to sit down or sleep at ease.

Locking up the landlords in the county jail. This is a heavier punishment than wearing the tall paper-hat. A local tyrant or one of the evil gentry is arrested and sent to the county jail; he is locked up and the county magistrate has to try him and punish him. Today the people who are locked up are no longer the same. Formerly it was the gentry who sent peasants to be locked up, now it is the other way round.

"*Banishment*". The peasants have no desire to banish the most notorious criminals among the local tyrants and evil gentry, but would rather arrest or execute them. Afraid of being arrested or executed, they run away. In counties where the peasant movement is well developed, almost all the important local tyrants and evil gentry have fled, and this amounts to banishment. Among them, the top ones have fled to Shanghai, those of the second rank to Hankow, those of the third to Changsha, and of the fourth to the county towns. Of all the fugitive local tyrants and evil gentry, those who have fled to Shanghai are the safest. Some of those who fled to Hankow, like the three from Huajung, were eventually captured and brought back. Those who fled to Changsha are in still greater danger of being seized at any moment by students in the provincial capital who hail from their counties; I myself saw two captured in Changsha. Those who have taken refuge in the county towns are only of the fourth rank, and the peasantry, having many eyes and ears, can easily track them down. The financial authorities once explained the difficulties encountered by the Hunan Provincial Government in raising money by the fact that the peasants were banishing the well-to-do, which gives some idea of the extent to which the local tyrants and evil gentry are not tolerated in their home villages.

Execution. This is confined to the worst local tyrants and evil gentry and is carried out by the peasants jointly with other sections of the people. For instance, Yang Chih-tse of Ninghsiang, Chou Chia-kan of Yuehyang and Fu Tao-nan and Sun Po-chu of Huajung were shot by the government authorities at the insistence of the peasants and other sections of the people. In the case of Yen Jung-chiu of Hsiangtan, the peasants and other sections of the people compelled the magistrate to agree to hand him over, and the peasants themselves executed him. Liu Chao of Ninghsiang was killed by the peasants. The execution of Peng Chih-fan of Liling and Chou Tien-chueh and Tsao Yun of Yiyang is pending, subject to the decision of the "special tribunal for trying local tyrants and evil gentry". The execution of one such big landlord reverberates through a whole county and is very effective in eradicating the remaining evils of feudalism. Every county has these major tyrants, some as many as several dozen and others at least a few, and the only effective way of suppressing the reactionaries is to execute at least a few in each county who are guilty of the most heinous crimes. When the local tyrants and evil gentry were at the height of their power, they literally slaughtered peasants without batting an eyelid. Ho Mai-chuan, for ten years head of the defence corps in the town of Hsinkang, Changsha County, was personally responsible for killing almost a thousand poverty-stricken peasants, which he euphemistically described as "executing bandits". In my native county of Hsiangtan, Tang Chun-yen and Lo Shu-lin who headed the defence corps in the town of Yintien have killed more than fifty people and buried four alive in the fourteen years since 1913. Of the more than fifty they murdered, the first two were perfectly innocent beggars. Tang Chun-yen said, "Let me make a start by killing a couple of beggars!" and so these two lives were snuffed out. Such was the cruelty of the local tyrants and evil gentry in former days, such was the White terror they created in the countryside, and now that the peasants have risen and shot a few and created just a little terror in suppressing the counter-revolutionaries, is there any reason for saying they should not do so?

3. HITTING THE LANDLORDS ECONOMICALLY

Prohibition on sending grain out of the area, forcing up grain prices, and hoarding and cornering. This is one of the great events of recent months in the economic struggle of the Hunan peasants. Since last October the poor peasants have prevented the outflow of the grain of the landlords and rich peasants and have banned the forcing up of grain prices and hoarding and cornering. As a result, the poor peasants have fully achieved their objective; the ban on the outflow of grain is watertight, grain prices have fallen considerably, and hoarding and cornering have disappeared.

Prohibition on increasing rents and deposits;[15] *agitation for reduced rents and deposits.* Last July and August, when the peasant associations were still weak, the landlords, following their long-established practice of maximum exploitation, served notice one after another on their tenants that rents and deposits would be increased. But by October, when the peasant associations had grown considerably in strength and had all come out against the raising of rents and deposits, the landlords dared not breathe another word on the subject. From November onwards, as the peasants have gained ascendancy over the landlords they have taken the further step of agitating for reduced rents and deposits. What a pity, they say, that the peasant associations were not strong enough when rents were being paid last autumn, or we could have reduced them then. The peasants are doing extensive propaganda for rent reduction in the coming autumn, and the landlords are asking how the reductions are to be carried out. As for the reduction of deposits, this is already under way in Hengshan and other counties.

Prohibition on cancelling tenancies. In July and August of last year there were still many instances of landlords cancelling tenancies and re-letting the land. But after October nobody dared cancel a tenancy. Today, the cancelling of tenancies and the re-letting of land are quite out of the question; all that remains as something of a problem is whether a tenancy can be cancelled if the landlord wants to cultivate the land himself. In some places even this is not allowed by the peasants. In others the cancelling of a tenancy may be permitted if the landlord wants to cultivate the land himself, but then the problem of unemployment among the tenant-peasants arises. There is as yet no uniform way of solving this problem.

Reduction of interest. Interest has been generally reduced in Anhua, and there have been reductions in other counties, too. But wherever the peasant associations are powerful, rural money-lending has virtually disappeared, the landlords having completely "stopped lending" for fear that the money will be "communized". What is currently called reduction of interest is confined to old loans. Not only is the interest on such old loans reduced, but the creditor is actually forbidden to press for the repayment of the principal. The poor peasant replies, "Don't blame me. The year is nearly over. I'll pay you back next year."

4. OVERTHROWING THE FEUDAL RULE OF THE LOCAL TYRANTS AND EVIL GENTRY — SMASHING THE *TU* AND *TUAN*[16]

The old organs of political power in the *tu* and *tuan* (*i.e.*, the district and the township), and especially at the *tu* level, just below the county level, used to be almost exclusively in the hands of the local tyrants and evil gentry. The *tu* had jurisdiction over a population of from ten to fifty or sixty thousand people, and had its own armed forces such as the township defence corps, its own fiscal powers such as the power to levy taxes per *mou*[17] of land, and its own judicial powers such as the power to arrest, imprison, try and punish the peasants at will. The evil gentry who ran these organs were virtual monarchs of the countryside. Comparatively speaking, the peasants were not so much concerned with the president of the Republic, the provincial military governor[18] or the county magistrate; their real "bosses" were these rural monarchs. A mere snort from these people, and the peasants knew they had to watch their step. As a consequence of the present revolt in the countryside the authority of the landlord class has generally been struck down, and the organs of rural administration dominated by the local tyrants and evil gentry have naturally collapsed in its wake. The heads of the *tu* and the *tuan* all steer clear of the people, dare not show their faces and push all local matters on to the peasant associations. They put people off with the remark, "It is none of my business!"

Whenever their conversation turns to the heads of the *tu* and the *tuan*, the peasants say angrily, "That bunch! They are finished!"

Yes, the term "finished" truly describes the state of the old organs of rural administration wherever the storm of revolution has raged.

5. OVERTHROWING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE LANDLORDS AND ESTABLISHING THOSE OF THE PEASANTS

The armed forces of the landlord class were smaller in central Hunan than in the western and southern parts of the province. An average of 600 rifles for each county would make a total of 45,000 rifles for all the seventy-five counties; there may, in fact, be more. In the southern and central parts where the peasant movement is well developed, the landlord class cannot hold its own because of the tremendous momentum with which the peasants have risen, and its armed forces have largely capitulated to the peasant associations and taken the side of the peasants; examples of this are to be found in such counties as Ninghsiang, Pingkiang, Liuyang, Changsha, Liling, Hsiangtan, Hsianghsiang, Anhua, Hengshan and Hengyang. In some counties such as Paoching, a small number of the landlords' armed forces are taking a neutral stand, though with a tendency to capitulate. Another small section are opposing the peasant associations, but the peasants are attacking them and may wipe them out before long, as, for example, in such counties as Yichang, Linwu and Chiaho. The armed forces thus taken over from the reactionary landlords are all being reorganized into a "standing household militia"[19] and placed under the new organs of rural self-government, which are organs of the political power of the peasantry. Taking over these old armed forces is one way in which the peasants are building up their own armed forces. A new way is through the setting up of spear corps under the peasant associations. The spears have pointed, double-edged blades mounted on long shafts, and there are now 100,000 of these weapons in the county of Hsianghsiang alone. Other counties like Hsiangtan, Hengshan, Liling and Changsha have 70,000-80,000, or 50,000-60,000, or 30,000-40,000 each. Every county where there is a peasant movement has a rapidly growing spear corps. These peasants thus armed form an "irregular household militia". This multitude equipped with spears, which is larger than the old armed forces mentioned above, is a new-born armed power the mere sight of which makes the local tyrants and evil gentry tremble. The revolutionary authorities in Hunan should see to it that it is built up on a really extensive scale among the more than twenty million peasants in the seventy-five counties of the province, that every peasant, whether young or in his prime, possesses a spear, and that no restrictions are imposed as though a spear were something dreadful. Anyone who is scared at the sight of the spear corps is indeed a weakling! Only the local tyrants and evil gentry are frightened of them, but no revolutionaries should take fright.

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6. OVERTHROWING THE POLITICAL POWER OF THE COUNTY MAGISTRATE AND HIS BAILIFFS

That county government cannot be clean until the peasants rise up was proved some time ago in Haifeng, Kwangtung Province. Now we have added proof, particularly in Hunan. In a county where power is in the hands of the local tyrants and evil gentry, the magistrate, whoever he may be, is almost invariably a corrupt official. In a county where the peasants have risen there is clean government, whoever the magistrate. In the counties I visited, the magistrates had to consult the peasant associations on everything in advance. In counties where the peasant power was very strong, the word of the peasant association worked miracles. If it demanded the arrest of a local tyrant in the morning, the magistrate dared not delay till noon; if it demanded arrest by noon, he dared not delay till the afternoon. When the power of the peasants was just beginning to make itself felt in the countryside, the magistrate worked in league with the local tyrants and evil gentry against the peasants. When the peasants' power grew till it matched that of the landlords, the magistrate took the position of trying to accommodate both the landlords and the peasants, accepting some of the peasant association's suggestions while rejecting others. The remark that the word of the peasant association "works miracles" applies only when the power of the landlords has been completely beaten down by that of the peasants. At present the political situation in such counties as Hsianghsiang, Hsiangtan, Liling and Hengshan is as follows:

(1) *All decisions are made by a joint council consisting of the magistrate and the representatives of the revolutionary mass organizations.* The council is convened by the magistrate and meets in his office. In some counties it is called the "joint council of public bodies and the local government", and in others the "council of county affairs". Besides the magistrate himself, the people attending are the representatives of the county peasant association, trade union council, merchant association, women's association, school staff association, student association and Kuomintang headquarters.[20] At such council meetings the magistrate is influenced by the views of the public organizations and invariably does their bidding. The adoption of a democratic committee system of county government should not, therefore, present much of a problem in Hunan. The present county governments are already quite democratic both in form and substance. This situation has been brought about only in the last two or three months, that is, since the peasants have risen all over the countryside and overthrown the power of the local tyrants and evil gentry. It has now come about that the magistrates, seeing their old props collapse and needing other props to retain their posts, have begun to curry favour with the public organizations.

(2) *The judicial assistant has scarcely any cases to handle.* The judicial system in Hunan remains one in which the county magistrate is concurrently in charge of judicial affairs, with an assistant to help him in handling cases. To get rich, the magistrate and his underlings used to rely entirely on collecting taxes and levies, procuring men and provisions for the armed forces, and extorting money in civil and criminal lawsuits by confounding right and wrong, the last being the most regular and reliable source of income. In the last few months, with the downfall of the local tyrants and evil gentry, all the legal pettifoggers have disappeared. What is more, the peasants' problems, big and small, are now all settled in the peasant associations at the various levels. Thus the county judicial assistant simply has nothing to do. The one in Hsianghsiang told me, "When there were no peasant associations, an average of sixty civil or criminal suits were brought to the county government each day; now it receives an average of only four or five a day." So it is that the purses of the magistrates and their underlings perforce remain empty.

(3) *The armed guards, the police and the bailiffs all keep out of the way and dare not go near the villages to practise their extortions.* In the past the villagers were afraid of the townspeople, but now the

townspeople are afraid of the villagers. In particular the vicious curs kept by the county government — the police, the armed guards and the bailiffs — are afraid of going to the villages, or if they do so, they no longer dare to practise their extortions. They tremble at the sight of the peasants' spears.

7. OVERTHR0WING THE CLAN AUTHORITY OF THE ANCESTRAL TEMPLES AND CLAN ELDERS, THE RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY OF TOWN AND VILLAGE GODS, AND THE MASCULINE AUTHORITY OF HUSBANDS

A man in China is usually subjected to the domination of three systems of authority: (1) the state system (political authority), ranging from the national, provincial and county government down to that of the township; (2) the clan system (clan authority), ranging from the central ancestral temple and its branch temples down to the head of the household; and (3) the supernatural system (religious authority), ranging from the King of Hell down to the town and village gods belonging to the nether world, and from the Emperor of Heaven down to all the various gods and spirits belonging to the celestial world. As for women, in addition to being dominated by these three systems of authority, they are also dominated by the men (the authority of the husband). These four authorities — political, clan, religious and masculine — are the embodiment of the whole feudal-patriarchal system and ideology, and are the four thick ropes binding the Chinese people, particularly the peasants. How the peasants have overthrown the political authority of the landlords in the countryside has been described above. The political authority of the landlords is the backbone of all the other systems of authority. With that overturned, the clan authority, the religious authority and the authority of the husband all begin to totter. Where the peasant association is powerful, the clan elders and administrators of temple funds no longer dare oppress those lower in the clan hierarchy or embezzle clan funds. The worst clan elders and administrators, being local tyrants, have been thrown out. No one any longer dares to practise the cruel corporal and capital punishments that used to be inflicted in the ancestral temples, such as flogging, drowning and burying alive. The old rule barring women and poor people from the banquets in the ancestral temples has also been broken. The women of Paikuo in Hengshan County gathered in force and swarmed into their ancestral temple, firmly planted their backsides in the seats and joined in the eating and drinking, while the venerable clan bigwigs had willy-nilly to let them do as they pleased. At another place, where poor peasants had been excluded from temple banquets, a group of them flocked in and ate and drank their fill, while the local tyrants and evil gentry and other long-gowned gentlemen all took to their heels in fright. Everywhere religious authority totters as the peasant movement develops. In many places the peasant associations have taken over the temples of the gods as their offices. Everywhere they advocate the appropriation of temple property in order to start peasant schools and to defray the expenses of the associations, calling it "public revenue from superstition". In Liling County, prohibiting superstitious practices and smashing idols have become quite the vogue. In its northern districts the peasants have prohibited the incense-burning processions to propitiate the god of pestilence. There were many idols in the Taoist temple at Fupoling in Lukou, but when extra room was needed for the district headquarters of the Kuomintang, they were all piled up in a corner, big and small together, and no peasant raised any objection. Since then, sacrifices to the gods, the performance of religious rites and the offering of sacred lamps have rarely been practised when a death occurs in a family. Because the initiative in this matter was taken by the chairman of the peasant association, Sun Hsiao-shan, he is hated by the local Taoist priests. In the Lungfeng Nunnery in the North Third District, the peasants and primary school teachers chopped up the wooden idols and actually used the wood to cook meat. More than thirty idols in the Tungfu Monastery in the Southern District were burned by the students and peasants together, and only two small images of Lord Pao[21] were snatched up by an old peasant who said, "Don't commit a sin!" In places where the power of the peasants is predominant, only the older peasants and the women still believe in the gods, the younger peasants no longer doing so. Since the latter control the associations, the overthrow of religious authority and the eradication of superstition are going on everywhere. As to the authority of the husband, this has always been weaker among the poor peasants because, out of economic necessity, their womenfolk have to do more manual labour than the women of the richer classes and therefore have more say and greater power of decision in family matters. With the increasing bankruptcy of the rural economy in recent years, the basis for men's domination over women has already been weakened. With the rise of the peasant movement, the women in many places have now begun to organize rural women's associations; the opportunity has come for them to lift up their heads, and the authority of the husband is getting shakier every day. In a word, the whole feudal-patriarchal system and ideology is tottering with the growth of the peasants' power. At the present time, however, the peasants are concentrating on destroying the landlords' political authority. Wherever it has been wholly destroyed, they are beginning to press their attack in the three other spheres of the clan, the gods and male domination. But such attacks have only just begun, and there can be no thorough overthrow of all three until the peasants have won complete victory in the economic struggle. Therefore, our present task is to lead the peasants to put their greatest efforts into the political struggle, so that the landlords' authority is entirely overthrown. The economic struggle should follow immediately, so that the land problem and the other economic problems of the poor peasants may be fundamentally solved. As for the clan system, superstition, and inequality between men and women, their abolition will follow as a natural consequence of victory in the political and economic struggles. If too much of an effort is made, arbitrarily and prematurely, to abolish these things, the local tyrants and evil gentry will seize the pretext to put about such counter-revolutionary propaganda as "the peasant association has no piety towards ancestors", "the peasant association is blasphemous and is destroying religion" and "the peasant association stands for the communization of wives", all for the purpose of undermining the peasant movement. A case in point is the recent events at Hsianghsiang in Hunan and Yanghsin in Hupeh, where the landlords exploited the opposition of some peasants to smashing idols. It is the peasants who made the idols, and when the time comes they will cast the idols aside with their own hands; there is no need for anyone else to do it for them prematurely. The Communist Party's propaganda policy in such matters should be, "Draw the bow without shooting, just indicate the motions."[22] It is for the peasants themselves to cast aside the idols, pull down the temples to the martyred virgins and the arches to the chaste and faithful widows; it is wrong for anybody else to do it for them.

While I was in the countryside, I did some propaganda against superstition among the peasants. I said:

"If you believe in the Eight Characters,[23] you hope for good luck; if you believe in geomancy,[24] you hope to benefit from the location of your ancestral graves. This year within the space of a few months the local tyrants, evil gentry and corrupt officials have all toppled from their pedestals. Is it possible that until a few months ago they all had good luck and enjoyed the benefit of well-sited ancestral graves, while suddenly in the last few months their luck has turned and their ancestral graves have ceased to exert a beneficial influence? The local tyrants and evil gentry jeer at your peasant association and say, 'How odd! Today, the world is a world of committeemen. Look, you can't even go to pass water without bumping into a committeeman!' Quite true, the towns and the villages, the trade unions and the peasant associations, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, all without exception have their executive committee members — it is indeed a world of committeemen. But is this due to the Eight Characters and the location of the ancestral graves? How strange! The Eight Characters of all the poor wretches in the countryside have suddenly turned auspicious! And their ancestral graves have suddenly started exerting beneficial influences! The gods? Worship them by all means. But if you had only Lord Kuan[25] and the Goddess of Mercy and no peasant association, could you have overthrown the local tyrants and evil gentry? The gods and goddesses are indeed miserable objects. You have worshipped them for centuries, and they have not overthrown a single one of the local tyrants or evil gentry for you! Now you want to have your rent reduced. Let me ask, how will you go about it? Will you believe in the gods or in the peasant association?"

My words made the peasants roar with laughter.

8. SPREADING POLITICAL PROPAGANDA

Even if ten thousand schools of law and political science had been opened, could they have brought as much political education to the people, men and women, young and old, all the way into the remotest corners of the countryside, as the peasant associations have done in so short a time? I don't think they could. "Down with imperialism!" "Down with the warlords!" "Down with the corrupt officials!" "Down with the local tyrants and evil gentry!" — these political slogans have grown wings, they have found their way to the young, the middle-aged and the old, to the women and children in countless villages, they have penetrated into their minds and are on their lips. For instance, watch a group of children at play. If one gets angry with another, if he glares, stamps his foot and shakes his fist, you will then immediately hear from the other the shrill cry of "Down with imperialism!"

In the Hsiangtan area, when the children who pasture the cattle get into a fight, one will act as Tang Sheng-chih, and the other as Yeh Kai-hsin;[26] when one is defeated and runs away, with the other chasing him, it is the pursuer who is Tang Sheng-chih and the pursued Yeh Kai-hsin. As to the song "Down with the Imperialist Powers!" of course almost every child in the towns can sing it, and now many village children can sing it too.

Some of the peasants can also recite Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament. They pick out the terms "freedom", "equality", "the Three People's Principles" and "unequal treaties" and apply them, if rather crudely, in their daily life. When somebody who looks like one of the gentry encounters a peasant and stands on his dignity, refusing to make way along a pathway, the peasant will say angrily, "Hey, you local tyrant, don't you know the Three People's Principles?" Formerly when the peasants from the vegetable farms on the outskirts of Changsha entered the city to sell their produce, they used to be pushed around by the police. Now they have found a weapon, which is none other than the Three People's Principles. When a policeman strikes or swears at a peasant selling vegetables, the peasant immediately answers back by invoking the Three People's Principles and that shuts the policeman up. Once in Hsiangtan when a district peasant association and a township peasant association could not see eye to eye, the chairman of the township association declared, "Down with the district peasant association's unequal treaties!"

The spread of political propaganda throughout the rural areas is entirely an achievement of the Communist Party and the peasant associations. Simple slogans, cartoons and speeches have produced such a widespread and speedy effect among the peasants that every one of them seems to have been through a political school. According to the reports of comrades engaged in rural work, political propaganda was very extensive at the time of the three great mass rallies, the anti-British demonstration, the celebration of the October Revolution and the victory celebration for the Northern Expedition. On these occasions, political propaganda was conducted extensively wherever there were peasant associations, arousing the whole countryside with tremendous effect. From now on care should be taken to use every opportunity gradually to enrich the content and clarify the meaning of those simple slogans.

9. PEASANT BANS AND PROHIBITIONS

When the peasant associations, under Communist Party leadership, establish their authority in the countryside, the peasants begin to prohibit or restrict the things they dislike. Gaming, gambling and opium-smoking are the three things that are most strictly forbidden.

Gaming. Where the peasant association is powerful, mahjong, dominoes and card games are completely banned.

The peasant association in the 14th District of Hsianghsiang burned two basketfuls of mahjong sets.

If you go to the countryside, you will find none of these games played; anyone who violates the ban is promptly and strictly punished.

Gambling. Former hardened gamblers are now themselves suppressing gambling; this abuse, too, has been swept away in places where the peasant association is powerful.

Opium-smoking. The prohibition is extremely strict. When the peasant association orders the surrender of opium pipes, no one dares to raise the least objection. In Liling County one of the evil gentry who did not surrender his pipes was arrested and paraded through the villages.

The peasants' campaign to "disarm the opium-smokers" is no less impressive than the disarming of the troops of Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang[27] by the Northern Expeditionary Army. Quite a number of venerable fathers of officers in the revolutionary army, old men who were opium-addicts and inseparable from their pipes, have been disarmed by the "emperors" (as the peasants are called derisively by the evil gentry). The "emperors" have banned not only the growing and smoking of opium, but also trafficking in it. A great deal of the opium transported from Kweichow to Kiangsi via the counties of Paoching, Hsianghsiang, Yuhsien and Liling has been intercepted on the way and burned. This has affected government revenues. As a result, out of consideration for the army's need for funds in the Northern Expedition, the provincial peasant association ordered the associations at the lower levels "temporarily to postpone the ban on opium traffic". This, however, has upset and displeased the peasants.

There are many other things besides these three which the peasants have prohibited or restricted, the following being some examples:

The flower drum. Vulgar performances are forbidden in many places.

Sedan-chairs. In many counties, especially Hsianghsiang, there have been cases of smashing sedan-chairs. The peasants, detesting the people who use this conveyance, are always ready to smash the chairs, but the peasant associations forbid them to do so. Association officials tell the peasants, "If you smash the chairs, you only save the rich money and lose the carriers their jobs. Will that not hurt our own people?" Seeing the point, the peasants have worked out a new tactic — considerably to increase the fares charged by the chair-carriers so as to penalize the rich.

Distilling and sugar-making. The use of grain for distilling spirits and making sugar is everywhere prohibited, and the distillers and sugar-refiners are constantly complaining. Distilling is not banned in Futienpu, Hengshan County, but prices are fixed very low, and the wine and spirits dealers, seeing no prospect of profit, have had to stop it.

Pigs. The number of pigs a family can keep is limited, for pigs consume grain.

Chickens and ducks. In Hsianghsiang County the raising of chickens and ducks is prohibited, but the women object. In Hengshan County, each family in Yangtang is allowed to keep only three, and in Futienpu five. In many places the raising of ducks is completely banned, for ducks not only consume grain but also ruin the rice plants and so are worse than chickens.

Feasts. Sumptuous feasts are generally forbidden. In Shaoshan, Hsiangtan County, it has been decided that guests are to be served with only three kinds of animal food, namely, chicken, fish and pork. It is also forbidden to serve bamboo shoots, kelp and lentil noodles. In Hengshan County it has been resolved that eight dishes and no more may be served at a banquet.[28] Only five dishes are allowed in the East Third District in Liling County, and only three meat and three vegetable dishes in the North Second District, while in the West Third District New Year feasts are forbidden entirely. In Hsianghsiang County, there is a ban on all "egg-cake feasts", which are by no means sumptuous. When a family in the Second District of Hsianghsiang gave an "egg-cake feast" at a son's wedding, the peasants, seeing the ban violated, swarmed into the house and broke up the celebration. In the town of Chiamo, Hsianghsiang County, the people have refrained from eating expensive foods and use only fruit when offering ancestral sacrifices.

Oxen. Oxen are a treasured possession of the peasants. "Slaughter an ox in this life and you will be an ox in the next" has become almost a religious tenet; oxen must never be killed. Before the peasants had power, they could only appeal to religious taboo in opposing the slaughter of cattle and had no means of banning it. Since the rise of the peasant associations their jurisdiction has extended even to the cattle, and they have prohibited the slaughter of cattle in the towns. Of the six butcheries in the county town of Hsiangtan, five are now closed and the remaining one slaughters only enfeebled or disabled animals. The slaughter of cattle is totally prohibited throughout the county of Hengshan. A peasant whose ox broke a leg consulted the peasant association before he dared kill it. When the Chamber of Commerce of Chuchow rashly slaughtered a cow, the peasants came into town and demanded an explanation, and the chamber, besides paying a fine, had to let off firecrackers by way of apology.

Tramps and vagabonds. A resolution passed in Liling County prohibited the drumming of New Year greetings or the chanting of praises to the local deities or the singing of lotus rhymes. Various other counties have similar prohibitions, or these practices have disappeared of themselves, as no one observes them any more. The "beggar-bullies" or "vagabonds" who used to be extremely aggressive now have no alternative but to submit to the peasant associations. In Shaoshan, Hsiangtan County, the vagabonds used to make the temple of the Rain God their regular haunt and feared nobody, but since the rise of the associations they have stolen away. The peasant association in Huti Township in the same county caught three such tramps and made them carry clay for the brick kilns. Resolutions have been passed prohibiting the wasteful customs associated with New Year calls and gifts.

Besides these, many other minor prohibitions have been introduced in various places, such as the Liling prohibitions on incense-burning processions to propitiate the god of pestilence, on buying preserves and fruit for ritual presents, burning ritual paper garments during the Festival of Spirits and pasting up good-luck posters at the New Year. At Kushui in Hsianghsiang County, there is a prohibition even on smoking water-pipes. In the Second District, letting off firecrackers and ceremonial guns is forbidden, with a fine of 1.20 yuan for the former and 2.40 yuan for the latter. Religious rites for the dead are prohibited in the 7th and 20th Districts. In the 18th District, it is forbidden to make funeral gifts of money. Things like these, which defy enumeration, may be generally called peasant bans and prohibitions.

They are of great significance in two respects. First, they represent a revolt against bad social customs, such as gaming, gambling and opium-smoking. These customs arose out of the rotten political environment of the landlord class and are swept away once its authority is overthrown. Second, the prohibitions are a form of self-defence against exploitation by city merchants; such are the prohibitions on feasts and on buying preserves and fruit for ritual presents. Manufactured goods are extremely dear and agricultural products are extremely cheap, the peasants are impoverished and ruthlessly exploited by the merchants, and they must therefore encourage frugality to protect themselves. As for the ban on sending grain out of the area, it is imposed to prevent the price from rising because the poor peasants have not enough to feed themselves and have to buy grain on the market. The reason for all this is the peasants' poverty and the contradictions between town and country; it is not a matter of their rejecting manufactured goods or trade between town and country in order to uphold the so-called Doctrine of Oriental Culture.[29] To protect themselves economically, the peasants must organize consumers' co-operatives for the collective buying of goods. It is also necessary for the government to help the peasant associations establish credit (loan) co-operatives. If these things were done, the peasants would naturally find it unnecessary to ban the outflow of grain as a method of keeping down the price, nor would they have to prohibit the inflow of certain manufactured goods in economic self-defence.

10. ELIMINATING BANDITRY

In my opinion, no ruler in any dynasty from Yu, Tang, Wen and Wu down to the Ching emperors and the presidents of the Republic has ever shown as much prowess in eliminating banditry as have the peasant associations today. Wherever the peasant associations are powerful, there is not a trace of banditry. Surprisingly enough, in many places even the pilfering of vegetables has disappeared. In other places there are still some pilferers. But in the counties I visited, even including those that were formerly bandit-ridden, there was no trace of bandits. The reasons are: First, the members of the peasant associations are everywhere spread out over the hills and dales, spear or cudgel in hand, ready to go into action in their hundreds, so that the bandits have nowhere to hide. Second, since the rise of the peasant movement the price of grain has dropped — it was six yuan a picul last spring but only two yuan last winter — and the problem of food has become less serious for the people. Third, members of the secret societies[30] have joined the peasant associations, in which they can openly and legally play the hero and vent their grievances, so that there is no further need for the secret "mountain", "lodge", "shrine" and "river" forms of organization.[31] In killing the pigs and sheep of the local tyrants and evil gentry and imposing heavy levies and fines, they have adequate outlets for their feelings against those who oppressed them. Fourth, the armies are recruiting large numbers of soldiers and many of the "unruly" have joined up. Thus the evil of banditry has ended with the rise of the peasant movement. On this point, even the well-to-do approve of the peasant associations. Their comment is, "The peasant associations? Well, to be fair, there is also something to be said for them."

In prohibiting gaming, gambling and opium-smoking, and in eliminating banditry, the peasant associations have won general approval.

11. ABOLISHING EXORBITANT LEVIES

As the country is not yet unified and the authority of the imperialists and the warlords has not been overthrown, there is as yet no way of removing the heavy burden of government taxes and levies on the peasants or, more explicitly, of removing the burden of expenditure for the revolutionary army. However, the exorbitant levies imposed on the peasants when the local tyrants and evil gentry dominated rural administration, *e.g.*, the surcharge on each *mou* of land, have been abolished or at least reduced with the rise of the peasant movement and the downfall of the local tyrants and evil gentry. This too should be counted among the achievements of the peasant associations.

12. THE MOVEMENT FOR EDUCATION

In China education has always been the exclusive preserve of the landlords, and the peasants have had no access to it. But the landlords' culture is created by the peasants, for its sole source is the peasants' sweat and blood. In China 90 per cent of the people have had no education, and of these the overwhelming majority are peasants. The moment the power of the landlords was overthrown in the rural areas, the peasants' movement for education began. See how the peasants who hitherto detested the schools are today zealously setting up evening classes! They always disliked the "foreign-style school". In my student days, when I went back to the village and saw that the peasants were against the "foreign-style school", I, too, used to identify myself with the general run of "foreign-style students and teachers" and stand up for it, feeling that the peasants were somehow wrong. It was not until 1925, when I lived in the countryside for six months and was already a Communist and had acquired the Marxist viewpoint, that I realized I had been wrong and the peasants right. The texts used in the rural primary schools were entirely about urban things and unsuited to rural needs. Besides, the attitude of the primary school teachers towards the peasants was very bad and, far from being helpful to the peasants, they became objects of dislike. Hence the peasants preferred the old-style schools ("Chinese classes", as they called them) to the modern schools (which they called "foreign classes") and the old-style teachers to the ones in the primary schools. Now the peasants are enthusiastically establishing evening classes, which they call peasant schools. Some have already been opened, others are being organized, and on the average there is one school per township. The peasants are very enthusiastic about these schools, and regard them, and only them, as their own. The funds for the evening schools come from the "public revenue from superstition", from ancestral temple funds, and from other idle public funds or property. The county education boards wanted to use this money to establish primary schools, that is, "foreign-style schools" not suited to the needs of the peasants, while the latter wanted to use it for peasant schools, and the outcome of the dispute was that both got some of the money, though there are places where the peasants got it all. The development of the peasant movement has resulted in a rapid rise in their cultural level. Before long tens of thousands of schools will have sprung up in the villages throughout the province; this is quite different from the empty talk about "universal education", which the intelligentsia and the so-called "educationalists" have been bandying back and forth and which after all this time remains an empty phrase.

13. THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

The peasants really need co-operatives, and especially consumers', marketing and credit co-operatives. When they buy goods, the merchants exploit them; when they sell their farm produce, the merchants cheat them; when they borrow money or rice, they are fleeced by the usurers; and they are eager to find a solution to these three problems. During the fighting in the Yangtse valley last winter, when trade routes were cut and the price of salt went up in Hunan, many peasants organized co-operatives to purchase salt. When the landlords deliberately stopped lending, there were many attempts by the peasants to organize credit agencies, because they needed to borrow money. A major problem is the absence of detailed, standard rules of organization. As these spontaneously organized peasant co-operatives often fail to conform to co-operative principles, the comrades working among the peasants are always eagerly enquiring about "rules and regulations". Given proper guidance, the co-operative movement can spread everywhere along with the growth of the peasant associations.

14. BUILDING ROADS AND REPAIRING EMBANKMENTS

This, too, is one of the achievements of the peasant associations. Before there were peasant associations the roads in the countryside were terrible. Roads cannot be repaired without money, and as the wealthy were unwilling to dip into their purses, the roads were left in a bad state. If there was any road work done at all, it was done as an act of charity; a little money was collected from families "wishing to gain merit in the next world", and a few narrow, skimpily paved roads were built. With the rise of the peasant associations orders have been given specifying the required width — three, five, seven or ten feet, according to the requirements of the different routes — and each landlord along a road has been ordered to build a section. Once the order is given, who dares to disobey? In a short time many good roads have appeared. This is no work of charity but the result of compulsion, and a little compulsion of this kind is not at all a bad thing. The same is true of the embankments. The ruthless landlords were always out to take what they could from the tenant-peasants and would never spend even a few coppers on embankment repairs; they would leave the ponds to dry up and the tenant-peasants to starve, caring about nothing but the rent. Now that there are peasant associations, the landlords can be bluntly ordered to repair the embankments. When a landlord refuses, the association will tell him politely, "Very well! If you won't do the repairs, you will contribute grain, a *tou* for each work-day." As this is a bad bargain for the landlord, he hastens to do the repairs. Consequently many defective embankments have been turned into good ones.

All the fourteen deeds enumerated above have been accomplished by the peasants under the leadership of the peasant associations. Would the reader please think it over and say whether any of them is bad in its fundamental spirit and revolutionary significance? Only the local tyrants and evil gentry, I think, will call them bad. Curiously enough, it is reported from Nanchang[32] that Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Ching-chiang[33] and other such gentlemen do not altogether approve of the activities of the Hunan peasants. This opinion is shared by Liu Yueh-chih[34] and other right-wing leaders in Hunan, all of whom say, "They have simply gone Red." But where would the national revolution be without this bit of Red? To talk about "arousing the masses of the people" day in and day out and then to be scared to death when the masses do rise — what difference is there between this and Lord Sheh's love of dragons?[35]

NOTES

[1] Hunan Province was then the centre of the peasant movement in China.

[2] Chao Heng-ti, the ruler of Hunan at the time, was the agent of the Northern warlords. He was overthrown by the Northern Expeditionary Army in 1926.

[3] The Revolution of 1911 overthrew the autocratic regime of the Ching Dynasty. On October 10 of that year, a section of the Ching Dynasty's New Army staged an uprising in Wuchang, Hupeh Province, at the urging of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois revolutionary societies. It was followed by uprisings in other provinces, and very soon the rule of the Ching Dynasty crumbled. On January 1, 1912, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China was set up in Nanking, and Sun Yat-sen was elected Provisional President. The revolution achieved victory through the alliance of the bourgeoisie with the peasants, workers and urban petty bourgeoisie. But state power fell into the hands of the Northern warlord Yuan Shih-kai, and the revolution failed, because the group which led it was conciliationist in nature, failed to give real benefits to the peasants and yielded to imperialist and feudal pressure.

[4] These were the virtues of Confucius, as described by one of his disciples.

[5] The old Chinese phrase, "exceeding the proper limits in righting a wrong", was often quoted for the purpose of restricting people's activities; reforms that remained within the framework of the established order were to be permitted, but activities aiming at the complete destruction of the old order were to be forbidden. Actions within this framework were regarded as "proper", but those that aimed at completely destroying the old order were described as "exceeding the proper limits". It is a convenient doctrine for reformists and opportunists in the revolutionary ranks. Comrade Mao Tse-tung refuted this kind of reformist doctrine.

His remark in the text that "Proper limits have to be exceeded in order to right a wrong, or else the wrong cannot be righted" meant that the mass revolutionary method, and not the revisionist-reformist method, had to be taken to end the old feudal order.

[6] Chiang Kai-shek had not yet been fully exposed as a counter-revolutionary in the winter of 1926 and the spring of 1927 when the Northern Expeditionary Army was marching into the Yangtse valley, and the peasant masses still thought that he was for the revolution. The landlords and rich peasants disliked him and spread the rumour that the Northern Expeditionary Army had suffered defeats and that he had been wounded in the leg. Chiang Kai-shek came to be fully revealed as a counter-revolutionary on April 12, 1927, when he staged his counter-revolutionary coup d'état in Shanghai and elsewhere, massacring the workers, suppressing the peasants and attacking the Communist Party. The landlords and rich peasants then changed their attitude and began to support him.

[7] Kwangtung was the first revolutionary base in the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27).

[8] Wu Pei-fu was one of the best-known of the Northern warlords. Together with Tsao Kun, who was notorious for his rigging of the presidential election in 1923 by bribing members of parliament, he belonged to the Chihli (Hopei) clique. He supported Tsao as the leader and the two were generally referred to as "Tsao-Wu". In 1920 after defeating Tuan Chi-jui, warlord of the Anhwei clique, Wu Pei-fu gained control of the Northern warlord government in Peking as an agent of the Anglo-American imperialists; it was he who gave the orders for the massacre, on February 7, 1923, of the workers on strike along the Peking-Hankow Railway. In 1924 he was defeated in the war with Chang Tso-lin (commonly known as the "war between the Chihli and Fengtien cliques"), and he was thereupon ousted from the Peking regime. In 1926 he joined forces with Chang Tso-lin at the instigation of the Japanese and British imperialists, and thus returned to power. When the Northern Expeditionary Army drove northward from Kwangtung in 1926, he was the first foe to be overthrown.

[9] The Three People's Principles were Sun Yat-sen's principles and programme for the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China on the questions of nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood. In 1924, in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, Sun Yat-sen restated the Three People's Principles, interpreting nationalism as opposition to imperialism and expressing active support for the movements of the workers and peasants. The old Three People's Principles thus developed into the new, consisting of the Three Great Policies, that is, alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers. The new Three People's Principles provided the political basis for co-operation between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang during the First Revolutionary Civil War period.

[10] The Chinese term for "long live" is *wansui*, literally "ten thousand years", and was the traditional salute to the emperor; it had become a synonym for "emperor".

[11] Rich peasants should not have been allowed to join the peasant associations, a point which the peasant masses did not yet understand in 1927.

[12] Here the "utterly destitute" means the farm labourers (the rural proletariat) and the rural *lumpen*-proletariat.

[13] The "less destitute" means the rural semi-proletariat.

[14] Yuan Tsu-ming was a warlord of Kweichow Province who controlled the western part of Hunan.

[15] A tenant generally gave his landlord, as a condition of tenancy, a deposit in cash or kind, often amounting to a considerable part of the value of the land. Though this was supposed to be a guarantee for payment of rent, it actually represented a form of extra exploitation.

[16] In Hunan, the *tu* corresponded to the district and the *tuan* to the township. The old administrations of the *tu* and the *tuan* type were instruments of landlord rule.

[17] The tax per *mou* was a surcharge on top of the regular land tax, ruthlessly imposed on the peasants by the landlord regime.

[18] Under the regime of the Northern warlords, the military head of a province was called "military governor". But he was the virtual dictator of the province, with administrative as well as military power gathered in his hands. In league with the imperialists, he maintained a separatist feudal-militarist regime in his locality.

[19] The "standing household militia" was one of the various kinds of armed forces in the countryside. The term "household" is used because some member of almost every household had to join it. After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, the landlords in many places seized control of the militia and turned them into armed counter-revolutionary bands.

[20] At the time, many of the county headquarters of the Kuomintang, under the leadership of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee in Wuhan, pursued Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. They constituted the revolutionary alliance of the Communists, the left-wingers of the Kuomintang, and other revolutionaries.

[21] Lord Pao (Pao Cheng) was prefect of Kaifeng, capital of the Northern Sung Dynasty (A.D. 960-1127). He was famous in popular legend as an upright official and a fearless, impartial judge with a knack of passing true verdicts in all the cases he tried.

[22] This reference to archery is taken from Mencius. It describes how the expert teacher of archery draws his bow with a histrionic gesture but does not release the arrow. The point is that while Communists should guide the peasants in attaining a full measure of political consciousness, they should leave it to the peasants' own initiative to abolish superstitious and other bad practices, and should not give them orders or do it for them.

[23] The Eight Characters were a method of fortune-telling in China based on the examination of the two cyclic characters each for the year, month, day and hour of a person's birth respectively.

[24] Geomancy refers to the superstition that the location of one's ancestors' grave influences one's fortune. The geomancers claim to be able to tell whether a particular site and its surroundings are auspicious.

[25] Lord Kuan (Kuan Yu, A.D. 160-219), a warrior in the epoch of the Three Kingdoms, was widely worshipped by the Chinese as the God of Loyalty and War.

[26] Tang Sheng-chih was a general who sided with the revolution in the Northern expedition. Yeh Kai-hsin was a general on the side of the Northern warlords who fought against the revolution.

[27] Sun Chuan-fang was a warlord whose rule extended over the five provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, Kiangi and Anhwei. He was responsible for the bloody suppression of the insurrections of the Shanghai workers. His main army

was crushed in the winter of 1926 by the Northern Expeditionary Army in Nanchang and Kiukiang, Kiangsi Province.

[28] In China a dish is served in a bowl or a plate for the whole table, and not individually.

[29] "0riental Culture" was a reactionary doctrine which rejected modern scientific civilization and favoured the preservation of the backward mode of agricultural production and the feudal culture of the Orient.

[30] For the secret societies, see "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", Note 18, p. 21 of this volume.

[31] "Mountain", "lodge", "shrine" and "river" were names used by primitive secret societies to denote some of their sects.

[32] When Nanchang was captured by the Northern Expeditionary Army in November 1926, Chiang Kai-shek seized the opportunity to establish his general headquarters there. He gathered around himself the right-wing members of the Kuomintang and a number of Northern warlord politicians and, in collusion with the imperialists, hatched his counter-revolutionary plot against Wuhan, the then revolutionary centre. Eventually, on April 12, 1927, he staged his counter-revolutionary coup d'état which was marked by tremendous massacres in Shanghai.

[33] Chang Ching-chiang, a right-wing Kuomintang leader, was a member of Chiang Kai-shek's brain trust.

[34] Liu Yueh-chih was head of the "Left Society", an important anti-Communist group in Hunan.

[35] As told by Liu Hsiang (77-6 B.C.) in his *Hsin Hsu*, Lord Sheh was so fond of dragons that he adorned his whole palace with drawings and carvings of them. But when a real dragon heard of his infatuation and paid him a visit, he was frightened out of his wits. Here Comrade Mao Tse-tung uses this metaphor to show that though Chiang Kai-shek and his like talked about revolution, they were afraid of revolution and against it.

THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR PERIOD

WHY IS IT THAT RED POLITICAL POWER CAN EXIST IN CHINA?

October 5, 1928

I. THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

The present regime of the new warlords of the Kuomintang remains a regime of the comprador class in the cities and the landlord class in the countryside; it is a regime which has capitulated to imperialism in its foreign relations and which at home has replaced the old warlords with new ones, subjecting the working class and the peasantry to an even more ruthless economic exploitation and political oppression. The bourgeois-democratic revolution which started in Kwangtung Province had gone only halfway when the comprador and landlord classes usurped the leadership and immediately shifted it on to the road of counter-revolution; throughout the country the workers, the peasants, the other sections of the common people, and even the bourgeoisie,[1] have remained under counter-revolutionary rule and obtained not the slightest particle of political or economic emancipation.

Before their capture of Peking and Tientsin, the four cliques of the new Kuomintang warlords, Chiang Kai-shek, the Kwangsi warlords, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan,[2] formed a temporary alliance against Chang Tso-lin.[3] As soon as these cities were captured, this alliance broke up, giving way to bitter struggle among the four cliques, and now a war is brewing between the Chiang and the Kwangsi cliques. The contradictions and struggles among the cliques of warlords in China reflect the contradictions and struggles among the imperialist powers. Hence, as long as China is divided among the imperialist powers, the various cliques of warlords cannot under any circumstances

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This article was part of the resolution, originally entitled "The Political Problems and the Tasks of the Border Area Party Organization", which was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Second Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area.

come to terms, and whatever compromises they may reach will only be temporary. A temporary compromise today engenders a bigger war tomorrow.

China is in urgent need of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and this revolution can be completed only under the leadership of the proletariat. Because the proletariat failed to exercise firm leadership in the revolution of 1926-27 which started from Kwangtung and spread towards the Yangtse River, leadership was seized by the comprador and landlord classes and the revolution was replaced by counter-revolution. The bourgeois-democratic revolution thus met with a temporary defeat. This defeat was a heavy blow to the Chinese proletariat and peasantry and also a blow to the Chinese bourgeoisie (but not to the comprador and landlord classes). Yet in the last few months, both in the north and in the south, there has been a growth of organized strikes by the workers in the cities and of insurrections by the peasants in the countryside under the leadership of the Communist Party. Hunger and cold are creating great unrest among the soldiers of the warlord armies. Meanwhile, urged on by the clique headed by Wang Ching-wei and Chen Kung-po, the bourgeoisie is promoting a reform movement of considerable proportions[4] in the coastal areas and along the Yangtse River. This is a new development.

According to the directives of the Communist International and the Central Committee of our Party, the content of China's democratic revolution consists in overthrowing the rule of imperialism and its warlord tools in China so as to complete the national revolution, and in carrying out the agrarian revolution so as to eliminate the feudal exploitation of the peasants by the landlord class. Such a revolutionary movement has been growing day by day since the Tsinan Massacre[5] in May 1928.

II. REASONS FOR THE EMERGENCE AND SURVIVAL OF RED POLITICAL POWER IN CHINA[6]

The long-term survival inside a country of one or more small areas under Red political power completely encircled by a White regime is a phenomenon that has never occurred anywhere else in the world. There are special reasons for this unusual phenomenon. It can exist and develop only under certain conditions.

First, it cannot occur in any imperialist country or in any colony under direct imperialist rule,[7] but can only occur in China which is economically backward, and which is semi-colonial and under indirect imperialist rule. For this unusual phenomenon can occur only in conjunction with another unusual phenomenon, namely, war within the White regime. It is a feature of semi-colonial China that, since the first year of the Republic (1912), the various cliques of old and new warlords have waged incessant wars against one another, supported by imperialism from abroad and by the comprador and landlord classes at home. Such a phenomenon is to be found in none of the imperialist countries nor for that matter in any colony under direct imperialist rule, but only in a country like China which is under indirect imperialist rule. Two things account for its occurrence, namely, a localized agricultural economy (not a unified capitalist economy) and the imperialist policy of marking off spheres of influence in order to divide and exploit. The prolonged splits and wars within the White regime provide a condition for the emergence and persistence of one or more small Red areas under the leadership of the Communist Party amidst the encirclement of the White regime. The independent regime carved out on the borders of Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces is one of many such small areas. In difficult or critical times some comrades often have doubts about the survival of Red political power and become pessimistic. The reason is that they have not found the correct explanation for its emergence and survival. If only we realize that splits and wars will never cease within the White regime in China, we shall have no doubts about the emergence, survival and daily growth of Red political power.

Second, the regions where China's Red political power has first emerged and is able to last for a long time have not been those unaffected by the democratic revolution, such as Szechuan, Kweichow, Yunnan and the northern provinces, but regions such as the provinces of Hunan, Kwangtung, Hupeh and Kiangsi, where the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers rose in great numbers in the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1926 and 1927. In many parts of these provinces trade unions and peasant associations were formed on a wide scale, and many economic and political struggles were waged by the working class and the peasantry against the landlord class and the bourgeoisie. This is why the people held political power for three days in the city of

Canton and why independent regimes of peasants emerged in Haifeng and Lufeng, in eastern and southern Hunan, in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area and in Huangan, Hupeh Province.[8] As for the present Red Army, it is a split-off from the National Revolutionary Army which underwent democratic political training and came under the influence of the masses of workers and peasants. The elements that make up the Red Army cannot possibly come from armies like those of Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Tso-lin, which have not received any democratic political training or come under the influence of the workers and peasants.

Third, whether it is possible for the people's political power in small areas to last depends on whether the nation-wide revolutionary situation continues to develop. If it does, then the small Red areas will undoubtedly last for a long time, and will, moreover, inevitably become one of the many forces for winning nation-wide political power. If the nation-wide revolutionary situation does not continue to develop but stagnates for a fairly long time, then it will be impossible for the small Red areas to last long. Actually, the revolutionary situation in China is continuing to develop with the continuous splits and wars within the ranks of the comprador and landlord classes and of the international bourgeoisie. Therefore the small Red areas will undoubtedly last for a long time, and will also continue to expand and gradually approach the goal of seizing political power throughout the country.

Fourth, the existence of a regular Red Army of adequate strength is a necessary condition for the existence of Red political power. If we have local Red Guards[9] only but no regular Red Army, then we cannot cope with the regular White forces, but only with the landlords' levies. Therefore, even when the masses of workers and peasants are active, it is definitely impossible to create an independent regime, let alone an independent regime which is durable and grows daily, unless we have regular forces of adequate strength. It follows that the idea of "establishing independent regimes of the workers and the peasants by armed force" is an important one which must be fully grasped by the Communist Party and by the masses of workers and peasants in areas under the independent regime.

Fifth, another important condition in addition to the above is required for the prolonged existence and development of Red political power, namely, that the Communist Party organization should be strong and its policy correct.

III. THE INDEPENDENT REGIME IN THE HUNAN-KIANGSI BORDER AREA AND THE AUGUST DEFEAT

Splits and wars among the warlords weaken the power of the White regime. Thus opportunities are provided for the rise of Red political power in small areas. But fighting among the warlords does not go on every day. Whenever the White regime in one or more provinces enjoys temporary stability, the ruling classes there inevitably combine and do their utmost to destroy Red political power. In areas where all the necessary conditions for its establishment and persistence are not fulfilled, Red political power is in danger of being overthrown by the enemy. This is the reason why many Red regimes emerging at favourable moments before last April in places like Canton, Haifeng and Lufeng, the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, southern Hunan, Liling and Huangan were crushed one after another by the White regime. Prom April onward the independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area was confronted with a temporarily stable ruling power in the south, and Hunan and Kiangsi would usually dispatch eight, nine or more regiments—sometimes as many as eighteen—to "suppress" us. Yet with a force of less than four regiments we fought the enemy for four long months, daily enlarging the territory under our independent regime, deepening the agrarian revolution, extending the organizations of the people's political power, and expanding the Red Army and the Red Guards. This was possible because the policies of the Communist Party organizations (local and army) in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area were correct. The policies of the Border Area Special Committee and the Army Committee of the Party were then as follows:

> Struggle resolutely against the enemy, set up political power in the middle section of the Lohsiao mountain range,[10] and oppose flightism.
>
> Deepen the agrarian revolution in areas under the independent regime.
>
> Promote the development of the local Party organization with the help of the army Party organization and promote the

development of the local armed forces with the help of the regular army.

Concentrate the Red Army units in order to fight the enemy confronting them when the time is opportune, and oppose the division of forces so as to avoid being destroyed one by one.

Adopt the policy of advancing in a series of waves to expand the area under the independent regime, and oppose the policy of expansion by adventurist advance.

Thanks to these proper tactics, to a terrain favourable to our struggle, and to the inadequate co-ordination between the troops invading from Hunan and those invading from Kiangsi, we were able to win a number of victories in the four months from April to July. Although several times stronger than we, the enemy was unable to prevent the constant expansion of our regime, let alone to destroy it, and our regime tended to exert an ever-growing influence on Hunan and Kiangsi. The sole reason for the August defeat was that, failing to realize that the period was one of temporary stability for the ruling classes, some comrades adopted a strategy suited to a period of political splits within the ruling classes and divided our forces for an adventurous advance, thus causing defeat both in the border area and in southern Hunan. Comrade Tu Hsiu-ching, the representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, failed to grasp the actual situation and disregarded the resolutions of the joint meeting of the Special Committee, the Army Committee and the Yunghsin County Committee of the Party; he just mechanically enforced the order of the Hunan Provincial Committee and echoed the views of the Red Army's 29th Regiment which wanted to evade struggle and return home, and his mistake was exceedingly grave. The situation arising from this defeat was salvaged as a result of the corrective measures taken by the Special Committee and the Army Committee of the Party after September.

IV. THE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT REGIME OF THE HUNAN-KIANGSI BORDER AREA IN HUNAN, HUPEH AND KIANGSI

The significance of the armed independent regime of workers and peasants in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, with Ningkang as its centre, is definitely not confined to the few counties in the border area; this regime will play an immense role in the process of the seizure of political power in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi through the insurrection of the workers and peasants in these three provinces. The following are tasks of great importance for the Party in the border area in connection with the insurrections unfolding in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi: Extend the influence of the agrarian revolution and of the people's political power in the border area to the lower reaches of the rivers in Hunan and Kiangsi and as far as Hupeh; constantly expand the Red Army and enhance its quality through struggle so that it can fulfil its mission in the coming general insurrection of the three provinces; enlarge the local armed forces in the counties, that is, the Red Guards and the workers' and peasants' insurrection detachments, and enhance their quality so that they are able to fight the landlords' levies and small armed units now and safeguard the political power of the border area in the future; gradually reduce the extent to which local work is dependent on the assistance of the Red Army personnel, so that the border area will have its own personnel to take charge of the work and even provide personnel for the Red Army and the expanded territory of the independent regime.

V. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The shortage of necessities and cash has become a very big problem for the army and the people inside the White encirclement. Because of the tight enemy blockade, necessities such as salt, cloth and medicines have been very scarce and dear all through the past year in the independent border area, which has upset, sometimes to an acute degree, the lives of the masses of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie,[11] as well as of the soldiers of the Red Army. The Red Army has to fight the enemy and to provision itself at one and the same time. It even lacks funds to pay the daily food allowance of five cents per person, which is provided in addition to grain; the soldiers are undernourished, many are ill, and the wounded in the hospitals are worse off. Such difficulties are of course unavoidable before the nation-wide seizure of political power; yet there is a pressing need to overcome them to some extent, to make life somewhat easier, and especially to secure more adequate supplies for the

Red Army. Unless the Party in the border area can find proper ways to deal with economic problems, the independent regime will have great difficulties during the comparatively long period in which the enemy's rule will remain stable. An adequate solution of these economic problems undoubtedly merits the attention of every Party member.

VI. THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY BASES

The Party in the border area has another task, namely, the consolidation of the military bases at Five Wells[12] and Chiulung. The Five Wells mountain area at the juncture of Yunghsin, Linghsien, Ningkang and Suichuan Counties, and the Chiulung mountain area at the juncture of Yunghsin, Ningkang, Chaling and Lienhua Counties, both of which have topographical advantages, are important military bases not only for the border area at present, but also for insurrections in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi in the future, and this is particularly true of Five Wells, where we have the support of the people as well as a terrain that is especially difficult and strategically important. The way to consolidate these bases is, first, to construct adequate defences, second, to store sufficient grain and, third, to set up comparatively good Red Army hospitals. The Party in the border area must strive to perform these three tasks effectively.

NOTES

[1] By the term "bourgeoisie", Comrade Mao Tse-tung means the national bourgeoisie. For his detailed account of the distinction between this class and the big comprador bourgeoisie, see "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism" (December 1935) and "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" (December 1939).

[2] These four cliques of warlords fought together against Chang Tso-lin and occupied Peking and Tientsin in June 1928.

[3] Chang Tso-lin, who headed the Fengtien clique of warlords, became the most powerful warlord in northern China after defeating Wu Pei-fu in the second Chihli-Fengtien War in 1924. In 1926, with Wu Pei-fu as his ally, he marched on and occupied Peking. In June 1928, while retreating to the Northeast by rail, he was killed *en route* by a bomb planted by the Japanese imperialists whose tool he had been.

[4] This reform movement arose after the Japanese invaders occupied Tsinan on May 3, 1928, and after Chiang Kai-shek openly and brazenly compromised with Japan.

Within the national bourgeoisie which had identified itself with the counter-revolutionary coup d'état of 1927, a section acting in its own interests gradually began to form an opposition to the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The careerist counter-revolutionary group of Wang Ching-wei, Chen Kung-po and others which was active in this movement formed what became known as the "Reorganization Clique" in the Kuomintang.

[5] In 1928 Chiang Kai-shek, backed by British and U.S. imperialism, drove north to attack Chang Tso-lin. The Japanese imperialists then occupied Tsinan, the provincial capital of Shantung, and cut the Tientsin-Pukow railway line to check the northward spread of British and American influence. On May 3 the invading Japanese troops slaughtered large numbers of Chinese in Tsinan. This became known as the Tsinan Massacre.

[6] The organizational form of China's Red political power was similar to that of Soviet political power. A Soviet is a representative council, a political institution created by the Russian working class during the 1905 Revolution. Lenin and Stalin, on the basis of Marxist theory, drew the conclusion that a Soviet republic is the most suitable form of social and political organization for the transition from capitalism to socialism. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin, the Russian October Socialist Revolution in 1917 brought into being for the first time in world history such a socialist Soviet republic, a dictatorship of the proletariat. After the defeat of the 1927 revolution in China, the representative council was adopted as the form of people's political power in various places in the mass revolutionary uprisings led by the Chinese Communist Party and, first and foremost, by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. In its nature political power at that stage of the Chinese revolution was a people's democratic dictatorship of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, new-democratic revolution led by the proletariat, which was different from the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union.

[7] During World War II, many colonial countries in the East formerly under the imperialist rule of Britain, the United States, France and the Netherlands were occupied by the Japanese imperialists. Led by their Communist Parties, the masses of workers, peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie and members of the national bourgeoisie in these countries took advantage of the contradictions between the British, U.S., French and Dutch imperialists on the one hand and the Japanese imperialists on the other, organized a broad united front against fascist aggression, built anti-Japanese base areas and waged bitter guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. Thus the political situation existing prior to World War II began to change. When the Japanese imperialists were driven out of these countries at the end of World War II, the imperialists of the United States, Britain, France and the Netherlands attempted to restore their colonial rule, but, having built up armed forces of considerable strength during the anti-Japanese war, these colonial peoples refused to return to the old way of life. Moreover, the imperialist system all over the world was profoundly shaken because the Soviet Union had become strong, because all the imperialist powers, except the United States, had either been overthrown or weakened in the war, and finally because the imperialist front was breached in China by the victorious Chinese revolution. Thus, much as in China, it has become possible for the peoples of all, or at least some, of the colonial countries in the East to maintain big and small revolutionary base areas and revolutionary regimes over a long period of time, and to carry on long-term revolutionary war in which to surround the cities from the countryside, and then gradually to advance to take the cities and win nation-wide victory. The view held by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in 1928 on the question of establishing independent regimes in colonies under direct imperialist rule has changed as a result of the changes in the situation.

[8] These were the first counter-attacks which the people under Communist leadership launched in various places against the forces of the counter-revolution after Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei successively turned traitor to the revolution in 1927. On December 11, 1927, the workers and revolutionary soldiers of Canton united to stage an uprising, and set up the people's political power. They fought fiercely against the counter-revolutionary forces, which were directly supported by imperialism, but failed because the disparity in strength was too great. Peasants in Haifeng and Lufeng on the eastern coast of Kwangtung Province had started a powerful revolutionary movement during 1923-25 under the leadership of Comrade Peng Pai, a member of the Communist Party, and this movement contributed greatly to the victory of the two eastern campaigns launched from Canton by the National Revolutionary Army against the counter-revolutionary clique headed by Chen Chiung-ming. After Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution on April 12, 1927, these peasants staged three uprisings in April, September and October, and established a revolutionary regime which held out until April 1928. In eastern Hunan Province, insurrectionary peasants captured an area embracing Liuyang, Pingkiang, Liling and Chuchow in September 1927. At about the same time, tens of thousands of peasants staged an armed uprising in Hsiaokan, Macheng and Huangan in northeastern Hupeh Province and occupied the county town of Huangan for over thirty days. In southern Hunan, peasants in the counties of Yichang, Chenchow, Leiyang, Yunghsing and Tzehsing rose in arms in January 1928 and set up a revolutionary regime, which lasted for three months.

[9] The Red Guards were armed units of the masses in the revolutionary base areas, whose members carried on their regular productive work.

[10] The Lohsiao mountain range is a large range running along the borders of Kiangsi and Hunan Provinces. The Chingkang Mountains are in its middle section.

[11] By the term "petty bourgeoisie" Comrade Mao Tse-tung means those elements other than the peasants—handicraftsmen, small merchants, professional people of various kinds and petty-bourgeois intellectuals. In China they mostly live in cities, but there are quite a number in the countryside.

[12] Five Wells designates the villages of Big Well, Small Well, Upper Well, Middle Well and Lower Well, in the Chingkang Mountains, which are situated between Yunghsin, Ningkang and Suichuan in western Kiangsi and Linghsien County in eastern Hunan.

THE STRUGGLE IN THE CHINGKANG MOUNTAINS

November 25, 1928

THE INDEPENDENT REGIME IN THE HUNAN-KIANGSI BORDER AREA AND THE AUGUST DEFEAT

China is the only country in the world today where one or more small areas under Red political power have emerged in the midst of a White regime which encircles them. We find on analysis that one reason for this phenomenon lies in the incessant splits and wars within China's comprador and landlord classes. So long as these splits and wars continue, it is possible for an armed independent regime of workers and peasants to survive and grow. In addition, its survival and growth require the following conditions: (1) a sound mass base, (2) a sound Party organization, (3) a fairly strong Red Army, (4) terrain favourable to military operations, and (5) economic resources sufficient for sustenance.

An independent regime must vary its strategy against the encircling ruling classes, adopting one strategy when the ruling class regime is temporarily stable and another when it is split up. In a period when the ruling classes are split up, as during the wars between Li Tsung-jen and Tang Sheng-chih in Hunan and Hupeh Provinces[1] and between Chang Fa-kuei and Li Chi-shen in Kwangtung Province,[2] our strategy can be comparatively adventurous and the area carved out by military operations can be comparatively large. However, we must take care to lay a solid foundation in the central districts so that we shall have something secure to rely on when the White terror strikes. In a period when the regime of the ruling classes is

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This was a report submitted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

comparatively stable, as it was in the southern provinces after April this year, our strategy must be one of gradual advance. In such a period, the worst thing in military affairs is to divide our forces for an adventurous advance, and the worst thing in local work (distributing land, establishing political power, expanding the Party and organizing local armed forces) is to scatter our personnel and neglect to lay a solid foundation in the central districts. The defeats which many small Red areas have suffered have been due either to the absence of the requisite objective conditions or to subjective mistakes in tactics. Mistakes in tactics have been made solely because of failure to distinguish clearly between the two kinds of period, that in which the regime of the ruling classes is temporarily stable and that in which it is split up. In a period of temporary stability, some comrades advocated dividing our forces for an adventurous advance and even proposed leaving the defence of extensive areas to the Red Guards alone, as though oblivious of the fact that the enemy could attack not merely with the landlords' levies but even in concentrated operations with regular troops. In local work, they utterly neglected to lay a solid foundation in the central districts and attempted unrestricted expansion regardless of whether it was within our capacity. If anyone advocated a policy of gradual advance in military operations or a policy of concentrating our effort in local work on laying a solid foundation in the central districts so as to secure an invincible position, they dubbed him a "conservative". Their wrong ideas were the root cause of the defeats sustained last August by the Hunan-Kiangsi border area and by the Fourth Red Army in southern Hunan.

Our work in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area began in October last year. At the start, all our Party organizations in the counties were defunct. The local armed forces consisted only of the two units under Yuan Wen-tsai and Wang Tso in the vicinity of the Chingkang Mountains, each unit having sixty rifles in bad repair, while the peasant self-defence corps in the counties of Yunghsin, Lienhua, Chaling and Linghsien had been totally disarmed by the landlord class and the revolutionary ardour of the masses had been stifled. By February this year Ningkang, Yunghsin, Chaling and Suichuan had county Party committees, Linghsien had a special district Party committee, and in Lienhua a Party organization was beginning to function and establish connections with the Wanan County Committee. All the counties except Linghsien had a few local armed units.

In Ningkang, Chaling, Suichuan and Yunghsin, and especially in the two latter counties, there were a good many guerrilla uprisings against the landlords which aroused the masses, and all were fairly successful. In that period the agrarian revolution had not yet been carried very far. The organs of political power were called governments of the workers, peasants and soldiers. Soldiers' committees[3] were set up in the army. When units went on separate missions, action committees were set up to direct them. The leading body of the Party there was the Front Committee (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary), which had been appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee during the Autumn Harvest Uprising. In early March, upon the request of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, the Front Committee was abolished and reorganized as the Divisional Party Committee (with Ho Ting-ying as secretary), which thus became a body in charge of Party organizations in the army only and without authority over the local Party organizations. Meanwhile, Mao Tse-tung's forces were dispatched to southern Hunan upon the request of the Special Committee there, and consequently the Hunan-Kiangsi border area was occupied by the enemy for more than a month. At the end of March came the defeat in southern Hunan, and in April the forces under Chu Teh and those under Mao Tse-tung, together with the peasant army of southern Hunan, withdrew to Ningkang and began to re-establish the independent regime in the border area.

From April onward the independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area was confronted with a temporarily stable ruling power in the south, and Hunan and Kiangsi would dispatch at least eight or nine regiments of reactionary forces to "suppress" us and sometimes as many as eighteen. Yet with a force of less than four regiments we fought the enemy for four long months, daily enlarging the territory under our independent regime, deepening the agrarian revolution, extending the people's political power and expanding the Red Army and the Red Guards. This was possible because the policies of the Party organizations (local and army) in the border area were correct. The policies of the Border Area Special Committee (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary) and the Army Committee (with Chen Yi as secretary) of the Party were then as follows:

> Struggle resolutely against the enemy, set up political power in the middle section of the Lohsiao mountain range, and oppose flightism.

> Deepen the agrarian revolution in areas under the independent regime.
>
> Promote the development of the local Party organization with the help of the army Party organization and promote the development of the local armed forces with the help of the regular army.
>
> Be on the defensive against Hunan with its comparatively strong ruling power, and take the offensive against Kiangsi with its comparatively weak ruling power.
>
> Devote great efforts to the development of Yunghsin, set up an independent regime of the people there and prepare for a prolonged struggle.
>
> Concentrate the Red Army units in order to fight the enemy confronting them when the time is opportune, and oppose the division of forces so as to avoid being destroyed one by one.
>
> Adopt the policy of advancing in a series of waves to expand the area under the independent regime, and oppose the policy of expansion by adventurist advance.

Thanks to these proper tactics, to the terrain of the border area which favoured our struggle, and to the inadequate co-ordination between the troops invading from Hunan and those invading from Kiangsi, we were able to win a number of military victories and expand the people's independent regime in the four months from April to July. Although several times stronger than we, the enemy was unable to prevent the expansion of our regime, let alone to destroy it. Our regime tended to exert an ever-growing influence on Hunan and Kiangsi. The sole reason for the August defeat was that, failing to realize that the period was one of temporary stability for the ruling classes, some comrades adopted a policy suited to a period of splits within the ruling classes and divided our forces for an adventurous advance on southern Hunan, thus causing defeat both in the border area and in southern Hunan. Tu Hsiu-ching, the representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, and Yang Kai-ming, the secretary of the Border Area Special Committee who had been appointed by the Provincial Committee, failed to grasp the actual situation and, taking advantage of the fact that Mao Tse-tung, Wan Hsi-hsien and other strongly dissenting comrades were far away in Yunghsin, they disregarded the resolutions of the joint meeting of the Army Committee, the Special Committee and the Yunghsin County Committee of the Party, which disapproved of the views of the Hunan Provincial

Committee. They just mechanically enforced the order of the Hunan Provincial Committee to march to southern Hunan and fell in with the desire of the Red Army's 29th Regiment (composed of peasants from Yichang) to evade struggle and return home, thus causing defeat both in the border area and in southern Hunan.

Originally, in mid-July, the Eighth Army from Hunan, under Wu Shang, had invaded Ningkang, penetrated to Yunghsin, sought battle with us in vain (our men tried to attack them from a side road but missed them) and then, being afraid of the masses who supported us, hurriedly retreated to Chaling via Lienhua. In the meantime, the major detachment of the Red Army, which was advancing from Ningkang to attack Linghsien and Chaling, changed its plans on reaching Linghsien and turned towards southern Hunan, while the enemy forces from Kiangsi, consisting of 5 regiments of the Third Army under Wang Chun and Chin Han-ting and 6 regiments of the Sixth Army under Hu Wen-tou, launched a joint assault on Yunghsin. At that point we had only 1 regiment in Yunghsin which, under the cover provided by the broad masses of the people, pinned down these 11 regiments within a radius of thirty *li* of Yunghsin county town for as long as twenty-five days by means of guerrilla attacks from every direction. In the end we lost Yunghsin because of the enemy's fierce assault, and also lost Lienhua and Ningkang shortly afterwards. At that moment internal dissensions suddenly flared up among the Kiangsi enemy forces; the Sixth Army under Hu Wen-tou withdrew in haste and presently engaged Wang Chun's Third Army at Changshu. The other 5 Kiangsi regiments then hastily withdrew to the county town of Yunghsin. Had our major detachment not moved to southern Hunan, it would have been entirely possible to rout this enemy force and extend the area of the independent regime to include Kian, Anfu and Pinghsiang and to link it up with Pingkiang and Liuyang. But as the major detachment was away and the one remaining regiment was much too exhausted, it was decided that some men should remain to defend the Chingkang Mountains in co-operation with the two units under Yuan Wen-tsai and Wang Tso, and that I should take the rest to Kueitung to meet the major detachment and to invite it back. By that time the major detachment was retreating from southern Hunan to Kueitung, and on August 23 we joined forces there.

When the major detachment of the Red Army had arrived in Linghsien in mid-July, the officers and men of the 29th Regiment, who were wavering politically and wanted to return to their homes in southern Hunan, refused to obey orders, while the 28th Regiment was against going to southern Hunan and wanted to go to southern Kiangsi, but in any case did not want to return to Yunghsin. As Tu Hsiu-ching encouraged the 29th Regiment in their mistaken ideas and the Army Committee failed to dissuade them, the major detachment set out from Linghsien for Chenchow on July 17. In an engagement with the enemy forces under Fan Shih-sheng in Chenchow on July 24, it was initially successful but was later defeated and withdrew from the battle. Thereupon, acting on its own, the 29th Regiment hurried homeward to Yichang with the result that one section was annihilated at Lochang by Hu Feng-chang's bandits, another scattered in the Chenchow-Yichang area and has never been heard of since, and no more than a hundred men were mustered again that day. Fortunately, the 28th Regiment, which was the main force, had not suffered great losses and on August 18 it occupied Kueitung. On August 23 the regiment was joined by the troops from the Chingkang Mountains, to which it was decided that the combined forces should return by way of Chungyi and Shangyu. When we reached Chungyi, battalion commander Yuan Chung-chuan defected with an infantry company and an artillery company, and though the two companies were brought back, our regimental commander Wang Erh-cho lost his life in this action. When our men were returning but had not yet reached their destination, enemy units from Hunan and Kiangsi seized the opportunity to attack the Chingkang Mountains on August 30. Using their points of vantage, the defending troops, numbering less than one battalion, fought back, routed the enemy and saved the base.

The causes of our August defeat were as follows: (1) some officers and men, who were wavering and homesick, lost their fighting capacity, while others, who were unwilling to go to southern Hunan, were lacking in enthusiasm; (2) our men were exhausted by long marches in the sweltering summer heat; (3) having ventured several hundred *li* away from Linghsien, our men lost contact with the border area and became isolated; (4) as the masses in southern Hunan had not yet been aroused, the expedition proved to be pure military adventurism; (5) we were uninformed about the enemy situation; and (6) the preparations were inadequate, and officers and men did not understand the purpose of the operation.

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE AREA UNDER THE INDEPENDENT REGIME

Since April this year the Red areas have been gradually extended. After the battle of Lungyuankou (on the borders of Yunghsin and Ningkang) on June 23, in which we defeated the Kiangsi enemy forces for the fourth time, the border area reached the peak of its development, embracing the three counties of Ningkang, Yunghsin and Lienhua, small sections of Kian and Anfu, the northern section of Suichuan, and the southeastern section of Linghsien. In the Red areas the greater part of the land had been distributed and the remainder was being distributed. Organs of political power were set up everywhere in the districts and townships. County governments were set up in Ningkang, Yunghsin, Lienhua and Suichuan, and a border area government was formed. Insurrectionary detachments of workers and peasants were organized in the villages, and Red Guards were formed at the district and county levels. In July the Kiangsi enemy forces launched attacks, and in August the Hunan and Kiangsi enemy forces jointly attacked the Chingkang Mountains. All the county towns and the plains in the border area were occupied by the enemy. The enemy's jackals—the peace preservation corps and the landlords' levies—ran amuck, and White terror raged throughout the towns and countryside. Most of the Party and government organizations collapsed. The rich peasants and the opportunists in the Party went over to the enemy in great numbers. It was not until the battle of the Chingkang Mountains was fought on August 30 that the Hunan enemy forces retreated to Linghsien; but the Kiangsi forces still held all the county towns and most of the villages. However, the enemy has never been able to capture the mountain areas, which include the western and northern districts of Ningkang; the Tienlung, Hsiaohsikiang and Wannienshan districts in the northern, western and southern sections of Yunghsin respectively; the Shanghsi district of Lienhua; the Chingkangshan district of Suichuan; and the Tsingshihkang and Tayuan districts of Linghsien. In July and August, in co-ordination with the Red Guards of the various counties, one regiment of the Red Army fought scores of battles, big and small, losing only thirty rifles, before it finally withdrew to the mountains.

As our men were marching back to the Chingkang Mountains via Chungyi and Shangyu, the enemy force from southern Kiangsi, the

Independent 7th Division under Liu Shih-yi, pursued us as far as Suichuan. On September 13 we defeated Liu Shih-yi, captured several hundred rifles and took Suichuan. On September 26 we returned to the Chingkang Mountains. On October 1, at Ningkang, we engaged and defeated one of Hsiung Shih-hui's brigades commanded by Chou Hun-yuan, recovering the entire county of Ningkang. Meanwhile, 126 men of the Hunan enemy forces under Yen Chung-ju, which had been stationed in Kueitung, came over to us and were organized into a special task battalion with Pi Chan-yun as commander. On November 9 we routed one regiment of Chou's brigade at Lungyuankou and the county town of Ningkang. On the next day we advanced and occupied Yunghsin, but withdrew to Ningkang shortly afterwards. At present our area, extending from the southern slopes of the Chingkang Mountains in Suichuan County in the south to the border of Lienhua County in the north, embraces the whole of Ningkang and parts of Suichuan, Linghsien and Yunghsin, forming a narrow unbroken stretch running north to south. The Shanghsi district of Lienhua and the Tienlung and Wannienshan districts of Yunghsin, however, are not firmly linked with this unbroken stretch. The enemy is attempting to destroy our base area by military attacks and economic blockade, and we are now preparing to defeat his attacks.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

Since the struggle in the border area is exclusively military, both the Party and the masses have to be placed on a war footing. How to deal with the enemy, how to fight, has become the central problem in our daily life. An independent regime must be an armed one. Wherever such an area is located, it will be immediately occupied by the enemy if armed forces are lacking or inadequate, or if wrong tactics are used in dealing with the enemy. As the struggle is getting fiercer every day, our problems have become extremely complex and serious.

The Red Army in the border area is drawn from: (1) troops formerly under Yeh Ting and Ho Lung in Chaochow and Swatow;[4] (2) the Guards Regiment of the former National Government at Wuchang;[5] (3) peasants from Pingkiang and Liuyang;[6] (4) peasants from southern Hunan[7] and workers from Shuikoushan,[8] (5) men captured from the forces under Hsu Keh-hsiang, Tang Sheng-chih, Pai Chung-hsi, Chu Pei-teh, Wu Shang and Hsiung Shih-hui; and

(6) peasants from the counties in the border area. However, of the troops formerly commanded by Yeh Ting and Ho Lung, the Guards Regiment and the peasants from Pingkiang and Liuyang, only one-third is left after more than a year's fighting. Casualties have also been heavy among the peasants from southern Hunan. Thus although the first four categories remain the backbone of the Fourth Red Army to this day, they are now far outnumbered by the last two categories. Furthermore, in the latter the peasants are outnumbered by the captured soldiers; without replacement from this source, there would be a serious manpower problem. Even so, the increase in men does not keep pace with the increase in rifles. Rifles are not easily lost, but men are wounded or killed, fall sick or desert and so are lost more easily. The Hunan Provincial Committee has promised to send us workers from Anyuan,[9] and we earnestly hope it will do so.

As to class origin, the Red Army consists partly of workers and peasants and partly of *lumpen*-proletarians. Of course, it is inadvisable to have too many of the latter. But they are able to fight, and as fighting is going on every day with mounting casualties, it is already no easy matter to get replacements even from among them. In these circumstances the only solution is to intensify political training.

The majority of the Red Army soldiers come from the mercenary armies, but their character changes once they are in the Red Army. First of all, the Red Army has abolished the mercenary system, making the men feel they are fighting for themselves and for the people and not for somebody else. So far the Red Army has no system of regular pay, but issues grain, money for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, and a little pocket money. Land has been allotted to all Red Army officers and men who are natives of the border area, but it is rather difficult to allot land to those from other parts of the country.

After receiving political education, the Red Army soldiers have become class-conscious, learned the essentials of distributing land, setting up political power, arming the workers and peasants, etc., and they know they are fighting for themselves, for the working class and the peasantry. Hence they can endure the hardships of the bitter struggle without complaint. Each company, battalion or regiment has its soldiers' committee which represents the interests of the soldiers and carries on political and mass work.

Experience has proved that the system of Party representatives[10] must not be abolished. The Party representative is particularly important at company level, since Party branches are organized on a company basis. He has to see that the soldiers' committee carries out political training, to guide the work of the mass movements, and to serve concurrently as the secretary of the Party branch. Facts have shown that the better the company Party representative, the sounder the company, and that the company commander can hardly play this important political role. As the casualties among the lower cadres are heavy, captured enemy soldiers often become platoon leaders or company commanders in a very short time; some of those captured in February or March are already battalion commanders. It might seem that since our army is called the Red Army it could do without Party representatives, but this is a gross error. At one time the 28th Regiment in southern Hunan abolished the system, only to restore it later. To rename the Party representatives "directors" would be to confuse them with the directors in the Kuomintang army who are detested by the captured soldiers. A change of name does not affect the nature of the system. Hence we have decided to make no change. Casualties among Party representatives are very heavy, and while we have started classes for training and replenishment, we hope that the Central Committee and the Hunan and Kiangsi Provincial Committees will send us at least thirty comrades who are able to serve as Party representatives.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Ordinarily a soldier needs six months' or a year's training before he can fight, but our soldiers, recruited only yesterday, have to fight today with practically no training. Poor in military technique, they fight on courage alone. As long periods of rest and training are out of the question, the only thing to do is to try and avoid certain engagements if possible and thus gain time for training. We now have a corps of 150 people in training as lower-ranking officers, and we intend to make this course a permanent institution. We hope that the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us more officers from platoon leader and company commander upwards.

The Hunan Provincial Committee has asked us to attend to the material conditions of the soldiers and make them at least a little better than those of the average worker or peasant. Actually they are worse. In addition to grain, each man receives only five cents a day for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, and even this is hard to keep up. The monthly cost of these items alone amounts to more than ten thousand silver dollars, which is obtained exclusively through expropriation of the local tyrants.[11] We now have cotton padding for winter clothing for the whole army of five thousand men but are still short of cloth. Cold as the weather is, many of our men are still wearing only two layers of thin clothing. Fortunately we are inured to hardships. What is more, all of us share the same hardships; from the commander of the army to the cook everyone lives on the daily food allowance of five cents, apart from grain. As for pocket money, everybody gets the same amount, whether it is twenty cents, or forty cents.[12] Consequently the soldiers have no complaints against anyone.

After each engagement there are some wounded. Also many officers and men have fallen ill from malnutrition, exposure to cold or other causes. Our hospitals up in the mountains give both Chinese and Western treatment, but are short of doctors and medicines. At present they have over eight hundred patients. The Hunan Provincial Committee promised to obtain drugs for us, but so far we have received none. We still hope the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us a few doctors with Western training, and some iodine.

Apart from the role played by the Party, the reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on in spite of such poor material conditions and such frequent engagements is its practice of democracy. The officers do not beat the men; officers and men receive equal treatment; soldiers are free to hold meetings and to speak out; trivial formalities have been done away with; and the accounts are open for all to inspect. The soldiers handle the mess arrangements and, out of the daily five cents for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, they can even save a little for pocket money, amounting to roughly six or seven coppers per person per day, which is called "mess savings". All this gives great satisfaction to the soldiers. The newly captured soldiers in particular feel that our army and the Kuomintang army are worlds apart. They feel spiritually liberated, even though material conditions in the Red Army are not equal to those in the White army. The very soldiers who had no courage in the White army yesterday are very brave in the Red Army today; such is the effect of democracy. The Red Army is like a furnace in which all captured soldiers are transmuted the moment they come over. In China the army needs democracy as much as the people do. Democracy in our army is an important weapon for undermining the feudal mercenary army.[13]

The Party organization now has four levels, the company branch, the battalion committee, the regimental committee and the army committee. In a company there is the branch, with a group in each squad. "The Party branch is organized on a company basis"; this is an important reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on such arduous fighting without falling apart. Two years ago, when we were in the Kuomintang army, our Party had no organizational roots among the soldiers, and even among Yeh Ting's troops[14] there was only one Party branch to each regiment; that is why we could not stand up to any serious test. In the Red Army today the ratio of Party to non-Party people is approximately one to three, or an average of one Party member in every four men. Recently we decided to recruit more Party members among the combat soldiers, so as to attain a fifty-fifty ratio.[15] At present the company branches are short of good Party secretaries, and we ask the Central Committee to send us a number of activists from among those who can no longer function where they are now. Almost all the cadres from southern Hunan are doing Party work in the army. But since some of them were scattered during the retreat in southern Hunan in August, we now have no people to spare.

The local armed forces consist of Red Guards and insurrectionary detachments of workers and peasants. Armed with spears and shotguns, these detachments are organized on a township basis, each township having one detachment whose strength varies with the population. Its job is to suppress counter-revolution, protect the township government and assist the Red Army and Red Guards in battle when the enemy appears. The insurrectionary detachments started in Yunghsin as an underground force, but they have come into the open since we captured the entire county. The organization has now been extended to other counties in the border area and the name remains unchanged. The arms of the Red Guards are mainly five-round rifles but also include some nine-round and single-round rifles. There are 140 rifles in Ningkang, 220 in Yunghsin, 43 in Lienhua, 50 in Chaling, 90 in Linghsien, 130 in Suichuan and 10 in Wanan, making a total of 683. Most of the rifles have been supplied by the Red Army, but a small number were captured from the enemy by the Red Guards themselves. Fighting constantly against the peace preservation corps and levies of the landlords, most of the Red Guards in the counties are steadily increasing their fighting capacity. Before the May 21st Incident,[16] all the counties had peasant self-defence corps. There were 300 rifles in Yuhsien, 300 in Chaling, 60 in Linghsien, 50 in Suichuan, 80 in Yunghsin, 60 in Lienhua, 60 in Ningkang (Yuan Wen-tsai's men) and 60 in the Chingkang Mountains (Wang Tso's men), totalling 970. After the incident, apart from the rifles in the hands of Yuan's and Wang's men, which remained intact, only 6 rifles were left in Suichuan and 1 in Lienhua, all the rest having been seized by the landlords. The peasant self-defence corps were not able to hold on to their rifles as a result of the opportunist line. At present the Red Guards in the counties still have far too few rifles, fewer than those of the landlords; the Red Army should continue to help them with arms. The Red Army should do everything, short of reducing its own fighting capacity, to help arm the people. We have laid it down that each battalion of the Red Army should consist of four companies, each with 75 rifles, and, counting the rifles of the special task company, machine-gun company, trench-mortar company, regimental headquarters and the three battalion headquarters, each regiment will have 1,075 rifles. Those captured in action should be used as far as possible for arming the local forces. The commanders of the Red Guards should be people who have been sent from the counties to the Red Army training corps and have finished their training. The Red Army should send fewer and fewer people from outside areas to command local forces. Chu Pei-teh is arming his peace preservation corps and levies, while the armed forces of the landlords in the border counties are of considerable size and fighting capacity. This makes it all the more urgent to enlarge our local Red forces.

The principle for the Red Army is concentration, and that for the Red Guards dispersion. At the present time when the reactionary regime is temporarily stable, the enemy can mass huge forces to attack the Red Army, and dispersion would not be to the Red Army's advantage. In our experience, the dispersion of forces has almost always led to defeat, while the concentration of forces to fight a numerically inferior, equal or slightly superior enemy force has often led to victory. The Central Committee has instructed us to develop guerrilla warfare in much too large an area, extending several thousand *li* in both length and breadth; this is probably due to an overestimation of our strength. For the Red Guards dispersion is an advantage, and they are now using this method in their operations in all the counties.

The most effective method in propaganda directed at the enemy forces is to release captured soldiers and give the wounded medical treatment. Whenever soldiers, platoon leaders, or company or battalion commanders of the enemy forces are captured, we immediately conduct propaganda among them; they are divided into those wishing to stay and those wishing to leave, and the latter are given travelling expenses and set free. This immediately knocks the bottom out of the enemy's slander that "the Communist bandits kill everyone on sight". Writing about this measure, the *Ten-Day Review*, the journal of Yang Chih-sheng's 9th Division, exclaimed: "How vicious!" The Red Army soldiers show great concern for the prisoners and arrange warm farewells for them, and at every "Farewell Party for Our New Brothers" the prisoners respond with speeches of heartfelt gratitude. Medical treatment for the enemy wounded also has a great effect. Clever people on the enemy side like Li Wen-pin have recently imitated us by stopping the killing of prisoners and by giving medical attention to the wounded. Nevertheless, our men rejoin us at the very next engagement, bringing their arms with them, and this has happened twice already. In addition, we do as much written propaganda as possible, for instance, painting slogans. Wherever we go, we cover the walls with them. But we are short of people who can draw and hope the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us a few.

As for the military bases, the first base, the Chingkang Mountains, is at the juncture of four counties, Ningkang, Linghsien, Suichuan and Yunghsin. The distance between Maoping on the northern slope in Ningkang County and Huangao on the southern slope in Suichuan is 90 *li*. The distance between Nashan on the eastern slope in Yunghsin County and Shuikou on the western slope in Linghsien is 80 *li*. The circumference measures 550 *li*, stretching from Nashan to Lungyuankou (both in Yunghsin County), Hsincheng, Maoping, Talung (all in Ningkang County), Shihtu, Shuikou, Hsiatsun (all in Linghsien County), Yingpanhsu, Taichiapu, Tafen, Tuitzechien, Huangao, Wutoukiang and Che-ao (all in Suichuan County) and back to Nashan. In the mountains there are paddy-fields and villages at Big Well, Small Well, Upper Well, Middle Well, Lower Well, Tzeping, Hsiachuang, Hsingchow, Tsaoping, Painihu and Lofu. All these places used to be infested by bandits and deserters but have now been turned into our base area. Its population is under two thousand, and the yield of unhusked rice is less than ten thousand piculs, and so the entire grain for the army has to be supplied from Ningkang, Yunghsin and Suichuan Counties. All the strategic passes in the mountains are fortified. Our hospitals, bedding and clothing workshops, ordnance department and regimental rear offices are all here. At the present moment grain is being transported to the mountains from Ningkang.

Provided we have adequate supplies, the enemy can never break in. The second base, the Chiulung Mountains, is at the juncture of the four counties of Ningkang, Yunghsin, Lienhua and Chaling. It is less important than the Chingkang Mountains, but serves as the rearmost base for the local armed forces of the four counties, and it too has been fortified. It is essential for an independent Red regime encircled by the White regime to make use of the strategic advantages offered by mountains.

LAND QUESTIONS

The land situation in the border areas. Roughly speaking, more than 60 per cent of the land belonged to the landlords and less than 40 per cent to the peasants. In the Kiangsi sector, landownership was most concentrated in Suichuan County, where about 80 per cent of the land belonged to the landlords. Yunghsin came next with about 70 per cent. In Wanan, Ningkang and Lienhua there were more owner-peasants, but the landlords still owned the bulk of the land, *i.e.*, about 60 per cent of the total, while the peasants owned only 40 per cent. In the Hunan sector, about 70 per cent of the land in both Chaling and Linghsien Counties belonged to the landlords.

The question of the intermediate class. Given this land situation, it is possible to win the support of the majority for the confiscation and redistribution of all the land.[17] The rural population is roughly divided into three classes, the class of big and middle landlords, the intermediate class of small landlords and rich peasants, and the class of middle and poor peasants. The interests of the rich peasants are often interwoven with those of the small landlords. The land of the rich peasants forms only a small percentage of the total, yet if the land of the small landlords is counted in, the amount is considerable. Probably this is more or less the case throughout the country. The land policy which has been adopted in the border areas is complete confiscation and thorough distribution; consequently, in the Red area the big and middle landlord class and the intermediate class are both being attacked. Such is the policy, but in its actual execution we have met with a great deal of obstruction from the intermediate class. In the early days of the revolution the intermediate class ostensibly capitulated to the poor peasant class, but in reality they exploited their traditional social position and clan authority to intimidate the poor peasants for the purpose of delaying the distribution of land.

When no further delay was possible, they concealed their actual holdings, or retained the good land and gave up the poor land. In this period the poor peasants, having long been trampled down and feeling that the victory of the revolution was uncertain, frequently yielded to the intermediate class and dared not take vigorous action. It is taken against the intermediate class in the villages only when the revolution is on the upsurge, for instance, when political power has been seized in one or more counties, the reactionary army has suffered several defeats and the prowess of the Red Army has been repeatedly demonstrated. The most serious instances of delay in land distribution and concealment of landholdings occurred in the southern section of Yunghsin County, where the intermediate class was the largest. The actual land distribution in this area was carried out only after the Red Army won its great victory at Lungyuankou on June 23 and the district government punished several people for delaying distribution. But as the feudal family system prevails in every county, and as all the families in a village or group of villages belong to a single clan, it will be quite a long time before people become conscious of their class and clan sentiment is overcome in the villages.

The defection of the intermediate class under the White terror. Having been under attack during the revolutionary upsurge, the intermediate class deserted to the enemy as soon as the White terror struck. In Yunghsin and Ningkang it was precisely the small landlords and rich peasants who led the reactionary troops in setting fire to the houses of revolutionary peasants. On the instructions of the reactionaries, they burned down houses and made arrests, and quite brazenly too. When the Red Army returned to the area of Ningkang, Hsincheng, Kucheng and Lungshih, several thousand peasants fled with the reactionaries to Yunghsin, because they were duped by the reactionary propaganda that the Communists would kill them. It was only after we hat conducted propaganda to the effect that "peasants who have defected will not be killed" and "peasants who have defected are welcome to come back to reap their crops" that some of them slowly came back.

When the revolution is at a low ebb in the country as a whole, the most difficult problem in our areas is to keep a firm hold on the intermediate class. The main reason for betrayal by this class is that it has received too heavy a blow from the revolution. But when there is a revolutionary upsurge in the country as a whole, the poor peasant class has something to rely on and becomes bolder, while the intermediate class has something to fear and dare not get out of hand. When the war between Li Tsung-jen and Tang Sheng-chih spread to Hunan, the small landlords in Chaling tried to placate the peasants, and some even sent them pork as a New Year gift (though by then the Red Army had already withdrawn from Chaling to Suichuan). But after the war ended, no one ever heard of such things again. Now that there is a nation-wide tide of counter-revolution, the intermediate class in the White areas, having suffered heavy blows, has attached itself almost wholly to the big landlord class, and the poor peasant class has become isolated. This is indeed a very serious problem.[18]

The pressure of daily life as a cause of the defection of the intermediate class. The Red and the White areas are now facing each other like two countries at war. Owing to the tight enemy blockade and to our mishandling of the petty bourgeoisie, trade between the two areas has almost entirely ceased; necessities such as salt, cloth and medicines are scarce and costly, and agricultural products such as timber, tea and oil cannot be sent out, so that the peasants' cash income is cut off and the people as a whole are affected. Poor peasants are more able to bear such hardships, but the intermediate class will go over to the big landlord class when it can bear them no longer. Unless the splits and wars within the landlord class and among the warlords in China continue, and unless a nation-wide revolutionary situation develops, the small independent Red regimes will come under great economic pressure and it is doubtful whether they will be able to last. For not only is such economic strain intolerable to the intermediate class, but some day it will prove too much even for the workers, poor peasants and Red Army men. In the counties of Yunghsin and Ningkang there was at one time no salt for cooking, and supplies of cloth and medicines, not to mention other things, were entirely cut off. Now salt can be had again but is very expensive. Cloth and medicines are still unobtainable. Timber, tea and oil, which are all produced abundantly in Ningkang, western Yunghsin and northern Suichuan (all within our areas at present), cannot be sent out.[19]

The criterion for land distribution. The township is taken as the unit for land distribution. In hillier regions with less farm land, for instance, in the Hsiaokiang district of Yunghsin, three or four townships were sometimes taken as the unit, but such cases were extremely rare. All the inhabitants, men and women, old and young, received equal shares. A change has now been made in accordance with the Central

Committee's plan whereby labour-power is taken as the criterion, so that a person with labour-power is allotted twice as much land as one without.[20]

The question of concessions to the owner-peasants. This has not yet been discussed in detail. Among the owner-peasants, the rich peasants have requested that productive capacity should be taken as the criterion, that is, that those with more manpower and capital (such as farm implements) should be allotted more land. They feel that neither equal distribution nor distribution according to labour-power is to their advantage. They have indicated that they are willing to put in more effort, which, coupled with the use of their capital, would enable them to raise bigger crops. They will not like it if they are allotted the same amount of land as everybody else and their special efforts and extra capital are ignored (left unused). Land distribution here is still being carried out in the way laid down by the Central Committee. But this question deserves further discussion, and a report will be submitted when conclusions are reached.

The land tax. In Ningkang the tax rate is 20 per cent of the crop, or 5 per cent more than the rate fixed by the Central Committee; it is inadvisable to make any change now as collection is already under way, but the rate will be reduced next year. Then there are the sections of Suichuan, Linghsien and Yunghsin under our regime which are all hilly areas, and where the peasants are so poverty-stricken that any taxation is inadvisable. We have to rely on expropriating the local tyrants in the White areas to cover the expenses of the government and the Red Guards. As for the provisioning of the Red Army, rice is obtained for the time being from the land tax in Ningkang, while cash is obtained solely from expropriation of the local tyrants. During our guerrilla operations in Suichuan in October, we collected more than ten thousand yuan, which will last us some time, and we shall see what can be done when it is spent.

QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL POWER

People's political power has been established everywhere at county, district and township levels, but more in name than in reality. In many places there is no council of workers, peasants and soldiers. The executive committees of the township, district or even county governments were invariably elected at some kind of mass meeting. But mass meetings called on the spur of the moment can neither discuss questions nor help in training the masses politically, and, what is more, they are only too apt to be manipulated by intellectuals or careerists. Some places do have a council, but it is regarded merely as a temporary body for electing the executive committee; once the election is over, authority is monopolized by the committee and the council is never heard of again. Not that there are no councils of workers, peasants and soldiers worthy of the name, but they are very few. The reason is the lack of propaganda and education concerning this new political system. The evil feudal practice of arbitrary dictation is so deeply rooted in the minds of the people and even of the ordinary Party members that it cannot be swept away at once; when anything crops up, they choose the easy way and have no liking for the bothersome democratic system. Democratic centralism can be widely and effectively practised in mass organizations only when its efficacy is demonstrated in revolutionary struggle and the masses understand that it is the best means of mobilizing their forces and is of the utmost help in their struggle. We are drafting a detailed organic law for the councils at all levels (based on the outline drawn up by the Central Committee) in order gradually to correct previous mistakes. In the Red Army, conferences of soldiers' representatives are now being established on a permanent basis and at all levels so as to correct the mistake of having only soldiers' committees and not conferences.

At present, what the masses of the people generally understand by the "government of workers, peasants and soldiers" is the executive committee, because they are still unaware of the powers of the council, and think that the executive committee alone is the real power. An executive committee without a council behind it often acts without regard for the views of the masses, and there are instances everywhere of hesitation and compromise on the confiscation and redistribution of land, of squandering or embezzling funds, and of recoiling before the White forces or fighting only half-heartedly. In addition, the committee seldom meets in full session, all business being decided and handled by its standing committee. In the district and township governments even the standing committee rarely meets, and business is decided and handled separately by the four individuals who work in the office, namely, the chairman, secretary, treasurer and commander of the Red Guards (or insurrectionary detachment). Thus democratic centralism has not become a regular practice even in the work of the government.

In the early days the small landlords and rich peasants scrambled to get on to government committees, especially at the township level. Wearing red ribbons and feigning enthusiasm, they wormed their way into the government committees by trickery and seized control of everything, relegating the poor-peasant members to a minor role. They can be cleared out only when they are unmasked in the course of struggle and the poor peasants assert themselves. Though not widespread, such a state of affairs exists in quite a number of places.

The Party enjoys immense prestige and authority among the masses, the government much less. The reason is that for the sake of convenience the Party handles many things directly and brushes aside the government bodies. There are many such instances. In some places there are no leading Party members' groups in the government organizations, while in others they exist but are not functioning properly. From now on the Party must carry out its task of giving leadership to the government; with the exception of propaganda, the Party's policies and the measures it recommends must be carried out through the government organizations. The Kuomintang's wrong practice of directly imposing orders on the government must be avoided.

QUESTIONS OF PARTY ORGANIZATION

The struggle against opportunism. It may be said that around the time of the May 21st Incident the Party organizations in the border area counties were controlled by opportunists. When the counter-revolution set in, there was very little resolute struggle. In October last year, when the Red Army (the First Regiment of the First Division of the First Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army) arrived in the border area counties, only a few Party member who had gone into hiding were left and the Party organizations had been entirely destroyed by the enemy. The period from last November to April was one of rebuilding the Party, and the period since May has been one of great expansion. But in the last twelve months manifestations of opportunism continued to be widespread. On the approach of the enemy, some members, lacking the will to fight, hid in remote hills, which they called "lying in ambush". Other members, though very active, resorted to blind insurrection. These were both expression of petty-bourgeois ideology. After a long period of tempering through struggle and of inner-Party education, such things have become less frequent. In the past year, the same petty-bourgeois ideology also existed in the Red Army. On the approach of the enemy, either reckless battle or precipitate flight would be proposed. Often both ideas emanated from the same individual in the course of the discussions on what military action to take. This opportunist ideology has been gradually corrected through prolonged inner-Party struggle and through lessons learned from actual events, for instance, from the losses incurred in reckless battle and the reverses suffered during precipitate flight.

Localism. The economy in the border area is agricultural, with some places still in the age of the hand-pestle (in the hilly regions the wooden pestle is still in general use for husking rice, while in the plains there are many stone pestles). The unit of social organization everywhere is the clan, consisting of people having the same family name. In the Party organizations in the villages, it often happens that a branch meeting virtually becomes a clan meeting, since branches consist of members bearing the same family name and living close together. In these circumstances it is very hard indeed to build a "militant Bolshevik Party". Such members do not quite understand when they are told that the Communists draw no sharp line of demarcation between one nation and another or between one province and another, or that a sharp line should not be drawn between different counties, districts and townships. Localism exists to a serious extent in the relations between counties and even between districts and townships within the same county. In eliminating localism, reasoning can at best produce only limited results, and it takes White oppression, which is by no means localized, to do much more. For instance, it is only when counter-revolutionary "joint suppression" campaigns by the two provinces make the people share a common lot in struggle that their localism is gradually broken down. Localism is declining as a result of many such lessons.

The question of the native inhabitants and the settlers. There is another peculiar feature in the border counties, namely, the rift between the native inhabitants and the settlers. A very wide rift has long existed between the native inhabitants and the settlers whose forefathers came from the north several hundred years ago; their traditional feuds are deep-seated and they sometimes erupt in violent clashes. The settlers, numbering several millions, live in a zone extending from the Fukien-Kwangtung border all the way along the Hunan-Kiangsi border to southern Hupeh. These settlers, who live in the hilly regions, have been oppressed by the native inhabitants in the plains and have never had any political rights. They welcomed the national revolution of the past two years, thinking that the day had come for them to raise their heads. But unfortunately the revolution failed and they continue to be oppressed by the native inhabitants. Within our own area the problem of the native inhabitants and the settlers exists in Ningkang, Suichuan, Linghsien and Chaling, and is most serious in Ningkang. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the revolutionaries among the native inhabitants of Ningkang, together with the settlers, overthrew the political power of the native landlords and gained control of the whole county in 1926-27. In June last year the Kiangsi government under Chu Pei-teh turned against the revolution; in September the landlords acted as guides for Chu's troops in the "suppression" campaign against Ningkang and once again stirred up the conflict between the native inhabitants and the settlers. In theory, this rift between the native inhabitants and the settlers ought not to extend into the exploited classes of workers and peasants, much less into the Communist Party. But it does, and it persists by force of long tradition. Here is an example. After the August defeat in the border area, when the native landlords returned to Ningkang, bringing with them the reactionary troops and spreading the rumour that the settlers were going to massacre the native inhabitants, most of the native peasants defected, put on white ribbons and guided the White troops in burning down houses and searching the hills. And when the Red Army routed the White troops in October and November, the native peasants fled with the reactionaries, and their property in turn was seized by the settler-peasants. This situation, reflected in the Party, often leads to senseless conflicts. Our solution is, on the one hand, to announce that "peasant who have defected will not be killed" and "peasants who have defected will also be given land when they return", in order to help them shake off the influence of the landlords and return home without misgivings; on the other hand, it is to get our county government to order the restoration by settler-peasants of any property they have seized, and to post notices that the native peasants will be protected. Inside the Party, education must be intensified to ensure unity between these two sections of the membership.

The defection of the careerists. During the revolutionary upsurge (in June), many careerists took advantage of the Party's open recruitment of members and sneaked into the Party, with the result that the membership in the border area rapidly rose to more than ten thousand. Since the leaders of the branches and district committees were mostly new members, good inner-Party education was out of the question. As soon as the White terror struck, the careerists defected and acted as guides for the counter-revolutionaries in rounding up our comrades, and the Party organizations in the White areas mostly collapsed. After September the Party carried out a drastic house cleaning and set strict class qualifications for membership. All the Party organizations in Yunghsin and Ningkang Counties were dissolved and a re-registration was undertaken. Though greatly reduced in numbers, the membership has gained in fighting capacity. All Party organizations used to be in the open, but since September underground organizations have been built up to prepare the Party for carrying on its activities when the reactionaries come. At the same time, we have been making every effort to penetrate into the White areas and operate inside the enemy camp. But in the nearby towns the foundations have not yet been laid for Party organization. The reasons are that, first, the enemy is stronger in the towns and, second, our army hurt the interests of the bourgeoisie too much during its occupation of the towns, so that it is difficult for Party members to keep a foothold there. We are now correcting these mistakes and doing our best to build Party organizations in the towns, but so far without much success.

The leading bodies of the Party. The branch executive has been renamed the branch committee. Above the branch there is the district committee, and above that the county committee. Where there are special circumstances, a special district committee is formed between the district and the county levels, as for instance the Peihsiang Special District Committee and the Southeastern Special District Committee in Yunghsin County. In the border area there are altogether five county committees, in Ningkang, Yunghsin, Lienhua, Suichuan and Linghsien. There used to be a county committee in Chaling, but as the work there did not take root, most of the organizations formed last winter and this spring have been crushed by the Whites; consequently, for the last six months we have been able to work only in the hilly regions near Ningkang and Yunghsin, and so the Chaling County Committee has been changed into a special district committee. Comrades were sent to Yuhsien and Anjen Counties, which can be reached only via Chaling, but they have returned without accomplishing anything. The Wanan County Committee was cut off from us by the Whites for more than six months after its joint meeting with us in Suichuan in January, and it was not until September, when the

Red Army reached Wanan in a guerrilla operation, that we resumed contact. From Wanan eighty revolutionary peasants returned with our men to the Chingkang Mountains and were organized as the Wanan Red Guards. There is no Party organization in Anfu. The County Committee of Kian, which borders on Yunghsin, has got in touch with us only twice and has given us no help, which is very strange. In the Shatien area of Kueitung County land distribution was carried out on two occasions, in March and in August, and Party organizations have been built up and placed under the Southern Hunan Special Committee with its centre at Shiherhtung in Lunghsi. Above the county committees there is the Special Committee of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area. On May 20 the first Party congress of the border area was held at Maoping in Ningkang County, and it elected twenty-three people as members of the First Special Committee, with Mao Tse-tung as secretary. In July the Hunan Provincial Committee sent over Yang Kai-ming and he became acting secretary. In September Yang fell ill and Tan Chen-lin took his place. In August, when the major detachment of the Red Army had gone to southern Hunan and the White forces were pressing hard on the border area, we held an emergency meeting at Yunghsin. In October after the Red Army's return to Ningkang, the second Party congress of the border area was held at Maoping. In its three-day session beginning on October 14, it adopted a number of resolutions, including "The Political Problems and the Tasks of the Border Area Party Organization", and elected the following nineteen people as members of the Second Special Committee, Tan Chen-lin, Chu Teh, Chen Yi, Lung Chao-ching, Chu Chang-chieh, Liu Tien-chien, Yuan Pan-chu, Tan Szu-tsung, Tan Ping, Li Chueh-fei, Sung Yi-yueh, Yuan Wen-tsai, Wang Tso-nung, Chen Cheng-jen, Mao Tse-tung, Wan Hsi-hsien, Wang Tso, Yang Kai-ming and Ho Ting-ying. A standing committee of five was formed, with Tan Chen-lin (a worker) as secretary and Chen Cheng-jen (an intellectual) as deputy secretary. The Sixth Party Congress of the Red Army was held on November 14 and it elected an Army Committee of twenty-three members, five of them forming a standing committee with Chu Teh as secretary. Both the Border Area Special Committee and the Army Committee are subordinate to the Front Committee. The Front Committee was reorganized on November 6, with the following five members designated by the Central Committee: Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, the secretary of the local Party headquarters (Tan Chen-lin), a worker comrade (Sung

Chiao-sheng) and a peasant comrade (Mao Ko-wen), with Mao Tse-tung as secretary. For the time being, this committee has set up a secretariat, a propaganda section, an organization section, a labour movement commission and a military affairs commission. The Front Committee is in charge of the local Party organizations. It is necessary to retain the Special Committee because sometimes the Front Committee has to move about with the troops. In our opinion the question of proletarian ideological leadership is very important. The Party organizations in the border area counties, which are composed almost exclusively of peasants, will go astray without the ideological leadership of the proletariat. Besides paying close attention to the labour movement in the county towns and other big towns, we should increase the workers' representation in the government bodies. The proportion of workers and poor peasants should also be increased in the leading organs of the Party at all levels.

THE QUESTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION

We fully agree with the Communist International's resolution on China. There is no doubt that China is still at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The programme for a thorough democratic revolution in China comprises, externally, the overthrow of imperialism so as to achieve complete national liberation, and, internally, the elimination of the power and influence of the comprador class in the cities, the completion of the agrarian revolution in order to abolish feudal relations in the villages, and the overthrow of the government of the warlords. We must go through such a democratic revolution before we can lay a real foundation for the transition to socialism. In the past year we have fought in many places and are keenly aware that the revolutionary tide is on the ebb in the country as a whole. While Red political power has been established in a few small areas, in the country as a whole the people lack the ordinary democratic rights, the workers, the peasants and even the bourgeois democrats do not have freedom of speech or assembly, and the worst crime is to join the Communist Party. Wherever the Red Army goes, the masses are cold and aloof, and only after our propaganda do they slowly move into action. Whatever enemy units we face, there are hardly any cases of mutiny or desertion to our side and we have to fight it out. This holds even for the enemy's Sixth Army which recruited the greatest number of "rebels" after the May 21st Incident. We have an acute sense of our isolation which we keep hoping will end. Only by launching a political and economic struggle for democracy, which will also involve the urban petty bourgeoisie, can we turn the revolution into a seething tide that will surge through the country.

Up to February this year we applied our policy towards the petty bourgeoisie fairly well. In March the representative of the Southern Hunan Special Committee arrived in Ningkang and criticized us for having leaned to the Right, for having done too little burning and killing, and for having failed to carry out the so-called policy of "turning the petty bourgeois into proletarians and then forcing them into the revolution", whereupon the leadership of the Front Committee was reorganized and the policy was changed. In April, after the whole of our army arrived in the border area, there was still not much burning and killing, but the expropriation of the middle merchants in the towns and the collection of compulsory contributions from the small landlords and rich peasants in the countryside were rigorously enforced. The slogan of "All factories to the workers", put forward by the Southern Hunan Special Committee, was also given wide publicity. This ultra-Left policy of attacking the petty bourgeoisie drove most of them to the side of the landlords, with the result that they put on white ribbons and opposed us. With the gradual change of this policy, the situation has been steadily improving. Good results have been achieved in Suichuan in particular, for the merchants in the county town and other market towns no longer fight shy of us, and quite a few speak well of the Red Army. The fair in Tsaolin (held every three days at noon) attracts some twenty thousand people, an attendance which breaks all previous records. This is proof that our policy is now correct. The landlords imposed very heavy taxes and levies on the people; the Pacification Guards[21] of Suichuan levied five toll charges along the seventy-*li* road from Huangao to Tsaolin, no farm produce being exempt. We crushed the Pacification Guards and abolished these tolls, thus winning the support of all the peasants as well as of the small and middle merchants.

The Central Committee wants us to issue a political programme which takes into account the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, and we for our part propose that the Central Committee work out, for general guidance, a programme for the whole democratic revolution which takes into account the workers' interests, the agrarian revolution and national liberation.

A special characteristic of the revolution in China, a country with a predominantly agricultural economy, is the use of military action to develop insurrection. We recommend that the Central Committee should devote great effort to military work.

THE QUESTION OF THE LOCATION OF OUR INDEPENDENT REGIME

The area stretching from northern Kwangtung along the Hunan-Kiangsi border into southern Hupeh lies entirely within the Lohsiao mountain range. We have traversed the whole range, and a comparison of its different sections shows that the middle section, with Ningkang as its centre, is the most suitable for our armed independent regime. The northern section has terrain which is less suitable for our taking either the offensive or the defensive, and it is too close to the enemy's big political centres. Besides, stationing large forces in the area of Liuyang, Liling, Pinghsiang and Tungku would involve a considerable risk, unless we plan a quick seizure of Changsha or Wuhan. The southern section has better terrain than the northern, but our mass base there is not as good as in the middle section, nor can we exert as great a political influence on Hunan and Kiangsi from it as we can from the middle section, from which any move can affect the lower river valleys of the two provinces. The middle section has the following advantages: (1) a mass base, which we have been cultivating for more than a year; (2) a fairly good basis for the Party organizations; (3) local armed forces which have been built up for more than a year and are well experienced in struggle—a rare achievement—and which, coupled with the Fourth Red Army, will prove indestructible in the face of any enemy force; (4) an excellent military base, the Chingkang Mountains, and bases for our local armed forces in all the counties; and (5) the influence it can exert on the two provinces and on the lower valleys of their rivers, an influence endowing it with much more political importance than that possessed by southern Hunan or southern Kiangsi, the influence of either of which can reach out only to its own province, or only to the upper river valley and the hinterland of its own province. The disadvantage of the middle section is that, since it has long been under the independent regime and is confronted by the enemy's large "encirclement and suppression" forces, its economic problems, especially the shortage of cash, are extremely difficult.

As for a plan of action here, the Hunan Provincial Committee advocated three different plans within a few weeks in June and July. First Yuan Teh-sheng came and approved our plan to establish political power in the middle section of the Lohsiao mountain range. Then Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang Kai-ming came and urged that the Red Army should move towards southern Hunan without the least hesitation and leave a force of only two hundred rifles behind to defend the border area together with the Red Guards this, they said, was the "absolutely correct" policy. The third time, barely ten days later, Yuan Teh-sheng came again with a letter which, besides rebuking us at great length, urged that the Red Army should set out for eastern Hunan; this was again described as the "absolutely correct" policy, to be carried out "without the least hesitation". These rigid directives put us in a real dilemma, because failure to comply would be tantamount to disobedience, while compliance would mean certain defeat. When the second message came, the Army Committee, the Border Area Special Committee and the Yunghsin County Committee of the Party met in a joint session and decided against carrying out the Provincial Committee's instructions, as it was considered dangerous to move towards southern Hunan. But a few days later, Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang Kai-ming, persisting in the Provincial Party Committee's plan and taking advantage of the 29th Regiment's homesickness, dragged the Red Army off to attack the county town of Chenchou, thus bringing defeat both to the border area and to the Red Army. The Red Army lost about half its men, and countless houses were burned down and innumerable people massacred in the border area; county after county fell to the enemy and some of them have not been recovered to this day. As for moving to eastern Hunan, it was certainly inadvisable for the main forces of the Red Army to do so unless there was a split among the ruling landlords of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi Provinces. If we had not advanced on southern Hunan in July, we would not only have averted the August defeat in the border area, but we could also have exploited the fighting between the Kuomintang's Sixth Army and Wang Chun's Kuomintang forces in Changshu, Kiangsi Province, to crush the enemy forces in Yunghsin, overrun Kian and Anfu, and make it possible for our advanced guard to reach Pinghsiang and establish contact with the Fifth Red Army in the northern section of the Lohsiao mountain range. Even if all that had happened, the proper place for our general headquarters should have still been Ningkang, and only guerrilla forces should have been dispatched to eastern Hunan. Since fighting had not broken out among the landlords and since formidable enemy forces were still in Pinghsiang, Chaling and Yuhsien on the Hunan border, we would have been giving the enemy his chance if we had moved our main forces northward. The Central Committee asked us to consider an advance on eastern or on southern Hunan, but either course was very dangerous; although the proposed expedition to eastern Hunan has not been carried out, the expedition to southern Hunan has proved a failure. This painful experience is always worth remembering.

We are not yet in a period when the regime of the landlord class has split up, and the "suppression" forces of the enemy deployed round the border area still number more than ten regiments. But if we can continue to find ways of getting cash (food and clothing no longer being a big problem), then, with the foundation for our work established in the border area, we shall be able to cope with these enemy forces, and even with larger ones. As far as the border area is concerned, it would at once suffer devastation, just as it did in August, if the Red Army moved away. Although not all our Red Guards would be wiped out, the Party and our mass base would receive a crippling blow, and while there are places in the mountains where we might retain a foothold, in the plains we would all have to go underground as in August and September. If the Red Army does not move away, then, building on the foundations we already have, we shall be able gradually to expand to surrounding areas and our prospects will be very bright. If we want to enlarge the Red Army, the only way is to engage the enemy in a prolonged struggle in the vicinity of the Chingkang Mountains where we have a good mass base, namely, in the counties of Ningkang, Yunghsin, Linghsien and Suichuan, utilizing in this struggle the divergence of interests between the enemy forces of Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces, their need to defend themselves on all sides and their consequent inability to concentrate their forces. We can gradually enlarge the Red Army by the use of correct tactics, fighting no battle unless we can win it and capture arms and men. With the preparatory work that had already been done among the masses in the border area between April and July, the Red Army could undoubtedly have been enlarged in August had its major detachment not made its expedition to southern Hunan. Despite that mistake, the Red Army has returned to the border area where the terrain is favourable and the people are friendly, and the prospects are not bad even now. Only through the determination to fight and stamina in fighting in places such as the border area can the Red Army add to its arms and train up good men. The Red Flag has been kept flying in the border area for a whole year. It has incurred the bitter hatred of the landlord class of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi and indeed of that of the whole country, but it is steadily raising the hopes of the workers, peasants and soldiers in the surrounding provinces. Consider the soldiers. Because the warlords are making the "bandit-suppression" campaign against the border area their major task and are issuing such statements as "a year has been spent and a million dollars used up in the effort to suppress the bandits" (Lu Ti-ping), or the Red Army "has 20,000 men with 5,000 rifles" (Wang Chun), the attention of their soldiers and disheartened junior officers is gradually turned towards us, and more and more of them will break away from the enemy to join our ranks, thus providing the Red Army with another source of recruitment. Besides, the fact that the Red Flag has never been lowered in the border area shows at once the strength of the Communist Party and the bankruptcy of the ruling classes, and this is of nation-wide political significance. Therefore, we hold, as we have always held, that it is absolutely necessary and correct to build up and expand Red political power in the middle section of the Lohsiao mountain range.

NOTES

[1] This war took place in October 1927.

[2] This war took place in November and December 1927.

[3] The system of the soldiers' representative conferences and soldiers' committees in the Red Army was later abolished. In 1947, the People's Liberation Army inaugurated a system of armymen's conferences and soldiers' committees, both under the leadership of cadres.

[4] These troops, originally under the command of Comrades Yeh Ting and Ho Lung, staged the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927. They were defeated in their advance on Chaochow and Swatow, Kwangtung Province, and some units, led by Comrades Chu Teh, Lin Piao and Chen Yi, withdrew to southern Hunan via Kiangsi to carry on guerrilla operations. They joined Comrade Mao Tse-tung's forces in the Chingkang Mountains in April 1928.

[5] In the revolutionary days of 1927 most of the cadres in the Guards Regiment of the National Government at Wuchang were members of the Communist Party. At

the end of July 1927, after Wang Ching-wei and his associates had betrayed the revolution, the regiment left Wuchang to join in the uprising at Nanchang. Learning *en route* that the revolutionary forces had already gone south from Nanchang, the regiment made a detour to Hsiushui in western Kiangsi to join the peasant armed forces of Pingkiang and Liuyang.

[6] In the spring of 1927 peasant armed forces of considerable strength were formed in the area of Pingkiang and Liuyang, Hunan Province. On May 21, Hsu Keh-hsiang staged a counter-revolutionary coup in Changsha and massacred the revolutionary masses. The peasant armed forces then marched on Changsha on May 31 to hit back at the counter-revolutionaries, but were stopped by the opportunist Chen Tu-hsiu and turned back. Thereupon a section was reorganized into an independent regiment to engage in guerrilla warfare. After the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, these armed peasants joined forces with the former Guards Regiment of the Wuchang National Government at Hsiushui and Tungku in Kiangsi Province and at Pingkiang and Liuyang in Hunan Province, and staged the Autumn Harvest Uprising in co-ordination with the armed coal miners of Pinghsiang, Kiangsi. In October Comrade Mao Tse-tung led these forces to the Chingkang Mountains.

[7] In early 1928, while Comrade Chu Teh was directing revolutionary guerrilla warfare in southern Hunan, peasant armies were organized in the counties of Yichang, Chenchow, Leiyang, Yunghsing and Tzehsing, where the peasant movement had already taken firm root. Comrade Chu Teh subsequently led them to the Chingkang Mountains to join the forces under Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

[8] Shuikoushan in Changning, Hunan Province, is well known for its lead mines. In 1922 the miners there led by the Communist Party formed a trade union and for years conducted struggles against the counter-revolution. Many of the miners joined the Red Army after the Autumn Harvest Uprising of 1927.

[9] The Anyuan Coal Mines in Pinghsiang County, Kiangsi Province, employing twelve thousand workers, were owned by the Han-Yeh-Ping Iron and Steel Company. From 1921 onwards Party organizations and a miners' union were set up there by the organizers sent by the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party.

[10] In 1929 the Party representatives in the Red Army were renamed political commissars. In 1931 the company political commissars were renamed political instructors.

[11] Expropriation of the local tyrants was only a temporary measure to defray part of the army's expenses. The expansion of the base areas and the growth of the army made it possible and necessary to defray army expenses through taxation.

[12] This practice of equal cash payment, necessary at the time, remained in force over many years in the Red Army. Later on, however, officers and men received payments which differed slightly according to rank.

[13] Here Comrade Mao Tse-tung lays special stress on the need for a definite measure of democracy in the revolutionary army, since, in the early period of the Red Army, without the stress on democracy it would not have been possible to arouse the revolutionary enthusiasm of the new peasant recruits and the captured White troops who had joined our ranks, nor would it have been possible to eliminate the warlord ways of the reactionary armies which had infected our cadres. Of course, democracy in the army must not transcend the limits of military discipline, which it must serve to strengthen and not weaken. Therefore, while a necessary measure of democracy should be promoted, the demand for ultra-democracy, which amounts to indiscipline, must be combated. Such indiscipline became a matter of serious concern at one point in the early days of the Red Army. For Comrade Mao Tse-tung's

struggle against ultra-democracy in the army, see "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", pp. 105-16 of this volume.

[14] Comrade Yeh Ting commanded an independent regiment during the Northern Expedition in 1926. With Communists as its nucleus the regiment became famous as a crack force. It was expanded into the 24th Division after the capture of Wuchang by the revolutionary army and then into the Eleventh Army after the Nanchang Uprising.

[15] Subsequent experience in the Red Army showed that a ratio of one Party member to two non-Party men was adequate. This proportion was generally maintained in the Red Army and later in the People's Liberation Army.

[16] Instigated by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang army commanders in Hunan, including Hsu Keh-hsiang and Ho Chien ordered a raid on the provincial headquarters of the trade unions, the peasant associations and other revolutionary organizations in Changsha on May 21, 1927. Communists and revolutionary workers and peasants were arrested and killed en masse. This signalized the open collaboration of the two counter-revolutionary Kuomintang cliques, the Wuhan clique headed by Wang Ching-wei and the Nanking clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

[17] Confiscation and redistribution of all the land was a provision in the Land Law promulgated in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area in 1928. Comrade Mao Tse-tung later pointed out that the confiscation of all land, instead of only the land of the landlords, was a mistake stemming from inexperience in agrarian struggles. In the Land Law of Hsingkuo County, Kiangsi, adopted in April 1929, the provision "confiscate all the land" was changed into "confiscate the public land and the land of the landlord class".

[18] In view of the importance of winning over the intermediate class in the countryside, Comrade Mao Tse-tung soon corrected the erroneous policy of dealing too sharply with it. Apart from the present article, Comrade Mao Tse-tung's views on policy towards this class were also set forth in proposals to the Sixth Party Congress of the Red Army (November 1928), including "The Prohibition of Reckless Burning and Killing" and "Protection of the Interests of the Middle and Small Merchants"; in the January 1929 proclamation of the Fourth Red Army, which declared "merchants in the towns who have gradually built up some property are to be left alone so long as they obey the authorities"; in the Land Law of Hsingkuo County adopted in April 1929 (see Note 17), etc.

[19] With the spread of the revolutionary war, the extension of the revolutionary base areas and the adoption of the policy of protecting industry and commerce by the revolutionary government, it became possible to change this situation, and a change did in fact occur later. What was crucial was resolutely to protect the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie and oppose ultra-Left policies.

[20] Labour-power is not an appropriate criterion for land distribution. In the Red areas land was in fact redistributed equally on a per capita basis.

[21] The Pacification Guards were a kind of local counter-revolutionary armed force.

ON CORRECTING MISTAKEN IDEAS IN THE PARTY

December 1929

There are various non-proletarian ideas in the Communist Party organization in the Fourth Red Army which greatly hinder the application of the Party's correct line. Unless these ideas are thoroughly corrected, the Fourth Army cannot possibly shoulder the tasks assigned to it in China's great revolutionary struggle. The source of such incorrect ideas in this Party organization lies, of course, in the fact that its basic units are composed largely of peasants and other elements of petty-bourgeois origin; yet the failure of the Party's leading bodies to wage a concerted and determined struggle against these incorrect ideas and to educate the members in the Party's correct line is also an important cause of their existence and growth. In accordance with the spirit of the September letter of the Central Committee, this congress hereby points out the manifestations of various non-proletarian ideas in the Party organization in the Fourth Army, their sources, and the methods of correcting them, and calls upon all comrades to eliminate them thoroughly.

ON THE PURELY MILITARY VIEWPOINT

The purely military viewpoint is very highly developed among a number of comrades in the Red Army. It manifests itself as follows:

This article was a resolution drawn up by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army. The building of the Chinese people's armed forces was a difficult process. The Chinese Red Army (which became the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies during the War of Resistance Against Japan and is now the People's Liberation Army) was created on August 1, 1927, during the Nanchang Uprising, and by December 1929 had been in existence

1. These comrades regard military affairs and politics as opposed to each other and refuse to recognize that military affairs are only one means of accomplishing political tasks. Some even say, "If you are good militarily, naturally you are good politically; if you are not good militarily, you cannot be any good politically"—this is to go a step further and give military affairs a leading position over politics.

2. They think that the task of the Red Army, like that of the White army, is merely to fight. They do not understand that the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up Party organizations. The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence.

3. Hence, organizationally, these comrades subordinate the departments of the Red Army doing political work to those doing military work, and put forward the slogan, "Let Army Headquarters handle outside matters." If allowed to develop, this idea would involve the danger of estrangement from the masses, control of the government by the army and departure from proletarian leadership—it would be to take the path of warlordism like the Kuomintang army.

4. At the same time, in propaganda work they overlook the importance of propaganda teams. On the question of mass organization, they neglect the organizing of soldiers' committees in the army and the organizing of the local workers and peasants. As a result, both propaganda and organizational work are abandoned.

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for over two years. During this period the Communist Party organization in the Red Army learned a great deal and gained quite a rich store of experience in the course of combating various mistaken ideas. The resolution summed up this experience. It enabled the Red Army to build itself entirely on a Marxist-Leninist basis and to eliminate all the influences of armies of the old type. It was carried out not only in the Fourth Army but also in all other units of the Red Army successively; in this way the whole Chinese Red Army became a genuine army of the people in every respect. In the last thirty years or so the Chinese people's armed forces have made tremendous developments and innovations in their Party activities and political work, which now present a very different picture, but the basic line remains the same as that laid down in this resolution.

5. They become conceited when a battle is won and dispirited when a battle is lost.

6. Selfish departmentalism—they think only of the Fourth Army and do not realize that it is an important task of the Red Army to arm the local masses. This is cliquism in a magnified form.

7. Unable to see beyond their limited environment in the Fourth Army, a few comrades believe that no other revolutionary forces exist. Hence their extreme addiction to the idea of conserving strength and avoiding action. This is a remnant of opportunism.

8. Some comrades, disregarding the subjective and objective conditions, suffer from the malady of revolutionary impetuosity; they will not take pains to do minute and detailed work among the masses, but, riddled with illusions, want only to do big things. This is a remnant of putschism.[1]

The sources of the purely military viewpoint are:

1. A low political level. From this flows the failure to recognize the role of political leadership in the army and to recognize that the Red Army and the White army are fundamentally different.

2. The mentality of mercenaries. Many prisoners captured in past battles have joined the Red Army, and such elements bring with them a markedly mercenary outlook, thereby providing a basis in the lower ranks for the purely military viewpoint.

3. From the two preceding causes there arises a third, overconfidence in military strength and absence of confidence in the strength of the masses of the people.

4. The Party's failure actively to attend to and discuss military work is also a reason for the emergence of the purely military viewpoint among a number of comrades.

The methods of correction are as follows:

1. Raise the political level in the Party by means of education, destroy the theoretical roots of the purely military viewpoint, and be clear on the fundamental difference between the Red Army and the White army. At the same time, eliminate the remnants of opportunism and putschism and break down the selfish departmentalism of the Fourth Army.

2. Intensify the political training of officers and men and especially the education of ex-prisoners. At the same time, as far as possible let the local governments select workers and peasants experienced in struggle to join the Red Army, thus organizationally weakening or even eradicating the purely military viewpoint.

3. Arouse the local Party organizations to criticize the Party organizations in the Red Army and the organs of mass political power to criticize the Red Army itself, in order to influence the Party organizations and the officers and men of the Red Army.

4. The Party must actively attend to and discuss military work. All the work must be discussed and decided upon by the Party before being carried out by the rank and file.

5. Draw up Red Army rules and regulations which clearly define its tasks, the relationship between its military and its political apparatus, the relationship between the Red Army and the masses of the people, and the powers and functions of the soldiers' committees and their relationship with the military and political organizations.

ON ULTRA-DEMOCRACY

Since the Fourth Army of the Red Army accepted the directives of the Central Committee, there has been a great decrease in the manifestations of ultra-democracy. For example, Party decisions are now carried out fairly well; and no longer does anyone bring up such erroneous demands as that the Red Army should apply "democratic centralism from the bottom to the top" or should "let the lower levels discuss all problems first, and then let the higher levels decide". Actually, however, this decrease is only temporary and superficial and does not mean that ultra-democratic ideas have already been eliminated. In other words, ultra-democracy is still deep-rooted in the minds of many comrades. Witness the various expressions of reluctance to carry out Party decisions.

The methods of correction are as follows:

1. In the sphere of theory, destroy the roots of ultra-democracy. First, it should be pointed out that the danger of ultra-democracy lies in the fact that it damages or even completely wrecks the Party organization and weakens or even completely undermines the Party's fighting capacity, rendering the Party incapable of fulfilling its fighting tasks and thereby causing the defeat of the revolution. Next, it should be pointed out that the source of ultra-democracy consists in the petty bourgeoisie's individualistic aversion to discipline. When this characteristic is brought into the Party, it develops into ultra-democratic ideas politically and organizationally. These ideas are utterly incompatible with the fighting tasks of the proletariat.

2. In the sphere of organization, ensure democracy under centralized guidance. It should be done on the following lines:

(1) The leading bodies of the Party must give a correct line of guidance and find solutions when problems arise, in order to establish themselves as centres of leadership.

(2) The higher bodies must be familiar with the life of the masses and with the situation in the lower bodies so as to have an objective basis for correct guidance.

(3) No Party organization at any level should make casual decisions in solving problems. Once a decision is reached, it must be firmly carried out.

(4) All decisions of any importance made by the Party's higher bodies must be promptly transmitted to the lower bodies and the Party rank and file. The method is to call meetings of activists or general membership meetings of the Party branches or even of the columns[2] (when circumstances permit) and to assign people to make reports at such meetings.

(5) The lower bodies of the Party and the Party rank and file must discuss the higher bodies' directives in detail in order to understand their meaning thoroughly and decide on the methods of carrying them out.

ON THE DISREGARD OF ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINE

Disregard of organizational discipline in the Party organization in the Fourth Army manifests itself as follows:

A. Failure of the minority to submit to the majority. For example, when a minority finds its motion voted down, it does not sincerely carry out the Party decisions.

The methods of correction are as follows:

1. At meetings, all participants should be encouraged to voice their opinions as fully as possible. The rights and wrongs in any controversy should be clarified without compromise or glossing over. In order to reach a clear-cut conclusion, what cannot be settled at one meeting should be discussed at another, provided there is no interference with the work.

2. One requirement of Party discipline is that the minority should submit to the majority. If the view of the minority has been rejected, it must support the decision passed by the majority. If necessary, it can bring up the matter for reconsideration at the next meeting, but apart from that it must not act against the decision in any way.

B. Criticism made without regard to organizational discipline:

1. Inner-Party criticism is a weapon for strengthening the Party organization and increasing its fighting capacity. In the Party organization of the Red Army, however, criticism is not always of this character, and sometimes turns into personal attack. As a result, it damages the Party organization as well as individuals. This is a manifestation of petty-bourgeois individualism. The method of correction is to help Party members understand that the purpose of criticism is to increase the Party's fighting capacity in order to achieve victory in the class struggle and that it should not be used as a means of personal attack.

2. Many Party members make their criticisms not inside, but outside, the Party. The reason is that the general membership has not yet grasped the importance of the Party organization (its meetings and so forth), and sees no difference between criticism inside and outside the organization. The method of correction is to educate Party members so that they understand the importance of Party organization and make their criticisms of Party committees or comrades at Party meetings.

ON ABSOLUTE EQUALITARIANISM

Absolute equalitarianism became quite serious in the Red Army at one time. Here are some examples. On the matter of allowances to wounded soldiers, there were objections to differentiating between light and serious cases, and the demand was raised for equal allowances for all. When officers rode on horseback, it was regarded not as something necessary for performing their duties but as a sign of inequality. Absolutely equal distribution of supplies was demanded, and there was objection to somewhat larger allotments in special cases. In the hauling of rice, the demand was made that all should carry the same load on their backs, irrespective of age or physical condition. Equality was demanded in the allotment of billets, and the

Headquarters would be abused for occupying larger rooms. Equality was demanded in the assignment of fatigue duties, and there was unwillingness to do a little more than the next man. It even went so far that when there were two wounded men but only one stretcher, neither could be carried away because each refused to yield priority to the other. Absolute equalitarianism, as shown in these examples, is still very serious among officers and soldiers of the Red Army.

Absolute equalitarianism, like ultra-democracy in political matters, is the product of a handicraft and small peasant economy—the only difference being that the one manifests itself in material affairs, while the other manifests itself in political affairs.

The method of correction: We should point out that, before the abolition of capitalism, absolute equalitarianism is a mere illusion of peasants and small proprietors, and that even under socialism there can be no absolute equality, for material things will then be distributed on the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" as well as on that of meeting the needs of the work. The distribution of material things in the Red Army must be more or less equal, as in the case of equal pay for officers and men, because this is required by the present circumstances of the struggle. But absolute equalitarianism beyond reason must be opposed because it is not required by the struggle; on the contrary, it hinders the struggle.

ON SUBJECTIVISM

Subjectivism exists to a serious degree among some Party members, causing great harm to the analysis of the political situation and the guidance of the work. The reason is that subjective analysis of a political situation and subjective guidance of work inevitably result either in opportunism or in putschism. As for subjective criticism, loose and groundless talk or suspiciousness, such practices inside the Party often breed unprincipled disputes and undermine the Party organization.

Another point that should be mentioned in connection with inner-Party criticism is that some comrades ignore the major issues and confine their attention to minor points when they make their criticism. They do not understand that the main task of criticism is to point out political and organizational mistakes. As to personal shortcomings;

unless they are related to political and organizational mistakes, there is no need to be overcritical and to embarrass the comrades concerned. Moreover, once such criticism develops, there is the great danger that the Party members will concentrate entirely on minor faults, and everyone will become timid and overcautious and forget the Party's political tasks.

The main method of correction is to educate Party members so that a political and scientific spirit pervades their thinking and their Party life. To this end we must: (1) teach Party members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method in analysing a political situation and appraising the class forces, instead of making a subjective analysis and appraisal; (2) direct the attention of Party members to social and economic investigation and study, so as to determine the tactics of struggle and methods of work, and help comrades to understand that without investigation of actual conditions they will fall into the pit of fantasy and putschism; and (3) in inner-Party criticism, guard against subjectivism, arbitrariness and the vulgarization of criticism; statements should be based on facts and criticism should centre on politics.

ON INDIVIDUALISM

The tendency towards individualism in the Red Army Party organization manifests itself as follows:

1. Retaliation. Some comrades, after being criticized inside the Party by a soldier comrade, look for opportunities to retaliate outside the Party, and one way is to beat or abuse the comrade in question. They also seek to retaliate within the Party. "You have criticized me at this meeting, so I'll find some way to pay you back at the next." Such retaliation arises from purely personal considerations, to the neglect of the interests of the class and of the Party as a whole. Its target is not the enemy class, but individuals in our own ranks. It is a corrosive which weakens the organization and its fighting capacity.

2. "Small group" mentality. Some comrades consider only the interests of their own small group and ignore the general interest. Although on the surface this does not seem to be the pursuit of personal interests, in reality it exemplifies the narrowest individualism and has a strong corrosive and centrifugal effect. "Small group" mentality used to be rife in the Red Army, and although there has been some

improvement as a result of criticism, there are still survivals and further effort is needed to overcome it.

3. The "employee" mentality. Some comrades do not understand that the Party and the Red Army, of which they are members, are both instruments for carrying out the tasks of the revolution. They do not realize that they themselves are makers of the revolution, but think that their responsibility is merely to their individual superiors and not to the revolution. This passive mentality of an "employee" of the revolution is also a manifestation of individualism. It explains why there are not very many activists who work unconditionally for the revolution. Unless it is eliminated, the number of activists will not grow and the heavy burden of the revolution will remain on the shoulders of a small number of people, much to the detriment of the struggle.

4. Pleasure-seeking. In the Red Army there are also quite a few people whose individualism finds expression in pleasure-seeking. They always hope that their unit will march into big cities. They want to go there not to work but to enjoy themselves. The last thing they want is to work in the Red areas where life is hard.

5. Passivity. Some comrades become passive and stop working whenever anything goes against their wishes. This is mainly due to lack of education, though sometimes it is also due to the leadership's improper conduct of affairs, assignment of work or enforcement of discipline.

6. The desire to leave the army. The number of people who ask for transfers from the Red Army to local work is on the increase. The reason for this does not lie entirely with the individuals but also with: (1) the material hardships of life in the Red Army, (2) exhaustion after long struggle, and (3) the leadership's improper conduct of affairs, assignment of work or enforcement of discipline.

The method of correction is primarily to strengthen education so as to rectify individualism ideologically. Next, it is to conduct affairs, make assignments and enforce discipline in a proper way. In addition, ways must be found to improve the material life of the Red Army, and every available opportunity must be utilized for rest and rehabilitation in order to improve material conditions. In our educational work we must explain that in its social origin individualism is a reflection within the Party of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois ideas.

ON THE IDEOLOGY OF ROVING REBEL BANDS

The political ideology of roving rebel bands has emerged in the Red Army because the proportion of vagabond elements is large and because there are great masses of vagabonds in China, especially in the southern provinces. This ideology manifests itself as follows: (1) Some people want to increase our political influence only by means of roving guerrilla actions, but are unwilling to increase it by undertaking the arduous task of building up base areas and establishing the people's political power. (2) In expanding the Red Army, some people follow the line of "hiring men and buying horses" and "recruiting deserters and accepting mutineers",[3] rather than the line of expanding the local Red Guards and the local troops and thus developing the main forces of the Red Army. (3) Some people lack the patience to carry on arduous struggles together with the masses, and only want to go to the big cities to eat and drink to their hearts' content. All these manifestations of the ideology of roving rebels seriously hamper the Red Army in performing its proper tasks; consequently its eradication is an important objective in the ideological struggle within the Red Army Party organization. It must be understood that the ways of roving rebels of the Huang Chao[4] or Li Chuang[5] type are not permissible under present-day conditions.

The methods of correction are as follows:

1. Intensify education, criticize incorrect ideas, and eradicate the ideology of roving rebel bands.
2. Intensify education among the basic sections of the Red Army and among recently recruited captives to counter the vagabond outlook.
3. Draw active workers and peasants experienced in struggle into the ranks of the Red Army so as to change its composition.
4. Create new units of the Red Army from among the masses of militant workers and peasants.

ON THE REMNANTS OF PUTSCHISM

The Party organization in the Red Army has already waged struggles against putschism, but not yet to a sufficient extent. Therefore, remnants of this ideology still exist in the Red Army. Their manifestations are: (1) blind action regardless of subjective and objective conditions; (2) inadequate and irresolute application of the Party's policies for the cities; (3) slack military discipline, especially in moments of defeat; (4) acts of house-burning by some units; and (5) the practices of shooting deserters and of inflicting corporal punishment, both of which smack of putschism. In its social origins putschism is a combination of *lumpen*-proletarian and petty-bourgeois ideology.

The methods of correction are as follows:

1. Eradicate putschism ideologically.
2. Correct putschist behaviour through rules, regulations and policies.

NOTES

[1] For a brief period after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, a "Left" putschist tendency arose in the Communist Party. Regarding the Chinese revolution as a "permanent revolution" and the revolutionary situation in China as a "permanent upsurge", the putschist comrades refused to organize an orderly retreat and, adopting the methods of commandism and relying only on a small number of Party members and a small section of the masses, erroneously attempted to stage a series of local uprisings throughout the country, which had no prospect of success. Such putschist activities were widespread at the end of 1927 but gradually subsided in the beginning of 1928, though sentiments in favour of putschism still survived among some comrades.

[2] In the guerrilla system of organization a column corresponded to a division in the regular army, with a complement much more flexible and usually much smaller than that of a regular division.

[3] These two Chinese idioms refer to the methods which some rebels in Chinese history adopted to expand their forces. In the application of these methods, attention was paid to numbers rather than to quality, and people of all sorts were indiscriminately recruited to swell the ranks.

[4] Huang Chao was the leader of the peasant revolts towards the end of the Tang Dynasty. In A.D. 875, starting from his home district Tsaochow (now Hotse County in Shantung), Huang led armed peasants in victorious battles against the imperial forces and styled himself the "Heaven-Storming General". In the course of a decade he swept over most of the provinces in the Yellow, Yangtse, Huai and Pearl river valleys, reaching as far as Kwangsi. He finally broke through the Tungkuan pass, captured the imperial capital of Changan (now Sian in Shensi), and was crowned Emperor of Chi. Internal dissensions and attacks by the non-Han tribal allies of the Tang forces compelled Huang to abandon Changan and retreat to his native district where he committed suicide. The ten years' war fought by him is one of the most famous peasant wars in Chinese history. Dynastic historians record that "all people suffering from heavy taxes and levies rallied to him". But as he merely carried on roving warfare without ever establishing relatively consolidated base areas, his forces were called "roving rebel bands".

[5] Li Chuang, short for Li Tzu-cheng the King Chuang (the Dare-All King), native of Michih, northern Shensi, was the leader of a peasant revolt which led to the overthrow of the Ming Dynasty. The revolt first started in northern Shensi in 1628. Li joined the forces led by Kao Ying-hsiang and campaigned through Honan and Anhwei and back to Shensi. After Kao's death in 1636, Li succeeded him, becoming King Chuang, and campaigned in and out of the provinces of Shensi, Szechuan, Honan and Hupeh. Finally he captured the imperial capital of Peking in 1644, whereupon the last Ming emperor committed suicide. The chief slogan he spread among the masses was "Support King Chuang, and pay no grain taxes". Another slogan of his to enforce discipline among his men ran: "Any murder means the killing of my father, any rape means the violation of my mother." Thus he won the support of the masses and his movement became the main current of the peasant revolts raging all over the country. As he, too, roamed about without ever establishing relatively consolidated base areas, he was eventually defeated by Wu San-kuei, a Ming general, who colluded with the Ching troops in a joint attack on Li.

A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE

January 1930

Some comrades in our Party still do not know how to appraise the current situation correctly and how to settle the attendant question of what action to take. Though they believe that a revolutionary high tide is inevitable, they do not believe it to be imminent. Therefore, they disapprove of the plan to take Kiangsi and only approve of roving guerrilla actions in the three areas on the borders of Fukien, Kwangtung and Kiangsi; at the same time, as they do not have a deep understanding of what it means to establish Red political power in the guerrilla areas, they do not have a deep understanding of the idea of accelerating the nation-wide revolutionary high tide through the consolidation and expansion of Red political power. They seem to think that, since the revolutionary high tide is still remote, it will be labour lost to attempt to establish political power by hard work. Instead, they want to extend our political influence through the easier method of roving guerrilla actions, and, once the masses throughout the country have been won over, or more or less won over, they want to launch a nation-wide armed insurrection which, with the participation of the Red Army, would become a great nation-wide revolution. Their theory that we must first win over the masses on a country-wide scale and in all regions and then establish political power does not accord with the actual state of the Chinese revolution. This theory derives mainly from the failure to understand clearly that China is a semi-colonial country for which many imperialist powers are contending. If one dearly understands this, one will understand first why the unusual phenomenon of prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes is only to be found in China, why this warfare is steadily growing fiercer and spreading, and why

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This was a letter written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in criticism of certain pessimistic views then existing in the Party.

there has never been a unified regime. Secondly, one will understand the gravity of the peasant problem and hence why rural uprisings have developed on the present country-wide scale. Thirdly, one will understand the correctness of the slogan of workers' and peasants' democratic political power. Fourthly, one will understand another unusual phenomenon, which is also absent outside China, and which follows from the first (that in China alone there is prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes), namely, the existence and development of the Red Army and the guerrilla forces, and together with them, the existence and development of small Red areas encircled by the White regime. Fifthly, one will understand that in semi-colonial China the establishment and expansion of the Red Army, the guerrilla forces and the Red areas is the highest form of peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat, the inevitable outcome of the growth of the semi-colonial peasant struggle, and undoubtedly the most important factor in accelerating the revolutionary high tide throughout the country. And sixthly, one will also understand that the policy which merely calls for roving guerrilla actions cannot accomplish the task of accelerating this nation-wide revolutionary high tide, while the kind of policy adopted by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung and also by Fang Chih-min[1] is undoubtedly correct — that is, the policy of establishing base areas; of systematically setting up political power; of deepening the agrarian revolution; of expanding the people's armed forces by a comprehensive process of building up first the township Red Guards, then the district Red Guards, then the county Red Guards, then the local Red Army troops, all the way up to the regular Red Army troops, of spreading political power by advancing in a series of waves, etc., etc. Only thus is it possible to build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union has built it throughout the world. Only thus is it possible to create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their foundations and hasten their internal disintegration. Only thus is it really possible to create a Red Army which will become the chief weapon for the great revolution of the future. In short, only thus is it possible to hasten the revolutionary high tide.

Comrades who suffer from revolutionary impetuosity overestimate the subjective forces of the revolution[2] and underestimate the forces of the counter-revolution. Such an appraisal stems mainly from subjectivism. In the end, it undoubtedly leads to putschism. On the other hand, underestimating the subjective forces of the revolution and overestimating the forces of the counter-revolution would also constitute an improper appraisal and be certain to produce bad results of another kind. Therefore, in judging the political situation in China it is necessary to understand the following:

1. Although the subjective forces of the revolution in China are now weak, so also are all organizations (organs of political power, armed forces, political parties, etc.) of the reactionary ruling classes, resting as they do on the backward and fragile social and economic structure of China. This helps to explain why revolution cannot break out at once in the countries of Western Europe where, although the subjective forces of revolution are now perhaps somewhat stronger than in China, the forces of the reactionary ruling classes are many times stronger. In China the revolution will undoubtedly move towards a high tide more rapidly, for although the subjective forces of the revolution at present are weak, the forces of the counter-revolution are relatively weak too.

2. The subjective forces of the revolution have indeed been greatly weakened since the defeat of the revolution in 1927. The remaining forces are very small and those comrades who judge by appearances alone naturally feel pessimistic. But if we judge by essentials, it is quite another story. Here we can apply the old Chinese saying, "A single spark can start a prairie fire." In other words, our forces, although small at present, will grow very rapidly. In the conditions prevailing in China, their growth is not only possible but indeed inevitable, as the May 30th Movement and the Great Revolution which followed have fully proved. When we look at a thing, we must examine its essence and treat its appearance merely as an usher at the threshold, and once we cross the threshold, we must grasp the essence of the thing; this is the only reliable and scientific method of analysis.

3. Similarly, in appraising the counter-revolutionary forces, we must never look merely at their appearance, but should examine their essence. In the initial period of our independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, some comrades genuinely believed the incorrect appraisal made by the Hunan Provincial Committee and regarded the class enemy as not worth a rap; the two descriptive terms, "terribly shaky" and "extremely panicky", which are standing jokes to this day, were used by the Hunan Provincial Committee at the time (from May to June 1928) in appraising the Hunan ruler

Lu Ti-ping.[3] Such an appraisal necessarily led to putschism in the political sphere. But during the four months from November of that year to February 1929 (before the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords),[4] when the enemy's third "joint suppression expedition"[5] was approaching the Chingkang Mountains, some comrades asked the question, "How long can we keep the Red Flag flying?" As a matter of fact, the struggle in China between Britain, the United States and Japan had by then become quite open, and a state of tangled warfare between Chiang Kai-shek, the Kwangsi clique and Feng Yu-hsiang was taking shape; hence it was actually the time when the counter-revolutionary tide had begun to ebb and the revolutionary tide to rise again. Yet pessimistic ideas were to be found not only in the Red Army and local Party organizations; even the Central Committee was misled by appearances and adopted a pessimistic tone. Its February letter is evidence of the pessimistic analysis made in the Party at that time.

4. The objective situation today is still such that comrades who see only the superficial appearance and not the essence of what is before them are liable to be misled. In particular, when our comrades working in the Red Army are defeated in battle or encircled or pursued by strong enemy forces, they often unwittingly generalize and exaggerate their momentary, specific and limited situation, as though the situation in China and the world as a whole gave no cause for optimism and the prospects of victory for the revolution were remote. The reason they seize on the appearance and brush aside the essence in their observation of things is that they have not made a scientific analysis of the essence of the overall situation. The question whether there will soon be a revolutionary high tide in China can be decided only by making a detailed examination to ascertain whether the contradictions leading to a revolutionary high tide are really developing. Since contradictions are developing in the world between the imperialist countries, between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between the imperialists and the proletariat in their own countries, there is an intensified need for the imperialists to contend for the domination of China. While the imperialist contention over China becomes more intense, both the contradiction between imperialism and the whole Chinese nation and the contradictions among the imperialists themselves develop simultaneously on Chinese soil, thereby creating the tangled warfare which is expanding and intensifying daily and giving rise to the continuous development of

the contradictions among the different cliques of China's reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradictions among the reactionary ruling cliques — the tangled warfare among the warlords — comes heavier taxation, which steadily sharpens the contradiction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradiction between imperialism and China's national industry comes the failure of the Chinese industrialists to obtain concessions from the imperialists, which sharpens the contradiction between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Chinese working class, with the Chinese capitalists trying to find a way out by frantically exploiting the workers and with the workers resisting. In the wake of imperialist commercial aggression, Chinese merchant-capitalist extortions, heavier government taxation, etc., comes the deepening of the contradiction between the landlord class and the peasantry, that is, exploitation through rent and usury is aggravated and the hatred of the peasants for the landlords grows. Because of the pressure of foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the worker and peasant masses, and the increase in government taxation, more and more dealers in Chinese-made goods and independent producers are being driven into bankruptcy. Because the reactionary government, though short of provisions and funds, endlessly expands its armies and thus constantly extends the warfare, the masses of soldiers are in a constant state of privation. Because of the growth in government taxation, the rise in rent and interest demanded by the landlords and the daily spread of the disasters of war, there are famine and banditry everywhere and the peasant masses and the urban poor can hardly keep alive. Because the schools have no money, many students fear that their education may be interrupted; because production is backward, many graduates have no hope of employment. Once we understand all these contradictions, we shall see in what a desperate situation, in what a chaotic state, China finds herself. We shall also see that the high tide of revolution against the imperialists, the warlords and the landlords is inevitable, and will come very soon. All China is littered with dry faggots which will soon be aflame. The saying, "A single spark can start a prairie fire", is an apt description of how the current situation will develop. We need only look at the strikes by the workers, the uprisings by the peasants, the mutinies of soldiers and the strikes of students which are developing in many places to see that it cannot be long before a "spark" kindles "a prairie fire".

The gist of the above was already contained in the letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee on April 5, 1929, which reads in part:

> The Central Committee's letter [dated February 9, 1929] makes too pessimistic an appraisal of the objective situation and our subjective forces. The Kuomintang's three "suppression" campaigns against the Chingkang Mountains was the high water mark reached by the counter-revolutionary tide. But there it stopped, and since then the counter-revolutionary tide has gradually receded while the revolutionary tide has gradually risen. Although our Party's fighting capacity and organizational strength have been weakened to the extent described by the Central Committee, they will be rapidly restored, and the passivity among comrades in the Party will quickly disappear as the counter-revolutionary tide gradually ebbs. The masses will certainly come over to us. The Kuomintang's policy of massacre only serves to "drive the fish into deep waters",[6] as the saying goes, and reformism no longer has any mass appeal. It is certain that the masses will soon shed their illusions about the Kuomintang. In the emerging situation, no other party will be able to compete with the Communist Party in winning over the masses. The political line and the organizational line laid down by the Party's Sixth National Congress[7] are correct, *i.e.*, the revolution at the present stage is democratic and not socialist, and the present task of the Party [here the words "in the big cities" should have been added][8] is to win over the masses and not to stage immediate insurrections. Nevertheless the revolution will develop swiftly, and we should take a positive attitude in our propaganda and preparations for armed insurrections. In the present chaotic situation we can lead the masses only by positive slogans and a positive attitude. Only by taking such an attitude can the Party recover its fighting capacity. . . . Proletarian leadership is the sole key to victory in the revolution. Building a proletarian foundation for the Party and setting up Party branches in industrial enterprises in key districts are important organizational tasks for the Party at present; but at the same time the major prerequisites for helping the struggle in the cities and hastening the rise of the revolutionary tide are specifically the development of the struggle in the countryside, the establishment of Red political power in small areas, and

> the creation and expansion of the Red Army. Therefore, it would be wrong to abandon the struggle in the cities, but in our opinion it would also be wrong for any of our Party members to fear the growth of peasant strength lest it should outstrip the workers' strength and harm the revolution. For in the revolution in semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership of the workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the workers.

The letter also contained the following reply on the question of the Red Army's operational tactics:

> To preserve the Red Army and arouse the masses, the Central Committee asks us to divide our forces into very small units and disperse them over the countryside and to withdraw Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung from the army, so concealing the major targets. This is an unrealistic view. In the winter of 1927-28, we did plan to disperse our forces over the countryside, with each company or battalion operating on its own and adopting guerrilla tactics in order to arouse the masses while trying not to present a target for the enemy; we have tried this out many times, but have failed every time. The reasons are: (1) most of the soldiers in the main force of the Red Army come from other areas and have a background different from that of the local Red Guards; (2) division into small units results in weak leadership and inability to cope with adverse circumstances, which easily leads to defeat; (3) the units are liable to be crushed by the enemy one by one; (4) the more adverse the circumstances, the greater the need for concentrating our forces and for the leaders to be resolute in struggle, because only thus can we have internal unity against the enemy. Only in favourable circumstances is it advisable to divide our forces for guerrilla operations, and it is only then that the leaders need not stay with the ranks all the time, as they must in adverse circumstances.

The weakness of this passage is that the reasons adduced against the division of forces were of a negative character, which was far from adequate. The positive reason for concentrating our forces is that only concentration will enable us to wipe out comparatively large enemy units and occupy towns. Only after we have wiped out comparatively large enemy units and occupied towns can we arouse the masses on a broad scale and set up political power extending over a number of adjoining counties. Only thus can we make a widespread impact (what we call "extending our political influence"), and contribute effectively to speeding the day of the revolutionary high tide. For instance, both the regime we set up in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area the year before last and the one we set up in western Fukien last year[9] were the product of this policy of concentrating our troops. This is a general principle. But are there not times when our forces should be divided up? Yes, there are. The letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee says of guerrilla tactics for the Red Army, including the division of forces within a short radius:

> The tactics we have derived from the struggle of the past three years are indeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign. With our tactics, the masses can be aroused for struggle on an ever-broadening scale, and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with us. Ours are guerrilla tactics. They consist mainly of the following points:
>
> "Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy."
>
> "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."
>
> "To extend stable base areas,[10] employ the policy of advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around."
>
> "Arouse the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time and by the best possible methods."
>
> These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment we should be able to cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in to deal with the enemy. Such are the tactics we have used for the past three years.

Here, "to cast the net wide" means to divide our forces within a short radius. For example, when we first captured the county town of Yunghsin in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, we divided the forces of the 29th and 31st Regiments within the boundaries of Yunghsin County. Again, when we captured Yunghsin for the third time, we once more divided our forces by dispatching the 28th Regiment to the border of Anfu County, the 29th to Lienhua, and the 31st to the border of Kian County. And, again, we divided our forces in the counties of southern Kiangsi last April and May, and in the counties of western Fukien last July. As to dividing our forces over a wide radius, it is possible only on the two conditions that circumstances are comparatively favourable and the leading bodies fairly strong. For the purpose of dividing up our forces is to put us in a better position for winning over the masses, for deepening the agrarian revolution and establishing political power, and for expanding the Red Army and the local armed units. It is better not to divide our forces when this purpose cannot be attained or the division of our forces would lead to defeat and to the weakening of the Red Army, as happened in August two years ago when our forces were divided on the Hunan-Kiangsi border for an attack on Chenchou. But there is no doubt that, given the two above-mentioned conditions, we should divide our forces, because division is then more advantageous than concentration.

The Central Committee’s February letter was not in the right spirit and had a bad effect on a number of Party comrades in the Fourth Army. At that time the Central Committee also issued a circular stating that war would not necessarily break out between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords. Since then, however, the appraisals and directives of the Central Committee have in the main been correct. It has already issued another circular correcting the one containing the wrong appraisal. Although it has not made any correction of the letter to the Red Army, its subsequent directives have not been couched in the same pessimistic tone and its views on the Red Army’s operations now coincide with ours. Yet the bad effect which this letter had on some comrades persists. Therefore, I feel that it is still necessary to give some explanation.

The plan to take Kiangsi Province within a year was also proposed last April by the Front Committee to the Central Committee, and a decision to that effect was later made at Yutu. The following reasons were given in the letter to the Central Committee:

> The armies of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords are approaching each other in the vicinity of Kiukiang, and a big battle is imminent. The resumption of mass struggle, coupled with the spread of contradictions among the ruling reactionaries, makes it probable that there will soon be a high tide of revolution. As for how our work should be arranged under these circumstances, we feel that, so far as the southern provinces are concerned, the armed forces of the compradors and landlords in Kwangtung and Hunan Provinces are too strong, and that in Hunan, more-

over, we have lost almost all our mass following, inside as well as outside the Party, because of the Party's putschist mistakes. In the three provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi and Chekiang, however, the situation is different. First, militarily the enemy is weakest there. In Chekiang, there is only a small provincial force under Chiang Po-cheng.[11] In Fukien, although there are five groups of enemy troops totalling fourteen regiments in all, Kuo Feng-ming's troops have already been smashed; the troops under Chen Kuo-hui and Lu Hsing-pang[12] are bandits of small fighting capacity; the two brigades of marines stationed along the coast have never seen action and their fighting capacity is undoubtedly not high; Chang Chen[13] alone can put up some sort of a fight, but, according to an analysis made by the Fukien Provincial Committee, even he has only two relatively strong regiments. In addition, Fukien is now in a state of complete chaos, confusion and disunity. In Kiangsi, there are sixteen regiments under the two commands of Chu Pei-teh[14] and Hsiung Shih-hui;[15] they are stronger than the armed forces of either Fukien or Chekiang, but far inferior to those of Hunan. Secondly, fewer putschist mistakes have been made in these three provinces. We are not clear about the situation in Chekiang, but the Party's organizational and mass base is somewhat better in Kiangsi and Fukien than in Hunan. Take Kiangsi for example. In northern Kiangsi we still have some basis in Tehan, Hsiushui and Tungku; in western Kiangsi the Party and the Red Guards still have some strength in Ningkang, Yunghsin, Lienhua and Suichuan; in southern Kiangsi the prospects are still brighter, as the 2nd and 4th Regiments of the Red Army are steadily growing in strength in the counties of Kian, Yungfeng and Hsingkuo; and what is more, the Red Army under Fang Chih-min has by no means been wiped out. All this places us in a position to close in on Nanchang. We hereby recommend to the Central Committee that during the period of prolonged warfare among the Kuomintang warlords, we should contend with Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi clique for Kiangsi Province and also for western Fukien and western Chekiang. In these three provinces we should enlarge the Red Army and create an independent regime of the masses, with a time limit of one year for accomplishing this plan.

This proposal to contend for Kiangsi erred only in setting a time limit of one year. It was based not only on conditions within the province itself, but also on the prospect that a nation-wide high tide of revolution would soon arise. For unless we had been convinced that there would soon be a high tide of revolution, we could not possibly have concluded that we could take Kiangsi in a year. The only weakness in the proposal was that it set a time limit of one year, which it should not have done, and so gave a flavour of impetuosity to the word "soon" in the statement, "there will soon be a high tide of revolution". As to the subjective and objective conditions in Kiangsi, they well deserve our attention. Besides the subjective conditions described in the letter to the Central Committee, three objective conditions can now be clearly pointed out. First, the economy of Kiangsi is mainly feudal, the merchant-capitalist class is relatively weak, and the armed forces of the landlords are weaker than in any other southern province. Secondly, Kiangsi has no provincial troops of its own and has always been garrisoned by troops from other provinces. Sent there for the "suppression of Communists" or "suppression of bandits", these troops are unfamiliar with local conditions, their interests are much less directly involved than if they were local troops, and they usually lack enthusiasm. And thirdly, unlike Kwangtung which is close to Hongkong and under British control in almost every respect, Kiangsi is comparatively remote from imperialist influence. Once we have grasped these three points, we can understand why rural uprisings are more widespread and the Red Army and guerrilla units more numerous in Kiangsi than in any other province.

How then should we interpret the word "soon" in the statement, "there will soon be a high tide of revolution"? This is a common question among comrades. Marxists are not fortune-tellers. They should, and indeed can, only indicate the general direction of future developments and changes; they should not and cannot fix the day and the hour in a mechanistic way. But when I say that there will soon be a high tide of revolution in China, I am emphatically not speaking of something which in the words of some people "is possibly coming", something illusory, unattainable and devoid of significance for action. It is like a ship far out at sea whose mast-head can already be seen from the shore; it is like the morning sun in the east whose shimmering rays are visible from a high mountain top; it is like a child about to be born moving restlessly in its mother's womb.

NOTES

[1] Comrade Fang Chih-min, a native of Yiyang, Kiangsi Province, and a member of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was the founder of the Red area in northeastern Kiangsi and of the Tenth Red Army. In 1934 he led the vanguard detachment of the Red Army in marching north to resist the Japanese invaders. In January 1935 he was captured in battle against the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang troops and in July he died a martyr's death in Nanchang, Kiangsi.

[2] The subjective forces of the revolution mean the organized forces of the revolution.

[3] Lu Ti-ping, a Kuomintang warlord, was the Kuomintang governor of Hunan Province in 1928.

[4] The war of March-April 1929 between Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang warlord in Nanking, and Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, the Kuomintang warlords in Kwangsi Province.

[5] The third invasion of the Red Army's base area on the Chingkang Mountains by the Kuomintang warlords in Hunan and Kiangsi lasting from the end of 1928 to the beginning of 1929.

[6] The quotation is from Mencius, who compared a tyrant who drove his people into seeking a benevolent ruler to the otter which "drives the fish into deep waters".

[7] The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in July 1928. It pointed out that after the defeat in 1927, China's revolution remained bourgeois-democratic in nature, *i.e.*, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal, and that since the inevitable new high tide in the revolution was not yet imminent, the general line for the revolution should be to win over the masses. The Sixth Congress liquidated the 1927 Right capitulationism of Chen Tu-hsiu and also repudiated the "Left" putschism which occurred in the Party at the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928.

[8] The statement in brackets has been added by the author.

[9] The regime set up in western Fukien came into being in 1929, when the Red Army in the Chingkang Mountains sallied eastward to build a new revolutionary base area and established the people's revolutionary political power in the counties of Lungyen, Yungting and Shanghang in the western part of that province.

[10] Stable base areas were the relatively stable revolutionary base areas established by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

[11] Chiang Po-cheng was then the commander of the Kuomintang peace preservation corps in Chekiang Province.

[12] Chen Kuo-hui and Lu Hsing-pang were two notorious Fukien bandits whose forces had been incorporated into the Kuomintang army.

[13] Chang Chen was a divisional commander of the Kuomintang army.

[14] Chu Pei-teh, a Kuomintang warlord, was then the Kuomintang governor of Kiangsi Province.

[15] Hsiung Shih-hui was then a divisional commander of the Kuomintang army in Kiangsi Province.

PAY ATTENTION TO ECONOMIC WORK

August 1933

The growing intensity of the revolutionary war makes it imperative for us to mobilize the masses in order to launch an immediate campaign on the economic front and undertake all possible and necessary tasks of economic construction. Why? Because all our present efforts should be directed towards gaining victory in the revolutionary war and, first and foremost, towards gaining complete victory in the fight to smash the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign;[1] they should be directed towards securing the material conditions which will guarantee food and other supplies for the Red Army, towards bettering the life of the people and so stimulating their more active participation in the revolutionary war, towards organizing the masses on the economic front and educating them so as to provide fresh mass strength for the war, and towards consolidating the worker-peasant alliance and the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants and strengthening proletarian leadership by building up the economy. Such economic construction is essential for the attainment of all these objectives. This must be clearly understood by everyone engaged in revolutionary work. Some comrades have thought it impossible to spare time for economic construction because the revolutionary war keeps people busy enough, and they have condemned anyone arguing for it as a "Right deviationist". In their opinion economic construction is impossible in the midst of a revolutionary war and is possible only in the peaceful, tranquil conditions prevailing after final victory. Comrades, such views are wrong. Whoever holds them fails to realize that without building up the economy it is impossible to secure the material prerequisites for the revolutionary war, and the people will become exhausted in the course of a long war. Just consider! The enemy is

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This speech was delivered at the economic construction conference of seventeen counties in southern Kiangsi in August 1933.

enforcing an economic blockade, unscrupulous merchants and reactionaries are disrupting our finance and commerce, and the trade of our Red areas with the outside is seriously hampered. Will not the revolutionary war be seriously affected unless these difficulties are overcome? Salt is very dear, and sometimes even unobtainable. Rice is cheap in the autumn and winter, but it becomes terribly dear in spring and summer. All this directly affects the life of the workers and peasants and prevents any improvement. And does it not affect our basic line — the alliance of workers and peasants? If the workers and peasants become dissatisfied with their living conditions, will it not affect the expansion of our Red Army and the mobilization of the masses for the revolutionary war? Therefore it is utterly wrong to think that no economic construction should be undertaken in the midst of the revolutionary war. Those who think this way often say that everything should be subordinated to the war effort, but they fail to understand that to dispense with economic construction would weaken the war effort rather than subordinate everything to it. Only by extending the work on the economic front and building the economy of the Red areas can we provide an adequate material basis for the revolutionary war, proceed smoothly with our military offensives and strike effective blows at the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaigns; only thus can we acquire the resources to enlarge the Red Army and push our front outwards to points thousands of *li* away, so that when the circumstances prove favourable, the Red Army will be able to attack Nanchang and Kiukiang free from all anxiety and, thus relieved of much of the task of provisioning itself, give its undivided attention to fighting; and only thus can we to a certain extent satisfy the material needs of the people so that they will join the Red Army or undertake other revolutionary tasks with even greater enthusiasm. Subordinating everything to the war effort means just this. Among those engaged in revolutionary work in various places, many do not yet understand the importance of economic construction in the revolutionary war, and there are many local governments which give. little attention to discussing the problems of economic construction The economic departments of the local governments are not yet well organized, and some are still without a director; in others some incompetent has been assigned simply to fill the post. The formation of co-operatives is still in the initial stage, and only in a few places has the work of regulating food supplies been started. There has been no propaganda among the people for the work of economic construction (though such propaganda is very important), and mass enthusiasm for it has not been aroused. All this is due to the failure to recognize the importance of economic construction. Through the discussions at this conference and through the reports you will make when you return to your posts, we must create mass enthusiasm for economic construction among all government personnel and among all workers and peasants. The importance of economic construction for the revolutionary war should be made clear to everyone, so that they will do their best to promote the sale of economic construction bonds, develop the co-operative movement, and set up public granaries and storehouses for famine relief everywhere. Each county must establish a sub-department for the regulation of food supplies, with branch offices in important districts and market centres. On the one hand, within our Red areas we should send grain from places with a surplus to those with a deficit, so that it will not pile up in one place and become unobtainable in another and its price will not be too low in one place and too high in another; on the other hand, we should send our grain surplus out of the Red areas in a planned way (*i.e.*, not in unlimited quantities) and bring in necessities from the White areas, thus avoiding exploitation by unscrupulous merchants. We must all do our best to develop agriculture and handicrafts and increase the output of farm implements and lime in order to ensure a bigger crop next year, and we must restore the output of such local products as wolfram, timber, camphor, paper, tobacco, linen, dried mushrooms and peppermint oil to former levels, and market them in the White areas in quantity.

Judged by volume, grain ranks first among the principal outgoing commodities in our trade with the outside areas. About three million piculs of unhusked rice are sent out yearly in exchange for necessary consumer goods, or an average of one picul a head of the three million population; it cannot, surely, be less than this. But who is handling this trade? It is handled entirely by the merchants who exploit us ruthlessly in the process. Last year they bought unhusked rice from the peasants in Wanan and Taiho Counties at fifty cents a picul and sold it in Kanchow for four yuan, making a sevenfold profit. Take another instance. Every year our three million people need about nine million yuan worth of salt and six million yuan worth of cotton cloth. Needless to say, this fifteen million yuan trade in salt and cloth has been entirely in the hands of the merchants; we have done nothing about it. The exploitation by the merchants is really enormous. For instance, they go to Meihsien and buy salt at one yuan for seven catties, and then sell it in our areas at one yuan for twelve ounces. Is this not shocking profiteering? We can no longer ignore such a state of affairs, and from now on we must handle this trade ourselves. Our department of trade with outside areas must make a great effort in this connection.

How shall we use the three million yuan from economic construction bonds? We plan to use it in the following way. One million will be allotted for the Red Army's war expenses, and two million will be loaned as capital to the co-operatives, the Bureau for the Regulation of Food Supplies and the Bureau of External Trade. Of the latter amount, the greater part will be used for expanding our external trade and the rest for expanding production. Our objective is not only to expand production but also to sell our products at fair prices to the White areas and then purchase salt and cloth cheaply for distribution among our people, so as to break the enemy's blockade and check the merchants' exploitation. We must bring about the continued growth of the people's economy, greatly improve the livelihood of the masses and substantially increase our public revenue, thus laying firm material foundations for the revolutionary war and for economic construction.

This is a great task, a great class struggle. But we should ask ourselves, can it be accomplished in the midst of fierce fighting? I think it can. We are not talking about building a railway to Lungyen or, for the time being, even about building a motor road to Kanchow. We are not saying that there should be a complete monopoly of the sale of grain, or that the government should handle all the salt and cloth trade, valued at fifteen million yuan, to the total exclusion of the merchants. This is not the point we are making or what we are trying to do. What we are talking about and trying to do is to develop agriculture and the handicrafts, and send out grain and wolfram in exchange for salt and cloth, starting temporarily with a fund of two million yuan plus the money invested by the people. Is there anything here that we should not undertake, or that we cannot undertake and achieve? We have already started this work and achieved some results. This year's autumn harvest is between 20 and 25 per cent larger than last year's, or more than our original estimate of a 20 per cent increase. In the handicraft industries the production of farm implements and lime is being restored, and we are beginning to restore wolfram production. The output of tobacco, paper and timber is recovering. Much has been accomplished this year in the regulation of food supplies. A start has been made on importing salt. It is on these achievements that we base our firm belief in the possibility of further progress. Is it not clearly wrong to say that economic construction is impossible now and has to wait until the war is over?

It is thus clear that, at the present stage, economic construction must revolve around our central task, the revolutionary war. Today the revolutionary war is our central task, which economic construction should serve, centre on and be subordinated to. It would likewise be wrong to regard economic construction as the centre of all our present work to the neglect of the revolutionary war, or to conduct it apart from the revolutionary war. Not until the civil war is over will it be possible and necessary to regard economic construction as the centre of all our work. In the midst of a civil war, it is sheer delusion to try to carry out such peace-time economic construction as can and should be done in the future but not at present. The tasks for the present are those urgently demanded by the war. Every one of them should serve the war; none is a peace-time undertaking separate from the war. If any comrade entertains the idea of carrying out economic construction apart from the war, he should correct this mistake at once.

It will be impossible to get a rapid campaign going on the economic front without a correct style of leadership and correct methods of work. This, too, presents an important problem which this conference must solve. For the comrades here will have a great deal to do as soon as they return, and will have to give guidance to the many people who will be working with them. In particular, the comrades who are working at the township and city levels and in the co-operatives, the food departments, the trade departments and the purchasing offices, are personally engaged in the practical work of mobilizing the people to organize co-operatives, regulating and transporting food supplies, and managing our trade with the outside areas. If their style of leadership is wrong and if they do not employ correct and efficient methods, the work will be immediately affected, we shall fail to win mass support for the various tasks, and during the coming autumn and winter and next spring and summer we shall be unable to carry out the whole of the Central Government's plan for economic construction. For these reasons I want to direct our comrades' attention to the following.

Firstly, mobilize the masses by various organizational means. In the first place, comrades on the presidiums and in the economic and finance departments of the government bodies at all levels must regularly put on their agenda and discuss, supervise and check up on such items of work as the sale of bonds, the formation of co-operatives, the regulation of food supplies and the promotion of production and trade. Next, the mass organizations, chiefly the trade unions and poor peasant leagues, must be moved into action. The trade unions should mobilize all their members to join these economic struggles. The poor peasant leagues are powerful bases for mobilizing the masses to build up co-operatives and subscribe to bonds, and they should be given vigorous leadership by district and township governments. Furthermore, we must conduct propaganda for economic construction at village or household meetings, explaining dearly how it is related to the revolutionary war and discussing in the most practical terms how to improve the livelihood of the masses and increase our strength for the struggle. We should appeal to the people to subscribe to bonds, develop co-operatives, regulate food supplies, consolidate finances and promote trade; we should call upon them to fight for these slogans and should heighten their enthusiasm. Our objectives cannot be attained unless we use various organizational means to mobilize the masses and conduct propaganda among them in the manner described, that is to say, unless the presidiums and the economic and finance departments of the government bodies at all levels actively attend to discussing and checking up on the work of economic construction, unless they spur the mass organizations into action and hold mass propaganda meetings.

Secondly, we must not be bureaucratic in our methods of mobilizing the masses. Bureaucratic leadership cannot be tolerated in economic construction any more than in any other branch of our revolutionary work. The ugly evil of bureaucracy, which no comrade likes, must be thrown into the cesspit. The methods which all comrades should prefer are those that appeal to the masses, *i.e.*, those which are welcomed by all workers and peasants. One manifestation of bureaucracy is slacking at work due to indifference or perfunctoriness. We must wage a stern struggle against this phenomenon. Commandism is another manifestation. To all appearances, persons given to commandism are not slackers; they give the impression of being hard workers. But in fact co-operatives set up by commandist methods will not succeed, and even if they appear to grow for a time, they cannot be consolidated. In the end the masses will lose faith in them, which will hamper their development. To push the sales of bonds in a commandist way and impose arbitrary quotas, regardless of whether people understand what the bonds are for and of how much they can afford, will ultimately arouse the people's

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

displeasure and make it impossible to achieve good sales. We must reject commandism; what we need is energetic propaganda to convince the masses, and we should develop the co-operatives, promote the sales of bonds and do all the work of economic mobilization in accordance with the actual conditions and the real feelings of the masses.

Thirdly, large numbers of cadres are needed to extend the campaign of economic construction. This is not a matter of scores or hundreds of people, but of thousands and tens of thousands whom we must organize, train and send to the economic construction front. They will be the commanders and the broad masses the soldiers on the economic front. People often sigh over the shortage of cadres. Comrades, is there really a shortage? Innumerable cadres have come to the fore from among the masses who have been steeled in the agrarian struggles, the economic struggles and the revolutionary war. How can we say there is a shortage of cadres? Discard this mistaken view and you will see cadres all around you.

Fourthly, economic construction today is inseparable not only from the general task of the war but from other tasks as well. Only if there is a thorough check-up on land distribution[2] will it be possible to abolish feudal and semi-feudal ownership of land completely, enhance the peasants' enthusiasm for production and swiftly draw the peasant masses into economic construction. Only if the labour laws are resolutely enforced will it be possible to better the life of the workers, bring them speedily into active participation in economic construction and strengthen their leadership of the peasants. Only if there is correct leadership in the elections and in the exposure campaigns[3] which accompany the check-up on land distribution will it be possible to strengthen our government bodies so that they can give more vigorous leadership in the revolutionary war and in all our work, including economic work. The raising of the political and cultural level of the people through cultural and educational work is also a most important task in the development of the economy. That the expansion of the Red Army must not be neglected for a single day goes without saying. Everybody understands that without Red Army victories the economic blockade would be still tighter. On the other hand, economic growth and a better life for the masses will undoubtedly be of great help to the work of expanding the Red Army and inspiring the masses to march eagerly to the front. To sum up, if we achieve all the above tasks, including the very important new one of economic construction, and if we make them all serve the revolutionary war, then victory in the revolutionary war will undoubtedly be ours.

NOTES

[1] Between 1930 and 1934 Chiang Kai-shek launched five large-scale onslaughts against the Red area centred on Juichin, Kiangsi; they were called "encirclement and suppression" campaigns. The fifth of such campaigns began in October 1933, though Chiang Kai-shek had been making active preparations for it since the summer.

[2] A campaign to check up land distribution was carried out in the Red area after the agrarian reform to ascertain whether the land had been properly redistributed.

[3] Exposure campaigns were democratic campaigns in which the people were encouraged to expose misdeeds by the functionaries of the democratic government.

HOW TO DIFFERENTIATE THE CLASSES IN THE RURAL AREAS

October 1933

I. THE LANDLORD

A landlord is a person who owns land, does not engage in labour himself, or does so only to a very small extent, and lives by exploiting the peasants. The collection of land rent is his main form of exploitation; in addition, he may lend money, hire labour, or engage in industry or commerce. But his exaction of land rent from the peasants is his principal form of exploitation. The administration of communal land and the collection of rent from school land[1] are included in the category of exploitation through land rent.

A bankrupt landlord shall still be classified as a landlord if he does not engage in labour but lives by swindling or robbing others or by receiving assistance from relatives or friends, and is better off than the average middle peasant.

Warlords, officials, local tyrants and evil gentry are political representatives and exceptionally ruthless members of the landlord class. Minor local tyrants and evil gentry are also very often to be found among the rich peasants.

Persons who assist landlords in collecting rent and managing property, who depend on landlord exploitation of the peasants as their main source of income and are better off than the average middle peasant shall be put in the same category as landlords.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this document in October 1933 to rectify the deviations that had occurred in the work of land reform and to provide a correct solution for the land problem. It was adopted by the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Central Government of that time as establishing the criteria for determining class status in the rural areas.

Usurers are persons who rely on exploitation by usury as their main source of income, are better off than the average middle peasant, and shall be put in the same category as landlords.

II. THE RICH PEASANT

The rich peasant, as a rule owns land. But some rich peasants own only part of their land and rent the remainder. Others have no land of their own at all and rent all their land. The rich peasant generally has rather more and better instruments of production and more liquid capital than the average and engages in labour himself, but always relies on exploitation for part or even the major part of his income. His main form of exploitation is the hiring of labour (long-term labourers). In addition, he may let part of his land and practise exploitation through land rent, or may lend money or engage in industry and commerce. Most rich peasants also engage in the administration of communal land. A person who owns a fair amount of good land, farms some of it himself without hiring labour, but exploits other peasants by means of land rent, loan interest or in other ways, shall also be treated as a rich peasant. Rich peasants regularly practise exploitation and many derive most of their income from this source.

III. THE MIDDLE PEASANT

Many middle peasants own land. Some own only part of their land and rent the rest. Others own no land of their own at all and rent all their land. All of them have a fair number of farm implements. A middle peasant derives his income wholly or mainly from his own labour. As a rule he does not exploit others and in many cases he himself is exploited by others, having to pay a small amount in land rent and in interest on loans. But generally he does not sell his labour power. Some middle peasants (the well-to-do middle peasants) do practise exploitation to a small extent, but this is not their regular or their main source of income.

IV. THE POOR PEASANT

Among the poor peasants some own part of their land and have a few odd farm implements, others own no land at all but only a few odd farm implements. As a rule poor peasants have to rent the land they work on and are subjected to exploitation, having to pay land rent and interest on loans and to hire themselves out to some extent.

In general, a middle peasant does not need to sell his labour power, while the poor peasant has to sell part of his labour power. This is the principal criterion for distinguishing between a middle and poor peasant.

V. THE WORKER

The worker (including the farm labourer) as a rule owns no land or farm implements, though some do own a very small amount of land and very few farm implements. Workers make their living wholly or mainly by selling their labour power.

NOTES

[1] There were various forms of public land in China's rural areas — land owned by the township or district government, by the ancestral temple of a clan, by a Buddhist or Taoist temple, a Catholic church or a mosque, or land whose income was used for public welfare purposes such as famine relief, or the building and maintenance of bridges and roads, or for educational purposes. In practice, most of such land was controlled by the landlords and rich peasants, and few peasants had any say in its administration.

OUR ECONOMIC POLICY

January 23, 1934

Only the Kuomintang warlords who have brought the areas under their own rule to the brink of bankruptcy have the utter shamelessness to spread the rumour, day in day out, that the Red areas are in a state of total collapse. The imperialists and the Kuomintang are bent on wrecking the Red areas, the work of economic construction now in progress there, and the welfare of the millions of workers and peasants who have achieved liberation. For this purpose, they have pursued a ruthless policy of economic blockade, in addition to organizing forces for military campaigns of "encirclement and suppression". But, leading the broad masses and the Red Army, we have not only smashed one enemy "encirclement and suppression" campaign after another, but have also been doing all the essential work of economic construction within our power in order to defeat this vicious economic blockade. In this respect, too, we have scored one success after another.

The principle governing our economic policy is to proceed with all the essential work of economic construction within our power and concentrate our economic resources on the war effort, and at the same time to improve the life of the people as much as possible, consolidate the worker-peasant alliance in the economic field, ensure proletarian leadership of the peasantry, and strive to secure leadership by the state sector of the economy over the private sector, thus creating the prerequisites for our future advance to socialism.

The focus of our economic construction is to increase agricultural and industrial production, expand our trade with the outside, and develop the co-operatives.

Agriculture in the Red areas is obviously making progress. As compared with 1932, the 1933 agricultural output was 15 per cent higher

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This report was given by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the Second National Congress of Workers' and Peasants' Representatives held in Juichin, Kiangsi Province in January 1934.

in southern Kiangsi and western Fukien and 20 per cent higher in the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi border area. The Szechuan-Shensi border area has had a good harvest. After a Red area is established, farm output often declines in the first year or two.[1] But it picks up again as the peasant masses work with greater enthusiasm after the land is redistributed and ownership is settled, and after we have given encouragement to production. Today in some places farm output has reached and even exceeded the pre-revolution level. In others, not only has land that lay waste during the revolutionary uprisings been reclaimed, but new land has been brought under cultivation. In many places mutual-aid groups and ploughing teams[2] have been organized to adjust the use of labour power in the villages, and co-operatives have been organized to overcome the shortage of draught oxen. Moreover, the women are taking part in production in great numbers. None of this could have happened in the Kuomintang days. With the land in the hands of the landlords, the peasants then were neither willing to improve it nor did they possess the means to do so. Only since we have distributed the land to the peasants and encouraged and rewarded production has their labour enthusiasm blossomed forth and great success in production been achieved. It should be pointed out that in the present conditions agriculture occupies first place in our economic construction; it is by agriculture that we solve both the most important problem of food, and the problem of raw materials such as cotton, hemp, sugar-cane and bamboo, which are needed for the making of clothes, sugar, paper and other necessities. The care of forests and the increase of livestock are also an important part of agriculture. Within the framework of small-scale peasant economy it is permissible and indeed necessary to draw up suitable plans for the output of certain important agricultural products and to mobilize the peasants to strive for their fulfilment. We should pay closer attention and devote greater efforts to this. We must actively lead the peasants in solving such difficult and essential problems in production as labour power, draught oxen, fertilizer, seed and irrigation. In this connection our fundamental task is to adjust the use of labour power in an organized way and to encourage women to do farm work. The necessary measures to solve the problem of labour power are organizing mutual-aid groups and ploughing teams and mobilizing and encouraging the whole rural population to help during the busy spring and summer ploughing seasons. Another big problem is that quite a large proportion (about 25 per cent) of the peasants are short of draught oxen. We must attend to organizing draught oxen co-operatives, encouraging the peasants without oxen to buy them for their common use through voluntary subscription to shares. Irrigation, which is the lifeblood of agriculture, also merits close attention. Of course, we cannot as yet bring up the question of state or collective farming, but it is urgently necessary to set up small experimental farms, agricultural research schools and exhibitions of farm produce in various places to stimulate the development of agriculture.

The enemy blockade has made it difficult for us to market goods outside our areas. There has been a decline in production in many handicraft industries in the Red areas, notably tobacco-curing and paper-making. But the difficulties of sending goods out are not entirely insurmountable. We have an extensive market of our own because of the mass demand in our areas. We should systematically restore and develop handicrafts and also certain industries, firstly to supply our own needs and secondly for trade with the outside. In the last two years, and especially since the first half of 1933, many handicrafts and a few industries have begun to look up because of the attention we have begun to devote to them and the gradual development of producers' co-operatives by the people. The most significant fields are tobacco, paper, wolfram, camphor, farm implements and fertilizers (such as lime). Moreover, in our present circumstances we should not neglect the manufacture of our own cotton cloth, medicines and sugar. In the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi border area, some industries have been set up which were previously non-existent, such as paper-making, cloth-making and sugar-refining, and they are doing well. To relieve the shortage of salt, people have begun to extract it from nitre. It requires proper planning to keep industry going. With a scattered handicraft industry, detailed and comprehensive planning is of course impossible. But fairly detailed production plans are absolutely essential for certain important enterprises, and first and foremost for state and co-operative enterprises. Every one of our state and co-operative industrial enterprises must pay attention from the very beginning to making accurate estimates of raw material output and marketing prospects in both the enemy areas and our own.

At the present time, it is particularly necessary for us to organize private external trading according to plan and for the state to handle certain essential commodities directly, for instance, the import of salt and cotton cloth, the export of grain and wolfram, and the adjustment of grain supply within our own areas. Such work was first undertaken in the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi border area and was started in the Central Area in the spring of 1933. With the establishment of the Bureau of External Trade and other agencies, initial successes have been achieved in this connection.

Our economy is made up of three sectors, state enterprise, co-operative enterprise and private enterprise.

At present, state enterprise is limited to what is possible and essential. State-operated industry and commerce have begun to grow and they have boundless prospects.

As regards the private sector of the economy, we shall not hamper it, indeed we shall promote and encourage it, so long as it does not transgress the legal limits set by our government. For the development of private enterprise is essential to the interests of the state and the people at the present stage. Needless to say, private enterprise is now preponderant and will inevitably continue to occupy a dominant position for a considerable time. Today, private undertakings in the Red areas are small in scale.

Co-operative enterprise is growing rapidly. There are altogether 1,423 co-operatives of various kinds, with a total capital of over 300,000 yuan, according to the September 1933 figures for seventeen counties in Kiangsi and Fukien. Consumers' co-operatives and grain co-operatives head the list, with producers' co-operatives coming next. Credit co-operatives have just started functioning. When the co-operative and the state enterprises become co-ordinated and grow over a long period of time, they will become a tremendous force in our economy and will gradually prevail and assume leadership over the private sector. Therefore, the greatest possible development of state enterprise and the extensive development of co-operative enterprise must go hand in hand with encouraging the development of private enterprise.

With the support of the masses, we have issued economic construction bonds to the value of three million yuan in order to develop state enterprise and assist the co-operatives. Such reliance on the strength of the masses is the only possible way to solve the problem of funds for economic construction at this time.

To increase our revenue by developing the economy is a basic principle of our financial policy; it has already brought tangible results in the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi border area and is beginning to do so in the Central Area, too. It is the duty of our financial and economic organizations to apply this principle conscientiously. In this connection, we should make quite sure that the issuing of notes by the state bank is based primarily on the needs of economic development, and only secondarily on purely fiscal needs.

Thrift should be the guiding principle in our government expenditure. It should be made clear to all government workers that corruption and waste are very great crimes. Our campaigns against corruption and waste have already achieved some results, but further efforts are required. Our system of accounting must be guided by the principle of saving every copper for the war effort, for the revolutionary cause and for our economic construction. Our methods of spending state revenue must be strictly different from those of the Kuomintang.

At a time when the country is plunged in economic disaster, when hundreds of millions of people are suffering the terrible hardships of hunger and cold, the people's government in our areas is staunchly pressing ahead with economic construction for the sake of the revolutionary war and in the interests of the nation, regardless of all the difficulties. The situation is perfectly clear — only by defeating imperialism and the Kuomintang and by undertaking planned, organized economic construction can we deliver the people of the whole of China from unprecedented disaster.

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[1] There was usually a decline in farm output in the first year or two after the establishment of a Red area, chiefly because landownership was not yet settled and the new economic order was not fully established during land redistribution, so that the peasants could not yet set their minds fully on production.

[2] Mutual-aid groups and ploughing teams, based on individual farming, were formed by peasants in the Red areas to facilitate production through a better organization of labour power. On the principle of voluntary participation and mutual benefit, the members did an equal amount of work for each other, or if one could not give another as much help as he received he made up the difference in cash. Apart from helping each other, the teams gave preferential treatment to the families of Red Army soldiers and worked for bereaved old folk without any pay except for meals during the work. As these measures of mutual aid were of great help to production and were carried out on a reasonable basis they won the warm support of the masses.

BE CONCERNED WITH THE WELL-BEING OF THE MASSES, PAY ATTENTION TO METHODS OF WORK

January 27, 1934

There are two questions which comrades have failed to stress during the discussion and which, I feel, should be dealt with.

The first concerns the well-being of the masses.

Our central task at present is to mobilize the broad masses to take part in the revolutionary war, overthrow imperialism and the Kuomintang by means of such war, spread the revolution throughout the country, and drive imperialism out of China. Anyone who does not attach enough importance to this central task is not a good revolutionary cadre. If our comrades really comprehend this task and understand that the revolution must at all costs be spread throughout the country, then they should in no way neglect or underestimate the question of the immediate interests, the well-being, of the broad masses. For the revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them.

If we only mobilize the people to carry on the war and do nothing else, can we succeed in defeating the enemy? Of course not. If we want to win, we must do a great deal more. We must lead the peasants' struggle for land and distribute the land to them, heighten their labour enthusiasm and increase agricultural production, safeguard the interests of the workers, establish co-operatives, develop trade with outside areas, and solve the problems facing the masses — food, shelter and clothing, fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt, sickness and hygiene, and marriage. In short, all the practical problems in the

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This was part of the concluding speech made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the Second National Congress of Workers' and Peasants' Representatives held in Juichin, Kiangsi Province in January, 1934.

masses' everyday life should claim our attention. If we attend to these problems, solve them and satisfy the needs of the masses, we shall really become organizers of the well-being of the masses, and they will truly rally round us and give us their warm support. Comrades, will we then be able to arouse them to take part in the revolutionary war? Yes, indeed we will.

Here is the kind of thing we have found among some of our cadres. They talk only about expanding the Red Army, enlarging the transport corps, collecting the land tax and selling bonds, as for other matters, they neither discuss nor attend to them, and even ignore them altogether. For instance, there was a time when the Tingchow Municipal Government concerned itself only with the expansion of the Red Army and with mobilization for the transport corps and paid not the slightest attention to the well-being of the masses. The problems facing the people of Tingchow city were that they had no firewood, no salt was on sale because the capitalists were hoarding it, some people had no houses to live in, and rice was both scarce and dear. These were practical problems for the masses of the people of Tingchow and they eagerly looked to us for help in solving them. But the Tingchow Municipal Government did not discuss any of these matters. That is why when the new workers' and peasants' representative council was elected in the city, a hundred or more representatives were unwilling to attend after the first few council meetings had discussed only the expansion of the Red Army and mobilization for the transport corps, entirely ignoring the well-being of the masses, so that the council was unable to go on meeting. The result was that very little was achieved in regard to the expansion of the Red Army and mobilization for the transport corps. That was one kind of situation.

Comrades I You have probably read the pamphlets given you about two model townships. There the situation is entirely different. What a great number of people have joined the Red Army from Changkang Township in Kiangsi[1] and Tsaihsi Township in Fukien![2] In Changkang 80 per cent of the young men and women have joined the Red Army, and in Tsaihsi the figure is 88 per cent. There has been a big sale of bonds, too, and 4,500 yuan worth have been sold in Changkang which has a population of 1,500. Much has also been done in other fields. What accounts for this? A few examples will make the point clear. In Changkang when fire broke out in a poor peasant's house destroying one and a half rooms, the township government appealed to the masses to contribute money to help him. In another instance, three persons were starving, so the township government and the mutual-aid society immediately gave them rice. During the food shortage last summer, the township government obtained rice from Kunglueh County,[3] more than two hundred *li* away, for the relief of the masses. Excellent work was done along these lines in Tsaihsi as well. Such township governments are really models. They are absolutely different from the Tingchow Municipal Government with its bureaucratic methods of leadership. We should learn from Changkang and Tsaihsi Townships and oppose bureaucratic leaders like those in Tingchow city.

I earnestly suggest to this congress that we pay close attention to the well-being of the masses, from the problems of land and labour to those of fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt. The women want to learn ploughing and harrowing. Whom can we get to teach them? The children want to go to school. Have we set up primary schools? The wooden bridge over there is too narrow and people may fall off. Should we not repair it? Many people suffer from boils and other ailments. What are we going to do about it? All such problems concerning the well-being of the masses should be placed on our agenda. We should discuss them, adopt and carry out decisions and check up on the results. We should convince the masses that we represent their interests, that our lives are intimately bound up with theirs. We should help them to proceed from these things to an understanding of the higher tasks which we have put forward, the tasks of the revolutionary war, so that they will support the revolution and spread it throughout the country, respond to our political appeals and fight to the end for victory in the revolution. The masses in Changkang say, "The Communist Party is really good! It has thought of everything on our behalf." The comrades in Changkang Township are an example to all of us. What admirable people! They have won the genuine affection of the broad masses, who support their call for war mobilization. Do we want to win the support of the masses? Do we want them to devote their strength to the front? If so, we must be with them, arouse their enthusiasm and initiative, be concerned with their well-being, work earnestly and sincerely in their interests and solve all their problems of production and everyday life — the problems of salt, rice, housing, clothing, childbirth, etc. If we do so, the masses will surely support us and regard the revolution as their most glorious banner, as their very life. In the event of a Kuomintang attack on the Red areas they will fight the Kuomintang to the death. There can be no doubt about this, for is it not a plain fact that we have smashed the enemy's first, second, third and fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns?

The Kuomintang is now pursuing a policy of blockhouse warfare,[4] feverishly constructing their "tortoise-shells" as though they were iron bastions. Comrades! Are they really iron bastions? Not in the least! Think of the palaces of the feudal emperors over thousands of years, were they not powerful with their walls and moats? Yet they crumbled one after another the moment the masses arose. The tsar of Russia was one of the world's most ferocious rulers, yet when the proletariat and the peasantry rose in revolution, was there anything left of him? No, nothing. His bastions of iron? They all crumbled. Comrades! What is a true bastion of iron? It is the masses, the millions upon millions of people who genuinely and sincerely support the revolution. That is the real iron bastion which no force can smash, no force whatsoever. The counter-revolution cannot smash us; on the contrary we shall smash it. Rallying millions upon millions of people round the revolutionary government and expanding our revolutionary war, we shall wipe out all counter-revolution and take over the whole of China.

The second question concerns our methods of work.

We are the leaders and organizers of the revolutionary war as well as the leaders and organizers of the life of the masses. To organize the revolutionary war and to improve the life of the masses are our two major tasks. In this respect, we are faced with the serious problem of methods of work. It is not enough to set tasks, we must also solve the problem of the methods for carrying them out. If our task is to cross a river, we cannot cross it without a bridge or a boat. Unless the bridge or boat problem is solved, it is idle to speak of crossing the river. Unless the problem of method is solved, talk about the task is useless. Unless we pay attention to giving leadership to the work of expanding the Red Army and devote particular care to our methods, we will never succeed even though we recite the phrase "Expand the Red Army" a thousand times. Nor can we accomplish our tasks in any other field, for instance, in checking up on land distribution, or in economic construction, or culture and education, or our work in the new areas and the outlying districts, if all we do is to set the tasks without attending to the methods of carrying them out, without combating bureaucratic methods of work and adopting practical and concrete ones, and without discarding commandist methods and adopting the method of patient persuasion.

The comrades in Hsingkuo have done first-rate work and deserve our praise as model workers. Similarly, the comrades in northeastern Kiangsi have done good work and are also model workers. By linking the problem of the well-being of the masses with that of the revolutionary war, the comrades in both these places are simultaneously solving the problems of revolutionary methods of work and of accomplishing their revolutionary tasks. They are working conscientiously, solving problems with minute care and shouldering their revolutionary responsibilities in earnest; they are good organizers and leaders both of revolutionary war and of the well-being of the masses. Elsewhere, too, the comrades have made progress in their work and deserve our praise — as in some parts of the counties of Shanghang, Changting and Yungting in Fukien Province; in Hsikiang and other places in southern Kiangsi Province; in some parts of the counties of Chaling, Yunghsin and Kian in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area; in some parts of Yanghsin County in the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border area; in districts and townships of many other counties in Kiangsi Province and in the county of Juichin which is directly under our central government.

In all the places under our leadership, there are undoubtedly many active cadres, excellent comrades, who have sprung from the masses. These comrades have a responsibility to help in places where our work is weak and to help comrades who are not yet able to work well. We are in the midst of a great revolutionary war; we must break through the enemy's large-scale "encirclement and suppression" and spread the revolution to all parts of the country. All revolutionary cadres have a tremendous responsibility. After this congress we must adopt effective measures to improve our work, the advanced areas should become even more advanced, and the backward areas should catch up with the advanced. We must create thousands of townships like Changkang and scores of counties like Hsingkuo. They will be our strongholds. From these strongholds we shall go forth to smash the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and overthrow the rule of imperialism and the Kuomintang throughout the country.

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[1] Changkang Township is in Hsingkuo County, Kiangsi Province.

[2] Tsaihsi Township is in Shanghang County, Fukien Province.

[3] Kunglueh County was then in the Red area in Kiangsi, with the town of Tungku lying southeast of Kian County as its centre. It was named after Comrade Huang Kung-lueh, Commander of the Third Army Corps of the Red Army, who laid down his life there in October 1931.

[4] The building of blockhouses round the Red areas was decided upon by Chiang Kai-shek at his military conference held at Lushan, Kiangsi Province in July 1933 as a new military tactic for his fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign. By the end of January 1934 an estimated total of 2,900 blockhouses had been built in Kiangsi Province. The Japanese aggressors later adopted the same tactic against the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies. Experience fully proved that the counter-revolutionary tactic of using blockhouses could be completely foiled and defeated by adhering to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's strategy of people's war.

ON TACTICS AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

December 27, 1935

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Comrades! A great change has now taken place in the political situation. Our Party has defined its tasks in the light of this changed situation.

What is the present situation?

Its main characteristic is that Japanese imperialism wants to turn China into a colony.

As we all know, for nearly a hundred years China has been a semi-colonial country jointly dominated by several imperialist powers. Owing to the Chinese people's struggle against imperialism and to conflicts among the imperialist powers, China has been able to retain a semi-independent status. For a time World War I gave Japanese imperialism the opportunity of dominating China exclusively. But the treaty surrendering China to Japan, the Twenty-one Demands[1] signed by Yuan Shih-kai,[2] the arch-traitor of that time, was inevitably rendered null and void as a result of the Chinese people's fight against Japanese imperialism and of the intervention by other imperialist powers. In 1922 at the Washington Nine-Power Conference called by the United States, a treaty[3] was signed which once again placed China

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This report was given by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the conference of Party activists which was held at Wayaopao, northern Shensi, after the Wayaopao meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in December 1935. This meeting, one of the most important ever called by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, criticized the mistaken view in the Party that the Chinese national bourgeoisie could not be an ally of the worker and peasants in the common fight against Japan, and it decided on the tactics of a national united front. On the basis of the Political Bureau's decisions, Comrade Mao Tse-tung explained in detail the possibility and the importance of re-establishing a united front with the national bourgeoisie on the condition that there must be resistance to Japan. He under the joint domination of several imperialist powers. But before long the situation changed again. The Incident of September 18, 1931,[4] began the present stage of Japan's colonization of China. As Japanese aggression was temporarily limited to the four northeastern provinces,[5] some people felt that the Japanese imperialists would probably advance no farther. Today things are different. The Japanese imperialists have already shown their intention of penetrating south of the Great Wall and occupying all China. Now they want to convert the whole of China from a semi-colony shared by several imperialist powers into a colony monopolized by Japan. The recent Eastern Hopei Incident[6] and diplomatic talks[7] are clear indications of this trend of events which threatens the survival of the whole Chinese people. This faces all classes and political groups in China with the question of what to do. Resist? Surrender? Or vacillate between the two?

Now let us see how the different classes in China answer this question.

The workers and the peasants are all demanding resistance. The revolution of 1924-27, the agrarian revolution from 1927 to the present day, and the anti-Japanese tide since the Incident of September 18, 1931, have all proved that the working class and peasantry are the most resolute forces in the Chinese revolution.

The petty bourgeoisie is also demanding resistance. Have not the student youth and the urban petty bourgeoisie already started a broad anti-Japanese movement?[8] This section of the Chinese petty bourgeoisie took part in the revolution of 1924-27. Like the peasants, they are small producers in their economic status, and their interests are irreconcilable with those of imperialism. Imperialism and the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces have done them great harm, driving many into unemployment, bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy. Now, faced with the immediate danger of becoming slaves to a foreign nation, they have no alternative but to resist.

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stressed the decisive significance of the leading role to be played by the Communist Party and the Red Army in this united front. He pointed out the protracted character of the Chinese revolution, and criticized the narrow-minded closed-doorism and overhastiness with regard to the revolution which had long existed in the Party and which were the basic cause of the serious setbacks of the Party and the Red Army during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. At the same time, he called the Party's attention to the historical lesson of the defeat of the revolution in 1927 which had been caused by Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism, and he showed that Chiang Kai-shek would inevitably try to undermine the forces of the revolution. Thus he enabled the Party to remain clear-headed in the new situation and to save the forces of the revolution from losses, in spite of Chiang Kai-shek's endless

But how do the national bourgeoisie, the comprador and landlord classes, and the Kuomintang face up to this question?

The big local tyrants and evil gentry, the big warlords and the big bureaucrats and compradors have long made up their minds. They maintain, as they have done all along, that revolution of whatever kind is worse than imperialism. They have formed a camp of traitors, for whom the question of whether to become slaves of a foreign nation simply does not exist because they have already lost all sense of nationality and their interests are inseparably linked with imperialism. Their chieftain is Chiang Kai-shek.[9] This camp of traitors are deadly enemies of the Chinese people. Japanese imperialism could not have become so blatant in its aggression were it not for this pack of traitors. They are the running dogs of imperialism.

The national bourgeoisie presents a complicated problem. This class took part in the revolution of 1924-27, but terrified by the flames of revolution, it later deserted to the enemy of the people, the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The question is whether there is any possibility that this class will undergo a change in the present circumstances. We think there is. For the national bourgeoisie is not the same as either the landlord or the comprador class; there is a difference between them. The national bourgeoisie is less feudal than the landlord class and not so comprador as the comprador class. The section having more ties with foreign capital and the Chinese landed interests form the right-wing of the national bourgeoisie; and we shall not, for the moment, consider whether it can change or not. The problem lies with those sections which have few or no such ties. We believe that in the new situation in which China is threatened with being reduced to a colony these sections may change their attitude. The change will be marked by vacillation. On the one hand they dislike imperialism, and on the other they fear thorough revolution, and they vacillate between the two. This explains why they took part in the revolution

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intrigues and many armed attacks. In January 1935, at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee which was convened in Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, a new Central Committee leadership headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung had been established in place of the former "Left" opportunist leadership. However, as that meeting took place during the Red Army's Long March, it had to confine itself to decisions on the most urgent military problems and on the organization of the Secretariat and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee. Only when the Red Army had reached northern Shensi after the Long March was it possible for the Central Committee of the Party to deal systematically with the various problems of tactics in the political sphere. A most comprehensive analysis of these problems is given in this report by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

of 1924-27 and why, in the end, they went over to Chiang Kai-shek's side. In what respect does the present period differ from 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution? China was then still a semi-colony, but now she is on the way to becoming a colony. Over the past nine years the national bourgeoisie has deserted its ally, the working class, and made friends with the landlord and comprador classes, but has it gained anything? Nothing, except the bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy of its industrial and commercial enterprises. Hence we believe that in the present situation the attitude of the national bourgeoisie can change. What will be the extent of the change? The general characteristic of the national bourgeoisie is to vacillate. But at a certain stage of the struggle, one section (the left-wing) may join in, while another section may vacillate towards neutrality.

Whose class interests does the 19th Route Army led by Tsai Ting-kai[10] and others represent? Those of the national bourgeoisie, the upper petty bourgeoisie, and the rich peasants and small landlords in the countryside. Did not Tsai Ting-kai and his associates once fight bitterly against the Red Army? Yes, but they subsequently concluded an anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang alliance with the Red Army. In Kiangsi they had attacked the Red Army, but later in Shanghai they fought the Japanese imperialists; later still, in Fukien they came to terms with the Red Army and turned their guns against Chiang Kai-shek. Whatever course Tsai Ting-kai and his associates may take in the future, and despite their Fukien People's Government's adherence to old practice in failing to arouse the people to struggle, it must be considered beneficial to the revolution that they turned their guns, originally trained on the Red Army, against Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek. It marked a split within the Kuomintang camp. If the circumstances following the September 18th Incident could cause this group to split away, why cannot the present circumstances give rise to other splits in the Kuomintang? Those Party members who hold that the whole landlord and bourgeois camp is united and permanent and will not change under any circumstances are wrong. They not only fail to appreciate the present grave situation, they have even forgotten history.

Let me speak a little more about the past. In 1926 and 1927, during the time when the revolutionary army advanced on Wuhan, captured it and marched into Honan, Tang Sheng-chih and Feng Yu-hsiang[11] took part in the revolution. In 1933, Feng Yu-hsiang co-operated for a time with the Communist Party in forming the Anti-Japanese Allied Army in Chahar Province.

Take another striking example. Did not the 26th Route Army which, together with the 19th Route Army, had attacked the Red Army in Kiangsi, stage the Ningtu Uprising[12] in December 1931 and become part of the Red Army? The leaders of the Ningtu Uprising, Chao Po-sheng, Tung Chen-tang and others, have become steadfast comrades in the revolution.

The anti-Japanese operations of Ma Chan-shan[13] in the three northeastern provinces represented another split in the ruling class camp.

All these instances indicate that splits will occur in the enemy camp when all China comes within the range of Japanese bombs, and when the struggle changes its normal pace and suddenly surges forward.

Now, comrades, let us turn to another aspect of the question.

Is it correct to object to our view on the ground that China's national bourgeoisie is politically and economically flabby, and to argue that it cannot possibly change its attitude in spite of the new circumstances? I think not. If weakness is the reason for its inability to change its attitude, why did the national bourgeoisie behave differently in 1924-27 when it did not merely vacillate towards the revolution but actually joined it? Can one say that the weakness of the national bourgeoisie is a new disease, and not one that accompanies it from the very womb? Can one say that the national bourgeoisie is weak today, but was not weak in 1924-27? One of the chief political and economic characteristics of a semi-colonial country is the weakness of its national bourgeoisie. That is exactly why the imperialists dare to bully them, and it follows that one of their characteristics is dislike of imperialism. Of course, so far from denying it, we fully recognize that it is the very weakness of the national bourgeoisie that may make it easy for the imperialists, landlords and compradors to entice them with the bait of some temporary advantage; hence their lack of revolutionary thoroughness. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that in the present circumstances there is no difference between the national bourgeoisie and the landlord and comprador classes.

Therefore, we emphatically assert that when the national crisis reaches a crucial point, splits will occur in the Kuomintang camp. Such splits have revealed themselves in the vacillation of the national bourgeoisie and the emergence of such anti-Japanese figures as Feng

Yu-hsiang, Tsai Ting-kai and Ma Chan-shan, who have become popular for a time. Basically, these splits are unfavourable to the counter-revolution and favourable to the revolution. Their possibility is increased by China's uneven political and economic development, and the consequent uneven development of the revolution.

Comrades, so much for the positive side of the question. Now let me take up the negative side, namely, the fact that certain elements among the national bourgeoisie are often past masters at deceiving the people. Why? Because apart from the genuine supporters of the people's revolutionary cause, this class includes many who temporarily appear as revolutionaries or semi-revolutionaries, and who thus acquire a deceptive status which makes it difficult for the people to see through their lack of revolutionary thoroughness and their false trappings. This increases the responsibility devolving on the Communist Party to criticize its allies, unmask the fake revolutionaries, and gain the leadership. To deny the possibility that the national bourgeoisie may vacillate and join the revolution during great upheavals amounts to abandoning, or at any rate to minimizing, our Party's task of contending for leadership. For if the national bourgeoisie were exactly the same as the landlords and compradors and had the same vile and traitorous visage, there would be little or no problem of contending with it for leadership.

In making a general analysis of the attitude of the Chinese landlord class and the bourgeoisie in times of great upheaval, we should also point to another aspect, namely, that even the landlord and comprador camp is not completely united. The reason is that China is a semi-colonial country for which many imperialist powers are contending. When the struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism, then the running dogs of the United States or Britain, obeying the varying tones of their masters' commands, may engage in veiled or even open strife with the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs. There have been many instances of such dog-fights and we shall not dwell on them. We will only mention the fact that Hu Han-min,[14] a Kuomintang politician once detained by Chiang Kai-shek, has recently added his signature to the Six-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation[15] which we have advanced. The warlords of the Kwangtung and Kwangsi cliques[16] who back Hu Han-min are also opposing Chiang Kai-shek, under the deceitful slogans of "Recover our lost territory", and "Resist Japan and at the same time suppress the bandits"[17] (as against Chiang Kai-shek's slogan of "First suppress the bandits, then resist Japan"). Is this not rather strange? No, it is not strange at all, but merely a particularly interesting example of a fight between large and small dogs, between well-fed and ill-fed dogs. It is not a big rift, but neither is it small; it is at once an irritating and painful contradiction. But such fights, such rifts, such contradictions are of use to the revolutionary people. We must turn to good account all such fights, rifts and contradictions in the enemy camp and turn them against our present main enemy.

Summing up the question of class relations, we may say that the basic change in the situation, namely, the Japanese invasion of China south of the Great Wall, has changed the relationship among the various classes in China, strengthening the camp of national revolution and weakening that of counter-revolution.

Now let us discuss the situation in the camp of China's national revolution.

First, the Red Army. As you know, comrades, for almost a year and a half the three main contingents of the Chinese Red Army have carried out great shifts of position. The Sixth Army Group led by Jen Pi-shih[18] and other comrades began to shift to Comrade Ho Lung's area[19] in August last year, and in October we ourselves started to shift position.[20] In March this year the Red Army in the Szechuan-Shensi border area[21] began its shift. All three Red Army contingents have abandoned their old positions and moved to new regions. These great shifts have turned the old areas into guerrilla zones. The Red Army has been considerably weakened in the process. From this aspect of the over-all situation, we can see that the enemy has won a temporary and partial victory, while we have suffered a temporary and partial defeat. Is this statement correct? I think it is. For it is a statement of fact. However, some people (Chang Kuo-tao[22] for instance) say that the Central Red Army[23] has failed. Is that correct? No. For it is not a statement of fact. In approaching a problem a Marxist should see the whole as well as the parts. A frog in a well says, "The sky is no bigger than the mouth of the well." That is untrue, for the sky is not just the size of the mouth of the well. If it said, "A part of the sky is the size of the mouth of a well", that would be true, for it tallies with the facts. What we say is that in one respect the Red Army has failed (*i.e.*, failed to maintain its original positions), but in another respect it has won a victory (*i.e.*, in executing the plan of the Long March). In one respect the enemy won a victory (*i.e.*, in occupying our original positions), but in another respect he has failed (*i.e.*, failed to execute his plan of "encirclement ant suppression" and of "pursuit and suppression"). That is the only appropriate formulation, for we have completed the Long March.

Speaking of the Long March, one may ask, "What is its significance?" We answer that the Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history, that it is a manifesto, a propaganda force, a seeding-machine. Since Pan Ku divided the heavens from the earth and the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors[24] reigned, has history ever witnessed a long march such as ours? For twelve months we were under daily reconnaissance and bombing from the skies by scores of planes, while on land we were encircled and pursued, obstructed and intercepted by a huge force of several hundred thousand men, and we encountered untold difficulties and dangers on the way; yet by using our two legs we swept across a distance of more than twenty thousand *li* through the length and breadth of eleven provinces. Let us ask, has history ever known a long march to equal ours? No, never. The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation. Without the Long March, how could the broad masses have learned so quickly about the existence of the great truth which the Red Army embodies? The Long March is also a seeding-machine. In the eleven provinces it has sown many seeds which will sprout, leaf, blossom, and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future. In a word, the Long March has ended with victory for us and defeat for the enemy. Who brought the Long March to victory? The Communist Party. Without the Communist Party, a long march of this kind would have been inconceivable. The Chinese Communist Party, its leadership, its cadres and its members fear no difficulties or hardships. Whoever questions our ability to lead the revolutionary war will fall into the morass of opportunism. A new situation arose as soon as the Long March was over. In the battle of Chihlochen the Central Red Army and the Northwestern Red Army, fighting in fraternal solidarity, shattered the traitor Chiang Kai-shek's campaign of "encirclement and suppression" against the Shensi-Kansu border area[25] and thus laid the cornerstone for the task undertaken by the Central Committee of the Party, the task of setting up the national headquarters of the revolution in northwestern China.

This being the situation with regard to the main body of the Red Army, what about the guerrilla warfare in the southern provinces? Our guerrilla forces there have suffered some setbacks but have not been wiped out. In many places, they are reasserting themselves, growing and expanding.[26]

In the Kuomintang areas, the workers' struggle is now moving beyond the factory walls, and from being an economic struggle is becoming a political struggle. A heroic working-class struggle against the Japanese and the traitors is now in intense ferment and, judging by the situation, it will erupt before long.

The peasants' struggle has never ceased. Harassed by aggression from abroad, by difficulties at home and by natural disasters, the peasants have unleashed widespread struggles in the form of guerrilla warfare, mass uprisings and famine riots. The anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare now going on in the northeastern provinces and eastern Hopei[27] is their reply to the attacks of Japanese imperialism.

The student movement has already grown considerably and will certainly go on doing so. But this movement can sustain itself and break through the martial law imposed by the traitors and the policy of disruption and massacre practised by the police, the secret service agents, the scoundrels in the educational world and the fascists only if it is co-ordinated with the struggles of the workers, peasants and soldiers.

We have already dealt with the vacillation of the national bourgeoisie, the rich peasants and small landlords and the possibility that they may actually participate in the anti-Japanese struggle.

The minority nationalities, and especially the people of Inner Mongolia who are directly menaced by Japanese imperialism, are now rising up in struggle. As time goes on, their struggle will merge with that of the people in northern China and with the operations of the Red Army in the Northwest.

All this indicates that the revolutionary situation is now changing from a localized into a nation-wide one and that it is gradually changing from a state of unevenness to a certain degree of evenness. We are on the eve of a great change. The task of the Party is to form a revolutionary national united front by combining the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, the peasants, the students, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie throughout the country.

THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

Having surveyed the situation with regard to both the counter-revolution and the revolution, we shall find it easy to define the Party's tactical tasks.

What is the basic tactical task of the Party? It is none other than to form a broad revolutionary national united front.

When the revolutionary situation changes, revolutionary tactics and methods of leadership must change accordingly. The task of the Japanese imperialists, the collaborators and the traitors is to turn China into a colony, while our task is to turn China into a free and independent country with full territorial integrity.

To win independence and freedom for China is a great task. It demands that we fight against foreign imperialism and the domestic counter-revolutionary forces. Japanese imperialism is determined to bludgeon its way deep into China. As yet the domestic counter-revolutionary forces of the big landlord and comprador classes are stronger than the people's revolutionary forces. The overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the counter-revolutionary forces in China cannot be accomplished in a day, and we must be prepared to devote a long time to it; it cannot be accomplished by small forces, and we must therefore accumulate great forces. In China, as in the world as a whole, the counter-revolutionary forces are weaker than before and the revolutionary forces stronger. This estimate is correct, representing one aspect of the matter. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the counter-revolutionary forces in China and in the world as a whole are stronger than the revolutionary forces for the time being. This estimate is also correct, representing another aspect of the matter. The uneven political and economic development of China gives rise to the uneven development of her revolution. As a rule, revolution starts, grows and triumphs first in those places in which the counter-revolutionary forces are comparatively weak, while it has yet to start or grows very slowly in those places in which they are strong. Such has long been the situation for the Chinese revolution. It can be predicted that the general revolutionary situation will grow further at certain stages in the future but that the unevenness will remain. The transformation of this unevenness into a general evenness will require a very long time, very great efforts, and the Party's application of a correct line. Seeing that the revolutionary war led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union[28] took three years to conclude, we must be prepared to devote to the already protracted revolutionary war led by the Chinese Communist Party the longer time necessary to dispose of the domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary forces finally and thoroughly. The kind of impatience that was formerly displayed will never do. Moreover, sound revolutionary tactics must be worked out; we will never achieve great things if we keep on milling around within narrow confines. This does not mean that in China things have to be done slowly; no, they must be done boldly, because the danger of national subjugation does not allow us to slacken for a moment. From now on the revolution will certainly develop much faster than before, for both China and the world are approaching a new period of war and revolution. For all that, China's revolutionary war will remain a protracted one; this follows from the strength of imperialism and the uneven development of the revolution. We say that the present situation is one in which a new high tide in the national revolution is imminent and in which China is on the eve of a great new nation-wide revolution; this is one characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. This is a fact, and it represents one aspect of the matter. But we must also say that imperialism is still a force to be earnestly reckoned with, that the unevenness in the development of the revolutionary forces is a serious weakness, and that to defeat our enemies we must be prepared to fight a protracted war; this is another characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. This, too, is a fact, and represents another aspect of the matter. Both characteristics, both facts, teach and urge us to revise our tactics and change our ways of disposing our forces and carrying on the struggle to suit the situation. The present situation demands that we boldly discard all closed-doorism, form a broad united front and guard against adventurism. We must not plunge into decisive battles until the time is ripe and unless we have the necessary strength.

Here I shall not discuss the relation of adventurism to closed-doorism, or the possible dangers of adventurism as events unfold on a larger scale; that can be left for later. For the moment I shall confine myself to explaining that united front tactics and closed-door tactics are diametrically opposed.

The former requires the recruiting of large forces for the purpose of surrounding and annihilating the enemy.

The latter means fighting single-handed in desperate combat against a formidable enemy.

The advocates of united front tactics say, if we are to make a proper estimate of the possibility of forming a broad revolutionary national united front, a proper estimate must be made of the changes that may occur in the alignment of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces in China resulting from the attempt of Japanese imperialism to turn China into a colony. Without a proper estimate of the strong and weak points of the Japanese and Chinese counter-revolutionary forces and of the Chinese revolutionary forces, we shall be unable fully to understand the necessity of organizing a broad revolutionary national united front, or to take firm measures to break down closed-doorism, or to use the united front as a means of organizing and rallying millions of people and all the armies that are potentially friendly to the revolution for the purpose of advancing to strike at our main target, namely, Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, the Chinese traitors, or to use this tactical weapon of ours to strike at the main target before us, but instead we shall aim at a variety of targets so that our bullets will hit not the principal enemy but our lesser enemies or even our allies. This would mean failure to single out the principal enemy and waste of ammunition. It would mean inability to close in and isolate him. It would mean inability to draw to our side all those in the enemy camp and on the enemy front who have joined them under compulsion, and those who were our enemies yesterday but may become our friends today. It would in fact mean helping the enemy, holding back, isolating and constricting the revolution, and bringing it to a low ebb and even to defeat.

The advocates of closed-door tactics say the above arguments are all wrong. The forces of the revolution must be pure, absolutely pure, and the road of the revolution must be straight, absolutely straight. Nothing is correct except what is literally recorded in Holy Writ. The national bourgeoisie is entirely and eternally counter-revolutionary. Not an inch must be conceded to the rich peasants. The yellow trade unions must be fought tooth and nail. If we shake hands with Tsai Ting-kai, we must call him a counter-revolutionary at the same moment. Was there ever a cat that did not love fish or a warlord who was not a counter-revolutionary? Intellectuals are three-day revolutionaries whom it is dangerous to recruit. It follows therefore that closed-doorism is the sole wonder-working magic, while the united front is an opportunist tactic.

Comrades, which is right, the united front or closed-doorism? Which indeed is approved by Marxism-Leninism? I answer without the slightest hesitation — the united front and not closed-doorism. Three-year-olds have many ideas which are right, but they cannot be entrusted with serious national or world affairs because they do not understand them yet. Marxism-Leninism is opposed to the "infantile disorder" found in the revolutionary ranks. This infantile disorder is just what the confirmed exponents of closed-doorism advocate. Like every other activity in the world, revolution always follows a tortuous road and never a straight one. The alignment of forces in the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary camps can change, just as everything else in the world changes. The Party's new tactics of a broad united front start from the two fundamental facts that Japanese imperialism is bent on reducing all China to a colony and that China's revolutionary forces still have serious weaknesses. In order to attack the forces of the counter-revolution, what the revolutionary forces need today is to organize millions upon millions of the masses and move a mighty revolutionary army into action. The plain truth is that only a force of such magnitude can crush the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators. Therefore, united front tactics are the only Marxist-Leninist tactics. The tactics of closed-doorism are, on the contrary, the tactics of the regal isolationist. Closed-doorism just "drives the fish into deep waters and the sparrows into the thickets", and it will drive the millions upon millions of the masses, this mighty army, over to the enemy's side, which will certainly win his acclaim. In practice, closed-doorism is the faithful servant of the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators. Its adherents' talk of the "pure" and the "straight" will be condemned by Marxist-Leninists and commended by the Japanese imperialists. We definitely want no closed-doorism; what we want is the revolutionary national united front, which will spell death to the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC[29]

If our government has hitherto been based on the alliance of the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, from now on it must be so transformed as to include also the members of all other classes who are willing to take part in the national revolution.

At the present time, the basic task of such a government should be to oppose the annexation of China by Japanese imperialism. It will have a broader representation so that it may include those who are interested only in the national revolution and not in the agrarian revolution, and even, if they so desire, those who may oppose Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, though they are not opposed to the European and U.S. imperialists because of their close ties with the latter. Therefore, as a matter of principle, the programme of such a government should be in keeping with the basic task of fighting Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, and we should modify our past policies accordingly.

The special feature on the revolutionary side at present is the existence of a well-steeled Communist Party and Red Army. This is of crucial importance. Great difficulties would arise if they did not exist. Why? Because the traitors and collaborators in China are numerous and powerful and are sure to devise every possible means to wreck the united front; they will sow dissension by means of intimidation and bribery and by manoeuvring among various groupings, and will employ their armies to oppress and crush, one by one, all those weaker than themselves who want to part company with them and join us in fighting Japan. All this would hardly be avoidable if the anti-Japanese government and army were to lack this vital factor, *i.e.*, the Communist Party and the Red Army. The revolution failed in 1927 chiefly because, with the opportunist line then prevailing in the Communist Party, no effort was made to expand our own ranks (the workers' and peasants' movement and the armed forces led by the Communist Party), and exclusive reliance was placed on a temporary ally, the Kuomintang. The result was that when imperialism ordered its lackeys, the landlord and comprador classes, to spread their numerous tentacles and draw over first Chiang Kai-shek and then Wang Ching-wei, the revolution suffered defeat. In those days the revolutionary united front had no mainstay, no strong revolutionary armed forces, and so when the defections came thick and fast, the Communist Party was forced to fight single-handed and was powerless to foil the tactics of crushing their opponents one by one which were adopted by the imperialists and the Chinese counter-revolutionaries. True, we had the troops under Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, but they were not yet politically consolidated, and the Party was not very skilled in leading them, so that they were finally defeated. The lesson we paid for with our blood was that the lack of a hard core of revolutionary forces brings the revolution to defeat. Today things are quite different. Now we have a strong Communist Party and a strong Red Army, and we also have the base areas of the Red Army. Not only are the Communist Party and the Red Army serving as the initiator of a national united front against Japan today, but in the future too they will inevitably become the powerful mainstay of China's anti-Japanese government and army, capable of preventing the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek from carrying through their policy of disrupting this united front. However, we must be very vigilant because the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek will undoubtedly resort to every possible form of intimidation and bribery and of manoeuvring among the various groupings.

Naturally we cannot expect every section of the broad national united front against Japan to be as firm as the Communist Party and the Red Army. In the course of their activities some bad elements may withdraw from the united front under the influence of the enemy. However, we need not fear the loss of such people. While bad elements may drop out under the enemy's influence good people will I come in under ours. The national united front will live and grow as long as the Communist Party and the Red Army live and grow. Such is the leading role of the Communist Party and the Red Army in the national united front. The Communists are no longer political infants and are able to take care of themselves and to handle relations with their allies. If the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek can manoeuvre in relation to the revolutionary forces, the Communist Party can do the same in relation to the counter-revolutionary forces. If they can draw bad elements in our ranks over to their side, we can equally well draw their "bad elements" (good ones from our point of view) over to our side. If we can draw a larger number over to our side, this will deplete the enemy's ranks and strengthen ours. In short, two basic forces are now locked in struggle, and in the nature of things all the forces in between will have to line up on one side or the other. The Japanese imperialists' policy of subjugating China and Chiang Kai-shek's policy of betraying China will inevitably drive many people over to our side — either directly into joining the ranks of the Communist Party and the Red Army or into forming a united front with us. This will come about unless we pursue closed-door tactics.

Why change the "workers' and peasants' republic" into a "people's republic"?

Our government represents not only the workers and peasants but the whole nation. This has been implicit in our slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic republic, because the workers and peasants constitute 80 to 90 per cent of the population. The Ten-Point Programme[30] adopted by the Sixth National Congress of our Party embodies the interests of the whole nation and not of the workers and peasants alone. But the present situation requires us to change our slogan, to change it into one of a people's republic. The reason is that Japanese invasion has altered class relations in China, and it is now possible not only for the petty bourgeoisie but even for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese struggle.

The people's republic will definitely not represent the interests of the enemy classes. On the contrary, it will stand in direct opposition to the landlord and comprador classes, the lackeys of imperialism, and will not count them among the people. In the same way, Chiang Kai-shek's "National Government of the Republic of China" represents only the wealthiest, but not the common people whom it does not count as part of the nation. As 80 to 90 per cent of China's population is made up of workers and peasants, the people's republic ought to represent their interests first and foremost. However, by throwing off imperialist oppression to make China free and independent and by throwing off landlord oppression to free China from semi-feudalism, the people's republic will benefit not only the workers and peasants but other sections of the people too. The sum total of the interests of the workers, peasants and the rest of the people constitutes the interests of the whole Chinese nation. The comprador and the landlord classes also live on Chinese soil, but as they have no regard for the national interests, their interests clash with those of the majority. This small minority are the only ones that we break with and are clashing with, and we therefore have the right to call ourselves the representatives of the whole nation.

There is, of course, a clash of interests between the working class and the national bourgeoisie. We shall not be able to extend the national revolution successfully unless the working class, the vanguard of the national revolution, is accorded political and economic rights and is enabled to direct its strength against imperialism and its running dogs, the traitors. However if the national bourgeoisie joins the anti-imperialist united front, the working class and the national bourgeoisie will have interests in common. In the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the people's republic will not expropriate private property other than imperialist and feudal private property, and so far from confiscating the national bourgeoisie's industrial and commercial enterprises, it will encourage their development. We shall protect every national capitalist who does not support the imperialists or the Chinese traitors. In the stage of democratic revolution there are limits to the struggle between labour and capital. The labour laws of the people's republic will protect the interests of the workers, but will not prevent the national bourgeoisie from making profits or developing their industrial and commercial enterprises, because such development is bad for imperialism and good for the Chinese people. Thus it is clear that the people's republic will represent the interests of all strata opposed to imperialism and the feudal forces. The government of the people's republic will be based primarily on the workers and peasants, but will also include representatives of the other classes which are opposed to imperialism and the feudal forces.

But is it not dangerous to let the representatives of such classes join the government of the people's republic? No. The workers and peasants are the basic masses of the republic. In giving the urban petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and other sections of the population who support the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal programme the right to have a voice in the government of the people's republic and to work in it, the right to vote and stand for election, we must not allow the interests of the workers and peasants, the basic masses, to be violated. The essential part of our programme must be the protection of their interests. With their representatives comprising the majority in this government and with the Communist Party exercising leadership and working within it, there is a guarantee that the participation of other classes will present no danger. It is perfectly obvious that the Chinese revolution at the present stage is still a bourgeois-democratic and not a proletarian socialist revolution in nature. Only the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites[31] talk such nonsense as that China has already completed her bourgeois-democratic revolution and that any further revolution can only be socialist. The revolution of 1924-27 was a bourgeois-democratic revolution, which was not carried to completion but failed. The agrarian revolution which we have led since 1927 is also a bourgeois-democratic revolution, because it is directed not against capitalism, but against imperialism and feudalism. This will remain true of our revolution for quite a long time to come.

Basically, the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie are still the motive forces of the revolution, but now there may be the national bourgeoisie as well.

The change in the revolution will come later. In the future the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a socialist revolution. As to when the transition will take place, that will depend on the presence of the necessary conditions, and it may take quite a long time. We should not hold forth about transition until all the necessary political and economic conditions are present and until it is advantageous and not detrimental to the overwhelming majority of the people throughout China. It is wrong to have any doubts on this matter and expect the transition to take place soon, as some of our comrades did when they maintained that the transition in the revolution would begin the moment the democratic revolution began to triumph in key provinces. They did so because they failed to understand what kind of country China is politically and economically and to realize that, compared with Russia, China will find it more difficult, and require much more time and effort, to complete her democratic revolution politically and economically.

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Finally, a word is necessary about the relation between the Chinese and the world revolution.

Ever since the monster of imperialism came into being, the affairs of the world have become so closely interwoven that it is impossible to separate them. We Chinese have the spirit to fight the enemy to the last drop of our blood, the determination to recover our lost territory by our own efforts, and the ability to stand on our own feet in the family of nations. But this does not mean that we can dispense with international support; no, today international support is necessary for the revolutionary struggle of any nation or country. There is the old adage, "In the Spring and Autumn Era there were no righteous wars."[32] This is even truer of imperialism today, for it is only the oppressed nations and the oppressed classes that can wage just wars. All wars anywhere in the world in which the people rise up to fight their oppressors are just struggles. The February and October Revolutions in Russia were just wars. The revolutions of the people in various European countries after World War I were just struggles. In China, the Anti-Opium War,[33] the War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom,[34] the Yi Ho Tuan War,[35] the Revolutionary War of 1911,[36] the Northern Expedition of 1926-27, the Agrarian Revolutionary War from 1927 to the present, and the present resistance to Japan and punitive actions against traitors — these are all just wars. Now, in the mounting tide of nation-wide struggle against Japan and of world-wide struggle against fascism, just wars will spread all over China and the globe. All just wars support each other, while all unjust wars should be turned into just wars — this is the Leninist line.[37] Our war against Japan needs the support of the people of the whole world and, above all, the support of the people of the Soviet Union, which they will certainly give us because they and we are bound together in a common cause. In the past, the Chinese revolutionary forces were temporarily cut off from the world revolutionary forces by Chiang Kai-shek, and in this sense we were isolated. Now the situation has changed, and changed to our advantage. Henceforth it will continue to change to our advantage. We can no longer be isolated. This provides a necessary condition for China's victory in the war against Japan and for victory in the Chinese revolution.

NOTES

[1] The Twenty-one Demands on the Yuan Shih-kai government were presented by the Japanese imperialists on January 18, 1915. On May 7, they sent an ultimatum demanding a reply within forty-eight hours. The demands were divided into five parts. The first four contained the following: to transfer to Japan the rights Germany had seized in Shantung and to grant Japan additional rights in the province; to grant rights to the Japanese to lease or own land in southern Manchuria and eastern Mongolia and to establish residence, engage in industry and commerce, and have exclusive railway building and mining rights there; to reorganize the Han-Yeh-Ping Iron and Steel Company as a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise; and to undertake not to lease or cede any harbours or islands along China's coastline to any third power. The fifth part contained demands that Japan should control China's political, financial, military and police affairs and should build vital railway lines connecting the provinces of Hupeh, Kiangsi and Kwangtung. Yuan Shih-kai accepted all the demands except those in the fifth part, about which he pleaded for "further negotiations". Thanks to the unanimous opposition of the Chinese people, Japan failed to get her demands implemented.

[2] Yuan Shih-kai was the head of the Northern warlords in the last years of the Ching Dynasty. After the Ching Dynasty was overthrown by the Revolution of

1911, he usurped the presidency of the Republic and organized the first government of the Northern warlords, which represented the big landlord and big comprador classes. He did this by relying on counter-revolutionary armed force and on the support of the imperialists and by taking advantage of the conciliationist nature of the bourgeoisie then leading the revolution. In 1915 he wanted to make himself emperor and, to gain the support of the Japanese imperialists, accepted the Twenty-one Demands with which Japan aimed at obtaining exclusive control of all China. In December of the same year an uprising against his assumption of the throne took place in Yunnan Province and promptly won country-wide response and support. Yuan Shih-kai died in Peking in June 1916.

[3] The Nine-Power Conference in Washington was called by the U.S. government in November 1921; China, Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Japan were invited. It was a struggle between the United States and Japan for hegemony in the Far East. On February 6, 1922, a nine-power treaty was concluded on the basis of the principle, advanced by the United States, of the "open door" or "equal opportunities for all nations in China". The aim of this treaty was to create a situation in which the imperialist powers had joint control of China and it actually cleared the way for exclusive domination by the U.S. imperialists, the purpose being to frustrate Japan's plans for exclusive domination.

[4] On September 18, 1931, the Japanese "Kwantung Army" in northeastern China seized Shenyang. Under Chiang Kai-shek's order of "absolute non-resistance", the Chinese troops at Shenyang and elsewhere in the Northeast (the Northeastern Army) withdrew to the south of Shanhaikuan, and consequently the Japanese forces rapidly occupied the provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang. This act of Japanese aggression has become known as the "September 18th Incident".

[5] The "four northeastern provinces" were then Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol, which correspond to the present Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang Provinces, the northeastern part of Hopei Province north of the Great Wall and the eastern part of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. After the September 18th Incident, the Japanese invaders occupied Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang and later, in 1933, seized Jehol.

[6] At the instigation of the Japanese, a puppet regime called the "Eastern Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Administration" was established in twenty-two counties in eastern Hopei by the Kuomintang traitor Yin Ju-keng on November 25, 1935. This became known as the Eastern Hopei Incident.

[7] The diplomatic talks between the Chiang Kai-shek government and the Japanese government discussed the so-called "Three Principles of Hirota", *i.e.*, the "Three Principles for Dealing with China" put forward by Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota, namely, (1) suppression by China of all anti-Japanese movements; (2) establishment of economic co-operation between China, Japan and "Manchukuo"; and (3) joint defence by China and Japan against communism. On January 21, 1936, Hirota told the Diet that the Chinese government "has accepted the three principles proposed by the Empire".

[8] The year 1935 witnessed a new upsurge in the popular patriotic movement throughout the country. Students in Peking, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, held a patriotic demonstration on December 9, putting forward such slogans as "Stop the civil war and unite to resist foreign aggression" and "Down with Japanese imperialism". This movement broke through the long reign of terror imposed by the Kuomintang government in league with the Japanese invaders and very quickly won the people's support throughout the country. It is

known as the "December 9th Movement". The outcome was that new changes manifested themselves in the relations among the various classes in the country and the Anti-Japanese National United Front proposed by the Communist Party of China became the openly advocated policy of all patriotic people. The Chiang Kai-shek government with its traitorous policy became very isolated.

[9] At the time of this report Chiang Kai-shek, after selling out the Northeast to Japan, was selling out northern China while actively keeping up his fighting against the Red Army. Therefore the Chinese Communist Party had to do its best to expose him as a traitor, and naturally he was not included in the Anti-Japanese National United Front proposed by the Party. But already in this report Comrade Mao Tse-tung mentioned the possible disintegration of the camp of the Chinese landlord and comprador classes as a result of the contradictions among the imperialist powers. And Japan's attack on northern China did subsequently lead to serious clashes of interest between Japanese and Anglo-American imperialism. The Chinese Communist Party maintained that the Chiang Kai-shek clique, with its close ties with Anglo-American imperialist interests, might change its attitude to Japan at its masters' bidding, and therefore it adopted the policy of compelling Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan. On its return to northern Shensi from Shansi, in May 1936 the Red Army appealed directly to the Nanking Kuomintang government for an end to the civil war and for united resistance to Japan. In August of the same year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party addressed a letter to the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee, calling for the formation of a bi-partisan united front against Japan and negotiations between the representatives of both parties. But Chiang Kai-shek rejected these proposals. It was not until December 1936 when Chiang Kai-shek was detained in Sian by Kuomintang army officers who favoured alliance with the Communists against Japan that he was compelled to accept the Communist Party's demand for ending the civil war and resisting Japan.

[10] Tsai Ting-kai was deputy commander of the Kuomintang's 19th Route Army and commander of one of its corps, the two other leaders being Chen Ming-shu and Chiang Kuang-nai. This army, which had fought the Red Army in Kiangsi, was transferred to Shanghai after the September 18th Incident. The mounting anti-Japanese tide of the people in Shanghai and the whole country had a great impact on the 19th Route Army. When the Japanese marines attacked in Shanghai during the night of January 28, 1932, the Army and the people of Shanghai put up a joint resistance. However, the battle was lost through the treachery of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei. Later, on Chiang's orders, the 19th Route Army was transferred to Fukien to fight the Red Army again. But the leaders of the Army gradually came to realize the futility of such fighting. In November 1933, allying themselves with Kuomintang forces under Li Chi-shen and others, they publicly renounced Chiang Kai-shek, established the "People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China" in Fukien, and concluded an agreement with the Red Army to resist Japan and oppose Chiang Kai-shek. The 19th Route Army and Fukien People's Government collapsed under the attacks of Chiang's troops. From then on, Tsai Ting-kai and others gradually moved towards a position of co-operation with the Communist Party.

[11] Feng Yu-hsiang, together with the forces under his command in Suiyuan Province, announced his break with the Northern warlord clique and joined the revolution when the revolutionary Northern Expeditionary Army reached Wuhan in September 1926. Early in 1927, his troops moved in from Shensi to attack Honan Province in co-ordination with the Northern Expeditionary Army. Although Feng

participated in anti-Communist activities following the betrayal of the revolution by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei in 1927, there was always a clash of interests between him and the Chiang Kai-shek clique. After Japan invaded China on September 18, 1931 he favoured resistance and in May 1933 co-operated with the Communist Party in forming the people's Anti-Japanese Allied Army in Changchiakou. His efforts came to naught in August under the pressure of both Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the Japanese invaders. In his later years Feng continued to co-operate with the Communist Party.

[12] An uprising took place at Ningtu, Kiangsi in December 1931 within the Kuomintang's 26th Route Army, which was sent by Chiang Kai-shek to attack the Red Army in Kiangsi Province. Led by Comrades Chao Po-sheng and Tung Chen-tang, more than ten thousand officers and men rose up and joined the Red Army in response to the Communist call for resistance to Japan.

[13] Ma Chan-shan was an officer of the Kuomintang's Northeastern Army whose troops were stationed in Heilungkiang. He and his men fought the Japanese invaders who drove towards Heilungkiang via Liaoning after the September 18th Incident.

[14] Hu Han-min, a well-known Kuomintang politician, was an opponent of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's policy of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party and was Chiang Kai-shek's accomplice in the counter-revolutionary coup d'état of April 12, 1927. Later he fell out with Chiang in a struggle for power and was held in detention by the latter. Set free after the September 18th Incident, he left Nanking for Canton where he instigated the warlords of Kwangtung and Kwangsi to oppose Chiang Kai-shek's Nanking government for a considerable period of time.

[15] The Six-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation was the "Chinese People's Basic Programme for Fighting Japan" put forward by the Chinese Communist Party in 1934 and published over the signatures of Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen) and others. The programme consisted of the following points: (1) mobilize all sea, land and air forces to fight Japan; (2) mobilize the people throughout the country; (3) arm all the people; (4) confiscate the property of the Japanese imperialists in China and of the traitors to defray war expenditure; (5) establish an all-China committee for national armed defence, to be elected by the representatives of workers, peasants, soldiers, students and businessmen; and (6) form an alliance with all the forces opposed to the Japanese imperialists, and establish friendly relations with all countries observing benevolent neutrality.

[16] These warlords were Chen Chi-tang of Kwangtung and Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi of Kwangsi.

[17] The Chiang Kai-shek gang of bandits described the revolutionary people as "bandits" and their armed attacks upon and massacre of the revolutionary people as "bandit suppression".

[18] Comrade Jen Pi-shih was a veteran member of the Chinese Communist Party and one of its first organizers. He was a member of the Party's Central Committee from its Fifth National Congress in 1927 onwards. He was elected to the Political Bureau at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in 1931. In 1933 he served as secretary of the Provincial Party Committee of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area and concurrently as political commissar of the Sixth Army Group of the Red Army. When the Sixth and Second Army Groups joined forces and formed the Second Front Army, he was appointed its political commissar. He was Director of the General Political Department of the Eighth Route Army in the first years of the War of Resistance. In 1940 he began to serve in the Secretariat of the Party's

Central Committee. At the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee in 1945 he was again elected a member of the Political Bureau and of the Secretariat. Comrade Jen Pi-shih died in Peking on October 27, 1950.

[19] The Sixth Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, originally stationed in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, broke through the enemy's siege and shifted its position in August 1934 on the orders of the Party's Central Committee. In October it joined forces with the Second Army Group led by Comrade Ho Lung in eastern Kweichow, and together they formed the Second Front Army of the Red Army and created the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow revolutionary base area.

[20] In October 1934 the First, Third and Fifth Army Groups of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (that is, the First Front Army of the Red Army, also known as the Central Red Army) set out from Changting and Ninghua in western Fukien and from Juichin, Yutu and other places in southern Kiangsi and started a major strategic movement. In traversing the eleven provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi, crossing perpetually snow-capped mountains and trackless grasslands, sustaining untold hardships and frustrating the enemy's repeated encirclements, pursuits, obstructions and interceptions, the Red Army covered 25,000 *li* (12,500 kilometres) on this march and finally arrived triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi in October 1935.

[21] The Red Army in the Szechuan-Shensi border area was the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In March 1935, it shifted from its base in the Szechuan-Shensi border area to the borders of Szechuan and Sikang Provinces. In June, it joined forces with the First Front Army in Maokung in western Szechuan and advanced northward by two routes, a right route and a left route. But on arriving in the Maoerhkai area near Sungpan in September, Chang Kuo-tao of the Fourth Front Army led the troops on the left route in a southward direction, in defiance of the Central Committee's orders, thus causing a disruption in the Red Army. The Second Front Army, which had broken through the enemy's siege and left the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow border area, arrived at Kantze, Sikang Province, in June 1936 via Hunan, Kweichow and Yunnan, and there it joined forces with the Fourth Front Army. Acting against Chang Kuo-tao's wishes, the comrades in the Fourth Front Army resumed the shift northward together with the Second Front Army. In October, the entire Second Front Army and a part of the Fourth Front Army arrived in northern Shensi and succeeded in joining forces with the First Front Army.

[22] Chang Kuo-tao was a renegade from the Chinese revolution. Speculating on the revolution, he joined the Chinese Communist Party in his youth. In the Party he made many mistakes and ended by committing grave crimes. Most notoriously, in 1935 he opposed the Red Army's northward march, advocating a defeatist and liquidationist withdrawal by the Red Army to the minority-nationality areas on the Szechuan-Sikang border, and he engaged in openly traitorous activities against the Party and the Central Committee, established his own bogus central committee, disrupted the unity of the Party and the Red Army, and caused heavy losses to its Fourth Front Army. Thanks to patient education by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee, the Fourth Front Army and its numerous cadres soon came back under the correct leadership of the Central Committee and played an honourable part in subsequent struggles. Chang Kuo-tao, however, proved incorrigible, escaped

by himself from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region in the spring of 1938 and joined the Kuomintang secret police.

[23] The Central Red Army, or the First Front Army, refers to the Red Army that was built up in the Kiangsi-Fukien area directly under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

[24] Pan Ku, according to Chinese mythology, was the creator of the world and the first ruler of mankind. The Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors were legendary rulers in ancient China.

[25] In July 1935, the Kuomintang troops started their third "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Shensi-Kansu revolutionary base area. The 26th Army Corps of the Northern Shensi Red Army routed two enemy brigades in the eastern sector and drove the enemy to the east of the Yellow River. In September, the 25th Army Corps of the Red Army, which had been operating in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base area, joined forces with the Northern Shensi Red Army after arriving in northern Shensi via southern Shensi and eastern Kansu, and together they formed the 15th Army Group of the Red Army. In the Kanchuan-Laoshan campaign, this army group wiped out most of the enemy 110th Division, killed its divisional commander and in a subsequent action destroyed four battalions of the enemy's 107th Division at Yulinchiao, Kanchuan County. The enemy organized new attacks and put Tung Ying-pin (an army corps commander of the Northeastern Army) in command of five divisions, which mounted an attack along two routes; the division on the east route drove northward by way of Lochuan and Fuhsien and the other four divisions on the west route drove along the Hulu River towards Fuhsien, northern Shensi, via Chingyang and Hoshui in Kansu. By October, the Central Red Army reached northern Shensi. In the following month the Central Red Army and the 15th Army Group jointly wiped out the enemy's 109th Division in Chihlochen, southwest of Fuhsien, and eliminated one regiment of the enemy's 106th Division at Heishuisze in the course of pursuit. Thus the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Shensi-Kansu border area was completely smashed.

[26] When the main forces of the Red Army in southern China shifted position during 1934-35, they left behind some units to operate as guerrillas. These guerrilla units held out in the following fourteen base areas in eight provinces: southern Chekiang, northern Fukien, eastern Fukien, southern Fukien, western Fukien, northeastern Kiangsi, the Fukien-Kiangsi border, the Kwangtung-Kiangsi border, southern Hunan, the Hunan-Kiangsi border, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border, the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border, the Tungpai Mountains in southern Honan and Hainan Island off the coast of Kwangtung.

[27] After the Japanese imperialists occupied the Northeast in 1931, the Chinese Communist Party called upon the people to put up armed resistance. It organized anti-Japanese guerrilla units, formed the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army and rendered assistance to various volunteer forces fighting the enemy. In 1934, under the leadership of the Party, all these forces were reorganized into the single Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, with the outstanding Communist Yang Ching-yu as Commander-in-Chief. This army kept up anti-Japanese guerrilla war in the Northeast for a long time. The anti-Japanese guerrilla war in eastern Hopei refers to the peasant uprising against Japan there in May 1935.

[28] The revolutionary war led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union refers to the fighting from 1918 to 1920 in which the Soviet people beat off armed interven-

tion by Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Poland, etc., and suppressed the White Guard rebellion.

[29] The political power and the policies of a people's republic, as here enunciated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, were made a reality in the people's Liberated Areas under the leadership of the Communist Party during the War of Resistance. That was why the Party was able to lead the people behind the enemy lines in waging a victorious war against the Japanese invaders. After Japan's surrender, the Third Revolutionary Civil War broke out. As the war went on, the area liberated by the people gradually extended to the whole of China, and in this way the unified People's Republic of China was born. Thus Comrade Mao Tse-tung's ideal of a people's republic was eventually realized throughout the country.

[30] The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in July 1928 adopted the following Ten-Point Programme: (1) overthrow imperialist rule; (2) confiscate foreign capitalist enterprises and banks; (3) unify China and recognize the right of the nationalities to self-determination; (4) overthrow the Kuomintang warlord government; (5) establish a government of councils of workers, peasants and soldiers; (6) institute the eight-hour day, increase wages, and establish unemployment relief and social insurance; (7) confiscate the land of all landlords and distribute the land among the peasants; (8) improve the living conditions of the soldiers, give land and jobs to ex-soldiers; (9) abolish all exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies and adopt a consolidated progressive tax; and (10) unite with the world proletariat, unite with the Soviet Union.

[31] Originally an anti-Leninist faction in the Russian working-class movement, the Trotskyite group later degenerated into a downright counter-revolutionary gang. In his report to the plenary session of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in 1937, Comrade Stalin explained the course this group of renegades had run as follows:

> In the past, seven or eight years ago, Trotskyism was one of such political trends in the working class, an anti-Leninist trend, it is true, and therefore profoundly mistaken, but nevertheless a political trend. . . . Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working class, but a gang without principle and without ideas, of wreckers and diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies, murderers, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, working in the pay of the intelligence services of foreign states.

After the failure of the Chinese revolution in 1927, a small number of Trotskyites appeared in China, too. Ganging up with Chen Tu-hsiu and other renegades, they formed a small counter-revolutionary clique in 1929 and spread such counter-revolutionary propaganda as that the Kuomintang had already completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and they became a dirty imperialist and Kuomintang instrument against the people. The Chinese Trotskyites shamelessly joined the Kuomintang secret service. After the September 18th Incident, to fulfil the order given by the criminal renegade Trotsky "not to impede the occupation of China by imperial Japan", they began collaborating with Japanese secret agents, received subsidies from them and engaged in all kinds of activities facilitating Japanese aggression.

[32] This quotation is from *Mencius*. Mencius made this remark because in the period known as the Spring and Autumn Era (722-481 B.C.) the feudal princes of China incessantly fought one another for power.

[33] Faced with the opposition of the Chinese people to her traffic in opium, Britain sent forces in 1840-4 to invade Kwangtung and other coastal regions of China, under the pretext of protecting trade. Led by Lin Tse-hsu, the troops in

Kwangtung fought a war of resistance. A "Quell-the-British Corps" which was spontaneously organized by the people of Canton also dealt the British aggressors severe blows.

[34] The War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was a peasant revolutionary war in the middle of the 19th century against the feudal rule and national oppression of the Ching Dynasty. In January 1851 Hung Hsiu-chuan, Yang Hsiu-ching and other leaders of this revolution staged an uprising in Chintien Village of Kueiping County in Kwangsi and proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In 1852 the peasant army, proceeding northward from Kwangsi, marched through Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei and in 1853 captured Nanking, the main city on the lower Yangtse. A part of the forces then continued the drive north and pushed to the vicinity of Tientsin. However, the Taiping army failed to build stable base areas in the places it occupied, and also, after establishing its capital in Nanking the leading group in the army committed many political and military errors; therefore it could not withstand the combined onslaught of the counter-revolutionary forces of the Ching government and of the British, U.S. and French aggressors, and it was finally defeated in 1864.

[35] The Yi Ho Tuan War was the vast spontaneous movement of the peasants and handicraftsmen in northern China in 1900. Forming themselves into mystical secret societies, these peasants and handicraftsmen carried on armed struggle against the imperialists. But the movement was put down with indescribable savagery, and Peking and Tientsin were occupied by the joint forces of eight imperialist powers.

[36] For the Revolution of 1911, see "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan", Note 3, p. 56 of this volume.

[37] See V. I. Lenin, "The War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1950, Vol. XXIII. See also *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, *Short Course*, Chapter 6, Section 3.

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR

December 1936

CHAPTER I

HOW TO STUDY WAR

1. THE LAWS OF WAR ARE DEVELOPMENTAL

The laws of war are a problem which anyone directing a war must study and solve.

The laws of revolutionary war are a problem which anyone directing a revolutionary war must study and solve.

The laws of China's revolutionary war are a problem which anyone directing China's revolutionary war must study and solve.

We are now engaged in a war; our war is a revolutionary war; and our revolutionary war is being waged in this semi-colonial and semi-feudal country of China. Therefore, we must study not only the laws of war in general, but the specific laws of revolutionary war, and the even more specific laws of revolutionary war in China.

It is well known that when you do anything, unless you understand its actual circumstances, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws governing it, or know how to do it, or be able to do it well.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this work to sum up the experience of the Second Revolutionary Civil War and used it for his lectures at the Red Army College in Northern Shensi. Only five chapters were completed. The chapters on the strategic offensive, political work and other problems were left undone because he was too busy in consequence of the Sian Incident. This work, a result of a major inner-Party controversy on military questions during the Second Revolutionary Civil War, gives expression to one line in military affairs as against another. The enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held at Tsunyi in January 1935 settled

War is the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, between classes, nations, states, or political groups, and it has existed ever since the emergence of private property and of classes. Unless you understand the actual circumstances of war, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws of war, or know how to direct war, or be able to win victory.

Revolutionary war, whether a revolutionary class war or a revolutionary national war, has its own specific circumstances and nature, in addition to the circumstances and nature of war in general. Therefore, besides the general laws of war, it has specific laws of its own. Unless you understand its specific circumstances and nature, unless you understand its specific laws, you will not be able to direct a revolutionary war and wage it successfully.

China's revolutionary war, whether civil war or national war, is waged in the specific environment of China and so has its own specific circumstances and nature distinguishing it both from war in general and from revolutionary war in general. Therefore, besides the laws of war in general and of revolutionary war in general, it has specific laws of its own. Unless you understand them, you will not be able to win in China's revolutionary war.

Therefore, we must study the laws of war in general, we must also study the laws of revolutionary war, and, finally, we must study the laws of China's revolutionary war.

Some people hold a wrong view, which we refuted long ago. They say that it is enough merely to study the laws of war in general, or, to put it more concretely, that it is enough merely to follow the military manuals published by the reactionary Chinese government or the reactionary military academies in China. They do not see that these manuals give merely the laws of war in general and moreover are wholly copied from abroad, and that if we copy and apply them exactly without the slightest change in form or content, we shall be "cutting the feet to fit the shoes" and be defeated. Their argument is: why should knowledge which has been acquired at the cost of

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the controversy about the military line, reaffirmed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's views and repudiated the erroneous line. In October 1935 the Central Committee moved to northern Shensi, and in December Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a report "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism" in which problems concerning the political line of the Party in the Second Revolutionary Civil War were systematically solved. He wrote this work a year later, in 1936, to explain the problems of strategy in China's revolutionary war in a systematic way.

blood be of no use? They fail to see that although we must cherish the earlier experience thus acquired, we must also cherish experience acquired at the cost of our own blood.

Others hold a second wrong view which we also refuted long ago. They say that it is enough merely to study the experience of revolutionary war in Russia, or, to put it more concretely, that it is enough merely to follow the laws by which the civil war in the Soviet Union was directed and the military manuals published by Soviet military organizations. They do not see that these laws and manuals embody the specific characteristics of the civil war and the Red Army in the Soviet Union, and that if we copy and apply them without allowing any change, we shall also be "cutting the feet to fit the shoes" and be defeated. Their argument is: since our war, like the war in the Soviet Union, is a revolutionary war, and since the Soviet Union won victory, how then can there be any alternative but to follow the Soviet example? They fail to see that while we should set special store by the war experience of the Soviet Union, because it is the most recent experience of revolutionary war and was acquired under the guidance of Lenin and Stalin, we should likewise cherish the experience of China's revolutionary war, because there are many factors that are specific to the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army.

Still others hold a third wrong view, which we likewise refuted long ago. They say that the most valuable experience is that of the Northern Expedition of 1926-27 and that we must learn from it, or, to put it more concretely, that we must imitate the Northern Expedition in driving straight ahead to seize the big cities. They fail to see that while the experience of the Northern Expedition should be studied, it should not be copied and applied mechanically, because the circumstances of our present war are different. We should take from the Northern Expedition only what still applies today, and work out something of our own in the light of present conditions.

Thus the different laws for directing different wars are determined by different circumstances of those wars—differences in their time, place and nature. As regards the time factor, both war and its laws develop; each historical stage has its special characteristics, and hence the laws of war in each historical stage have their special characteristics and cannot be mechanically applied in another stage. As for the nature of war, since revolutionary war and counter-revolutionary war both have their special characteristics, the laws governing them also have their own characteristics, and those applying to one cannot be mechanically transferred to the other. As for the factor of place, since each country or nation, especially a large country or nation, has its own characteristics, the laws of war for each country or nation also have their own characteristics, and here, too, those applying to one cannot be mechanically transferred to the other. In studying the laws for directing wars that occur at different historical stages, that differ in nature and that are waged in different places and by different nations, we must fix our attention on the characteristics and development of each, and must oppose a mechanical approach to the problem of war.

Nor is this all. It signifies progress and development in a commander who is initially capable of commanding only a small formation, if he becomes capable of commanding a big one. There is also a difference between operating in one locality and in many. It likewise signifies progress and development in a commander who is initially capable of operating only in a locality he knows well, if he becomes capable of operating in many other localities. Owing to technical, tactical and strategic developments on the enemy side and on our own, the circumstances also differ from stage to stage within a given war. It signifies still more progress and development in a commander who is capable of exercising command in a war at its lower stages, if he becomes capable of exercising command in its higher stages. A commander who remains capable of commanding only a formation of a certain size, only in a certain locality and at a certain stage in the development of a war shows that he has made no progress and has not developed. There are some people who, contented with a single skill or a peep-hole view, never make any progress; they may play some role in the revolution at a given place and time, but not a significant one. We need directors of war who can play a significant role. All the laws for directing war develop as history develops and as war develops; nothing is changeless.

2. THE AIM OF WAR IS TO ELIMINATE WAR

War, this monster of mutual slaughter among men, will be finally eliminated by the progress of human society, and in the not too distant future too. But there is only one way to eliminate it and that is to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national revolutionary war, and to oppose counter-revolutionary class war with revolutionary class war. History knows only two kinds of war, just and unjust. We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are just. Mankind's era of wars will be brought to an end by our own efforts, and beyond doubt the war we wage is part of the final battle. But also beyond doubt the war we face will be part of the biggest and most ruthless of all wars. The biggest and most ruthless of unjust counter-revolutionary wars is hanging over us, and the vast majority of mankind will be ravaged unless we raise the banner of a just war. The banner of mankind's just war is the banner of mankind's salvation. The banner of China's just war is the banner of China's salvation.- A war waged by the great majority of mankind and of the Chinese-people is beyond doubt a just war, a most lofty and glorious undertaking for the salvation of mankind and China, and a bridge to a new era in world history. When human society advances to the point where classes and states are eliminated, there will be no more wars, counter-revolutionary or revolutionary, unjust or just; that will be the era of perpetual peace for mankind. Our study of the laws of revolutionary war springs from the desire to eliminate all wars; herein lies the distinction between us Communists and all the exploiting classes.

3. STRATEGY IS THE STUDY OF THE LAWS OF A WAR SITUATION AS A WHOLE

Wherever there is war, there is a war situation as a whole. The war situation as a whole may cover the entire world, may cover an entire country, or may cover an independent guerrilla zone or an independent major operational front. Any war situation which acquires a comprehensive consideration of its various aspects and stages forms a war situation as a whole.

The task of the science of strategy is to study those laws for directing a war that govern a war situation as a whole. The task of the science of campaigns and the science of tactics[1] is to study those laws for directing a war that govern a partial situation.

Why is it necessary for the commander of a campaign or a tactical operation to understand the laws of strategy to some degree? Because an understanding of the whole facilitates the handling of the part, and because the part is subordinate to the whole. The view that strategic victory is determined by tactical successes alone is wrong because it overlooks the fact that victory or defeat in a war is first and foremost a question of whether the situation as a whole and its various stages are properly taken into account. If there are serious defects or mistakes in taking the situation as a whole and its various stages into account, the war is sure to be lost. "One careless move loses the whole game" refers to a move affecting the situation as a whole, a move decisive for the whole situation, and not to a move of a partial nature, a move which is not decisive for the whole situation. As in chess, so in war.

But the situation as a whole cannot be detached from its parts and become independent of them, for it is made up of all its parts. Sometimes certain parts may suffer destruction or defeat without seriously affecting the situation as a whole, because they are not decisive for it. Some defeats or failures in tactical operations or campaigns do not lead to deterioration in the war situation as a whole, because they are not of decisive significance. But the loss of most of the campaigns making up the war situation as a whole, or of one or two decisive campaigns, immediately changes the whole situation. Here, "most of the campaigns" or "one or two campaigns" are decisive. In the history of war, there are instances where defeat in a single battle nullified all the advantages of a series of victories, and there are also instances where victory in a single battle after many defeats opened up a new situation. In those instances the "series of victories" and the "many defeats" were partial in nature and not decisive for the situation as a whole, while "defeat in a single battle" or "victory in a single battle" played the decisive role. All this explains the importance of taking into account the situation as a whole. What is most important for the person in over-all command is to concentrate on attending to the war situation as a whole. The main point is that, according to the circumstances, he should concern himself with the problems of the grouping of his military units and formations, the relations between campaigns, the relations between various operational stages, and the relations between our activities as a whole and the enemy's activities as a whole—all these problems demand his greatest care and effort, and if he ignores them and immerses himself in secondary problems, he can hardly avoid setbacks.

The relationship between the whole and the part holds not only for the relationship between strategy and campaign but also for that between campaign and tactics. Examples are to be found in the relation between the operations of a division and those of its regiments and battalions, and in the relation between the operations of a company and those of its platoons and squads. The commanding officer at any level should centre his attention on the most important and decisive problem or action in the whole situation he is handling, and not on other problems or actions.

What is important or decisive should be determined not by general or abstract considerations, but according to the concrete circumstances. In a military operation the direction and point of assault should be selected according to the actual situation of the enemy, the terrain, and the strength of our own forces at the moment. One must see to it that the soldiers do not overeat when supplies are abundant, and take care that they do not go hungry when supplies are short. In the White areas the mere leakage of a piece of information may cause defeat in a subsequent engagement, but in the Red areas such leakage is often not a very serious matter. It is necessary for the high commanders to participate personally in certain battles but not in others. For a military school, the most important question is the selection of a director and instructors and the adoption of a training programme. For a mass meeting, the main thing is mobilizing the masses to attend and putting forward suitable slogans. And so on and so forth. In a word, the principle is to centre our attention on the important links that have a bearing on the situation as a whole.

The only way to study the laws governing a war situation as a whole is to do some hard thinking. For what pertains to the situation as a whole is not visible to the eye, and we can understand it only by hard thinking; there is no other way. But because the situation as a whole is made up of parts, people with experience of the parts, experience of campaigns and tactics, can understand matters of a higher order provided they are willing to think hard. The problems of strategy include the following:

> Giving proper consideration to the relation between the enemy and ourselves.
>
> Giving proper consideration to the relation between various campaigns or between various operational stages.
>
> Giving proper consideration to those parts which have a bearing on (are decisive for) the situation as a whole.
>
> Giving proper consideration to the special features contained in the general situation.

Giving proper consideration to the relation between the front and the rear.

Giving proper consideration to the distinction as well as the connection between losses and replacements, between fighting and resting, between concentration and dispersion, between attack and defence, between advance and retreat, between concealment and exposure, between the main attack and supplementary attacks, between assault and containing action, between centralized command and decentralized command, between protracted war and war of quick decision, between positional war and mobile war, between our own forces and friendly forces, between one military arm and another, between higher and lower levels, between cadres and the rank and file, between old and new soldiers, between senior and junior cadres, between old and new cadres, between Red areas and White areas, between old Red areas and new ones, between the central district and the borders of a given base area, between the warm season and the cold season, between victory and defeat, between large and small troop formations, between the regular army and the guerrilla forces, between destroying the enemy and winning over the masses, between expanding the Red Army and consolidating it, between military work and political work, between past and present tasks, between present and future tasks, between tasks arising from one set of circumstances and tasks arising from another, between fixed fronts and fluid fronts, between civil war and national war, between one historical stage and another, etc., etc.

None of these problems of strategy is visible to the eye, and yet, if we think hard, we can comprehend, grasp and master them all, that is, we can raise the important problems concerning a war or concerning military operations to the higher plane of principle and solve them. Our task in studying the problems of strategy is to attain this goal.

4. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO BE GOOD AT LEARNING

Why have we organized the Red Army? For the purpose of defeating the enemy. Why do we study the laws of war? For the purpose of applying them in war.

To learn is no easy matter and to apply what one has learned is even harder. Many people appear impressive when discoursing on military science in classrooms or in books, but when it comes to actual fighting, some win battles and others lose them. Both the history of war and our own experience in war have proved this point.

Where then does the crux lie?

In real life, we cannot ask for "ever-victorious generals", who are few and far between in history. What we can ask for is generals who are brave and sagacious and who normally win their battles in the course of a war, generals who combine wisdom with courage. To become both wise and courageous one must acquire a method, a method to be employed in learning as well as in applying what has been learned.

What method? The method is to familiarize ourselves with all aspects of the enemy situation and our own, to discover the laws governing the actions of both sides and to make use of these laws in our own operations.

The military manuals issued in many countries point both to the necessity of a "flexible application of principles according to circumstances" and to the measures to be taken in case of defeat. They point to the former in order to warn a commander against subjectively committing mistakes through too rigid an application of principles, and to the latter in order to enable him to cope with the situation after he has committed subjective mistakes or after unexpected and irresistible changes have occurred in the objective circumstances.

Why are subjective mistakes made? Because the way the forces in a war or a battle are disposed or directed does not fit the conditions of the given time and place, because subjective direction does not correspond to, or is at variance with, the objective conditions, in other words, because the contradiction between the subjective and the objective has not been resolved. People can hardly avoid such situations whatever they are doing, but some people prove themselves more competent than others. As in any job we demand a comparatively high degree of competence, so in war we demand more victories or, conversely, fewer defeats. Here the crux is to bring the subjective and the objective into proper correspondence with each other.

Take an example in tactics. If the point chosen for attack is on one of the enemy's flanks and it is located precisely where his weak spot happens to be, and in consequence the assault succeeds, then the subjective corresponds with the objective, that is, the commander's reconnaissance, judgement and decision have corresponded with the enemy's actual situation and dispositions. If the point chosen for attack is on another flank or in the centre and the attack hits a snag and makes no headway, then such correspondence is lacking. If the attack is properly timed, if the reserves are used neither too late nor too early, and if all the other dispositions and operations in the battle are such as to favour us and not the enemy, then the subjective direction throughout the battle completely corresponds with the objective situation. Such complete correspondence is extremely rare in a war or a battle, in which the belligerents are groups of live human beings bearing arms and keeping their secrets from each other; this is quite unlike handling inanimate objects or routine matters. But if the direction given by the commander corresponds in the main with the actual situation, that is, if the decisive elements in the direction correspond with the actual situation, then there is a basis for victory.

A commander's correct dispositions stem from his correct decisions, his correct decisions stem from his correct judgements, and his correct judgements stem from a thorough and necessary reconnaissance and from pondering on and piecing together the data of various kinds gathered through reconnaissance. He applies all possible and necessary methods of reconnaissance, and ponders on the information gathered about the enemy's situation, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the outside to the inside; then, he takes the conditions on his own side into account, and makes a study of both sides and their interrelations, thereby forming his judgements, making up his mind and working out his plans. Such is the complete process of knowing a situation which a military man goes through before he formulates a strategic plan, a campaign plan or a battle plan. But instead of doing this, a careless military man bases his military plans on his own wishful thinking, and hence his plans are fanciful and do not correspond with reality. A rash military man relying solely upon enthusiasm is bound to be tricked by the enemy, or lured on by some superficial or partial aspect of the enemy's situation, or swayed by irresponsible suggestions from subordinates that are not based on real knowledge or deep insight, and so he runs his head against a brick wall, because he does not know or does not want to know that every military plan must be based on the necessary reconnaissance and on careful consideration of the enemy's situation, his own situation, and their interrelations.

The process of knowing a situation goes on not only before the formulation of a military plan but also after. In carrying out the plan

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from the moment it is put into effect to the end of the operation, there is another process of knowing the situation, namely, the process of practice. In the course of this process, it is necessary to examine anew whether the plan worked out in the preceding process corresponds with reality. If it does not correspond with reality, or if it does not fully do so, then in the light of our new knowledge, it becomes necessary to form new judgements, make new decisions and change the original plan so as to meet the new situation. The plan is partially changed in almost every operation, and sometimes it is even changed completely. A rash man who does not understand the need for such alterations or is unwilling to make them, but who acts blindly, will inevitably run his head against a brick wall.

The above applies to a strategic action, a campaign or a battle. Provided he is modest and willing to learn, an experienced military man will be able to familiarize himself with the character of his own forces (commanders, men, arms, supplies, etc., and their sum total), with the character of the enemy forces (likewise, commanders, men, arms, supplies, etc., and their sum total) and with all other conditions related to the war, such as politics, economics, geography and weather; such a military man will have a better grasp in directing a war or an operation and will be more likely to win victories. He will achieve this because, over a long period of time, he has come to know the situation on the enemy side and his own, discovered the laws of action, and resolved the contradictions between the subjective and the objective. This process of knowing is extremely important; without such a long period of experience, it would be difficult to understand and grasp the laws of an entire war. Neither a beginner nor a person who fights only on paper can become a really able high-ranking commander; only one who has learned through actual fighting in war can do so.

All military laws and military theories which are in the nature of principles are the experience of past wars summed up by people in former days or in our own times. We should seriously study these lessons, paid for in blood, which are a heritage of past wars. That is one point. But there is another. We should put these conclusions to the test of our own experience, assimilating what is useful, rejecting what is useless, and adding what is specifically our own. The latter is very important, for otherwise we cannot direct a war.

Reading is learning, but applying is also learning and the more important kind of learning at that. Our chief method is to learn warfare through warfare. A person who has had no opportunity to go to school can also learn warfare—he can learn through fighting in war. A revolutionary war is a mass undertaking; it is often not a matter of first learning and then doing, but of doing and then learning, for doing is itself learning. There is a gap between the ordinary civilian and the soldier, but it is no Great Wall, and it can be quickly closed, and the way to close it is to take part in revolution, in war. By saying that it is not easy to learn and to apply, we mean that it is hard to learn thoroughly and to apply skilfully. By saying that civilians can very quickly become soldiers, we mean that it is not difficult to cross the threshold. To put the two statements together, we may cite the Chinese adage, "Nothing in the world is difficult for one who sets his mind to it." To cross the threshold is not difficult and mastery, too, is possible provided one sets one's mind to the task and is good at learning.

The laws of war, like the laws governing all other things, are reflections in our minds of objective realities; everything outside of the mind is objective reality. Consequently what has to be learned and known includes the state of affairs on the enemy side and that on our side, both of which should be regarded as the object of study while the mind (the capacity to think) alone is the subject performing the study. Some people are good at knowing themselves and poor at knowing their enemy, and some are the other way round; neither can solve the problem of learning and applying the laws of war. There is a saying in the book of Sun Wu Tzu, the great military scientist of ancient China, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat",[2] which refers both to the stage of learning and to the stage of application both to knowing the laws of the development of objective reality and to deciding on our own action in accordance with these laws in order to overcome the enemy facing us. We should not take this saying lightly.

War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes, or political groups, and all the laws of war are applied by warring nations, states, classes, or political groups for the purpose of achieving victory for themselves. Unquestionably, victory or defeat in war is determined mainly by the military, political, economic and natural conditions on both sides. But not by these alone. It is also determined by each side's subjective ability in directing the war. In his endeavour to win a war, a military man cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the material conditions; within these limitations, however, he can and must strive for victory. The stage of action for a military man is built upon objective material conditions, but on that stage he can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour, power and grandeur. Therefore, given the objective material foundations, *i.e.*, the military, political, economic and natural conditions, our Red Army commanders must display their prowess and marshal all their forces to crush the national and class enemies and to transform this evil world. Here is where our subjective ability in directing war can and must be exercised. We do not permit any of our Red Army commanders to become a blundering hothead; we decidedly want every Red Army commander to become a hero who is both brave and sagacious, who possesses both all-conquering courage and the ability to remain master of the situation throughout the changes and vicissitudes of the entire war. Swimming in the ocean of war, he not only must not flounder but must make sure of reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. The laws for directing war constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war.

So much for our methods.

CHAPTER II

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR

China's revolutionary war, which began in 1924, has passed through two stages, the first from 1924 to 1927, and the second from 1927 to 1936; the stage of national revolutionary war against Japan will now commence. In all three of its stages this revolutionary war has been, is and will be fought under the leadership of the Chinese proletariat and its party, the Chinese Communist Party. The chief enemies in China's revolutionary war are imperialism and the feudal forces. Although the Chinese bourgeoisie may take part in the revolutionary war at certain historical junctures, yet its selfishness and lack of political and economic independence render it both unwilling and unable to lead China's revolutionary war on to the road of complete victory. The masses of China's peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie wish to take an active part in the revolutionary war and to carry it to complete victory. They are the main forces in the revolutionary war, but, being small-scale producers, they are limited in their political outlook (and some of the unemployed masses have anarchist views), so that they are unable to give correct leadership in the war. Therefore, in an era when the proletariat has already appeared on the political stage, the responsibility for leading China's revolutionary war inevitably falls on the shoulders of the Chinese Communist Party. In this era, any revolutionary war will definitely end in defeat if it lacks, or runs counter to, the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party. Of all the social strata and political groupings in semi-colonial China, the proletariat and the Communist Party are the ones most free from narrow-mindedness and selfishness, are politically the most far-sighted, the best organized and the readiest to learn with an open mind from the experience of the vanguard class, the proletariat, and its political party throughout the world and to make use of this experience in their own cause. Hence only the proletariat and the Communist Party can lead the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie, can overcome the narrow-mindedness of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, the destructiveness of the unemployed masses, and also (provided the Communist Party does not err in its policy) the vacillation and lack of thoroughness of the bourgeoisie — and can lead the revolution and the war on to the road of victory.

The revolutionary war of 1924-27 was waged, basically speaking, in conditions in which the international proletariat and the Chinese proletariat and its party exerted political influence on the Chinese national bourgeoisie and its parties and entered into political co-operation with them. However, this revolutionary war failed at the critical juncture, first of all because the big bourgeoisie turned traitor, and at the same time because the opportunists within the revolutionary ranks voluntarily surrendered the leadership of the revolution.

The Agrarian Revolutionary War, lasting from 1927 to the present, has been waged under new conditions. The enemy in this war is not imperialism alone but also the alliance of the big bourgeoisie and the big landlords. And the national bourgeoisie has become a tail to the big bourgeoisie. This revolutionary war is led by the Communist Party alone, which has established absolute leadership over it. This absolute leadership is the most important condition enabling the revolutionary war to be carried through firmly to the end. Without it, it is inconceivable that the revolutionary war could have been carried on with such perseverance.

The Chinese Communist Party has led China's revolutionary war courageously and resolutely, and for fifteen long years[3] has demonstrated to the whole nation that it is the people's friend, fighting at all times in the forefront of the revolutionary war in defence of the people's interests and for their freedom and liberation.

By its arduous struggles and by the martyrdom of hundreds of thousands of its heroic members and tens of thousands of its heroic cadres, the Communist Party of China has played a great educative role among hundreds of millions of people throughout the country. The Party's great historic achievements in its revolutionary struggles have provided the prerequisite for the survival and salvation of China at this critical juncture when she is being invaded by a national enemy; and this prerequisite is the existence of a political leadership enjoying the confidence of the vast majority of the people and chosen by them after long years of testing. Today, the people accept what the Communist Party says more readily than what any other political party says. Were it not for the arduous struggles of the Chinese Communist Party in the last fifteen years, it would be impossible to save China in the face of the new menace of subjugation.

Besides the errors of the Right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu[4] and the "Left" opportunism of Li Li-san,[5] the Chinese Communist Party has committed two other errors in the course of the revolutionary war. The first error was the "Left" opportunism of 1931-34,[6] which resulted in serious losses in the Agrarian Revolutionary War so that, instead of our defeating the enemy's fifth campaign of "encirclement and suppression", we lost our base areas and the Red Army was weakened. This error was corrected at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at Tsunyi in January 1935. The second was the Right opportunism of Chang Kuo-tao in 1935-36[7] which grew to such an extent that it undermined the discipline of the Party and of the Red Army and caused serious losses to part of the Red Army's main forces. But this error was also finally rectified, thanks to the correct leadership of the Central Committee and the political consciousness of Party members, commanders and fighters in the Red Army. Of course all these errors were harmful to our Party, to our revolution and the war, but in the end we overcame them, and in doing so our Party and our Red Army have steeled themselves and become still stronger.

The Chinese Communist Party has led and continues to lead the stirring, magnificent and victorious revolutionary war. This war is not only the banner of China's liberation, but has international revolutionary significance as well. The eyes of the revolutionary people the world over are upon us. In the new stage, the stage of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, we shall lead the Chinese revolution to its completion and exert a profound influence on the revolution in the East and in the whole world. Our revolutionary war has proved that we need a correct Marxist military line as well as a correct Marxist political line. Fifteen years of revolution and war have hammered out such political and military lines. We believe that from now on, in the new stage of the war, these lines will be further developed, filled out and enriched in new circumstances, so that we can attain our aim of defeating the national enemy. History tells us that correct political and military lines do not emerge and develop spontaneously and tranquilly, but only in the course of struggle. These lines must combat- "Left" opportunism on the one hand and Right opportunism on the- other. Without combating and thoroughly overcoming these harmful tendencies which damage the revolution and the revolutionary war, it would be impossible to establish a correct line and win victory in this war. It is for this reason that I often refer to erroneous views in this pamphlet.

CHAPTER III

CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT

People who do not admit, do not know, or do not want to know that China's revolutionary war has its own characteristics have equated the war waged by the Red Army against the Kuomintang forces with war in general or with the civil war in the Soviet Union. The experience of the civil war in the Soviet Union directed by Lenin and Stalin has a world-wide significance. All Communist Parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, regard this experience and its theoretical summing-up by Lenin and Stalin as their guide. But this does not mean that we should apply it mechanically to our own conditions. In many of its aspects China's revolutionary war has characteristics distinguishing it from the civil war in the Soviet Union. Of course it is wrong to take no account of these characteristics or deny their existence. This point has been fully borne out in our ten years of war.

Our enemy has made similar mistakes. He did not recognize that fighting against the Red Army required a different strategy and different tactics from those used in fighting other forces. Relying on his superiority in various respects, he took us lightly and stuck to his old methods of warfare. This was the case both before and during his fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign in 1933, with the result that he suffered a series of defeats. In the Kuomintang army a new approach to the problem was suggested first by the reactionary Kuomintang general Liu Wei-yuan and then by Tai Yueh. Their idea was eventually accepted by Chiang Kai-shek. That was how Chiang Kai-shek's Officers' Training Corps at Lushan[8] came into being and how the new reactionary military principles[9] applied in the fifth campaign of "encirclement and suppression" were evolved.

But when the enemy changed his military principles to suit operations against the Red Army, there appeared in our ranks a group of people who reverted to the "old ways". They urged a return to ways suited to the general run of things, refused to go into the specific circumstances of each case, rejected the experience gained in the Red Army's history of sanguinary battles, belittled the strength of imperialism and the Kuomintang as well as that of the Kuomintang army, and turned a blind eye to the new reactionary principles adopted by the enemy. As a result, all the revolutionary bases except the Shensi-Kansu border area were lost, the Red Army was reduced from 300,000 to a few tens of thousands, the membership of the Chinese Communist Party fell from 300,000 to a few tens of thousands, and the Party organizations in the Kuomintang areas were almost all destroyed. In short, we paid a severe penalty, which was historic in its significance. This group of people called themselves Marxist-Leninists, but actually they had not learned an iota of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin said that the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions.[10] That was precisely the point these comrades of ours forgot.

Hence one can see that, without an understanding of the characteristics of China's revolutionary war, it is impossible to direct it and lead it to victory.

2. WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR?

What then are the characteristics of China's revolutionary war?

I think there are four principal ones.

The first is that China is a vast, semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through the revolution of 1924-27.

This characteristic indicates that it is possible for China's revolutionary war to develop and attain victory. We already pointed this out that the First Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area)[11] when in late 1927 and early 1928, soon after guerrilla warfare was started in China, some comrades in the Chingkang Mountains in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area raised the question, "How long can we keep the Red Flag flying?" For this was a most fundamental question. Without answering this question of whether China's revolutionary base areas and the Chinese Red Army could survive and develop, we could not have advanced a single step. The Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1928 again gave the answer to the question. Since then the Chinese revolutionary movement has had a correct theoretical basis.

Let us now analyse this characteristic.

China's political and economic development is uneven — a weak capitalist economy coexists with a preponderant semi-feudal economy; a few modern industrial and commercial cities coexist with a vast stagnant countryside; several million industrial workers coexist with several hundred millions of peasants and handicraftsmen labouring under the old system; big warlords controlling the central government coexist with small warlords controlling the provinces; two kinds of reactionary armies, the so-called Central Army under Chiang Kai-shek and "miscellaneous troops" under the warlords in the provinces, exist side by side; a few railways, steamship lines and motor roads exist side by side with a vast number of wheelbarrow paths and foot-paths many of which are difficult to negotiate even on foot.

China is a semi-colonial country — disunity among the imperialist powers makes for disunity among the ruling groups in China. There is difference between a semi-colonial country controlled by several countries and a colony controlled by a single country.

China is a vast country — "When it is dark in the east, it is light in the west; when things are dark in the south, there is still light in the north." Hence one need not worry about lack of room for manoeuvre.

China has gone through a great revolution — this has provided the seeds from which the Red Army has grown, provided the leader of the Red Army, namely, the Chinese Communist Party, and provided the masses with experience of participation in a revolution.

We say, therefore, that the first characteristic of China's revolutionary war is that it is waged in a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through a revolution. This characteristic basically determines our military strategy and tactics as well as our political strategy and tactics.

The second characteristic is that our enemy is big and powerful.

How do matters stand with the Kuomintang, the enemy of the Red Army? It is a party that has seized political power and has more or less stabilized its power. It has gained the support of the world's principal counter-revolutionary states. It has remodelled its army which has thus become different from any other army in Chinese history and on the whole similar to the armies of modern states; this army is much better supplied with weapons and *matériel* than the Red Army, and is larger than any army in Chinese history, or for that matter than the standing army of any other country. There is a world of difference between the Kuomintang army and the Red Army. The Kuomintang controls the key positions or lifelines in the politics, economy, communications and culture of China; its political power is nation-wide.

The Chinese Red Army is thus confronted with a big and powerful enemy. This is the second characteristic of China's revolutionary war. It necessarily makes the military operations of the Red Army different in many ways from those of wars in general and from those of the civil war in the Soviet Union or of the Northern Expedition.

The third characteristic is that the Red Army is small and weak.

The Chinese Red Army, starting as guerrilla units, came into being after the defeat of the first great revolution. This occurred in a period of relative political and economic stability in the reactionary capitalist countries of the world as well as in a period of reaction in China.

Our political power exists in scattered and isolated mountainous or remote regions and receives no outside help whatsoever. Economic and cultural conditions in the revolutionary base areas are backward compared with those in the Kuomintang areas. The revolutionary base areas embrace only rural districts and small towns. These areas were extremely small in the beginning and have not grown much larger since. Moreover, they are fluid and not stationary, and the Red Army has no really consolidated bases.

The Red Army is numerically small, its arms are poor, and it has great difficulty in obtaining supplies such as food, bedding and clothing.

This characteristic presents a sharp contrast to the preceding one. From this sharp contrast have arisen the strategy and tactics of the Red Army.

The fourth characteristic is Communist Party leadership and the agrarian-revolution.

This characteristic is the inevitable consequence of the first one. It has given rise to two features. On the one hand, despite the fact that China's revolutionary war is taking place in a period of reaction in China and throughout the capitalist world, victory is possible because it is under the leadership of the Communist Party and has the support of the peasantry. Thanks to this support, our base areas, small as they are, are politically very powerful and stand firmly opposed to the enormous Kuomintang regime, while militarily they place great difficulties in the way of the Kuomintang attacks. Small as it is, the Red Army has great fighting capacity, because its members, led by the Communist Party, are born of the agrarian revolution and are fighting for their own interests, and because its commanders and fighters are politically united.

The Kuomintang, on the other hand, presents a sharp contrast. It opposes the agrarian revolution and therefore has no support from the peasantry. Though it has a large army, the Kuomintang cannot make its soldiers and the many lower-ranking officers, who were originally small producers, risk their lives willingly for it. Its officers and men are politically divided, which reduces its fighting capacity.

3. OUR STRATEGY AND TACTICS ENSUING FROM THESE CHARACTERISTICS

Thus the four principal characteristics of China's revolutionary war are: a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through a great revolution; a big and powerful enemy; a small and weak Red Army; and the agrarian revolution. These characteristics determine the line for guiding China's revolutionary war as well as many of its strategic and tactical principles. It follows from the first and fourth characteristics that it is possible for the Chinese Red Army to grow and defeat its enemy. It follows from the second and third characteristics that it is impossible for the Chinese Red Army to grow very rapidly or defeat its enemy quickly; in other words, the war will be protracted and may even be lost if it is mishandled.

These are the two aspects of China's revolutionary war. They exist simultaneously, that is, there are favourable factors and there are difficulties. This is the fundamental law of China's revolutionary war, from which many other laws ensue. The history of our ten years of war has proved the validity of this law. He who has eyes but fails to see this fundamental law cannot direct China's revolutionary war, cannot lead the Red Army to victories.

It is clear that we must correctly settle all the following matters of principle:

> Determine our strategic orientation correctly, oppose adventurism when on the offensive, oppose conservatism when on the defensive, and oppose flightism when shifting from one place to another.
>
> Oppose guerrilla-ism in the Red Army, while recognizing the guerrilla character of its operations.
>
> Oppose protracted campaigns and a strategy of quick decision, and uphold the strategy of protracted war and campaigns of quick decision.
>
> Oppose fixed battle lines and positional warfare, and favour fluid battle lines and mobile warfare.
>
> Oppose fighting merely to rout the enemy, and uphold fighting to annihilate the enemy.
>
> Oppose the strategy of striking with two "fists" in two directions at the same time, and uphold the strategy of striking with one "fist" in one direction at one time.[12]

Oppose the principle of maintaining one large rear area, and uphold the principle of small rear areas.

Oppose an absolutely centralized command, and favour a relatively centralized command.

Oppose the purely military viewpoint and the ways of roving rebels,[13] and recognize that the Red Army is a propagandist and organizer of the Chinese revolution.

Oppose bandit ways,[14] and uphold strict political discipline.

Oppose warlord ways, and favour both democracy within proper limits and an authoritative discipline in the army.

Oppose an incorrect, sectarian policy on cadres, and uphold the correct policy on cadres.

Oppose the policy of isolation, and affirm the policy of winning over all possible allies.

Oppose keeping the Red Army at its old stage, and strive to develop it to a new stage.

Our present discussion of the problems of strategy is intended to elucidate these matters carefully in the light of the historical experience gained in China's ten years of bloody revolutionary war.

CHAPTER IV

"ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUPPRESSION" AND COUNTER-CAMPAIGNS AGAINST IT — THE MAIN PATTERN OF CHINA'S CIVIL WAR

In the ten years since our guerrilla war began, every independent Red guerrilla unit, every Red Army unit or every revolutionary base area has been regularly subjected by the enemy to "encirclement and suppression". The enemy looks upon the Red Army as a monster and seeks to capture it the moment it shows itself. He is for ever pursuing the Red Army and for ever trying to encircle it. For ten years this pattern of warfare has not changed, and unless the civil war gives place to a national war, the pattern will remain the same till the day the enemy becomes the weaker contestant and the Red Army the stronger.

The Red Army's operations take the form of counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression". For us victory means chiefly victory in combating "encirclement and suppression", that is, strategic victory and victories in campaigns. The fight against each "encirclement and suppression" campaign constitutes a counter-campaign, which usually comprises several or even scores of battles, big and small. Until an "encirclement and suppression" campaign has been basically smashed, one cannot speak of strategic victory or of victory in the counter-campaign as a whole, even though many battles may have been won. The history of the Red Army's decade of war is a history of counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression".

In the enemy's, "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and the Red Army's counter-campaigns against them, the two forms of fighting, offensive and defensive, are both employed, and here there is no difference from any other war, ancient or modern, in China or elsewhere. The special characteristic of China's civil war, however, is the repeated alternation of the two forms over a long period of time. In each "encirclement and suppression" campaign, the enemy employs the offensive against the Red Army's defensive, and the Red Army employs the defensive against his offensive; this is the first stage of a counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression". Then the enemy employs the defensive against the Red Army's offensive, and the Red Army employs the offensive against his defensive; this is the second stage of the counter-campaign. Every "encirclement and suppression" campaign has these two stages, and they alternate over a long period.

By repeated alternation over a long period we mean the repetition of this pattern of warfare and these forms of fighting. This is a fact obvious to everybody. An "encirclement and suppression" campaign and a counter-campaign against it — such is the repeated pattern of the war. In each campaign the alternation in the forms of fighting consists of the first stage in which the enemy employs the offensive against our defensive and we meet his offensive with our defensive, and of the second stage in which the enemy employs the defensive against our offensive and we meet his defensive with our offensive.

As for the content of a campaign or of a battle, it does not consist of mere repetition but is different each time. This, too, is a fact and obvious to everybody. In this connection it has become a rule that with each campaign and each counter-campaign, the scale becomes larger, the situation more complicated and the fighting more intense.

But this does not mean that there are no ups and downs. After the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, the Red Army was greatly weakened, and all the base areas in the south were lost.

Having shifted to the northwest, the Red Army now no longer holds a vital position threatening the internal enemy as it did in the south, and as a result the scale of the "encirclement and suppression" campaigns has become smaller, the situation simpler and the fighting less intense.

What constitutes a defeat for the Red Army? Strategically speaking, there is a defeat only when a counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" fails completely, but even then the defeat is only partial and temporary. For only the total destruction of the Red Army would constitute complete defeat in the civil war; but this has never happened. The loss of extensive base areas and the shift of the Red Army constituted a temporary and partial defeat, not a final and complete one, even though this partial defeat entailed losing 90 per cent of the Party membership, of the armed forces and of the base areas. We call this shift the continuation of our defensive and the enemy's pursuit the continuation of his offensive. That is to say, in the course of the struggle between the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" and our counter-campaign we allowed our defensive to be broken by the enemy's offensive instead of turning from the defensive to the offensive; and so our defensive turned into a retreat and the enemy's offensive into a pursuit. But when the Red Army reached a new area, as for example when we shifted from Kiangsi Province and various other regions to Shensi Province, the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns began afresh. That is why we say that the Red Army's strategic retreat (the Long March) was a continuation of its strategic defensive and the enemy's strategic pursuit was a continuation of his strategic offensive.

In the Chinese civil war, as in all other wars, ancient or modern, in China or abroad, there are only two basic forms of fighting, attack and defence. The special characteristic of China's civil war consists in the long-term repetition of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and of our counter-campaigns together with the long-term alternation in the two forms of fighting, attack and defence, with the inclusion of the phenomenon of the great strategic shift of more than ten thousand kilometres (the Long March).[15]

A defeat for the enemy is much the same. It is a strategic defeat for the enemy when his "encirclement and suppression" campaign is broken and our defensive becomes an offensive, when the enemy turns to the defensive and has to reorganize before launching another "encirclement and suppression" campaign. The enemy has not had to make a strategic shift of more than ten thousand kilometres such as we have, because he rules the whole country and is much stronger than we are. But there have been partial shifts of his forces. Sometimes, enemy forces in White strongholds encircled by the Red Army in some base areas have broken through our encirclement and withdrawn to the White areas to organize new offensives. If the civil war is prolonged and the Red Army's victories become more extensive, there will be more of this sort of thing. But the enemy cannot achieve the same results as the Red Army, because he does not have the help of the people and because his officers and men are not united. If he were to imitate the Red Army's long-distance shift, he would certainly be wiped out.

In the period of the Li Li-san line in 1930, Comrade Li Li-san failed to understand the protracted nature of China's civil war and for that reason did not perceive the law that in the course of this war there is repetition over a long period of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and of their defeat (by that time there had already been three in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area and two in Fukien). Hence, in an attempt to achieve rapid victory for the revolution, he ordered the Red Army, which was then still in its infancy, to attack Wuhan, and also ordered a nation-wide armed uprising. Thus he committed the error of "Left" opportunism.

Likewise the "Left" opportunists of 1931-34 did not believe in the law of the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns. Some responsible comrades in our base area along the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border held an "auxiliary force" theory, maintaining that the Kuomintang army had become merely an auxiliary force after the defeat of its third "encirclement and suppression" campaign and that the imperialists themselves would have to take the field as the main force in further attacks on the Red Army. The strategy based on this estimate was that the Red Army should attack Wuhan. In principle, this fitted in with the views of those comrades in Kiangsi who called for a Red Army attack on Nanchang, were against the work of linking up the base areas and the tactics of luring the enemy in deep, regarded the seizure of the capital and other key cities of a province as the starting point for victory in that province, and held that "the fight against the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' campaign represents the decisive battle between the road of revolution and the road of colonialism". This "Left" opportunism was the source of the wrong line adopted in the struggles against the fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area and in those against the fifth in the Central Area in Kiangsi; and it rendered the Red Army helpless before these fierce enemy campaigns and brought enormous losses to the Chinese revolution.

The view that the Red Army should under no circumstances adopt defensive methods was directly related to this "Left" opportunism, which denied the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, and it, too, was entirely erroneous.

The proposition that a revolution or a revolutionary war is an offensive is of course correct. A revolution or a revolutionary war in its emergence and growth from a small force to a big force, from the absence of political power to the seizure of political power, from the absence of a Red Army to the creation of a Red Army, and from the absence of revolutionary base areas to their establishment, must be on the offensive and cannot be conservative; and tendencies towards conservatism must be opposed.

The only entirely correct proposition is that a revolution or a revolutionary war is an offensive but also involves defence and retreat. To defend in order to attack, to retreat in order to advance, to move against the flanks in order to move against the front, and to take a roundabout route in order to get on to the direct route — this is inevitable in the process of development of many phenomena, especially military movements.

Of the two propositions stated above, the first may be correct in the political sphere, but it is incorrect when transposed to the military sphere. Moreover, it is correct politically only in one situation (when the revolution is advancing), but incorrect when transposed to another situation (when the revolution is in retreat, in general retreat as in Russia in 1906[16] and in China in 1927, or in partial retreat as in Russia at the time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918).[17] Only-the second proposition is entirely correct and true. The "Left" opportunism of 1931-34, which mechanically opposed the employment of defensive military measures, was nothing but infantile thinking.

When will the pattern of repeated "encirclement and suppression" campaigns come to an end? In my opinion, if the civil war is prolonged, this repetition will cease when a fundamental change takes place in the balance of forces. It will cease when the Red Army has become stronger than the enemy. Then we shall be encircling and suppressing the enemy and he will be resorting to counter-campaigns, but political and military conditions will not allow him to attain the same position as that of the Red Army in its counter-campaigns. It can be definitely asserted that by then the pattern of repeated "encirclement and suppression" campaigns will have largely, if not completely, come to an end.

CHAPTER V

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

Under this heading I would like to discuss the following problems: (1) active and passive defence; (2) preparations for combating "encirclement and suppression" campaigns; (3) strategic retreat; (4) strategic counter-offensive; (5) starting the counter-offensive; (6) concentration of troops; (7) mobile warfare; (8) war of quick decision; and (9) war of annihilation.

1. ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENCE

Why do we begin by discussing defence? After the failure of China's first national united front of 1924-27, the revolution became a most intense and ruthless class war. While the enemy ruled the whole country, we had only small armed forces; consequently, from the very beginning we have had to wage a bitter struggle against his "encirclement and suppression" campaigns. Our offensives have been closely linked with our efforts to break them, and our fate depends entirely on whether or not we are able to do so. The process of breaking an "encirclement and suppression" campaign is usually circuitous and not as direct as one would wish. The primary problem, and a serious one too, is how to conserve our strength and await an opportunity to defeat the enemy. Therefore, the strategic defensive is the most complicated and most important problem facing the Red Army in its operations.

In our ten years of war two deviations often arose with regard to the strategic defensive; one was to belittle the enemy, the other was to be terrified of him.

As a result of belittling the enemy, many guerrilla units suffered defeat, and on several occasions the Red Army was unable to break the enemy's "encirclement and suppression".

When the revolutionary guerrilla units first came into existence, their leaders often failed to assess the enemy's situation and our own correctly. Because they had been successful in organizing sudden armed uprisings in certain places or mutinies among the White troops, they saw only the momentarily favourable circumstances, or failed to see the grave situation actually confronting them, and so usually underestimated the enemy. Moreover, they had no understanding of their own weaknesses (*i.e.*, lack of experience and smallness of forces). It was an objective fact that the enemy was strong and we were weak, and yet some people refused to give it thought, talked only of attack but never of defence or retreat, thus mentally disarming themselves in the matter of defence, and hence misdirected their actions. Many guerrilla units were defeated on this account.

Examples in which the Red Army, for this reason, failed to break the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaigns were its defeat in 1928 in the Haifeng-Lufeng area of Kwangtung Province,[18] and its loss of freedom of action in 1932 in the fourth counter-campaign against the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area, where the Red Army acted on the theory that the Kuomintang army was merely an auxiliary force.

There are many instances of setbacks which were due to being terrified of the enemy.

As against those who underestimated him, some people greatly overestimated him and also greatly underestimated our own strength, as a result of which they adopted an unwarranted policy of retreat and likewise disarmed themselves mentally in the matter of defence. This resulted in the defeat of some guerrilla units, or the failure of certain Red Army campaigns, or the loss of base areas.

The most striking example of the loss of a base area was that of the Central Base Area in Kiangsi during the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression". The mistake here arose from a Rightist viewpoint. The leaders feared the enemy as if he were a tiger, set up defences everywhere, fought defensive actions at every step and did not dare to advance to the enemy's rear and attack him there, which would have been to our advantage, or boldly to lure the enemy troops in deep so as to herd them together and annihilate them. As a result, the whole base area was lost and the Red Army had to undertake the Long March of over 12,000 kilometres. However, this kind of mistake was usually preceded by a "Left" error of underestimating the enemy. The military adventurism of attacking the key cities in 1932 was the root cause of the line of passive defence subsequently adopted in coping with the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign.

The most extreme example of being terrified of the enemy was the retreatism of the "Chang Kuo-tao line". The defeat of the Western Column of the Fourth Front Red Army west of the Yellow River[19] marked the final bankruptcy of this line.

Active defence is also known as offensive defence, or defence through decisive engagements. Passive defence is also known as purely defensive defence or pure defence. Passive defence is actually a spurious kind of defence, and the only real defence is active defence, defence for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive. As far as I know, there is no military manual of value nor any sensible military expert, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, that does not oppose passive defence, whether in strategy or tactics. Only a complete fool or a madman would cherish passive defence as a talisman. However, there are people in this world who do such things. That is an error in war, a manifestation of conservatism in military matters, which we must resolutely oppose.

The military experts of the newer and rapidly developing imperialist countries, namely, Germany and Japan, trumpet the advantages of the strategic offensive and come out against the strategic defensive. This kind of military thinking is absolutely unsuited to China's revolutionary war. These military experts assert that a serious weakness of the defensive is that it shakes popular morale, instead of inspiring it. This applies to countries where class contradictions are acute and the war benefits only the reactionary ruling strata or the reactionary political groups in power. But our situation is different. With the slogan of defending the revolutionary base areas and defending China, we can rally the overwhelming majority of the people to fight with one heart and one mind, because we are the oppressed and the victims of aggression. It was also by using the form of the defensive that the Red Army of the Soviet Union defeated its enemies during the civil war. When the imperialist countries organized the Whites for attack, the war was waged under the slogan of defending the Soviets; even when the October Uprising was being prepared, the military mobilization was carried out under the slogan of defending the capital. In every just war the defensive not only has a lulling effect on politically alien elements, it also makes possible the rallying of the backward sections of the masses to join in the war.

When Marx said that once an armed uprising is started there must not be a moment's pause in the attack,[20] he meant that the masses, having taken the enemy unawares in an insurrection, must give the reactionary rulers no chance to retain or recover their political power, must seize this moment to beat the nation's reactionary ruling forces when they are unprepared, and must not rest content with the victories already won, underestimate the enemy, slacken their attacks or hesitate to press forward, and so let slip the opportunity of destroying the enemy, bringing failure to the revolution. This is correct. It does not mean, however, that when we are already locked in battle with an enemy who enjoys superiority, we revolutionaries should not adopt defensive measures even when we are hard pressed. Only a prize idiot would think in this way.

Taken as a whole, our war has been an offensive against the Kuomintang, but militarily it has assumed the form of breaking the enemy's "encirclement and suppression".

Militarily speaking, our warfare consists of the alternate use of the defensive and the offensive. In our case it makes no difference whether the offensive is said to follow or to precede the defensive, because the crux of the matter is to break the "encirclement and suppression". The defensive continues until an "encirclement and suppression" campaign is broken, whereupon the offensive begins, these being but two stages of the same thing; and one such enemy campaign is closely followed by another. Of the two stages, the defensive is the more complicated and the more important. It involves numerous problems of how to break the "encirclement and suppression". The basic principle here is to stand for active defence and oppose passive defence.

In our civil war, when the strength of the Red Army surpasses that of the enemy, we shall, in general, no longer need the strategic defensive. Our policy then will be the strategic offensive alone. This change will depend on an over-all change in the balance of forces. By that time the only remaining defensive measures will be of a partial character.

2. PREPARATIONS FOR COMBATING "ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUPPRESSION" CAMPAIGNS

Unless we have made necessary and sufficient preparations against a planned enemy "encirclement and suppression" campaign, we shall certainly be forced into a passive position. To accept battle in haste is to fight without being sure of victory. Therefore, when the enemy is preparing an "encirclement and suppression" campaign, it is absolutely necessary for us to prepare our counter-campaign. To be opposed to such preparations, as some people in our ranks were at one time, is childish and ridiculous.

There is a difficult problem here on which controversy may easily arise. When should we conclude our offensive and switch to the phase of preparing our counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression"? When we are victoriously on the offensive and the enemy is on the defensive, his preparations for the next "encirclement and suppression" campaign are conducted in secret, and therefore it is difficult for us to know when his offensive will begin. If our work of preparing the counter-campaign begins too early, it is bound to reduce the gains from our offensive and will sometimes even have certain harmful effects on the Red Army and the people. For the chief measures in the preparatory phase are the military preparations for withdrawal and the political mobilization for them. Sometimes, if we start preparing too early, this will turn into waiting for the enemy; after waiting a long time without the enemy's appearing, we will have to renew our offensive. And sometimes, the enemy will start his offensive just as our new offensive is beginning, thus putting us in a difficult position. Hence the choice of the right moment to begin our preparations is an important problem. The right moment should be determined with due regard both to the enemy's situation and our own and to the relation between the two. In order to know the enemy's situation, we should collect information on his political, military and financial position and the state of public opinion in his territory. In analysing such information we must take the total strength of the enemy into full account and must not exaggerate the extent of his past defeats, but on the other hand we must not fail to take into account his internal contradictions, his financial difficulties, the effect of his past defeats, etc. As for our side, we must not exaggerate the extent of our past victories, but neither should we fail to take full account of their effect.

Generally speaking, however, on the question of timing the preparations, it is preferable to start them too early rather than too late. For the former involves smaller losses and has the advantage that preparedness averts peril and puts us in a fundamentally invincible position.

The essential problems during the preparatory phase are the preparations for the withdrawal of the Red Army, political mobilization, recruitment, arrangements for finance and provisions, and the handling of politically alien elements.

By preparations for the Red Army's withdrawal we mean taking care that it does not move in a direction jeopardizing the withdrawal or advance too far in its attacks or become too fatigued. These are the things the main forces of the Red Army must attend to on the eve of a large-scale enemy offensive. At such a time, the Red Army must devote its attention mainly to planning the selection and preparation of the battle areas, the acquisition of supplies, and the enlargement and training of its own forces.

Political mobilization is a problem of prime importance in the struggle against "encirclement and suppression". That is to say, we should tell the Red Army and the people in the base area clearly, resolutely and fully that the enemy's offensive is inevitable and imminent and will do serious harm to the people, but at the same time, we should tell them about his weaknesses, the factors favourable to the Red Army, our indomitable will to victory and our general plan of work. We should call upon the Red Army and the entire population to fight against the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaign and defend the base area. Except where military secrets are concerned, political mobilization must be carried out openly, and, what is more, every effort should be made to extend it to all who might possibly support the revolutionary cause. The key link here is to convince the cadres.

Recruitment of new soldiers should be based on two considerations, first, on the level of political consciousness of the people and the size of the population and, second, on the current state of the Red Army and the possible extent of its losses in the whole course of the counter-campaign.

Needless to say, the problems of finance and food are of great importance to the counter-campaign. We must take the possibility of a prolonged enemy campaign into account. It is necessary to make an estimate of the minimum material requirements — chiefly of the Red Army but also of the people in the revolutionary base area — for the entire struggle against the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaign.

With regard to politically alien elements we should not be off our guard, but neither should we be unduly apprehensive of treachery on their part and adopt excessive precautionary measures. Distinction should be made between the landlords, the merchants and the rich peasants, and the main point is to explain things to them politically and win their neutrality, while at the same time organizing the masses of the people to keep an eye on them. Only against the very few elements who are most dangerous should stern measures like arrest be taken.

The extent of success in a struggle against "encirclement and suppression" is closely related to the degree to which the tasks of the preparatory phase have been fulfilled. Relaxation of preparatory work which is due to underestimation of the enemy and panic which is due to being terrified of the enemy's attacks are harmful tendencies, and both should be resolutely opposed. What we need is an enthusiastic but calm state of mind and intense but orderly work.

3. STRATEGIC RETREAT

A strategic retreat is a planned strategic step taken by an inferior force for the purpose of conserving its strength and biding its time to defeat the enemy, when it finds itself confronted with a superior force whose offensive it is unable to smash quickly. But military adventurists stubbornly oppose such a step and advocate "engaging the enemy outside the gates".

We all know that when two boxers fight, the clever boxer usually gives a little ground at first, while the foolish one rushes in furiously and uses up all his resources at the very start, and in the end he is often beaten by the man who has given ground.

In the novel *Shui Hu Chuan*,[21] the drill master Hung, challenging Lin Chung to a fight on Chai Chin's estate, shouts, "Come on! Come on! Come on!" In the end it is the retreating Lin Chung who spots Hung's weak point and floors him with one blow.

During the Spring and Autumn Era, when the states of Lu and Chi[22] were at war, Duke Chuang of Lu wanted to attack before the Chi troops had tired themselves out, but Tsao Kuei prevented him. When instead he adopted the tactic of "the enemy tires, we attack", he defeated the Chi army. This is a classic example from China's military history of a weak force defeating a strong force. Here is the account given by the historian Tsochiu Ming:[23]

> In the spring the Chi troops invaded us. The Duke was about to fight. Tsao Kuei requested an audience. His neighbours said,

> "This is the business of meat-eating officials, why meddle with it?" Tsao replied, "Meat-eaters are fools, they cannot plan ahead." So he saw the Duke. And he asked, "What will you rely on when you fight?" The Duke answered, "I never dare to keep all my food and clothing for my own enjoyment, but always share them with others." Tsao said, "Such paltry charity cannot reach all. The people will not follow you." The Duke said, "I never offer to the gods less sacrificial beasts, jade or silk than are due to them. I keep good faith." Tsao said, "Such paltry faith wins no trust. The gods will not bless you." The Duke said, "Though unable personally to attend to the details of all trials, big and small, I always demand the facts." Tsao said, "That shows your devotion to your people. You can give battle. When you do so, I beg to follow you." The Duke and he rode in the same chariot. The battle was joined at Changshao. When the Duke was about to sound the drum for the attack, Tsao said, "Not yet." When the men of Chi had drummed thrice, Tsao said, "Now we can drum." The army of Chi was routed. The Duke wanted to pursue. Again Tsao said, "Not yet." He got down from the chariot to examine the enemy's wheel-tracks, then mounted the arm-rest of the chariot to look afar. He said, "Now we can pursue!" So began the pursuit of the Chi troops. After the victory the Duke asked Tsao why he had given such advice. Tsao replied, "A battle depends upon courage. At the first drum courage is aroused, at the second it flags, and with the third it runs out. When the enemy's courage ran out, ours was still high and so we won. It is difficult to fathom the moves of a great state, and I feared an ambush. But when I examined the enemy's wheel-tracks and found them criss-crossing and looked afar and saw his banners drooping, I advised pursuit."

That was a case of a weak state resisting a strong state. The story speaks of the political preparations before a battle — winning the confidence of the people; it speaks of a battlefield favourable for switching over to the counter-offensive — Changshao; it indicates the favourable time for starting the counter-offensive — when the enemy's courage is running out and one's own is high; and it points to the moment for starting the pursuit — when the enemy's tracks are criss-crossed and his banners are drooping. Though the battle was not a big one, it illustrates the principles of the strategic defensive. China's military history contains numerous instances of victories won on these principles. In such famous battles as the Battle of Chengkao between the states of Chu and Han,[24] the Battle of Kunyang between the states of Hsin and Han,[25] the Battle of Kuantu between Yuan Shao and Tsao Tsao,[26] the Battle of Chihpi between the states of Wu and Wei,[27] the Battle of Yiling between the states of Wu and Shu,[28] and the Battle of Feishui between the states of Chin and Tsin,[29] in each case the contending sides were unequal, and the weaker side, yielding some ground at first, gained mastery by striking only after the enemy had struck and so defeated the stronger side.

Our war began in the autumn of 1927, and we then had no experience at all. The Nanchang Uprising[30] and the Canton Uprising[31] failed, and in the Autumn Harvest Uprising[32] the Red Army in the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border area also suffered several defeats and shifted to the Chingkang Mountains on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. In the following April the units which had survived the defeat of the Nanchang Uprising also moved to the Chingkang Mountains by way of southern Hunan. By May 1928, however, basic principles of guerrilla warfare, simple in nature and suited to the conditions of the time, had already been evolved, that is, the sixteen-character formula: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." This sixteen-character formulation of military principles was accepted by the Central Committee before the Li Li-san line. Later our operational principles were developed a step further. At the time of our first counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in the Kiangsi base area, the principle of "luring the enemy in deep" was put forward and, moreover, successfully applied. By the time the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign was defeated, a complete set of operational principles for the Red Army had taken shape. This marked a new stage in the development of our military principles, which were greatly enriched in content and underwent many changes in form, mainly in the sense that although they basically remained the same as in the sixteen-character formula, they transcended their originally simple nature. The sixteen-character formula covered the basic principles for combating "encirclement and suppression"; it covered the two stages of the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive, and within the defensive, it covered the two stages of the strategic retreat and the strategic counter-offensive. What came later was only a development of this formula.

But beginning from January 1932, after the publication of the Party's resolution entitled "Struggle for Victory First in One or More Provinces After Smashing the Third 'Encirclement and Suppression' Campaign", which contained serious errors of principle, the "Left" opportunists attacked these correct principles, finally abrogated the whole set and instituted a complete set of contrary "new principles" or "regular principles". From then on, the old principles were no longer to be considered as regular but were to be rejected as "guerrilla-ism". The opposition to "guerrilla-ism" reigned for three whole years. Its first stage was military adventurism, in the second it turned into military conservatism and, finally, in the third stage it became flightism. It was not until the Central Committee held the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau at Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, in January 1935 that this wrong line was declared bankrupt and the correctness of the old line reaffirmed. But at what a cost!

Those comrades who vigorously opposed "guerrilla-ism" argued along the following lines. It was wrong to lure the enemy in deep because we had to abandon so much territory. Although battles had been won in this way, was not the situation different now? Moreover, was it not better to defeat the enemy without abandoning territory? And was it not better still to defeat the enemy in his own areas, or on the borders between his areas and ours? The old practices had had nothing "regular" about them and were methods used only by guerrillas. Now our own state had been established and our Red Army had become a regular army. Our fight against Chiang Kai-shek had become a war between two states, between two great armies. History should not repeat itself, and everything pertaining to "guerrilla-ism" should be totally discarded. The new principles were "completely Marxist", while the old had been created by guerrilla units in the mountains, and there was no Marxism in the mountains. The new principles were the antithesis of the old. They were: "Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred, fight bravely and determinedly, and exploit victories by hot pursuit"; "Attack on all fronts"; "Seize key cities"; and "Strike with two 'fists' in two directions at the same time". When the enemy attacked, the methods of dealing with him were: "Engage the enemy outside the gates", "Gain mastery by striking first", "Don't let our pots and pans be smashed", "Don't give up an inch of territory" and "Divide the forces into six routes". The war was "the decisive battle between the road of revolution and the road of colonialism", a war of short swift thrusts, blockhouse warfare, war of attrition, "protracted war". There were, further, the policy of maintaining a great rear area and an absolutely centralized command. Finally there was a large-scale "house-moving". And anyone who did not accept these things was to be punished, labelled an opportunist, and so on and so forth.

Without a doubt these theories and practices were all wrong. They were nothing but subjectivism. Under favourable circumstances this subjectivism manifested itself in petty-bourgeois revolutionary fanaticism and impetuosity, but in times of adversity, as the situation worsened, it changed successively into desperate recklessness, conservatism and flightism. They were the theories and practices of hotheads and ignoramuses; they did not have the slightest flavour of Marxism about them; indeed they were anti-Marxist.

Here we shall discuss only strategic retreat, which in Kiangsi was called "luring the enemy in deep" and in Szechuan "contracting the front". No previous theorist or practitioner of war has ever denied that this is the policy a weak army fighting a strong army must adopt in the initial stage of a war. It has been said by a foreign military expert that in strategically defensive operations, decisive battles are usually avoided in the beginning, and are sought only when conditions have become favourable. That is entirely correct and we have nothing to add to it.

The object of strategic retreat is to conserve military strength and prepare for the counter-offensive. Retreat is necessary because not to retreat a step before the onset of a strong enemy inevitably means to jeopardize the preservation of one's own forces. In the past, however, many people were stubbornly opposed to retreat, considering it to be an "opportunist line of pure defence". Our history has proved that their opposition was entirely wrong.

To prepare for a counter-offensive, we must select or create conditions favourable to ourselves but unfavourable to the enemy, so as to bring about a change in the balance of forces, before we go on to the stage of the counter-offensive.

In the light of our past experience, during the stage of retreat we should in general secure at least two of the following conditions before we can consider the situation as being favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy and before we can go over to the counter-offensive. These conditions are:

(1) The population actively supports the Red Army.
(2) The terrain is favourable for operations.
(3) All the main forces of the Red Army are concentrated.

(4) The enemy's weak spots have been discovered.

(5) The enemy has been reduced to a tired and demoralized state.

(6) The enemy has been induced to make mistakes.

The first condition, active support of the population, is the most important one for the Red Army. It means having a base area. Moreover, given this condition, it is easy to achieve conditions 4, 5 and 6. Therefore, when the enemy launches a full-scale offensive, the Red Army generally withdraws from the White area into the base area, because that is where the population is most active in supporting the Red Army against the White army. Also, there is a difference between the borders and the central district of a base area; in the latter the people are better at blocking the passage of information to the enemy, better at reconnaissance, transportation, joining in the fighting, and so on. Thus when we were combating the first, second and third "encirclement and suppression" campaigns in Kiangsi, all the places selected as "terminal points for the retreat" were situated where the first condition, popular support, was excellent or quite good. This characteristic of our base areas made the Red Army's operations very different from ordinary operations and was the main reason why the enemy subsequently had to resort to the policy of blockhouse warfare.

One advantage of operating on interior lines is that it makes it possible for the retreating army to choose terrain favourable to itself and force the attacking army to fight on its terms. In order to defeat a strong army, a weak army must carefully choose favourable terrain as a battleground. But this condition alone is not enough and must be accompanied by others. The first of these is popular support. The next is a vulnerable enemy, for instance, an enemy who is tired or has made mistakes, or an advancing enemy column that is comparatively poor in fighting capacity. In the absence of these conditions, even if we have found excellent terrain, we have to disregard it and continue to retreat in order to secure them. In the White areas there is no lack of good terrain, but we do not have the favourable condition of active popular support. If other conditions are not yet fulfilled, the Red Army has no alternative but to retreat towards its base area. Distinctions such as those between the White areas and the Red areas also usually exist between the borders and the central district of a base area.

Except for local units and containing forces, all our assault troops should, on principle, be concentrated. When attacking an enemy who is on the defensive strategically, the Red Army usually disperses its own forces. Once the enemy launches a full-scale offensive, the Red Army effects a "retreat towards the centre". The terminal point chosen for the retreat is usually in the central section of the base area, but sometimes it is in the frontal or rear sections, as circumstances require. By such a retreat towards the centre all the main forces of the Red Army can be concentrated.

Another essential condition for a weak army fighting a strong one is to pick out the enemy's weaker units for attack. But at the beginning of the enemy's offensive we usually do not know which of his advancing columns is the strongest and which the second strongest, which is the weakest and which the second weakest, and so a process of reconnaissance is required. This often takes a considerable time. That is another reason why strategic retreat is necessary.

If the attacking enemy is far more numerous and much stronger than we are, we can accomplish a change in the balance of forces only when the enemy has penetrated deeply into our base area and tasted all the bitterness it holds for him. As the chief of staff of one of Chiang Kai-shek's brigades remarked during the third "encirclement and suppression" campaign, "Our stout men have worn themselves thin and our thin men have worn themselves to death." Or, in the words of Chen Ming-shu, Commander-in-Chief of the Western Route of the Kuomintang's "Encirclement and Suppression" Army, "Everywhere the National Army gropes in the dark, while the Red Army walks in broad daylight." By then the enemy army, although still strong, is much weakened, its soldiers are tired, its morale is sagging and many of its weak spots are revealed. But the Red Army, though weak, has conserved its strength and stored up its energy, and is waiting at its ease for the fatigued enemy. At such a time it is generally possible to attain a certain parity between the two sides, or to change the enemy's absolute superiority to relative superiority and our absolute inferiority to relative inferiority, and occasionally even to become superior to the enemy. When fighting against the third "encirclement and suppression" campaign in Kiangsi, the Red Army executed a retreat to the extreme limit (to concentrate in the rear section of the base area); if it had not done so, it could not have defeated the enemy because the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" forces were then over ten times the size of the Red Army. When Sun Wu Tzu said, "Avoid the enemy when he is full of vigour, strike when he is fatigued and withdraws", he was referring to tiring and demoralizing the enemy so as to reduce his superiority.

Finally, the object of retreat is to induce the enemy to make mistakes or to detect his mistakes. One must realize that an enemy commander, however wise, cannot avoid making some mistakes over a relatively long period of time, and hence it is always possible for us to exploit the openings he leaves us. The enemy is liable to make mistakes, just as we ourselves sometimes miscalculate and give him openings to exploit. In addition, we can induce the enemy to make mistakes by our own actions, for instance, by "counterfeiting an appearance", as Sun Wu Tzu called it, that is, by making a feint to the east but attacking in the west. If we are to do this, the terminal point for the retreat cannot be rigidly limited to a definite area. Sometimes when we have retreated to the predetermined area and not yet found openings to exploit, we have to retreat farther and wait for the enemy to give us an opening.

The favourable conditions which we seek by retreating are in general those stated above. But this does not mean that a counter-offensive cannot be launched until all these conditions are present. The presence of all of them at the same time is neither possible nor necessary. But a weak force operating on interior lines against a strong enemy should strive to secure such conditions as are necessary in the light of the enemy's actual situation. All views to the contrary are incorrect.

The decision on the terminal point for retreat should depend on the situation as a whole. It is wrong to decide on a place which, considered in relation to only part of the situation, appears to be favourable for our passing to the counter-offensive, if it is not also advantageous from the point of view of the situation as a whole. For at the start of our counter-offensive we must take subsequent developments into consideration, and our counter-offensives always begin on a partial scale. Sometimes the terminal point for retreat should be fixed in the frontal section of the base area, as it was during our second and fourth counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi and our third counter-campaign in the Shensi-Kansu area. At times it should be in the middle section of the base area, as in our first counter-campaign in Kiangsi. At other times, it should be fixed in the rear section of the base area, as in our third counter-campaign in Kiangsi. In all these cases the decision was taken by correlating the partial situation with the situation as a whole. But during the fifth counter-campaign in Kiangsi, our army gave no consideration whatsoever to retreat, because it did not take account of either the partial or the total situation, and this was really rash and foolhardy conduct. A situation is made up of a number of factors; in considering the relation between a part of the situation and the whole, we should base our judgements on whether the factors on the enemy's side and on ours, as manifested in both the partial and the whole situation, are to a certain extent favourable for our starting a counter-offensive.

The terminal points for retreat in a base area can be generally divided into three types, those in the frontal, those in the middle, and those in the rear section of the base area. Does this, however, mean refusing to fight in the White areas altogether? No. It is only when we have to deal with a large-scale campaign of enemy "encirclement and suppression" that we refuse to fight in the White areas. It is only when there is a wide disparity between the enemy's strength and ours that, acting on the principle of conserving our strength and biding our time to defeat the enemy, we advocate retreating to the base area and luring him in deep, for only by so doing can we create or find conditions favourable for our counter-offensive. If the situation is not so serious, or if it is so serious that the Red Army cannot begin its counter-offensive even in the base area, or if the counter-offensive is not going well and a further retreat is necessary to bring about a change in the situation, then we should recognize, theoretically at least, that the terminal point for the retreat may be fixed in a White area, though we have had very little experience of this kind.

In general, the terminal points for retreat in a White area can also be divided into three types: (1) those in front of our base area, (2) those on its flanks, and (3) those behind it. Here is an example of the first type.

> During our first counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi, had it not been for the disunity inside the Red Army and the split in the local Party organization (the two difficult problems created by the Li Li-san line and the A-B Group),[33] it is conceivable that we might have concentrated our forces within the triangle formed by Kian, Nanfeng and Changshu and launched a counter-offensive. For the enemy force advancing from the area between the Kan and Fu Rivers was not very greatly superior to the Red Army in strength (100,000 against 40,000). Though the popular support there was not as active as in the base area, the terrain was favourable; moreover, it would have

> been possible to smash, one by one, the enemy forces advancing along separate routes.

Now for an example of the second type.

> During our third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the enemy's offensive had not been on so large a scale, if one of the enemy's columns had advanced from Chienning, Lichuan and Taining on the Fukien-Kiangsi border, and if that column had not been too strong for us to attack, it is likewise conceivable that the Red Army might have massed its forces in the White area in western Fukien and crushed that column first, without having to make a thousand-*li* detour through Juichin to Hsingkuo.

Finally, an example of the third type.

> During that same third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the enemy's main force had headed south instead of west, we might have been compelled to withdraw to the Huichang-Hsunwu-Anyuan area (a White area), in order to induce the enemy to move further south; the Red Army could have then driven northward into the interior of the base area, by which time the enemy force in the north of the base area would not have been very large.

The above, however, are all hypothetical examples not based on actual experience; they should be regarded as exceptional and not treated as general principles. When the enemy launches a large-scale "encirclement and suppression" campaign, our general principle is to lure him in deep, withdraw into the base area and fight him there, because this is our surest method of smashing his offensive.

Those who advocate "engaging the enemy outside the gates" oppose strategic retreat, arguing that to retreat means to lose territory, to bring harm on the people ("to let our pots and pans be smashed", as they call it), and to give rise to unfavourable repercussions outside. During our fifth counter-campaign, they argued that every time we retreated a step the enemy would push his blockhouses forward a step, so that our base areas would continuously shrink and we would have no way of recovering lost ground. Even though luring the enemy deep into our territory might have been useful in the past, it would be useless against the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign in which he adopted the policy of blockhouse warfare. The only way to deal with this campaign, they said, was to divide up our forces for resistance and make short swift thrusts at the enemy.

It is easy to give an answer to such views, and our history has already done so. As for loss of territory, it often happens that only by loss can loss be avoided; this is the principle of "Give in order to take". If what we lose is territory and what we gain is victory over the enemy, plus recovery and also expansion of our territory, then it is a paying proposition. In a business transaction, if a buyer does not "lose" some money, he cannot obtain goods; if a seller does not "lose" some goods, he cannot obtain money. The losses incurred in a revolutionary movement involve destruction, and what is gained is construction of a progressive character. Sleep and rest involve loss of time, but energy is gained for tomorrow's work. If any fool does not understand this and refuses to sleep, he will have no energy the next day, and that is a losing proposition. We lost out in the fifth counter-campaign for precisely such reasons. Reluctance to give up part of our territory resulted in the loss of it all. Abyssinia, too, lost all her territory when she fought the enemy head-on, though that was not the sole cause of her defeat.

The same holds true on the question of bringing damage on the people. If you refuse to let the pots and pans of some households be smashed over a short period of time, you will cause the smashing of the pots and pans of all the people to go on over a long period of time. If you are afraid of unfavourable short-term political repercussions, you will have to pay the price in unfavourable long-term political repercussions. After the October Revolution, if the Russian Bolsheviks had acted on the opinions of the "Left Communists" and refused to sign the peace treaty with Germany, the new-born Soviets would have been in danger of early death.[34]

Such seemingly revolutionary "Left" opinions originate from the revolutionary impetuosity of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals as well as from the narrow conservatism of the peasant small producers. People holding such opinions look at problems only one-sidedly and are unable to take a comprehensive view of the situation as a whole; they are unwilling to link the interests of today with those of tomorrow or the interests of the part with those of the whole, but cling like grim death to the partial and the temporary. Certainly, we should cling tenaciously to the partial and the temporary when, in the concrete circumstances of the time, they are favourable — and especially when they are decisive — for the whole current situation and the whole period, or otherwise we shall become advocates of letting things slide and doing nothing about them. That is why a retreat must have a terminal point. We must not go by the short-sightedness of the small producer. We should learn the wisdom of the Bolsheviks. The naked eye is not enough, we must have the aid of the telescope and the microscope. The Marxist method is our telescope and microscope in political and military matters.

Of course, strategic retreat has its difficulties. To pick the time for beginning the retreat, to select the terminal point, to convince the cadres and the people politically — these are difficult problems demanding solution.

The problem of timing the beginning of the retreat is very important. If in the course of our first counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi Province our retreat had not been carried out just when it was, that is, if it had been delayed, then at the very least the extent of our victory would have been affected. Both a premature and a belated retreat, of course, bring losses. But generally speaking, a belated retreat brings more losses than a premature one. A well-timed retreat, which enables us to keep all the initiative, is of great assistance to us in switching to the counter-offensive when, having reached the terminal point for our retreat, we have regrouped our forces and are waiting at our ease for the fatigued enemy. When smashing the enemy's first, second and fourth campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi, we were able to handle him confidently and without haste. It was only during the third campaign that the Red Army was very fatigued by the detour it had hastily had to make in order to reassemble, because we had not expected the enemy to launch a new offensive so quickly after suffering such a crushing defeat in the second campaign (we ended our second counter-campaign on May 29, 1931, and Chiang Kai-shek began his third "encirclement and suppression" campaign on July 1). The timing of the retreat is decided in the same way as the timing of the preparatory phase of a counter-campaign which we discussed earlier, that is, entirely on the basis of the requisite information we have collected and of the appraisal of the general situation on the enemy side and on our own.

It is extremely difficult to convince the cadres and the people of the necessity of strategic retreat when they have had no experience of it, and when the prestige of the army leadership is not yet such that it can concentrate the authority for deciding on strategic retreat in the hands of a few persons or of a single person and at the same time enjoy the confidence of the cadres. Because the cadres lacked experience and had no faith in strategic retreat, great difficulties were encountered at the beginning of our first and fourth counter-campaigns and during the whole of the fifth. During the first counter-campaign the cadres, under the influence of the Li Li-san line, were in favour not of retreat but of attack until they were convinced otherwise. In the fourth counter-campaign the cadres, under the influence of military adventurism, objected to making preparations for retreat. In the fifth, they at first persisted in the military adventurist view, which opposed luring the enemy in deep, but later turned to military conservatism. Another case is that of the adherents of the Chang Kuo-tao line, who did not admit the impossibility of establishing our bases in the regions of the Tibetan and the Hui peoples[35] until they ran up against a brick wall. Experience is essential for the cadres, and failure is indeed the mother of success. But it is also necessary to learn with an open mind from other people's experience, and it is sheer "narrow empiricism" to insist on one's own personal experience in all matters and, in its absence, to adhere stubbornly to one's own opinions and reject other people's experience. Our war has suffered in no small measure on this account.

The people's lack of faith in the need for a strategic retreat, which was due to their inexperience, was never greater than in our first counter-campaign in Kiangsi. At that time the local Party organizations and the masses of the people in the counties of Kian, Hsingkuo and Yungfeng were all opposed to the Red Army's withdrawal. But after the experience of the first counter-campaign, no such problem occurred in the subsequent ones. Everyone was convinced that the loss of territory in the base area and the sufferings of the people were temporary and was confident that the Red Army could smash the enemy's "encirclement and suppression". However, whether or not the people have faith is closely tied up with whether or not the cadres have faith, and hence the first and foremost task is to convince the cadres.

Strategic retreat is aimed solely at switching over to the counter-offensive and is merely the first stage of the strategic defensive. The decisive link in the entire strategy is whether victory can be won in the stage of the counter-offensive which follows.

4. STRATEGIC COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

To defeat the offensive of an enemy who enjoys absolute superiority we rely on the situation created during the stage of our strategic retreat, a situation which is favourable to ourselves, unfavourable to the enemy and different from that at the beginning of his offensive. It takes many elements to make up such a situation. All this has been dealt with above.

However, the presence of these conditions and of a situation favourable to ourselves and unfavourable to the enemy does not mean that we have already defeated him. Such conditions and such a situation provide the possibility for our victory and his defeat, but do not constitute the reality of victory or defeat; they have not yet brought actual victory or defeat to either army. To bring about victory or defeat a decisive battle between the two armies is necessary. Only a decisive battle can settle the question as to which army is the victor and which the vanquished. This is the sole task in the stage of strategic counter-offensive. The counter-offensive is a long process, the most fascinating, the most dynamic, and also the final stage of a defensive campaign. What is called active defence refers chiefly to this strategic counter-offensive, which is in the nature of a decisive engagement.

Conditions and situation are created not only in the stage of the strategic retreat, but continue to be created in that of the counter-offensive. Whether in form or in nature, they are not exactly the same in the latter stage as in the former.

What might remain the same in form and in nature, for example, is the fact that the enemy troops will be even more fatigued and depleted, which is simply a continuation of their fatigue and depletion in the previous stage.

But wholly new conditions and a wholly new situation are bound to emerge. Thus, when the enemy has suffered one or more defeats, the conditions advantageous to us and disadvantageous to him will not be confined to his fatigue, etc., but a new factor will have been added, namely, that he has suffered defeats. New changes will take place in the situation, too. When the enemy begins to manoeuvre his troops in a disorderly way and to make false moves, the relative strengths of the two opposing armies will naturally no longer be the same as before.

But if it is not the enemy's forces but ours that have suffered one or more defeats, then both the conditions and the situation will change in the opposite direction. That is to say, the enemy's disadvantages will be reduced, while on our side disadvantages will emerge and even grow. That again will be something entirely new and different.

A defeat for either side will lead directly and speedily to a new effort by the defeated side to avert disaster, to extricate itself from the new conditions and the new situation unfavourable to it and favourable to the enemy and to re-create such conditions and such a situation as are favourable to it and unfavourable to its opponent, in order to bring pressure to bear on the latter.

The effort of the winning side will be exactly the opposite. It will strive to exploit its victory and inflict still greater damage on the enemy, add to the conditions that are in its favour and further improve its situation, and prevent the enemy from succeeding in extricating himself from his unfavourable conditions and unfavourable situation and averting disaster.

Thus, for either side, the struggle at the stage of the decisive battle is the most intense, the most complicated and the most changeful as well as the most difficult and trying in the whole war or the whole campaign; it is the most exacting time of all from the point of view of command.

In the stage of counter-offensive, there are many problems, the chief of which are the starting of the counter-offensive, the concentration of troops, mobile warfare, war of quick decision and war of annihilation.

Whether in a counter-offensive or in an offensive, the principles with regard to these problems do not differ in their basic character. In this sense we may say that a counter-offensive is an offensive.

Still, it is not exactly an offensive. The principles of the counter-offensive are applied when the enemy is on the offensive. The principles of the offensive are applied when the enemy is on the defensive. In this sense, there are certain differences between a counter-offensive and an offensive.

For this reason, although the various operational problems are all included in the discussion of the counter-offensive in the present chapter on the strategic defensive, and although the chapter on the strategic offensive will deal only with other problems in order to avoid repetition, we should not overlook either the similarities or the differences between the counter-offensive and the offensive when it comes to actual application.

5. STARTING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

The problem of starting a counter-offensive is the problem of the "initial battle" or "prelude".

Many bourgeois military experts advise caution in the initial battle, whether one is on the strategic defensive or on the strategic offensive, but more especially when on the defensive. In the past we, too, have stressed this as a serious point. Our operations against the five enemy campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi Province have given us rich experience, a study of which will not be without benefit.

In his first campaign, the enemy employed about 100,000 men, divided into eight columns, to advance southward from the Kian-Chienning line against the Red Army's base area. The Red Army had about 40,000 men and was concentrated in the area of Huangpi and Hsiaopu in Ningtu County, Kiangsi Province.

The situation was as follows:

(1) The "suppression" forces did not exceed 100,000 men, none of whom were Chiang Kai-shek's own troops, and the general situation was not very grave.

(2) The enemy division under Lo Lin, defending Kian, was located across the Kan River to the west.

(3) The three enemy divisions under Kung Ping-fan, Chang Hui-tsan and Tan Tao-yuan had advanced and occupied the Futien-Tungku-Lungkang-Yuantou sector southeast of Kian and northwest of Ningtu. The main body of Chang Hui-tsan's division was at Lungkang and that of Tan Tao-yuan's division at Yuantou. It was not advisable to select Futien and Tungku as the battleground, as the inhabitants, misled by the A-B Group, were for a time mistrustful of and opposed to the Red Army.

(4) The enemy division under Liu Ho-ting was far away in Chienning in the White area of Fukien, and was unlikely to cross into Kiangsi.

(5) The two enemy divisions under Mao Ping-wen and Hsu Keh-hsiang had entered the Toupi-Lokou-Tungshao sector lying between Kuangchang and Ningtu. Toupi was a White area, Lokou a guerrilla zone, and Tungshao, where there were A-B Group elements, was a place from which information was liable to leak out. Furthermore, if we were to attack Mao Ping-wen and Hsu Keh-hsiang and then drive westward, the three enemy divisions in the west under Chang Hui-tsan, Tan Tao-yuan and Kung Ping-fan might join forces, thus making it difficult for us to win victory and impossible to bring the issue to a final solution.

(6) The two divisions under Chang Hui-tsan and Tan Tao-yuan, which made up the enemy's main force, were troops belonging to Lu Ti-ping, who was commander-in-chief of this "encirclement and suppression" campaign and governor of Kiangsi Province, and Chang Hui-tsan was the field commander. To wipe out these two divisions would be practically to smash the campaign. Each division had about fourteen thousand men and Chang's was divided between two places, so that if we attacked one division at a time we would enjoy absolute superiority.

(7) The Lungkang-Yuantou sector, where the main forces of the Chang and Tan divisions were located, was close to our concentrations, and there was good popular support to cover our approach.

(8) The terrain in Lungkang was good. Yuantou was not easy to attack. But were the enemy to advance to Hsiaopu to attack us, we would have good terrain there too.

(9) We could mass the largest number of troops in the Lungkang sector. In Hsingkuo, less than a hundred *li* to the southwest of Lungkang, we had an independent division of over one thousand men, which could manoeuvre in the enemy's rear.

(10) If our troops made a breakthrough at the centre and breached the enemy's front, his columns to the east and west would be cut into two widely separated groups.

For the above reasons, we decided that our first battle should be against Chang Hui-tsan's main force, and we successfully hit two of his brigades and his divisional headquarters, capturing the entire force of nine thousand men and the divisional commander himself, without letting a single man or horse escape. This one victory scared Tan's division into fleeing towards Tungshao and Hsu's division into fleeing towards Toupi. Our troops then pursued Tan's division and wiped out half of it. We fought two battles in five days (December 27, 1930 to January 1, 1931), and, fearing defeat, the enemy forces in Futien, Tungku and Toupi retreated in disorder. So ended the first campaign of "encirclement and suppression".

The situation in the second campaign was as follows:

(1) The "suppression" forces numbering 200,000 were under the command of Ho Ying-chin with headquarters at Nanchang.

(2) As in the first enemy campaign, none of the forces were Chiang Kai-shek's own troops. Among them the 19th Route Army

under Tsai Ting-kai, the 26th under Sun Lien-chung and the 8th under Chu Shao-liang were strong, or fairly strong, while all the rest were rather weak.

(3) The A-B Group had been cleaned up, and the entire population of the base area supported the Red Army.

(4) The 5th Route Army under Wang Chin-yu, newly arrived from the north, was afraid of us, and, generally speaking, so were the two divisions on its left flank under Kuo Hua-tsung and Hao Meng-ling.

(5) If our troops attacked Futien first and then swept across to the east, we could expand the base area to the Chienning-Lichuan-Taining sector on the Fukien-Kiangsi border and acquire supplies to help smash the next "encirclement and suppression" campaign. But if we were to thrust westward, we would come up against the Kan River and have no room for expansion after the battle. To turn east again after the battle would tire our troops and waste time.

(6) Though our army (numbering over 30,000 men) was somewhat smaller than in the first campaign, it had had four months in which to recuperate and build up energy.

For these reasons, we decided, for our first battle, to engage the forces of Wang Chin-yu and of Kung Ping-fan (totalling 11 regiments) in the Futien sector. After winning this battle we attacked Kuo Hua-tsung, Sun Lien-chung, Chu Shao-liang and Liu Ho-ting in succession. In fifteen days (from May 16 to May 30, 1931) we marched seven hundred *li*, fought five battles, captured more than twenty thousand rifles and roundly smashed the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaign. When fighting Wang Chin-yu, we were between the two enemy forces under Tsai Ting-kai and Kuo Hua-tsung, some ten *li* from the latter and forty *li* from the former, and some people said we were "getting into a blind alley", but we got through all the same. This was mainly due to the popular support we enjoyed in the base area and to the lack of co-ordination among the enemy units. After Kuo Hua-tsung's division was defeated, Hao Meng-ling's division fled by night back to Yungfeng, and so avoided disaster.

The situation in the third "encirclement and suppression" campaign was as follows:

(1) Chiang Kai-shek personally took the field as commander-in-chief. Under him there were three subordinate commanders,

> each in charge of a column — the left, the right and the centre. The central column was commanded by Ho Ying-chin, who, like Chiang Kai-shek, had his headquarters in Nanchang, the right was commanded by Chen Ming-shu with headquarters at Kian, and the left by Chu Shao-liang with headquarters at Nanfeng.
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> (2) The "suppression" forces numbered 300,000. The main forces, totalling about 100,000 men, were Chiang Kai-shek's own troops and consisted of 5 divisions (of 9 regiments each), commanded by Chen Cheng, Lo Cho-ying, Chao Kuan-tao, Wei Lihuang and Chiang Ting-wen respectively. Besides these, there were 3 divisions (totalling 40,000 men) under Chiang Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai and Han Teh-chin. Then there was Sun Lien-chung's army of 20,000. In addition, there were other, weaker forces that were likewise not Chiang's own troops.
>
> (3) The enemy's strategy in this "suppression" campaign was to "drive straight in", which was vastly different from the strategy of "consolidating at every step" he used in the second campaign. The aim was to press the Red Army back against the Kan River and annihilate it there.
>
> (4) There was an interval of only one month between the end of the second enemy campaign and the beginning of the third. The Red Army (then about 30,000 strong) had had neither rest nor replenishments after much hard fighting and had just made a detour of a thousand *li* to concentrate at Hsingkuo in the western part of the southern Kiangsi base area, when the enemy pressed it hard from several directions.

In this situation the plan we first decided on was to move from Hsingkuo by way of Wanan, make a breakthrough at Futien, and then sweep from west to east across the enemy's rear communication lines, thus letting the enemy's main forces make a deep but useless penetration into our base area in southern Kiangsi; this was to be the first phase of our operation. Then when the enemy turned back northward, inevitably very fatigued, we were to seize the opportunity to strike at his vulnerable units; that was to be the second phase of our operation. The heart of this plan was to avoid the enemy's main forces and strike at his weak spots. But when our forces were advancing on Futien, we were detected by the enemy, who rushed the two divisions under Chen Cheng and Lo Cho-ying to the scene. We had to change our plan and fall back to Kaohsinghsu in the western part of Hsingkuo County, which, together with its environs of less than a hundred square *li*, was then the only place for our troops to concentrate in. The day after our concentration we decided to make a thrust eastward towards Lientang in eastern Hsingkuo County, Liangtsun in southern Yungfeng County and Huangpi in northern Ningtu County. That same night, under cover of darkness, we passed through the forty-*li* gap between Chiang Ting-wen's division and the forces of Chiang Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai and Han Teh-chin, and swung to Lientang. On the second day we skirmished with the forward units under Shangkuan Yun-hsiang (who was in command of Hao Meng-ling's division as well as his own). The first battle was fought on the third day with Shangkuan Yun-hsiang's division and the second battle on the fourth day with Hao Meng-ling's division; after a three-day march we reached Huangpi and fought our third battle against Mao Ping-wen's division. We won all three battles and captured over ten thousand rifles. At this point all the main enemy forces, which had been advancing westward and southward, turned eastward. Focusing on Huangpi, they converged at furious speed to seek battle and closed in on us in a major compact encirclement. We slipped through in the high mountains that lay in the twenty-*li* gap between the forces of Chiang Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai and Han Teh-chin on the one side and Chen Cheng and Lo Cho-ying on the other, and thus, returning from the east to the west, reassembled within the borders of Hsingkuo County. By the time the enemy discovered this fact and began advancing west again, our forces had already had a fortnight's rest, whereas the enemy forces, hungry, exhausted and demoralized, were no good for fighting and so decided to retreat. Taking advantage of their retreat, we attacked the forces of Chiang Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai, Chiang Ting-wen and Han Teh-chin, wiping out one of Chiang Ting-wen's brigades and Han Teh-chin's entire division. As for the divisions under Chiang Kuang-nai and Tsai Ting-kai, the fight resulted in a stalemate and they got away.

The situation in the fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign was as follows. The enemy was advancing on Kuangchang in three columns; the eastern one was his main force, while the two divisions forming his western column were exposed to us and were also very close to the area where our forces were concentrated. Thus we had the opportunity to attack his western column in southern Yihuang County first, and at one stroke we annihilated the two divisions under Li Ming and Chen Shih-chi. As the enemy then sent two divisions from the eastern column to give support to his central column and advanced further, we were again able to wipe out a division in southern Yihuang County. In these two battles we captured more than ten thousand rifles and, in the main, smashed this campaign of "encirclement and suppression".

In his fifth campaign the enemy advanced by means of his new strategy of building blockhouses and first occupied Lichuan. But, in attempting to recover Lichuan and engage the enemy outside the base area, we made an attack north of Lichuan at Hsiaoshih, which was an enemy strongpoint and was situated, moreover, in the White area. Failing to win the battle, we shifted our attack to Tzehsichiao, which was also an enemy strongpoint situated in the White area southeast of Hsiaoshih, and again we failed. Then in seeking battle we milled around between the enemy's main forces and his blockhouses and were reduced to complete passivity. All through our fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", which lasted a whole year, we showed not the slightest initiative or drive. In the end we had to withdraw from our Kiangsi base area.

Our army's experience in these five counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression" proves that the first battle in the counter-offensive is of the greatest importance for the Red Army, which is on the defensive, if it is to smash a large and powerful enemy "suppression" force. Victory or defeat in the first battle has a tremendous effect upon the entire situation, all the way to the final engagement. Hence we arrive at the following conclusions.

First, the first battle must be won. We should strike only when positively certain that the enemy's situation, the terrain and popular support are all in our favour and not in his. Otherwise we should rather fall back and carefully bide our time. There will always be opportunities; we should not rashly accept battle. In our first counter-campaign we originally planned to strike at Tan Tao-yuan's troops; we advanced twice but each time had to restrain ourselves and pull back, because they would not budge from their commanding position on the Yuantou heights. A few days later we sought out Chang Hui-tsan's troops, which were more vulnerable to our attack. In our second counter-campaign our army advanced to Tungku where, for the sole purpose of waiting for Wang Chin-yu's men to leave their strongpoint at Futien, we encamped close to the enemy for twenty-five days even at the risk of leakage of information; we rejected all impatient suggestions for a quick attack and finally attained our aim. In our third counter-campaign, although the storm was breaking all around us and we had made a detour of a thousand *li*, and although the enemy had discovered our plan to outflank him, we nevertheless exercised patience, turned back, changed our tactics to a breakthrough in the centre, and finally fought the first battle successfully at Lientang. In our fourth counter-campaign, after our attack on Nanfeng had failed, we unhesitatingly withdrew, wheeled round to the enemy's right flank, and reassembled our forces in the area of Tungshao, whereupon we launched our great and victorious battle in southern Yihuang County. It was only in the fifth counter-campaign that the importance of the first battle was not recognized at all. Taking alarm at the loss of the single county town of Lichuan, our forces marched north to meet the enemy in an attempt to recover it. Then, the unexpected encounter at Hsunkou, which had resulted in a victory (with the annihilation of an enemy division), was not treated as the first battle, nor were the changes that were bound to ensue foreseen, but instead Hsiaoshih was rashly attacked with no assurance of success. Thus the initiative was lost at the very first move, and that is really the worst and most stupid way to fight.

Second, the plan for the first battle must be the prelude to, and an organic part of, the plan for the whole campaign. Without a good plan for the whole campaign it is absolutely impossible to fight a really good first battle. That is to say, even though victory is won in the first battle, if the battle harms rather than helps the campaign as a whole, such a victory can only be reckoned a defeat (as in the case of the battle of Hsunkou in the fifth campaign). Hence, before fighting the first battle one must have a general idea of how the second, third, fourth, and even the final battle will be fought, and consider what changes will ensue in the enemy's situation as a whole if we win, or lose, each of the succeeding battles. Although the result may not — and, in fact, definitely will not — turn out exactly as we expect, we must think everything out carefully and realistically in the light of the general situation on both sides. Without a grasp of the situation as a whole, it is impossible to make any really good move on the chessboard.

Third, one must also consider what will happen in the next strategic stage of the war. Whoever directs strategy will not be doing his duty if he occupies himself only with the counter-offensive and neglects the measures to be taken after it succeeds, or in case it fails. In a particular strategic stage, he should take into consideration the succeeding stages, or, at the very least, the following one. Even though future changes are difficult to foresee and the farther ahead one looks the more blurred things seem, a general calculation is possible and an appraisal of distant prospects is necessary. In war as well as in politics, planning only one step at a time as one goes along is a harmful way of directing matters. After each step, it is necessary to examine the ensuing concrete changes and to modify or develop one's strategic and operational plans accordingly, or otherwise one is liable to make the mistake of rushing straight ahead regardless of danger. However, it is absolutely essential to have a long-term plan which has been thought out in its general outline and which covers an entire strategic stage or even several strategic stages. Failure to make such a plan will lead to the mistake of hesitating and allowing oneself to be tied down, which in fact serves the enemy's strategic objects and reduces one to a passive position. It must be borne in mind that the enemy's supreme command is not lacking in strategic insight. Only when we have trained ourselves to be a head taller than the enemy will strategic victories be possible. During the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, failure to do so was the main reason for the errors in strategic direction under the "Left" opportunist and the Chang Kuo-tao lines. In short, in the stage of retreat we must see ahead to the stage of the counter-offensive, in the stage of the counter-offensive we must see ahead to that of the offensive, and in the stage of the offensive we must again see ahead to a stage of retreat. Not to do so but to confine ourselves to considerations of the moment is to court defeat.

The first battle must be won. The plan for the whole campaign must be taken into account. And the strategic stage that comes next must be taken into account. These are the three principles we must never forget when we begin a counter-offensive, that is, when we fight the first battle.

6. CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS

The concentration of troops seems easy but is quite hard in practice. Everybody knows that the best way is to use a large force to defeat a small one, and yet many people fail to do so and on the contrary often divide their forces up. The reason is that such military leaders have no head for strategy and are confused by complicated circumstances; hence, they are at the mercy of these circumstances, lose their initiative and have recourse to passive response.

No matter how complicated, grave and harsh the circumstances, what a military leader needs most of all is the ability to function independently in organizing and employing the forces under his command. He may often be forced into a passive position by the enemy, but the important thing is to regain the initiative quickly. Failure to do so spells defeat.

The initiative is not something imaginary but is concrete and material. Here the most important thing is to conserve and mass an armed force that is as large as possible and full of fighting spirit.

It is easy to fall into a passive position in defensive warfare, which gives far less scope for the full exercise of initiative than does offensive warfare. However, defensive warfare, which is passive in form, can be active in content, and can be switched from the stage in which it is passive in form to the stage in which it is active both in form and in content. In appearance a fully planned strategic retreat is made under compulsion, but in reality it is effected in order to conserve our strength and bide our time to defeat the enemy, to lure him in deep and prepare for our counter-offensive. On the other hand, refusal to retreat and hasty acceptance of battle (as in the battle of Hsiaoshih) may appear a serious effort to gain the initiative, while in reality it is passive. Not only is a strategic counter-offensive active in content, but in form, too, it discards the passive posture of the period of retreat. In relation to the enemy, our counter-offensive represents our effort to make him relinquish the initiative and put him in a passive position.

Concentration of troops, mobile warfare, war of quick decision and war of annihilation are all necessary conditions for the full achievement of this aim. And of these, concentration of troops is the first and most essential.

This concentration is necessary for the purpose of reversing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves. First, its purpose is to reverse the situation as regards advance and retreat. Previously it was the enemy who was advancing and we who were retreating; now we seek a situation in which we advance and he retreats. When we concentrate our troops and win a battle, then in that battle we gain the above purpose, and this influences the whole campaign.

Second, its purpose is to reverse the situation with regard to attack and defence. In defensive warfare the retreat to the prescribed terminal point belongs basically to the passive, or "defence", stage. The counter-offensive belongs to the active, or "attack", stage. Although the strategic defensive retains its defensive character throughout its duration, still as compared with the retreat the counter-offensive already represents a change not only in form but in content. The counter-offensive is transitional between the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive, and in the nature of a prelude to the strategic offensive; it is precisely for the purpose of the counter-offensive that troops are concentrated.

Third, its purpose is to reverse the situation with regard to interior and exterior lines. An army operating on strategically interior lines suffers from many disadvantages, and this is especially so in the case of the Red Army, confronted as it is with "encirclement and suppression". But in campaigns and battles we can and absolutely must change this situation. We can turn a big "encirclement and suppression" campaign waged by the enemy against us into a number of small, separate campaigns of encirclement and suppression waged by us against the enemy. We can change the converging attack directed by the enemy against us on the plane of strategy into converging attacks directed by us against the enemy on the plane of campaigns and battles. We can change the enemy's strategic superiority over us into our superiority over him in campaigns and battles. We can put the enemy who is in a strong position strategically into a weak position in campaigns and battles. At the same time we can change our own strategically weak position into a strong position in campaigns and battles. This is what we call exterior-line operations within interior-line operations, encirclement and suppression within "encirclement and suppression", blockade within blockade, the offensive within the defensive, superiority within inferiority, strength within weakness, advantage within disadvantage, and initiative within passivity. The winning of victory in the strategic defensive depends basically on this measure — concentration of troops.

In the war annals of the Chinese Red Army, this has often been an important controversial issue. In the battle of Kian on October 4, 1930, our advance and attack were begun before our forces were fully concentrated, but fortunately the enemy force (Teng Ying's division) fled of its own accord; by itself our attack was ineffective.

Beginning from 1932, there was the slogan "Attack on all fronts", which called for attacks from the base area in all directions — north, south, east and west. This is wrong not only for the strategic defensive but even for the strategic offensive. As long as there is no fundamental change in the over-all balance of forces, both strategy and tactics involve the defensive and the offensive, containing actions and assaults, and "attacks on all fronts" are in fact extremely rare. This slogan expresses the military equalitarianism which accompanies military adventurism.

In 1933 the exponents of military equalitarianism put forward the theory of "striking with two 'fists'" and splitting the main force of the Red Army in two, to seek victories simultaneously in two strategic directions. As a result, one fist remained idle while the other was tired out with fighting, and we failed to win the greatest victory possible at the time. In my opinion, when we face a powerful enemy, we should employ our army, whatever its size, in only one main direction at a time, not two. I am not objecting to operations in two or more directions, but at any given time there ought to be only one main direction. The Chinese Red Army, which entered the arena of the civil war as a small and weak force, has since repeatedly defeated its powerful antagonist and won victories that have astonished the world, and it has done so by relying largely on the employment of concentrated strength. Any one of its great victories can prove this point. When we say, "Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred", we are speaking of strategy, of the whole war and the over-all balance of forces, and in the strategic sense that is just what we have been doing. However, we are not speaking of campaigns and tactics, in which we must never do so. Whether in counter-offensives or offensives, we should always concentrate a big force to strike at one part of the enemy forces. We suffered every time we did not concentrate our troops, as in the battles against Tan Tao-yuan in the Tungshao area of Ningtu County in Kiangsi Province in January 1931, against the 19th Route Army in the Kaohsinghsu area of Hsingkuo County in Kiangsi in August 1931, against Chen Chi-tang in the Shuikouhsu area of Nanhsiung County in Kwangtung Province in July 1932, and against Chen Cheng in the Tuantsun area of Lichuan County in Kiangsi in March 1934. In the past, battles such as those of Shuikouhsu and Tuantsun were generally deemed victories or even big victories (in the former we routed twenty regiments under Chen Chi-tang, in the latter twelve regiments under Chen Cheng), but we never welcomed such victories and in a certain sense even regarded them as defeats. For, in our opinion, a battle has little significance when there are no prisoners or war booty, or when they do not outweigh the losses.

Our strategy is "pit one against ten" and our tactics are "pit ten against one" — this is one of our fundamental principles for gaining mastery over the enemy.

Military equalitarianism reached its extreme point in our fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in 1934. It was thought that we could beat the enemy by "dividing the forces into six routes" and "resisting on all fronts", but instead we were beaten by the enemy, and the reason was fear of losing territory. Naturally one can scarcely avoid loss of territory when concentrating the main forces in one direction while leaving only containing forces in others. But this loss is temporary and partial and is compensated for by victory in the place where the assault is made. After such a victory is won, territory lost in the area of the containing forces can be recovered. The enemy's first, second, third and fourth campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" all entailed the loss of territory — particularly the third campaign, in which the Kiangsi base area of the Red Army was almost completely lost — but in the end we not only recovered but extended our territory.

Failure to appreciate the strength of the people in the base area has often given rise to unwarranted fear of moving the Red Army too far away from the base area. This happened when the Red Army in Kiangsi made a long drive to attack Changchow in Fukien Province in 1932, and also when it wheeled around to attack Fukien after the victory in our fourth counter-campaign in 1933. There was fear in the first case that the enemy would seize the entire base area, and in the second that he would seize part of it; consequently there was opposition to concentrating our forces and advocacy of dividing them up for defence, but in the end all this proved to be wrong. As far as the enemy is concerned, he is afraid to advance into our base area, but the main danger in his eyes is a Red Army that has driven into the White area. His attention is always fixed on the whereabouts of the main force of the Red Army, and he rarely takes his eyes off it to concentrate on the base area. Even when the Red Army is on the defensive, it is still the centre of the enemy's attention. Part of his over-all plan is to reduce the size of our base area, but if the Red Army concentrates its main force to annihilate one of his columns, the enemy's supreme command will be compelled to focus greater attention on the Red Army and concentrate larger forces against it. Hence it is possible to wreck an enemy plan for reducing the size of a base area.

Also, it was wrong to say, "In the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' campaign which is being carried on by means of blockhouse warfare, it is impossible for us to operate with concentrated forces, and all we can do is to divide them up for defence and for short swift thrusts." The enemy's tactics of pushing forward 3, 5, 8, or 10 *li* at a time and building blockhouses at each halt were entirely the result of the Red Army's practice of fighting defensive actions at every successive point. The situation would certainly have been different if our army had abandoned the tactics of point-by-point defence on interior lines and, when possible and necessary, had turned and driven into the enemy's interior lines. The principle of concentration of forces is precisely the means for defeating the enemy's blockhouse warfare.

The kind of concentration of forces we advocate does not mean the abandonment of people's guerrilla warfare. To abandon small-scale guerrilla warfare and "concentrate every single rifle in the Red Army", as advocated by the Li Li-san line, has long since been proved wrong. Considering the revolutionary war as a whole, the operations of the people's guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each other like a man's right arm and left arm, and if we had only the main forces of the Red Army without the people's guerrillas, we would be like a warrior with only one arm. In concrete terms, and especially with regard to military operations, when we talk of the people in the base area as a factor, we mean that we have an armed people. That is the main reason why the enemy is afraid to approach our base area.

It is also necessary to employ Red Army detachments for operations in secondary directions; not all the forces of the Red Army should be concentrated. The kind of concentration we advocate is based on the principle of guaranteeing absolute or relative superiority on the battlefield. To cope with a strong enemy or to fight on a battlefield of vital importance, we must have an absolutely superior force; for instance, a force of 40,000 was concentrated to fight the 9,000 men under Chang Hui-tsan on December 30, 1930, in the first battle of our first counter-campaign. To cope with a weaker enemy or to fight on a battlefield of no great importance, a relatively superior force is sufficient; for instance, only some 10,000 Red Army men were employed to fight Liu Ho-ting's division of 7,000 men in Chienning on May 29, 1931, in the last battle of our second counter-campaign.

That is not to say we must have numerical superiority on every occasion. In certain circumstances, we may go into battle with a relatively or absolutely inferior force. Take the case of going into battle with a relatively inferior force when we have only a rather small Red Army force in a certain area (it is not that we have more troops and have not concentrated them). Then, in order to smash the attack of the stronger enemy in conditions where popular support, terrain and weather are greatly in our favour, it is of course necessary to concentrate the main part of our Red Army force for a surprise attack on a segment of one flank of the enemy while containing his centre and his other flank with guerrillas or small detachments, and in this way victory can be won. In our surprise attack on this segment of the enemy flank, the principle of using a superior force against an inferior force, of using the many to defeat the few, still applies. The same principle also applies when we go into battle with an absolutely inferior force, for example, when a guerrilla force makes a surprise attack on a large White army force, but is attacking only a small part of it.

As for the argument that the concentration of a large force for action in a single battle area is subject to the limitations of terrain, roads, supplies and billeting facilities, it should be evaluated according to the circumstances. There is a difference in the degree to which these limitations affect the Red Army and the White army, as the Red Army can stand greater hardships than the White army.

We use the few to defeat the many — this we say to the rulers of China as a whole. We use the many to defeat the few — this we say to each separate enemy force on the battlefield. That is no longer a secret, and in general the enemy is by now well acquainted with our way. However, he can neither prevent our victories nor avoid his own losses, because he does not know when and where we shall act. This we keep secret. The Red Army generally operates by surprise attacks.

7. MOBILE WARFARE

Mobile warfare or positional warfare? Our answer is mobile warfare. So long as we lack a large army or reserves of ammunition, and so long as there is only a single Red Army force to do the fighting in each base area, positional warfare is generally useless to us. For us, positional warfare is generally inapplicable in attack as well as in defence.

One of the outstanding characteristics of the Red Army's operations, which follows from the fact that the enemy is powerful while the Red Army is deficient in technical equipment, is the absence of fixed battle lines.

The Red Army's battle lines are determined by the direction in which it is operating. As its operational direction often shifts, its battle lines are fluid. Though the main direction does not change in a given period of time, within its ambit the secondary directions may shift at any moment; when we find ourselves checked in one direction, we must turn to another. If, after a time, we also find ourselves checked in the main direction, then we must change it too.

In a revolutionary civil war, there cannot be fixed battle lines, which was also the case in the Soviet Union. The difference between the Soviet Army and ours is that its battle lines were not so fluid as ours. There cannot be absolutely fixed battle lines in any war, because the vicissitudes of victory and defeat, advance and retreat, preclude it. But relatively fixed battle lines are often to be found in the general run of wars. Exceptions occur only where an army faces a much stronger enemy, as is the case with the Chinese Red Army in its present stage.

Fluidity of battle lines leads to fluidity in the size of our base areas. Our base areas are constantly expanding and contracting, and often as one base area falls another rises. This fluidity of territory is entirely a result of the fluidity of the war.

Fluidity in the war and in our territory produces fluidity in all fields of construction in our base areas. Construction plans covering several years are out of the question. Frequent changes of plan are all in the day's work.

It is to our advantage to recognize this characteristic. We must base our planning on it and must not have illusions about a war of advance without any retreats, take alarm at any temporary fluidity of our territory or of the rear areas of our army, or endeavour to draw up detailed long-term plans. We must adapt our thinking and our work to the circumstances, be ready to sit down as well as to march on, and always have our marching rations handy. It is only by exerting ourselves in today's fluid way of life that tomorrow we can secure relative stability, and eventually full stability.

The exponents of the strategy of "regular warfare" which dominated our fifth counter-campaign denied this fluidity and opposed what they called "guerrilla-ism". Those comrades who opposed fluidity managed affairs as though they were the rulers of a big state, and the result was an extraordinary and immense fluidity — the 25,000-*li* Long March.

Our workers' and peasants' democratic republic is a state, but today it is not yet a full-fledged one. Today we are still in the period of strategic defensive in the civil war, the form of our political power is still far from that of a full-fledged state, our army is still much inferior to the enemy both in numbers and technical equipment, our territory is still very small, and our enemy is constantly out to destroy us and will never rest content till he has done so. In defining our policy on the basis of these facts, we should not repudiate guerrilla-ism in general terms but should honestly admit the guerrilla character of the Red Army. It is no use being ashamed of this. On the contrary, this guerrilla character is precisely our distinguishing feature, our strong point, and our means of defeating the enemy. We should be prepared to discard it, but we cannot do so today. In the future this guerrilla character will definitely become something to be ashamed of and to be discarded, but today it is invaluable and we must stick to it.

"Fight when you can win, move away when you can't win" — this is the popular way of describing our mobile warfare today. There is no military expert anywhere in the world who approves only of fighting and never of moving, though few people do as much moving as we do. We generally spend more time in moving than in fighting and would be doing well if we fought an average of one sizable battle a month. All our "moving" is for the purpose of "fighting", and all our strategy and tactics are built on "fighting". Nevertheless, there are times when it is inadvisable for us to fight. In the first place, it is inadvisable to fight when the force confronting us is too large; second, it is sometimes inadvisable to fight when the force confronting us, though not so large, is very close to other enemy forces; third, it is generally inadvisable to fight an enemy force that is not isolated and is strongly entrenched; fourth, it is inadvisable to continue an engagement in which there is no prospect of victory. In any one of these situations we are prepared to move away. Such moving away is both permissible and necessary. For our recognition of the necessity of moving away is based on our recognition of the necessity of fighting. Herein lies the fundamental characteristic of the Red Army's mobile warfare.

Mobile warfare is primary, but we do not reject positional warfare where it is possible and necessary. It should be admitted that positional warfare should be employed for the tenacious defence of particular key points in a containing action during the strategic defensive, and when, during the strategic offensive, we encounter an enemy force that is isolated and cut off from help. We have had considerable experience in defeating the enemy by such positional warfare; we have cracked open many enemy cities, blockhouses and forts and broken through fairly well-fortified enemy field positions. In future we shall increase our efforts and remedy our inadequacies in this respect. We should by all means advocate positional attack or defence when circumstances require and permit it. At the present time, what we are opposed to is the general use of positional warfare or putting it on an equal footing with mobile warfare; that is impermissible.

During the ten years' civil war, have there been no changes whatsoever in the guerrilla character of the Red Army, its lack of fixed battle lines, the fluidity of its base areas, or the fluidity of construction work in its base areas? Yes, there have been changes. The period from the days in the Chingkang Mountains to our first counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi was the first stage, the stage in which the guerrilla character and fluidity were very pronounced, the Red Army being in its infancy and the base areas still being guerrilla zones. In the second stage, comprising the period from the first to the third counter-campaign, both the guerrilla character and the fluidity were considerably reduced, front armies having been formed and base areas with a population of several millions established. In the third stage, which comprised the period from the end of the third to the fifth counter-campaign, the guerrilla character and the fluidity were further reduced, and a central government and a revolutionary military commission had already been set up. The fourth stage was the Long March. The mistaken rejection of guerrilla warfare and fluidity on a small scale had led to guerrilla warfare and fluidity on a great scale. Now we are in the fifth stage. Because of our failure to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign and because of this great fluidity, the Red Army and the base areas have been greatly reduced, but we have planted our feet in the Northwest and consolidated and developed the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, our base area here. The three front armies which form the main forces of the Red Army have been brought under a unified command, which is unprecedented.

Going by the nature of our strategy, we may also say the period from the days in the Chingkang Mountains to our fourth counter-campaign was one stage, the period of the fifth counter-campaign was another, and the period from the Long March to the present is the third. During the fifth counter-campaign the correct policy of the past was wrongly discarded; today we have correctly discarded the wrong policy adopted during the fifth counter-campaign and revived the earlier and correct policy. However, we have not thrown out everything in the fifth counter-campaign, nor revived everything that preceded it. We have revived only what was good in the past, and discarded only the mistakes of the period of the fifth counter-campaign.

Guerrilla-ism has two aspects. One is irregularity, that is, decentralization, lack of uniformity, absence of strict discipline, and simple methods of work. These features stemmed from the Red Army's infancy, and some of them were just what was needed at the time. As the Red Army reaches a higher stage, we must gradually and consciously eliminate them so as to make the Red Army more centralized, more unified, more disciplined and more thorough in its work — in short, more regular in character. In the directing of operations we should also gradually and consciously reduce such guerrilla characteristics as are no longer required at a higher stage. Refusal to make progress in this respect and obstinate adherence to the old stage are impermissible and harmful, and are detrimental to large-scale operations.

The other aspect of guerrilla-ism consists of the principle of mobile warfare, the guerrilla character of both strategic and tactical operations which is still necessary at present, the inevitable fluidity of our base areas, flexibility in planning the development of the base areas, and the rejection of premature regularization in building the Red Army. In this connection, it is equally impermissible, disadvantageous and harmful to our present operations to deny the facts of history, oppose the retention of what is useful, and rashly leave the present stage in order to rush blindly towards a "new stage", which as yet is beyond reach and has no real significance.

We are now on the eve of a new stage with respect to the Red Army's technical equipment and organization. We must be prepared to go over to this new stage. Not to prepare ourselves would be wrong and harmful to our future warfare. In the future, when the technical and organizational conditions in the Red Army have changed and the building of the Red Army has entered a new stage, its operational directions and battle lines will become more stable; there will be more positional warfare; the fluidity of the war, of our territory and of our construction work will be greatly reduced and finally disappear; and we will no longer be handicapped by present limitations, such as the enemy's superiority and his strongly entrenched positions.

At present we oppose both the wrong measures of the period of the domination of "Left" opportunism and the revival of many of the irregular features which the Red Army had in its infancy but which are now unnecessary. But we should be resolute in restoring the many valuable principles of army building and of strategy and tactics by which the Red Army has consistently won its victories. We must sum up all that is good from the past in a systematic, more highly developed and richer military line, in order to win victories over the enemy today and prepare to go over to the new stage in the future.

The waging of mobile warfare involves many problems, such as reconnaissance, judgement, decision, combat disposition, command, concealment, concentration, advance, deployment, attack, pursuit, surprise attack, positional attack, positional defence, encounter action, retreat, night fighting, special operations, evading the strong and attacking the weak, besieging the enemy in order to strike at his reinforcements, feint attack, defence against aircraft, operating amongst several enemy forces, by-passing operations, consecutive operations, operating without a rear, the need for rest and building up energy. These problems exhibited many specific features in the history of the Red Army, features which should be methodically dealt with and summed up in the science of campaigns, and I shall not go into them here.

8. WAR OF QUICK DECISION

A strategically protracted war and campaigns or battles of quick decision are two aspects of the same thing, two principles which should

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

receive equal and simultaneous emphasis in civil wars and which are also applicable in anti-imperialist wars.

Because the reactionary forces are very strong, revolutionary forces grow only gradually, and this fact determines the protracted nature of our war. Here impatience is harmful and advocacy of "quick decision" incorrect. To wage a revolutionary war for ten years, as we have done, might be surprising in other countries, but for us it is like the opening sections in an "eight-legged essay" — the "presentation, amplification and preliminary exposition of the theme"[36] — and many exciting parts are yet to follow. No doubt developments in the future will be greatly accelerated under the influence of domestic and international conditions. As changes have already taken place in the international and domestic situation and greater changes are coming, it can be said that we have outgrown the past state of slow development and fighting in isolation. But we should not expect successes overnight. The aspiration to "wipe out the enemy before breakfast" is admirable, but it is bad to make concrete plans to do so. As China's reactionary forces are backed by many imperialist powers, our revolutionary war will continue to be a protracted one until China's revolutionary forces have built up enough strength to breach the main positions of our internal and external enemies, and until the international revolutionary forces have crushed or contained most of the international reactionary forces. To proceed from this point in formulating our strategy of long-term warfare is one of the important principles guiding our strategy.

The reverse is true of campaigns and battles — here the principle is not protractedness but quick decision. Quick decision is sought in campaigns and battles, and this is true at all times and in all countries. In a war as a whole, too, quick decision is sought at all times and in all countries, and a long drawn-out war is considered harmful. China's war, however, must be handled with the greatest patience and treated as a protracted war. During the period of the Li Li-san line, some people ridiculed our way of doing things as "shadow-boxing tactics" (meaning our tactics of fighting many battles back and forth before going on to seize the big cities), and said that we would not see the victory of the revolution until our hair turned white. Such impatience was proved wrong long ago. But if their criticism had been applied not to strategy but to campaigns and battles, they would have been perfectly right, and for the following reasons. First, the Red Army has no sources from which to replenish its arms and especially its ammunition; second, the White forces consist of many armies while there is only one Red Army, which must be prepared to fight one operation after another in quick succession in order to smash each campaign of "encirclement and suppression"; and third, though the White armies advance separately, most of them keep fairly close to one another, and if we fail to gain a quick decision in attacking one of them, all the others will converge upon us. For these reasons we have to fight battles of quick decision. It is usual for us to conclude a battle in a few hours, or in a day or two. It is only when our plan is to "besiege the enemy in order to strike at his reinforcements" and our purpose is to strike not at the besieged enemy but at his reinforcements that we are prepared for a certain degree of protractedness in our besieging operations; but even then we seek a quick decision against the reinforcements. A plan of protracted operations is often applied in campaigns or battles when we are strategically on the defensive and are tenaciously defending positions on a holding front, or when, in a strategic offensive, we are attacking isolated enemy forces cut off from help, or are eliminating White strongholds within our base areas. But protracted operations of this kind help rather than hinder the main Red Army force in its battles of quick decision.

A quick decision cannot be achieved simply by wanting it, but requires many specific conditions. The main requirements are: adequate preparations, seizing the opportune moment, concentration of superior forces, encircling and outflanking tactics, favourable terrain, and striking at the enemy when he is on the move, or when he is stationary but has not yet consolidated his positions. Unless these requirements are satisfied, it is impossible to achieve quick decision in a campaign or battle.

The smashing of an enemy "encirclement and suppression" is a major campaign, but the principle of quick decision and not that of protractedness still applies. For the manpower, financial resources and military strength of a base area do not allow protractedness.

While quick decision is the general principle, we must oppose undue impatience. It is altogether necessary that the highest military and political leading body of a revolutionary base area, having taken into account the circumstances in its base area and the situation of the enemy, should not be overawed by his truculence, dispirited by hardships that can be endured, or dejected by setbacks, but should have the requisite patience and stamina. The smashing of the first enemy "encirclement and suppression" campaign in Kiangsi Province took only one week from the first battle to the last; the second was smashed in barely a fortnight; the third dragged on for three months before it was smashed; the fourth took three weeks; and the fifth taxed our endurance for a whole year. When we were compelled to break through the enemy's encirclement after the failure to smash his fifth campaign, we showed an unjustifiable haste. In the circumstances then obtaining, we could well have held out for another two or three months, giving the troops some time for rest and reorganization. If that had been done, and if the leadership had been a little wiser after our breakthrough, the outcome would have been very different.

For all that, the principle of shortening the duration of a campaign by every possible means remains valid. Campaign and battle plans should call for our maximum effort in concentration of troops, mobile warfare, and so on, so as to ensure the destruction of the enemy's effective strength on the interior lines (that is, in the base area) and the quick defeat of his "encirclement and suppression" campaign, but where it is evident that the campaign cannot be terminated on our interior lines, we should employ the main Red Army force to break through the enemy's encirclement and switch to our exterior lines (that is, the enemy's interior lines) in order to defeat him there. Now that the enemy has developed his blockhouse warfare to a high degree, this will become our usual method of operation. At the time of the Fukien Incident,[37] two months after the commencement of our fifth counter-campaign, the main forces of the Red Army should undoubtedly have thrust into the Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhwei-Kiangsi region, with Chekiang as the centre, and swept over the length and breadth of the area between Hangchow, Soochow, Nanking, Wuhu, Nanchang and Foochow, turning our strategic defensive into a strategic offensive, menacing the enemy's vital centres and seeking battles in the vast areas where there were no blockhouses. By such means we could have compelled the enemy, who was attacking southern Kiangsi and western Fukien, to turn back to defend his vital centres, broken his attack on the base area in Kiangsi and rendered aid to Fukien People's Government — we certainly could have aided it by this means. As this plan was rejected, the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign could not be broken, and the People's Government in Fukien inevitably collapsed. Even after a year's fighting, though it had become inopportune for us to advance on Chekiang, we could still have turned to the strategic offensive in another direction by moving our main forces towards Hunan, that is, by driving into central Hunan instead of going through Hunan to Kweichow, and in this way we could have manoeuvred the enemy from Kiangsi into Hunan and destroyed him there. As this plan, too, was rejected, all hope of breaking the enemy's fifth campaign was finally dashed, and we had no alternative but to set out on the Long March.

9. WAR OF ANNIHILATION

It is inappropriate to advocate a "contest of attrition" for the Chinese Red Army today. A "contest of treasures" not between Dragon Kings but between a Dragon King and a beggar would be rather ludicrous. For the Red Army which gets almost all its supplies from the enemy, war of annihilation is the basic policy. Only by annihilating the enemy's effective strength can we smash his "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and expand our revolutionary base areas. Inflicting casualties is a means of annihilating the enemy, or otherwise there would be no sense to it. We incur losses ourselves in inflicting casualties on the enemy, but we replenish ourselves by annihilating his units, thereby not only making good our losses but adding to the strength of our army. A battle in which the enemy is routed is not basically decisive in a contest with a foe of great strength. A battle of annihilation, on the other hand, produces a great and immediate impact on any enemy. Injuring all of a man's ten fingers is not as effective as chopping off one, and routing ten enemy divisions is not as effective as annihilating one of them.

Our policy for dealing with the enemy's first, second, third and fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns was war of annihilation. The forces annihilated in each campaign constituted only part of his total strength, and yet all these "encirclement and suppression" campaigns were smashed. In our fifth counter-campaign, however, the opposite policy was pursued, which in fact helped the enemy to attain his aims.

War of annihilation entails the concentration of superior forces and the adoption of encircling or outflanking tactics. We cannot have the former without the latter. Conditions such as popular support, favourable terrain, a vulnerable enemy force and the advantage of surprise are all indispensable for the purpose of annihilation.

Merely routing one enemy force or permitting it to escape has meaning only if, in the battle or campaign as a whole, our main force is concentrating its operations of annihilation against another enemy force, or otherwise it is meaningless. Here the losses are justified by the gains.

In establishing our own war industry we must not allow ourselves to become dependent on it. Our basic policy is to rely on the war industries of the imperialist countries and of our domestic enemy. We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang, and, what is more, it is delivered to us by the enemy's transport corps. This is the sober truth, it is not a jest.

NOTES

[1] The science of strategy, the science of campaigns and the science of tactics are all components of Chinese military science. The science of strategy deals with the laws that govern the war situation as a whole. The science of campaigns deals with the laws that govern campaigns and is applied in directing campaigns. The science of tactics deals with the laws that govern battles and is applied in directing battles.

[2] Sun Wu Tzu, or Sun Wu, was a famous Chinese military scientist in the 5th century B.C., who wrote *Sun Tzu*, a treatise on war containing thirteen chapters. This quotation is from Chapter 3, "The Strategy of Attack".

[3] When Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this article in 1936, it was exactly fifteen years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in July 1921.

[4] Chen Tu-hsiu was originally a professor at Peking University and became famous as an editor of *New Youth*. He was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. Owing to his reputation at the time of the May 4th Movement and owing to the Party's immaturity in its initial period, he became General Secretary of the Party. In the last period of the revolution of 1924-27, the Rightist thinking in the Party represented by Chen Tu-hsiu developed into a line of capitulationism. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has observed that the capitulationists at that time "voluntarily gave up the Party's leadership of the peasant masses, urban petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie, and in particular gave up the Party's leadership of the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of the revolution" ("The Present Situation and Our Tasks", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1961, Vol. IV, p. 171). After the defeat of 1927 Chen Tu-hsiu and a handful of other capitulationists lost faith in the future of the revolution and became liquidationists. They took the reactionary Trotskyist stand and together with the Trotskyites formed a small anti-Party group. Consequently Chen Tu-hsiu was expelled from the Party in November 1929. He died in 1942.

[5] The "Left" opportunism of Li Li-san, generally known as the "Li Li-san line", refers to the "Left" opportunist line which existed in the Party for about four months beginning from June 1930 and which was represented by Comrade Li Li-san, then the

most influential leader of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The Li Li-san line had the following characteristics: It violated the policy of the Party's Sixth National Congress; it denied that mass strength had to be built up for the revolution and denied that the development of the revolution was uneven; it regarded as "extremely erroneous . . . localism and conservatism characteristic of peasant mentality" the ideas of Comrade Mao Tse-tung that for a long time we should devote our attention mainly to creating rural base areas, use the rural areas to encircle the cities and use these bases to advance a high tide of country-wide revolution; and it held that preparations should be made for immediate insurrections in all parts of the country. On the basis of this erroneous line, Comrade Li Li-san drew up an adventurist plan for organizing immediate armed insurrections in the key cities throughout the country. At the same time, he refused to recognize the uneven development of the world revolution, holding that the general outbreak of the Chinese revolution would inevitably lead to a general outbreak of world revolution, without which the Chinese revolution could not be successful; he also refused to recognize the protracted nature of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, holding that the beginnings of victory in one or more provinces would mark the beginning of the transition to socialist revolution, and thus formulated a number of inappropriate "Left" adventurist policies. Comrade Mao Tse-tung opposed this erroneous line, and the broad masses of cadres and members in the Party also demanded its rectification. At the Third Plenary Session of the Party's Sixth Central Committee in September 1930 Comrade Li Li-san admitted the mistakes that had been pointed out and then relinquished his leading position in the Central Committee. Over a long period of time Comrade Li Li-san corrected his wrong views, and so he was re-elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress of the Party.

[6] The Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party held in September 1930, and the subsequent central leading body adopted many positive measures to put an end to the Li Li-san line. But later a number of Party comrades who were inexperienced in practical revolutionary struggle, with Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming) and Chin Pang-hsien (Po Ku) in the lead, came out against the Central Committee's measures. In the pamphlet, *The Two Lines* or *The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China*, they most emphatically declared that the main danger then existing in the Party was not "Left" opportunism but "Right opportunism" and, to justify their own activities, they "criticized" the Li Li-san line as "Rightist". They put forward a new political programme which continued, revived or developed the Li Li-san line and other "Left" ideas and policies in a new guise, and set themselves against the correct line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. It was mainly to criticize the military mistakes of this new "Left" opportunist line that Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote the present article, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War". This line was dominant in the Party from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931 to the meeting of the Political Bureau convened by the Central Committee at Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, in January 1935, which ended the dominance of this erroneous line and established the new central leadership headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The erroneous "Left" line dominated the Party for a particularly long time (four years) and brought extremely heavy losses, with disastrous consequences, to the Party and the revolution. A loss of 90 per cent was inflicted on the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Red Army and its base areas, tens of millions of people in the revolutionary base areas were made to suffer the

cruel oppression of the Kuomintang, and the progress of the Chinese revolution was retarded. The overwhelming majority of the errant comrades have realized and corrected their mistakes through a long process of learning from experience and have done much good work for the Party and the people. Under Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leadership they are now united with the masses of other comrades in the Party on the basis of a common political understanding.

[7] For the Right opportunism of Chang Kuo-tao, see "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", Notes 21 and 22, pp. 175-76 of this volume.

[8] The Officers' Training Corps at Lushan was an organization set up by Chiang Kai-shek in July 1933 on Lushan Mountain in Kiukiang, Kiangsi Province, for training anti-Communist military cadres. Officers of Chiang Kai-shek's armed forces were sent there in rotation to receive fascist military and political training from German, Italian and American instructors.

[9] These new military principles largely constituted the Chiang Kai-shek gang's policy of "blockhouse warfare" in accordance with which it advanced gradually and entrenched itself at every step.

[10] See V. I. Lenin, "'Communism'", in which Lenin, criticizing the Hungarian Communist Bela Kun, said that he "gives up the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, the concrete analysis of concrete conditions" (*Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1950, Vol. XXXI, p. 143).

[11] The First Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area was held on May 20, 1928 at Maoping, Ningkang County.

[12] For an explanation, see pp. 236-37 of this volume.

[13] For roving rebels, see "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", Notes 4 and 5, pp. 115-16 of this volume.

[14] "Bandit ways" refers to plundering and looting resulting from lack of discipline, organization and clear political direction.

[15] The Long March of 25,000 *li* (12,500 kilometres) was made by the Red Army from Kiangsi Province to northern Shensi Province. For further reference, see "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", Note 20, p. 175 of this volume.

[16] The period after the December uprising of 1905 was defeated, in which the revolutionary tide in Russia gradually receded. See *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, *Short Course*, Chapter 3, Sections 5 and 6.

[17] The peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded between Soviet Russia and Germany in March 1918. Confronted with obviously superior enemy forces, the revolutionary forces had to make a temporary retreat in order to prevent the German imperialists from launching an attack on the new-born Soviet Republic, which as yet had no army of its own. The conclusion of this treaty gained time for the Soviet Republic to consolidate the political power of the proletariat, reorganize its economy and build up the Red Army. It enabled the proletariat to maintain its leadership over the peasantry and build up sufficient strength to defeat the White Guards and the armed intervention of Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Poland and other countries in 1918-20.

[18] On October 30, 1927 the peasants of the Haifeng-Lufeng area of Kwangtung Province launched their third insurrection under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. They occupied Haifeng and Lufeng and the surrounding area, organized a Red Army and established the democratic political power of the workers and

peasants. They were later defeated because they made the mistake of underestimating the enemy.

[19] The Fourth Front Army and the Second Front Army of the Red Army joined forces in the autumn of 1936 and shifted northward from the northeastern part of Sikang. Chang Kuo-tao was then still persisting in his anti-Party stand and in his policy of retreat and liquidation. In October of the same year, when the Second and Fourth Front Armies arrived in Kansu, he ordered the advance units of the Fourth Front Army, numbering more than 20,000, to organize the Western Column for crossing the Yellow River and advancing westward to Chinghai. This Column was practically defeated after suffering blows in battles in December 1936 and was completely defeated in March 1937.

[20] See letter from Karl Marx to L. Kugelmann on the Paris Commune.

[21] *Shui Hu Chuan (Heroes of the Marshes)* is a celebrated Chinese novel describing a peasant war. The novel is attributed to Shih Nai-an who lived around the end of the Yuan Dynasty and the beginning of the Ming Dynasty (14th century). Lin Chung and Chai Chin are both heroes in this novel. Hung is the drill master on Chai Chin's estate.

[22] Lu and Chi were two feudal states in the Spring and Autumn Era (722-481 B.C.). Chi was a big state in the central part of the present Shantung Province, and Lu was a smaller one in the southern part. Duke Chuang reigned over Lu from 693 to 662 B.C.

[23] Tsochiu Ming was the author of *Tso Chuan*, a classical chronicle of the Chou Dynasty. For the passage quoted, see the section in *Tso Chuan* entitled "The 10th Year of Duke Chuang" (684 B.C.).

[24] The ancient town of Chengkao, in the northwest of the present Chengkao County, Honan Province, was of great military importance. It was the scene of battles fought in 203 B.C. between Liu Pang, King of Han, and Hsiang Yu, King of Chu. At first Hsiang Yu captured Hsingyang and Chengkao and Liu Pang's troops were almost routed. Liu Pang waited until the opportune moment when Hsiang Yu's troops were in midstream crossing the Szeshui River, and then crushed them and recaptured Chengkao.

[25] The ancient town of Kunyang, in the north of the present Yehhsien County, Honan Province, was the place where Liu Hsiu, founder of the Eastern Han Dynasty, defeated the troops of Wang Mang, Emperor of the Hsin Dynasty, in A.D. 23. There was a huge numerical disparity between the two sides, Liu Hsiu's forces totalling 8,000 to 9,000 men as against Wang Mang's 400,000. But taking advantage of the negligence of Wang Mang's generals, Wang Hsun and Wang Yi, who underestimated the enemy, Liu Hsiu with only 3,000 picked troops put Wang Mang's main forces to rout. He followed up this victory by crushing the rest of the enemy troops.

[26] Kuantu was in the northeast of the present Chungmou County, Honan Province, and the scene of the battle between the armies of Tsao Tsao and Yuan Shao in A.D. 200. Yuan Shao had an army of 100,000, while Tsao Tsao had only a meagre force and was short of supplies. Taking advantage of lack of vigilance on the part of Yuan Shao's troops, who belittled the enemy, Tsao Tsao dispatched his light-footed soldiers to spring a surprise attack on them and set their supplies on fire. Yuan Shao's army was thrown into confusion and its main force wiped out.

[27] The state of Wu was ruled by Sun Chuan, and the state of Wei by Tsao Tsao. Chihpi is situated on the south bank of the Yangtse River, to the northeast of Chiayu, Hupeh Province. In A.D. 208 Tsao Tsao led an army of over 500,000 men, which he

proclaimed to be 800,000 strong, to launch an attack on Sun Chuan. The latter, in alliance with Tsao Tsao's antagonist Liu Pei, mustered a force of 30,000. Knowing that Tsao Tsao's army was plagued by epidemics and was unaccustomed to action afloat, the allied forces of Sun Chuan and Liu Pei set fire to Tsao Tsao's fleet and crushed his army.

[28] Yiling, to the east of the present Ichang, Hupeh Province, was the place where Lu Hsun, a general of the state of Wu, defeated the army of Liu Pei, ruler of Shu, in A.D. 222. Liu Pei's troops scored successive victories at the beginning of the war and penetrated five or six hundred *li* into the territory of Wu as far as Yiling. Lu Hsun, who was defending Yiling, avoided battle for over seven months until Liu Pei "was at his wits' end and his troops were exhausted and demoralized". Then he crushed Liu Pei's troops by taking advantage of a favourable wind to set fire to their tents.

[29] Hsieh Hsuan, a general of Eastern Tsin Dynasty, defeated Fu Chien, ruler of the state of Chin, in A.D. 383 at the Feishui River in Anhwei Province. Fu Chien had an infantry force of more than 600,000, a cavalry force of 270,000 and a guards corps of more than 30,000, while the land and river forces of Eastern Tsin numbered only 80,000. When the armies lined up on opposite banks of the Feishui River, Hsieh Hsuan, taking advantage of the overconfidence and conceit of the enemy troops, requested Fu Chien to move his troops back so as to leave room for the Eastern Tsin troops to cross the river and fight it out. Fu Chien complied, but when he ordered withdrawal, his troops got into a panic and could not be stopped. Seizing the opportunity, the Eastern Tsin troops crossed the river, launched an offensive and crushed the enemy.

[30] Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province, was the scene of the famous uprising on August 1,1927 led by the Communist Party of China in order to combat the counter-revolution of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei and to continue the revolution of 1924-27. More than thirty thousand troops took part in the uprising which was led by Comrades Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ho Lung and Yeh Ting. The insurrectionary army withdrew from Nanchang on August 5 as planned, but suffered a defeat when approaching Chaochow and Swatow in Kwangtung Province. Led by Comrades Chu Teh, Chen Yi and Lin Piao, part of the troops later fought their way to the Chingkang Mountains and joined forces with the 1st Division of the First Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army under Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

[31] See "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?", Note 8, p. 72 of this volume.

[32] The famous Autumn Harvest Uprising under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung was launched in September 1927 by the people's armed forces of Hsiushui, Pinghsiang, Pingkiang and Liuyang Counties on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, who formed the First Division of the First Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. Comrade Mao Tse-tung led this force to the Chingkang Mountains where a revolutionary base was established.

[33] The A-B (initials for "Anti-Bolshevik") Group was a counter-revolutionary organization of undercover Kuomintang agents in the Red areas.

[34] See V. I. Lenin, "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace", "Strange and Monstrous", "A Serious Lesson and a Serious Responsibility", "Report on War and Peace", *Selected Works*, in two volumes, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1952, Vol. II, Part I and also *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*. Chapter 7, Section 7.

[35] The regions referred to here are those inhabited by the Tibetans in Sikang and the Hui people in Kansu, Chinghai and Sinkiang Provinces.

[36] The "eight-legged essay" was the prescribed form in the imperial competitive examinations in feudal China from the 15th to the 19th century. The main body of the essay was made up of the inceptive paragraph, the middle paragraph, the rear paragraph and the concluding paragraph, with each paragraph comprising two parts. Here Comrade Mao Tse-tung is using the development of the theme in this kind of essay as a metaphor to illustrate the development of the revolution through its various stages. However, Comrade Mao Tse-tung generally uses the term "eight-legged essay" to ridicule dogmatism.

[37] In November 1933, under the influence of the people's anti-Japanese upsurge throughout China, the leaders of the Kuomintang's 19th Route Army, in alliance with the Kuomintang forces under Li Chi-shen, publicly renounced Chiang Kai-shek and established the "People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China" in Fukien, concluding an agreement with the Red Army to attack Chiang Kai-shek and resist Japan. This episode was referred to as the Fukien Incident. The 19th Route Army and Fukien People's Government, however, collapsed under the attacks of Chiang Kai-shek's troops.

A STATEMENT ON CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S STATEMENT

December 28, 1936

In Sian Chiang Kai-shek accepted the demand for resistance to Japan put forward by Generals Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng and the people of the Northwest and, as an initial step, he has ordered his civil war troops to withdraw from the provinces of Shensi and Kansu. This marks the beginning of Chiang's reversal of his wrong policy in the past decade.[1] It is a blow to the intrigues conducted by the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese "punitive" group[2] to stage-manage a civil war, foment splits and get Chiang killed in the Sian Incident. Their disappointment is already apparent. The indication that Chiang Kai-shek is beginning to wake up may be considered a sign of the Kuomintang's willingness to end the wrong policy it has pursued for ten years.

On December 26 Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement in Loyang, the so-called "Admonition to Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng", which is so ambiguous and evasive as to be an interesting specimen among China's political documents. If Chiang really wants to draw a serious lesson from the incident and try to revitalize the Kuomintang, and if he wants to end his consistently wrong policy of compromise in foreign affairs and of civil war and oppression at home, so that the Kuomintang will no longer stand opposed to the wishes of the people, then as a token of good faith he should have produced a better piece of writing, repenting his political past and setting a new course for the future. The statement of December 26 cannot meet the demands of the Chinese masses.

However, it does contain one praiseworthy passage, in which Chiang asserts that "promises must be kept and action must be resolute". This means that, although he did not sign the terms set forth by Chang and Yang in Sian, he is willing to accept such demands as are beneficial to the state and the nation and will not break his word on the grounds that he did not sign. We shall see whether, after he has withdrawn his troops, Chiang will act in good faith and carry out the terms he has accepted. The terms are:

(1) to reorganize the Kuomintang and the National Government, expel the pro-Japanese group and admit anti-Japanese elements;

(2) to release the patriotic leaders in Shanghai[3] and all other political prisoners, and guarantee the freedoms and rights of the people;

(3) to end the policy of "suppressing the Communists" and enter into an alliance with the Red Army to resist Japan;

(4) to convene a national salvation conference, representing all parties, groups, sections of the population and armies, to decide on the policy of resisting Japan and saving the nation;

(5) to enter into co-operation with countries sympathetic to China's resistance to Japan; and

(6) to adopt other specific ways and means to save the nation.

The fulfilment of these terms requires above all good faith, and also some courage. We shall judge Chiang by his future actions.

But his statement contains the remark that the Sian Incident was brought about under the pressure of "reactionaries". It is a pity that he did not explain what kind of people he meant by "reactionaries" nor is it clear how the word "reactionary" is defined in Chiang's dictionary. However, what is certain is that the Sian Incident took place under the influence of the following forces:

(1) the mounting indignation against Japan among the troops of Generals Chang and Yang and among the revolutionary people of the Northwest;

(2) the mounting indignation against Japan among the people of the whole country;

(3) the growth of the Left forces in the Kuomintang;

(4) he demand by the groups in power in various provinces for resistance to Japan and for the salvation of the nation;

(5) the stand taken by the Communist Party for a national united front against Japan; and

(6) the development of the world peace front.

All these are indisputable facts. It is just these forces that Chiang calls "reactionary"; while other people call them revolutionary, Chiang calls them "reactionary" — that is all. Since he declared in Sian that he would fight Japan in earnest, presumably he will not resume violent attacks on the revolutionary forces immediately after leaving Sian; not only does his own political life and that of his group hang upon his good faith, but they now have confronting them and obstructing their political path a force which has expanded to their detriment — the "punitive" group which tried to get him killed in the Sian Incident. We therefore advise Chiang Kai-shek to revise his political dictionary, changing the word "reactionary" to "revolutionary", for it is better to use terms corresponding to the facts.

Chiang should remember that he owes his safe departure from Sian to the mediation of the Communist Party, as well as to the efforts of Generals Chang and Yang, the leaders in the Sian Incident. Throughout the incident, the Communist Party stood for a peaceful settlement and made every effort to that end, acting solely in the interests of national survival. Had the civil war spread and had Chang and Yang kept Chiang Kai-shek in custody for long, the incident could only have developed in favour of the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese "punitive" group. It was in these circumstances that the Communist Party firmly exposed the intrigues of the Japanese imperialists and of Wang Ching-wei,[4] Ho Ying-chin[5] and other members of the Chinese "punitive" group, and firmly advocated a peaceful settlement, which happened to coincide with the views of Generals Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng and such members of the Kuomintang as T. V. Soong.[6] This is exactly what the people throughout the country call for, because they bitterly detest the present civil war.

Chiang was set free upon his acceptance of the Sian terms. From now on the question is whether he will carry out to the letter his pledge that "promises must be kept and action must be resolute", and strictly fulfil all the terms for saving the nation. The nation will not permit any further hesitation on his part or allow him any discount in fulfilling the terms. If he wavers on the issue of resisting Japan or delays in fulfilling his pledge, then the nation-wide revolutionary tide will sweep him away. Chiang and his group should bear in mind the old saying: "If a man does not keep his word, what is he good for?"

If Chiang can clean up the dirt created by the Kuomintang's reactionary policy over the past ten years, thoroughly correct his fundamental errors of compromise in foreign affairs and of civil war and oppression at home, immediately join the anti-Japanese front uniting all parties and groups and really take the military and political measures that can save the nation, then of course the Communist Party will support him. As early as August 25, the Communist Party promised such support to Chiang and the Kuomintang in its letter to the Kuomintang.[7] The people throughout the country have known for fifteen years that the Communist Party observes the maxim, "Promises must be kept and action must be resolute." They undoubtedly have more confidence in the words and deeds of the Communist Party than in those of any other party or group in China.

NOTES

[1] Under the influence of the Chinese Red Army and the people's anti-Japanese movement, the Kuomintang's Northeastern Army headed by Chang Hsueh-liang and the Kuomintang's 17th Route Army headed by Yang Hu-cheng agreed to the anti-Japanese national united front proposed by the Communist Party of China and demanded that Chiang Kai-shek should unite with the Communist Party to resist Japan. He refused, became still more active in his military preparations for the "suppression of the Communists" and massacred young people in Sian who were anti-Japanese. Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng took joint action and arrested Chiang Kai-shek. This was the famous Sian Incident of December 12, 1936. He was forced to accept the terms of unity with the Communist Party and resistance to Japan, and was then set free to return to Nanking.

[2] The Chinese "punitive" group consisted of the pro-Japanese elements in the Kuomintang government in Nanking who tried to wrest power from Chiang Kai-shek during the Sian Incident. With Wang Ching-wei and Ho Ying-chin as their leaders, they advocated a "punitive expedition" against Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng. Availing themselves of the incident, they prepared to start large-scale civil war in order to clear the way for the Japanese invaders and wrest political power from Chiang Kai-shek.

[3] Seven leaders of the patriotic anti-Japanese movement in Shanghai had been arrested by Chiang Kai-shek's government in November 1936. They were Shen Chun-ju, Chang Nai-chi, Tsou Tao-fen, Li Kung-pu, Sha Chien-li, Shih Liang and Wang Tsao-shih. They were kept in prison till July 1937.

[4] Wang Ching-wei was the head of the pro-Japanese group in the Kuomintang. He had stood for compromise with the Japanese imperialists ever since their invasion of the Northeast in 1931. In December 1938 he left Chungking, openly capitulated to the Japanese invaders, and set up a puppet government in Nanking.

[5] Ho Ying-chin, a Kuomintang warlord, was another leader of the pro-Japanese group. During the Sian Incident he actively plotted civil war by deploying Kuomintang

troops for an attack on Shensi along the Lunghai Railway. He planned to kill Chiang Kai-shek by bombing Sian, in order to take over Chiang's position.

[6] T. V. Soong was a pro-American member of the Kuomintang. Championing U.S. interests he, too, favoured a peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident, because U.S. imperialism was at loggerheads with Japanese imperialism with which it was then contending for supremacy in the Far East.

[7] This letter sternly criticized the Kuomintang's reactionary rule and the decisions of the Second Plenary Session of its Central Executive Committee. It also set out the Communist Party's policy of forming an anti-Japanese national united front and renewing its co-operation with the Kuomintang. The main part of the letter reads:

> In talking about "centralization and unification", the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of your party is really confusing cause and effect. It must be emphasized that the civil war and disunity of the last ten years have been entirely caused by the disastrous policy of dependence on imperialism pursued by your party and your party's government, and especially the policy of non-resistance to Japan persisted in ever since the Incident of September 18, 1931. Under the slogan of "Internal pacification before resistance to foreign invasion", your party and your party's government have been carrying on incessant civil war and launching numerous encirclement campaigns against the Red Army, and have spared no effort in suppressing the patriotic and democratic movements of the people throughout the country. Being blind to the fact that Japanese imperialism is China's deadliest enemy, you have had no qualms even in recent months about abandoning northeastern and northern China, you have used all your strength to fight the Red Army and wage factional struggles within your own party, you have blocked the Red Army on its way to fight the Japanese and harassed its rear, you have ignored the nation-wide demand for resistance to Japan and have deprived the people of their freedoms and rights. Patriotism is penalized and innocent people are in jail everywhere; treason is rewarded and traitors are jubilant over their new appointments and honours. To seek centralization and unification by means of this wrong policy is like "climbing a tree to seek fish" and will produce exactly the opposite results. We wish to warn you gentlemen that if you do not make a fundamental change in your erroneous policy, and if you do not direct your hatred against the Japanese imperialists but continue to direct it against your own countrymen, you will find it impossible even to maintain the status quo, and any talk about centralization, unification and a so-called "modern state" will remain idle chatter. What the whole nation demands is centralization and unification for fighting Japan and saving the nation, not for fawning on the foreigners and persecuting our own people. The people are now eagerly demanding a government that can really save their country and themselves, a really democratic republic They demand a democratic republican government which will serve their interests. The programme of such a government must principally provide for: first, resistance to foreign aggression; second, democratic rights for the people; and third, development of the national economy and elimination, or at least alleviation, of the people's sufferings. If there is any sense in your talk about a "modern state", this is the only programme genuinely meeting the needs of colonial and semi-colonial China in the present era. With eager hopes and firm determination the people are struggling for the realization of these objectives. But your party and your

party's government are pursuing a policy that runs counter to their hopes, and you will never win their confidence. The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Red Army hereby solemnly declare: we stand for the setting up of a unified democratic republic for the whole country and the convening of a parliament elected by universal suffrage, and we support an anti-Japanese national salvation congress representative of all the people and all the anti-Japanese armed forces in the country, and a unified national defence government for the whole country. We hereby declare: as soon as a unified democratic republic is set up for the whole of China, the Red areas will become one of its component parts, the representatives of the people of the Red areas will attend the all-China parliament, and the same democratic system will be set up in the Red areas as in other parts of China. We hold that the national defence council, which the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of your party has decided to organize, and the national assembly, which your party and your party's government are in process of convening, cannot achieve centralization and unification for resisting Japan and saving the nation. According to the regulations of the national defence council passed by the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of your party, this council will be confined to a few officials who hold power in your party and your party's government, and its task is merely to serve as an advisory body to that government. It is only too clear that such a council cannot achieve anything or win any confidence among the people. The same applies to the national assembly which you gentlemen propose to convene; according to the "Draft Constitution of the Republic of China" and the "Organic Law and Election Law of the National Assembly" passed by your party's government, this assembly will be merely an organ manipulated by a few officials of your party and your party's government, it will be nothing but an appendage for them, or a piece of ornamentation. A national defence council and a national assembly of this kind have nothing at all in common with the all-China congress for resistance to Japan and for national salvation — the national defence council — and the Chinese democratic republic and its parliament which our Party has proposed. We hold that a national defence council for resistance to Japan and national salvation must include representatives of all the political parties and groups, all walks of life and all the armed forces, and must constitute a real organ of authority to decide the major policies for resisting Japan and saving the nation, and that a unified national defence government must be formed from this council. The national assembly must be a parliament elected by universal suffrage and the supreme organ of authority of the democratic republic of China. Only such a national defence council and such an all-China parliament will win the approval, support and participation of the people of the whole country and place the great cause of saving the nation and the people on a firm, unshakable foundation. Mere fine words are useless and will not win the people's approval. The failure of the various conferences held by your party and your party's government is the best proof of this. The declaration of the Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of your party stated, "Dangers and obstacles are only to be expected; but we will never, because of the difficulties and troubles that beset the nation, relax in the fulfilment of our duty." And again, "As to the survival of the nation, naturally our party will work for it persistently, body and soul." True enough, being the ruling party in the largest part of China, your party must bear the political responsibility for all past deeds. In view of the fact that the Kuomintang government is a one-party dictatorship, your party can never escape this responsibility. In particular, you can never shift onto others your responsibility for the loss of almost half of China, resulting from the absolutely wrong policy which your party has pursued since the September 18th Incident against the wishes of all the people and the interests of the whole nation. As we and all the people see it, since half of China has been abandoned by your party, it certainly cannot evade its duty of recovering the territory and restoring China's sovereignty. At the same time, even within your party many men of conscience are now clearly awake to the horrors of national subjugation and the inviolability of the people's will; they are beginning to turn in a new direction and feel indignant and dissatisfied with those in their midst who have brought disaster both to their party and to the nation. The Chinese Communist Party has full sympathy with this new turn and warmly applauds the noble spirit and awakening of these patriotic and conscientious members of the Kuomintang, their readiness to make sacrifices in the struggle, and their courage to introduce reforms when the nation is on the brink of ruin. We know that the number of awakened and patriotic people is increasing daily in your party's central and provincial headquarters, in its central and provincial governments, in educational, scientific, artistic, journalistic and industrial circles, among the women and in religious and medical circles, within the police service, among all kinds of popular organizations, and in particular among the broad ranks of the army and among both old and new Kuomintang members as well as Kuomintang leaders at various levels; this is very heartening. The Chinese Communist Party is always ready to join hands with these members of the Kuomintang and form a solid national united front with them to fight the nation's deadliest enemy, Japanese imperialism. We hope that they will speedily grow into a dominant force in the Kuomintang and prevail over those wicked and shameless members who have ignored the interests of the nation and virtually become Japanese agents and collaborators — members who are a disgrace to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's memory — and we hope that they will thus be able to revive the spirit of Dr. Sun's revolutionary Three People's Principles, reaffirm his Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers, and "work persistently, body and soul" for the realization of the revolutionary Three People's Principles, of the Three Great Policies and of Dr. Sun's revolutionary Testament. We hope that, together with the patriotic leaders of all political parties and groups and of all walks of life and together with all patriotic people, they will resolutely shoulder the responsibility of continuing Dr. Sun's revolutionary cause and will throw themselves into the struggle to drive out the Japanese imperialists and save the Chinese nation from subjugation, to win democratic rights for the people, to develop China's national economy and free the vast majority of its people from their sufferings, and to bring into being the democratic republic of China with a democratic parliament and democratic government. The Chinese Communist Party hereby declares to all members of the Kuomintang: if you really do this, we shall resolutely support you and are ready to form with you a solid revolutionary united front like that of the great revolutionary period of 1924-27 against imperialist and feudal oppression, for this is the only correct way today to save the nation from subjugation and ensure its survival.

THE TASKS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF RESISTANCE TO JAPAN

May 3, 1937

THE PRESENT STAGE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS

1. As the contradiction between China and Japan has become the principal one and China's internal contradictions have dropped into a secondary and subordinate place, changes have occurred in China's international relations and internal class relations, giving rise to a new stage of development in the current situation.

2. China has long been in the grip of two acute and basic contradictions, the contradiction between China and imperialism and the contradiction between feudalism and the masses of the people. In 1927 the bourgeoisie, represented by the Kuomintang, betrayed the revolution and sold China's national interests to imperialism, thus creating a situation in which the state power of the workers and peasants stood in sharp antagonism to that of the Kuomintang, and, of necessity, the task of the national and democratic revolution devolved upon the Chinese Communist Party alone.

3. Since the Incident of September 18, 1931 and especially since the Northern China Incident of 1935,[1] the following changes have taken place in these contradictions:

(1) The contradiction between China and imperialism in general has given way to the particularly salient and sharp contradiction between China and Japanese imperialism. Japanese imperialism is carrying out a policy of total conquest of China. Consequently, the contradictions between China and certain other imperialist powers

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this report at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, held in Yenan in May 1937.

have been relegated to a secondary position, while the rift between these powers and Japan has been widened. Consequently also, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people are faced with the task of linking China's anti-Japanese national united front with the world peace front. This means that China should not only unite with the Soviet Union, which has been the consistently good friend of the Chinese people, but as far as possible should work for joint opposition to Japanese imperialism with those imperialist countries which, at the present time, are willing to maintain peace and are against new wars of aggression. The aim of our united front must be resistance to Japan, and not simultaneous opposition to all the imperialist powers.

(2) The contradiction between China and Japan has changed internal class relations within China and has confronted the bourgeoisie and even the warlords with the question of survival, so that they and their political parties have been undergoing a gradual change in their political attitude. This has placed the task of establishing an anti-Japanese national united front before the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. Our united front should include the bourgeoisie and all who agree to the defence of the motherland; it should represent national solidarity against the foreign foe. This task not only must, but can, be fulfilled.

(3) The contradiction between China and Japan has changed matters for the masses throughout the country (the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie) and for the Communist Party, and it has changed the Party's policy. More and more people have risen to fight for national salvation. The policy proclaimed by the Communist Party after the September 18th Incident was to conclude agreements with those sections of the Kuomintang which were willing to co-operate with us for resistance, subject to three conditions (stop attacking the revolutionary base areas, guarantee the freedoms and rights of the people, arm the people), and it has developed into a policy of establishing an anti-Japanese united front of the whole nation. This is the reason for the following steps taken by our Party: in 1935, the August declaration[2] and the December resolution;[3] in 1936 the abandonment of the "anti-Chiang Kai-shek" slogan in May,[4] the letter to the Kuomintang in August,[5] the resolution on the democratic republic in September,[6] and the insistence on a peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident in December; and in 1937, the February telegram to the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.[7]

(4) Because of the contradiction between China and Japan, a change has also occurred in the Chinese warlord regimes and the civil wars among them, which are the product of the imperialist policy of spheres of influence and of China's semi-colonial economic conditions. Japanese imperialism fosters such separate regimes and civil wars for the purpose of facilitating exclusive Japanese domination of China. Certain other imperialist powers are temporarily in favour of unity and peace in China in their own interests. The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people on their part are exerting their utmost efforts against civil wars and splits and for peace and unity.

(5) In terms of relative political importance the development of the national contradiction between China and Japan has demoted the domestic contradictions between classes and between political groupings to a secondary and subordinate place. But they still exist and have by no means diminished or disappeared. The same is true of the contradictions between China and the imperialist powers other than Japan. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people are faced with the following task — to make the appropriate adjustments with regard to those internal and external contradictions which can and must be adjusted at present so as to fit in with the general task of unity against Japan. This is the reason for the Chinese Communist Party's policies of peace and unity, democracy, bettering the life of the people and negotiations with foreign countries that are opposed to Japan.

4. The first stage of the new period in the Chinese revolution began on December 9, 1935 and ended when the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee held its Third Plenary Session in February 1937. The major events in this stage were the movements for national salvation among the students and cultural and press circles; the Red Army's entry into the Northwest; the Communist Party's work of propaganda and organization for its anti-Japanese national united front policy; the anti-Japanese strikes in Shanghai and Tsingtao;[8] the relative stiffening of British policy towards Japan;[9] the Kwangtung-Kwangsi Incident;[10] the resistance in Suiyuan and the movement in its support;[11] Nanking's somewhat firmer attitude in the Sino-Japanese negotiations;[12] the Sian Incident; and finally, the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Nanking.[13] These events all centred on the basic contradiction, which is the antagonism between China and Japan; they all centred directly on the historical need for an anti-Japanese national united front.

The basic task of the revolution at this stage was to struggle for internal peace and stop the internal armed conflicts, so that there could be unity against Japan. During this stage the Communist Party issued its call, “Stop the civil war and unite against Japan”, a call which in the main has been put into effect, and thereby created the primary prerequisite for the actual establishment of an anti-Japanese national united front.

5. Owing to the presence of the pro-Japanese group inside the Kuomintang, it made no definite or thoroughgoing change in its policy at the Third Plenary Session of its Central Executive Committee and did not concretely solve any problem. However, owing to the pressure of the people and to developments in its own ranks, the Kuomintang had to begin to change its wrong policy of the previous ten years, that is, it had to turn away from the policy of civil war, dictatorship and non-resistance to Japan and to move in the direction of peace, democracy and resistance to Japan, and it had to begin accepting the policy of an anti-Japanese national united front; this initial change revealed itself at the Third Plenary Session of its Central Executive Committee. From now on the demand must be for a thorough change in Kuomintang policy. In order to attain this goal our Party and the people throughout the country must develop the movement for resistance to Japan and for democracy still more extensively, must go a step further in criticizing the Kuomintang, pushing it into action and keeping up the pressure, must unite with all those within the Kuomintang who stand for peace, democracy and resistance to Japan, and must help the hesitant waverers forward and throw out the pro-Japanese elements.

6. The present stage is the second one in the new period. Both the previous and present stages are stages of transition towards nationwide armed resistance to Japan. If in the previous stage the principal task was the fight for peace, then in the present stage the principal task is the fight for democracy. It must be understood that just as a genuine and solid anti-Japanese national united front cannot be established without internal peace, so it cannot be established without internal democracy. Hence at the present stage of development the fight for democracy is the central link in the revolutionary task. If we fail to see the importance of democracy clearly and slacken our fight for it, we shall be unable to establish a genuine and solid anti-Japanese national united front.

THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM

7. Japanese imperialism is now intensifying its preparations for the invasion of China south of the Great Wall. In concert with the intensified preparations of Hitler and Mussolini for predatory war in the West, Japan is exerting every ounce of energy in the East in order to prepare the ground, according to a definite plan, for the subjugation of China at a single stroke — she is creating the military, political, economic and ideological conditions at home and the diplomatic conditions internationally, and fostering the pro-Japanese forces in China. Japan's propaganda about "Sino-Japanese collaboration" and a certain relaxation in her diplomatic measures stem precisely from the tactical needs of her policy of aggression on the eve of war. China is now approaching the critical moment of decision between survival and extinction and must rush preparations for resisting Japan and saving the nation. We are certainly not against preparation; what we are against is the doctrine of protracted preparation and the frivolous, dissipated and gluttonous life of civil and military officialdom which imperils the nation; such things actually help the enemy and must be quickly swept away.

8. Political, military, economic and educational preparations for national defence are all necessary for armed resistance to save the nation, and none of them should be delayed for a moment. But the key that will ensure victory for our armed resistance is the winning of political democracy and freedom. Armed resistance requires domestic peace and unity, but the peace already won cannot be consolidated and internal unity cannot be strengthened without democracy and freedom. Armed resistance requires the mobilization of the people, but there is no way of mobilizing them without democracy and freedom. Unless peace and unity are consolidated, unless the people are mobilized, our armed resistance will meet the same fate as Abyssinia's. Abyssinia was defeated mainly because her feudal regime could not achieve solid internal unity and rouse the initiative of her people. Without democracy, a genuine and solid national united front against Japan cannot be established in China and its goals cannot be attained.

9. China must at once start democratic changes in the-two following respects. First, in the matter of the political system, the reactionary Kuomintang dictatorship of one party and one class must be changed

into a democratic government based on the co-operation of all parties and all classes. In this respect, a start should be made by changing the undemocratic procedures for electing and convening the national assembly, and by holding democratic elections to the assembly and ensuring freedom in the conduct of its meetings, after which it will be necessary to go on to framing and adopting a truly democratic constitution, convening a truly democratic parliament, and electing a genuinely democratic government that will carry out genuinely democratic policies. Only thus can internal peace be truly consolidated, internal armed hostilities ended and internal unity strengthened, enabling the whole nation to unite and resist the foreign foe. It is possible that Japanese imperialism will attack us before the changes are completed. Therefore, in order to be able to resist and thoroughly crush the Japanese attack when it comes, we must quickly go ahead with the reforms and be prepared to accomplish them fully in the course of our armed resistance. The people of the whole country and the patriots of all parties should throw off their former indifference towards the question of a national assembly and a constitution, and should concentrate on the movement for a national assembly and a constitution, a movement that is important for national defence; they should subject the Kuomintang, the party in power, to severe criticism, and press and impel it to give up its one-party, one-class dictatorship and act according to the opinions of the people. In the next few months of this year, a broad democratic movement must be set going throughout the country, with the immediate objective of completely democratizing the national assembly and the constitution. The second matter concerns freedom of speech, assembly and association for the people. Without such freedom, it will be impossible to carry out the democratic reconstruction of the political system, mobilize the people for the war of resistance and victoriously defend the motherland and recover the lost territories. In the next few months the nation-wide democratic movement should strive for at least a minimal achievement of such freedoms, which must include the release of political prisoners, the removal of the ban on political parties, etc. Democratic reconstruction of the political system and freedom and rights for the people constitute an important part of the programme of the anti-Japanese national united front; at the same time they are prerequisites for the establishment of a genuine and solid anti-Japanese national united front.

10. Our enemies — the Japanese imperialists, the Chinese traitors, the pro-Japanese elements and the Trotskyites — have been doing their utmost to wreck every move for peace and unity, democracy and freedom in China and for armed resistance to Japan. In the past, while we were fighting strenuously for peace and unity, they were doing all they could to foment civil war and splits. At present and in the near future, while we fight strenuously for democracy and freedom, they will no doubt resort to their wrecking again. Their general objective is to thwart us in our task of armed resistance in defence of the motherland and to accomplish their aggressive plan for subjugating China. From now on, in the struggle for democracy and freedom, we must not only exert ourselves in propaganda, agitation and criticism directed towards the Kuomintang die-hards and the backward sections of the people, but must also fully expose and firmly combat the intrigues of the Japanese imperialists and of the pro-Japanese elements and Trotskyites who serve as their running dogs in the invasion of China.

11. For the sake of internal peace, democracy and armed resistance and for the sake of establishing the anti-Japanese national united front, the Chinese Communist Party has made the following four pledges in its telegram to the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang:

> (1) the Communist-led government in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia revolutionary base area will be renamed the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China and the Red Army will be redesignated as part of the National Revolutionary Army, and they will come under the direction of the Central Government in Nanking and its Military Council respectively;
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> (2) a thoroughly democratic system will be applied in the areas under the Government of the Special Region;
>
> (3) the policy of overthrowing the Kuomintang by armed force will be discontinued; and
>
> (4) the confiscation of the land of the landlords will be discontinued.

These pledges are necessary as well as permissible. For only thus can we transform the state of antagonism between the two different regimes within the country and achieve unity for common action against the enemy, in line with the changes in the relative political importance of China's external and internal contradictions. These are principled and conditional concessions, made with the aim of obtaining in return what the whole nation needs — peace, democracy and armed resistance. Moreover, the concessions have limits. The preservation of the Communist Party's leadership over the Special Region and in the Red Army, and the preservation of the Communist Party's independence and freedom of criticism in its relations with the Kuomintang — these are the limits beyond which it is impermissible to go. Concessions mean concessions by both parties: the Kuomintang abandons the policy of civil war, dictatorship and non-resistance to the foreign foe, and the Communist Party abandons the policy of maintaining antagonism between the two regimes. We exchange the latter for the former and resume our co-operation with the Kuomintang to fight for national salvation. To describe this as capitulation by the Communist Party is nothing but Ah Q-ism[14] or malicious slander.

12. Does the Communist Party agree with the Three People's Principles? Our answer is, Yes, we do.[15] The Three People's Principles have undergone changes in the course of their history. The revolutionary Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen won the people's confidence and became the banner of the victorious revolution of 1924-27 because they were resolutely applied as a result of his co-operation with the Communist Party. In 1927, however, the Kuomintang turned on the Communist Party (the party purge[16] and the anti-Communist war) and pursued an opposite policy, bringing the revolution down in defeat and endangering the nation; consequently the people lost confidence in the Three People's Principles. Now that there is an extremely grave national crisis and the Kuomintang cannot continue to rule in the same old way, the people of the whole country and the patriots within the Kuomintang are urgently demanding co-operation between the two parties. Consequently, it is completely in keeping with the historical requirements of the Chinese revolution that the essence of the Three People's Principles should be revived and restored, and that the two parties should resume their co-operation, in accordance with the Principle of Nationalism, or the struggle for national independence and liberation, the Principle of Democracy, or the attainment of internal democracy and freedom, and the Principle of People's Livelihood, or the promotion of the people's welfare, and they should lead the people to put these principles resolutely into practice. This ought to be clearly grasped by every member of the Communist Party. Communists will never abandon their ideal of socialism and communism, which they will

attain by going through the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Chinese Communist Party has its own political and economic programme. Its maximum programme is socialism and communism, which is different from the Three People's Principles. Even its programme for the period of the democratic revolution is more thoroughgoing than that of any other party in China. But the Communist Party's programme for the democratic revolution and the programme of the Three People's Principles as proclaimed by the Kuomintang's First National Congress are basically not in conflict. Therefore, far from rejecting the Three People's Principles, we are ready staunchly to put them into practice; moreover, we ask the Kuomintang to implement them together with us, and we call upon the whole nation to put them into effect. We hold that the Communist Party, the Kuomintang and the people of the whole country should unite and fight for these three great objectives of national independence, democracy and freedom, and the people's livelihood.

13. Was our past slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic republic wrong? No, it was not. Since the bourgeoisie, and particularly the big bourgeoisie, withdrew from the revolution, became retainers of imperialism and the feudal forces and turned into enemies of the people, the only remaining motive forces of the revolution were the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the only remaining revolutionary party was the Communist Party, which, as such, inevitably had to shoulder the responsibility for organizing the revolution. The Communist Party alone continued to hold aloft the banner of revolution, preserved the revolutionary tradition, put forward the slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic republic and fought hard for it for many years. This slogan was not in conflict with the task of bourgeois-democratic revolution but signified that we were resolutely carrying out this task. Not a single item of policy adopted in our actual struggle was out of keeping with this task. Our policy, including the confiscation of the land of the landlords and the enforcement of the eight-hour working day, never went beyond the bounds of capitalist private ownership; our policy was not to put socialism in practice then. What will be the composition of the new democratic republic? It will consist of the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie, and all those in the country who agree with the national and democratic revolution; it will be the alliance of these classes in the national and democratic revolution. The salient feature here is the inclusion

of the bourgeoisie; the reason is that in the present circumstances there is a possibility that the bourgeoisie will once again co-operate with us and join in the resistance to Japan, and the party of the proletariat should therefore not repel but welcome them and revive its alliance with them for the common struggle, so as to help the Chinese revolution forward. In order to end the internal armed conflict, the Communist Party is willing to discontinue the policy of forcible confiscation of the land of the landlords and is prepared to solve the land problem by legislative and other appropriate means in the course of building the new democratic republic. The first question to be settled is whether China's land will be owned by the Japanese or by the Chinese. Since the solution of the land problem of the peasants is predicated on the defence of China, it is absolutely necessary for us to turn from the method of forcible confiscation to appropriate new methods.

It was correct to put forward the slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic republic in the past, and it is correct to drop it today.

14. To establish the national united front for joint resistance to the enemy, it is necessary properly to resolve certain internal contradictions, the principle here being that the solution should help strengthen and extend the anti-Japanese national united front and not weaken or narrow it. During the stage of the democratic revolution, it is impossible to avoid contradictions and struggles between classes, parties and political groupings, but it is both possible and essential to put an end to such struggles as are detrimental to unity and to resisting Japan (the civil war, the antagonistic conflict between the political parties, provincial separatism, feudal political and economic oppression on the one hand, and the policy of insurrection and excessive economic demands harmful to the resistance on the other, etc.), and to continue such struggles as benefit unity and resistance to Japan (for freedom of criticism, for the independence of the political parties, for the improvement of the political and economic life of the people, etc.).

15. Within the over-all task of fighting for an anti-Japanese national united front and a unified democratic republic, the tasks of the Red Army and the anti-Japanese base area are:

(1) To suit the circumstances of war against Japan, the Red Army should immediately be reorganized into the National Rev-

olutionary Army and become a model army in that war by raising the level of its military, political and cultural education.

(2) Our base area should become a component part of the state, apply its democratic system under the new conditions, reorganize its peace preservation corps, clear out traitors and saboteurs, and become a region that is a model of resistance and democracy.

(3) Essential economic construction should be conducted in this area and the livelihood of the people should be improved.

(4) Essential cultural work should be carried out.

OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO LEAD

16. It is a law confirmed by Chinese history that the Chinese bourgeoisie, which may participate in fighting imperialism and feudalism in certain historical circumstances, vacillates and turns traitor in others, because of its economic and political flabbiness. Thus it is history's verdict that China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism is a task that can be completed, not under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, but only under that of the proletariat. What is more, it is possible to overcome the bourgeoisie's inherent vacillation and lack of thoroughness and to prevent the miscarriage of the revolution only by bringing the perseverance and thoroughness of the proletariat in the democratic revolution into full play. Is the proletariat to follow the bourgeoisie, or is the bourgeoisie to follow the proletariat? This question of responsibility for leadership in the Chinese revolution is the linchpin upon which the success or failure of the revolution depends. The experience of 1924-27 shows how the revolution forged ahead when the bourgeoisie followed the political leadership of the proletariat and met defeat when the proletariat became the political tail of the bourgeoisie through the fault of the Communist Party.[17] This piece of history should not be allowed to repeat itself. In the present circumstances, without the political leadership of the proletariat and its party it is impossible to establish an anti-Japanese national united front, to attain the objectives of peace, democracy and armed resistance and to defend the motherland, and impossible to set up a unified democratic republic. Today the bourgeoisie, represented by the Kuomintang, is still very passive

and conservative, and the proof of this is its long hesitation about accepting the anti-Japanese national united front initiated by the Communist Party. This situation increases the responsibility of the proletariat and its party for giving political leadership. To function as the general staff in resisting Japan and saving the nation is a responsibility the Communist Party cannot relinquish, an obligation it cannot decline.

17. How does the proletariat give political leadership through its party to all the revolutionary classes in the country? First, by putting forward basic political slogans that accord with the course of historical development and by putting forward slogans of action for each stage of development and each major turn of events in order to translate these political slogans into reality. For instance, we have put forward the basic slogans for "an anti-Japanese national united front" and for "a unified democratic republic", but we have also put forward the slogans, "end the civil war", "fight for democracy" and "carry out armed resistance", as specific objectives for concerted action by the entire nation; without such specific objectives political leadership is out of the question. Second, the proletariat, and especially its vanguard the Communist Party, should set an example through its boundless enthusiasm and loyalty in achieving the specific objectives when the whole country goes into action for them. In the fight to fulfil all the tasks of the anti-Japanese national united front and the democratic republic, Communists should be the most far-sighted, the most self-sacrificing, the most resolute, and the least prejudiced in sizing up situations, and should rely on the majority of the masses and win their support. Third, the Communist Party should establish proper relations with its allies and develop and consolidate its alliance with them, while adhering to the principle of never relinquishing its defined political objectives. Fourth, it should expand the ranks of the Communist Party and maintain its ideological unity and strict discipline. It is by doing all these things that the Communist Party gives effect to its political leadership of the people throughout China. They constitute the foundation for guaranteeing our political leadership and for ensuring that the revolution will win complete victory and not be disrupted by the vacillations of our allies.

18. When internal peace is achieved and co-operation is established between the two parties, changes will have to be made in the forms of struggle, organization and work which we adopted when the line was one of maintaining a regime-antagonistic-to that of the Kuo-

mintang. They will mainly be changes from military to peaceful forms and from illegal to legal forms. It will not be easy to make these changes and we shall have to learn afresh. The retraining of our cadres thus becomes a key link.

19. Many comrades have been asking questions about the nature of the democratic republic and its future. Our answer is: as to its class nature, the republic will be an alliance of all revolutionary classes, and as to its future, it may move towards socialism. Our democratic republic is to be established in the course of national armed resistance under the leadership of the proletariat and in the new international environment (with socialism victorious in the Soviet Union and the approach of a new period of world revolution). Therefore, though it will still be a bourgeois-democratic state socially and economically, yet it will be different from the general run of bourgeois republics because, in concrete political terms, it will have to be a state based on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. Thus, as to the future of the democratic republic, though it may move in a capitalist direction, the possibility also exists that it will turn towards socialism, and the party of the Chinese proletariat should struggle hard for the latter prospect.

20. The fight against closed-doorism and adventurism and also against tailism is essential to the accomplishment of the Party's tasks. In the mass movements our Party has a traditional tendency towards rank closed-doorism, haughty sectarianism, and adventurism; this ugly tendency hinders the Party in establishing an anti-Japanese national united front and winning over the majority of the masses. It is absolutely necessary to wipe out this tendency in each and every field of work. What we ask is: rely on the majority and take the whole situation into account. There must be no revival of the Chen Tu-hsiu type of tailism, which is a reflection of bourgeois reformism in the ranks of the proletariat. To debase the class stand of the Party, to obscure its distinctive features, to sacrifice the interests of the workers and peasants to suit the needs of bourgeois reformism, is sure to lead the revolution to defeat. What we ask is: carry out firm revolutionary policies and strive for complete victory in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. To overcome the undesirable tendencies we have described, it is absolutely necessary to raise the Marxist-Leninist theoretical level of the whole Party, for Marxism-Leninism alone is the compass which can guide the Chinese revolution to victory.

NOTES

[1] The Northern China Incident took place in 1935 when the Japanese carried on aggression against northern China and the Kuomintang government headed by Chiang Kai-shek betrayed our sovereignty and humiliated our nation. In May of that year, the Japanese demanded that the Kuomintang government grant them administrative authority over northern China, and in June Ho Ying-chin, the Kuomintang government's representative there, submitted and signed an agreement with Yoshijiro Umezu, commander of the invading forces in northern China, which became known as the "Ho-Umezu Agreement". By its terms China forfeited much of her sovereignty in the provinces of Hopei and Chahar. In October at the instigation of the Japanese invaders, some Chinese traitors staged a revolt in Hsiangho, Hopei Province, and seized the county town. In November, a number of Chinese traitors were put up by the Japanese invaders to start a self-styled movement of autonomy in the five provinces of northern China, and a puppet "Anti-Communist Autonomous Administration" was established in eastern Hopei. To meet the Japanese demand for "special administration for northern China", the Kuomintang government appointed Sung Cheh-yuan and others to form a "Political Council for Hopei and Chahar".

[2] This declaration was issued by the Chinese Communist Party on August 1, 1935. Its main points are contained in the following extracts:

> "At this moment when our country and our people are threatened with imminent destruction, the Communist Party once again appeals to all fellow-countrymen: whatever the past or present differences of political opinion and of interests among the political parties, whatever the differences of view and of interests among our countrymen in their various walks of life, whatever the past or present hostilities between the various armies, we should all truly awaken to the realization that 'brothers quarrelling at home, join forces against attacks from without' and, first and foremost, we should stop the civil war so as to concentrate the nation's resources (manpower, material and financial resources, and the armed forces) on the fight for the sacred cause of resisting Japan and saving the nation. Once again the Communist Party solemnly declares: if the Kuomintang troops cease their attacks on the Red Army and if any units carry out resistance to Japan, then the Red Army, regardless of any old feuds or present conflicts or differences on domestic issues, will not only immediately cease its hostile actions against these units, but willingly work closely with them to save the nation."
>
> "The Communist Party is willing to initiate a national defence government of this kind; for the joint formation of such a national defence government it is ready to hold immediate talks with all those willing to join the cause of resisting Japan and saving the nation — all political parties, all organizations (trade unions, peasant associations, student unions, chambers of commerce educational associations, journalists' societies, associations of teachers and other staff of schools, fellow-townsmen's associations, the Chih Kung Tang, the Association for National Armed Self-Defence, the Anti-Japanese Association the Association for National Salvation, etc.), all prominent public figures, scholars and statesmen and all local military and administrative bodies. The national defence government emerging out of these negotiations should be a provisional organ of leadership for saving the nation from subjugation and ensuring its

> survival. It should endeavour to convene a delegate body truly representative of all our countrymen (with delegates democratically elected by all the various circles of workers, peasants, soldiers, government personnel, businessmen and students, by all parties and all organizations willing to resist Japan and save the nation, and by all overseas Chinese and all the nationalities within China's boundaries) to discuss all problems relating to armed resistance and national salvation in more specific terms. The Communist Party will do its very best to help convene such an assembly of representatives of the people and to carry out all its decisions."
>
> "An anti-Japanese united army should be formed of all troops willing to fight Japan. A single general headquarters of this army should be set up under the leadership of the national defence government. The question of whether this headquarters should be composed of representatives elected by the officers and men of the various anti-Japanese army units or be formed in some other way should be decided by the representatives of all circles and by the will of the people. The Red Army will unreservedly be the first to join this united army and fulfil its duty in resisting Japan and saving the nation. To enable the national defence government and the anti-Japanese united army effectively to discharge their immense responsibilities for national defence and for resisting Japan, the Communist Party hereby appeals to the whole nation: those who have money give money, those who have guns give guns, those who have grain give grain, those who have labour power give labour power, and those who have special skill contribute special skill, so that all our fellow-countrymen will be mobilized and all weapons, old or modern, will be used to arm the people in millions upon millions."

[3] The December resolution was the "Resolution on the Present Political Situation and the Tasks of the Party", adopted at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at Wayaopao, northern Shensi, on December 25, 1935. It made a comprehensive analysis of the current internal and international situation and the changes in class relations in China, and formulated the Party's policy. The resolution runs in part as follows:

> The present situation shows that the attempts of Japanese imperialism to annex China have shocked the whole country and the whole world. Changes have taken place or are taking place in the relations between all classes, strata, political parties and armed forces in China's political life. There is a realignment of forces in both the national revolutionary front and the national counter-revolutionary front. Therefore, the Party's tactical line is to arouse, unite and organize the revolutionary forces throughout the country and among all the nationalities to oppose the chief enemy confronting them, namely, Japanese imperialism and the arch-traitor Chiang Kai-shek. All people, all parties, all armed forces and all classes, in so far as they are opposed to Japanese imperialism and the traitor Chiang Kai-shek, should unite and wage the sacred national revolutionary war, drive the Japanese imperialists out of China, overthrow the rule of their running dogs in China, achieve the complete liberation of the Chinese nation and safeguard China's independence and territorial integrity. Only by establishing the broadest anti-Japanese national united front (embracing the lower and upper strata) can we defeat Japanese imperialism and its running dog, Chiang Kai-shek. Of course, different individuals, different organizations, different social classes and strata and the various armed forces join the anti-Japanese national revolution from different motives and with different class standpoints. Some do so in order to hold on to their

positions, some to gain leadership in the movement so that it will not go beyond the limits they allow, and some genuinely to work for the complete liberation of the Chinese nation. Precisely because their motives and their standpoints differ, some will vacillate or turn traitor at the very start of the struggle, some will become indifferent or withdraw from the fight midway, and some will determinedly fight to the end. Nevertheless, our task is to unite not only all possible basic forces but also all potential allies likely to resist Japan, and enable the people throughout the country who have labour power to give labour power, those who have money to give money, those who have guns to give guns, and those who have knowledge to contribute knowledge, leaving no patriotic Chinese outside the anti-Japanese front. Such is the general line of the Party's tactics for the broadest possible national united front. Only by pursuing this line can we mobilize the forces of the whole people to deal with the common enemy, Japanese imperialism and the traitor Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese working class and peasantry remain the basic motive forces of the Chinese revolution. The broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie and the revolutionary intellectuals are their most reliable allies in the national revolution. A solid alliance of the workers, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie is the basic force for defeating Japanese imperialism and the traitors and collaborators. When a section of the national bourgeoisie and the warlords gives moral support, maintains benevolent neutrality or directly participates in the struggle against Japan and the traitors and collaborators, this will serve to expand the anti-Japanese front, however much it may disapprove of the agrarian revolution and Red political power. For the total strength of the counter-revolution will thus be reduced and the total strength of the revolution increased. To this end, the Party should adopt appropriate ways and means to win these forces over to the anti-Japanese front. Moreover, unity is by no means prevalent even in the camp of the landlord and comprador classes. Since the contention for China among many imperialist powers has generated contending groups of traitors in their service with contradictions and conflicts among them, the Party should employ a variety of methods to ensure that for the time being some of these counter-revolutionary forces do not actively oppose the anti-Japanese front. The same tactics should be applied in dealing with the imperialist powers other than Japan. In arousing, uniting and organizing the forces of the people throughout the country to fight the common enemy, the Party should resolutely and unswervingly combat all tendencies towards vacillation, compromise, capitulation and betrayal within the anti-Japanese united front. Those who disrupt the Chinese people's anti-Japanese movement are traitors or collaborators whom we should all join in hitting hard. The Communist Party should win the leadership of the anti-Japanese front by being resolute and right in its words and deeds against the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators. Only under the Communist Party's leadership can the anti-Japanese movement be completely victorious. With regard to the masses in the anti-Japanese war, it is necessary to satisfy their demands in matters affecting their basic interests (the demand of the peasants for land and the demand of the workers, the soldiers the urban poor and the intellectuals for better living). Only by satisfying their demands will we be able to mobilize still broader sections of the masses to join the anti-Japanese ranks, keep up the anti-Japanese movement, and lead the movement to complete victory. And only thus can the Party win leadership in the anti-Japanese war.

See "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", pp. 153-78 of this volume.

[4] The Red Army sent an open telegram on May 5, 1936 demanding that the Nanking government end the civil war, conduct peace negotiations with the Communists for unity against Japan. The text reads as follows:

> To the Military Council of the Nanking National Government; to all land, sea and air forces; to all parties, all political groups; all public bodies, all newspapers; and to all fellow-countrymen refusing to be slaves to a foreign nation:
>
> After crossing the Yellow River on its eastward expedition, the Anti-Japanese Vanguard of the Chinese People's Red Army, organized by the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Red Army, was everywhere victorious and won support from all over the country. But when it occupied the Tatung-Puchow Railway and was energetically preparing to drive eastward into Hopei to engage the Japanese imperialists directly, Chiang Kai-shek sent more than ten divisions into Shansi and co-operated with Yen Hsi-shan in barring its advance against the Japanese. He also ordered the troops under Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng, as well as the troops in northern Shensi, to march on the Shensi-Kansu Red area to harass our anti-Japanese rear. In order to be able to reach and fight the Japanese, the people's Anti-Japanese Vanguard should have concentrated its entire strength and wiped out Chiang's troops blocking the way. But after much deliberation, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Red Army decided that a battle to the finish between the two sides in the present national crisis would only damage China's strength for national defence and delight the Japanese imperialists, whichever side emerged victorious. Furthermore, there are quite a number of patriotic officers and men in Chiang Kai-shek's and Yen Hsi-shan's armies who are willing to end the civil war and unite to resist Japan, and it is really against their consciences to obey Chiang's and Yen's orders and block the Red Army on its way to fight the Japanese. Therefore, in spite of its numerous victories in Shansi, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Red Army has withdrawn the people's Anti-Japanese Vanguard to the west of the Yellow River in order to preserve China's strength for national defence and thereby help to bring nearer the war of resistance against Japan, resolutely carry out our repeated declarations to the nation on ending the civil war and uniting to resist Japan, and hasten the final awakening of Chiang Kai-shek and the patriotic officers and men in his army. With this demonstration of our good faith to the Nanking government, to all the country's land, sea and air forces and to the whole nation, we are ready to arrange a cease-fire with all the armed units attacking the anti-Japanese Red Army within one month and to enter into peace negotiations with them in order to end the civil war and resist Japan. The Revolutionary Military Commission of the Red Army hereby solemnly advises the gentlemen of the Nanking government at this critical juncture, when our country and people are threatened with imminent destruction, to make a determined effort to atone for past misdeeds and end the civil war in the whole country, to join forces against attacks from without in the spirit of brothers quarrelling at home, and first of all end the civil war in Shensi, Kansu and Shansi, whereupon both sides should appoint delegates to discuss specific measures for resisting Japan and saving the nation. This will be a blessing to the nation and the country as well as for your own good. However, if you obstinately refuse to listen to reason and prefer to be traitors and collaborators, your rule will surely collapse in the end and you will be spurned and overthrown by the whole nation. The old saying runs, "A thousand pointing fingers accuse, and a man dies even without

> a sickness." Or as another raying goes, "The butcher who lays down his knife at once becomes a Buddha." These are words for you gentlemen to digest and ponder. And the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Red Army calls upon all organizations, all parties and all people in the country, who refuse to be slaves to a foreign nation, to support our proposal for a cease-fire and peace negotiations, and for unity against Japan, to organize committees for hastening the cessation of the civil war and to send representatives to the front to stop the firing on both sides and to supervise the full implementation of this proposal.

[5] See "A Statement on Chiang Kai-shek's Statement", Note 7, pp. 259-61 of this volume.

[6] The slogan of "A people's republic" was first put forward in the "Resolution on the Present Political Situation and the Tasks of the Party", adopted at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in December 1935, and in the report by Comrade Mao Tse-tung "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism". Later circumstances made it necessary for the Party to adopt the policy of forcing Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan, and, as the slogan would have been unacceptable to the Chiang Kai-shek clique, it was changed into "A democratic republic" in the Party's letter of August 1936 to the Kuomintang. The slogan of a democratic republic was subsequently explained in more concrete terms in the "Resolution on the New Situation in the Movement to Resist Japan and Save the Nation, and on the Democratic Republic", which the Central Committee of the Party adopted in September of the same year. Though different in form, the two slogans are in essence the same. The following two extracts concerning the democratic republic are from the September 1936 resolution of the Party's Central Committee:

> "The Central Committee holds that in the present situation it is necessary to put forward the slogan of 'establish a democratic republic', because this is the best way to unite all the anti-Japanese forces to safeguard China's territorial integrity and avert the calamity of the destruction of China and of the subjugation of her people, and also because this is the most fitting slogan for the formation of a united front based on the democratic demands of the broad masses of the people. By 'a democratic republic' we mean a democracy which is geographically more extensive than that of the workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship in one part of China and a political system which is far more progressive than the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang in the main parts of China; it will therefore offer a better guarantee of the wide development of armed resistance to Japan and the achievement of complete victory. Moreover, the democratic republic will not only enable the broadest sections of the Chinese people to take part in the country's political life and enhance their political consciousness and organized strength, but also give the Chinese proletariat and its leader, the Communist Party, scope for activity in the struggle for the future victory of socialism. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party proclaims its active support of the movement for a democratic republic. It also declares that when the democratic republic is established through the length and breadth of China and a parliament elected by universal suffrage is convened, the Red areas will at once become an organic part of the republic, the people of the Red areas will elect their representatives to the parliament, and the same democratic system will be put into practice in the Red areas."
>
> "The Central Committee stresses that we shall impel the Kuomintang government in Nanking to resist Japan and we shall create the prerequisites for the

democratic republic only by extending the Chinese people's movement of armed resistance and national salvation, by broadening the anti-Japanese national united front of all political parties, people of all walks of life and all armies, by strengthening the Chinese Communist Party's role of political leadership in the national united front, by greatly consolidating the Red political power and the Red Army, and by waging a determined struggle against all words and deeds which betray our sovereignty and humiliate our nation or weaken the forces of the national united front. It is impossible for the democratic republic to become a reality without bitter and sustained struggles, without the mobilization of the entire Chinese nation, and without a high tide of revolution. In the course of the struggle for the democratic republic, the Chinese Communist Party should insist that the democratic republic should begin by carrying out the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation proposed by our Party and go on until it finally fulfils the basic tasks of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution."

[7] This telegram was dispatched on February 10, 1937. The full text reads as follows:

To the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

Gentlemen:

It is a matter of national rejoicing that the Sian Incident has been settled peacefully. From now on it will be possible for the policy of internal peace and for unity and solidarity against foreign aggression to be carried out; this is a blessing to the nation and the country. At this moment when the Japanese invaders are running amuck and the survival of the Chinese nation hangs by a thread, our Party eagerly hopes that, in accordance with this policy, the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of your party will decide on the following as the national policy:

(1) end all civil wars and concentrate the country's strength in a united effort to meet the foreign aggression;

(2) guarantee freedom of speech, assembly and association, and release all political prisoners;

(3) call a conference of representatives of all political parties, people of all walks of life and all armies, and concentrate the nation's talents in a common endeavour to save the country;

(4) speedily complete all preparations for resisting Japan; and

(5) improve the livelihood of the people.

If the Third Plenary Session of your Central Executive Committee can succeed in resolutely and firmly deciding on this as the national policy, our Party will pledge the following as an expression of our good faith in solidarity against foreign aggression:

(1) the policy of armed insurrection to overthrow the National Government will be discontinued throughout the country;

(2) the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government will be renamed the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China and the Red Army will be redesignated as part of the National Revolutionary Army, and they will come under the direction of the Central Government in Nanking and its Military Council respectively;

(3) a thoroughly democratic system based on universal suffrage will be put into effect in the areas under the Government of the Special Region; and

(4) the policy of confiscating the land of the landlords will be discontinued and the common programme of the anti-Japanese national united front resolutely carried out.

[8] In November and December 1936, big strikes broke out among 45,000 workers in twenty-six Japanese and Chinese-owned textile mills in Shanghai. In December all the workers of the Japanese-owned textile mills in Tsingtao struck in sympathy. The Shanghai workers won their strike, their wages were increased five per cent retrospectively from November, and the employers undertook not to sack workers arbitrarily or assault or abuse them. But the strike in Tsingtao was suppressed by Japanese marines.

[9] Britain and the United States began to change their attitude towards Japan and exerted some influence on the Chiang Kai-shek government in its policy towards Japan after Japanese imperialism occupied Shanhaikuan and penetrated into northern China in 1933, and especially after the conclusion of the "Ho-Umezu Agreement" (see Note 1, p. 276) in 1935, which directly jeopardized their imperialist interests in northern and central China. During the Sian Incident of 1936, Britain suggested rejection of Japanese demands prejudicial to British interests in China and even intimated that, provided the Chiang Kai-shek government maintained its rule over the Chinese people, it would not be a bad thing for it to "form some sort of alliance with the Communist Party" so as to deal a blow to the Japanese policy of aggression.

[10] In June 1936, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, warlords of Kwangsi, and Chen Chi-tang, warlord of Kwangtung, jointly declared their opposition to Chiang Kai-shek under the pretext of "resisting Japan and saving the nation". In August their opposition melted away before Chiang Kai-shek's tactics of bribery and divide and rule.

[11] The Japanese forces and puppet troops began to invade Suiyuan in August 1936. In November, the Chinese troops there fought back and the people throughout the country started a movement in support of their fight.

[12] After the "Ho-Umezu Agreement" of 1935, the Nanking Kuomintang government took a firmer attitude towards Japan under the pressure of the people's rising anti-Japanese sentiment and under the impact of the stiffer policy the British and U.S. imperialists were adopting towards Japan. The Kuomintang government used stalling tactics in the negotiations with Japan from September to December 6, which ended without result.

[13] This was the meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on February 15, 1937 after the peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident.

[14] Ah Q is the leading character in *The True Story of Ah Q*, the famous novel by the great Chinese writer Lu Hsun. Ah Q typifies all those who compensate themselves for their failures and setbacks in real life by regarding them as moral or spiritual victories.

[15] In the stage of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, the Communists agreed with the basic points of Sun Yat-sen's programme and co-operated with him, which did not mean that they agreed with the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois world outlook or ideological system of which he was the exponent. As the vanguard of the Chinese proletariat, the Chinese Communists had an entirely different world outlook or ideological system and theoretical approach to the national and other problems, from those of Sun Yat-sen.

[16] Reorganized by Sun Yat-sen in 1924, the Kuomintang became a revolutionary alliance of several classes, which members of the Communist Party joined

in their individual capacity. After its betrayal of the revolution in 1927, the Kuomintang carried out what it called a "party purge" throughout the country, butchering the Communists and many of its own left-wingers who genuinely supported Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies. From then on the Kuomintang became the counter-revolutionary political party of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie.

[17] This refers to the situation created by the opportunist leadership of the Central Committee of the Party in the first half of 1927.

WIN THE MASSES IN THEIR MILLIONS FOR THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

May 7, 1937

Comrades! In the course of the discussions of the last few days you have expressed agreement with my report, "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan"; only a few comrades expressed different views. As these dissenting views were rather significant, I shall discuss them first in my concluding speech before dealing with certain other problems.

THE QUESTION OF PEACE

For nearly two years our Party has fought for internal peace. After the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, we declared that peace had been attained, that the stage of "fighting for peace" was over, and that the new task was to "consolidate the peace". We also pointed out that this new task was linked with "fighting for democracy", *i.e.*, consolidating the peace by fighting for democracy. However, some comrades argue that this view of ours is untenable. It follows that they must either arrive at the opposite view or hover between the two. For they argue, "Japan is retreating[1] and Nanking is wavering more than ever; the contradiction between the two countries is becoming weaker and the contradiction within the country is growing sharper." Naturally, according to this appraisal,

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This was the concluding speech made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, held in May 1937.

there is no new stage or new task, and the situation has reverted to its old stage or even deteriorated. I think this view incorrect.

In saying that peace has been attained, we do not mean that it is consolidated; on the contrary, we have said that it is not consolidated. Bringing about peace and consolidating it are two different things. History might reverse its course for a while and peace might meet with setbacks because of the existence of Japanese imperialism, traitors and the pro-Japanese group. But the fact is that peace was attained after the Sian Incident and was the product of several factors (Japan's fundamental policy of invasion, the favourable attitude of the Soviet Union and also Britain, the United States and France towards internal peace in China, the pressure of the Chinese people, the Communist Party's peace policy during the Sian Incident and its policy for ending the antagonism between the two regimes, the differentiation within the bourgeoisie, the differentiation within the Kuomintang, and so on); peace cannot be made or unmade by Chiang Kai-shek alone. To unmake it, he would have to fight against many forces and draw closer to the Japanese imperialists and the pro-Japanese group. There is no doubt that the Japanese imperialists and the pro-Japanese group are still endeavouring to prolong civil war in China. That is precisely why peace is not yet consolidated. Such being the case, we have come to the conclusion that, instead of reverting to the old slogans of "end the civil war" and "fight for peace", we should take a step forward and adopt the new slogan of "fight for democracy", for this is the only way to consolidate internal peace and bring the war of resistance against Japan into being. Why do we put forward the three closely related slogans of "consolidate the peace", "fight for democracy", and "carry out armed resistance"? The answer is that we desire to push the wheel of revolution forward and that circumstances allow us to do so. Those who deny the new stage and the new task, who deny that the Kuomintang has "begun to change" and by the same logic also deny the achievements of all the forces that have been struggling for peace during the last year and a half will remain where they were before, without advancing an inch.

Why do these comrades make such an unsound appraisal? Because in weighing up the current situation they start not from fundamentals but from a number of limited and transient phenomena (Sato's diplomacy, the Soochow trial,[2] the suppression of strikes, the eastward transfer of the Northeastern Army,[3] General Yang Hu-cheng's journey

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

abroad,[4] and so on); hence their dismal picture. We say that the Kuomintang has begun to change and we also say that it has not changed completely. It is inconceivable that the Kuomintang's reactionary policy over the past ten years will completely change without new efforts — without more and greater efforts — on our part and on the part of the people. Quite a number of reputedly "Left" people, who often bitterly denounce the Kuomintang and who during the Sian Incident advocated putting Chiang to death and "fighting our way out through Tungkuan",[5] are now astonished when events like the Soochow trial occur immediately after peace is attained, and ask, "Why does Chiang Kai-shek still do such things?" They ought to understand that neither the Communists nor Chiang Kai-shek are gods, nor are they isolated individuals, but members of a party or a class. The Communist Party can push the revolution forward by degrees but cannot clear away all the evils in the country overnight. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang have begun to change, but the accumulated filth of the past ten years will certainly not be rapidly removed without great effort on the part of the whole people. We maintain that the trend is towards peace, democracy and resistance, but this does not imply that the old evils — civil war, dictatorship and non-resistance — will be swept away without any effort. It is only through struggle and hard work, and over a long period too, that we can eliminate the old evils, the old filth, and prevent setbacks or even reversals in the revolution.

"They are bent on destroying us." Quite true, they are always trying to destroy us. I fully admit the soundness of this appraisal, and indeed one would have to be fast asleep to overlook the point. But the question is whether there has been any change in the way they are trying to destroy us. I think there has been. The change is from war and massacre to reform and deceit, from a tough policy to a soft one, from a military to a political policy. Why has there been such a change? Confronted with Japanese imperialism, the bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang are temporarily forced to seek an ally in the proletariat, just as we are seeking an ally in the bourgeoisie. We should take this as our point of departure in considering the question. Internationally, for a similar reason, the French government has changed from hostility towards the Soviet Union to alliance with it.[6] Our domestic task has changed from a military to a political one. We for our part have no use for plotting or scheming; our aim is to defeat Japanese imperialism in a common effort by uniting with all those members of the bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang who favour resistance.

THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY

"To put the emphasis on democracy is wrong, the emphasis should be solely on resistance to Japan. Without direct action against Japan, there can be no movement for democracy. The majority of the people want only resistance to Japan, not democracy, and what is needed is another December 9th Movement."[7]

Let me first put a few questions. Can it be said that what the majority of the people wanted in the previous stage (*i.e.*, from the December 9th Movement of 1935 to the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in February 1937) was merely resistance to Japan and not internal peace? Was it wrong to emphasize internal peace then? Was it impossible to have a movement for internal peace without direct action against Japan (the Sian Incident and the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee took place after the resistance in Suiyuan ended, and today, too, there is as yet nothing equivalent to the Suiyuan resistance or the December 9th Movement)? Everybody knew that in order to resist Japan there had to be internal peace, that without internal peace there could be no resistance to Japan, and that internal peace was a condition for resistance. All the anti-Japanese activities in the previous stage, whether direct or indirect (beginning with the December 9th Movement and ending with the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee), were centred on the struggle for internal peace which was then the central link, the most essential thing, in the anti-Japanese movement.

Similarly today, in the new stage, democracy is the most essential thing for resistance to Japan, and to work for democracy is to work for resistance to Japan. Resistance and democracy are interdependent, just as are resistance and internal peace, democracy and internal peace. Democracy is the guarantee of resistance, while resistance can provide favourable conditions for developing the movement for democracy.

We hope there may be — and indeed there will be — many direct and indirect struggles against Japan in the new stage, and these will give an impetus to the war of resistance and greatly assist the movement for democracy. But the core and essence of the revolutionary task history has set us is the winning of democracy. Is it, then, wrong to keep stressing democracy? I do not think so.

"Japan is stepping back, Britain and Japan are virtually inclined to strike a balance, and Nanking is wavering more than ever." Ignorance of the laws of historical development has given rise to this needless anxiety. If there were a revolution in Japan and she really withdrew from China, it would help the Chinese revolution and would be just what we want, marking the beginning of the collapse of the world front of aggression. What room for anxiety would there be then? But as a matter of fact, this is not what is happening; Sato's diplomatic moves are preparations for a major war, and a major war confronts us. Britain's policy of wavering can get her nowhere, her clash of interests with Japan making this certain. If Nanking continues to waver for long, it will become the enemy of the whole nation, and its own interests do not allow it to keep on wavering. A temporary retrogression cannot change the general law of history. Hence one should not deny the existence of the new stage or the necessity of setting the task of winning democracy. In any case, moreover, the slogan of democracy is appropriate, because it is obvious to everybody that the Chinese people have far too little democracy, and not too much. Actual events have also shown that to define the new stage, and to set the winning of democracy as our task, is to move a step closer to resistance. Events have moved forward; let us not put the clock back!

"Why do we place so much emphasis on a national assembly?" Because it is something which can affect every aspect of life, because it is the bridge from reactionary dictatorship to democracy, because it is connected with national defence, and because it is a legal institution. To recover eastern Hopei and northern Chahar, to combat smuggling,[8] to oppose "economic collaboration",[9] etc., as many comrades have proposed, is quite correct, but this complements rather than in any way conflicts with the fight for democracy and a national assembly; the essential thing is still the national assembly and freedom for the people.

It is correct and indisputable that the day-to-day struggle against Japan and the people's struggle for a better life must be linked up with the movement for democracy. Nevertheless, the central and essential thing in the present stage is democracy and freedom.

THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF THE REVOLUTION

Some comrades have raised this question, and here I can only give a brief answer.

In the writing of an article the second half can be written only after the first half is finished. Resolute leadership of the democratic revolution is the prerequisite for the victory of socialism. We are fighting for socialism, and in this respect we are different from those who confine themselves to the revolutionary Three People's Principles. It is the great future goal to which our present efforts are directed if we lose sight of the goal, we cease to be Communists. But equally we cease to be Communists if we relax our efforts of today.

We are exponents of the theory of the transition of the revolution[10] and we are for the transition of the democratic revolution in the direction of socialism. The democratic revolution will develop through several stages, all under the slogan of a democratic republic. The change from the predominance of the bourgeoisie to that of the proletariat is a long process of struggle, of struggle for leadership in which success depends on the work of the Communist Party in raising the level of political consciousness and organization both of the proletariat and of the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie.

The staunch ally of the proletariat is the peasantry, and next comes the urban petty bourgeoisie. It is the bourgeoisie that will contend with us for leadership.

To overcome the vacillation of the bourgeoisie and its lack of revolutionary thoroughness we must rely on the strength of the masses and on the correctness of our policy, or otherwise the bourgeoisie will come out on top.

A bloodless transition is what we would like and we should strive for it, but what will happen will depend on the strength of the masses.

We are exponents of the theory of the transition of the revolution, and not of the Trotskyite theory of "permanent revolution".[11] We are for the attainment of socialism by going through all the necessary stages of the democratic republic. We are opposed to tailism, but we are also opposed to adventurism and impetuosity.

To reject the participation of the bourgeoisie in the revolution on the ground that it can only be temporary and to describe the alliance with anti-Japanese sections of the bourgeoisie (in a semi-colonial country) as capitulation is a Trotskyite approach, with which we cannot agree. Today such an alliance is in fact a necessary bridge on the way to socialism.

THE QUESTION OF CADRES

A great revolution requires a great party and many first-rate cadres to guide it. In China, with a population of 450 million, it is impossible to carry through our great revolution, which is unprecedented in history, if the leadership consists of a small, narrow group and if the Party leaders and cadres are petty-minded, short-sighted and incompetent. The Chinese Communist Party has been a large party for a long time and it is still large despite the losses during the period of reaction; it has many good leaders and cadres, but still not enough. Our Party organizations must be extended all over the country and we must purposefully train tens of thousands of cadres and hundreds of first-rate leaders. They must be cadres and leaders versed in Marxism-Leninism, politically far-sighted, competent in work, full of the spirit of self-sacrifice, capable of tackling problems on their own, steadfast in the midst of difficulties and loyal and devoted in serving the nation, the class and the Party. It is on these cadres and leaders that the Party relies for its links with the membership and the masses, and it is by relying on their firm leadership of the masses that the Party can succeed in defeating the enemy. Such cadres and leaders must be free from selfishness, from individualistic heroism, ostentation, sloth, passivity, and sectarian arrogance, and they must be selfless national and class heroes; such are the qualities and the style of work demanded of the members, cadres and leaders of our Party. Such is the spiritual legacy handed down to us by the tens of thousands of members, the thousands of cadres, and the scores of first-rate leaders who have laid down their lives for the cause. Beyond any doubt, we ought to acquire these qualities, do still better in remoulding ourselves and raise ourselves to a higher revolutionary level. But even this is not enough; we must also regard it as our duty to discover many more new cadres and leaders in the Party and the country. Our revolution depends on cadres. As Stalin said, "Cadres decide everything."[12]

THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE PARTY

To attain this aim, inner-Party democracy is essential. If we are to make the Party strong, we must practise democratic centralism to stimulate the initiative of the whole membership. There was more centralism during the period of reaction and civil war. In the new period, centralism should be closely linked with democracy. Let us apply democracy, and so give scope to initiative throughout the Party. Let us give scope to the initiative of the whole Party membership and so train new cadres in great numbers, eliminate the remnants of sectarianism, and unite the whole Party as solidly as steel.

UNITY IN THE CONFERENCE AND IN THE WHOLE PARTY

After explanation, the dissenting views on political issues voiced at this conference have given way to agreement, and the earlier difference between the line of the Central Committee and the line of retreat adopted under the leadership of certain comrades, has also been settled;[13] this shows that our Party is very solidly united. This unity provides the most important basis for the present national and democratic revolution, because it is only through the unity of the Communist Party that the unity of the whole class and the whole nation can be achieved, and it is only through the unity of the whole class and the whole nation that the enemy can be defeated and the national and democratic revolution accomplished.

WIN THE MASSES IN THEIR MILLIONS FOR THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

The aim of our correct political policy and of our solid unity is to win the masses in their millions for the anti-Japanese national united front. The broad masses of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie need our work of propaganda, agitation and organization. Further efforts on our part are also needed to establish an alliance with those sections of the bourgeoisie which are opposed to Japan. To make the policy of the Party the policy of the masses requires effort, long and persistent effort, unrelenting and strenuous, patient and painstaking effort. Without such effort, we shall achieve nothing. The formation and consolidation of the anti-Japanese national united front, the accomplishment of the task incumbent on it and the establishment of a democratic republic in China are absolutely inseparable from our effort to win over the masses. If we succeed in bringing millions upon millions of the masses under our leadership by such effort, our revolutionary task can be speedily fulfilled. By our exertions we shall surely overthrow Japanese imperialism and attain complete national and social liberation.

NOTES

[1] The Japanese imperialists made temporary conciliatory gestures after the Sian Incident in order to induce the Kuomintang authorities to disrupt the internal peace which was being restored and to break up the anti-Japanese national united front which was taking shape. They arranged for the bogus autonomous government of Inner Mongolia under their control to release two messages, one in December 1936 and another in March 1937, pledging allegiance to the Kuomintang government in Nanking. And the Japanese foreign minister, Sato himself, publicly wooed Chiang Kai-shek, slyly declaring that Japan would improve its relations with China and help China achieve political unification and economic recovery. Furthermore, Japan sent a so-called Economic Study Group, headed by Kenji Kodama, a Japanese financial magnate, ostensibly to help China "complete the organization of a modern state" These were schemes for aggression and were known as "Sato's diplomacy"; they were called a "retreat on the part of Japan" by those people who were deluded by the Japanese imperialist make-believe.

[2] In April 1937, the Kuomintang High Court in Soochow tried Shen Chun-ju and six other leaders of the Resist Japan and Save the Nation Movement who had been arrested in November 1936 in Shanghai. The charge was "endangering the Republic", the usual trumped-up indictment the reactionary Kuomintang authorities used to stigmatize all patriotic movements.

[3] Prior to the Sian Incident, the Northeastern Army was stationed on the border between Shensi and Kansu Provinces and was in direct contact with the Red Army in northern Shensi. Greatly influenced by the Red Army, it subsequently staged the coup in Sian In March 1937, the Northeastern Army was forced to go east to Honan and Anhwei Provinces, a move taken by the Kuomintang reactionaries to cut it off from contact with the Red Army and at the same time to sow discord in its ranks.

[4] General Yang Hu-cheng was a military leader in China's Northwest who staged the Sian Incident together with Chang Hsueh-liang. Thus the prime movers

in this incident were popularly linked together in the double-barreled surname "Chang-Yang". When Chiang Kai-shek was released, Chang accompanied him to Nanking but was immediately placed under detention. In April 1937 Yang, too, was ousted from his post by the Kuomintang reactionaries and had to take leave of absence abroad. When the War of Resistance began, Yang returned to China to offer his services, only to be interned by Chiang Kai-shek for the rest of his life In September 1949, when the People's Liberation Army was driving forward near Chungking, the Kuomintang had him murdered in a concentration camp.

[5] Tungkuan is a strategically important gateway on the borders of Shensi, Honan and Shansi. At the time of the Sian Incident the Kuomintang troops were mainly quartered east of it. Certain reputedly "Left" people in the Party, like Chang Kuo-tao, then urged that the Red Army should "fight its way out through Tungkuan", which meant that the Red Army should mount an offensive against the Kuomintang troops. This proposal ran counter to the Central Committee's policy for a peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident.

[6] For a long time after the October Revolution, the French imperialists pursued a hostile policy towards the Soviet Union. From 1918 to 1920, the French government took an active part in the armed intervention by 14 powers against the Soviet Union and continued its reactionary policy of isolating the Soviet Union even after the intervention failed. It was not until May 1935 that, under the influence of the Soviet Union's peace policy among the French people and because of the German fascist menace, France concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, though her reactionary government failed to observe it.

[7] The students' patriotic demonstration in Peking on December 9, 1935, led by the Chinese Communist Party. The movement called for the cessation of civil war and armed resistance to Japan and won nation-wide support.

[8] The smuggling of Japanese goods into China.

[9] This refers to the self-styled Sino-Japanese economic collaboration.

[10] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Part IV; V. I. Lenin, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, Part XII and Part XIII; *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, *Short Course*, Chapter 3, Section 3.

[11] See J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", Part III; "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists", Part II; "Concerning Questions of Leninism", Part III.

[12] See J. V. Stalin, "Address Delivered in the Kremlin Palace to the Graduates from the Red Army Academies" in May 1935, in which he said: ". . . of all the valuable capital the world possesses, the most valuable and most decisive is people, cadres. It must be realized that under our present conditions 'cadres decide everything.'"

[13] This difference was between the line of the Party's Central Committee and Chang Kuo-tao's line of retreat in 1935-36. See "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", Note 22, pp. 175-76 of this volume. In stating that the earlier difference . . . has . . . been settled", Comrade Mao Tse-tung was referring to the fact that the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army had joined forces with the Central Red Army. Chang Kuo-tao's subsequent open betrayal of the Party and his degeneration into a counter-revolutionary was the act of an individual traitor and no longer a question of differences over Party line.

ON PRACTICE

On the Relation Between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and Doing

July 1937

Before Marx, materialism examined the problem of knowledge apart from the social nature of man and apart from his historical development, and was therefore incapable of understanding the dependence of knowledge on social practice, that is, the dependence of knowledge on production and the class struggle.

Above all, Marxists regard man's activity in production as the most fundamental practical activity, the determinant of all his other activities. Man's knowledge depends mainly on his activity in material production, through which he comes gradually to understand the phenomena, the properties and the laws of nature, and the relations between himself and nature; and through his activity in production he also gradually comes to understand, in varying degrees, certain relations that exist between man and man. None of this knowledge can be acquired apart from activity in production. In a classless society every person, as a member of society, joins in common effort with the other members, enters into definite relations of production with them and engages in production to meet man's material needs. In all class societies, the members of the different social classes also enter, in different ways, into definite relations of production and

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There used to be a number of comrades in our Party who were dogmatists and who for a long period rejected the experience of the Chinese revolution, denying the truth that "Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action" and overawing people with words and phrases from Marxist works, torn out of context. There were also a number of comrades who were empiricists and who for a long period restricted themselves to their own fragmentary experience and did not understand the importance of theory for revolutionary practice or see the revolution as a whole, but worked blindly though industriously. The erroneous ideas of these two types of comrades, and particularly of the dogmatists, caused enormous losses to the engage in production to meet their material needs. This is the primary source from which human knowledge develops.

Man's social practice is not confined to activity in production, but takes many other forms — class struggle, political life, scientific and artistic pursuits; in short, as a social being, man participates in all spheres of the practical life of society. Thus man, in varying degrees, comes to know the different relations between man and man, not only through his material life but also through his political and cultural life (both of which are intimately bound up with material life). Of these other types of social practice, class struggle in particular, in all its various forms, exerts a profound influence on the development of man's knowledge. In class society everyone lives as a member of a particular class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped with the brand of a class.

Marxists hold that in human society activity in production develops step by step from a lower to a higher level and that consequently man's knowledge, whether of nature or of society, also develops step by step from a lower to a higher level, that is, from the shallower to the deeper, from the one-sided to the many-sided. For a very long period in history, men were necessarily confined to a one-sided understanding of the history of society because, for one thing, the bias of the exploiting classes always distorted history and, for another, the small scale of production limited man's outlook. It was not until the modern proletariat emerged along with immense forces of production (large-scale industry) that man was able to acquire a comprehensive, historical understanding of the development of society and turn this knowledge into a science, the science of Marxism.

Marxists hold that man's social practice alone is the criterion of the truth of his knowledge of the external world. What actually happens is that man's knowledge is verified only when he achieves the anticipated results in the process of social practice (material production, class struggle or scientific experiment). If a man wants to succeed in his work, that is, to achieve the anticipated results,

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Chinese revolution during 1931-34, and get the dogmatists, cloaking themselves as Marxists, confused a great many comrades. "On Practice" was written in order to expose the subjectivist errors of dogmatism and empiricism in the Party, and especially the error of dogmatism, from the standpoint of the Marxist theory of knowledge. It was entitled "On Practice" because its stress was on exposing the dogmatist kind of subjectivism, which belittles practice. The ideas contained in this essay were presented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in a lecture at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yenan.

he must bring his ideas into correspondence with the laws of the objective external world; if they do not correspond, he will fail in his practice. After he fails, he draws his lessons, corrects his ideas to make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into success; this is what is meant by "failure is the mother of success" and "a fall into the pit, a gain in your wit". The dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge places practice in the primary position, holding that human knowledge can in no way be separated from practice and repudiating all the erroneous theories which deny the importance of practice or separate knowledge from practice. Thus Lenin said, "*Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge*, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality."[1] The Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism has two outstanding characteristics. One is its class nature: it openly avows that dialectical materialism is in the service of the proletariat. The other is its practicality: it emphasizes the dependence of theory on practice, emphasizes that theory is based on practice and in turn serves practice. The truth of any knowledge or theory is determined not by subjective feelings, but by objective results in social practice. Only social practice can be the criterion of truth. The standpoint of practice is the primary and basic standpoint in the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge.[2]

But how then does human knowledge arise from practice and in turn serve practice? This will become clear if we look at the process of development of knowledge.

In the process of practice, man at first sees only the phenomenal side, the separate aspects, the external relations of things. For instance, some people from outside come to Yenan on a tour of observation. In the first day or two, they see its topography, streets and houses; they meet many people, attend banquets, evening parties and mass meetings, hear talk of various kinds and read various documents, all these being the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things. This is called the perceptual stage of cognition, namely, the stage of sense perceptions and impressions. That is, these particular things in Yenan act on the sense organs of the members of the observation group, evoke sense perceptions and give rise in their brains to many impressions together with a rough sketch of the external relations among these impressions: this is the first stage of cognition. At this stage, man cannot as yet form concepts, which are deeper, or draw logical conclusions.

As social practice continues, things that give rise to man's sense perceptions and impressions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change (leap) takes place in the brain in the process of cognition, and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things; they grasp the essence, the totality and the internal relations of things. Between concepts and sense perceptions there is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative difference. Proceeding further, by means of judgement and inference one is able to draw logical conclusions. The expression in *San Kuo Yen Yi*,[3] "knit the brows and a stratagem comes to mind", or in everyday language, "let me think it over", refers to man's use of concepts in the brain to form judgements and inferences. This is the second stage of cognition. When the members of the observation group have collected various data and, what is more, have "thought them over", they are able to arrive at the judgement that "the Communist Party's policy of the National United Front Against Japan is thorough, sincere and genuine". Having made this judgement, they can, if they too are genuine about uniting to save the nation, go a step further and draw the following conclusion, "The National United Front Against Japan can succeed." This stage of conception, judgement and inference is the more important stage in the entire process of knowing a thing; it is the stage of rational knowledge. The real task of knowing is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to arrive step by step at the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their laws and of the internal relations between one process and another, that is, to arrive at logical knowledge. To repeat, logical knowledge differs from perceptual knowledge in that perceptual knowledge pertains to the separate aspects, the phenomena and the external relations of things, whereas logical knowledge takes a big stride forward to reach the totality, the essence and the internal relations of things and discloses the inner contradictions in the surrounding world. Therefore, logical knowledge is capable of grasping the development of the surrounding world in its totality, in the internal relations of all its aspects.

This dialectical-materialist theory of the process of development of knowledge, basing itself on practice and proceeding from the shallower to the deeper, was never worked out by anybody before the rise of Marxism. Marxist materialism solved this problem correctly for the first time, pointing out both materialistically and dialectically the deepening movement of cognition, the movement by which man in society progresses from perceptual knowledge to logical knowledge in his complex, constantly recurring practice of production and class struggle. Lenin said, “The abstraction of *matter*, of a *law* of nature, the abstraction of *value*, etc., in short, *all* scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and *completely*.”[4] Marxism-Leninism holds that each of the two stages in the process of cognition has its own characteristics, with knowledge manifesting itself as perceptual at the lower stage and logical at the higher stage, but that both are stages in an integrated process of cognition. The perceptual and the rational are qualitatively different, but are not divorced from each other; they are unified on the basis of practice. Our practice proves that what is perceived cannot at once be comprehended and that only what is comprehended can be more deeply perceived. Perception only solves the problem of phenomena; theory alone can solve the problem of essence. The solving of both these problems is not separable in the slightest degree from practice. Whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it, that is, by living (practising) in its environment. In feudal society it was impossible to know the laws of capitalist society in advance because capitalism had not yet emerged, the relevant practice was lacking. Marxism could be the product only of capitalist society. Marx, in the era of laissez-faire capitalism, could not concretely know certain laws peculiar to the era of imperialism beforehand, because imperialism, the last stage of capitalism, had not yet emerged and the relevant practice was lacking; only Lenin and Stalin could undertake this task. Leaving aside their genius, the reason why Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin could work out their theories was mainly that they personally took part in the practice of the class struggle and the scientific experimentation of their time; lacking this condition, no genius could have succeeded. The saying, “without stepping outside his gate the scholar knows all the wide world’s affairs”, was mere empty talk in past times when technology was undeveloped. Even though this saying can be valid in the present age of developed technology, the people with real personal knowledge are those engaged in practice the wide world over. And it is only when these people have come to “know” through their practice and when their knowledge has reached him through writing and technical media that the “scholar” can indirectly “know all the wide world’s affairs”. If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of things directly, you must personally participate in the practical struggle to change reality, to change that thing or class of things, for only thus can you come into contact with them as phenomena; only through personal participation in the practical struggle to change reality can you uncover the essence of that thing or class of things and comprehend them. This is the path to knowledge which every man actually travels, though some people, deliberately distorting matters, argue to the contrary. The most ridiculous person in the world is the "know-all" who picks up a smattering of hearsay knowledge and proclaims himself "the world's Number One authority"; this merely shows that he has not taken a proper measure of himself. Knowledge is a matter of science, and no dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is permissible. What is required is definitely the reverse — honesty and modesty. If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. If you want to know the structure and properties of the atom, you must make physical and chemical experiments to change the state of the atom. If you want to know the theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in revolution. All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience. But one cannot have direct experience of everything; as a matter of fact, most of our knowledge comes from indirect experience, for example, all knowledge from past times and foreign lands. To our ancestors and to foreigners, such knowledge was — or is — a matter of direct experience, and this knowledge is reliable if in the course of their direct experience the requirement of "scientific abstraction", spoken of by Lenin, was — or is — fulfilled and objective reality scientifically reflected, otherwise it is not reliable. Hence a man's knowledge consists only of two parts, that which comes from direct experience and that which comes from indirect experience. Moreover, what is indirect experience for me is direct experience for other people. Consequently, considered as a whole, knowledge of any kind is inseparable from direct experience. All knowledge originates in perception of the objective external world through man's physical sense organs. Anyone who denies such perception, denies direct experience, or denies personal participation in the practice that changes reality, is not a materialist. That is why the "know-all" is ridiculous. There is an old Chinese saying, "How can you catch tiger cubs without entering the tiger's lair?" This saying holds true for man's practice and it also holds true for the theory of knowledge. There can be no knowledge apart from practice.

To make clear the dialectical-materialist movement of cognition arising on the basis of the practice which changes reality — to make clear the gradually deepening movement of cognition — a few additional concrete examples are given below.

In its knowledge of capitalist society, the proletariat was only in the perceptual stage of cognition in the first period of its practice, the period of machine-smashing and spontaneous struggle; it knew only some of the aspects and the external relations of the phenomena of capitalism. The proletariat was then still a "class-in-itself". But when it reached the second period of its practice, the period of conscious and organized economic and political struggles, the proletariat was able to comprehend the essence of capitalist society, the relations of exploitation between social classes and its own historical task; and it was able to do so because of its own practice and because of its experience of prolonged struggle, which Marx and Engels scientifically summed up in all its variety to create the theory of Marxism for the education of the proletariat. It was then that the proletariat became a "class-for-itself".

Similarly with the Chinese people's knowledge of imperialism. The first stage was one of superficial, perceptual knowledge, as shown in the indiscriminate anti-foreign struggles of the Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Yi Ho Tuan Movement, and so on. It was only in the second stage that the Chinese people reached the stage of rational knowledge, saw the internal and external contradictions of imperialism and saw the essential truth that imperialism had allied itself with China's comprador and feudal classes to oppress and exploit the great masses of the Chinese people. This knowledge began about the time of the May 4th Movement of 1919.

Next, let us consider war. If those who lead a war lack experience of war, then at the initial stage they will not understand the profound laws pertaining to the directing of a specific war (such as our Agrarian Revolutionary War of the past decade). At the initial stage they will merely experience a good deal of fighting and, what is more, suffer many defeats. But this experience (the experience of battles won and especially of battles lost) enables them to comprehend the inner thread of the whole war, namely, the laws of that specific war, to understand its strategy and tactics, and consequently to direct the war with confidence. If, at such a moment, the command is turned over to an inexperienced person, then he too will have to suffer a number of defeats (gain experience) before he can comprehend the true laws of the war.

"I am not sure I can handle it." We often hear this remark when a comrade hesitates to accept an assignment. Why is he unsure of himself? Because he has no systematic understanding of the content and circumstances of the assignment, or because he has had little or no contact with such work, and so the laws governing it are beyond him. After a detailed analysis of the nature and circumstances of the assignment, he will feel more sure of himself and do it willingly. If he spends some time at the job and gains experience and if he is a person who is willing to look into matters with an open mind and not one who approaches problems subjectively, one-sidedly and superficially, then he can draw conclusions for himself as to how to go about the job and do it with much more courage. Only those who are subjective, one-sided and superficial in their approach to problems will smugly issue orders or directives the moment they arrive on the scene, without considering the circumstances, without viewing things in their totality (their history and their present state as a whole) and without getting to the essence of things (their nature and the internal relations between one thing and another). Such people are bound to trip and fall.

Thus it can be seen that the first step in the process of cognition is contact with the objects of the external world; this belongs to the stage of perception. The second step is to synthesize the data of perception by arranging and reconstructing them; this belongs to the stage of conception, judgement and inference. It is only when the data of perception are very rich (not fragmentary) and correspond to reality (are not illusory) that they can be the basis for forming correct concepts and theories.

Here two important points must be emphasized. The first, which has been stated before but should be repeated here, is the dependence of rational knowledge upon perceptual knowledge. Anyone who thinks that rational knowledge need not be derived from perceptual knowledge is an idealist. In the history of philosophy there is the "rationalist" school that admits the reality only of reason and not of experience, believing that reason alone is reliable while perceptual experience is not; this school errs by turning things upside down. The rational is reliable precisely because it has its source in sense perceptions, otherwise it would be like water without a source, a tree without roots, subjective, self-engendered and unreliable. As to the sequence in the process of cognition, perceptual experience comes first; we stress the significance of social practice in the process of cognition precisely because social practice alone can give rise to human knowledge and it alone can start man on the acquisition of perceptual experience from the objective world. For a person who shuts his eyes, stops his ears and totally cuts himself off from the objective world there can be no such thing as knowledge. Knowledge begins with experience — this is the materialism of the theory of knowledge.

The second point is that knowledge needs to be deepened, that the perceptual stage of knowledge needs to be developed to the rational stage — this is the dialectics of the theory of knowledge.[5] To think that knowledge can stop at the lower, perceptual stage and that perceptual knowledge alone is reliable while rational knowledge is not, would be to repeat the historical error of "empiricism". This theory errs in failing to understand that, although the data of perception reflect certain realities in the objective world (I am not speaking here of idealist empiricism which confines experience to so-called introspection), they are merely one-sided and superficial, reflecting things incompletely and not reflecting their essence. Fully to reflect a thing in its totality, to reflect its essence, to reflect its inherent laws, it is necessary through the exercise of thought to reconstruct the rich data of sense perception, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the outside to the inside, in order to form a system of concepts and theories — it is necessary to make a leap from perceptual to rational knowledge. Such reconstructed knowledge is not more empty or more unreliable; on the contrary, whatever has been scientifically reconstructed in the process of cognition, on the basis of practice, reflects objective reality, as Lenin said, more deeply, more truly, more fully. As against this, vulgar "practical men" respect experience but despise theory, and therefore cannot have a comprehensive view of an entire objective process, lack clear direction and long-range perspective, and are complacent over occasional successes and glimpses of the truth. If such persons direct a revolution, they will lead it up a blind alley.

Rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge remains to be developed into rational knowledge — this is the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge. In philosophy, neither "rationalism" nor "empiricism" understands the historical or the dialectical nature of knowledge, and although each of these schools contains one aspect of the truth (here I am referring to materialist, not to idealist, rationalism and empiricism), both are wrong on the theory of knowledge as a whole. The dialectical-materialist movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational holds true for a minor process of cognition (for instance, knowing a single thing or task) as well as for a major process of cognition (for instance, knowing a whole society or a revolution).

But the movement of knowledge does not end here. If the dialectical-materialist movement of knowledge were to stop at rational knowledge, only half the problem would be dealt with. And as far as Marxist philosophy is concerned, only the less important half at that. Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world. From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully expressed in Lenin's statement, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."[6] But Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory but merely prate about it, pigeonhole it and do not put it into practice, then that theory, however good, is of no significance. Knowledge begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must then return to practice. The active function of knowledge manifests itself not only in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge, but — and this is more important — it must manifest itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice. The knowledge which grasps the laws of the world, must be redirected to the practice of changing the world, must be applied anew in the practice of production, in the practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle and in the practice of scientific experiment. This is the process of testing and developing theory, the continuation of the whole process of cognition. The problem of whether theory corresponds to objective reality is not, and cannot be, completely solved in the movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, mentioned above. The only way to solve this problem completely is to redirect rational knowledge to social practice, apply theory to practice and see whether it can achieve the objectives one has in mind. Many theories of natural science are held to be true not only because they were so considered when natural scientists originated them, but because they have been verified in subsequent scientific practice. Similarly, Marxism-Leninism is held to be true not only because it was so considered when it was scientifically formulated by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin but because it has been verified in the subsequent practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle. Dialectical materialism is universally true because it is impossible for anyone to escape from its domain in his practice. The history of human knowledge tells us that the truth of many theories is incomplete and that this incompleteness is remedied through the test of practice. Many theories are erroneous and it is through the test of practice that their errors are corrected. That is why practice is the criterion of truth and why "the standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge".[7] Stalin has well said, "Theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory."[8]

When we get to this point, is the movement of knowledge completed? Our answer is: it is and yet it is not. When men in society throw themselves into the practice of changing a certain objective process (whether natural or social) at a certain stage of its development, they can, as a result of the reflection of the objective process in their brains and the exercise of their subjective activity, advance their knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, and create ideas, theories, plans or programmes which correspond in general to the laws of that objective process. They then apply these ideas, theories, plans or programmes in practice in the same objective process. And if they can realize the aims they have in mind, that is, if in that same process of practice they can translate, or on the whole translate, those previously formulated ideas, theories, plans or programmes into fact, then the movement of knowledge may be considered completed with regard to this particular process. In the process of changing nature, take for example the fulfilment of an engineering plan, the verification of a scientific hypothesis, the manufacture of an implement or the reaping of a crop; or in the process of changing society, take for example the victory of a strike, victory in a war or the fulfilment of an educational plan. All these may be considered the realization of aims one has in mind. But generally speaking, whether in the practice of changing nature or of changing society, men's original ideas, theories, plans or programmes are seldom realized without any alteration.

This is because people engaged in changing reality are usually subject to numerous limitations; they are limited not only by existing scientific and technological conditions but also by the development of the objective process itself and the degree to which this process has become manifest (the aspects and the essence of the objective process have not yet been fully revealed). In such a situation, ideas, theories, plans or programmes are usually altered partially and sometimes even wholly, because of the discovery of unforeseen circumstances in the course of practice. That is to say, it does happen that the original ideas, theories, plans or programmes fail to correspond with reality either in whole or in part and are wholly or partially incorrect. In many instances, failures have to be repeated many times before errors in knowledge can be corrected and correspondence with the laws of the objective process achieved, and consequently before the subjective can be transformed into the objective, or in other words, before the anticipated results can be achieved in practice. But when that point is reached, no matter how, the movement of human knowledge regarding a certain objective process at a certain stage of its development may be considered completed.

However, so far as the progression of the process is concerned, the movement of human knowledge is not completed. Every process, whether in the realm of nature or of society, progresses and develops by reason of its internal contradiction and struggle, and the movement of human knowledge should also progress and develop along with it. As far as social movements are concerned, true revolutionary leaders must not only be good at correcting their ideas, theories, plans or programmes when errors are discovered, as has been indicated above; but when a certain objective process has already progressed and changed from one stage of development to another, they must also be good at making themselves and all their fellow-revolutionaries progress and change in their subjective knowledge along with it, that is to say, they must ensure that the proposed new revolutionary tasks and new working programmes correspond to the new changes in the situation. In a revolutionary period the situation changes very rapidly; if the knowledge of revolutionaries does not change rapidly in accordance with the changed situation, they will be unable to lead the revolution to victory.

It often happens, however, that thinking lags behind reality; this is because man's cognition is limited by numerous social conditions. We are opposed to die-hards in the revolutionary ranks whose thinking fails to advance with changing objective circumstances and has manifested itself historically as Right opportunism. These people fail to see that the struggle of opposites has already pushed the objective process forward while their knowledge has stopped at the old stage. This is characteristic of the thinking of all die-hards. Their thinking is divorced from social practice, and they cannot march ahead to guide the chariot of society; they simply trail behind, grumbling that it goes too fast and trying to drag it back or turn it in the opposite direction.

We are also opposed to "Left" phrase-mongering. The thinking of "Leftists" outstrips a given stage of development of the objective process; some regard their fantasies as truth, while others strain to realize in the present an ideal which can only be realized in the future. They alienate themselves from the current practice of the majority of the people and from the realities of the day, and show themselves adventurist in their actions.

Idealism and mechanical materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized by the breach between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies. Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of the universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth.[9] The development of an objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge. In social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing and passing away in human knowledge. As man's practice which changes objective reality in accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances further and further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper. The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so is man's cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowing and doing, and we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies, whether "Left" or Right, which depart from concrete history.

In the present epoch of the development of society, the responsibility of correctly knowing and changing the world has been placed by history upon the shoulders of the proletariat and its party. This process, the practice of changing the world, which is determined in accordance with scientific knowledge, has already reached a historic moment in the world and in China, a great moment unprecedented in human history, that is, the moment for completely banishing darkness from the world and from China and for changing the world into a world of light such as never previously existed. The struggle of the proletariat and the revolutionary people to change the world comprises the fulfilment of the following tasks: to change the objective world and, at the same time, their own subjective world — to change their cognitive ability and change the relations between the subjective and the objective world. Such a change has already come about in one part of the globe, in the Soviet Union. There the people are pushing forward this process of change. The people of China and the rest of the world either are going through, or will go through, such a process. And the objective world which is to be changed also includes all the opponents of change, who, in order to be changed, must go through a stage of compulsion before they can enter the stage of voluntary, conscious change. The epoch of world communism will be reached when all mankind voluntarily and consciously changes itself and the world.

Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level. Such is the whole of the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, and such is the dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing.

NOTES

[1] V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 205.

[2] See Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, in two volumes, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, p. 403, and V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1952, pp. 136-42.

[3] *San Kuo Yen Yi* (*Tales of the Three Kingdoms*) is a famous Chinese historical novel by Lo Kuan-chung (late 14th and early 15th century).

[4] V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 161.

[5] "In order to understand, it is necessary empirically to begin understanding, study, to rise from empiricism to the universal." (*Ibid.*, p. 197.)

[6] V. I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?", *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1961, Vol. V, p. 369.

[7] V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1952, p. 141.

[8] J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", *Problems of Leninism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, p. 31.

[9] See V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1952, pp. 129-36.

ON CONTRADICTION

August 1937

The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics. Lenin said, "Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction *in the very essence of objects*."[1] Lenin often called this law the essence of dialectics; he also called it the kernel of dialectics.[2] In studying this law, therefore, we cannot but touch upon a variety of questions, upon a number of philosophical problems. If we can become clear on all these problems, we shall arrive at a fundamental understanding of materialist dialectics. The problems are: the two world outlooks, the universality of contradiction, the particularity of contradiction, the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction, the identity and struggle of the aspects of a contradiction, and the place of antagonism in contradiction.

The criticism to which the idealism of the Deborin school has been subjected in Soviet philosophical circles in recent years has aroused great interest among us. Deborin's idealism has exerted a very bad influence in the Chinese Communist Party, and it cannot be said that the dogmatist thinking in our Party is unrelated to the approach of that school. Our present study of philosophy should therefore have the eradication of dogmatist thinking as its main objective.

I. THE TWO WORLD OUTLOOKS

Throughout the history of human knowledge, there have been two conceptions concerning the law of development of the universe, the

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This essay on philosophy was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung after his essay "On Practice" and with the same object of overcoming the serious error of dogmatist thinking to be found in the Party at the time. Originally delivered as lectures at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yenan, it was revised by the author on its inclusion in his *Selected Works*.

metaphysical conception and the dialectical conception, which form two opposing world outlooks. Lenin said:

> The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, *and* development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).[3]

Here Lenin was referring to these two different world outlooks.

In China another name for metaphysics is *hsuan-hsueh*. For a long period in history whether in China or in Europe, this way of thinking, which is part and parcel of the idealist world outlook, occupied a dominant position in human thought. In Europe, the materialism of the bourgeoisie in its early days was also metaphysical. As the social economy of many European countries advanced to the stage of highly developed capitalism, as the forces of production, the class struggle and the sciences developed to a level unprecedented in history, and as the industrial proletariat became the greatest motive force in historical development, there arose the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics. Then, in addition to open and barefaced reactionary idealism, vulgar evolutionism emerged among the bourgeoisie to oppose materialist dialectics.

The metaphysical or vulgar evolutionist world outlook sees things as isolated, static and one-sided. It regards all things in the universe, their forms and their species, as eternally isolated from one another and immutable. Such change as there is can only be an increase or decrease in quantity or a change of place. Moreover, the cause of such an increase or decrease or change of place is not inside things but outside them, that is, the motive force is external. Metaphysicians hold that all the different kinds of things in the universe and all their characteristics have been the same ever since they first came into being. All subsequent changes have simply been increases or decreases in quantity. They contend that a thing can only keep on repeating itself as the same kind of thing and cannot change into anything different. In their opinion, capitalist exploitation, capitalist competition, the individualist ideology of capitalist society, and so on, can all be found in ancient slave society, or even in primitive society, and will exist for ever unchanged. They ascribe the causes of social development to factors external to society, such as geography and climate. They search in an over-simplified way outside a thing for the causes of its development, and they deny the theory of materialist dialectics which holds that development arises from the contradictions inside a thing. Consequently they can explain neither the qualitative diversity of things, nor the phenomenon of one quality changing into another. In Europe, this mode of thinking existed as mechanical materialism in the 17th and 18th centuries and as vulgar evolutionism at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. In China, there was the metaphysical thinking exemplified in the saying "Heaven changeth not, likewise the Tao changeth not",[4] and it was supported by the decadent feudal ruling classes for a long time. Mechanical materialism and vulgar evolutionism, which were imported from Europe in the last hundred years, are supported by the bourgeoisie.

As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development. Contradictoriness within a thing is the fundamental cause of its development, while its interrelations and interactions with other things are secondary causes. Thus materialist dialectics effectively combats the theory of external causes, or of an external motive force, advanced by metaphysical mechanical materialism and vulgar evolutionism. It is evident that purely external causes can only give rise to mechanical motion, that is, to changes in scale or quantity, but cannot explain why things differ qualitatively in thousands of ways and why one thing changes into another. As a matter of fact, even mechanical motion under external force occurs through the internal contradictoriness of things. Simple growth in plants and animals, their quantitative development, is likewise chiefly the result of their internal contradictions. Similarly, social development is due chiefly not to external but to internal causes. Countries with almost the same geographical and climatic conditions display great diversity and unevenness in their development. Moreover, great social changes may take place in one and the same country although its geography and climate remain unchanged. Imperialist Russia changed into the socialist Soviet Union, and feudal Japan, which had locked its doors against the world, changed into imperialist Japan, although no change occurred in the geography and climate of either country. Long dominated by feudalism, China has undergone great changes in the last hundred years and is now changing in the direction of a new China, liberated and free, and yet no change has occurred in her geography and climate. Changes do take place in the geography and climate of the earth as a whole and in every part of it, but they are insignificant when compared with changes in society; geographical and climatic changes manifest themselves in terms of tens of thousands of years, while social changes manifest themselves in thousands, hundreds or tens of years, and even in a few years or months in times of revolution. According to materialist dialectics, changes in nature are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in nature. Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in society, that is, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between classes and the contradiction between the old and the new; it is the development of these contradictions that pushes society forward and gives the impetus for the supersession of the old society by the new. Does materialist dialectics exclude external causes? Not at all. It holds that external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and that external causes become operative through internal causes. In a suitable temperature an egg changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken, because each has a different basis. There is constant interaction between the peoples of different countries. In the era of capitalism, and especially in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, the interaction and mutual impact of different countries in the political, economic and cultural spheres are extremely great. The October Socialist Revolution ushered in a new epoch in world history as well as in Russian history. It exerted influence on internal changes in the other countries in the world and, similarly and in a particularly profound way, on internal changes in China. These changes, however, were effected through the inner laws of development of these countries, China included. In battle, one army is victorious and the other is defeated; both the victory and the defeat are determined by internal causes. The one is victorious either because it is strong or because of its competent generalship, the other is vanquished either because it is weak or because of its incompetent generalship; it is through internal causes that external causes become operative. In China in 1927, the defeat of the proletariat by the big bourgeoisie came about through the opportunism then to be found within the Chinese proletariat itself (inside the Chinese Communist Party). When we liquidated this opportunism, the Chinese revolution resumed its advance. Later, the Chinese revolution again suffered severe setbacks at the hands of the enemy, because adventurism had risen within our Party. When we liquidated this adventurism, our cause advanced once again. Thus it can be seen that to lead the revolution to victory, a political party must depend on the correctness of its own political line and the solidity of its own organization.

The dialectical world outlook emerged in ancient times both in China and in Europe. Ancient dialectics, however, had a somewhat spontaneous and naive character; in the social and historical conditions then prevailing, it was not yet able to form a theoretical system, hence it could not fully explain the world and was supplanted by metaphysics. The famous German philosopher Hegel, who lived in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, made most important contributions to dialectics, but his dialectics was idealist. It was not until Marx and Engels, the great protagonists of the proletarian movement, had synthesized the positive achievements in the history of human knowledge and, in particular, critically absorbed the rational elements of Hegelian dialectics and created the great theory of dialectical and historical materialism that an unprecedented revolution occurred in the history of human knowledge. This theory was further developed by Lenin and Stalin. As soon as it spread to China, it wrought tremendous changes in the world of Chinese thought.

This dialectical world outlook teaches us primarily how to observe and analyse the movement of opposites in different things and, on the basis of such analysis, to indicate the methods for resolving contradictions. It is therefore most important for us to understand the law of contradiction in things in a concrete way.

II. THE UNIVERSALITY OF CONTRADICTION

For convenience of exposition, I shall deal first with the universality of contradiction and then proceed to the particularity of contradiction. The reason is that the universality of contradiction can be explained more briefly, for it has been widely recognized ever since the materialist-dialectical world outlook was discovered and materialist dialectics applied with outstanding success to analysing many aspects of human history and natural history and to changing many aspects of society and nature (as in the Soviet Union) by the great creators and continuers of Marxism — Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin; whereas the particularity of contradiction is still not clearly understood by many comrades, and especially by the dogmatists. They do not understand that it is precisely in the particularity of contradiction that the universality of contradiction resides. Nor do they understand how important is the study of the particularity of contradiction in the concrete things confronting us for guiding the course of revolutionary practice. Therefore, it is necessary to stress the study of the particularity of contradiction and to explain it at adequate length. For this reason, in our analysis of the law of contradiction in things, we shall first analyse the universality of contradiction, then place special stress on analysing the particularity of contradiction, and finally return to the universality of contradiction.

The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.

Engels said, "Motion itself is a contradiction."[5] Lenin defined the law of the unit of opposites as "the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, *mutually exclusive*, opposite tendencies in *all* phenomena and processes of nature (*including* mind and society)".[6] Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their development forward. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist.

Contradiction is the basis of the simple forms of motion (for instance, mechanical motion) and still more so of the complex forms of motion.

Engels explained the universality of contradiction as follows:

> If simple mechanical change of place contains a contradiction, this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. . . . life consists precisely and primarily in this — that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction

> which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also in the sphere of thought we could not escape contradictions, and that for example the contradiction between man's inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presence only in men who are externally limited and possess limited cognition finds its solution in what is — at least practically, for us — an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress.
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> . . . one of the basic principles of higher mathematics is the contradiction that in certain circumstances straight lines and curves may be the same. . . .
>
> But even lower mathematics teems with contradictions.[7]

Lenin illustrated the universality of contradiction as follows:

> In mathematics: + and —. Differential and integral.
> In mechanics: action and reaction.
> In physics: positive and negative electricity.
> In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms.
> In social science: the class struggle.[8]

In war, offence and defence, advance and retreat, victory and defeat are all mutually contradictory phenomena. One cannot exist without the other. The two aspects are at once in conflict and in interdependence, and this constitutes the totality of a war, pushes its development forward and solves its problems.

Every difference in men's concepts should be regarded as reflecting an objective contradiction. Objective contradictions are reflected in subjective thinking, and this process constitutes the contradictory movement of concepts, pushes forward the development of thought, and ceaselessly solves problems in man's thinking.

Opposition and struggle between ideas of different kinds constantly occur within the Party; this is a reflection within the Party of contradictions between classes and between the new and the old in society. If there were no contradictions in the Party and no ideological struggles to resolve them, the Party's life would come to an end.

Thus it is already clear that contradiction exists universally and in all processes, whether in the simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or ideological phenomena. But does contradiction also exist at the initial stage of each process?

Is there a movement of opposites from beginning to end in the process of development of every single thing?

As can be seen from the articles written by Soviet philosophers criticizing it, the Deborin school maintains that contradiction appears not at the inception of a process but only when it has developed to a certain stage. If this were the case, then the cause of the development of the process before that stage would be external and not internal. Deborin thus reverts to the metaphysical theories of external causality and of mechanism. Applying this view in the analysis of concrete problems, the Deborin school sees only differences but no contradictions between the kulaks and the peasants in general under existing conditions in the Soviet Union, thus entirely agreeing with Bukharin. In analysing the French Revolution, it holds that before the Revolution there were likewise only differences but not contradictions within the Third Estate, which was composed of the workers, the peasants and the bourgeoisie. These views of the Deborin school are anti-Marxist. This school does not understand that each and every difference already contains contradiction and that difference itself is contradiction. Labour and capital have been in contradiction ever since the two classes came into being, only at first the contradiction had not yet become intense. Even under the social conditions existing in the Soviet Union, there is a difference between workers and peasants and this very difference is a contradiction, although, unlike the contradiction between labour and capital, it will not become intensified into antagonism or assume the form of class struggle; the workers and the peasants have established a firm alliance in the course of socialist construction and are gradually resolving this contradiction in the course of the advance from socialism to communism. The question is one of different kinds of contradiction, not of the presence or absence of contradiction. Contradiction is universal and absolute, it is present in the process of development of all things and permeates every process from beginning to end.

What is meant by the emergence of a new process? The old unity with its constituent opposites yields to a new unity with its constituent opposites, whereupon a new process emerges to replace the old. The old process ends and the new one begins. The new process contains new contradictions and begins its own history of the development of contradictions.

As Lenin pointed out, Marx in his *Capital* gave a model analysis of this movement of opposites which runs through the process of development of things from beginning to end. This is the method that must be employed in studying the development of all things. Lenin, too, employed this method correctly and adhered to it in all his writings.

> In his *Capital*, Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most common and everyday *relation* of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of times, viz. the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this "cell" of bourgeois society) analysis reveals *all* the contradictions (or the germs of *all* the contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (*both* growth *and* movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the $\sum$ [summation] of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end.

Lenin added, "Such must also be the method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general."[9]

Chinese Communists must learn this method; only then will they be able correctly to analyse the history and the present state of the Chinese revolution and infer its future.

III. THE PARTICULARITY OF CONTRADICTION

Contradiction is present in the process of development of all things; it permeates the process of development of each thing from beginning to end. This is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction which we have discussed above. Now let us discuss the particularity and relativity of contradiction.

This problem should be studied on several levels.

First, the contradiction in each form of motion of matter has its particularity. Man's knowledge of matter is knowledge of its forms of motion, because there is nothing in this world except matter in motion and this motion must assume certain forms. In considering each form of motion of matter, we must observe the points which it has in common with other forms of motion. But what is especially important and necessary, constituting as it does the foundation of our knowledge of a thing, is to observe what is particular to this form of motion of matter, namely, to observe the qualitative difference between this form of motion and other forms. Only when we have done so can we distinguish between things. Every form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction. This particular contradiction constitutes the particular essence which distinguishes one thing from another. It is the internal cause or, as it may be called, the basis for the immense variety of things in the world. There are many forms of motion in nature, mechanical motion, sound, light, heat, electricity, dissociation, combination, and so on. All these forms are interdependent, but in its essence each is different from the others. The particular essence of each form of motion is determined by its own particular contradiction. This holds true not only for nature but also for social and ideological phenomena. Every form of society, every form of ideology, has its own particular contradiction and particular essence.

The sciences are differentiated precisely on the basis of the particular contradictions inherent in their respective objects of study. Thus the contradiction peculiar to a certain field of phenomena constitutes the object of study for a specific branch of science. For example, positive and negative numbers in mathematics; action and reaction in mechanics; positive and negative electricity in physics; dissociation and combination in chemistry; forces of production and relations of production, classes and class struggle, in social science; offence and defence in military science; idealism and materialism, the metaphysical outlook and the dialectical outlook, in philosophy; and so on — all these are the objects of study of different branches of science precisely because each branch has its own particular contradiction and particular essence. Of course, unless we understand the universality of contradiction, we have no way of discovering the universal cause or universal basis for the movement or development of things; however, unless we study the particularity of contradiction, we have no way of determining the particular essence of a thing which differentiates it from other things, no way of discovering the particular cause or particular basis for the movement or development of a thing, and no way of distinguishing one thing from another or of demarcating the fields of science.

As regards the sequence in the movement of man's knowledge, there is always a gradual growth from the knowledge of individual and particular things to the knowledge of things in general. Only after man knows the particular essence of many different things can he proceed to generalization and know the common essence of things.

When man attains the knowledge of this common essence, he uses it as a guide and proceeds to study various concrete things which have not yet been studied, or studied thoroughly, and to discover the particular essence of each; only thus is he able to supplement, enrich and develop his knowledge of their common essence and prevent such knowledge from withering or petrifying. These are the two processes of cognition: one, from the particular to the general, and the other, from the general to the particular. Thus cognition always moves in cycles and (so long as scientific method is strictly adhered to) each cycle advances human knowledge a step higher and so makes it more and more profound. Where our dogmatists err on this question is that, on the one hand, they do not understand that we have to study the particularity of contradiction and know the particular essence of individual things before we can adequately know the universality of contradiction and the common essence of things, and that, on the other hand, they do not understand that after knowing the common essence of things, we must go further and study the concrete things that have not yet been thoroughly studied or have only just emerged. Our dogmatists are lazy-bones. They refuse to undertake any painstaking study of concrete things, they regard general truths as emerging out of the void, they turn them into purely abstract unfathomable formulas, and thereby completely deny and reverse the normal sequence by which man comes to know truth. Nor do they understand the interconnection of the two processes in cognition — from the particular to the general and then from the general to the particular. They understand nothing of the Marxist theory of knowledge.

It is necessary not only to study the particular contradiction and the essence determined thereby of every great system of the forms of motion of matter, but also to study the particular contradiction and the essence of each process in the long course of development of each form of motion of matter. In every form of motion, each process of development which is real (and not imaginary) is qualitatively different. Our study must emphasize and start from this point.

Qualitatively different contradictions can only be resolved by qualitatively different methods. For instance, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is resolved by the method of socialist revolution; the contradiction between the great masses of the people and the feudal system is resolved by the method of democratic revolution; the contradiction between the colonies and imperialism is resolved by the method of national revolutionary war; the contradiction between the working class and the peasant class in socialist society is resolved by the method of collectivization and mechanization in agriculture; contradiction within the Communist Party is resolved by the method of criticism and self-criticism; the contradiction between society and nature is resolved by the method of developing the productive forces. Processes change, old processes and old contradictions disappear, new processes and new contradictions emerge, and the methods of resolving contradictions differ accordingly. In Russia, there was a fundamental difference between the contradiction resolved by the February Revolution and the contradiction resolved by the October Revolution, as well as between the methods used to resolve them. The principle of using different methods to resolve different contradictions is one which Marxist-Leninists must strictly observe. The dogmatists do not observe this principle; they do not understand that conditions differ in different kinds of revolution and so do not understand that different methods should be used to resolve different contradictions; on the contrary, they invariably adopt what they imagine to be an unalterable formula and arbitrarily apply it everywhere, which only causes setbacks to the revolution or makes a sorry mess of what was originally well done.

In order to reveal the particularity of the contradictions in any process in the development of a thing, in their totality or interconnections, that is, in order to reveal the essence of the process, it is necessary to reveal the particularity of the two aspects of each of the contradictions in that process; otherwise it will be impossible to discover the essence of the process. This likewise requires the utmost attention in our study.

There are many contradictions in the course of development of any major thing. For instance, in the course of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, where the conditions are exceedingly complex, there exist the contradiction between all the oppressed classes in Chinese society and imperialism, the contradiction between the great masses of the people and feudalism, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie on the one hand and the bourgeoisie on the other, the contradiction between the various reactionary ruling groups, and so on. These contradictions cannot be treated in the same way since each has its own particularity; moreover, the two aspects of each contradiction cannot be treated in the same way since each aspect has its own characteristics. We who are engaged in the Chinese revolution should not only understand the particularity of these contradictions in their totality, that is, in their interconnections, but should also study the two aspects of each contradiction as the only means of understanding the totality. When we speak of understanding each aspect of a contradiction, we mean understanding what specific position each aspect occupies, what concrete forms it assumes in its interdependence and in its contradiction with its opposite, and what concrete methods are employed in the struggle with its opposite, when the two are both interdependent and in contradiction, and also after the interdependence breaks down. It is of great importance to study these problems. Lenin meant just this when he said that the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions.[10] Our dogmatists have violated Lenin's teachings; they never use their brains to analyse anything concretely, and in their writings and speeches they always use stereotypes devoid of content, thereby creating a very bad style of work in our Party.

In studying a problem, we must shun subjectivity, one-sidedness and superficiality. To be subjective means not to look at problems objectively, that is, not to use the materialist viewpoint in looking at problems. I have discussed this in my essay "On Practice". To be one-sided means not to look at problems all-sidedly, for example, to understand only China but not Japan, only the Communist Party but not the Kuomintang, only the proletariat but not the bourgeoisie, only the peasants but not the landlords, only the favourable conditions but not the difficult ones, only the past but not the future, only individual parts but not the whole, only the defects but not the achievements, only the plaintiff's case but not the defendant's, only underground revolutionary work but not open revolutionary work, and so on. In a word, it means not to understand the characteristics of both aspects of a contradiction. This is what we mean by looking at a problem one-sidedly. Or it may be called seeing the part but not the whole, seeing the trees but not the forest. That way it is impossible to find the method for resolving a contradiction, it is impossible to accomplish the tasks of the revolution, to carry out assignments well or to develop inner-Party ideological struggle correctly. When Sun Wu Tzu said in discussing military science, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat",[11] he was referring to the two sides in a battle. Wei Cheng[12] of the Tang Dynasty also understood the error of one-sidedness when he said, "Listen to both sides and you will be enlightened, heed only one side and you will be benighted." But our comrades often look at problems one-sidedly, and so they often run into snags. In the novel *Shui Hu Chuan*, Sung Chiang thrice attacked Chu Village.[13] Twice he was defeated because he was ignorant of the local conditions and used the wrong method. Later he changed his method; first he investigated the situation, and he familiarized himself with the maze of roads, then he broke up the alliance between the Li, Hu and Chu Villages and sent his men in disguise into the enemy camp to lie in wait, using a stratagem similar to that of the Trojan Horse in the foreign story. And on the third occasion he won. There are many examples of materialist dialectics in *Shui Hu Chuan*, of which the episode of the three attacks on Chu Village is one of the best. Lenin said:

> . . . in order really to know an object we must embrace, study, all its sides, all connections and "mediations". We shall never achieve this completely, but the demand for all-sidedness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity.[14]

We should remember his words. To be superficial means to consider neither the characteristics of a contradiction in its totality nor the characteristics of each of its aspects; it means to deny the necessity for probing deeply into a thing and minutely studying the characteristics of its contradiction, but instead merely to look from afar and, after glimpsing the rough outline, immediately to try to resolve the contradiction (to answer a question, settle a dispute, handle work, or direct a military operation). This way of doing things is bound to lead to trouble. The reason the dogmatist and empiricist comrades in China have made mistakes lies precisely in their subjectivist, one-sided and superficial way of looking at things. To be one-sided and superficial is at the same time to be subjective. For all objective things are actually interconnected and are governed by inner laws, but instead of undertaking the task of reflecting things as they really are some people only look at things one-sidedly or superficially and who know neither their interconnections nor their inner laws, and so their method is subjectivist.

Not only does the whole process of the movement of opposites in the development of a thing, both in their interconnections and in each of the aspects, have particular features to which we must give attention, but each stage in the process has its particular features to which we must give attention too.

The fundamental contradiction in the process of development of a thing and the essence of the process determined by this fundamental contradiction will not disappear until the process is completed; but in a lengthy process the conditions usually differ at each stage. The reason is that, although the nature of the fundamental contradiction in the process of development of a thing and the essence of the process remain unchanged, the fundamental contradiction becomes more and more intensified as it passes from one stage to another in the lengthy process. In addition, among the numerous major and minor contradictions which are determined or influenced by the fundamental contradiction, some become intensified, some are temporarily or partially resolved or mitigated, and some new ones emerge; hence the process is marked by stages. If people do not pay attention to the stages in the process of development of a thing, they cannot deal with its contradictions properly.

For instance, when the capitalism of the era of free competition developed into imperialism, there was no change in the class nature of the two classes in fundamental contradiction, namely, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, or in the capitalist essence of society; however, the contradiction between these two classes became intensified, the contradiction between monopoly and non-monopoly capital emerged, the contradiction between the colonial powers and the colonies became intensified, the contradiction among the capitalist countries resulting from their uneven development manifested itself with particular sharpness, and thus there arose the special stage of capitalism, the stage of imperialism. Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution precisely because Lenin and Stalin have correctly explained these contradictions and correctly formulated the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution for their resolution.

Take the process of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, which began with the Revolution of 1911; it, too, has several distinct stages. In particular, the revolution in its period of bourgeois leadership and the revolution in its period of proletarian leadership represent two vastly different historical stages. In other words, proletarian leadership has fundamentally changed the whole face of the revolution, has brought about a new alignment of classes, given rise to a tremendous upsurge in the peasant revolution, imparted thoroughness to the revolution against imperialism and feudalism, created the possibility of the transition from the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, and so on. None of these was possible in the period when the revolution was under bourgeois leadership. Although no change has taken place in the nature of the fundamental contradiction in the process as a whole, *i.e.*, in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic-revolutionary nature of the process (the opposite of which is its semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature), nonetheless this process has passed through several stages of development in the course of more than twenty years; during this time many great events have taken place — the failure of the Revolution of 1911 and the establishment of the regime of the Northern warlords, the formation of the first national united front and the revolution of 1924-27, the break-up of the united front and the desertion of the bourgeoisie to the side of the counter-revolution, the wars among the new warlords, the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the establishment of the second national united front and the War of Resistance Against Japan. These stages are marked by particular features such as the intensification of certain contradictions (*e.g.*, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the Japanese invasion of the four northeastern provinces), the partial or temporary resolution of other contradictions (*e.g.*, the destruction of the Northern warlords and our confiscation of the land of the landlords), and the emergence of yet other contradictions (*e.g.*, the conflicts among the new warlords, and the landlords' recapture of the land after the loss of our revolutionary base areas in the south).

In studying the particularities of the contradictions at each stage in the process of development of a thing, we must not only observe them in their interconnections or their totality, we must also examine the two aspects of each contradiction.

For instance, consider the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Take one aspect, the Kuomintang. In the period of the first united front, the Kuomintang carried out Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers; hence it was revolutionary and vigorous, it was an alliance of various classes for the democratic revolution. After 1927, however, the Kuomintang changed into its opposite and became a reactionary bloc of the landlords and big bourgeoisie. After the Sian Incident in December 1936, it began another change in the direction of ending the civil war and co-operating with the Communist Party for joint opposition to Japanese imperialism. Such have been the particular features of the Kuomintang in the three stages. Of course, these features have arisen from a variety of causes. Now take the other aspect, the Chinese Communist Party. In the period of the first united front, the Chinese Communist Party was in its infancy; it courageously led the revolution of 1924-27 but revealed its immaturity in its understanding of the character, the tasks and the methods of the revolution, and consequently it became possible for Chen Tu-hsiuism, which appeared during the latter part of this revolution, to assert itself and bring about the defeat of the revolution. After 1927, the Communist Party courageously led the Agrarian Revolutionary War and created the revolutionary army and revolutionary base areas; however, it committed adventurist errors which brought about very great losses both to the army and to the base areas. Since 1935 the Party has corrected these errors and has been leading the new united front for resistance to Japan; this great struggle is now developing. At the present stage, the Communist Party is a Party that has gone through the test of two revolutions and acquired a wealth of experience. Such have been the particular features of the Chinese Communist Party in the three stages. These features, too, have arisen from a variety of causes. Without studying both these sets of features we cannot understand the particular relations between the two parties during the various stages of their development, namely, the establishment of a united front, the break-up of the united front, and the establishment of another united front. What is even more fundamental for the study of the particular features of the two parties is the examination of the class basis of the two parties and the resultant contradictions which have arisen between each party and other forces at different periods. For instance, in the period of its first co-operation with the Communist Party, the Kuomintang stood in contradiction to foreign imperialism and was therefore anti-imperialist; on the other hand, it stood in contradiction to the great masses of the people within the country — although in words it promised many benefits to the working people, in fact it gave them little or nothing. In the period when it carried on the anti-Communist war, the Kuomintang collaborated with imperialism and feudalism against the great masses of the people and wiped out all the gains they had won in the revolution, and thereby intensified its contradictions with them. In the present period of the anti-Japanese war, the Kuomintang stands in contradiction to Japanese imperialism and wants co-operation with the Communist Party, without however relaxing its struggle against the Communist Party and the people or its oppression of them. As for the Communist Party, it has always, in every period, stood with the great masses of the people against imperialism and feudalism, but in the present period of the anti-Japanese war, it has adopted a moderate policy towards the Kuomintang and the domestic feudal forces because the Kuomintang has expressed itself in favour of resisting Japan. The above circumstances have resulted now in alliance between the two parties and now in struggle between them, and even during the periods of alliance there has been a complicated state of simultaneous alliance and struggle. If we do not study the particular features of both aspects of the contradiction, we shall fail to understand not only the relations of each party with the other forces, but also the relations between the two parties.

It can thus be seen that in studying the particularity of any kind of contradiction — the contradiction in each form of motion of matter, the contradiction in each of its processes of development, the two aspects of the contradiction in each process, the contradiction at each stage of a process, and the two aspects of the contradiction at each stage — in studying the particularity of all these contradictions, we must not be subjective and arbitrary but must analyse it concretely. Without concrete analysis there can be no knowledge of the particularity of any contradiction. We must always remember Lenin's words, the concrete analysis of concrete conditions.

Marx and Engels were the first to provide us with excellent models of such concrete analysis.

When Marx and Engels applied the law of contradiction in things to the study of the socio-historical process, they discovered the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, they discovered the contradiction between the exploiting and exploited classes and also the resultant contradiction between the economic base and its superstructure (politics, ideology, etc.), and they discovered how these contradictions inevitably lead to different kinds of social revolution in different kinds of class society.

When Marx applied this law to the study of the economic structure of capitalist society, he discovered that the basic contradiction of this society is the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of ownership. This contradiction manifests itself in the contradiction between the organized character of production in individual enterprises and the anarchic character of production in society as a whole. In terms of class relations, it manifests itself in the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Because the range of things is vast and there is no limit to their development, what is universal in one context becomes particular in another. Conversely, what is particular in one context becomes universal in another. The contradiction in the capitalist system between the social character of production and the private ownership of the means of production is common to all countries where capitalism exists and develops; as far as capitalism is concerned, this constitutes the universality of contradiction. But this contradiction of capitalism belongs only to a certain historical stage in the general development of class society; as far as the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in class society as a whole is concerned, it constitutes the particularity of contradiction. However, in the course of dissecting the particularity of all these contradictions in capitalist society, Marx gave a still more profound, more adequate and more complete elucidation of the universality of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in class society in general.

Since the particular is united with the universal and since the universality as well as the particularity of contradiction is inherent in everything, universality residing in particularity, we should, when studying an object, try to discover both the particular and the universal and their interconnection, to discover both particularity and universality and also their interconnection within the object itself, and to discover the interconnections of this object with the many objects outside it. When Stalin explained the historical roots of Leninism in his famous work, *The Foundations of Leninism*, he analysed the international situation in which Leninism arose, analysed those contradictions of capitalism which reached their culmination under imperialism, and showed how these contradictions made proletarian revolution a matter for immediate action and created favourable conditions for a direct onslaught on capitalism. What is more, he analysed the reasons why Russia became the cradle of Leninism, why tsarist Russia became the focus of all the contradictions of imperialism, and why it was possible for the Russian proletariat to become the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. Thus, Stalin analysed the universality of contradiction in imperialism, showing why Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, and at the same time analysed the particularity of tsarist Russian imperialism within this general contradiction, showing why Russia became the birthplace of the theory and tactics of proletarian revolution and how the universality of contradiction is contained in this particularity. Stalin's analysis provides us with a model for understanding the particularity and the universality of contradiction and their interconnection.

On the question of using dialectics in the study of objective phenomena, Marx and Engels, and likewise Lenin and Stalin, always enjoin people not to be in any way subjective and arbitrary but, from the concrete conditions in the actual objective movement of these phenomena, to discover their concrete contradictions, the concrete position of each aspect of every contradiction and the concrete interrelations of the contradictions. Our dogmatists do not have this attitude in study and therefore can never get anything right. We must take warning from their failure and learn to acquire this attitude which is the only correct one in study.

The relationship between the universality and the particularity of contradiction is the relationship between the general character and the individual character of contradiction. By the former we mean that contradiction exists in and runs through all processes from beginning to end; motion, things, processes, thinking — all are contradictions. To deny contradiction is to deny everything. This is a universal truth for all times and all countries, which admits of no exception. Hence the general character, the absoluteness of contradiction. But this general character is contained in every individual character; without individual character there can be no general character. If all individual character were removed, what general character would remain? It is because each contradiction is particular that individual character arises. All individual character exists conditionally and temporarily and hence is relative.

This truth concerning general and individual character, concerning absoluteness and relativity, is the quintessence of the problem of contradiction in things; failure to understand it is tantamount to abandoning dialectics.

IV. THE PRINCIPAL CONTRADICTION AND THE PRINCIPAL ASPECT OF A CONTRADICTION

There are still two points in the problem of the particularity of contradiction which must be singled out for analysis, namely, the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction.

There are many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions.

For instance, in capitalist society the two forces in contradiction, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, form the principal contradiction. The other contradictions, such as those between the remnant feudal class and the bourgeoisie, between the peasant petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, between the proletariat and the peasant petty bourgeoisie, between the non-monopoly capitalists and the monopoly capitalists, between bourgeois democracy and bourgeois fascism, among the capitalist countries and between imperialism and the colonies, are all determined or influenced by this principal contradiction.

In a semi-colonial country such as China, the relationship between the principal contradiction and the non-principal contradictions presents a complicated picture.

When imperialism launches a war of aggression against such a country, all its various classes, except for some traitors, can temporarily unite in a national war against imperialism. At such a time, the contradiction between imperialism and the country concerned becomes the principal contradiction, while all the contradictions among the various classes within the country (including what was the principal contradiction, between the feudal system and the great masses of the people) are temporarily relegated to a secondary and subordinate position. So it was in China in the Opium War of 1840, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the Yi Ho Tuan War of 1900, and so it is now in the present Sino-Japanese War.

But in another situation, the contradictions change position. When imperialism carries on its oppression not by war, but by milder means — political, economic and cultural — the ruling classes in semi-colonial countries capitulate to imperialism, and the two form an alliance for the joint oppression of the masses of the people. At such a time, the masses often resort to civil war against the alliance of imperialism and the feudal classes, while imperialism often employs indirect methods rather than direct action in helping the reactionaries in the semi-colonial countries to oppress the people, and thus the internal contradictions become particularly sharp. This is what happened in China in the Revolutionary War of 1911, the Revolutionary War of 1924-27, and the ten years of Agrarian Revolutionary War after 1927. Wars among the various reactionary ruling groups in the semi-colonial countries, *e.g.*, the wars among the warlords in China, fall into the same category.

When a revolutionary civil war develops to the point of threatening the very existence of imperialism and its running dogs, the domestic reactionaries, imperialism often adopts other methods in order to maintain its rule; it either tries to split the revolutionary front from within or sends armed forces to help the domestic reactionaries directly. At such a time, foreign imperialism and domestic reaction stand quite openly at one pole while the masses of the people stand at the other pole, thus forming the principal contradiction which determines or influences the development of the other contradictions. The assistance given by various capitalist countries to the Russian reactionaries after the October Revolution is an example of armed intervention. Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal in 1927 is an example of splitting the revolutionary front.

But whatever happens, there is no doubt at all that at every stage in the development of a process, there is only one principal contradiction which plays the leading role.

Hence, if in any process there are a number of contradictions, one of them must be the principal contradiction playing the leading and decisive role, while the rest occupy a secondary and subordinate position. Therefore, in studying any complex process in which there are two or more contradictions, we must devote every effort to finding its principal contradiction. Once this principal contradiction is grasped, all problems can be readily solved. This is the method Marx taught us in his study of capitalist society. Likewise Lenin and Stalin taught us this method when they studied imperialism and the general crisis of capitalism and when they studied the Soviet economy. There are thousands of scholars and men of action who do not understand it, and the result is that, lost in a fog, they are unable to get to the heart of a problem and naturally cannot find a way to resolve its contradictions.

As we have said, one must not treat all the contradictions in a process as being equal but must distinguish between the principal and the secondary contradictions, and pay special attention to grasping the principal one. But, in any given contradiction, whether principal or secondary, should the two contradictory aspects be treated as equal? Again, no. In any contradiction the development of the contradictory aspects is uneven. Sometimes they seem to be in equilibrium, which is however only temporary and relative, while unevenness is basic. Of the two contradictory aspects, one must be principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is the one playing the leading role in the contradiction. The nature of a thing is determined mainly by the principal aspect of a contradiction, the aspect which has gained the dominant position.

But this situation is not static; the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the nature of the thing changes accordingly. In a given process or at a given stage in the development of a contradiction, A is the principal aspect and B is the non-principal aspect; at another stage or in another process the roles are reversed — a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle against the other in the course of the development of a thing.

We often speak of "the new superseding the old". The supersession of the old by the new is a general, eternal and inviolable law of the universe. The transformation of one thing into another, through leaps of different forms in accordance with its essence and external conditions — this is the process of the new superseding the old. In each thing there is contradiction between its new and its old aspects, and this gives rise to a series of struggles with many twists and turns. As a result of these struggles, the new aspect changes from being minor to being major and rises to predominance, while the old aspect changes from being major to being minor and gradually dies out. And the moment the new aspect gains dominance over the old, the old thing changes qualitatively into a new thing. It can thus be seen that the nature of a thing is mainly determined by the principal aspect of the contradiction, the aspect which has gained predominance. When the principal aspect which has gained predominance changes, the nature of a thing changes accordingly.

In capitalist society, capitalism has changed its position from being a subordinate force in the old feudal era to being the dominant force, and the nature of society has accordingly changed from feudal to capitalist. In the new, capitalist era, the feudal forces changed from their former dominant position to a subordinate one, gradually dying out. Such was the case, for example, in Britain and France. With the development of the productive forces, the bourgeoisie changes from being a new class playing a progressive role to being an old class playing a reactionary role, until it is finally overthrown by the proletariat and becomes a class deprived of privately owned means of production and stripped of power, when it, too, gradually dies out. The proletariat, which is much more numerous than the bourgeoisie and grows simultaneously with it but under its rule, is a new force which, initially subordinate to the bourgeoisie, gradually gains strength, becomes an independent class playing the leading role in history, and finally seizes political power and becomes the ruling class. Thereupon the nature of society changes and the old capitalist society becomes the new socialist society. This is the path already taken by the Soviet Union, a path that all other countries will inevitably take.

Look at China, for instance. Imperialism occupies the principal position in the contradiction in which China has been reduced to a semi-colony, it oppresses the Chinese people, and China has been changed from an independent country into a semi-colonial one. But this state of affairs will inevitably change; in the struggle between the two sides, the power of the Chinese people which is growing under the leadership of the proletariat will inevitably change China from a semi-colony into an independent country, whereas imperialism will be overthrown and old China will inevitably change into New China.

The change of old China into New China also involves a change in the relation between the old feudal forces and the new popular forces within the country. The old feudal landlord class will be overthrown, and from being the ruler it will change into being the ruled; and this class, too, will gradually die out. From being the ruled the people, led by the proletariat, will become the rulers. Thereupon, the nature of Chinese society will change and the old, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society will change into a new democratic society.

Instances of such reciprocal transformation are found in our past experience. The Ching Dynasty which ruled China for nearly three hundred years was overthrown in the Revolution of 1911, and the revolutionary *Tung Meng Hui* under Sun Yat-sen's leadership was victorious for a time. In the Revolutionary War of 1924-27, the revolutionary forces of the Communist-Kuomintang alliance in the south changed from being weak to being strong and won victory in the Northern Expedition, while the Northern warlords who once ruled the roost were overthrown. In 1927, the people's forces led by the Communist Party were greatly reduced numerically under the attacks of Kuomintang reaction, but with the elimination of opportunism within their ranks they gradually grew again. In the revolutionary base areas under Communist leadership, the peasants have been transformed from being the ruled to being the rulers, while the landlords have undergone a reverse transformation. It is always so in the world, the new displacing the old, the old being superseded by the new, the old being eliminated to make way for the new, and the new emerging out of the old.

At certain times in the revolutionary struggle, the difficulties outweigh the favourable conditions and so constitute the principal aspect of the contradiction and the favourable conditions constitute the secondary aspect. But through their efforts the revolutionaries can overcome the difficulties step by step and open up a favourable new situation; thus a difficult situation yields place to a favourable one. This is what happened after the failure of the revolution in China in 1927 and during the Long March of the Chinese Red Army. In the present Sino-Japanese War, China is again in a difficult position, but we can change this and fundamentally transform the situation as between China and Japan. Conversely, favourable conditions can be transformed into difficulty if the revolutionaries make mistakes. Thus the victory of the revolution of 1924-27 turned into defeat. The revolutionary base areas which grew up in the southern provinces after 1927 had all suffered defeat by 1934.

When we engage in study, the same holds good for the contradiction in the passage from ignorance to knowledge. At the very beginning of our study of Marxism, our ignorance of or scanty acquaintance with Marxism stands in contradiction to knowledge of Marxism. But by assiduous study, ignorance can be transformed into knowledge, scanty knowledge into substantial knowledge, and blindness in the application of Marxism into mastery of its application.

Some people think that this is not true of certain contradictions. For instance, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the productive forces are the principal aspect; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect; in the contradiction between the economic base and the superstructure, the economic base is the principal aspect;

and there is no change in their respective positions. This is the mechanical materialist conception, not the dialectical materialist conception. True, the productive forces, practice and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role. When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production plays the principal and decisive role. The creation and advocacy of revolutionary theory plays the principal and decisive role in those times of which Lenin said, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."[15] When a task, no matter which, has to be performed, but there is as yet no guiding line, method, plan or policy, the principal and decisive thing is to decide on a guiding line, method, plan or policy. When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. Are we going against materialism when we say this? No. The reason is that while we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines the mental and social being determines social consciousness, we also — and indeed must — recognize the reaction of mental on material things, of social consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base. This does not go against materialism; on the contrary, it avoids mechanical materialism and firmly upholds dialectical materialism.

In studying the particularity of contradiction, unless we examine these two facets — the principal and the non-principal contradictions in a process, and the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction — that is, unless we examine the distinctive character of these two facets of contradiction, we shall get bogged down in abstractions, be unable to understand contradiction concretely and consequently be unable to find the correct method of resolving it. The distinctive character or particularity of these two facets of contradiction represents the unevenness of the forces that are in contradiction. Nothing in this world develops absolutely evenly; we must oppose the theory of even development or the theory of equilibrium. Moreover, it is these concrete features of a contradiction and the changes in the principal and non-principal aspects of a contradiction in the course of its development that manifest the force of the new superseding the old. The study of the various states of unevenness in contradictions, of the principal and non-principal contradictions and of the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction constitutes an essential method by which a revolutionary political party correctly determines its strategic and tactical policies both in political and in military affairs. All Communists must give it attention.

V. THE IDENTITY AND STRUGGLE OF THE ASPECTS OF A CONTRADICTION

When we understand the universality and the particularity of contradiction, we must proceed to study the problem of the identity and struggle of the aspects of a contradiction.

Identity, unity, coincidence, interpenetration, interpermeation, interdependence (or mutual dependence for existence), interconnection or mutual co-operation — all these different terms mean the same thing and refer to the following two points: first, the existence of each of the two aspects of a contradiction in the process of the development of a thing presupposes the existence of the other aspect, and both aspects coexist in a single entity; second, in given conditions, each of the two contradictory aspects transforms itself into its opposite. This is the meaning of identity.

Lenin said:

> *Dialectics* is the teaching which shows how *opposites* can be and how they happen to be (how they become) *identical* — under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another, — why the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another.[16]

What does this passage mean?

The contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each other and are in opposition to each other. Without exception, they are contained in the process of development of all things and in all human thought. A simple process contains only a single pair of opposites, while a complex process contains more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites are in contradiction to one another

That is how all things in the objective world and all human thought are constituted and how they are set in motion.

This being so, there is an utter lack of identity or unity. How then can one speak of identity or unity?

The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without "above", there would be no "below"; without "below", there would be no "above". Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune, there would be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty; without difficulty, there would be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semi-colonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies "how *opposites* can be . . . *identical*". How then can they be identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity.

But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.

Why is there identity here, too? You see, by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time the ruled, is transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?

The Kuomintang, which played a certain positive role at a certain stage in modern Chinese history, became a counter-revolutionary party after 1927 because of its inherent class nature and because of imperialist blandishments (these being the conditions); but it has been compelled to agree to resist Japan because of the sharpening of the contradiction between China and Japan and because of the Communist Party's policy of the united front (these being the conditions). Things in contradiction change into one another, and herein lies a definite identity.

Our agrarian revolution has been a process in which the landlord class owning the land is transformed into a class that has lost its land, while the peasants who once lost their land are transformed into small holders who have acquired land, and it will be such a process once again. In given conditions having and not having, acquiring and losing, are interconnected; there is identity of the two sides. Under socialism, private peasant ownership is transformed into the public ownership of socialist agriculture; this has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place everywhere else. There is a bridge leading from private property to public property, which in philosophy is called identity, or transformation into each other, or interpenetration.

To consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the people is in fact to prepare the conditions for abolishing this dictatorship and advancing to the higher stage when all state systems are eliminated. To establish and build the Communist Party is in fact to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the Communist Party and all political parties. To build a revolutionary army under the leadership of the Communist Party and to carry on revolutionary war is in fact to prepare the conditions for the permanent elimination of war. These opposites are at the same time complementary.

War and peace, as everybody knows, transform themselves into each other. War is transformed into peace; for instance, the First World War was transformed into the post-war peace, and the civil war in China has now stopped, giving place to internal peace. Peace is transformed into war; for instance, the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was transformed into war in 1927, and today's situation of world peace may be transformed into a second world war. Why is this so? Because in class society such contradictory things as war and peace have an identity in given conditions.

All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed "how they happen to be (how they become) *identical* — under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another".

Why is it that "the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another"? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite. Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling classes of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who regard opposites not as living, conditional, mobile and transforming themselves into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their rule. The task of Communists is to expose the fallacies of the re actionaries and metaphysicians, to propagate the dialectics inherent in things, and so accelerate the transformation of things and achieve the goal of revolution.

In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another. There are innumerable transformations in mythology, for instance, Kua Fu's race with the sun in *Shan Hai Ching*,[17] Yi's shooting down of nine suns in *Huai Nan Tzu*,[18] the Monkey King's seventy-two metamorphoses in *Hsi Yu Chi*,[19] the numerous episodes of ghosts and foxes metamorphosed into human beings in the *Strange Tales of Liao Chai*,[20] etc. But these legendary transformations of opposites are not concrete changes reflecting concrete contradictions. They are naive, imaginary, subjectively conceived transformations conjured up in men's minds

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

by innumerable real and complex transformations of opposites into one another. Marx said, “All mythology masters and dominates and shapes the forces of nature in and through the imagination; hence it disappears as soon as man gains mastery over the forces of nature.”[21] The myriads of changes in mythology (and also in nursery tales) delight people because they imaginatively picture man’s conquest of the forces of nature, and the best myths possess “eternal charm”, as Marx put it; but myths are not built out of the concrete contradictions existing in given conditions and therefore are not a scientific reflection of reality. That is to say, in myths or nursery tales the aspects constituting a contradiction have only an imaginary identity, not a concrete identity. The scientific reflection of the identity in real transformations is Marxist dialectics.

Why can an egg but not a stone be transformed into a chicken? Why is there identity between war and peace and none between war and a stone? Why can human beings give birth only to human beings and not to anything else? The sole reason is that the identity of opposites exists only in necessary given conditions. Without these necessary given conditions there can be no identity whatsoever.

Why is it that in Russia in 1917 the bourgeois-democratic February Revolution was directly linked with the proletarian socialist October Revolution, while in France the bourgeois revolution was not directly linked with a socialist revolution and the Paris Commune of 1871 ended in failure? Why is it, on the other hand, that the nomadic system of Mongolia and Central Asia has been directly linked with socialism? Why is it that the Chinese revolution can avoid a capitalist future and be directly linked with socialism without taking the old historical road of the Western countries, without passing through a period of bourgeois dictatorship? The sole reason is the concrete conditions of the time. When certain necessary conditions are present, certain contradictions arise in the process of development of things and, moreover, the opposites contained in them are interdependent and become transformed into one another; otherwise none of this would be possible.

Such is the problem of identity. What then is struggle? And what is the relation between identity and struggle?

Lenin said:

> The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of

> mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.[22]

What does this passage mean?

All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute.

There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute.

When we said above that two opposite things can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is to say, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions, they cannot constitute a contradiction, cannot coexist in the same entity and cannot transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said identity is conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between opposites permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore unconditional and absolute.

The combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of opposites in all things.

We Chinese often say, "Things that oppose each other also complement each other."[23] That is, things opposed to each other have identity. This saying is dialectical and contrary to metaphysics. "Oppose each other" refers to the mutual exclusion or the struggle of two contradictory aspects. "Complement each other" means that in given conditions the two contradictory aspects unite and achieve identity. Yet struggle is inherent in identity and without struggle there can be no identity.

In identity there is struggle, in particularity there is universality, and in individuality there is generality. To quote Lenin, ". . . there *is* an absolute *in* the relative."[24]

VI. THE PLACE OF ANTAGONISM IN CONTRADICTION

The question of the struggle of opposites includes the question of what is antagonism. Our answer is that antagonism is one form, but not the only form, of the struggle of opposites.

In human history, antagonism between classes exists as a particular manifestation of the struggle of opposites. Consider the contradiction between the exploiting and the exploited classes. Such contradictory classes coexist for a long time in the same society, be it slave society, feudal society or capitalist society, and they struggle with each other; but it is not until the contradiction between the two classes develops to a certain stage that it assumes the form of open antagonism and develops into revolution. The same holds for the transformation of peace into war in class society.

Before it explodes, a bomb is a single entity in which opposites coexist in given conditions. The explosion takes place only when a new condition, ignition, is present. An analogous situation arises in all those natural phenomena which finally assume the form of open conflict to resolve old contradictions and produce new things.

It is highly important to grasp this fact. It enables us to understand that revolutions and revolutionary wars are inevitable in class society and that without them, it is impossible to accomplish any leap in social development and to overthrow the reactionary ruling classes and therefore impossible for the people to win political power. Communists must expose the deceitful propaganda of the reactionaries, such as the assertion that social revolution is unnecessary and impossible. They must firmly uphold the Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution and enable the people to understand that social revolution is not only entirely necessary but also entirely practicable, and that the whole history of mankind and the triumph of the Soviet Union have confirmed this scientific truth.

However, we must make a concrete study of the circumstances of each specific struggle of opposites and should not arbitrarily apply the formula discussed above to everything. Contradiction and struggle are universal and absolute, but the methods of resolving contradictions, that is, the forms of struggle, differ according to the differences in the nature of the contradictions. Some contradictions are characterized by open antagonism, others are not. In accordance with the concrete development of things, some contradictions which were originally non-antagonistic develop into antagonistic ones, while others which were originally antagonistic develop into non-antagonistic ones.

As already mentioned, so long as classes exist, contradictions between correct and incorrect ideas in the Communist Party are reflections within the Party of class contradictions. At first, with regard to certain issues, such contradictions may not manifest themselves as antagonistic. But with the development of the class struggle, they may grow and become antagonistic. The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union shows us that the contradictions between the correct thinking of Lenin and Stalin and the fallacious thinking of Trotsky, Bukharin and others did not at first manifest themselves in an antagonistic form, but that later they did develop into antagonism. There are similar cases in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. At first the contradictions between the correct thinking of many of our Party comrades and the fallacious thinking of Chen Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-tao and others also did not manifest themselves in an antagonistic form, but later they did develop into antagonism. At present the contradiction between correct and incorrect thinking in our Party does not manifest itself in an antagonistic form, and if comrades who have committed mistakes can correct them, it will not develop into antagonism. Therefore, the Party must on the one hand wage a serious struggle against erroneous thinking, and on the other give the comrades who have committed errors ample opportunity to wake up. This being the case, excessive struggle is obviously inappropriate. But if the people who have committed errors persist in them and aggravate them, there is the possibility that this contradiction will develop into antagonism.

Economically, the contradiction between town and country is an extremely antagonistic one both in capitalist society, where under the rule of the bourgeoisie the towns ruthlessly plunder the countryside, and in the Kuomintang areas in China, where under the rule of foreign imperialism and the Chinese big comprador bourgeoisie the towns most rapaciously plunder the countryside. But in a socialist country and in our revolutionary base areas, this antagonistic contradiction has changed into one that is non-antagonistic; and when communist society is reached it will be abolished.

Lenin said, "Antagonism and contradiction are not at all one and the same. Under socialism, the first will disappear, the second will remain."[25] That is to say, antagonism is one form, but not the only form, of the struggle of opposites; the formula of antagonism cannot be arbitrarily applied everywhere.

VII. CONCLUSION

We may now say a few words to sum up. The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the fundamental law of nature and of society and therefore also the fundamental law of thought. It stands opposed to the metaphysical world outlook. It represents a great revolution in the history of human knowledge. According to dialectical materialism, contradiction is present in all processes of objectively existing things and of subjective thought and permeates all these processes from beginning to end; this is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. Each contradiction and each of its aspects have their respective characteristics; this is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. In given conditions, opposites possess identity, and consequently can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other; this again is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. But the struggle of opposites is ceaseless, it goes on both when the opposites are coexisting and when they are transforming themselves into each other, and becomes especially conspicuous when they are transforming themselves into one another; this again is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. In studying the particularity and relativity of contradiction, we must give attention to the distinction between the principal contradiction and the non-principal contradictions and to the distinction between the principal aspect and the non-principal aspect of a contradiction; in studying the universality of contradiction and the struggle of opposites in contradiction, we must give attention to the distinction between the different forms of struggle. Otherwise we shall make mistakes. If, through study, we achieve a real understanding of the essentials explained above, we shall be able to demolish dogmatist ideas which are contrary to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and detrimental to our revolutionary cause, and our comrades with practical experience will be able to organize their experience into principles and avoid repeating empiricist errors. These are a few simple conclusions from our study of the law of contradiction.

NOTES

[1] V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 249.

[2] In his essay "On the Question of Dialectics", Lenin said, "The splitting in two of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts (see the quotation from Philo on Heraclitus at the beginning of Section 3 'On Cognition' in Lassalle's book on Heraclitus) is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics." (*Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 357.) In his "Conspectus of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*", he said, "In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This grasps the kernel of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development." (*Ibid.*, p. 215.)

[3] V. I. Lenin, "On the Question of Dialectics", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 358.

[4] A saying of Tung Chung-shu (179-104 B.C.), a well-known exponent of Confucianism in the Han Dynasty.

[5] Frederick Engels, "Dialectics. Quantity and Quality", *Anti-Dühring*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1959, p. 166.

[6] V. I. Lenin, "On the Question of Dialectics", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 357-58.

[7] Frederick Engels, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-67.

[8] V. I. Lenin, "On the Question of Dialectics", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 357.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 358-59.

[10] See "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", Note 10, p. 251 of this volume.

[11] See *ibid.*, Note 2, p. 249 of this volume.

[12] Wei Cheng (A.D. 580-643) was a statesman and historian of the Tang Dynasty.

[13] Shui Hu Chuan (Heroes of the Marshes), a famous 14th century Chinese novel, describes a peasant war towards the end of the Northern Sung Dynasty. Chu Village was in the vicinity of Liangshanpo, where Sung Chiang, leader of the peasant uprising and hero of the novel, established his base. Chu Chao-feng, the head of this village, was a despotic landlord.

[14] V. I. Lenin, "Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Present Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin", *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., International Publishers, New York, 1943, Vol. IX, p. 66.

[15] V. I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?", *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1961, Vol. V, p. 369.

[16] V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 97-98.

[17] *Shan Hai Ching (Book of Mountains and Seas)* was written in the era of the Warring States (403-221 B.C.). In one of its fables Kua Fu, a superman, pursued and overtook the sun. But he died of thirst, whereupon his staff was transformed into the forest of Teng.

[18] Yi is one of the legendary heroes of ancient China, famous for his archery. According to a legend in *Huai Nan Tzu*, compiled in the 2nd century B.C., there were ten suns in the sky in the days of Emperor Yao. To put an end to the damage to vegetation caused by these scorching suns, Emperor Yao ordered Yi to shoot them down. In another legend recorded by Wang Yi (2nd century A.D.), the archer is said to have shot down nine of the ten suns.

[19] *Hsi Yu Chi (Pilgrimage to the West)* is a 16th century novel, the hero of which is the monkey god Sun Wu-kung. He could miraculously change at will into seventy-two different shapes, such as a bird, a tree and a stone.

[20] The *Strange Tales of Liao Chai*, written by Pu Sung-ling in the 17th century, is a well-known collection of 431 tales, mostly about ghosts and fox spirits.

[21] Karl Marx, "Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy", *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Eng. ed., Chicago, 1904, pp. 310-11.

[22] V. I. Lenin, "On the Question of Dialectics", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 358.

[23] The saying "Things that oppose each other also complement each other" first appeared in the *History of the Earlier Han Dynasty* by Pan Ku, a celebrated historian in the 1st century A.D. It has long been a popular saying.

[24] V. I. Lenin, "On the Question of Dialectics", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 358.

[25] V. I. Lenin, "Remarks on N. I. Bukharin's *Economics of the Transitional Period*", *Selected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow-Leningrad, 1931, Vol. XI, p. 357.

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FROM MARX TO MAO

CONTENTS

THE PERIOD OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN (I)

POLICIES, MEASURES AND PERSPECTIVES FOR RESISTING THE JAPANESE INVASION 13

- I. Two Policies 13
- II. Two Sets of Measures 16
- III. Two Perspectives 20
- IV. Conclusions 20

FOR THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL THE NATION'S FORCES FOR VICTORY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE 23

COMBAT LIBERALISM 31

URGENT TASKS FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST CO-OPERATION 35

INTERVIEW WITH THE BRITISH JOURNALIST JAMES BERTRAM 47

- The Communist Party of China and the War of Resistance 47
- The War Situation and Its Lessons 48
- The Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance 52
- Capitulationism in the War of Resistance 55
- Democracy and the War of Resistance 56

THE SITUATION AND TASKS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR AFTER THE FALL OF SHANGHAI AND TAIYUAN 61

- I. The Present Situation Is One of Transition from a War of Partial Resistance to a War of Total Resistance 61
- II. Capitulation Must Be Combated Both Inside the Party and Throughout the Country 65
  - Inside the Party, Oppose Class Capitulationism 65
  - In the Country as a Whole, Oppose National Capitulationism 69
  - The Relation Between Class Capitulationism and National Capitulationism 70

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGSIA BORDER REGION AND THE REAR HEADQUARTERS OF THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY 75

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN 79

Chapter I
Why Raise the Question of Strategy in Guerrilla War? 79

Chapter II
The Basic Principle of War is to Preserve Oneself and Destroy the Enemy 81

Chapter III
Six Specific Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan 82

Chapter IV
Initiative, Flexibility and Planning in Conducting Offensives Within the Defensive, Battles of Quick Decision Within Protracted War, and Exterior-Line Operations Within Interior-Line Operations 83

Chapter V
Co-ordination with Regular Warfare 91

Chapter VI
The Establishment of Base Areas 93
1. The Types of Base Areas 94
2. Guerrilla Zones and Base Zones 96
3. Conditions for Establishing Base Areas 98
4. The Consolidation and Expansion of Base Areas 100
5. Forms in Which We and the Enemy Encircle One Another 101

Chapter VII
The Strategic Defensive and the Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War 102
1. The Strategic Defensive in Guerrilla War 103
2. The Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War 105

Chapter VIII
Development of Guerrilla War into Mobile War 107

Chapter IX
The Relationship of Command 109

ON PROTRACTED WAR 113
Statement of the Problem 113
The Basis of the Problem 121
Refutation of the Theory of National Subjugation 124
Compromise or Resistance? Corruption or Progress? 128

The Theory of National Subjugation Is Wrong and the Theory of Quick Victory Is Likewise Wrong 132
Why a Protracted War? 134
The Three Stages of the Protracted War 136
A War of Jig-Saw Pattern 145
Fighting for Perpetual Peace 148
Man's Dynamic Role in War 151
War and Politics 152
Political Mobilization for the War of Resistance 154
The Object of War 155
Offense Within Defense, Quick Decisions Within a Protracted War, Exterior Lines Within Interior Lines 157
Initiative, Flexibility and Planning 161
Mobile Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare and Positional Warfare 170
War of Attrition and War of Annihilation 174
The Possibilities of Exploiting the Enemy's Mistakes 178
The Question of Decisive Engagements in the Anti-Japanese War 180
The Army and the People Are the Foundation of Victory 183
Conclusions 188

THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE NATIONAL WAR 195

Patriotism and Internationalism 196
Communists Should Set an Example in the National War 197
Unite the Whole Nation and Combat Enemy Agents in Its Midst 199
Expand the Communist Party and Prevent Infiltration by Enemy Agents 199
Maintain Both the United Front and the Independence of the Party 200
Consider the Situation as a Whole, Think in Terms of the Majority, and Work Together with Our Allies 201
Cadres Policy 201
Party Discipline 203
Party Democracy 204
Our Party Has Consolidated Itself and Grown Strong Through the Struggle on Two Fronts 205
The Present Struggle on Two Fronts 207
Study 208
Unity and Victory 210

THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE AND INITIATIVE WITHIN THE UNITED FRONT 213
Help and Concessions Should Be Positive, Not Negative 213
The Identity Between the National and the Class Struggle 215
"Everything Through the United Front" Is Wrong 215

PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY 219
I. China's Characteristics and Revolutionary War 219
II. The War History of the Kuomintang 223
III. The War History of the Chinese Communist Party 225
IV. Changes in the Party's Military Strategy in the Civil War and the National War 227
V. The Strategic Role of Guerrilla Warfare Against Japan 229
VI. Pay Great Attention to the Study of Military Matters 232

THE MAY 4TH MOVEMENT 237

THE ORIENTATION OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT 241

OPPOSE CAPITULATIONIST ACTIVITY 251

THE REACTIONARIES MUST BE PUNISHED 257

INTERVIEW WITH A *NEW CHINA DAILY* CORRESPONDENT ON THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 263

INTERVIEW WITH THREE CORRESPONDENTS FROM THE CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, THE *SAO TANG PAO* AND THE *HSIN MIN PAO* 269

THE IDENTITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ALL MANKIND 275

INTRODUCING *THE COMMUNIST* 285

THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE PARTY'S TASKS 297

RECRUIT LARGE NUMBERS OF INTELLECTUALS 301

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 305

Chapter I
Chinese Society 305
1. The Chinese Nation 305
2. The Old Feudal Society 307
3. Present-Day Colonial, Semi-Colonial and Semi-Feudal Society 309

Chapter II
The Chinese Revolution 314
1. The Revolutionary Movements in the Last Hundred Years 314
2. The Targets of the Chinese Revolution 315

3. The Tasks of the Chinese Revolution 318
4. The Motive Forces of the Chinese Revolution 319
5. The Character of the Chinese Revolution 326
6. The Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution 329
7. The Twofold Task of the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party 330

STALIN, FRIEND OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE 335

IN MEMORY OF NORMAN BETHUNE 337

ON NEW DEMOCRACY 339

I. Whither China? 339
II. We Want to Build a New China 340
III. China's Historical Circumstances 340
IV. The Chinese Revolution Is Part of the World Revolution 342
V. The Politics of New Democracy 347
VI. The Economy of New Democracy 353
VII. Refutation of Bourgeois Dictatorship 354
VIII. Refutation of "Left" Phrase-mongering 358
IX. Refutation of the Die-hards 360
X. The Three People's Principles, Old and New 363
XI. The Culture of New Democracy 369
XII. The Historical Characteristics of China's Cultural Revolution 371
XIII. The Four Periods 373
XIV. Some Wrong Ideas About the Nature of Culture 378
XV. A National, Scientific and Mass Culture 380

OVERCOME THE DANGER OF CAPITULATION AND STRIVE FOR A TURN FOR THE BETTER 385

UNITE ALL ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES AND COMBAT THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS 389

TEN DEMANDS ON THE KUOMINTANG 395

INTRODUCING *THE CHINESE WORKER* 403

WE MUST STRESS UNITY AND PROGRESS 405

NEW DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 407

ON THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE BASE AREAS 417

CURRENT PROBLEMS OF TACTICS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT 421

FREELY EXPAND THE ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES AND RESIST THE ONSLAUGHTS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS 431

UNITY TO THE VERY END 437

ON POLICY 441

ORDER AND STATEMENT ON THE SOUTHERN ANHWEI INCIDENT 451

Order of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 451

Statement by the Spokesman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to a Correspondent of the Hsinhua News Agency 452

THE SITUATION AFTER THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT 459

CONCLUSION ON THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT 463

THE PERIOD OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN (I)

POLICIES, MEASURES AND PERSPECTIVES FOR RESISTING THE JAPANESE INVASION

July 23, 1937

I. TWO POLICIES

On July 8, the day after the Lukouchiao Incident,[1] the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a manifesto to the whole nation calling for a war of resistance. The manifesto reads in part:

> Fellow-countrymen! Peiping and Tientsin are in peril! Northern China is in peril! The Chinese nation is in peril! A war of resistance by the whole nation is the only way out. We demand immediate and resolute resistance to the invading Japanese armies and immediate preparations to meet all emergencies. From top to bottom the whole nation must at once abandon any idea of being able to live in submissive peace with the Japanese aggressors. Fellow-countrymen! We should acclaim and support the heroic resistance of Feng Chih-an's troops. We should acclaim and support the declaration of the local authorities of northern China that they will defend the homeland to the death. We demand that General

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[1] On July 7, 1937, the Japanese imperialists staged the Lukouchiao Incident in their attempt to annex the whole of China by armed force. The Chinese people unanimously demanded war against Japan. Ten days elapsed before Chiang Kai-shek tardily made a public statement at Lushan announcing armed resistance to Japan. He did so under nation-wide popular pressure and as a result of the serious blow the Japanese invasion had dealt to the interests both of the British and U.S. imperialists in China and of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie whom Chiang Kai-shek directly represented. But at the same time the Chiang Kai-shek government continued to parley with the Japanese aggressors and even accepted the so-called peaceful settlements they concluded with local authorities. It was not until August 13, 1937, when the Japanese aggressors launched a major attack on Shanghai and

> Sung Cheh-yuan immediately mobilize the entire 29th Army[2] and send it into action at the front. Of the Central Government in Nanking we demand the following: Give effective aid to the 29th Army. Immediately lift the ban on patriotic movements among the masses and let the people give full play to their enthusiasm for armed resistance. Immediately mobilize all the country's land, sea and air forces for action. Immediately weed out all the hidden traitors and Japanese agents in China and so consolidate our rear. We call on the people of the whole country to throw all their strength behind the sacred war of self-defence against Japan. Our slogans are: Armed defence of Peiping, Tientsin and northern China! Defend our homeland to the last drop of our blood! Let the people of the whole country, the government, and the armed forces unite and build up the national united front as our solid Great Wall of resistance to Japanese aggression! Let the Kuomintang and the Communist Party closely co-operate and resist the new attacks of the Japanese aggressors! Drive the Japanese aggressors out of China!

This is a declaration of policy.

On July 17, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek made a statement at Lushan. Setting out as it did a policy of preparing for a war of resistance, the statement was the Kuomintang's first correct declaration on foreign affairs for many years and it has consequently been welcomed by all our countrymen as well as by ourselves. The statement listed four conditions for the settlement of the Lukouchiao Incident:

> (1) Any settlement must not infringe China's sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) there must be no unlawful change in the administrative structure of Hopei and Chahar Provinces; (3) there must be no dismissal and replacement, at the demand of others,

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thus made it impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to maintain his rule in southeastern China, that he was compelled to embark on armed resistance; but Chiang never ceased his clandestine attempts to make peace with Japan right up to 1944. Throughout the War of Resistance Chiang Kai-shek opposed all-out people's war in which the entire people are mobilized, and pursued the reactionary policy of passively resisting Japan but actively opposing the Communist Party and the people; thus his actions completely violated his own Lushan statement that "once war breaks out, every person, young or old, in the north or in the south, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending our homeland". The two policies, two sets of measures and two perspectives discussed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in this article reflect the struggle between the line of the Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek's line in the War of Resistance.

> of local officials appointed by the Central Government; (4) the 29th Army must not be confined to the area in which it is now stationed.

The concluding remarks of the statement read:

> Concerning the Lukouchiao Incident, the government has decided on a policy and a stand to which it will always adhere. We realize that when the whole nation goes to war, sacrifices to the bitter end will be called for, and we should not cherish the faintest hope of an easy way out. Once war breaks out, every person, young or old, in the north or in the south, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending our homeland.

This, too, is a declaration of policy.

Here we have two historic political declarations on the Lukouchiao Incident, one by the Communist Party and the other by the Kuomintang. They have this point in common: both stand for a resolute war of resistance and oppose compromise and concessions.

This is one kind of policy for meeting Japanese invasion, the correct policy.

But there is the possibility of the adoption of another kind of policy. In recent months the traitors and the pro-Japanese elements in Peiping and Tientsin have been very active, they have been trying to get the local authorities to acquiesce in Japan's demands, they have been undermining the policy of resolute armed resistance and advocating compromise and concessions. These are extremely dangerous signs.

The policy of compromise and concessions is the diametrical opposite of the policy of resolute armed resistance. If it is not speedily reversed, Peiping, Tientsin and the whole of northern China will fall into the hands of the enemy, and the entire nation will be seriously imperilled. Everyone must be on the alert.

Patriotic officers and men of the 29th Army, unite! Oppose compromise and concessions and conduct resolute armed resistance!

Fellow patriots of Peiping, Tientsin and northern China, unite! Oppose compromise and concessions and support resolute armed resistance!

Fellow patriots throughout the country, unite! Oppose compromise and concessions and support resolute armed resistance!

Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and all patriotic members of the Kuomintang! We hope that you will firmly adhere to your policy, fulfil your promises, oppose compromise and concessions, conduct resolute armed resistance, and thus answer the outrages of the enemy with deeds.

Let all the armed forces in the country, including the Red Army, support Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's declaration, oppose compromise and concessions and conduct resolute armed resistance!

We Communists are whole-heartedly and faithfully carrying out our own manifesto, and at the same time we resolutely support Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's declaration; together with the members of the Kuomintang and all our fellow-countrymen, we are ready to defend the homeland to the last drop of our blood; we oppose any hesitation, vacillation, compromise or concessions, and will conduct resolute armed resistance.

II. TWO SETS OF MEASURES

To achieve its purpose the policy of resolute armed resistance calls for a whole set of measures.

What are they? The principal ones are the following:

1. *Mobilize all the armed forces of the whole country*. Mobilize our standing armed forces of well over two million men, including the land, sea and air forces, the Central Army, the local troops and the Red Army, and immediately send the main forces to the national defence lines, while keeping some forces in the rear to maintain order. Entrust the command on the various fronts to generals loyal to the national interests. Call a national defence conference to decide on strategy and to achieve unity of purpose in military operations. Overhaul the political work in the army in order to achieve unity between officers and men and between the army and the people. Establish the principle that guerrilla warfare should carry the responsibility for one aspect of the strategic task, and ensure proper co-ordination between guerrilla and regular warfare. Weed out traitors from the army. Call up an adequate number of reserves and train them for service at the front. Adequately replenish the equipment and supplies of the armed forces. Military plans on these lines must be made, in keeping with the general policy of resolute armed resistance. China's troops are far from few, but unless these plans are executed, they will not be able to defeat the enemy. However, if the political and material factors are combined, our armed forces will become unmatched in East Asia.

2. *Mobilize the whole people.* Lift the ban on patriotic movements, release political prisoners, annul the "Emergency Decree for Dealing with Actions Endangering the Republic"[3] and the "Press Censorship Regulations",[4] grant legal status to existing patriotic organizations, extend these organizations among the workers, peasants, businessmen and intellectuals, arm the people for self-defence and for operations in support of the army. In a word, give the people freedom to express their patriotism. By their combined strength the people and the army will deal a death-blow to Japanese imperialism. Beyond doubt, there can be no victory in a national war without reliance on the great masses of the people. Let us take warning from the fall of Abyssinia.[5] No one who is sincere about waging a resolute war of resistance can afford to ignore this point.

3. *Reform the government apparatus.* Bring representatives of all political parties and groups and public leaders into the government for joint management of the affairs of the state and weed out the hidden pro-Japanese elements and traitors in the government, so that the government can become one with the people. Resistance to Japan is a gigantic task which cannot be performed by a few individuals alone. If they insist on keeping it in their own hands, they will only bungle it. If the government is to be a real government of national defence, it must rely on the people and practise democratic centralism. It must be at once democratic and centralized; it is this kind of government which is the most powerful. The national assembly must be truly representative of the people; it must be the supreme organ of authority, determine the major policies of the state and decide on the policies and plans for resisting Japan and saving the nation.

4. *Adopt an anti-Japanese foreign policy.* Accord the Japanese imperialists no advantages or facilities, but on the contrary confiscate their property, repudiate their loans, weed out their lackeys and expel their spies. Immediately conclude a military and political alliance with the Soviet Union and closely unite with the Soviet Union, the country which is most reliable, most powerful and most capable of helping China to resist Japan. Enlist the sympathy of Britain, the United States and France for our resistance to Japan, and secure their help provided that it entails no loss of our territory or our sovereign rights. We should rely mainly on our own strength to defeat the Japanese aggressors; but foreign aid cannot be dispensed with, and an isolationist policy will only play into the enemy's hands.

5. *Proclaim a programme for improving the livelihood of the people and immediately begin to put it into effect.* Start with the following minimum points: Abolish exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, reduce land rent, restrict usury, increase the workers' pay, improve the livelihood of the soldiers and junior officers, improve the livelihood of office workers, and provide relief for victims of natural calamities. Far from making a mess of the country's finances as some people argue, these new measures will increase the people's purchasing power and lead to thriving commercial and financial conditions. They will add immeasurably to our strength for resisting Japan and consolidate the government's foundations.

6. *Institute education for national defence.* Radically reform the existing educational policy and system. All projects that are not urgent and all measures that are not rational must be discarded. Newspapers, books and magazines, films, plays, literature and art should all serve national defence. Traitorous propaganda must be prohibited.

7. *Adopt financial and economic policies for resisting Japan.* Financial policy should be based on the principle that those with money should contribute money and that the property of the Japanese imperialists and Chinese traitors should be confiscated, and economic policy should be based on the principle of boycotting Japanese goods and promoting home products — everything for the sake of resistance to Japan. Financial strain is the product of wrong measures and can surely be overcome after the adoption of new policies such as these, which serve the interests of the people. It is sheer nonsense to say that a country with so vast a territory and so huge a population is financially and economically helpless.

8. *Unite the entire Chinese people, the government and the armed forces to build up the national united front as our solid Great Wall.* The application of the policy of armed resistance and of the above measures depends on this united front. Here the key is close co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Let the government, the troops, all the political parties and the whole people unite on the basis of such co-operation between the two parties. The slogan "Unity in good faith to meet the national crisis" must not be limited to fine words but must be demonstrated in fine deeds. Unity must be genuine; deception will not do. There must be more large-mindedness and a broader sweep in the conduct of state affairs. Petty niggling, mean tricks, bureaucracy, and Ah Q-ism[6] are of no use at all. They are of no avail against the enemy and simply ridiculous if

practised on one's own countrymen. There are major and minor principles in everything, and the minor principles are all subordinate to the major. Our compatriots must think things over carefully in the light of the major principles, for only then will they be able to orientate their own ideas and actions properly. Today, anyone who has not begun to have some genuine desire for unity ought to examine his conscience in the stillness of the night and feel some shame, even if no one else censures him.

The set of measures for resolute armed resistance described above may be called the Eight-Point Programme.

The policy of resolute armed resistance must be accompanied by this set of measures, or otherwise victory will never be achieved and Japanese aggression against China will never be ended, while China will be helpless against Japan and hardly be able to escape the fate of Abyssinia.

Whoever is sincere about the policy of resolute armed resistance must put this set of measures into practice. And the test of whether or not he is sincere about resolute armed resistance is whether or not he accepts and carries out this set of measures.

There is another set of measures which is contrary to this set in every respect.

Not the total mobilization of the armed forces, but their immobilization or withdrawal.

Not freedom for the people, but oppression.

Not a government of national defence based on democratic centralism, but an autocratic government of bureaucrats, compradors and big landlords.

Not a foreign policy of resisting Japan, but one of fawning on her.

Not the improvement of the people's livelihood, but continued extortions so that they groan under their sufferings and are powerless to resist Japan.

Not education for national defence, but education for national subjugation.

Not financial and economic policies for resisting Japan, but the same old, or even worse, financial and economic policies benefiting the enemy rather than our own country.

Not building up the Anti-Japanese National United Front as our Great Wall, but tearing it down, or talking glibly about unity while never doing anything to advance it.

Measures stem from policy. If the policy is one of non-resistance, all measures will reflect non-resistance; we have been taught this lesson over the last six years. If the policy is one of resolute armed resistance, then it is imperative to apply the appropriate measures — the Eight-Point Programme.

III. TWO PERSPECTIVES

What are the perspectives? This is what everyone is anxious about. Pursue the first policy and adopt the first set of measures, and the perspective will definitely be the expulsion of Japanese imperialism and the attainment of China's liberation. Can there still be any doubt about it? I think not.

Pursue the second policy and adopt the second set of measures, and the perspective will definitely be the occupation of China by the Japanese imperialists, with the Chinese people being turned into slaves and beasts of burden. Can there still be any doubt about it? Again, I think not.

IV. CONCLUSION

It is imperative to carry out the first policy, to adopt the first set of measures and to strive for the first perspective.

It is imperative to oppose the second policy, to reject the second set of measures and to avert the second perspective.

Let all patriotic members of the Kuomintang and all members of the Communist Party unite and steadfastly carry out the first policy, adopt the first set of measures and strive for the first perspective; let them steadfastly oppose the second policy, reject the second set of measures and avert the second perspective.

Let all patriotic people, patriotic troops and patriotic parties and groups unite as one and steadfastly carry out the first policy, adopt the first set of measures and strive for the first perspective; let them steadfastly oppose the second policy, reject the second set of measures and avert the second perspective.

Long live the national revolutionary war!

Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

NOTES

[1] On July 7, 1937, the Japanese invading forces attacked the Chinese garrison at Lukouchiao, some ten kilometres southwest of Peking. Under the influence of the ardent nation-wide anti-Japanese movement, the Chinese troops put up resistance. This incident marked the beginning of the Chinese people's heroic War of Resistance Against Japan which lasted for eight years.

[2] The 29th Army, which was originally part of the Kuomintang's Northwestern Army under Feng Yu-hsiang, was then stationed in Hopei and Chahar Provinces. Sung Cheh-yuan was its commander and Feng Chih-an one of its divisional commanders.

[3] The Kuomintang government promulgated the so-called "Emergency Decree for Dealing with Actions Endangering the Republic" on January 31, 1931, using the trumped-up charge of "endangering the Republic" to persecute and slaughter patriots and revolutionaries. This decree imposed extremely brutal measures of persecution.

[4] "Press Censorship Regulations" was another name for the "General Measures for Press Censorship" issued by the Kuomintang government in August 1934 to stifle the voice of the people. They laid down that "all news copy must be submitted to censorship".

[5] See "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 267.

[6] Ah Q is the leading character in *The True Story of Ah Q*, the famous work by the great Chinese writer Lu Hsun. Ah Q typifies all those who compensate themselves for their failures and setbacks in real life by regarding them as moral or spiritual victories.

FOR THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL THE NATION'S FORCES FOR VICTORY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

August 25, 1937

A. The Lukouchiao Incident of July 7 marked the beginning of the Japanese imperialist all-out invasion of China south of the Great Wall. The fight put up by the Chinese troops at Lukouchiao marked the beginning of China's nation-wide War of Resistance. The ceaseless Japanese attacks, the people's resolute struggle, the national bourgeoisie's tendency towards resistance, the Communist Party's vigorous advocacy and firm application of a national united front policy and the nation-wide support this policy has won — all these have compelled the Chinese authorities to begin changing their policy of non-resistance, as pursued ever since the September 18th Incident of 1931, to a policy of resistance since the Lukouchiao Incident, and have caused the Chinese revolution to develop beyond the stage reached after the December 9th Movement,[1] *i.e.*, the stage of ending the civil war and preparing for resistance, into the stage of actual resistance. The initial changes in the Kuomintang's policy with the Sian Incident and the Third Plenary Session of its Central Executive Committee as their starting point, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's Lushan statement of July 17 on the question of resistance to Japan, and many of his measures of national defence, all deserve commendation. The troops at the front, whether the land and air forces or the local armed units, have all fought courageously and demonstrated the heroic spirit of the Chinese nation. In the name of the national revolution, the Chinese

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This was an outline for propaganda and agitation written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in August 1937 for the propaganda organs of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was approved by the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at Lochuan, northern Shensi.

Communist Party ardently salutes our patriotic troops and fellow-countrymen throughout China.

B. But on the other hand, even after the Lukouchiao Incident of July 7, the Kuomintang authorities are continuing to pursue the wrong policy they have pursued ever since the September 18th Incident, making compromises and concessions,[2] suppressing the zeal of the patriotic troops and clamping down on the patriotic people's national salvation movement. There is no doubt that, having seized Peiping and Tientsin, Japanese imperialism will press ahead with its policy of large-scale offensives, take the second and third steps in its pre-meditated war plan and launch fierce attacks on the whole of northern China and other areas, relying on its own brute military strength while at the same time drawing support from German and Italian imperialism and exploiting the vacillations of British imperialism and the estrangement of the Kuomintang from the broad masses of the working people. The flames of war are already raging in Chahar and in Shanghai. To save our motherland, to resist the attacks of the powerful invaders, to defend northern China and the seacoast and recover Peiping, Tientsin and northeastern China, the Kuomintang authorities and the whole people must thoroughly learn the lesson of the loss of northeastern China, Peiping and Tientsin, learn and take warning from the fall of Abyssinia, learn from the Soviet Union's past victories over its foreign enemies,[3] learn from Spain's present experience in successfully defending Madrid,[4] and firmly unite to fight to the end in defence of the motherland. Henceforth the task is: "Mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance", and the key to its accomplishment is a complete and thorough change in Kuomintang policy. The step forward taken by the Kuomintang on the question of resistance is to be commended; it is what the Chinese Communist Party and the people of the whole country have for years been hoping for, and we welcome it. But the Kuomintang has not changed its policies on such matters as the mobilization of the masses and the introduction of political reforms. It is still basically unwilling to lift the ban on the people's anti-Japanese movement or make fundamental changes in the government apparatus, it still has no policy for improving the people's livelihood, and is still not sufficiently sincere in its co-operation with the Communist Party. If, at this critical juncture of life or death for our nation, the Kuomintang continues in the same old groove and does not quickly change its policy, it will bring disaster to the War of Resistance. Some Kuomintang members say, "Let political reforms be instituted after victory." They think the Japanese aggressors can be defeated by the government's efforts alone, but they are wrong. A few battles may be won in a war of resistance fought by the government alone, but it will be impossible to defeat the Japanese aggressors thoroughly. This can be done only by a war of total resistance by the whole nation. Such a war, however, requires a complete and drastic change in Kuomintang policy and the joint efforts of the whole nation from top to bottom to carry out a thoroughgoing programme of resistance to Japan, that is, a national salvation programme formulated in the spirit of the revolutionary Three People's Principles and the Three Great Policies[5] drawn up personally by Dr. Sun Yat-sen during the first period of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation.

C. In all earnestness the Chinese Communist Party proposes to the Kuomintang, to the people of the whole country, to all political parties and groups, to people in all walks of life and to all the armed forces a Ten-Point National Salvation Programme for the purpose of completely defeating the Japanese aggressors. It firmly believes that only by carrying out this programme fully, sincerely and resolutely will it be possible to defend the motherland and defeat the Japanese aggressors. Otherwise, the responsibility will fall on those who procrastinate and allow the situation to deteriorate; once the country's doom is sealed, it will be too late for regrets and lamentations. The ten points are as follows:

1. Overthrow Japanese imperialism.

Sever diplomatic relations with Japan, expel Japanese officials, arrest Japanese agents, confiscate Japanese property in China, repudiate debts to Japan, abrogate treaties signed with Japan and take back all Japanese Concessions.

Fight to the finish in defence of northern China and the seacoast.

Fight to the finish for the recovery of Peiping, Tientsin and northeastern China.

Drive the Japanese imperialists out of China.

Oppose all vacillation and compromise.

2. Mobilize the military strength of the whole nation.

Mobilize all land, sea and air forces for a nation-wide war of resistance.

Oppose a passive, purely defensive strategy and adopt an active, independent strategy.

Set up a permanent council of national defence to deliberate and decide on national defence plans and strategy.

Arm the people and develop anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in co-ordination with the operations of the main forces.

Reform the political work in the armed forces to achieve unity between officers and men.

Achieve unity between the army and the people and bring the army's militant spirit into play.

Support the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army and disrupt the enemy's rear.

Give equal treatment to all troops fighting in the War of Resistance.

Establish military zones in all parts of the country, mobilize the whole nation to join in the war and thus effect a gradual change from the mercenary system to one of general military service.

3. Mobilize the people of the whole country.

Let all the people of the country (with the exception of the traitors) have freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association in resisting Japan and saving the nation, and the right to take up arms against the enemy.

Annul all old laws and decrees which restrict the people's patriotic movements and promulgate new, revolutionary laws and decrees.

Release all patriotic and revolutionary political prisoners and lift the ban on political parties.

Let the people of the whole country mobilize, take up arms and join the War of Resistance. Let those with strength contribute strength, those with money contribute money, those with guns contribute guns, and those with knowledge contribute knowledge.

Mobilize the Mongolian, the Hui and all other minority nationalities, in accordance with the principle of national self-determination and autonomy, in the common fight against Japan.

4. Reform the government apparatus.

Call a national assembly which is genuinely representative of the people to adopt a genuinely democratic constitution, to decide on policies for resisting Japan and saving the nation, and to elect a government of national defence.

The government of national defence must draw in the revolutionaries of all parties and mass organizations, and expel the pro-Japanese elements.

The government of national defence shall practise democratic centralism, and shall be at once democratic and centralized.

The government of national defence shall pursue revolutionary policies for resisting Japan and saving the nation.

Institute local self-government, throw out corrupt officials and establish clean government.

5. Adopt an anti-Japanese foreign policy.

Conclude anti-aggression alliances and anti-Japanese pacts for mutual military aid with all countries that are opposed to Japanese aggression, provided that this entails no loss of our territory or of our sovereign rights.

Support the international peace front and oppose the front of aggression of Germany, Japan and Italy.

Unite with the worker and peasant masses of Korea and Japan against Japanese imperialism.

6. Adopt wartime financial and economic policies.

Financial policy should be based on the principle that those with money should contribute money and that the property of the traitors should be confiscated in order to meet war expenditures. Economic policy should consist in readjusting and expanding defence production, developing the rural economy and assuring self-sufficiency in wartime commodities. Encourage the use of Chinese goods and improve local products. Completely prohibit Japanese goods. Suppress profiteering merchants and ban speculation and manipulation of the market.

7. Improve the people's livelihood.

Improve the conditions of workers, office employees and teachers, and of soldiers fighting the Japanese.

Give preferential treatment to the families of the soldiers fighting the Japanese.

Abolish exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies.

Reduce rent and interest.

Give relief to the unemployed.

Regulate grain supplies.

Aid the victims of natural calamities.

8. Adopt an anti-Japanese educational policy.

Change the existing educational system and curriculum and put into effect a new system and curriculum aimed at resisting Japan and saving the nation.

9. Weed out traitors and pro-Japanese elements and consolidate the rear.

10. Achieve national unity against Japan.

Build up the Anti-Japanese National United Front of all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life and all armed forces on the basis of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation in order to lead the War of Resistance, unite in good faith and meet the national crisis.

D. It is imperative to discard the policy of resistance by the government alone and to enforce the policy of total resistance by the whole nation. The government must unite with the people, fully restore the revolutionary spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, put the above Ten-Point Programme into effect and strive for complete victory. Together with the masses of the people and the armed forces under its leadership, the Chinese Communist Party will firmly adhere to this programme and stand in the forefront of the War of Resistance, defending the motherland to the last drop of its blood. In keeping with its consistent policy, the Chinese Communist Party is ready to stand side by side with the Kuomintang and the other political parties and groups and unite with them in building the solid Great Wall of the national united front to defeat the infamous Japanese aggressors and strive for a new China which is independent, happy and free. To achieve this goal, we must firmly repudiate the traitors' theories of compromise and capitulation, and combat national defeatism according to which it is impossible to defeat the Japanese aggressors. The Chinese Communist Party firmly believes that the Japanese aggressors can definitely be defeated provided the above Ten-Point Programme is carried out. If our 450 million countrymen all exert themselves, the Chinese nation will certainly achieve final victory!

Down with Japanese imperialism!

Long live the national revolutionary war!

Long live New China, independent, happy and free!

NOTES

[1] The year 1935 witnessed a new upsurge in the popular patriotic movement throughout the country. Students in Peking, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, held a patriotic demonstration on December 9, putting forward such slogans as "Stop the civil war and unite to resist foreign aggression" and "Down with Japanese imperialism". This movement broke through the long reign of terror imposed by the Kuomintang government in league with the Japanese invaders and very quickly won the people's support throughout the country. It is known as the

"December 9th Movement". The outcome was that new changes manifested themselves in the relations among the various classes in the country, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front proposed by the Communist Party of China became the openly advocated policy of all patriotic people. The Chiang Kai-shek government with its traitorous policy became very isolated.

[2] See the introductory note to "Policies, Measures and Perspectives for Resisting the Japanese Invasion", pp. 13-14 of this volume.

[3] See *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, *Short Course*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1951, pp. 347-81.

[4] The defence of Madrid, starting in October 1936, lasted for two years and five months. In 1936, fascist Germany and Italy made use of the Spanish fascist warlord Franco to launch a war of aggression against Spain. The Spanish people, led by the Popular Front Government, heroically defended democracy against aggression. The battle of Madrid, the capital of Spain, was the bitterest in the whole war. Madrid fell in March 1939 because Britain, France and other imperialist countries assisted the aggressors by their hypocritical policy of "non-intervention" and because divisions arose within the Popular Front.

[5] The Three People's Principles were the principles and the programme put forward by Sun Yat-sen on the questions of nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution. In the manifesto adopted by the Kuomintang at its First National Congress in 1924 Sun Yat-sen restated the Three People's Principles. Nationalism was interpreted as opposition to imperialism and active support was expressed for the movements of the workers and peasants. Thus the old Three People's Principles were transformed into the new Three People's Principles characterized by the Three Great Policies, that is, alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers. The new Three People's Principles provided the political basis for the co-operation between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang during the First Revolutionary Civil War period.

COMBAT LIBERALISM

September 7, 1937

We stand for active ideological struggle because it is the weapon for ensuring unity within the Party and the revolutionary organizations in the interest of our fight. Every Communist and revolutionary should take up this weapon.

But liberalism rejects ideological struggle and stands for unprincipled peace, thus giving rise to a decadent, philistine attitude and bringing about political degeneration in certain units and individuals in the Party and the revolutionary organizations.

Liberalism manifests itself in various ways.

To let things slide for the sake of peace and friendship when a person has clearly gone wrong, and refrain from principled argument because he is an old acquaintance, a fellow townsman, a schoolmate, a close friend, a loved one, an old colleague or old subordinate. Or to touch on the matter lightly instead of going into it thoroughly, so as to keep on good terms. The result is that both the organization and the individual are harmed. This is one type of liberalism.

To indulge in irresponsible criticism in private instead of actively putting forward one's suggestions to the organization. To say nothing to people to their faces but to gossip behind their backs, or to say nothing at a meeting but to gossip afterwards. To show no regard at all for the principles of collective life but to follow one's own inclination. This is a second type.

To let things drift if they do not affect one personally; to say as little as possible while knowing perfectly well what is wrong, to be worldly wise and play safe and seek only to avoid blame. This is a third type.

Not to obey orders but to give pride of place to one's own opinions. To demand special consideration from the organization but to reject its discipline. This is a fourth type.

To indulge in personal attacks, pick quarrels, vent personal spite or seek revenge instead of entering into an argument and struggling against incorrect views for the sake of unity or progress or getting the work done properly. This is a fifth type.

To hear incorrect views without rebutting them and even to hear counter-revolutionary remarks without reporting them, but instead to take them calmly as if nothing had happened. This is a sixth type.

To be among the masses and fail to conduct propaganda and agitation or speak at meetings or conduct investigations and inquiries among them, and instead to be indifferent to them and show no concern for their well-being, forgetting that one is a Communist and behaving as if one were an ordinary non-Communist. This is a seventh type.

To see someone harming the interests of the masses and yet not feel indignant, or dissuade or stop him or reason with him, but to allow him to continue. This is an eighth type.

To work half-heartedly without a definite plan or direction; to work perfunctorily and muddle along — "So long as one remains a monk, one goes on tolling the bell." This is a ninth type.

To regard oneself as having rendered great service to the revolution to pride oneself on being a veteran, to disdain minor assignments while being quite unequal to major tasks, to be slipshod in work and slack in study. This is a tenth type.

To be aware of one's own mistakes and yet make no attempt to correct them, taking a liberal attitude towards oneself. This is an eleventh type.

We could name more. But these eleven are the principal types.

They are all manifestations of liberalism.

Liberalism is extremely harmful in a revolutionary collective. It is a corrosive which eats away unity, undermines cohesion, causes apathy and creates dissension. It robs the revolutionary ranks of compact organization and strict discipline, prevents policies from being carried through and alienates the Party organizations from the masses which the Party leads. It is an extremely bad tendency.

Liberalism stems from petty-bourgeois selfishness, it places personal interests first and the interests of the revolution second, and this gives rise to ideological, political and organizational liberalism.

People who are liberals look upon the principles of Marxism as abstract dogma. They approve of Marxism, but are not prepared to practise it or to practise it in full; they are not prepared to replace their liberalism by Marxism. These people have their Marxism, but they have their liberalism as well — they talk Marxism but practise liberalism; they apply Marxism to others but liberalism to themselves. They keep both kinds of goods in stock and find a use for each. This is how the minds of certain people work.

Liberalism is a manifestation of opportunism and conflicts fundamentally with Marxism. It is negative and objectively has the effect of helping the enemy; that is why the enemy welcomes its preservation in our midst. Such being its nature, there should be no place for it in the ranks of the revolution.

We must use Marxism, which is positive in spirit, to overcome liberalism, which is negative. A Communist should have largeness of mind and he should be staunch and active, looking upon the interests of the revolution as his very life and subordinating his personal interests to those of the revolution; always and everywhere he should adhere to principle and wage a tireless struggle against all incorrect ideas and actions, so as to consolidate the collective life of the Party and strengthen the ties between the Party and the masses; he should be more concerned about the Party and the masses than about any private person, and more concerned about others than about himself. Only thus can he be considered a Communist.

All loyal, honest, active and upright Communists must unite to oppose the liberal tendencies shown by certain people among us, and set them on the right path. This is one of the tasks on our ideological front.

URGENT TASKS FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST CO-OPERATION

September 29, 1941

As far back as 1933, the Chinese Communist Party issued a declaration stating that it was ready to conclude an agreement for resisting Japan with any section of the Kuomintang army on three conditions, namely, that attacks on the Red Army be stopped, that democratic freedoms be granted to the people and that the people be armed. This declaration was made because after the September 18th Incident in 1931, resistance to the Japanese imperialist invasion became the primary task of the Chinese people. But we did not succeed in our objective.

In August 1935, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Red Army called upon all political parties and groups and the people throughout the country to organize an anti-Japanese united army and a government of national defence for a common fight against Japanese imperialism.[1] In December of that year, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a resolution[2] on the formation of an anti-Japanese national united front with the national bourgeoisie. In May 1936, the Red Army published an open telegram[3] demanding that the Nanking government stop the civil war and make common cause against Japan. In August of that year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent a letter[4] to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang demanding that the Kuomintang stop the civil war and form a united front of the two parties to fight jointly against Japanese imperialism. In September of the same year, the Communist Party passed a resolution[5] on the establishment of a unified democratic republic in China. Besides the declaration, the open telegram, the letter and the resolutions, we sent representatives to hold discussions with people from the Kuomintang side on many occasions, and yet all in vain. It was only towards the end of 1936 after the Sian Incident that the plenipotentiary of the Chinese Communist Party and the responsible chief of the Kuomintang reached an agreement on a contemporary issue of vital political importance, namely, cessation of the civil war between the two parties, and brought about the peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident. This was a great event in Chinese history and provided a prerequisite for the renewal of co-operation between the two parties.

On February 10 this year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent a telegram[6] to the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee on the eve of its meeting, making comprehensive proposals for concrete co-operation between the two parties. In that telegram we demanded that the Kuomintang give the Communist Party guarantees on the following five points: the ending of the civil war, the realization of democratic freedoms, the convening of a national assembly, speedy preparations for resisting Japan, and improvement of the people's livelihood. At the same time the Communist Party offered guarantees to the Kuomintang on the following four points: the elimination of the state of antagonism between the two regimes, the redesignation of the Red Army, the application of the new-democratic system in the revolutionary base areas, and the discontinuance of the confiscation of the land of the landlords. This was likewise an important political step, for without it the establishment of co-operation between the two parties would have been retarded, which would have been wholly detrimental to speedy preparations for resisting Japan.

Since then the two parties have moved a step closer to each other in their negotiations. The Communist Party has made more specific proposals on the question of a common political programme for the two parties, on the question of lifting the ban on the mass movements and releasing political prisoners, and on the question of redesignating the Red Army. So far the common programme has not yet been promulgated, nor has the ban on the mass movements been lifted, nor has the new system in the revolutionary base areas been recognized; however, about a month after the fall of Peiping and Tientsin an order was issued to the effect that the Red Army was to be redesignated as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army (also called the Eighteenth Group Army in the anti-Japanese battle order).

The declaration of the Central Committee of our Party on the establishment of bi-partisan co-operation, which had been conveyed to the Kuomintang as early as July 15, and Chiang Kai-shek's statement recognizing the legal status of the Communist Party of China, which should have been published as agreed simultaneously with the declaration, were finally released to the public (alas after a long delay) by the Kuomintang Central News Agency on September 22 and 23 respectively, when the situation at the front had become critical. The Communist Party's declaration and Chiang Kai-shek's statement announced the establishment of co-operation between the two parties and laid the necessary foundation for the great cause of alliance between the two parties to save the nation. The declaration of the Communist Party not only embodies the principle of unity between the two parties but also embodies the basic principle of the great unity of the people throughout the country. It is good that Chiang Kai-shek, in his statement, recognized the legal status of the Communist Party throughout China and spoke of the necessity of unity to save the nation; however, he has not abandoned his Kuomintang arrogance or made any necessary self-criticism, and we can hardly be satisfied with that. Nevertheless, the united front between the two parties has been proclaimed as established. This has ushered in a new epoch in the history of the Chinese revolution. It will exert a widespread and profound influence on the Chinese revolution and play a decisive role in defeating Japanese imperialism.

Ever since 1924, the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party has played a decisive role in the Chinese revolution. The revolution of 1924-27 took place as a result of the co-operation of the two parties on the basis of a definite programme. In a mere two or three years, tremendous successes were achieved in the national revolution to which Dr. Sun Yat-sen had devoted forty years and which he had left unaccomplished; these successes were the establishment of the revolutionary base in Kwangtung and the victory of the Northern Expedition. They were the products of the formation of the united front of the two parties. But at the very moment when the revolution was nearing its triumph, some people who failed to uphold the revolutionary cause disrupted the two-party united front and so brought about the failure of the revolution, and the door was left open for foreign aggression. These were the products of the disruption of the united front of the two parties. Now the newly formed united front between the two parties has ushered in a new period in the Chinese revolution. There are still people who do not understand the historical role of the united front and its great future and regard it as a mere temporary makeshift devised under the pressure of circumstances; nevertheless, through this united front, the wheel of history will propel the Chinese revolution forward to a completely new stage. Whether China can extricate herself from the national and social crisis which is now so grave depends on how this united front will develop. There is already fresh evidence that the prospects are favourable. First, as soon as the policy of the united front was put forward by the Chinese Communist Party, it won the approval of the people everywhere. This is a clear expression of the will of the people. Second, immediately after the Sian Incident was settled peacefully and the two parties ended the civil war, all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life and all armed forces in the country achieved unprecedented unity. This unity, however, still falls far short of meeting the needs of resisting Japan, especially as the problem of unity between the government and the people remains basically unsolved. Third, and most striking of all, is the fact that the nation-wide War of Resistance has started. We are not satisfied with the War of Resistance in its present state because, though national in character, it is still confined to the government and the armed forces. As we pointed out earlier, Japanese imperialism cannot be defeated through a war of resistance of this kind. Nevertheless, for the first time in a hundred years, China is definitely putting up nation-wide resistance to a foreign invader, and this could never have come about without internal peace and without co-operation between the two parties. If the Japanese aggressors were able to take the four northeastern provinces without firing a single shot during the time when the two-party united front was broken up, then today, when the united front has been re-established, they will not be able to occupy more Chinese territory without paying a price in bloody battles. Fourth, there is the effect abroad. The proposal for the anti-Japanese united front put forward by the Chinese Communist Party has won the support of the workers and peasants and the Communist Parties all over the world. With the establishment of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the people of various countries, and particularly of the Soviet Union, will help China more actively. China and the Soviet Union have concluded a treaty of non-aggression[7] and the relations between the two countries can be expected to improve still further. From all this evidence we can state with certainty that the growth of the united front will carry China towards a bright and great future, namely, the defeat of Japanese imperialism and the establishment of a unified democratic republic.

However, the united front cannot accomplish this great task if it remains in its present state. The united front of the two parties must be developed further. For in its present state it is not yet broadly based or consolidated.

Should the Anti-Japanese National United Front be confined to the Kuomintang and the Communist Party? No, it should be a united front of the whole nation, with the two parties forming only a part of it. It should be a united front of all parties and groups, people in all walks of life and all armed forces, a united front of all patriots — the workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen. So far, the united front has in fact been confined to the two parties, while the masses of the workers, peasants, soldiers and urban petty bourgeoisie and a large number of other patriots have not yet been aroused, called into action, organized or armed. This is the most serious problem at present. It is serious because it makes victories at the front impossible. It is no longer possible to conceal the critical situation at the front both in northern China and in Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces, nor is there any need to do so; the question is how to save the situation. And the only way to save it is to put Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament into practice, to "arouse the masses of the people". In his deathbed Testament, Dr. Sun declared he was deeply convinced, from the experience accumulated over forty years, that only thus could the goal of revolution be achieved. What reason is there for obstinately refusing to put this testament into practice? What reason is there for failing to do so at a moment when the fate of the nation is at stake? Everybody knows that autocracy and suppression run counter to the principle of "arousing the masses of the people". Resistance by the government and the army alone can never defeat Japanese imperialism. Early in May this year we warned the ruling Kuomintang in all seriousness that unless the masses of the people were aroused to resist, China would follow the same path to disaster as Abyssinia. This point has been made not only by the Chinese Communists but by progressives throughout the country and by many intelligent members of the Kuomintang itself. Yet the policy of autocratic rule remains unchanged. As a result the government has estranged itself from the people, the army from the masses, and the military command from the rank and file. Unless the united front is reinforced by the participation of the masses, the crisis on the war fronts will inevitably be aggravated, not mitigated.

The present anti-Japanese united front still lacks a political programme to replace the Kuomintang's policy of autocratic rule, a programme accepted by both parties and formally promulgated. In relation to the masses the Kuomintang is continuing the same practices it has followed for the last ten years; there has been no change and on the whole everything has remained the same for the last ten years, from the government apparatus, the army system and the policy towards civilians to financial, economic and educational policies. Changes there are and very great ones too — cessation of civil war and unity against Japan. The two parties have ended the civil war and the nation-wide War of Resistance Against Japan has started, which mean a tremendous change in the Chinese political scene since the Sian Incident. But so far there has been no change in the practices enumerated above, and there is thus a disharmony between the things that have not changed and those that have. The old practices are suited only to compromise abroad and suppression of the revolution at home, and they prove ill-suited in every respect and reveal all their inadequacies when it comes to coping with the Japanese imperialist invasion. It would be another story if we did not want to resist Japan, but since we do and resistance has actually begun, and since a serious crisis has already revealed itself, refusal to change over to new ways will lead to the gravest dangers imaginable. Resistance to Japan requires a broadly based united front, and hence all the people should be mobilized to join it. Resistance to Japan requires a consolidated united front, and this calls for a common programme. The common programme will be the united front's guide to action and will serve also as the tie which, like a cord, closely binds together all the organizations and individuals in the united front, all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life and all armed forces. Only in this way will we be able to speak of firm unity. We are opposed to the old binding rules, because they are unsuited to the national revolutionary war. We look forward to the introduction of new binding rules to replace the old, that is, to the promulgation of a common programme and the establishment of revolutionary order. Nothing else will suit the War of Resistance.

What should the common programme be? It should be the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation[8] proposed by the Communist Party on August 25 this year.

In its declaration announcing Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, the Chinese Communist Party stated that "the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization". Some people find it strange that the Communist Party should be ready to put the Three People's Principles of the Kuomintang into practice; Chu Ching-lai[9] of Shanghai, for instance, has expressed doubts in a local periodical. These people think that communism and the Three People's Principles are incompatible. This is a purely formal approach. Communism will be put into practice at a future stage of the development of the revolution; at the present stage the communists harbour no illusions about being able to realize it but will carry out the national and democratic revolution as required by history. This is the basic reason why the Communist Party has proposed an anti-Japanese national united front and a unified democratic republic. As for the Three People's Principles, at the Kuomintang's First National Congress the Communist Party and the Kuomintang jointly decided to put them into practice during the first two-party united front over ten years ago, and they were put into practice from 1924 to 1927 in large areas of the country through the efforts of all loyal Communists and all loyal members of the Kuomintang. Unfortunately that united front broke up in 1927, and in the subsequent ten years the Kuomintang opposed the application of the Three People's Principles. But as far as the Communist Party is concerned, all its policies in these ten years have been fundamentally in line with the revolutionary spirit of Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles and Three Great Policies. Not a day has passed without the Communist Party's conducting a struggle against imperialism, which means the thoroughgoing application of the Principle of Nationalism; the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship is nothing but the thoroughgoing application of the Principle of Democracy; the Agrarian Revolution is the thoroughgoing application of the Principle of People's Livelihood. Why, then, has the Communist Party announced the abolition of the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship and the discontinuance of confiscating the land of landlords? The reason, as we explained some time ago, is not that there is anything at all wrong with these things, but that the Japanese imperialist armed aggression has led to a change in class relations in the country, and has thereby not only made it necessary to unite all classes of the nation against Japanese imperialism, but also created the possibility of doing so. An anti-fascist united front for the sake of the common struggle against fascism is both necessary and possible not only in China but throughout the world. Therefore we stand for the establishment of a national and democratic united front in China. It is on these grounds that we have proposed a democratic republic based on the alliance of all classes in place of a worker-peasant democratic dictatorship. The Agrarian Revolution put into effect the principle of "land to the tiller", which is precisely what Dr. Sun Yat-sen proposed. We have now discontinued it for the sake of uniting greater numbers of people against Japanese imperialism, but that does not mean China does not need to solve her land problem. We have unequivocally explained our position on the causes of these changes in policy and their timing. It is precisely because the Chinese Communist Party, basing itself on Marxist principles, has constantly adhered to and developed the revolutionary Three People's Principles — the common programme of the first Kuomintang-Communist united front — that, in this hour of national crisis when our country is invaded by a powerful aggressor, the Party has been able to put forward the timely proposal for a national and democratic united front, which is the only policy capable of saving the nation, and to apply this policy with unremitting effort. The question now is not whether it is the Communist Party which believes in or carries out the revolutionary Three People's Principles, but whether it is the Kuomintang which does so. The present task is to restore the revolutionary spirit of Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles throughout the country, and on this basis to work out a definite programme and policy and put them into practice sincerely and not half-heartedly, conscientiously and not perfunctorily, promptly and not tardily; the Chinese Communist Party has been earnestly praying day and night for this to happen. For this very reason, it put forward the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation after the Lukouchiao Incident. The Ten-Point Programme is in line both with Marxism and with the genuine revolutionary Three People's Principles. It is an initial programme, the programme for the Chinese revolution at the present stage, which is the stage of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war; China can be saved only if this programme is put into effect. History will punish those who persist in any course conflicting with this programme.

It is impossible to put this programme into practice throughout the country without the consent of the Kuomintang, because the Kuomintang today is still the biggest party in China and the party in

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power. We believe that the day will come when intelligent members of the Kuomintang will agree to this programme. For if they do not, the Three People's Principles will for ever remain an empty phrase, and it will be impossible to restore the revolutionary spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism and impossible for the Chinese people to escape becoming the slaves of a foreign power. No really intelligent member of the Kuomintang can possibly want this to happen, and our people will never allow themselves to be turned into slaves. Moreover, in his statement of September 23 Mr. Chiang Kai-shek declared:

> I hold that we who stand for the revolution should put aside personal grudges and prejudices and devote ourselves to the realization of the Three People's Principles. At this critical juncture of life and death, we should all the more let bygones be bygones and together with the whole nation make a completely fresh start, and work strenuously for unity in order to preserve the very life and existence of our country.

This is most true. The urgent task at present is to strive for the realization of the Three People's Principles, to discard personal and factional prejudices, to change the old set of practices, to carry out a revolutionary programme in line with the Three People's Principles immediately and to make a completely fresh start together with the whole nation. Today this is the only course. With further delay it will be too late to repent.

But there must be instruments for carrying out the Three People's Principles and the Ten-Point Programme, and this raises the question of reforming the government and the army. The present government is still a one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang and not a government of the national democratic united front. In the absence of a government of the national democratic united front, it is impossible to carry out the Three People's Principles and the Ten-Point Programme. The present army system of the Kuomintang is still the old one, and it is impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism with troops organized under this system. The troops are now engaged in resistance and we have great admiration and respect for them all, and especially for those fighting at the front. But the lessons of the War of Resistance in the last three months demonstrate that the Kuomintang army system must be changed, as it is unsuited to the task of completely defeating the Japanese aggressors and to the successful application of the Three People's Principles and the revolutionary programme. The change should be based on the principles of unity between officers and men and unity between the army and the people. The present army system of the Kuomintang is fundamentally opposed to both these principles. It prevents the mass of officers and men from giving their best despite their loyalty and courage, and therefore an immediate start must be made to reform it. This does not mean that the fighting has to stop until the system is reformed; it can be reformed while the fighting is going on. Here the central task is to bring about a change in the army's political spirit and its political work. The National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition provides an admirable precedent, for in general it did establish unity between officers and men and between the army and the people; a revival of the spirit of those days is absolutely necessary. China should learn from the war in Spain where the Republican army has been built up under extremely adverse circumstances. China is in a better position than Spain, but she lacks a broadly based and consolidated united front, she lacks a united front government capable of carrying out the whole revolutionary programme and large numbers of troops organized according to a new system. She must remedy these defects. With regard to the war as a whole, the Red Army led by the Chinese Communist Party can at present only play a vanguard role, it cannot yet play a decisive role on a national scale. Nevertheless its political, military and organizational merits are well worth acquiring by friendly armies throughout the country. At its inception the Red Army was not what it is today; it, too, has undergone many reforms, the main ones being the weeding out of feudal practices within the army and the application of the principles of unity between officers and men and unity between the army and the people. Friendly armies throughout the country can draw on this experience.

Anti-Japanese comrades of the ruling Kuomintang party! Today we share with you the responsibility for saving the nation from extinction and ensuring its survival. You have already formed an anti-Japanese united front with us. That is very good. You have started resisting Japan. That is also very good. But we do not approve of your continuing your other policies in the old way. We should all develop and broaden the united front and draw in the masses of the people. It is necessary to consolidate the united front and pursue a common programme. It is essential resolutely to reform the political and army systems. It is absolutely necessary to have a new government, which alone can carry out the revolutionary programme and start to reform the armies on a national scale. This proposal of ours answers the needs of the times. Many people in your party also feel that now is the time to put it into practice. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in his day, made up his mind and reformed the political and army systems, thereby laying the foundation for the revolution of 1924-27. The responsibility for effecting the same kind of reform now falls on your shoulders. We believe that no loyal and patriotic member of the Kuomintang will consider that our proposal is ill-suited to the needs of the situation. We are firmly convinced that it meets the objective needs.

The fate of our nation is at stake — let the Kuomintang and the Communist Party unite closely! Let all our fellow-countrymen who refuse to become slaves unite closely on the basis of Kuomintang-Communist unity! The urgent task in the Chinese revolution today is to make all the reforms necessary to overcome all difficulties. When this task is accomplished, we can surely defeat Japanese imperialism. If we try hard, our future will be bright.

NOTES

[1] See "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", Note 2, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 276-77.

[2] For the resolution see *ibid.*, Note 3, pp. 277-78.

[3] For the open telegram see *ibid.*, Note 4, pp. 279-80.

[4] For the contents of the letter see "A Statement on Chiang Kai-shek's Statement", Note 7, *ibid.*, pp. 259-61.

[5] For the resolution see "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", Note 6, *ibid.*, pp. 280-81.

[6] For the telegram see *ibid.*, Note 7, pp. 281-82.

[7] The Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was concluded on August 21, 1937.

[8] For the Ten-Point Programme see "For the Mobilization of All the Nation's Forces for Victory in the War of Resistance", pp. 25-28 of this volume.

[9] Chu Ching-lai was a leader of the National Socialist Party (a small clique organized by reactionary landlords, bureaucrats and big bourgeoisie) who later became a member of the traitorous Wang Ching-wei government.

INTERVIEW WITH THE BRITISH JOURNALIST JAMES BERTRAM

October 25, 1933

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

James Bertram: What specific pronouncements has the Chinese Communist Party made before and since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war?

Mao Tse-tung: Before the war broke out, the Chinese Communist Party warned the whole nation time and again that war with Japan was inevitable, and that all the Japanese imperialists' talk of a "peaceful settlement" and all the fine phrases of the Japanese diplomats were only so much camouflage to screen their preparations for war. We repeatedly stressed that a victorious war of national liberation cannot be waged unless the united front is strengthened and a revolutionary policy is adopted. The most important point in this revolutionary policy is that the Chinese government must institute democratic reforms in order to mobilize all the people to join the anti-Japanese front. We repeatedly pointed out the error of those who believed in Japan's "peace pledge" and thought that war might be avoided, or of those who believed in the possibility of resisting the Japanese aggressors without mobilizing the masses. Both the outbreak of the war and its course have proved our views to be correct. The day after the Lukouchiao Incident, the Communist Party issued a manifesto to the whole country, calling upon all political parties and groups and all social strata to make common cause in resisting Japanese aggression and strengthening the national united front. Soon afterwards we announced the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, in which we set out the policies that the Chinese government ought to adopt in the War of Resistance. With the institution of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation we issued another important declaration. All this testifies to our firm adherence to the principle of waging the War of Resistance by strengthening the united front and putting a revolutionary policy into effect. In the present period our basic slogan is "Total resistance by the whole nation".

THE WAR SITUATION AND ITS LESSONS

Question: As you see it, what are the results of the war up to the present?

Answer: There are two main aspects. On the one hand, by capturing our cities, seizing our territory, raping, plundering, burning and massacring, the Japanese imperialists have irrevocably brought the Chinese people face to face with the danger of national subjugation. On the other hand, the majority of the Chinese people have consequently become very much aware that the crisis cannot be overcome without greater unity and without resistance by the whole nation. At the same time, the peace-loving countries of the world are being awakened to the necessity of resisting the Japanese menace. These are the results produced by the war so far.

Question: What do you think are Japan's objectives, and how far have they been achieved?

Answer: Japan's plan is to occupy northern China and Shanghai as the first step and then to occupy other regions of China. As to how far the Japanese aggressors have realized their plan, they seized the three provinces of Hopei, Chahar and Suiyuan within a short space of time, and now they are threatening Shansi; the reason is that China's War of Resistance has hitherto been confined to resistance by the government and the army alone. This crisis can be overcome only if resistance is carried out jointly by the people and the government.

Question: In your opinion, has China scored any achievements in the War of Resistance? If there are any lessons to be drawn, what are they?

Answer: I would like to discuss this question with you in some detail. First of all, there have been achievements, and great achievements too. They are to be seen in the following: (1) Never since imperialist aggression began against China has there been anything comparable to the present War of Resistance Against Japan. Geographically, it is truly a war involving the whole country. This war is revolutionary in character. (2) The war has changed a disunited country into a relatively united one. The basis of this unity is Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. (3) The war has the sympathy of world public opinion. Those who once despised China for her non-resistance now respect her for her resistance. (4) The war has inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese aggressors. The daily drain on their resources is reported to be twenty million yen and their casualties are also undoubtedly very heavy, though figures are not yet available. While the Japanese aggressors took the four northeastern provinces with ease and with hardly any exertion, now they cannot occupy Chinese territory without fighting bloody battles. The aggressors expected to be able to gorge themselves in China, but China's protracted resistance will bring about the collapse of Japanese imperialism. Thus China is fighting not only to save herself but also to discharge her great duty in the world anti-fascist front. Here also the revolutionary character of the War of Resistance is manifest. (5) We have learned some lessons from the war. They have been paid for in territory and blood.

As for the lessons, they are likewise great ones. Several months of fighting have disclosed many of China's weaknesses. They are manifest above all in the political sphere. Although geographically the war involves the whole country, it is not being waged by the whole nation. As in the past, the broad masses are restrained by the government from taking part, and so the war is not yet of a mass character. Unless it has a mass character, the war against Japanese imperialist aggression cannot possibly succeed. Some say, "The war is already an all-embracing war." But this is true only in the sense that vast parts of the country are involved. As regards participation, it is still a partial war because it is being waged only by the government and the army, and not by the people. It is precisely here that the chief reason for the great loss of territory and for the many military setbacks during the last few months is to be found. Therefore, although the present armed resistance is a revolutionary one, its revolutionary character is incomplete because it is not yet a mass war. Here, too, the problem of unity is involved. Although the political parties and groups are relatively united as compared with the past, unity still falls far short of what is needed. Most of the political prisoners have not yet been released, and the ban on political parties has not been completely lifted.

Relations are still very bad between the government and the people, between the army and the people, and between officers and men, and here one observes estrangement instead of unity. This is a fundamental problem. Unless it is solved, victory is out of the question. In addition, military blunders are another major reason for our losses in men and territory. The battles fought have been mostly passive, or to put it in military terms, have been battles of "pure defence". We can never win by fighting this way. For the attainment of victory, policies radically different from the present ones are necessary in both the political and the military fields. These are the lessons we have learned.

Question: What, then, are the political and military prerequisites?

Answer: On the political side, first, the present government must be transformed into a united front government in which the representatives of the people play their part. This government must be at once democratic and centralized. It should carry out the necessary revolutionary policies. Secondly, the people must be granted freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly and association and the right to take up arms against the enemy, so that the war will acquire a mass character. Thirdly, the people's livelihood must be improved through such measures as the abolition of exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, the reduction of rent and interest, better conditions for workers, junior officers and soldiers, preferential treatment for the families of the soldiers fighting the Japanese, and relief for victims of natural calamities and war refugees. Government finance should be based on the principle of equitable distribution of the economic burden, which means that those who have money should contribute money. Fourthly, there should be a positive foreign policy. Fifthly, cultural and educational policy should be changed. Sixthly, traitors must be sternly suppressed. The problem has become extremely serious. The traitors are running wild. At the front they are helping the enemy; in the rear they are creating disturbances, and some of them even put on an anti-Japanese pose and denounce patriotic people as traitors and have them arrested. Effective suppression of the traitors will be possible only when the people are free to co-operate with the government. On the military side, comprehensive reforms are required, the most important of these being to change from pure defence in strategy and tactics to the principle of active attack; to change the armies of the old type into armies of a new type; to change the method of forcible recruitment into one of arousing the people to go to the front; to change the divided command into a unified command; to change the indiscipline which alienates the army from the people into conscious discipline which forbids the slightest violation of the people's interests; to change the present situation in which the regular army is fighting alone into one in which extensive guerrilla warfare by the people is developed in co-ordination with regular army operations; and so on and so forth. All these political and military prerequisites are listed in our published Ten-Point Programme. They all conform to the spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, his Three Great Policies and his Testament. The war can be won only when they are carried into effect.

Question: What is the Communist Party doing to carry out this programme?

Answer: We take it as our task tirelessly to explain the situation and to unite with the Kuomintang and all other patriotic parties and groups in the effort to expand and consolidate the Anti-Japanese National United Front, mobilize all forces and achieve victory in the War of Resistance. The Anti-Japanese National United Front is still very limited in scope and it is necessary to broaden it, that is, to "arouse the masses of the people", as called for in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament, by mobilizing the people at the grass roots to join the united front. Consolidation of the united front means carrying out a common programme which will be binding on all political parties and groups in their actions. We agree to accept Dr. Sun's revolutionary Three People's Principles, Three Great Policies and Testament as the common programme of the united front of all political parties and all social classes. But so far this programme has not been accepted by all the parties, and above all the Kuomintang has not agreed to the proclamation of such an over-all programme. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Principle of Nationalism has been partially put into practice by the Kuomintang, as shown in its resistance to Japan. But neither his Principle of Democracy nor his Principle of People's Livelihood has been applied, and the present serious crisis in the War of Resistance is the result. The war situation having become so critical, it is high time that the Kuomintang applied the Three People's Principles in full, or otherwise it will be too late to repent. It is the duty of the Communist Party to raise its voice and tirelessly and persuasively explain all this to the Kuomintang and the whole nation so that the genuinely revolutionary Three People's Principles, the Three Great Policies and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament are fully and thoroughly applied throughout the country, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front is broadened and consolidated.

THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

Question: Please tell me about the Eighth Route Army in which so many people are interested — for instance, about its strategy and tactics, its political work, and so on.

Answer: Indeed a large number of people have become interested in its activities since the Red Army was redesignated as the Eighth Route Army and went to the front. I shall now give you a general account.

First about its field operations. Strategically, the Eighth Route Army is centring them on Shansi. As you know, it has won many victories. Examples are the battle of Pinghsingkuan, the recapture of Chingping, Pinglu and Ningwu, the recovery of Laiyuan and Kuangling, the capture of Tzechingkuan, the cutting of the three main supply routes of the Japanese troops (between Tatung and Yenmenkuan, between Weihsien and Pinghsingkuan, and between Shuohsien and Ningwu), the assault on the rear of the Japanese forces south of Yenmenkuan, the recapture twice over of Pinghsingkuan and Yenmenkuan, and the recent recovery of Chuyang and Tanghsien. The Japanese troops in Shansi are being strategically encircled by the Eighth Route Army and other Chinese troops. We may say with certainty that the Japanese troops will meet with the most stubborn resistance in northern China. If they try to ride roughshod over Shansi, they will certainly encounter greater difficulties than ever.

Next about strategy and tactics. We are doing what the other Chinese troops have not done, *i.e.*, operating chiefly on the enemy's flanks and rear. This way of fighting is vastly different from purely frontal defence. We are not against employing part of the forces in frontal operations, for that is necessary. But the main forces must be used against the enemy's flanks and it is essential to adopt encircling and outflanking tactics in order to attack the enemy independently and with the initiative in our hands, for that is the only way to destroy his forces and preserve our own. Furthermore, the use of some of our armed forces against the enemy's rear is particularly effective, because they can disrupt his supply lines and bases. Even the frontal forces should rely mainly on "counter assault" and not on purely defensive tactics. One important reason for the military setbacks in the last few months has been the use of unsuitable methods of fighting. The methods of fighting employed by the Eighth Route Army are what we call guerrilla and mobile warfare applied independently and with the initiative in our hands. In principle these methods are basically the same as those we used during the civil war, but there are certain differences. For example, at the present stage, in order to facilitate our surprise attacks on the enemy's flanks and rear over an extensive area, we divide our forces more often than we concentrate them. Since the armed forces of the country as a whole are numerically strong, some of them should be used for frontal defence and some dispersed to carry on guerrilla operations, but the main forces should always be concentrated against the enemy's flanks. The first essential in war is to preserve oneself and to destroy the enemy, and for this purpose it is necessary to wage guerrilla and mobile warfare independently and with the initiative in our hands and to avoid all passive and inflexible tactics. If a vast number of troops wage mobile warfare with the Eighth Route Army assisting them by guerrilla warfare, our victory will be certain.

Next about political work. Another highly significant and distinctive feature of the Eighth Route Army is its political work, which is guided by three basic principles. First, the principle of unity between officers and men, which means eradicating feudal practices in the army, prohibiting beating and abuse, building up a conscious discipline, and sharing weal and woe — as a result of which the entire army is closely united. Second, the principle of unity between the army and the people, which means maintaining a discipline that forbids the slightest violation of the people's interests, conducting propaganda among the masses, organizing and arming them, lightening their financial burdens and suppressing the traitors and collaborators who do harm to the army and the people — as a result of which the army is closely united with the people and welcomed everywhere. Third, the principle of disintegrating the enemy troops and giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war. Our victory depends not only upon our military operations but also upon the disintegration of the enemy troops. Although our measures for disintegrating the enemy troops and for treating prisoners of war leniently have not yielded conspicuous results as yet, they will certainly do so in the future. Moreover, in line with the second of the three principles, the Eighth Route Army replenishes its forces not by coercion but by the much more effective method of arousing the people to volunteer for the front.

Although Hopei, Chahar and Suiyuan and part of Shansi have been lost, we are not at all discouraged but are resolutely calling upon the entire army to co-ordinate with the friendly armies and fight with grim determination to defend Shansi and recover the lost territories. The Eighth Route Army will co-ordinate its actions with those of other Chinese troops in order to maintain the resistance in Shansi; this will be very important for the war as a whole, and especially for the war in northern China.

Question: In your opinion, can these good points of the Eighth Route Army also be acquired by the other Chinese armies?

Answer: Certainly they can. In 1924-27 the spirit of the Kuomintang troops was broadly similar to that of the Eighth Route Army today. The Communist Party and the Kuomintang were then co-operating in organizing armed forces of a new type which, beginning with only two regiments, rallied round themselves many other troops and won their first victory when they defeated Chen Chiung-ming. These forces later grew into an army corps and still more troops came under its influence; only then did the Northern Expedition take place. A fresh spirit prevailed among these forces; on the whole there was unity between officers and men and between the army and the people, and the army was filled with a revolutionary militancy. The system of Party representatives and of political departments, adopted for the first time in China, entirely changed the complexion of these armed forces. The Red Army, which was founded in 1927, and the Eighth Route Army of today have inherited this system and developed it. In the revolutionary period of 1924-27, the armed forces which were imbued with this new spirit naturally employed methods of fighting consistent with their political outlook, operating not in a passive and inflexible way but with initiative and with an eagerness to take the offensive, and consequently they were victorious in the Northern Expedition. It is troops of this kind we need on the battlefields today. We do not necessarily need them in millions; with a nucleus of a few hundred thousand such men, we can defeat Japanese imperialism. We deeply esteem the armies throughout the country for their heroic sacrifices since the War of Resistance began, but there are lessons to be learned from the bloody battles that have been fought.

Question: Japanese army discipline being what it is, will not your policy of giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war prove ineffective?

For instance, the Japanese command may kill the prisoners when you release them and the Japanese army as a whole will not understand the meaning of your policy.

Answer: That is impossible. The more they kill, the more sympathy will be aroused for the Chinese forces among the Japanese soldiers. Such facts cannot be concealed from the rank and file. We will persevere in this policy of ours. For instance, we shall not change it even if the Japanese army carries out its declared intention of using poison-gas against the Eighth Route Army. We shall go on giving lenient treatment to captured Japanese soldiers and to those captured junior officers who have fought us under coercion; we shall not insult or abuse them, but shall set them free after explaining to them the identity of the interests of the people of the two countries. Those who do not want to go back may serve in the Eighth Route Army. If an international brigade appears on the anti-Japanese battle front, they may join it and take up arms against Japanese imperialism.

CAPITULATIONISM IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

Question: I understand that while carrying on the war, Japan is spreading peace rumours in Shanghai. What are her real objectives?

Answer: After succeeding in certain of their plans, the Japanese imperialists will once again put up a smokescreen of peace in order to attain three objectives. They are: (1) to consolidate the positions already captured for use as a strategic springboard for further offensives; (2) to split China's anti-Japanese front; and (3) to break up the international front of support for China. The present peace rumours are simply the first smoke-bomb. The danger is that there are certain vacillating elements in China who are ready to succumb to the enemy's wiles and that the traitors and collaborators are manoeuvring among them and spreading all kinds of rumours in their efforts to make China capitulate to the Japanese aggressors.

Question: As you see it, what could this danger lead to?

Answer: There can be only two courses of development: either the Chinese people will overcome capitulationism, or capitulationism will prevail, with the result that the anti-Japanese front will be split and China will be plunged into disorder.

Question: Which of the two is the more likely?

Answer: The whole Chinese people demand that the war be fought to a finish. If a section of the ruling group takes the road of capitulation, the rest who remain firm will certainly oppose it and carry on resistance together with the people. Of course it would be a misfortune for China's anti-Japanese front. But I am sure that the capitulationists cannot win mass support and that the masses will overcome capitulationism, persevere in the war and achieve victory.

Question: May I ask how capitulationism can be overcome?

Answer: Both by words, that is, by exposing the danger of capitulationism, and by deeds, that is, by organizing the masses to stop the capitulationist activities. Capitulationism has its roots in national defeatism or national pessimism, that is, in the idea that having lost some battles, China has no strength left to fight Japan. These pessimists do not realize that failure is the mother of success, that the lessons learned from failures are the basis for future triumphs. They see the defeats but not the successes in the War of Resistance, and in particular they fail to see that our defeats contain the elements of victory, while the enemy's victories contain the elements of defeat. We must show the masses of the people the victorious prospects of the war and help them to understand that our defeats and difficulties are temporary and that, as long as we keep on fighting in spite of all setbacks, the final victory will be ours. Deprived of a mass base, the capitulationists will have no chance to play their tricks, and the anti-Japanese front will be consolidated.

DEMOCRACY AND THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

Question: What is the meaning of "democracy" as put forward by the Communist Party in its programme? Does it not conflict with a "wartime government"?

Answer: Not at all. The Communist Party put forward the slogan of a "democratic republic" as early as August 1936. Politically and organizationally this slogan signifies: (1) The state and government must not belong to a single class but must be based on the alliance of all the anti-Japanese classes to the exclusion of traitors and collaborators, and must include the workers, the peasants and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie. (2) The organizational form of such a government will be democratic centralism, which is at once democratic and centralized, with the two seeming opposites of democracy and centralization united in a definite form. (3) This government will grant the people all the necessary political freedoms, especially the freedom to organize and train and arm themselves for self-defence. In these three respects, it can be seen that a democratic republic in no way conflicts with a wartime government, but is precisely the form of state and government advantageous to the War of Resistance.

Question: Is not "democratic centralism" a self-contradictory term?

Answer: We must look not only at the term but at the reality. There is no impassable gulf between democracy and centralism, both of which are essential for China. On the one hand, the government we want must be truly representative of the popular will; it must have the support of the broad masses throughout the country and the people must be free to support it and have every opportunity of influencing its policies. This is the meaning of democracy. On the other hand, the centralization of administrative power is also necessary, and once the policy measures demanded by the people are transmitted to their own elected government through their representative body, the government will carry them out and will certainly be able to do so smoothly, so long as it does not go against the policy adopted in accordance with the people's will. This is the meaning of centralism. Only by adopting democratic centralism can a government be really strong, and this system must be adopted by China's government of national defence in the anti-Japanese war.

Question: This does not correspond to a war cabinet, does it?

Answer: It does not correspond to some of the war cabinets of the past.

Question: Have there ever been any war cabinets of this kind?

Answer: Yes. Systems of government in wartime may generally be divided into two kinds, as determined by the nature of the war — one kind is democratic centralism and the other absolute centralism. All wars in history may be divided into two kinds according to their nature: just wars and unjust wars. For instance, the Great War in Europe some twenty years ago was an unjust, imperialist war. The governments of the imperialist countries forced the people to fight for the interests of imperialism and thus went against the people's interests, these circumstances necessitating a type of government such as the Lloyd George government in Britain. Lloyd George repressed the British people, forbidding them to speak against the imperialist war and banning organizations or assemblies that expressed popular opinion against the war; even though Parliament remained, it was merely the organ of a group of imperialists, a parliament which rubber-stamped the war budget. The absence of unity between the government and the people in a war gives rise to a government of absolute centralism with all centralism and no democracy. But historically there have also been revolutionary wars, *e.g.*, in France, Russia, and present-day Spain. In such wars the government does not fear popular disapproval, because the people are most willing to wage this kind of war; far from fearing the people, it endeavours to arouse them and encourages them to express their views so that they will actively participate in the war, because the government rests upon the people's voluntary support. China's war of national liberation has the full approval of the people and cannot be won without their participation; therefore democratic centralism becomes a necessity. In the Northern Expedition of 1926-27, too, the victories were achieved through democratic centralism. Thus it can be seen that when the aims of a war directly reflect the interests of the people, the more democratic the government, the more effectively can the war be prosecuted. Such a government need have no fear that the people will oppose the war; rather it should be worried lest the people remain inactive or indifferent to the war. The nature of a war determines the relationship between the government and the people — this is a law of history.

Question: Then what steps are you prepared to take for this system of government to be instituted?

Answer: The key question is co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

Question: Why?

Answer: For the last fifteen years, the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party has been the decisive political factor in China. The co-operation of the two parties in 1924-27 resulted in the victories of the first revolution. The split between the two parties in 1927 resulted in the unfortunate situation of the last decade. However, the responsibility for the split was not ours; we were compelled to resist the Kuomintang's oppression, and we persisted in holding high the glorious banner of China's liberation. Now the third stage has come, and the two parties must co-operate fully on a definite programme in order to resist Japan and save the nation. Through our ceaseless efforts, the establishment of co-operation has at last been announced, but the point is that both sides must accept a common programme and act upon it. An essential part of such a programme is the setting up of a new system of government.

Question: How can the new system be set up through the co-operation of the two parties?

Answer: We are proposing a reconstruction of the government apparatus and the army system. We propose that a provisional national assembly be convened to meet the present emergency. Delegates to this assembly should be chosen in due proportion from the various anti-Japanese political parties, anti-Japanese armies and anti-Japanese popular and business organizations, as Dr. Sun Yat-sen suggested in 1924. This assembly should function as the supreme organ of state authority to decide on the policies for saving the nation, adopt a constitutional programme and elect the government. We hold that the War of Resistance has reached a critical turning point and that only the immediate convening of such a national assembly vested with authority and representative of the popular will can regenerate China's political life and overcome the present crisis. We are exchanging views with the Kuomintang about this proposal and hope to obtain its agreement.

Question: Has not the National Government announced that the national assembly has been called off?

Answer: It was right to call it off. What has been called off is the national assembly which the Kuomintang was preparing to convene; according to the Kuomintang's stipulations it would not have had the slightest power, and the procedure for its election was entirely in conflict with the popular will. Together with the people of all sections of society, we disapproved of that kind of national assembly. The provisional national assembly we are proposing is radically different from the one that has been called off. The convening of this provisional national assembly will undoubtedly impart a new spirit to the whole country and provide the essential prerequisite for reconstructing the government apparatus and the army and for mobilizing the entire people. On this hinges the favourable turn in the War of Resistance.

THE SITUATION AND TASKS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR AFTER THE FALL OF SHANGHAI AND TAIYUAN

November 12, 1941

I. THE PRESENT SITUATION IS ONE OF TRANSITION FROM A WAR OF PARTIAL RESISTANCE TO A WAR OF TOTAL RESISTANCE

1. We support any kind of war of resistance, even though partial, against the invasion of Japanese imperialism. For partial resistance is a step forward from non-resistance, and to a certain extent it is revolutionary in character and is a war in defence of the motherland.

2. However, a war of partial resistance by the government alone without the mass participation of the people will certainly fail, as we have already pointed out (at the meeting of Party activists in Yenan in April of this year, at the Party's National Conference in May, and in the resolution[1] of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in August). For it is not a national revolutionary war in the full sense, not a people's war.

3. We stand for a national revolutionary war in the full sense, a war in which the entire people are mobilized, in other words, total resistance. For only such resistance constitutes a people's war and can achieve the goal of defending the motherland.

This was the outline for a report made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in Yenan in November 1937 at a meeting of Party activists. It met with immediate opposition from the Right opportunists in the Party, and not until the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in October 1938 was the Right deviation basically overcome.

4. Although the war of partial resistance advocated by the Kuomintang also constitutes a national war and is revolutionary in character to a certain extent, its revolutionary character is far from complete. Partial resistance is bound to lead to defeat in the war; it can never successfully defend the motherland.

5. Herein lies the difference in principle between the stand of the Communist Party and the present stand of the Kuomintang with regard to resistance. If Communists forget this difference in principle, they will be unable to guide the War of Resistance correctly, they will be powerless to overcome the Kuomintang's one-sidedness, and they will debase themselves to the point of abandoning their principles and reduce their Party to the level of the Kuomintang. That would be a crime against the sacred cause of the national revolutionary war and the defence of the motherland.

6. In a national revolutionary war in the full sense, in a war of total resistance, it is essential to put into effect the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation proposed by the Communist Party, and it is essential to have a government and an army that will enforce this programme in its entirety.

7. The situation after the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan is as follows:

> (1) In northern China, regular warfare in which the Kuomintang played the chief role has ended, and guerrilla warfare in which the Communist Party is playing the chief role has become primary. In Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces, the Japanese aggressors have broken through the Kuomintang's battle lines and are advancing on Nanking and the Yangtse valley. It is already clear that the Kuomintang's partial resistance cannot last long.
>
> (2) In their own imperialist interests, the governments of Britain, the United States and France have indicated that they will help China, but so far there has been only verbal sympathy and no practical aid whatsoever.
>
> (3) The German and Italian fascists are doing everything to assist Japanese imperialism.
>
> (4) The Kuomintang is still unwilling to make any fundamental change in its one-party dictatorship and autocratic rule over the people, through which it is carrying on partial resistance.

This is one side of the picture.

The other side is seen in the following:

(1) The political influence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army is spreading fast and far, and they are being acclaimed throughout the country as "the saviours of the nation". The Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army are determined to keep up the guerrilla warfare in northern China, so as to defend the whole country, tie down the Japanese aggressors and hinder them from attacking the Central Plains and the Northwest.

(2) The mass movement has developed a step further.

(3) The national bourgeoisie is leaning towards the left.

(4) Forces favouring reforms are growing within the Kuomintang.

(5) The movement to oppose Japan and aid China is spreading among the people of the world.

(6) The Soviet Union is preparing to give practical assistance to China.

This is the other side of the picture.

8. Therefore, the present situation is one of transition from partial to total resistance. While partial resistance cannot last long, total resistance has not yet begun. The transition from one to the other, the gap in time, is fraught with danger.

9. In this period, China's partial resistance may develop in one of three directions:

The first is the ending of partial resistance and its replacement by total resistance. This is what the majority of the nation demands, but the Kuomintang is still undecided.

The second is the ending of armed resistance and its replacement by capitulation. This is what the Japanese aggressors, the collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements demand, but the majority of the Chinese people oppose it.

The third is the coexistence of armed resistance and capitulation in China. This could come about as a result of the intrigues of the Japanese aggressors, the collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements to split China's anti-Japanese front when they find it impossible to attain the second direction. They are now engineering something of this kind. Indeed this danger is very grave.

10. Judging from the present situation, the domestic and international factors which prevent capitulationism from winning out have the upper hand. These factors include: Japan's persistence in its policy of subjugating China, which leaves China no alternative but to fight;

the existence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army; the wishes of the Chinese people; the wishes of the majority of the Kuomintang members; the anxiety of Britain, the United States and France lest capitulation by the Kuomintang damage their interests; the existence of the Soviet Union and its policy of helping China; the high hopes which the Chinese people place (not without foundation) in the Soviet Union. The proper and co-ordinated use of these factors would not only frustrate capitulationism and splitting but also overcome the obstructions to any advance beyond partial resistance.

11. Therefore, the prospect of going over from partial to total resistance does exist. To strive for this prospect is the urgent common task of all Chinese Communists, all progressive members of the Kuomintang, and all the Chinese people.

12. China's anti-Japanese national revolutionary war is now confronting a grave crisis. This crisis may be prolonged, or it may be overcome fairly quickly. Internally, the decisive factors are Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and a change in Kuomintang policy on the basis of this co-operation, and the strength of the worker and peasant masses. Externally, the decisive factor is assistance from the Soviet Union.

13. Political and organizational reform of the Kuomintang is both necessary and possible.[2] The main reasons are Japanese pressure, the Chinese Communist Party's united front policy, the wishes of the Chinese people, and the growth of new forces inside the Kuomintang. Our task is to work for this reform of the Kuomintang as a basis for reforming the government and the army. This reform undoubtedly requires the consent of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and we are only in a position to offer suggestions.

14. The government should be reformed. We have proposed the convening of a provisional national assembly, which is likewise both necessary and possible. Undoubtedly this reform also requires the consent of the Kuomintang.

15. The task of reforming the army consists in building up new armies and reforming the old armies. If a new army of 250,000 to 300,000 men imbued with a new political spirit can be built up within six to twelve months, the situation on the anti-Japanese battlefield will begin to mend. Such an army would influence all the old armies and rally them around itself. This would provide the military basis for the turn to the strategic counter-offensive in the War of Resistance. This reform likewise requires the Kuomintang's consent. The Eighth

Route Army ought to have an exemplary role to play in the course of this reform. And the Eighth Route Army itself should be expanded.

II. CAPITULATIONISM MUST BE COMBATED BOTH INSIDE THE PARTY AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY

INSIDE THE PARTY, OPPOSE CLASS CAPITULATIONISM

16. In 1927 Chen Tu-hsiu's capitulationism led to the failure of the revolution. No member of our Party should ever forget this historical lesson written in blood.

17. With regard to the Party's line of an anti-Japanese national united front, the main danger inside the Party before the Lukouchiao Incident was "Left" opportunism, that is, closed-doorism, the reason being chiefly that the Kuomintang had not yet begun to resist Japan.

18. Since the Lukouchiao Incident the main danger inside the Party is no longer "Left" closed-doorism but Right opportunism, that is, capitulationism, the reason being chiefly that the Kuomintang has begun to resist Japan.

19. Already in April at the Yenan meeting of Party activists, then again in May at the National Conference of the Party, and especially in August at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (the Lochuan meeting), we posed the following question: Will the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie in the united front, or the bourgeoisie the proletariat? Will the Kuomintang draw over the Communist Party, or the Communist Party the Kuomintang? In relation to the current specific political task this question means: Is the Kuomintang to be raised to the level of the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, to the level of the total resistance advocated by the Communist Party? Or is the Communist Party to sink to the level of the Kuomintang dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie, to the level of partial resistance?

20. Why must we pose the question so sharply? The answer is:

On the one hand, we have the Chinese bourgeoisie's proneness to compromise; the Kuomintang's superiority in material strength; the declaration and the decisions of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, which slander and insult the Communist Party and cry out for "an end to the class struggle"; the Kuomintang's yearning for "the capitulation of the Communist Party" and its widespread propaganda to this end; Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to place the Communist Party under his control; the Kuomintang's policy of restricting and weakening the Red Army and the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; the plan concocted during the Kuomintang's Lushan Training Course[3] in July "to reduce the Communist Party's strength by two-fifths in the course of the War of Resistance"; the attempts of the Kuomintang to seduce Communist cadres with offers of fame and fortune and wine and women; the political capitulation of certain petty-bourgeois radicals (represented by Chang Nai-chi[4]); etc.

On the other hand, we have the uneven theoretical level among Communists; the fact that many of our Party members lack the experience of co-operation between the two parties gained during the Northern Expedition; the fact that a large number of Party members are of petty-bourgeois origin; the reluctance of some Party members to continue a life of bitter struggle; the tendency towards unprincipled accommodation with the Kuomintang in the united front; the emergence of a tendency towards a new type of warlordism in the Eighth Route Army; the emergence of the problem of Communist participation in the Kuomintang government; the emergence of a tendency towards excessive accommodation in the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; etc.

We must sharply pose the question of who is to lead and must resolutely combat capitulationism in view of the grave situation described above.

21. For several months now, and especially since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Central Committee and Party organizations at all levels have waged a clear-cut and firm struggle against capitulationist tendencies, actual or potential, have taken various necessary precautions against them and have achieved good results.

The Central Committee has issued a draft resolution[5] on the problem of Communist participation in the government.

A struggle has been started against the tendency towards new warlordism in the Eighth Route Army. This tendency is manifest in certain individuals who, since the redesignation of the Red Army, have become unwilling to submit strictly to Communist Party leadership, have developed individualistic heroism, taken pride in being given appointments by the Kuomintang (*i.e.*, in becoming officials), and so forth. The tendency towards this new type of warlordism has the same root (the reduction of the Communist Party to the level of the Kuomintang) and the same result (the alienation of the masses) as the tendency towards the old type of warlordism, which expressed itself in beating and abusing people, violating discipline, etc.; it is particularly dangerous because it is occurring in the period of the Kuomintang-Communist united front, and it therefore calls for special attention and determined opposition. Both the system of political commissars, which was abolished because of Kuomintang intervention, and the system of political departments, which were renamed "political training offices" for the same reason, have now been restored. We have initiated and staunchly carried out the new strategic principle of "independent guerrilla warfare in the mountain regions with the initiative in our own hands", thus basically ensuring the Eighth Route Army's successes in fighting and in its other tasks. We have rejected the Kuomintang's demand that its members should be sent to the Eighth Route Army units as cadres and have upheld the principle of absolute leadership of the Eighth Route Army by the Communist Party. Similarly, we have introduced the principle of "independence and initiative within the united front" in the revolutionary anti-Japanese base areas. We have corrected the tendency towards "parliamentarism"[6] (of course not the parliamentarism of the Second International, which is absent in the Chinese Party); we have also persisted in our struggle against bandits, enemy spies and saboteurs.

In Sian we have corrected the tendency towards unprincipled accommodation in our relations with the Kuomintang and have developed the mass struggle anew.

In eastern Kansu we have on the whole done the same as in Sian.

In Shanghai we have criticized Chang Nai-chi's line of "issuing fewer calls and offering more suggestions" and begun to correct the tendency towards excessive accommodation in the work of the national salvation movement.

In the guerrilla zones in the south — these representing part of the gains of our decade of sanguinary warfare with the Kuomintang, our strategic strongholds for the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war in the southern provinces, and our forces which the Kuomintang tried to wipe out by "encirclement and suppression" even after the Sian Incident, and which it has tried to weaken by the newer method of "luring the tiger out of the mountains" even after the Lukouchiao Incident — we have taken special care (1) to guard against concentrating our forces regardless of circumstances (which would suit the Kuomintang's desire to destroy these strongholds), (2) to reject Kuomintang appointees, and (3) to be on the alert against the danger of another Ho Ming Incident[7] (*i.e.*, the danger of being surrounded and disarmed by the Kuomintang).

Our attitude in the *Liberation Weekly*[8] has continued to be one of serious and fair criticism.

22. In order to persevere in armed resistance and win final victory as well as to turn partial resistance into total resistance, it is necessary to adhere to the Anti-Japanese National United Front and expand and strengthen it. No views disruptive of the Kuomintang-Communist united front will be tolerated. We must still guard against "Left" closed-doorism. But at the same time we must closely adhere to the principle of independence and initiative in all our united front work. Our united front with the Kuomintang and other parties is based on the execution of a definite programme. Without this basis there can be no united front, and in that case co-operation would become unprincipled and a manifestation of capitulationism. Thus the key to leading the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war to victory is to explain, apply and uphold the principle of "independence and initiative within the united front".

23. What is our purpose in all this? In one respect, it is to hold the ground we have already won, for this ground is our strategic point of departure and its loss would mean the end of everything. But our chief purpose is to extend the ground already won and realize the positive aim of "winning the masses in their millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the overthrow of Japanese imperialism". Holding our ground and extending it are inseparably connected. In the last few months, many more left-wing members of the petty bourgeoisie have become united under our influence, the new forces in the Kuomintang camp have grown, the mass struggle in Shansi has developed, and our Party organizations have expanded in many places.

24. But we must clearly understand that generally speaking the organizational strength of our Party is still quite small in the country as a whole. The strength of the masses in the country as a whole is also very small, because the workers and peasants, the basic sections of the masses, are not yet organized. All this is due to the Kuomintang's policy of control and repression on the one hand and the inadequacy of our own work or even its complete absence on the other. This is the

fundamental weakness of our Party in the present anti-Japanese national revolutionary war. Unless we overcome this weakness, Japanese imperialism cannot be defeated. To this end we must apply the principle of "independence and initiative within the united front" and overcome all tendencies towards capitulation or excessive accommodation.

IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE, OPPOSE NATIONAL CAPITULATIONISM

25. The above points deal with class capitulationism. This tendency would lead the proletariat to accommodate itself to bourgeois reformism and bourgeois lack of thoroughness. Unless it is overcome, we cannot succeed in carrying forward the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, in turning partial resistance into total resistance and in defending the motherland.

But there is also the other kind of capitulationism, national capitulationism, which would lead China to accommodate herself to the interests of Japanese imperialism, make China a Japanese colony and turn the Chinese people into colonial slaves. This tendency has now appeared in the right wing of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

26. The left wing of the Anti-Japanese National United Front is composed of the Communist-led masses, which include the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie. Our task is to do our utmost to extend and consolidate this wing. The accomplishment of this task is the basic prerequisite for reforming the Kuomintang, the government and the army, for establishing a unified democratic republic, for turning partial resistance into total resistance and for overthrowing Japanese imperialism.

27. The intermediate section of the Anti-Japanese National United Front is composed of the national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. Those for whom the leading Shanghai newspapers speak are now tending towards the Left,[9] while some members of the Fu Hsing Society have begun to vacillate and some members of the C.C. Clique are also wavering.[10] The armies resisting Japan have learned severe lessons, and some have begun or are preparing to introduce reforms. Our task is to help the intermediate section to move forward and change its stand.

28. The right wing of the Anti-Japanese National United Front consists of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, and it is the nerve

centre of national capitulationism. It is inevitable that these people should tend towards capitulationism, for they fear both the destruction of their property in the war and the rise of the masses. Many of them are already collaborators, many have become or are ready to become pro-Japanese, many are vacillating, and only a few, owing to special circumstances, are firmly anti-Japanese. Some of them have joined the national united front for the time being under compulsion and with reluctance. Generally speaking, it will not be long before they split away. Indeed many of the worst elements among the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are at this very moment engineering a split in the Anti-Japanese National United Front. They are manufacturing rumours, and stories such as "the Communists are engaged in insurrection" and "the Eighth Route Army is in retreat" are sure to multiply daily. Our task is to combat national capitulationism resolutely and, in the course of this struggle, to expand and consolidate the left wing and help the intermediate section to move forward and change its stand.

THE RELATION BETWEEN CLASS CAPITULATIONISM AND NATIONAL CAPITULATIONISM

29. Class capitulationism is actually the reserve force of national capitulationism in the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war; it is a vile tendency that lends support to the camp of the right wing and leads to defeat in the war. We must fight this tendency inside the Communist Party and the proletariat and extend the fight to all spheres of our work, in order to invigorate the struggle against national capitulationism, and in order to achieve the liberation of the Chinese nation and the emancipation of the toiling masses.

NOTES

[1] This refers to the "Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party" adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at its meeting in Lochuan, northern Shensi, on August 25, 1937. The full text reads as follows:

> (1) The military provocation by the Japanese aggressors at Lukouchiao and their occupation of Peiping and Tientsin represent only the beginning of their large-scale invasion of China south of the Great Wall. They have already begun

their national mobilization for war. Their propaganda that they have "no desire to aggravate the situation" is only a smokescreen for further attacks.

(2) Under the pressure of the Japanese aggressors' attacks and the Chinese people's indignation, the Nanking government is beginning to make up its mind to fight. General defence arrangements and actual resistance in some places have already started. Full-scale war between China and Japan is inevitable. The resistance at Lukouchiao on July 7 marked the starting point of China's national war of resistance.

(3) Thus a new stage has opened in China's political situation, the stage of actual resistance. The stage of preparation for resistance is over. In the present stage the central task is to mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance. The winning of democracy, which was not accomplished in the previous stage because of the Kuomintang's unwillingness and the inadequate mobilization of the people, is a task that must be fulfilled in the course of the struggle for victory in the War of Resistance.

(4) Our differences and disputes with the Kuomintang and other anti-Japanese groups in this new stage are no longer about whether to wage a war of resistance but about how to win victory.

(5) The key to victory in the war now lies in developing the resistance that has already begun into a war of total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a war of total resistance can final victory be won. The Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation now proposed by our Party spells out concretely the way to win final victory in the War of Resistance.

(6) A great danger lurks in the present state of resistance. The main reason for this danger is that the Kuomintang is still unwilling to arouse the whole people to take part in the war. Instead, it regards the war as the concern of the government alone, and at every turn fears and restricts the people's participation in the war, prevents the government and the army from forming close ties with the people, denies the people the democratic right to resist Japan and save the nation, and refuses to reform the government apparatus thoroughly and to turn the government into a national defence government of the whole nation. A war of resistance of this kind may achieve partial victories, but never final victory. On the contrary, it may end in grievous failure.

(7) The existence of serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance may lead to many setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises and other such reverses. Therefore it should be realized that the war will be an arduous and protracted war. But we are confident that, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the resistance already started will sweep aside all obstacles and continue to advance and develop. We must overcome all difficulties and firmly fight for the realization of the Ten-Point Programme for victory proposed by our Party. We must firmly oppose all wrong policies which run counter to it and combat national defeatism and the pessimism and despair it engenders.

(8) Together with the people and the armed forces under the leadership of the Party, members of the Communist Party must actively take their stand in the forefront of the struggle, become the core of the nation's resistance and do their utmost to develop the anti-Japanese mass movement. They must never for a moment relax or miss a single opportunity to do propaganda among the masses and to organize and arm them. Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan will be certain provided the masses in their millions are really organized in the national united front.

[2] In the initial period of the War of Resistance, the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek made a number of promises to introduce various reforms under popular pressure, but very quickly broke them one after another. The possibility that the Kuomintang might introduce the reforms desired by the whole people was not actualized. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung said later in "On Coalition Government":

> All the people, including the Communists and other democrats, earnestly hoped that the Kuomintang government would seize the opportunity, at a time when the nation was in peril and the people were filled with enthusiasm, to institute democratic reforms and put Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles into practice But their hopes came to nought (See *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. III, p 263.)

[3] The Lushan Training Course was set up by Chiang Kai-shek at Lushan, Kiangsi Province, to train high and middle-ranking officials of the Kuomintang party and government to form the core of his reactionary regime.

[4] Chang Nai-chi was then advocating "issuing fewer calls and offering more suggestions". But it would have been useless merely to submit "suggestions" to the Kuomintang, since it was following a policy of oppression. Calls had to be made directly to the masses, in order to arouse them to struggle against the Kuomintang. Otherwise, it would have been impossible to keep up the war against Japan or to resist Kuomintang reaction Chang Nai-chi was wrong on this point, and gradually be realized his mistake.

[5] This refers to the "Draft Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Concerning the Communist Party's Participation in the Government" which was drawn up on September 25, 1937. The full text reads as follows.

> (1) The present situation in the anti-Japanese war urgently requires a united front government representing the whole nation, for only such a government can effectively lead the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war and defeat Japanese imperialism. The Communist Party is ready to participate in such a government, that is, to undertake administrative responsibilities in the government directly and officially and play an active part in it. But such a government does not yet exist. What exists today is still the government of the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship.
>
> (2) The Communist Party of China can participate in the government only when it is changed from a one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang into a united front government of the whole nation, that is, when the present Kuomintang government (a) accepts the fundamentals of the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation proposed by our Party and promulgates an administrative programme in accordance therewith; (b) begins to show by deeds the sincerity of its efforts to carry out this programme and achieves definite results; and (c) permits the legal existence of Communist Party organizations and guarantees the Communist Party freedom to mobilize, organize and educate the masses.
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> (3) Before the Central Committee of the Party decides to participate in the Central Government, members of the Communist Party must not as a rule participate in any local government or in any administrative councils or committees attached to the administrative organs of the government, central or local. For such participation would only obscure the distinctive features of the Communist Party, prolong the Kuomintang's dictatorship and hinder rather than help the effort to bring a unified democratic government into being.

(4) However, members of the Communist Party may participate in the local governments of certain particular regions, such as battle areas, where the old authorities find it impossible to rule as before and are on the whole willing to put the Communist Party's policies into effect, where the Communist Party is free to operate openly, and where the present emergency makes Communist participation a necessity in the opinion both of the people and of the government. Still more so in the Japanese-occupied areas, the Communist Party should come forward openly as the organizer of the anti-Japanese united front governments.

(5) Before the Communist Party officially joins the government, it is permissible in principle for Party members to participate in representative bodies, such as an all-China national assembly, for the purpose of discussing a democratic constitution and policies to save the nation. Thus, the Communist Party should strive to get its members elected to such assemblies and use them as a forum for propagating the Party's views, so as to mobilize the people and rally them round the Party and promote the establishment of a unified democratic government.

(6) Given a definite common programme and the principle of absolute equality, the Central Committee of the Communist Party or its local branches may form united front organizations with the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang or its local headquarters, such as various joint committees (*e.g.*, national revolutionary leagues, committees for mass movements and committees for mobilization in the war zones), and through such joint activities the Communist Party should achieve co-operation with the Kuomintang.

(7) With the redesignation of the Red Army as part of the National Revolutionary Army and the change of the organ of Red political power into the Government of the Special Region, their representatives may, by virtue of the legal status they have acquired, join all the military and mass organizations which further the resistance to Japan and the salvation of the nation.

(8) It is most essential to maintain absolutely independent Communist Party leadership in what was originally the Red Army and in all the guerrilla units, and Communists must not show any vacillation on this matter of principle.

[6] "Parliamentarism" here refers to the proposal of some Party comrades that the system of political power in the revolutionary base areas, the system of people's representative conferences, should be changed into the bourgeois parliamentary system.

[7] The Ho Ming Incident took place after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. In October 1934, when the Central Red Army moved northward, Red Army guerrilla units stayed behind and maintained guerrilla warfare in extremely difficult circumstances in fourteen areas in the eight southern provinces of Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, Honan, Chekiang and Anhwei. When the anti-Japanese war began, these units, acting on instructions from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, entered into negotiations with the Kuomintang for the cessation of civil war and organized themselves into a single army (namely, the New Fourth Army which later stubbornly fought the Japanese on the southern and northern banks of the Yangtse River) and moved to the front to resist Japan. But Chiang Kai-shek plotted to exploit these negotiations for the purpose of wiping out the guerrilla units. Ho Ming was one of the guerrilla leaders in the Fukien-Kwangtung border area which was one of the fourteen guerrilla areas. He was not on the alert against Chiang Kai-shek's plot, with the result that more than one

thousand of the guerrillas under his command were surrounded and disarmed by the Kuomintang forces after they assembled.

[8] Founded in Yenan in 1937, the *Liberation Weekly* was the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It was superseded by the *Liberation Daily* in 1941.

[9] They were that section of the national bourgeoisie for whom newspapers like the Shanghai *Shen Pao* served as a vehicle.

[10] In The Fu Hsing Society and the C.C. Clique, two fascist organizations within the Kuomintang, were headed by Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Li-fu respectively. They served the oligarchic interests of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. But many petty-bourgeois elements had joined them under compulsion or had been duped into joining. The text refers to the section of the Fu Hsing Society consisting mainly of lower and middle-ranking officers in the Kuomintang army and to the section of the C.C. Clique consisting mainly of members not in power.

PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGSIA BORDER REGION AND THE REAR HEADQUARTERS OF THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY

May 15, 1938

Be it hereby proclaimed: Ever since the Lukouchiao Incident, all our patriotic countrymen have been firmly waging the War of Resistance. Officers and men at the front are shedding their blood and sacrificing their lives. All political parties and groups have united in good faith. All sections of the people have joined forces to save the nation. This points to a bright future for the Chinese nation and affords a firm guarantee for victory over Japan. All our fellow-countrymen must continue along this line of advance. The army and the people of our Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region[1] have followed the Government's leadership and devoted their efforts to the cause of national salvation. Whatever they have done has been just and honourable. Under bitter hardships, they have struggled on tirelessly and uncomplainingly. The people throughout the country are unanimous in praising them. For their part the Border Region Government and the Rear Headquarters will encourage the people of the whole region to continue their efforts to the very end. Nobody will be allowed to neglect his duty and nothing will be allowed to undermine the

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This proclamation was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Government of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Rear Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army with a view to countering disruptive activities by the Chiang Kai-shek clique. Shortly after the establishment of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, the Chiang Kai-shek clique began to plot disruption against the revolutionary forces under Communist leadership. The disruption of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region was part of their plot. Comrade Mao Tse-tung maintained that a firm stand was necessary to defend the interests of the revolution. The proclamation dealt a blow at the opportunist stand of some Party members in the anti-Japanese united front with regard to the intrigues of the Chiang clique.

cause of national salvation. However, recent investigations in the Border Region have disclosed that, disregarding the public interest, some persons are using various means to force the peasants to return land and houses that have been distributed to them, to compel debtors to pay back old cancelled loans,[2] to coerce the people into changing the democratic system that has been built up, or to disrupt the military, economic, cultural and mass organizations that have been established. Some of them are even acting as spies, conspiring with bandits, inciting our soldiers to mutiny, making surveys and maps of our region, secretly collecting information, or openly spreading propaganda against the Border Region Government. Clearly, all these activities are violations of the basic principle of unity for resistance to Japan, run counter to the will of the people of the Border Region, and are intended to foment internal dissension, disrupt the united front, damage the people's interests, undermine the prestige of the Border Region Government and increase the difficulties of mobilization against Japan. The reason is that a handful of die-hards are behaving unscrupulously to the detriment of the national interest. Some are even serving as tools of the Japanese aggressors, using various guises to camouflage their conspiratorial activities. For several months, reports demanding our daily attention have been steadily pouring in from people in the counties requesting us to put a stop to such activities. With a view to strengthening the anti-Japanese forces, consolidating the rear against Japan, and safeguarding the interests of the people, the Government and the Rear Headquarters find it imperative to proscribe the above-mentioned activities. Accordingly, we hereby unequivocally proclaim:

(1) The Government and the Rear Headquarters, in order to protect the rights already secured by the people, forbid any unauthorized change in the distribution of land or houses and in the cancellation of debts made within the areas under the jurisdiction of the Border Region Government before internal peace was established.

(2) The Government and the Rear Headquarters will protect the activities of all the military, political, economic, cultural and mass organizations which were in existence when internal peace was established and which have since advanced and expanded in accordance with the principle of the united front, will promote their progress, and stop all intrigues and disruptive activities against them.

(3) The Government and the Rear Headquarters, resolutely carrying out the Programme of Armed Resistance and National

Reconstruction, will gladly initiate and promote any undertaking that serves the cause of resistance to Japan and national salvation. We welcome sincere assistance from people in every quarter. But to guard against impostors and keep out traitors, we prohibit any person, whatever his activities, from entering and staying in the Border Region unless he secures permission and written authorization from the Government and the Rear Headquarters.

(4) In this tense period of armed resistance, it is right and proper for the people to report any person who tries to sabotage, engage in disruption, stir up sedition or ferret out military secrets within the boundaries of the Border Region. Upon valid evidence, persons so charged may be arrested on the spot. If convicted, offenders will be punished with due severity.

These four regulations must be observed by all members of the armed forces and all civilians throughout the Border Region, and no violation whatsoever will be permitted. Henceforward, should any lawless person dare to plot disruption, the Border Region Government and the Rear Headquarters will enforce these regulations to the letter and will accept no plea of ignorance.

This proclamation is hereby issued with the full force of the law.

NOTES

[1] The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region was the revolutionary base area which was gradually built up after 1931 through revolutionary guerrilla war in northern Shensi. When the Central Red Army arrived in northern Shensi after the Long March, it became the central base area of the revolution and the seat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was named the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region after the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front in 1937, and it included twenty-three counties along the common borders of the three provinces.

[2] By 1936 most places in the Border Region had carried out the policy of confiscating the land of the landlords and distributing it among the peasants and cancelling the old debts of the peasants. After 1936, in order to facilitate the formation of a broad anti-Japanese national united front, the Chinese Communist Party changed its policy for the country as a whole to one of reduction of rent and interest; at the same time, however, it resolutely protected the gains already secured by the peasants in the land reform.

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN

May 1938

CHAPTER I

WHY RAISE THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR?

In the War of Resistance Against Japan, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. This point has already been correctly settled. Thus, it seems there are only tactical problems in guerrilla warfare. Why then raise the question of strategy?

If China were a small country in which the role of guerrilla warfare was only to render direct support over short distances to the campaigns of the regular army, there would, of course, be only tactical problems but no strategic ones. On the other hand, if China were a country as strong as the Soviet Union and the invading enemy could either be quickly expelled, or, even though his expulsion were to take some time, he could not occupy extensive areas, then again guerrilla warfare would simply play a supporting role in campaigns, and would naturally involve only tactical but not strategic problems.

The question of strategy in guerrilla war does arise, however, in the case of China, which is neither small nor like the Soviet Union, but which is both a large and a weak country. This large and weak country is being attacked by a small and strong country, but the large

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In the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan, many people inside and outside the Party belittled the important strategic role of guerrilla warfare and pinned their hopes on regular warfare alone, and particularly on the operations of the Kuomintang forces. Comrade Mao Tse-tung refuted this view and wrote this article to show the correct road of development for anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. As a result, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which had just over 40,000 men when the War of Resistance began in 1937, grew to a great army and weak country is in an era of progress; this is the source of the whole problem. It is in these circumstances that vast areas have come under enemy occupation and that the war has become a protracted one. The enemy is occupying vast areas of this large country of ours, but Japan is a small country, she does not have sufficient soldiers and has to leave many gaps in the occupied areas, so that our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare consists primarily not in interior-line operations in support of the campaigns of the regular troops but in independent operations on exterior lines; furthermore, China is progressive, that is to say, she has a staunch army and broad masses of people, both led by the Communist Party, so that, far from being small-scale, our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is in fact large-scale warfare. Hence the emergence of a whole series of problems, such as the strategic defensive, the strategic offensive, etc. The protracted nature of the war and its attendant ruthlessness have made it imperative for guerrilla warfare to undertake many unusual tasks; hence such problems as those of the base areas, the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, and so on. For all these reasons, China's guerrilla warfare against Japan has broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock at the gates of strategy, and it demands examination from the viewpoint of strategy. The point that merits our particular attention is that such extensive as well as protracted guerrilla warfare is quite new in the entire history of war. This is bound up with the fact that we are now in the Nineteen Thirties and Nineteen Forties and that we now have the Communist Party and the Red Army. Herein lies the heart of the matter. Our enemy is probably still cherishing fond dreams of emulating the Mongol conquest of the Sung Dynasty, the Manchu conquest of the Ming Dynasty, the British occupation of North America and India, the Latin occupation of Central and South America, etc. But such dreams have no practical value in present-day China because there are certain factors present in the China of today which were absent in those historical instances, and one of them is guerrilla warfare, which is quite a new phenomenon. If our enemy overlooks this fact, he will certainly come to grief.

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of one million by the time Japan surrendered in 1945, established many revolutionary base areas, played a great part in the war and thus, throughout this period, made Chiang Kai-shek afraid to capitulate to Japan or launch a nation-wide civil war. In 1946, when Chiang Kai-shek did launch a nation-wide civil war, the People's Liberation Army, formed out of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, was strong enough to deal with his attacks.

These are the reasons why our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, though occupying only a supplementary place in the War of Resistance as a whole, must nevertheless be examined from the viewpoint of strategy.

Why not, then, apply to guerrilla warfare the general strategic principles of the War of Resistance?

The question of strategy in our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is indeed closely linked with the question of strategy in the War of Resistance as a whole, because they have much in common. On the other hand, guerrilla warfare is different from regular warfare and has its own peculiarities, and consequently many peculiar elements are involved in the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare. Without modification it is impossible to apply the strategic principles of the War of Resistance in general to guerrilla warfare with its own peculiarities.

CHAPTER II

THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF WAR IS TO PRESERVE ONESELF AND DESTROY THE ENEMY

Before discussing the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare in concrete terms, a few words are needed on the fundamental problem of war. All the guiding principles of military operations grow out of the one basic principle: to strive to the utmost to preserve one's own strength and destroy that of the enemy. In a revolutionary war, this principle is directly linked with basic political principles. For instance, the basic political principle of China's War of Resistance Against Japan, *i.e.*, its political aim, is to drive out Japanese imperialism and build an independent, free and happy new China. In terms of military action this principle means the use of armed force to defend our motherland and to drive out the Japanese invaders. To attain this end, the operations of the armed units take the form of doing their utmost to preserve their own strength on the one hand and destroy the enemy's on the other. How then do we justify the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Every war exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high one. Is this not in contradiction with "preserving oneself"? In fact, there is no contradiction at all; to put it more exactly, sacrifice and self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. For such sacrifice is essential not only for destroying the enemy but also for preserving oneself — partial and temporary "non-preservation" (sacrifice, or paying the price) is necessary for the sake of general and permanent preservation. From this basic principle stems the series of principles guiding military operations, all of which — from the principles of shooting (taking cover to preserve oneself, and making full use of fire-power to destroy the enemy) to the principles of strategy — are permeated with the spirit of this basic principle. All technical, tactical and strategic principles represent applications of this basic principle. The principle of preserving oneself and destroying the enemy is the basis of all military principles.

CHAPTER III

SIX SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Now let us see what policies or principles have to be adopted in guerrilla operations against Japan before we can attain the object of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. Since the guerrilla units in the War of Resistance (and in all other revolutionary wars) generally grow out of nothing and expand from a small to a large force, they must preserve themselves and, moreover, they must expand. Hence the question is, what policies or principles have to be adopted before we can attain the object of preserving and expanding ourselves and destroying the enemy?

Generally speaking, the main principles are as follows: (1) the use of initiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations; (2) co-ordination with regular warfare; (3) establishment of base areas; (4) the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive; (5) the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare; and (6) correct relationship of command. These six items constitute the whole of the strategic programme for guerrilla war against Japan and are the means necessary for the preservation and expansion of our forces, for the destruction and expulsion of the enemy, for co-ordination with regular warfare and the winning of final victory.

CHAPTER IV

INITIATIVE, FLEXIBILITY AND PLANNING IN CONDUCTING OFFENSIVES WITHIN THE DEFENSIVE, BATTLES OF QUICK DECISION WITHIN PROTRACTED WAR, AND EXTERIOR-LINE OPERATIONS WITHIN INTERIOR-LINE OPERATIONS

Here the subject may be dealt with under four headings: (1) the relationship between the defensive and the offensive, between protractedness and quick decision, and between the interior and exterior lines; (2) the initiative in all operations; (3) flexible employment of forces; and (4) planning in all operations.

To start with the first.

If we take the War of Resistance as a whole, the fact that Japan is a strong country and is attacking while China is a weak country and is defending herself makes our war strategically a defensive and protracted war. As far as the operational lines are concerned, the Japanese are operating on exterior and we on interior lines. This is one aspect of the situation. But there is another aspect which is just the reverse. The enemy forces, though strong (in arms, in certain qualities of their men, and certain other factors), are numerically small, whereas our forces, though weak (likewise, in arms, in certain qualities of our men, and certain other factors), are numerically very large. Added to the fact that the enemy is an alien nation invading our country while we are resisting his invasion on our own soil, this determines the following strategy. It is possible and necessary to use tactical offensives within the strategic defensive, to fight campaigns and battles of quick decision within a strategically protracted war and to fight campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. Such is the strategy to be adopted in the War of Resistance as a whole. It holds true both for regular and for guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is different only in degree and form. Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the form of surprise attacks. Although surprise attacks can and should be employed in regular warfare too, the degree of surprise is less. In guerrilla warfare, the need to bring operations to a quick decision is very great, and our exterior-line ring of encirclement of the enemy in campaigns and battles is very small. All these distinguish it from regular warfare.

Thus it can be seen that in their operations guerrilla units have to concentrate the maximum forces, act secretly and swiftly, attack the enemy by surprise and bring battles to a quick decision, and that they must strictly avoid passive defence, procrastination and the dispersal of forces before engagements. Of course, guerrilla warfare includes not only the strategic but also the tactical defensive. The latter embraces, among other things, containing and outpost actions during battles; the disposition of forces for resistance at narrow passes, strategic points, rivers or villages in order to deplete and exhaust the enemy; and action to cover withdrawal. But the basic principle of guerrilla warfare must be the offensive, and guerrilla warfare is more offensive in its character than regular warfare. The offensive, moreover, must take the form of surprise attacks, and to expose ourselves by ostentatiously parading our forces is even less permissible in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare. From the fact that the enemy is strong and we are weak it necessarily follows that, in guerrilla operations in general even more than in regular warfare, battles must be decided quickly, though on some occasions guerrilla fighting may be kept up for several days, as in an assault on a small and isolated enemy force cut off from help. Because of its dispersed character, guerrilla warfare can spread everywhere, and in many of its tasks, as in harassing, containing and disrupting the enemy and in mass work, its principle is dispersal of forces; but a guerrilla unit, or a guerrilla formation, must concentrate its main forces when it is engaged in destroying the enemy, and especially when it is striving to smash an enemy attack. "Concentrate a big force to strike at a small section of the enemy force" remains a principle of field operations in guerrilla warfare.

Thus it can also be seen that, if we take the War of Resistance as a whole, we can attain the aim of our strategic defensive and finally defeat Japanese imperialism only through the cumulative effect of many offensive campaigns and battles in both regular and guerrilla warfare, namely, through the cumulative effect of many victories in offensive actions. Only through the cumulative effect of many campaigns and battles of quick decision, namely, the cumulative effect of many victories achieved through quick decision in offensive campaigns and battles, can we attain our goal of strategic protractedness, which means gaining time to increase our capacity to resist while hastening or awaiting changes in the international situation and the internal collapse of the enemy, in order to be able to launch a strategic counter-offensive and drive the Japanese invaders out of China. We must concentrate superior forces and fight exterior-line operations in every campaign or battle, whether in the stage of strategic defensive or in that of strategic counter-offensive, in order to encircle and destroy the enemy forces, encircling part if not all of them, destroying part if not all of the forces we have encircled, and inflicting heavy casualties on the encircled forces if we cannot capture them in large numbers. Only through the cumulative effect of many such battles of annihilation can we change the relative position as between the enemy and ourselves, thoroughly smash his strategic encirclement — that is, his scheme of exterior-line operations — and finally, in co-ordination with international forces and the revolutionary struggles of the Japanese people, surround the Japanese imperialists and deal them the *coup de grâce*. These results are to be achieved mainly through regular warfare, with guerrilla warfare making a secondary contribution. What is common to both, however, is the accumulation of many minor victories to make a major victory. Herein lies the great strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance.

Now let us discuss initiative, flexibility and planning in guerrilla warfare.

What is initiative in guerrilla warfare?

In any war, the opponents contend for the initiative, whether on a battlefield, in a battle area, in a war zone or in the whole war, for the initiative means freedom of action for an army. Any army which, losing the initiative, is forced into a passive position and ceases to have freedom of action, faces the danger of defeat or extermination. Naturally, gaining the initiative is harder in strategic defensive and interior-line operations and easier in offensive exterior-line operations. However, Japanese imperialism has two basic weaknesses, namely, its shortage of troops and the fact that it is fighting on foreign soil. Moreover, its underestimation of China's strength and the internal contradictions among the Japanese militarists have given rise to many mistakes in command, such as piecemeal reinforcement, lack of strategic co-ordination, occasional absence of a main direction for attack, failure to grasp opportunities in some operations and failure to wipe out encircled forces, all of which may be considered the third weakness of Japanese imperialism. Thus, despite the advantage of being on the offensive and operating on exterior lines, the Japanese militarists are gradually losing the initiative, because of their shortage of troops (their small territory, small population, inadequate resources, feudalistic imperialism, etc.), because of the fact that they are fighting on foreign soil (their war is imperialist and barbarous) and because of their stupidities in command. Japan is neither willing nor able to conclude the war at present, nor has her strategic offensive yet come to an end, but, as the general trend shows, her offensive is confined within certain limits, which is the inevitable consequence of her three weaknesses; she cannot go on indefinitely till she swallows the whole of China. Already there are signs that Japan will one day find herself in an utterly passive position. China, on the other hand, was in a rather passive position at the beginning of the war, but, having gained experience, she is now turning to the new policy of mobile warfare, the policy of taking the offensive, seeking quick decisions and operating on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, which, together with the policy of developing widespread guerrilla warfare, is helping China to build up a position of initiative day by day.

The question of the initiative is even more vital in guerrilla warfare. For most guerrilla units operate in very difficult circumstances, fighting without a rear, with their own weak forces facing the enemy's strong forces, lacking experience (when the units are newly organized), being separated, etc. Nevertheless, it is possible to build up the initiative in guerrilla warfare, the essential condition being to seize on the enemy's three weaknesses. Taking advantage of the enemy's shortage of troops (from the viewpoint of the war as a whole), the guerrilla units can boldly use vast areas as their fields of operation; taking advantage of the fact that the enemy is an alien invader and is pursuing a most barbarous policy, the guerrilla units can boldly enlist the support of millions upon millions of people; and taking advantage of the stupidities in the enemy's command, the guerrilla units can give full scope to their resourcefulness. While the regular army must seize on all these weaknesses of the enemy and turn them to good account in order to defeat him, it is even more important for the guerrilla units to do so. As for the guerrilla units' own weaknesses, they can be gradually reduced in the course of the struggle. Moreover, these weaknesses sometimes constitute the very condition for gaining the initiative. For example, it is precisely because the guerrilla units are small that they can mysteriously appear and disappear in their operations behind enemy lines, without the enemy's being able to do anything about them, and thus enjoy a freedom of action such as massive regular armies never can.

When the enemy is making a converging attack from several directions, a guerrilla unit can exercise initiative only with difficulty and can lose it all too easily. In such a case, if its appraisals and dispositions are wrong, it is liable to get into a passive position and consequently fail to smash the converging enemy attack. This may occur even when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive. For the initiative results from making a correct appraisal of the situation (both our own and that of the enemy) and from making the correct military and political dispositions. A pessimistic appraisal out of accord with the objective conditions and the passive dispositions ensuing from it will undoubtedly result in the loss of the initiative and throw one into a passive position. On the other hand, an over-optimistic appraisal out of accord with the objective conditions and the risky (unjustifiably risky) dispositions ensuing from it will also result in the loss of the initiative and eventually land one in a position similar to that of the pessimists. The initiative is not an innate attribute of genius, but is something an intelligent leader attains through open-minded study and correct appraisal of the objective conditions and through correct military and political dispositions. It follows that the initiative is not ready-made but is something that requires conscious effort.

When forced into a passive position through some incorrect appraisal and disposition or through overwhelming pressure, a guerrilla unit must strive to extricate itself. How this can be done depends on the circumstances. In many cases it is necessary to "move away". The ability to move is the distinctive feature of a guerrilla unit. To move away is the principal method for getting out of a passive position and regaining the initiative. But it is not the sole method. The moment when the enemy is most energetic and we are in the greatest difficulties is often the very moment when things begin to turn against him and in our favour. Frequently a favourable situation recurs and the initiative is regained as a result of "holding out a little longer".

Next, let us deal with flexibility.

Flexibility is a concrete expression of the initiative. The flexible employment of forces is more essential in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare.

A guerrilla commander must understand that the flexible employment of his forces is the most important means of changing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves and of gaining the initiative. The nature of guerrilla warfare is such that guerrilla forces must be employed flexibly in accordance with the task in hand and with such circumstances as the state of the enemy, the terrain and the local population, and the chief ways of employing the forces are dispersal, concentration and shifting of position. In employing his forces, a guerrilla commander is like a fisherman casting his net, which he should be able to spread wide as well as draw in tight. When casting his net, the fisherman has to ascertain the depth of the water, the speed of the current and the presence or absence of obstructions; similarly, when dispersing his units, a guerrilla commander must take care not to incur losses through ignorance of the situation or through miscalculated action. Just as the fisherman must keep a grip on the cord in order to draw his net in tight, so the guerrilla commander must maintain liaison and communication with all his forces and keep enough of his main forces at hand. Just as a frequent change of position is necessary in fishing, so a frequent shift of position is necessary for a guerrilla unit. Dispersal, concentration and shifting of position are the three ways of flexibly employing forces in guerrilla warfare.

Generally speaking, the dispersal of guerrilla units, or "breaking up the whole into parts", is employed chiefly: (1) when we want to threaten the enemy with a wide frontal attack because he is on the defensive, and there is temporarily no chance to mass our forces for action; (2) when we want to harass and disrupt the enemy throughout an area where his forces are weak; (3) when we are unable to break through the enemy's encirclement and try to slip away by making ourselves less conspicuous; (4) when we are restricted by terrain or supplies; or (5) when we are carrying on mass work over a wide area. But whatever the circumstances, when dispersing for action we should pay attention to the following: 1) we should never make an absolutely even dispersal of forces, but should keep a fairly large part in an area convenient for manoeuvre, so that any possible exigency can be met and there is a centre of gravity for the task being carried out in dispersion; and (2) we should assign to the dispersed units clearly defined tasks, fields of operation, time limits for actions, places for reassembly and ways and means of liaison.

Concentration of forces, or "assembling the parts into a whole", is the method usually applied to destroy an enemy when he is on the offensive and sometimes to destroy some of his stationary forces when he is on the defensive. Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the massing of the main forces for use in one important direction while retaining or dispatching part of the forces for use in other directions to contain, harass or disrupt the enemy, or to carry on mass work.

Although the flexible dispersal or concentration of forces according to circumstances is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must also know how to shift (or transfer) our forces flexibly. When the enemy feels seriously threatened by guerrillas, he will send troops to attack or suppress them. Hence the guerrilla units will have to take stock of the situation. If advisable, they should fight where they are; if not, they should lose no time in shifting elsewhere. Sometimes, in order to crush the enemy units one by one, guerrilla units which have destroyed an enemy force in one place may immediately shift to another so as to wipe out a second enemy force; sometimes, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, they may have to disengage quickly and fight the enemy elsewhere. If the enemy's forces in a certain place present a particularly serious threat, the guerrilla units should not linger, but should move off with lightning speed. In general, shifts of position should be made with secrecy and speed. In order to mislead, decoy and confuse the enemy, they should constantly use stratagems, such as making a feint to the east but attacking in the west, appearing now in the south and now in the north, hit-and-run attacks, and night actions.

Flexibility in dispersal, concentration and shifts of position is a concrete expression of the initiative in guerrilla warfare, whereas rigidness and inertia inevitably lead to passivity and cause unnecessary losses. But a commander proves himself wise not just by recognition of the importance of employing his forces flexibly but by skill in dispersing, concentrating or shifting them in good time according to the specific circumstances. This wisdom in sensing changes and choosing the right moment to act is not easily acquired; it can be gained only by those who study with a receptive mind and investigate and ponder diligently. Prudent consideration of the circumstances is essential to prevent flexibility from turning into impulsive action.

Lastly, we come to planning.

Without planning, victories in guerrilla warfare are impossible. Any idea that guerrilla warfare can be conducted in haphazard fashion indicates either a flippant attitude or ignorance of guerrilla warfare.

The operations in a guerrilla zone as a whole, or those of a guerrilla unit or formation, must be preceded by as thorough planning as possible, by preparation in advance for every action. Grasping the situation, setting the tasks, disposing the forces, giving military and political training, securing supplies, putting the equipment in good order, making proper use of the people's help, etc. — all these are part of the work of the guerrilla commanders, which they must carefully consider and conscientiously perform and check up on. There can be no initiative, no flexibility, and no offensive unless they do so. True, guerrilla conditions do not allow as high a degree of planning as do those of regular warfare, and it would be a mistake to attempt very thorough planning in guerrilla warfare. But it is necessary to plan as thoroughly as the objective conditions permit, for it should be understood that fighting the enemy is no joke.

The above points serve to explain the first of the strategic principles of guerrilla warfare, the principle of using initiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations. It is the key problem in the strategy of guerrilla warfare. The solution of this problem provides the major guarantee of victory in guerrilla warfare so far as military command is concerned.

Although a variety of matters have been dealt with here, they all revolve around the offensive in campaigns and battles. The initiative can be decisively grasped only after victory in an offensive. Every offensive operation must be organized on our initiative and not launched under compulsion. Flexibility in the employment of forces revolves around the effort to take the offensive, and planning likewise is necessary chiefly in order to ensure success in offensive operations. Measures of tactical defence are meaningless if they are divorced from their role of giving either direct or indirect support to an offensive. Quick decision refers to the tempo of an offensive, and exterior lines refer to its scope. The offensive is the only means of destroying the enemy and is also the principal means of self-preservation, while pure defence and retreat can play only a temporary and partial role in self-preservation and are quite useless for destroying the enemy.

The principle stated above is basically the same for both regular and guerrilla war; it differs to some degree only in its form of expression. But in guerrilla war it is both important and necessary to note this difference. It is precisely this difference in form which distinguishes the operational methods of guerrilla war from those of regular war.

If we confuse the two different forms in which the principle is expressed, victory in guerrilla war will be impossible.

CHAPTER V

CO-ORDINATION WITH REGULAR WARFARE

The second problem of strategy in guerrilla warfare is its co-ordination with regular warfare. It is a matter of clarifying the relation between guerrilla and regular warfare on the operational level, in the light of the nature of actual guerrilla operations. An understanding of this relation is very important for effectiveness in defeating the enemy.

There are three kinds of co-ordination between guerrilla and regular warfare, co-ordination in strategy, in campaigns and in battles.

Taken as a whole, guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, which cripples the enemy, pins him down, disrupts his supply lines and inspires the regular forces and the people throughout the country, is co-ordinated with regular warfare in strategy. Take the case of the guerrilla warfare in the three northeastern provinces. Of course, the question of co-ordination did not arise before the nation-wide War of Resistance, but since the war began the significance of such co-ordination has become obvious. Every enemy soldier the guerrillas kill there, every bullet they make the enemy expend, every enemy soldier they stop from advancing south of the Great Wall, can be reckoned a contribution to the total strength of the resistance. It is, moreover, clear that they are having a demoralizing effect on the whole enemy army and all Japan and a heartening effect on our whole army and people. Still clearer is the role in strategic co-ordination played by the guerrilla warfare along the Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, Tatung-Puchow, Chengting-Taiyuan and Shanghai-Hangchow Railways. Not only are the guerrilla units performing the function of co-ordination with the regular forces in our present strategic defensive, when the enemy is on the strategic offensive; not only will they co-ordinate with the regular forces in disrupting the enemy's hold on the occupied territory, after he concludes his strategic offensive and switches to the safeguarding of his gains; they will also co-ordinate with the regular forces in driving out the enemy forces and recovering all the lost territories, when the regular forces launch the strategic counter-offensive. The great role of guerrilla warfare in strategic co-ordination must not be overlooked. The commanders both of the guerrilla units and of the regular forces must clearly understand this role.

In addition, guerrilla warfare performs the function of co-ordination with regular warfare in campaigns. For instance, in the campaign at Hsinkou, north of Taiyuan, the guerrillas played a remarkable role in co-ordination both north and south of Yenmenkuan by wrecking the Tatung-Puchow Railway and the motor roads running through Pinghsingkuan and Yangfangkou. Or take another instance. After the enemy occupied Fenglingtu, guerrilla warfare, which was already widespread throughout Shansi Province and was conducted mainly by the regular forces, played an even greater role through co-ordination with the defensive campaigns west of the Yellow River in Shensi Province and south of the Yellow River in Honan Province. Again, when the enemy attacked southern Shantung, the guerrilla warfare in the five provinces of northern China contributed a great deal through co-ordination with the campaigns of our army. In performing a task of this sort, the leaders of each guerrilla base behind the enemy lines, or the commanders of a guerrilla formation temporarily dispatched there, must dispose their forces well and, by adopting different tactics suited to the time and place, move energetically against the enemy's most vital and vulnerable spots in order to cripple him, pin him down, disrupt his supply lines, inspire our armies campaigning on the interior lines, and so fulfil their duty of co-ordinating with the campaign. If each guerrilla zone or unit goes it alone without giving any attention to co-ordinating with the campaigns of the regular forces, its role in strategic co-ordination will lose a great deal of its significance, although it will still play some such role in the general strategy. All guerrilla commanders should give this point serious attention. To achieve co-ordination in campaigns, it is absolutely necessary for all larger guerrilla units and guerrilla formations to have radio equipment.

Finally, co-ordination with the regular forces in battles, in actual fighting on the battlefield, is the task of all guerrilla units in the vicinity of an interior-line battlefield. Of course, this applies only to guerrilla units operating close to the regular forces or to units of regulars dispatched on temporary guerrilla missions. In such cases, a guerrilla unit has to perform whatever task it is assigned by the commander of the regular forces, which is usually to pin down some of the enemy's forces, disrupt his supply lines, conduct reconnaissance, or act as guides for the regular forces. Even without such an assignment, the guerrilla unit should carry out these tasks on its own initiative. To sit by idly, neither moving nor fighting, or to move about without fighting, would be an intolerable attitude for a guerrilla unit.

CHAPTER VI

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AREAS

The third problem of strategy in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is the establishment of base areas, which is important and essential because of the protracted nature and ruthlessness of the war. The recovery of our lost territories will have to await the nation-wide strategic counter-offensive; by then the enemy's front will have extended deep into central China and cut it in two from north to south, and a part or even a greater part of our territory will have fallen into the hands of the enemy and become his rear. We shall have to extend guerrilla warfare all over this vast enemy-occupied area, make a front out of the enemy's rear, and force him to fight ceaselessly throughout the territory he occupies. Until such time as our strategic counter-offensive is launched and so long as our lost territories are not recovered, it will be necessary to persist in guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, certainly for a fairly long time, though one cannot say definitely for how long. This is why the war will be a protracted one. And in order to safeguard his gains in the occupied areas, the enemy is bound to step up his anti-guerrilla measures and, especially after the halting of his strategic offensive, to embark on relentless suppression of the guerrillas. With ruthlessness thus added to protractedness, it will be impossible to sustain guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines without base areas.

What, then, are these base areas? They are the strategic bases on which the guerrilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the object of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy. Without such strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend on in carrying out any of our strategic tasks or achieving the aim of the war. It is a characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines that it is fought without a rear, for the guerrilla forces are severed from the country's general rear. But guerrilla warfare could not last long or grow without base areas. The base areas, indeed, are its rear.

History knows many peasant wars of the "roving rebel" type, but none of them ever succeeded. In the present age of advanced communications and technology, it would be all the more groundless to imagine that one can win victory by fighting in the manner of roving rebels. However, this roving-rebel idea still exists among impoverished peasants, and in the minds of guerrilla commanders it becomes the view that base areas are neither necessary nor important. Therefore, ridding the minds of guerrilla commanders of this idea is a prerequisite for deciding on a policy of establishing base areas. The question of whether or not to have base areas and of whether or not to regard them as important, in other words, the conflict between the idea of establishing base areas and that of fighting like roving rebels, arises in all guerrilla warfare, and, to a certain extent, our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is no exception. Therefore the struggle against the roving-rebel ideology is an inevitable process. Only when this ideology is thoroughly overcome and the policy of establishing base areas is initiated and applied will there be conditions favourable for the maintenance of guerrilla warfare over a long period.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Now that the necessity and importance of base areas have been made clear, let us pass on to the following problems which must be understood and solved when it comes to establishing the base areas. These problems are the types of base areas, the guerrilla zones and the base areas, the conditions for establishing base areas, their consolidation and expansion, and the forms in which we and the enemy encircle one another.

1. THE TYPES OF BASE AREAS

Base areas in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare are mainly of three types, those in the mountains, those on the plains and those in the river-lake-estuary regions.

The advantage of setting up base areas in mountainous regions is obvious, and those which have been, are being or will be established in the Changpai,[1] Wutai,[2] Taihang,[3] Taishan,[4] Yenshan[5] and Maoshan[6] Mountains all belong to this type. They are all places where anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare can be maintained for the longest time and are important strongholds for the War of Resistance. We must develop guerrilla warfare and set up base areas in all the mountainous regions behind the enemy lines.

Of course, the plains are less suitable than the mountains, but it is by no means impossible to develop guerrilla warfare or establish any base areas there. Indeed, the widespread guerrilla warfare in the plains of Hopei and of northern and northwestern Shantung proves that it is possible to develop guerrilla warfare in the plains. While there is as yet no evidence on the possibility of setting up base areas there and maintaining them for long, it has been proved that the setting up of temporary base areas is possible, and it should be possible to set up base areas for small units or for seasonal use. On the one hand, the enemy does not have enough troops at his disposal and is pursuing a policy of unparalleled brutality, and on the other hand, China has a vast territory and vast numbers of people who are resisting Japan; the objective conditions for spreading guerrilla warfare and setting up temporary base areas in the plains are therefore fulfilled. Given competent military command, it should of course be possible to establish bases for small guerrilla units there, bases which are long-term but not fixed.[7] Broadly speaking, when the strategic offensive of the enemy is brought to a halt and he enters the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas, he will undoubtedly launch savage attacks on all the guerrilla base areas, and those in the plains will naturally be the first to bear the brunt. The large guerrilla formations operating on the plains will be unable to keep on fighting there for long and will gradually have to move up into the mountains as the circumstances require, as for instance, from the Hopei Plain to the Wutai and Taihang Mountains, or from the Shantung Plain to Taishan Mountain and the Shantung Peninsula in the east. But in the circumstances of our national war it is not impossible for numerous small guerrilla units to keep going in various counties over the vast plains and adopt a fluid way of fighting, *i.e.*, by shifting their bases from place to place. It is definitely possible to conduct seasonal guerrilla warfare by taking advantage of the “green curtain” of tall crops in summer and of the frozen rivers in winter. As the enemy has no strength to spare now and will never be able to attend to everything even when he has the strength to spare, it is absolutely necessary for us to decide on the policy, for the present, of spreading guerrilla warfare far and wide and setting up temporary base areas in the plains and, for the future, of preparing to keep up guerrilla warfare by small units, if only seasonally, and of creating base areas which are not fixed.

Objectively speaking, the possibilities of developing guerrilla warfare and establishing base areas are greater in the river-lake-estuary regions than in the plains, though less than in the mountains. The dramatic battles fought by "pirates" and "water-bandits", of which our history is full, and the guerrilla warfare round the Hunghu Lake kept up for several years in the Red Army period, both testify to the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and of establishing base areas in the river-lake-estuary regions. So far, however, the political parties and the masses who are resisting Japan have given this possibility little attention. Though the subjective conditions are as yet lacking, we should undoubtedly turn our attention to this possibility and start working on it. As one aspect in the development of our nation-wide guerrilla warfare, we should effectively organize guerrilla warfare in the Hungtse Lake region north of the Yangtse River, in the Taihu Lake region south of the Yangtse, and in all river-lake-estuary regions in the enemy-occupied areas along the rivers and on the seacoast, and we should create permanent base areas in and near such places. By overlooking this aspect we are virtually providing the enemy with water transport facilities; this is a gap in our strategic plan for the War of Resistance which must be filled in good time.

2. GUERRILLA ZONES AND BASE AREAS

In guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, there is a difference between guerrilla zones and base areas. Areas which are surrounded by the enemy but whose central parts are not occupied or have been recovered, like some counties in the Wutai mountain region (*i.e.*, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area) and also some places in the Taihang and Taishan mountain regions, are ready-made bases for the convenient use of guerrilla units in developing guerrilla warfare. But elsewhere in these areas the situation is different, as for instance in the eastern and northern sections of the Wutai mountain region, which include parts of western Hopei and southern Chahar, and in many places east of Paoting and west of Tsangchow. When guerrilla warfare began, the guerrillas could not completely occupy these places but could only make frequent raids; they are areas which are held by the guerrillas when they are there and by the puppet regime when they are gone, and are therefore not yet guerrilla bases but only what may be called guerrilla zones. Such guerrilla zones will be transformed into base areas when they have gone through the necessary processes of guerrilla warfare, that is, when large numbers of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated there, the puppet regime has been destroyed, the masses have been roused to activity, anti-Japanese mass organizations have been formed, people's local armed forces have been developed, and anti-Japanese political power has been established. By the expansion of our base areas we mean the addition of areas such as these to the bases already established.

In some places, for example, eastern Hopei, the whole area of guerrilla operations has been a guerrilla zone from the very beginning. The puppet regime is of long standing there, and from the beginning the whole area of operations has been a guerrilla zone both for the people's armed forces that have grown out of local uprisings and for the guerrilla detachments dispatched from the Wutai Mountains. At the outset of their activities, all they could do was to choose some fairly good spots there as temporary rear or base areas. Such places will not be transformed from guerrilla zones into relatively stable base areas until the enemy forces are destroyed and the work of arousing the people is in full swing.

Thus the transformation of a guerrilla zone into a base area is an arduous creative process, and its accomplishment depends on the extent to which the enemy is destroyed and the masses are aroused.

Many regions will remain guerrilla zones for a long time. In these regions the enemy will not be able to set up stable puppet regimes, however much he tries to maintain control, while we, on our part, will not be able to achieve the aim of establishing anti-Japanese political power, however much we develop guerrilla warfare. Examples of this kind are to be found in the enemy-occupied regions along the railway lines, in the neighbourhood of big cities and in certain areas in the plains.

As for the big cities, the railway stops and the areas in the plains which are strongly garrisoned by the enemy, guerrilla warfare can only extend to the fringes and not right into these places which have relatively stable puppet regimes. This is another kind of situation.

Mistakes in our leadership or strong enemy pressure may cause a reversal of the state of affairs described above, *i.e.*, a guerrilla base may turn into a guerrilla zone, and a guerrilla zone may turn into an area under relatively stable enemy occupation. Such changes are possible, and they deserve special vigilance on the part of guerrilla commanders.

Therefore, as a result of guerrilla warfare and the struggle between us and the enemy, the entire enemy-occupied territory will fall into the following three categories: first, anti-Japanese bases held by our guerrilla units and our organs of political power; second, areas held by Japanese imperialism and its puppet regimes; and third, intermediate zones contested by both sides, namely, guerrilla zones. Guerrilla commanders have the duty to expand the first and third categories to the maximum and to reduce the second category to the minimum. This is the strategic task of guerrilla warfare.

3. CONDITIONS FOR ESTABLISHING BASE AREAS

The fundamental conditions for establishing a base area are that there should be anti-Japanese armed forces, that these armed forces should be employed to inflict defeats on the enemy and that they should arouse the people to action. Thus the establishment of a base area is first and foremost a matter of building an armed force. Leaders in guerrilla war must devote their energy to building one or more guerrilla units, and must gradually develop them in the course of struggle into guerrilla formations or even into units and formations of regular troops. The building up of an armed force is the key to establishing a base area; if there is no armed force or if the armed force is weak, nothing can be done. This constitutes the first condition.

The second indispensable condition for establishing a base area is that the armed forces should be used in co-ordination with the people to defeat the enemy. All places under enemy control are enemy, and not guerrilla, base areas, and obviously cannot be transformed into guerrilla base areas unless the enemy is defeated. Unless we repulse the enemy's attacks and defeat him, even places held by the guerrillas will come under enemy control, and then it will be impossible to establish base areas.

The third indispensable condition for establishing a base area is the use of all our strength, including our armed forces, to arouse the masses for struggle against Japan. In the course of this struggle we must arm the people, *i.e.*, organize self-defence corps and guerrilla units. In the course of this struggle, we must form mass organizations, we must organize the workers, peasants, youth, women, children, merchants and professional people — according to the degree of their political consciousness and fighting enthusiasm — into the various mass organizations necessary for the struggle against Japanese aggression, and we must gradually expand them. Without organization, the people cannot give effect to their anti-Japanese strength. In the course of this struggle, we must weed out the open and the hidden traitors a task which can be accomplished only by relying on the strength of the people. In this struggle, it is particularly important to arouse the people to establish, or to consolidate, their local organs of anti-Japanese political power. Where the original Chinese organs of political power have not been destroyed by the enemy, we must reorganize and strengthen them with the support of the broad masses, and where they have been destroyed by the enemy, we should rebuild them by the efforts of the masses. They are organs of political power for carrying out the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and should unite all the forces of the people to fight against our sole enemy, Japanese imperialism, and its jackals, the traitors and reactionaries.

A base area for guerrilla war can be truly established only with the gradual fulfilment of the three basic conditions, *i.e.*, only after the anti-Japanese armed forces are built up, the enemy has suffered defeats and the people are aroused.

Mention must also be made of geographical and economic conditions. As for the former, we have already discussed three different categories in the earlier section on the types of base areas, and here we need only mention one major requirement, namely, that the area must be extensive. In places surrounded by the enemy on all sides, or on three sides, the mountainous regions naturally offer the best conditions for setting up base areas which can hold out for a long time, but the main thing is that there must be enough room for the guerrillas to manoeuvre, namely, the areas have to be extensive. Given an extensive area, guerrilla warfare can be developed and sustained even in the plains, not to mention the river-lake-estuary regions. By and large, the vastness of China's territory and the enemy's shortage of troops provide guerrilla warfare in China with this condition. This is an important, even a primary condition, as far as the possibility of waging guerrilla warfare is concerned, and small countries like Belgium which lack this condition have few or no such possibilities.[8] In China, this condition is not something which has to be striven for, nor does it present a problem; it is there physically, waiting only to be exploited.

So far as their physical setting is concerned, the economic conditions resemble the geographical conditions. For now we are discussing the establishment of base areas not in a desert, where no enemy is to be found, but behind the enemy lines; every place the enemy can penetrate already has its Chinese inhabitants and an economic basis for subsistence, so that the question of choice of economic conditions in establishing base areas simply does not arise. Irrespective of the economic conditions, we should do our utmost to develop guerrilla warfare and set up permanent or temporary base areas in all places where Chinese inhabitants and enemy forces are to be found. In a political sense, however, the economic conditions do present a problem, a problem of economic policy which is of immense importance to the establishment of base areas. The economic policy of the guerrilla base areas must follow the principles of the Anti-Japanese National United Front by equitably distributing the financial burden and protecting commerce. Neither the local organs of political power nor the guerrilla units must violate these principles, or otherwise the establishment of base areas and the maintenance of guerrilla warfare would be adversely affected. The equitable distribution of the financial burden means that "those with money should contribute money", while the peasants should supply the guerrilla units with grain within certain limits. The protection of commerce means that the guerrilla units should be highly disciplined and that the confiscation of shops, except those owned by proved traitors, should be strictly prohibited. This is no easy matter, but the policy is set and must be put into effect.

4. THE CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION OF BASE AREAS

In order to confine the enemy invaders to a few strongholds, that is, to the big cities and along the main communication lines, the guerrillas must do all they can to extend guerrilla warfare from their base areas as widely as possible and hem in all the enemy's strongholds, thus threatening his existence and shaking his morale while expanding the base areas. This is essential. In this context, we must oppose conservatism in guerrilla warfare. Whether originating in the desire for an easy life or in overestimation of the enemy's strength, conservatism can only bring losses in the War of Resistance and is harmful to guerrilla warfare and to the base areas themselves. At the same time, we must not forget the consolidation of the base areas, the chief task being to arouse and organize the masses and to train guerrilla units and local armed forces. Such consolidation is needed for maintaining protracted warfare and also for expansion, and in its absence energetic expansion is impossible. If we attend only to expansion and forget about consolidation in our guerrilla warfare, we shall be unable to withstand the enemy's attacks, and consequently not only forfeit the possibility of expansion but also endanger the very existence of the base areas. The correct principle is expansion with consolidation, which is a good method and allows us to take the offensive or the defensive as we choose. Given a protracted war, the problem of consolidating and expanding base areas constantly arises for every guerrilla unit. The concrete solution depends, of course, on the circumstances. At one time, the emphasis may be on expansion, *i.e.*, on expanding the guerrilla zones and increasing the number of guerrillas. At another, the emphasis may be on consolidation, *i.e.*, on organizing the masses and training the troops. As expansion and consolidation differ in nature, and as the military dispositions and other tasks will differ accordingly, an effective solution of the problem is possible only if we alternate the emphasis according to time and circumstances.

5. FORMS IN WHICH WE AND THE ENEMY ENCIRCLE ONE ANOTHER

Taking the War of Resistance as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy, because he is on the strategic offensive and is operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensive and are operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemy encirclement. We on our part encircle each of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes, because we apply the policy of the offensive and of exterior-line operations in campaigns and battles by using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from exterior lines. This is the first form of our encirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai mountain region, or on three sides, like the northwestern Shansi area. This is the second form of enemy encirclement. However, if one considers all the guerrilla base areas together and in their relation to the battle fronts of the regular forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy forces. In Shansi Province, for instance, we have surrounded the Tatung-Puchow Railway on three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similar instances in Hopei and Shantung Provinces. This is the second form of our encirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own — rather like a game of *weichi*.[9] Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of strongholds by the enemy and of guerrilla base areas by us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. It is in the matter of "dominating the spaces" that the great strategic role of guerrilla base areas in the rear of the enemy is revealed. We are raising this question in the War of Resistance in order that the nation's military authorities and the guerrilla commanders in all areas should place on the agenda the development of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines and the establishment of base areas wherever possible, and carry this out as a strategic task. If on the international plane we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, and the Soviet Union and other countries which may join it as other strategic units, we shall then have one more form of encirclement against the enemy than he has against us and bring about exterior-line operations in the Pacific region by which to encircle and destroy fascist Japan. To be sure, this is of little practical significance at present, but such a prospect is not impossible.

CHAPTER VII

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE AND THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WAR

The fourth problem of strategy in guerrilla war concerns the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive. This is the problem of how the policy of offensive warfare, which we mentioned in our discussion of the first problem, is to be carried out in practice, when we are on the defensive and when we are on the offensive in our guerrilla warfare against Japan.

Within the nation-wide strategic defensive or strategic offensive (to be more exact, the strategic counter-offensive), small-scale strategic defensives and offensives take place in and around each guerrilla base area. By strategic defensive we mean our strategic situation and policy when the enemy is on the offensive and we are on the defensive; by strategic offensive we mean our strategic situation and policy when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive.

1. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WAR

After guerrilla warfare has broken out and grown to a considerable extent, the enemy will inevitably attack the guerrilla base areas, especially in the period when his strategic offensive against the country as a whole is brought to an end and he adopts the policy of safeguarding his occupied areas. It is essential to recognize the inevitability of such attacks, for otherwise the guerrilla commanders will be caught wholly unprepared, and in the face of heavy enemy attacks they will undoubtedly become alarmed and confused and their forces will be routed.

To wipe out the guerrillas and their base areas, the enemy frequently resorts to converging attacks. For instance, in each of the four or five "punitive expeditions" directed against the Wutai mountain region, the enemy made a planned advance in three, four or even six or seven columns simultaneously. The larger the scale of the guerrilla fighting, the more important the position of the base areas, and the greater the threat to the enemy's strategic centres and vital communication lines, the fiercer will be the enemy's attacks. Therefore, the fiercer the enemy's attacks on a guerrilla area, the greater the indication that the guerrilla warfare there is successful and is being effectively co-ordinated with the regular fighting.

When the enemy launches a converging attack in several columns, the guerrilla policy should be to smash it by counter-attack. It can be easily smashed if each advancing enemy column consists of only one unit, whether big or small, has no follow-up units and is unable to station troops along the route of advance, construct blockhouses or build motor roads. When the enemy launches a converging attack, he is on the offensive and operating on exterior lines, while we are on the defensive and operating on interior lines. As for our dispositions, we should use our secondary forces to pin down several enemy columns, while our main force should launch surprise attacks (chiefly in the form of ambushes) in a campaign or battle against a single enemy column, striking it when it is on the move. The enemy, though strong, will be weakened by repeated surprise attacks and will often withdraw when he is halfway; the guerrilla units can then make more surprise attacks during the pursuit and weaken him still further. The enemy generally occupies the county towns or other towns in our base areas before he stops his offensive or begins to withdraw, and we should encircle these towns, cutting off his grain supply and severing his communications, so that when he cannot hold out and begins to retreat, we can seize the opportunity to pursue and attack him. After smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another, and, by smashing them one by one, shatter the converging attack.

A big base area like the Wutai mountain region forms a military area, which is divided into four or five, or even more, military sub-areas, each with its own armed forces operating independently. By employing the tactics described above, these forces have often smashed the enemy's attacks simultaneously or successively.

In our plan of operations against a converging attack by the enemy, we generally place our main force on interior lines. But when we have the strength to spare, we should use our secondary forces (such as the county or the district guerrilla units, or even detachments of the main force) on exterior lines to disrupt the enemy's communications and pin down his reinforcements. Should the enemy stay put in our base area, we may reverse the tactics, namely, leave some of our forces in the base area to invest the enemy while employing the main force to attack the region whence he has come and to step up our activities there, in order to induce him to withdraw and attack our main force; this is the tactic of "relieving the state of Chao by besieging the state of Wei".[10]

In the course of operations against a converging attack, the local anti-Japanese self-defence corps and all the mass organizations should mobilize for action and in every way help our troops to fight the enemy. In fighting the enemy, it is important both to enforce local martial law and, as far as possible, to "strengthen our defence works and clear the fields". The purpose of the former is to suppress traitors and prevent the enemy from getting information, and of the latter to assist our own operations (by strengthening our defence works) and prevent the enemy from getting food (by clearing the fields). "Clearing the fields" means harvesting the crops as soon as they are ripe.

When the enemy retreats, he often burns down the houses in the cities and towns he has occupied and razes the villages along his route, with the purpose of destroying the guerrilla base areas; but in so doing he deprives himself of shelter and food in his next offensive, and the damage recoils upon his own head. This is a concrete illustration of what we mean by one and the same thing having two contradictory aspects.

A guerrilla commander should not think of abandoning his base area and shifting to another, unless it proves impossible, after repeated operations, to smash the enemy's heavy converging attacks. In these circumstances he must guard against pessimism. So long as the leaders do not blunder in matters of principle, it is generally possible to smash the converging attacks and hold on to the base areas in the mountainous regions. It is only in the plains that, when confronted by a heavy converging attack, the guerrilla commander should consider other measures in the light of the specific circumstances, namely, leaving many small units for scattered operations, while temporarily shifting large guerrilla formations to some mountainous region, so that they can return and resume their activities in the plains once the main forces of the enemy move away.

Generally speaking, the Japanese cannot adopt the principle of blockhouse warfare, which the Kuomintang employed in the days of the civil war, because their forces are inadequate in relation to China's vast territory. However, we should reckon with the possibility that they may use it to some extent against those guerrilla base areas which pose a particular threat to their vital positions, but even in such circumstances we should be prepared to keep up guerrilla warfare in those areas. Since we have had the experience of being able to maintain guerrilla warfare during the civil war, there is not the slightest doubt of our greater capacity to do so in a national war. Though, in point of relative military strength, the enemy can throw forces that are vastly superior in quantity as well as in quality against some of our base areas, there remain the insoluble national contradiction between us and the enemy and the unavoidable weaknesses of his command. Our victories are based on thorough work among the masses and flexible tactics in our operations.

2. THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WAR

After we have smashed an enemy offensive and before the enemy starts a new offensive, he is on the strategic defensive and we are on the strategic offensive.

At such times our operational policy is not to attack enemy forces which are entrenched in defensive positions and which we are not sure of defeating, but systematically to destroy or drive out the small enemy units and puppet forces in certain areas, which our guerrilla units are strong enough to deal with, and to expand our areas, arouse the masses for struggle against Japan, replenish and train our troops and organize new guerrilla units. If the enemy still remains on the defensive when these tasks are under way, we can expand our new areas still further and attack weakly garrisoned cities and communication lines and hold them for as long as circumstances permit. These are all tasks of the strategic offensive, and the purpose is to take advantage of the fact that the enemy is on the defensive so that we may effectively build up our own military and mass strength, effectively reduce the enemy's strength and prepare to smash the enemy methodically and vigorously when he mounts an offensive again.

It is essential to rest and train our troops, and the best time for doing so is when the enemy is on the defensive. It is not a question of shutting ourselves off from everything else for rest and training, but of finding time for rest and training while expanding our areas, mopping up small enemy units and arousing the people. This is usually also the time for tackling the difficult problem of getting food supplies, bedding, clothing, etc.

It is also the time for destroying the enemy's communication lines on a large scale, hampering his transport and giving direct support to the regular forces in their campaigns.

At such times the guerrilla base areas, guerrilla zones and guerrilla units are in high spirits, and the areas devastated by the enemy are gradually rehabilitated and revived. The people in the enemy-occupied territories are also delighted, and the fame of the guerrillas resounds everywhere. On the other hand, in the camp of the enemy and his running dogs, the traitors, panic and disintegration are mounting, while there is growing hatred of the guerrillas and their base areas and preparations to deal with them are intensified. During the strategic offensive, therefore, it is impermissible for the guerrilla commanders to become so elated as to underrate the enemy and forget to strengthen unity in their own ranks and to consolidate their base areas and their forces. At such times, they must skilfully watch the enemy's every move for signs of any new offensive against us, so that the moment it comes they can wind up their strategic offensive in good order, turn to the strategic defensive and thereby smash the enemy's offensive.

CHAPTER VIII

DEVELOPMENT OF GUERRILLA WAR INTO MOBILE WAR

The fifth problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan is its development into mobile war, a development which is necessary and possible because the war is protracted and ruthless. If China could speedily defeat the Japanese invaders and recover her lost territories, and if the war were neither protracted nor ruthless, this would not be necessary. But as, on the contrary, the war is protracted and ruthless, guerrilla warfare cannot adapt itself to such a war except by developing into mobile warfare. Since the war is protracted and ruthless, it is possible for the guerrilla units to undergo the necessary steeling and gradually to transform themselves into regular forces, so that their mode of operations is gradually regularized and guerrilla warfare develops into mobile warfare. The necessity and possibility of this development must be clearly recognized by the guerrilla commanders if they are to persist in, and systematically carry out, the policy of turning guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare.

In many places, such as the Wutai mountain region, the present guerrilla warfare owes its growth to the strong detachments sent there by the regular forces. The operations there, though generally of a guerrilla character, have contained an element of mobile warfare from the very beginning. This element will gradually increase as the war goes on. Herein lies the advantage which makes possible the swift expansion of the present anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and its rapid development to a higher level; thus the conditions for guerrilla warfare are far superior to what they were in the three northeastern provinces.

To transform guerrilla units waging guerrilla warfare into regular forces waging mobile warfare, two conditions are necessary — an increase in numbers, and an improvement in quality. Apart from directly mobilizing the people to join the forces, increased numbers can be attained by amalgamating small units, while better quality depends on steeling the fighters and improving their weapons in the course of the war.

In amalgamating small units, we must, on the one hand, guard against localism, whereby attention is concentrated exclusively on local interests and centralization is impeded, and, on the other, guard against the purely military approach, whereby local interests are brushed aside.

Localism exists among the local guerrilla units and local governments, which are frequently preoccupied with local considerations to the neglect of the general interest, or which prefer to act each on its own because they are unaccustomed to acting in larger groups. The commanders of the main guerrilla units or of the guerrilla formations must take this into account and adopt the method of gradual amalgamation of part of the local units, allowing the localities to keep some of their forces and expand their guerrilla warfare; the commanders should draw these units into joint operations and then bring about their amalgamation without breaking up their original organization or reshuffling their cadres, so that the small groups may integrate smoothly into the larger group.

As against localism, the purely military approach represents the wrong viewpoint held in the main forces by those who are bent on expanding their own strength and who neglect to assist the local armed units. They do not realize that the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare means not the abandonment of guerrilla warfare, but the gradual formation, in the midst of widespread guerrilla warfare, of a main force capable of conducting mobile warfare, a force around which there must still be numerous guerrilla units carrying on extensive guerrilla operations. These guerrilla units are powerful auxiliaries to the main force and serve as inexhaustible reserves for its continuous growth. Therefore, if a commander of a main force has made the mistake of neglecting the interests of the local population and the local government as a result of a purely military approach, he must correct it in order that the expansion of the main force and the multiplication of the local armed units may both receive due attention.

To raise the quality of the guerrilla units it is imperative to raise their political and organizational level and improve their equipment, military technique, tactics and discipline, so that they gradually pattern themselves on the regular forces and shed their guerrilla ways. Politically, it is imperative to get both the commanders and the fighters to realize the necessity of raising the guerrilla units to the level of the regular forces, to encourage them to strive towards this end, and to guarantee its attainment by means of political work. Organizationally, it is imperative gradually to fulfil all the requirements of a regular formation in the following respects — military and political organs, staff and working methods, a regular supply system, a medical service, etc. In the matter of equipment, it is imperative to acquire better and more varied weapons and increase the supply of the necessary communications equipment. In the matter of military technique and tactics, it is imperative to raise the guerrilla units to the level required of a regular formation. In the matter of discipline, it is imperative to raise the level so that uniform standards are observed, every order is executed without fail and all slackness is eliminated. To accomplish all these tasks requires a prolonged effort, and it cannot be done overnight; but that is the direction in which we must develop. Only thus can a main force be built up in each guerrilla base area and mobile warfare emerge for more effective attacks on the enemy. Where detachments or cadres have been sent in by the regular forces, the goal can be achieved more easily. Hence all the regular forces have the responsibility of helping the guerrilla units to develop into regular units.

CHAPTER IX

THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMMAND

The last problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan concerns the relationship of command. A correct solution of this problem is one of the prerequisites for the unhampered development of guerrilla warfare.

Since guerrilla units are a lower level of armed organization characterized by dispersed operations, the methods of command in guerrilla warfare do not allow as high a degree of centralization as in regular warfare. If any attempt is made to apply the methods of command in regular warfare to guerrilla warfare, its great flexibility will inevitably be restricted and its vitality sapped. A highly centralized command is in direct contradiction to the great flexibility of guerrilla warfare and must not and cannot be applied to it.

However, guerrilla warfare cannot be successfully developed without some centralized command. When extensive regular warfare and extensive guerrilla warfare are going on at the same time, their operations must be properly co-ordinated; hence the need for a command co-ordinating the two, *i.e.*, for a unified strategic command by the national general staff and the war-zone commanders. In a guerrilla zone or guerrilla base area with many guerrilla units, there are usually one or more guerrilla formations (sometimes together with regular formations) which constitute the main force, a number of other guerrilla units, big and small, which represent the supplementary force, and many armed units composed of people not withdrawn from production; the enemy forces there usually form a unified complex to concert their operations against the guerrillas. Consequently, the problem arises of setting up a unified or centralized command in such guerrilla zones or base areas.

Hence, as opposed both to absolute centralization and to absolute decentralization, the principle of command in guerrilla war should be centralized strategic command and decentralized command in campaigns and battles.

Centralized strategic command includes the planning and direction of guerrilla warfare as a whole by the state, the co-ordination of guerrilla warfare with regular warfare in each war zone, and the unified direction of all the anti-Japanese armed forces in each guerrilla zone or base area. Here lack of harmony, unity and centralization is harmful, and every effort must be made to ensure all three. In general matters, that is, matters of strategy, the lower levels should report to the higher and follow their instructions so as to ensure concerted action. Centralization, however, stops at this point, and it would likewise be harmful to go beyond it and interfere with the lower levels in matters of detail like the specific dispositions for a campaign or battle. For such details must be settled in the light of specific conditions, which change from time to time and from place to place and are quite beyond the knowledge of the distant higher levels of command. This is what is meant by the principle of decentralized command in campaigns and battles. The same principle generally applies in regular operations, especially when communications are inadequate. In a word, it means guerrilla warfare waged independently and with the initiative in our hands within the framework of a unified strategy.

Where a guerrilla base area constitutes a military area divided into sub-areas, each comprising several counties, each of which is again divided into districts, the relationship between the various levels, from the headquarters of the military area and sub-areas down to the county and district governments, is one of consecutive subordination, and every armed force must, according to its nature, be under the direct command of one of these. On the principle that has been enunciated, in the relationship of command at these levels matters of general policy should be centralized in the higher levels, while actual operations should be carried out in the light of the specific circumstances by the lower levels, which should have the right of independent action. If a higher level has something to say about the actual operations undertaken at a lower level, it can and should advance its views as "instructions" but must not issue hard and fast "commands". The more extensive the area, the more complex the situation and the greater the distance between the higher and the lower levels, the more advisable it becomes to allow greater independence to the lower levels in their actual operations and thus give those operations a character conforming more closely to the local requirements, so that the lower levels and the local personnel may develop the ability to work independently, cope with complicated situations, and successfully expand guerrilla warfare. For an armed unit or bigger formation which is engaged in a concentrated operation, the principle to be applied is one of centralization in its internal relationship of command, since the situation is clear to the higher command but the moment this unit or formation breaks up for dispersed action, the principle of centralization in general matters and of decentralization in details should be applied, for then the specific situation cannot be clear to the higher command.

Absence of centralization where it is needed means negligence by the higher levels or usurpation of authority by the lower levels, neither of which can be tolerated in the relationship between higher and lower levels, especially in the military sphere. If decentralization is not effected where it should be, that means monopolization of power by the higher levels and lack of initiative on the part of the lower levels, neither of which can be tolerated in the relationship between higher and lower levels, especially in the command of guerrilla warfare. The above principles constitute the only correct policy for solving the problem of the relationship of command.

NOTES

[1] The Changpai mountain range is situated on the northeastern border of China. After the Japanese invasion on September 18, 1931, the region became a base area for the anti-Japanese guerrillas led by the Chinese Communist Party.

[2] The Wutai mountain range is situated on the borders between Shansi, Hopei and what was then Chahar Province. In October 1937 the Eighth Route Army led by the Chinese Communist Party started building the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei anti-Japanese base area with the Wutai mountain region as its centre.

[3] The Taihang mountain range is situated on the borders between Shansi, Hopei and Honan Provinces. In November 1937 the Eighth Route Army started building the southeastern Shansi anti-Japanese base area with the Taihang mountain region as its centre.

[4] The Taishan Mountain is one of the chief peaks of the Tai-Yi mountain range in central Shantung. In the winter of 1937 the guerrilla forces led by the Communist Party started building the central Shantung anti-Japanese base area with the Tai-Yi mountain region as its centre.

[5] The Yenshan mountain range is situated on the border of Hopei and what was then Jehol Province. In the summer of 1938 the Eighth Route Army started building the eastern Hopei anti-Japanese base area with the Yenshan mountain region as its centre.

[6] The Maoshan Mountains are in southern Kiangsu. In June 1938 the New Fourth Army led by the Communist Party started building the southern Kiangsu anti-Japanese base area with the Maoshan mountain region as its centre.

[7] Experience gained in the War of Resistance proved that it was possible to establish long-term and, in many places, stable base areas in the plains. This was due to their vastness and big populations, the correctness of the Communist Party's policies, the extensive mobilization of the people and the enemy's shortage of troops. Comrade Mao Tse-tung affirmed this possibility more definitely in later directives.

[8] Ever since the end of World War II, the national and democratic revolutionary movement has been surging forward in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In many countries the people, led by their own revolutionary and progressive forces, have carried on sustained armed struggles to overthrow the dark rule of imperialism and reaction. This demonstrates that in the new historical circumstances — when the socialist camp, the revolutionary forces of the people in the colonial countries and the forces of the people striving for democracy and progress in all countries are taking giant strides forward, when the world capitalist system is weakening still further, and when the colonial rule of imperialism is heading for disintegration — the conditions under which the people of various countries conduct guerrilla warfare today need not be quite the same as those which were necessary in the days of the guerrilla warfare waged by the Chinese people against Japan. In other words, guerrilla war can be victoriously waged in a country which is not large in territory, as for instance, in Cuba, Algeria, Laos and southern Viet Nam.

[9] *Weichi* is an old Chinese game, in which the two players try to encircle each other's pieces on the board. When a player's pieces are encircled, they are counted as "dead" (captured). But if there is a sufficient number of blank spaces among the encircled pieces, then the latter are still "alive" (not captured).

[10] In 353 B.C. the state of Wei laid siege to Hantan, capital of the state of Chao. The king of the state of Chi, an ally of Chao, ordered his generals Tien Chi and Sun Pin to aid Chao with their troops. Knowing that the crack forces of Wei had entered Chao and left their own territory weakly garrisoned, General Sun Pin attacked the state of Wei whose troops withdrew to defend their own country. Taking advantage of their exhaustion, the troops of Chi engaged and routed them at Kueiling (northeast of the present Hotse County in Shantung). The siege of Hantan, capital of Chao, was thus lifted. Since then Chinese strategists have referred to similar tactics as "relieving the state of Chao by besieging the state of Wei".

ON PROTRACTED WAR

May 1938

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. It will soon be July 7, the first anniversary of the great War of Resistance Against Japan. Rallying in unity, persevering in resistance and persevering in the united front, the forces of the whole nation have been valiantly fighting the enemy for almost a year. The people of the whole world are attentively following this war, which has no precedent in the history of the East, and which will go down as a great war in world history too. Every Chinese suffering from the disasters of the war and fighting for the survival of his nation daily yearns for victory. But what actually will be the course of the war? Can we win? Can we win quickly? Many people are talking about a protracted war, but why is it a protracted war? How to carry on a protracted war? Many people are talking about final victory, but why will final victory be ours? How shall we strive for final victory? Not everyone has found answers to these questions; in fact, to this day most people have not done so. Therefore the defeatist exponents of the theory of national subjugation have come forward to tell people that China will be subjugated, that final victory will not be China's. On the other hand, some impetuous friends have come forward to tell people that China will win very quickly without having to exert any great effort. But are these views correct? We have said all along they are not. However, most people have not yet grasped what we have been saying. This is partly because we did not do enough propaganda and explanatory work, and partly because the development

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This series of lectures was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung from May 26 to June 3, 1938, at the Yenan Association for the Study of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

of objective events had not yet fully and clearly revealed their inherent nature and their features to the people, who were thus not in a position to foresee the over-all trend and the outcome and hence to decide on a complete set of policies and tactics. Now things are better; the experience of ten months of war has been quite sufficient to explode the utterly baseless theory of national subjugation and to dissuade our impetuous friends from their theory of quick victory. In these circumstances many people are asking for a comprehensive explanation. All the more so with regard to protracted war, not only because of the opposing theories of national subjugation and quick victory but also because of the shallow understanding of its nature. "Our four hundred million people have been making a concerted effort since the Lukouchiao Incident, and the final victory will belong to China." This formula has a wide currency. It is a correct formula but needs to be given more content. Our perseverance in the War of Resistance and in the united front has been possible because of many factors. Internally, they comprise all the political parties in the country from the Communist Party to the Kuomintang, all the people from the workers and peasants to the bourgeoisie, and all the armed forces from the regular forces to the guerrillas; internationally, they range from the land of socialism to justice-loving people in all countries; in the camp of the enemy, they range from those people in Japan who are against the war to those Japanese soldiers at the front who are against the war. In short, all these forces have contributed in varying degrees to our War of Resistance. Every man with a conscience should salute them. We Communists, together with all the other anti-Japanese political parties and the whole people, have no other course than to strive to unite all forces for the defeat of the diabolical Japanese aggressors. July 1 this year will be the 17th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. A serious study of protracted war is necessary in order to enable every Communist to play a better and greater part in the War of Resistance. Therefore my lectures will be devoted to such a study. I shall try to speak on all the problems relevant to the protracted war, but I cannot possibly go into everything in one series of lectures.

2. All the experience of the ten months of war proves the error both of the theory of China's inevitable subjugation and of the theory of China's quick victory. The former gives rise to the tendency to compromise and the latter to the tendency to underestimate the enemy.

Both approaches to the problem are subjective and one-sided, or, in a word, unscientific.

3. Before the War of Resistance, there was a great deal of talk about national subjugation. Some said, "China is inferior in arms and is bound to lose in a war." Others said, "If China offers armed resistance, she is sure to become another Abyssinia." Since the beginning of the war, open talk of national subjugation has disappeared, but secret talk, and quite a lot of it too, still continues. For instance, from time to time an atmosphere of compromise arises and the advocates of compromise argue that "the continuance of the war spells subjugation".[1] In a letter from Hunan a student has written:

> In the countryside everything seems difficult. Doing propaganda work on my own, I have to talk to people when and where I find them. The people I have talked to are by no means ignoramuses; they all have some understanding of what is going on and are very interested in what I have to say. But when I run into my own relatives, they always say: "China cannot win; she is doomed." They make one sick! Fortunately, they do not go around spreading their views, otherwise things would really be bad. The peasants would naturally put more stock in what they say.

Such exponents of the theory of China's inevitable subjugation form the social basis of the tendency to compromise. They are to be found everywhere in China, and therefore the problem of compromise is liable to crop up within the anti-Japanese front at any time and will probably remain with us right until the end of the war. Now that Hsuchow has fallen and Wuhan is in danger, it will not be unprofitable, I think, to knock the bottom out of the theory of national subjugation.

4. During these ten months of war all kinds of views which are indicative of impetuosity have also appeared. For instance, at the outset of the war many people were groundlessly optimistic, underestimating Japan and even believing that the Japanese could not get as far as Shansi. Some belittled the strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance and doubted the proposition, "With regard to the whole, mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary; with regard to the parts, guerrilla warfare is primary and mobile warfare supplementary." They disagreed with the Eighth Route

Army's strategy, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions", which they regarded as a "mechanical" approach.[2] During the battle of Shanghai some people said: "If we can fight for just three months, the international situation is bound to change, the Soviet Union is bound to send troops, and the war will be over." They pinned their hopes for the future of the War of Resistance chiefly on foreign aid.[3] After the Taierhchuang victory,[4] some people maintained that the Hsuchow campaign should be fought as a "quasi-decisive campaign" and that the policy of protracted war should be changed. They said such things as, "This campaign marks the last desperate struggle of the enemy," or, "If we win, the Japanese warlords will be demoralized and able only to await their Day of Judgement."[5] The victory at Pinghsingkuan turned some people's heads, and further victory at Taierhchuang has turned more people's heads. Doubts have arisen as to whether the enemy will attack Wuhan. Many people think "probably not", and many others "definitely not". Such doubts may affect all major issues. For instance, is our anti-Japanese strength already sufficient? Some people may answer affirmatively, for our present strength is already sufficient to check the enemy's advance, so why increase it? Or, for instance, is the slogan "Consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front" still correct? Some people may answer negatively, for the united front in its present state is already strong enough to repulse the enemy, so why consolidate and expand it? Or, for instance, should our efforts in diplomacy and international propaganda be intensified? Here again the answer may be in the negative. Or, for instance, should we proceed in earnest to reform the army system and the system of government, develop the mass movement, enforce education for national defence, suppress traitors and Trotskyites, develop war industries and improve the people's livelihood? Or, for instance, are the slogans calling for the defence of Wuhan, of Canton and of the Northwest and for the vigorous development of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear still correct? The answers might all be in the negative. There are even some people who, the moment a slightly favourable turn occurs in the war situation, are prepared to intensify the "friction" between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, diverting attention from external to internal matters. This almost invariably occurs whenever a comparatively big battle is won or the enemy's advance comes to a temporary halt. All the above can be termed political and military short-sightedness. Such talk, however plausible, is actually specious and groundless. To sweep away such verbiage should help the victorious prosecution of the War of Resistance.

5. The question now is: Will China be subjugated? The answer is, No, she will not be subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win quickly? The answer is, No, she cannot win quickly, and the War of Resistance will be a protracted war.

6. As early as two years ago, we broadly indicated the main arguments on these questions. On July 16, 1936, five months before the Sian Incident and twelve months before the Lukouchiao Incident, in an interview with the American correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, I made a general estimate of the situation with regard to war between China and Japan and advanced various principles for winning victory. The following excerpts may serve as a reminder:

> *Question:* Under what conditions do you think China can defeat and destroy the forces of Japan?
>
> *Answer:* Three conditions are required: first, the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front in China; second, the formation of an international anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement of the people in Japan and the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint of the Chinese people, the unity of the people of China is the most important of the three conditions.
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> *Question:* How long do you think such a war would last?
>
> *Answer:* That depends on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united front and many other conditioning factors involving China and Japan. That is to say, apart from China's own strength, which is the main thing, international help to China and the help rendered by the revolution in Japan are also important. If China's anti-Japanese united front is greatly expanded and effectively organized horizontally and vertically, if the necessary help is given to China by those governments and peoples which recognize the Japanese imperialist menace to their own interests and if revolution comes quickly in Japan, the war will speedily be brought to an end and China will speedily win victory. If these conditions are not realized quickly, the war will be prolonged. But in the end, just the same, Japan will certainly be defeated and China will certainly be victorious. Only the sacrifices will be great and there will be a very painful period.

Question: What is your opinion of the probable course of development of such a war, politically and militarily?

Answer: Japan's continental policy is already fixed, and those who think they can halt the Japanese advance by making compromises with Japan at the expense of more Chinese territory and sovereign rights are indulging in mere fantasy. We definitely know that the lower Yangtse valley and our southern seaports are already included in the continental programme of Japanese imperialism. Moreover, Japan wants to occupy the Philippines, Siam, Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch East Indies in order to cut off other countries from China and monopolize the southwestern Pacific. This is Japan's maritime policy. In such a period, China will undoubtedly be in an extremely difficult position. But the majority of the Chinese people believe that such difficulties can be overcome; only the rich in the big port cities are defeatists because they are afraid of losing their property. Many people think it would be impossible for China to continue the war, once her coastline is blockaded by Japan. This is nonsense. To refute them we need only cite the war history of the Red Army. In the present War of Resistance Against Japan, China's position is much superior to that of the Red Army in the civil war. China is a vast country, and even if Japan should succeed in occupying a section of China with as many as 100 to 200 million people, we would still be far from defeated. We would still have ample strength to fight against Japan, while the Japanese would have to fight defensive battles in their rear throughout the war. The heterogeneity and uneven development of China's economy are rather advantageous in the war of resistance. For example, to sever Shanghai from the rest of China would definitely not be as disastrous to China as would be the severance of New York from the rest of the United States. Even if Japan blockades the Chinese coastline, it is impossible for her to blockade China's Northwest, Southwest and West. Thus, once more the central point of the problem is the unity of the entire Chinese people and the building up of a nation-wide anti-Japanese front. This is what we have long been advocating.

Question: If the war drags on for a long time and Japan is not completely defeated, would the Communist Party agree to the negotiation of a peace with Japan and recognize her rule in northeastern China?

Answer: No. Like the people of the whole country, the Chinese Communist Party will not allow Japan to retain an inch of Chinese territory.

Question: What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy and tactics to be followed in this "war of liberation"?

Answer: Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to operate over an extended and fluid front. To achieve success, the Chinese troops must conduct their warfare with a high degree of mobility on extensive battlefields, making swift advances and withdrawals, swift concentrations and dispersals. This means large-scale mobile warfare, and not positional warfare depending exclusively on defence works with deep trenches, high fortresses and successive rows of defensive positions. It does not mean the abandonment of all the vital strategic points, which should be defended by positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be mobile warfare. Positional warfare is also necessary, but strategically it is auxiliary and secondary. Geographically the theatre of the war is so vast that it is possible for us to conduct mobile warfare most effectively. In the face of the vigorous actions of our forces, the Japanese army will have to be cautious. Its war-machine is ponderous and slow-moving, with limited efficiency. If we concentrate our forces on a narrow front for a defensive war of attrition, we would be throwing away the advantages of our geography and economic organization and repeating the mistake of Abyssinia. In the early period of the war, we must avoid any major decisive battles, and must first employ mobile warfare gradually to break the morale and combat effectiveness of the enemy troops.

Besides employing trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize great numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants. One should know that the anti-Japanese volunteer units in the three northeastern provinces are only a minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the peasants of the whole country. The Chinese peasants have very great latent power; properly organized and directed, they can keep the Japanese army busy twenty-four hours a day and worry it to death. It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China, that is to say, the Japanese army will be entirely surrounded by the hostile Chinese people, it will be forced to move in all its provisions and guard them, it must use large numbers of troops to protect

> its lines of communications and constantly guard against attacks, and it needs large forces to garrison Manchuria and Japan as well.
>
> In the course of the war, China will be able to capture many Japanese soldiers and seize many weapons and munitions with which to arm herself; at the same time China will win foreign aid to reinforce the equipment of her troops gradually. Therefore China will be able to conduct positional warfare in the latter period of the war and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus Japan's economy will crack under the strain of China's long resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces will break under the trial of innumerable battles. On the Chinese side, however, the growing latent power of resistance will be constantly brought into play and large numbers of revolutionary people will be pouring into the front lines to fight for their freedom. The combination of all these and other factors will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on the fortifications and bases in the Japanese-occupied areas and drive the Japanese forces of aggression out of China.

The above views have been proved correct in the light of the experience of the ten months of war and will also be borne out in the future.

7. As far back as August 25, 1937, less than two months after the Lukouchiao Incident, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party clearly pointed out in its "Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party":

> The military provocation by the Japanese aggressors at Lukouchiao and their occupation of Peiping and Tientsin represent only the beginning of their large-scale invasion of China south of the Great Wall. They have already begun their national mobilization for war. Their propaganda that they have "no desire to aggravate the situation" is only a smokescreen for further attacks.
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> The resistance at Lukouchiao on July 7 marked the starting point of China's national War of Resistance.
>
> Thus a new stage has opened in China's political situation, the stage of actual resistance. The stage of preparation for resistance is over. In the present stage the central task is to mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance.
>
> The key to victory in the war now lies in developing the resistance that has already begun into a war of total resistance

> by the whole nation. Only through such a war of total resistance can final victory be won.
>
> The existence of serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance may lead to many setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises and other such reverses. Therefore it should be realized that the war will be an arduous and protracted war. But we are confident that, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the resistance already started will sweep aside all obstacles and continue to advance and develop.

The above thesis, too, has been proved correct in the light of the experience of the ten months of war and will also be borne out in the future.

8. Epistemologically speaking, the source of all erroneous views on war lies in idealist and mechanistic tendencies on the question. People with such tendencies are subjective and one-sided in their approach to problems. They either indulge in groundless and purely subjective talk, or, basing themselves upon a single aspect or a temporary manifestation, magnify it with similar subjectivity into the whole of the problem. But there are two categories of erroneous views, one comprising fundamental, and therefore consistent, errors which are hard to correct, and the other comprising accidental, and therefore temporary, errors which are easy to correct. Since both are wrong, both need to be corrected. Therefore, only by opposing idealist and mechanistic tendencies and taking an objective and all-sided view in making a study of war can we draw correct conclusions on the question of war.

THE BASIS OF THE PROBLEM

9. Why is the War of Resistance Against Japan a protracted war? Why will the final victory be China's? What is the basis for these statements?

The war between China and Japan is not just any war, it is specifically a war of life and death between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the Nineteen Thirties. Herein lies the basis of the whole problem. The two sides in the war have many contrasting features, which will be considered in turn below.

10. *The Japanese side.* First, Japan is a powerful imperialist country, which ranks first in the East in military, economic and political-organizational power, and is one of the five or six foremost imperialist countries of the world. These are the basic factors in Japan's war of aggression. The inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China are due to Japan's imperialist system and her great military, economic and political-organizational power. Secondly, however, the imperialist character of Japan's social economy determines the imperialist character of her war, a war that is retrogressive and barbarous. In the Nineteen Thirties, the internal and external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have driven her not only to embark on an adventurist war unparalleled in scale but also to approach her final collapse. In terms of social development, Japan is no longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the prosperity sought by her ruling classes but to the very reverse, the doom of Japanese imperialism. This is what we mean by the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. It is this reactionary quality, coupled with the military-feudal character of Japanese imperialism, that gives rise to the peculiar barbarity of Japan's war. All of which will arouse to the utmost the class antagonisms within Japan, the antagonism between the Japanese and the Chinese nations, and the antagonism between Japan and most other countries of the world. The reactionary and barbarous character of Japan's war constitutes the primary reason for her inevitable defeat. Thirdly, Japan's war is conducted on the basis of her great military, economic and political-organizational power, but at the same time it rests on an inadequate natural endowment. Japan's military, economic and political-organizational power is great but quantitatively inadequate. Japan is a comparatively small country, deficient in manpower and in military, financial and material resources, and she cannot stand a long war. Japan's rulers are endeavouring to resolve this difficulty through war, but again they will get the very reverse of what they desire; that is to say, the war they have launched to resolve this difficulty will eventually aggravate it and even exhaust Japan's original resources. Fourthly and lastly, while Japan can get international support from the fascist countries, the international opposition she is bound to encounter will be greater than her international support. This opposition will gradually grow and eventually not only cancel out the support but even bear down upon Japan herself. Such is the law that an unjust cause finds meagre support, and such is the con-

sequence of the very nature of Japan's war. To sum up, Japan's advantage lies in her great capacity to wage war, and her disadvantages lie in the reactionary and barbarous nature of her war, in the inadequacy of her manpower and material resources, and in her meagre international support. These are the characteristics on the Japanese side.

II. *The Chinese side*. First, we are a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The Opium War,[6] the Taiping Revolution,[7] the Reform Movement of 1898,[8] the Revolution of 1911[9] and the Northern Expedition[10] — the revolutionary or reform movements which aimed at extricating China from her semi-colonial and semi-feudal state — all met with serious setbacks, and China remains a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. We are still a weak country and manifestly inferior to the enemy in military, economic and political-organizational power. Here again one can find the basis for the inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China. Secondly, however, China's liberation movement, with its cumulative development over the last hundred years, is now different from that of any previous period. Although the domestic and foreign forces opposing it have caused it serious setbacks, at the same time they have tempered the Chinese people. Although China today is not so strong as Japan militarily, economically, politically and culturally, yet there are factors in China more progressive than in any other period of her history. The Communist Party of China and the army under its leadership represent these progressive factors. It is on the basis of this progress that China's present war of liberation can be protracted and can achieve final victory. By contrast with Japanese imperialism, which is declining, China is a country rising like the morning sun. China's war is progressive, hence its just character. Because it is a just war it is capable of arousing the nation to unity, of evoking the sympathy of the people in Japan and of winning the support of most countries in the world. Thirdly, and again by contrast with Japan, China is a very big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population and plenty of soldiers, and is capable of sustaining a long war. Fourthly and lastly, there is broad international support for China stemming from the progressive and just character of her war, which is again exactly the reverse of the meagre support for Japan's unjust cause. To sum up, China's disadvantage lies in her military weakness, and her advantages lie in the progressive and just character of her war, her great size and her abundant international support. These are China's characteristics.

12. Thus it can be seen that Japan has great military, economic and political-organizational power, but that her war is reactionary and barbarous, her manpower and material resources are inadequate, and she is in an unfavourable position internationally. China, on the contrary, has less military, economic and political-organizational power, but she is in her era of progress, her war is progressive and just, she is moreover a big country, a factor which enables her to sustain a protracted war, and she will be supported by most countries. The above are the basic, mutually contradictory characteristics of the Sino-Japanese war. They have determined and are determining all the political policies and military strategies and tactics of the two sides; they have determined and are determining the protracted character of the war and its outcome, namely, that the final victory will go to China and not to Japan. The war is a contest between these characteristics. They will change in the course of the war, each according to its own nature; and from this everything else will follow. These characteristics exist objectively and are not invented to deceive people; they constitute all the basic elements of the war, and are not incomplete fragments; they permeate all major and minor problems on both sides and all stages of the war, and they are not matters of no consequence. If anyone forgets these characteristics in studying the Sino-Japanese war, he will surely go wrong; and even though some of his ideas win credence for a time and may seem right, they will inevitably be proved wrong by the course of the war. On the basis of these characteristics we shall now proceed to explain the problems to be dealt with.

REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF NATIONAL SUBJUGATION

13. The theorists of national subjugation, who see nothing but the contrast between the enemy's strength and our weakness, used to say, "Resistance will mean subjugation," and now they are saying, "The continuance of the war spells subjugation." We shall not be able to convince them merely by stating that Japan, though strong, is small, while China, though weak, is large. They can adduce historical

instances, such as the destruction of the Sung Dynasty by the Yuan and the destruction of the Ming Dynasty by the Ching, to prove that a small but strong country can vanquish a large but weak one and, moreover, that a backward country can vanquish an advanced one. If we say these events occurred long ago and do not prove the point, they can cite the British subjugation of India to prove that a small but strong capitalist country can vanquish a large but weak and backward country. Therefore, we have to produce other grounds before we can silence and convince all the subjugationists, and supply everyone engaged in propaganda with adequate arguments to persuade those who are still confused or irresolute and so strengthen their faith in the War of Resistance.

14. What then are the grounds we should advance? The characteristics of the epoch. These characteristics are concretely reflected in Japan's retrogression and paucity of support and in China's progress and abundance of support.

15. Our war is not just any war, it is specifically a war between China and Japan fought in the Nineteen Thirties. Our enemy, Japan, is first of all a moribund imperialist power; she is already in her era of decline and is not only different from Britain at the time of the subjugation of India, when British capitalism was still in the era of its ascendency, but also different from what she herself was at the time of World War I twenty years ago. The present war was launched on the eve of the general collapse of world imperialism and, above all, of the fascist countries; that is the very reason the enemy has launched this adventurist war, which is in the nature of a last desperate struggle. Therefore, it is an inescapable certainty that it will not be China but the ruling circles of Japanese imperialism which will be destroyed as a result of the war. Moreover, Japan has undertaken this war at a time when many countries have been or are about to be embroiled in war, when we are all fighting or preparing to fight against barbarous aggression, and China's fortunes are linked with those of most of the countries and peoples of the world. This is the root cause of the opposition Japan has aroused and will increasingly arouse among those countries and peoples.

16. What about China? The China of today cannot be compared with the China of any other historical period. She is a semi-colony and a semi-feudal society, and she is consequently considered a weak country. But at the same time, China is historically in her era of progress; this is the primary reason for her ability to defeat Japan.

When we say that the War of Resistance Against Japan is progressive, we do not mean progressive in the ordinary or general sense, nor do we mean progressive in the sense that the Abyssinian war against Italy, or the Taiping Revolution or the Revolution of 1911 were progressive, we mean progressive in the sense that China is progressive today. In what way is the China of today progressive? She is progressive because she is no longer a completely feudal country and because we already have some capitalism in China, we have a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, we have vast numbers of people who have awakened or are awakening, we have a Communist Party, we have a politically progressive army — the Chinese Red Army led by the Communist Party — and we have the tradition and the experience of many decades of revolution, and especially the experience of the seventeen years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. This experience has schooled the people and the political parties of China and forms the very basis for the present unity against Japan. If it is said that without the experience of 1905 the victory of 1917 would have been impossible in Russia, then we can also say that without the experience of the last seventeen years it would be impossible to win our War of Resistance. Such is the internal situation.

In the existing international situation, China is not isolated in the war, and this fact too is without precedent in history. In the past, China's wars, and India's too, were wars fought in isolation. It is only today that we meet with world-wide popular movements, extraordinary in breadth and depth, which have arisen or are arising and which are supporting China. The Russian Revolution of 1917 also received international support, and thus the Russian workers and peasants won; but that support was not so broad in scale and deep in nature as ours today. The popular movements in the world today are developing on a scale and with a depth that are unprecedented. The existence of the Soviet Union is a particularly vital factor in present-day international politics, and the Soviet Union will certainly support China with the greatest enthusiasm; there was nothing like this twenty years ago. All these factors have created and are creating important conditions indispensable to China's final victory. Large-scale direct assistance is as yet lacking and will come only in the future, but China is progressive and is a big country, and these are the factors enabling her to protract the war and to promote as well as await international help.

17. There is the additional factor that while Japan is a small country with a small territory, few resources, a small population and a limited number of soldiers, China is a big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population and plenty of soldiers, so that, besides the contrast between strength and weakness, there is the contrast between a small country, retrogression and meagre support and a big country, progress and abundant support. This is the reason why China will never be subjugated. It follows from the contrast between strength and weakness that Japan can ride roughshod over China for a certain time and to a certain extent, that China must unavoidably travel a hard stretch of road, and that the War of Resistance will be a protracted war and not a war of quick decision; nevertheless, it follows from the other contrast — a small country, retrogression and meagre support versus a big country, progress and abundant support — that Japan cannot ride roughshod over China indefinitely but is sure to meet final defeat, while China can never be subjugated but is sure to win final victory.

18. Why was Abyssinia vanquished? First, she was not only weak but also small. Second, she was not as progressive as China; she was an old country passing from the slave to the serf system, a country without any capitalism or bourgeois political parties, let alone a Communist Party, and with no army such as the Chinese army, let alone one like the Eighth Route Army. Third, she was unable to hold out and wait for international assistance and had to fight her war in isolation. Fourth, and most important of all, there were mistakes in the direction of her war against Italy. Therefore Abyssinia was subjugated. But there is still quite extensive guerrilla warfare in Abyssinia, which, if persisted in, will enable the Abyssinians to recover their country when the world situation changes.

19. If the subjugationists quote the history of the failure of liberation movements in modern China to prove their assertions first that "resistance will mean subjugation", and then that "the continuance of the war spells subjugation", here again our answer is, "Times are different." China herself, the internal situation in Japan and the international environment are all different now. It is a serious matter that Japan is stronger than before while China in her unchanged semi-colonial and semi-feudal position is still fairly weak. It is also a fact that for the time being Japan can still control her people at home and exploit international contradictions in order to invade China. But during a long war, these things are bound to change in the

opposite direction. Such changes are not yet accomplished facts, but they will become so in future. The subjugationists dismiss this point. As for China, we already have new people, a new political party, a new army and a new policy of resistance to Japan, a situation very different from that of over a decade ago, and what is more, all these will inevitably make further progress. It is true that historically the liberation movements met with repeated setbacks with the result that China could not accumulate greater strength for the present War of Resistance — this is a very painful historical lesson, and never again should we destroy any of our revolutionary forces. Yet even on the present basis, by exerting great efforts we can certainly forge ahead gradually and increase the strength of our resistance. All such efforts should converge on the great Anti-Japanese National United Front. As for international support, though direct and large-scale assistance is not yet in sight, it is in the making, the international situation being fundamentally different from before. The countless failures in the liberation movement of modern China had their subjective and objective causes, but the situation today is entirely different. Today, although there are many difficulties which make the War of Resistance arduous — such as the enemy's strength and our weakness, and the fact that his difficulties are just starting, while our own progress is far from sufficient — nevertheless many favourable conditions exist for defeating the enemy; we need only add our subjective efforts, and we shall be able to overcome the difficulties and win through to victory. These are favourable conditions such as never existed before in any period of our history, and that is why the War of Resistance Against Japan, unlike the liberation movements of the past, will not end in failure.

COMPROMISE OR RESISTANCE? CORRUPTION OR PROGRESS?

20. It has been fully explained above that the theory of national subjugation is groundless. But there are many people who do not subscribe to this theory; they are honest patriots, who are nevertheless deeply worried about the present situation. Two things are worrying them, fear of a compromise with Japan and doubts about the possibility of political progress. These two vexing questions are

being widely discussed and no key has been found to their solution. Let us now examine them.

21. As previously explained, the question of compromise has its social roots, and as long as these roots exist the question is bound to arise. But compromise will not avail. To prove the point, again we need only look for substantiation to Japan, China, and the international situation. First take Japan. At the very beginning of the War of Resistance, we estimated that the time would come when an atmosphere conducive to compromise would arise, in other words, that after occupying northern China, Kiangsu and Chekiang, Japan would probably resort to the scheme of inducing China to capitulate. True enough, she did resort to the scheme, but the crisis soon passed, one reason being that the enemy everywhere pursued a barbarous policy and practised naked plunder. Had China capitulated, every Chinese would have become a slave without a country. The enemy's predatory policy, the policy of subjugating China, has two aspects, the material and the spiritual, both of which are being applied universally to all Chinese, not only to the people of the lower strata but also to members of the upper strata; of course the latter are treated a little more politely, but the difference is only one of degree, not of principle. In the main the enemy is transplanting into the interior of China the same old measures he adopted in the three northeastern provinces. Materially, he is robbing the common people even of their food and clothing, making them cry out in hunger and cold; he is plundering the means of production, thus ruining and enslaving China's national industries. Spiritually, he is working to destroy the national consciousness of the Chinese people. Under the flag of the "Rising Sun" all Chinese are forced to be docile subjects, beasts of burden forbidden to show the slightest trace of Chinese national spirit. This barbarous enemy policy will be carried deeper into the interior of China. Japan with her voracious appetite is unwilling to stop the war. As was inevitable, the policy set forth in the Japanese cabinet's statement of January 16, 1938[11] is still being obstinately carried out, which has enraged all strata of the Chinese people. This rage is engendered by the reactionary and barbarous character of Japan's war — "there is no escape from fate", and hence an absolute hostility has crystallized. It is to be expected that on some future occasion the enemy will once again resort to the scheme of inducing China to capitulate and that certain subjugationists will again crawl out and most probably collude with certain foreign elements (to be found in Britain, the United States and France, and

especially among the upper strata in Britain) as partners in crime. But the general trend of events will not permit capitulation; the obstinate and peculiarly barbarous character of Japan's war has decided this aspect of the question.

22. Second, let us take China. There are three factors contributing to China's perseverance in the War of Resistance. In the first place, the Communist Party, which is the reliable force leading the people to resist Japan. Next, the Kuomintang, which depends on Britain and the United States and hence will not capitulate to Japan unless they tell it to. Finally, the other political parties and groups, most of which oppose compromise and support the War of Resistance. With unity among these three, whoever compromises will be standing with the traitors, and anybody will have the right to punish him. All those unwilling to be traitors have no choice but to unite and carry on the War of Resistance to the end; therefore compromise can hardly succeed.

23. Third, take the international aspect. Except for Japan's allies and certain elements in the upper strata of other capitalist countries, the whole world is in favour of resistance, and not of compromise by China. This factor reinforces China's hopes. Today the people throughout the country cherish the hope that international forces will gradually give China increasing help. It is not a vain hope; the existence of the Soviet Union in particular encourages China in her War of Resistance. The socialist Soviet Union, now strong as never before, has always shared China's joys and sorrows. In direct contrast to all the members of the upper strata in the capitalist countries who seek nothing but profits, the Soviet Union considers it its duty to help all weak nations and all revolutionary wars. That China is not fighting her war in isolation has its basis not only in international support in general but in Soviet support in particular. China and the Soviet Union are in close geographical proximity, which aggravates Japan's crisis and facilitates China's War of Resistance. Geographical proximity to Japan increases the difficulties of China's resistance. Proximity to the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is a favourable condition for the War of Resistance.

24. Hence we may conclude that the danger of compromise exists but can be overcome. Even if the enemy can modify his policy to some extent, he cannot alter it fundamentally. In China the social roots of compromise are present, but the opponents of compromise are in the majority. Internationally, also, some forces favour compromise but the main forces favour resistance. The combination of these three

factors makes it possible to overcome the danger of compromise and persist to the end in the War of Resistance.

25. Let us now answer the second question. Political progress at home and perseverance in the War of Resistance are inseparable. The greater the political progress, the more we can persevere in the war, and the more we persevere in the war, the greater the political progress. But, fundamentally, everything depends on our perseverance in the War of Resistance. The unhealthy phenomena in various fields under the Kuomintang regime are very serious, and the accumulation of these undesirable factors over the years has caused great anxiety and vexation among the broad ranks of our patriots. But there is no ground for pessimism, since experience in the War of Resistance has already proved that the Chinese people have made as much progress in the last ten months as in many years in the past. Although the cumulative effects of long years of corruption are seriously retarding the growth of the people's strength to resist Japan, thus reducing the extent of our victories and causing us losses in the war, yet the over-all situation in China, in Japan and in the world is such that the Chinese people cannot but make progress. This progress will be slow because of the factor of corruption, which impedes progress. Progress and the slow pace of progress are two characteristics of the present situation, and the second ill accords with the urgent needs of the war, which is a source of great concern to patriots. But we are in the midst of a revolutionary war, and revolutionary war is an antitoxin which not only eliminates the enemy's poison but also purges us of our own filth. Every just, revolutionary war is endowed with tremendous power, which can transform many things or clear the way for their transformation. The Sino-Japanese war will transform both China and Japan; provided China perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front, the old Japan will surely be transformed into a new Japan and the old China into a new China, and people and everything else in both China and Japan will be transformed during and after the war. It is proper for us to regard the anti-Japanese war and our national reconstruction as interconnected. To say that Japan can also be transformed is to say that the war of aggression by her rulers will end in defeat and may lead to a revolution by the Japanese people. The day of triumph of the Japanese people's revolution will be the day Japan is transformed. All this is closely linked with China's War of Resistance and is a prospect we should take into account.

THE THEORY OF NATIONAL SUBJUGATION IS WRONG AND THE THEORY OF QUICK VICTORY IS LIKEWISE WRONG

26. In our comparative study of the enemy and ourselves with respect to the basic contradictory characteristics, such as relative strength, relative size, progress or reaction, and the relative extent of support, we have already refuted the theory of national subjugation, and we have explained why compromise is unlikely and why political progress is possible. The subjugationists stress the contradiction between strength and weakness and puff it up until it becomes the basis of their whole argument on the question, neglecting all the other contradictions. Their preoccupation with the contrast in strength shows their one-sidedness, and their exaggeration of this one side of the matter into the whole shows their subjectivism. Thus, if one looks at the matter as a whole, it will be seen that they have no ground to stand on and are wrong. As for those who are neither subjugationists nor confirmed pessimists, but who are in a pessimistic frame of mind for the moment simply because they are confused by the disparity between our strength and that of the enemy at a given time and in certain respects or by the corruption in the country, we should point out to them that their approach also tends to be one-sided and subjective. But in their case correction is relatively easy; once they are alerted, they will understand, for they are patriots and their error is only momentary.

27. The exponents of quick victory are likewise wrong. Either they completely forget the contradiction between strength and weakness, remembering only the other contradictions, or they exaggerate China's advantages beyond all semblance of reality and beyond recognition, or they presumptuously take the balance of forces at one time and place for the whole situation, as in the old saying, "A leaf before the eye shuts out Mount Tai." In a word, they lack the courage to admit that the enemy is strong while we are weak. They often deny this point and consequently deny one aspect of the truth. Nor do they have the courage to admit the limitations of our advantages, and thus they deny another aspect of the truth. The result is that they make mistakes, big and small, and here again it is subjectivism and one-sidedness that are doing the mischief. These friends have their

hearts in the right place, and they, too, are patriots. But while "the gentlemen's aspirations are indeed lofty", their views are wrong, and to act according to them we certainly be to run into a brick wall. For if appraisal does not conform to reality, action cannot attain its objective; and to act notwithstanding would mean the army's defeat and the nation's subjugation, so that the result would be the same as with the defeatists. Hence this theory of quick victory will not do either.

28. Do we deny the danger of national subjugation? No, we do not. We recognize that China faces two possible prospects, liberation or subjugation, and that the two are in violent conflict. Our task is to achieve liberation and to avert subjugation. The conditions for liberation are China's progress, which is basic, the enemy's difficulties, and international support. We differ from the subjugationists. Taking an objective and all-sided view, we recognize the two possibilities of national subjugation and liberation, stress that liberation is the dominant possibility, point out the conditions for its achievement, and strive to secure them. The subjugationists, on the other hand, taking a subjective and one-sided view, recognize only one possibility, that of subjugation; they do not admit the possibility of liberation, and still less point out the conditions necessary for liberation or strive to secure them. Moreover, while acknowledging the tendency to compromise and the corruption, we see other tendencies and phenomena which, we indicate, will gradually prevail and are already in violent conflict with the former; in addition, we point out the conditions necessary for the healthy tendencies and phenomena to prevail, and we strive to overcome the tendency to compromise and to change the state of corruption. Therefore, contrary to the pessimists, we are not at all down-hearted.

29. Not that we would not like a quick victory; everybody would be in favour of driving the "devils" out overnight. But we point out that, in the absence of certain definite conditions, quick victory is somehing that exists only in one's mind and not in objective reality, and that it is a mere illusion, a false theory. Accordingly, having made an objective and comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances concerning both the enemy and ourselves, we point out that the only way to final victory is the strategy of protracted war, and we reject the groundless theory of quick victory. We maintain that we must strive to secure all the conditions indispensable to final victory, and the more fully and the earlier these conditions are secured, the

surer we shall be of victory and the earlier we shall win it. We believe that only in this way can the course of the war be shortened, and we reject the theory of quick victory, which is just idle talk and an effort to get things on the cheap.

WHY A PROTRACTED WAR?

30. Let us now examine the problem of protracted war. A correct answer to the question "Why a protracted war?" can be arrived at only on the basis of all the fundamental contrasts between China and Japan. For instance, if we say merely that the enemy is a strong imperialist power while we are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, we are in danger of falling into the theory of national subjugation. For neither in theory nor in practice can a struggle become protracted by simply pitting the weak against the strong. Nor can it become protracted by simply pitting the big against the small, the progressive against the reactionary, or abundant support against meagre support. The annexation of a small country by a big one or of a big country by a small one is a common occurrence. It often happens that a progressive country which is not strong is destroyed by a big, reactionary country, and the same holds for everything that is progressive but not strong. Abundant or meagre support is an important but a subsidiary factor, and the degree of its effect depends upon the fundamental factors on both sides. Therefore when we say that the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war, our conclusion is derived from the interrelations of all the factors at work on both sides. The enemy is strong and we are weak, and the danger of subjugation is there. But in other respects the enemy has shortcomings and we have advantages. The enemy's advantage can be reduced and his shortcomings aggravated by our efforts. On the other hand, our advantages can be enhanced and our shortcoming remedied by our efforts. Hence, we can win final victory and avert subjugation, while the enemy will ultimately be defeated and will be unable to avert the collapse of his whole imperialist system.

31. Since the enemy has advantages only in one respect but shortcomings in all others and we have shortcomings in only one respect but advantages in all others, why has this produced not a balance, but, on the contrary, a superior position for him and an inferior

position for us at the present time? Quite clearly, we cannot consider the question in such a formal way. The fact is that the disparity between the enemy's strength and our own is now so great that the enemy's shortcomings have not developed, and for the time being cannot develop, to a degree sufficient to offset his strength, while our advantages have not developed, and for the time being cannot develop, to a degree sufficient to compensate for our weakness. Therefore there can as yet be no balance, only imbalance.

32. Although our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and the united front have somewhat changed the enemy's strength and superiority as against our weakness and inferiority, there has as yet been no basic change. Hence during a certain stage of the war, to a certain degree the enemy will be victorious and we shall suffer defeat. But why is it that in this stage the enemy's victories and our defeats are definitely restricted in degree and cannot be transcended by complete victory or complete defeat? The reason is that, first, from the very beginning the enemy's strength and our weakness have been relative and not absolute, and that, second, our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front have further accentuated this relativeness. In comparison with the original situation, the enemy is still strong, but unfavourable factors have reduced his strength, although not yet to a degree sufficient to destroy his superiority, and similarly we are still weak, but favourable factors have compensated for our weakness, although not yet to a degree sufficient to transform our inferiority. Thus it turns out that the enemy is relatively strong and we are relatively weak, that the enemy is in a relatively superior and we are in a relatively inferior position. On both sides, strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority, have never been absolute, and besides, our efforts in persevering in resistance to Japan and in the united front during the war have brought about further changes in the original balance of forces between us and the enemy. Therefore, in this stage the enemy's victory and our defeat are definitely restricted in degree, and hence the war becomes protracted.

33. But circumstances are continually changing. In the course of the war, provided we employ correct military and political tactics, make no mistakes of principle and exert our best efforts, the enemy's disadvantages and China's advantages will both grow as the war is drawn out, with the inevitable result that there will be a continual change in the difference in comparative strength and hence in the relative position of the two sides. When a new stage is reached, a great

change will take place in the balance of forces, resulting in the enemy's defeat and our victory.

34. At present the enemy can still manage to exploit his strength, and our War of Resistance has not yet fundamentally weakened him. The insufficiency in his manpower and material resources is not yet such as to prevent his offensive; on the contrary, they can still sustain his offensive to a certain extent. The reactionary and barbarous nature of his war, a factor which intensifies both class antagonisms within Japan and the resistance of the Chinese nation, has not yet brought about a situation which radically impedes his advance. The enemy's international isolation is increasing but is not yet complete. In many countries which have indicated they will help us, the capitalists dealing in munitions and war materials and bent solely on profit are still furnishing Japan with large quantities of war supplies,[12] and their governments[13] are still reluctant to join the Soviet Union in practical sanctions against Japan. From all this it follows that our War of Resistance cannot be won quickly and can only be a protracted war. As for China, although there has been some improvement with regard to her weakness in the military, economic, political and cultural spheres in the ten months of resistance, it is still a long way from what is required to prevent the enemy's offensive and prepare our counter-offensive. Moreover, quantitatively speaking, we have had to sustain certain losses. Although all the factors favourable to us are having a positive effect, it will not be sufficient to halt the enemy's offensive and to prepare for our counter-offensive unless we make an immense effort. Neither the abolition of corruption and the acceleration of progress at home, nor the curbing of the pro-Japanese forces and the expansion of the anti-Japanese forces abroad, are yet accomplished facts. From all this it follows that our war cannot be won quickly but can only be a protracted war.

THE THREE STAGES OF THE PROTRACTED WAR

35. Since the Sino-Japanese war is a protracted one and final victory will belong to China, it can reasonably be assumed that this protracted war will pass through three stages. The first stage covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic con-

solidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. It is impossible to predict the concrete situation in the three stages, but certain main trends in the war may be pointed out in the light of present conditions. The objective course of events will be exceedingly rich and varied, with many twists and turns, and nobody can cast a horoscope for the Sino-Japanese war; nevertheless it is necessary for the strategic direction of the war to make a rough sketch of its trends. Although our sketch may not be in full accord with the subsequent facts and will be amended by them, it is still necessary to make it in order to give firm and purposeful strategic direction to the protracted war.

36. The first stage has not yet ended. The enemy's design is to occupy Canton, Wuhan and Lanchow and link up these three points. To accomplish this aim the enemy will have to use at least fifty divisions, or about one and a half million men, spend from one and a half to two years, and expend more than ten thousand million yen. In penetrating so deeply, he will encounter immense difficulties, with consequences disastrous beyond imagination. As for attempting to occupy the entire length of the Canton-Hankow Railway and the Sian-Lanchow Highway, he will have to fight perilous battles and even so may not fully accomplish his design. But in drawing up our operational plan we should base ourselves on the assumption that the enemy may occupy the three points and even certain additional areas, as well as link them up, and we should make dispositions for a protracted war, so that even if he does so, we shall be able to cope with him. In this stage the form of fighting we should adopt is primarily mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare. Through the subjective errors of the Kuomintang military authorities, positional warfare was assigned the primary role in the first phase of this stage, but it is nevertheless supplementary from the point of view of the stage as a whole. In this stage, China has already built up a broad united front and achieved unprecedented unity. Although the enemy has used and will continue to use base and shameless means to induce China to capitulate in the attempt to realize his plan for a quick decision and to conquer the whole country without much effort, he has failed so far, nor is he likely to succeed in the future. In this stage, in spite of considerable losses, China will make considerable progress, which will become the main basis for her continued resistance in the second stage. In the present stage the Soviet Union

has already given substantial aid to China. On the enemy side, there are already signs of flagging morale, and his army's momentum of attack is less in the middle phase of this stage than it was in the initial phase, and it will diminish still further in the concluding phase. Signs of exhaustion are beginning to appear in his finances and economy; war-weariness is beginning to set in among his people and troops; and within the clique at the helm of the war, "war frustrations" are beginning to manifest themselves and pessimism about the prospects of the war is growing.

FROM MARX TO MAO

37. The second stage may be termed one of strategic stalemate. At the tail end of the first stage, the enemy will be forced to fix certain terminal points to his strategic offensive owing to his shortage of troops and our firm resistance, and upon reaching them he will stop his strategic offensive and enter the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas. In the second stage, the enemy will attempt to safeguard the occupied areas and to make them his own by the fraudulent method of setting up puppet governments, while plundering the Chinese people to the limit; but again he will be confronted with stubborn guerrilla warfare. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's rear is unguarded, our guerrilla warfare will develop extensively in the first stage, and many base areas will be established, seriously threatening the enemy's consolidation of the occupied areas, and so in the second stage there will still be widespread fighting. In this stage, our form of fighting will be primarily guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. China will still retain a large regular army, but she will find it difficult to launch the strategic counter-offensive immediately because, on the one hand, the enemy will adopt a strategically defensive position in the big cities and along the main lines of communication under his occupation and, on the other hand, China will not yet be adequately equipped technically. Except for the troops engaged in frontal defence against the enemy, our forces will be switched in large numbers to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed dispositions, and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemy and co-ordinating with the people's local armed forces, they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied areas, keeping the enemy on the move as far as possible in order to destroy him in mobile warfare, as is now being done in Shansi Province. The fighting in the second stage will be ruthless, and the country will suffer serious devastation. But the guerrilla warfare will be successful, and if it is well conducted the

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enemy may be able to retain only about one-third of his occupied territory, with the remaining two-thirds in our hands, and this will constitute a great defeat for the enemy and a great victory for China. By then the enemy-occupied territory as a whole will fall into three categories: first, the enemy base areas; second, our base areas for guerrilla warfare; and, third, the guerrilla areas contested by both sides. The duration of this stage will depend on the degree of change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy and on the changes in the international situation; generally speaking, we should be prepared to see this stage last a comparatively long time and to weather its hardships. It will be a very painful period for China; the two big problems will be economic difficulties and the disruptive activities of the traitors. The enemy will go all out to wreck China's united front, and the traitor organizations in all the occupied areas will merge into a so-called "unified government". Owing to the loss of big cities and the hardships of war, vacillating elements within our ranks will clamour for compromise, and pessimism will grow to a serious extent. Our tasks will then be to mobilize the whole people to unite as one man and carry on the war with unflinching perseverance, to broaden and consolidate the united front, sweep away all pessimism and ideas of compromise, promote the will to hard struggle and apply new wartime policies, and so to weather the hardships. In the second stage, we will have to call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a united government, we will have to oppose splits and systematically improve fighting techniques, reform the armed forces, mobilize the entire people and prepare for the counter-offensive. The international situation will become still more unfavourable to Japan and the main international forces will incline towards giving more help to China, even though there may be talk of "realism" of the Chamberlain type which accommodates itself to *faits accomplis*. Japan's threat to Southeast Asia and Siberia will become greater, and there may even be another war. As regards Japan, scores of her divisions will be inextricably bogged down in China. Widespread guerrilla warfare and the people's anti-Japanese movement will wear down this big Japanese force, greatly reducing it and also disintegrating its morale by stimulating the growth of homesickness, war-weariness and even anti-war sentiment. Though it would be wrong to say that Japan will achieve no results at all in her plunder of China, yet, being short of capital and harassed by guerrilla warfare, she cannot possibly achieve rapid or substantial results. This second stage will be the transitional stage of the entire war; it will be the most trying period but also the pivotal one. Whether China becomes an independent country or is reduced to a colony will be determined not by the retention or loss of the big cities in the first stage but by the extent to which the whole nation exerts itself in the second. If we can persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front and in the protracted war, China will in that stage gain the power to change from weakness to strength. It will be the second act in the three-act drama of China's War of Resistance. And through the efforts of the entire cast it will become possible to perform a most brilliant last act.

38. The third stage will be the stage of the counter-offensive to recover our lost territories. Their recovery will depend mainly upon the strength which China has built up in the preceding stage and which will continue to grow in the third stage. But China's strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall also have to rely on the support of international forces and on the changes that will take place inside Japan, or otherwise we shall not be able to win; this adds to China's tasks in international propaganda and diplomacy. In the third stage, our war will no longer be one of strategic defensive, but will turn into a strategic counter-offensive manifesting itself in strategic offensives; and it will no longer be fought on strategically interior lines, but will shift gradually to strategically exterior lines. Not until we fight our way to the Yalu River can this war be considered over. The third stage will be the last in the protracted war, and when we talk of persevering in the war to the end, we mean going all the way through this stage. Our primary form of fighting will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will rise to importance. While positional defence cannot be regarded as important in the first stage because of the prevailing circumstances, positional attack will become quite important in the third stage because of the changed conditions and the requirements of the task. In the third stage guerrilla warfare will again provide strategic support by supplementing mobile and positional warfare, but it will not be the primary form as in the second stage.

39. It is thus obvious that the war is protracted and consequently ruthless in nature. The enemy will not be able to gobble up the whole of China but will be able to occupy many places for a considerable time. China will not be able to oust the Japanese quickly, but the greater part of her territory will remain in her hands. Ultimately the enemy will lose and we will win, but we shall have a hard stretch of road to travel.

40. The Chinese people will become tempered in the course of this long and ruthless war. The political parties taking part in the war will also be steeled and tested. The united front must be persevered in; only by persevering in the united front can we persevere in the war; and only by persevering in the united front and in the war can we win final victory. Only thus can all difficulties be overcome. After travelling the hard stretch of road we shall reach the highway to victory. This is the natural logic of the war.

41. In the three stages the changes in relative strength will proceed along the following lines. In the first stage, the enemy is superior and we are inferior in strength. With regard to our inferiority we must reckon on changes of two different kinds from the eve of the War of Resistance to the end of this stage. The first kind is a change for the worse. China's original inferiority will be aggravated by war losses, namely, decreases in territory, population, economic strength, military strength and cultural institutions. Towards the end of the first stage, the decrease will probably be considerable, especially on the economic side. This point will be exploited by some people as a basis for their theories of national subjugation and of compromise. But the second kind of change, the change for the better, must also be noted. It includes the experience gained in the war, the progress made by the armed forces, the political progress, the mobilization of the people, the development of culture in a new direction, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, the increase in international support, etc. What is on the downgrade in the first stage is the old quantity and the old quality, the manifestations being mainly quantitative. What is on the upgrade is the new quantity and the new quality, the manifestations being mainly qualitative. It is the second kind of change that provides a basis for our ability to fight a protracted war and win final victory.

42. In the first stage, changes of two kinds are also occurring on the enemy's side. The first kind is a change for the worse and manifests itself in hundreds of thousands of casualties, the drain on arms and ammunition, deterioration of troop morale, popular discontent at home, shrinkage of trade, the expenditure of over ten thousand million yen, condemnation by world opinion, etc. This trend also provides a basis for our ability to fight a protracted war and win final victory. But we must likewise reckon with the second kind of change on the enemy's side, a change for the better, that is, his expansion in territory, population and resources. This too is a basis for the protracted nature of our War of Resistance and the impossibility of quick victory, but

at the same time certain people will use it as a basis for their theories of national subjugation and of compromise. However, we must take into account the transitory and partial character of this change for the better on the enemy's side. Japan is an imperialist power heading for collapse, and her occupation of China's territory is temporary. The vigorous growth of guerrilla warfare in China will restrict her actual occupation to narrow zones. Moreover, her occupation of Chinese territory has created and intensified contradictions between Japan and other foreign countries. Besides, generally speaking, such occupation involves a considerable period in which Japan will make capital outlays without drawing any profits, as is shown by the experience in the three northeastern provinces. All of which again gives us a basis for demolishing the theories of national subjugation and of compromise and for establishing the theories of protracted war and of final victory.

43. In the second stage, the above changes on both sides will continue to develop. While the situation cannot be predicted in detail, on the whole Japan will continue on the downgrade and China on the upgrade.[14] For example, Japan's military and financial resources will be seriously drained by China's guerrilla warfare, popular discontent will grow in Japan, the morale of her troops will deteriorate further, and she will become more isolated internationally. As for China, she will make further progress in the political, military and cultural spheres and in the mobilization of the people, guerrilla warfare will develop further; there will be some new economic growth on the basis of the small industries and the widespread agriculture in the interior; international support will gradually increase; and the whole picture will be quite different from what it is now. This second stage may last quite a long time, during which there will be a great reversal in the balance of forces, with China gradually rising and Japan gradually declining. China will emerge from her inferior position, and Japan will lose her superior position; first the two countries will become evenly matched, and then their relative positions will be reversed. Thereupon, China will in general have completed her preparations for the strategic counter-offensive and will enter the stage of the counter-offensive and the expulsion of the enemy. It should be reiterated that the change from inferiority to superiority and the completion of preparations for the counter-offensive will involve three things, namely, an increase in China's own strength, an increase in Japan's difficulties, and an increase in international support; it is the combination of all these forces that will bring about

China's superiority and the completion of her preparations for the counter-offensive.

44. Because of the unevenness in China's political and economic development, the strategic counter-offensive of the third stage will not present a uniform and even picture throughout the country in its initial phase but will be regional in character, rising here and subsiding there. During this stage, the enemy will not relax his divisive tricks to break China's united front, hence the task of maintaining internal unity in China will become still more important, and we shall have to ensure that the strategic counter-offensive does not collapse halfway through internal dissension. In this period the international situation will become very favourable to China. China's task will be to take advantage of it in order to attain complete liberation and establish an independent democratic state, which at the same time will mean helping the world anti-fascist movement.

45. China moving from inferiority to parity and then to superiority, Japan moving from superiority to parity and then to inferiority; China moving from the defensive to stalemate and then to the counter-offensive, Japan moving from the offensive to the safeguarding of her gains and then to retreat — such will be the course of the Sino-Japanese war and its inevitable trend.

46. Hence the questions and the conclusions are as follows: Will China be subjugated? The answer is, No, she will not be subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win quickly? The answer is, No, she cannot win quickly, and the war must be a protracted one. Are these conclusions correct? I think they are.

47. At this point, the exponents of national subjugation and of compromise will again rush in and say, "To move from inferiority to parity China needs a military and economic power equal to Japan's, and to move from parity to superiority she will need a military and economic power greater than Japan's. But this is impossible, hence the above conclusions are not correct."

48. This is the so-called theory that "weapons decide everything",[15] which constitutes a mechanical approach to the question of war and a subjective and one-sided view. Our view is opposed to this; we see not only weapons but also people. Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by

people. If the great majority of the Chinese, of the Japanese and of the people of other countries are on the side of our War of Resistance Against Japan, how can Japan's military and economic power, wielded as it is by a small minority through coercion, count as superiority? And if not, then does not China, though wielding relatively inferior military and economic power, become the superior? There is no doubt that China will gradually grow in military and economic power, provided she perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front. As for our enemy, weakened as he will be by the long war and by internal and external contradictions, his military and economic power is bound to change in the reverse direction. In these circumstances, is there any reason why China cannot become the superior? And that is not all. Although we cannot as yet count the military and economic power of other countries as being openly and to any great extent on our side, is there any reason why we will not be able to do so in the future? If Japan's enemy is not just China, if in future one or more other countries make open use of their considerable military and economic power defensively or offensively against Japan and openly help us, then will not our superiority be still greater? Japan is a small country, her war is reactionary and barbarous, and she will become more and more isolated internationally; China is a large country, her war is progressive and just, and she will enjoy more and more support internationally. Is there any reason why the long-term development of these factors should not definitely change the relative position between the enemy and ourselves?

49. The exponents of quick victory, however, do not realize that war is a contest of strength, and that before a certain change has taken place in the relative strength of the belligerents, there is no basis for trying to fight strategically decisive battles and shorten the road to liberation. Were their ideas to be put into practice, we should inevitably run our heads into a brick wall. Or perhaps they are just talking for their own pleasure without really intending to put their ideas into practice. In the end Mr. Reality will come and pour a bucket of cold water over these chatterers, showing them up as mere windbags who want to get things on the cheap, to have gains without pains. We have had this kind of idle chatter before and we have it now, though not very much so far; but there may be more as the war develops into the stage of stalemate and then of counter-offensive. But in the meantime, if China's losses in the first stage are fairly heavy and the second stage drags on very long, the theories of

national subjugation and of compromise will gain great currency. Therefore, our fire should be directed mainly against them and only secondarily against the idle chatter about quick victory.

50. That the war will be protracted is certain, but nobody can predict exactly how many months or years it will last, as this depends entirely upon the degree of the change in the balance of forces. All those who wish to shorten the war have no alternative but to work hard to increase our own strength and reduce that of the enemy. Specifically, the only way is to strive to win more battles and wear down the enemy's forces, develop guerrilla warfare to reduce enemy-occupied territory to a minimum, consolidate and expand the united front to rally the forces of the whole nation, build up new armies and develop new war industries, promote political, economic and cultural progress, mobilize the workers, peasants, businessmen, intellectuals and other sections of the people, disintegrate the enemy forces and win over their soldiers, carry on international propaganda to secure foreign support, and win the support of the Japanese people and other oppressed peoples. Only by doing all this can we reduce the duration of the war. There is no magic short-cut.

A WAR OF JIG-SAW PATTERN

51. We can say with certainty that the protracted War of Resistance Against Japan will write a splendid page unique in the war history of mankind. One of the special features of this war is the interlocking "jig-saw" pattern which arises from such contradictory factors as the barbarity of Japan and her shortage of troops on the one hand, and the progressiveness of China and the extensiveness of her territory on the other. There have been other wars of jig-saw pattern in history, the three years' civil war in Russia after the October Revolution being a case in point. But what distinguishes this war in China is its especially protracted and extensive character, which will set a record in history. Its jig-saw pattern manifests itself as follows.

52. *Interior and exterior lines.* The anti-Japanese war as a whole is being fought on interior lines; but as far as the relation between the main forces and the guerrilla units is concerned, the former are on the interior lines while the latter are on the exterior lines, presenting a remarkable spectacle of pincers around the enemy. The same can be

said of the relationship between the various guerrilla areas. From its own viewpoint each guerrilla area is on interior lines and the other areas are on exterior lines; together they form many battle fronts, which hold the enemy in pincers. In the first stage of the war, the regular army operating strategically on interior lines is withdrawing, but the guerrilla units operating strategically on exterior lines will advance with great strides over wide areas to the rear of the enemy — they will advance even more fiercely in the second stage — thereby presenting a remarkable picture of both withdrawal and advance.

53. *Possession and non-possession of the rear area.* The main forces, which extend the front lines to the outer limits of the enemy's occupied areas, are operating from the rear area of the country as a whole. The guerrilla units, which extend the battle lines into the enemy rear, are separated from the rear area of the country as a whole. But each guerrilla area has a small rear of its own, upon which it relies to establish its fluid battle lines. The case is different with the guerrilla detachments which are dispatched by a guerrilla area for short-term operations in the rear of the enemy in the same area; such detachments have no rear, nor do they have a battle line. "Operating without a rear area" is a special feature of revolutionary war in the new era, wherever a vast territory, a progressive people, and an advanced political party and army are to be found; there is nothing to fear but much to gain from it, and far from having doubts about it we should promote it.

54. *Encirclement and counter-encirclement.* Taking the war as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy because he is on the strategic offensive and operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensive and operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemy encirclement. We on our part can encircle one or more of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes, because we apply the policy of fighting campaigns and battles from tactically exterior lines by using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from strategically exterior lines. This is the first form of our counter-encirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai Mountains, or on three sides, like the northwestern Shansi area. This is the second form of enemy encirclement. However, if one considers all the guerrilla base areas together and in their relation to the positions of the regular

forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy forces. In Shansi Province, for instance, we have surrounded the Tatung-Puchow Railway on three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similar instances in Hopei and Shantung Provinces. This is the second form of our counter-encirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own — rather like a game of *weichi*.[16] Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of enemy strongholds (such as Taiyuan) and our guerrilla base areas (such as the Wutai Mountains) resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. If the game of *weichi* is extended to include the world, there is yet a third form of encirclement as between us and the enemy, namely, the interrelation between the front of aggression and the front of peace. The enemy encircles China, the Soviet Union, France and Czechoslovakia with his front of aggression, while we counter-encircle Germany, Japan and Italy with our front of peace. But our encirclement, like the hand of Buddha, will turn into the Mountain of Five Elements lying athwart the Universe, and the modern Sun Wu-kungs[17] — the fascist aggressors — will finally be buried underneath it, never to rise again. Therefore, if on the international plane we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, with the Soviet Union and other countries which may join it as other strategic units, and with the Japanese people's movement as still another strategic unit, and thus form a gigantic net from which the fascist Sun Wu-kungs can find no escape, then that will be our enemy's day of doom. Indeed, the day when this gigantic net is formed will undoubtedly be the day of the complete overthrow of Japanese imperialism. We are not jesting; this is the inevitable trend of the war.

55. *Big areas and little areas*. There is a possibility that the enemy will occupy the greater part of Chinese territory south of the Great Wall, and only the smaller part will be kept intact. That is one aspect of the situation. But within this greater part, which does not include the three northeastern provinces, the enemy can actually hold only the big cities, the main lines of communication and some of the plains — which may rank first in importance, but will probably constitute only the smaller part of the occupied territory in size and population, while the greater part will be taken up by the guerrilla areas that will grow up everywhere. That is another aspect of the

situation. If we go beyond the provinces south of the Great Wall and include Mongolia, Sinkiang, Chinghai and Tibet, then the unoccupied area will constitute the greater part of China's territory, and the enemy-occupied area will become the smaller part, even with the three northeastern provinces. That is yet another aspect of the situation. The area kept intact is undoubtedly important, and we should devote great efforts to developing it, not only politically, militarily and economically but, what is also important, culturally. The enemy has transformed our former cultural centres into culturally backward areas, and we on our part must transform the former culturally backward areas into cultural centres. At the same time, the work of developing extensive guerrilla areas behind the enemy lines is also extremely important, and we should attend to every aspect of this work, including the cultural. All in all, big pieces of China's territory, namely, the rural areas, will be transformed into regions of progress and light, while the small pieces, namely, the enemy-occupied areas and especially the big cities, will temporarily become regions of backwardness and darkness.

56. Thus it can be seen that the protracted and far-flung War of Resistance Against Japan is a war of a jig-saw pattern militarily, politically, economically and culturally. It is a marvellous spectacle in the annals of war, a heroic undertaking by the Chinese nation, a magnificent and earth-shaking feat. This war will not only affect China and Japan, strongly impelling both to advance, but will also affect the whole world, impelling all nations, especially the oppressed nations such as India, to march forward. Every Chinese should consciously throw himself into this war of a jig-saw pattern, for this is the form of war by which the Chinese nation is liberating itself, the special form of war of liberation waged by a big semi-colonial country in the Nineteen Thirties and the Nineteen Forties.

FIGHTING FOR PERPETUAL PEACE

57. The protracted nature of China's anti-Japanese war is inseparably connected with the fight for perpetual peace in China and the whole world. Never has there been a historical period such as the present in which war is so close to perpetual peace. For several thousand years since the emergence of classes, the life of mankind

has been full of wars; each nation has fought countless wars, either internally or with other nations. In the imperialist epoch of capitalist society, wars are waged on a particularly extensive scale and with a peculiar ruthlessness. The first great imperialist war of twenty years ago was the first of its kind in history, but not the last. Only the war which has now begun comes close to being the final war, that is, comes close to the perpetual peace of mankind. By now one-third of the world's population has entered the war. Look! Italy, then Japan; Abyssinia, then Spain, then China. The population of the countries at war now amounts to almost 600 million, or nearly a third of the total population of the world. The characteristics of the present war are its uninterruptedness and its proximity to perpetual peace. Why is it uninterrupted? After attacking Abyssinia, Italy attacked Spain, and Germany joined in; then Japan attacked China. What will come next? Undoubtedly Hitler will fight the great powers. "Fascism is war"[18] — this is perfectly true. There will be no interruption in the development of the present war into a world war; mankind will not be able to avoid the calamity of war. Why then do we say the present war is near to perpetual peace? The present war is the result of the development of the general crisis of world capitalism which began with World War I; this general crisis is driving the capitalist countries into a new war and, above all, driving the fascist countries into new war adventures. This war, we can foresee, will not save capitalism, but will hasten its collapse. It will be greater in scale and more ruthless than the war of twenty years ago, all nations will inevitably be drawn in, it will drag on for a very long time, and mankind will suffer greatly. But, owing to the existence of the Soviet Union and the growing political consciousness of the people of the world, great revolutionary wars will undoubtedly emerge from this war to oppose all counter-revolutionary wars, thus giving this war the character of a struggle for perpetual peace. Even if later there should be another period of war, perpetual world peace will not be far off. Once man has eliminated capitalism, he will attain the era of perpetual peace, and there will be no more need for war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military aircraft, nor poison gas will then be needed. Thereafter and for all time, mankind will never again know war. The revolutionary wars which have already begun are part of the war for perpetual peace. The war between China and Japan, two countries which have a combined population of over 500 million, will take an important place in this war for perpetual peace, and out of it will come the liberation of the Chinese nation. The liberated new China of the future will be inseparable from the liberated new world of the future. Hence our War of Resistance Against Japan takes on the character of a struggle for perpetual peace.

58. History shows that wars are divided into two kinds, just and unjust. All wars that are progressive are just, and all wars that impede progress are unjust. We Communists oppose all unjust wars that impede progress, but we do not oppose progressive, just wars. Not only do we Communists not oppose just wars, we actively participate in them. As for unjust wars, World War I is an instance in which both sides fought for imperialist interests; therefore the Communists of the whole world firmly opposed that war. The way to oppose a war of this kind is to do everything possible to prevent it before it breaks out and, once it breaks out, to oppose war with war, to oppose unjust war with just war, whenever possible. Japan's war is an unjust war that impedes progress, and the peoples of the world, including the Japanese people, should oppose it and are opposing it. In our country the people and the government, the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, have all raised the banner of righteousness in the national revolutionary war against aggression. Our war is sacred and just, it is progressive and its aim is peace. The aim is peace not just in one country but throughout the world, not just temporary but perpetual peace. To achieve this aim we must wage a life-and-death struggle, be prepared for any sacrifice, persevere to the end and never stop short of the goal. However great the sacrifice and however long the time needed to attain it, a new world of perpetual peace and brightness already lies clearly before us. Our faith in waging this war is based upon the new China and the new world of perpetual peace and brightness for which we are striving. Fascism and imperialism wish to perpetuate war, but we wish to put an end to it in the not too distant future. The great majority of mankind should exert their utmost efforts for this purpose. The 450 million people of China constitute one quarter of the world's population, and if by their concerted efforts they overthrow Japanese imperialism and create a new China of freedom and equality, they will most certainly be making a tremendous contribution to the struggle for perpetual world peace. This is no vain hope, for the whole world is approaching this point in the course of its social and economic development, and provided that the majority of mankind work together, our goal will surely be attained in several decades.

MAN'S DYNAMIC ROLE IN WAR

59. We have so far explained why the war is a protracted war and why the final victory will be China's, and in the main dealt with what protracted war is and what it is not. Now we shall turn to the question of what to do and what not to do. How to conduct protracted war and how to win the final victory? These are the questions answered below. We shall therefore successively discuss the following problems: man's dynamic role in war, war and politics, political mobilization for the War of Resistance, the object of war, offence within defence, quick decisions within a protracted war, exterior lines within interior lines, initiative, flexibility, planning, mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare, positional warfare, war of annihilation, war of attrition, the possibilities of exploiting the enemy's mistakes, the question of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war, and the army and the people as the foundation of victory. Let us start with the problem of man's dynamic role.

60. When we say we are opposed to a subjective approach to problems, we mean that we must oppose ideas which are not based upon or do not correspond to objective facts, because such ideas are fanciful and fallacious and will lead to failure if acted on. But whatever is done has to be done by human beings; protracted war and final victory will not come about without human action. For such action to be effective there must be people who derive ideas, principles or views from the objective facts, and put forward plans, directives, policies, strategies and tactics. Ideas, etc. are subjective, while deeds or actions are the subjective translated into the objective, but both represent the dynamic role peculiar to human beings. We term this kind of dynamic role "man's conscious dynamic role", and it is a characteristic that distinguishes man from all other beings. All ideas based upon and corresponding to objective facts are correct ideas, and all deeds or actions based upon correct ideas are correct actions. We must give full scope to these ideas and actions, to this dynamic role. The anti-Japanese war is being waged to drive out imperialism and transform the old China into a new China; this can be achieved only when the whole Chinese people are mobilized and full scope is given to their conscious dynamic role in resisting Japan. If we just sit by and take no action, only subjugation awaits us and there will be neither protracted war nor final victory.

61. It is a human characteristic to exercise a conscious dynamic role. Man strongly displays this characteristic in war. True, victory or defeat in war is decided by the military, political, economic and geographical conditions on both sides, the nature of the war each side is waging and the international support each enjoys, but it is not decided by these alone; in themselves, all these provide only the possibility of victory or defeat but do not decide the issue. To decide the issue, subjective effort must be added, namely, the directing and waging of war, man's conscious dynamic role in war.

62. In seeking victory, those who direct a war cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the objective conditions; within these limitations, however, they can and must play a dynamic role in striving for victory. The stage of action for commanders in a war must be built upon objective possibilities, but on that stage they can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour, power and grandeur. Given the objective material foundations, the commanders in the anti-Japanese war should display their prowess and marshal all their forces to crush the national enemy, transform the present situation in which our country and society are suffering from aggression and oppression, and create a new China of freedom and equality; here is where our subjective faculties for directing war can and must be exercised. We do not want any of our commanders in the war to detach himself from the objective conditions and become a blundering hothead, but we decidedly want every commander to become a general who is both bold and sagacious. Our commanders should have not only the boldness to overwhelm the enemy but also the ability to remain masters of the situation throughout the changes and vicissitudes of the entire war. Swimming in the ocean of war, they must not flounder but make sure of reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. Strategy and tactics, as the laws for directing war, constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war.

WAR AND POLITICS

63. "War is the continuation of politics." In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character. The anti-Japanese war is a revolutionary war waged by the whole nation, and

victory is inseparable from the political aim of the war — to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality — inseparable from the general policy of persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front, from the mobilization of the entire people, and from the political principles of the unity between officers and men, the unity between army and people and the disintegration of the enemy forces, and inseparable from the effective application of united front policy, from mobilization on the cultural front, and from the efforts to win international support and the support of the people inside Japan. In a word, war cannot for a single moment be separated from politics. Any tendency among the anti-Japanese armed forces to belittle politics by isolating war from it and advocating the idea of war as an absolute is wrong and should be corrected.

64. But war has its own particular characteristics and in this sense it cannot be equated with politics in general. "War is the continuation of politics by other . . . means."[19] When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way. For instance, the semi-independent status of China is an obstacle to the political growth of Japanese imperialism, hence Japan has unleashed a war of aggression to sweep away that obstacle. What about China? Imperialist oppression has long been an obstacle to China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, hence many wars of liberation have been waged in the effort to sweep it away. Japan is now using war for the purpose of oppressing China and completely blocking the advance of the Chinese revolution, and therefore China is compelled to wage the War of Resistance in her determination to sweep away this obstacle. When the obstacle is removed, our political aim will be attained and the war concluded. But if the obstacle is not completely swept away, the war will have to continue till the aim is fully accomplished. Thus anyone who seeks a compromise before the task of the anti-Japanese war is fulfilled is bound to fail, because even if a compromise were to occur for one reason or another, the war would break out again, since the broad masses of the people would certainly not submit but would continue the war until its political objective was achieved. It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.

65. From the particular characteristics of war there arise a particular set of organizations, a particular series of methods and a particular kind of process. The organizations are the armed forces and

everything that goes with them. The methods are the strategy and tactics for directing war. The process is the particular form of social activity in which the opposing armed forces attack each other or defend themselves against one another, employing strategy and tactics favourable to themselves and unfavourable to the enemy. Hence war experience is a particular kind of experience. All who take part in war must rid themselves of their customary ways and accustom themselves to war before they can win victory.

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION FOR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

66. A national revolutionary war as great as ours cannot be won without extensive and thoroughgoing political mobilization. Before the anti-Japanese war there was no political mobilization for resistance to Japan, and this was a great drawback, as a result of which China has already lost a move to the enemy. After the war began, political mobilization was very far from extensive, let alone thoroughgoing. It was the enemy's gunfire and the bombs dropped by enemy aeroplanes that brought news of the war to the great majority of the people. That was also a kind of mobilization, but it was done for us by the enemy, we did not do it ourselves. Even now the people in the remoter regions beyond the noise of the guns are carrying on quietly as usual. This situation must change, or otherwise we cannot win in our life-and-death struggle. We must never lose another move to the enemy; on the contrary, we must make full use of this move, political mobilization, to get the better of him. This move is crucial; it is indeed of primary importance, while our inferiority in weapons and other things is only secondary. The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war. To win victory, we must persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front and in the protracted war. But all these are inseparable from the mobilization of the common people. To wish for victory and yet neglect political mobilization is like wishing to "go south by driving the chariot north", and the result would inevitably be to forfeit victory.

67. What does political mobilization mean? First, it means telling the army and the people about the political aim of the war. It is necessary for every soldier and civilian to see why the war must be fought and how it concerns him. The political aim of the war is "to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality"; we must proclaim this aim to everybody, to all soldiers and civilians, before we can create an anti-Japanese upsurge and unite hundreds of millions as one man to contribute their all to the war. Secondly, it is not enough merely to explain the aim to them; the steps and policies for its attainment must also be given, that is, there must be a political programme. We already have the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and also the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction; we should popularize both of them in the army and among the people and mobilize everyone to carry them out. Without a clear-cut, concrete political programme it is impossible to mobilize all the armed forces and the whole people to carry the war against Japan through to the end. Thirdly, how should we mobilize them? By word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through plays and films, through schools, through the mass organizations and through our cadres. What has been done so far in the Kuomintang areas is only a drop in the ocean, and moreover it has been done in a manner ill-suited to the people's tastes and in a spirit uncongenial to them; this must be drastically changed. Fourthly, to mobilize once is not enough; political mobilization for the War of Resistance must be continuous. Our job is not to recite our political programme to the people, for nobody will listen to such recitations; we must link the political mobilization for the war with developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous movement. This is a matter of immense importance on which our victory in the war primarily depends.

THE OBJECT OF WAR

68. Here we are not dealing with the political aim of war; the political aim of the War of Resistance Against Japan has been defined above as "to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality". Here we are dealing with the elementary object of war, war as "politics with bloodshed", as mutual

slaughter by opposing armies. The object of war is specifically "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy" (to destroy the enemy means to disarm him or "deprive him of the power to resist", and does not mean to destroy every member of his forces physically). In ancient warfare, the spear and the shield were used, the spear to attack and destroy the enemy, and the shield to defend and preserve oneself. To the present day, all weapons are still an extension of the spear and the shield. The bomber, the machine-gun, the long-range gun and poison gas are developments of the spear, while the air-raid shelter, the steel helmet, the concrete fortification and the gas mask are developments of the shield. The tank is a new weapon combining the functions of both spear and shield. Attack is the chief means of destroying the enemy, but defence cannot be dispensed with. In attack the immediate object is to destroy the enemy, but at the same time it is self-preservation, because if the enemy is not destroyed, you will be destroyed. In defence the immediate object is to preserve yourself, but at the same time defence is a means of supplementing attack or preparing to go over to the attack. Retreat is in the category of defence and is a continuation of defence, while pursuit is a continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that destruction of the enemy is the primary object of war and self-preservation the secondary, because only by destroying the enemy in large numbers can one effectively preserve oneself. Therefore attack, the chief means of destroying the enemy, is primary, while defence, a supplementary means of destroying the enemy and a means of self-preservation, is secondary. In actual warfare the chief role is played by defence much of the time and by attack for the rest of the time, but if war is taken as a whole, attack remains primary.

69. How do we justify the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Does it not contradict "self-preservation"? No, it does not; sacrifice and self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. War is politics with bloodshed and exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high price. Partial and temporary sacrifice (non-preservation) is incurred for the sake of general and permanent preservation. This is precisely why we say that attack, which is basically a means of destroying the enemy, also has the function of self-preservation. It is also the reason why defence must be accompanied by attack and should not be defence pure and simple.

70. The object of war, namely, the preservation of oneself and the destruction of the enemy, is the essence of war and the basis of

all war activities, an essence which pervades all war activities, from the technical to the strategic. The object of war is the underlying principle of war, and no technical, tactical, or strategic concepts or principles can in any way depart from it. What for instance is meant by the principle of "taking cover and making full use of fire-power" in shooting? The purpose of the former is self-preservation, of the latter the destruction of the enemy. The former gives rise to such techniques as making use of the terrain and its features, advancing in spurts, and spreading out in dispersed formation. The latter gives rise to other techniques, such as clearing the field of fire and organizing a fire-net. As for the assault force, the containing force and the reserve force in a tactical operation, the first is for annihilating the enemy, the second for preserving oneself, and the third is for either purpose according to circumstances — either for annihilating the enemy (in which case it reinforces the assault force or serves as a pursuit force), or for self-preservation (in which case it reinforces the containing force or serves as a covering force). Thus, no technical, tactical, or strategical principles or operations can in any way depart from the object of war, and this object pervades the whole of a war and runs through it from beginning to end.

71. In directing the anti-Japanese war, leaders at the various levels must lose sight neither of the contrast between the fundamental factors on each side nor of the object of this war. In the course of military operations these contrasting fundamental factors unfold themselves in the struggle by each side to preserve itself and destroy the other. In our war we strive in every engagement to win a victory, big or small, and to disarm a part of the enemy and destroy a part of his men and *matériel*. We must accumulate the results of these partial destructions of the enemy into major strategic victories and so achieve the final political aim of expelling the enemy, protecting the motherland and building a new China.

OFFENCE WITHIN DEFENCE, QUICK DECISIONS WITHIN A PROTRACTED WAR, EXTERIOR LINES WITHIN INTERIOR LINES

72. Now let us examine the specific strategy of the War of Resistance Against Japan. We have already said that our strategy

for resisting Japan is that of protracted war, and indeed this is perfectly right. But this strategy is general, not specific. Specifically, how should the protracted war be conducted? We shall now discuss this question. Our answer is as follows. In the first and second stages of the war, *i.e.*, in the stages of the enemy's offensive and preservation of his gains, we should conduct tactical offensives within the strategic defensive, campaigns and battles of quick decision within the strategically protracted war, and campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. In the third stage, we should launch the strategic counter-offensive.

73. Since Japan is a strong imperialist power and we are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, she has adopted the policy of the strategic offensive while we are on the strategic defensive. Japan is trying to execute the strategy of a war of quick decision; we should consciously execute the strategy of protracted war. Japan is using dozens of army divisions of fairly high combat effectiveness (now numbering thirty) and part of her navy to encircle and blockade China from both land and sea, and is using her air force to bomb China. Her army has already established a long front stretching from Paotow to Hangchow and her navy has reached Fukien and Kwangtung; thus exterior-line operations have taken shape on a vast scale. On the other hand, we are in the position of operating on interior lines. All this is due to the fact that the enemy is strong while we are weak. This is one aspect of the situation.

74. But there is another and exactly opposite aspect. Japan, though strong, does not have enough soldiers. China, though weak, has a vast territory, a large population and plenty of soldiers. Two important consequences follow. First, the enemy, employing his small forces against a vast country, can only occupy some big cities and main lines of communication and part of the plains. Thus there are extensive areas in the territory under his occupation which he has had to leave ungarrisoned, and which provide a vast arena for our guerrilla warfare. Taking China as a whole, even if the enemy manages to occupy the line connecting Canton, Wuhan and Lanchow and its adjacent areas, he can hardly seize the regions beyond, and this gives China a general rear and vital bases from which to carry on the protracted war to final victory. Secondly, in pitting his small forces against large forces, the enemy is encircled by our large forces. The enemy is attacking us along several routes, strategically he is on exterior lines while we are on interior lines, strategically he is on the offensive while we are on the

defensive; all this looks very much to our disadvantage. However, we can make use of our two advantages, namely, our vast territory and large forces, and, instead of stubborn positional warfare, carry on flexible mobile warfare, employing several divisions against one enemy division, several tens of thousands of our men against ten thousand of his, several columns against one of his columns, and suddenly encircling and attacking a single column from the exterior lines of the battlefield. In this way, while the enemy is on exterior lines and on the offensive in strategic operations, he will be forced to fight on interior lines and on the defensive in campaigns and battles. And for us, interior lines and the defensive in strategic operations will be transformed into exterior lines and the offensive in campaigns and battles. This is the way to deal with one or indeed with any advancing enemy column. Both the consequences discussed above follow from the fact that the enemy is small while we are big. Moreover, the enemy forces, though small, are strong (in arms and in training) while our forces, though large, are weak (in arms and in training but not in morale), and in campaigns and battles, therefore, we should not only employ large forces against small and operate from exterior against interior lines, but also follow the policy of seeking quick decisions. In general, to achieve quick decision, we should attack a moving and not a stationary enemy. We should concentrate a big force under cover beforehand alongside the route which the enemy is sure to take, and while he is on the move, advance suddenly to encircle and attack him before he knows what is happening, and thus quickly conclude the battle. If we fight well, we may destroy the entire enemy force or the greater part or some part of it, and even if we do not fight so well, we may still inflict heavy casualties. This applies to any and every one of our battles. If each month we could win one sizable victory like that at Pinghsingkuan or Taierhchuang, not to speak of more, it would greatly demoralize the enemy, stimulate the morale of our own forces and evoke international support. Thus our strategically protracted war is translated in the held into battles of quick decision. The enemy's war of strategic quick decision is bound to change into protracted war after he is defeated in many campaigns and battles.

75. In a word, the above operational principle for fighting campaigns and battles is one of "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines". It is the opposite of our strategic principle of "protracted defensive warfare on interior lines", and yet it is the

indispensable principle for carrying out this strategy. If we should use "protracted defensive warfare on interior lines" as the principle for campaigns and battles too, as we did at the beginning of the War of Resistance, it would be totally unsuited to the circumstances in which the enemy is small while we are big and the enemy is strong while we are weak; in that case we could never achieve our strategic objective of a protracted war and we would be defeated by the enemy. That is why we have always advocated the organization of the forces of the entire country into a number of large field armies, each counterposed to one of the enemy's field armies but having two, three or four times its strength, and so keeping the enemy engaged in extensive theatres of war in accordance with the principle outlined above. This principle of "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines" can and must be applied in guerrilla as well as in regular warfare. It is applicable not only to any one stage of the war but to its entire course. In the stage of strategic counter-offensive, when we are better equipped technically and are no longer in the position of the weak fighting the strong, we shall be able to capture prisoners and booty on a large scale all the more effectively if we continue to employ superior numbers in quick-decision offensive battles from exterior lines. For instance, if we employ two, three or four mechanized divisions against one mechanized enemy division, we can be all the more certain of destroying it. It is common sense that several hefty fellows can easily beat one.

76. If we resolutely apply "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines" on a battlefield, we shall not only change the balance of forces on that battlefield, but also gradually change the general situation. On the battlefield we shall be on the offensive and the enemy on the defensive, we shall be employing superior numbers on exterior lines and the enemy inferior numbers on interior lines, and we shall seek quick decisions, while the enemy, try as he may, will not be able to protract the fighting in the expectation of reinforcements; for all these reasons, the enemy's position will change from strong to weak, from superior to inferior, while that of our forces will change from weak to strong, from inferior to superior. After many such battles have been victoriously fought, the general situation between us and the enemy will change. That is to say, through the accumulation of victories on many battlefields by quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, we shall gradually strengthen ourselves and weaken the enemy, which will necessarily affect the general balance of forces and bring about changes in it. When that happens, these changes, together with

other factors on our side and together with the changes inside the enemy camp and a favourable international situation, will turn the over-all situation between us and the enemy first into one of parity and then into one of superiority for us. That will be the time for us to launch the counter-offensive and drive the enemy out of the country.

77. War is a contest of strength, but the original pattern of strength changes in the course of war. Here the decisive factor is subjective effort — winning more victories and committing fewer errors. The objective factors provide the possibility for such change, but in order to turn this possibility into actuality both correct policy and subjective effort are essential. It is then that the subjective plays the decisive role.

INITIATIVE, FLEXIBILITY AND PLANNING

78. In quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines, as discussed above, the crucial point is the "offensive"; "exterior lines" refers to the sphere of the offensive and "quick-decision" to its duration. Hence the name "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines". It is the best principle for waging a protracted war and it is also the principle for what is known as mobile warfare. But it cannot be put into effect without initiative, flexibility and planning. Let us now study these three questions.

79. We have already discussed man's conscious dynamic role, so why do we talk about the initiative again? By conscious dynamic role we mean conscious action and effort, a characteristic distinguishing man from other beings, and this human characteristic manifests itself most strongly in war; all this has been discussed already. The initiative here means an army's freedom of action as distinguished from an enforced loss of freedom. Freedom of action is the very life of an army and, once it is lost, the army is close to defeat or destruction. The disarming of a soldier is the result of his losing freedom of action through being forced into a passive position. The same is true of the defeat of an army. For this reason both sides in war do all they can to gain the initiative and avoid passivity. It may be said that the quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines which we advocate and the flexibility and planning necessary for its execution are designed to gain the initiative and thus force the enemy into a passive position and achieve the object of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. But initiative

or passivity is inseparable from superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war. Consequently it is also inseparable from the correctness or incorrectness of the subjective direction of war. In addition, there is the question of exploiting the enemy's misconceptions and unpreparedness in order to gain the initiative and force the enemy into passivity. These points are analysed below.

80. Initiative is inseparable from superiority in capacity to wage war, while passivity is inseparable from inferiority in capacity to wage war. Such superiority or inferiority is the objective basis of initiative or passivity. It is natural that the strategic initiative can be better maintained and exercised through a strategic offensive, but to maintain the initiative always and everywhere, that is, to have the absolute initiative, is possible only when there is absolute superiority matched against absolute inferiority. When a strong, healthy man wrestles with an invalid, he has the absolute initiative. If Japan were not riddled with insoluble contradictions, if, for instance, she could throw in a huge force of several million or ten million men all at once, if her financial resources were several times what they are, if she had no opposition from her own people or from other countries, and if she did not pursue the barbarous policies which arouse the desperate resistance of the Chinese people, then she would be able to maintain absolute superiority and have the absolute initiative always and everywhere. In history, such absolute superiority rarely appears in the early stages of a war or a campaign but is to be found towards its end. For instance, on the eve of Germany's capitulation in World War I, the Entente countries became absolutely superior and Germany absolutely inferior, so that Germany was defeated and the Entente countries were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority towards the end of a war. Again, on the eve of the Chinese victory at Taierhchuang, the isolated Japanese forces there were reduced after bitter fighting to absolute inferiority while our forces achieved absolute superiority, so that the enemy was defeated and we were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority towards the end of a campaign. A war or campaign may also end in a situation of relative superiority or of parity, in which case there is compromise in the war or stalemate in the campaign. But in most cases it is absolute superiority and inferiority that decide victory and defeat. All this holds for the end of a war or a campaign, and not for the beginning. The outcome of the Sino-Japanese war, it can be predicted, will be that Japan will become absolutely inferior and be

defeated and that China will become absolutely superior and gain victory. But at present superiority or inferiority is not absolute on either side, but is relative. With the advantages of her military, economic and political-organizational power, Japan enjoys superiority over us with our military, economic and political-organizational weakness, which creates the basis for her initiative. But since quantitatively her military and other power is not great and she has many other disadvantages, her superiority is reduced by her own contradictions. Upon her invasion of China, her superiority has been reduced still further because she has come up against our vast territory, large population, great numbers of troops and resolute nation-wide resistance. Hence, Japan's general position has become one of only relative superiority, and her ability to exercise and maintain the initiative, which is thereby restricted, has likewise become relative. As for China, though placed in a somewhat passive position strategically because of her inferior strength, she is nevertheless quantitatively superior in territory, population and troops, and also superior in the morale of her people and army and their patriotic hatred of the enemy; this superiority, together with other advantages, reduces the extent of her inferiority in military, economic and other power, and changes it into a relative strategic inferiority. This also reduces the degree of China's passivity so that her strategic position is one of only relative passivity. Any passivity, however, is a disadvantage, and one must strive hard to shake it off. Militarily, the way to do so is resolutely to wage quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, to launch guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy and so secure overwhelming local superiority and initiative in many campaigns of mobile and guerrilla warfare. Through such local superiority and local initiative in many campaigns, we can gradually create strategic superiority and strategic initiative and extricate ourselves from strategic inferiority and passivity. Such is the interrelation between initiative and passivity, between superiority and inferiority.

81. From this we can also understand the relationship between initiative or passivity and the subjective directing of war. As already explained, it is possible to escape from our position of relative strategic inferiority and passivity, and the method is to create local superiority and initiative in many campaigns, so depriving the enemy of local superiority and initiative and plunging him into inferiority and passivity. These local successes will add up to strategic superiority and initiative for us and strategic inferiority and passivity for the enemy. Such a change depends upon correct subjective direction. Why? Because while

we seek superiority and the initiative, so does the enemy; viewed from this angle, war is a contest in subjective ability between the commanders of the opposing armies in their struggle for superiority and for the initiative on the basis of material conditions such as military forces and financial resources. Out of the contest there emerge a victor and a vanquished; leaving aside the contrast in objective material conditions, the victor will necessarily owe his success to correct subjective direction and the vanquished his defeat to wrong subjective direction. We admit that the phenomenon of war is more elusive and is characterized by greater uncertainty than any other social phenomenon, in other words, that it is more a matter of "probability". Yet war is in no way supernatural, but a mundane process governed by necessity. That is why Sun Wu Tzu's axiom, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat",[20] remains a scientific truth. Mistakes arise from ignorance about the enemy and about ourselves, and moreover the peculiar nature of war makes it impossible in many cases to have full knowledge about both sides; hence the uncertainty about military conditions and operations, and hence mistakes and defeats. But whatever the situation and the moves in a war, one can know their general aspects and essential points. It is possible for a commander to reduce errors and give generally correct direction, first through all kinds of reconnaissance and then through intelligent inference and judgement. Armed with the weapon of "generally correct direction", we can win more battles and transform our inferiority into superiority and our passivity into initiative. This is how initiative or passivity is related to the correct or incorrect subjective direction of a war.

82. The thesis that incorrect subjective direction can change superiority and initiative into inferiority and passivity, and that correct subjective direction can effect a reverse change, becomes all the more convincing when we look at the record of defeats suffered by big and powerful armies and of victories won by small and weak armies. There are many such instances in Chinese and foreign history. Examples in China are the Battle of Chengpu between the states of Tsin and Chu,[21] the Battle of Chengkao between the states of Chu and Han,[22] the Battle in which Han Hsin defeated the Chao armies,[23] the Battle of Kunyang between the states of Hsin and Han,[24] the Battle of Kuantu between Yuan Shao and Tsao Tsao,[25] the Battle of Chihpi between the states of Wu and Wei,[26] the Battle of Yiling between the states of Wu and Shu,[27] the Battle of Feishui between the states

of Chin and Tsin,[28] etc. Among examples to be found abroad are most of Napoleon's campaigns and the civil war in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution. In all these instances, victory was won by small forces over big and by inferior over superior forces. In every case, the weaker force, pitting local superiority and initiative against the enemy's local inferiority and passivity, first inflicted one sharp defeat on the enemy and then turned on the rest of his forces and smashed them one by one, thus transforming the over-all situation into one of superiority and initiative. The reverse was the case with the enemy who originally had superiority and held the initiative; owing to subjective errors and internal contradictions, it sometimes happened that he completely lost an excellent or fairly good position in which he enjoyed superiority and initiative, and became a general without an army or a king without a kingdom. Thus it can be seen that although superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war is the objective basis determining initiative or passivity, it is not in itself actual initiative or passivity; it is only through a struggle, a contest of ability, that actual initiative or passivity can emerge. In the struggle, correct subjective direction can transform inferiority into superiority and passivity into initiative, and incorrect subjective direction can do the opposite. The fact that every ruling dynasty was defeated by revolutionary armies shows that mere superiority in certain respects does not guarantee the initiative, much less the final victory. The inferior side can wrest the initiative and victory from the superior side by securing certain conditions through active subjective endeavour in accordance with the actual circumstances.

83. To have misconceptions and to be caught unawares may mean to lose superiority and initiative. Hence, deliberately creating misconceptions for the enemy and then springing surprise attacks upon him are two ways — indeed two important means — of achieving superiority and seizing the initiative. What are misconceptions? "To see every bush and tree on Mount Pakung as an enemy soldier"[29] is an example of misconception. And "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west" is a way of creating misconceptions among the enemy. When the mass support is sufficiently good to block the leakage of news, it is often possible by various ruses to succeed in leading the enemy into a morass of wrong judgements and actions so that he loses his superiority and the initiative. The saying, "There can never be too much deception in war", means precisely this. What does "being caught unawares" mean? It means being unprepared. Without

preparedness superiority is not real superiority and there can be no initiative either. Having grasped this point, a force which is inferior but prepared can often defeat a superior enemy by surprise attack. We say an enemy on the move is easy to attack precisely because he is then off guard, that is, unprepared. These two points — creating misconceptions among the enemy and springing surprise attacks on him — mean transferring the uncertainties of war to the enemy while securing the greatest possible certainty for ourselves and thereby gaining superiority, the initiative and victory. Excellent organization of the masses is the prerequisite for attaining all this. Therefore it is extremely important to arouse all the people who are opposed to the enemy, to arm themselves to the last man, make widespread raids on the enemy and also prevent the leakage of news and provide a screen for our own forces; in this way the enemy will be kept in the dark about where and when our forces will attack, and an objective basis will be created for misconceptions and unpreparedness on his part. It was largely owing to the organized, armed masses of the people that the weak and small force of the Chinese Red Army was able to win many battles in the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War. Logically, a national war should win broader mass support than an agrarian revolutionary war; however, as a result of past mistakes[30] the people are in an unorganized state, cannot be promptly drawn in to serve the cause and are sometimes even made use of by the enemy. The resolute rallying of the people on a broad scale is the only way to secure inexhaustible resources to meet all the requirements of the war. Moreover, it will definitely play a big part in carrying out our tactics of defeating the enemy by misleading him and catching him unawares. We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no use for his asinine ethics.[31] In order to achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds. The above concerns the way in which the initiative or passivity is related to the subjective direction of the war. Such subjective direction is indispensable for defeating Japan.

84. By and large, Japan has held the initiative in the stage of her offensive by reason of her military power and her exploitation of our subjective errors, past and present. But her initiative is beginning to wane to some extent because of her many inherent disadvantages and of the subjective errors she too has committed in the course of the war (of which more later) and also because of our many advantages

The enemy's defeat at Taierhchuang and his predicament in Shansi prove this clearly. The widespread development of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear has placed his garrisons in the occupied areas in a completely passive position. Although he is still on the offensive strategically and still holds the initiative, his initiative will end when his strategic offensive ends. The first reason why the enemy will not be able to maintain the initiative is that his shortage of troops renders it impossible for him to carry on the offensive indefinitely. Our offensive warfare in campaigns and our guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, together with other factors, constitute the second reason why he will have to cease his offensive at a certain limit and will not be able to keep his initiative. The existence of the Soviet Union and changes in the international situation constitute the third reason. Thus it can be seen that the enemy's initiative is limited and can be shattered. If, in military operations, China can keep up offensive warfare by her main forces in campaigns and battles, vigorously develop guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear and mobilize the people on a broad scale politically, we can gradually build up a position of strategic initiative.

85. Let us now discuss flexibility. What is flexibility? It is the concrete realization of the initiative in military operations; it is the flexible employment of armed forces. The flexible employment of armed forces is the central task in directing a war, a task most difficult to perform well. In addition to organizing and educating the army and the people, the business of war consists in the employment of troops in combat, and all these things are done to win the fight. Of course it is difficult to organize an army, etc., but it is even more difficult to employ it, particularly when the weak are fighting the strong. To do so requires subjective ability of a very high order and requires the overcoming of the confusion, obscurity and uncertainty peculiar to war and the discovery of order, clarity and certainty in it; only thus can flexibility in command be realized.

86. The basic principle of field operations for the War of Resistance Against Japan is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines. There are various tactics or methods for giving effect to this principle, such as dispersion and concentration of forces, diverging advance and converging attack, the offensive and the defensive, assault and containment, encirclement and outflanking, advance and retreat. It is easy to understand these tactics, but not at all easy to employ and vary them flexibly. Here the three crucial links are the time, the place and the troops. No victory can be won

unless the time, the place and the troops are well chosen. For example, in attacking an enemy force on the move, if we strike too early, we expose ourselves and give the enemy a chance to prepare, and if we strike too late, the enemy may have encamped and concentrated his forces, presenting us with a hard nut to crack. This is the question of the time. If we select a point of assault on the left flank which actually turns out to be the enemy's weak point, victory will be easy; but if we select the right flank and hit a snag, nothing will be achieved. This is the question of the place. If a particular unit of our forces is employed for a particular task, victory may be easy; but if another unit is employed for the same task, it may be hard to achieve results. This is the question of the troops. We should know not only how to employ tactics but how to vary them. For flexibility of command the important task is to make changes such as from the offensive to the defensive or from the defensive to the offensive, from advance to retreat or from retreat to advance, from containment to assault or from assault to containment, from encirclement to outflanking or from outflanking to encirclement, and to make such changes properly and in good time according to the circumstances of the troops and terrain on both sides. This is true of command in campaigns and strategic command as well as of command in battles.

87. The ancients said: "Ingenuity in varying tactics depends on mother wit"; this "ingenuity", which is what we mean by flexibility, is the contribution of the intelligent commander. Flexibility does not mean recklessness; recklessness must be rejected. Flexibility consists in the intelligent commander's ability to take timely and appropriate measures on the basis of objective conditions after "judging the hour and sizing up the situation" (the "situation" includes the enemy's situation, our situation and the terrain), and this flexibility is "ingenuity in varying tactics". On the basis of this ingenuity, we can win more victories in quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, change the balance of forces in our favour, gain the initiative over the enemy, and overwhelm and crush him so that the final victory will be ours.

88. Let us now discuss the question of planning. Because of the uncertainty peculiar to war, it is much more difficult to prosecute war according to plan than is the case with other activities. Yet, since "preparedness ensures success and unpreparedness spells failure", there can be no victory in war without advance planning and preparations. There is no absolute certainty in war, and yet it is not without some

degree of relative certainty. We are comparatively certain about our own situation. We are very uncertain about the enemy's, but here too there are signs for us to read, clues to follow and sequences of phenomena to ponder. These form what we call a degree of relative certainty, which provides an objective basis for planning in war. Modern technical developments (telegraphy, radio, aeroplanes, motor vehicles, railways, steamships, etc.) have added to the possibilities of planning in war. However, complete or stable planning is difficult because there is only very limited and transient certainty in war; such planning must change with the movement (flow or change) of the war and vary in degree according to the scale of the war. Tactical plans, such as plans for attack or defence by small formations or units, often have to be changed several times a day. A plan of campaign, that is, of action by large formations, can generally stand till the conclusion of the campaign, in the course of which, however, it is often changed partially or sometimes even wholly. A strategic plan based on the over-all situation of both belligerents is still more stable, but it too is applicable only in a given strategic stage and has to be changed when the war moves towards a new stage. The making and changing of tactical, campaign and strategic plans in accordance with scope and circumstance is a key factor in directing a war; it is the concrete expression of flexibility in war, in other words, it is also ingenuity in varying one's tactics. Commanders at all levels in the anti-Japanese war should take note.

89. Because of the fluidity of war, some people categorically deny that war plans or policies can be relatively stable, describing such plans or policies as "mechanical". This view is wrong. In the preceding section we fully recognized that, because the circumstances of war are only relatively certain and the flow (movement or change) of war is rapid, war plans or policies can be only relatively stable and have to be changed or revised in good time in accordance with changing circumstances and the flow of the war; otherwise we would become mechanists. But one must not deny the need for war plans or policies that are relatively stable over given periods; to negate this is to negate everything, including the war itself as well as the negator himself. As both military conditions and operations are relatively stable, we must grant the relative stability of the war plans and policies resulting from them. For example, since both the circumstances of the war in northern China and the dispersed nature of the Eighth Route Army's operations are relatively stable for a particular stage, it is absolutely

necessary during this stage to acknowledge the relative stability of the Eighth Route Army's strategic principle of operation, namely, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions." The period of validity of a plan for a campaign is shorter than that of a strategic plan, and for a tactical plan it is shorter still, but each is stable over a given period. Anyone denying this point would have no way of handling warfare and would become a relativist in war with no settled views, for whom one course is just as wrong or just as right as another. No one denies that even a plan valid for a given period is fluid; otherwise, one plan would never be abandoned in favour of another. But it is fluid within limits, fluid within the bounds of the various war operations undertaken for carrying it out, but not fluid as to its essence; in other words, it is quantitatively but not qualitatively fluid. Within such a given period of time, this essence is definitely not fluid, which is what we mean by relative stability within a given period. In the great river of absolute fluidity throughout the war there is relative stability at each particular stretch — such is our fundamental view regarding war plans or policies.

90. Having dealt with protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategy and with quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, and also with the initiative, flexibility and planning, we can now sum up briefly. The anti-Japanese war must have a plan. War plans, which are the concrete application of strategy and tactics, must be flexible so that they can be adapted to the circumstances of the war. We should always seek to transform our inferiority into superiority and our passivity into the initiative so as to change the situation as between the enemy and ourselves. All these find expression in quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles and protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategy.

MOBILE WARFARE, GUERRILLA WARFARE AND POSITIONAL WARFARE

91. A war will take the form of mobile warfare when its content is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles within the framework of the strategy of interior lines, protracted

war and defence. Mobile warfare is the form in which regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operation. At the same time, it includes "mobile defence", which is conducted when necessary to facilitate such offensive battles; it also includes positional attack and positional defence in a supplementary role. Its characteristics are regular armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles, the offensive, and fluidity.

92. China has a vast territory and an immense number of soldiers, but her troops are inadequately equipped and trained; the enemy's forces, on the other hand, are inadequate in number, but better equipped and trained. In this situation, there is no doubt that we must adopt offensive mobile warfare as our primary form of warfare, supplementing it by others and integrating them all into mobile warfare. We must oppose "only retreat, never advance", which is flightism, and at the same time oppose "only advance, never retreat", which is desperate recklessness.

93. One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not only permits but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw in great strides. However, it has nothing in common with flightism of the Han Fu-chu brand.[32] The primary requirement of war is to destroy the enemy, and the other requirement is self-preservation. The object of self-preservation is to destroy the enemy, and to destroy the enemy is in turn the most effective means of self-preservation. Hence mobile warfare is in no way an excuse for people like Han Fu-chu and can never mean moving only backward, and never forward; that kind of "moving" which negates the basic offensive character of mobile warfare would, in practice, "move" China out of existence despite her vastness.

94. However, the other view, which we call the desperate recklessness of "only advance, never retreat", is also wrong. The mobile warfare we advocate, the content of which is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, includes positional warfare in a supplementary role, "mobile defence" and retreat, without all of which mobile warfare cannot be fully carried out. Desperate recklessness is military short-sightedness, originating often from fear of losing territory. A man who acts with desperate recklessness does not know that one characteristic of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not only permits but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw in great strides. On the positive side, in order to

draw the enemy into a fight unfavourable to him but favourable to us, it is usually necessary that he should be on the move and that we should have a number of advantages, such as favourable terrain, a vulnerable enemy, a local population that can prevent the leakage of information, and the enemy's fatigue and unpreparedness. This requires that the enemy should advance, and we should not grudge a temporary loss of part of our territory. For the temporary loss of part of our territory is the price we pay for the permanent preservation of all our territory, including the recovery of lost territory. On the negative side, whenever we are forced into a disadvantageous position which fundamentally endangers the preservation of our forces, we should have the courage to retreat, so as to preserve our forces and hit the enemy when new opportunities arise. In their ignorance of this principle, the advocates of desperate action will contest a city or a piece of ground even when the position is obviously and definitely unfavourable; as a result, they not only lose the city or ground but fail to preserve their forces. We have always advocated the policy of "luring the enemy in deep", precisely because it is the most effective military policy for a weak army strategically on the defensive to employ against a strong army.

95. Among the forms of warfare in the anti-Japanese war mobile warfare comes first and guerrilla warfare second. When we say that in the entire war mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, we mean that the outcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially in its mobile form, and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main responsibility in deciding the outcome. It does not follow, however, that the role of guerrilla warfare is unimportant in the strategy of the war. Its role in the strategy of the war as a whole is second only to that of mobile warfare, for without its support we cannot defeat the enemy. In saying this we also have in mind the strategic task of developing guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare. Guerrilla warfare will not remain the same throughout this long and cruel war, but will rise to a higher level and develop into mobile warfare. Thus the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold, to support regular warfare and to transform itself into regular warfare. Considering the unprecedented extent and duration of guerrilla warfare in China's War of Resistance, it is all the more important not to underestimate its strategic role. Guerrilla warfare in China, therefore, has not only its tactical but also its peculiar strategic problems. I have already discussed this in "Problems

of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan". As indicated above, the forms of warfare in the three strategic stages of the War of Resistance are as follows. In the first stage mobile warfare is primary, while guerrilla and positional warfare are supplementary. In the second stage guerrilla warfare will advance to the first place and will be supplemented by mobile and positional warfare. In the third stage mobile warfare will again become the primary form and will be supplemented by positional and guerrilla warfare. But the mobile warfare of the third stage will no longer be undertaken solely by the original regular forces; part, possibly quite an important part, will be undertaken by forces which were originally guerrillas but which will have progressed from guerrilla to mobile warfare. From the viewpoint of all three stages in China's War of Resistance Against Japan, guerrilla warfare is definitely indispensable. Our guerrilla war will present a great drama unparalleled in the annals of war. For this reason, out of the millions of China's regular troops, it is absolutely necessary to assign at least several hundred thousand to disperse through all enemy-occupied areas, arouse the masses to arm themselves, and wage guerrilla warfare in co-ordination with the masses. The regular forces so assigned should shoulder this sacred task conscientiously, and they should not think their status lowered because they fight fewer big battles and for the time being do not appear as national heroes. Any such thinking is wrong. Guerrilla warfare does not bring as quick results or as great renown as regular warfare, but "a long road tests a horse's strength and a long task proves a man's heart", and in the course of this long and cruel war guerrilla warfare will demonstrate its immense power; it is indeed no ordinary undertaking. Moreover, such regular forces can conduct guerrilla warfare when dispersed and mobile warfare when concentrated, as the Eighth Route Army has been doing. The principle of the Eighth Route Army is, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions." This principle is perfectly correct; the views of its opponents are wrong.

96. At China's present technical level, positional warfare, defensive or offensive, is generally impracticable, and this is where our weakness manifests itself. Moreover, the enemy is also exploiting the vastness of our territory to bypass our fortified positions. Hence positional warfare cannot be an important, still less the principal, means for us. But in the first and second stages of the war, it is possible and essential, within the scope of mobile warfare, to employ localized

positional warfare in a supplementary role in campaigns. Semi-positional "mobile defence" is a still more essential part of mobile warfare undertaken for the purpose of resisting the enemy at every step, thereby depleting his forces and gaining extra time. China must strive to increase her supplies of modern weapons so that she can fully carry out the tasks of positional attack in the stage of the strategic counter-offensive. In this third stage positional warfare will undoubtedly play a greater role, for then the enemy will be holding fast to his positions, and we shall not be able to recover our lost territory unless we launch powerful positional attacks in support of mobile warfare. Nevertheless, in the third stage too, we must exert our every effort to make mobile warfare the primary form of warfare. For the art of directing war and the active role of man are largely nullified in positional warfare such as that fought in Western Europe in the second half of World War I. It is only natural that the war should be taken "out of the trenches", since the war is being fought in the vast expanses of China and since our side will remain poorly equipped technically for quite a long time. Even during the third stage, when China's technical position will be better, she will hardly surpass her enemy in that respect, and so will have to concentrate on highly mobile warfare, without which she cannot achieve final victory. Hence, throughout the War of Resistance China will not adopt positional warfare as primary; the primary or important forms are mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. These two forms of warfare will afford full play to the art of directing war and to the active role of man — what a piece of good fortune out of our misfortune!

WAR OF ATTRITION AND WAR OF ANNIHILATION

97. As we have said before, the essence, or the object, of war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy. Since there are three forms of warfare, mobile, positional and guerrilla, for achieving this object, and since they differ in degrees of effectiveness, there arises the broad distinction between war of attrition and war of annihilation.

98. To begin with, we may say that the anti-Japanese war is at once a war of attrition and a war of annihilation. Why? Because the enemy is still exploiting his strength and retains strategic superiority and strategic initiative, and therefore, unless we fight campaigns and

battles of annihilation, we cannot effectively and speedily reduce his strength and break his superiority and initiative. We still have our weakness and have not yet rid ourselves of strategic inferiority and passivity; therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot win time to improve our internal and international situation and alter our unfavourable position. Hence campaigns of annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition. In this sense war of annihilation is war of attrition. It is chiefly by using the method of attrition through annihilation that China can wage protracted war.

99. But the objective of strategic attrition may also be achieved by campaigns of attrition. Generally speaking, mobile warfare performs the task of annihilation, positional warfare performs the task of attrition, and guerrilla warfare performs both simultaneously; the three forms of warfare are thus distinguished from one another. In this sense war of annihilation is different from war of attrition. Campaigns of attrition are supplementary but necessary in protracted war.

100. Speaking theoretically and in terms of China's needs, in order to achieve the strategic objective of greatly depleting the enemy's forces, China in her defensive stage should not only exploit the function of annihilation, which is fulfilled primarily by mobile warfare and partially by guerrilla warfare, but also exploit the function of attrition, which is fulfilled primarily by positional warfare (which itself is supplementary) and partially by guerrilla warfare. In the stage of stalemate we should continue to exploit the functions of annihilation and attrition fulfilled by guerrilla and mobile warfare for further large-scale depletion of the enemy's forces. All this is aimed at protracting the war, gradually changing the general balance of forces and preparing the conditions for our counter-offensive. During the strategic counter-offensive, we should continue to employ the method of attrition through annihilation so as finally to expel the enemy.

101. But as a matter of fact, it was our experience in the last ten months that many or even most of the mobile warfare campaigns became campaigns of attrition, and guerrilla warfare did not adequately fulfil its proper function of annihilation in certain areas. The positive aspect is that at least we depleted the enemy's forces, which is important both for the protracted warfare and for our final victory, and did not shed our blood in vain. But the drawbacks are first, that we did not sufficiently deplete the enemy, and second, that we were

unable to avoid rather heavy losses and captured little war booty. Although we should recognize the objective cause of this situation, namely, the disparity between us and the enemy in technical equipment and in the training of troops, in any case it is necessary, both theoretically and practically, to urge that our main forces should fight vigorous battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are favourable. And although our guerrilla units have to wage battles of pure attrition in performing specific tasks such as sabotage and harassment, it is necessary to advocate and vigorously carry out campaigns and battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are favourable, so as greatly to deplete the enemy's forces and greatly replenish our own.

102. The "exterior lines", the "quick-decision" and the "offensive" in quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines and the "mobility" in mobile warfare find their main operational expression in the use of encircling and outflanking tactics; hence the necessity for concentrating superior forces. Therefore concentration of forces and the use of encircling and outflanking tactics are the prerequisites for mobile warfare, that is, for quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines. All this is aimed at annihilating the enemy forces.

103. The strength of the Japanese army lies not only in its weapons but also in the training of its officers and men — its degree of organization, its self-confidence arising from never having been defeated, its superstitious belief in the Mikado and in supernatural beings, its arrogance, its contempt for the Chinese people and other such characteristics, all of which stem from long years of indoctrination by the Japanese warlords and from the Japanese national tradition. This is the chief reason why we have taken very few prisoners, although we have killed and wounded a great many enemy troops. It is a point that has been underestimated by many people in the past. To destroy these enemy characteristics will be a long process. The first thing to do is to give the matter serious attention, and then patiently and systematically to work at it in the political field and in the fields of international propaganda and the Japanese people's movement; in the military sphere war of annihilation is of course one of the means. In these enemy characteristics pessimists may find a basis for the theory of national subjugation, and passively minded military men a basis for opposition to war of annihilation. We, on the contrary, maintain that these strong points of the Japanese army can be destroyed and that their destruction has already begun.

The chief method of destroying them is to win over the Japanese soldiers politically. We should understand, rather than hurt, their pride and channel it in the proper direction and, by treating prisoners of war leniently, lead the Japanese soldiers to see the anti-popular character of the aggression committed by the Japanese rulers. On the other hand, we should demonstrate to the Japanese soldiers the indomitable spirit and the heroic, stubborn fighting capacity of the Chinese army and the Chinese people, that is, we should deal them blows in battles of annihilation. Our experience in the last ten months of military operations shows that it is possible to annihilate enemy forces — witness the Pinghsingkuan and Taierhchuang campaigns. The Japanese army's morale is beginning to sag, its soldiers do not understand the aim of the war, they are engulfed by the Chinese armies and by the Chinese people, in assault they show far less courage than the Chinese soldiers, and so on; all these are objective factors favourable to waging battles of annihilation, and they will, moreover, steadily develop as the war becomes protracted. From the viewpoint of destroying the enemy's overweening arrogance through battles of annihilation, such battles are one of the prerequisites for shortening the war and accelerating the emancipation of the Japanese soldiers and the Japanese people. Cats make friends with cats, and nowhere in the world do cats make friends with mice.

104. On the other hand, it must be admitted that for the present we are inferior to the enemy in technical equipment and in troop training. Therefore, it is often difficult to achieve the maximum in annihilation, such as capturing the whole or the greater part of an enemy force, especially when fighting on the plains. In this connection the excessive demands of the theorists of quick victory are wrong. What should be demanded of our forces in the anti-Japanese war is that they should fight battles of annihilation as far as possible. In favourable circumstances, we should concentrate superior forces in every battle and employ encircling and outflanking tactics — encircle part if not all of the enemy forces, capture part if not all of the encircled forces, and inflict heavy casualties on part of the encircled forces if we cannot capture them. In circumstances which are unfavourable for battles of annihilation, we should fight battles of attrition. In favourable circumstances, we should employ the principle of concentration of forces, and in unfavourable circumstances that of their dispersion. As for the relationship of command in campaigns, we should apply the principle of centralized command in the former and

that of decentralized command in the latter. These are the basic principles of field operations for the War of Resistance Against Japan.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF EXPLOITING THE ENEMY'S MISTAKES

105. The enemy command itself provides a basis for the possibility of defeating Japan. History has never known an infallible general, and the enemy makes mistakes just as we ourselves can hardly avoid making them; hence, the possibility exists of exploiting the enemy's errors. In the ten months of his war of aggression the enemy has already made many mistakes in strategy and tactics. There are five major ones.

> First, piecemeal reinforcement. This is due to the enemy's underestimation of China and also to his shortage of troops. The enemy has always looked down on us. After grabbing the four northeastern provinces at small cost, he occupied eastern Hopei and northern Chahar, all by way of strategic reconnaissance. The conclusion the enemy came to was that the Chinese nation is a heap of loose sand. Thus, thinking that China would crumble at a single blow, he mapped out a plan of "quick decision", attempting with very small forces to send us scampering in panic. He did not expect to find such great unity and such immense powers of resistance as China has shown during the past ten months, forgetting as he did that China is already in an era of progress and already has an advanced political party, an advanced army and an advanced people. Meeting with setbacks, the enemy then increased his forces piecemeal from about a dozen to thirty divisions. If he wants to advance, he will have to augment his forces still further. But because of Japan's antagonism with the Soviet Union and her inherent shortage of manpower and finances, there are inevitable limits to the maximum number of men she can throw in and to the furthest extent of her advance.
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> Second, absence of a main direction of attack. Before the Taierhchuang campaign, the enemy had divided his forces more or less evenly between northern and central China and had again divided them inside each of these areas. In northern China, for instance, he divided his forces among the Tientsin-Pukow,

> the Peiping-Hankow and the Tatung-Puchow Railways, and along each of these lines he suffered some casualties and left some garrisons in the places occupied, after which he lacked the forces for further advances. After the Taierhchuang defeat, from which he learned a lesson, the enemy concentrated his main forces in the direction of Hsuchow, and so temporarily corrected this mistake.
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> Third, lack of strategic co-ordination. On the whole co-ordination exists within the groups of enemy forces in northern China and in central China, but there is glaring lack of co-ordination between the two. When his forces on the southern section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway attacked Hsiaopengpu, those on the northern section made no move, and when his forces on the northern section attacked Taierhchuang, those on the southern section made no move. After the enemy came to grief at both places, the Japanese minister of war arrived on an inspection tour and the chief of general staff turned up to take charge, and for the moment, it seemed, there was co-ordination. The landlord class, the bourgeoisie and the warlords of Japan have very serious internal contradictions, which are growing, and the lack of military co-ordination is one of the concrete manifestations of this fact.
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> Fourth, failure to grasp strategic opportunities. This failure was conspicuously shown in the enemy's halt after the occupation of Nanking and Taiyuan, chiefly because of his shortage of troops and his lack of a strategic pursuit force.
>
> Fifth, encirclement of large, but annihilation of small, numbers. Before the Taierhchuang campaign, in the campaigns of Shanghai, Nanking, Tsangchow, Paoting, Nankow, Hsinkou and Linfen, many Chinese troops were routed but few were taken prisoner, which shows the stupidity of the enemy command.

These five errors — piecemeal reinforcement, absence of a main direction of attack, lack of strategic co-ordination, failure to grasp opportunities, and encirclement of large, but annihilation of small, numbers — were all points of incompetence in the Japanese command before the Taierhchuang campaign. Although the enemy has since made some improvements, he cannot possibly avoid repeating his errors because of his shortage of troops, his internal contradictions and other factors. In addition, what he gains at one point he loses at another. For instance, when he concentrated his forces in northern China on Hsuchow, he left a great vacuum in the occupied areas in northern China, which gave us full scope for developing guerrilla warfare. These mistakes were of the enemy's own making and not induced by us. On our part, we can deliberately make the enemy commit errors, that is, we can mislead him and manoeuvre him into the desired position by ingenious and effective moves with the help of a well-organized local population, for example, by "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west". This possibility has already been discussed. All the above shows that in the enemy's command, too, we can find some basis for victory. Of course, we should not take it as an important basis for our strategic planning; on the contrary, the only reliable course is to base our planning on the assumption that the enemy will make few mistakes. Besides, the enemy can exploit our mistakes just as we can exploit his. It is the duty of our command to allow him the minimum of opportunities for doing so. Actually, the enemy command has committed errors, will again commit errors in the future, and can be made to do so through our endeavours. All these errors we can exploit, and it is the business of our generals in the War of Resistance to do their utmost to seize upon them. However, although much of the enemy's strategic and campaign command is incompetent, there are quite a few excellent points in his battle command, that is, in his unit and small formation tactics, and here we should learn from him.

THE QUESTION OF DECISIVE ENGAGEMENTS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

106. The question of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war should be approached from three aspects: we should resolutely fight a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are sure of victory; we should avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are not sure of victory; and we should absolutely avoid a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked. The characteristics differentiating our War of Resistance Against Japan from many other wars are also revealed in this question of decisive engagements. In the first and second stages of the war, which are marked by the enemy's strength

and our weakness, the enemy's objective is to have us concentrate our main forces for a decisive engagement. Our objective is exactly the opposite. We want to choose conditions favourable to us, concentrate superior forces and fight decisive campaigns or battles only when we are sure of victory, as in the battles at Pinghsingkuan, Taierhchuang and other places; we want to avoid decisive engagements under unfavourable conditions when we are not sure of victory, this being the policy we adopted in the Changteh and other campaigns. As for fighting a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked, we simply must not do so, as witness the recent withdrawal from Hsuchow. The enemy's plan for a "quick decision" was thus foiled, and now he cannot help fighting a protracted war with us. These principles are impracticable in a country with a small territory, and hardly practicable in a country that is very backward politically. They are practicable in China because she is a big country and is in an era of progress. If strategically decisive engagements are avoided, then "as long as the green mountains are there, one need not worry about firewood", for even though some of our territory may be lost, we shall still have plenty of room for manoeuvre and thus be able to promote and await domestic progress, international support and the internal disintegration of the enemy; that is the best policy for us in the anti-Japanese war. Unable to endure the arduous trials of a protracted war and eager for an early triumph, the impetuous theorists of quick victory clamour for a strategically decisive engagement the moment the situation takes a slightly favourable turn. To do what they want would be to inflict incalculable damage on the entire war, spell finis to the protracted war, and land us in the enemy's deadly trap; actually, it would be the worst policy. Undoubtedly, if we are to avoid decisive engagements, we shall have to abandon territory, and we must have the courage to do so when (and only when) it becomes completely unavoidable. At such times we should not feel the slightest regret, for this policy of trading space for time is correct. History tells us how Russia made a courageous retreat to avoid a decisive engagement and then defeated Napoleon, the terror of his age. Today China should do likewise.

107. Are we not afraid of being denounced as "non-resisters"? No, we are not. Not to fight at all but to compromise with the enemy — that is non-resistance, which should not only be denounced but must never be tolerated. We must resolutely fight the War of Resistance, but in order to avoid the enemy's deadly trap, it is

absolutely necessary that we should not allow our main forces to be finished off at one blow, which would make it difficult to continue the War of Resistance — in brief, it is absolutely necessary to avoid national subjugation. To have doubts on this point is to be short-sighted on the question of the war and is sure to lead one into the ranks of the subjugationists. We have criticized the desperate recklessness of "only advance, never retreat" precisely because, if it became the fashion, this doctrine would make it impossible to continue the War of Resistance and would lead to the danger of ultimate national subjugation.

108. We are for decisive engagements whenever circumstances are favourable, whether in battles or in major or minor campaigns, and in this respect we should never tolerate passivity. Only through such decisive engagements can we achieve the objective of annihilating or depleting the enemy forces, and every soldier in the anti-Japanese war should resolutely play his part. For this purpose considerable partial sacrifices are necessary; to avoid any sacrifice whatsoever is the attitude of cowards and of those afflicted by the fear of Japan and must be firmly opposed. The execution of Li Fu-ying, Han Fu-chu and other flightists was justified. Within the scope of correct war planning, encouraging the spirit and practice of heroic self-sacrifice and dauntless advance in battle is absolutely necessary and inseparable from the waging of protracted war and the achievement of final victory. We have strongly condemned the flightism of "only retreat, never advance" and have supported the strict enforcement of discipline, because it is only through heroic decisive engagements, fought under a correct plan, that we can vanquish the powerful enemy; flightism, on the contrary, gives direct support to the theory of national subjugation.

109. Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and then abandon territory? Will not our heroic fighters have shed their blood in vain? That is not at all the way questions should be posed. To eat and then to empty your bowels — is this not to eat in vain? To sleep and then to get up — is this not to sleep in vain? Can questions be posed in such a way? I would suppose not. To keep on eating, to keep on sleeping, to keep on fighting heroically all the way to the Yalu River without a stop — these are subjectivist and formalist illusions, not realities of life. As everybody knows, although in fighting and shedding our blood in order to gain time and prepare the counter-offensive we have had to abandon some territory, in fact we have gained time,

we have achieved the objective of annihilating and depleting enemy forces, we have acquired experience in fighting, we have aroused hitherto inactive people and improved our international standing. Has our blood been shed in vain? Certainly not. Territory has been given up in order to preserve our military forces and indeed to preserve territory, because if we do not abandon part of our territory when conditions are unfavourable but blindly fight decisive engagements without the least assurance of winning, we shall lose our military forces and then be unable to avoid the loss of all our territory, to say nothing of recovering territory already lost. A capitalist must have capital to run his business, and if he loses it all he is no longer a capitalist. Even a gambler must have money to stake, and if he risks it all on a single throw and his luck fails, he cannot gamble any more. Events have their twists and turns and do not follow a straight line, and war is no exception; only formalists are unable to comprehend this truth.

110. I think the same will also hold true for the decisive engagements in the stage of strategic counter-offensive. Although by then the enemy will be in the inferior and we in the superior position, the principle of "fighting profitable decisive engagements and avoiding unprofitable ones" will still apply and will continue to apply until we have fought our way to the Yalu River. This is how we will be able to maintain our initiative from beginning to end, and as for the enemy's "challenges" and other people's "taunts", we should imperturbably brush them aside and ignore them. In the War of Resistance only those generals who show this kind of firmness can be deemed courageous and wise. This is beyond the ken of those who "jump whenever touched". Even though we are in a more or less passive position strategically in this first stage of the war, we should have the initiative in every campaign; and of course we should have the initiative throughout the later stages. We are for protracted war and final victory, we are not gamblers who risk everything on a single throw.

THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE ARE THE FOUNDATION OF VICTORY

111. Japanese imperialism will never relax in its aggression against and repression of revolutionary China; this is determined by its

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

imperialist nature. If China did not resist, Japan would easily seize all China without firing a single shot, as she did the four northeastern provinces. Since China is resisting, it is an inexorable law that Japan will try to repress this resistance until the force of her repression is exceeded by the force of China's resistance. The Japanese landlord class and bourgeoisie are very ambitious, and in order to drive south to Southeast Asia and north to Siberia, they have adopted the policy of breaking through in the centre by first attacking China. Those who think that Japan will know where to stop and be content with the occupation of northern China and of Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces completely fail to perceive that imperialist Japan, which has developed to a new stage and is approaching extinction, differs from the Japan of the past. When we say that there is a definite limit both to the number of men Japan can throw in and to the extent of her advance, we mean that with her available strength, Japan can only commit part of her forces against China and only penetrate China as far as their capacity allows, for she also wants to attack in other directions and has to defend herself against other enemies; at the same time China has given proof of progress and capacity for stubborn resistance, and it is inconceivable that there should be fierce attacks by Japan without inevitable resistance by China. Japan cannot occupy the whole of China, but she will spare no effort to suppress China's resistance in all the areas she can reach, and will not stop until internal and external developments push Japanese imperialism to the brink of the grave. There are only two possible outcomes to the political situation in Japan. Either the downfall of her entire ruling class occurs rapidly, political power passes to the people and war thus comes to an end, which is impossible at the moment; or her landlord class and bourgeoisie become more and more fascist and maintain the war until the day of their downfall, which is the very road Japan is now travelling. There can be no other outcome. Those who hope that the moderates among the Japanese bourgeoisie will come forward and stop the war are only harbouring illusions. The reality of Japanese politics for many years has been that the bourgeois moderates of Japan have fallen captive to the landlords and the financial magnates. Now that Japan has launched war against China, so long as she does not suffer a fatal blow from Chinese resistance and still retains sufficient strength, she is bound to attack Southeast Asia or Siberia, or even both. She will do so once war breaks out in Europe; in their wishful calculations, the rulers of Japan have it worked out on a grandiose scale. Of course.

it is possible that Japan will have to drop her original plan of invading Siberia and adopt a mainly defensive attitude towards the Soviet Union on account of Soviet strength and of the serious extent to which Japan herself has been weakened by her war against China. But in that case, so far from relaxing her aggression against China she will intensify it, because then the only way left to her will be to gobble up the weak. China's task of persevering in the War of Resistance, the united front and the protracted war will then become all the more weighty, and it will be all the more necessary not to slacken our efforts in the slightest.

112. Under the circumstances the main prerequisites for China's victory over Japan are nation-wide unity and all-round progress on a scale ten or even a hundred times greater than in the past. China is already in an era of progress and has achieved a splendid unity, but her progress and unity are still far from adequate. That Japan has occupied such an extensive area is due not only to her strength but also to China's weakness; this weakness is entirely the cumulative effect of the various historical errors of the last hundred years, and especially of the last ten years, which have confined progress to its present bounds. It is impossible to vanquish so strong an enemy without making an extensive and long-term effort. There are many things we have to exert ourselves to do; here I will deal only with two fundamental aspects, the progress of the army and the progress of the people.

113. The reform of our military system requires its modernization and improved technical equipment, without which we cannot drive the enemy back across the Yalu River. In our employment of troops we need progressive, flexible strategy and tactics, without which we likewise cannot win victory. Nevertheless, soldiers are the foundation of an army; unless they are imbued with a progressive political spirit, and unless such a spirit is fostered through progressive political work, it will be impossible to achieve genuine unity between officers and men, impossible to arouse their enthusiasm for the War of Resistance to the full, and impossible to provide a sound basis for the most effective use of all our technical equipment and tactics. When we say that Japan will finally be defeated despite her technical superiority, we mean that the blows we deliver through annihilation and attrition, apart from inflicting losses, will eventually shake the morale of the enemy army whose weapons are not in the hands of politically conscious soldiers. With us, on the contrary, officers and men are at one on the

political aim of the War of Resistance. This gives us the foundation for political work among all the anti-Japanese forces. A proper measure of democracy should be put into effect in the army, chiefly by abolishing the feudal practice of bullying and beating and by having officers and men share weal and woe. Once this is done, unity will be achieved between officers and men, the combat effectiveness of the army will be greatly increased, and there will be no doubt of our ability to sustain the long, cruel war.

114. The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people. It is mainly because of the unorganized state of the Chinese masses that Japan dares to bully us. When this defect is remedied, then the Japanese aggressor, like a mad bull crashing into a ring of flames, will be surrounded by hundreds of millions of our people standing upright, the mere sound of their voices will strike terror into him, and he will be burned to death. China's armies must have an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements, and the abuses of press-ganging and of buying substitutes,[33] which now exist at the lower levels, must immediately be banned and replaced by widespread and enthusiastic political mobilization, which will make it easy to enlist millions of men. We now have great difficulties in raising money for the war, but once the people are mobilized, finances too will cease to be a problem. Why should a country as large and populous as China suffer from lack of funds? The army must become one with the people so that they see it as their own army. Such an army will be invincible, and an imperialist power like Japan will be no match for it.

115. Many people think that it is wrong methods that make for strained relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, but I always tell them that it is a question of basic attitude (or basic principle), of having respect for the soldiers and the people. It is from this attitude that the various policies, methods and forms ensue. If we depart from this attitude, then the policies, methods and forms will certainly be wrong, and the relations between officers and men and between the army and the people are bound to be unsatisfactory. Our three major principles for the army's political work are, first, unity between officers and men; second, unity between the army and the people; and third, the disintegration of the enemy forces. To apply these principles effectively, we must start with this basic attitude of respect for the soldiers and the people, and of

respect for the human dignity of prisoners of war once they have laid down their arms. Those who take all this as a technical matter and not one of basic attitude are indeed wrong, and they should correct their view.

116. At this moment when the defence of Wuhan and other places has become urgent, it is a task of the utmost importance to arouse the initiative and enthusiasm of the whole army and the whole people to the full in support of the war. There is no doubt that the task of defending Wuhan and other places must be seriously posed and seriously performed. But whether we can be certain of holding them depends not on our subjective desires but on concrete conditions. Among the most important of these conditions is the political mobilization of the whole army and people for the struggle. If a strenuous effort is not made to secure all the necessary conditions, indeed even if one of these conditions is missing, disasters like the loss of Nanking and other places are bound to be repeated. China will have her Madrids in places where the conditions are present. So far China has not had a Madrid, and from now on we should work hard to create several, but it all depends on the conditions. The most fundamental of these is extensive political mobilization of the whole army and people.

117. In all our work we must persevere in the Anti-Japanese National United Front as the general policy. For only with this policy can we persevere in the War of Resistance and in protracted warfare, bring about a widespread and profound improvement in the relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, arouse to the full the initiative and enthusiasm of the entire army and the entire people in the fight for the defence of all the territory still in our hands and for the recovery of what we have lost, and so win final victory.

118. This question of the political mobilization of the army and the people is indeed of the greatest importance. We have dwelt on it at the risk of repetition precisely because victory is impossible without it. There are, of course, many other conditions indispensable to victory, but political mobilization is the most fundamental. The Anti-Japanese National United Front is a united front of the whole army and the whole people, it is certainly not a united front merely of the headquarters and members of a few political parties; our basic objective in initiating the Anti-Japanese National United Front is to mobilize the whole army and the whole people to participate in it.

CONCLUSIONS

119. What are our conclusions? They are:

"Under what conditions do you think China can defeat and destroy the forces of Japan?" "Three conditions are required: first, the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front in China; second, the formation of an international anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement of the people in Japan and the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint of the Chinese people, the unity of the people of China is the most important of the three conditions."

"How long do you think such a war would last?" "That depends on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united front and many other conditioning factors involving China and Japan."

"If these conditions are not realized quickly, the war will be prolonged. But in the end, just the same, Japan will certainly be defeated and China will certainly be victorious. Only the sacrifices will be great and there will be a very painful period."

"Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to operate over an extended and fluid front. To achieve success, the Chinese troops must conduct their warfare with a high degree of mobility on extensive battlefields."

"Besides employing trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize great numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants."

"In the course of the war, China will be able to . . . reinforce the equipment of her troops gradually. Therefore China will be able to conduct positional warfare in the latter period of the war and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus Japan's economy will crack under the strain of China's long resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces will break under the trial of innumerable battles. On the Chinese side, however, the growing latent power of resistance will be constantly brought into play and large numbers of revolutionary people will be pouring into the front lines to fight for their freedom. The combination of all these and other factors will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on the fortifications and bases in the Japanese-occupied areas and drive the Japanese forces of aggression out of China." (From an interview with Edgar Snow in July 1936.)

> "Thus a new stage has opened in China's political situation. . . . In the present stage the central task is to mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance."
>
> "The key to victory in the war now lies in developing the resistance that has already begun into a war of total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a war of total resistance can final victory be won."
>
> "The existence of serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance may lead to setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises and other such reverses. Therefore it should be realized that the war will be arduous and protracted. But we are confident that, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the resistance already started will sweep aside all obstacles and continue to advance and develop." ("Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party", adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, August 1937.)

These are our conclusions. In the eyes of the subjugationists the enemy are supermen and we Chinese are worthless, while in the eyes of the theorists of quick victory we Chinese are supermen and the enemy are worthless. Both are wrong. We take a different view; the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war, and the final victory will be China's. These are our conclusions.

120. My lectures end here. The great War of Resistance Against Japan is unfolding, and many people are hoping for a summary of experience to facilitate the winning of complete victory. What I have discussed is simply the general experience of the past ten months, and it may perhaps serve as a kind of summary. The problem of protracted war deserves wide attention and discussion; what I have given is only an outline, which I hope you will examine and discuss, amend and amplify.

NOTES

[1] This theory of national subjugation was the view held by the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang was unwilling to resist Japan and fought Japan only under compulsion. After the Lukouchiao Incident (July 7, 1937), the Chiang Kai-shek clique reluctantly took part in the War of Resistance, while the Wang Ching-wei clique became the representatives of the theory of national subjugation, was ready to capitulate to Japan

and in fact subsequently did so. However, the idea of national subjugation not only existed in the Kuomintang, but also affected certain sections of the middle strata of society and even certain backward elements among the labouring people. As the corrupt and impotent Kuomintang government lost one battle after another and the Japanese troops advanced unchecked to the vicinity of Wuhan in the first year of the War of Resistance, some backward people became profoundly pessimistic.

[2] These views were to be found within the Communist Party. During the first six months of the War of Resistance, there was a tendency to take the enemy lightly among some members of the Party, who held the view that Japan could be defeated at a single blow. It was not that they felt our own forces to be so strong, since they well knew that the troops and the organized people's forces led by the Communist Party were still small, but that the Kuomintang had begun to resist Japan. In their opinion, the Kuomintang was quite powerful, and, in co-ordination with the Communist Party, could deal Japan telling blows. They made this erroneous appraisal because they saw only one aspect of the Kuomintang, that it was resisting Japan, but overlooked the other aspect, that it was reactionary and corrupt.

[3] Such was the view of Chiang Kai-shek and company. Though they were compelled to resist Japan, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang pinned their hopes solely on prompt foreign aid and had no confidence in their own strength, much less in the strength of the people.

[4] Taierhchuang is a town in southern Shantung where the Chinese army fought a battle in March 1938 against the Japanese invaders. By pitting 400,000 men against Japan's 70,000 to 80,000, the Chinese army defeated the Japanese.

[5] This view was put forward in an editorial in the *Ta Kung Pao*, then the organ of the Political Science Group in the Kuomintang. Indulging in wishful thinking, this clique hoped that a few more victories of the Taierhchuang type would stop Japan's advance and that there would be no need to mobilize the people for a protracted war, which would threaten the security of its own class. This wishful thinking then pervaded the Kuomintang as a whole.

[6] For many decades, beginning with the end of the 18th century, Britain exported an increasing quantity of opium to China. This traffic not only subjected the Chinese people to drugging but also plundered China of her silver. It aroused fierce opposition in China. In 1840, under the pretext of safeguarding its trade with China, Britain launched armed aggression against her. The Chinese troops led by Lin Tse-hsu put up resistance, and the people in Canton spontaneously organized the "Quell-the-British Corps", which dealt serious blows to the British forces of aggression. In 1842, however, the corrupt Ching regime signed the Treaty of Nanking with Britain. This treaty provided for the payment of indemnities and the cession of Hongkong to Britain, and stipulated that Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Ningpo and Canton were to be opened to British trade and that tariff rates for British goods imported into China were to be jointly fixed by China and Britain.

[7] The Taiping Revolution, or the Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, was the mid-19th century revolutionary peasant movement against the feudal rule and national oppression of the Ching Dynasty. In January 1851 Hung Hsiu-chuan, Yang Hsiu-ching and other leaders launched an uprising in Chintien Village in Kueiping County, Kwangsi Province, and proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Proceeding northward from Kwangsi, their peasant army attacked and occupied Hunan and Hupeh in 1852. In 1853 it marched through Kiangsi and Anhwei and captured Nanking. A section of the force then continued the drive north and pushed on to the vicinity of Tientsin. However the Taiping army failed

to build stable base areas in the places it occupied; moreover, after establishing its capital in Nanking, its leading group committed many political and military errors. Therefore it was unable to withstand the combined onslaughts of the counter-revolutionary forces of the Ching government and the British, U.S. and French aggressors, and was finally defeated in 1864.

[8] The Reform Movement of 1898, whose leading spirits were Kang Yu-wei, Liang Chi-chao and Tan Szu-tung represented the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie and the enlightened landlords. The movement was favoured and supported by Emperor Kuang Hsu, but had no mass basis. Yuan Shih-kai, who had an army behind him, betrayed the reformers to Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, the leader of the die-hards, who seized power again and had Emperor Kuang Hsu imprisoned and Tan Szu-tung and five others beheaded. Thus the movement ended in tragic defeat.

[9] The Revolution of 1911 was the bourgeois revolution which overthrew the autocratic regime of the Ching Dynasty. On October 10 of that year, a section of the Ching Dynasty's New Army who were under revolutionary influence staged an uprising in Wuchang, Hupeh Province. The existing bourgeois and petty-bourgeois revolutionary societies and the broad masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers responded enthusiastically, and very soon the rule of the Ching Dynasty crumbled. In January 1912, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China was set up in Nanking, with Sun Yat-sen as the Provisional President. Thus China's feudal monarchic system which had lasted for more than two thousand years was brought to an end. The idea of a democratic republic had entered deep in the hearts of the people. But the bourgeoisie which led the revolution was strongly conciliationist in nature. It did not mobilize the peasant masses on an extensive scale to crush the feudal rule of the landlord class in the countryside, but instead handed state power over to the Northern warlord Yuan Shih-kai under imperialist and feudal pressure. As a result, the revolution ended in defeat.

[10] The Northern Expedition was the punitive war against the Northern warlords launched by the revolutionary army which marched north from Kwangtung Province in May-July 1926. The Northern Expeditionary Army, with the Communist Party of China taking part in its leadership and under the Party's influence (the political work in the army was at that time mostly under the charge of Communist Party members), gained the warm support of the broad masses of workers and peasants. In the second half of 1926 and the first half of 1927 it occupied most of the provinces along the Yangtse and Yellow Rivers and defeated the Northern warlords. In April 1927 this revolutionary war failed as a result of betrayal by the reactionary clique under Chiang Kai-shek within the revolutionary army.

[11] On January 16, 1938, the Japanese cabinet declared in a policy statement that Japan would subjugate China by force. At the same time it tried by threats and blandishments to make the Kuomintang government capitulate, declaring that if the Kuomintang government "continued to plan resistance", the Japanese government would foster a new puppet regime in China and no longer accept the Kuomintang as "the other party" in negotiations.

[12] The capitalists referred to here are chiefly those of the United States.

[13] By "their governments" Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here referring to the governments of the imperialist countries — Britain, the United States and France.

[14] Comrade Mao Tse-tung's prediction that there would be an upswing in China during the stage of stalemate in the War of Resistance Against Japan was completely confirmed in the case of the Liberated Areas under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. But there was actually a decline instead of an upswing in the Kuomintang

areas, because the ruling clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek was passive in resisting Japan and active in opposing the Communist Party and the people. This roused opposition among the broad masses of the people and raised their political consciousness.

[15] According to the theory that "weapons decide everything", China which was inferior to Japan in regard to arms was bound to be defeated in the war. This view was current among all the leaders of the Kuomintang reaction, Chiang Kai-shek included.

[16] See "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan", Note 9, p. 112 of this volume.

[17] Sun Wu-kung is the monkey king in the Chinese novel *Hsi Yu Chi* (*Pilgrimage to the West*), written in the 16th century. He could cover 108,000 *li* by turning a somersault. Yet once in the palm of the Buddha, he could not escape from it, however many somersaults he turned. With a flick of his palm Buddha transformed his fingers into the five-peak Mountain of Five Elements, and buried Sun Wu-kung.

[18] "*Fascism is unbridled chauvinism and predatory war*," said Comrade Georgi Dimitrov in his report to the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in August 1935, entitled "The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International" (see *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Eng. ed., Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1951, p. 44). In July 1937, Comrade Dimitrov published an article entitled *Fascism Is War*.

[19] V. I. Lenin, *Socialism and War*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1950, p. 19.

[20] *Sun Tzu*, Chapter 3, "The Strategy of Attack".

[21] Chengpu, situated in the southwest of the present Chuancheng County in Shantung Province, was the scene of a great battle between the states of Tsin and Chu in 632 B.C. At the beginning of the battle the Chu troops got the upper hand. The Tsin troops, after making a retreat of 90 *li*, chose the right and left flanks of the Chu troops, their weak spots, and inflicted heavy defeats on them.

[22] The ancient town of Chengkao, in the northwest of the present Chengkao County, Honan Province, was of great military importance. It was the scene of battles fought in 203 B.C. between Liu Pang, King of Han, and Hsiang Yu, King of Chu. At first Hsiang Yu captured Hsingyang and Chengkao and Liu Pang's troops were almost routed. Liu Pang waited until the opportune moment when Hsiang Yu's troops were in midstream crossing the Szeshui River, and then crushed them and recaptured Chengkao.

[23] In 204 B.C., Han Hsin, a general of the state of Han, led his men in a big battle with Chao Hsieh at Chinghsing. Chao Hsieh's army, said to be 200,000 strong, was several times that of Han. Deploying his troops with their backs to a river, Han Hsin led them in valiant combat, and at the same time dispatched some units to attack and occupy the enemy's weakly garrisoned rear. Caught in a pincer, Chao Hsieh's troops were utterly defeated.

[24] The ancient town of Kunyang, in the north of the present Yehhsien County, Honan Province, was the place where Liu Hsiu, founder of the Eastern Han Dynasty, defeated the troops of Wang Mang, Emperor of the Hsin Dynasty, in A.D. 23. There was a huge numerical disparity between the two sides, Liu Hsiu's forces totalling 8,000 to 9,000 men as against Wang Mang's 400,000. But taking advantage of the negligence of Wang Mang's generals, Wang Hsun and Wang Yi, who underestimated the enemy, Liu Hsiu with only three thousand picked troops put Wang Mang's main forces to rout. He followed up this victory by crushing the rest of the enemy troops.

[25] Kuantu was in the northeast of the present Chungmou County, Honan Province, and the scene of the battle between the armies of Tsao Tsao and Yuan Shao in A.D.

200. Yuan Shao had an army of 100,000, while Tsao Tsao had only a meagre force and was short of supplies. Taking advantage of the lack of vigilance on the part of Yuan Shao's troops, who belittled the enemy, Tsao Tsao dispatched his light-footed soldiers to spring a surprise attack on them and set their supplies on fire. Yuan Shao's army was thrown into confusion and its main force wiped out.

[26] The state of Wu was ruled by Sun Chuan, and the state of Wei by Tsao Tsao. Chihpi is situated on the south bank of the Yangtse River, to the northeast of Chiayu, Hupeh Province. In A.D. 208 Tsao Tsao led an army of over 500,000 men, which he proclaimed to be 800,000 strong, to launch an attack on Sun Chuan. The latter, in alliance with Tsao Tsao's antagonist Liu Pei, mustered a force of 30,000. Knowing that Tsao Tsao's army was plagued by epidemics and was unaccustomed to action afloat, the allied forces of Sun Chuan and Liu Pei set fire to Tsao Tsao's fleet and crushed his army.

[27] Yiling, to the east of the present Ichang, Hupeh Province, was the place where Lu Sun, a general of the state of Wu, defeated the army of Liu Pei, ruler of Shu, in A.D. 222. Liu Pei's troops scored successive victories at the beginning of the war and penetrated five or six hundred *li* into the territory of Wu as far as Yiling. Lu Sun, who was defending Yiling, avoided battle for over seven months until Liu Pei "was at his wits' end and his troops were exhausted and demoralized". Then he crushed Liu Pei's troops by taking advantage of a favourable wind to set fire to their tents.

[28] Hsieh Hsuan, a general of Eastern Tsin Dynasty, defeated Fu Chien, ruler of the state of Chin, in A.D. 383 at the Feishui River in Anhwei Province. Fu Chien had an infantry force of more than 600,000, a cavalry force of 270,000 and a guards corps of more than 30,000, while the land and river forces of Eastern Tsin numbered only 80,000. When the armies lined up on opposite banks of the Feishui River, Hsieh Hsuan, taking advantage of the overconfidence and conceit of the enemy troops, requested Fu Chien to move his troops back so as to leave room for the Eastern Tsin troops to cross the river and fight it out. Fu Chien complied, but when he ordered withdrawal, his troops got into a panic and could not be stopped. Seizing the opportunity, the Eastern Tsin troops crossed the river, launched an offensive and crushed the enemy.

[29] In A.D. 383, Fu Chien, the ruler of the state of Chin, belittled the forces of Tsin and attacked them. The Tsin troops defeated the enemy's advance units at Lochien, Shouyang County, Anhwei Province, and pushed forward by land and water. Ascending the city wall of Shouyang, Fu Chien observed the excellent alignment of the Tsin troops and, mistaking the woods and bushes on Mount Pakung for enemy soldiers, was frightened by the enemy's apparent strength.

[30] Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here referring to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, having betrayed the first national democratic united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1927, launched a ten-year war against the people, and thus made it impossible for the Chinese people to be organized on a large scale. For this the Kuomintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek must be held responsible.

[31] Duke Hsiang of Sung ruled in the Spring and Autumn Era. In 638 B.C., the state of Sung fought with the powerful state of Chu. The Sung forces were already deployed in battle positions when the Chu troops were crossing the river. One of the Sung officers suggested that, as the Chu troops were numerically stronger, this was the moment for attack. But the Duke said, "No, a gentleman should never attack one who is unprepared." When the Chu troops had crossed the river but had not yet completed their battle alignment, the officer again proposed an immediate attack,

and once again the Duke said, "No, a gentleman should never attack an army which has not yet completed its battle alignment." The Duke gave the order for attack only after the Chu troops were fully prepared. As a result, the Sung troops met with a disastrous defeat and the Duke himself was wounded.

[32] Han Fu-chu, a Kuomintang warlord, was for several years governor of Shantung. When the Japanese invaders thrust southward to Shantung along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway after occupying Peiping and Tientsin in 1937, Han Fu-chu fled all the way from Shantung to Honan without fighting a single battle.

[33] The Kuomintang expanded its army by press-ganging. Its military and police seized people everywhere, roping them up and treating them like convicts. Those who had money would bribe the Kuomintang officials or pay for substitutes.

THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE NATIONAL WAR

October 1938

Comrades, the prospects ahead of us are bright. Not only is it necessary for us to defeat Japanese imperialism and build a new China, but we are certainly capable of achieving these aims. However, there is a difficult road ahead between the present and the bright future. In the struggle for a new China, the Chinese Communist Party and the whole people must fight the Japanese aggressors in a planned way and can defeat them only through a long war. We have already said a good deal about the various problems relating to the war. We have summed up the experience gained since its outbreak and appraised the present situation, defined the urgent tasks confronting the whole nation and explained the reasons for sustaining a long war by means of a long-term national united front against Japan and the methods for doing so, and we have analysed the international situation. What problems then remain? Comrades, there is one more problem, namely, what role the Chinese Communist Party should play in the national war, or how Communists should understand their own role, strengthen themselves and close their ranks in order to be able to lead this war to victory and not to defeat.

This report was made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party. The session endorsed the line of the Political Bureau headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and was a very important one. In discussing the question of the role of the Chinese Communist Party in the national war he helped all comrades clearly to understand and conscientiously to shoulder the Party's great and historic responsibility of leading the War of Resistance Against Japan. The plenary session decided on the line of persisting in the anti-Japanese united front, but at the same time pointed out that there had to be struggle as well as unity within the united front and that the proposition, "Everything through the united front", did not suit Chinese conditions. Thus the error of accommoda-

PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot? We hold that he not only can be but must be. The specific content of patriotism is determined by historical conditions. There is the "patriotism" of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler, and there is our patriotism. Communists must resolutely oppose the "patriotism" of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler. The Communists of Japan and Germany are defeatists with regard to the wars being waged by their countries. To bring about the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler by every possible means is in the interests of the Japanese and the German people, and the more complete the defeat the better. This is what the Japanese and German Communists should be doing and what they are doing. For the wars launched by the Japanese aggressors and Hitler are harming their own people as well as the people of the world. China's case is different, because she is the victim of aggression. Chinese Communists must therefore combine patriotism with internationalism. We are at once internationalists and patriots, and our slogan is, "Fight to defend the motherland against the aggressors." For us defeatism is a crime and to strive for victory in the War of Resistance is an inescapable duty. For only by fighting in defence of the motherland can we defeat the aggressors and achieve national liberation. And only by achieving national liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own emancipation. The victory of China and the defeat of the invading imperialists will help the people of other countries. Thus in wars of national liberation patriotism is applied internationalism. For this reason Communists must use their initiative to the full, march bravely and resolutely to the battle front

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tionism in regard to the united front was criticized; this problem was dealt with by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in "The Question of Independence and Initiative Within the United Front", which was part of his concluding speech at the same session. Affirming that it was extremely important for the whole Party to devote itself to organizing the people's armed struggle against Japan, the session decided that the war zones and the enemy's rear should be the Party's main fields of work and repudiated the erroneous ideas of those who pinned their hopes of victory on the Kuomintang armies and who would have entrusted the fate of the people to legal struggles under the reactionary Kuomintang rule. This problem was dealt with by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in "Problems of War and Strategy", which was also part of his concluding speech at the session.

of the war of national liberation and train their guns on the Japanese aggressors. For this reason, immediately after the Incident of September 18, 1931, our Party issued its call to resist the Japanese aggressors by a war of national defence, and later proposed a national united front against Japan, ordered the Red Army to reorganize as part of the anti-Japanese National Revolutionary Army and to march to the front, and instructed Party members to take their place in the forefront of the war and defend the motherland to the last drop of their blood. These are good patriotic actions and, far from running counter to internationalism, are its application in China. Only those who are politically muddle-headed or have ulterior motives talk nonsense about our having made a mistake and abandoned internationalism.

COMMUNISTS SHOULD SET AN EXAMPLE IN THE NATIONAL WAR

For the above reasons Communists should show a high degree of initiative in the national war, and show it concretely, that is, they should play an exemplary vanguard role in every sphere. Our war is being waged under adverse circumstances. National consciousness, national self-respect and national self-confidence are not sufficiently developed among the broad masses, the majority of the people are unorganized, China's military power is weak, the economy is backward, the political system is undemocratic, corruption and pessimism exist, and a lack of unity and solidarity is to be found within the united front; these are among the adverse circumstances. Therefore, Communists must consciously shoulder the great responsibility of uniting the entire nation so as to put an end to all such undesirable phenomena. Here the exemplary vanguard role of the Communists is of vital importance. Communists in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies should set an example in fighting bravely, carrying out orders, observing discipline, doing political work and fostering internal unity and solidarity. In their relations with friendly parties and armies, Communists should take a firm stand of unity for resistance to Japan, uphold the programme of the united front and set an example in carrying out the tasks of resistance; they should be true in word and resolute in deed, free from arrogance and sincere in consulting and co-operating with the friendly parties and armies, and they should be models in inter-party relations within the united front. Every Communist engaged in government work should set an example of absolute integrity, of freedom from favouritism in making appointments and of hard work for little remuneration. Every Communist working among the masses should be their friend and not a boss over them, an indefatigable teacher and not a bureaucratic politician. At no time and in no circumstances should a Communist place his personal interests first; he should subordinate them to the interests of the nation and of the masses. Hence, selfishness, slacking, corruption, seeking the limelight, and so on, are most contemptible, while selflessness, working with all one's energy, whole-hearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard work will command respect. Communists should work in harmony with all progressives outside the Party and endeavour to unite the entire people to do away with whatever is undesirable. It must be realized that Communists form only a small section of the nation, and that there are large numbers of progressives and activists outside the Party with whom we must work. It is entirely wrong to think that we alone are good and no one else is any good. As for people who are politically backward, Communists should not slight or despise them, but should befriend them, unite with them, convince them and encourage them to go forward. The attitude of Communists towards any person who has made mistakes in his work should be one of persuasion in order to help him change and start afresh and not one of exclusion, unless he is incorrigible. Communists should set an example in being practical as well as far-sighted. For only by being practical can they fulfil the appointed tasks, and only far-sightedness can prevent them from losing their bearings in the march forward. Communists should therefore set an example in study; at all times they should learn from the masses as well as teach them. Only by learning from the people, from actual circumstances and from the friendly parties and armies, and by knowing them well, can we be practical in our work and far-sighted as to the future. In a long war and in adverse circumstances, the dynamic energy of the whole nation can be mobilized in the struggle to overcome difficulties, defeat the enemy and build a new China only if the Communists play an exemplary vanguard role to the best of their ability together with all the advanced elements among the friendly parties and armies and among the masses.

UNITE THE WHOLE NATION AND COMBAT ENEMY AGENTS IN ITS MIDST

The one and only policy for overcoming difficulties, defeating the enemy and building a new China is to consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front and mobilize the dynamic energy of the whole nation. However, there are already enemy agents playing a disruptive role within our national united front, namely, the traitors, Trotskyites and pro-Japanese elements. Communists must always be on the look-out for them, expose their criminal activities with factual evidence and warn the people not to be duped by them. Communists must sharpen their political vigilance towards these enemy agents. They must understand that the expansion and consolidation of the national united front is inseparable from the exposure and weeding out of enemy agents. It is entirely wrong to pay attention only to the one side and forget the other.

EXPAND THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND PREVENT INFILTRATION BY ENEMY AGENTS

To overcome the difficulties, defeat the enemy and build a new China, the Communist Party must expand its organization and become a great mass party by opening its doors to the masses of workers, peasants and young activists who are truly devoted to the revolution, who believe in the Party's principles, support its policies and are willing to observe its discipline and work hard. Here no tendency towards closed-doorism should be tolerated. But at the same time, there must be no slackening of vigilance against infiltration by enemy agents. The Japanese imperialist secret services are ceaselessly trying to disrupt our Party and to smuggle undercover traitors, Trotskyites, pro-Japanese elements, degenerates and careerists into its ranks in the guise of activists. Not for a moment must we relax our vigilance and our strict precautions against such persons. We must not close our doors for fear of enemy agents, our set policy being boldly to expand our Party. But while boldly enlarging our membership, we must not relax our vigilance against enemy agents and careerists who will avail themselves of this opportunity to sneak in. We shall make mistakes if we only pay attention to the one side and forget the other.

The only correct policy is: "Expand the Party boldly but do not let a single undesirable in."

MAINTAIN BOTH THE UNITED FRONT AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PARTY

It is only by firmly maintaining the national united front that the difficulties can be overcome, the enemy defeated and a new China built. This is beyond all doubt. At the same time, every party and group in the united front must preserve its ideological, political and organizational independence this holds good for the Kuomintang, the Communist Party or any other party or group. In inter-party relations, the Principle of Democracy in the Three People's Principles permits both the union of all parties and groups and the independent existence of each. To speak of unity alone while denying independence is to abandon the Principle of Democracy, and to this neither the Communist Party nor any other party would agree. There is no doubt that independence within the united front is relative and not absolute, and that to regard it as absolute would undermine the general policy of unity against the enemy. But this relative independence must not be denied; ideologically, politically and organizationally, each party must have its relative independence, that is, relative freedom. Also, the general policy of unity against the enemy would be undermined if this relative freedom were denied or voluntarily abandoned. This should be clearly understood by all members of the Communist Party as well as of the friendly parties.

The same is true of the relationship between the class struggle and the national struggle. It is an established principle that in the War of Resistance everything must be subordinated to the interests of resistance. Therefore, the interests of the class struggle must be subordinated to, and must not conflict with, the interests of the War of Resistance. But classes and the class struggle are facts, and those people who deny the fact of class struggle are wrong. The theory which attempts to deny this fact is utterly wrong. We do not deny the class struggle, we adjust it. The policy of mutual help and mutual concessions which we advocate is applicable not only to party relations but also to class relations. Unity against Japan requires an appropriate policy of adjustment in class relations, a policy which does not leave the labouring people without political and material safeguards but also gives consideration to the interests of the rich, thereby meeting the demands of solidarity against the enemy. It is bad for the War of Resistance to pay attention only to the one side and neglect the other.

CONSIDER THE SITUATION AS A WHOLE, THINK IN TERMS OF THE MAJORITY, AND WORK TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES

In leading the masses in struggle against the enemy, Communists must consider the situation as a whole, think in terms of the majority of the people and work together with their allies. They must grasp the principle of subordinating the needs of the part to the needs of the whole. If a proposal appears feasible for a partial situation but not for the situation as a whole, then the part must give way to the whole. Conversely, if the proposal is not feasible for the part but is feasible in the light of the situation as a whole, again the part must give way to the whole. This is what is meant by considering the situation as a whole. Communists must never separate themselves from the majority of the people or neglect them by leading only a few progressive contingents in an isolated and rash advance, but must forge close links between the progressive elements and the broad masses. This is what is meant by thinking in terms of the majority. Wherever there are democratic parties or individuals willing to co-operate with us, the proper attitude for Communists is to talk things over with them and work together with them. It is wrong to indulge in arbitrary decisions and peremptory actions and to ignore our allies. A good Communist must be good at considering the situation as a whole, good at thinking in terms of the majority and good at working with his allies. We have had serious shortcomings in this respect, and we must still give the matter attention.

CADRES POLICY

The Chinese Communist Party is a party leading a great revolutionary struggle in a nation several hundred million strong, and it cannot fulfil its historic task without a large number of leading cadres who combine ability with political integrity. In the last seventeen years our Party has trained a good many competent leaders, so that we have a framework of cadres in military, political, cultural, Party and mass work; all honour is due to the Party and to the nation for this achievement. But the present framework is not yet strong enough to support the vast edifice of our struggle, and it is still necessary to train capable people on a large scale. Many activists have come forward, and are continuing to come forward, in the great struggle of the Chinese people. We have the responsibility for organizing and training them and for taking good care and making proper use of them. Cadres are a decisive factor, once the political line is determined.[1] Therefore, it is our fighting task to train large numbers of new cadres in a planned way.

Our concern should extend to non-Party cadres as well as to Party cadres. There are many capable people outside the Party whom we must not ignore. The duty of every Communist is to rid himself of aloofness and arrogance and to work well with non-Party cadres, give them sincere help, have a warm, comradely attitude towards them and enlist their initiative in the great cause of resisting Japan and reconstructing the nation.

We must know how to judge cadres. We must not confine our judgement to a short period or a single incident in a cadre's life, but should consider his life and work as a whole. This is the principal method of judging cadres.

We must know how to use cadres well. In the final analysis, leadership involves two main responsibilities: to work out ideas, and to use cadres well. Such things as drawing up plans, making decisions, and giving orders and directives, are all in the category of "working out ideas". To put the ideas into practice, we must weld the cadres together and encourage them to go into action; this comes into the category of "using the cadres well". Throughout our national history there have been two sharply contrasting lines on the subject of the use of cadres, one being to "appoint people on their merit", and the other to "appoint people by favouritism". The former is the honest and the latter the dishonest way. The criterion the Communist Party should apply in its cadres policy is whether or not a cadre is resolute in carrying out the Party line, keeps to Party discipline, has close ties with the masses, has the ability to find his bearings independently, and is active, hard-working and unselfish. This is what "appointing people on their merit" means. The cadres policy of Chang Kuo-tao was the exact opposite. Following the line of "appointing people by favouritism", he gathered personal favourites round himself to form a small clique, and in the end he turned traitor to the Party and decamped. This is an important lesson for us. Taking warning from it and from similar historical lessons, the Central Committee and the leaders at all levels must make it their major responsibility to adhere to the honest and fair way in cadres policy and reject the dishonest and unfair way, and so consolidate the unity of the Party.

We must know how to take good care of cadres. There are several ways of doing so.

> First, give them guidance. This means allowing them a free hand in their work so that they have the courage to assume responsibility and, at the same time, giving them timely instructions so that, guided by the Party's political line, they are able to make full use of their initiative.
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> Second, raise their level. This means educating them by giving them the opportunity to study so that they can enhance their theoretical understanding and their working ability.
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> Third, check up on their work, and help them sum up their experience, carry forward their achievements and correct their mistakes. To assign work without checking up and to take notice only when serious mistakes are made — that is not the way to take care of cadres.
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> Fourth, in general, use the method of persuasion with cadres who have made mistakes, and help them correct their mistakes. The method of struggle should be confined to those who make serious mistakes and nevertheless refuse to accept guidance. Here patience is essential. It is wrong lightly to label people "opportunists" or lightly to begin "waging struggles" against them.
>
> Fifth, help them with their difficulties. When cadres are in difficulty as a result of illness, straitened means or domestic or other troubles, we must be sure to give them as much care as possible.

This is how to take good care of cadres.

PARTY DISCIPLINE

In view of Chang Kuo-tao's serious violations of discipline, we must affirm anew the discipline of the Party, namely:

(1) the individual is subordinate to the organization;
(2) the minority is subordinate to the majority;
(3) the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and
(4) the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee.

Whoever violates these articles of discipline disrupts Party unity. Experience proves that some people violate Party discipline through not knowing what it is, while others, like Chang Kuo-tao, violate it knowingly and take advantage of many Party members' ignorance to achieve their treacherous purposes. Hence it is necessary to educate members in Party discipline so that the rank and file will not only observe discipline themselves, but will exercise supervision over the leaders so that they, too, observe it, thus preventing the recurrence of cases like Chang Kuo-tao's. If we are to ensure the development of inner-Party relations along the right lines, besides the four most important articles of discipline mentioned above we must work out a set of fairly detailed Party rules which will serve to unify the actions of the leading bodies at all levels.

PARTY DEMOCRACY

In the present great struggle, the Chinese Communist Party demands that all its leading bodies and all its members and cadres should give the fullest expression to their initiative, which alone can ensure victory. This initiative must be demonstrated concretely in the ability of the leading bodies, the cadres and the Party rank and file to work creatively, in their readiness to assume responsibility, in the exuberant vigour they show in their work, in their courage and ability to raise questions, voice opinions and criticize defects, and in the comradely supervision that is maintained over the leading bodies and the leading cadres. Otherwise, "initiative" will be an empty thing. But the exercise of such initiative depends on the spread of democracy in Party life. It cannot be brought into play if there is not enough democracy in Party life. Only in an atmosphere of democracy can large numbers of able people be brought forward. Ours is a country in which small-scale production and the patriarchal system prevail, and taking the country as a whole there is as yet no democratic life;

consequently, this state of affairs is reflected in our Party by insufficient democracy in Party life. This phenomenon hinders the entire Party from exercising its initiative to the full. Similarly, it has led to insufficient democracy in the united front and in the mass movements. For these reasons, education in democracy must be carried on within the Party so that members can understand the meaning of democratic life, the meaning of the relationship between democracy and centralism, and the way in which democratic centralism should be put into practice. Only in this way can we really extend democracy within the Party and at the same time avoid ultra-democracy and the *laissez-faire* which destroys discipline.

It is also essential to extend democracy in our Party organizations in the army to the degree necessary to stimulate the initiative of the Party members and increase the combat effectiveness of the troops. However, there cannot be as much democracy in the Party organizations in the army as in the local Party organizations. Both in the army and in the local organizations, inner-Party democracy is meant to strengthen discipline and increase combat effectiveness, not to weaken them.

The extension of democracy in the Party should be seen as an essential step in its consolidation and development, and as an important weapon enabling it to be most active in the great struggle, to prove equal to its tasks, create fresh strength and surmount the difficulties of the war.

OUR PARTY HAS CONSOLIDATED ITSELF AND GROWN STRONG THROUGH THE STRUGGLE ON TWO FRONTS

Broadly speaking, in the last seventeen years our Party has learned to use the Marxist-Leninist weapon of ideological struggle against incorrect ideas within the Party on two fronts — against Right opportunism and against "Left" opportunism.

Before the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee,[2] our Party fought Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism and Comrade Li Li-san's "Left" opportunism. It made great progress thanks to the victories achieved in these two inner-Party struggles. After the Fifth Plenary Session there were two further historic inner-Party struggles, namely, the struggles at the Tsunyi Meeting and in connection with the expulsion of Chang Kuo-tao.

The Tsunyi Meeting corrected serious errors of a "Left" opportunist character — errors of principle committed in the fight against the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign — and united the Party and the Red Army; it enabled the Central Committee of the Party and the main forces of the Red Army to bring the Long March to a triumphant conclusion, to advance to a forward position in the resistance to Japan and to carry out the new policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. By combating Chang Kuo-tao's Right opportunism, the Pasi and Yenan Meetings (the fight against the Chang Kuo-tao line began at the Pasi Meeting[3] and ended at the Yenan Meeting[4]) succeeded in bringing all the Red forces together and in strengthening the unity of the whole Party for the heroic struggle against Japan. Both kinds of opportunist mistakes arose during the revolutionary civil war, and their characteristic was that they were errors related to the war.

What are the lessons which have been derived from these two inner-Party struggles? They are:

> (1) The tendency to "Left" impetuosity, which disregards both the subjective and the objective factors, is extremely harmful to a revolutionary war and, for that matter, to any revolutionary movement — it was among the serious errors of principle which were manifested in the struggle against the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, and which arose from ignorance of the characteristics of China's revolutionary war.
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> (2) The opportunism of Chang Kuo-tao, however, was Right opportunism in the revolutionary war and was a combination of a retreatist line, warlordism and anti-Party activity. It was only with the overcoming of this brand of opportunism that large numbers of cadres and Party members in the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, men of intrinsically fine quality and with a long record of heroic struggle, were able to free themselves from its toils and return to the correct line of the Central Committee.
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> (3) Striking results were achieved in the great organizational work of the ten years of the Agrarian Revolutionary War — in army building, government work, mass work and Party building. Had it not been for the support rendered by such organizational work to the heroic fighting at the front, we could not have kept

up the bitter struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. However, in the latter part of that period serious errors of principle were made in the Party's policy concerning cadres and organization, errors which showed themselves in the tendency towards sectarianism, in punitiveness and in the policy of ideological struggle carried to excess. They were due both to our failure to eliminate the vestiges of the former Li Li-san line and to the political mistakes in matters of principle committed at the time. These errors, too, were corrected at the Tsunyi Meeting, and the Party was thus able to make the turn to a correct cadres policy and to correct organizational principles. As for Chang Kuo-tao's organizational line, it violated all Party principles, disrupted Party discipline and carried factional activity to the point of opposition to the Party, the Central Committee and the Communist International. The Central Committee did everything possible to overcome Chang Kuo-tao's iniquitous and erroneous line and to frustrate his anti-Party activity, and also tried to save Chang Kuo-tao himself. But as he stubbornly refused to correct his mistakes and resorted to double-dealing, and subsequently even betrayed the Party and threw himself into the arms of the Kuomintang, the Party had to take firm measures and expel him. This disciplinary action won the support not only of all Party members but of all people loyal to the cause of national liberation. The Communist International also endorsed the decision and denounced Chang Kuo-tao as a deserter and renegade.

These lessons, these achievements, have furnished us with the prerequisites for uniting the whole Party, for strengthening its ideological, political and organizational unity, and for successfully waging the War of Resistance. Our Party has consolidated itself and grown strong through the struggle on the two fronts.

THE PRESENT STRUGGLE ON TWO FRONTS

From now on, it is of paramount importance to wage a political struggle against Rightist pessimism in the War of Resistance, although it is still necessary to keep an eye on "Left" impetuosity. On questions of the united front and of Party and mass organization, we must continue the fight against the "Left" tendency towards closed-doorism if we are to achieve co-operation with the various other anti-Japanese parties and groups, expand the Communist Party and broaden the mass movement. At the same time, we must take care to combat the Right opportunist tendency towards co-operation and expansion which are unconditional in character, or otherwise they will both be hindered and be turned into capitulationist co-operation and unprincipled expansion.

Ideological struggle on the two fronts must suit the concrete circumstances of each case, and we must never approach a problem subjectively or permit the bad old habit of "sticking labels" on people to continue.

In the struggle against deviations, we must give serious attention to opposing double-faced behaviour. As Chang Kuo-tao's career shows, the greatest danger of such behaviour is that it may develop into factional activity. To comply in public but oppose in private, to say yes and mean no, to say nice things to a person's face but play tricks behind his back — these are all forms of double-dealing. Only by sharpening the vigilance of cadres and Party members against such behaviour can we strengthen Party discipline.

STUDY

Generally speaking, all Communist Party members who can do so should study the theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, study our national history and study current movements and trends; moreover, they should help to educate members with less schooling. The cadres in particular should study these subjects carefully, while members of the Central Committee and senior cadres should give them even more attention. No political party can possibly lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless it possesses revolutionary theory and a knowledge of history and has a profound grasp of the practical movement.

The theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin is universally applicable. We should regard it not as a dogma, but as a guide to action. Studying it is not merely a matter of learning terms and phrases but of learning Marxism-Leninism as the science of revolution. It is not just a matter of understanding the general laws derived by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin from their extensive study of real life and revolutionary experience, but of studying their standpoint and method in examining and solving problems. Our Party's mastery of Marxism-Leninism is now rather better than it used to be, but is still far from being extensive or deep. Ours is the task of leading a great nation of several hundred million in a great and unprecedented struggle. For us, therefore, the spreading and deepening of the study of Marxism-Leninism present a big problem demanding an early solution which is possible only through concentrated effort. Following on this plenary session of the Central Committee, I hope to see an all-Party emulation in study which will show who has really learned something, and who has learned more and learned better. So far as shouldering the main responsibility of leadership is concerned, our Party's fighting capacity will be much greater and our task of defeating Japanese imperialism will be more quickly accomplished if there are one or two hundred comrades with a grasp of Marxism-Leninism which is systematic and not fragmentary, genuine and not hollow.

Another of our tasks is to study our historical heritage and use the Marxist method to sum it up critically. Our national history goes back several thousand years and has its own characteristics and innumerable treasures. But in these matters we are mere schoolboys. Contemporary China has grown out of the China of the past; we are Marxist in our historical approach and must not lop off our history. We should sum up our history from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen and take over this valuable legacy. This is important for guiding the great movement of today. Being Marxists, Communists are internationalists, but we can put Marxism into practice only when it is integrated with the specific characteristics of our country and acquires a definite national form. The great strength of Marxism-Leninism lies precisely in its integration with the concrete revolutionary practice of all countries. For the Chinese Communist Party, it is a matter of learning to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism to the specific circumstances of China. For the Chinese Communists who are part of the great Chinese nation, flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood, any talk about Marxism in isolation from China's characteristics is merely Marxism in the abstract, Marxism in a vacuum. Hence to apply Marxism concretely in China so that its every manifestation has an indubitably Chinese character, *i.e.*, to apply Marxism in the light of China's specific characteristics, becomes a problem which it is urgent for the whole Party to understand and solve. Foreign stereotypes must be abolished, there must be less singing of empty, abstract tunes, and dogmatism must be laid to rest; they must be replaced by the fresh, lively Chinese style and spirit which the common people of China love. To separate internationalist content from national form is the practice of those who do not understand the first thing about internationalism. We, on the contrary, must link the two closely. In this matter there are serious errors in our ranks which should be conscientiously overcome.

What are the characteristics of the present movement? What are its laws? How is it to be directed? These are all practical questions. To this day we do not yet understand everything about Japanese imperialism, or about China. The movement is developing, new things have yet to emerge, and they are emerging in an endless stream. To study this movement in its entirety and in its development is a great task claiming our constant attention. Whoever refuses to study these problems seriously and carefully is no Marxist.

Complacency is the enemy of study. We cannot really learn anything until we rid ourselves of complacency. Our attitude towards ourselves should be "to be insatiable in learning" and towards others "to be tireless in teaching".

UNITY AND VICTORY

Unity within the Chinese Communist Party is the fundamental prerequisite for uniting the whole nation to win the War of Resistance and build a new China. Seventeen years of tempering have taught the Chinese Communist Party many ways of attaining internal unity, and ours is now a much more seasoned Party. Thus we are able to form a powerful nucleus for the whole people in the struggle to win victory in the War of Resistance and to build a new China. Comrades, so long as we are united, we can certainly reach this goal.

NOTES

[1] In his report to the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in January 1934, Stalin said: ". . . after the correct political line has been laid down, organizational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, its success or failure."

(See *Problems of Leninism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, p. 644. He also dealt with the question of "proper selection of personnel". In his address in May 1935 delivered in the Kremlin Palace to the graduates from the Red Army Academies, Stalin put forward and explained the slogan: "Cadres decide everything." (*Ibid.*, pp. 661-62. In his report to the 18th Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in March 1939, Stalin said: "After a correct political line has been worked out and tested in practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in the leadership exercised by the Party and the state." (*Ibid.*, p. 784.)

[2] The period referred to was that from the emergency meeting of the Political Bureau of the Fifth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in August to the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1934.

[3] The Pasi Meeting was called by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in August 1935 at Pasi, northwest of the county town of Sungpan, on the borders of northwestern Szechuan and southeastern Kansu. Chang Kuo-tao, leading a section of the Red Army, had broken away from the Central Committee, and was challenging its orders and attempting to undermine it. At this meeting the Central Committee decided to leave the danger zone for northern Shensi with those forces of the Red Army which obeyed its orders. However, Chang Kuo-tao led the Red Army units he had deceived southward to the area of Tienchuan, Lushan, the Big and Small Chinchuan and Ahpa, where he established a bogus central committee and came out publicly against the Party.

[4] The Yenan Meeting was the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party held in Yenan in April 1937. Prior to this meeting large numbers of cadres and soldiers in the Red Army units under Chang Kuo-tao who had already become aware of his deception marched northward towards the Shensi-Kansu border area. On their way, however, some units acted on mistaken orders and switched westward to the area of Kanchow, Liangchow and Suchow, all in Kansu Province. Most of these were wiped out by the enemy and the rest made their way to Sinkiang and only later returned to the Shensi-Kansu border area. The other units had long since reached the Shensi-Kansu border area and joined forces with the Central Red Army. Chang Kuo-tao himself also turned up in northern Shensi and attended the Yenan Meeting. The meeting systematically and conclusively condemned his opportunism and rebellion against the Party. He feigned acquiescence but actually made preparations for his final betrayal of the Party.

THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE AND INITIATIVE WITHIN THE UNITED FRONT

November 5, 1938

HELP AND CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE POSITIVE, NOT NEGATIVE

All political parties and groups in the united front must help each other and make mutual concessions for the sake of long-term co-operation, but such help and concessions should be positive, not negative. We must consolidate and expand our own Party and army, and at the same time should assist friendly parties and armies to consolidate and expand; the people want the government to satisfy their political and economic demands, and at the same time give the government every possible help to prosecute the War of Resistance; the factory workers demand better conditions from the owners, and at the same time work hard in the interests of resistance; for the sake of unity against foreign aggression, the landlords should reduce rent and interest, and at the same time the peasants should pay rent and interest. All these principles and policies of mutual assistance are positive, not negative or one-sided. The same should be true of mutual concessions. Each side should refrain from undermining the other and from organizing secret party branches within the other's party, government and army. For our part we organize no secret party

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This is part of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's concluding speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party. At the time, the issue of independence and initiative within the united front was one of the outstanding questions concerning the anti-Japanese united front, a question on which there were differences of opinion between Comrade Mao Tse-tung and Chen Shao-yu. In essence what was involved was proletarian leadership in the united front. In his report of branches inside the Kuomintang and its government or army, and so set the Kuomintang's mind at rest, to the advantage of the War of Resistance. The saying, "Refrain from doing some things in order to be able to do other things",[1] exactly meets the case. A national war of resistance would have been impossible without the reorganization of the Red Army, the change in the administrative system in the Red areas, and the abandonment of the policy of armed insurrection. By giving way on the latter we have achieved the former; negative measures have yielded positive results. "To fall back the better to leap forward"[2] — that is Leninism. To regard concessions as something purely negative is contrary to Marxism-Leninism. There are indeed instances of purely negative concessions — the Second International's doctrine of collaboration between labour and capital[3] resulted in the betrayal of a whole class and a whole revolution. In China, Chen Tu-hsiu and then Chang Kuo-tao were both capitulators; capitulationism must be strenuously opposed. When we make concessions, fall back, turn to the defensive or halt our advance in our relations with either allies or enemies, we should always see these actions as part of our whole revolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolutionary line, as one turn in a zigzag course. In a word, they are positive.

December 1947 ("The Present Situation and Our Tasks") Comrade Mao Tse-tung briefly summed up these differences:

> During the War of Resistance, our Party combated ideas similar to those of the capitulationists [referring to Chen Tu-hsiu's capitulationism in the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War], that is, such ideas as making concessions to the Kuomintang's anti-popular policies, having more confidence in the Kuomintang than in the masses, not daring to arouse and give full rein to mass struggles, not daring to expand the Liberated Areas and the people's armies in the Japanese-occupied areas, and handing over the leadership in the War of Resistance to the Kuomintang. Our Party waged a resolute struggle against such impotent and degenerate ideas, which run counter to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, resolutely carried out its political line of "developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle forces and isolating the die-hard forces", and resolutely expanded the Liberated Areas and the People's Liberation Army. Not only did this ensure our Party's ability to defeat Japanese imperialism in the period of its aggression, but also, in the period after the Japanese surrender when Chiang Kai-shek launched his counter-revolutionary war, it ensured our Party's ability to switch smoothly and without loss to the course of opposing Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary war with a people's revolutionary war and to win great victories in a short time. All Party comrades must keep these lessons of history firmly in mind.

THE IDENTITY BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE

To sustain a long war by long-term co-operation or, in other words, to subordinate the class struggle to the present national struggle against Japan — such is the fundamental principle of the united front. Subject to this principle, the independent character of the parties and classes and their independence and initiative within the united front should be preserved, and their essential rights should not be sacrificed to co-operation and unity, but on the contrary must be firmly upheld within certain limits. Only thus can co-operation be promoted, indeed only thus can there be any co-operation at all. Otherwise co-operation will turn into amalgamation and the united front will inevitably be sacrificed. In a struggle that is national in character, the class struggle takes the form of national struggle, which demonstrates the identity between the two. On the one hand, for a given historical period the political and economic demands of the various classes must not be such as to disrupt co-operation; on the other hand, the demands of the national struggle (the need to resist Japan) should be the point of departure for all class struggle. Thus there is identity in the united front between unity and independence and between the national struggle and the class struggle.

"EVERYTHING THROUGH THE UNITED FRONT" IS WRONG

The Kuomintang is the party in power, and so far has not allowed the united front to assume an organizational form. Behind the enemy lines, the idea of "everything through" is impossible, for there we have to act independently and with the initiative in our own hands while keeping to the agreements which the Kuomintang has approved (for instance, the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction). Or we may act first and report afterwards, anticipating what the Kuomintang might agree to. For instance, the appointment of administrative commissioners and the dispatch of troops to Shantung Province would never have occurred if we had tried to get these things done "through the united front". It is said that the French Communist

Party once put forward a similar slogan, but that was probably because in France, where a joint committee of the parties already existed and the Socialist Party was unwilling to act in accordance with the jointly agreed programme and wanted to have its own way, the Communist Party had to put forward such a slogan in order to restrain the Socialist Party, and certainly it did not do so to shackle itself. In the case of China, the Kuomintang has deprived all other political parties of equal rights and is trying to compel them to take its orders. If this slogan is meant to be a demand that everything done by the Kuomintang must go through us, it is both ridiculous and impossible. If we have to secure the Kuomintang's consent beforehand for everything we do, what if the Kuomintang does not consent? Since the policy of the Kuomintang is to restrict our growth, there is no reason whatever for us to propose such a slogan, which simply binds us hand and foot. At present there are things for which we should secure prior consent from the Kuomintang, such as the expansion of our three divisions into three army corps — this is to report first and act afterwards. There are other things which the Kuomintang can be told after they have become accomplished facts, such as the expansion of our forces to over 200,000 men — this is to act first and report afterwards. There are also things, such as the convening of the Border Region Assembly, which we shall do without reporting for the time being, knowing that the Kuomintang will not agree. There are still other things which, for the time being, we shall neither do nor report, for they are likely to jeopardize the whole situation. In short, we must not split the united front, but neither should we allow ourselves to be bound hand and foot, and hence the slogan of "everything through the united front" should not be put forward. If "everything must be submitted to the united front" is interpreted as "everything must be submitted to" Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan, then that slogan, too, is wrong. Our policy is one of independence and initiative within the united front, a policy both of unity and of independence.

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[1] A quotation from *Mencius*.

[2] V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's Book *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*", *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 275.

[3] "The doctrine of collaboration between labour and capital" is the reactionary doctrine of the Second International, which advocates such collaboration in the capitalist countries and opposes the revolutionary overthrow of bourgeois rule and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

November 6, 1938

I. CHINA'S CHARACTERISTICS AND REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.

But while the principle remains the same, its application by the party of the proletariat finds expression in varying ways according to the varying conditions. Internally, capitalist countries practise bourgeois democracy (not feudalism) when they are not fascist or not at war; in their external relations, they are not oppressed by, but themselves oppress, other nations. Because of these characteristics, it is the task of the party of the proletariat in the capitalist countries to educate the workers and build up strength through a long period of legal struggle, and thus prepare for the final overthrow of capitalism. In these countries, the question is one of a long legal struggle, of utilizing parliament as a platform, of economic and political strikes, of organizing trade unions and educating the workers. There the form of organization is legal and the form of struggle bloodless (non-military). On the issue of war, the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries oppose the imperialist wars waged by their own

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This article is part of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's concluding speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party. In his "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan" and "On Protracted War", Comrade Mao Tse-tung had already settled the question of the Party's leading role in the War of Resistance Against Japan. But some comrades, committing Right opportunist errors, denied that the Party must maintain its independence and initiative in the united front, and so doubted and even opposed the Party's line on the war and on strategy.

countries; if such wars occur, the policy of these Parties is to bring about the defeat of the reactionary governments of their own countries. The one war they want to fight is the civil war for which they are preparing.[1] But this insurrection and war should not be launched until the bourgeoisie becomes really helpless, until the majority of the proletariat are determined to rise in arms and fight, and until the rural masses are giving willing help to the proletariat. And when the time comes to launch such an insurrection and war, the first step will be to seize the cities, and then advance into the countryside, and not the other way about. All this has been done by Communist Parties in capitalist countries, and it has been proved correct by the October Revolution in Russia.

China is different however. The characteristics of China are that she is not independent and democratic but semi-colonial and semi-feudal, that internally she has no democracy but is under feudal oppression and that in her external relations she has no national independence but is oppressed by imperialism. It follows that we have no parliament to make use of and no legal right to organize the workers to strike. Basically, the task of the Communist Party here is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before launching insurrection and war, and not to seize the big cities first and then occupy the countryside, but the reverse.

When imperialism is not making armed attacks on our country, the Chinese Communist Party either wages civil war jointly with the bourgeoisie against the warlords (lackeys of imperialism), as in 1924-27 in the wars in Kwangtung Province[2] and the Northern Expedition, or unites with the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie to wage civil war against the landlord class and the comprador bourgeoisie (also lackeys of imperialism), as in the War of Agrarian Revolution of 1927-36. When imperialism launches armed attacks on China, the Party unites all classes and strata in the country opposing the foreign aggressors to wage a national war against the foreign enemy, as it is doing in the present War of Resistance Against Japan.

In order to overcome this Right opportunism, bring the whole Party to a clearer understanding of the prime importance of the problems of war and strategy in the Chinese revolution and mobilize it for serious work in this connection, Comrade Mao Tse-tung again stressed the importance of the subject at this plenary session, approaching it from the viewpoint of the history of China's political struggles, and analysed the development of the Party's military work and the specific changes in its strategy. The result was unanimity of thought in the Party leadership and unanimity of action throughout the Party.

All this shows the difference between China and the capitalist countries. In China war is the main form of struggle and the army is the main form of organization. Other forms such as mass organization and mass struggle are also extremely important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war. Before the outbreak of a war all organization and struggle are in preparation for the war, as in the period from the May 4th Movement of 1919 to the May 30th Movement of 1925. After war breaks out, all organization and struggle are co-ordinated with the war either directly or indirectly, as, for instance in the period of the Northern Expedition when all organization and struggle in the rear areas of the revolutionary army were co-ordinated with the war directly, and those in the Northern warlord areas were co-ordinated with the war indirectly. Again in the period of the War of Agrarian Revolution all organization and struggle inside the Red areas were co-ordinated with the war directly, and outside the Red areas indirectly. Yet again in the present period, the War of Resistance, all organization and struggle in the rear areas of the anti-Japanese forces and in the areas occupied by the enemy are directly or indirectly co-ordinated with the war.

"In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution."[3] This thesis of Comrade Stalin's is perfectly correct and is equally valid for the Northern Expedition, the War of Agrarian Revolution, and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. They are all revolutionary wars, all directed against counter-revolutionaries and all waged mainly by the revolutionary people, differing only in the sense that a civil war differs from a national war, and that a war conducted by the Communist Party differs from a war it conducts jointly with the Kuomintang. Of course, these differences are important. They indicate the breadth of the main forces in the war (an alliance of the workers and peasants, or of the workers, peasants and bourgeoisie) and whether our antagonist in the war is internal or external (whether the war is against domestic or foreign foes, and, if domestic, whether against the Northern warlords or against the Kuomintang); they also indicate that the content of China's revolutionary war differs at different stages of its history. But all these wars are instances of armed revolution fighting armed counter-revolution, they are all revolutionary wars, and all exhibit the specific features and advantages of the Chinese revolution. The thesis that revolutionary war "is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution" fits China's conditions perfectly. The main task of the party of the Chinese proletariat, a task confronting it almost from its very inception, has been to unite with as many allies as possible and, according to the circumstances, to organize armed struggles for national and social liberation against armed counter-revolution, whether internal or external. Without armed struggle the proletariat and the Communist Party would have no standing at all in China, and it would be impossible to accomplish any revolutionary task.

Our Party did not grasp this point fully during the first five or six years after it was founded, that is, from 1921 to its participation in the Northern Expedition in 1926. It did not then understand the supreme importance of armed struggle in China, or seriously prepare for war and organize armed forces, or apply itself to the study of military strategy and tactics. During the Northern Expedition it neglected to win over the army but laid one-sided stress on the mass movement, with the result that the whole mass movement collapsed the moment the Kuomintang turned reactionary. For a long time after 1927 many comrades continued to make it the Party's central task to prepare for insurrections in the cities and to work in the White areas. It was only after our victory in repelling the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign in 1931 that some comrades fundamentally changed their attitude on this question. But this was not true of the whole Party, and there were other comrades who did not think along the lines presented here.

Experience tells us that China's problems cannot be settled without armed force. An understanding of this point will help us in successfully waging the War of Resistance Against Japan from now on. The fact that the whole nation is rising in armed resistance in the war against Japan should inculcate a better understanding of the importance of this question in the whole Party, and every Party member should be prepared to take up arms and go to the front at any moment. Moreover, our present session has clearly defined the direction for our efforts by deciding that the Party's main fields of work are in the battle zones and in the enemy's rear. This is also an excellent antidote against the tendency of some Party members to be willing only to work in Party organizations and in the mass movement but to be unwilling to study or participate in warfare, and against the failure of some schools to encourage students to go to the front, and other such phenomena. In most of China, Party organizational work and mass work are directly linked with armed struggle; there is not and cannot be, any Party work or mass work that is isolated and stands by itself. Even in rear areas remote from the battle zones (like Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechuan) and in enemy-occupied areas (like Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking and Shanghai), Party organizational work and mass work are co-ordinated with the war, and should and must exclusively serve the needs of the front. In a word, the whole Party must pay great attention to war, study military matters and prepare itself for fighting.

II. THE WAR HISTORY OF THE KUOMINTANG

It will be useful for us to look at the history of the Kuomintang and see what attention it pays to war.

From the start, when he organized a small revolutionary group, Sun Yat-sen staged armed insurrections against the Ching Dynasty.[4] The period of *Tung Meng Hui* (the Chinese Revolutionary League) was replete with armed insurrections,[5] right up to the armed overthrow of the Ching Dynasty by the Revolution of 1911. Then, during the period of the Chinese Revolutionary Party, he carried out a military campaign against Yuan Shih-kai.[6] Subsequent events such as the southern movement of the naval units,[7] the northern expedition from Kweilin[8] and the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy[9] were also among Sun Yat-sen's military undertakings.

After Sun Yat-sen came Chiang Kai-shek, who brought the Kuomintang's military power to its zenith. He values the army as his very life and has had the experience of three wars, namely, the Northern Expedition, the Civil War and the War of Resistance Against Japan. For the last ten years Chiang Kai-shek has been a counter-revolutionary. He has created a huge "Central Army" for counter-revolutionary purposes. He has held firmly to the vital point that whoever has an army has power and that war decides everything. In this respect we ought to learn from him. In this respect both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek are our teachers.

Since the Revolution of 1911, all the warlords have clung to their armies for dear life, setting great store by the principle, "Whoever has an army has power."

Tan Yen-kai,[10] a clever bureaucrat who had a chequered career in Hunan, was never a civil governor pure and simple but always insisted on being both the military governor and the civil governor. Even when he became President of the National Government first in Canton and then in Wuhan, he was concurrently the commander of the Second Army. There are many such warlords who understand this peculiarity of China's.

There have also been parties in China, notably the Progressive Party,[11] which did not want to have an army; yet even this party recognized that it could not get government positions without some warlord backing. Among its successive patrons have been Yuan Shih-kai,[12] Tuan Chi-jui[13] and Chiang Kai-shek (to whom the Political Science Group,[14] formed out of a section of the Progressive Party, has attached itself).

A few small political parties with a short history, *e.g.*, the Youth Party,[15] have no army, and so have not been able to get anywhere.

In other countries there is no need for each of the bourgeois parties to have an armed force under its direct command. But things are different in China, where, because of the feudal division of the country, those landlord or bourgeois groupings or parties which have guns have power, and those which have more guns have more power. Placed in such an environment, the party of the proletariat should see clearly to the heart of the matter.

Communists do not fight for personal military power (they must in no circumstances do that, and let no one ever again follow the example of Chang Kuo-tao), but they must fight for military power for the Party, for military power for the people. As a national war of resistance is going on, we must also fight for military power for the nation. Where there is naivety on the question of military power, nothing whatsoever can be achieved. It is very difficult for the labouring people, who have been deceived and intimidated by the reactionary ruling classes for thousands of years, to awaken to the importance of having guns in their own hands. Now that Japanese imperialist oppression and the nation-wide resistance to it have pushed our labouring people into the arena of war, Communists should prove themselves the most politically conscious leaders in this war. Every Communist must grasp the truth, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. Yet, having guns, we can create Party organizations, as witness the powerful Party organizations which the Eighth Route Army has created in northern China. We can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movements. Everything in Yenan has been created by having guns. All things grow out of the barrel of a gun. According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army. Some people ridicule us as advocates of the "omnipotence of war". Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; that is good, not bad, it is Marxist. The guns of the Russian Communist Party created socialism. We shall create a democratic republic. Experience in the class struggle in the era of imperialism teaches us that it is only by the power of the gun that the working class and the labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords; in this sense we may say that only with guns can the whole world be transformed. We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun.

III. THE WAR HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Our Party failed to grasp the importance of engaging itself directly in preparations for war and in the organization of armed forces for a period of three or four years, that is, from 1921 (when the Chinese Communist Party was founded) to 1924 (when the First National Congress of the Kuomintang was held), and it still lacked adequate understanding of this issue in the 1924-27 period and even later; nevertheless, after 1924, when it began to participate in the Whampoa Military Academy, it entered a new stage and began to see the importance of military affairs. Through helping the Kuomintang in the wars in Kwangtung Province and participating in the Northern Expedition, the Party gained leadership over some armed forces.[16] Then, having learned a bitter lesson from the failure of the revolution, the Party organized the Nanchang Uprising,[17] the Autumn Harvest Uprising[18] and the Canton Uprising, and entered on a new period, the founding of the Red Army. That was the crucial period in which our Party arrived at a thorough understanding of the importance of the army. Had there been no Red Army and no war fought by the Red Army in this period, that is, had the Communist Party adopted Chen Tu-hsiu's liquidationism, the present War of Resistance would have been inconceivable or could not have been sustained for long.

At its emergency meeting held on August 7, 1927, the Central Committee of the Party combated Right opportunism in the political sphere, thus enabling the Party to take a big stride forward. At its fourth plenary session in January 1931, the Sixth Central Committee nominally combated "Left" opportunism in the political sphere, but in fact itself committed the error of "Left" opportunism anew. The two meetings differed in their content and historical role, but neither of them dealt seriously with the problems of war and strategy, a fact which showed that war had not yet been made the centre of gravity in the Party's work. After the central leadership of the Party moved into the Red areas in 1933, this situation underwent a radical change, but mistakes in principle were again committed on the problem of war (and all other major problems), bringing serious losses to the revolutionary war. The Tsunyi Meeting of 1935, on the other hand, was mainly a fight against opportunism in the military sphere and gave top priority to the question of war, and this was a reflection of the war conditions of the time. Today we can say with confidence that in the struggles of the past seventeen years the Chinese Communist Party has forged not only a firm Marxist political line but also a firm Marxist military line. We have been able to apply Marxism in solving not only political but also military problems; we have trained not only a large core of cadres capable of running the Party and the state, but also a large core of cadres capable of running the army. These achievements are the flower of the revolution, watered by the blood of countless martyrs, a glory that belongs not only to the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, but also to the Communist Parties and the peoples of the whole world. There are only three armies in the whole world which belong to the proletariat and the labouring people, the armies led by the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, of China and of Spain, and as yet Communist Parties in other countries have had no military experience; hence our army and our military experience are all the more precious.

In order to carry the present War of Resistance Against Japan to victory, it is extremely important to expand and consolidate the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and all the guerrilla forces led by our Party. Acting on this principle, the Party should dispatch a sufficient number of its best members and cadres to the front. Everything must serve victory at the front, and the organizational task must be subordinated to the political task.

IV. CHANGES IN THE PARTY'S MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE CIVIL WAR AND THE NATIONAL WAR

The changes in our Party's military strategy are worth studying. Let us deal separately with the two processes, the civil war and the national war.

The civil war can be roughly divided into two strategic periods. Guerrilla warfare was primary in the first period and regular warfare in the second. But this regular warfare was of the Chinese type, regular only in its concentration of forces for mobile warfare and in a certain degree of centralization and planning in command and organization; in other respects it retained a guerrilla character and, as regular warfare, was on a low level and not comparable with the regular warfare of foreign armies or, in some ways, even with that of the Kuomintang army. Thus, in a sense, this type of regular warfare was only guerrilla warfare raised to a higher level.

The War of Resistance Against Japan can also be roughly divided into two strategic periods, so far as our Party's military tasks are concerned. In the first period (comprising the stages of the strategic defensive and strategic stalemate) it is guerrilla warfare which is primary, while in the second (the stage of the strategic counter-offensive) it is regular warfare which will be primary. However, the guerrilla warfare of the first period of the War of Resistance differs considerably in content from that of the first period of the civil war, because the dispersed guerrilla tasks are being carried out by the regular (*i.e.*, regular to a certain degree) Eighth Route Army. Likewise, the regular warfare of the second period of the War of Resistance will be different from that of the second period of the civil war because we can assume that, given up-to-date equipment, a great change will take place both in the army and in its operations. Our army will then attain a high degree of centralization and organization, and its operations will lose much of their guerrilla character and attain a high degree of regularity; what is now on a low level will then be raised to a higher level, and the Chinese type of regular warfare will change into the general type. That will be our task in the stage of the strategic counter-offensive.

Thus we see that the two processes, the civil war and the War of Resistance Against Japan, and their four strategic periods, contain three changes in strategy. The first was the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the civil war. The second was the change from regular warfare in the civil war to guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance. And the third will be the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the War of Resistance.

The first of the three changes encountered great difficulties. It involved a twofold task. On the one hand, we had to combat the Right tendency of localism and guerrilla-ism, which consisted in clinging to guerrilla habits and refusing to make the turn to regularization, a tendency which arose because our cadres underestimated the changes in the enemy's situation and our own tasks. In the Central Red Area it was only after much painstaking education that this tendency was gradually corrected. On the other hand, we also had to combat the "Left" tendency of over-centralization and adventurism which put undue stress on regularization, a tendency which arose because some of the leading cadres overestimated the enemy, set the tasks too high and mechanically applied foreign experience regardless of the actual conditions. For three long years (before the Tsunyi Meeting) this tendency imposed enormous sacrifices on the Central Red Area, and it was corrected only after we had learned lessons for which we paid in blood. Its correction was the achievement of the Tsunyi Meeting.

The second change in strategy took place in the autumn of 1937 (after the Lukouchiao Incident), at the juncture of the two different wars. We faced a new enemy, Japanese imperialism, and had as our ally our former enemy, the Kuomintang (which was still hostile to us), and the theatre of war was the vast expanse of northern China (which was temporarily our army's front but would soon be the enemy's rear and would remain so for a long time). In this special situation, our change in strategy was an extremely serious one. In this special situation we had to transform the regular army of the past into a guerrilla army (in respect to its dispersed operations, and not to its sense of organization or to its discipline), and transform the mobile warfare of the past into guerrilla warfare, so that we could adapt ourselves to the kind of enemy facing us and to the tasks before us. But this change was, to all appearances, a step backward and therefore necessarily very difficult. Both underestimation and morbid fear of Japan, tendencies likely to occur at such a time, did actually occur among the Kuomintang. When the Kuomintang changed over from civil war to national war, it suffered many needless losses mainly because of its underestimation of the enemy, but also because of its morbid fear of Japan (as exemplified by Han Fu-chu and Liu Chih[19]). On the other hand, we have effected the change fairly smoothly and, instead of suffering losses, have won big victories. The reason is that the great majority of our cadres accepted the correct guidance of the Central Committee in good time and skilfully sized up the actual situation, even though there were serious arguments between the Central Committee and some of the army cadres. The extreme importance of this change for persevering in, developing and winning the War of Resistance as a whole, as well as for the future of the Communist Party of China, can be seen immediately if we think of the historic significance of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in determining the fate of the national liberation struggle in China. In its extraordinary breadth and protractedness, China's anti-Japanese guerrilla war is without precedent, not only in the East but perhaps in the whole history of mankind.

The third change, from guerrilla to regular warfare against Japan, belongs to the future development of the war, which will presumably give rise to new circumstances and new difficulties. We need not discuss it now.

V. THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN

In the anti-Japanese war as a whole, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, for only regular warfare can decide the final outcome of the war. Of the three strategic stages (the defensive, the stalemate and the counter-offensive) in the entire process of the war in the country as a whole, the first and last are stages in which regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. In the intermediate stage guerrilla warfare will become primary and regular warfare supplementary, because the enemy will be holding on to the areas he has occupied and we will be preparing for the counter-offensive but will not yet be ready to launch it. Though this stage will possibly be the longest, it is still only one of the three stages in the entire war. If we take the war as a whole, therefore, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. Unless we understand this, unless we recognize that regular warfare will decide the final outcome of the war, and unless we pay attention to building a regular army and to studying and directing regular warfare, we shall be unable to defeat Japan. This is one aspect of the matter.

All the same, guerrilla warfare has its important strategic place throughout the war. Without guerrilla warfare and without due attention to building guerrilla units and guerrilla armies and to studying and directing guerrilla warfare, we shall likewise be unable to defeat Japan. The reason is that, since the greater part of China will be converted into the enemy's rear, in the absence of the most extensive and persistent guerrilla warfare the enemy will entrench himself securely without any fear of attacks from behind, will inflict heavy losses on our main forces fighting at the front and will launch increasingly fierce offensives; thus it will be difficult for us to bring about a stalemate, and the very continuation of the War of Resistance may be jeopardized. But even if things do not turn out that way, other unfavourable circumstances will ensue, such as the inadequate building up of strength for our counter-offensive, the absence of supporting actions during the counter-offensive, and the possibility that the enemy will be able to replace his losses. If these circumstances arise and are not overcome by the timely development of extensive and persistent guerrilla warfare, it will likewise be impossible to defeat Japan. Hence, though guerrilla warfare occupies a supplementary place in the war as a whole, it does have an extremely important place in strategy. In waging the War of Resistance Against Japan it is undoubtedly a grave error to neglect guerrilla warfare. This is the other aspect of the matter.

Given a big country, guerrilla warfare is possible; hence there was guerrilla warfare in the past too. But guerrilla warfare can be persevered in only when led by the Communist Party. That is why guerrilla warfare generally failed in the past and why it can be victorious only in modern times and only in big countries in which Communist Parties have emerged, as in the Soviet Union during its civil war and in China at present. Considering the present circumstances and the general situation with respect to the war, the division of labour between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the anti-Japanese war, in which the former carries on frontal regular warfare and the latter carries on guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, is both necessary and proper, and is a matter of mutual need, mutual co-ordination and mutual assistance.

It can thus be understood how important and necessary it was for our Party to change its military strategy from the regular warfare of the latter period of the civil war to the guerrilla warfare of the first period of the War of Resistance. The favourable effects of this change can be summed up in the following eighteen points:

(1) reduction of the areas occupied by the enemy forces;

(2) expansion of the base areas of our own forces;

(3) in the stage of the defensive, co-ordination with operations at the regular front, so as to pin down the enemy;

(4) in the stage of stalemate, maintenance of a firm hold on the base areas behind the enemy lines, so as to facilitate the training and reorganization of troops at the regular front;

(5) in the stage of the counter-offensive, co-ordination with the regular front in recovering lost territory;

(6) the quickest and most effective expansion of our forces;

(7) the widest expansion of the Communist Party, so that a Party branch may be organized in every village;

(8) the broadest development of the mass movements, so that all the people behind the enemy lines, except for those in his strongholds, may be organized;

(9) the most extensive establishment of organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power;

(10) the widest development of anti-Japanese cultural and educational work;

(11) the most extensive improvement of the people's livelihood;

(12) the most effective disintegration of the enemy troops;

(13) the most extensive and enduring impact on popular feeling and stimulation of morale throughout the country;

(14) the most extensive impetus to progress in the friendly armies and parties;

(15) adaptation to the situation in which the enemy is strong and we are weak, so that we suffer fewer losses and win more victories;

(16) adaptation to the fact that China is large and Japan small, so as to make the enemy suffer more losses and win fewer victories;

(17) the quickest and most effective training of large numbers of cadres for leadership; and

(18) the most effective solution of the problem of provisions.

It is also beyond doubt that in the long course of struggle the guerrilla units and guerrilla warfare will not remain as they are but will develop to a higher stage and evolve gradually into regular units and regular warfare. Through guerrilla warfare, we shall build up our strength and turn ourselves into a decisive element in the crushing of Japanese imperialism.

VI. PAY GREAT ATTENTION TO THE STUDY OF MILITARY MATTERS

All the issues between two hostile armies depend on war for their solution, and China's survival or extinction depends on her victory or defeat in the present war. Hence our study of military theory, of strategy and tactics and of army political work brooks not a moment's delay. Though our study of tactics is still inadequate, our comrades who are engaged in military work have achieved a great deal in the last ten years and, on the basis of Chinese conditions, have brought forth much that is new; the shortcoming here is that there has been no general summing-up. But so far only a few people have taken up the study of the problems of strategy and the theory of war. First-rate results have been achieved in the study of our political work, which, in wealth of experience and in the number and quality of its innovations, ranks second only to that of the Soviet Union; here too the shortcoming is insufficient synthesis and systematization. The popularization of military knowledge is an urgent task for the Party and the whole country. We must now pay great attention to all these things, but most of all to the theory of war and strategy. I deem it imperative that we arouse interest in the study of military theory and direct the attention of the whole membership to the study of military matters.

NOTES

[1] See V. I. Lenin, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" (*Collected Works*, Eng. ed., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, Vol. XXI, pp. 27-34), "The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad" (*ibid.*, pp. 158-64), "The Defeat of One's Own

Government in the Imperialist War" (*ibid.*, pp. 275-80), "The Defeat of Russia and the Revolutionary Crisis" (*ibid.*, pp. 378-82). These articles, written in 1914-15, deal specifically with the imperialist war of that time. See also *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1951, pp. 258-67.

[2] In 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in alliance with the Communist Party and the revolutionary workers and peasants, defeated the "Merchants' Corps", an armed force of the compradors and landlords which engaged in counter-revolutionary activities in Canton in collaboration with the British imperialists. The revolutionary army, which had been founded on the basis of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, set out from Canton early in 1925, fought the Eastern Campaign and, with the support of the peasants, defeated the troops of the warlord Chen Chiung-ming. It then returned to Canton and overthrew the Yunnan and Kwangsi warlords who had entrenched themselves there. That autumn it conducted the Second Eastern Campaign and finally wiped out Chen Chiung-ming's forces. These campaigns, in which members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League fought heroically in the van, brought about the political unification of Kwangtung Province and paved the way for the Northern Expedition.

[3] J. V. Stalin, "The Prospects of the Revolution in China", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. VIII, p. 379.

[4] In 1894, Dr. Sun Yat-sen formed a small revolutionary organization in Honolulu called the *Hsing Chung Hui* (Society for China's Regeneration). With the support of the secret societies among the people, he staged two armed insurrections in Kwangtung Province against the Ching government after its defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, one at Canton in 1895 and the other at Huichow in 1900.

[5] *Tung Meng Hui*, or the Chinese Revolutionary League (a united front organization of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and a section of the landed gentry opposed to the Ching government), was formed in 1905 through the merging of the *Hsing Chung Hui* (see note above) and two other groups, the *Hua Hsing Hui* (Society for China's Regeneration) and the *Kuang Fu Hui* (Society for Breaking the Foreign Yoke). It put forward a programme of bourgeois revolution advocating "the expulsion of the Tartars (Manchus), the recovery of China, the establishment of a republic and the equalization of landownership". In the period of the Chinese Revolutionary League, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, allying himself with the secret societies and a part of the New Army of the Ching government, launched a number of armed insurrections against the Ching regime, notably those at Pinghsiang (Kiangsi Province), Liuyang and Liling (Hunan Province) in 1906, at Huangkang, Chaochow and Chinchow (Kwangtung Province), and at Chennankuan (Kwangsi Province) in 1907, at Hokou (Yunnan Province) in 1908 and at Canton in 1911. The last was followed in the same year by the Wuchang Uprising which resulted in the overthrow of the Ching Dynasty.

[6] In 1912, the Chinese Revolutionary League was reorganized into the Kuomintang and made a compromise with the Northern warlord regime headed by Yuan Shih-kai. In 1913 Yuan's troops marched southward to suppress the forces which had emerged in the provinces of Kiangsi, Anhwei and Kwangtung in the course of the 1911 revolution. Armed resistance was organized by Dr. Sun Yat-sen but it was soon crushed. In 1914, realizing the error of the Kuomintang's policy of compromise, Dr. Sun formed the *Chung Hua Ke Ming Tang* (Chinese Revolutionary Party) in Tokyo, Japan, in order to distinguish his organization from the Kuomintang of the time. The new party was actually an alliance of the political representatives of a section of the petty bourgeoisie and a section of the bourgeoisie against Yuan Shih-kai. Through this

alliance, Dr. Sun Yat-sen staged a minor insurrection in Shanghai in 1914. In 1915 when Yuan Shih-kai proclaimed himself emperor, Tsai Ngo and others set out from Yunnan to take action against him, and Dr. Sun was also very active in advocating and promoting armed opposition to Yuan Shih-kai.

[7] In 1917 Dr. Sun Yat-sen went from Shanghai to Canton at the head of a naval force which was under his influence. Using Kwangtung as a base and co-operating with the Southwestern warlords who were opposed to the Northern warlord Tuan Chi-jui, he set up a military government opposed to Tuan Chi-jui.

[8] In 1921 Dr. Sun Yat-sen planned a northern expedition from Kweilin, Kwangsi Province. But his plan was frustrated by the mutiny of his subordinate, Chen Chiung-ming, who was in league with the Northern warlords.

[9] The Whampoa Military Academy, located at Whampoa near Canton, was established by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 after the reorganization of the Kuomintang with the help of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Before Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, the academy was run jointly by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Comrades Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Yun Tai-ying, Hsiao Chu-nu and others held responsible posts in the academy at one time or another. Many of the cadets were members of the Communist Party or the Communist Youth League, and they formed the revolutionary core of the academy.

[10] Tan Yen-kai was a native of Hunan who had been a *Hanlin*, a member of the highest official scholastic body under the Ching Dynasty. He was a careerist who first advocated a constitutional monarchy and then took part in the Revolution of 1911. His later adherence to the Kuomintang reflected the contradiction between the Hunan landlords and the Northern warlords.

[11] The Progressive Party was organized by Liang Chi-chao and others under the aegis of Yuan Shih-kai during the first years of the Republic.

[12] Yuan Shih-kai was the head of the Northern warlords in the last years of the Ching Dynasty. After the Ching Dynasty was overthrown by the Revolution of 1911, he usurped the presidency of the Republic and organized the first government of the Northern warlords, which represented the big landlord and big comprador classes. He did this by relying on counter-revolutionary armed force and on the support of the imperialists and by taking advantage of the conciliationist character of the bourgeoisie, which was then leading the revolution. In 1915 he wanted to make himself emperor and, to gain the support of the Japanese imperialists, accepted the Twenty-one Demands with which Japan aimed at obtaining exclusive control of all China. In December of the same year an uprising against his assumption of the throne took place in Yunnan Province and promptly won nation-wide response and support. Yuan Shih-kai died in Peking in June 1916.

[13] Tuan Chi-jui was an old subordinate of Yuan Shih-kai and head of the Anhwei clique of Northern warlords. After Yuan's death he more than once controlled the Peking government.

[14] The extremely right-wing Political Science Group was formed in 1916 by a section of the Progressive Party and a section of the Kuomintang. It gambled now on the Southern, now on the Northern, warlords in order to grab government posts. During the Northern Expedition of 1926-27, its pro-Japanese members, such as Huang Fu, Chang Chun and Yang Yung-tai, began to collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek and, using their reactionary political experience, helped him build up a counter-revolutionary regime.

[15] The Youth Party, also called the Chinese Youth Party or the *Étatiste* Party, was formed by a handful of unscrupulous fascist politicians. They made counter-

revolutionary careers for themselves by opposing the Communist Party and the Soviet Union and received subsidies from the various groups of reactionaries in power and from the imperialists.

[16] Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here referring mainly to the independent regiment commanded by General Yeh Ting, a Communist, during the Northern Expedition. See "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", Note 14, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 104.

[17] Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province, was the scene of the famous uprising on August 1, 1927 led by the Communist Party of China in order to combat the counter-revolution of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei and to continue the revolution of 1924-27. More than thirty thousand troops took part in the uprising which was led by Comrades Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ho Lung and Yeh Ting. The insurrectionary army withdrew from Nanchang on August 5 as planned, but suffered a defeat when approaching Chaochow and Swatow in Kwangtung Province. Led by Comrades Chu Teh, Chen Yi and Lin Piao, part of the troops later fought their way to the Chingkang Mountains and joined forces with the First Division of the First Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army under Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

[18] The famous Autumn Harvest Uprising under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung was launched in September 1927 by the people's armed forces of Hsiushui, Pinghsiang, Pingkiang and Liuyang Counties on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, who formed the First Division of the First Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. Comrade Mao Tse-tung led this force to the Chingkang Mountains where a revolutionary base was established.

[19] Han Fu-chu was a Kuomintang warlord in Shantung Province. Liu Chih, another warlord, who commanded Chiang Kai-shek's personal troops in Honan Province, was responsible for the defence of the Paoting area in Hopei after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Both of them fled before the Japanese without firing a shot.

THE MAY 4TH MOVEMENT

May 1939

The May 4th Movement twenty years ago marked a new stage in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism. The cultural reform movement which grew out of the May 4th Movement was only one of the manifestations of this revolution. With the growth and development of new social forces in that period, a powerful camp made its appearance in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, a camp consisting of the working class, the student masses and the new national bourgeoisie. Around the time of the May 4th Movement, hundreds of thousands of students courageously took their place in the van. In these respects the May 4th Movement went a step beyond the Revolution of 1911.

If we trace China's bourgeois-democratic revolution back to its formative period, we see that it has passed through a number of stages in its development: the Opium War, the War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894,[1] the Reform Movement of 1898,[2] the Yi Ho Tuan Movement,[3] the Revolution of 1911, the May 4th Movement, the Northern Expedition, and the War of the Agrarian Revolution. The present War of Resistance Against Japan is yet another stage, and is the greatest, most vigorous and most dynamic stage of all. The bourgeois-democratic revolution can be considered accomplished only when the forces of foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism have basically been overthrown and an independent democratic state has been established. From the Opium War onwards each stage in the development of the revolution has had its own distinguishing characteristics. But the most important feature differentiating them is whether they came before or after the emergence of the Communist Party. However, taken as a whole, all

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this article for newspapers in Yenan to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the May 4th Movement.

the stages bear the character of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. The aim of this democratic revolution is to establish a social system hitherto unknown in Chinese history, namely, a democratic social system having a feudal society (during the last hundred years a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society) as its precursor and a socialist society as its successor. If anyone asks why a Communist should strive to bring into being first a bourgeois-democratic society and then a socialist society, our answer is: we are following the inevitable course of history.

China's democratic revolution depends on definite social forces for its accomplishment. These social forces are the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the progressive section of the bourgeoisie, that is, the revolutionary workers, peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals, and businessmen, with the workers and peasants as the basic revolutionary forces and the workers as the class which leads the revolution. It is impossible to accomplish the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution without these basic revolutionary forces and without the leadership of the working class. Today, the principal enemies of the revolution are the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese traitors, and the fundamental policy in the revolution is the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, consisting of all workers, peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals, and businessmen who are against Japanese aggression. Final victory in the War of Resistance will be won when this united front is greatly consolidated and developed.

In the Chinese democratic revolutionary movement, it was the intellectuals who were the first to awaken. This was clearly demonstrated both in the Revolution of 1911 and in the May 4th Movement, and in the days of the May 4th Movement the intellectuals were more numerous and more politically conscious than in the days of the Revolution of 1911. But the intellectuals will accomplish nothing if they fail to integrate themselves with the workers and peasants. In the final analysis, the dividing line between revolutionary intellectuals and non-revolutionary or counter-revolutionary intellectuals is whether or not they are willing to integrate themselves with the workers and peasants and actually do so. Ultimately it is this alone, and not professions of faith in the Three People's Principles or in Marxism, that distinguishes one from the other. A true revolutionary must be one who is willing to integrate himself with the workers and peasants and actually does so.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

It is now twenty years since the May 4th Movement and almost two years since the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. The young people and the cultural circles of the whole country bear a heavy responsibility in the democratic revolution and the War of Resistance. I hope they will understand the character and the motive forces of the Chinese revolution, make their work serve the workers and peasants, go into their midst and become propagandists and organizers among them. Victory will be ours when the entire people arises against Japan. Young people of the whole country, bestir yourselves!

NOTES

[1] The Sino-Japanese War of 1894 was started by Japanese imperialism for the purpose of invading Korea and China. Many Chinese soldiers and some patriotic generals put up a heroic fight. But China suffered defeat because of the corruption of the Ching government and its failure to prepare resistance. In 1895 the Ching government concluded the shameful Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan.

[2] For the Reform Movement of 1898 see "On Protracted War", Note 8, p. 191 of this volume.

[3] The Yi Ho Tuan Movement was the anti-imperialist armed struggle which took place in northern China in 1900. The broad masses of peasants, handicraftsmen and other people took part in this movement. Getting in touch with one another through religious and other channels, they organized themselves on the basis of secret societies and waged a heroic struggle against the joint forces of aggression of the eight imperialist powers—the United States, Britain, Japan, Germany, Russia, France, Italy and Austria. The movement was put down with indescribable savagery after the joint forces of aggression occupied Tientsin and Peking.

THE ORIENTATION OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT

May 4, 1939

Today is the twentieth anniversary of the May 4th Movement, and the youth of Yenan are all gathered here for this commemoration meeting. I shall therefore take the occasion to speak on some questions concerning the orientation of the youth movement in China.

First, May 4 has now been designated as China's Youth Day,[1] and rightly so. Twenty years have elapsed since the May 4th Movement, yet it is only this year that the day has been designated as the national Youth Day, and this is a most significant fact. For it indicates that the Chinese people's democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism will soon reach a turning point. This revolution encountered repeated failures over several decades, but now there must be a change, a change towards victory and not another failure. The Chinese revolution is now going forward, forward to victory. The repeated failures of the past cannot and must not be allowed to recur, and they must be turned into victory. But has the change already taken place? No. It has not, nor have we yet won victory. But victory can be won. It is precisely in the present War of Resistance Against Japan that we are striving to reach the turning point from failure to victory. The May 4th Movement was directed against a government of national betrayal, a government which conspired with imperialism and sold out the interests of the nation, a government which oppressed the people. Was it not necessary to oppose such a government? If it was not, then the May 4th Movement was simply a mistake. It is obvious that such a government must be opposed, that a government of national betrayal must be overthrown. Just consider, long before the

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This speech was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a mass meeting of youth in Yenan to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the May 4th Movement. It represented a development in his ideas on the question of the Chinese revolution.

May 4th Movement Dr. Sun Yat-sen was already a rebel against the government of his day; he opposed and overthrew the Ching government. Was he right in doing so? In my opinion he was quite right. For the government he opposed did not resist imperialism but conspired with it, and was not a revolutionary government but one that suppressed the revolution. The May 4th Movement was a revolutionary movement precisely because it opposed a government of national betrayal. The youth of China should see the May 4th Movement in this light. Today, when the whole nation has militantly risen to resist Japan, we are determined to defeat Japanese imperialism, and we shall not tolerate any traitors or allow the revolution to fail again, for we have taken warning from its failures in the past. With few exceptions, the whole youth of China is awakened and determined to win, and this is reflected in the designation of May 4th as Youth Day. We are advancing along the road to victory and, provided the whole people make a concerted effort, the Chinese revolution will definitely triumph through the War of Resistance.

Secondly, what is the Chinese revolution directed against? What are the targets of the revolution? As everybody knows, imperialism is one target and feudalism the other. What are the targets of the revolution at this moment? One is Japanese imperialism, and the other the Chinese collaborators. To make our revolution we must overthrow Japanese imperialism and the Chinese traitors. Who are the makers of the revolution? What is its main force? The common people of China. The motive forces of the revolution are the proletariat, the peasantry and all members of other classes who are willing to oppose imperialism and feudalism; these are the revolutionary forces opposing imperialism and feudalism. But who, among so many, are the basic force, the backbone of the revolution? The workers and the peasants, forming 90 per cent of the country's population. What is the nature of the Chinese revolution? What kind of revolution are we making today? Today we are making a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and nothing we do goes beyond its scope. By and large, we should not destroy the bourgeois system of private property for the present; what we want to destroy is imperialism and feudalism. This is what we mean by the bourgeois-democratic revolution. But its accomplishment is already beyond the capacity of the bourgeoisie and must depend on the efforts of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people. What is the goal of this revolution? To overthrow imperialism and feudalism and to establish a people's democratic republic. A people's democratic republic means a republic based on the revolutionary Three People's Principles. It will be different both from the semi-colonial and semi-feudal state of the present and from the socialist system of the future. Capitalists have no place in a socialist society, but they should still be allowed in a people's democracy. Will there always be a place for capitalists in China? No, definitely not in the future. This is true not only of China but of the whole world. In the future no country, whether it be Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Germany, or Italy, will have any place for capitalists, and China will be no exception. The Soviet Union is a country which has already established socialism, and beyond all doubt the whole world will follow its example. China will certainly go over to socialism in the future; that is an irresistible law. But at the present stage our task is not to put socialism into practice, but to destroy imperialism and feudalism, change China's present semi-colonial and semi-feudal status, and establish people's democracy. This is what the youth of the whole country must strive for.

Thirdly, what are the lessons of the Chinese revolution? This question is also an important one for our youth to understand. Strictly speaking, China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism was begun by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and has been going on for more than fifty years; as for foreign capitalist aggression against China, it has been going on for almost a hundred years. During that century, there was first the Opium War against British aggression, then came the War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, then the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the Reform Movement of 1898, the Yi Ho Tuan Movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4th Movement, the Northern Expedition, and the war waged by the Red Army—although these struggles differed from each other, their common purpose was to repel foreign enemies or change existing conditions. However, it was only with Dr. Sun Yat-sen that a more or less clearly defined bourgeois-democratic revolution began. In the last fifty years the revolution started by Dr. Sun Yat-sen has had both its successes and its failures. Was not the Revolution of 1911 a success? Didn't it send the emperor packing? Yet it was a failure in the sense that while it sent the emperor packing, it left China under imperialist and feudal oppression, so that the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary task remained unaccomplished. What was the aim of the May 4th Movement? Its aim likewise was to overthrow imperialism and feudalism, but it, too, failed, and China still remained under the rule of imperialism and feudalism. The same is true of the revolution known as the Northern Expedition; it scored successes, but it too failed. From the time the Kuomintang turned against the Communist Party,[2] China again fell under the domination of imperialism and feudalism. The inevitable result was the ten years' war waged by the Red Army. But these ten years of struggle fulfilled the revolutionary task only in parts of China and not in the country as a whole. If we are to sum up the revolution during the past decades, we may say that it has won only temporary and partial victories and not permanent and nation-wide victory. As Dr. Sun Yat-sen said, "The revolution is not yet completed, all my comrades must struggle on." The question now is: Why, after decades of struggle, has the Chinese revolution not yet attained its goal? What are the reasons? I think there are two: first, the enemy forces have been too strong; second, our own forces have been too weak. Because one side was strong and the other side weak, the revolution did not succeed. In saying that the enemy forces have been too strong, we mean that the forces of imperialism (the primary factor) and of feudalism have been too strong. In saying that our own forces have been too weak, we mean weak in the military, political, economic and cultural fields; but our weaknesses and our consequent failure to fulfil the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal task are chiefly due to the fact that the labouring people, the workers and peasants, constituting 90 per cent of the population, have not yet been mobilized. If we are to sum up the experience of the revolution of the past decades, we may say that the people throughout the country have not been fully mobilized and that the reactionaries have invariably opposed and sabotaged such mobilization. Only by mobilizing and organizing the workers and peasants, who comprise 90 per cent of the population, is it possible to overthrow imperialism and feudalism. Dr. Sun Yat-sen said in his Testament:

> For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution with the aim of winning freedom and equality for China. My experiences during these forty years have firmly convinced me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals.

It is now more than ten years since Dr. Sun died, and if we add these on, the total is over fifty years. What is the lesson of the revolution during these years? Fundamentally, it is, "arouse the masses of the people". You should carefully study this lesson, and so should all China's youth. They must know that only by mobilizing the masses of workers and peasants, who form go per cent of the population, can we defeat imperialism and feudalism. Unless we mobilize the workers and peasants of the whole country, it will be impossible for us to defeat Japan and build a new China.

Fourthly, to return to the youth movement. On this very day twenty years ago there occurred in China the great historical event known as the May 4th Movement, in which the students participated; it was a movement of tremendous significance. What role have China's young people played since the May 4th Movement? In a way they have played a vanguard role—a fact recognized by everybody except the die-hards. What is a vanguard role? It means taking the lead and marching in the forefront of the revolutionary ranks. In the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal ranks of the Chinese people, there is a contingent composed of the country's young intellectuals and students. It is a contingent of considerable size and, even if the many who have given their lives are not included, it now numbers several million. It is an army on one of the fronts against imperialism and feudalism, and an important army too. But this army is not enough; we cannot defeat the enemy by relying on it alone, for when all is said and done it is not the main force. What then is the main force? The workers and peasants. Our young intellectuals and students must go among the workers and peasants, who make up 90 per cent of the population, and mobilize and organize them. Without this main force of workers and peasants, we cannot win the fight against imperialism and feudalism, we cannot win it by relying only on the contingent of young intellectuals and students. Therefore, the young intellectuals and students throughout the country must unite with the broad masses of workers and peasants and become one with them, and only then can a mighty force be created. A force of hundreds of millions of people! Only with this huge force can the enemy's strongholds be taken and his last fortresses smashed. In assessing the youth movement of the past from this viewpoint, we should call attention to a wrong tendency. In the youth movement of the last few decades, a section of the young people have been unwilling to unite with the workers and peasants and have opposed their movements; this is a counter-current in the youth movement. In fact, these people are not at all bright in their refusal to unite with the masses who make up

90 per cent of the population and in going so far as to oppose them outright. Is this a good tendency? I think not, because in opposing the workers and peasants they are in fact opposing the revolution; that is why we say it is a counter-current in the youth movement. A youth movement of that kind would come to no good. A few days ago I wrote a short article in which I noted:

> In the final analysis, the dividing line between revolutionary intellectuals and non-revolutionary or counter-revolutionary intellectuals is whether or not they are willing to integrate themselves with the workers and peasants and actually do so.

Here I advanced a criterion which I regard as the only valid one. How should we judge whether a youth is a revolutionary? How can we tell? There can only be one criterion, namely, whether or not he is willing to integrate himself with the broad masses of workers and peasants and does so in practice. If he is willing to do so and actually does so, he is a revolutionary; otherwise he is a non-revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary. If today he integrates himself with the masses of workers and peasants, then today he is a revolutionary; if tomorrow he ceases to do so or turns round to oppress the common people, then he becomes a non-revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary. Some young people talk glibly about their belief in the Three People's Principles or in Marxism, but this does not prove anything. Doesn't Hitler profess belief in "socialism"? Twenty years ago even Mussolini was a "socialist"! And what does their "socialism" amount to? Fascism! Didn't Chen Tu-hsiu once "believe" in Marxism? What did he do later? He went over to the counter-revolution. Didn't Chang Kuo-tao "believe" in Marxism? Where is he now? He has run away and landed in the mire. Some people style themselves "followers of the Three People's Principles" or even old stalwarts of these Principles; but what have they done? It turns out that their Principle of Nationalism means conspiring with imperialism, that their Principle of Democracy means oppressing the common people, and that their Principle of People's Livelihood means sucking the people's blood. They affirm the Three People's Principles with their lips but deny them in their hearts. So when we assess a person and judge whether he is a true or false adherent of the Three People's Principles, whether he is a true or false Marxist, we need only find out how he stands in relation to the broad masses of workers and peasants, and then we shall know him for what he is. This is the only criterion, there is no other. I hope that the youth of our country will never allow themselves to be carried away by this sinister counter-current but will clearly recognize the workers and peasants as their friends and march forward to a bright future.

Fifthly, the present War of Resistance Against Japan marks a new stage—the greatest, most dynamic and most vigorous stage—in the Chinese revolution. In this stage the youth shoulder tremendous responsibilities. Our revolutionary movement has gone through many stages of struggle in the last decades, but at no stage has it been so broad as in the present War of Resistance. When we maintain that the Chinese revolution now has features distinguishing it from the revolution in the past and that it will make the turn from failure to victory, we mean that the masses of the Chinese people have made progress, of which the progress of the youth is a clear proof. Hence the anti-Japanese war must and certainly will triumph. As everybody knows, the basic policy in this war is the Anti-Japanese National United Front, whose aim it is to overthrow Japanese imperialism and the Chinese collaborators, transform the old China into a new China, and liberate the whole nation from its semi-colonial and semi-feudal status. The present lack of unity in the Chinese youth movement is a serious weakness. You should continue to strive for unity, because unity is strength. You must help the youth of the whole country to understand the present situation, to achieve unity and to resist Japan to the end.

Sixthly and lastly, I want to speak about the youth movement in Yenan. It is the model for the youth movement throughout the country. The direction it is taking is in fact the orientation for the youth movement of the entire country. Why? Because it is the correct orientation. You see, in the matter of unity the youth of Yenan have acquitted themselves well, indeed very well. The youth of Yenan have achieved solidarity and unity. The young intellectuals and students, the young workers and peasants in Yenan are all united. Large numbers of revolutionary youth from all over the country, and even from Chinese communities abroad, have come to study in Yenan. Most of you attending this meeting today have come to Yenan from thousands of miles away; whether your surname is Chang or Li, whether you are a man or a woman, a worker or a peasant, you are all of one mind. Should this not be regarded as a model for the whole country? The youth in Yenan, besides being united among themselves, have integrated themselves with the masses of workers and peasants, and more than anything else this makes you a model for the whole country. What have you been doing? You have been learning the theory of revolution and studying the principles and methods for resisting Japan and saving the nation. You have been carrying out the campaign for production and have reclaimed thousands of *mou* of waste land. Confucius never reclaimed land or tilled the soil. When he ran his school, he had quite a number of students, "seventy worthies and three thousand disciples" — quite a flourishing school! But he had far fewer students than there are in Yenan, and what is more, they would have disliked production campaigns. When a student asked him how to plough the fields, Confucius answered, "I don't know, I am not as good at that as a farmer." Confucius was next asked how to grow vegetables, and he answered, "I don't know, I am not as good at that as a vegetable gardener." In ancient times the youth of China who studied under a sage neither learned revolutionary theory nor took part in labour. Today, there is little revolutionary theory taught and there are no such things as production movements in the schools over vast regions of our country. It is only here in Yenan and in the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines that the young people are fundamentally different; they are really the vanguard in resisting Japan and saving the nation because their political orientation and their methods of work are correct. That is why I say the youth movement in Yenan is the model for the youth movement throughout the country.

Our meeting today is highly significant. I have said all I wanted. I hope you will all study the lessons of the Chinese revolution in the last fifty years, develop its good points and discard its mistakes, so that the youth will be at one with the people of the whole country and the revolution will make the turn from failure to victory. When the youth and the whole nation are mobilized, organized and united, Japanese imperialism will be overthrown. Each young person must shoulder his responsibility. You must each be different from before and resolve to unite the youth and organize the people of the whole country for the overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the transformation of the old China into a new China. This is what I expect of all of you.

NOTES

[1] May 4 was first adopted as China's Youth Day by the youth organization of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. Under the pressure of the patriotic upsurge of the broad masses of young people, the Kuomintang government expressed its

agreement. But it subsequently proclaimed March 29 as its own Youth Day (in commemoration of the revolutionary martyrs who died during an uprising at Canton in 1911) because, fearing that the youth would turn revolutionary, it regarded the decision to observe May 4 as dangerous. However, May 4 continued to be observed as Youth Day in the revolutionary base areas under the leadership of the Communist Party, and was officially proclaimed China's Youth Day by the Administrative Council of the Central People's Government in December 1949 after the founding of the People's Republic of China.

[2] "The Kuomintang turned against the Communist Party" here refers to the counter-revolutionary coups staged in 1927 by Chiang Kai-shek in Shanghai and Nanking and by Wang Ching-wei in Wuhan.

OPPOSE CAPITULATIONIST ACTIVITY

June 30, 1939

Ever since the Chinese nation was confronted with the Japanese aggression, the first and foremost question has been to fight or not to fight. This question aroused serious controversy in the period from the Incident of September 18, 1931 to the Lukouchiao Incident of July 7, 1937. The conclusion reached by all patriotic political parties and groups and by all our patriotic fellow-countrymen was: "To fight is to survive, not to fight is to perish." The conclusion reached by all the capitulationists was: "To fight is to perish, not to fight is to survive." For a time, the roaring guns of the resistance at Lukouchiao decided the issue. They proclaimed the first conclusion right and the second wrong. But why was the question settled only temporarily and not once and for all? Because the Japanese imperialists adopted the policy of inducing China to capitulate, the international capitulationists[1] tried to bring about a compromise, and certain people within our anti-Japanese front wavered. Now the issue has been raised again, worded in a slightly different way as a question of "peace or war". Thus a controversy has arisen inside China between those who favour continuing the war and those who favour making peace. Their respective positions remain the same: the conclusion of the war group is "to fight is to survive, to make peace is to perish"; the conclusion of the peace group is "to make peace is to survive, to fight is to perish". The former comprises all patriotic parties and all patriots and they make up the great majority of the nation, while the latter, *i.e.*, the capitulationists, constitutes only a small wavering minority within the anti-Japanese front. Consequently, the peace group has to resort to lying propaganda, and, above all, to anti-Communist propaganda. For example, it has fabricated and released a spate of false news, false reports, false documents and false resolutions, such as: "the Communist Party engages in disruptive activities", "the Eighth Route Army and the

New Fourth Army are merely moving about without fighting and refuse to obey orders", "a separatist regime has been formed in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and is expanding beyond its confines", "the Communist Party is plotting to overthrow the government", and even, "the Soviet Union is plotting aggression against China". Its purpose is to make peace, or in other words to capitulate, by covering up the real facts and confusing public opinion. The peace group, the group of capitulationists, is doing all this because it cannot wreck Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, split the Anti-Japanese National United Front and surrender to Japan unless it combats the Communist Party, which is the initiator and champion of the united front. Second, it hopes that Japanese imperialism will make concessions. It believes that Japan is well-nigh exhausted and will change her basic policy, voluntarily withdrawing from central, southern and even northern China, and that China can thus win without doing any more fighting. Third, it pins its hopes on international pressure. Many people in the peace group bank on the exertion of pressure by the big powers not only on Japan, so that she will make some concessions and thereby facilitate a peace settlement, but also on the Chinese government, so that they can say to the war group: "Look! In the present international climate, we have to make peace!" and "A Pacific international conference[2] would be to China's advantage. It would not be another Munich,[3] but a step towards China's rejuvenation!" This forms the sum total of the views, tactics and schemes of the peace group, the Chinese capitulationists. The drama is being acted out not only by Wang Ching-wei himself, but, what is more serious, by many others like him who are concealed within the anti-Japanese front and are collaborating with him in a kind of duet[4] or joint performance, with some wearing the white make-up of the stage villain and others the red make-up of the hero.

We Communists openly proclaim that, at all times, we stand with those who favour continuing the war and resolutely oppose those who favour making peace. We have but one desire, that is, together with all other patriotic parties and all other patriots, to strengthen unity and strengthen the national united front and Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, put the Three People's Principles into effect, carry the War of Resistance through to the end, fight all the way to the Yalu River and recover all our lost territories.[5] We firmly denounce the Wang Ching-weis, both overt and covert, who are creating an anti-Communist climate, engineering "friction"[6] between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and even trying to provoke another civil war between the two parties. We say to them: In essence, your divisive schemes are nothing but preparations for capitulation, and your divisive and capitulationist policy simply reveals your general plan of selling out the interests of the nation for the selfish interests of a few individuals. People have eyes and will see through your scheming. We categorically repudiate the absurd view that a Pacific conference would not be an Eastern Munich. Of course, the so-called Pacific conference would be an Eastern Munich, a preparation for turning China into another Czechoslovakia. We firmly denounce the groundless assertion that Japanese imperialism may come to its senses and make concessions. Japanese imperialism will never change its basic policy of subjugating China. Japan's honeyed words after the fall of Wuhan — for instance, the suggestion that she would abandon the policy of "not accepting the National Government as the opposite party in negotiations"[7] and would instead recognize it as such, or that she would withdraw her troops from central and southern China on certain conditions — are nothing but cunning bait to hook the fish, so that whoever swallows the bait must expect to be well and truly cooked. The international capitulationists are likewise pursuing a cunning policy to induce China to surrender. They have countenanced Japanese aggression against China, while they themselves "sit on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight", waiting for the opportune moment to engineer a so-called Pacific conference for mediation in order to profit at others' expense. Anyone who pins his hopes on such schemers will likewise find that he has been badly duped.

What was once a question of whether or not to fight has now become a question of whether to continue the war or to make peace, but essentially it is the same question, the most important and fundamental of all questions. In the last six months, with Japan pressing on with her policy of inducing China to capitulate, with the international capitulationists intensifying their activities and, above all, with some people in our anti-Japanese front wavering more than ever, a great clamour has arisen around the question of peace or war, so that capitulation has become the main danger in the present political situation. And the first and most important move the capitulationists are making to prepare for it is to fight communism, that is, to break up Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and the unity of the anti-Japanese front. In these circumstances, all patriotic parties and all patriots must keep a close watch over the capitulationists' activities and must understand the main characteristics of the present situation, namely, that capitulation is the chief danger and that anti-communism is the preparatory step to capitulation, and they must do their utmost to oppose capitulation and a split. No group of people must ever be allowed to undermine or betray the war against Japanese imperialism, a war which has cost the whole nation two full years of bloodshed. No group of people must ever be allowed to disrupt or split the Anti-Japanese National United Front which has been forged by the common effort of the whole nation.

Fight on and persist in unity, and China will survive.

Make peace and persist in splitting, and China will perish.

Which to reject and which to accept? Our countrymen must quickly make their choice.

We Communists will definitely fight on and persist in unity.

All patriotic parties and all patriots will fight on and persist in unity.

Even if the capitulationists who are plotting surrender and a split should get the upper hand for a while, they will eventually be unmasked and punished by the people. The historical task of the Chinese nation is to achieve liberation through united resistance. What the capitulationists desire is the exact opposite, but however much they may have the upper hand, however jubilant they may be, fancying that nobody dare harm them, they cannot escape punishment by the whole people.

Oppose capitulation and a split — this is the urgent task now confronting all the patriotic political parties and groups and all our patriotic fellow-countrymen.

People of the whole country, unite! Persist in resistance and unity, and suppress all plots for capitulation and a split!

NOTES

[1] "The international capitulationists" were the British and U.S. imperialists who were plotting to compromise with Japan by sacrificing China.

[2] The projected Pacific international conference was dubbed a Far Eastern Munich because the British, U.S. and French imperialists, in collaboration with the Chinese group which favoured making peace, were plotting to reach a compromise with Japan by selling out China. It was Chiang Kai-shek who used the absurd argument, which Comrade Mao Tse-tung refutes in this article, that such a conference would not constitute an Eastern Munich.

[3] In September 1938, the heads of the British, French, German and Italian governments met in Munich, Germany, and concluded the Munich Agreement under which Britain and France betrayed Czechoslovakia to Germany in exchange for a German attack on the Soviet Union. In 1938 and 1939, British and U.S. imperialism made several moves to reach a compromise with Japanese imperialism by sacrificing China. At the time when Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this article in June 1939, talks were being held between Britain and Japan in another attempt to carry out this scheme. It was called an "Eastern Munich" because of its similarity to the Munich conspiracy of Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

[4] The duet was being acted by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei. While Wang Ching-wei was the ringleader of the open capitulationists, Chiang was the ringleader of those hiding in the anti-Japanese front.

[5] At the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Fifth Central Executive Committee in January 1939, Chiang Kai-shek openly declared that what he meant by "to the very end" in the slogan "Carry the War of Resistance through to the very end" was merely "to restore the *status quo* before the Lukouchiao Incident", an interpretation that would have meant abandoning vast areas of northern and northeastern China to Japanese occupation. Therefore, to counter Chiang Kai-shek's capitulationist policy, Comrade Mao Tse-tung specially stressed that "to the very end" meant "to fight all the way to the Yalu River and recover all our lost territories".

[6] The term "friction" was widely used at the time to refer to the various kinds of reactionary political and military actions of the Kuomintang reactionaries undertaken to wreck the Anti-Japanese National United Front and to oppose the Communist Party and the progressive forces, such as massacres and large-scale attacks on the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

[7] Subsequent to the Japanese occupation of Nanking on December 13, 1937, the Japanese government issued a statement on January 16, 1938, saying that Japan would "not accept the National Government as the opposite party in negotiations, and expects a new government to be established". After Japanese troops occupied Canton and Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese government, taking advantage of Chiang Kai-shek's vacillation, changed its policy in order to induce him to capitulate. It issued another statement on November 3, which read in part: "As for the National Government, provided it abandons its hitherto erroneous policy and gets new men to carry out rehabilitation and to maintain peace and order, the Empire will not decline to negotiate with it."

REACTIONARIES MUST BE PUNISHED

August 1, 1939

Today, the First of August, we are gathered here for a memorial meeting. Why are we holding this memorial meeting? Because the reactionaries have killed our revolutionary comrades, killed fighters against Japan. Who should be killed in these times? The Chinese traitors and the Japanese imperialists. China has been fighting Japanese imperialism for two years, but the outcome is not yet decided. The traitors are still very active, and very few of them have been killed. Yet our revolutionary comrades, all warriors against Japan, have been killed. Killed by whom? Killed by the troops. Why did the troops kill fighters against Japan? They were carrying out orders; certain people gave them the order to kill. Who gave them the order to kill? The reactionaries.[1] Comrades! Logically, who would want to kill fighters against Japan? First, the Japanese imperialists, and next, the Chinese collaborators and traitors such as Wang Ching-wei. But the scene of the killing was not Shanghai, Peiping, Tientsin or Nanking, or any other place occupied by the Japanese aggressors and Chinese collaborators; it took place in Pingkiang, in the rear of the War of Resistance, and among the victims were Comrades Tu Cheng-kun and Lo Tzu-ming, responsible comrades of the Pingkiang Liaison Office of the New Fourth Army. Obviously, the killing was perpetrated by a gang of Chinese reactionaries acting on the orders of the Japanese imperialists and Wang Ching-wei. Preparing to capitulate, these reactionaries obsequiously carried out the orders of the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei, and the first people they killed were the most resolute fighters against Japan. This is no trivial matter; we must raise our voices against it, we must denounce it!

This speech was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a memorial meeting held by the people of Yenan for the martyrs of Pingkiang.

The whole nation is now resisting Japan and has forged a great union of the people for the purpose of resistance. But within this great union there are reactionaries and capitulators. What are they doing? They are killing fighters against Japan, holding back progress and working in collusion with the Japanese aggressors and Chinese collaborators to pave the way for capitulation.

Has anyone taken action on this serious case of the murder of anti-Japanese comrades? The murder was committed at 3 p.m. on June 12, today is August 1, but in all this time have we seen anyone step forward and take action? No. Who should have done so? Action should have been taken under the law of the land by the administrators of the law. If such a thing had happened in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, our high court would have acted long ago. But although nearly two months have elapsed since the Pingkiang massacre, the law and its administrators have done nothing. What is the reason? The reason is, China is not unified.[2]

China must be unified; there can be no victory without unification. But what does unification mean? It means that everybody should resist Japan, that all should unite and strive for progress and that there should be due rewards and punishments. Who ought to be rewarded? Those who resist Japan, those who uphold unity, those who are progressive. And who ought to be punished? The collaborators and reactionaries who undermine resistance, unity and progress. Is our country now unified? It is not. The Pingkiang massacre proves it. It shows that there is no unification where there should be. We have long demanded the unification of the whole country. First, unification on the basis of the War of Resistance. But now, instead of being rewarded, Tu Cheng-kun, Lo Tzu-ming and the other comrades who were resisting the Japanese have been brutally murdered, whereas scoundrels who oppose resistance, prepare to capitulate and commit murder go unpunished. That is not unification. We must oppose these scoundrels and capitulators, and arrest the murderers. Second, unification on the basis of unity. Those who stand for unity ought to be rewarded and those who undermine it ought to be punished. But now, Comrades Tu Cheng-kun, Lo Tzu-ming and the others who upheld unity have been punished, have been brutally murdered, whereas the scoundrels who undermine unity are allowed to go scot-free. That is not unification. Third, unification on the basis of progress. The whole country must go forward; the backward must try to keep pace with the progressive, and the progressive must not be held back to the pace of the backward. The butchers at Pingkiang killed progressive people. Hundreds of Communists and patriots have been assassinated since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Pingkiang massacre being only the most recent example. It will be disastrous for China if this continues; all who resist Japan may be murdered. What do these murders mean? They mean that the Chinese reactionaries, acting under orders from the Japanese imperialists and Wang Ching-wei, are preparing to capitulate, and that is why they begin by killing fighters against Japan, by killing Communists and patriots. If this is not stopped, China will perish at the hands of these reactionaries. These murders, therefore, concern the whole country, they are of the gravest importance, and we must demand that the National Government punish these reactionaries with the utmost severity.

Comrades must also realize that Japanese imperialism has recently intensified its disruptive activities, that international imperialism has become more active in helping Japan,[3] and that the traitors in China, both the overt and the covert Wang Ching-weis, are more active than ever in sabotaging the War of Resistance, wrecking unity and turning the clock back. They want to surrender the greater part of our country, cause an internal split and engineer a civil war. At the present time certain secret measures known as "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties"[4] are being extensively enforced. They are reactionary to the core, helpful to Japanese imperialism and detrimental to resistance, unity and progress. Which are the "alien parties"? The Japanese imperialists, Wang Ching-wei and the traitors. How can the Communist Party and all the other anti-Japanese political parties, which are united in resistance to Japan, be called "alien parties"? Yet the capitulators, reactionaries and die-hards are deliberately creating friction and disunity within the anti-Japanese ranks. Is this kind of activity right or wrong? It is absolutely wrong! (*Unanimous applause.*) When it comes to restriction, what sort of people should be restricted? The Japanese imperialists, Wang Ching-wei, the reactionaries and capitulators. (*Unanimous applause.*) Why restrict the Communist Party, which is the most resolute in resisting Japan, the most revolutionary and the most progressive? It is absolutely wrong. We the people of Yenan voice our firm opposition and strong protest. (*Unanimous applause.*) We must oppose the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties", for such measures are at the very root of all kinds of criminal actions that wreck unity. We are holding this mass meeting today for the sake of continued resistance, unity and progress. To this end, the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" must be abolished, the capitulators and reactionaries must be punished, and all revolutionary comrades, all the comrades and people resisting Japan must be protected. (*Warm applause and slogan shouting.*)

NOTES

[1] These reactionaries were Chiang Kai-shek and his henchmen. On June 12, 1939, acting on a secret order from Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang's 27th Group Army dispatched troops to surround the New Fourth Army Liaison Office at Pingkiang, Hunan Province, and in cold blood murdered Comrade Tu Cheng-kun, staff officer of the New Fourth Army, Comrade Lo Tzu-ming, major and adjutant of the Eighth Route Army, and four other comrades. This massacre aroused indignation not only among the people in the anti-Japanese democratic base areas but also among honest people in the Kuomintang areas.

[2] Comrade Mao Tse-tung defined unification in order to counter the Kuomintang reactionaries' use of "unification" as a pretext for their schemes to liquidate the Communist-led anti-Japanese armed forces and base areas. After the renewed Kuomintang-Communist co-operation for joint resistance to Japan, the slogan of "unification" became the Kuomintang's chief weapon in attacking the Communist Party, which it accused of always seeking to be different and of obstructing unification and damaging the cause of resistance. This reactionary clamour increased after January 1939, when the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Fifth Central Executive Committee adopted the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" on the proposal of Chiang Kai-shek. Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrested the slogan of "unification" from the Kuomintang reactionaries and turned it into a revolutionary slogan for opposing the Kuomintang's divisive activities against the people and the nation.

[3] After the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, Japan's main policy became one of employing political means to lure the Kuomintang into capitulation. International imperialism, including the British and U.S. imperialists, also repeatedly suggested to Chiang Kai-shek that he should negotiate peace, and Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, indicated that Britain would take part in the so-called "reconstruction of the Far East". The Japanese aggressors and the international imperialists stepped up their conspiracies in 1939. In April of that year, Clark-Kerr, the British ambassador to China, acted as an intermediary between Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese aggressors in arranging a peace parley. In July an agreement was reached between Britain and Japan under which the British government was prepared to recognize the "actual situation" Japan had brought about in China.

[4] The "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" were secretly issued by the central authorities of the Kuomintang in 1939. They imposed severe

restrictions on communist and all other progressive ideas, speech and action, with the aim of disrupting all the anti-Japanese organizations of the people. They also stipulated that in places where, in the opinion of the Kuomintang, "the Communists were most active", the "law of collective responsibility and collective punishment" was to be enforced and an "information network", or counter-revolutionary secret service, was to be generally established within the *pao-chia* organizations. *Pao* and *chia* were then the basic administrative units of the Kuomintang's fascist regime. Ten households formed a *chia* and ten *chia* a *pao*.

INTERVIEW WITH A *NEW CHINA DAILY* CORRESPONDENT ON THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

September 1, 1939

Correspondent: What is the significance of the Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the Soviet Union and Germany?[1]

Mao Tse-tung: The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty is the result of the growing socialist strength of the Soviet Union and the policy of peace persistently followed by the Soviet government. The treaty has shattered the intrigues by which the reactionary international bourgeoisie represented by Chamberlain and Daladier sought to instigate a Soviet-German war, has broken the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the German-Italian-Japanese anti-Communist bloc, strengthened peace between the Soviet Union and Germany, and safeguarded the progress of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. In the East it deals a blow to Japan and helps China; it strengthens the position of China's forces of resistance to Japan and deals a blow to the capitulators. All this provides a basis for helping the people throughout the world to win freedom and liberation. Such is the full political significance of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty.

Question: Some people do not realize yet that the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty is the result of the breakdown of the Anglo-French-Soviet talks, but think that the Soviet-German treaty caused the breakdown. Will you please explain why the Anglo-French-Soviet talks failed?

Answer: The talks failed purely because the British and French governments were insincere. In recent years the reactionary international bourgeoisie, and primarily that of Britain and France, have consistently pursued the reactionary policy of "non-intervention" towards aggression by fascist Germany, Italy and Japan. Their purpose is to connive at wars of aggression and to profit by them.

Thus Britain and France flatly rejected the Soviet Union's repeated proposals for a genuine front against aggression; standing on the side-lines, they took a "non-interventionist" position and connived at German, Italian and Japanese aggression. Their aim was to step forward and intervene when the belligerents had worn each other out. In pursuit of this reactionary policy they sacrificed half of China to Japan, and the whole of Abyssinia, Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia to Italy and Germany.[2] Then they wanted to sacrifice the Soviet Union. This plot was clearly revealed in the recent Anglo-French-Soviet talks. They lasted for more than four months, from April 15 to August 23, during which the Soviet Union exercised the utmost patience. But, from start to finish, Britain and France rejected the principle of equality and reciprocity; they demanded that the Soviet Union provide safeguards for their security, but refused to do likewise for the Soviet Union and the small Baltic states, so as to leave a gap through which Germany could attack, and they also refused to allow the passage of Soviet troops through Poland to fight the aggressor. That is why the talks broke down. In the meantime, Germany indicated her willingness to stop her activities against the Soviet Union and abandon the so-called Agreement Against the Communist International[3] and recognized the inviolability of the Soviet frontiers; hence the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty. The policy of "non-intervention" pursued by international and primarily Anglo-French reaction is a policy of "sitting on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight", a downright imperialist policy of profiting at others' expense. This policy was initiated when Chamberlain took office reached its climax in the Munich agreement of September last year and finally collapsed in the recent Anglo-French-Soviet talks. From now on the situation will inevitably develop into one of direct conflict between the two big imperialist blocs, the Anglo-French bloc and the German-Italian bloc. As I said in October 1938 at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of our Party, "The inevitable result of Chamberlain's policy will be like 'lifting a rock only to drop it on one's own toes'." Chamberlain started with the aim of injuring others only to end up by ruining himself. This is the law of development which governs all reactionary policies.

Question: In your opinion, how will the present situation develop?

Answer: The international situation has already entered a new phase. The one-sided situation in the second imperialist war which has existed for some time, in other words, the situation in which, as a result of the policy of "non-intervention", one group of imperialist states attacks while another sits tight and looks on, will inevitably be replaced by a situation of all-embracing war as far as Europe is concerned. The second imperialist war has entered a new stage.

In Europe, a large-scale imperialist war is imminent between the German-Italian and the Anglo-French imperialist blocs which are contending for domination over the colonial peoples. In this war, each of the belligerents will brazenly declare its own cause to be just and that of its opponents unjust in order to delude people and win the support of public opinion. Actually this is a swindle. The aims of both sides are imperialist, both are fighting for the domination of colonies and semi-colonies and for spheres of influence, and both are waging a predatory war. At present, they are fighting over Poland, the Balkans and the Mediterranean littoral. This war is not at all a just war. The only just wars are non-predatory wars, wars of liberation. Communists will in no circumstances support any predatory war: They will, however, bravely step forward to support every just and non-predatory war for liberation, and they will stand in the forefront of the struggle. With Chamberlain and Daladier practising intimidation and bribery, the social-democratic parties affiliated to the Second International are splitting up. One section, the reactionary upper stratum, is following the same old disastrous road as in the First World War and is ready to support the new imperialist war. But another section will join with the Communists in forming a popular front against war and fascism. Chamberlain and Daladier are following in the footsteps of Germany and Italy and are becoming more and more reactionary, taking advantage of the war mobilization to put the state structure in their countries on a fascist footing and to militarize the economy. In short, the two big imperialist blocs are feverishly preparing for war and millions of people are facing the danger of mass slaughter. Surely all this will arouse movements of resistance among the masses. Whether in Germany or in Italy, Britain or France, or anywhere else in Europe or the world at large, if the people do not want to be used as imperialist cannon-fodder, they will have to rise up and oppose the imperialist war in every possible way.

Besides these two big blocs, there is a third bloc in the capitalist world, headed by the United States and including a number of Central and South American countries. In its own interests, this bloc will not enter the war for the time being. In the name of neutrality, U.S. imperialism is temporarily refraining from joining either of the belligerents, so as to be able to come on the scene later and contend for the leadership of the capitalist world. The fact that the U.S. bourgeoisie is not yet prepared to discard democracy and a peace-time economy at home is favourable to the world peace movement.

Badly hit by the Soviet-German treaty, Japanese imperialism is facing a future beset with still greater difficulties. Two factions within Japan are fighting over foreign policy. The militarists are contemplating an alliance with Germany and Italy for the purpose of gaining exclusive control of China, invading Southeast Asia and expelling Britain, the United States and France from the East; on the other hand, one section of the bourgeoisie would prefer to make concessions to Britain, the United States and France in order to concentrate on plundering China. At present, there is a strong tendency towards a compromise with Britain. The British reactionaries will offer Japan the joint partition of China plus financial and economic help, in return for which Japan will have to serve as the watchdog of British interests in the East, suppress the Chinese national liberation movement and contain the Soviet Union. Therefore, whatever happens, Japan's basic aim of conquering China will never change. The possibility that Japan will launch large-scale frontal military offensives in China may not be very great, but it will step up its political offensive to "use Chinese to subdue Chinese"[4] and its economic plundering of China to "sustain the war by means of war",[5] while keeping up its frantic "mopping-up" campaigns[6] in the occupied areas; moreover, it will work through Britain to force China to surrender. At a favourable moment it will propose an Eastern Munich and, with some relatively big concessions as bait, will try to coax and bully China into accepting its terms for surrender, so as to attain its aim of subjugating China. No matter what cabinet changes the Japanese ruling class may make, this imperialist aim will remain unchanged until the Japanese people rise in revolution.

Outside the capitalist world there is a world of light, the socialist Soviet Union. The Soviet-German treaty enables the Soviet Union to give greater help to the world movement for peace and to China in her resistance to Japan.

This is my appraisal of the international situation.

Question: In these circumstances, what are the prospects for China?

Answer: There are two possibilities. One is perseverance in resistance, unity and progress, which would mean national rejuvenation. The other is compromise, a split and retrogression, which would mean national subjugation.

In the new international situation, as Japan comes up against increased difficulties and China firmly refuses to compromise, the stage of strategic retreat will end for us and that of strategic stalemate will begin. The latter stage is one of preparation for the counter-offensive.

However, stalemate along the front means the reverse of stalemate in the enemy's rear; with the emergence of a stalemate along the front lines, the struggle behind the enemy's lines will become intense. Thus the large-scale "mopping-up" campaigns the enemy has been conducting in the occupied areas — mainly in northern China — since the fall of Wuhan will not only continue but will be intensified from now on. Furthermore, since the enemy's main policy at present consists in his political offensive to "use Chinese to subdue Chinese" and in his economic aggression for "sustaining the war by means of war", and since a Far Eastern Munich is the objective of British policy in the East, the danger of the surrender of the greater part of China and of an internal split will increase enormously. China is still far weaker than the enemy, and unless the whole country unites in an arduous struggle, it will not be able to build up strength for the counter-offensive.

Therefore, the most serious task for our country is still perseverance in the war, and there must be no slackening.

Beyond any doubt, China must on no account miss the present opportunity or make a wrong decision but must take a firm political stand.

In other words: First, firm adherence to the stand of resistance to Japan and opposition to any moves towards compromise. Determined blows must be struck at all the open or undercover Wang Ching-weis. China must firmly reject any blandishments, whether from Japan or from Britain, and must never take part in an Eastern Munich.

Second, firm adherence to the stand of unity and opposition to any moves towards a split. Strict vigilance must be maintained against such moves whether they stem from the Japanese imperialists, from other foreign countries, or from the capitulators at home. All internal friction harmful to the War of Resistance must be sternly checked.

Third, firm adherence to the stand of progress and opposition to any retrogression. Whether in the military, political, financial or economic sphere, or in party affairs, or in the field of culture and education, or in the mass movement, every theory, every institution, every measure harmful to the war must be re-examined and effectively changed to serve the War of Resistance.

If all this is done, China will be able effectively to build up her strength for the counter-offensive.

From now on the whole country must make "preparation for the counter-offensive" its over-all task in the War of Resistance.

Today, it is necessary on the one hand earnestly to sustain our defence along the front lines and vigorously to help the fighting behind the enemy lines and on the other to institute political, military and other reforms and build up tremendous strength, so that when the moment comes, the whole might of the nation can be thrown into a large-scale counter-offensive for the recovery of our lost territories.

NOTES

[1] The Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the Soviet Union and Germany was signed on August 23, 1939.

[2] Aided and abetted by the "non-intervention" policy of the British and French governments, fascist Germany and Italy committed a series of acts of aggression and achieved their purpose. Italy began her armed aggression against Abyssinia in October 1935 and occupied the whole country in May 1936. In July 1936 Germany and Italy started their joint armed intervention in the internal affairs of Spain and supported the fascist Franco in his rebellion against the Popular Front Government. After a prolonged war with the German and Italian interventionists and Franco's rebel troops, the Popular Front Government was defeated in March 1939. German troops occupied Austria in March 1938 and invaded the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia in October. In March 1939 the whole of Czechoslovakia came under German occupation.

[3] The Agreement Against the Communist International was concluded between Japan and Germany in November 1936; Italy joined it in November 1937.

[4] "Using Chinese to subdue Chinese" was a sinister device of the Japanese imperialists in their aggression against China. To create divisions within the country, they cultivated various Chinese elements to serve as their stooges. After the outbreak of the war, they not only employed the openly pro-Japanese clique within the Kuomintang headed by Wang Ching-wei but also made use of Chiang Kai-shek's clique, in order to check the Communist Party which was the most resolute in resisting Japan. In 1939, they ceased attacking Chiang Kai-shek's troops and gave him political encouragement in his anti-Communist activities.

[5] "Sustaining the war by means of war" refers to Japan's policy of ruthless plunder of the Chinese areas under her occupation to meet the expenses of her aggressive war.

[6] "Mopping-up" campaigns were the Japanese aggressors' euphemism for their barbarous policy of triple atrocity — burning all, killing all and looting all.

INTERVIEW WITH THREE CORRESPONDENTS FROM THE CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, THE *SAO TANG PAO* AND THE *HSIN MIN PAO*[1]

September 16, 1939

Correspondent: May we ask for your views on a few questions? We have read your statement of September 1 in today's *New China* News; it covers some of our questions, but there are others on which we would like you to elaborate. Our written questions are divided into three groups and we would be glad if you would give us your views on each of them.

Mao Tse-tung: I shall deal with them according to your list.

You ask if the War of Resistance has reached the stage of stalemate. I think it has in a sense — in the sense that there is a new international situation and that Japan is facing greater difficulties while China has stood firm against compromise. This does not rule out the possibility that the enemy may still launch fairly big offensive campaigns; for instance, he may attack Pakhoi, Changsha or even Sian. When we say that the enemy's large-scale strategic offensive and our strategic retreat have in a sense largely come to an end, we do not altogether exclude the possibility of further offensives and retreats. As for the specific task in the new stage, it is to prepare for the counter-offensive, and this concept covers everything. That is to say, during the stage of stalemate China must build up all the strength required for the future counter-offensive. To prepare for the counter-offensive does not mean launching it immediately, since it cannot be done unless the conditions are ripe. What we are talking about is the strategic, and not the tactical, counter-offensive. Tactical counter-offensives, such as our repulse of the enemy's "mopping-up" campaigns in southeastern Shansi, are not only possible but absolutely necessary. But the time has not yet arrived for an all-out strategic counter-offensive, and we are now at the stage of actively preparing for it. At this stage we shall still have to repulse a certain number of offensive campaigns the enemy may launch at the front.

To itemize the tasks of the new stage, in the enemy's rear we must keep up guerrilla warfare, smash his "mopping-up" campaigns and defeat his economic aggression; at the front we must strengthen our military defences and repulse any offensive campaign the enemy may launch; in the Great Rear Area the main thing is to work hard for political reforms. All these form the specific content of our preparations for the counter-offensive.

Internal political reform is very important because at present the enemy is mainly carrying on a political offensive, and so we must strengthen our political resistance in particular. In other words, the problem of democracy must be solved as soon as possible, for only in this way can we increase our capacity for political resistance and build up our military strength. China has to rely mainly on her own efforts in the War of Resistance. We have stood for regeneration through our own efforts, and this has become even more important in the new international situation. The essence of such regeneration is democracy.

Question: You have just said that democracy is essential to winning victory in the War of Resistance through our own efforts. How can such a system be brought into being in the present circumstances?

Answer: Dr. Sun Yat-sen originally envisaged the three stages of military rule, political tutelage and constitutional government.[2] But in his "Statement on My Departure for the North"[3] issued shortly before his death, he no longer spoke of three stages, but said instead that a national assembly must be convened immediately. This shows that Dr. Sun himself modified his views many years ago in the light of changing circumstances. In the grave situation prevailing today, with the War of Resistance going on, both the early convening of a national assembly and the introduction of democratic government are imperative for averting the calamity of national subjugation and for driving out the enemy. Opinions differ on this question. Some say that the common people are ignorant and democratic government cannot be introduced. They are wrong. The common people have made very rapid progress in the war and, given leadership and proper policy, democratic government can certainly be introduced. For instance, it has been put into practice in northern China. Most of the heads of districts, townships and the *pao* and *chia* there are chosen by popular vote. Even some county magistrates have been chosen in this way, and progressive elements and promising young people have been elected. The question should be thrown open to public discussion.

In the second group on your list, you raise the question of "restricting alien parties", that is, the question of the friction in various localities. Your concern over this matter is justified. There has been some improvement recently, but fundamentally the situation remains unchanged.

Question: Has the Communist Party made its position on this question clear to the Central Government?

Answer: We have protested.

Question: In what way?

Answer: Our Party representative, Comrade Chou En-lai, wrote a letter to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as early as July. Then again on August 1, people from all walks of life in Yenan sent a telegram to the Generalissimo and the National Government, demanding the withdrawal of the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties", which had been secretly circulated and which are at the very root of the "friction" in various places.

Question: Has there been any reply from the Central Government?

Answer: No. But it is said that there are also people in the Kuomintang who disapprove of these measures. As everybody knows, an army that participates in the common fight against Japan is a friendly army, not an "alien army", and similarly, a political party that participates in the common fight against Japan is a friendly party, not an "alien party". There are many parties and groups taking part in the War of Resistance and, while they vary in strength, they are fighting in the same cause; surely they must all unite and must in no circumstances "restrict" one another. Which party is an alien party? The party of the traitors headed by Wang Ching-wei, the running dog of Japan, because it has nothing in common politically with the anti-Japanese parties; that is the kind of party which should be restricted. Between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party there is common political ground, namely, resistance to Japanese aggression. Therefore, the problem is to concentrate all our strength on opposing and checking Japan and Wang Ching-wei, and not on opposing and checking the Communist Party. This is the only basis for formulating correct slogans.

Wang Ching-wei has three slogans: "Oppose Chiang Kai-shek", "Oppose the Communist Party", and "Be friends with Japan". Wang Ching-wei is the common enemy of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and the entire people. But the Communist Party is not the enemy of the Kuomintang, nor is the Kuomintang the enemy of the Communist Party; they should unite and help each other rather than oppose or "restrict" each other. The slogans on our side must be different from Wang Ching-wei's, they must be the opposite of his and never be confused with them. If he says, "Oppose Chiang Kai-shek", everyone should support Chiang Kai-shek; if he says, "Oppose the Communist Party", everyone should unite with the Communist Party; and if he says, "Be friends with Japan", everyone should resist Japan. We should support whatever the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy supports. In articles nowadays people often quote the saying, "Do not sadden your friends and gladden your enemies." It comes from a letter which Chu Fou, a general under Liu Hsiu of the Eastern Han Dynasty, wrote to Peng Chung, the prefect of Yuyang. In context it reads, "Whatever you do, you must be sure that you do not sadden your friends and gladden your enemies." Chu Fou's words express a clear-cut political principle which we must never forget.

In your list of questions you also ask about the Communist Party's attitude to what has come to be known as "friction". I tell you frankly that we are absolutely opposed to friction between the anti-Japanese parties, which cancels out their strength. But if anyone persists in using violence against us, tries to bully us and resorts to repression, the Communist Party will have to take a firm stand. Our attitude is: We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. But our stand is strictly one of self-defence; no Communist is permitted to go beyond the principle of self-defence.

Question: How about the friction in northern China?

Answer: Chang Yin-wu and Chin Chi-jung are the two expert friction-mongers there. Chang Yin-wu in Hopei and Chin Chi-jung in Shantung are simply violating all laws, human or divine, and are scarcely distinguishable from the traitors. They seldom fight the enemy but often attack the Eighth Route Army. We have already sent Generalissimo Chiang a mass of indisputable evidence, such as Chang Yin-wu's orders to his subordinates to attack the Eighth Route Army.

Question: Is there any friction with the New Fourth Army?

Answer: Yes, there is. The incident of the Pingkiang massacre has shocked the whole nation.

Question: Some people say that the united front is important but that the Border Region Government should be abolished for the sake of unification. What do you think of this?

Answer: Nonsense of all sorts is being talked everywhere, the so-called abolition of the Border Region being one example. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region is a democratic anti-Japanese base area and is politically the most progressive region in the whole country. What grounds are there for abolishing it? Moreover, Generalissimo Chiang long ago recognized the Border Region and the Executive Yuan of the National Government officially recognized it as long ago as the winter of the 26th year of the Republic (1937). China certainly needs to be unified, but it must be unified on the basis of resistance, unity and progress. If unification is sought on the opposite basis, the country will perish.

Question: Since there are different interpretations of unification, is there any possibility of a split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party?

Answer: If we are merely talking of possibilities, we can envisage both the possibility of unity and the possibility of a split, depending on the attitudes of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and especially of the people throughout the country. As far as we Communists are concerned, we have long made it clear that our policy is co-operation, and that we not only hope for long-term co-operation but are working hard for it. It is said that at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek also declared that domestic problems should not be solved by force. Confronted with a formidable enemy and bearing in mind the lessons of the past, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party must each persist in long-term co-operation and avoid a split. But to avoid all possibility of a split, political guarantees for long-term co-operation must be found, namely, perseverance in the War of Resistance and the introduction of democratic government. With these, unity can be maintained and a split avoided; it depends on the common effort of the two parties and the whole nation and the effort must be made. "Persist in resistance and oppose capitulation", "Persist in unity and oppose a split" and "Persist in progress and oppose retrogression" — these are the three great political slogans our Party put forward in its Manifesto of July 7 this year. In our opinion, this is the only way China can avoid subjugation and drive out the enemy. There is no other way.

NOTES

[1] The Central News Agency was the official Kuomintang news agency, the *Sao Tang Pao* was a paper run by military circles in the Kuomintang government, and the *Hsin Min Pao* was one of the mouthpieces of the national bourgeoisie.

[2] See Dr. Sun Yat-sen's *Programme of National Reconstruction*. For a long time, the Kuomintang reactionary clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek sought to justify their ruthless counter-revolutionary dictatorship by representing it as either the stage of "military rule" or that of "political tutelage" as envisaged by Dr. Sun.

[3] This statement was made by Dr. Sun Yat-sen on November 10, 1924, two days before he left Canton for Peking at the invitation of Feng Yu-hsiang. In this statement, which won the support of the whole nation, Dr. Sun reiterated his opposition to imperialism and the warlords and urged that a national assembly be called to settle the problems facing the country. Feng Yu-hsiang originally belonged to the Chihli warlord clique, but in the winter of 1924, when war broke out for the second time between them and the Fengtien warlord clique, he refused to fight and led his troops back to Peking, thus causing the downfall of Wu Pei-fu, the actual leader of the Chihli warlords. It was then that he sent the telegram inviting Dr. Sun to Peking.

THE IDENTITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ALL MANKIND

September 28, 1939

With the approach of the twenty-second anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Sino-Soviet Cultural Association has asked me for an article. On the basis of my own observations, I should like to elucidate a few problems concerning the Soviet Union and China. For they are being discussed by the people in China today and apparently no definite conclusions have yet been reached. It may be of some help if I take this opportunity to set forth my views for the consideration of those who are concerned about the war in Europe and about Sino-Soviet relations.

Some people say that the Soviet Union does not want the world to remain at peace because the outbreak of a world war is to its advantage, and that the present war was precipitated by the Soviet Union's conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with Germany instead of a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain and France. I consider this view incorrect. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union over a very long period of time has consistently been one of peace, a policy based on the close links between its own interests and those of the overwhelming majority of mankind. For its own socialist construction the Soviet Union has always needed peace, has always needed to strengthen its peaceful relations with other countries and prevent an anti-Soviet war; for the sake of peace on a world scale, it has also needed to check the aggression of the fascist countries, curb the war-mongering of the so-called democratic countries and delay the outbreak of an imperialist world war for as long as possible. The Soviet Union has long devoted great energy to the cause of world peace. For instance, it has joined the League of Nations,[1] signed treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia[2] and tried hard to conclude security pacts with Britain and all other countries that might be willing to have peace. After Germany and Italy jointly invaded Spain and when Britain, the United States and France adopted a policy of nominal "non-intervention" but of actual connivance at their aggression, the Soviet Union opposed the "non-intervention" policy and gave the Spanish republican forces active help in their resistance to Germany and Italy. After Japan invaded China and when the same three powers adopted the same kind of "non-intervention" policy, the Soviet Union not only concluded a non-aggression treaty with China but gave China active help in her resistance. When Britain and France connived at Hitler's aggression and sacrificed Austria and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union spared no effort in exposing the sinister aims behind the Munich policy and made proposals to Britain and France for checking further aggression. When Poland became the burning question in the spring and summer of this year and it was touch-and-go whether world war would break out, the Soviet Union negotiated with Britain and France for over four months, despite Chamberlain's and Daladier's complete lack of sincerity, in an endeavour to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance to prevent the outbreak of war. But all these efforts were blocked by the imperialist policy of the British and French governments, a policy of conniving at, instigating and spreading war, so that eventually the cause of world peace was thwarted and the imperialist world war broke out. The governments of Britain, the United States and France had no genuine desire to prevent this war; on the contrary, they helped to bring it about. Their refusal to come to terms with the Soviet Union and conclude a really effective treaty of mutual assistance based on equality and reciprocity proved that they wanted not peace but war. Everybody knows that in the contemporary world rejection of the Soviet Union means rejection of peace. Even Lloyd George, that typical representative of the British bourgeoisie, knows this.[3] It was in these circumstances, and when Germany agreed to stop her anti-Soviet activities, abandon the Agreement Against the Communist International and recognize the inviolability of the Soviet frontiers, that the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty was concluded. The plan of Britain, the United States and France was to egg Germany on to attack the Soviet Union, so that they themselves, "sitting on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight", could come down and take over after the Soviet Union and Germany had worn each other out. The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty smashed this plot. In overlooking this plot and the schemes of the Anglo-French imperialists who connived at and instigated war and precipitated a world war, some of our fellow-countrymen have actually been taken in by the sugary propaganda of these schemers. These crafty politicians were not the least bit interested in checking aggression against Spain, against China, or against Austria and Czechoslovakia; on the contrary, they connived at aggression and instigated war, playing the proverbial role of the fisherman who set the snipe and clam at each other and then took advantage of both. They euphemistically described their actions as "non-intervention", but what they actually did was to "sit on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight". Quite a number of people throughout the world have been fooled by the honeyed words of Chamberlain and his partners, failing to see the murderous intent behind their smiles, or to understand that the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty was concluded only after Chamberlain and Daladier had made up their minds to reject the Soviet Union and bring about the imperialist war. It is time for these people to wake up. The fact that the Soviet Union worked hard to preserve world peace to the very last minute proves that the interests of the Soviet Union are identical with those of the overwhelming majority of mankind. This is the first question I wanted to talk about.

Some people say that now that the second imperialist world war has broken out, the Soviet Union will probably take sides — in other words, the Soviet Red Army seems to be on the point of joining the German imperialist front. I consider this view incorrect. On whichever side, the Anglo-French or the German, the war that has just broken out is an unjust, predatory and imperialist war. The Communist Parties and the people of all countries should rise up against it and expose the imperialist character of both belligerents, for this imperialist war brings only harm and no benefit whatever to the people of the world, and they should expose the criminal acts of the social-democratic parties in supporting the imperialist war and betraying the interests of the proletariat. The Soviet Union is a socialist country, a country in which the Communist Party is in power, and it necessarily maintains a clear-cut twofold attitude towards wars: (1) It firmly refuses to take part in any unjust, predatory and imperialist war and maintains strict neutrality towards the belligerents. Hence the Soviet Red Army will never disregard principles and join either of the imperialist war fronts. (2) It actively supports just and non-predatory wars of liberation. For instance, it helped the Chinese people in their war of the Northern

FROM MARX TO MAO
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Expedition thirteen years ago and the Spanish people in their war against Germany and Italy up to this last year; it has been helping the Chinese people in their War of Resistance Against Japan for the last two years and the Mongolian people in resisting Japan for the last few months; and it will certainly give help to any war for the liberation of the masses or of a nation which may break out in other countries in the future, and will certainly give help to any wars that contribute to the defence of peace. The history of the Soviet Union in the last twenty-two years has already proved this, and history will prove it again in the future. Some people regard the Soviet Union's trade with Germany, which is based on the Soviet-German commercial agreement, as an act of participation in the war on the German side. This view, too, is wrong, for it confuses trade with participation in war. Trade must not be confused with participation in war or with rendering assistance. For example, the Soviet Union traded with Germany and Italy during the Spanish war, yet nobody in the world said that the Soviet Union was helping Germany and Italy in their aggression against Spain; on the contrary, people said that it was helping Spain in resisting this aggression, the reason being that the Soviet Union actually did give help to Spain. Again, during the present Sino-Japanese war the Soviet Union is trading with Japan, but nobody in the world is saying that the Soviet Union is helping Japan in its aggression against China; on the contrary, people say that it is helping China to resist this aggression, the reason being that it actually is helping China. At present, both sides in the world war have trading relations with the Soviet Union, but this cannot be regarded as assistance to either, still less as taking part in the war. Only if the nature of the war changes, if the war in one or more countries undergoes certain necessary changes and becomes advantageous to the Soviet Union and the peoples of the world, will it be possible for the Soviet Union to help or participate; otherwise it will not. As for the fact that the Soviet Union is obliged to trade to a greater or lesser extent on more or less preferential terms with one or another of the belligerents according to how friendly or hostile it happens to be, that depends not on the Soviet Union but on the attitude of the belligerents. But even if one or several countries adopt an anti-Soviet attitude, the Soviet Union will not break off trade relations with them so long as they, like Germany before August 23, are willing to maintain diplomatic relations and conclude trade treaties with it, and do not declare war on it. It should be clearly understood that such commercial relations do not mean assistance, much less participation in war. This is the second question I wanted to talk about.

Many people in China are bewildered by the fact that Soviet troops have entered Poland.[4] The Polish question should be viewed from various angles, from that of Germany, of Britain and France, of the Polish government, of the Polish people and of the Soviet Union. Germany started the war in order to plunder the Polish people and smash one flank of the Anglo-French imperialist front. By its nature, Germany's war is imperialist and should be opposed, not approved. As for Britain and France, they have regarded Poland as an object of plunder for their finance capital, exploited her to thwart the German imperialist attempt at a world re-division of the spoils, and made her a flank of their own imperialist front. Thus their war is an imperialist war, their so-called aid to Poland being merely for the purpose of contending with Germany for the domination of Poland, and this war, too, should be opposed, not approved. As for the Polish government, it was a fascist, reactionary government of the Polish landlords and bourgeoisie which ruthlessly exploited the workers and peasants and oppressed the Polish democrats; moreover, it was a government of Greater Poland chauvinists which ruthlessly oppressed the non-Polish minority nationalities — the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Jews, Germans, Lithuanians and others, who number more than ten million; it was itself an imperialist government. In the war, this reactionary Polish government willingly drove the Polish people to serve as cannon-fodder for British and French finance capital, and it willingly served as a sector of the reactionary front of international finance capital. For twenty years the Polish government consistently opposed the Soviet Union and, during the talks between Britain, France and the Soviet Union, it obstinately rejected the Soviet offer to help it with troops. Moreover, it was an utterly incompetent government, its huge army of over 1,500,000 collapsed at the first blow, and it brought the country to ruin in just two weeks, leaving the Polish people under the heel of German imperialism. Such were the towering crimes of the Polish government and it would be wrong for us to waste any sympathy on it. As for the Polish people, they are victims; they should rise up against the oppression of the German fascists and against their own reactionary landlord and bourgeois classes, and establish an independent, free and democratic Polish state. Without the slightest doubt, our sympathy must go out to the Polish people. As for the Soviet Union, its actions have been perfectly just. It was confronted by two problems. The first problem was whether to let the whole of Poland fall under the rule of German imperialism or to help the minority nationalities of eastern Poland win their liberation. It chose the second course. A vast stretch of territory inhabited by Byelorussians and Ukrainians had been snatched from the new-born Soviet state by the German imperialists as far back as 1918 when the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, and it was later arbitrarily put under the rule of the reactionary Polish government by the Treaty of Versailles. What the Soviet Union has now done is merely to recover its lost territory, liberate the oppressed Byelorussians and Ukrainians and save them from German oppression. The news dispatches of the last few days show how warmly these minority nationalities are welcoming the Red Army with food and drink as their liberator, while not a single report of this kind has come in from western Poland which has been occupied by German troops or from the places in western Germany which have been occupied by French troops. This shows clearly that the Soviet Union's war is a just and non-predatory war of liberation, a war helping to liberate weak and small nations and free the people. On the other hand, the war being waged by Germany and by Britain and France is an unjust, predatory and imperialist war for the oppression of other nations and peoples. The second problem confronting the Soviet Union was Chamberlain's endeavour to continue his old anti-Soviet policy. His policy was, first, to impose a large-scale blockade on Germany and bring pressure on her from the west; second, to try to form an alliance with the United States and to buy over Italy, Japan and the countries of northern Europe so as to isolate Germany; and third, to bribe Germany with the offer of Poland, and even of Hungary and Rumania. In short, Chamberlain resorted to all kinds of intimidation and bribery to get Germany to renounce the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty and turn her guns on the Soviet Union. This intrigue has been going on for some time and will continue. The powerful Soviet army's entry into eastern Poland, with the aim of recovering the Soviet Union's own territory and liberating the weak and small nationalities there, was at the same time a practical move to prevent the forces of German aggression from expanding eastward and to frustrate Chamberlain's intrigue. Judging by the news reports of the last few days, this Soviet policy has been most successful. It is a concrete manifestation of the identity of the interests of the Soviet Union with those of the overwhelming majority of mankind, including those of the oppressed people under reactionary Polish rule. This is the third question I wanted to talk about.

The whole situation since the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty constitutes a great blow to Japan and a great help to China; it strengthens the position of those resisting Japan and weakens the capitulators. The Chinese people have rightly welcomed this treaty. However, since the signing of the Nomonhan truce agreement,[5] British and U.S. news agencies have been busy spreading the story that a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression treaty is about to be signed, and this has caused concern among some Chinese people, who think that the Soviet Union may no longer help China. I believe they are wrong. The nature of the Nomonhan truce agreement is the same as that of the previous Changkufeng truce agreement;[6] that is to say, the Japanese militarists, being compelled to admit defeat, have had to recognize the inviolability of the Soviet and Mongolian frontiers. These truce agreements will enable the Soviet Union to increase rather than decrease its aid to China. As for the talk about a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression treaty, the Soviet Union has been proposing it for many years but Japan has invariably rejected it. Now there is a section of the Japanese ruling class that wants such a treaty with the Soviet Union, but whether the Soviet Union will be willing depends on the basic principle of whether the treaty will accord with the interests of the Soviet Union and of the overwhelming majority of mankind. Specifically, it depends on whether the treaty will conflict with the interests of China's war of national liberation. Judging from Stalin's report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 10 this year and Molotov's speech at the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on May 30, I think the Soviet Union will not alter this basic principle. Even if such a treaty were to be concluded, the Soviet Union would certainly not agree to anything that would restrict its freedom of action in helping China. The interests of the Soviet Union will always conform and never conflict with the interests of China's national liberation. I hold this as absolutely beyond doubt. People who are prejudiced against the Soviet Union are capitalizing on the Nomonhan truce agreement and on the talk about a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression treaty in order to make trouble and stir up ill feeling between the two great nations of China and the Soviet Union. This is what the British, U.S. and French intriguers and the Chinese capitulators are doing; it is highly dangerous and we must thoroughly expose their dirty tricks. It is obvious that

China's foreign policy must be one of resistance to Japanese aggression. This policy means primarily relying on our own efforts, while not ignoring any possibility of securing help from abroad. Now that the imperialist world war has broken out, foreign help is coming chiefly from three sources: (1) the socialist Soviet Union, (2) the people of the capitalist countries, and (3) the oppressed nations in the colonies and semi-colonies. These are our only reliable sources of help. Anything else that might be called foreign help, even if it might become available, can only be regarded as supplementary and temporary. Of course, China should try to obtain such supplementary and temporary foreign help, but must never depend too much on it or consider it reliable. China should maintain strict neutrality towards the belligerents in the imperialist war and not join either side. To maintain that China should join the Anglo-French imperialist war front is a capitulator's view, which is harmful to the War of Resistance as well as to the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation, and it should be flatly rejected. This is the fourth question I wanted to talk about.

These four questions are being widely discussed by our fellow-countrymen. It is a very good thing that they are giving attention to the study of international problems, to the relations between the imperialist world war and China's War of Resistance and between the Soviet Union and China, because their aim is victory over Japanese aggression. Here I have given some of my basic views on these questions, and I hope that readers will not spare their comments.

NOTES

[1] The League of Nations was an organization formed by Britain, France, Japan and other imperialist powers after World War I for the re-division of the world through bargaining and temporary adjustments of conflicting interests. In 1931 the Japanese imperialists occupied China's Northeast and in 1933 Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in order to be able to extend her aggression more freely. In the same year the German fascists came to power, and later they, too, withdrew from the League of Nations to facilitate their preparations for a war of aggression. It was in 1934, when the threat of a fascist war of aggression was growing, that the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations; in this way the possibility arose of this imperialist organization for the re-division of the world being turned into one that might serve the cause of world peace. Italy withdrew from the League of Nations after her invasion of Abyssinia in 1935.

[2] The Treaty of Mutual Assistance Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France and the Treaty of Mutual Assistance Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic were concluded in 1935.

[3] The British bourgeois politician Lloyd George, who had been Prime Minister during World War I, declared in Parliament in November 1938 when Britain, France, Germany and Italy were going to negotiate, that peace could not be won by rejecting Soviet participation in the negotiations.

[4] On September 1, 1939, the Germans invaded Poland and occupied most of her territory. On the 17th the reactionary Polish government fled abroad. On the same day, the Soviet Union dispatched its troops to eastern Poland in order to recover its own lost territories, emancipate the oppressed Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples and check the eastward drive of the German fascist troops.

[5] The Nomonhan truce agreement was concluded in Moscow in September 1939. In May 1939 the Japanese and the puppet "Manchukuo" troops had jointly attacked the troops of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Mongolia at Nomonhan, on the border between Mongolia and "Manchukuo", and were completely defeated by the Soviet and Mongolian forces in a heroic war of self-defence. The Japanese then sued for peace. The truce agreement provided for an immediate cease-fire and the formation of a commission of four, with two representatives from each side, to demarcate the frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and the puppet state of "Manchukuo" at places where the conflict had taken place.

[6] The Changkufeng truce agreement was concluded in Moscow on August 11, 1938. At the end of July and the beginning of August 1938, the Japanese had committed acts of provocation against the Soviet troops in the Changkufeng district on the border between China, Korea and the Soviet Union and had been vigorously repulsed. The Japanese sued for peace. The truce agreement provided for an immediate cease-fire and the formation of a commission of four, with two representatives from the Soviet side and two from the Japanese-"Manchukuo" side, to investigate the boundary lines and make a final settlement.

INTRODUCING *THE COMMUNIST*

October 4, 1939

The Central Committee has long planned to publish an internal Party journal, and now at last the plan has materialized. Such a journal is necessary for building up a bolshevized Chinese Communist Party, a party which is national in scale and has a broad mass character, a party which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally. This necessity is all the more obvious in the present situation, which has special features: on the one hand, the danger of capitulation, of a split and of retrogression within the Anti-Japanese National United Front is increasing daily, while on the other, our Party has stepped out of its narrow confines and become a major national party. The duty of the Party is to mobilize the masses to overcome the dangers of capitulation, a split and retrogression and prepare against all possible eventualities so that in case they occur, the Party and the revolution will not suffer unexpected losses. An internal Party journal is indeed most necessary at a time like this.

This internal Party journal is called *The Communist*. What is its purpose? What will it deal with? In what way will it differ from other Party publications?

Its purpose is to help build a bolshevized Chinese Communist Party which is national in scale, has a broad mass character, and is fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally. The building of such a party is imperative for the victory of the Chinese revolution and on the whole the subjective and objective conditions for it are present; indeed this great undertaking is now in progress. A special Party periodical is needed to help achieve this great task, which is beyond the capability of an ordinary Party publication, and this is why *The Communist* is now being published.

To a certain extent our Party is already national in scale and has a broad mass character; and it is already a bolshevized party, consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally, so far as its core of leadership, a part of its membership and its general line and revolutionary work are concerned.

That being so, why set a new task?

The reason is that we now have many new branches, which have a great many new members but which cannot yet be considered as having a broad mass character, as being ideologically, politically and organizationally consolidated, or as being bolshevized. At the same time, there is the problem of raising the political level of the older Party members and of making further progress in bolshevizing the older branches and consolidating them ideologically, politically and organizationally. The circumstances in which the Party now finds itself and the responsibilities it is shouldering are quite unlike those in the revolutionary civil war period; the circumstances are much more complex and the responsibilities much heavier.

This is the period of the national united front, and we have formed a united front with the bourgeoisie; this is the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the armed forces of our Party are at the front, fighting a ruthless war against the enemy in co-ordination with the friendly armies; this is the period when our Party has become a major national party and is therefore no longer what it was before. If we take all these factors together, we shall understand how glorious and momentous is the task we have set ourselves, the task of "building up a bolshevized Chinese Communist Party, a party which is national in scale and has a broad mass character, a party fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally".

It is this kind of party that we now want to build, but how shall we go about it? We cannot answer this question without going into the history of our Party and of its eighteen years of struggle.

It is fully eighteen years since our First National Congress in 1921. In these eighteen years our Party has gone through many great struggles. And the members of the Party, its cadres and organizations, have all tempered themselves in these great struggles. They have had the experience both of splendid victories and grave defeats in the revolution. The Party established a national united front with the bourgeoisie and, with the break-up of this united front, engaged in a bitter armed struggle with the big bourgeoisie and its allies. During the last three years, it has again entered into a period of a national united front with the bourgeoisie. It is through this kind of complex relationship with the Chinese bourgeoisie that the Chinese revolution and the Communist Party of China have progressed in their development. This is a special historical feature, a feature peculiar to the revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries and not to be found in the revolutionary history of any capitalist country. Moreover, since China is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, since her political, economic and cultural development is uneven, since her economy is predominantly semi-feudal and since her territory is vast, it follows that the character of the Chinese revolution in its present stage is bourgeois-democratic, that its principal targets are imperialism and feudalism and that its basic motive forces are the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, with the national bourgeoisie taking part at certain times and to a certain extent; it also follows that the principal form of struggle in the Chinese revolution is armed struggle. Indeed, the history of our Party may be called a history of armed struggle. Comrade Stalin has said, "In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution."[1] This is perfectly true. The specific feature peculiar to semi-colonial China is not present, or is not present in the same way, in the history of the revolutions led by Communist Parties in the capitalist countries. Thus, there are two basic specific features in the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution: (1) the proletariat either establishes a revolutionary national united front with the bourgeoisie, or is forced to break it up; and (2) armed struggle is the principal form of the revolution. Here we do not describe the Party's relations with the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie as a basic specific feature, first, because these relations are in principle the same as those which confront Communist Parties all over the world, and secondly, because armed struggle in China is, in essence, peasant war and the Party's relations with the peasantry and its close relations with the peasant war are one and the same thing.

It is because of these two basic specific features, in fact precisely because of them, that the building up and bolshevization of our Party are proceeding in special circumstances. The Party's failures or successes, its retreats or advances, its contraction or expansion, its development and consolidation are inevitably linked up with its relations with the bourgeoisie and with armed struggle. When the Party takes a correct political line on the question of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie or of breaking it up when forced to do so, our Party moves a step forward in its development, consolidation and bolshevization; but when it takes an incorrect line on its relations with the bourgeoisie, then our Party moves a step backward. Similarly, when our Party handles the question of revolutionary armed struggle correctly, it moves a step forward in its development, consolidation and bolshevization; but when it handles the question incorrectly, it moves a step backward. Thus, for eighteen years, the building and bolshevization of the Party have been closely linked with its political line, with the correct or incorrect handling of the questions of the united front and armed struggle. This conclusion is clearly confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party's history. Or conversely, the more bolshevized the Party, the more correctly can it decide upon its political line and handle the questions of the united front and armed struggle. This conclusion, too, is clearly confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party's history.

Therefore the united front, armed struggle and Party building are the three fundamental questions for our Party in the Chinese revolution. Having a correct grasp of these three questions and their interrelations is tantamount to giving correct leadership to the whole Chinese revolution. We are now able to draw correct conclusions concerning these three questions by virtue of our abundant experience in the eighteen years of our Party's history, our rich and profound experience of failures and successes, retreats and advances, contraction and expansion. This means that we are now able to handle the questions of the united front, of armed struggle and of Party building in a correct way. It also means that our eighteen years of experience have taught us that the united front, armed struggle and Party building are the Chinese Communist Party's three "magic weapons", its three principal magic weapons for defeating the enemy in the Chinese revolution. This is a great achievement of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Chinese revolution.

Here let us briefly discuss each of the three magic weapons, each of the three questions.

In the last eighteen years, the united front of the Chinese proletariat with the bourgeoisie and other classes has developed under three different sets of circumstances or through three different stages: the First Great Revolution from 1924 to 1927, the War of Agrarian Revolution from 1927 to 1937, and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. The history of the three stages has confirmed the following laws:

(1) The Chinese national bourgeoisie will take part in the struggle against imperialism and the feudal warlords at certain

> times and to a certain extent, because foreign oppression is the greatest oppression to which China is subjected. Therefore, at such times, the proletariat should form a united front with the national bourgeoisie and maintain it as far as possible. (2) In other historical circumstances, the Chinese national bourgeoisie will vacillate and defect because of its economic and political flabbiness. Therefore the composition of China's revolutionary united front will not remain constant at all times, but is liable to change. At one time the national bourgeoisie may take part in it, at another it may not. (3) The Chinese big bourgeoisie, which is comprador in character, is a class which directly serves imperialism and is fostered by it. Hence the comprador Chinese big bourgeoisie has always been a target of the revolution. However, different groups within this big bourgeoisie are backed by different imperialist powers, so that when contradictions among these powers become sharper and when the edge of the revolution is mainly directed against a particular power, the big bourgeois groups dependent upon the other powers may join the struggle against that particular imperialist power to a certain extent and for a certain time. At such times, in order to weaken the enemy and add to its own reserves, the Chinese proletariat may form a united front with these groups and should maintain it as far as possible, provided it is advantageous to the revolution. (4) The comprador big bourgeoisie continues to be most reactionary even when it joins the united front alongside the proletariat in struggling against the common enemy. It stubbornly opposes any ideological, political and organizational development of the proletariat and the proletarian party, tries to impose restrictions on them and employs disruptive tactics such as deception, blandishments, "corrosion" and savage attacks against them; moreover, it does all this to prepare for capitulating to the enemy and splitting the united front. (5) The peasantry is the firm ally of the proletariat. (6) The urban petty bourgeoisie is a reliable ally.

The validity of these laws was confirmed during the First Great Revolution and the Agrarian Revolution, and it is being confirmed again in the present War of Resistance. Therefore, in forming a united front with the bourgeoisie (and especially with the big bourgeoisie), the party of the proletariat must carry on a stern and resolute struggle on two fronts. On the one hand, it is necessary to combat the error of neglecting the possibility that the bourgeoisie may join in the revolutionary struggle at certain times and to a certain extent. It is an error of "Left" closed-doorism to regard the bourgeoisie in China as being the same as in the capitalist countries, and consequently to neglect the policy of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie and maintaining it for as long as possible. On the other hand, it is also necessary to combat the error of identifying the programme, policy, ideology, practice, etc. of the proletariat with those of the bourgeoisie, and neglecting the differences in principle between them. The error here consists in neglecting the fact that the bourgeoisie (and especially the big bourgeoisie) not only exerts an influence on the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, but does its utmost to influence the proletariat and the Communist Party in a strenuous effort to destroy their ideological, political and organizational independence, turn them into an appendage of the bourgeoisie and its political party, and ensure that it will reap the fruits of the revolution for itself or its political party alone; this error also consists in neglecting the fact that the bourgeoisie (and especially the big bourgeoisie) betrays the revolution whenever the revolution conflicts with its own selfish interests or with those of its own political party. To neglect all this is Right opportunism. The characteristic feature of Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism was that it led the proletariat to accommodate itself to the selfish interests of the bourgeoisie and its political party, and this was the subjective cause of the failure of the First Great Revolution. The dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic revolution exerts a great effect on our political line and our Party building, and without grasping this dual character we cannot have a good grasp of our political line or of Party building. One important component of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party is the policy both of unity with the bourgeoisie and of struggle against it. In fact, the development and tempering of the Party through its unity and struggle with the bourgeoisie are an important component of Party building. Unity here means the united front with the bourgeoisie. Struggle here means the "peaceful" and "bloodless" struggle, ideological, political and organizational, which goes on when we are united with the bourgeoisie and which turns into armed struggle when we are forced to break with it. If our Party does not understand that it must unite with the bourgeoisie in certain periods, it cannot advance and the revolution cannot develop; if our Party does not understand that it must wage a stern and resolute "peaceful" struggle against the bourgeoisie while uniting with it, then our Party will disintegrate ideologically, politically and organizationally and the revolution will fail; and if our Party does not wage a stern and resolute armed struggle against the bourgeoisie when forced to break with it, our Party will likewise disintegrate and the revolution will likewise fail. The truth of all this has been confirmed by the events of the past eighteen years.

Armed struggle by the Chinese Communist Party takes the form of peasant war under proletarian leadership. The history of this armed struggle, too, falls into three stages. The first was the stage in which we took part in the Northern Expedition. Our Party had already begun to realize the importance of armed struggle, but did not understand it fully, it did not understand that armed struggle was the principal form of struggle in the Chinese revolution. The second stage was the War of the Agrarian Revolution. By that time our Party had already built up its own independent armed forces, learned the art of fighting independently, and established people's political power and base areas. Our Party was already able to achieve direct or indirect co-ordination of armed struggle, the principal form of struggle, with many other necessary forms, that is, to co-ordinate it on a national scale with the workers' struggle, the peasants' struggle (which was the main thing), the struggle of the youth, the women and all other sections of the people, the struggle for political power, the struggles on the economic, the anti-espionage and the ideological fronts, and other forms of struggle. And this armed struggle was the peasant agrarian revolution under the leadership of the proletariat. The third stage is the present stage, the War of Resistance. In this stage we are able to turn to good account our experience of armed struggle in the first and especially the second stage, and our experience of co-ordinating armed struggle with all other necessary forms of struggle. In general, armed struggle at the present time means guerrilla warfare.[2] What is guerrilla warfare? It is the indispensable and therefore the best form of struggle for the people's armed forces to employ over a long period in a backward country, a large semi-colonial country, in order to inflict defeats on the armed enemy and build up their own bases. So far both our political line and our Party building have been closely linked with this form of struggle. It is impossible to have a good understanding of our political line and, consequently, of our Party building in isolation from armed struggle, from guerrilla warfare. Armed struggle is an important component of our political line. For eighteen years our Party has gradually learned to wage armed struggle and has persisted in it. We have learned that without armed struggle neither the proletariat, nor the people, nor the Communist Party would have any standing at all in China and that it would be impossible for the revolution to triumph. In these years the development, consolidation and bolshevization of our Party have proceeded in the midst of revolutionary wars; without armed struggle the Communist Party would assuredly not be what it is today. Comrades throughout the Party must never forget this experience for which we have paid in blood.

Similarly, there have been three distinct stages in the building up of the Party, its development, consolidation and bolshevization.

> The first stage was the Party's infancy. In the early and middle phases of this stage the Party's line was correct and the revolutionary zeal both of the rank and file and of the cadres was exceedingly high; hence the victories in the First Great Revolution. But after all, ours was then still an infant Party, it lacked experience concerning the three basic problems of the united front, armed struggle and Party building, it did not have much knowledge of Chinese history and Chinese society or of the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution, and it lacked a comprehensive understanding of the unity between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution. Hence in the last phase of this stage, or at the critical juncture of this stage, those occupying a dominant position in the Party's leading body failed to lead the Party in consolidating the victories of the revolution and, as a result, they were deceived by the bourgeoisie and brought the revolution to defeat. The Party organizations expanded in this stage but they were not consolidated, and they failed to help Party members and cadres become firm and stable ideologically and politically. There were plenty of new members but they were not given the necessary Marxist-Leninist education. There was also abundant experience in work, but it was not summed up properly. Many careerists sneaked into the Party, but they were not combed out. The Party was caught in a maze of schemes and intrigues both of enemies and of allies, but it lacked vigilance. Within the Party, activists came forward in great numbers, but they were not turned into the mainstay of the Party in good time. The Party had some revolutionary armed units under its command but it was unable to keep a tight grip on them. The reasons for all

this were inexperience, insufficient depth of revolutionary under standing, and ineptitude in integrating the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution. Such was the first stage of Party building.

The second stage was the War of the Agrarian Revolution. Our Party was able to wage a successful agrarian revolutionary struggle for ten years because of the experience it had gained in the first stage, because of its better understanding of Chinese history and society and of the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution, and because its cadres had a better grasp of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and were better able to integrate it with the practice of the Chinese revolution. Although the bourgeoisie had turned traitor, our Party was able to rely firmly on the peasantry. The Party organization not only grew afresh but also became consolidated. Day in day out the enemy tried to sabotage our Party, but the Party drove out the saboteurs. Once again large numbers of cadres came forward in the Party, and this time they became its mainstay. The Party blazed the trail of people's political power and thus learned the art of government. The Party created strong armed forces and thus learned the art of war. These were momentous advances and achievements. Nevertheless, in the course of these great struggles some of our comrades sank into the quagmire of opportunism, or did so at least for a time, and again the reasons were that they did not learn modestly from the experience of the past, did not acquire an understanding of Chinese history and society and of the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution, and did not have an understanding of the unity between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution. Hence throughout this stage certain people who held leading positions in the Party failed to adhere to correct political and organizational lines. At one time the Party and the revolution were damaged by Comrade Li Li-san's "Left" opportunism, at another by "Left" opportunism in the revolutionary war and in the work in the White areas. Not until the Tsunyi Meeting (the meeting of the Political Bureau at Tsunyi, Kweichow, in January 1935) did the Party definitively take the road of bolshevization and lay the foundations for its subsequent victory over Chang Kuo-tao's Right opportunism and for the establishment of an anti-Japanese national united front. This was the second stage in the Party's development.

The third stage is that of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. We have been in this stage for three years now and these years of struggle are extremely important. Drawing on its experience in the two preceding revolutionary stages, on its organizational strength and the strength of its armed forces, on its high political prestige among the people of the whole country, and on its deeper understanding of the unity between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution, our Party has not only established the Anti-Japanese National United Front but has also been conducting the great War of Resistance Against Japan. Organizationally, it has stepped out of its narrow confines and become a major national party. Its armed forces are again growing and are becoming still stronger in the struggle against the Japanese aggressors. Its influence among the whole people is becoming more extensive. These are all great achievements. However, many of our new Party members have not yet been given education, many of the new organizations have not yet been consolidated, and there is still a vast difference between them and the older members and organizations. Many of the new Party members and cadres have not yet had sufficient revolutionary experience. They still know little or nothing about Chinese history and society or about the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution. Their understanding of the unity between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution is far from being comprehensive. During the expansion of the Party's organizations, a good many careerists and enemy saboteurs did succeed in sneaking in despite the fact that the Central Committee stressed the slogan "Expand the Party boldly, but do not let a single undesirable in". Although the united front was formed and has been maintained for three years now, the bourgeoisie, and especially the big bourgeoisie, has constantly been trying to destroy our Party, the big bourgeois capitulators and die-hards have been instigating serious friction throughout the country, and the anti-Communist clamour is incessant. All this is being used by the big bourgeois capitulators and die-hards to prepare the way for capitulating to Japanese imperialism, breaking up the united front and dragging China backwards. Ideologically, the big bourgeoisie is trying to "corrode" communism, whilst politically and organizationally it is trying to liquidate the Com-

> munist Party, the Border Region and the Party's armed forces. In these circumstances it is undoubtedly our task to overcome the dangers of capitulation, a split and retrogression, to maintain the national united front and Kuomintang-Communist co-operation as far as possible, to work for continued resistance to Japan and continued unity and progress, and at the same time to prepare against all possible eventualities so that in case they occur, the Party and the revolution will not suffer unexpected losses. To this end, we must strengthen the Party's organization and its armed forces, and mobilize the whole people for resolute struggle against capitulation, a split and retrogression. The accomplishment of this task depends upon the efforts of the whole Party, upon the unrelenting and persistent struggle of all Party members, cadres and organizations everywhere and at every level. We are confident that the Chinese Communist Party with its eighteen years of experience will be able to achieve these objectives by the joint efforts of its experienced older members and cadres and its vigorous and youthful newer members and cadres, by the joint efforts of its well-tried bolshevized Central Committee and its local organizations, and by the joint efforts of its powerful armed forces and the progressive masses.

We have set out the principal experiences and principal problems of our Party in its eighteen years of history.

Our eighteen years of experience show that the united front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle. And the Party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy's positions. That is how the three are related to each other.

How are we to build up our Party today? How can we build up "a bolshevized Chinese Communist Party, a party which is national in scale and has a broad mass character, a party which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally"? The answer can be found by studying the Party's history, by studying Party building in connection with the united front and armed struggle, in connection with the problem of both uniting and struggling with the bourgeoisie, and with that of persistence in guerrilla warfare against Japan by the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies and the establishment of anti-Japanese base areas.

To sum up our eighteen years of experience and our current new experience on the basis of our understanding of the unity between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution, and to spread this experience throughout the Party, so that our Party becomes as solid as steel and avoids repeating past mistakes — such is our task.

NOTES

[1] J. V. Stalin, "The Prospects of the Revolution in China", *Works*, Eng. ed. FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. VIII, p. 379.

[2] In saying that in general, armed struggle in the Chinese revolution means guerrilla warfare, Comrade Mao Tse-tung is summing up China's experience of revolutionary war from the Second Revolutionary Civil War to the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan. During the long period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War, all the armed struggles led by the Chinese Communist Party took the form of guerrilla warfare. In the latter phase of that period, as the strength of the Red Army grew, guerrilla warfare changed into mobile warfare of a guerrilla character which, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung defines it, is guerrilla warfare on a higher level. But in the War of Resistance Against Japan, with a different enemy and in different circumstances, there was a shift back to guerrilla warfare. In the early days of the anti-Japanese war, those Party comrades who committed the error of Right opportunism belittled the guerrilla warfare led by the Party and pinned their hopes on the operations of the Kuomintang army. Comrade Mao Tse-tung refuted their views in his "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan", "On Protracted War" and "Problems of War and Strategy", and in the present article he gave a theoretical summing-up of the experience gained in waging the prolonged armed struggle of the Chinese revolution which took the form of guerrilla warfare. In the latter stage of the anti-Japanese war, and more particularly in the period of the Third Revolutionary Civil War (1945-49), guerrilla warfare changed into regular warfare as the main form of armed struggle under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and this was due to the further growth of the revolutionary forces and the changes in the enemy's circumstances. The latter stage of the Third Revolutionary Civil War witnessed a further development, when operations were conducted by huge formations, which, equipped with heavy arms, were able to storm strongly fortified enemy positions.

THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE PARTY'S TASKS

October 10, 1939

1. The outbreak of the imperialist world war is the result of the attempt of the imperialist countries to extricate themselves from a new economic and political crisis. Whether on the German side or the Anglo-French, the war is unjust, predatory and imperialist in character. The Communist Parties throughout the world must firmly oppose this war and also the criminal action of the social-democratic parties in betraying the proletariat by supporting it. The socialist Soviet Union is persevering as before in its policy of peace, is maintaining strict neutrality towards both belligerents and, by sending its armed forces into Poland, has checked the eastward expansion of the German forces of aggression, strengthened peace in Eastern Europe, and liberated its brother nations in western Ukraine and Byelorussia from the oppression of the Polish rulers. The Soviet Union has concluded a number of pacts with neighbouring countries to prevent any possible attacks by the forces of international reaction and is endeavouring to restore world peace.

2. The policy of Japanese imperialism in this new international situation is to concentrate its attacks on China in order to settle the China question, in preparation for extending its international adventures in the future. The policy by which it is attempting to settle the China question is as follows:

> (a) With regard to the occupied areas, its policy is to tighten its hold on them in preparation for subjugating the whole of China. To do this it has to "mop up" the anti-Japanese guerrilla base areas, exploit economic resources, set up puppet regimes and break the people's national spirit.

This was a decision drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

(b) With regard to China's rear areas, its policy is to launch mainly political offensives, supplemented by military offensives. Political offensives mean concentration not on launching large-scale military attacks but on disrupting the anti-Japanese united front, breaking up Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and inducing the Kuomintang government to capitulate.

In the present period the enemy is not likely to launch big strategic offensives like the one against Wuhan, because of the blows dealt by China's heroic resistance during the past two years and of the inadequacy of his armed strength and financial resources. In this sense, basically the War of Resistance has reached the stage of strategic stalemate. And the stage of strategic stalemate is the stage of preparation for our counter-offensive. But first, when we say that basically a stalemate has been reached, we do not rule out the possibility of further offensive campaigns by the enemy; Changsha is now being attacked and other places may be attacked later. Second, as the possibility of a stalemate at the front grows, the enemy will intensify his "mopping-up" operations against our guerrilla base areas. Third, if China should fail to disrupt the enemy's occupation of the areas he has seized and allow him to succeed in his attempts to tighten his hold on them and exploit them, if China should fail to repulse the enemy's political offensives and to persist in resistance, unity and progress and thus fail to accumulate strength for the counter-offensive, or if the Kuomintang government should capitulate of its own accord, then the enemy may still launch bigger offensives. In other words, the stalemate that has now been reached may still be broken by the enemy or by the capitulators.

3. The danger of capitulation, a split and retrogression within the anti-Japanese united front is still the greatest current danger, and the present anti-Communist and retrogressive actions of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie continue to be preparatory steps to their capitulation. In order to build up strength for the counter-offensive, it is still our task, in co-operation with all Chinese patriots, to mobilize the masses for the effective application of the three great political slogans put forward in our Party's Manifesto of July 7: "Persist in resistance and oppose capitulation", "Persist in unity and oppose a split", and "Persist in progress and oppose retrogression". To achieve this objective, behind the enemy lines it is imperative to keep up guerrilla warfare, defeat the enemy's "mopping-up" opera-

tions, disrupt the enemy's occupation of the areas he has seized, and introduce radical political and economic changes beneficial to the masses who are resisting Japan. At the front, it is imperative to sustain military defence and repel any offensive campaigns the enemy may launch. In China's rear area, it is imperative to introduce speedy and genuine political reforms, end the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship, convene a national assembly truly representative of the people's will and invested with real power, draw up and adopt a constitution, and put constitutional government into practice. Any vacillation or procrastination, any contrary policy, is absolutely wrong. At the same time the leading bodies of our Party at all levels and all Party members must exercise more vigilance in the present situation and do their utmost to achieve the ideological, political and organizational consolidation of our Party and of the armed forces and organs of political power under its leadership, in order to be ready for any emergency endangering the Chinese revolution and to prevent unexpected losses to the Party and the revolution.

RECRUIT LARGE NUMBERS OF INTELLECTUALS[1]

December 1, 1939

1. In the long and ruthless war of national liberation, in the great struggle to build a new China, the Communist Party must be good at winning intellectuals, for only in this way will it be able to organize great strength for the War of Resistance, organize the millions of peasants, develop the revolutionary cultural movement and expand the revolutionary united front. Without the participation of the intellectuals victory in the revolution is impossible.

2. Our Party and our army have made considerable efforts to recruit intellectuals during the last three years, and many revolutionary intellectuals have been absorbed into the Party, the army, the organs of government, the cultural movement and the mass movement, thus broadening the united front, this is a major achievement. But many of the army cadres are not yet alive to the importance of the intellectuals, they still regard them with some apprehension and are even inclined to discriminate against them or shut them out. Many of our training institutes are still hesitant about enrolling young students in large numbers. Many of our local Party branches are still reluctant to let intellectuals join. All this is due to failure to understand the importance of the intellectuals for the revolutionary cause, the difference between intellectuals in colonial and semi-colonial countries and those in capitalist countries and the difference between intellectuals who serve the landlords and the bourgeoisie and those who serve the working class and the peasantry, as well as the seriousness of the situation in which the bourgeois political parties are desperately contending with us for the intellectuals and in which the Japanese imperialists are also trying in every possible way to buy over Chinese

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This was a decision drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

intellectuals or corrupt their minds; in particular, it is due to the failure to understand the favourable factor that our Party and our army have already developed a hard core of well-tested cadres and are thus capable of leading the intellectuals.

3. From now on attention should therefore be paid to the following:

(a) All Party organizations in the war areas and all army units led by the Party should recruit large numbers of intellectuals into our army, training institutes and organs of government. We should use various ways and means to recruit all intellectuals who are willing to fight Japan and who are fairly loyal, hard-working and able to endure hardship; we should give them political education and help them to temper themselves in war and work and to serve the army, the government and the masses; and, taking each case on its merits, we should admit into the Party those who measure up to the requirements of Party membership. As for those who do not qualify or do not wish to join the Party, we should have good working relations with them and give them guidance in their work with us.

(b) In applying the policy of recruiting intellectuals in large numbers, we must undoubtedly take great care to prevent the infiltration of those elements sent in by the enemy and the bourgeois political parties and to keep out other disloyal elements. We must be very strict about keeping out such elements. Those who have already sneaked into our Party, army or government organs must be firmly but discriminatingly combed out on the basis of conclusive evidence. But we must not on that account suspect reasonably loyal intellectuals, and we must be strictly on guard against the false accusation of innocent people by counter-revolutionaries.

(c) We should assign appropriate work to all intellectuals who are reasonably loyal and useful, and we should earnestly give them political education and guidance so that in the long course of the struggle they gradually overcome their weaknesses, revolutionize their outlook, identify themselves with the masses, and merge with the older Party members and cadres and the worker and peasant members of the Party.

(d) The necessity of admitting intellectuals into our work should be brought home to those cadres, and especially to certain cadres in the main forces of our army, who are opposed to their admission. At the same time, we should work effectively to encourage worker and peasant cadres to study hard and raise their cultural level. Thus worker and peasant cadres will at the same time become intellectuals, while the intellectuals will at the same time become workers and peasants.

(e) In the main the principles stated above are also applicable in the Kuomintang areas and in the Japanese-occupied areas, except that, on admitting intellectuals into the Party, more attention must be paid to their degree of loyalty, so as to ensure still tighter Party organization in those areas. We should maintain suitable contact with the huge numbers of non-Party intellectuals who sympathize with us and organize them in the great struggle for resistance to Japan and for democracy, and in the cultural movement and the work of the united front.

4. All our Party comrades must understand that a correct policy towards the intellectuals is an important prerequisite for victory in the revolution. There must be no repetition of the incorrect attitude towards intellectuals which Party organizations in many localities and army units adopted during the Agrarian Revolution; the proletariat cannot produce intellectuals of its own without the help of the existing intellectuals. The Central Committee hopes that the Party committees at all levels and all Party comrades will give this matter their serious attention.

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[1] The term "intellectuals" refers to all those who have had middle school or higher education and those with similar educational levels. They include university and middle school teachers and staff members, university and middle school students, primary school teachers, professionals, engineers and technicians, among whom the university and middle school students occupy an important position.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

December 1939

CHAPTER I

CHINESE SOCIETY

1. THE CHINESE NATION

China is one of the largest countries in the world, her territory being about the size of the whole of Europe. In this vast country of ours there are large areas of fertile land which provide us with food and clothing; mountain ranges across its length and breadth with extensive forests and rich mineral deposits; many rivers and lakes which provide us with water transport and irrigation; and a long coastline which facilitates communication with nations beyond the seas. From ancient times our forefathers have laboured, lived and multiplied on this vast territory.

China borders on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the northeast, the northwest and part of the west; the Mongolian People's Republic in the north; Afghanistan, India, Bhutan and Nepal in the southwest and part of the west; Burma and Indo-China in the south;

The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party is a textbook which was written jointly by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and several other comrades in Yenan in the winter of 1939. The first chapter, "Chinese Society", was drafted by other comrades and revised by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The second chapter, "The Chinese Revolution", was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung himself. Another chapter, scheduled to deal with "Party Building", was left unfinished by the comrades working on it. The two published chapters, and especially Chapter II, have played a great educational role in the Chinese Communist Party and among the Chinese people. The views on New Democracy set out by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in Chapter II were considerably developed in his "On New Democracy", written in January 1940.

and Korea in the east, where she is also a close neighbour of Japan and the Philippines. China's geographical setting has its advantages and disadvantages for the Chinese people's revolution. It is an advantage to be adjacent to the Soviet Union and fairly distant from the major imperialist countries in Europe and America, and to have many colonial or semi-colonial countries around us. It is a disadvantage that Japanese imperialism, making use of its geographical proximity, is constantly threatening the very existence of all China's nationalities and the Chinese people's revolution.

China has a population of 450 million, or almost a quarter of the world total. Over nine-tenths of her inhabitants belong to the Han nationality. There are also scores of minority nationalities, including the Mongol, Hui, Tibetan, Uighur, Miao, Yi, Chuang, Chungchia and Korean nationalities, all with long histories though at different levels of cultural development. Thus China is a country with a very large population composed of many nationalities.

Developing along the same lines as many other nations of the world, the Chinese people (here we refer mainly to the Hans) went through many thousands of years of life in classless primitive communes. Some 4,000 years have gone by since the collapse of these primitive communes and the transition to class society, which took the form first of slave and then of feudal society. Throughout the history of Chinese civilization its agriculture and handicrafts have been renowned for their high level of development; there have been many great thinkers, scientists, inventors, statesmen, soldiers, men of letters and artists, and we have a rich store of classical works. The compass was invented in China very long ago.[1] The art of paper-making was discovered as early as 1,800 years ago.[2] Block-printing was invented 1,300 years ago,[3] and movable type 800 years ago.[4] The use of gunpowder was known to the Chinese before the Europeans.[5] Thus China has one of the oldest civilizations in the world; she has a recorded history of nearly 4,000 years.

The Chinese nation is known throughout the world not only for its industriousness and stamina, but also for its ardent love of freedom and its rich revolutionary traditions. The history of the Han people, for instance, demonstrates that the Chinese never submit to tyrannical rule but invariably use revolutionary means to overthrow or change it. In the thousands of years of Han history, there have been hundreds of peasant uprisings, great and small, against the dark rule of the landlords and the nobility. And most dynastic changes came about as a result of such peasant uprisings. All the nationalities of China have resisted foreign oppression and have invariably resorted to rebellion to shake it off. They favour a union on the basis of equality but are against the oppression of one nationality by another. During the thousands of years of recorded history, the Chinese nation has given birth to many national heroes and revolutionary leaders. Thus the Chinese nation has a glorious revolutionary tradition and a splendid historical heritage.

2. THE OLD FEUDAL SOCIETY

Although China is a great nation and although she is a vast country with an immense population, a long history, a rich revolutionary tradition and a splendid historical heritage, her economic, political and cultural development was sluggish for a long time after the transition from slave to feudal society. This feudal society, beginning with the Chou and Chin Dynasties, lasted about 3,000 years.

The main features of the economic and political system of China's feudal era were as follows:

(1) A self-sufficient natural economy predominated. The peasants produced for themselves not only agricultural products but most of the handicraft articles they needed. What the landlords and the nobility exacted from them in the form of land rent was also chiefly for private enjoyment and not for exchange. Although exchange developed as time went on, it did not play a decisive role in the economy as a whole.

(2) The feudal ruling class composed of landlords, the nobility and the emperor owned most of the land, while the peasants had very little or none at all. The peasants tilled the land of the landlords, the nobility and the royal family with their own farm implements and had to turn over to them for their private enjoyment 40, 50, 60, 70, or even 80 per cent or more of the crop. In effect the peasants were still serfs.

(3) Not only did the landlords, the nobility and the royal family live on rent extorted from the peasants, but the landlord state also exacted tribute, taxes and *corvée* services from them to support a horde of government officials and an army which was used mainly for their repression.

(4) The feudal landlord state was the organ of power protecting this system of feudal exploitation. While the feudal state was torn apart into rival principalities in the period before the Chin Dynasty,

it became autocratic and centralized after the first Chin emperor unified China, though some feudal separatism remained. The emperor reigned supreme in the feudal state, appointing officials in charge of the armed forces, the law courts, the treasury and state granaries in all parts of the country and relying on the landed gentry as the mainstay of the entire system of feudal rule.

It was under such feudal economic exploitation and political oppression that the Chinese peasants lived like slaves, in poverty and suffering, through the ages. Under the bondage of feudalism they had no freedom of person. The landlord had the right to beat, abuse or even kill them at will, and they had no political rights whatsoever. The extreme poverty and backwardness of the peasants resulting from ruthless landlord exploitation and oppression is the basic reason why Chinese society remained at the same stage of socio-economic development for several thousand years.

The principal contradiction in feudal society was between the peasantry and the landlord class.

The peasants and the handicraft workers were the basic classes which created the wealth and culture of this society.

The ruthless economic exploitation and political oppression of the Chinese peasants forced them into numerous uprisings against landlord rule. There were hundreds of uprisings, great and small, all of them peasant revolts or peasant revolutionary wars — from the uprisings of Chen Sheng, Wu Kuang, Hsiang Yu and Liu Pang[6] in the Chin Dynasty, those of Hsinshih, Pinglin, the Red Eyebrows, the Bronze Horses[7] and the Yellow Turbans[8] in the Han Dynasty, those of Li Mi and Tou Chien-teh[9] in the Sui Dynasty, those of Wang Hsien-chih and Huang Chao[10] in the Tang Dynasty, those of Sung Chiang and Fang La[11] in the Sung Dynasty, that of Chu Yuan-chang[12] in the Yuan Dynasty, and that of Li Tzu-cheng[13] in the Ming Dynasty, down to the uprising known as the War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in the Ching Dynasty. The scale of peasant uprisings and peasant wars in Chinese history has no parallel anywhere else. The class struggles of the peasants, the peasant uprisings and peasant wars constituted the real motive force of historical development in Chinese feudal society. For each of the major peasant uprisings and wars dealt a blow to the feudal regime of the time, and hence more or less furthered the growth of the social productive forces. However, since neither new productive forces, nor new relations of production, nor new class forces, nor any advanced political party existed in those days, the peasant uprisings and wars did not have correct leadership such as the proletariat and the Communist Party provide today; every peasant revolution failed, and the peasantry was invariably used by the landlords and the nobility, either during or after the revolution, as a lever for bringing about dynastic change. Therefore, although some social progress was made after each great peasant revolutionary struggle, the feudal economic relations and political system remained basically unchanged.

It is only in the last hundred years that a change of a different order has taken place.

3. PRESENT-DAY COLONIAL, SEMI-COLONIAL AND SEMI-FEUDAL SOCIETY

As explained above, Chinese society remained feudal for 3,000 years. But is it still completely feudal today? No, China has changed. After the Opium War of 1840 China gradually changed into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. Since the Incident of September 18, 1931, when the Japanese imperialists started their armed aggression, China has changed further into a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. We shall now describe the course of this change.

As discussed in Section 2, Chinese feudal society lasted for about 3,000 years. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century, with the penetration of foreign capitalism, that great changes took place in Chinese society.

As China's feudal society had developed a commodity economy, and so carried within itself the seeds of capitalism, China would of herself have developed slowly into a capitalist society even without the impact of foreign capitalism. Penetration by foreign capitalism accelerated this process. Foreign capitalism played an important part in the disintegration of China's social economy; on the one hand, it undermined the foundations of her self-sufficient natural economy and wrecked the handicraft industries both in the cities and in the peasants' homes, and on the other, it hastened the growth of a commodity economy in town and country.

Apart from its disintegrating effects on the foundations of China's feudal economy, this state of affairs gave rise to certain objective conditions and possibilities for the development of capitalist production in China. For the destruction of the natural economy created a commodity market for capitalism, while the bankruptcy of large numbers of peasants and handicraftsmen provided it with a home market.

In fact, some merchants, landlords and bureaucrats began investing in modern industry as far back as sixty years ago, in the latter part of the 19th century, under the stimulus of foreign capitalism and because of certain cracks in the feudal economic structure. About forty years ago, at the turn of the century, China's national capitalism took its first steps forward. Then about twenty years ago, during the first imperialist world war, China's national industry expanded, chiefly in textiles and flour milling, because the imperialist countries in Europe and America were preoccupied with the war and temporarily relaxed their oppression of China.

The history of the emergence and development of national capitalism is at the same time the history of the emergence and development of the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat. Just as a section of the merchants, landlords and bureaucrats were precursors of the Chinese bourgeoisie, so a section of the peasants and handicraft workers were the precursors of the Chinese proletariat. As distinct social classes, the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat are new-born and never existed before in Chinese history. They have evolved into new social classes from the womb of feudal society. They are twins born of China's old (feudal) society, at once linked to each other and antagonistic to each other. However, the Chinese proletariat emerged and grew simultaneously not only with the Chinese national bourgeoisie but also with the enterprises directly operated by the imperialists in China. Hence, a very large section of the Chinese proletariat is older and more experienced than the Chinese bourgeoisie, and is therefore a greater and more broadly based social force.

However, the emergence and development of capitalism is only one aspect of the change that has taken place since the imperialist penetration of China. There is another concomitant and obstructive aspect, namely, the collusion of imperialism with the Chinese feudal forces to arrest the development of Chinese capitalism.

It is certainly not the purpose the imperialist powers invading China to transform feudal China into capitalist China. On the contrary, their purpose is to transform China into their own semi-colony or colony.

To this end the imperialist powers have used and continue to use military, political, economic and cultural means of oppression, so that China has gradually become a semi-colony and colony. They are as follows:

(1) The imperialist powers have waged many wars of aggression against China, for instance, the Opium War launched by Britain in 1840, the war launched by the Anglo-French allied forces in 1857,[14] the Sino-French War of 1884,[15] the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, and the war launched by the allied forces of the eight powers in 1900.[16] After defeating China in war, they not only occupied many neighbouring countries formerly under her protection, but seized or "leased" parts of her territory. For instance, Japan occupied Taiwan and the Penghu Islands and "leased" the port of Lushun, Britain seized Hongkong and France "leased" Kwangchowwan. In addition to annexing territory, they exacted huge indemnities. Thus heavy blows were struck at China's huge feudal empire.

(2) The imperialist powers have forced China to sign numerous unequal treaties by which they have acquired the right to station land and sea forces and exercise consular jurisdiction in China,[17] and they have carved up the whole country into imperialist spheres of influence.[18]

(3) The imperialist powers have gained control of all the important trading ports in China by these unequal treaties and have marked off areas in many of these ports as concessions under their direct administration.[19] They have also gained control of China's customs foreign trade and communications (sea, land, inland water and air). Thus they have been able to dump their goods in China, turn her into a market for their industrial products, and at the same time subordinate her agriculture to their imperialist needs.

(4) The imperialist powers operate many enterprises in both light and heavy industry in China in order to utilize her raw materials and cheap labour on the spot, and they thereby directly exert economic pressure on China's national industry and obstruct the development of her productive forces.

(5) The imperialist powers monopolize China's banking and finance by extending loans to the Chinese government and establishing banks in China. Thus they have not only overwhelmed China's national capitalism in commodity competition, they have also secured a stranglehold on her banking and finance.

(6) The imperialist powers have established a network of comprador and merchant-usurer exploitation right across China, from the trading ports to the remote hinterland, and have created a comprador and merchant-usurer class in their service, so as to facilitate their exploitation of the masses of the Chinese peasantry and other sections of the people.

(7) The imperialist powers have made the feudal landlord class as well as the comprador class the main props of their rule in China. Imperialism "first allies itself with the ruling strata of the previous social structure, with the feudal lords and the trading and money-lending bourgeoisie, against the majority of the people. Everywhere imperialism attempts to preserve and to perpetuate all those pre-capitalist forms of exploitation (especially in the villages) which serve as the basis for the existence of its reactionary allies".[20] "Imperialism, with all its financial and military might, is the force in China that supports, inspires, fosters and preserves the feudal survivals, together with their entire bureaucratic-militarist superstructure."[21]

(8) The imperialist powers supply the reactionary government with large quantities of munitions and a host of military advisers, in order to keep the warlords fighting among themselves and to suppress the Chinese people.

(9) Furthermore, the imperialist powers have never slackened their efforts to poison the minds of the Chinese people. This is their policy of cultural aggression. And it is carried out through missionary work, through establishing hospitals and schools, publishing newspapers and inducing Chinese students to study abroad. Their aim is to train intellectuals who will serve their interests and to dupe the people.

(10) Since September 18, 1931, the large-scale invasion of Japanese imperialism has turned a big chunk of semi-colonial China into a Japanese colony.

These facts represent the other aspect of the change that has taken place since the imperialist penetration of China — the blood-stained picture of feudal China being reduced to semi-feudal, semi-colonial and colonial China.

It is thus clear that in their aggression against China the imperialist powers have on the one hand hastened the disintegration of feudal society and the growth of elements of capitalism, thereby transforming a feudal into a semi-feudal society, and on the other imposed their ruthless rule on China, reducing an independent country to a semi-colonial and colonial country.

Taking both these aspects together, we can see that China's colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society possesses the following characteristics:

(1) The foundations of the self-sufficient natural economy of feudal times have been destroyed, but the exploitation of the peasantry by the landlord class, which is the basis of the system of feudal

exploitation, not only remains intact but, linked as it is with exploitation by comprador and usurer capital, clearly dominates China's social and economic life.

(2) National capitalism has developed to a certain extent and has played a considerable part in China's political and cultural life, but it has not become the principal pattern in China's social economy; it is flabby and is mostly associated with foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism in varying degrees.

(3) The autocratic rule of the emperors and nobility has been overthrown, and in its place there have arisen first the warlord-bureaucrat rule of the landlord class and then the joint dictatorship of the landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. In the occupied areas there is the rule of Japanese imperialism and its puppets.

(4) Imperialism controls not only China's vital financial and economic arteries but also her political and military power. In the occupied areas everything is in the hands of Japanese imperialism.

(5) China's economic, political and cultural development is very uneven, because she has been under the complete or partial domination of many imperialist powers, because she has actually been in a state of disunity for a long time, and because her territory is immense.

(6) Under the twofold oppression of imperialism and feudalism, and especially as a result of the large-scale invasion of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese people, and particularly the peasants, have become more and more impoverished and have even been pauperized in large numbers, living in hunger and cold and without any political rights. The poverty and lack of freedom among the Chinese people are on a scale seldom found elsewhere.

Such are the characteristics of China's colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society.

This situation has in the main been determined by the Japanese and other imperialist forces; it is the result of the collusion of foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism.

The contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation and the contradiction between feudalism and the great masses of the people are the basic contradictions in modern Chinese society. Of course, there are others, such as the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and the contradictions within the reactionary ruling classes themselves. But the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation is the principal one. These contradictions and their intensification must inevitably result in the incessant growth of revolutionary movements. The great revolutions in modern and contemporary China have emerged and grown on the basis of these basic contradictions.

CHAPTER II

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

1. THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS

The history of China's transformation into a semi-colony and colony by imperialism in collusion with Chinese feudalism is at the same time a history of struggle by the Chinese people against imperialism and its lackeys. The Opium War, the Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese War, the Reform Movement of 1898, the Yi Ho Tuan Movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4th Movement, the May 30th Movement, the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the present War of Resistance Against Japan — all testify to the Chinese people's indomitable spirit in fighting imperialism and its lackeys.

Thanks to the Chinese people's unrelenting and heroic struggle during the last hundred years, imperialism has not been able to subjugate China, nor will it ever be able to do so.

The valiant Chinese people will certainly fight on, even though Japanese imperialism is now exerting its full strength in an all-out offensive and many landlord and big bourgeois elements, such as the overt and covert Wang Ching-weis, have already capitulated to the enemy or are preparing to do so. This heroic struggle will not cease until the Chinese people have driven Japanese imperialism out of China and achieved the complete liberation of the country.

The national revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people has a history of fully one hundred years counting from the Opium War of 1840, or of thirty years counting from the Revolution of 1911. It has not yet run its full course, nor has it yet performed its tasks with any signal success; therefore the Chinese people, and above all the Communist Party, must shoulder the responsibility of resolutely fighting on.

What are the targets of the revolution? What are its tasks? What are its motive forces? What is its character? And what are its perspectives? These are the questions we shall now deal with.

2. THE TARGETS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

From our analysis in the third section of Chapter I, we know that present-day Chinese society is a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. Only when we grasp the nature of Chinese society will we be able clearly to understand the targets, tasks, motive forces and character of the Chinese revolution and its perspectives and future transition. A clear understanding of the nature of Chinese society, that is, of Chinese conditions, is therefore the key to a clear understanding of all the problems of the revolution.

Since the nature of present-day Chinese society is colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal, what are the chief targets or enemies at this stage of the Chinese revolution?

They are imperialism and feudalism, the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the landlord class of our country. For it is these two that are the chief oppressors, the chief obstacles to the progress of Chinese society at the present stage. The two collude with each other in oppressing the Chinese people, and imperialism is the foremost and most ferocious enemy of the Chinese people, because national oppression by imperialism is the more onerous.

Since Japan's armed invasion of China, the principal enemy of the revolution has been Japanese imperialism together with all the Chinese traitors and reactionaries in league with it, whether they have capitulated openly or are preparing to do so.

The Chinese bourgeoisie, which is also a victim of imperialist oppression, once led or played a principal role in revolutionary struggles such as the Revolution of 1911, and has participated in revolutionary struggles such as the Northern Expedition and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. In the long period from 1927 to 1937, however, its upper stratum, namely, the section represented by the reactionary clique within the Kuomintang, collaborated with imperialism, formed a reactionary alliance with the landlord class, betrayed the friends who had helped it — the Communist Party, the proletariat, the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie — betrayed the Chinese revolution and brought about its defeat. At that time, therefore, the revolutionary people and the revolutionary political party (the Communist Party) could not but regard these bourgeois elements as one of the targets of the revolution. In the War of Resistance a section of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie, represented by Wang Ching-wei, has turned traitor and deserted to the enemy. Consequently, the anti-Japanese people cannot but regard these big bourgeois elements who have betrayed our national interests as one of the targets of the revolution.

It is evident, then, that the enemies of the Chinese revolution are very powerful. They include not only powerful imperialists and powerful feudal forces, but also, at times, the bourgeois reactionaries who collaborate with the imperialist and feudal forces to oppose the people. Therefore, it is wrong to underestimate the strength of the enemies of the revolutionary Chinese people.

In the face of such enemies, the Chinese revolution cannot be other than protracted and ruthless. With such powerful enemies, the revolutionary forces cannot be built up and tempered into a power capable of crushing them except over a long period of time. With enemies who so ruthlessly suppress the Chinese revolution, the revolutionary forces cannot hold their own positions, let alone capture those of the enemy, unless they steel themselves and display their tenacity to the full. It is therefore wrong to think that the forces of the Chinese revolution can be built up in the twinkling of an eye, or that China's revolutionary struggle can triumph overnight.

In the face of such enemies, the principal means or form of the Chinese revolution must be armed struggle, not peaceful struggle. For our enemies have made peaceful activity impossible for the Chinese people and have deprived them of all political freedom and democratic rights. Stalin says, "In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution."[22] This formulation is perfectly correct. Therefore, it is wrong to belittle armed struggle, revolutionary war, guerrilla war and army work.

In the face of such enemies, there arises the question of revolutionary base areas. Since China's key cities have long been occupied by the powerful imperialists and their reactionary Chinese allies, it is imperative for the revolutionary ranks to turn the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural bastions of the revolution from which to fight their vicious enemies who are using the cities for attacks on the rural districts, and in this way gradually to achieve the complete victory of the revolution through protracted fighting; it is imperative for them to do so if they do not wish to compromise with imperialism and its lackeys but are determined to fight on, and if they intend to build up and temper their forces, and avoid decisive battles with a powerful enemy while their own strength is inadequate. Such being the case, victory in the Chinese revolution can be won first in the rural areas, and this is possible because China's economic development is uneven (her economy not being a unified capitalist economy), because her territory is extensive (which gives the revolutionary forces room to manoeuvre), because the counter-revolutionary camp is disunited and full of contradictions, and because the struggle of the peasants who are the main force in the revolution is led by the Communist Party, the party of the proletariat; but on the other hand, these very circumstances make the revolution uneven and render the task of winning complete victory protracted and arduous. Clearly then the protracted revolutionary struggle in the revolutionary base areas consists mainly in peasant guerrilla warfare led by the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, it is wrong to ignore the necessity of using rural districts as revolutionary base areas, to neglect painstaking work among the peasants, and to neglect guerrilla warfare.

However, stressing armed struggle does not mean abandoning other forms of struggle; on the contrary, armed struggle cannot succeed unless co-ordinated with other forms of struggle. And stressing the work in the rural base areas does not mean abandoning our work in the cities and in the other vast rural areas which are still under the enemy's rule; on the contrary, without the work in the cities and in these other rural areas, our own rural base areas would be isolated and the revolution would suffer defeat. Moreover, the final objective of the revolution is the capture of the cities, the enemy's main bases, and this objective cannot be achieved without adequate work in the cities.

It is thus clear that the revolution cannot triumph either in the rural areas or in the cities without the destruction of the enemy's army, his chief weapon against the people. Therefore, besides annihilating the enemy's troops in battle, there is the important task of disintegrating them.

It is also clear that the Communist Party must not be impetuous and adventurist in its propaganda and organizational work in the urban and rural areas which have been occupied by the enemy and dominated by the forces of reaction and darkness for a long time, but that it must have well-selected cadres working underground, must accumulate strength and bide its time there. In leading the people in struggle against the enemy, the Party must adopt the tactics of advancing step by step slowly and surely, keeping to the principle of waging struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, and making use of such open forms of activity as are permitted by law, decree and social custom; empty clamour and reckless action can never lead to success.

3. THE TASKS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Imperialism and the feudal landlord class being the chief enemies of the Chinese revolution at this stage, what are the present tasks of the revolution?

Unquestionably, the main tasks are to strike at these two enemies, to carry out a national revolution to overthrow foreign imperialist oppression and a democratic revolution to overthrow feudal landlord oppression, the primary and foremost task being the national revolution to overthrow imperialism.

These two great tasks are interrelated. Unless imperialist rule is overthrown, the rule of the feudal landlord class cannot be terminated, because imperialism is its main support. Conversely, unless help is given to the peasants in their struggle to overthrow the feudal landlord class, it will be impossible to build powerful revolutionary contingents to overthrow imperialist rule, because the feudal landlord class is the main social base of imperialist rule in China and the peasantry is the main force in the Chinese revolution. Therefore the two fundamental tasks, the national revolution and the democratic revolution, are at once distinct and united.

In fact, the two revolutionary tasks are already linked, since the main immediate task of the national revolution is to resist the Japanese imperialist invaders and since the democratic revolution must be accomplished in order to win the war. It is wrong to regard the national revolution and the democratic revolution as two entirely different stages of the revolution.

4. THE MOTIVE FORCES OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Given the nature of Chinese society and the present targets and tasks of the Chinese revolution as analysed and defined above, what are the motive forces of the Chinese revolution?

Since Chinese society is colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal, since the targets of the revolution are mainly foreign imperialist rule and domestic feudalism, and since its tasks are to overthrow these two oppressors, which of the various classes and strata in Chinese society constitute the forces capable of fighting them? This is the question of the motive forces of the Chinese revolution at the present stage. A clear understanding of this question is indispensable to a correct solution of the problem of the basic tactics of the Chinese revolution.

What classes are there in present-day Chinese society? There are the landlord class and the bourgeoisie, the landlord class and the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie constituting the ruling classes in Chinese society. And there are the proletariat, the peasantry, and the different sections of the petty bourgeoisie other than the peasantry, all of which are still the subject classes in vast areas of China.

The attitude and the stand of these classes towards the Chinese revolution are entirely determined by their economic status in society. Thus the motive forces as well as the targets and tasks of the revolution are determined by the nature of China's socio-economic system.

Let us now analyse the different classes in Chinese society.

I. The Landlord Class

The landlord class forms the main social base for imperialist rule in China; it is a class which uses the feudal system to exploit and oppress the peasants, obstructs China's political, economic and cultural development and plays no progressive role whatsoever.

Therefore, the landlords, as a class, are a target and not a motive force of the revolution.

In the present War of Resistance a section of the big landlords, along with one section of the big bourgeoisie (the capitulationists), has surrendered to the Japanese aggressors and turned traitor, while another section of the big landlords, along with another section of the big bourgeoisie the die-hards), is increasingly wavering even though it is still in the anti-Japanese camp. But a good many of the enlightened gentry who are middle and small landlords and who have some capitalist colouration display some enthusiasm for the war, and we should unite with them in the common fight against Japan.

2. The Bourgeoisie

There is a distinction between the comprador big bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie.

The comprador big bourgeoisie is a class which directly serves the capitalists of the imperialist countries and is nurtured by them; countless ties link it closely with the feudal forces in the countryside. Therefore, it is a target of the Chinese revolution and never in the history of the revolution has it been a motive force.

However, different sections of the comprador big bourgeoisie owe allegiance to different imperialist powers, so that when the contradictions among the latter become very acute and the revolution is directed mainly against one particular imperialist power, it becomes possible for the sections of the comprador class which serve other imperialist groupings to join the current anti-imperialist front to a certain extent and for a certain period. But they will turn against the Chinese revolution the moment their masters do.

In the present war the pro-Japanese big bourgeoisie (the capitulationists) have either surrendered or are preparing to surrender. The pro-European and pro-American big bourgeoisie (the die-hards) are wavering more and more, even though they are still in the anti-Japanese camp, and they playing the double game of simultaneously resisting Japan and opposing the Communist Party. Our policy towards the big bourgeoisie capitulationists is to treat them as enemies and resolutely strike them down. Towards the big bourgeois die-hards, we employ a revolutionary dual policy; on the one hand, we unite with them because they are still anti-Japanese and we should make use of their contradictions with Japanese imperialism, but on the other hand, we firmly struggle against them because they pursue a high-handed anti-Communist, reactionary policy detrimental to resistance and unity, both of which would be jeopardized without such a struggle.

The national bourgeoisie is a class with a dual character.

On the one hand, it is oppressed by imperialism and fettered by feudalism and consequently is in contradiction with both of them. In this respect it constitutes one of the revolutionary forces. In the course of the Chinese revolution it has displayed a certain enthusiasm for fighting imperialism and the governments of bureaucrats and warlords.

But on the other hand, it lacks the courage to oppose imperialism and feudalism thoroughly because it is economically and politically flabby and still has economic ties with imperialism and feudalism. This emerges very clearly when the people's revolutionary forces grow powerful.

It follows from the dual character of the national bourgeoisie that, at certain times and to a certain extent, it can take part in the revolution against imperialism and the governments of bureaucrats and warlords and can become a revolutionary force, but that at other times there is the danger of its following the comprador big bourgeoisie and acting as its accomplice in counter-revolution.

The national bourgeoisie in China, which is mainly the middle bourgeoisie, has never really held political power but has been restricted by the reactionary policies of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie which are in power, although it followed them in opposing the revolution in the period from 1927 to 1931 (before the September 18th Incident). In the present war, it differs not only from the capitulationists of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie but also from the big bourgeois die-hards, and so far has been a fairly good ally of ours. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to have a prudent policy towards the national bourgeoisie.

3. The Different Sections of the Petty Bourgeoisie Other than the Peasantry

The petty bourgeoisie, other than the peasantry, consists of the vast numbers of intellectuals, small tradesmen, handicraftsmen and professional people.

Their status somewhat resembles that of the middle peasants, they all suffer under the oppression of imperialism, feudalism and the big bourgeoisie, and they are being driven ever nearer to bankruptcy or destitution.

Hence these sections of the petty bourgeoisie constitute one of the motive forces of the revolution and are a reliable ally of the proletariat. Only under the leadership of the proletariat can they achieve their liberation.

Let us now analyse the different sections of the petty bourgeoisie other than the peasantry.

First, the intellectuals and student youth. They do not constitute a separate class or stratum. In present-day China most of them may be placed in the petty-bourgeois category, judging by their family origin, their living conditions and their political outlook. Their numbers have grown considerably during the past few decades. Apart from that section of the intellectuals which has associated itself with the imperialists and the big bourgeoisie and works for them against the people, most intellectuals and students are oppressed by imperialism, feudalism and the big bourgeoisie, and live in fear of unemployment or of having to discontinue their studies. Therefore, they tend to be quite revolutionary. They are more or less equipped with bourgeois scientific knowledge, have a keen political sense and often play a vanguard role or serve as a link with the masses in the present stage of the revolution. The movement of the Chinese students abroad before the revolution of 1911, the May 4th Movement of 1919, the May 30th Movement of 1925 and the December 9th Movement of 1935 are striking proofs of this. In particular, the large numbers of more or less impoverished intellectuals can join hands with the workers and peasants in supporting or participating in the revolution. In China, it was among the intellectuals and young students that Marxist-Leninist ideology was first widely disseminated and accepted. The revolutionary forces cannot be successfully organized and revolutionary work cannot be successfully conducted without the participation of revolutionary intellectuals. But the intellectuals often tend to be subjective and individualistic, impractical in their thinking and irresolute in action until they have thrown themselves heart and soul into mass revolutionary struggles, or made up their minds to serve the interests of the masses and become one with them. Hence although the mass of revolutionary intellectuals in China can play a vanguard role or serve as a link with the masses, not all of them will remain revolutionaries to the end. Some will drop out of the revolutionary ranks at critical moments and become passive, while a few may even become enemies of the revolution. The intellectuals can overcome their shortcomings only in mass struggles over a long period.

Second, the small tradesmen. Generally they run small shops and employ few or no assistants. They live under the threat of bankruptcy as a result of exploitation by imperialism, the big bourgeoisie and the usurers.

Third, the handicraftsmen. They are very numerous. They possess their own means of production and hire no workers, or only one or two apprentices or helpers. Their position is similar to that of the middle peasants.

Fourth, professional people. They include doctors and men of other professions. They do not exploit other people, or do so only to a slight degree. Their position is similar to that of the handicraftsmen.

These sections of the petty bourgeoisie make up a vast multitude of people whom we must win over and whose interests we must protect because in general they can support or join the revolution and are good allies. Their weakness is that some of them are easily influenced by the bourgeoisie; consequently, we must carry on revolutionary propaganda and organizational work among them.

4. The Peasantry

The peasantry constitutes approximately 80 per cent of China's total population and is the main force in her national economy today.

A sharp process of polarization is taking place among the peasantry.

First, the rich peasants: They form about 5 per cent of the rural population (or about 10 per cent together with the landlords) and constitute the rural bourgeoisie. Most of the rich peasants in China are semi-feudal in character, since they let a part of their land, practise usury and ruthlessly exploit the farm labourers. But they generally engage in labour themselves and in this sense are part of the peasantry. The rich-peasant form of production will remain useful for a definite period. Generally speaking, they might make some contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle of the peasant masses and stay neutral in the agrarian revolutionary struggle against the landlords. Therefore we should not regard the rich peasants as belonging to the same class as the landlords and should not prematurely adopt a policy of liquidating the rich peasantry.

Second, the middle peasantry. They form about 20 per cent of China's rural population. They are economically self-supporting (they may have something to lay aside when the crops are good, and occasionally hire some labour or lend small sums of money at interest); and generally they do not exploit others but are exploited by imperialism, the landlord class and the bourgeoisie. They have no political rights. Some of them do not have enough land, and only a section (the well-to-do middle peasants) have some surplus land. Not only can the middle peasants join the anti-imperialist revolution and the Agrarian Revolution, but they can also accept socialism. Therefore the whole middle peasantry can be a reliable ally of the proletariat and is an important motive force of the revolution. The positive or negative attitude of the middle peasants is one of the factors determining victory or defeat in the revolution, and this is especially true after the agrarian revolution when they become the majority of the rural population.

Third, the poor peasants. The poor peasants in China, together with farm labourers, form about 70 per cent of the rural population. They are the broad peasant masses with no land or insufficient land, the semi-proletariat of the countryside, the biggest motive force of the Chinese revolution, the natural and most reliable ally of the proletariat and the main contingent of China's revolutionary forces. Only under the leadership of the proletariat can the poor and middle peasants achieve their liberation, and only by forming a firm alliance with the poor and middle peasants can the proletariat lead the revolution to victory. Otherwise neither is possible. The term "peasantry" refers mainly to the poor and middle peasants.

5. The Proletariat

Among the Chinese proletariat, the modern industrial workers number from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 the workers in small-scale industry and in handicrafts and the shop assistants in the cities total about 12,000,000, and in addition there are great numbers of rural proletarians (the farm labourers) and other propertyless people in the cities and the countryside.

In addition to the basic qualities it shares with the proletariat everywhere — its association with the most advanced form of economy, its strong sense of organization and discipline and its lack of private means of production — the Chinese proletariat has many other outstanding qualities.

What are they?

First, the Chinese proletariat is more resolute and thoroughgoing in revolutionary struggle than any other class because it is subjected to a threefold oppression (imperialist, bourgeois and feudal) which is marked by a severity and cruelty seldom found in other countries. Since there is no economic basis for social reformism in colonial and semi-colonial China as there is in Europe, the whole proletariat, with the exception of a few scabs, is most revolutionary.

Secondly, from the moment it appeared on the revolutionary scene, the Chinese proletariat came under the leadership of its own revolutionary party — the Communist Party of China — and became the most politically conscious class in Chinese society.

Thirdly, because the Chinese proletariat by origin is largely made up of bankrupted peasants, it has natural ties with the peasant masses which facilitates its forming a close alliance with them.

Therefore, in spite of certain unavoidable weaknesses, for instance, its smallness (as compared with the peasantry), its youth (as compared with the proletariat in the capitalist countries) and its low educational level (as compared with the bourgeoisie), the Chinese proletariat is nonetheless the basic motive force of the Chinese revolution. Unless it is led by the proletariat, the Chinese revolution cannot possibly succeed. To take an example from the past, the Revolution of 1911 miscarried because the proletariat did not consciously participate in it and the Communist Party was not yet in existence. More recently, the revolution of 1924-27 achieved great success for a time because the proletariat consciously participated and exercised leadership and the Communist Party was already in existence; it ended in defeat because the big bourgeoisie betrayed its alliance with the proletariat and abandoned the common revolutionary programme, and also because the Chinese proletariat and its political party did not yet have enough revolutionary experience. Now take the present anti-Japanese war — because the proletariat and the Communist Party are exercising leadership in the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the whole nation has been united and the great War of Resistance has been launched and is being resolutely pursued.

The Chinese proletariat should understand that although it is the class with the highest political consciousness and sense of organization, it cannot win victory by its own strength alone. In order to win, it must unite, according to varying circumstances, with all classes and strata that can take part in the revolution, and must organize a revolutionary united front. Among all the classes in Chinese society, the peasantry is a firm ally of the working class, the urban petty bourgeoisie is a reliable ally, and the national bourgeoisie is an ally in certain periods and to a certain extent. This is one of the fundamental laws established by China's modern revolutionary history.

6. The Vagrants

China's status as a colony and semi-colony has given rise to a multitude of rural and urban unemployed. Denied proper means of making a living, many of them are forced to resort to illegitimate ones, hence the robbers, gangsters, beggars and prostitutes and the numerous people who live on superstitious practices. This social stratum is unstable; while some are apt to be bought over by the reactionary forces, others may join the revolution. These people lack constructive qualities and are given to destruction rather than construction; after joining the revolution, they become a source of roving-rebel and anarchist ideology in the revolutionary ranks. Therefore, we should know how to remould them and guard against their destructiveness.

The above is our analysis of the motive forces of the Chinese revolution.

5. THE CHARACTER OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

We have now gained an understanding of the nature of Chinese society, *i.e.*, of the specific conditions in China; this understanding is the essential prerequisite for solving all China's revolutionary problems. We are also clear about the targets, the tasks and the motive forces of the Chinese revolution; these are basic issues at the present stage of the revolution and arise from the special nature of Chinese society, *i.e.*, from China's specific conditions. Understanding all this, we can now understand another basic issue of the revolution at the present stage, *i.e.*, the character of the Chinese revolution.

What, indeed, is the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage? Is it a bourgeois-democratic or a proletarian-socialist revolution? Obviously, it is not the latter but the former.

Since Chinese society is colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal, since the principal enemies of the Chinese revolution are imperialism and feudalism, since the tasks of the revolution are to overthrow these two enemies by means of a national and democratic revolution in which the bourgeoisie sometimes takes part, and since the edge of the revolution is directed against imperialism and feudalism and not against capitalism and capitalist private property in general even if the big bourgeoisie betrays the revolution and becomes its enemy — since all this is true, the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is not proletarian-socialist but bourgeois-democratic.[23]

However, in present-day China the bourgeois-democratic revolution is no longer of the old general type, which is now obsolete, but one of a new special type. We call this type the new-democratic revolution and it is developing in all other colonial and semi-colonial countries as well as in China. The new-democratic revolution is part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution, for it resolutely opposes imperialism, *i.e.*, international capitalism. Politically, it strives for the joint dictatorship of the revolutionary classes over the imperialists, traitors and reactionaries, and opposes the transformation of Chinese society into a society under bourgeois dictatorship. Economically, it aims at the nationalization of all the big enterprises and capital of the imperialists, traitors and reactionaries, and the distribution among the peasants of the land held by the landlords, while preserving private capitalist enterprise in general and not eliminating the rich-peasant economy. Thus, the new type of democratic revolution clears the way for capitalism on the one hand and creates the prerequisites for socialism on the other. The present stage of the Chinese revolution is a stage of transition between the abolition of the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society and the establishment of a socialist society, *i.e.*, it is a process of new-democratic revolution. This process, begun only after the First World War and the Russian October Revolution, started in China with the May 4th Movement of 1919. A new-democratic revolution is an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. Chinese society can advance to socialism only through such a revolution; there is no other way.

The new-democratic revolution is vastly different from the democratic revolutions of Europe and America in that it results not in a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie but in a dictatorship of the united front of all the revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat. In the present War of Resistance, the anti-Japanese democratic political power established in the base areas which are under the leadership of the Communist Party is the political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; this is neither a bourgeois nor a proletarian one-class dictatorship, but a joint dictatorship of the revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat. All who stand for resistance to Japan and for democracy are entitled to share in this political power, regardless of their party affiliation.

The new-democratic revolution also differs from a socialist revolution in that it overthrows the rule of the imperialists, traitors and reactionaries in China but does not destroy any section of capitalism which is capable of contributing to the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle.

The new-democratic revolution is basically in line with the revolution envisaged in the Three People's Principles as advocated by

Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924. In the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang issued in that year, Dr. Sun stated:

> The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. On the other hand, the Kuomintang's Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.

He added:

> Enterprises, such as banks, railways and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and administrated by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: this is the main principle of the regulation of capital.

And again in his Testament, Dr. Sun pointed out the fundamental principle for domestic and foreign policy: "We must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals." The Three People's Principles of the old democracy, which were adapted to the old international and domestic conditions, were thus reshaped into the Three People's Principles of New Democracy, which are adapted to the new international and domestic conditions. The Communist Party of China was referring to the latter kind of Three People's Principles and to no other when, in its Manifesto of September 22, 1937, it declared that "the Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization". These Three People's Principles embody Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies — alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. In the new international and domestic conditions, any kind of Three People's Principles which departs from the Three Great Policies is not revolutionary. (Here we shall not deal with the fact that, while communism and the Three People's Principles agree on the basic political programme for the democratic revolution, they differ in all other respects.)

Thus, the role of the proletariat, the peasantry and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution cannot be ignored, either in the alignment of forces for the struggle (that is, in the united front) or in the organization of state power. Anyone who tries to bypass these classes will certainly be unable to solve the problem of the destiny of the Chinese nation or indeed any of China's problems. The Chinese revolution at the present stage must strive to create a democratic republic in which the workers, the peasants and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie all occupy a definite position and play a definite role. In other words, it must be a democratic republic based on a revolutionary alliance of the workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie and all others who are against imperialism and feudalism. Only under the leadership of the proletariat can such a republic be completely realized.

6. THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Now that the basic issues — the nature of Chinese society and the targets, tasks, motive forces and character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage — have been clarified, it is easy to see its perspectives, that is, to understand the relation between the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian-socialist revolution, or between the present and future stages of the Chinese revolution.

There can be no doubt that the ultimate perspective of the Chinese revolution is not capitalism but socialism and communism, since China's bourgeois-democratic revolution at the present stage is not of the old general type but is a democratic revolution of a new special type — a new-democratic revolution — and since it is taking place in the new international environment of the Nineteen Thirties and Forties characterized by the rise of socialism and the decline of capitalism, in the period of the Second World War and the era of revolution.

However, it is not at all surprising but entirely to be expected that a capitalist economy will develop to a certain extent within Chinese society with the sweeping away of the obstacles to the development of capitalism after the victory of the revolution, since the purpose of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is to change the existing colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal state of society, *i.e.*, to strive for the completion of the new-democratic revolution. A certain degree of capitalist development will be an inevitable result of the victory of the democratic revolution in economically backward China. But that will be only one aspect of the outcome of the Chinese revolution and not the whole picture. The whole picture will show the development of socialist as well as capitalist factors. What will the socialist factors be? The increasing relative importance of the proletariat and the Communist Party among the political forces in the country; leadership by the proletariat and the Communist Party which the peasantry, intelligentsia and the urban petty bourgeoisie already accept or are likely to accept; and the state sector of the economy owned by the democratic republic, and the co-operative sector of the economy owned by the working people. All these will be socialist factors. With the addition of a favourable international environment, these factors render it highly probable that China's bourgeois-democratic revolution will ultimately avoid a capitalist future and enjoy a socialist future.

7. THE TWOFOLD TASK OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Summing up the foregoing sections of this chapter, we can see that the Chinese revolution taken as a whole involves a twofold task. That is to say, it embraces both the bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new-democratic revolution) and the proletarian-socialist revolution, *i.e.*, both the present and future stages of the revolution. The leadership in this twofold revolutionary task devolves on the Chinese Communist Party, the party of the proletariat, without whose leadership no revolution can succeed.

To complete China's bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new-democratic revolution) and to transform it into a socialist revolution when all the necessary conditions are ripe — such is the sum total of the great and glorious revolutionary task of the Chinese Communist Party. Every Party member must strive for its accomplishment and must under no circumstances give up halfway. Some immature Communists think that our task is confined to the present democratic revolution and does not include the future socialist revolution, or that the present revolution or the Agrarian Revolution is actually a socialist revolution. It must be emphatically pointed out that these views are wrong. Every Communist ought to know that, taken as a whole, the Chinese revolutionary movement led by the Communist Party embraces the two stages, *i.e.*, the democratic and the socialist revolutions, which are two essentially different revolutionary processes, and that the second process can be carried through only after the first has been completed. The democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable sequel to the democratic revolution. The ultimate aim for which all communists strive is to bring about a socialist and communist society. A clear understanding of both the differences and the interconnections between the democratic and the socialist revolutions is indispensable to correct leadership in the Chinese revolution.

Except for the Communist Party, no political party (bourgeois or petty-bourgeois) is equal to the task of leading China's two great revolutions, the democratic and the socialist revolutions, to complete fulfilment. From the very day of its birth, the Communist Party has taken this twofold task on its own shoulders and for eighteen years has fought strenuously for its accomplishment.

It is a task at once glorious and arduous. And it cannot be accomplished without a bolshevized Chinese Communist Party which is national in scale and has a broad mass character, a party fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally. Therefore every Communist has the duty of playing an active part in building up such a Communist Party.

NOTES

[1] With reference to the invention of the compass, the magnetic power of the loadstone was mentioned as early as the 3rd century B.C. by Lu Pu-wei in his *Almanac*, and at the beginning of the 1st century A.D., Wang Chung, the materialist philosopher, observed in his *Lun Heng* that the loadstone points to the south, which indicates that magnetic polarity was known by then. Works of travel written at the beginning of the 12th century show that the compass was already in general use among Chinese navigators at that time.

[2] It is recorded in ancient documents that Tsai Lun, a eunuch of the Eastern Han Dynasty (A.D. 25-220), invented paper, which he had made from bark, hemp, rags and worn-out fishing nets. In A.D. 105 (the last year of the reign of Emperor Ho Ti), Tsai Lun presented his invention to the emperor, and subsequently this method of making paper from plant fibre gradually spread in China.

[3] Block-printing was invented about A.D. 600, in the Sui Dynasty.

[4] Movable type was invented by Pi Sheng in the Sung Dynasty between 1041 and 1048.

[5] According to tradition, gunpowder was invented in China in the 9th century, and by the 11th century it was already in use for firing cannon.

[6] Chen Sheng, Wu Kuang, Hsiang Yu and Liu Pang were leaders of the first great peasant uprising in the Chin Dynasty. In 209 B.C. Chen Sheng and Wu Kuang,

who were among nine hundred conscripts on their way to take up garrison duty at a frontier post, organized a revolt in Chihsien County (now Suhsien County in Anhwei Province) against the tyranny of the Chin Dynasty. Hsiang Yu and Liu Pang were the most prominent of those who rose in response to this armed uprising all over the country. Hsiang Yu's army annihilated the main forces of Chin, and Liu Pang's troops took Chin's capital. In the ensuing struggle between Liu Pang and Hsiang Yu, Liu Pang defeated Hsiang Yu and founded the Han Dynasty.

[7] The Hsinshih, the Pinglin, the Red Eyebrows and the Bronze Horses are the names of peasant uprisings in the latter years of the Western Han Dynasty when peasant unrest was widespread. In A.D. 8, Wang Mang overthrew the reigning dynasty, ascended the throne and introduced a few reforms to stave off the peasant unrest. But the starving masses in Hsinshih (in what is now Chingshan County in Hupeh) and Pinglin (in what is now Suihsien County in Hupeh) rose in revolt. The Bronze Horses and the Red Eyebrows were the peasant forces which revolted during his reign in what are now central Hopei and central Shantung Provinces. The Red Eyebrows, the largest of the peasant forces, were so named because the soldiers painted their eyebrows red.

[8] The Yellow Turbans, a peasant force which revolted in A.D. 184, were named after their headgear.

[9] Li Mi and Tou Chien-teh were leaders of great peasant uprisings against the Sui Dynasty in Honan and Hopei respectively at the opening of the 7th century.

[10] Wang Hsien-chih organized an uprising in Shantung in A.D. 874. In the following year Huang Chao organized an uprising to support him.

[11] Sung Chiang and Pang La were famous leaders of peasant uprisings early in the 12th century; Sung Chiang was active along the borders between Shantung, Hopei, Honan and Kiangsu, while Fang La was active in Chekiang and Anhwei.

[12] In 1351, the people in many parts of the country rose in revolt against the rule of the Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty. In 1352, Chu Yuan-chang joined the rebel forces led by Kuo Tzu-hsing and became their commander upon the latter's death. In 1368, he finally succeeded in overthrowing the rule of the Mongol Dynasty, which had been tottering under the attacks of the people's forces, and founded the Ming Dynasty.

[13] Li Tzu-cheng, also called King Chuang (the Dare-All King), native of Michih, northern Shensi, was the leader of a peasant revolt which led to the overthrow of the Ming Dynasty. The revolt first started in northern Shensi in 1628. Li joined the forces led by Kao Ying-hsiang and campaigned through Honan and Anhwei and back to Shensi. After Kao's death in 1636, Li succeeded him, becoming King Chuang, and campaigned in and out of the provinces of Shensi, Szechuan, Honan and Hupeh. Finally he captured the imperial capital of Peking in 1644, whereupon the last Ming emperor committed suicide. The chief slogan he spread among the masses was "Support King Chuang, and pay no grain taxes". Another slogan of his to enforce discipline among his men ran: "Any murder means the killing of my father, any rape means the violation of my mother." Thus he won the support of the masses and his movement became the main current of the peasant revolts raging all over the country. As he, too, roamed about without ever establishing relatively consolidated base areas, he was eventually defeated by Wu San-kuei, a Ming general, who colluded with the Ching troops in a joint attack on Li.

[14] From 1856 to 1860 Britain and France jointly waged a war of aggression against China, with the United States and tsarist Russia supporting them from the side-lines. The government of the Ching Dynasty was then devoting all its energies

to suppressing the peasant revolution of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and adopted a policy of passive resistance towards the foreign aggressors. The Anglo-French forces occupied such major cities as Canton, Tientsin and Peking, plundered and burned down the Yuan Ming Yuan Palace in Peking and forced the Ching government to conclude the Treaties of Tientsin and Peking. Their main provisions included the opening of Tientsin, Newchwang, Tengchow, Taiwan, Tamsui, Chaochow, Chiungchow, Nanking. Chinkiang, Kiukiang and Hankow as treaty ports, and the granting to foreigners of special privileges for travel, missionary activities and inland navigation in China's interior. From then on, the foreign forces of aggression spread through all China's coastal provinces and penetrated deep into the hinterland.

[15] In 1882-83, the French aggressors invaded the northern part of Indo-China. In 1884-85 they extended their war of aggression to the Chinese provinces of Kwangsi, Taiwan, Fukien and Chekiang. Despite the victories gained in this war, the corrupt Ching government signed the humiliating Treaty of Tientsin.

[16] In 1900 eight imperialist powers, Britain, the United States, Germany, France, tsarist Russia, Japan, Italy and Austria, sent a joint force to attack China in their attempt to suppress the Yi Ho Tuan Movement of the Chinese people against aggression. The Chinese people resisted heroically. The allied forces of the eight powers captured Taku and occupied Tientsin and Peking. In 1901 the Ching government concluded a treaty with the eight imperialist countries; its main provisions were that China had to pay those countries the huge sum of 450 million taels of silver as war reparations and grant them the special privilege of stationing troops in Peking and in the area from Peking to Tientsin and Shanhaikuan.

[17] Consular jurisdiction was one of the special privileges provided in the unequal treaties which the imperialist powers forced on the governments of old China — beginning with the supplementary treaty to the Sino-British Treaty of Nanking, signed at Humen (the Bogue) in 1843, and with the Sino-American Treaty of Wanghia in 1844. It meant that, if a national of any country enjoying the privilege of consular jurisdiction in China became a defendant in a lawsuit, civil or criminal, he was not to be tried by a Chinese court but by the consul of his own country.

[18] Spheres of influence were different parts of China marked off at the end of the 19th century by the imperialist powers that committed aggression against China. Each of these powers marked off those areas which fell within its economic and military influence. Thus, the provinces in the lower and middle Yangtse valley were specified as the British sphere of influence; Yunnan, Kwangtung and Kwangsi as the French; Shantung as the German sphere; Fukien as the Japanese; and the three northeastern provinces (the present provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang) as the tsarist Russian sphere. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 the southern part of the three northeastern provinces came under Japanese influence.

[19] The foreign concessions were areas which the imperialist powers seized in the treaty ports after compelling the Ching government to open these ports. In these so-called concessions they enforced an imperialist system of colonial rule entirely independent of Chinese law and administration. Through those concessions, the imperialists exercised direct or indirect political and economic control over the Chinese feudal and comprador regime. During the revolution of 1924-27 the revolutionary people led by the Chinese Communist Party started a movement to abolish the concessions, and in January 1927 they took over the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. However, the imperialists retained various concessions after Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution.

[20] "The Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries" adopted by the Sixth Comintern Congress, stenographic record of the Sixth Comintern Congress, issue No. 6, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1929, p. 128.

[21] J. V. Stalin, "The Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Comintern", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. IX, p. 292.

[22] J. V. Stalin, "The Prospects of the Revolution in China", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. VIII, p. 379.

[23] See V. I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907", *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1962 Vol. XIII, pp. 219-429.

STALIN, FRIEND OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

December 20, 1939

On the Twenty-first of December, Comrade Stalin will be sixty years old. We can be sure that his birthday will evoke warm and affectionate congratulations from the hearts of all revolutionary people throughout the world who know of the occasion.

Congratulating Stalin is not a formality. Congratulating Stalin means supporting him and his cause, supporting the victory of socialism, and the way forward for mankind which he points out, it means supporting a dear friend. For the great majority of mankind today are suffering, and mankind can free itself from suffering only by the road pointed out by Stalin and with his help.

Living in a period of the bitterest suffering in our history, we Chinese people most urgently need help from others. The *Book of Odes* says, "A bird sings out to draw a friend's response." This aptly describes our present situation.

But who are our friends?

There are so-called friends, self-styled friends of the Chinese people, whom even some Chinese unthinkingly accept as friends. But such friends can only be classed with Li Lin-fu,[1] the prime minister in the Tang Dynasty who was notorious as a man with "honey on his lips and murder in his heart". They are indeed "friends" with "honey on their lips and murder in their hearts". Who are these people? They are the imperialists who profess sympathy with China.

However, there are friends of another kind, friends who have real sympathy with us and regard us as brothers. Who are they? They are the Soviet people and Stalin.

No other country has renounced its privileges in China; the Soviet Union alone has done so.

All the imperialists opposed us during our First Great Revolution; the Soviet Union alone helped us.

No government of any imperialist country has given us real help since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan; the Soviet Union alone has helped China with its aviation and supplies.

Is not the point clear enough?

Only the land of socialism, its leaders and people, and socialist thinkers, statesmen and workers can give real help to the cause of liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, and without their help our cause cannot win final victory.

Stalin is the true friend of the cause of liberation of the Chinese people. No attempt to sow dissension, no lies and calumnies, can affect the Chinese people's whole-hearted love and respect for Stalin and our genuine friendship for the Soviet Union.

NOTES

[1] Li Lin-fu (8th century) was a prime minister under Emperor Hsuan Tsung of the Tang Dynasty. Although feigning friendship, he plotted the ruin of all those who surpassed him in ability and fame or found favour in the emperor's eyes. Hence he was known to his contemporaries as a man with "honey on his lips and murder in his heart".

IN MEMORY OF NORMAN BETHUNE

December 21, 1939

Comrade Norman Bethune,[1] a member of the Communist Party of Canada, was around fifty when he was sent by the Communist Parties of Canada and the United States to China; he made light of travelling thousands of miles to help us in our War of Resistance Against Japan. He arrived in Yenan in the spring of last year, went to work in the Wutai Mountains, and to our great sorrow died a martyr at his post. What kind of spirit is this that makes a foreigner selflessly adopt the cause of the Chinese people's liberation as his own? It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, from which every Chinese Communist must learn. Leninism teaches that the world revolution can only succeed if the proletariat of the capitalist countries supports the struggle for liberation of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples and if the proletariat of the colonies and semi-colonies supports that of the proletariat of the capitalist countries.[2] Comrade Bethune put this Leninist line into practice. We Chinese Communists must also follow this line in our practice. We must unite with the proletariat of all the capitalist countries, with the proletariat of Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy and all other capitalist countries, for this is the only way to overthrow imperialism, to liberate our nation and people and to liberate the other nations and peoples of the world. This is our internationalism, the internationalism with which we oppose both narrow nationalism and narrow patriotism.

Comrade Bethune's spirit, his utter devotion to others without any thought of self, was shown in his great sense of responsibility in his work and his great warm-heartedness towards all comrades and the people. Every Communist must learn from him. There are not a few people who are irresponsible in their work, preferring the light and shirking the heavy, passing the burdensome tasks on to others and choosing the easy ones for themselves. At every turn they think of themselves before others. When they make some small contribution, they swell with pride and brag about it for fear that others will not know. They feel no warmth towards comrades and the people but are cold, indifferent and apathetic. In truth such people are not Communists, or at least cannot be counted as devoted Communists. No one who returned from the front failed to express admiration for Bethune whenever his name was mentioned, and none remained unmoved by his spirit. In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area, no soldier or civilian was unmoved who had been treated by Dr. Bethune or had seen how he worked. Every Communist must learn this true communist spirit from Comrade Bethune.

Comrade Bethune was a doctor, the art of healing was his profession and he was constantly perfecting his skill, which stood very high in the Eighth Route Army's medical service. His example is an excellent lesson for those people who wish to change their work the moment they see something different and for those who despise technical work as of no consequence or as promising no future.

Comrade Bethune and I met only once. Afterwards he wrote me many letters. But I was busy, and I wrote him only one letter and do not even know if he ever received it. I am deeply grieved over his death. Now we are all commemorating him, which shows how profoundly his spirit inspires everyone. We must all learn the spirit of absolute selflessness from him. With this spirit everyone can be very useful to the people. A man's ability may be great or small, but if he has this spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure, a man of moral integrity and above vulgar interests, a man who is of value to the people.

NOTES

[1] The distinguished surgeon Norman Bethune was a member of the Canadian Communist Party. In 1936 when the German and Italian fascist bandits invaded Spain, he went to the front and worked for the anti-fascist Spanish people. In order to help the Chinese people in their War of Resistance Against Japan, he came to China at the head of a medical team and arrived in Yenan in the spring of 1938. Soon after he went to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area. Imbued with ardent internationalism and the great communist spirit, he served the army and the people of the Liberated Areas for nearly two years. He contracted blood poisoning while operating on wounded soldiers and died in Tanghsien, Hopei, on November 12, 1939.

[2] See J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", *Problems of Leninism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, pp. 70-79.

ON NEW DEMOCRACY

January 1940

I. WHITHER CHINA?

A lively atmosphere has prevailed throughout the country ever since the War of Resistance began, there is a general feeling that a way out of the impasse has been found, and people no longer knit their brows in despair. Of late, however, the dust and din of compromise and anti-communism have once again filled the air, and once again the people are thrown into bewilderment. Most susceptible, and the first to be affected, are the intellectuals and the young students. The question once again arises: What is to be done? Whither China? On the occasion of the publication of *Chinese Culture*,[1] it may therefore be profitable to clarify the political and cultural trends in the country. I am a layman in matters of culture; I would like to study them, but have only just begun to do so. Fortunately, there are many comrades in Yenan who have written at length in this field, so that my rough and ready words may serve the same purpose as the beating of the gongs before a theatrical performance. Our observations may contain a grain of truth for the nation's advanced cultural workers and may serve as a modest spur to induce them to come forward with valuable contributions of their own, and we hope that they will join in the discussion to reach correct conclusions which will meet our national needs. To "seek truth from facts" is the scientific approach, and presumptuously to claim infallibility and lecture people will never settle anything. The troubles that have befallen our nation are extremely serious, and only a scientific approach and a spirit of responsibility can lead it on to the road of liberation. There is but one truth, and the question of whether or not one has arrived at it depends not on subjective boasting but on objective practice. The only yardstick of truth is the revolutionary practice of millions of people. This, I think, can be regarded as the attitude of *Chinese Culture*.

II. WE WANT TO BUILD A NEW CHINA

For many years we Communists have struggled for a cultural revolution as well as for a political and economic revolution, and our aim is to build a new society and a new state for the Chinese nation. That new society and new state will have not only a new politics and a new economy but a new culture. In other words, not only do we want to change a China that is politically oppressed and economically exploited into a China that is politically free and economically prosperous, we also want to change the China which is being kept ignorant and backward under the sway of the old culture into an enlightened and progressive China under the sway of a new culture. In short, we want to build a new China. Our aim in the cultural sphere is to build a new Chinese national culture.

III. CHINA'S HISTORICAL CHARACTERISTICS

We want to build a new national culture, but what kind of culture should it be?

Any given culture (as an ideological form) is a reflection of the politics and economics of a given society, and the former in turn has a tremendous influence and effect upon the latter; economics is the base and politics the concentrated expression of economics.[2] This is our fundamental view of the relation of culture to politics and economics and of the relation of politics to economics. It follows that the form of culture is first determined by the political and economic form, and only then does it operate on and influence the given political and economic form. Marx says, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."[3] He also says, "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it."[4] For the first time in human history, these scientific formulations correctly solved the problem of the relationship between consciousness and existence, and they are the basic concepts underlying the dynamic revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality which was later elaborated so profoundly by Lenin. These basic concepts must be kept in mind in our discussion of China's cultural problems.

Thus it is quite clear that the reactionary elements of the old national culture we want to eliminate are inseparable from the old national politics and economics, while the new national culture which we want to build up is inseparable from the new national politics and economics. The old politics and economics of the Chinese nation form the basis of its old culture, just as its new politics and economics will form the basis of its new culture.

What are China's old politics and economics? And what is her old culture?

From the Chou and Chin Dynasties onwards, Chinese society was feudal, as were its politics and its economy. And the dominant culture, reflecting the politics and economy, was feudal culture.

Since the invasion of foreign capitalism and the gradual growth of capitalist elements in Chinese society, the country has changed by degrees into a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. China today is colonial in the Japanese-occupied areas and basically semi-colonial in the Kuomintang areas, and it is predominantly feudal or semi-feudal in both. Such, then, is the character of present-day Chinese society and the state of affairs in our country. The politics and the economy of this society are predominantly colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal, and the predominant culture, reflecting the politics and economy, is also colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal.

It is precisely against these predominant political, economic and cultural forms that our revolution is directed. What we want to get rid of is the old colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal politics and economy and the old culture in their service. And what we want to build up is their direct opposite, *i.e.*, the new politics, the new economy and the new culture of the Chinese nation.

What, then, are the new politics and the new economy of the Chinese nation, and what is its new culture?

In the course of its history the Chinese revolution must go through two stages, first, the democratic revolution, and second, the socialist revolution, and by their very nature they are two different revolutionary processes. Here democracy does not belong to the old category — it is not the old democracy, but belongs to the new category — it is New Democracy.

It can thus be affirmed that China's new politics are the politics of New Democracy, that China's new economy is the economy of New Democracy and that China's new culture is the culture of New Democracy.

Such are the historical characteristics of the Chinese revolution at the present time. Any political party, group or person taking part in the Chinese revolution that fails to understand this will not be able to direct the revolution and lead it to victory, but will be cast aside by the people and left to grieve out in the cold.

IV. THE CHINESE REVOLUTION IS PART OF THE WORLD REVOLUTION

The historical characteristic of the Chinese revolution lies in its division into the two stages, democracy and socialism, the first being no longer democracy in general, but democracy of the Chinese type, a new and special type, namely, New Democracy. How, then, has this historical characteristic come into being? Has it been in existence for the past hundred years, or is it of recent origin?

A brief study of the historical development of China and of the world shows that this characteristic did not emerge immediately after the Opium War, but took shape later, after the first imperialist world war and the October Revolution in Russia. Let us now examine the process of its formation.

Clearly, it follows from the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of present-day Chinese society that the Chinese revolution must be divided into two stages. The first step is to change the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal form of society into an independent, democratic society. The second is to carry the revolution forward and build a socialist society. At present the Chinese revolution is taking the first step.

The preparatory period for the first step began with the Opium War in 1840, *i.e.*, when China's feudal society started changing into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal one. Then came the Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese

War, the Reform Movement of 1898, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4th Movement, the Northern Expedition, the War of the Agrarian Revolution and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. Together these have taken up a whole century and in a sense they represent that first step, being struggles waged by the Chinese people, on different occasions and in varying degrees, against imperialism and the feudal forces in order to build up an independent, democratic society and complete the first revolution. The Revolution of 1911 was in a fuller sense the beginning of that revolution. In its social character, this revolution is a bourgeois-democratic and not a proletarian-socialist revolution. It is still unfinished and still demands great efforts, because to this day its enemies are still very strong. When Dr. Sun Yat-sen said, "The revolution is not yet completed, all my comrades must struggle on", he was referring to the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

A change, however, occurred in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution after the outbreak of the first imperialist world war in 1914 and the founding of a socialist state on one-sixth of the globe as a result of the Russian October Revolution of 1917.

Before these events, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution came within the old category of the bourgeois-democratic world revolution, of which it was a part.

Since these events, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution has changed, it has come within the new category of bourgeois-democratic revolutions and, as far as the alignment of revolutionary forces is concerned, forms part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.

Why? Because the first imperialist world war and the first victorious socialist revolution, the October Revolution, have changed the whole course of world history and ushered in a new era.

It is an era in which the world capitalist front has collapsed in one part of the globe (one-sixth of the world) and has fully revealed its decadence everywhere else, in which the remaining capitalist parts cannot survive without relying more than ever on the colonies and semi-colonies, in which a socialist state has been established and has proclaimed its readiness to give active support to the liberation movement of all colonies and semi-colonies, and in which the proletariat of the capitalist countries is steadily freeing itself from the social-imperialist influence of the social-democratic parties and has proclaimed its support for the liberation movement in the colonies and semi-colonies. In this era, any revolution in a colony or semi-colony that is directed against imperialism, *i.e.*, against the international bourgeoisie or international capitalism, no longer comes within the old category of the bourgeois-democratic world revolution, but within the new category. It is no longer part of the old bourgeois, or capitalist, world revolution, but is part of the new world revolution, the proletarian-socialist world revolution. Such revolutionary colonies and semi-colonies can no longer be regarded as allies of the counter-revolutionary front of world capitalism; they have become allies of the revolutionary front of world socialism.

Although such a revolution in a colonial and semi-colonial country is still fundamentally bourgeois-democratic in its social character during its first stage or first step, and although its objective mission is to clear the path for the development of capitalism, it is no longer a revolution of the old type led by the bourgeoisie with the aim of establishing a capitalist society and a state under bourgeois dictatorship. It belongs to the new type of revolution led by the proletariat with the aim, in the first stage, of establishing a new-democratic society and a state under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes. Thus this revolution actually serves the purpose of clearing a still wider path for the development of socialism. In the course of its progress, there may be a number of further sub-stages, because of changes on the enemy's side and within the ranks of our allies, but the fundamental character of the revolution remains unchanged.

Such a revolution attacks imperialism at its very roots, and is therefore not tolerated but opposed by imperialism. However, it is favoured by socialism and supported by the land of socialism and the socialist international proletariat.

Therefore, such a revolution inevitably becomes part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.

The correct thesis that "the Chinese revolution is part of the world revolution" was put forward as early as 1924-27 during the period of China's First Great Revolution. It was put forward by the Chinese Communists and endorsed by all those taking part in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle of the time. However, the significance of this thesis was not fully expounded in those days, and consequently it was only vaguely understood.

The "world revolution" no longer refers to the old world revolution, for the old bourgeois world revolution has long been a thing of the past; it refers to the new world revolution, the socialist world revolution. Similarly, to form "part of" means to form part not of the old bourgeois but of the new socialist revolution. This is a tremendous change unparalleled in the history of China and of the world.

This correct thesis advanced by the Chinese Communists is based on Stalin's theory.

As early as 1918, in an article commemorating the first anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin wrote:

> The great world-wide significance of the October Revolution chiefly consists in the fact that:
>
> 1) It has widened the scope of the national question and converted it from the particular question of combating national oppression in Europe into the general question of emancipating the oppressed peoples, colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism;
>
> 2) It has opened up wide possibilities for their emancipation and the right paths towards it, has thereby greatly facilitated the cause of the emancipation of the oppressed peoples of the West and the East, and has drawn them into the common current of the victorious struggle against imperialism;
>
> 3) *It has thereby erected a bridge between the socialist West and the enslaved East*, having created a new front of revolutions *against* world imperialism, extending from the proletarians of the West, through the Russian Revolution, to the oppressed peoples of the East.[5]

Since writing this article, Stalin has again and again expounded the theory that revolutions in the colonies and semi-colonies have broken away from the old category and become part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. The clearest and most precise explanation is given in an article published on June 30, 1925, in which Stalin carried on a controversy with the Yugoslav nationalists of the time. Entitled "The National Question Once Again", it is included in a book translated by Chang Chung-shih and published under the title *Stalin on the National Question*. It contains the following passage:

> Semich refers to a passage in Stalin's pamphlet *Marxism and the National Question*, written at the end of 1912. There it says that "the national struggle under the conditions of *rising* capitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves". Evidently, by this Semich is trying to suggest that his formula defining the social significance of the national movement under the present

> historical conditions is correct. But Stalin's pamphlet was written before the imperialist war, when the national question was not yet regarded by Marxists as a question of world significance, when the Marxists' fundamental demand for the right to self-determination was regarded not as part of the proletarian revolution, but as part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It would be ridiculous not to see that since then the international situation has radically changed, that the war, on the one hand, and the October Revolution in Russia, on the other, transformed the national question from a part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. As far back as October 1916, in his article, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", Lenin said that the main point of the national question, the right to self-determination, had ceased to be a part of the general democratic movement, that it had already become a component part of the general proletarian, socialist revolution. I do not even mention subsequent works on the national question by Lenin and by other representatives of Russian communism. After all this, what significance can Semich's reference to the passage in Stalin's pamphlet, written in the period of the *bourgeois*-democratic revolution in Russia, have at the present time, when, as a consequence of the new historical situation, we have entered a new epoch, the epoch of *proletarian* revolution? It can only signify that Semich quotes outside of space and time, without reference to the living historical situation, and thereby violates the most elementary requirements of dialectics, and ignores the fact that what is right for one historical situation may prove to be wrong in another historical situation.[6]

From this it can be seen that there are two kinds of world revolution, the first belonging to the bourgeois or capitalist category. The era of this kind of world revolution is long past, having come to an end as far back as 1914 when the first imperialist world war broke out, and more particularly in 1917 when the October Revolution took place. The second kind, namely, the proletarian-socialist world revolution, thereupon began. This revolution has the proletariat of the capitalist countries as its main force and the oppressed peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies as its allies. No matter what classes, parties or individuals in an oppressed nation join the revolution, and no matter whether they themselves are conscious of the point or understand it, so long as they oppose imperialism, their revolution becomes part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and they become its allies.

Today, the Chinese revolution has taken on still greater significance. This is a time when the economic and political crises of capitalism are dragging the world more and more deeply into the Second World War, when the Soviet Union has reached the period of transition from socialism to communism and is capable of leading and helping the proletariat and oppressed nations of the whole world in their fight against imperialist war and capitalist reaction, when the proletariat of the capitalist countries is preparing to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism, and when the proletariat, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie in China have become a mighty independent political force under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Situated as we are in this day and age, should we not make the appraisal that the Chinese revolution has taken on still greater world significance? I think we should. The Chinese revolution has become a very important part of the world revolution.

Although the Chinese revolution in this first stage (with its many sub-stages) is a new type of bourgeois-democratic revolution and is not yet itself a proletarian-socialist revolution in its social character, it has long become a part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and is now even a very important part and a great ally of this world revolution. The first step or stage in our revolution is definitely not, and cannot be, the establishment of a capitalist society under the dictatorship of the Chinese bourgeoisie, but will result in the establishment of a new-democratic society under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes of China headed by the Chinese proletariat. The revolution will then be carried forward to the second stage, in which a socialist society will be established in China.

This is the fundamental characteristic of the Chinese revolution of today, of the new revolutionary process of the past twenty years (counting from the May 4th Movement of 1919), and its concrete living essence.

V. THE POLITICS OF NEW DEMOCRACY

The new historical characteristic of the Chinese revolution is its division into two stages, the first being the new-democratic revolution.

How does this manifest itself concretely in internal political and economic relations? Let us consider the question.

Before the May 4th Movement of 1919 (which occurred after the first imperialist world war of 1914 and the Russian October Revolution of 1917), the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie (through their intellectuals) were the political leaders of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Chinese proletariat had not yet appeared on the political scene as an awakened and independent class force, but participated in the revolution only as a follower of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. Such was the case with the proletariat at the time of the Revolution of 1911.

After the May 4th Movement, the political leader of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution was no longer the bourgeoisie but the proletariat, although the national bourgeoisie continued to take part in the revolution. The Chinese proletariat rapidly became an awakened and independent political force as a result of its maturing and of the influence of the Russian Revolution. It was the Chinese Communist Party that put forward the slogan "Down with imperialism" and the thoroughgoing programme for the whole bourgeois-democratic revolution, and it was the Chinese Communist Party alone that carried out the Agrarian Revolution.

Being a bourgeoisie in a colonial and semi-colonial country and oppressed by imperialism, the Chinese national bourgeoisie retains a certain revolutionary quality at certain periods and to a certain degree — even in the era of imperialism — in its opposition to the foreign imperialists and the domestic governments of bureaucrats and warlords (instances of opposition to the latter can be found in the periods of the Revolution of 1911 and the Northern Expedition), and it may ally itself with the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie against such enemies as it is ready to oppose. In this respect the Chinese bourgeoisie differs from the bourgeoisie of old tsarist Russia. Since tsarist Russia was a military-feudal imperialism which carried on aggression against other countries, the Russian bourgeoisie was entirely lacking in revolutionary quality. There, the task of the proletariat was to oppose the bourgeoisie, not to unite with it. But China's national bourgeoisie has a revolutionary quality at certain periods and to a certain degree, because China is a colonial and semi-colonial country which is a victim of aggression. Here, the task of the proletariat is to form a united front with the national bourgeoisie against imperialism and

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the bureaucrat and warlord governments without overlooking its revolutionary quality.

At the same time, however, being a bourgeois class in a colonial and semi-colonial country and so being extremely flabby economically and politically, the Chinese national bourgeoisie also has another quality, namely, a proneness to conciliation with the enemies of the revolution. Even when it takes part in the revolution, it is unwilling to break with imperialism completely and, moreover, it is closely associated with the exploitation of the rural areas through land rent; thus it is neither willing nor able to overthrow imperialism, and much less the feudal forces, in a thorough way. So neither of the two basic problems or tasks of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution can be solved or accomplished by the national bourgeoisie. As for China's big bourgeoisie, which is represented by the Kuomintang, all through the long period from 1927 to 1937 it nestled in the arms of the imperialists and formed an alliance with the feudal forces against the revolutionary people. In 1927 and for some time afterwards, the Chinese national bourgeoisie also followed the counter-revolution. During the present anti-Japanese war, the section of the big bourgeoisie represented by Wang Ching-wei has capitulated to the enemy, which constitutes a fresh betrayal on the part of the big bourgeoisie. In this respect, then, the bourgeoisie in China differs from the earlier bourgeoisie of the European and American countries, and especially of France. When the bourgeoisie in those countries, and especially in France, was still in its revolutionary era, the bourgeois revolution was comparatively thorough, whereas the bourgeoisie in China lacks even this degree of thoroughness.

Possible participation in the revolution on the one hand and proneness to conciliation with the enemies of the revolution on the other — such is the dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie, it faces both ways. Even the bourgeoisie in European and American history had shared this dual character. When confronted by a formidable enemy, they united with the workers and peasants against him, but when the workers and peasants awakened, they turned round to unite with the enemy against the workers and peasants. This is a general rule applicable to the bourgeoisie everywhere in the world, but the trait is more pronounced in the Chinese bourgeoisie.

In China, it is perfectly clear that whoever can lead the people in overthrowing imperialism and the forces of feudalism can win the people's confidence, because these two, and especially imperialism, are the mortal enemies of the people. Today, whoever can lead the people in driving out Japanese imperialism and introducing democratic government will be the saviours of the people. History has proved that the Chinese bourgeoisie cannot fulfil this responsibility, which inevitably falls upon the shoulders of the proletariat.

Therefore, the proletariat, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie undoubtedly constitute the basic forces determining China's fate. These classes, some already awakened and others in the process of awakening, will necessarily become the basic components of the state and governmental structure in the democratic republic of China, with the proletariat as the leading force. The Chinese democratic republic which we desire to establish now must be a democratic republic under the joint dictatorship of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal people led by the proletariat, that is, a new-democratic republic, a republic of the genuinely revolutionary new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies.

This new-democratic republic will be different from the old European-American form of capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship, which is the old democratic form and already out of date. On the other hand, it will also be different from the socialist republic of the Soviet type under the dictatorship of the proletariat which is already flourishing in the U.S.S.R., and which, moreover, will be established in all the capitalist countries and will undoubtedly become the dominant form of state and governmental structure in all the industrially advanced countries. However, for a certain historical period, this form is not suitable for the revolutions in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. During this period, therefore, a third form of state must be adopted in the revolutions of all colonial and semi-colonial countries, namely, the new-democratic republic. This form suits a certain historical period and is therefore transitional; nevertheless, it is a form which is necessary and cannot be dispensed with.

Thus the numerous types of state system in the world can be reduced to three basic kinds according to the class character of their political power: (1) republics under bourgeois dictatorship; (2) republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat; and (3) republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes.

The first kind comprises the old democratic states. Today, after the outbreak of the second imperialist war, there is hardly a trace of democracy in many of the capitalist countries, which have come or are coming under the bloody militarist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

Certain countries under the joint dictatorship of the landlords and the bourgeoisie can be grouped with this kind.

The second kind exists in the Soviet Union, and the conditions for its birth are ripening in capitalist countries. In the future, it will be the dominant form throughout the world for a certain period.

The third kind is the transitional form of state to be adopted in the revolutions of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Each of these revolutions will necessarily have specific characteristics of its own, but these will be minor variations on a general theme. So long as they are revolutions in colonial or semi-colonial countries, their state and governmental structure will of necessity be basically the same, *i.e.*, a new-democratic state under the joint dictatorship of several anti-imperialist classes. In present-day China, the anti-Japanese united front represents the new-democratic form of state. It is anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist; it is also a united front, an alliance of several revolutionary classes. But unfortunately, despite the fact that the war has been going on for so long, the work of introducing democracy has hardly started in most of the country outside the democratic anti-Japanese base areas under the leadership of the Communist Party, and the Japanese imperialists have exploited this fundamental weakness to stride into our country. If nothing is done about it, our national future will be gravely imperilled.

The question under discussion here is that of the "state system". After several decades of wrangling since the last years of the Ching Dynasty, it has still not been cleared up. Actually it is simply a question of the status of the various social classes within the state. The bourgeoisie, as a rule, conceals the problem of class status and carries out its one-class dictatorship under the "national" label. Such concealment is of no advantage to the revolutionary people and the matter should be clearly explained to them. The term "national" is all right, but it must not include counter-revolutionaries and traitors. The kind of state we need today is a dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes over the counter-revolutionaries and traitors.

> The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. On the other hand, the Kuomintang's Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.

Such was the solemn declaration made in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, held in 1924 during the period of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. For sixteen years the Kuomintang has violated this declaration and as a result it has created the present grave national crisis. This is a gross blunder, which we hope the Kuomintang will correct in the cleansing flames of the anti-Japanese war.

As for the question of "the system of government", this is a matter of how political power is organized, the form in which one social class or another chooses to arrange its apparatus of political power to oppose its enemies and protect itself. There is no state which does not have an appropriate apparatus of political power to represent it. China may now adopt a system of people's congresses, from the national people's congress down to the provincial, county, district and township people's congresses, with all levels electing their respective governmental bodies. But if there is to be a proper representation for each revolutionary class according to its status in the state, a proper expression of the people's will, a proper direction for revolutionary struggles and a proper manifestation of the spirit of New Democracy, then a system of really universal and equal suffrage, irrespective of sex, creed, property or education, must be introduced. Such is the system of democratic centralism. Only a government based on democratic centralism can fully express the will of all the revolutionary people and fight the enemies of the revolution most effectively. There must be a spirit of refusal to be "privately owned by the few" in the government and the army; without a genuinely democratic system this cannot be attained and the system of government and the state system will be out of harmony.

The state system, a joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes and the system of government, democratic centralism — these constitute the politics of New Democracy, the republic of New Democracy, the republic of the anti-Japanese united front, the republic of the new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies, the Republic of China in reality as well as in name. Today we have a Republic of China in name but not in reality, and our present task is to create the reality that will fit the name.

Such are the internal political relations which a revolutionary China, a China fighting Japanese aggression, should and must establish without fail; such is the orientation, the only correct orientation, for our present work of national reconstruction.

VI. THE ECONOMY OF NEW DEMOCRACY

If such a republic is to be established in China, it must be new-democratic not only in its politics but also in its economy.

It will own the big banks and the big industrial and commercial enterprises.

> Enterprises, such as banks, railways and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and administered by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: this is the main principle of the regulation of capital.

This is another solemn declaration in the Manifesto of the Kuomintang's First National Congress held during the period of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, and it is the correct policy for the economic structure of the new-democratic republic. In the new-democratic republic under the leadership of the proletariat, the state enterprises will be of a socialist character and will constitute the leading force in the whole national economy, but the republic will neither confiscate capitalist private property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production as does not "dominate the livelihood of the people", for China's economy is still very backward.

The republic will take certain necessary steps to confiscate the land of the landlords and distribute it to those peasants having little or no land, carry out Dr. Sun Yat-sen's slogan of "land to the tiller", abolish feudal relations in the rural areas, and turn the land over to the private ownership of the peasants. A rich peasant economy will be allowed in the rural areas. Such is the policy of "equalization of landownership". "Land to the tiller" is the correct slogan for this policy. In general, socialist agriculture will not be established at this stage, though various types of co-operative enterprises developed on the basis of "land to the tiller" will contain elements of socialism.

China's economy must develop along the path of the "regulation of capital" and the "equalization of landownership", and must never be "privately owned by the few"; we must never permit the few capitalists and landlords to "dominate the livelihood of the people"; we must never establish a capitalist society of the European-American type or allow the old semi-feudal society to survive. Whoever dares to go counter to this line of advance will certainly not succeed but will run into a brick wall.

Such are the internal economic relations which a revolutionary China, a China fighting Japanese aggression, must and necessarily will establish.

Such is the economy of New Democracy.

And the politics of New Democracy are the concentrated expression of the economy of New Democracy.

VII. REFUTATION OF BOURGEOIS DICTATORSHIP

More than 90 per cent of the people are in favour of a republic of this kind with its new-democratic politics and new-democratic economy; there is no alternative road.

What about the road to a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship? To be sure, that was the old road taken by the European and American bourgeoisie, but whether one likes it or not, neither the international nor the domestic situation allows China to do the same.

Judging by the international situation, that road is blocked. In its fundamentals, the present international situation is one of a struggle between capitalism and socialism, in which capitalism is on the downgrade and socialism on the upgrade. In the first place international capitalism, or imperialism, will not permit the establishment in China of a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship. Indeed the history of modern China is a history of imperialist aggression, of imperialist opposition to China's independence and to her development of capitalism. Earlier revolutions failed in China because imperialism strangled them, and innumerable revolutionary martyrs died, bitterly lamenting the non-fulfilment of their mission. Today a powerful Japanese imperialism is forcing its way into China and wants to reduce her to a colony; it is not China that is developing Chinese capitalism but Japan that is developing Japanese capitalism in our country; and it is not the Chinese bourgeoisie but the Japanese bourgeoisie that is exercising dictatorship in our country. True enough, this is the period of the final struggle of dying imperialism — imperialism is "moribund capitalism".[7] But just because it is dying, it is all the more dependent on colonies and semi-colonies for survival and will certainly not allow any colony or semi-colony to establish anything like a capitalist society under the dictatorship of its own bourgeoisie. Just because Japanese imperialism is bogged down in serious economic and political crises, just because it is dying, it must invade China and reduce her to a colony, thereby blocking the road to bourgeois dictatorship and national capitalism in China.

In the second place, socialism will not permit it. All the imperialist powers in the world are our enemies, and China cannot possibly gain her independence without the assistance of the land of socialism and the international proletariat. That is, she cannot do so without the help of the Soviet Union and the help which the proletariat of Japan, Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Italy and other countries provide through their struggles against capitalism. Although no one can say that the victory of the Chinese revolution must wait upon the victory of the revolution in all of these countries, or in one or two of them, there is no doubt that we cannot win without the added strength of their proletariat. In particular, Soviet assistance is absolutely indispensable for China's final victory in the War of Resistance. Refuse Soviet assistance, and the revolution will fail. Don't the anti-Soviet campaigns from 1927 onwards[8] provide an extraordinarily clear lesson? The world today is in a new era of wars and revolutions, an era in which capitalism is unquestionably dying and socialism is unquestionably prospering. In these circumstances, would it not be sheer fantasy to desire the establishment in China of a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship after the defeat of imperialism and feudalism?

Even though the petty Kemalist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie[9] did emerge in Turkey after the first imperialist world war and the October Revolution owing to certain specific conditions (the bourgeoisie's success in repelling Greek aggression and the weakness of the proletariat), there can be no second Turkey, much less a "Turkey" with a population of 450 million, after World War II and the accomplishment of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. In the specific conditions of China (the flabbiness of the bourgeoisie with its proneness to conciliation and the strength of the proletariat with its revolutionary thoroughness), things just never work out so easily as in Turkey. Did not some members of the Chinese bourgeoisie clamour for Kemalism after the First Great Revolution failed in 1927? But where is China's Kemal? And where are China's bourgeois dictatorship and capitalist society? Besides, even Kemalist Turkey eventually had to throw herself into the arms of Anglo-French imperialism, becoming more and more of a semi-colony and part of the reactionary imperialist world. In the international situation of today, the "heroes" in the colonies and semi-colonies either line up on the imperialist front and become part of the forces of world counter-revolution, or they line up on the anti-imperialist front and become part of the forces of world revolution. They must do one or the other, for there is no third choice.

Judging by the domestic situation, too, the Chinese bourgeoisie should have learned its lesson by now. No sooner had the strength of the proletariat and of the peasant and other petty bourgeois masses brought the revolution of 1927 to victory than the capitalist class, headed by the big bourgeoisie, kicked the masses aside, seized the fruits of the revolution, formed a counter-revolutionary alliance with imperialism and the feudal forces, and strained themselves to the limit in a war of "Communist suppression" for ten years. But what was the upshot? Today, when a powerful enemy has penetrated deep into our territory and the anti-Japanese war has been going on for two years, is it possible that there are still people who want to copy the obsolete recipes of the European and American bourgeoisie? A decade was spent on "suppressing the Communists" out of existence, but no capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship was "suppressed" into existence. Is it possible that there are still people who want to have another try? True, a "one-party dictatorship" was "suppressed" into existence through the decade of "Communist suppression", but it is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal dictatorship. What is more, at the end of four years of "Communist suppression" (from 1927 to the Incident of September 18, 1931), "Manchukuo" was "suppressed" into existence and in 1937, after another six years of such "suppression", the Japanese imperialists made their way into China south of the Great Wall. Today if anyone wants to carry on "suppression" for another decade, it would mean a new type of "Communist suppression", somewhat different from the old. But is there not one fleet-footed person who has already outstripped everyone else and boldly undertaken this new enterprise of "Communist suppression"? Yes, Wang Ching-wei, who has become the new-style anti-Communist celebrity. Anyone who wishes to join his gang can please himself; but wouldn't that turn out to be an added embarrassment when talking big about bourgeois dictatorship, capitalist society, Kemalism, a modern state, a one-party dictatorship, "one doctrine", and so on and so forth? And if, instead of joining the Wang Ching-wei gang, someone wants to come into the "fight Japan" camp of the people but imagines that once the war is won he will be able to kick aside the people fighting Japan, seize the fruits of the victory of the fight against Japan and establish a "perpetual one-party dictatorship", isn't he just day-dreaming? "Fight Japan!" "Fight Japan!" But who is doing the fighting? Without the workers and the peasants and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, you cannot move a step. Anyone who still dares to try and kick them aside will himself be crushed. Hasn't this, too, become a matter of common sense? But the die-hards among the Chinese bourgeoisie (I am referring solely to the die-hards) seem to have learned nothing in the past twenty years. Aren't they still shouting: "Restrict communism", "Corrode communism" and "Combat communism"? Haven't we seen "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" followed by "Measures for Dealing with the Alien Party Problem" and still later by "Directives for Dealing with the Alien Party Problem"? Heavens! With all this "restricting" and "dealing with" going on, one wonders what kind of future they are preparing for our nation and for themselves! We earnestly and sincerely advise these gentlemen: Open your eyes, take a good look at China and the world, see how things stand inside as well as outside the country, and do not repeat your mistakes. If you persist in your mistakes, the future of our nation will of course be disastrous, but I am sure things will not go well with you either. This is absolutely true, absolutely certain. Unless the die-hards among the Chinese bourgeoisie wake up, their future will be far from bright — they will only bring about their own destruction. Therefore we hope that China's anti-Japanese united front will be maintained and that, with the co-operation of all instead of the monopoly of a single clique, the anti-Japanese cause will be brought to victory; it is the only good policy — any other policy is bad. This is the sincere advice we Communists are giving, and do not blame us for not having forewarned you.

"If there is food, let everyone share it." This old Chinese saying contains much truth. Since we all share in fighting the enemy, we should all share in eating, we should all share in the work to be done, and we should all share access to education. Such attitudes as "I and I alone will take everything" and "no one dare harm me" are nothing but the old tricks of feudal lords which simply will not work in the Nineteen Forties.

We Communists will never push aside anyone who is revolutionary; we shall persevere in the united front and practise long-term co-operation with all those classes, strata, political parties and groups and individuals that are willing to fight Japan to the end. But it will not do if certain people want to push aside the Communist Party it will not do if they want to split the united front. China must keep on fighting Japan, uniting and moving forward, and we cannot tolerate anyone who tries to capitulate, cause splits or move backward.

VIII. REFUTATION OF "LEFT" PHRASE-MONGERING

If the capitalist road of bourgeois dictatorship is out of the question, then is it possible to take the socialist road of proletarian dictatorship?

No, that is not possible either.

Without a doubt, the present revolution is the first step, which will develop into the second step, that of socialism, at a later date. And China will attain true happiness only when she enters the socialist era. But today is not yet the time to introduce socialism. The present task of the revolution in China is to fight imperialism and feudalism, and socialism is out of the question until this task is completed. The Chinese revolution cannot avoid taking the two steps, first of New Democracy and then of socialism. Moreover, the first step will need quite a long time and cannot be accomplished overnight. We are not utopians and cannot divorce ourselves from the actual conditions confronting us.

Certain malicious propagandists, deliberately confusing these two distinct revolutionary stages, advocate the so-called theory of a single revolution in order to prove that the Three People's Principles apply to all kinds of revolutions and that communism therefore loses its *raison d'être*. Utilizing this "theory", they frantically oppose communism and the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. Their real purpose is to root out all revolution, to oppose a thoroughgoing bourgeois-democratic revolution and thoroughgoing resistance to Japan and to prepare public opinion for their capitulation to the Japanese aggressors. This is deliberately being fostered by the Japanese imperialists. Since their occupation of Wuhan, they have come to realize that military force alone cannot subjugate China and have therefore resorted to political offensives and economic blandishments. Their political offensives consist in tempting wavering elements in the anti-Japanese camp, splitting the united front and undermining Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. Their economic blandishments take the form of the so-called joint industrial enterprises. In central and southern China the Japanese aggressors are allowing Chinese capitalists to invest 51 per cent of the capital in such enterprises, with Japanese capital making up the other 49 per cent; in northern China they are allowing Chinese capitalists to invest 49 per cent of the capital, with Japanese capital making up the other 51 per cent. The Japanese invaders have also promised to restore the former assets of the Chinese capitalists to them in the form of capital shares in the investment. At the prospect of profits, some conscienceless capitalists forget all moral principles and itch to have a go. One section, represented by Wang Ching-wei, has already capitulated. Another section lurking in the anti-Japanese camp would also like to cross over. But, with the cowardice of thieves, they fear that the Communists will block their exit and, what is more, that the common people will brand them as traitors. So they have put their heads together and decided to prepare the ground in cultural circles and through the press. Having determined on their policy, they have lost no time in hiring some "metaphysics-mongers"[10] plus a few Trotskyites who, brandishing their pens like lances, are tilting in all directions and creating bedlam. Hence the whole bag of tricks for deceiving those who do not know what is going on in the world around them — the "theory of a single revolution", the tales that communism does not suit the national conditions of China, that there is no need for a Communist Party in China, that the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies are sabotaging the anti-Japanese war and are merely moving about without fighting, that the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region is a feudal separatist regime, that the Communist Party is disobedient, dissident, intriguing and disruptive — and all for the purpose of providing the capitalists with good grounds for getting their 49 or 51 per cent and selling out the nation's interests to the enemy at the opportune moment. This is "stealing the beams and pillars and replacing them with rotten timbers" — preparing the public mind for their projected capitulation. Thus, these gentlemen who, in all apparent seriousness, are pushing the "theory of a single revolution" to oppose communism and the Communist Party are out for nothing but their 49 or 51 per cent. How they must have cudgelled their brains! The "theory of a single revolution" is simply a theory of no revolution at all, and that is the heart of the matter.

But there are other people, apparently with no evil intentions, who are misled by the "theory of a single revolution" and the fanciful notion of "accomplishing both the political revolution and the social revolution at one stroke"; they do not understand that our revolution is divided into stages, that we can only proceed to the next stage of revolution after accomplishing the first, and that there is no such thing as "accomplishing both at one stroke". Their approach is likewise very harmful because it confuses the steps to be taken in the revolution and weakens the effort directed towards the current task. It is correct and in accord with the Marxist theory of revolutionary development to say of the two revolutionary stages that the first provides the conditions for the second and that the two must be consecutive, without allowing any intervening stage of bourgeois dictatorship. However, it is a utopian view rejected by true revolutionaries to say that the democratic revolution does not have a specific task and period of its own but can be merged and accomplished simultaneously with another task, *i.e.*, the socialist task (which can only be carried out in another period), and this is what they call "accomplishing both at one stroke".

IX. REFUTATION OF THE DIE-HARDS

The bourgeois die-hards in their turn come forward and say: "Well, you Communists have postponed the socialist system to a later stage and have declared, 'The Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization.'[11] All right then, fold up your communism for the time being." A fearful hullabaloo has recently been raised with this sort of argument in the form of the "one doctrine" theory. In essence it is the howl of the die-hards for bourgeois despotism. Out of courtesy, however, we may simply describe it as totally lacking in common sense.

Communism is at once a complete system of proletarian ideology and a new social system. It is different from any other ideology or social system, and is the most complete, progressive, revolutionary and rational system in human history. The ideological and social system of feudalism has a place only in the museum of history. The ideological and social system of capitalism has also become a museum piece in one part of the world (in the Soviet Union), while in other countries it resembles "a dying person who is sinking fast, like the sun setting beyond the western hills", and will soon be relegated to the museum. The communist ideological and social system alone is full of youth and vitality, sweeping the world with the momentum of an avalanche and the force of a thunderbolt. The introduction of scientific communism into China has opened new vistas for people and has changed the face of the Chinese revolution. Without communism to guide it, China's democratic revolution cannot possibly succeed, let alone move on to the next stage. This is the reason why the bourgeois die-hards are so loudly demanding that communism be "folded up". But it must not be "folded up", for once communism is "folded up", China will be doomed. The whole world today depends on communism for its salvation, and China is no exception.

Everybody knows that the Communist Party has an immediate and a future programme, a minimum and a maximum programme, with regard to the social system it advocates. For the present period, New Democracy, and for the future, socialism; these are two parts of an organic whole, guided by one and the same communist ideology. Is it not, therefore, in the highest degree absurd to clamour for communism to be "folded up" on the ground that the Communist Party's minimum programme is in basic agreement with the political tenets of the Three People's Principles? It is precisely because of this basic agreement between the two that we Communists find it possible to recognize "the Three People's Principles as the political basis for the anti-Japanese united front" and to acknowledge that "the Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization"; otherwise no such possibility would exist. Here we have a united front between communism and the Three People's Principles in the stage of the democratic revolution, the kind of united front Dr. Sun Yat-sen had in mind when he said: "Communism is the good friend of the Three People's Principles."[12] To reject communism is in fact to reject the united front. The die-hards have concocted absurd arguments for the rejection of communism just because they want to reject the united front and practise their one-party doctrine.

Moreover, the "one doctrine" theory is an absurdity. So long as classes exist, there will be as many doctrines as there are classes, and even various groups in the same class may have their different doctrines. Since the feudal class has a feudal doctrine, the bourgeoisie a capitalist doctrine, the Buddhists Buddhism, the Christians

Christianity and the peasants polytheism, and since in recent years some people have also advocated Kemalism, fascism, vitalism,[13] the "doctrine of distribution according to labour",[14] and what not, why then cannot the proletariat have its communism? Since there are countless "isms", why should the cry of "Fold it up!" be raised at the sight of communism alone? Frankly, "folding it up" will not work. Let us rather have a contest. If communism is beaten, we Communists will admit defeat in good grace. But if not, then let all that stuff about "one doctrine", which violates the Principle of Democracy, be "folded up" as soon as possible.

To avoid misunderstanding and for the edification of the die-hards, it is necessary to show clearly where the Three People's Principles and communism do coincide and where they do not.

Comparison of the two reveals both similarities and differences.

First for the similarities. They are to be found in the basic political programme of both doctrines during the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China. The three political tenets of the revolutionary Three People's Principles of Nationalism, Democracy and the People's Livelihood as reinterpreted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 are basically similar to the communist political programme for the stage of the democratic revolution in China. Because of these similarities and because of the carrying out of the Three People's Principles, the united front of the two doctrines and the two parties came into existence. It is wrong to ignore this aspect.

Next for the differences. (1) There is a difference in part of the programme for the stage of the democratic revolution. The communist programme for the whole course of the democratic revolution includes full rights for the people, the eight-hour working day and a thorough agrarian revolution, whereas the Three People's Principles do not. Unless these points are added to the Three People's Principles and there is the readiness to carry them out, the two democratic programmes are only basically the same and cannot be described as altogether the same. (2) Another difference is that one includes the stage of the socialist revolution, and the other does not. Communism envisages the stage of the socialist revolution beyond the stage of the democratic revolution, and hence, beyond its minimum programme it has a maximum programme, *i.e.*, the programme for the attainment of socialism and communism. The Three People's Principles which envisage only the stage of the democratic revolution and not the stage of the socialist revolution have only a minimum programme and not a maximum programme, *i.e.*, they have no programme for the establishment of socialism and communism. (3) There is the difference in world outlook. The world outlook of communism is dialectical and historical materialism, while the Three People's Principles explain history in terms of the people's livelihood, which in essence is a dualist or idealist outlook; the two world outlooks are opposed to each other. (4) There is the difference in revolutionary thoroughness. With communists, theory and practice go together, *i.e.*, communists possess revolutionary thoroughness. With the followers of the Three People's Principles, except for those completely loyal to the revolution and to truth, theory and practice do not go together and their deeds contradict their words, *i.e.*, they lack revolutionary thoroughness. The above are the differences between the two. They distinguish communists from the followers of the Three People's Principles. It is undoubtedly very wrong to ignore this distinction and see only the aspect of unity and not of contradiction.

Once all this is understood, it is easy to see what the bourgeois die-hards have in mind when they demand that communism be "folded up". If it does not mean bourgeois despotism, then there is no sense to it at all.

X. THE THREE PEOPLE'S PRINCIPLES, OLD AND NEW

The bourgeois die-hards have no understanding whatsoever of historical change; their knowledge is so poor that it is practically non-existent. They do not know the difference either between communism and the Three People's Principles or between the new Three People's Principles and the old.

We Communists recognize "the Three People's Principles as the political basis for the Anti-Japanese National United Front", we acknowledge that "the Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization", and we admit the basic agreement between the communist minimum programme and the political tenets of the Three People's Principles. But which kind of Three People's Principles? The Three People's Principles as reinterpreted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, and no other. I wish the die-hard gentlemen would spare a moment from the work of "restricting communism", "corroding communism" and "combating communism", in which the are so gleefully engaged, to glance through this manifesto. In the manifesto Dr. Sun Yat-sen said: "Here is the true interpretation of the Kuomintang's Three People's Principles." Hence these are the only genuine Three People's Principles and all others are spurious. The only "true interpretation" of the Three People's Principles is the one contained in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, and all other interpretations are false. Presumably this is no Communist fabrication, for many Kuomintang members and I myself personally witnessed the adoption of the manifesto.

The manifesto marks off the two epochs in the history of the Three People's Principles. Before it, they belonged to the old category; they were the Three People's Principles of the old bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semi-colony, the Three People's Principles of old democracy, the old Three People's Principles.

After it, they came within the new category; the became the Three People's Principles of the new bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semi-colony, the Three People's Principles of New Democracy, the new Three People's Principles. These and these alone are the revolutionary Three People's Principles of the new period.

The revolutionary Three People's Principles of the new period, the new or genuine Three People's Principles, embody the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. Without each and every one of these Three Great Policies, the Three People's Principles become either false or incomplete in the new period.

In the first place, the revolutionary, new or genuine Three People's Principles must include alliance with Russia. As things are today, it is perfectly clear that unless there is the policy of alliance with Russia, with the land of socialism, there will inevitably be a policy of alliance with imperialism, with the imperialist powers. Is this not exactly what happened after 1927? Once the conflict between the socialist Soviet Union and the imperialist powers grows sharper, China will have to take her stand on one side or the other. This is an inevitable trend. Is it possible to avoid leaning to either side? No, that is an illusion. The whole world will be swept into one or the other of these two fronts, and "neutrality" will then be merely a deceptive term. Especially is this true of China which, fighting an imperialist power that has penetrated deep into her territory, cannot conceive of ultimate victory without the assistance of the Soviet Union. If alliance with Russia is sacrificed for the sake of alliance with imperialism, the word "revolutionary" will have to be expunged from the Three People's Principles, which will then become reactionary. In the last analysis, there can be no "neutral" Three People's Principles; they can only be either revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. Would it not be more heroic to "fight against attacks from both sides"[15] as Wang Ching-wei once remarked, and to have the kind of Three People's Principles that serves this "fight"? Unfortunately, even its inventor Wang Ching-wei himself has abandoned (or "folded up") this kind of Three People's Principles, for he has adopted the Three People's Principles of alliance with imperialism. If it is argued that there is a difference between Eastern and Western imperialism, and that, unlike Wang Ching-wei who has allied himself with Eastern imperialism, one should ally oneself with some of the Western imperialists to march eastward and attack, then would not such conduct be quite revolutionary? However, whether you like it or not, the Western imperialists are determined to oppose the Soviet Union and communism, and if you ally yourself with them, they will ask you to march northward and attack, and your revolution will come to nothing. All these circumstances make it essential for the revolutionary, new and genuine Three People's Principles to include alliance with Russia, and under no circumstances alliance with imperialism against Russia.

In the second place, the revolutionary, new and genuine Three People's Principles must include co-operation with the Communist Party. Either you co-operate with the Communist Party or you oppose it. Opposition to communism is the policy of the Japanese imperialists and Wang Ching-wei, and if that is what you want, very well, they will invite you to join their Anti-Communist Company. But wouldn't that look suspiciously like turning traitor? You may say, "I am not following Japan, but some other country." That is just ridiculous. No matter whom you follow, the moment you oppose the Communist Party you become a traitor, because you can no longer resist Japan. If you say, "I am going to oppose the Communist Party independently", that is arrant nonsense. How can the "heroes" in a colony or semi-colony tackle a counter-revolutionary job of this magnitude without depending on the strength of imperialism? For ten long years, virtually all the imperialist forces in the world were enlisted against the Communist Party, but in vain. How can you suddenly oppose it "independently"?

Some people outside the Border Region, we are told, are now saying: "Opposing the Communist Party is good, but you can never succeed in it." This remark, if it is not simply hearsay, is only half wrong, for what "good" is there in opposing the Communist Party? But the other half is true, you certainly can "never succeed in it". Basically, the reason lies not with the Communists but with the common people, who like the Communist Party and do not like "opposing" it. If you oppose the Communist Party at a juncture when our national enemy is penetrating deep into our territory, the people will be after your hide; they will certainly show you no mercy. This much is certain, whoever wants to oppose the Communist Party must be prepared to be ground to dust. If you are not keen on being ground to dust, you had certainly better drop this opposition. This is our sincere advice to all the anti-Communist "heroes". Thus it is as clear as can be that the Three People's Principles of today must include co-operation with the Communist Party, or otherwise those Principles will perish. It is a question of life and death for the Three People's Principles. Co-operating with the Communist Party, they will survive; opposing the Communist Party, they will perish. Can anyone prove the contrary?

In the third place, the revolutionary, new and genuine Three People's Principles must include the policy of assisting the peasants and workers. Rejection of this policy, failure whole-heartedly to assist the peasants and workers or failure to carry out the behest in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament to "arouse the masses of the people", amounts to preparing the way for the defeat of the revolution, and one's own defeat into the bargain. Stalin has said that "*in essence*, the national question is a peasant question".[16] This means that the Chinese revolution is essentially a peasant revolution and that the resistance to Japan now going on is essentially peasant resistance. Essentially, the politics of New Democracy means giving the peasants their rights. The new and genuine Three People's Principles are essentially the principles of a peasant revolution. Essentially, mass culture means raising the cultural level of the peasants. The anti-Japanese war is essentially a peasant war. We are now living in a time when the "principle of going up into the hills"[17] applies; meetings, work, classes, newspaper publication, the writing of books, theatrical performances — everything is done up in the hills, and all essentially for the sake of the peasants. And essentially it is the peasants who provide everything that sustains the resistance to Japan and keeps us going. By "essentially" we mean basically, not ignoring the other sections of the people, as Stalin himself has explained. As every schoolboy knows, 80 per cent of China's population are peasants. So the peasant problem becomes the basic problem of the Chinese revolution and the strength of the peasants is the main strength of the Chinese revolution. In the Chinese population the workers rank second to the peasants in number. There are several million industrial workers in China and several tens of millions of handicraft workers and agricultural labourers. China cannot live without her workers in the various industries, because they are the producers in the industrial sector of the economy. And the revolution cannot succeed without the modern industrial working class, because it is the leader of the Chinese revolution and is the most revolutionary class. In these circumstances, the revolutionary, new and genuine Three People's Principles must include the policy of assisting the peasants and workers. Any other kind of Three People's Principles which lack this policy, do not give the peasants and workers whole-hearted assistance or do not carry out the behest to "arouse the masses of the people", will certainly perish.

Thus it is clear that there is no future for any Three People's Principles which depart from the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. Every conscientious follower of the Three People's Principles must seriously consider this point.

The Three People's Principles comprising the Three Great Policies — in other words, the revolutionary, new and genuine Three People's Principles — are the Three People's Principles of New Democracy, a development of the old Three People's Principles, a great contribution of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's and a product of the era in which the Chinese revolution has become part of the world socialist revolution. It is only these Three People's Principles which the Chinese Communist Party regards as "being what China needs today" and for whose "complete realization" it declares itself pledged "to fight". These are the only Three People's Principles which are in basic agreement with the Communist Party's political programme for the stage of democratic revolution, namely, with its minimum programme.

As for the old Three People's Principles, they were a product of the old period of the Chinese revolution. Russia was then an imperialist power, and naturally there could be no policy of alliance with her; there was then no Communist Party in existence in our country, and naturally there could be no policy of co-operation with it; the movement of the workers and peasants had not yet revealed its full political significance and aroused people's attention, and naturally there could be no policy of alliance with them. Hence the Three People's Principles of the period before the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924 belonged to the old category, and they became obsolete. The Kuomintang could not have gone forward unless it had developed them into the new Three People's Principles. Dr. Sun Yat-sen in his wisdom saw this point, secured the help of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party and reinterpreted the Three People's Principles so as to endow them with new characteristics suited to the times; as a result, a united front was formed between the Three People's Principles and communism, Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was established for the first time, the sympathy of the people of the whole country was won, and the revolution of 1924-27 was launched.

The old Three People's Principles were revolutionary in the old period and reflected its historical features. But if the old stuff is repeated in the new period after the new Three People's Principles have been established, or alliance with Russia is opposed after the socialist state has been established, or co-operation with the Communist Party is opposed after the Communist Party has come into existence, or the policy of assisting the peasants and workers is opposed after they have awakened and demonstrated their political strength, then that is reactionary and shows ignorance of the times. The period of reaction after 1927 was the result of such ignorance. The old proverb says, "Whosoever understands the signs of the times is a great man." I hope the followers of the Three People's Principles today will bear this in mind.

Were the Three People's Principles to fall within the old category, then they would have nothing basically in common with the communist minimum programme, because they would belong to the past and be obsolete. Any sort of Three People's Principles that oppose Russia, the Communist Party or the peasants and workers are definitely reactionary; they not only have absolutely nothing in common with the communist minimum programme but are the enemy of communism, and there is no common ground at all. This, too, the followers of the Three People's Principles should carefully consider.

In any case, people with a conscience will never forsake the new Three People's Principles until the task of opposing imperialism and feudalism is basically accomplished. The only ones who do are people like Wang Ching-wei. No matter how energetically they push their spurious Three People's Principles which oppose Russia, the Communist Party and the peasants and workers, there will surely be no lack of people with a conscience and sense of justice who will continue to support Sun Yat-sen's genuine Three People's Principles. Many followers of the genuine Three People's Principles continued the struggle for the Chinese revolution even after the reaction of 1927, and their numbers will undoubtedly swell to tens upon tens of thousands now that the national enemy has penetrated deep into our territory. We Communists will always persevere in long-term co-operation with all the true followers of the Three People's Principles and, while rejecting the traitors and the sworn enemies of communism, will never forsake any of our friends.

XI. THE CULTURE OF NEW DEMOCRACY

In the foregoing we have explained the historical characteristics of Chinese politics in the new period and the question of the new-democratic republic. We can now proceed to the question of culture.

A given culture is the ideological reflection of the politics and economics of a given society. There is in China an imperialist culture which is a reflection of imperialist rule, or partial rule, in the political and economic fields. This culture is fostered not only by the cultural organizations run directly by the imperialists in China but by a number of Chinese who have lost all sense of shame. Into this category falls all culture embodying a slave ideology. China also has a semi-feudal culture which reflects her semi-feudal politics and economy, and whose exponents include all those who advocate the worship of Confucius, the study of the Confucian canon, the old ethical code and the old ideas in opposition to the new culture and new ideas. Imperialist culture and semi-feudal culture are devoted brothers and have formed a reactionary cultural alliance against China's new culture. This kind of reactionary culture serves the imperialists and the feudal class and must be swept away. Unless it is swept away, no new culture of any kind can be built up. There is no construction without destruction, no flowing without damming and no motion without rest; the two are locked in a life-and-death struggle.

As for the new culture, it is the ideological reflection of the new politics and the new economy which it sets out to serve.

As we have already stated in Section 3, Chinese society has gradually changed in character since the emergence of a capitalist economy in China; it is no longer an entirely feudal but a semi-feudal society, although the feudal economy still predominates. Compared with the feudal economy, this capitalist economy is a new one. The political forces of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat are the new political forces which have emerged and grown simultaneously with this new capitalist economy. And the new culture reflects these new economic and political forces in the field of ideology and serves them. Without the capitalist economy, without the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and without the political forces of these classes, the new ideology or new culture could not have emerged.

These new political, economic and cultural forces are all revolutionary forces which are opposed to the old politics, the old economy and the old culture. The old is composed of two parts, one being China's own semi-feudal politics, economy and culture, and the other the politics, economy and culture of imperialism, with the latter heading the alliance. Both are bad and should be completely destroyed. The struggle between the new and the old in Chinese society is a struggle between the new forces of the people (the various revolutionary classes) and the old forces of imperialism and the feudal class. It is a struggle between revolution and counter-revolution. This struggle has lasted a full hundred years if dated from the Opium War, and nearly thirty years if dated from the Revolution of 1911.

But as already indicated, revolutions too can be classified into old and new, and what is new in one historical period becomes old in another. The century of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution can be divided into two main stages, a first stage of eighty years and a second of twenty years. Each has its basic historical characteristics: China's bourgeois-democratic revolution in the first eighty years belongs to the old category, while in the last twenty years, owing to the change in the international and domestic political situation, it belongs to the new category. Old democracy is the characteristic of the first eighty years. New Democracy is the characteristic of the last twenty. This distinction holds good in culture as well as in politics.

How does it manifest itself in the field of culture? We shall explain this next.

XII. THE HISTORICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION

On the cultural or ideological front, the two periods preceding and following the May 4th Movement form two distinct historical periods.

Before the May 4th Movement, the struggle on China's cultural front was one between the new culture of the bourgeoisie and the old culture of the feudal class. The struggles between the modern school system and the imperial examination system,[18] between the new learning and the old learning, and between Western learning and Chinese learning, were all of this nature. The so-called modern schools or new learning or Western learning of that time concentrated mainly (we say mainly, because in part pernicious vestiges of Chinese feudalism still remained) on the natural sciences and bourgeois social and political theories, which were needed by the representatives of the bourgeoisie. At the time, the ideology of the new learning played a revolutionary role in fighting the Chinese feudal ideology, and it served the bourgeois-democratic revolution of the old period. However, because the Chinese bourgeoisie lacked strength and the world had already entered the era of imperialism, this bourgeois ideology was only able to last out a few rounds and was beaten back by the reactionary alliance of the enslaving ideology of foreign imperialism and the "back to the ancients" ideology of Chinese feudalism; as soon as this reactionary ideological alliance started a minor counter-offensive, the so-called new learning lowered its banners, muffled its drums and beat a retreat, retaining its outer form but losing its soul. The old bourgeois-democratic culture became enervated and decayed in the era of imperialism, and its failure was inevitable.

But since the May 4th Movement things have been different. A brand-new cultural force came into being in China, that is, the communist culture and ideology guided by the Chinese Communists, or the communist world outlook and theory of social revolution. The May 4th Movement occurred in 1919, and in 1921 came the founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the real beginning of China's labour movement — all in the wake of the First World War and the October Revolution, *i.e.*, at a time when the national problem and the colonial revolutionary movements of the world underwent a change, and the connection between the Chinese revolution and the world revolution became quite obvious. The new political force of the proletariat and the Communist Party entered the Chinese political arena, and as a result, the new cultural force, in new uniform and with new weapons, mustering all possible allies and deploying its ranks in battle array, launched heroic attacks on imperialist culture and feudal culture. This new force has made great strides in the domain of the social sciences and of the arts and letters, whether of philosophy, economics, political science, military science, history, literature or art (including the theatre, the cinema, music, sculpture and painting). For the last twenty years, wherever this new cultural force has directed its attack, a great revolution has taken place both in ideological content and in form (for example, in the written language). Its influence has been so great and its impact so powerful that it is invincible wherever it goes. The numbers it has rallied behind it have no parallel in Chinese history. Lu Hsun was the greatest and the most courageous standard-bearer of this new cultural force. The chief commander of China's cultural revolution, he was not only a great man of letters but a great thinker and revolutionary. Lu Hsun was a man of unyielding integrity, free from all sycophancy or obsequiousness; this quality is invaluable among colonial and semi-colonial peoples. Representing the great majority of the nation, Lu Hsun breached and stormed the enemy citadel; on the cultural front he was the bravest and most correct, the firmest, the most loyal and the most ardent national hero, a hero without parallel in our history. The road he took was the very road of China's new national culture.

Prior to the May 4th Movement, China's new culture was a culture of the old-democratic kind and part of the capitalist cultural revolution of the world bourgeoisie. Since the May 4th Movement, it has become new-democratic and part of the socialist cultural revolution of the world proletariat.

Prior to the May 4th Movement, China's new cultural movement, her cultural revolution, was led by the bourgeoisie, which still had a leading role to play. After the May 4th Movement, its culture and ideology became even more backward than its politics and were incapable of playing any leading role; at most, they could serve to a certain extent as an ally during revolutionary periods, while inevitably the responsibility for leading the alliance rested on proletarian culture and ideology. This is an undeniable fact.

The new-democratic culture is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the broad masses; today it is the culture of the anti-Japanese united front. This culture can be led only by the culture and ideology of the proletariat, by the ideology of communism, and not by the culture and ideology of any other class. In a word, new-democratic culture is the proletarian-led, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the broad masses.

XIII. THE FOUR PERIODS

A cultural revolution is the ideological reflection of the political and economic revolution and is in their service. In China there is a united front in the cultural as in the political revolution.

The history of the united front in the cultural revolution during the last twenty years can be divided into four periods. The first covers the two years from 1919 to 1921, the second the six years from 1921 to 1927, the third the ten years from 1927 to 1937, and the fourth the three years from 1937 to the present.

The first period extended from the May 4th Movement of 1919 to the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. The May 4th Movement was its chief landmark.

The May 4th Movement was an anti-imperialist as well as an anti-feudal movement. Its outstanding historical significance is to be seen in a feature which was absent from the Revolution of 1911, namely, its thorough and uncompromising opposition to imperialism as well as to feudalism. The May 4th Movement possessed this quality because capitalism had developed a step further in China and because new hopes had arisen for the liberation of the Chinese nation as China's revolutionary intellectuals saw the collapse of three great imperialist powers, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the weakening of two others, Britain and France, while the Russian proletariat had established a socialist state and the German, Hungarian and Italian proletariat had risen in revolution. The May 4th Movement came into being at the call of the world revolution, of the Russian Revolution and of Lenin. It was part of the world proletarian revolution of the time. Although the Communist Party had not yet come into existence, there were already large numbers of intellectuals who approved of the Russian Revolution and had the rudiments of communist ideology. In the beginning the May 4th Movement was the revolutionary movement of a united front of three sections of people — communist intellectuals, revolutionary petty-bourgeois intellectuals and bourgeois intellectuals (the last forming the right wing of the movement). Its shortcoming was that it was confined to the intellectuals and that the workers and peasants did not join in. But as soon as it developed into the June 3rd Movement,[19] not only the intellectuals but the mass of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie joined in, and it became a nation-wide revolutionary movement. The cultural revolution ushered in by the May 4th Movement was uncompromising in its opposition to feudal culture; there had never been such a great and thoroughgoing cultural revolution since the dawn of Chinese history. Raising aloft the two great banners of the day, "Down with the old ethics and up with the new!" and "Down with the old literature and up with the new!", the cultural revolution had great achievements to its credit. At that time it was not yet possible for this cultural movement to become widely diffused among the workers and peasants. The slogan of "Literature for the common people" was advanced, but in fact the "common people" then could only refer to the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois intellectuals in the cities, that is, the urban intelligentsia. Both in ideology and in the matter of cadres, the May 4th Movement paved the way for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 and for the May 30th Movement in 1925 and the Northern Expedition. The bourgeois intellectuals, who constituted the right wing of the May 4th Movement, mostly compromised with the enemy in the second period and went over to the side of reaction.

In the second period, whose landmarks were the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, the May 30th Movement and the Northern Expedition, the united front of the three classes formed in the May 4th Movement was continued and expanded, the peasantry was drawn into it and a political united front of all these classes, the first instance of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, was established. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was a great man not only because he led the great Revolution of 1911 (although it was only a democratic revolution of the old period), but also because, "adapting himself to the trends of the world and meeting the needs of the masses", he had the capacity to ring forward the revolutionary Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers, give new meaning to the Three People's Principles and thus institute the new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies. Previously, the Three People's Principles had exerted little influence on the educational and academic world or with the youth, because they had not raised the issues of opposition to imperialism or to the feudal social system and feudal culture and ideology. They were the old Three People's Principles which people regarded as the time-serving banner of a group of men bent on seizing power, in other words, on securing official positions, a banner used purely for political manoeuvring. Then came the new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies. The co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the joint efforts of the revolutionary members of the two parties spread the new Three People's Principles all over China, extending to a section of the educational and academic world and the mass of student youth. This was entirely due to the fact that the original Three People's Principles had developed into the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and new-democratic Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies. Without this development it would have been impossible to disseminate the ideas of the Three People's Principles.

During this period, the revolutionary Three People's Principles became the political basis of the united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and of all the revolutionary classes, and since "communism is the good friend of the Three People's Principles", a united front was formed between the two of them. In terms of social classes, it was a united front of the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. Using the Communist *Weekly Guide*, the Kuomintang's *Republican Daily News* of Shanghai and other newspapers in various localities as their bases of operations, the two parties jointly advocated anti-imperialism, jointly combated feudal education based upon the worship of Confucius and upon the study of the Confucian canon and jointly opposed feudal literature and the classical language and promoted the new literature and the vernacular style of writing with an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal content. During the wars in Kwangtung and during the Northern Expedition, they reformed China's armed forces by the inculcation of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal ideas. The slogans, "Down with the corrupt officials" and "Down with the local tyrants and evil gentry", were raised among the peasant millions, and great peasant revolutionary struggles were aroused. Thanks to all this and to the assistance of the Soviet Union, the Northern Expedition was victorious. But no sooner did the big bourgeoisie climb to power than it put an end to this revolution, thus creating an entirely new political situation.

The third period was the new revolutionary period of 1927-37. As a change had taken place within the revolutionary camp towards the end of the second period, with the big bourgeoisie going over to the counter-revolutionary camp of the imperialist and feudal forces and the national bourgeoisie trailing after it, only three of the four classes formerly within the revolutionary camp remained, *i.e.*, the proletariat, the peasantry and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie (including the revolutionary intellectuals), and consequently the Chinese revolution inevitably entered a new period in which the Chinese Communist Party alone gave leadership to the masses. This period was one of counter-revolutionary campaigns of "encirclement and suppression", on the one hand, and of the deepening of the revolution, on the other. There were two kinds of counter-revolutionary campaigns of encirclement and suppression", the military and the cultural. The deepening of the revolution was of two kinds; both the agrarian and the cultural revolutions were deepened. At the instigation of the imperialists, the counter-revolutionary forces of the whole country and of the whole world were mobilized for both kinds of campaigns of "encirclement and suppression", which lasted no less than ten years and were unparalleled in their ruthlessness; hundreds of thousands of Communists and young students were slaughtered and millions of workers and peasants suffered cruel persecution. The people responsible for all this apparently had no doubt that communism and the Communist Party could be "exterminated once and for all". However, the outcome was different; both kinds of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns failed miserably. The military campaign resulted in the northern march of the Red Army to resist the Japanese, and the cultural campaign resulted in the outbreak of the December 9th Movement of the revolutionary youth in 1935. And the common result of both was the awakening of the people of the whole country. These were three positive results. The most amazing thing of all was that the Kuomintang's cultural "encirclement and suppression" campaign failed completely in the Kuomintang areas as well, although the Communist Party was in an utterly defenceless position in all the cultural and educational institutions there. Why did this happen? Does it not give food for prolonged and deep thought? It was in the very midst of such campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" that Lu Hsun, who believed in communism, became the giant of China's cultural revolution.

The negative result of the counter-revolutionary campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" was the invasion of our country by

Japanese imperialism. This is the chief reason why to this very day the people of the whole country still bitterly detest those ten years of anti-communism.

In the struggles of this period, the revolutionary side firmly upheld the people's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal New Democracy and their new Three People's Principles, while the counter-revolutionary side, under the direction of imperialism, imposed the despotic regime of the coalition of the landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. That despotic regime butchered Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies and his new Three People's Principles both politically and culturally, with catastrophic consequences to the Chinese nation.

The fourth period is that of the present anti-Japanese war. Pursuing its zigzag course, the Chinese revolution has again arrived at a united front of the four classes; but the scope of the united front is now much broader because its upper stratum includes many members of the ruling classes, its middle stratum includes the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, and its lower stratum includes the entire proletariat, so that the various classes and strata of the nation have become members of the alliance resolutely resisting Japanese imperialism. The first stage of this period lasted until the fall of Wuhan. During that stage, there was a lively atmosphere in the country in every field; politically there was a trend towards democracy and culturally there was fairly widespread activity. With the fall of Wuhan the second stage began, during which the political situation has undergone many changes, with one section of the big bourgeoisie capitulating to the enemy and another desiring an early end to the War of Resistance. In the cultural sphere, this situation has been reflected in the reactionary activities of Yeh Ching,[20] Chang Chun-mai and others, and in the suppression of freedom of speech and of the press.

To overcome this crisis, a firm struggle is necessary against all ideas opposed to resistance, unity and progress, and unless these reactionary ideas are crushed, there will be no hope of victory. How will this struggle turn out? This is the big question in the minds of the people of the whole country. Judging by the domestic and international situation, the Chinese people are bound to win, however numerous the obstacles on the path of resistance. The progress achieved during the twenty years since the May 4th Movement exceeds not only that of the preceding eighty years but virtually surpasses that achieved in the thousands of years of Chinese history. Can we not visualize what further progress China will make in another twenty years? The unbridled violence of all the forces of darkness, whether domestic or foreign, has brought disaster to our nation; but this very violence indicates that while the forces of darkness still have some strength left, they are already in their death throes, and that the people are gradually approaching victory. This is true of China, of the whole East and of the entire world.

XIV. SOME WRONG IDEAS ABOUT THE NATURE OF CULTURE

Everything new comes from the forge of hard and bitter struggle. This is also true of the new culture which has followed a zigzag course in the past twenty years, during which both the good and the bad were tested and proved in struggle.

The bourgeois die-hards are as hopelessly wrong on the question of culture as on that of political power. They neither understand the historical characteristics of this new period in China, nor recognize the new-democratic culture of the masses. Their starting point is bourgeois despotism, which in culture becomes the cultural despotism of the bourgeoisie. It seems that a section (and I refer only to a section) of educated people from the so-called European-American school[21] who in fact supported the Kuomintang government's "Communist suppression" campaign on the cultural front in the past are now supporting its policy of "restricting" and "corroding" the Communist Party. They do not want the workers and the peasants to hold up their heads politically or culturally. This bourgeois die-hard road of cultural despotism leads nowhere; as in the case of political despotism, the domestic and international pre-conditions are lacking. Therefore this cultural despotism, too, had better be "folded up".

So far as the orientation of our national culture is concerned, communist ideology plays the guiding role, and we should work hard both to disseminate socialism and communism throughout the working class and to educate the peasantry and other sections of the people in socialism properly and step by step. However, our national culture as a whole is not yet socialist.

Because of the leadership of the proletariat, the politics, the economy and the culture of New Democracy all contain an element of socialism, and by no means a mere casual element but one with a decisive role. However, taken as a whole, the political, economic and cultural situation so far is new-democratic and not socialist. For the Chinese revolution in its present stage is not yet a socialist revolution for the overthrow of capitalism but a bourgeois-democratic revolution, its central task being mainly that of combating foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism. In the sphere of national culture, it is wrong to assume that the existing national culture is, or should be, socialist in its entirety. That would amount to confusing the dissemination of communist ideology with the carrying out of an immediate programme of action, and to confusing the application of the communist standpoint and method in investigating problems, undertaking research, handling work and training cadres with the general policy for national education and national culture in the democratic stage of the Chinese revolution. A national culture with a socialist content will necessarily be the reflection of a socialist politics and a socialist economy. There are socialist elements in our politics and our economy, and hence these socialist elements are reflected in our national culture; but taking our society as a whole, we do not have a socialist politics and a socialist economy yet, so that there cannot be a wholly socialist national culture. Since the present Chinese revolution is part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution, the new culture of China today is part of the world proletarian-socialist new culture and is its great ally. While this part contains vital elements of socialist culture, the national culture as a whole joins the stream of the world proletarian-socialist new culture not entirely as a socialist culture, but as the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal new-democratic culture of the broad masses. And since the Chinese revolution today cannot do without proletarian leadership, China's new culture cannot do without the leadership of proletarian culture and ideology, of communist ideology. At the present stage, however, this kind of leadership means leading the masses of the people in an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal political and cultural revolution, and therefore, taken as a whole, the content of China's new national culture is still not socialist but new-democratic.

Beyond all doubt, now is the time to spread communist ideas more widely and put more energy into the study of Marxism-Leninism, or otherwise we shall not only be unable to lead the Chinese revolution forward to the future stage of socialism, but shall also be unable to guide the present democratic revolution to victory. However, we must keep the spreading of communist ideas and propaganda about the communist social system distinct from the practical application of the new-democratic programme of action; we must also keep the communist theory and method of investigating problems, undertaking research, handling work and training cadres distinct from the new-democratic line for national culture as a whole. It is undoubtedly inappropriate to mix the two up.

It can thus be seen that the content of China's new national culture at the present stage is neither the cultural despotism of the bourgeoisie nor the socialism of the proletariat, but the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal New Democracy of the masses, under the leadership of proletarian-socialist culture and ideology.

XV. A NATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND MASS CULTURE

New-democratic culture is national. It opposes imperialist oppression and upholds the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation. It belongs to our own nation and bears our own national characteristics. It links up with the socialist and new-democratic cultures of all other nations and they are related in such a way that they can absorb something from each other and help each other to develop, together forming a new world culture; but as a revolutionary national culture it can never link up with any reactionary imperialist culture of whatever nation. To nourish her own culture China needs to assimilate a good deal of foreign progressive culture, not enough of which was done in the past. We should assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the present-day socialist and new-democratic cultures but also from the earlier cultures of other nations, for example, from the culture of the various capitalist countries in the Age of Enlightenment. However, we should not gulp any of this foreign material down uncritically, but must treat it as we do our food — first chewing it, then submitting it to the working of the stomach and intestines with their juices and secretions, and separating it into nutriment to be absorbed and waste matter to be discarded — before it can nourish us. To advocate "wholesale westernization"[22] is wrong. China has suffered a great deal from the mechanical absorption of foreign material. Similarly, in applying Marxism to China, Chinese communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form if it is to be useful, and in no circumstances can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula. Marxists who make a fetish of formulas are simply playing the fool with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no room for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution. Chinese culture should have its own form, its own national form. National in form and new-democratic in content — such is our new culture today.

New-democratic culture is scientific. Opposed as it is to all feudal and superstitious ideas, it stands for seeking truth from facts, for objective truth and for the unity of theory and practice. On this point, the possibility exists of a united front against imperialism, feudalism and superstition between the scientific thought of the Chinese proletariat and those Chinese bourgeois materialists and natural scientists who are progressive, but in no case is there a possibility of a united front with any reactionary idealism. In the field of political action Communists may form an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front with some idealists and even religious people, but we can never approve of their idealism or religious doctrines. A splendid old culture was created during the long period of Chinese feudal society. To study the development of this old culture, to reject its feudal dross and assimilate its democratic essence is a necessary condition for developing our new national culture and increasing our national self-confidence, but we should never swallow anything and everything uncritically. It is imperative to separate the fine old culture of the people which had a more or less democratic and revolutionary character from all the decadence of the old feudal ruling class. China's present new politics and new economy have developed out of her old politics and old economy, and her present new culture, too, has developed out of her old culture; therefore, we must respect our own history and must not lop it off. However, respect for history means giving it its proper place as a science, respecting its dialectical development, and not eulogizing the past at the expense of the present or praising every drop of feudal poison. As far as the masses and the young students are concerned, the essential thing is to guide them to look forward and not backward.

New-democratic culture belongs to the broad masses and is therefore democratic. It should serve the toiling masses of workers and peasants who make up more than 90 per cent of the nation's population and should gradually become their very own. There is a difference of degree, as well as a close link, between the knowledge imparted to the revolutionary cadres and the knowledge imparted to the revolutionary masses, between the raising of cultural standards and popularization. Revolutionary culture is a powerful revolutionary weapon for the broad masses of the people. It prepares the ground ideologically before the revolution comes and is an important, indeed essential, fighting front in the general revolutionary front during the revolution. People engaged in revolutionary cultural work are the commanders at various levels on this cultural front. "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement";[23] one can thus see how important the cultural movement is for the practical revolutionary movement. Both the cultural and practical movements must be of the masses. Therefore all progressive cultural workers in the anti-Japanese war must have their own cultural battalions, that is, the broad masses. A revolutionary cultural worker who is not close to the people is a commander without an army, whose fire-power cannot bring the enemy down. To attain this objective, written Chinese must be reformed, given the requisite conditions, and our spoken language brought closer to that of the people, for the people, it must be stressed, are the inexhaustible source of our revolutionary culture.

A national, scientific and mass culture — such is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the people, the culture of New Democracy, the new culture of the Chinese nation.

Combine the politics, the economy and the culture of New Democracy, and you have the new-democratic republic, the Republic of China both in name and in reality, the new China we want to create.

Behold, New China is within sight. Let us all hail her!

Her masts have already risen above the horizon. Let us all cheer in welcome!

Raise both your hands. New China is ours!

NOTES

[1] *Chinese Culture* was a magazine founded in January 1940 in Yenan; the present article appeared in the first number.

[2] See V. I. Lenin, "Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Present Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin", *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., International Publishers, New York, 1943, Vol. IX, p. 54.

[3] Karl Marx, "Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*", *Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, p. 363.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

[4] Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", *Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, p. 405.

[5] J. V. Stalin, "The October Revolution and the National Question", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1953, Vol. IV, pp. 169-70.

[6] J. V. Stalin, "The National Question Once Again", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. VII, pp. 225-27.

[7] V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1950, Vol. I, Part 2, p. 566.

[8] These anti-Soviet campaigns were instigated by the Kuomintang government following Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution. On December 13, 1927, the Kuomintang murdered the Soviet vice-consul in Canton and on the next day its government in Nanking issued a decree breaking off relations with Russia, withdrawing official recognition from Soviet consuls in the provinces and ordering Soviet commercial establishments to cease activity. In August 1929 Chiang Kai-shek, under the instigation of the imperialists, organized acts of provocation in the Northeast against the Soviet Union, which resulted in armed clashes.

[9] After World War I the British imperialists instigated their vassal Greece to commit aggression against Turkey, but the Turkish people, with the help of the Soviet Union, defeated the Greek troops in 1922. In 1923, Kemal was elected President of Turkey. Stalin said:

> A Kemalist revolution is a revolution of the top stratum, a revolution of the national merchant bourgeoisie, arising in a struggle against the foreign imperialists, and whose subsequent development is essentially directed against the peasants and workers, against the very possibility of an agrarian revolution. ("Talk with Students of the Sun Yat-sen University", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. IX, p. 261.)

[10] The "metaphysics-mongers" were Chang Chun-mai and his group. After the May 4th Movement, Chang openly opposed science and advocated metaphysics, or what he called "spiritual culture", and thus came to be known as a "metaphysics-monger". In order to support Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese aggressors, he published an "Open Letter to Mr. Mao Tse-tung" in December 1938 at Chiang Kai-shek's bidding, wildly demanding the abolition of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

[11] See the manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the establishment of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, issued in September 1937.

[12] See Dr. Sun Yat-sen, *Lectures on the Principle of People's Livelihood*, 1924, Lecture II.

[13] Vitalism was an exposition of Kuomintang fascism, a hotch-potch ghost-written by a number of reactionary hacks for Chen Li-fu, one of the notorious chiefs of Chiang Kai-shek's secret service.

[14] The "doctrine of distribution according to labour" was a high-sounding slogan shamelessly put forward by Yen Hsi-shan, warlord and representative of the big landlords and big compradors in Shansi Province.

[15] "Fight Against Attacks from Both Sides" was the title of an article written by Wang Ching-wei after his betrayal of the revolution in 1927.

[16] J. V. Stalin, "Concerning the National Question in Yugoslavia", a speech delivered in the Yugoslav Commission of the E.C.C.I., March 30, 1925. Stalin said:

> . . . the peasantry constitutes the main army of the national movement, . . . there is no powerful national movement without the peasant army, nor can

> there be. That is what is meant when it is said that, in essence, the national question is a peasant question. (*Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. VII, pp. 71-72.)

[17] The "principle of going up into the hills" was a dogmatist gibe against Comrade Mao Tse-tung for his emphasis on rural revolutionary bases. He makes use of the expression to explain the importance of the role played by the rural revolutionary bases.

[18] The modern school system was the educational system modelled on that of capitalist countries in Europe and America. The imperial examination system was the old examination system in feudal China. Towards the end of the 19th century, enlightened Chinese intellectuals urged the abolition of the old competitive examination system and the establishment of modern schools.

[19] The June 3rd Movement marked a new stage in the patriotic movement of May 4. On June 3, 1919, students in Peking held public meetings and made speeches in defiance of persecution and repression by the army and police. They went on strike and the strike spread to the workers and merchants in Shanghai, Nanking Tientsin, Hangchow, Wuhan and Kiukiang and in the provinces of Shantung and Anhwei. Thus the May 4th Movement grew into a broad mass movement in which the proletariat, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie all participated.

[20] Yeh Ching was a renegade Communist who became a hired hack in the Kuomintang secret service.

[21] The spokesman of the so-called European-American school was the counter-revolutionary Hu Shih.

[22] Wholesale westernization was the view held by a number of westernized Chinese bourgeois intellectuals who unconditionally praised the outmoded individualist bourgeois culture of the West and advocated the servile imitation of capitalist Europe and America.

[23] V. I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?", *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1961, Vol. V, p. 369.

OVERCOME THE DANGER OF CAPITULATION AND STRIVE FOR A TURN FOR THE BETTER

January 28, 1940

Current developments confirm the correctness of the Central Committee's appraisals. The line of capitulation taken by the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie runs sharply counter to the line of armed resistance taken by the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, and there is a struggle between the two. Both lines exist at present, and one or the other can win out in the future. What all our Party comrades must realize in this connection is that the serious cases of capitulation, anti-communism and retrogression which have occurred in various places should not be viewed in isolation. We should realize their seriousness, combat them resolutely and not be overwhelmed by their impact. If we lack this spirit and a correct policy for dealing firmly with these incidents, if we let the Kuomintang die-hards continue their "military and political restriction of the Communist Party" and are in constant dread at the thought of the break-up of the united front, then the War of Resistance will be jeopardized, capitulation and anti-communism will spread throughout the country, and there will be a real danger of the break-up of the united front. But it must be made abundantly clear that many objective conditions favourable to our struggle for continued resistance, unity and progress are still present both at home and abroad. For example, Japan's policy towards China remains as tough as ever; it is very difficult to rig up a Far Eastern Munich conference because there has been no real reconciliation between Japan on the one hand and Britain, the United States and France on the other despite some lessening of the contradictions between them, and because the British and

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This was an inner-Party directive written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

French positions in the East have been weakened by the European war; and the Soviet Union is actively helping China. These are the international factors which render it difficult for the Kuomintang to capitulate or compromise, or to launch a nation-wide anti-Communist war. At home, the Communist Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are firmly opposing capitulation and upholding the policy of resistance and unity; the intermediate classes, too, are against capitulation; and the capitulators and the die-hards within the Kuomintang, though in power, are numerically a minority. These are the domestic factors which render it difficult for the Kuomintang to capitulate or compromise, or to launch a nation-wide anti-Communist war. In these circumstances, our Party has a twofold task. On the one hand, it must resolutely resist the military and political offensives of the capitulators and die-hards. On the other, it must actively develop the united front of the political parties, the government organs, the armed forces, the civilian population and the intellectuals; it must do its utmost to win over the majority of the Kuomintang, the intermediate classes and sympathizers in the armies fighting Japan, to deepen the mass movement, to win over the intellectuals, to consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas, expand the anti-Japanese armed forces and the organs of anti-Japanese political power, and consolidate our Party and ensure its progress. If we do both these tasks simultaneously, we shall be able to overcome the danger of capitulation by the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and to bring about a turn for the better in the whole situation. Therefore, the present general policy of the Party is to strive for a turn for the better and at the same time to be on guard against any emergencies (such emergencies, so far, being on a limited and local scale).

Now that Wang Ching-wei has announced his traitorous pact[1] and Chiang Kai-shek has published his message to the nation, it is beyond doubt that the agitation for peace will suffer a setback and that the forces favouring resistance will grow; on the other hand, the "military and political restriction of the Communist Party" will continue, there will be more local incidents, and the Kuomintang may stress so-called "unification against the foreign enemy" in order to attack us. The reason is that the forces supporting resistance and progress cannot build up enough strength in the immediate future to overwhelm the forces supporting capitulation and retrogression. Our policy is to spare no effort in extending the propaganda campaign against Wang Ching-wei's traitorous pact in all parts of the country having Communist Party organizations. In his message, Chiang Kai-shek states that he will carry on the War of Resistance, but.he does not stress the need to strengthen national unity, nor does he mention any policy for persevering in resistance and progress, without which it would be impossible to persist in the war. Hence in the campaign against Wang Ching-wei we should stress the following points: (1) support the national policy of waging the War of Resistance to the very end and oppose Wang Ching-wei's traitorous pact; (2) the whole country must unite and overthrow the traitor Wang Ching-wei and his puppet central government; (3) support Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and crush Wang Ching-wei's anti-Communist policy; (4) down with the hidden traitors of the Wang Ching-wei brand, anti-communism being Wang Ching-wei's plot for splitting the anti-Japanese united front; (5) strengthen national unity and eliminate internal "friction"; (6) introduce political reforms, unfold the movement for constitutionalism and institute democracy; (7) lift the ban on political parties and grant legal status to anti-Japanese parties and groups; (8) guarantee the people freedom of speech and assembly in order to combat the Japanese and the traitors; (9) consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas and oppose the disruptive plots of the Wang Ching-wei brand of traitors; (10) support the troops who are fighting really well in the war and give adequate supplies to the fronts; and (11) promote cultural activities which help the cause of resistance, protect the progressive youth and proscribe all expression of collaborationist views. The above slogans should be widely publicized. Large numbers of articles, manifestoes, leaflets and pamphlets should be published and speeches delivered, and other slogans suitable to local circumstances should be added.

A mass rally to denounce Wang Ching-wei's traitorous pact is scheduled to be held on February 1 in Yenan. Together with the people of all circles and with the anti-Japanese members of the Kuomintang, we should organize similar mass rallies in all areas in the early part or the middle of February in order to create a nation-wide upsurge against capitulation, against the collaborators and against "friction".

NOTES

[1] Wang Ching-wei signed a traitorous secret pact, called the "Programme for Readjusting Sino-Japanese Relations", with the Japanese aggressors at the end of 1939. According to its main provisions:

(1) Northeastern China was to be ceded to Japan and the "Mongolian Territory" (*i.e.*, what was at that time Suiyuan, Chahar and northern Shansi), northern China, the lower Yangtse valley and the islands in southern China were to be marked off as "zones for close Sino-Japanese collaboration", that is, as zones permanently occupied by Japanese troops.

(2) From its central government down to the local governments, the puppet regime was to be under the supervision of Japanese advisors and officials.

(3) The puppet troops and police were to be trained by Japanese military instructors and their equipment was to be supplied by Japan.

(4) The puppet government's fiscal and economic policies, its industrial and agricultural enterprises and its means of communication were to be controlled by Japan, and China's natural resources were to be freely exploited by Japan.

(5) All anti-Japanese activities were to be prohibited.

UNITE ALL ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES AND COMBAT THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS

February 1, 1940

Why are we, the people of all circles in Yenan, meeting here today? We are here to denounce the traitor Wang Ching-wei, we are here to unite all anti-Japanese forces and to combat the anti-Communist die-hards.

Time and again we Communists have pointed out that Japanese imperialism is set in its policy of subjugating China. Whatever cabinet changes there may be in Japan, she will not change her basic policy of subjugating China and reducing it to a colony. Frightened out of his wits by this fact, Wang Ching-wei, the political representative of the pro-Japanese faction of the Chinese big bourgeoisie, grovels before Japan and concludes a traitorous pact, betraying China to Japanese imperialism. Moreover, he wants to set up a puppet government and army in opposition to the anti-Japanese government and army. Of late he has hardly mentioned opposition to Chiang Kai-shek and is said to have shifted over to "alliance with Chiang". Anti-communism is the main objective both of Japan and of Wang Ching-wei. Knowing that the Communist Party is the most resolute in fighting Japan and that Kuomintang-Communist co-operation means greater strength for resistance, they are trying their hardest to break up this co-operation and to separate the two parties, or better still, to set them to fighting each other. Hence they have used the die-hards within the Kuomintang to create trouble everywhere. In Hunan, there was the Pingkiang massacre;[1] in Honan, the Chuehshan massacre;[2] in Shansi, the old army attacked the new army;[3] in Hopei, Chang Yin-wu attacked

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this speech at a mass rally in Yenan to denounce Wang Ching-wei.

the Eighth Route Army;[4] in Shantung, Chin Chi-jung attacked the guerrillas;[5] in eastern Hupeh, Cheng Ju-huai killed between five and six hundred Communists;[6] and as for the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, the die-hards are trying to set up a spy network from within and enforce a "blockade" from without, and are preparing an armed attack.[7] In addition, they have arrested a large number of progressive young people and put them in concentration camps;[8] they have hired that metaphysics-monger Chang Chun-mai to make reactionary proposals for the liquidation of the Communist Party, the abolition of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the disbandment of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies; and they have hired the Trotskyite Yeh Ching and others to write articles abusing the Communist Party. All this has one purpose only — to disrupt resistance to Japan and turn the Chinese people into colonial slaves.[9]

Thus, the Wang Ching-wei clique and the anti-Communist die-hards in the Kuomintang have been working in collusion, one from without and the other from within, and have created pandemonium.

This state of affairs has infuriated large numbers of people who think that the resistance to Japan is now finished and done for and that the members of the Kuomintang are all scoundrels who ought to be opposed. We must say that their fury is entirely justified, for how can anybody help becoming infuriated in the face of such a grave situation? But resistance to Japan is not finished and done for, nor are all Kuomintang members scoundrels. Different policies should be adopted towards the different sections of the Kuomintang. Those conscienceless scoundrels who had the audacity to stab the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in the back, to perpetrate the massacres at Pingkiang and Chuehshan, to disrupt the Border Region and to attack progressive armies and organizations and progressive individuals — these scoundrels must not be tolerated but must be dealt counterblows; any concession to them is out of the question. For they are so utterly devoid of conscience that they are even creating "friction" and perpetrating massacres and splits after our national enemy has penetrated deep into our territory. Whatever they may think, they are actually helping Japan and Wang Ching-wei, and some of them have been undercover traitors from the very outset. Failure to punish them would be a mistake; it would be an encouragement to the collaborators and traitors, it would be disloyalty to the national resistance and to our motherland, and an invitation to the scoundrels to disrupt the united front. It would be a violation of the policy of our Party.

However, the sole purpose, of the policy of dealing blows to the capitulators and the anti-Communist die-hards is to keep up the resistance to Japan and safeguard the anti-Japanese united front. Therefore, we should show goodwill towards those Kuomintang members who are not capitulators or anti-Communist die-hards but are loyal to the War of Resistance; we should unite with them, respect them and be willing to continue our long-term co-operation with them so as to put our country in order. Whoever does otherwise is also violating the policy of the Party.

The policy of our Party is twofold: on the one hand to unite all the progressive forces and all people loyal to the cause of resisting Japan, and on the other to oppose all the heartless scoundrels, the capitulators and the anti-Communist die-hards. Both these aspects of our policy have a single objective — to bring about a turn for the better and defeat Japan. The task of the Communist Party and the people all over the country is to unite all the forces of resistance and progress, to combat all the forces of capitulation and retrogression, and to work hard to stop the present deterioration and change the situation for the better. This is our basic policy. We are optimistic, we shall never become pessimistic or despairing. We are not afraid of any attacks by the capitulators or the anti-Communist die-hards. We must smash them, and we certainly shall. China will surely achieve national liberation; China will never perish. China will surely achieve progress, the present retrogression is only a temporary phenomenon.

In our meeting today we also want to make it clear to the people throughout the country that the unity and progress of the whole nation are essential to the War of Resistance. Some people emphasize resistance alone and are reluctant to emphasize unity and progress, or even fail to mention them. This is wrong. How can the War of Resistance be maintained without genuine and firm unity, without rapid and solid progress? The anti-Communist die-hards within the Kuomintang emphasize unification, but their so-called unification is not genuine but a sham, not a rational but an irrational unification, not a unification in substance but in form. They howl for unification, but what they really want is to liquidate the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, on the pretext that China cannot be unified so long as these exist. They want to turn everything over to the Kuomintang and not merely to continue but to extend their one-party dictatorship. If this were to occur, what unification could there be? Truth to tell, if the

Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region had not stepped forth and sincerely advocated ending the civil war and uniting for resistance to Japan, there would have been nobody to initiate the Anti-Japanese National United Front or to take the lead in the peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident, and there would have been no possibility at all of resisting Japan. And if today the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the anti-Japanese democratic base areas did not step forth and sincerely sustain the resistance to Japan and combat the dangerous tendencies towards capitulation, a split and retrogression, the situation would indeed be in a terrible mess. The several hundred thousand troops of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are holding two-fifths of the enemy forces in check by engaging seventeen out of the forty Japanese divisions.[10] Why should these armies be disbanded? The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region is the most progressive region in the country, it is a democratic anti-Japanese base area. Here there are, first, no corrupt officials; second, no local tyrants and evil gentry; third, no gambling; fourth, no prostitutes; fifth, no concubines; sixth, no beggars; seventh, no narrow self-seeking cliques; eighth, no atmosphere of dejection and laxity; ninth, no professional friction-mongers; and tenth, no war profiteers. Why then should the Border Region be abolished? Only people without any sense of shame dare suggest anything so shameful. What right have these die-hards to breathe a word against us? No, Comrades! What needs to be done is not to abolish the Border Region but to get the whole country to follow its example, not to disband the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies but to get the whole country to follow their example, not to liquidate the Communist Party but to get the whole country to follow its example, not to pull progressive people back to the level of backward people but to get the latter to catch up with the former. We Communists are the staunchest advocates of unification; it is we who have initiated and maintained the united front and who have put forward the slogan for a unified democratic republic. Who else could have proposed these things? Who else could have put them into effect? Who else could be content with a monthly allowance of only five yuan?[11] Who else could have formed such a clean and incorruptible government? There is unification and unification. The capitulators have their idea of unification, they want to unify us into capitulating; the anti-Communist die-hards have their idea of unification, they want to unify us into splitting and retrogression. Could we ever accept these ideas of theirs? Can any unification that is not based on resistance, unity and progress be considered genuine? Or rational? Or real unification? What a pipe dream! It is to put forward our own idea of unification that we are meeting here today. Our idea of unification is identical with that of all the people of China, of every man and woman with a conscience. It is based on resistance, unity and progress. Only through progress can we achieve unity; only through unity can we resist Japan; and only through progress, unity and resistance can the country be unified. This is our idea of unification, a genuine, rational, real unification. The idea of a sham, irrational and formal unification is one which would lead to national subjugation and which is held by persons utterly devoid of conscience. These people want to destroy the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the anti-Japanese democratic base areas, and wipe out all the local anti-Japanese forces, in order to establish unification under the Kuomintang. This is a plot, an attempt to perpetuate autocratic rule under the guise of unification, to sell the dog-meat of their one-party dictatorship under the label of the sheep's head of unification; it is a plot of brazen-faced braggarts who are lost to all sense of shame. We are meeting here today precisely to punch holes in this paper tiger of theirs. Let us relentlessly combat these anti-Communist die-hards.

NOTES

[1] For the Pingkiang massacre, see "The Reactionaries Must Be Punished", Note 1, p. 260 of this volume.

[2] The Chuehshan massacre occurred on November 11, 1939, when more than 1,800 Kuomintang secret agents and soldiers attacked the liaison offices of the New Fourth Army in the town of Chukou, Chuehshan County, Honan. Over two hundred people were murdered, including New Fourth Army officers and soldiers who had been wounded in the anti-Japanese war and members of their families.

[3] The old army refers to the troops under Yen Hsi-shan, the Kuomintang warlord in Shansi; the new army, known as the Anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die Corps, was the people's anti-Japanese army of Shansi which grew up under the influence and leadership of the Communist Party. In December 1939 Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan concentrated six army corps in western Shansi to attack the corps, but met with a smashing defeat. At the same time, Yen's troops in southeastern Shansi attacked the anti-Japanese democratic county governments and mass organizations in the Yangcheng-Chincheng area and murdered a great number of Communists and progressives.

[4] Chang Yin-wu, commander of the peace preservation corps of the Kuomintang brigands in Hopei, sprang a surprise attack on the liaison offices of the Eighth Route Army in Shenhsien County, Hopei, in June 1939 and slaughtered more than four hundred of its cadres and soldiers.

[5] In April 1939, on the instructions of Shen Hung-lieh, the Kuomintang governor of Shantung, Chin Chi-jung's bandit troops attacked the Third Guerrilla Detachment of the Shantung Column of the Eighth Route Army at Poshan, killing four hundred men, including regimental officers.

[6] In September 1939, Cheng Ju-huai, a Kuomintang military commander in eastern Hupeh, attacked the liaison offices of the New Fourth Army and killed between five and six hundred Communists.

[7] From the winter of 1939 to the spring of 1940 the Kuomintang troops seized the county towns of Chunhua, Hsunyi, Chengning, Ninghsien and Chenyuan in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

[8] Imitating the German and Italian fascists, the Kuomintang reactionaries established during the anti-Japanese war many concentration camps which extended from Lanchow and Sian in the Northwest to Kanchow and Shangjao in the Southeast. Large numbers of Communists, patriots and progressive youth were interned in them.

[9] After the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, the Kuomintang intensified its anti-Communist activities. In February 1939 Chiang Kai-shek secretly issued such documents as "Measures for Dealing with the Communist Problem" and "Measures for Guarding Against Communist Activities in the Japanese-Occupied Areas", and stepped up his political repression of the Communist Party in the Kuomintang-controlled areas and his military attacks on it in central and northern China. The culmination was the first large-scale anti-Communist onslaught of December 1939-March 1940.

[10] The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies later engaged an even larger number of Japanese troops. By 1943 they were fighting 64 pet cent of Japan's forces of aggression and 95 per cent of the puppet troops.

[11] Five yuan was the average monthly allowance for all men serving in the anti-Japanese armed forces and in the anti-Japanese government offices under Communist leadership.

TEN DEMANDS ON THE KUOMINTANG

February 1, 1940

This mass rally against Wang Ching-wei, held in Yenan on February 1, unanimously resolves, in righteous indignation, to denounce his treason and capitulation and to wage the War of Resistance Against Japan to the very end. To overcome the present crisis and ensure victory in the War of Resistance, we hereby submit ten major points for saving the country, in the hope that the National Government, all political parties and groups, all officers and men fighting in the War of Resistance and all our fellow-countrymen will accept them and act upon them.

1. *Let the whole nation denounce the Wang Ching-weis.* Now that the traitor Wang Ching-wei has gathered his gang together, betrayed his country, attached himself to the enemy and signed traitorous secret pacts, playing the jackal to the tiger, all our countrymen demand his death. But this only takes care of the open Wang Ching-weis and leaves out the undercover ones. The latter are either craftily seizing key posts and swaggering about, or working obscurely and worming their way into all walks of life. In effect, the corrupt officials are part of the Wang Ching-wei gang and all the friction-mongers are its underlings. Unless there is a national campaign to denounce the Wang Ching-weis, a campaign in town and country and from top to bottom in which everyone is mobilized, including all political parties, government organs, armed forces, civilian bodies, the press and the educational institutions, the Wang Ching-wei gang will never be eradicated but will persist in its nefarious activities, doing incalculable damage by opening the door to the enemy from without and by subversion from within. The government should issue a decree calling on the whole people to repudiate the Wang Ching-weis. Wherever the

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This was an open telegram drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf of the Yenan mass rally denouncing Wang Ching-wei.

decree is not carried out, the officials should be called to account. The Wang Ching-wei gang must be extirpated. This is the first point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

2. *Strengthen unity.* Nowadays some people talk not of unity but of unification, and the implication is that unification means nothing short of liquidating the Communist Party, disbanding the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, abolishing the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and demolishing the anti-Japanese forces everywhere. What this kind of talk ignores is the fact that the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region are the staunchest advocates of unification in all China Was it not they who recommended the peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident? Is it not they who have initiated the Anti-Japanese National United Front, proposed a unified democratic republic and worked really hard for both? Is it not they who are standing at the forefront of the nation's defences, resisting seventeen enemy divisions, shielding the Central Plains and the Northwest and defending northern China and the regions south of the lower Yangtse, and resolutely applying the Three People's Principles and the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction? Yet the moment Wang Ching-wei openly came out against the Communists and sided with the Japanese, sorcerers like Chang Chun-mai and Yeh Ching chimed in with tendentious articles, and the anti-Communist and die-hard cliques joined in by stirring up "friction". Autocratic rule has been imposed in the name of unification. The principle of unity has been discarded and the thin end of the wedge of disruption driven in. This Szuma Chao trick is obvious to every man in the street.[1] The Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the Border Region stand firmly for genuine and against sham unification, for rational and against irrational unification, and for unification in substance and against unification in form. They advocate unification for resistance and not for capitulation, for unity and not for division, for progress and not for retrogression. Unification on the basis of these three — resistance, unity and progress — is genuine, rational and real unification. To seek unification on any other basis, whatever intrigues or tricks are used, is like "going south by driving the chariot north"; with that we beg to disagree. All the local anti-Japanese forces should be looked after equally well, without discriminating against some and favouring others; all of them should be trusted, provisioned, supported,

and encouraged with rewards. There should be sincerity and not hypocrisy, large-mindedness and not pettiness, in dealing with people. If things are really done in this way, all except those with ulterior motives will unite and take the road of national unification. It is an unalterable truth that unification must be based on unity and unity in its turn must be based on progress, and that only progress can bring unity and only unity can bring unification. This is the second point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

3. *Put constitutional government into effect.* The long years of "political tutelage" have yielded nothing. "A thing turns into its opposite if pushed too far"; hence constitutional government is now on the order of the day. There is still no freedom of speech, the ban on political parties has not been lifted, and constitutionalism is violated everywhere. If the constitution is drawn up on these lines, it will be a mere scrap of official paper. Such constitutionalism will be no different from one-party dictatorship. Now that there is a profound national crisis, with the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei harassing us from without and the traitors disrupting us from within, our existence as a nation and people will be placed in jeopardy unless there is a change of policy. The government should immediately lift the ban on the political parties and encourage freedom of opinion to show that it sincerely intends to put constitutionalism into practice. Nothing is more urgent for winning the full confidence of the people and shaping the destiny of the nation anew. This is the third point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

4. *Put an end to the "friction".* Since the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" were introduced in March last year, the clamour for "restricting", "corroding" and "combating" the Communist Party has reverberated throughout the country, there has been one tragic incident after another, and blood has flown freely. As if this were not enough, the additional "Measures for Dealing with the Alien Party Problem" were introduced in October last year. Then there are the "Directives for Dealing with the Alien Party Problem" in northwestern, northern and central China. People have been saying, and quite justifiably, that "political restriction" of the Communist Party has been succeeded by "military restriction". In fact, restricting communism equals anti-communism. And anti-communism is the cunning and pernicious scheme used by the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei for subjugating China. That is why the people are suspicious and

shocked and are telling one another about it, and are afraid that the bitter tragedy of a decade ago is being re-enacted. Matters have gone far enough, with the Pingkiang Massacre in Hunan, the Chuehshan Massacre in Honan, the attack on the Eighth Route Army by Chang Yin-wu in Hopei, the attack on the guerrillas by Chin Chi-jung in Shantung, the ruthless slaughter of between five and six hundred Communists by Cheng Ju-huai in eastern Hupeh, the large-scale assaults on the garrison forces of the Eighth Route Army by the Central Army in eastern Kansu and, more recently, the tragedy in Shansi where the old army attacked the new army and invaded positions held by the Eighth Route Army. If such incidents are not immediately prohibited, both sides will be doomed, and what hope will there be then of victory over Japan? For the sake of unity in the War of Resistance, the government should order the punishment of all the perpetrators of these massacres and announce to the whole nation that no such incident will be allowed to recur. This is the fourth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

5. *Protect the youth.* Concentration camps have recently been set up near Sian, and people have been horrified to learn that more than seven hundred progressive young people from the northwestern and central provinces have already been interned there, subjected to mental and physical bondage and treated like convicts. What crime have they committed to deserve such cruelty? Young people are the cream of the nation, and the progressive ones in particular are our most precious asset in the War of Resistance. Everyone should enjoy freedom of belief; ideas can never be suppressed by force of arms. The crime of the ten years of "cultural suppression" is known to everyone; why should anyone desire to repeat it today? The government should immediately issue a nation-wide order for the protection of youth, for the abolition of the concentration camps near Sian and for the strict prohibition of the outrageous attacks on young people in various places. This is the fifth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

6. *Support the front.* Troops who are fighting in the very front line and with fine records of service, such as the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and certain other units, are receiving the worst treatment; they are thinly clad, badly fed and kept short of ammunition and medicines. Yet unscrupulous traitors are allowed to slander them. There is a deafening din of countless absurd slanders against them. Merit goes unrewarded and distinguished service uncited, while false

charges and malicious plots become more and more brazen. This fantastic state of affairs dampens the ardour of our officers and men and wins applause only from the enemy; on no account must it be allowed to continue. To lift up the hearts of the troops and so help the war, the government should adequately provision the front-line troops who have good service records and at the same time strictly prohibit the treacherous slanders and accusations against them. This is the sixth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

7. *Proscribe the secret service.* People are comparing the secret service agents to Chou Hsing and Lai Chun-chen[2] of the Tang Dynasty and Wei Chung-hsien and Liu Chin[3] of the Ming Dynasty because of their lawlessness and violence. Ignoring the enemy and concentrating on our own countrymen, they are committing innumerable murders and insatiably taking bribes; in fact the secret service is the headquarters of the rumour-mongers and a breeding ground of treason and evil. Ordinary people everywhere recoil and turn away in fear from these fiendish brutes of agents. To preserve its own prestige, the government should immediately proscribe these activities of the secret service and reorganize it, defining its duties as exclusively directed against the enemy and the traitors, so that the people's confidence may be restored and the foundations of the state strengthened. This is the seventh point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

8. *Dismiss corrupt officials.* Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, there have been cases of officials netting up to 100 million yuan out of the national crisis and taking as many as eight or nine concubines. Conscription, government bonds, economic controls, famine relief and war relief, all without exception have become money-making opportunities for corrupt officials. With such a pack of wolves running wild, no wonder the country's affairs are in chaos. The people are seething with discontent and anger, yet none dare expose the ruthlessness of these officials. To save the country from collapse, drastic and effective steps should immediately be taken to clear out all corrupt officials. This is the eighth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

9. *Put the Testament of Dr. Sun Yat-sen into effect.* The Testament says:

> For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution with the aim of winning freedom and equality for China. My experiences during these forty years have firmly

> convinced me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses of the people. . . .

A most remarkable statement indeed, and we the 450 million people of China are all familiar with it. But the Testament is more often chanted than carried out. Desecrators of the Testament are rewarded while those who honour it in their acts are punished. What could be more preposterous? The government should decree that anyone who dares to violate the Testament and who tramples on the masses of the people instead of arousing them will be punished for profaning Dr. Sun Yat-sen's memory. This is the ninth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

10. *Put the Three People's Principles into effect.* The Three People's Principles are the platform of the Kuomintang. Yet many people, making anti-communism their first duty, are giving up the war effort and doing everything possible to suppress and hold back the people as they rise to resist Japan, which is tantamount to abandoning the Principle of Nationalism; officials are depriving the people of all democratic rights, which is tantamount to abandoning the Principle of Democracy, they are ignoring the people's sufferings, which is tantamount to abandoning the Principle of the People's Livelihood. Such persons pay only lip-service to the Three People's Principles and either ridicule those who seriously try to put them into effect as busybodies or severely punish them. Thus, all sorts of fantastic abuses have sprung up and the government's prestige has reached rock bottom. An unequivocal order should immediately be issued for the strict carrying out of the Three People's Principles throughout the country. Those who violate the order should be severely punished and all who carry it out amply encouraged. It is only in this way that the Three People's Principles can at long last be put into effect and the foundations laid for victory in the war. This is the tenth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

These ten proposals are essential measures for saving the nation and winning the war. Now that the enemy is stepping up his aggression against China and traitor Wang Ching-wei is running wild, we dare not remain silent on what we feel to be crucial issues. Please accept and act upon these proposals, and great advantage will ensue to the War of Resistance and the cause of national liberation. It is with a keen sense of urgency that we state our views, and we await your considered opinion.

NOTES

[1] Szuma Chao was a prime minister of the state of Wei (220-265) who nursed a secret ambition to ascend the throne. The emperor once remarked: “Szuma Chao’s intention is obvious to every man in the street.”

[2] Chou Hsing and Lai Chun-chen were notoriously cruel inquisitors in the Tang Dynasty. They organized a network of spies who wantonly arrested people they disliked and subjected these people to all kinds of torture.

[3] Liu Chin and Wei Chung-hsien were eunuchs in the Ming Dynasty. The first was a favourite of Emperor Wu Tsung (in the 16th century), and the second of Emperor Hsi Tsung (in the 17th century). They made use of large secret services to persecute and murder those who opposed them.

INTRODUCING *THE CHINESE WORKER*

February 7, 1940

The publication of *The Chinese Worker*[1] meets a need. Led by its own political party, the Communist Party of China, the Chinese working class has waged heroic struggles for the past twenty years and become the most politically awakened section of the people and the leader of the Chinese revolution. Rallying the peasantry and all revolutionary people against imperialism and feudalism, it has fought to establish a new-democratic China and to drive out Japanese imperialism, and its contribution has been outstanding. But the Chinese revolution has not yet triumphed and great efforts are still needed to unite the working class itself and to unite the peasantry and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and the entire revolutionary people. This is a tremendous political and organizational task. The responsibility for its accomplishment rests on the Communist Party of China, on the progressive workers and on the entire working class. The ultimate liberation of the working class and the people as a whole will be achieved only under socialism, which is the final goal the Chinese proletariat must struggle to attain. But before we can enter the stage of socialism, we must pass through the stage of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution. The immediate task of the Chinese working class, therefore, is to strengthen unity in its own ranks and unite the people, to oppose imperialism and feudalism, and to struggle for a new China, a China of New Democracy. *The Chinese Worker* is being published with just this task in view.

Using simple language, *The Chinese Worker* will explain the hows and whys of many issues to the workers, report the realities of the working-class struggle in the War of Resistance and sum up the experience gained, and in this way it will endeavour to fulfil its task.

The Chinese Worker should become a school for educating the workers and for training cadres from their midst, and the readers will be its students. It is necessary to educate many cadres from among the workers, knowledgeable and capable cadres who do not seek empty fame but are ready for honest work. It is impossible for the working class to attain liberation without large numbers of such cadres.

The working class should welcome the help of the revolutionary intellectuals and never refuse it. For without their help the working class itself cannot go forward nor can the revolution succeed.

I hope that the journal will be well edited and that it will publish a good deal of lively writing, carefully avoiding wooden and trite articles which are flat, insipid and unintelligible.

Once started, a journal must be run conscientiously and well. This is the responsibility of the readers as well as of the staff. It is very important for the readers to send in suggestions and write brief letters and articles indicating what they like and what they dislike, for this is the only way to make the journal a success.

With these few words I express my hopes; let them serve as an introduction to *The Chinese Worker.*

NOTES

[1] *The Chinese Worker* was a monthly founded in February 1940 in Yenan and published under the auspices of the Trade Union Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

WE MUST STRESS UNITY AND PROGRESS

February 10, 1940

Resistance, unity and progress — these are the three major principles which the Communist Party put forward last July 7 on the second anniversary of the War of Resistance. The three form an organic whole, and not one of them can be dispensed with. If the stress is solely on resistance to the exclusion of unity and progress, then such "resistance" will be neither dependable nor enduring. Without a programme for unity and progress, resistance must sooner or later turn into capitulation or end in defeat. We Communists hold that the three must be integrated. For the sake of the War of Resistance, it is necessary to fight against capitulation, against Wang Ching-wei's traitorous pact with Japan, against his puppet regime, and against all the traitors and capitulators concealed in the anti-Japanese ranks. For the sake of unity, it is necessary to oppose splitting activities and internal "friction", to oppose the stabbing of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and other progressive anti-Japanese groups in the back, to oppose the disruption of the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines and of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region which is the rear area of the Eighth Route Army, to oppose the denial of legal status to the Communist Party and the avalanche of documents for "restricting the activities of alien parties". For the sake of progress, it is necessary to oppose retrogression and the shelving of the Three People's Principles and of the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, to oppose the refusal to carry out the injunction in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament to "arouse the masses of the people", to oppose the internment of progressive young people in concentration camps, to oppose the suppression of what little freedom of speech and of the press there was in the early days of the War of Resistance, to oppose

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This article was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the *New China News* of Yenan on the occasion of its first anniversary.

the scheme to turn the movement for constitutional government into the private concern of a few bureaucrats, to oppose the attacks on the new army, the persecution of the League of Self-Sacrifice and the massacre of progressives in Shansi,[1] to oppose the activities of the Three People's Principles Youth League in kidnapping people along the Hsienyang-Yulin Highway and the Lunghai Railway,[2] to oppose such shameless practices as taking nine concubines and making fortunes of 100 million yuan out of the national crisis, and to oppose the unbridled brutality of the corrupt officials and the local tyrants and evil gentry. Without opposing all these and without unity and progress, "resistance" will be just empty talk and victory a vain hope. What will be the political orientation of the *New China News* in its second year? It will be to stress unity and progress and oppose all the vicious practices which are detrimental to the war, so that further successes can be achieved in our cause of resistance to Japan.

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[1] The League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation in Shansi was a local anti-Japanese mass organization formed in 1936 which co-operated closely with the Communist Party. It played an important role in the anti-Japanese fighting there. In December 1939 Yen Hsi-shan, the Kuomintang warlord-governor of Shansi openly began to suppress the league in the western part of the province and brutally killed a great number of Communists, officers of the league and other progressives.

[2] In 1939 the Kuomintang drew a cordon along the Hsienyang-Yulin Highway and the Lunghai (Kansu-Haichow) Railway by setting up a number of check-posts in the guise of "hostels" of the Three People's Principles Youth League. Secret agents posted at these hostels, working together with the Kuomintang troops, arrested progressive young people and intellectuals entering or leaving the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and interned them in concentration camps, where they were either cruelly murdered or compelled to turn informer against the Communist Party.

NEW-DEMOCRACTIC CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

February 20, 1940

It is highly significant that representatives of the people of all circles in Yenan are meeting here today to inaugurate the Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government and that everybody has become interested in constitutionalism. What is the purpose of our meeting? It is to facilitate the full expression of the popular will, the defeat of Japan and the building of a new China.

Armed resistance to Japan, which we all support, is already being carried out, and the question now is only one of persevering in it. But there is something else, namely, democracy, which is not being carried out. Both are of paramount importance to China today. To be sure, China lacks many things, but the main ones are independence and democracy. In the absence of either, China's affairs will not go well. And while there are two things lacking, there are also two superfluous ones. What are they? Imperialist oppression and feudal oppression. It is because of these two superfluous things that China has become a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The principal demands of the nation today are for independence and democracy, and therefore imperialism and feudalism must be destroyed. They must be destroyed resolutely, thoroughly, and without the least mercy. Some say that only

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this speech before the Yenan Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government. Confused by Chiang Kai-shek's deceptive propaganda at the time, many comrades in the Party thought that perhaps the Kuomintang really would establish a constitutional government. Comrade Mao Tse-tung here exposed Chiang Kai-shek's deceit, wrested the propaganda weapon of "constitutional government" from his hands and turned it into a weapon for awakening the people to demand freedom and democracy from Chiang Kai-shek. Thereupon, Chiang Kai-shek immediately packed up this bag of tricks, and never again throughout the whole War of Resistance Against Japan did he dare to propagate his so-called constitutional government.

construction is needed, not destruction. Well, we should like to ask: Shouldn't Wang Ching-wei be destroyed? Shouldn't Japanese imperialism be destroyed? Shouldn't the feudal system be destroyed? Construction is certainly out of the question unless you destroy these evils. Only by destroying them can China be saved and construction be set going; otherwise, it will all be an idle dream. Only by destroying the old and the rotten can we build the new and the sound. Combine independence and democracy and you have resistance on the basis of democracy, or democracy in the service of resistance. Without democracy, resistance will fail. Without democracy, resistance cannot be maintained. With democracy, we shall certainly win even if we have to go on resisting for eight or ten years.

What is constitutional government? It is democratic government. I agree with what our old Comrade Wu[1] has just said. What kind of democratic government do we need today? New-democratic government, the constitutional government of New Democracy. Not the old, outmoded, European-American type of so-called democracy which is bourgeois dictatorship, nor as yet the Soviet type of democracy which is the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Democracy of the old type, practised in other countries, is on its way out and has become reactionary. Under no circumstances should we accept such a reactionary thing. The sort of constitutional government which the Chinese die-hards are talking about is the old type of bourgeois democracy found abroad. But while they talk about it, they do not really want even that; they are using such talk to deceive the people. What they really want is a one-party fascist dictatorship. The Chinese national bourgeoisie, on the other hand, does want this type of constitutional government and would like to establish a bourgeois dictatorship in China, but it can never succeed. For the Chinese people do not want such a government and would not welcome a one-class dictatorship by the bourgeoisie. China's affairs must be decided by the vast majority of the Chinese people, and the monopoly of government by the bourgeoisie alone must be absolutely rejected. Then what about socialist democracy? Of course, it is very good, and will eventually prevail throughout the world. But today this type of democracy is not yet practicable in China, and we must therefore do without it for the time being. Not until certain conditions are present will it be possible to have socialist democracy. The kind of democratic government we need today is neither democracy of the old type nor yet democracy of the socialist type, but New Democracy which is suited to the conditions of present-day China. The constitutional government to be promoted is new-democratic constitutional government.

What is new-democratic constitutional government? It is the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries. Someone once said, "If there is food, let everyone share it." I think this can serve to illustrate New Democracy. Just as everyone should share what food there is, so there should be no monopoly of power by a single party, group or class. This idea was well expressed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang:

> The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. On the other hand, the Kuomintang's Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.

Comrades, in studying constitutional government we shall read various books, but above all, we must study this manifesto, and this passage should be learned by heart. "Shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few" — this is the substance of what we describe as new-democratic constitutional government, as the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries; such is the constitutional government we need today. And it is the form which a constitutional government of the anti-Japanese united front should take.

The purpose of our meeting today is to promote or urge the establishment of constitutional government. Why do we have to "urge" it? If everybody were marching forward, then nobody would need to be urged. Why do we trouble to hold this meeting? Because some people, instead of marching forward, are lying down and refusing to move on. Not only do they refuse to move forward, they actually want to go back. You call on them to go forward, but they would rather die than do so; these people are die-hards. They are so stubborn that we have to hold this meeting to give them an "urging". Where does the term "urge" come from? Who first applied it in this connection? Not we, but that great and venerated man, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who said: "For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution. . . ." Read his Testament and you will find the following words: "Most recently I have recommended the convocation of the national assembly . . . and its realization in the shortest possible time must in particular be urged. This is my heartfelt charge to you." Comrades, not an ordinary "charge" but a "heartfelt charge". A "heartfelt charge" is not just the usual kind of charge, so how can it be lightly ignored? Again, "the shortest possible time"; first, not the longest time, second, not a relatively long time, and third, not just a short time but "the shortest possible time". If we want the national assembly to come into being in the shortest possible time, then we have to "urge" it. Dr. Sun Yat-sen has been dead for fifteen years, but to this day the national assembly he recommended has not been convened. Fiddling every day with political tutelage, certain people have senselessly fiddled away the time, turning "the shortest possible time" into the longest time, and yet they are for ever invoking Dr. Sun Yat-sen's name. How Dr. Sun's ghost would rebuke these unworthy followers of his! It is perfectly clear that without "urging", there will be no moving forward; "urging" is needed because many are moving back and many others are not yet awakened.

As some people are not moving forward, we have to urge them. We have to urge others because they are slow. That is why we are calling many meetings to urge the establishment of constitutional government. The youth have held such meetings, and so have the women, the workers, the schools, government organizations and army units. It is all very lively and very good. And now we are holding this general meeting for the same purpose, so that all of us can go into action to urge the speedy enforcement of constitutional government and the immediate application of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teachings.

Some say: "You are in Yenan while those people are in various other places. What is the use of your urging them if they take no notice?" Yes, there is some use. For things are moving and they will have to take notice. If we hold more meetings, write more articles, make more speeches and send more telegrams, they will find it impossible not to take notice. I think our numerous meetings in Yenan to promote constitutional government have a twofold purpose. One is to study the problem and the other is to push people forward. Why do we have to study? Because supposing they do not go forward and you urge them, and they then ask why you are pushing, it is necessary to be able to answer. To do so, we have to make a serious study of the hows and whys of constitutional government. This is exactly what our old Comrade Wu has been talking about in some detail. All schools, government organizations and army units and all sections of the people should study the problem of constitutional government confronting us.

Once we have studied it, we can push people forward. To push them forward is to urge them on and, as we push in all fields, things will all gradually move ahead. The many little streams will merge into a great river to wash away all that is rotten and filthy, and new-democratic constitutional government will emerge. The effect of such pushing will be very great. What we do in Yenan is bound to influence the whole country.

Comrades, do you imagine that once the meetings have been held and the telegrams dispatched, the die-hards will be bowled over, will start moving forward, will submit to our orders? No, they will not be as docile as that. A great many of them are graduates of special training schools for die-hards. Die-hards they are today, and die-hards they will remain tomorrow and even the day after. What does die-hard mean? "Hard" means to be inflexible and "die" means to be dead set against progress today, tomorrow and even the day after. Such are the people we call die-hards. To make them listen to us is no easy matter.

As far as the constitutional governments the world has so far known are concerned, whether in Britain, France, the United States or the Soviet Union, a body of basic laws, that is, a constitution, has generally been promulgated after a successful revolution to give recognition to the actual establishment of democracy. But China's case is different. In China the revolution has not yet succeeded and, except in areas like our Border Region, democratic government is not yet a fact. The fact is that China today is under semi-colonial and semi-feudal rule, and even if a good constitution were promulgated, it would inevitably be hindered by the feudal forces and obstructed by the die-hards, so that it would be impossible to carry it out smoothly. Thus the present movement for constitutional government has to strive for a democracy that is not yet achieved, rather than to affirm a democracy that has already become a fact. This means a major struggle, and it is certainly no light or easy matter.

Those who have all along opposed constitutional government[2] are now paying it lip-service. Why? Because they are under pressure from the people, who want to fight Japan, and they have to temporize a little. They are even shouting at the top of their voices, "We have always stood for constitutional government!" and making a terrific din. For years we have been hearing the words "constitutional government", but so far we have seen no trace of it. These people say one thing and do another and may be called double-dealers in constitutional government. Their "always stood for" is truly an example of their double-dealing. The die-hards of today are precisely such double-dealers. Their constitutional government is a swindle. In the not too distant future you may get a constitution, and a president into the bargain. But as for democracy and freedom, heaven alone knows when they will give you that. China has already had a constitution. Did not Tsao Kun promulgate one?[3] But where were democracy and freedom to be found? As for presidents, there have been a number of them. The first, Sun Yat-sen, was good, but he was edged out by Yuan Shih-kai. The second was Yuan Shih-kai, the third Li Yuan-hung,[4] the fourth Feng Kuo-chang[5] and the fifth Hsu Shih-chang,[6] indeed a great many, but were they any different from the despotic emperors? Both the constitution and the presidents were fakes. At the present time the so-called constitutional and democratic governments of countries like Britain, France and the United States are in fact man-eating governments. The same is true of Central and South America where many countries display the republican signboard but in fact have no trace of democracy. Similarly with China's present-day die-hards. Their talk of constitutional government is only "selling dog-meat under the label of a sheep's head". They display the sheep's head of constitutional government while selling the dog-meat of one-party dictatorship. I am not attacking them groundlessly; my words are well-founded, because for all their talk about constitutional government they do not give the people a particle of freedom.

Comrades, real constitutional government will never come easily; it can only be obtained through hard struggle. Therefore you must not expect that it will come immediately after we have held our meetings, sent our telegrams and written our articles. Nor must you expect that once the People's Political Council[7] passes a resolution, the National Government issues a decree, and the national assembly[8] meets on November 12, promulgates a constitution and even elects a president, everything will be fine and all will be right with the world. That is impossible, so don't get confused. This needs to be explained to the common people so that they will not be confused either. Things will never be that easy.

Should we then lament the cause as lost? Things are so difficult that it seems hopeless. But that is not so either. There is still hope for constitutional government, and great hope at that, and China will certainly become a new-democratic state. Why? The difficulties arise because of trouble-making by the die-hards, but they cannot go on being die-hards for ever, and that is why we still have high hopes. The die-hards of the world may be die-hards today and remain so tomorrow and even the day after, but not for ever; in the end they will have to change. Wang Ching-wei, for example, was a die-hard for a very long time, yet he could not keep on acting the die-hard within the anti-Japanese ranks and had to go over to the Japanese. Chang Kuo-tao, to take another example, was also a die-hard for a very long time, but he, too, took to his heels after we held a number of meetings and struggled repeatedly against him. Actually, the die-hards may be hard, but they are not hard unto death, and in the end they change — into something filthy and contemptible, like dog's dung. Some change for the better and that is also the result of our repeated struggles against them — they come to see their mistakes and change for the better. In short, die-hards do change eventually. They always have many schemes in hand, schemes for profiting at others' expense, for double-dealing, and so on. But they always get the opposite of what they want. They invariably start by doing others harm but end by ruining themselves. We once said that Chamberlain was "lifting a rock only to drop it on his own toes", and this has now come to pass. Chamberlain had set his heart on using Hitler as the rock with which to crush the toes of the Soviet people, but since that September day last year when war broke out between Germany on the one side and Britain and France on the other, the rock in his hands has fallen on his own toes. To this day he is still smarting from it. Similar instances abound in China. Yuan Shih-kai wanted to crush the toes of the common people but in the event hurt himself, and he died just a few months after becoming emperor.[9] Tuan Chi-jui, Hsu Shih-chang, Tsao Kun, Wu Pei-fu and all the rest wanted to repress the people, but finally they were all overthrown by the people. Whoever tries to profit at others' expense will come to no good end.

I think that, unless they move forward, the anti-Communist die-hards of today can be no exception to this rule. On the high-sounding pretext of unification, they are planning to liquidate the progressive Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, the progressive Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, the progressive Communist Party and mass organizations. They have any number of schemes of this sort. But I believe the outcome will be not the liquidation of progress by die-hardism but the liquidation of die-hardism by progress. Indeed, to escape liquidation the die-hards have no alternative but to move forward. Hence we have often advised them not to attack the Eighth Route Army, the Communist Party and the Border Region. If they must, they had better make a resolution starting as follows: "Determined as we are to liquidate ourselves and provide the Communist Party with ample opportunity to expand, we, the die-hards, assume the responsibility for attacking the Communist Party and the Border Region." The die-hards have had plenty of experience in "suppressing the Communists", and should they now want to have another go, they are free to do so. If after eating their fill and having a good sleep, they feel like doing some "suppression", that is up to them. However, they must be prepared for the above resolution to go into effect, for it is unalterable. The "suppression of the Communists" in the past ten years invariably turned out in conformity with this resolution. Any further "suppression" will also conform to it. Hence I advise them not to go in for "suppression". For what the whole nation wants is not "suppression of the Communists" but resistance, unity and progress. Therefore, anyone who tries to "suppress the Communists" is bound to fail.

In short, retrogression eventually produces the reverse of what its promoters intend. There is no exception to this rule either in modern or in ancient times, in China or elsewhere.

The same is true of constitutional government today. If the die-hards keep on opposing it, the result will certainly be the reverse of what they intend. The movement for constitutional government will never follow the course decided on by the die-hards, but will run counter to their intentions, and it will inevitably take the course decided on by the people. This is certain, for the people throughout the country demand it, and so do the current of China's historical development and the whole trend of world affairs. Who can resist it? The wheel of history cannot be pushed back. However, the work we have undertaken requires time and cannot be accomplished overnight; it requires effort and cannot be done in a slipshod way; it requires the mobilization of the great masses of the people and cannot be done effectively by a single pair of hands. It is a very good thing that we are holding this meeting here today; after our meeting we shall write articles and send telegrams, and we shall also hold similar meetings in the Wutai Mountains, the Taihang Mountains, northern China, central China and all over the country. If we go on doing this and keep it up for several years, that will be just about right. We must make a good job of it, we must win democracy and freedom, we must establish new-democratic constitutional government. If this is not done and the die-hards are allowed to have their way, the nation will perish. This is the way we must work to avoid national subjugation. For this purpose everybody must exert himself. If we do so, there is great hope for our cause. It must further be understood that after all the die-hards are only a minority, while the majority consists not of die-hards but of people capable of moving forward. With the majority pitted against the minority, plus the efforts we exert, the hope will be even greater. That is why I say that, difficult though the task may be, there is great hope.

NOTES

[1] Old Comrade Wu is Comrade Wu Yu-chang, who was then Chairman of the Yenan Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government.

[2] "Those" refers to the Kuomintang reactionary clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

[3] In 1923 Tsao Kun, a big Northern warlord, had himself elected President of the Republic by bribing 590 members of parliament with 5,000 silver dollars each. He then promulgated a constitution, which came to be known as the "Tsao Kun Constitution" or the "Constitution of Bribery".

[4] Li Yuan-hung was originally commander of a brigade in the armed forces of the Ching Dynasty. He was compelled by his officers and men to side with the revolution during the Wuchang Uprising in 1911 and was made military governor of Hupeh Province. He later became Vice-President and then President of the Republic under the regime of the Northern warlord clique.

[5] Feng Kuo-chang was one of Yuan Shih-kai's underlings. After Yuan's death, he became the leader of the Chihli (Hopei) group of the Northern warlord clique. In 1917 he got rid of Li Yuan-hung and became President himself.

[6] Hsu Shih-chang was a politician in the service of the Northern warlord clique. He was elected President in 1918 by the parliament controlled by Tuan Chi-jui.

[7] The People's Political Council was a mere advisory body reluctantly set up by the Kuomintang government after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. The members were all "invited" by the Kuomintang government. Nominally it included the representatives of all anti-Japanese political parties and groups, but it was actually dominated by the Kuomintang majority. It had no power to influence the policies or the measures adopted by the Kuomintang government. As Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang became more and more reactionary, the number of Kuomintang and other reactionaries on the council increased while the number of democrats decreased and their freedom of speech was severely curtailed, until the council increasingly became a mere tool of Kuomintang reaction. After the Southern Anhwei Incident of 1941, the Communist members of the council boycotted its meetings several times in protest against the Kuomintang's reactionary measures.

[8] A resolution demanding that the Kuomintang government convene a national assembly and establish a constitutional government at a fixed date was passed at the Fourth Session of the People's Political Council in September 1939, on the proposal of the Communist Party and the democrats of other parties and groups. In November 1939 the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang announced that the national assembly would be convened on November 12, 1940. Though much publicized to dupe the people, this pledge came to nothing.

[9] Yuan Shih-kai proclaimed himself emperor on December 12, 1915, but was force to give up the title on March 22, 1916.

ON THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE BASE AREAS

March 6, 1940

1. This is a time when the anti-Communist die-hards of the Kuomintang are doing all they can to prevent us from setting up organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power in northern and central China and other places, while we on our part must set them up, and in the major anti-Japanese base areas it is already possible for us to do so. Our struggle with the anti-Communist die-hards over this issue in northern, central and northwestern China can help to promote the establishment of united front organs of political power over the whole country and it is being followed attentively by the whole nation. Therefore, this issue must be handled carefully.

2. The political power we are establishing during the anti-Japanese war is of a united front character. It is the political power of all those who support both resistance and democracy; it is the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries. It differs from the counter-revolutionary dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie as well as from the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship of the Agrarian Revolution period. A clear understanding of the character of this political power and conscientious efforts to put it into practice will greatly help to spread democracy through the country. Any deviation, either to the "Left" or the Right, will create a very bad impression on the whole nation.

3. The convening of the Hopei Provincial Assembly and the elections to the Hopei Administrative Council, preparations for which have just been started, will be of exceptional importance. Equally important will be the establishment of the new organs of political power in northwestern Shansi, in Shantung, in areas north of the Huai

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This inner-Party directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

River, in the counties of Suiteh and Fuhsien, and in eastern Kansu. We must proceed according to the united front principle and do our utmost to avoid any Right or "Left" tendencies. At the moment the "Left" tendency of neglecting to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry is the more serious danger.

4. In accordance with the united front principle concerning the organs of political power, the allocation of places should be one-third for Communists, one-third for non-Party left progressives, and one-third for the intermediate sections who are neither left nor right.

5. We must make sure that the Communists play the leading role in the organs of political power, and therefore the Party members who occupy one-third of the places must be of high calibre. This will be enough to ensure the Party's leadership without a larger representation. Leadership is neither a slogan to be shouted from morning till night nor an arrogant demand for obedience; it consists rather in using the Party's correct policies and the example we set by our own work to convince and educate people outside the Party so that they willingly accept our proposals.

6. The non-Party progressives must be allocated one-third of the places because they are linked with the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie. This will be of tremendous importance in winning the latter over.

7. Our aim in allocating one-third of the places to the intermediate sections is to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. Winning over these sections is an important step in isolating the die-hards. At the present time, we must not fail to take the strength of these sections into account and must be circumspect in our relations with them.

8. Our attitude to the non-Communists must be one of co-operation, whether or not they have party affiliations and whatever these may be, so long as they favour resistance to Japan and are willing to co-operate with the Communist Party.

9. The allocation of places described above represents the genuine policy of the Party, and we must on no account be half-hearted about it. To execute this policy, we must educate the Party members who work in the organs of political power, overcome the narrowness manifested in their reluctance and uneasiness in co-operating with non-Communists, and encourage a democratic style of work, that is, consultation with the non-Party people and winning majority approval before taking action. At the same time, we must do all we can to

encourage the non-Party people to express their views on various problems and must lend an attentive ear to their suggestions. We must never think that because we hold military and political power we can force unconditional compliance with our decisions, and on that account shun the effort to win the non-Party people over to our views so that they carry them out gladly and whole-heartedly.

10. The above figures for the allocation of places are not rigid quotas to be filled mechanically; they are in the nature of a rough proportion which every locality must apply according to its specific circumstances. At the lowest level, the ratio may be somewhat modified to prevent the landlords and evil gentry from sneaking into the organs of political power. Where such organs have been in existence for some time, as in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area, the central Hopei area, the Taihang mountain area and the southern Hopei area, there should be a re-examination of policy in the light of this principle. And this principle should be observed whenever a new organ of political power is set up.

11. The united front policy on suffrage should be that every Chinese who reaches the age of eighteen and is in favour of resistance and democracy should enjoy the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of class, nationality, sex, creed, party affiliation or educational level. The organs of political power of the anti-Japanese united front must be elected by the people. Their form of organization should be based on democratic centralism.

12. The fundamental point of departure for all major policy measures in the united front organs of political power should be opposition to Japanese imperialism, protection of the people who are resisting Japan, proper adjustment of the interests of all the anti-Japanese social strata, improvement of the livelihood of the workers and peasants and suppression of traitors and reactionaries.

13. The non-Party people who work in our organs of political power should not be required to live, talk and act like Communists, or otherwise they may feel dissatisfied or ill at ease.

14. All regional and sub-regional bureaus of the Central Committee, all area Party committees and all heads of army units are hereby instructed to give a clear explanation of this directive to Party members, and ensure that it is fully carried out in the work of our organs of political power.

CURRENT PROBLEMS OF TACTICS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT

March 11, 1940

1. The present political situation is as follows:

(a) Japanese imperialism has been dealt a heavy blow by China's War of Resistance and is already incapable of launching any more large-scale military offensives, so that the relation of forces between the enemy and ourselves has now reached the stage of strategic stalemate. But the enemy is still holding fast to his basic policy of subjugating China and is pursuing it by such means as undermining our anti-Japanese united front, intensifying his "mopping-up" campaigns in the rear areas and stepping up his economic aggression.

(b) Britain and France are finding their positions in the East weakened by the war in Europe, while the United States is continuing its policy of "sitting on top of the mountain and watching the tigers fight", so that an Eastern Munich[1] conference is out of the question for the moment.

(c) The Soviet Union has gained new successes in its foreign policy and is maintaining its policy of giving active support to China's War of Resistance.

(d) The pro-Japanese section of the big bourgeoisie, having completely capitulated to Japan, is ready to play the puppet. The pro-European and pro-American big bourgeoisie may continue to resist Japan, but its proneness to conciliation remains serious. It follows a dual policy. While desiring to remain united with the various non-Kuomintang forces to cope with Japan, it is doing all it can to suppress them, and especially the Communist Party

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this outline for the report he made at a meeting of the Party's senior cadres in Yenan.

and the other progressive forces. It forms the die-hard section of the anti-Japanese united front.

(e) The intermediate forces, including the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and the regional power groups, often take a middle position between the progressives and the die-hards because of their contradictions with the main ruling sections of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie on the one hand, and with the working class and the peasantry on the other. They form the middle section of the anti-Japanese united front.

(f) Recently, the Communist-led progressive forces of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie have grown much stronger and in the main have succeeded in creating base areas in which anti-Japanese democratic political power has been established. Their influence is very great among the workers, peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie throughout the country and is also quite considerable among the middle forces. On the battlefield the Communists are fighting roughly as many Japanese troops as is the Kuomintang. They form the progressive section of the anti-Japanese united front.

This is the present political situation in China. In these circumstances the possibility still exists of preventing the situation from deteriorating and of changing it for the better; the Central Committee's resolutions of February 1 are entirely correct

2. The basic condition for victory in the War of Resistance is the extension and consolidation of the anti-Japanese united front. The tactics required for this purpose are to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and combat the die-hard forces; these are three inseparable links, and the means to be used to unite all the anti-Japanese forces is struggle. In the period of the anti-Japanese united front, struggle is the means to unity and unity is the aim of struggle. If unity is sought through struggle, it will live; if unity is sought through yielding, it will perish. This truth is gradually being grasped by Party comrades. However, there are still many who do not understand it; some think that struggle will split the united front or that struggle can be employed without restraint, and others use wrong tactics towards the middle forces or have mistaken notions about the die-hard forces. All this must be corrected.

3. Developing the progressive forces means building up the forces of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, boldly

expanding the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, establishing anti-Japanese democratic base areas on an extensive scale, building up Communist organizations throughout the country, developing national mass movements of the workers, peasants, youth, women and children, winning over the intellectuals in all parts of the country, and spreading the movement for constitutional government among the masses as a struggle for democracy. Steady expansion of the progressive forces is the only way to prevent the situation from deteriorating, to forestall capitulation and splitting, and to lay a firm and indestructible foundation for victory in the War of Resistance. But the expansion of the progressive forces is a serious process of struggle, which must be ruthlessly waged not only against the Japanese imperialists and the traitors but also against the die-hards. For the latter are opposed to the growth of the progressive forces, while the middle section is sceptical. Unless we engage in resolute struggle against the die-hards and, moreover, get tangible results, we shall be unable to resist their pressure or dispel the doubts of the middle section. In that case the progressive forces will have no way of expanding.

4. Winning over the middle forces means winning over the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and the regional power groups. They are three distinct categories, but as things are, they all belong to the middle forces. The middle bourgeoisie constitutes the national bourgeoisie as distinct from the comprador class, *i.e.*, from the big bourgeoisie. Although it has its class contradictions with the workers and does not approve of the independence of the working class, it still wants to resist Japan and, moreover, would like to grasp political power for itself, because it is oppressed by the Japanese imperialists in the occupied areas and kept down by the big landlords and big bourgeoisie in the Kuomintang areas. When it comes to resisting Japan, it is in favour of united resistance; when it comes to winning political power, it is in favour of the movement for constitutional government and tries to exploit the contradictions between the progressives and the die-hards for its own ends. This is a stratum we must win over. Then there are the enlightened gentry who are the left-wing of the landlord class, that is, the section with a bourgeois colouration, whose political attitude is roughly the same as that of the middle bourgeoisie. Although they have class contradictions with the peasants, they also have their contradictions with the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. They do not support the die-hards and they, too, want to exploit the

contradictions between us and the die-hards for their own political ends. On no account should we neglect this section either, and our policy must be to win them over. As for the regional power groups, they are of two kinds — the forces which control certain regions as their own, and the troops of miscellaneous brands which do not. Although these groups are in contradiction with the progressive forces, they a]so have their contradictions with the Kuomintang Central Government because of the self-seeking policy it pursues at their expense; they, too, want to exploit the contradictions between us and the die-hards for their own political ends. Most of the leaders of the regional power groups belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie and, therefore, progressive as they may appear at certain times during the war, they soon turn reactionary again; nevertheless, because of their contradictions with the Kuomintang central authorities, the possibility exists of their remaining neutral in our struggle against the die-hards, provided we pursue a correct policy. Our policy towards the three categories of middle forces described above is to win them over. However, this policy differs from that of winning over the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and, moreover, it varies for each category of the middle forces. While the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie should be won over as basic allies, the middle forces should be won over as allies against imperialism. Among the middle forces, it is possible for the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry to join us in the common fight against Japan and also in the setting up of anti-Japanese democratic political power, but they fear agrarian revolution. In the struggle against the die-hards, some may join in to a limited degree, others may observe a benevolent neutrality, and still others a rather reluctant neutrality. But, apart from joining us in the war, the regional power groups will at most observe a temporary neutrality in our struggle against the die-hards; they are unwilling to join us in establishing democratic political power since they themselves belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. The middle forces tend to vacillate and are bound to break up, and we should educate and criticize them appropriately, with special reference to their vacillating attitude.

The winning over of the middle forces is an extremely important task for us in the period of the anti-Japanese united front, but it can only be accomplished given certain conditions. These are: (1) that we have ample strength; (2) that we respect their interests; and (3) that we are resolute in our struggle against the die-hards and steadily win victories. If these conditions are lacking, the middle forces will vacillate or even become allies of the die-hards in the latter's attacks on us, because the die-hards are also doing their best to win over the middle forces in order to isolate us. The middle forces carry considerable weight in China and may often be the decisive factor in our struggle against the die-hards; we must therefore be prudent in dealing with them.

5. The die-hard forces at the present time are the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. Divided at the moment into the group that has capitulated to Japan and the group that favours resistance, these classes will gradually become still further differentiated. Within the big bourgeoisie, the group favouring resistance is now different from the group that has already capitulated. It pursues a dual policy. It still stands for unity against Japan, but at the same time it follows the extremely reactionary policy of suppressing the progressive forces in preparation for its eventual capitulation. As it still favours unity against Japan, we can still try and keep it in the anti-Japanese united front, and the longer the better. It would be wrong to neglect our policy of winning over this group and co-operating with it and to regard it as having already capitulated and as being on the verge of launching an anti-Communist war. But at the same time, we must adopt tactics of struggle to combat its reactionary policy and carry on a determined ideological, political and military fight against it, because all over the country it pursues the reactionary policy of suppressing the progressive forces, because instead of carrying out the common programme of the revolutionary Three People's Principles it stubbornly opposes our efforts to do so, and because it works hard to prevent us from going beyond the limits it has set for us, *i.e.*, it tries to confine us to the passive resistance it itself practises, and, moreover, it tries to assimilate us, failing which it applies ideological, political and military pressure against us. Such is our revolutionary dual policy to meet the dual policy of the die-hards, and such is our policy of seeking unity through struggle. If in the ideological sphere we can put forward correct revolutionary theory and strike hard at their counter-revolutionary theory, if in the political sphere we adopt tactics suited to the times and strike hard at their anti-Communist and anti-progressive policies, and if in the military sphere we take appropriate measures and strike back hard at their attacks, then we shall be able to restrict the effective range of their reactionary policy and compel

them to recognize the status of the progressive forces, and we shall be able to expand the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the die-hard forces. What is more, we shall be able to induce those die-hards who are still willing to resist Japan to prolong their participation in the anti-Japanese united front, and shall thus be able to avert a large-scale civil war of the kind that broke out before. Thus the purpose of our struggle against the die-hards in the period of the anti-Japanese united front is not only to parry their attacks in order to protect the progressive forces and enable the latter to go on growing, it is also to prolong the die-hards' resistance to Japan and to preserve our co-operation with them in order to avert large-scale civil war. Without struggle, these progressive forces would be exterminated by the die-hard forces, the united front would cease to exist, there would be nothing to hinder the die-hards from capitulating to the enemy, and civil war would break out. Therefore, struggle against the die-hards is an indispensable means of uniting all the anti-Japanese forces, achieving a favourable turn in the situation and averting large-scale civil war. All our experience confirms this truth.

However, there are several principles which we must observe in our struggle against the die-hards in the period of the anti-Japanese united front. First, the principle of self-defence. We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. That is to say, we must never attack others without provocation, but once attacked we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of our struggle. The military attacks of the die-hards must be smashed — resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely. Second, the principle of victory. We will not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must never fight without a plan, without preparation, and without certainty of success. We must know how to exploit the contradictions among the die-hards and must not take on too many of them at a single time, but must direct our blows at the most reactionary of them first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Third, the principle of a truce. After repulsing one die-hard attack, we should know when to stop and bring that particular fight to a close before another attack is made on us. A truce should be made in the interval. We should then take the initiative in seeking unity with the die-hards and, if they concur, we should make a peace agreement with them. On no account should we fight on day after day without cease, or be carried away by success. Herein lies the temporary

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nature of each struggle. Only when the die-hards launch a new attack should we counter with a new struggle. In other words, the three principles are to fight "on just grounds", "to our advantage" and "with restraint". By keeping to this kind of struggle, waged on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint, we can develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the die-hard forces, and we can also make the die-hards think twice before attacking us, compromising with the enemy or starting large-scale civil war. Thus a favourable turn in the situation will become possible.

6. The Kuomintang is a heterogeneous party which includes die-hards, middle elements and progressives; taken as a whole, it must not be equated with the die-hards. Some people regard the Kuomintang as consisting entirely of die-hards because its Central Executive Committee has promulgated such counter-revolutionary friction-mongering decrees as the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" and has mobilized every ounce of its strength for counter-revolutionary friction-mongering in the ideological, political, and military spheres throughout the country. But this is a mistaken view. The die-hards in the Kuomintang are still in a position to dictate its policies, but numerically they are in a minority, while the majority of the membership (many are members only in name) are not necessarily die-hards. This point must be clearly recognized if we are to take advantage of the contradictions within the Kuomintang, follow a policy of differentiating between its different sections and do our utmost to unite with its middle and progressive sections.

7. On the question of political power in the anti-Japanese base areas, we must make sure that the political power established there is that of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. No such political power exists as yet in the Kuomintang areas. It is the political power of all who support both resistance and democracy, *i.e.*, the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries. It is different from the dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie, and is also somewhat different from a strictly worker-peasant democratic dictatorship. Places in the organs of political power should be allocated as follows: one-third to the Communists, representing the proletariat and the poor peasantry; one-third to the left progressives, representing the petty bourgeoisie; and the remaining one-third to the middle and other elements, representing the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. Traitors

and anti-Communist elements are the only people disqualified from participation in these organs of political power. This general rule for the allocation of places is necessary, or otherwise it will not be possible to maintain the principle of united front political power. This allocation of places represents the genuine policy of our Party and must be carried out conscientiously; there must be no half-heartedness about it. It provides a broad rule which has to be applied according to the specific conditions, and there must be no mechanical filling up of quotas. At the lowest level the ratio may have to be somewhat modified to prevent domination by the landlords and evil gentry, but the fundamental spirit of this policy must not be violated. We should not labour the question of whether the non-Communists in these organs have party affiliations, or what their party affiliations are. In areas under the political power of the united front, all political parties, whether the Kuomintang or any other, must be granted legal status so long as they co-operate with and do not oppose the Communist Party. On the question of suffrage, the policy is that every Chinese who reaches the age of eighteen and is in favour of resistance and democracy should have the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of class, nationality, party affiliation, sex, creed or educational level. The organs of united front political power should be elected by the people and then apply to the National Government for confirmation. Their form of organization must be based on democratic centralism. The fundamental point of departure for all major policy measures in the united front organs of political power should be opposition to Japanese imperialism, opposition to confirmed traitors and reactionaries, protection of the people who are resisting Japan, proper adjustment of the interests of all the anti-Japanese social strata and improvement of the livelihood of the workers and peasants. The establishment of this anti-Japanese united front political power will exert a great influence on the whole country and serve as a model for united front political power on a national scale; therefore this policy should be fully understood and resolutely carried out by all Party comrades.

8. In our struggle to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the die-hard forces, we must not overlook the role of the intellectuals, whom the die-hards are doing their utmost to win over; therefore it is an important and indeed an essential policy to win over all progressive intellectuals and bring them under the influence of the Party.

9. In our propaganda we should stress the following programme:

(a) carry out the Testament of Dr. Sun Yat-sen by arousing the masses for united resistance to Japan;

(b) carry out the Principle of Nationalism by firmly resisting Japanese imperialism and striving for complete national liberation and the equality of all the nationalities within China;

(c) carry out the Principle of Democracy by granting the people absolute freedom to resist Japan and save the nation, by enabling them to elect governments at all levels, and by establishing the revolutionary democratic political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front;

(d) carry out the Principle of the People's Livelihood by abolishing exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, reducing land rent and interest, enforcing the eight-hour working day, developing agriculture, industry and commerce, and improving the livelihood of the people; and

(e) carry out Chiang Kai-shek's declaration that "every person, young or old, in the north or in the south, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending our homeland".

All these points are in the Kuomintang's own published programme, which is also the common programme of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. But the Kuomintang has failed to carry out any part of this programme other than resistance to Japan; only the Communist Party and the progressive forces arc able to carry it out. It is a simple enough programme and is widely known, yet many Communists fail to use it as a weapon for mobilizing the masses and isolating the die-hards. From now on we should keep attention focussed on the five points of this programme and popularize them through public notices, manifestoes, leaflets, articles, speeches, statements, and so on. In the Kuomintang areas it is still only a propaganda programme, but in the areas reached by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army it is already a programme of action. In acting according to this programme we are within the law, and when the die-hards oppose our carrying it out, it is they who are outside the law. In the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, this programme of the Kuomintang's is basically the same as ours, but the ideology of the Kuomintang is entirely different from that of the Communist Party. It is this common programme of the democratic revolution that we should put into practice, but on no account should we follow the ideology of the Kuomintang.

NOTES

[1] For the Eastern Munich, see "Oppose Capitulationist Activity", Note 3, p. 255 of this volume.

FREELY EXPAND THE ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES AND RESIST THE ONSLAUGHTS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS

May 4, 1940

1. In all regions behind the enemy lines and in all the war zones, stress should be laid not on particularity, but on identity; to do otherwise would be a gross error. While each region has its individual peculiarities, they are all identical in that all are confronted by the enemy and all are engaged in the War of Resistance, whether in northern, central or southern China, in the areas north or south of the Yangtse River, or in the plains, the mountain or lake regions, and whether the force involved is the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army or the South China Guerrilla Column.[1] It follows that in all cases we can and should expand. The Central Committee has pointed out this policy of expansion to you time and again. To expand means to reach out into all enemy-occupied areas and not to be bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions but to go beyond the limits allowed by the Kuomintang, not to expect official appointments from them or depend on the higher-ups for financial support but instead to expand the armed forces freely and independently, set up base areas unhesitatingly, independently arouse the masses in those areas to action and build up united front organs of political power under the leadership of the Communist Party. In Kiangsu Province, for example, despite the verbal attacks and the restrictions and oppression by anti-Communist elements

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This directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and addressed to its Southeast Bureau. At the time of writing, Comrade Hsiang Ying, member of the Central Committee and secretary of its Southeast Bureau, held strong Rightist views and was irresolute in carrying out the line of the Central Committee. He did not dare fully to arouse the masses to action and to expand the Liberated Areas and the people's army in the Japanese-occupied areas, did not sufficiently realize the seriousness of the possibility of reactionary attacks by the Kuomintang, and was therefore unprepared such as Ku Chu-tung, Leng Hsin and Han Teh-chin,[2] we should gain control of as many districts as possible from Nanking in the west to the seacoast in the east and from Hangchow in the south to Hsuchow in the north, and do so as fast as possible and yet steadily and systematically; and we should independently expand the armed forces, establish organs of political power, set up fiscal offices to levy taxes for resistance to Japan and economic agencies to promote agriculture, industry and commerce, and open up schools of various kinds to train large numbers of cadres. The Central Committee previously instructed you to enlarge the anti-Japanese armed forces to 100,000 men, with as many rifles, and to set up organs of political power promptly in the regions behind the enemy lines in Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces before the end of this year. What concrete measures have you taken? Opportunities have been missed before, and if this year they are missed again, things will become still more difficult.

2. At a time when the anti-Communist die-hards in the Kuomintang are obstinately persisting in their policy of containing, restricting and combating the Communist Party in preparation for capitulation to Japan, we must stress struggle and not unity; to do otherwise would be a gross error. Therefore, whether in the theoretical, the political, or the military sphere, we should as a matter of principle firmly resist all the verbal attacks, propaganda, orders and laws of the anti-Communist die-hards designed to contain, restrict and oppose the Communist Party, and our attitude towards them should be one of firm struggle. This struggle must be based on the principle of fighting on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, that is, on the principles of self-defence, victory and truce, which means that every concrete struggle is defensive, limited and temporary in nature. We must take tit-for-tat action and conduct a determined struggle against all the reactionary verbal attacks, propaganda, orders and laws of the anti-Communist die-hards. For instance, when they demanded that our Fourth and Fifth Detachments[3] be moved to the south, we countered

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for them mentally and organizationally. When the directive reached the Southeast Bureau, Comrade Chen Yi, member of the Southeast Bureau and commander of the First Detachment of the New Fourth Army, immediately put it into effect, but Comrade Hsiang Ying was reluctant to do so. He made no preparations against the attacks of the Kuomintang reactionaries so that he was in a weak and helpless position when Chiang Kai-shek staged the Southern Anhwei Incident in January 1941, in which nine thousand of our troops were annihilated and Comrade Hsiang Ying himself was killed.

by insisting that it was absolutely impossible to do so; when they demanded that the units under Yeh Fei and Chang Yun-yi[4] be moved to the south, we countered by asking permission for a part of these units to move to the north; when they charged us with having undermined their conscription plans, we asked them to enlarge the recruiting area for the New Fourth Army; when they said we were carrying on wrong propaganda, we asked them to stop all their anti-Communist propaganda and to rescind all decrees and orders which cause "friction"; and whenever they launch military attacks against us, we should smash them by counter-attacks. We are on just grounds in carrying out this tit-for-tat policy. And it is not only the Central Committee of our Party that should take action whenever we are on just grounds, but every unit of our army should do so. What Chang Yun-yi did to Li Pin-hsien and what Li Hsien-nien did to Li Tsung-jen[5] are both good examples of strong protests from the lower levels to the higher-ups. This kind of strong attitude towards the die-hards and the policy of struggling against them on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint are the only way to make the die-hards somewhat afraid of repressing us, to reduce the scope of their activities in containing, restricting and combating the Communist Party, to force them to recognize our legal status, and to make them think twice before causing a split. Therefore, struggle is by far the most important means of averting the danger of capitulation, of achieving a turn for the better in the situation and of strengthening Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. Within our own Party and army, persistence in the struggle against the die-hards is the only way to heighten our fighting spirit, give full play to our courage, unite our cadres, increase our strength and consolidate our army and Party. In our relations with the intermediate sections, persistence in the struggle against the die-hards is the only way to win over the waverers and give support to our sympathizers — there is no other way. Similarly, struggle is the only policy which can ensure that the whole Party and the whole army are mentally on the alert against a possible nation-wide emergency and are prepared for it in their work. Otherwise, the mistake of 1927[6] will be repeated.

3. In appraising the present situation, we should clearly understand that while the danger of capitulation has greatly increased, it is still possible to avert it. The present military clashes are still local and not national. They are acts of strategic reconnaissance by our opponents and not yet "Communist suppression" on a large scale; they are steps preparatory to capitulation and not yet steps immediately preceding

capitulation. Our task is persistently and vigorously to carry out the threefold policy laid down by the Central Committee, which is the only correct policy, namely, to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the die-hard forces, for the purpose of averting the danger of capitulation and bringing about a turn for the better in the situation. It would be perilous not to point out and correct any "Left" or Right deviations in appraising the situation and in defining our tasks.

4. The battles of self-defence fought by the Fourth and the Fifth Detachments against the attacks of Han Teh-chin and Li Tsung-jen in eastern Anhwei and those fought by Li Hsien-nien's column against the die-hards' attacks in central and eastern Hupeh, the determined struggle carried on by Peng Hsueh-feng's detachment north of the Huai River, the expansion of Yeh Fei's forces north of the Yangtse River, and the southward movement of over 20,000 men of the Eighth Route Army to areas north of the Huai River and to eastern Anhwei and northern Kiangsu[7] — all these were not only absolutely necessary and correct in themselves, but were indispensable for making Ku Chu-tung think twice before attacking you in southern Anhwei and southern Kiangsu. That is to say, the more victories we win and the more we expand north of the Yangtse River, the more will Ku Chu-tung be afraid to act rashly south of the Yangtse River, and the easier will It be for you to play your role in southern Anhwei and southern Kiangsu. Similarly, the more the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Guerrilla Column expand in northwestern, northern, central and southern China, and the more the Communist Party grows throughout the country, the greater will be the possibility of averting the danger of capitulation and bringing about a turn for the better in the situation, and the easier will it be for our Party to play its role in all parts of the country. It is wrong to make the opposite appraisal or adopt the opposite tactics in the belief that the more our forces expand, the more the die-hards will tend towards capitulation, that the more concessions we make, the more they will resist Japan, or that the whole country is on the verge of a split and Kuomintang-Communist co-operation is no longer possible.

5. The Anti-Japanese National United Front is our policy for the whole country in the War of Resistance. The establishment of democratic anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy rear is part of this policy. You should firmly carry out the Central Committee's decisions on the question of political power.

6. Our policy in the Kuomintang areas is different from that in the war zones and the areas behind the enemy lines. In the Kuomintang areas our policy is to have well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, to accumulate strength and bide our time, and to avoid rashness and exposure. In conformity with the principle of waging struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, our tactics in combating the die-hards are to wage steady and sure struggles and to build up our strength by utilizing all Kuomintang laws and decrees that can serve our purpose as well as everything permitted by social custom. If a member of our Party is forced to join the Kuomintang, let him do so; our members should penetrate the *pao chia*[8] and the educational, economic and military organizations everywhere; they should develop extensive united front work, *i.e.*, make friends, in the Central Army and among the troops of miscellaneous brands.[9] In all the Kuomintang areas the Party's basic policy is likewise to develop the progressive forces (the Party organizations and the mass movements), to win over the middle forces (seven categories in all, namely, the national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, the troops of miscellaneous brands, the intermediate sections in the Kuomintang, the intermediate sections in the Central Army, the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, and the small political parties and groups) and to isolate the die-hard forces, in order to avert the danger of capitulation and bring about a favourable turn in the situation. At the same time we should be fully prepared to deal with any emergency on a local or national scale. Our Party organizations in the Kuomintang areas must be kept strictly secret. In the Southeast Bureau[10] and in all the provincial, special, county and district committees, the whole personnel (from Party secretaries to cooks) must be strictly scrutinized one by one, and no one open to the slightest suspicion should be allowed to remain in any of these leading bodies. Great care must be taken to protect our cadres, and whoever is in danger of being arrested and killed by the Kuomintang while working in an open or semi-open capacity should either be sent to some other locality and go underground or be transferred to the army. In the Japanese-occupied areas (in Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhu or Wusih, or in any other city, large or small, and also in the countryside), our policy is basically the same as in the Kuomintang areas.

7. The present tactical directive was decided upon by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at its recent meeting, and comrades of the Southeast Bureau and the military sub-commission are requested

to discuss it, relay it to all cadres in the Party organizations and the army, and firmly carry it out.

8. Comrade Hsiang Ying is instructed to relay this directive in southern Anhwei and Comrade Chen Yi to relay it in southern Kiangsu. Discussion and relaying should be completed within a month of receiving this telegram. Comrade Hsiang Ying has the over-all responsibility for arranging Party and army work in the whole area in accordance with the line of the Central Committee and should report the results to the Central Committee.

NOTES

[1] The South China Guerrilla Column was a general name given to a number of anti-Japanese guerrilla units in southern China led by the Chinese Communist Party.

[2] Ku Chu-tung, Leng Hsin and Han Teh-chin were reactionary Kuomintang generals stationed in Kiangsu, Chekiang, southern Anhwei, Kiangsi and other places.

[3] The Fourth and Fifth Detachments of the New Fourth Army were then building up an anti-Japanese base area in the Huai River valley on the Kiangsu-Anhwei provincial border.

[4] The units of the New Fourth Army under Yeh Fei and Chang Yun-yi were then carrying on anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and building up an anti-Japanese base area north of the Yangtse River in central Kiangsu and eastern Anhwei.

[5] During March and April 1940, Li Pin-hsien, the Kuomintang provincial governor of Anhwei, and Li Tsung-jen, the Kuomintang commander of the 5th War Zone both warlords of the Kwangsi clique, launched large-scale offensives on the New Fourth Army in the Anhwei-Hupeh border area Comrade Chang Yun-yi, commander of New Fourth Army units north of the Yangtse River, and Comrade Li Hsien-nien, commander of the Army's Hupeh-Honan Assault Troops, lodged strong protests and repulsed the offensives.

[6] The mistake of 1927 refers to Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism.

[7] In January 1940 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party dispatched more than 20,000 men of the Eighth Route Army from northern China to reinforce the New Fourth Army in its anti-Japanese warfare north of the Huai River and in eastern Anhwei and northern Kiangsu.

[8] *Pao chia* was the administrative system by which the Kuomintang reactionary clique enforced its fascist rule at the primary level.

[9] Chiang Kai-shek's clique called its own armed forces the Central Army and those belonging to other cliques troops of miscellaneous brands. It discriminated against the latter and did not treat them on an equal footing with the Central Army.

[10] The Southeast Bureau directed the work in southeastern China (including the provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupeh and Hunan) on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the period 1938-41.

UNITY TO THE VERY END

July 1940

The third anniversary of the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the nineteenth anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China occur within a few days of each other. In commemorating the anniversary of the resistance today we Communists feel our responsibility all the more keenly. To fight for the survival of the Chinese nation is a responsibility which falls on all the anti-Japanese political parties and groups and the whole people, but as we see it an even heavier responsibility falls on us as Communists. The Central Committee of our Party has issued a statement on the present situation, the essence of which is a call for resistance and unity to the very end. This statement, we hope, will meet with the approval of the friendly parties and armies and the whole nation, and Communists in particular must conscientiously carry out the line it has laid down.

All Communists must realize that only through resistance to the very end can there be unity to the very end, and vice versa. Therefore, Communists must set an example in both resistance and unity. Our opposition is directed solely against the enemy and against the determined capitulators and anti-Communists; with all others we must unite in earnest. In every place the determined capitulators and anti-Communists are only a minority. I made an investigation of one local government and found that out of 1,300 staff members, only 40 to 50, or less than 4 per cent, were confirmed anti-Communists, while all the rest wanted unity and resistance. Of course we cannot tolerate these capitulators and anti-Communists, because that would amount to allowing them to sabotage resistance and wreck unity; we must resolutely oppose the capitulators and, in self-defence, firmly repel the attacks of the anti-Communist elements. Failure to do so would be Right opportunism and would harm unity and resistance. However, our policy must be one of unity with all those who are not absolutely set in their capitulation and anti-communism. For some face both ways, others are acting under compulsion, and still others have temporarily gone astray; for the sake of continued unity and resistance we must win over all these people. Failure to do so would be "Left" opportunism and this, too, would harm unity and resistance. All Communists should realize that, having initiated the Anti-Japanese National United Front, we must maintain it. Now that the national crisis is deepening and the world situation is undergoing a great change, we must shoulder the very heavy responsibility of saving the Chinese nation. We must defeat Japanese imperialism and build China into an independent, free and democratic republic, and to do so we must unite the greatest possible number of people, with or without party affiliations. Communists should not enter into unprincipled united fronts and must therefore oppose all such schemes as corroding, restricting, containing and repressing the Communist Party as well a oppose the Right opportunism within the Party. But at the same time Communists should not fail to respect the Party's united front policy and must therefore unite, on the principle of resistance, with all those who are still willing to resist Japan and must oppose "Left" opportunism within the Party.

Thus, as far as political power is concerned, we stand for united front organs of political power; we do not favour one-party dictatorship either by the Communist Party or by any other party, but we stand for the joint dictatorship of all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life and all armed forces, that is, for united front political power. Whenever we establish organs of anti-Japanese political power in the enemy rear after destroying the enemy and the puppet regimes there, we should adopt the "three thirds system" as decided upon by the Central Committee of our Party, so that Communists take only one-third of the places in all government or people's representative bodies, while the remaining two-thirds are taken by people who stand for resistance and democracy whether or not they are members of other parties or groups. Anybody may take part in the work of the government so long as he is not in favour of capitulation or is not an anti-Communist. Every political party or group shall have the right to exist and carry on its activities under the anti-Japanese political power, so long as it is not in favour of capitulation and is not anti-Communist.

In regard to the question of the armed forces, our Party's statement has made it clear that we shall continue to observe the decision "not to extend our Party organizations to any friendly army". Local Party organizations which have not strictly observed this decision should immediately put the matter right. A friendly attitude should be taken towards all armed units that do not start armed clashes with the Eighth Route or New Fourth Armies. Friendly relations should be restored even with those troops that have created "friction", once they stop doing so. This is our united front policy with regard to the armed forces.

As for our policies on other matters, whether financial, economic, cultural or educational or anti-espionage, for the sake of resistance we must follow the united front policy by adjusting the interests of the different classes and must oppose both Right and "Left" opportunism.

Internationally the imperialist war is becoming world-wide and the extremely grave political and economic crises to which it has given rise will inevitably cause revolutions to break out in many countries. We are in a new era of wars and revolutions. The Soviet Union, which has not been drawn into the maelstrom of this imperialist war, is the supporter of all the oppressed people and all the oppressed nations of the world. These factors are favourable to China's War of Resistance. But at the same time the danger of capitulation is more serious than ever before because Japanese imperialism is intensifying its attacks on China in preparation for its aggression against Southeast Asia, and this will certainly induce some of the vacillating elements to surrender. The fourth year of the war is going to be a most difficult one. Our task is to unite all anti-Japanese forces, oppose the capitulators, surmount all the difficulties and persist in nation-wide resistance. All Communists must unite with the friendly parties and armies to accomplish this task. We are confident that, through the united efforts of all members of our Party, of the friendly parties and armies and the whole people, we shall succeed in preventing capitulation, in conquering the difficulties, in driving out the Japanese aggressors and in recovering our lost territories. The prospects for our War of Resistance are indeed bright.

ON POLICY

December 25, 1940

In the present high tide of anti-Communist attacks, the policy we adopt is of decisive importance. But many of our cadres fail to realize that the Party's present policy must be very different from its policy during the Agrarian Revolution. It has to be understood that in no circumstances will the Party change its united front policy for the entire period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and that many of the policies adopted during the ten years of the Agrarian Revolution cannot just be duplicated today. In particular, many ultra-Left policies of the latter period of the Agrarian Revolution are not merely totally inapplicable today in the War of Resistance, but were wrong even then, arising as they did from the failure to understand two fundamental points — that the Chinese revolution is a bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semi-colonial country, and that it is a protracted revolution. For example, there was the thesis that the Kuomintang's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign and our counter-campaign constituted the decisive battle between counter-revolution and revolution; there was the economic elimination of the capitalist class (the ultra-Left policies on labour and taxation) and of the rich peasants (by allotting them poor land); the physical elimination of the landlords (by not allotting them any land); the attack on the intellectuals; the "Left" deviation in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries; the monopolizing by Communists of the organs of political power; the focussing on communism as the objective in popular education; the ultra-Left military policy (of attacking the big cities and denying the role of guerrilla warfare); the putschist policy in the work in the White areas; and the policy within the Party of attacks on comrades through the abuse of disciplinary measures. These

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This inner-Party directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

ultra-Left policies were manifestations of the error of "Left" opportunism, or exactly the reverse of the Right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu in the latter period of the First Great Revolution. It was all alliance and no struggle in the latter period of the First Great Revolution, and all struggle and no alliance (except with the basic sections of the peasantry) in the latter period of the Agrarian Revolution — truly striking demonstrations of the two extremist policies. Both extremist policies caused great losses to the Party and the revolution.

Today our Anti-Japanese National United Front policy is neither all alliance and no struggle nor all struggle and no alliance, but combines alliance and struggle. Specifically, it means:

(1) All people favouring resistance (that is, all anti-Japanese workers, peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals, and businessmen) must unite in the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

(2) Within the united front our policy must be one of independence and initiative, *i.e.*, both unity and independence are necessary.

(3) As far as military strategy is concerned, our policy is guerrilla warfare waged independently and with the initiative in our own hands within the framework of a unified strategy; guerrilla warfare is basic, but no chance of waging mobile warfare should be lost when the conditions are favourable.

(4) In the struggle against the anti-Communist die-hards, our policy is to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one, and to wage struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint.

(5) In the enemy-occupied and Kuomintang areas our policy is, on the one hand, to develop the united front to the greatest possible extent and, on the other, to have well-selected cadres working underground. With regard to the forms of organization and struggle, our policy is to have well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, to accumulate strength and bide our time.

(6) With regard to the alignment of the various classes within the country, our basic policy is to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the anti-Communist die-hard forces.

(7) With respect to the anti-Communist die-hards, ours is a revolutionary dual policy of uniting with them, in so far as they are still in favour of resisting Japan, and of isolating them, in so far as they are determined to oppose the Communist Party. Moreover, the die-hards have a dual character with regard to resistance to Japan, and our policy is to unite with them, in so far as they are still in favour

of resistance, and to struggle against them and isolate them in so far as they vacillate (for instance, when they collude with the Japanese aggressors and show reluctance in opposing Wang Ching-wei and other traitors). As their opposition to the Communist Party has also a dual character, our policy, too, should have a dual character; in so far as they are still unwilling to break up Kuomintang-Communist co-operation altogether, it is one of alliance with them, but in so far as they are high-handed and launch armed attacks on our Party and the people, it is one of struggling against them and isolating them. We make a distinction between such people with a dual character and the traitors and pro-Japanese elements.

(8) Even among the traitors and pro-Japanese elements there are people with a dual character, towards whom we should likewise employ a revolutionary dual policy. In so far as they are pro-Japanese, our policy is to struggle against them and isolate them, but in so far as they vacillate, our policy is to draw them nearer to us and win them over. We make a distinction between such ambivalent elements and the out-and-out traitors like Wang Ching-wei, Wang Yi-tang[1] and Shih Yu-san.[2]

(9) The pro-Japanese big landlords and big bourgeoisie who are against resistance must be distinguished from the pro-British and pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie who are for resistance; similarly, the ambivalent big landlords and big bourgeoisie who are for resistance but vacillate, and who are for unity but are anti-Communist, must be distinguished from the national bourgeoisie, the middle and small landlords and the enlightened gentry, the duality of whose character is less pronounced. We build our policy on these distinctions. The diverse policies mentioned above all stem from these distinctions in class relations.

(10) We deal with imperialism in the same way. The Communist Party opposes all imperialism, but we make a distinction between Japanese imperialism which is now committing aggression against China and the imperialist powers which are not doing so now, between German and Italian imperialism which are allies of Japan and have recognized "Manchukuo" and British and U.S. imperialism which are opposed to Japan, and between the Britain and the United States of yesterday which followed a Munich policy in the Far East and undermined China's resistance to Japan, and the Britain and the United States of today which have abandoned this policy and are now in favour of China's resistance. Our tactics are guided by one and

the same principle: to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one. Our foreign policy differs from that of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang claims, "There is only one enemy and all the rest are friends"; it appears to treat all countries other than Japan alike, but in fact it is pro-British and pro-American. On our part we must draw certain distinctions, first, between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries, second, between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other, third, between the people of Britain and the United States and their imperialist governments, and fourth, between the policy of Britain and the United States during their Far Eastern Munich period and their policy today. We build our policy on these distinctions. In direct contrast to the Kuomintang our basic line is to use all possible foreign help, subject to the principle of independent prosecution of the war and reliance on our own efforts, and not, as the Kuomintang does, to abandon this principle by relying entirely on foreign help or hanging on to one imperialist bloc or another.

To correct the lop-sided views of many Party cadres on the question of tactics and their consequent vacillations between "Left" and Right, we must help them to acquire an all-round and integrated understanding of the changes and developments in the Party's policy, past and present. The ultra-Left viewpoint is creating trouble and is still the main danger in the Party. In the Kuomintang areas, there are many people who cannot seriously carry out the policy of having well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, of accumulating strength and biding our time, because they underestimate the gravity of the Kuomintang's anti-Communist policy. At the same time, there are many others who cannot carry out the policy of expanding the united front, because they over-simplify matters and consider the entire Kuomintang to be quite hopeless and are therefore at a loss what to do. A similar state of affairs exists in the Japanese-occupied areas.

In the Kuomintang areas and the anti-Japanese base areas, the Rightist views which were once prevalent to a serious extent have now been basically overcome; those who held such views used to stress alliance to the exclusion of struggle and overestimate the Kuomintang's inclination to resist Japan, and they therefore blurred the difference in principle between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, rejected the policy of independence and initiative within the united front, appeased the big landlords and big bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang, and tied their own hands instead of boldly expanding the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces and conducting resolute struggle against the Kuomintang's policy of opposing and restricting the Communist Party. But since the winter of 1939 an ultra-Left tendency has cropped up in many places as a result of the anti-Communist "friction" engineered by the Kuomintang and of the struggles we have waged in self-defence. This tendency has been corrected to some extent but not altogether, and it still finds expression in concrete policies in many places. It is therefore most necessary for us to examine and define our concrete policies now.

As the Central Committee has already issued a series of directives on concrete policies, now only a few points are given here by way of summary.

The organs of political power. The "three thirds system", under which Communists have only one-third of the places in the organs of political power and many non-Communists are drawn into participation, must be carried out resolutely. In areas like northern Kiangsu, where we have just begun to establish anti-Japanese democratic political power, the proportion of Communists may be even less than one-third. The representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry who are not actively opposed to the Communist Party must be drawn into participation both in the government and in the people's representative bodies, and those Kuomintang members who do not oppose the Communist Party must also be allowed to participate. Even a small number of right-wingers may be allowed to join the people's representative bodies. On no account should our Party monopolize everything. We are not destroying the dictatorship of the big comprador bourgeoisie and the big landlord class in order to replace it with a one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party.

Labour policy. The livelihood of the workers must be improved if their enthusiasm in the fight against Japan is to be fully aroused. But we must strictly guard against being ultra-Leftist; there must not be excessive increases in wages or excessive reductions in working hours. Under present conditions, the eight-hour working day cannot be universally introduced in China and a ten-hour working day should still be permitted in certain branches of production. In other branches of production the working day should be fixed according to the circumstances. Once a contract between labour and capital is concluded, the workers must observe labour discipline and the capitalists must be allowed to make some profit. Otherwise factories will close down, which will neither help the war nor benefit the workers. Particularly in the rural areas, the living standards and wages of the workers should not be raised too high, or it will give rise to complaints from the peasants, create unemployment among the workers and result in a decline in production.

Land policy. It must be explained to Party members and to the peasants that this is not the time for a thorough agrarian revolution and that the series of measures taken during the Agrarian Revolution cannot be applied today. On the one hand, our present policy should stipulate that the landlords shall reduce rent and interest, for this serves to arouse the enthusiasm of the basic peasant masses for resistance to Japan, but the reductions should not be too great. In general, land rent should be reduced by 25 per cent, and if the masses demand a greater reduction, the tenant-farmer may keep up to 60 or 70 per cent of his crop, but not more. The reduction in interest on loans should not be so great as to render credit transactions impossible. On the other hand, our policy should stipulate that the peasants shall pay rent and interest and that the landlords shall retain their ownership of land and other property. Interest should not be so low as to make it impossible for the peasants to obtain loans, nor the settlement of old accounts be such as to enable the peasants to get back their mortgaged land gratis.

Tax policy. Taxes must be levied according to income. Except for the very poor who should be exempt, all people with an income shall pay taxes to the state, which means that the burden shall be carried by more than 80 per cent of the population, including the workers and peasants, and not be placed entirely on the landlords and the capitalists. Arresting people and imposing fines on them as a means of financing the army must be forbidden. We may use the existing Kuomintang system of taxation with appropriate alterations until we have devised a new and more suitable one.

Anti-espionage policy. We must firmly suppress the confirmed traitors and anti-Communists, or otherwise we shall not be able to protect the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces. But there must not be too much killing, and no innocent person should be incriminated. Vacillating elements and reluctant followers among the reactionaries should be dealt with leniently. Corporal punishment must be abolished in trying criminals; the stress must be on the weight of evidence and confessions should not be taken on trust. Our policy towards prisoners captured from the Japanese, puppet or anti-Communist troops is to set them all free, except for those who have incurred the bitter hatred of the masses and must receive capital punishment and whose death sentence has been approved by the higher authorities. Among the prisoners, those who were coerced into joining the reactionary forces but who are more or less inclined towards the revolution should be won over in large numbers to work for our army. The rest should be released and, if they fight us and are captured again, should again be set free. We should not insult them, take away their personal effects or try to exact recantations from them, but without exception should treat them sincerely and kindly. This should be our policy, however reactionary they may be. It is a very effective way of isolating the hard core of reaction. As for renegades, except for those who have committed heinous crimes, they should be given a chance to turn over a new leaf provided they discontinue their anti-Communist activities; and if they come back and wish to rejoin the revolution they may be accepted, but must not be re-admitted into the Party. The general run of Kuomintang intelligence agents must not be identified with the Japanese spies and Chinese traitors; the two should be differentiated and handled accordingly. An end should be put to the state of confusion in which any governmental or non-governmental organization can make arrests. To establish revolutionary order in the interests of the war, it must be stipulated that, with the exception of army units in combat action, only government judicial or public security agencies shall be empowered to make arrests.

The rights of the people. It must be laid down that all landlords and capitalists not opposed to the War of Resistance shall enjoy the same rights of person and property, the same right to vote and the same freedom of speech, assembly, association, political conviction and religious belief as the workers and peasants. The government shall take action only against saboteurs and those who organize riots in our base areas, and shall protect all others and not molest them.

Economic policy. We must actively develop industry and agriculture and promote the circulation of commodities. Capitalists should be encouraged to come into our anti-Japanese base areas and start enterprises here if they so desire. Private enterprise should be encouraged and state enterprise regarded as only one sector of the economy. The purpose in all this is to achieve self-sufficiency. Care must be taken not to damage any useful enterprise. Both our tariff and our monetary policies should conform to our basic line of expanding agriculture, industry and commerce, and not run counter to it. The essential factor in maintaining the base areas over a long period is the achievement of self-sufficiency through a conscientious and meticulous, not a crude and careless, organization of the economy.

Cultural and educational policy. This should centre on promoting and spreading the knowledge and skills needed for the war and a sense of national pride among the masses of the people. Bourgeois-liberal educators, men of letters, journalists, scholars and technical experts should be allowed to come to our base areas and co-operate with us in running schools and newspapers and doing other work. We should accept into our schools all intellectuals and students who show enthusiasm for resisting Japan, give them short-term training, and then assign them to work in the army, the government, or mass organizations; we should boldly draw them in, give them work and promote them. We should not be over-cautious or too afraid of reactionaries sneaking in. Unavoidably, some such elements will creep in, but there will be time to comb them out in the course of study and work. Every base area must establish printing shops, publish books and newspapers and organize distribution and delivery agencies. Every base area must also, as far as possible, set up big schools for training cadres, and the more and bigger, the better.

Military policy. There must be maximum expansion of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, because they are the most reliable armed forces of the Chinese people in pressing on with the national war of resistance. We should continue our policy of never attacking the Kuomintang troops unless attacked and do all we can to make friends with them. In order to help the building up of our army, no effort should be spared to draw those officers who are sympathetic to us into the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, whether they are members of the Kuomintang or are without party affiliation. Something must be done now to change the situation where Communists dominate everything in our armies by sheer numbers. Of course, the "three thirds system" should not be introduced into our main forces, but so long as the leadership of the army is kept in the hands of the Party (this is an absolute and inviolable necessity), we need not be afraid of drawing large numbers of sympathizers into the work of building up the military and technical departments of our army. Now that the ideological and organizational foundations of our Party and our army have been firmly laid, not only is there no danger in drawing in large numbers of sympathizers (not saboteurs of course) but it is indeed an indispensable policy, for otherwise it will be impossible to win the sympathy of the whole country and expand our revolutionary forces.

All these tactical principles for the united front and the concrete policies formulated in accordance with them must be firmly applied by the whole Party. At a time when the Japanese invaders are intensifying their aggression against China and when the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are pursuing high-handed policies and launching armed attacks against the Communist Party and the people, the application of the tactical principles and concrete policies outlined above is the only way to press on with the War of Resistance, broaden the united front, win the sympathy of the whole people and bring about a turn for the better in the situation. In rectifying errors, however, we must proceed step by step, and must not be so hasty as to cause discontent among the cadres, suspicion among the masses, counter-attacks by the landlords, or other undesirable developments.

NOTES

[1] Wang Yi-tang was a big bureaucrat in the period of the Northern warlords and a pro-Japanese traitor. He was recalled from retirement by Chiang Kai-shek after the Northern China Incident of 1935 to serve in the Kuomintang government. In 1938, he served as a Japanese puppet in northern China and was made chairman of the bogus Northern China Political Council.

[2] Shih Yu-san was a Kuomintang warlord who frequently changed sides. He was commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's 10th Army Group after the outbreak of the War of Resistance, collaborated with the Japanese armed forces in southern Hopei and did nothing but attack the Eighth Route Army, destroy organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power and slaughter Communists and progressives.

ORDER AND STATEMENT ON THE SOUTHERN ANHWEI INCIDENT

January 1941

ORDER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

Yenan, January 20, 1941

The New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army has won fame both at home and abroad by its distinguished service in the War of Resistance. Commander Yeh Ting has an outstanding record in leading the army against the enemy. Recently, however, while it was moving northward in accordance with instructions, this army was treacherously attacked by the pro-Japanese clique, and Commander Yeh, wounded and exhausted in the fighting, was thrown into jail. Informed of the whole course of the Southern Anhwei Incident by telegrams from Chen Yi, the Commander of the First Detachment of the army, and Chang Yun-yi, the army's Chief of Staff, the Commission expresses its great wrath and its deep solicitude for our comrades. In addition to the adoption of measures to deal with the towering crime of the pro-Japanese clique in sabotaging the War of Resistance, attacking the people's armed forces and launching civil war, the Commission hereby appoints Chen Yi as Acting Commander of the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army, Chang Yun-yi as Deputy Commander, Lai Chuan-chu as Chief of Staff, and Teng Tzu-hui as Director of the Political Department. Acting Commander Chen Yi and his associates are hereby instructed to devote their efforts to strengthening the army, reinforcing unity within its ranks, ensuring good relations with the people, carrying out the Three People's Principles, adhering to the Testament of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and consolidating and expanding the Anti-Japanese National United Front in the struggle to defend our people and our country, to carry the War of Resistance forward to the end and to guard against attacks by the pro-Japanese clique.

STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA TO A CORRESPONDENT OF THE HSINHUA NEWS AGENCY

January 22, 1941

The recent anti-Communist Southern Anhwei Incident had been brewing for a long time. Present developments are but the opening phase of a national emergency. Since the formation of their triple alliance[1] with Germany and Italy, the Japanese aggressors have redoubled their efforts to engineer changes within China so as to find a quick solution to the Sino-Japanese war. Their purpose is to use the Chinese themselves to suppress the anti-Japanese movement and consolidate the rear for Japan's southward drive, so that she will be free to drive south in co-ordination with Hitler's offensive against Britain. A considerable number of ringleaders from the pro-Japanese clique have long entrenched themselves in the party, government and army organizations of the Kuomintang and have been carrying on agitation day and night. The preparations for their plot were completed by the end of last year. The attack on the New Fourth Army units in southern Anhwei and the reactionary Order of January 17[2] are only the first open signs of this plot. Incidents of the gravest nature will now be staged one after another. What are the details of the plot of the Japanese aggressors and the pro-Japanese clique? They are as follows:

(1) To publish the two telegrams of October 19 and December 8[3] to Chu Teh, Peng Teh-huai, Yeh Ting and Hsiang Ying over the signatures of Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi, in order to arouse public opinion.

(2) To start a press campaign on the importance of observing military discipline and military orders in preparation for launching civil war.

(3) To wipe out the New Fourth Army units in southern Anhwei.

(4) To declare that the New Fourth Army has "mutinied" and cancel its official designation.

These four steps have already been taken.

(5) To appoint Tang En-po, Li Pin-hsien, Wang Chung-lien and Han Teh-chin as "Communist suppression" commanders of the various route armies in central China, with Li Tsung-jen as supreme commander, in order to attack the New Fourth Army units under Peng Hsueh-feng, Chang Yun-yi and Li Hsien-nien and, if this comes off, to make further attacks on the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army units in Shantung and northern Kiangsu, with the Japanese troops acting in close co-ordination.

This step is now being taken.

(6) To find a pretext to declare that the Eighth Route Army has "mutinied", cancel its official designation, and order the arrest of Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai.

This move is now in preparation.

(7) To close down the liaison offices of the Eighth Route Army in Chungking, Sian and Kweilin, and arrest Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Tung Pi-wu and Teng Ying-chao.

This move has begun with the closing down of the liaison office in Kweilin.

(8) To close down the *New China Daily*.

(9) To launch attacks on the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and seize Yenan.

(10) To make wholesale arrests of prominent people favouring resistance to Japan and suppress the anti-Japanese movement in Chungking and in the provinces.

(11) To destroy Communist Party organizations in all provinces and make wholesale arrests of Communists.

(12) To proclaim "the recovery of lost territories" by the Kuomintang government upon the withdrawal of Japanese troops from central and southern China, and at the same time to carry out propaganda on the necessity of concluding a so-called "peace with honour".

(13) Japan to launch most ferocious attacks on the Eighth Route Army by bringing up her troops from central and southern China as reinforcements to the north, and to co-operate with the Kuomintang forces in order to annihilate the whole Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

(14) The Kuomintang to continue last year's state of cease-fire with Japan on all fronts in order to turn it into one of general truce and peace negotiations while ceaselessly attacking the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.

(15) The Kuomintang government to sign a peace treaty with Japan and join the triple alliance.

Active preparations are now being made for these moves.

Such in general outline is the treacherous plot of Japan and the pro-Japanese clique. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China pointed out in its Manifesto of July 7, 1939: "Capitulation presents the greatest danger in the current situation, and anti-communism is the preparatory step to capitulation." Its Manifesto of July 7, 1940 stated: "The danger of capitulation has never been so serious and the difficulties in the war have never been so great as they are today." Chu Teh, Peng Teh-huai, Yeh Ting and Hsiang Ying pointed this out even more concretely in their telegram of November 9 of last year:

> Certain people at home are engineering a new anti-Communist onslaught in an attempt to clear the way for capitulation. . . . They want to put an end to the War of Resistance by what they call Sino-Japanese co-operation in "suppressing the Communists". They want to substitute civil war for the War of Resistance, capitulation for independence, a split for unity and darkness for light. Their activities are sinister and their designs pernicious. People are telling each other the news and are horrified. Indeed, the situation has never been so critical as it is today.

Thus the Southern Anhwei Incident and the Order of January 17 of the Military Council in Chungking are merely the beginning of a series of incidents. The Order of January 17 in particular is full of grave political implications. The fact that those who issued this counter-revolutionary order dared to do so openly, risking universal condemnation, shows that they must have determined upon a complete split and out-and-out capitulation. For without their wire-pulling masters the political representatives of the flabby class of big landlords and big bourgeoisie in China cannot move an inch, let alone embark on an undertaking such as this which has shocked the whole world. In the present circumstances, it seems very difficult to make those who issued the order change their minds and it will probably be impossible to do so without emergency action by the whole nation and strong diplomatic pressure from abroad. Hence the urgent task of the whole nation now is to watch developments with the utmost vigilance and prepare itself against any sinister eventuality that the reactionaries may precipitate; there must not be the slightest negligence. As for China's future, the matter is quite clear. Even if the Japanese aggressors and the pro-Japanese clique are able to succeed in their plots, we Chinese Communists and the people will never allow them to keep up their tyranny indefinitely; not only are we duty bound to step forward and take control of the situation, we are also confident of our ability to do so. However dark the situation, however thorny the road, and whatever the price that road exacts (the loss of the New Fourth Army units in southern Anhwei is part of that price), the Japanese aggressors and the pro-Japanese clique are certainly doomed. The reasons are as follows:

(1) The Communist Party of China can no longer be easily deceived and crushed, as it was in 1927. It is now a major party standing firmly on its own feet.

(2) Many members of other parties and groups (including the Kuomintang) who are apprehensive of the disaster of national subjugation certainly have no wish to capitulate and fight a civil war. Some of them are hoodwinked for the moment, but they may come to their senses in due course.

(3) The same is true of the troops. Most of them oppose the Communist Party under compulsion.

(4) The vast majority of the Chinese people have no desire to be colonial slaves.

(5) The imperialist war is on the eve of a great change. However rampant they may be for the moment, the parasites who depend on imperialism will soon find out that their bosses are not reliable. The whole situation will change when the tree falls and the monkeys scatter.

(6) The outbreak of revolution in many countries is only a question of time, and it is certain that these revolutions and the Chinese revolution will support one another in the joint struggle for victory.

(7) The Soviet Union is the strongest force in the world and will definitely help China fight the War of Resistance to the very end.

For all these reasons we hope that those who are playing with fire will not get too dizzy. We now serve them with this formal warning: Better be careful. This fire is not a plaything. Look out for your own skins! If you calm down and give the matter some thought, you will have to take the following steps promptly and in earnest:

(1) Rein in on the brink of the precipice and stop your provocations.

(2) Rescind the reactionary Order of January 17 and publicly admit that you have been completely wrong.

(3) Punish Ho Ying-chin, Ku Chu-tung and Shangkuan Yun-hsiang, the chief culprits in the Southern Anhwei Incident.

(4) Release Yeh Ting and reinstate him as Commander of the New Fourth Army.

(5) Return all the men and arms captured in southern Anhwei to the New Fourth Army.

(6) Compensate all the officers and men of the New Fourth Army who were wounded and the families of those who were killed in southern Anhwei.

(7) Withdraw the troops sent to central China for "Communist suppression".

(8) Demolish the blockade line in the Northwest.[4]

(9) Release all patriotic political prisoners.

(10) Abolish the one-party dictatorship and introduce democratic government.

(11) Carry out the Three People's Principles and observe Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament.

(12) Arrest the ringleaders of the pro-Japanese clique and bring them to trial in accordance with the law of the land.

There will, of course, be a return to normal if these twelve points are put into effect, and we Communists and the whole people will certainly not push matters to extremes. Otherwise, "Chi Sun's troubles, I am afraid, will not come from Chuanyu but will arise at home";[5] in other words, the reactionaries will be lifting a rock only to drop it on their own toes, and then we will not be able to help them even if we would like to. We value co-operation, but they ought to set store by it, too. To be frank, there is a limit to our concessions; the stage of concessions is over as far as we are concerned. They have inflicted the first gash, and a very deep one at that. If they still care for their own future, they should come forward of their own accord and dress the wound. "It is not too late to mend the fold even after some of the sheep have been lost." It is a matter of life and death for them, and we feel obliged to give them this final piece of advice. But if they remain impenitent and keep up their wrongdoing, the people of China, having reached the end of their forbearance, will dump them on the muck heap and then it will be too late for repentance. As for the New Fourth Army, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued an order on

January 20, appointing Chen Yi as Acting Commander, Chang Yun-yi as Deputy Commander, Lai Chuan-chu as Chief of Staff and Teng Tzu-hui as Director of the Political Department. With more than 90,000 troops remaining in central China and the southern part of Kiangsu, the New Fourth Army, though subjected to pincer attacks by the Japanese aggressors and the anti-Communist troops, will certainly fight on despite all hardships and will never cease to render loyal service to the nation. Meanwhile, the units of its brother army, the Eighth Route Army, will not sit by and watch it suffer these pincer attacks, but will certainly take steps to give the necessary assistance — this I can say bluntly. As for the statement made by the spokesman of the Military Council in Chungking, the only possible comment is that it is self-contradictory. While the Chungking Military Council stated in its Order that the New Fourth Army had "mutinied", the spokesman said that its aim was to move into the Nanking-Shanghai-Hangchow triangle in order to establish a base there. Now, suppose we accept what he says. Can a move into the Nanking-Shanghai-Hangchow triangle be regarded as a "mutiny"? That blockhead of a Chungking spokesman did not stop to think. Against whom would the New Fourth Army be mutinying in that area? Is it not an area under Japanese occupation? Then why should you prevent the New Fourth Army from moving into that area and try to wipe it out while it was still in southern Anhwei? Ah, of course! After all that is what loyal servants of Japanese imperialism would do. Hence their plan to mass seven divisions in an annihilation campaign, hence their Order of January 17, and hence their trial of Yeh Ting. However, I still say that the Chungking spokesman is an idiot, for without being pressed he has let the cat out of the bag and revealed the plans of Japanese imperialism to the whole people.

NOTES

[1] The triple alliance refers to the tripartite pact between Germany, Italy and Japan signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940.

[2] The counter-revolutionary Order of January 17 for the disbandment of the New Fourth Army was issued by Chiang Kai-shek in the name of the Military Council of the National Government.

[3] These two notorious telegrams were sent late in 1940 by Chiang Kai-shek when he launched the second anti-Communist onslaught, and they were signed by

Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi, Chief and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Military Council of the Kuomintang government. The telegram of October 19 contained outrageous calumnies against the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army which were fighting in the enemy-occupied areas and peremptorily ordered their units operating against the Japanese south of the Yellow River to be shifted to the north by a specified date. In the interest of unity for armed resistance, Comrades Chu Teh, Peng Teh-huai, Yeh Ting and Hsiang Ying, in a joint reply on November 9, consented to shift the troops in southern Anhwei to the north, at the same time rebutting the slanders. The telegram of December 8 signed by Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi, which was a reply to the telegram of November 9, represented a further attempt to turn public opinion against the Communists.

[4] The blockade line in the Northwest was built by the Kuomintang reactionaries around the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. From 1939 onward they pressed the local people into service and built five lines of blockhouses, stone walls and trenches. The line started from Ningsia in the west, ran along the Chingshui River in the south and terminated at the Yellow River in the east. On the eve of the Southern Anhwei Incident the Kuomintang troops surrounding the Border Region were increased to more than 200,000.

[5] The quotation is from *Confucian Analects*, Book XVI, Chapter I. Confucius made this remark when Chi Sun, minister of the state of Lu, was about to attack Chuanyu, a small neighbouring state.

THE SITUATION AFTER THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT

March 18, 1941

1. The second anti-Communist onslaught,[1] which was touched off by the telegram of Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi (dated October 19 last year), reached its climax in the Southern Anhwei Incident and Chiang Kai-shek's Order of January 17; the rearguard actions are his anti-Communist speech of March 6 and the anti-Communist resolution of the People's Political Council.[2] From now on there may be some temporary easing of the situation. With the world's two major imperialist blocs on the eve of a decisive struggle, that section of China's big bourgeoisie which is pro-British and pro-American and which is still opposed to the Japanese aggressors finds it necessary to seek a slight temporary relaxation in the present strained relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Besides, the Kuomintang cannot keep these relations strained to the pitch of the past five months, because of the situation within the Kuomintang (there are contradictions between its central and local authorities, between the C.C. Clique and the Political Science Group, between the C.C. Clique and the Fu Hsing Society[3] and between the die-hards and the intermediate sections, and also contradictions within the C.C. Clique and the Fu Hsing Society themselves), because of the domestic situation (the broad masses of the people are opposed to the Kuomintang's tyranny and sympathize with the Communist Party) and because of our Party's own policy (of continuing the protest campaign). At the moment, therefore, Chiang Kai-shek needs a slight temporary easing of the tension.

This inner-Party directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

2. The recent struggle points to a decline in the standing of the Kuomintang and a rise in that of the Communist Party, and this is the key factor in certain changes that have occurred in the relative strength of the two parties. All this has compelled Chiang Kai-shek to reconsider his own position and attitude. In stressing national defence and preaching that party politics are out of date, he is posing as a "national leader" who is above domestic contradictions and feigning impartiality to class and party, his aim being to preserve the rule of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang. But this attempt of his will certainly prove futile, if it is only a subterfuge and means no real change in policy.

FROM MARX TO MAO

3. At the beginning of the recent anti-Communist onslaught, the policy of conciliation and concession which our Party adopted out of consideration for the general interest (as indicated in the telegram of November 9 last year) won the sympathy of the people, and we again won the support of the whole people when, after the Southern Anhwei Incident, we turned to a vigorous counter-offensive (as indicated by our two sets of twelve demands,[4] our refusal to attend the People's Political Council, and the country-wide protest campaign). This policy of ours, the policy of waging struggle on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, was entirely necessary for repulsing the latest anti-Communist onslaught, and it has already proved fruitful. Until there is a reasonable settlement of the major points at issue between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, we must not show any slackening in our campaign of stern protest against the Southern Anhwei Incident, which was engineered by the pro-Japanese and anti-Communist cliques in the Kuomintang, and against their political and military oppression in all its forms, and must intensify our propaganda for the first twelve demands.

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4. The Kuomintang will never relax its policy of oppression of our Party and other progressives or its anti-Communist propaganda in the areas under its rule; therefore our Party must heighten its vigilance. The Kuomintang will continue its attacks on the areas north of the Huai River, in eastern Anhwei and in central Hupeh, and our armed forces must not hesitate to repulse them. All base areas must strictly carry out the Central Committee's directive of December 25 last year,[5] intensify inner-Party education on tactics and rectify ultra-Left views, so that we can unfalteringly maintain the anti-Japanese democratic base areas. Throughout the country, including, of course, all the base areas, we must reject the erroneous estimate that a final split

between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party has either already occurred or is about to occur, together with the many incorrect views arising therefrom.

NOTES

[1] For a fuller account of the second anti-Communist onslaught, see "A Comment on the Sessions of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and of the People's Political Council", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. III. pp. 137-51.

[2] On March 6, 1941, Chiang Kai-shek delivered an anti-Communist speech at a meeting of the People's Political Council. Harping on his old theme that the "direction of all military and political affairs" must be "unified", he declared that the organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power in the enemy's rear should be abolished and that the people's armed forces led by the Chinese Communist Party must be "concentrated in specified areas" according to his "orders and plans". On the same day, the People's Political Council, which was dominated by the Kuomintang reactionaries, passed a resolution whitewashing Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist and anti-popular activities and violently attacking the Communist members of the People's Political Council for their refusal to attend the council's session in protest against the Southern Anhwei Incident.

[3] For the Political Science Group, see "Problems of War and Strategy", Note 14, p. 234 of this volume. For the C.C. Clique and the Fu Hsing Society, see "The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan", Note 10, p. 74 of this volume.

[4] The first set of "twelve demands", proposed by the Communist members of the People's Political Council at its session of February 15, 1941, were similar to those listed in the "Order and Statement on the Southern Anhwei Incident". The second set were put to Chiang Kai-shek on March 2, 1941 by the Communist members of the People's Political Council as a condition for their attendance of the council's sessions and were as follows:

(1) Immediately stop the anti-Communist military attacks all over the country.

(2) Immediately stop the nation-wide political persecution of the Chinese Communist Party and of all other democratic parties and groups, recognize their legal status, and release all their members arrested in Sian, Chungking, Kweiyang and other places.

(3) Lift the ban on the bookshops which have been closed down in various places, and rescind the order for impounding anti-Japanese books and newspapers in post offices.

(4) Immediately stop all restrictions on the *New China Daily*.

(5) Recognize the legal status of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

(6) Recognize the organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power in the enemy's rear.

(7) Maintain the *status quo* in the division of garrison areas in central northern and northwestern China.

(8) Let the Communist-led armed forces form another group army in addition to the Eighteenth Group Army, making a total of six army corps.

(9) Release all the cadres arrested during the Southern Anhwei Incident and provide funds for the relief of the victims' families.

(10) Release all officers and men taken prisoner during the Southern Anhwei Incident and return all their arms.

(11) Form a joint committee of all the parties and groups, with one representative from each, and appoint the Kuomintang and the Communist Party representatives to be its chairman and vice-chairman respectively.

(12) Include Communist representatives in the presidium of the People's Political Council.

[5] The directive of December 25 is included as the article "On Policy", pp. 441-49 of this volume.

CONCLUSIONS ON THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT

May 8, 1941

As the Central Committee's directive of March 18, 1941, has stated, the second anti-Communist onslaught has come to an end. What has followed since is the continuance of the War of Resistance Against Japan in new circumstances, international as well as domestic. The additional factors in these new circumstances are the spread of the imperialist war, the upsurge of the international revolutionary movement, the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan,[1] the defeat of the Kuomintang's second anti-Communist onslaught and the consequent decline in the political standing of the Kuomintang and rise in that of the Communist Party, and, furthermore, the latest preparations by Japan for a new large-scale offensive against China. It is absolutely necessary for us to study and learn the lessons of our Party's heroic and victorious struggle against the recent anti-Communist onslaught, for the purpose of uniting the people throughout the country to persevere in the War of Resistance and for the purpose of continuing effectively to overcome the danger of capitulation and the anti-Communist counter-current of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie.

1. Of China's two major contradictions, the national contradiction between China and Japan is still primary and the internal class contradiction in China is still subordinate. The fact that a national enemy has penetrated deep into our country is all-decisive. As long as the contradiction between China and Japan remains acute, even if the entire big landlord class and big bourgeoisie turn traitor and

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This inner-Party directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

surrender, they can never bring about another 1927 situation, with a repetition of the April 12th[2] and the May 21st Incidents[3] of that year. The first anti-Communist onslaught[4] was appraised as another May 21st Incident by some comrades, and the second onslaught as a repetition of the April 12th and the May 21st Incidents, but objective facts have proved these appraisals wrong. The mistake of these comrades lies in forgetting that the national contradiction is the primary one.

2. In the circumstances, the pro-British and pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie, who direct all Kuomintang government policy, remain classes with a dual character. On the one hand they are opposed to Japan, and on the other they are opposed to the Communist Party and the broad masses of the people represented by the Party. And both their resistance to Japan and their anti-communism bear a dual character. With regard to their resistance to Japan, while they are opposed to Japan, they are not actively waging war or actively opposing Wang Ching-wei and the other traitors, and sometimes they even flirt with Japan's peace emissaries. With regard to their anti-communism, they are opposed to the Communist Party, having gone so far as to create the Southern Anhwei Incident and to issue the Order of January 17, but at the same time they do not want a final split and still maintain their stick-and-carrot policy. These facts have been confirmed once again in the recent anti-Communist onslaught. Chinese politics, which are extremely complex, demand our comrades' deepest attention. Since the pro-British and pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie are still resisting Japan and are still using the stick and carrot in dealing with our Party, the policy of our Party is to "do unto them as they do unto us",[5] stick for stick and carrot for carrot. Such is the revolutionary dual policy. So long as the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie do not completely turn traitor, this policy of ours will not change.

3. A whole range of tactics is needed to combat the Kuomintang's anti-Communist policy, and there must be absolutely no carelessness or negligence. The enmity and brutality of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek towards the people's revolutionary forces were not only demonstrated by the ten years of anti-Communist war, but they have been fully demonstrated in the midst of the war against Japan by two anti-Communist onslaughts, and particularly by the Southern Anhwei Incident during the second anti-Communist onslaught. If a people's

revolutionary force is to avoid extermination by Chiang Kai-shek and to compel him to acknowledge its existence, it has no alternative but to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against his counter-revolutionary policies. The defeat resulting from Comrade Hsiang Ying's opportunism during the recent anti-Communist onslaught should serve as a grave warning to the whole Party. But the struggle must be waged on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint; if any of the three is lacking, we shall suffer setbacks.

4. In the struggle against the Kuomintang die-hards, the big comprador bourgeoisie must be distinguished from the national bourgeoisie, which has little or no comprador character, and the most reactionary big landlords must be distinguished from the enlightened gentry and the general run of landlords. This is the theoretical basis of our Party's endeavour to win over the intermediate sections and establish organs of political power on the "three thirds system", and it has been repeatedly stressed by the Central Committee since March last year. Its correctness was proved afresh during the recent anti-Communist onslaught. The stand we took before the Southern Anhwei Incident, as expressed in our November 9 telegram,[6] was entirely necessary for our shift to the political counter-attack after the incident; otherwise we could not have won over the intermediate sections. For unless they had been taught time and again by experience, the intermediate sections would have been unable to understand why our Party must wage resolute struggles against the Kuomintang die-hards, why unity can be gained only through struggle and why there can be no unity whatsoever if struggle is abandoned. Although the leading elements in the regional power groups belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, generally they should also be regarded and treated as intermediate section, since there are contradictions between them and the big landlords and big bourgeois who control the central government. Yen Hsi-shan who was most active in the first anti-Communist onslaught took a middle stand in the second, and although the Kwangsi clique which took a middle stand in the first onslaught came in on the anti-Communist side in the second, it is still in contradiction with the Chiang Kai-shek clique and not to be identified with it. This applies with still greater force to other regional power groups. Many of our comrades, however, still lump the different landlord and bourgeois groups together, as though the entire landlord class and bourgeoisie had turned traitor after the Southern Anhwei Incident; this is an over-simplification of

China's complex politics. Were we to adopt this view and identify all the landlords and the bourgeoisie with the Kuomintang die-hards, we would isolate ourselves. It must be realized that Chinese society is big in the middle and small at both ends[7] and that the Communist Party cannot solve China's problems unless it wins over the masses of the intermediate classes and unless it enables them to play their proper role according to their circumstances.

5. Because some comrades have wavered on the point that the contradiction between China and Japan is the primary one and hence have wrongly appraised class relations in China, they have at times wavered on the policy of the Party. Proceeding from their appraisal of the Southern Anhwei Incident as another April 12th or May 21st Incident, these comrades now seem to think that the Central Committee's policy directive of December 25 last year is no longer applicable, or at least not altogether applicable. They believe that we no longer need the kind of state power that includes all who stand for resistance and democracy but need a so-called state power of the workers, peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie, and that we no longer need the united front policy of the period of the War of Resistance but need a policy of agrarian revolution as during the ten years' civil war. The Party's correct policy has become blurred in the minds of these comrades, at any rate for the time being.

6. When these comrades were instructed by the Central Committee of our Party to be prepared against a possible split by the Kuomintang, that is, against the worst possible development, they forgot the other possibilities. They do not understand that while it is absolutely necessary to prepare for the worst possibility, this does not mean ignoring the favourable possibilities; on the contrary, such preparation for the worst is precisely a condition for creating favourable possibilities and turning them into reality. On this occasion, we were fully prepared against a split by the Kuomintang, and so the Kuomintang dared not bring about a split lightly.

7. There are even more comrades who fail to understand the unity of the national struggle and the class struggle, and who fail to understand united front policy and class policy, and consequently the unity of united front education and class education. They hold that after the Southern Anhwei Incident special emphasis should be placed on class education as distinct from united front education. Even now they do not understand that for the whole period of the anti-Japanese war the Party has a single integral policy — the national united front

policy (a dual policy) which integrates the two aspects, unity and struggle — towards all those in the upper and middle strata who are still resisting Japan, whether they belong to the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie or the intermediate classes. This dual policy should be applied even to the puppet troops, the traitors and the pro-Japanese elements, except for those who are absolutely unrepentant, whom we must resolutely crush. The education which our Party conducts among its own members and the people in general likewise embraces both these aspects, that is, it teaches the proletariat and the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie how to unite, in different ways, with the different strata of the bourgeoisie and the landlord class for resistance to Japan, and at the same time how to conduct struggles against them in varying degrees according to the varying degrees in which they compromise, vacillate and are anti-Communist. United front policy *is* class policy and the two are inseparable; whoever is unclear on this will be unclear on many other problems.

8. Other comrades do not understand that the social character of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the anti-Japanese base areas in northern and central China is already new-democratic. The main criterion in judging whether an area is new-democratic in character is whether representatives of the broad masses of the people participate in the political power there and whether this political power is led by the Communist Party. Therefore, united front political power under Communist leadership is the chief mark of a new-democratic society. Some people think that New Democracy can be considered as accomplished only if there is an agrarian revolution like that of the ten years' civil war, but they are wrong. At present the political system in the base areas is a political system of the united front of all the people who are for resistance and democracy, the economy is one from which the elements of semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism have been basically eliminated, and the culture is an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the broad masses of the people. Therefore, whether viewed politically, economically or culturally, both the anti-Japanese base areas which have only enforced the reduction of rent and interest and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region which has gone through a thorough agrarian revolution are new-democratic in character. When the example of the anti-Japanese base areas is extended throughout the country, then the whole of China will become a new-democratic republic.

[1] The neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan, concluded on April 13, 1941, ensured peace on the eastern border of the Soviet Union, thus crushing the plot for a joint German, Italian and Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. It marked a major victory for the Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy.

[2] The April 12th Incident was the counter-revolutionary coup d'état staged by Chiang Kai-shek in Shanghai on April 12, 1927, during which a great number of Communists and revolutionary workers, peasants and students and intellectuals were massacred.

[3] Instigated by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang army commanders in Hunan, including Hsu Keh-hsiang and Ho Chien, ordered a raid on the provincial headquarters of the trade unions, the peasant associations and other revolutionary organizations in Changsha on May 21, 1927. Communists and revolutionary workers and peasants were arrested and killed en masse. This signalized the open collaboration of the two counter-revolutionary Kuomintang cliques, the Wuhan clique headed by Wang Ching-wei and the Nanking cliques headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

[4] The first anti-Communist onslaught during the anti-Japanese war was conducted by Chiang Kai-shek in the winter of 1939 and the spring of 1940.

[5] The quotation is from the commentary by Chu Hsi (1130-1200), a philosopher of the Sung Dynasty, on the Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, Chapter 13.

[6] The telegram of November 9, 1940 was sent by Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai, Commander-in-Chief and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Eighteenth Group Army (Eighth Route Army), and Yeh Ting and Hsiang Ying, Commander and Deputy Commander of the New Fourth Army, in reply to the telegram of the Kuomintang generals Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi, dated October 19, 1940. Exposing the plot by the Kuomintang reactionaries to attack the Communist Party and capitulate to Japan, they denounced Ho Ying-chin's and Pai Chung-hsi's absurd proposal that the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army should shift from the south to the north of the Yellow River. However, in a spirit of conciliation and compromise for the sake of maintaining unity against Japan, they agreed to shift their forces from the south to the north of the Yangtse River, while demanding the solution of a number of major outstanding issues between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The telegram won the sympathy of the intermediate sections and served to isolate Chiang Kai-shek.

[7] Comrade Mao Tse-tung's remark about Chinese society means that the Chinese industrial proletariat which led the revolution formed only a minority of China's population, as did also the reactionary big landlords and big bourgeoisie.

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FROM MARX
TO MAO

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Volume III

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From Marx to Mao

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OF
MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume III

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FROM MARX TO MAO

CONTENTS

THE PERIOD OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN (II)

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

PREFACE AND POSTSCRIPT TO *RURAL SURVEYS* 11
    Preface 11
    Postscript 14
REFORM OUR STUDY 17
EXPOSE THE PLOT FOR A FAR EASTERN MUNICH 27
ON THE INTERNATIONAL UNITED FRONT AGAINST FASCISM 29
SPEECH AT THE ASSEMBLY OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGSIA BORDER REGION 31
RECTIFY THE PARTY'S STYLE OF WORK 35
OPPOSE STEREOTYPED PARTY WRITING 53
TALKS AT THE YENAN FORUM ON LITERATURE AND ART 69
    Introduction 69
    Conclusion 74
A MOST IMPORTANT POLICY 99
THE TURNING POINT IN WORLD WAR II 103
IN CELEBRATION OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 109
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR 111
SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING METHODS OF LEADERSHIP 117
SOME POINTED QUESTIONS FOR THE KUOMINTANG 123
SPREAD THE CAMPAIGNS TO REDUCE RENT, INCREASE PRODUCTION AND "SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT AND CHERISH THE PEOPLE" IN THE BASE AREAS 131
A COMMENT ON THE SESSIONS OF THE KUOMINTANG CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND OF THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL 137

GET ORGANIZED! 153

OUR STUDY AND THE CURRENT SITUATION 163
  Appendix: Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party 177

SERVE THE PEOPLE 227

ON CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S SPEECH ON THE DOUBLE TENTH FESTIVAL 229

THE UNITED FRONT IN CULTURAL WORK 235

WE MUST LEARN TO DO ECONOMIC WORK 239

PRODUCTION IS ALSO POSSIBLE IN THE GUERRILLA ZONES 247

CHINA'S TWO POSSIBLE DESTINIES 251

ON COALITION GOVERNMENT 255
  I. The fundamental Demands of the Chinese People 255
  II. The International and the Domestic Situation 256
  III. Two Lines in the Anti-Japanese War 258
    The Key to China's Problems 258
    History Follows a Tortuous Course 260
    The People's War 263
    Two Battle Fronts 267
    China's Liberated Areas 269
    The Kuomintang Areas 270
    A Contrast 272
    Who Is "Sabotaging the War of Resistance and Endangering the State"? 273
    "Disobedience to Governmental and Military Orders" 274
    The Danger of Civil War 275
    Negotiations 276
    Two Prospects 276
  IV. The Policy of the Chinese Communist Party 277
    Our General Programme 278
    Our Specific Programme 285
      1. *Destroy the Japanese Aggressors Completely, Allow No Compromise Halfway* 289
      2. *Abolish the Kuomintang One-Party Dictatorship, Establish a Democratic Coalition Government* 290
      3. *Freedom for the People* 292
      4. *Unity of the People* 294
      5. *The People's Army* 295
      6. *The Land Problem* 297

7. *The Problem of Industry* 302
8. *The Problem of Culture, Education and the Intellectuals* 304
9. *The Problem of the Minority Nationalities* 305
10. *The Problem of Foreign Policy* 306
The Tasks in the Kuomintang Areas 308
The Tasks in the Japanese-Occupied Areas 310
The Tasks in the Liberated Areas 311
V. Let the Whole Party Unite and Fight to Accomplish Its Tasks! 313

THE FOOLISH OLD MAN WHO REMOVES THE MOUNTAINS 321

ON PRODUCTION BY THE ARMY FOR ITS OWN SUPPORT AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GREAT MOVEMENTS FOR RECTIFICATION AND FOR PRODUCTION 325

THE HURLEY-CHIANG DUET IS A FLOP 331

ON THE DANGER OF THE HURLEY POLICY 335

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE WILLIAM Z. FOSTER 337

THE LAST ROUND WITH THE JAPANESE INVADERS 339

THE PERIOD OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN (II)

PREFACE AND POSTSCRIPT TO *RURAL SURVEYS*

March and April 1941

PREFACE

March 17, 1941

The present rural policy of the Party is not one of Agrarian Revolution as during the ten years' civil war, but is a rural policy for the National United Front Against Japan. The whole Party should carry out the Central Committee's directives of July 7 and December 25, 1940,[1] and the directives of the forthcoming Seventh National Congress. The following material is being published to help comrades find a method for studying problems. Many of our comrades still have a crude and careless style of work, do not seek to understand things thoroughly and may even be completely ignorant of conditions at the lower levels, and yet they are responsible for directing work. This is an extremely dangerous state of affairs. Without a really concrete knowledge of the actual conditions of the classes in Chinese society there can be no really good leadership.

The only way to know conditions is to make social investigations, to investigate the conditions of each social class in real life. For those charged with directing work, the basic method for knowing conditions is to concentrate on a few cities and villages according to a plan, use the fundamental viewpoint of Marxism, *i.e.*, the method of class analysis, and make a number of thorough investigations. Only thus can we acquire even the most rudimentary knowledge of China's social problems.

To do this, first, direct your eyes downward, do not hold your head high and gaze at the sky. Unless a person is interested in turning his eyes downward and is determined to do so, he will never in his whole life really understand things in China.

Second, hold fact-finding meetings. Certainly, no all-round knowledge can be acquired merely by glancing this way and that and listening to hearsay. Of the data I obtained through fact-finding meetings, those on Hunan Province and on Chingkangshan have been lost. The materials published here consist mainly of the "Survey of Hsingkuo", the "Survey of Changkang Township" and the "Survey of Tsaihsi Township". Holding fact-finding meetings is the simplest, most practicable and most reliable method, from which I have derived much benefit; it is a better school than any university. Those attending such meetings should be really experienced cadres of middle and lower ranks, or ordinary people. In my investigations of five counties in Hunan Province and two counties in Chingkangshan, I approached responsible cadres of middle rank; in the Hsunwu investigation I approached cadres of the middle and lower ranks, a poor *hsiutsai*,[2] a bankrupt ex-president of the chamber of commerce and a petty official in charge of county revenue who had lost his job. All of these people gave me a great deal of information I had never even heard of. The man who for the first time gave me a complete picture of the rottenness of Chinese jails was a petty jailer I met during my investigation in Hengshan County, Hunan. In my investigations of Hsingkuo County and Changkang and Tsaihsi townships, I approached comrades working at the township level and ordinary peasants. These cadres, the peasants, the *hsiutsei*, the jailer, the merchant and the revenue clerk were all my esteemed teachers, and as their pupil I had to be respectful and diligent and comradely in my attitude; otherwise they would have paid no attention to me, and, though they knew, would not have spoken or, if they spoke, would not have told all they knew. A fact-finding meeting need not be large; from three to five or seven or eight people are enough. Ample time must be allowed and an outline for the investigation must be prepared; furthermore, one must personally ask questions, take notes and have discussions with those at the meeting. Therefore one certainly cannot make an investigation, or do it well, without zeal, a determination to direct one's eyes downward and a thirst for knowledge, and without shedding the ugly mantle of pretentiousness and becoming a willing pupil. It has to be understood that the masses are the real heroes, while we ourselves are often childish and ignorant, and without this understanding it is impossible to acquire even the most rudimentary knowledge.

I should like to repeat that the main purpose of publishing this reference material is to indicate a method for finding out the conditions prevailing at the lower levels; it is not to have comrades memorize the specific material and the conclusions drawn from it. Speaking generally, the infant bourgeoisie of China has not been able, and never will be able, to provide relatively comprehensive or even rudimentary material on social conditions, as the bourgeoisie in Europe, America and Japan has done; we have therefore no alternative but to collect it ourselves. Speaking specifically, people engaged in practical work must at all times keep abreast of changing conditions, and this is something for which no Communist Party in any country can depend on others. Therefore, everyone engaged in practical work must investigate conditions at the lower levels. Such investigation is especially necessary for those who know theory but do not know the actual conditions, for otherwise they will not be able to link theory with practice. Although my assertion, "No investigation, no right to speak", has been ridiculed as "narrow empiricism", to this day I do not regret having made it; what is more, I still insist that without investigation there cannot possibly be any right to speak. There are many people who "the moment they alight from the official carriage" make a hullabaloo, spout opinions, criticize this and condemn that; but, in fact, ten out of ten of them will meet with failure. For such views or criticisms, which are not based on thorough investigation, are nothing but ignorant twaddle. Countless times our Party suffered at the hands of these "imperial envoys", who rushed here, there and everywhere. Stalin rightly says that "theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice". And he rightly adds that "practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory".[3] Nobody should be labelled a "narrow empiricist" except the "practical man" who gropes in the dark and lacks perspective and foresight.

Today I still feel keenly the necessity for thorough research into Chinese and world affairs; this is related to the scantiness of my own knowledge of Chinese and world affairs and does not imply that I know everything and that others are ignorant. It is my wish to go on being a pupil, learning from the masses, together with all other Party comrades.

POSTSCRIPT

April 19, 1941

The experience of the period of the ten years' civil war is the best and most pertinent for the present period, the War of Resistance Against Japan. This refers to the aspect of how to link ourselves with the masses and mobilize them against the enemy, but not to the aspect of the tactical line. The Party's present tactical line is different in principle from that of the past. Formerly, the Party's tactical line was to oppose the landlords and the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie; now, it is to unite with all those landlords and members of the bourgeoisie who are not against resisting Japan. Even in the latter stage of the ten years' civil war, it was incorrect not to have adopted differing policies towards the reactionary government and political party which were launching armed attacks on us on the one hand, and towards all the social strata of a capitalist character under our own rule on the other; it was also incorrect not to have adopted differing policies towards the different groups within the reactionary government and political party. At that time, a policy of "all struggle" was pursued towards every section of society other than the peasantry and the lower strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie, and this policy was undoubtedly wrong. In agrarian policy, it was also wrong to repudiate the correct policy adopted in the early and middle periods of the ten years' civil war,[4] whereby the landlords were given the same allotment of land as the peasants so that they could engage in farming and would not become displaced or go up into the mountains as bandits and disrupt public order. The Party's policy is now of necessity a different one; it is not "all struggle and no alliance", neither is it "all alliance and no struggle" (like the Chen Tu-hsiuism of 1927). Instead, it is a policy of uniting with all social strata opposed to Japanese imperialism, of forming a united front with and yet of waging struggles against them, struggles that differ in form according to the different degrees in which their vacillating or reactionary side manifests itself in capitulation to the enemy and opposition to the Communist Party and the people. The present policy is a dual policy which synthesizes "alliance" and "struggle". In labour policy, it is the dual policy of suitably improving the workers' livelihood and of not hampering the proper development of the capitalist economy. In agrarian policy, it is the dual policy of requiring the landlords to reduce rent and interest and of stipulating that the peasants should pay this reduced rent and interest. In the sphere of political rights, it is the dual policy of allowing all the anti-Japanese landlords and capitalists the same rights of person and the same political and property rights as the workers and peasants and yet of guarding against possible counter-revolutionary activity on their part. State-owned and co-operative economy should be developed, but the main economic sector in the rural base areas today consists not of state but of private enterprises, and the sector of non-monopoly capitalism in our economy should be given the opportunity to develop and be used against Japanese imperialism and the semi-feudal system. This is the most revolutionary policy for China today, and to oppose or impede its execution is undoubtedly a mistake. To preserve the communist purity of Party members scrupulously and resolutely, and to protect the useful part of the capitalist sector of the social economy and enable it to develop appropriately, are both indispensable tasks for us in the period of resisting Japan and building a democratic republic. In this period it is possible that some Communists may be corrupted by the bourgeoisie and that capitalist ideas may emerge among members of the Party, and we must fight against these decadent ideas; however, we should not mistakenly carry over the struggle against capitalist ideas within the Party to the field of social economy and oppose the capitalist sector of the economy. We must draw a clear line of demarcation between the two. The Communist Party of China is working in a complicated environment, and every Party member, and especially every cadre, must temper himself to become a fighter who understands Marxist tactics. A one-sided and over-simplified approach to problems can never lead the revolution to victory.

NOTES

[1] The Central Committee's directive of July 7, 1940 is the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Present Situation and the Party's Policy". The Central Committee's directive of December 25, 1940 is included in the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II, as the article "On Policy".

[2] A *hsiutsai* was a holder of the lowest degree in the imperial examinations.

[3] J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", *Problems of Leninism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, p. 31.

[4] The first period of the ten years' civil war lasted from late 1927 to late 1928 and is generally known as the Chingkangshan period; the middle period ran from early 1929 to the autumn of 1931, that is, from the establishment of the Central Red Base Area to the victorious conclusion of the campaign against the third "encirclement and suppression"; and the third period from late 1931 to late 1934, that is, from the victorious conclusion of that campaign to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau at Tsunyi in Kweichow Province called by the Central Committee of the Party. The Tsunyi Meeting of January 1935 put an end to the domination of the "Left" opportunist line in the Party, which had lasted from 1931 to 1934, and steered the Party back to the correct line.

REFORM OUR STUDY

May 1941

I propose that we should reform the method and the system of study throughout the Party. The reasons are as follows:

I

The twenty years of the Communist Party of China have been twenty years in which the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism has become more and more integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. If we recall how superficial and meagre our understanding of Marxism-Leninism and of the Chinese revolution was during our Party's infancy, we can see how much deeper and richer it is now. For a hundred years, the finest sons and daughters of the disaster-ridden Chinese nation fought and sacrificed their lives, one stepping into the breach as another fell, in quest of the truth that would save the country and the people. This moves us to song and tears. But it was only after World War I and the October Revolution in Russia that we found Marxism-Leninism, the best of truths, the best of weapons for liberating our nation. And the Communist Party of China has been the initiator, propagandist and organizer in the wielding of this weapon. As soon as it was linked with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the universal truth of Marxism-

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung made this report to a cadres' meeting in Yenan The report and the two articles, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work" and "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing", are Comrade Mao Tse-tung's basic works on the rectification movement In these he summed up, on the ideological plane, past differences in the Party over the Party line and analysed the petty-bourgeois ideology and style which, masquerading as Marxism-Leninism, were prevalent in the Party, and which chiefly manifested themselves in subjectivist and sectarian tendencies, their form

Leninism gave an entirely new complexion to the Chinese revolution. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, our Party, basing itself on the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, has taken a further step in its study of the concrete practice of this war and in its study of China and the world today, and has also made a beginning in the study of Chinese history. These are all very good signs.

II

However, we still have shortcomings, and very big ones too. Unless we correct these shortcomings, we shall not, in my opinion, be able to take another step forward in our work and in our great cause of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.

First, take the study of current conditions. We have achieved some success in our study of present domestic and international conditions, but for such a large political party as ours, the material we have collected is fragmentary and our research work unsystematic on each and every aspect of these subjects, whether it be the political, military, economic or cultural aspect. Generally speaking, in the last twenty years we have not done systematic and thorough work in collecting and studying material on these aspects, and we are lacking in a climate of investigation and study of objective reality. To behave like “a blindfolded man catching sparrows”, or “a blind man groping for fish”, to be crude and careless, to indulge in verbiage, to rest content with a smattering of knowledge — such is the extremely bad style of work that still exists among many comrades in our Party, a style utterly opposed to the fundamental spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin have taught us that it is necessary to study conditions conscientiously and to proceed from objective reality and not from subjective wishes; but many of our comrades act in direct violation of this truth.

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of expression being stereotyped Party writing. Comrade Mao Tse-tung called for a Patty-wide movement of Marxist-Leninist education to rectify style of work in accordance with the ideological principle of Marxism-Leninism. His call very quickly led to a great debate between proletarian and petty-bourgeois ideology inside and outside the Party. This consolidated the position of proletarian ideology inside and outside the Party, enabled the broad ranks of cadres to take a great step forward ideologically and the Party to achieve unprecedented unity.

Second, take the study of history. Although a few Party members and sympathizers have undertaken this work, it has not been done in an organized way. Many Party members are still in a fog about Chinese history, whether of the last hundred years or of ancient times. There are many Marxist-Leninist scholars who cannot open their mouths without citing ancient Greece; but as for their own ancestors — sorry, they have been forgotten. There is no climate of serious study either of current conditions or of past history.

Third, take the study of international revolutionary experience, the study of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism. Many comrades seem to study Marxism-Leninism not to meet the needs of revolutionary practice, but purely for the sake of study. Consequently, though they read, they cannot digest. They can only cite odd quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin in a one-sided manner, but are unable to apply the stand, viewpoint and method of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin to the concrete study of China's present conditions and her history or to the concrete analysis and solution of the problems of the Chinese revolution. Such an attitude towards Marxism-Leninism does a great deal of harm, particularly among cadres of the middle and higher ranks.

The three aspects I have just mentioned, neglect of the study of current conditions, neglect of the study of history and neglect of the application of Marxism-Leninism, all constitute an extremely bad style of work. Its spread has harmed many of our comrades.

There are indeed many comrades in our ranks who have been led astray by this style of work. Unwilling to carry on systematic and thorough investigation and study of the specific conditions inside and outside the country, the province, county or district, they issue orders on no other basis than their scanty knowledge and "It must be so because it seems so to me". Does not this subjectivist style still exist among a great many comrades?

There are some who are proud, instead of ashamed, of knowing nothing or very little of our own history. What is particularly significant is that very few really know the history of the Communist Party of China and the history of China in the hundred years since the Opium War. Hardly anyone has seriously taken up the study of the economic, political, military and cultural history of the last hundred years. Ignorant of their own country, some people can only relate tales of ancient Greece and other foreign lands, and even this knowledge is quite pathetic, consisting of odds and ends from old foreign books.

For several decades, many of the returned students from abroad have suffered from this malady. Coming home from Europe, America or Japan, they can only parrot things foreign. They become gramophones and forget their duty to understand and create new things. This malady has also infected the Communist Party.

Although we are studying Marxism, the way many of our people study it runs directly counter to Marxism. That is to say, they violate the fundamental principle earnestly enjoined on us by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, the unity of theory and practice. Having violated this principle, they invent an opposite principle of their own, the separation of theory from practice. In the schools and in the education of cadres at work, teachers of philosophy do not guide students to study the logic of the Chinese revolution; teachers of economics do not guide them to study the characteristics of the Chinese economy; teachers of political science do not guide them to study the tactics of the Chinese revolution; teachers of military science do not guide them to study the strategy and tactics adapted to China's special features; and so on and so forth. Consequently, error is disseminated, doing people great harm. A person does not know how to apply in Fuhsien[1] what he has learned in Yenan. Professors of economics cannot explain the relationship between the Border Region currency and the Kuomintang currency,[2] so naturally the students cannot explain it either. Thus a perverse mentality has been created among many students; instead of showing an interest in China's problems and taking the Party's directives seriously, they give all their hearts to the supposedly eternal and immutable dogmas learned from their teachers.

Of course, what I have just said refers to the worst type in our Party, and I am not saying that it is the general case. However, people of this type do exist; what is more, there are quite a few of them and they cause a great deal of harm. This matter should not be treated lightly.

III

In order to explain this idea further, I should like to contrast two opposite attitudes.

First, there is the subjectivist attitude.

With this attitude, a person does not make a systematic and thorough study of the environment, but works by sheer subjective enthusiasm and has a blurred picture of the face of China today. With this attitude, he chops up history, knows only ancient Greece but not China and is in a fog about the China of yesterday and the day before yesterday. With this attitude, a person studies Marxist-Leninist theory in the abstract and without any aim. He goes to Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin not to seek the stand, viewpoint and method with which to solve the theoretical and tactical problems of the Chinese revolution but to study theory purely for theory's sake. He does not shoot the arrow at the target but shoots at random. Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin have taught us that we should proceed from objective realities and that we should derive laws from them to serve as our guide to action. For this purpose, we should, as Marx has said, appropriate the material in detail and subject it to scientific analysis and synthesis.[3] Many of our people do not act in this way but do the opposite. A good number of them are doing research work but have no interest in studying either the China of today or the China of yesterday and confine their interest to the study of empty "theories" divorced from reality. Many others are doing practical work, but they too pay no attention to the study of objective conditions, often rely on sheer enthusiasm and substitute their personal feelings for policy. Both kinds of people, relying on the subjective, ignore the existence of objective realities. When making speeches, they indulge in a long string of headings, A, B, C, D, 1, 2, 3, 4, and when writing articles, they turn out a lot of verbiage. They have no intention of seeking truth from facts, but only a desire to curry favour by claptrap. They are flashy without substance, brittle without solidity. They are always right, they are the Number One authority under Heaven, "imperial envoys" who rush everywhere. Such is the style of work of some comrades in our ranks. To govern one's own conduct by this style is to harm oneself, to teach it to others is to harm others, and to use it to direct the revolution is to harm the revolution. To sum up, this subjectivist method which is contrary to science and Marxism-Leninism is a formidable enemy of the Communist Party, the working class, the people and the nation; it is a manifestation of impurity in Party spirit. A formidable enemy stands before us, and we must overthrow him. Only when subjectivism is overthrown can the truth of Marxism-Leninism prevail, can Party spirit be strengthened, can the revolution be victorious. We must assert that the absence of a scientific attitude, that is, the absence of the Marxist-Leninist approach of uniting theory and practice, means that Party spirit is either absent or deficient.

There is a couplet which portrays this type of person. It runs:

> *The reed growing on the wall — top-heavy, thin-stemmed and shallow of root;*
> *The bamboo shoot in the hills — sharp-tongued, thick-skinned and hollow inside.*

Is this not an apt description of those who do not have a scientific attitude, who can only recite words and phrases from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and who enjoy a reputation unwarranted by any real learning? If anyone really wishes to cure himself of his malady, I advise him to commit this couplet to memory or to show still more courage and paste it on the wall of his room. Marxism-Leninism is a science, and science means honest, solid knowledge; there is no room for playing tricks. Let us, then, be honest.

Secondly, there is the Marxist-Leninist attitude.

With this attitude, a person applies the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism to the systematic and thorough investigation and study of the environment. He does not work by enthusiasm alone but, as Stalin says, combines revolutionary sweep with practicalness.[4] With this attitude he will not chop up history. It is not enough for him to know ancient Greece, he must know China; he must know the revolutionary history not only of foreign countries but also of China, not only the China of today but also the China of yesterday and of the day before yesterday. With this attitude, one studies the theory of Marxism-Leninism with a purpose, that is, to integrate Marxist-Leninist theory with the actual movement of the Chinese revolution and to seek from this theory the stand, viewpoint and method with which to solve the theoretical and tactical problems of the Chinese revolution. Such an attitude is one of shooting the arrow at the target. The "target" is the Chinese revolution, the "arrow" is Marxism-Leninism. We Chinese Communists have been seeking this arrow because we want to hit the target of the Chinese revolution and of the revolution of the East. To take such an attitude is to seek truth from facts. "Facts" are all the things that exist objectively, "truth" means their internal relations, that is, the laws governing them, and "to seek" means to study. We should proceed from the actual conditions inside and outside the country, the province, county or district, and derive from them, as our guide to action, laws which are inherent in them and not imaginary, that is, we should find the internal relations of the events occurring around us. And in order to do that we must rely not on subjective imagination, not on momentary enthusiasm, not on lifeless books, but on facts that exist objectively; we must appropriate the material in detail and, guided by the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, draw correct conclusions from it. Such conclusions are not mere lists of phenomena in A, B, C, D order or writings full of platitudes, but are scientific conclusions. Such an attitude is one of seeking truth from facts and not of currying favour by claptrap. It is the manifestation of Party spirit, the Marxist-Leninist style of uniting theory and practice. It is the attitude every Communist Party member should have at the very least. He who adopts this attitude will be neither "top-heavy, thin-stemmed and shallow of root" nor "sharp-tongued, thick-skinned and hollow inside".

IV

In accordance with the above views, I would like to make the following proposals:

1. We should place before the whole Party the task of making a systematic and thorough study of the situation around us. On the basis of the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism, we should make a detailed investigation and study of developments in the economic, financial, political, military, cultural and party activities of our enemies, our friends and ourselves, and then draw the proper and necessary conclusions. To this end, we should direct our comrades' attention to the investigation and study of these practical matters. We should get our comrades to understand that the twofold basic task of the leading bodies of the Communist Party is to know conditions and to master policy; the former means knowing the world and the latter changing the world. We should get our comrades to understand that without investigation there is no right to speak, and that bombastic twaddle and a mere list of phenomena in 1, 2, 3, 4 order are of no use. Take propaganda work, for instance; if we do not know the situation with regard to the propaganda of our enemies, our friends and ourselves, we shall be unable to decide on a correct

propaganda policy. In the work of any department, it is necessary to know the situation first and only then can the work be well handled. The fundamental link in changing the Party's style of work is to carry out plans for investigation and study throughout the Party.

2. As for China's history in the last hundred years, we should assemble qualified persons to study it, in co-operation and with a proper division of labour, and so overcome the present disorganized state of affairs. First it is necessary to make analytical studies in the several fields of economic history, political history, military history and cultural history, and only then will it be possible to make synthetical studies.

3. As for education for cadres whether at work or in schools for cadres, a policy should be established of focusing such education on the study of the practical problems of the Chinese revolution and using the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism as the guide, and the method of studying Marxism-Leninism statically and in isolation should be discarded. Moreover, in studying Marxism-Leninism, we should use the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, *Short Course* as the principal material. It is the best synthesis and summing-up of the world communist movement of the past hundred years, a model of the integration of theory and practice, and so far the only comprehensive model in the whole world. When we see how Lenin and Stalin integrated the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Soviet revolution and thereby developed Marxism, we shall know how we should work in China.

We have made many detours. But error is often the precursor of what is correct. I am confident that in the context of the Chinese revolution and the world revolution, which is so intensely alive and so richly varied, this reform of our study will certainly yield good results.

NOTES

[1] Fuhsien County is about seventy kilometres south of Yenan.

[2] The Border Region currency consisted of the currency notes issued by the Bank of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. The Kuomintang currency was the paper currency issued by the four big Kuomintang bureaucrat-capitalist banks from 1935 onwards with British and U.S. imperialist support. Comrade Mao

Tse-tung was referring to the fluctuations in the rates of exchange between these two currencies.

[3] See Karl Marx, "Afterword to the Second German Edition" of *Capital* in which he wrote: "The latter [the method of inquiry] has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described." (*Capital*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, Vol. I, p. 19.)

[4] See J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", *Problems of Leninism*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1952, p. 80.

EXPOSE THE PLOT FOR A FAR EASTERN MUNICH

May 25, 1941

1. A compromise between Japan and the United States at the expense of China and the creation of an Eastern Munich against communism and against the Soviet Union — such is the new plot which is now being hatched by Japan, the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. We must expose this plot and fight it.

2. Now that the Japanese imperialists have ended their latest round of military attacks, which was designed to force Chiang Kai-shek to capitulate, there are bound to be moves to induce him to capitulate. This is a repeat performance of the enemy's old policy of using the stick and the carrot, either alternately or simultaneously. We must expose this policy and fight it.

3. Simultaneously with her military attacks, Japan has launched a rumour-mongering campaign alleging that "the Eighth Route Army does not want to fight in co-ordination with the Kuomintang Central Army", that "the Eighth Route Army is seizing every opportunity to expand its territory", that "it is opening up an international route", that "it is setting up another Central Government", etc. This is a cunning Japanese scheme to foment discord between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and thus to make it easier for them to induce the Kuomintang to capitulate. The Kuomintang Central News Agency and the Kuomintang press are copying and spreading these rumours, showing no qualms about echoing Japan's anti-Communist propaganda, and their intentions are most dubious. This, too, we must expose and fight.

4. Although the New Fourth Army has been declared to be "in rebellion" and the Eighth Route Army has not received a single

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This inner-Party directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

bullet or a single copper from the Kuomintang, they have never for a moment ceased fighting the enemy. The Eighth Route Army, moreover, has taken the initiative in co-ordinating its operations with those of the Kuomintang troops in the fighting in the present campaign in southern Shansi,[1] and for the last two weeks it has been launching attacks on all fronts in northern China, where fierce battles are raging at this very moment. The armed forces and the people led by the Communist Party have already become the mainstay in the War of Resistance Against Japan. All the calumnies against the Communist Party are aimed at sabotaging the War of Resistance and paving the way for capitulation. We should extend the military successes of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and oppose all the defeatists and capitulationists.

NOTES

[1] The Southern Shansi campaign refers to the campaign of the Chungtiao Mountains. In May 1941, a Japanese invading force 50,000 strong attacked the Chungtiao Mountains area to the north of the Yellow River in southern Shansi. Altogether seven Kuomintang corps were massed in that area, and another four in the Kaoping area to the northeast, making a total of 250,000 men. Since the fight against the Communists was the main job of the Kuomintang troops north of the Yellow River, they had never prepared themselves to fight the Japanese, and most of them tried to avoid combat when the Japanese aggressors attacked. Therefore, in spite of vigorous efforts-by the Eighth Route Army to support the Kuomintang troops against the enemy in this campaign, the Kuomintang troops were completely routed, losing more than 50,000 men in three weeks, while the remainder fled to the south of the Yellow River.

ON THE INTERNATIONAL UNITED FRONT AGAINST FASCISM

June 23, 1941

On June 22 the fascist rulers of Germany attacked the Soviet Union. This is a perfidious crime of aggression not only against the Soviet Union but against the freedom and independence of all nations. The Soviet Union's sacred war of resistance against fascist aggression is being waged not only in its own defence but in defence of all the nations struggling to liberate themselves from fascist enslavement.

For Communists throughout the world the task now is to mobilize the people of all countries and organize an international united front to fight fascism and defend the Soviet Union, defend China, and defend the freedom and independence of all nations. In the present period, every effort must be concentrated on combating fascist enslavement.

For the Chinese Communist Party the tasks throughout the country are as follows:

1. Persevere in the National United Front Against Japan, persevere in Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, drive the Japanese imperialists out of China, and by these means assist the Soviet Union.
2. Resolutely combat all the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist activities of the reactionaries among the big bourgeoisie.
3. In foreign relations, unite against the common foe with everybody in Britain, the United States and other countries who is opposed to the fascist rulers of Germany, Italy and Japan.

This inner-Party directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

SPEECH AT THE ASSEMBLY OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGSIA BORDER REGION

November 21, 1941

Members of the Assembly! Comrades! Today's inauguration of the Border Region Assembly of Representatives is of great significance. The Assembly has but one objective, the overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the building of a China of New Democracy or, in other words, a China of the revolutionary Three People's Principles. In the China of today there can be no other objective. For our chief enemies now are not domestic, but are the Japanese fascists and the German and Italian fascists. At this moment the Soviet Red Army is fighting for the destiny of the Soviet Union and of the whole of mankind, and we, for our part, are combating Japanese imperialism. Japanese imperialism is continuing its aggression with the purpose of subjugating China. The Communist Party of China stands for uniting all the anti-Japanese forces throughout the country to overthrow Japanese imperialism, and for co-operating with all anti-Japanese parties, classes and nationalities; everyone, excepting traitors, must unite in the common struggle. This has been the consistent stand of the Communist Party. For more than four years the Chinese people have been heroically waging the War of Resistance, a war that has been maintained through the co-operation of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and of all classes, parties and nationalities. But it is not yet won, and to win it we have to fight on and ensure that the revolutionary Three People's Principles are put into effect.

Why must we put the revolutionary Three People's Principles into effect? Because up to the present time Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles have not been translated into reality in all parts of China. Why don't we demand that socialism be put into effect now? Of course socialism is a superior system and has long been in operation in the Soviet Union, but in China today the conditions for it are still lacking. It is the revolutionary Three People's Principles that have been put into effect in our Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. We have not gone beyond them in solving any of our practical problems. As far as these principles are concerned, today the Principle of Nationalism means overthrowing Japanese imperialism, and the Principles of Democracy and People's Livelihood mean working in the interests not of just one section but of all the people who are against Japan. Throughout the country the people should enjoy freedom of the person, the right to take part in political activity and the right to protection of property. Throughout the country the people should have the opportunity of voicing their opinions, and they should have clothes to wear, food to eat, work to do and schools to attend; in short, some provision should be made for everyone. Chinese society is small at both ends and big in the middle, that is, the proletariat at one end and the landlord class and big bourgeoisie at the other each constitute only a small minority, while the great majority of the people consists of the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the other intermediate classes. No political party that wants to run China's affairs properly can do so unless its policy gives consideration to the interests of these classes, unless some provision is made for the members of these classes, and unless they have the right to voice their opinions. The policies put forward by the Chinese Communist Party seek to unite all the people who oppose Japan and take into account the interests of every class that does so, and especially the interests of the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the other intermediate classes. The policies of the Communist Party, which give all sections of the people the opportunity to voice their opinions and make sure they have work to do and food to eat, are policies embodying the genuinely revolutionary Three People's Principles. In agrarian relations, on the one hand we carry out reduction of rent and interest so that the peasants will have food, and on the other we provide for the payment of the reduced rent and interest so that the landlords, too, can live. In the relations between labour and capital, on the one hand we help the workers so that they have both work and food, and on the other we pursue a policy of developing industry so that the capitalists may obtain some profit. In all this our purpose is to unite the people of the whole country in the common endeavour of resistance to Japan. This is what we call the policy of New Democracy. It is the kind of policy that really suits the conditions in present-day China, and we hope that its application will not be limited to the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, or to the anti-Japanese base areas in the rear of the enemy, but will spread throughout the country.

We have pursued this policy with success and have won the approval of the people all over China. But there have also been shortcomings. Some Communists still do not know how to co-operate with non-Party people in a democratic way and have an exclusive, "dosed-door" or sectarian style of work; they still do not understand the basic principle that Communists are in duty bound to co-operate with people outside the Party who are against Japan, and have no right to shut them out. This principle means that we should listen attentively to the views of the masses, keep in close touch with them and not become alienated from them. There is an article in the Administrative Programme of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region which stipulates that Communists should co-operate democratically with non-Party people and must not act arbitrarily or keep everything in their own hands. It is directed precisely at the comrades who still fail to understand the Party's policy. Communists must listen attentively to the views of people outside the Party and let them have their say. If what they say is right, we ought to welcome it, and we should learn from their strong points; if it is wrong, we should let them finish what they are saying and then patiently explain things to them. A Communist must never be opinionated or domineering, or think that he is good in everything while others are good in nothing; he must never shut himself up in his little room, or brag and boast and lord it over others. Apart from the die-hard reactionaries who are in league with the Japanese aggressors and with the traitors and are sabotaging resistance and unity, and who of course have no right to speak, everyone is entitled to freedom of speech, and it does not matter even if what he says is wrong. Affairs of state are the public affairs of the whole nation and not the private affairs of a single party or group. Hence Communists have the duty to co-operate democratically with non-Party people and have no right to exclude them and monopolize everything. The Communist Party is a political party which works in the interests of the nation and people and which has absolutely no private ends to pursue. It should be supervised by the people and must never go against their will. Its members should be among the people and with them and must not set themselves above them. Members of the Assembly and Comrades, this Communist Party principle of democratic co-operation with non-Party people is fixed and unalterable. So long as parties exist, people who join them will always be a minority while those outside them will always be the majority; hence our Party members must always co-operate with non-Party people, and they should make a good start right here in the Assembly. With this policy of ours, I believe that Communist members of the Assembly will get very good training here and overcome their "closed-doorism" and sectarianism. We are not a small opinionated sect and we must learn how to open our doors and co-operate democratically with non-Party people, and how to consult with others. Perhaps even now there are Communists who may say, "If it is necessary to co-operate with others, then leave me out." But I am sure there are very few. I can assure you that the overwhelming majority of our members will certainly be able to carry out the line of the Central Committee of our Party. At the same time I wish to ask all non-Party comrades to realize what we stand for, to understand that the Communist Party is not a small sect or clique pursuing private ends. No! The Communist Party sincerely and honestly wishes to set the affairs of state to rights. But we still have many failings. We are not afraid to admit them and are determined to get rid of them. We shall do so by strengthening education within the Party and by co-operating democratically with non-Party people. It is only by subjecting our failings to such a cross-fire, both from within and from without, that we can remedy them and really set the affairs of state to rights.

Members of the Assembly! You have taken the trouble to come here for this meeting, and I am happy to greet this distinguished gathering and wish it success.

RECTIFY THE PARTY'S STYLE OF WORK

February 1, 1941

The Party School opens today and I wish it every success.

I would like to say something about the problem of our Party's style of work.

Why must there be a revolutionary party? There must be a revolutionary party because the world contains enemies who oppress the people and the people want to throw off enemy oppression. In the era of capitalism and imperialism, just such a revolutionary party as the Communist Party is needed. Without such a party it is simply impossible for the people to throw off enemy oppression. We are Communists, we want to lead the people in overthrowing the enemy, and so we must keep our ranks in good order, we must march in step, our troops must be picked troops and our weapons good weapons. Without these conditions the enemy cannot be overthrown.

What is the problem now facing our Party? The general line of the Party is correct and presents no problem, and the Party's work has been fruitful. The Party has several hundred thousand members who are leading the people in extremely hard and bitter struggles against the enemy. This is plain to everybody and beyond all doubt.

Then is there or is there not any problem still facing our Party? I say there is and, in a certain sense, the problem is quite serious.

What is the problem? It is the fact that there is something in the minds of a number of our comrades which strikes one as not quite right, not quite proper.

In other words, there is still something wrong with our style of study, with our style in the Party's internal and external relations and with our style of writing. By something wrong with the style of study we mean the malady of subjectivism. By something wrong with

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This speech was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the opening of the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

our style in Party relations we mean the malady of sectarianism. By something wrong with the style of writing we mean the malady of stereotyped Party writing.[1] All these are wrong, they are ill winds, but they are not like the wintry north winds that sweep across the whole sky. Subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing are no longer the dominant styles, but merely gusts of contrary wind, ill winds from the air-raid tunnels. (*Laughter.*) It is bad, however, that such winds should still be blowing in the Party. We must seal off the passages which produce them. Our whole Party should undertake the job of sealing off these passages, and so should the Party School. These three ill winds, subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing, have their historical origins. Although no longer dominant in the whole Party, they still constantly create trouble and assail us. Therefore, it is necessary to resist them and to study, analyse and elucidate them.

Fight subjectivism in order to rectify the style of study, fight sectarianism in order to rectify the style in Party relations, and fight Party stereotypes in order to rectify the style of writing — such is the task before us.

To accomplish the task of overthrowing the enemy, we must accomplish the task of rectifying these styles within the Party. The style of study and the style of writing are also the Party's style of work. Once our Party's style of work is put completely right, the people all over the country will learn from our example. Those outside the Party who have the same kind of bad style will, if they are good and honest people, learn from our example and correct their mistakes, and thus the whole nation will be influenced. So long as our Communist ranks are in good order and march in step, so long as our troops are picked troops and our weapons are good weapons, any enemy, however powerful, can be overthrown.

Let me speak now about subjectivism.

Subjectivism is an improper style of study; it is opposed to Marxism-Leninism and is incompatible with the Communist Party. What we want is the Marxist-Leninist style of study. What we call style of study means not just style of study in the schools but in the whole Party. It is a question of the method of thinking of comrades in our leading bodies, of all cadres and Party members, a question of our attitude towards Marxism-Leninism, of the attitude of all Party comrades in their work. As such, it is a question of extraordinary, indeed of primary, importance.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Certain muddled ideas find currency among many people. There are, for instance, muddled ideas about what is a theorist, what is an intellectual and what is meant by linking theory and practice.

Let us first ask, is the theoretical level of our Party high or low? Recently more Marxist-Leninist works have been translated and more people have been reading them. That is a very good thing. But can we therefore say that the theoretical level of our Party has been greatly raised? True, the level is now somewhat higher than before. But our theoretical front is very much out of harmony with the rich content of the Chinese revolutionary movement, and a comparison of the two shows that the theoretical side is lagging far behind. Generally speaking, our theory cannot as yet keep pace with our revolutionary practice, let alone lead the way as it should. We have not yet raised our rich and varied practice to the proper theoretical plane. We have not yet examined all the problems of revolutionary practice — or even the important ones — and raised them to a theoretical plane. Just think, how many of us have created theories worthy of the name on China's economics, politics, military affairs or culture, theories which can be regarded as scientific and comprehensive, and not crude and sketchy? Especially in the field of economic theory: Chinese capitalism has had a century of development since the Opium War, and yet not a single theoretical work has been produced which accords with the realities of China's economic development and is genuinely scientific. Can we say that in the study of China's economic problems, for instance, the theoretical level is already high? Can we say that our Party already has economic theorists worthy of the name? Certainly not. We have read a great many Marxist-Leninist books, but can we claim, then, that we have theorists? We cannot. For Marxism-Leninism is the theory created by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on the basis of practice, their general conclusion drawn from historical and revolutionary reality. If we merely read their works but do not proceed to study the realities of China's history and revolution in the light of their theory or do not make any effort to think through China's revolutionary practice carefully in terms of theory, we should not be so presumptuous as to call ourselves Marxist theorists. Our achievements on the theoretical front will be very poor indeed if, as members of the Communist Party of China, we close our eyes to China's problems and can only memorize isolated conclusions or principles from Marxist writings. If all a person can do is to commit Marxist economics or philosophy to memory, reciting glibly from Chapter I to Chapter X, but is utterly unable to apply them, can he be considered a Marxist theorist? No! He cannot. What kind of theorists do we want? We want theorists who can, in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method, correctly interpret the practical problems arising in the course of history and revolution and give scientific explanations and theoretical elucidations of China's economic, political, military, cultural and other problems. Such are the theorists we want. To be a theorist of this kind, a person must have a true grasp of the essence of Marxism-Leninism, of the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method and of the theories of Lenin and Stalin on the colonial revolution and the Chinese revolution, and he must be able to apply them in a penetrating and scientific analysis of China's practical problems and discover the laws of development of these problems. Such are the theorists we really need.

The Central Committee of our Party has now made a decision calling upon our comrades to learn how to apply the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method in the serious study of China's history, and of China's economics, politics, military affairs and culture, and to analyse every problem concretely on the basis of detailed material and then draw theoretical conclusions. This is the responsibility we must shoulder.

Our comrades in the Party School should not regard Marxist theory as lifeless dogma. It is necessary to master Marxist theory and apply it, master it for the sole purpose of applying it. If you can apply the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint in elucidating one or two practical problems, you should be commended and credited with some achievement. The more problems you elucidate and the more comprehensively and profoundly you do so, the greater will be your achievement. Our Party School should also lay down the rule to grade students good or poor according to how they look at China's problems after they have studied Marxism-Leninism, according to whether or not they see the problems clearly and whether or not they see them at all.

Next let us talk about the question of the "intellectuals". Since China is a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country and her culture is not well developed, intellectuals are particularly treasured. On this question of the intellectuals, the Central Committee of the Party made the decision[2] over two years ago that we should win over the great numbers of intellectuals and, insofar as they are revolutionary and willing to take part in the resistance to Japan, welcome them one and all. It is entirely right for us to esteem intellectuals, for without revolutionary intellectuals the revolution cannot triumph. But we all know there are many intellectuals who fancy themselves very learned and assume airs of erudition without realizing that such airs are bad and harmful and hinder their own progress. They ought to be aware of the truth that actually many so-called intellectuals are, relatively speaking, most ignorant and the workers and peasants sometimes know more than they do. Here some will say, "Ha! You are turning things upside down and talking nonsense." (*Laughter.*) But, comrades, don't get excited; there is some sense in what I am saying.

What is knowledge? Ever since class society came into being the world has had only two kinds of knowledge, knowledge of the struggle for production and knowledge of the class struggle. Natural science and social science are the crystallizations of these two kinds of knowledge, and philosophy is the generalization and summation of the knowledge of nature and the knowledge of society. Is there any other kind of knowledge? No. Now let us take a look at certain students, those brought up in schools that are completely cut off from the practical activities of society. What about them? A person goes from a primary school of this kind all the way through to a university of the same kind, graduates and is reckoned to have a stock of learning. But all he has is book-learning; he has not yet taken part in any practical activities or applied what he has learned to any field of life. Can such a person be regarded as a completely developed intellectual? Hardly so, in my opinion, because his knowledge is still incomplete. What then is relatively complete knowledge? All relatively complete knowledge is formed in two stages: the first stage is perceptual knowledge, the second is rational knowledge, the latter being the development of the former to a higher stage. What sort of knowledge is the students' book-learning? Even supposing all their knowledge is truth, it is still not knowledge acquired through their own personal experience, but consists of theories set down by their predecessors in summarizing experience of the struggle for production and of the class struggle. It is entirely necessary that students should acquire this kind of knowledge, but it must be understood that as far as they are concerned such knowledge is in a sense still one-sided, something which has been verified by others but not yet by themselves. What is most important is to be good at applying this knowledge in life and in practice. Therefore, I advise those who have only book-learning but as yet no contact with reality, and also those with little practical experience, to realize their own shortcomings and become a little more modest.

How can those who have only book-learning be turned into intellectuals in the true sense? The only way is to get them to take part in practical work and become practical workers, to get those engaged in theoretical work to study important practical problems. In this way our aim can be attained.

What I have said will probably make some people angry. They will say, "According to your explanation, even Marx would not be regarded as an intellectual." I say they are wrong. Marx took part in the practice of the revolutionary movement and also created revolutionary theory. Beginning with the commodity, the simplest element of capitalism, he made a thorough study of the economic structure of capitalist society. Millions of people saw and handled commodities every day but were so used to them that they took no notice. Marx alone studied commodities scientifically. He carried out a tremendous work of research into their actual development and derived a thoroughly scientific theory from what existed universally. He studied nature, history and proletarian revolution and created dialectical materialism, historical materialism and the theory of proletarian revolution. Thus Marx became a most completely developed intellectual, representing the acme of human wisdom; he was fundamentally different from those who have only book-learning. Marx undertook detailed investigations and studies in the course of practical struggles, formed generalizations and then verified his conclusions by testing them in practical struggles — this is what we call theoretical work. Our Party needs a large number of comrades who will learn how to do such work. In our Party there are many comrades who can learn to do this kind of theoretical research; most of them are intelligent and promising and we should value them. But they must follow correct principles and not repeat the mistake of the past. They must discard dogmatism and not confine themselves to ready-made phrases in books.

There is only one kind of true theory in this world, theory that is drawn from objective reality and then verified by objective reality; nothing else is worthy of the name of theory in our sense. Stalin said that theory becomes aimless when it is not connected with practice.[3] Aimless theory is useless and false and should be discarded. We should point the finger of scorn at those who are fond of aimless theorizing. Marxism-Leninism is the most correct, scientific and revolutionary truth, born out of and verified by objective reality, but many who study Marxism-Leninism take it as lifeless dogma, thus impeding the development of theory and harming themselves as well as other comrades.

On the other hand, our comrades who are engaged in practical work will also come to grief if they misuse their experience. True, these people are often rich in experience, which is very valuable, but it is very dangerous if they rest content with their own experience. They must realize that their knowledge is mostly perceptual and partial and that they lack rational and comprehensive knowledge; in other words, they lack theory and their knowledge, too, is relatively incomplete. Without comparatively complete knowledge it is impossible to do revolutionary work well.

Thus, there are two kinds of incomplete knowledge, one is ready-made knowledge found in books and the other is knowledge that is mostly perceptual and partial; both are one-sided. Only an integration of the two can yield knowledge that is sound and relatively complete.

In order to study theory, however, our cadres of working-class and peasant origin must first acquire an elementary education. Without it they cannot learn Marxist-Leninist theory. Having acquired it, they can study Marxism-Leninism at any time. In my childhood I never attended a Marxist-Leninist school and was taught only such things as, "The Master said: 'How pleasant it is to learn and constantly review what one has learned.'"[4] Though this teaching material was antiquated, it did me some good because from it I learned to read. Nowadays we no longer study the Confucian classics but such new subjects as modern Chinese, history, geography and elementary natural science, which, once learned, are useful everywhere. The Central Committee of our Party now emphatically requires that our cadres of working-class and peasant origin should obtain an elementary education because they can then take up any branch of study — politics, military science or economics. Otherwise, for all their rich experience they will never be able to study theory.

It follows that to combat subjectivism we must enable people of each of these two types to develop in whichever direction they are deficient and to merge with the other type. Those with book-learning must develop in the direction of practice; it is only in this way that they will stop being content with books and avoid committing dogmatist errors. Those experienced in work must take up the study of theory and must read seriously; only then will they be able to systematize and synthesize their experience and raise it to the level of theory, only then will they not mistake their partial experience for universal truth and not commit empiricist errors. Dogmatism and empiricism alike are subjectivism, each originating from an opposite pole.

Hence there are two kinds of subjectivism in our Party, dogmatism and empiricism. Each sees only a part and not the whole. If people are not on guard, do not realize that such one-sidedness is a shortcoming and do not strive to overcome it, they are liable to go astray.

However, of the two kinds of subjectivism, dogmatism is still the greater danger in our Party. For dogmatists can easily assume a Marxist guise to bluff, capture and make servitors of cadres of working-class and peasant origin who cannot easily see through them; they can also bluff and ensnare the naive youth. If we overcome dogmatism, cadres with book-learning will readily join with those who have experience and will take to the study of practical things, and then many good cadres who integrate theory with experience, as well as some real theorists, will emerge. If we overcome dogmatism, the comrades with practical experience will have good teachers to help them raise their experience to the level of theory and so avoid empiricist errors.

Besides muddled ideas about the “theorist” and the “intellectual”, there is a muddled idea among many comrades about “linking theory and practice”, a phrase they have on their lips every day. They talk constantly about “linking”, but actually they mean “separating”, because they make no effort at linking. How is Marxist-Leninist theory to be linked with the practice of the Chinese revolution? To use a common expression, it is by “shooting the arrow at the target”. As the arrow is to the target, so is Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese revolution. Some comrades, however, are “shooting without a target”, shooting at random, and such people are liable to harm the revolution. Others merely stroke the arrow fondly, exclaiming, “What a fine arrow! What a fine arrow!”, but never want to shoot it. These people are only connoisseurs of curios and have virtually nothing to do with the revolution. The arrow of Marxism-Leninism must be used to shoot at the target of the Chinese revolution. Unless this point is made clear, the theoretical level of our Party can never be raised and the Chinese revolution can never be victorious.

Our comrades must understand that we study Marxism-Leninism not for display, nor because there is any mystery about it, but solely because it is the science which leads the revolutionary cause of the proletariat to victory. Even now, there are not a few people who still regard odd quotations from Marxist-Leninist works as a ready-made panacea which, once acquired, can easily cure all maladies. These people show childish ignorance, and we should enlighten them. It is precisely such ignorant people who take Marxism-Leninism as a religious dogma. To them we should say bluntly, "Your dogma is worthless." Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin have repeatedly stated that our theory is not a dogma but a guide to action. But such people prefer to forget this statement which is of the greatest, indeed the utmost, importance. Chinese Communists can be regarded as linking theory with practice only when they become good at applying the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method and the teachings of Lenin and Stalin concerning the Chinese revolution and when, furthermore, through serious research into the realities of China's history and revolution, they do creative theoretical work to meet China's needs in different spheres. Merely talking about linking theory and practice without actually doing anything about it is of no use, even if one goes on talking for a hundred years. To oppose the subjectivist, one-sided approach to problems, we must demolish dogmatist subjectiveness and one-sidedness.

So much for today about combating subjectivism in order to rectify the style of study throughout the Party.

Let me now speak about the question of sectarianism.

Having been steeled for twenty years, our Party is no longer dominated by sectarianism. Remnants of sectarianism, however, are still found both in the Party's internal relations and in its external relations. Sectarian tendencies in internal relations lead to exclusiveness towards comrades inside the Party and hinder inner-Party unity and solidarity, while sectarian tendencies in external relations lead to exclusiveness towards people outside the Party and hinder the Party in its task of uniting the whole people. Only by uprooting this evil in both its aspects can the Party advance unimpeded in its great task of achieving unity among all Party comrades and among all the people of our country.

What are the remnants of inner-Party sectarianism? They are mainly as follows:

First, the assertion of "independence". Some comrades see only the interests of the part and not the whole; they always put undue stress on that part of the work for which they themselves are responsible and always wish to subordinate the interests of the whole to the interests of their own part. They do not understand the Party's system of democratic centralism; they do not realize that the Communist Party not only needs democracy but needs centralization even more. They forget the system of democratic centralism in which the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, the part to the whole and the entire membership to the Central Committee. Chang Kuo-tao[5] asserted his "independence" of the Central Committee of the Party and as a result "asserted" himself into betraying the Party and became a Kuomintang agent. Although the sectarianism we are now discussing is not of this extremely serious kind, it must still be guarded against and we must do away completely with all manifestations of disunity. We should encourage comrades to take the interests of the whole into account. Every Party member, every branch of work, every statement and every action must proceed from the interests of the whole Party; it is absolutely impermissible to violate this principle.

Those who assert this kind of "independence" are usually wedded to the doctrine of "me first" and are generally wrong on the question of the relationship between the individual and the Party. Although in words they profess respect for the Party, in practice they put themselves first and the Party second. What are these people after? They are after fame and position and want to be in the limelight. Whenever they are put in charge of a branch of work, they assert their "independence". With this aim, they draw some people in, push others out and resort to boasting, flattery and touting among the comrades, thus importing the vulgar style of the bourgeois political parties into the Communist Party. It is their dishonesty that causes them to come to grief. I believe we should do things honestly, for without an honest attitude it is absolutely impossible to accomplish anything in this world. Which are the honest people? Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin are honest, men of science are honest. Which are the dishonest people? Trotsky, Bukharin, Chen Tu-hsiu and Chang Kuo-tao are extremely dishonest; and those who assert "independence" out of personal or sectional interest are dishonest too. All sly people, all those who do not have a scientific attitude in their work, fancy themselves resourceful and clever, but in fact they are most stupid and will come to no good. Students in our Party School must pay attention to this problem. We must build a centralized, unified

Party and make a clean sweep of all unprincipled factional struggles. We must combat individualism and sectarianism so as to enable our whole Party to march in step and fight for one common goal.

Cadres from the outside and those from the locality must unite and combat sectarian tendencies. Very careful attention must be given to the relations between outside and local cadres because many anti-Japanese base areas were established only after the arrival of the Eighth Route Army or the New Fourth Army and much of the local work developed only after the arrival of outside cadres. Our comrades must understand that in these conditions it is possible for our base areas to be consolidated and for our Party to take root there only when the two kinds of cadres unite as one and when a large number of local cadres develop and are promoted; otherwise it is impossible. Both the outside and the local cadres have their strong and weak points, and to make any progress they must overcome their own weak points by learning from each other's strong points. The outside cadres are generally not up to the local cadres in familiarity with local conditions and links with the masses. Take me for instance. Although I have been in northern Shensi five or six years, I am far behind the local comrades in understanding local conditions and in links with the people here. Our comrades going to the anti-Japanese base areas in Shansi, Hopei, Shantung and other provinces must pay attention to this. Moreover, even within the same base area, owing to the fact that some districts develop earlier and others later, there is a difference between the local cadres of a district and those from outside it. Cadres who come from a more developed to a less developed district are also outside cadres in relation to that locality, and they, too, should pay great attention to fostering and helping local cadres. Generally speaking, in places where outside cadres are in charge, it is they who should bear the main responsibility if their relations with the local cadres are not good. And the chief comrades in charge should bear greater responsibility. The attention paid to this problem in some places is still very inadequate. Some people look down on the local cadres and ridicule them, saying, "What do these locals know? Clodhoppers!" Such people utterly fail to understand the importance of local cadres; they know neither the latter's strong points nor their own weaknesses and adopt an incorrect, sectarian attitude. All outside cadres must cherish the local cadres and give them constant help and must not be permitted to ridicule or attack them. Of course, the local cadres on their part must learn from the strong points of the outside cadres and rid themselves of inappropriate, narrow views so that they and the outside cadres become as one, with no distinction between "them" and "us", and thus avoid sectarian tendencies.

The same applies to the relationship between cadres in army service and other cadres working in the locality. They must be completely united and must oppose sectarian tendencies. The army cadres must help the local cadres, and vice versa. If there is friction between them, each should make allowance for the other and carry out proper self-criticism. Generally speaking, in places where army cadres are actually in positions of leadership, it is they who should bear the main responsibility if their relations with the local cadres are not good. Only when the army cadres understand their own responsibility and are modest in their attitude towards the local cadres can the conditions be created for the smooth progress of our war effort and our work of construction in the base areas.

The same applies to the relationship among different army units, different localities and different departments. We must oppose the tendency towards selfish departmentalism by which the interests of one's own unit are looked after to the exclusion of those of others. Whoever is indifferent to the difficulties of others, refuses to transfer cadres to other units on request, or releases only the inferior ones, "using the neighbour's field as an outlet for his overflow", and does not give the slightest consideration to other departments, localities or people — such a person is a selfish departmentalist who has entirely lost the spirit of communism. Lack of consideration for the whole and complete indifference to other departments, localities and people are characteristics of a selfish departmentalist. We must intensify our efforts to educate such persons and to make them understand that selfish departmentalism is a sectarian tendency which will become very dangerous, if allowed to develop.

Another problem is the relationship between old and new cadres. Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, our Party has grown enormously, and large numbers of new cadres have emerged; that is a very good thing. In his report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B.), Comrade Stalin said, ". . . there are never enough old cadres, there are far less than required, and they are already partly going out of commission owing to the operation of the laws of nature." Here he was discussing the cadres situation and not only the laws of nature. If our Party does not have a great many new cadres working in unity and co-operation with the old cadres, our cause will come to a stop. All old cadres, therefore, should welcome the new ones with the utmost enthusiasm and show them the warmest solicitude. True, new cadres have their shortcomings. They have not been long in the revolution and lack experience, and unavoidably some have brought with them vestiges of the unwholesome ideology of the old society, remnants of the ideology of petty-bourgeois individualism. But such shortcomings can be gradually eliminated through education and tempering in the revolution. The strong point of the new cadres, as Stalin has said, is that they are acutely sensitive to what is new and are therefore enthusiastic and active to a high degree — the very qualities which some of the old cadres lack.[6] Cadres, new and old, should respect each other, learn from each other and overcome their own shortcomings by learning from each other's strong points, so as to unite as one in the common cause and guard against sectarian tendencies. Generally speaking, in places where the old cadres are mainly in charge, it is they who should bear the chief responsibility if relations with the new cadres are not good.

All the above — relations between the part and the whole, relations between the individual and the Party, relations between outside and local cadres, relations between army cadres and other cadres working in the locality, relations between this and that army unit, between this and that locality, between this and that department and relations between old and new cadres — are relations within the Party. In all these relations it is necessary to enhance the spirit of communism and guard against sectarian tendencies, so that the ranks of our Party will be in good order, march in step and therefore fight well. This is a very important problem which we must solve thoroughly in rectifying the Party's style of work. Sectarianism is an expression of subjectivism in organizational relations; if we want to get rid of subjectivism and promote the Marxist-Leninist spirit of seeking truth from facts, we must sweep the remnants of sectarianism out of the Party and proceed from the principle that the Party's interests are above personal or sectional interests, so that the Party can attain complete solidarity and unity.

The remnants of sectarianism must be eliminated from the Party's external as well as its internal relations. The reason is this: we cannot defeat the enemy by merely uniting the comrades throughout the Party, we can defeat the enemy only by uniting the people throughout the country. For twenty years the Communist Party of China has done great and arduous work in the cause of uniting the people of the whole country, and the achievements in this work since the outbreak of the War of Resistance are even greater than in the past. This does not mean, however, that all our comrades already have a correct style in dealing with the masses and are free from sectarian tendencies. No. In fact, sectarian tendencies still exist among a number of comrades, and in some cases to a very serious degree. Many of our comrades tend to be overbearing in their relations with non-Party people, look down upon them, despise or refuse to respect them or appreciate their strong points. This is indeed a sectarian tendency. After reading a few Marxist books, such comrades become more arrogant instead of more modest, and invariably dismiss others as no good without realizing that in fact their own knowledge is only half-baked. Our comrades must realize the truth that Communist Party members are at all times a minority as compared with non-Party people. Supposing one out of every hundred persons were a Communist, then there would be 4,500,000 Communists among China's population of 450,000,000. Yet, even if our membership reached this huge figure, Communists would still form only one per cent of the whole population, while 99 per cent would be non-Party people. What reason can we then have for not co-operating with non-Party people? As regards all those who wish to co-operate with us or might co-operate with us, we have only the duty of co-operating and absolutely no right to shut them out. But some Party members do not understand this and look down upon, or even shut out, those who wish to co-operate with us. There are no grounds whatsoever for doing so. Have Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin given us any grounds? They have not. On the contrary, they have always earnestly enjoined us to form close ties with the masses and not divorce ourselves from them. Or has the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China given us any grounds? No. Among all its resolutions there is not a single one that says we may divorce ourselves from the masses and so isolate ourselves. On the contrary, the Central Committee has always told us to form close ties with the masses and not to divorce ourselves from them. Thus any action divorcing us from the masses has no justification at all and is simply the mischievous result of the sectarian ideas some of our comrades have themselves concocted. As such sectarianism remains very serious among some of our comrades and still obstructs the application of the Party line, we should carry out extensive education within the Party to meet this problem. Above all, we should make our cadres really understand how serious the problem is and how utterly impossible it is to overthrow the enemy and attain the goal of the revolution unless Party members unite with the non-Party cadres and with non-Party people.

All sectarian ideas are subjectivist and are incompatible with the real needs of the revolution; hence the struggle against sectarianism and the struggle against subjectivism should go on simultaneously.

There is no time today to talk about the question of stereotyped Party writing; I shall discuss it at another meeting. Stereotyped Party writing is a vehicle for filth, a form of expression for subjectivism and sectarianism. It does people harm and damages the revolution, and we must get rid of it completely.

To combat subjectivism we must propagate materialism and dialectics. However, there are many comrades in our Party who lay no stress on the propaganda either of materialism or of dialectics. Some tolerate subjectivist propaganda and regard it with equanimity. They think they believe in Marxism, but make no effort to propagate materialism and do not give it a thought or express any opinion when they hear or read subjectivist stuff. This is not the attitude of a Communist. It allows many of our comrades to be poisoned by subjectivist ideas, which numb their sensitivity. We should therefore launch a campaign of enlightenment within the Party to free the minds of our comrades from the fog of subjectivism and dogmatism and should call upon them to boycott subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing. Such evils are like Japanese goods, for only our enemy wishes us to preserve them and continue to befuddle ourselves with them; so we should advocate a boycott against them, just as we boycott Japanese goods.[7] We should boycott all the wares of subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing, make their sale difficult, and not allow their purveyors to ply their trade by exploiting the low theoretical level in the Party. Our comrades must develop a good nose for this purpose; they should take a sniff at everything and distinguish the good from the bad before they decide whether to welcome it or boycott it. Communists must always go into the whys and wherefores of anything, use their own heads and carefully think over whether or not it corresponds to reality and is really well founded; on no account should they follow blindly and encourage slavishness.

Finally, in opposing subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing we must have in mind two purposes: first, "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones", and second, "cure the sickness to save the patient". The mistakes of the past must be exposed without sparing anyone's sensibilities; it is necessary to analyse and criticize what was bad in the past with a scientific attitude so that work in the future will be done more carefully and done better. This is what is meant by "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones". But our aim in exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings, like that of a doctor curing a sickness, is solely to save the patient and not to doctor him to death. A person with appendicitis is saved when the surgeon removes his appendix. So long as a person who has made mistakes does not hide his sickness for fear of treatment or persist in his mistakes until he is beyond cure, so long as he honestly and sincerely wishes to be cured and to mend his ways, we should welcome him and cure his sickness so that he can become a good comrade. We can never succeed if we just let ourselves go, and lash out at him. In treating an ideological or a political malady, one must never be rough and rash but must adopt the approach of "curing the sickness to save the patient", which is the only correct and effective method.

I have taken this occasion of the opening of the Party School to speak at length, and I hope comrades will think over what I have said. (*Enthusiastic applause.*)

NOTES

[1] Stereotyped writing, or the "eight-legged essay", was the special form of essay prescribed in the imperial examinations under China's feudal dynasties from the 15th to the 19th centuries; it consisted in juggling with words, concentrated only on form and was devoid of content. Structurally the main body of the essay had eight parts — presentation, amplification, preliminary exposition, initial argument, inceptive paragraphs, middle paragraphs, rear paragraphs and concluding paragraphs, and the fifth to eighth parts each had to have two "legs", *i.e.*, two antithetical paragraphs, hence the name "eight-legged essay". The "eight-legged essay" became a byword in China denoting stereotyped formalism and triteness. Thus "stereotyped Party writing" characterizes the writings of certain people in the revolutionary ranks who piled up revolutionary phrases and terms higgledy-piggledy instead of analysing the facts. Like the "eight-legged essay", their writings were nothing but verbiage.

[2] This was the decision on recruiting intellectuals adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in December 1939, which is printed under the title "Recruit Large Numbers of Intellectuals" in the *Selected Work of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II.

[3] See J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", *Problems of Leninism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, p. 31.

[4] This is the opening sentence of the *Confucian Analects*, a record of the dialogues of Confucius and his disciples.

[5] Chang Kuo-tao was a renegade from the Chinese revolution. In early life speculating on the revolution, he joined the Chinese Communist Party. In the Party he made many mistakes resulting in serious crimes. The most notorious of these was his Opposition, in 1935, to the Red Army's northward march and his defeatism and liquidationism in advocating withdrawal by the Red Army to the minority-nationality areas on the Szechuan-Sikang borders; what is more, he openly carried out traitorous activities against the Party and the Central Committee, established his own bogus central committee, disrupted the unity of the Party and the Red Army, and caused heavy losses to the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army. But thanks to patient education by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee, the Fourth Front Army and its numerous cadres soon returned to the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and played a glorious role in subsequent struggles. Chang Kuo-tao, however, proved incorrigible and in the spring of 1938 he slipped out of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and joined the Kuomintang secret police.

[6] See J. V. Stalin, "Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on the Work of the Central Committee", *Problems of Leninism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, pp. 784-86.

[7] Boycotting Japanese goods was a method of struggle frequently used by the Chinese people against Japanese imperialist aggression in the first half of the 20th century, as in the patriotic May 4th Movement of 1919, after the September 18th Incident of 1931, and during the War of Resistance Against Japan.

OPPOSE STEREOTYPED PARTY WRITING

February 8, 1942

Comrade Kai-feng has just stated the purpose of today's meeting. I now want to discuss the ways subjectivism and sectarianism use stereotyped Party writing (or the Party "eight-legged essay")[1] as their instrument of propaganda or form of expression. We are fighting against subjectivism and sectarianism, but they will still have a hiding-place to lurk in if at the same time we do not get rid of stereotyped Party writing. If we destroy that too, we shall "checkmate" subjectivism and sectarianism and make both these monsters show themselves in their true colours, and then we shall easily be able to annihilate them, like "rats running across the street with everyone yelling: Kill them! Kill them!"

It does not matter much if a person produces stereotyped Party writings only for himself to read. If he passes them on to someone else, the number of readers is doubled, and already no small harm is done. If he has them posted up, mimeographed, printed in newspapers or published in book form, then the problem becomes indeed a big one, for they can influence many people. And those who produce stereotyped Party writing always seek large audiences. Thus it has become imperative to expose and destroy it.

Stereotyped Party writing is, moreover, one brand of the "foreign stereotype", which was attacked by Lu Hsun a long time ago.[2] Why then do we call it the Party "eight-legged essay"? Because, besides its foreign flavour, it has some smell of native soil. Perhaps it too can be counted as creative work of a sort! Who says our people have not produced any creative works? Here is one! (*Loud laughter.*)

Stereotyped Party writing has a long history in our Party; particularly during the Agrarian Revolution, it sometimes became quite rampant.

This speech was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a cadres' meeting in Yenan.

Viewed historically, stereotyped Party writing is a reaction to the May 4th Movement.

During the May 4th Movement, modern-minded people opposed the use of the classical Chinese language and advocated vernacular Chinese, opposed the traditional dogmas and advocated science and democracy, all of which was quite right. The movement then was vigorous and lively, progressive and revolutionary. In those days the ruling classes indoctrinated students with Confucian teachings and compelled the people to venerate all the trappings of Confucianism as religious dogma, and all writers used the classical language. In short, what was written and taught by the ruling classes and their hangers-on was in the nature of stereotyped writing and dogma, both in content and in form. That was the old stereotype and the old dogma. A tremendous achievement of the May 4th Movement was its public exposure of the ugliness of the old stereotype and the old dogma and its call to the people to rise against them. Another great and related achievement was its fight against imperialism, but the struggle against the old stereotype and the old dogma remains one of the great achievements of the May 4th Movement. Later on, however, foreign stereotyped writing and foreign dogma came into being. Running counter to Marxism, certain people in our Party developed the foreign stereotype and dogma into subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing. These are the new stereotype and the new dogma. They have become so deeply ingrained in the minds of many comrades that today we still have a very strenuous job of remoulding to do. Thus we see that the lively, vigorous, progressive and revolutionary movement of the May 4th period which fought the old feudal stereotyped writing and dogma was later turned by some people into its very opposite, giving rise to the new stereotyped writing and dogma. The latter are not lively and vigorous but dead and stiff, not progressive but retrogressive, not revolutionary but obstacles to revolution. That is to say, the foreign stereotyped writing, or stereotyped Party writing, is a reaction to the original nature of the May 4th Movement. The May 4th Movement, however, had its own weaknesses. Many of the leaders lacked the critical spirit of Marxism, and the method they used was generally that of the bourgeoisie, that is, the formalist method. They were quite right in opposing the old stereotype and the old dogma and in advocating science and democracy. But in dealing with current conditions, with history, and with things foreign, they lacked the critical spirit of historical materialism and regarded what was bad as absolutely and wholly bad and what was good as absolutely and wholly good. This formalist approach to problems affected the subsequent course of the movement. In its development, the May 4th Movement divided into two currents. One section inherited its scientific and democratic spirit and transformed it on the basis of Marxism; this is what the Communists and some non-Party Marxists did. Another section took the road of the bourgeoisie; this was the development of formalism towards the Right. But within the Communist Party too the situation was not uniform; there, too, some members deviated and, lacking a firm grasp of Marxism, committed errors of formalism, namely, the errors of subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing. This was the development of formalism towards the "Left". So it can be seen that stereotyped Party writing is no accident, but is, on the one hand, a reaction to the positive elements of the May 4th Movement and, on the other, a legacy, a continuation or development of its negative elements. It is useful for us to understand this point. Just as it was revolutionary and necessary to fight the old stereotyped writing and the old dogmatism during the period of the May 4th Movement, so it is revolutionary and necessary today for us to use Marxism to criticize the new stereotyped writing and the new dogmatism. If there had been no fight against the old stereotype and the old dogmatism during the May 4th period, the minds of the Chinese people would not have been freed from bondage to them, and China would have no hope of freedom and independence. This task was merely begun in the period of the May 4th Movement, and a very great effort — a huge job of work on the road of revolutionary remoulding — is still necessary to enable the whole people to free themselves completely from the domination of the old stereotype and dogmatism. If today we do not oppose the new stereotyped writing and the new dogmatism, the minds of the Chinese people will be fettered by formalism of another kind. If we do not get rid of the poison of stereotyped Party writing and the error of dogmatism found among a section (only a section, of course) of Party comrades, then it will be impossible to arouse a vigorous and lively revolutionary spirit, to eradicate the bad habit of taking a wrong attitude towards Marxism and to disseminate and develop true Marxism; furthermore, it will be impossible to conduct an energetic struggle against the influence of the old stereotyped writing and dogma among the whole and against that of foreign stereotyped writing and dogma among many of the people, and impossible to attain the purpose of demolishing and sweeping away these influences.

Subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing — all three are anti-Marxist and meet the needs not of the proletariat but of the exploiting classes. They are a reflection of petty-bourgeois ideology in our Party. China is a country with a very large petty bourgeoisie and our Party is surrounded by this enormous class; a great number of our Party members come from this class, and when they join the Party they inevitably drag in with them a petty-bourgeois tail, be it long or short. Unless checked and transformed, the fanaticism and one-sidedness of petty-bourgeois revolutionaries can easily engender subjectivism and sectarianism, of which foreign stereotyped writing, or stereotyped Party writing, is one form of expression.

It is not easy to clean out these things and sweep them away. It must be done properly, that is, by taking pains to reason with people. If we reason earnestly and properly, it will be effective. The first thing to do in this reasoning process is to give the patient a good shake-up by shouting at him, "You are ill!" so as to administer a shock and make him break out in a sweat, and then to give him sincere advice on getting treatment.

Let us now analyse stereotyped Party writing and see where its evils lie. Using poison as an antidote to poison, we shall imitate the form of the stereotyped eight-section essay and set forth the following "eight-legs", which might be called the eight major indictments.

The first indictment against stereotyped Party writing is that it fills endless pages with empty verbiage. Some of our comrades love to write long articles with no substance, very much like the "foot-bindings of a slattern, long as well as smelly". Why must they write such long and empty articles? There can be only one explanation; they are determined the masses shall not read them. Because the articles are long and empty, the masses shake their heads at the very sight of them. How can they be expected to read them? Such writings are good for nothing except to bluff the naive, among whom they spread bad influences and foster bad habits. On June 22 last year the Soviet Union began waging a gigantic war against aggression, and yet Stalin's speech on July 3 was only the length of an editorial in our *Liberation Daily*. Had any of our gentlemen written that speech, just imagine. It would have run to tens of thousands of words at a minimum. We are in the midst of a war, and we should learn how to write shorter and pithier articles. Although there is as yet no fighting here in Yenan, our troops at the front are daily engaged in battle, and the people in the rear are busy at work. If articles are too long, who will read them? Some comrades at the front, too, like to write long reports. They take pains over writing them and send them here for us to read. But who has the hardihood to read them? If long and empty articles are no good, are short and empty ones any better? They are no good either. We should forbid all empty talk. But the first and foremost task is to throw the long, smelly foot-bindings of the slattern into the dustbin. Some may ask, "Isn't *Capital* very long? What are we to do about that?" The answer is simple, just go on reading it. There is a proverb, "Sing different songs on different mountains"; another runs, "Fit the appetite to the dishes and the dress to the figure". Whatever we do must be done according to actual circumstances, and it is the same with writing articles and making speeches. What we oppose is long-winded and empty stereotyped writing, but we do not mean that everything must necessarily be short in order to be good. True, we need short articles in war time, but above all we need articles that have substance. Articles devoid of substance are the least justifiable and the most objectionable. The same applies to speech-making; we must put an end to all empty, long-winded speeches.

The second indictment against stereotyped Party writing is that it strikes a pose in order to intimidate people. Some stereotyped Party writing is not only long and empty, but also pretentious with the deliberate intention of intimidating people; it carries the worst kind of poison. Writing long-winded and empty articles may be set down to immaturity, but striking a pose to overawe people is not merely immature but downright knavish. Lu Hsun once said in criticism of such people, "Hurling insults and threats is certainly not fighting."[3] What is scientific never fears criticism, for science is truth and fears no refutation. But those who write subjectivist and sectarian articles and speeches in the form of Party stereotypes fear refutation, are very cowardly, and therefore rely on pretentiousness to overawe others, believing that they can thereby silence people and "win the day". Such pretentiousness cannot reflect truth but is an obstacle to truth. Truth does not strike a pose to overawe people but talks and acts honestly and sincerely. Two terms used to appear in the articles in speeches of many comrades, one being "ruthless struggle" and the other merciless blows". Measures of that kind are entirely necessary against the enemy or against enemy ideology, but to use them against our own comrades is wrong. It often happens that enemies and enemy ideology infiltrate into the Party, as is discussed in Item 4 of the Conclusion of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*. Against these enemies, we must undoubtedly resort to ruthless struggle and merciless blows, because the scoundrels use these very measures against the Party; if we were tolerant of them, we should fall right into their trap. But the same measures should not be used against comrades who occasionally make mistakes; to them we should apply the method of criticism and self-criticism, the method indicated in Item 5 of the Conclusion of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*. The comrades who in the past loudly advocated "ruthless struggle" and "merciless blows" against comrades who occasionally made mistakes did so because, for one thing, they failed to make any analysis of the persons they were dealing with and, for another, they were striking a pose in an effort to intimidate. This method is no good, no matter whom you are dealing with. Against the enemy this tactic of intimidation is utterly useless, and with our own comrades it can only do harm. It is a tactic which the exploiting classes and the *lumpen*-proletariat habitually practise, but for which the proletariat has no use. For the proletariat the sharpest and most effective weapon is a serious and militant scientific attitude. The Communist Party lives by the truth of Marxism-Leninism, by seeking truth from facts, by science, and not by intimidating people. Needless to say, the idea of attaining fame and position for oneself by pretentiousness is even more contemptible. In short, when organizations make decisions and issue instructions and when comrades write articles and make speeches, they must without exception depend on Marxist-Leninist truth and seek to serve a useful purpose. This is the only basis on which victory in the revolution can be achieved; all else is of no avail.

The third indictment against stereotyped Party writing is that it shoots at random, without considering the audience. A few years ago a slogan appeared on the Yenan city wall which read, "Working men and peasants, unite and strive for victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan!" The idea of the slogan was not at all bad, but the character "工" [*kung*, meaning working] in "工人" [*kung jen*, meaning working men], was written as " ", with its perpendicular stroke twisted into a zigzag. How about the character "人" [*jen*, meaning men]? It became " ", with three slanting strokes added to its right leg. The comrade who wrote this was no doubt a disciple of the ancient scholars, but it is rather baffling why he should have written such characters in such a place, on the Yenan city wall, at the time of the War of Resistance. Perhaps he had taken a vow that the common people should not read them; it is difficult to explain otherwise. Communists who really want to do propaganda must consider their audience and bear in mind those who will read their articles and slogans or listen to their speeches and their talk; otherwise they are in effect resolving not to be read or listened to by anyone. Many people often take it for granted that what they write and say can be easily understood by everybody, when it is not so at all. How can people understand them when they write and speak in Party stereotypes? The saying "to play the lute to a cow" implies a gibe at the audience. If we substitute the idea of respect for the audience, the gibe is turned against the player. Why should he strum away without considering his audience? What is worse, he is producing a Party stereotype as raucous as a crow, and yet he insists on cawing at the masses. When shooting an arrow, one must aim at the target; when playing the lute, one must consider the listener; how, then, can one write articles or make speeches without taking the reader or the audience into account? Suppose we want to make friends with a person, whoever he may be, can we become bosom friends if we cannot understand each other's hearts, do not know each other's thoughts? It simply will not do for our propaganda workers to rattle on without investigating, studying and analysing their audience.

The fourth indictment against stereotyped Party writing is its drab language that reminds one of a *piehsan*. Like our stereotyped Party writing, the creatures known in Shanghai as "little *piehsan*" are wizened and ugly. If an article or a speech merely rings the changes on a few terms in a classroom tone without a shred of vigour or spirit, is it not rather like a *piehsan*, drab of speech and repulsive in appearance? If someone enters primary school at seven, goes to middle school in his teens, graduates from college in his twenties and never has contact with the masses of the people, he is not to blame if his language is poor and monotonous. But we are revolutionaries working for the masses, and if we do not learn the language of the masses, we cannot work well. At present many of our comrades doing propaganda work make no study of language. Their propaganda is very dull and few people care to read their articles or listen to their talk.

Why do we need to study language and, what is more, spend much effort on it? Because the mastery of language is not easy and requires painstaking effort. First, let us learn language from the masses. The people's vocabulary is rich, vigorous, vivid and expressive of real life. It is because many of us have not mastered language that our articles and speeches contain few vigorous, vivid and effective expressions and resemble not a hale and healthy person, but an emaciated *piehsan*, a mere bag of bones. Secondly, let us absorb what we need from foreign languages. We should not import foreign expressions mechanically or use them indiscriminately, but should absorb what is good and suits our needs. Our current vocabulary has already incorporated many foreign expressions, because the old Chinese vocabulary was inadequate. For instance, today we are holding a meeting of *kanpu* [cadres], and the term *kanpu* is derived from a foreign word. We should continue to absorb many fresh things from abroad, not only progressive ideas but new expressions as well. Thirdly, let us also learn whatever is alive in the classical Chinese language. Since we have not studied classical Chinese hard enough, we have not made full and proper use of much that is still alive in it. Of course, we are resolutely opposed to the use of obsolete expressions or allusions, and that is final; but what is good and still useful should be taken over. Those who are badly infected by stereotyped Party writing do not take pains to study what is useful in the language of the people, in foreign languages, or in classical Chinese, so the masses do not welcome their dry and dull propaganda, and we too have no need for such poor and incompetent propagandists. Who are our propagandists? They include not only teachers, journalists, writers and artists, but all our cadres. Take the military commanders, for instance. Though they make no public statements, they have to talk to the soldiers and have dealings with the people. What is this if not propaganda? Whenever a man speaks to others, he is doing propaganda work. Unless he is dumb, he always has a few words to say. It is therefore imperative that our comrades should all study language.

The fifth indictment against stereotyped Party writing is that it arranges items under a complicated set of headings, as if starting a Chinese pharmacy. Go and take a look at any Chinese pharmacy, and you will see cabinets with numerous drawers, each bearing the name of a drug — toncal, foxglove, rhubarb, saltpetre . . . indeed, everything that should be there. This method has been picked up by our comrades. In their articles and speeches, their books and reports, they use first the big Chinese numerals, second the small Chinese numerals, third the characters for the ten celestial stems, fourth the characters for the twelve earthly branches, and then capital A, B, C, D, then small a, b, c, d, followed by the Arabic numerals, and what not! How fortunate that the ancients and the foreigners created all these symbols for us so that we can start a Chinese pharmacy without the slightest effort. For all its verbiage, an article that bristles with such symbols, that does not pose, analyse or solve problems and that does not take a stand for or against anything is devoid of real content and nothing but a Chinese pharmacy. I am not saying that such symbols as the ten celestial stems, etc., should not be used, but that this kind of approach to problems is wrong. The method borrowed from the Chinese pharmacy, which many of our comrades are very fond of, is really the most crude, infantile and philistine of all. It is a formalist method, classifying things according to their external features instead of their internal relations. If one takes a conglomeration of concepts that are not internally related and arranges them into an article, speech or report simply according to the external features of things, then one is juggling with concepts and may also lead others to indulge in the same sort of game, with the result that they do not use their brains to think over problems and probe into the essence of things, but are satisfied merely to list phenomena in ABCD order. What is a problem? A problem is the contradiction in a thing. Where one has an unresolved contradiction, there one has a problem. Since there is a problem, you have to be for one side and against the other, and you have to pose the problem. To pose the problem, you must first make a preliminary investigation and study of the two basic aspects of the problem or contradiction before you can understand the nature of the contradiction. This is the process of discovering the problem. Preliminary investigation and study can discover the problem, can pose the problem, but cannot as yet solve it. In order to solve the problem it is necessary to make a systematic and thorough investigation and study. This is the process of analysis. In posing the problem too, analysis is needed, otherwise, faced with a chaotic and bewildering mass of phenomena, you will not be able to discern where the problem or contradiction lies. But here, by the process of analysis we mean a process of systematic and thorough analysis. It often happens that although a problem has been posed it cannot be solved because the internal relations of things have not yet been revealed, because this process of systematic and thorough analysis has not yet been carried out; consequently we still cannot see the contours of the problem clearly, cannot make a synthesis and so cannot solve the problem well. If an article or speech is important and meant to give guidance, it ought to pose a particular problem, then analyse it and then make a synthesis pointing to the nature of the problem and providing the method for solving it; in all this, formalist methods are useless. Since infantile, crude, philistine and lazy-minded formalist methods are prevalent in our Party, we must expose them; only thus can everybody learn to use the Marxist method to observe, pose, analyse and solve problems; only thus can we do our work well and only thus can our revolutionary cause triumph.

The sixth indictment against stereotyped Party writing is that it is irresponsible and harms people wherever it appears. All the offences mentioned above are due partly to immaturity and partly to an insufficient sense of responsibility. Let us take washing the face to illustrate the point. We all wash our faces every day, many of us more than once, and inspect ourselves in the mirror afterwards by way of "investigation and study" (*loud laughter*), for fear that something may not be quite right. What a great sense of responsibility! If we wrote articles and made speeches with the same sense of responsibility, we would not be doing badly. Do not present what is not presentable. Always bear in mind that it may influence the thoughts and actions of others. If a man happens not to wash his face for a day or two, that of course is not good, and if after washing he leaves a smudge or two, that too is not so pleasing, but there is no serious danger. It is different with writing articles or making speeches; they are intended solely to influence others. Yet our comrades go about this task casually; this means putting the trivial above the important. Many people write articles and make speeches without prior study or preparation, and after writing an article, they do not bother to go over it several times in the same way as they would examine their faces in the mirror after washing, but instead offhandedly send it to be published. Often the result is "A thousand words from the pen in a stream, but ten thousand *li* away from the theme". Talented though these writers may appear, they actually harm people. This bad habit, this weak sense of responsibility, must be corrected.

The seventh indictment against stereotyped Party writing is that it poisons the whole Party and jeopardizes the revolution. The eighth indictment is that its spread would wreck the country and ruin the people. These two indictments are self-evident and require no elaboration. In other words, if stereotyped Party writing is not transformed but is allowed to develop unchecked, the consequences will be very serious indeed. The poison of subjectivism and sectarianism is hidden in stereotyped Party writing, and if this poison spreads it will endanger both the Party and the country.

The aforesaid eight counts are our call to arms against stereotyped Party writing.

As a form, the Party stereotype is not only unsuitable for expressing the revolutionary spirit but is apt to stifle it. To develop the revolutionary spirit it is necessary to discard stereotyped Party writing and instead to adopt the Marxist-Leninist style of writing, which is vigorous, lively, fresh and forceful. This style of writing has existed for a long time, but is yet to be enriched and spread widely among us. When we have destroyed foreign stereotyped writing and stereotyped Party writing, we can enrich our new style of writing and spread it widely, thereby advancing the Party's revolutionary cause.

The Party stereotype is not only confined to articles and speeches, but is also found in the conduct of meetings. "1. Opening announcement; 2. report; 3. discussion; 4. conclusions; and 5. adjournment." If this rigid procedure is followed at every meeting, large or small, everywhere and every time, is not that another Party stereotype? When "reports" are made at meetings they often go as follows: "1. the international situation; 2. the domestic situation; 3. the Border Region; and 4. our own department"; and the meetings often last from morning till night, with even those having nothing to say taking the floor, as though they would let the others down unless they spoke. In short, there is a disregard for actual conditions and deadly adherence to rigid old forms and habits. Should we not correct all these things too?

Nowadays many people are calling for a transformation to a national, scientific and mass style. That is very good. But "transformation" means thorough change, from top to bottom and inside out. Yet some people who have not made even a slight change are calling for a transformation. I would therefore advise these comrades to begin by making just a little change before they go on to "transform", or else they will remain entangled in dogmatism and stereotyped Party writing. This can be described as having grandiose aims but puny abilities, great ambition but little talent, and it will accomplish nothing. So whoever talks glibly about "transformation to a mass style" while in fact he is stuck fast in his own small circle had better watch out, or some day one of the masses may bump into him along the road and say, "What about all this 'transformation', sir? Can I see a bit of it, please?" and he will be in a fix. If he is not just prating but sincerely wants to transform to a mass style, he must really go among the common people and learn from them, otherwise his "transformation" will remain up in the air. There are some who keep clamouring for transformation to a mass style but cannot speak three sentences in the language of the common people. It shows they are not really determined to learn from the masses. Their minds are still confined to their own small circles.

At this meeting copies of *A Guide to Propaganda*, a pamphlet containing four articles, have been distributed, and I advise our comrades to read and re-read it.

The first piece, composed of excerpts from the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, deals with the way Lenin did propaganda work. It describes, among other things, how Lenin wrote leaflets:

> Under Lenin's guidance, the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class was the first body in Russia that began to *unite Socialism with the working-class movement*. When a strike broke out in some factory, the League of Struggle, which through the members of its circles was kept well posted on the state of affairs in the factories, immediately responded by issuing leaflets and Socialist proclamations. These leaflets exposed the oppression of the workers by the manufacturers, explained how the workers should fight for their interests, and set forth the workers' demands. The leaflets told the plain truth about the ulcers of capitalism, the poverty of the workers, their intolerably hard working day of 12 to 14 hours, and their utter lack of rights. They also put forward appropriate political demands.

Take note, "well posted" and "told the plain truth"! Again:

> With the collaboration of the worker Babushkin, Lenin at the end of 1894 wrote the first agitational leaflet of this kind and an appeal to the workers of the Semyannikov Works in St. Petersburg who were on strike.

To write a leaflet, you must consult with comrades who are well posted on the state of affairs. It was on the basis of such investigation and study that Lenin wrote and worked.

> Every leaflet greatly helped to stiffen the spirit of the workers. They saw that the Socialists were helping and defending them.[4]

Do we agree with Lenin? If we do, we must work in the spirit of Lenin. That is, we must do as Lenin did and not fill endless pages with verbiage, or shoot at random without considering the audience, or become self-opinionated and bombastic.

The second piece is composed of excerpts from Dimitrov's statements at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International. What did Dimitrov say? He said:

> We must learn to talk to the masses, not in the language of book formulas, but in the language of fighters for the cause of the masses, whose every word, whose every idea reflects the innermost thoughts and sentiments of millions.[5]

And again:

> . . . *the masses cannot assimilate our decisions unless we learn to speak the language which the masses understand.*
>
> We do not always know how to speak simply, concretely, in images which are familiar and intelligible to the masses. We are still unable to refrain from abstract formulas which we have learned by rote. As a matter of fact, if you look through our leaflets, newspapers, resolutions and theses, you will find that they are often written in a language and style so heavy that they are difficult for even our Party functionaries to understand, let alone the rank-and-file workers.[6]

Well? Does not Dimitrov put his finger on our weak spot? Apparently, stereotyped Party writing exists in foreign countries as well as in China, so you can see it is a common disease. (*Laughter.*) In any case, we should cure our own disease quickly in accordance with Comrade Dimitrov's injunction.

> Every one of us must make this a law, a Bolshevik law, an elementary rule:
>
> *When writing or speaking always have in mind the rank-and-file worker who must understand you, must believe in your*

> *appeal and be ready to follow you! You must have in mind for whom you write, to whom you speak.*[7]

This is the prescription made out for us by the Communist International, a prescription that must be followed. Let it be a law for us!

The third article, selected from the *Complete Works of Lu Hsun*, is the author's reply to the magazine *The Dipper*,[8] discussing how to write. What did Lu Hsun say? Altogether he set forth eight rules of writing, some of which I shall pick out for comment here.

> Rule 1: "Pay close attention to all manner of things; observe more, and if you have observed only a little, then do not write."

What he says is, "pay close attention to all manner of things", not just to one thing or half a thing. He says "observe more", not just take a look or half a look. How about us? Don't we often do exactly the opposite and write after having observed only a little?

> Rule 2: "Do not force yourself to write when you have nothing to say."

What about us? Don't we often force ourselves to write a great deal when it is all too clear that there is nothing in our heads? It is sheer irresponsibility to pick up the pen and "force ourselves to write" without investigation or study.

> Rule 4: "After writing something, read it over twice at least, and do your utmost to strike out non-essential words, sentences and paragraphs, without the slightest compunction. Rather condense the material for a novel into a sketch, never spin out the material for a sketch into a novel."

Confucius advised, "Think twice",[9] and Han Yu said, "A deed is accomplished through taking thought."[10] That was in ancient times. Today matters have become very complicated, and sometimes it is not even enough to think them over three or four times. Lu Hsun said, "Read it over twice at least." And at most? He did not say, but in my opinion it does no harm to go over an important article more than ten times and to revise it conscientiously before it is published. Articles are the reflection of objective reality, which is intricate and complex and must be studied over and over again before it can be properly reflected; to be slipshod in this respect is to be ignorant of the rudiments of writing.

> Rule 6: "Do not coin adjectives or other terms that are intelligible to nobody but yourself."

We have "coined" too many expressions that are "intelligible to nobody". Sometimes a single clause runs to forty or fifty words and is packed with "adjectives or other terms that are intelligible to nobody". Many who never tire of professing to follow Lu Hsun are the very ones who turn their backs on him!

The last piece is taken from the report on how to develop a national style of propaganda, which was adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. At that session held in 1938, we said that "any talk about Marxism apart from China's specific characteristics is only Marxism in the abstract, Marxism in a vacuum". That is to say, we must oppose all empty talk about Marxism, and Communists living in China must study Marxism by linking it with the realities of the Chinese revolution.

The report said:

> Foreign stereotypes must be abolished, there must be less singing of empty, abstract tunes, and dogmatism must be laid to rest; they must be replaced by the fresh, lively Chinese style and spirit which the common people of China love. To separate internationalist content from national form is the practice of those who do not understand the first thing about internationalism. We, on the contrary, must link the two closely. In this matter there are serious errors in our ranks which should be conscientiously overcome.

The abolition of foreign stereotypes was demanded in that report, yet some comrades are still promoting them. Less singing of empty, abstract tunes was demanded, yet some comrades are obstinately singing more. The demand was made that dogmatism be laid to rest, yet some comrades are telling it to get out of bed. In short, many people have let this report which was adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session go in one ear and out of the other, as if wilfully opposed to it.

The Central Committee has now made the decision that we must discard stereotyped Party writing, dogmatism and the like once and or all, and that is why I have come and talked at some length. I hope that comrades will think over and analyse what I have said and that each comrade will also analyse his own particular case. Everyone should carefully examine himself, talk over with his close friends and the comrades around him whatever he has clarified and really get rid of his own defects.

NOTES

[1] For stereotyped Party writing, see "Rectify the Party's Style of Work", Note 1, p. 50 of this volume.

[2] Opposition to stereotyped writing, whether old or new, runs all through Lu Hsun's works. The foreign stereotype was developed after the May 4th Movement by some shallow bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intellectuals and, disseminated by them, existed for a long time among revolutionary cultural workers. In a number of essays, Lu Hsun fought against the foreign stereotype as found in their ranks and condemned it in these terms:

> A clean sweep should be made of all stereotyped writings, whether old or new. . . . For instance, it is also a kind of stereotype if all one can do is to "hurl insults", "threaten" or even "pass sentence" and merely copy old formulas and apply these indiscriminately to every fact, instead of specifically and concretely using formulas derived from science to interpret the new facts and phenomena which emerge every day. ("A Reply to Chu Hsiu-hsia's Letter", appended to "Giving the Show Away".)

[3] "Hurling Insults and Threats Is Certainly Not Fighting" was the title of an Essay written in 1932 and included in the collection *Mixed Dialects* (Lu Hsun, *Complete Works*, Chin. ed., 1957, Vol. V).

[4] See History of the *Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, *Short Course*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1951, pp. 36-37.

[5] Georgi Dimitrov, "Unity of the Working Class Against Fascism", *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Eng. ed., Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1951, pp. 116-17.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 132-33.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 135.

[8] *he Dipper* was a monthly published in 1931 and 1932 by the League of Chinese Left-Wing Writers. "In Reply to the Question Put by *The Dipper*" is included in the collection *Two Hearts* (Lu Hsun, *Complete Works*, Chin. ed., Vol. IV).

[9] From *Confucian Analects*, Book V, "Kungyeh Chang".

[10] Han Yu (768-824) was a famous Chinese writer of the Tang Dynasty. In his essay "The Scholar's Apologia" he wrote, "A deed is accomplished through taking thought and fails through lack of thought."

TALKS AT THE YENAN FORUM ON LITERATURE AND ART

May 1942

INTRODUCTION

May 2, 1942

Comrades! You have been invited to this forum today to exchange ideas and examine the relationship between work in the literary and artistic fields and revolutionary work in general. Our aim is to ensure that revolutionary literature and art follow the correct path of development and provide better help to other revolutionary work in facilitating the overthrow of our national enemy and the accomplishment of the task of national liberation.

In our struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people there are various fronts, among which there are the fronts of the pen and of the gun, the cultural and the military fronts. To defeat the enemy we must rely primarily on the army with guns. But this army alone is not enough; we must also have a cultural army, which is absolutely indispensable for uniting our own ranks and defeating the enemy. Since the May 4th Movement such a cultural army has taken shape in China, and it has helped the Chinese revolution, gradually reduced the domain of China's feudal culture and of the comprador culture which serves imperialist aggression, and weakened their influence. To oppose the new culture the Chinese reactionaries can now only "pit quantity against quality". In other words, reactionaries have money, and though they can produce nothing good, they can go all out and produce in quantity. Literature and art have been an important and successful part of the cultural front since the May 4th Movement. During the ten years' civil war, the revolutionary literature and art movement grew greatly. That movement and the revolutionary war both headed in the same general direction, but these two fraternal armies were not linked together in their practical work because the reactionaries had cut them off from each other. It is very good that since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, more and more revolutionary writers and artists have been coming to Yenan and our other anti-Japanese base areas. But it does not necessarily follow that, having come to the base areas, they have already integrated themselves completely with the masses of the people here. The two must be completely integrated if we are to push ahead with our revolutionary work. The purpose of our meeting today is precisely to ensure that literature and art fit well into the whole revolutionary machine as a component part, that they operate as powerful weapons for uniting and educating the people and for attacking and destroying the enemy, and that they help the people fight the enemy with one heart and one mind. What are the problems that must be solved to achieve this objective? I think they are the problems of the class stand of the writers and artists, their attitude, their audience, their work and their study.

The problem of class stand. Our stand is that of the proletariat and of the masses. For members of the Communist Party, this means keeping to the stand of the Party, keeping to Party spirit and Party policy. Are there any of our literary and art workers who are still mistaken or not clear in their understanding of this problem? I think there are. Many of our comrades have frequently departed from the correct stand.

The problem of attitude. From one's stand there follow specific attitudes towards specific matters. For instance, is one to extol or to expose? This is a question of attitude. Which attitude is wanted? I would say both. The question is, whom are you dealing with? There are three kinds of persons, the enemy, our allies in the united front and our own people; the last are the masses and their vanguard. We need to adopt a different attitude towards each of the three. With regard to the enemy, that is, Japanese imperialism and all the other enemies of the people, the task of revolutionary writers and artists is to expose their duplicity and cruelty and at the same time to point out the inevitability of their defeat, so as to encourage the anti-Japanese army and people to fight staunchly with one heart and one mind for their overthrow. With regard to our different allies in the united front, our attitude should be one of both alliance and criticism, and there should be different kinds of alliance and different kinds of criticism. We support them in their resistance to Japan and praise them for any achievement. But if the are not active in the War of Resistance, we should criticize them. If anyone opposes the Communist Party and the people and keeps moving down the path of reaction, we will firmly oppose him. As for the masses of the people, their toil and their struggle, their army and their Party, we should certainly praise them. The people, too, have their shortcomings. Among the proletariat many retain petty-bourgeois ideas, while both the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie have backward ideas; these are burdens hampering them in their struggle. We should be patient and spend a long time in educating them and helping them to get these loads off their backs and combat their own shortcomings and errors, so that they can advance with great strides. They have remoulded themselves in struggle or are doing so, and our literature and art should depict this process. As long as they do not persist in their errors, we should not dwell on their negative side and consequently make the mistake of ridiculing them or, worse still, of being hostile to them. Our writings should help them to unite, to make progress, to press ahead with one heart and one mind, to discard what is backward and develop what is revolutionary, and should certainly not do the opposite.

The problem of audience, *i.e.*, the people for whom our works of literature and art are produced. In the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the anti-Japanese base areas of northern and central China, this problem differs from that in the Kuomintang areas, and differs still more from that in Shanghai before the War of Resistance. In the Shanghai period, the audience for works of revolutionary literature and art consisted mainly of a section of the students, office workers and shop assistants. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance the audience in the Kuomintang areas became somewhat wider, but it still consisted mainly of the same kind of people because the government there prevented the workers, peasants and soldiers from having access to revolutionary literature and art. In our base areas the situation is entirely different. Here the audience for works of literature and art consists of workers, peasants, soldiers and revolutionary cadres. There are students in the base areas, too, but they are different from students of the old type; they are either former or future cadres. The cadres of all types, fighters in the army, workers in the factories and peasants in the villages all want to read books and newspapers once they become literate, and those who are illiterate want to see plays and operas, look at drawings and paintings, sing songs and hear music; they are the audience for our works of literature and art. Take the cadres alone. Do not think they are few; they far outnumber the readers of any book published in the Kuomintang areas. There, an edition usually runs to only 2,000 copies, and even three editions add up to only 6,000; but as for the cadres in the base areas, in Yenan alone there are more than 10,000 who read books. Many of them, moreover, are tempered revolutionaries of long standing, who have come from all parts of the country and will go out to work in different places, so it is very important to do educational work among them. Our literary and art workers must do a good job in this respect.

Since the audience for our literature and art consists of workers, peasants and soldiers and of their cadres, the problem arises of understanding them and knowing them well. A great deal of work has to be done in order to understand them and know them well, to understand and know well all the different kinds of people and phenomena in the Party and government organizations, in the villages and factories and in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. Our writers and artists have their literary and art work to do, but their primary task is to understand people and know them well. In this regard, how have matters stood with our writers and artists? I would say they have been lacking in knowledge and understanding; they have been like “a hero with no place to display his prowess”. What does lacking in knowledge mean? Not knowing people well. The writers and artists do not have a good knowledge either of those whom they describe or of their audience; indeed they may hardly know them at all. They do not know the workers or peasants or soldiers well, and do not know the cadres well either. What does lacking in understanding mean? Not understanding the language, that is, not being familiar with the rich, lively language of the masses. Since many writers and artists stand aloof from the masses and lead empty lives, naturally they are unfamiliar with the language of the people. Accordingly, their works are not only insipid in language but often contain nondescript expressions of their own coining which run counter to popular usage. Many comrades like to talk about “a mass style”. But what does it really mean? It means that the thoughts and feelings of our writers and artists should be fused with those of the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers. To achieve this fusion, they should conscientiously learn the language of the masses. How can you talk of literary and artistic creation if you find the very language of the masses largely incomprehensible? By “a hero with no place to display his prowess”, we mean that your collection of great truths is not appreciated by the masses. The more you put on the airs of a veteran before the masses and play the “hero”, the more you try to peddle such stuff to the masses, the less likely they are to accept it. If you want the masses to understand you, if you want to be one with the masses, you must make up your mind to undergo a long and even painful process of tempering. Here I might mention the experience of how my own feelings changed. I began life as a student and at school acquired the ways of a student; I then used to feel it undignified to do even a little manual labour, such as carrying my own luggage in the presence of my fellow students, who were incapable of carrying anything, either on their shoulders or in their hands. At that time I felt that intellectuals were the only clean people in the world, while in comparison workers and peasants were dirty. I did not mind wearing the clothes of other intellectuals, believing them clean, but I would not put on clothes belonging to a worker or peasant, believing them dirty. But after I became a revolutionary and lived with workers and peasants and with soldiers of the revolutionary army, I gradually came to know them well, and they gradually came to know me well too. It was then, and only then, that I fundamentally changed the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois feelings implanted in me in the bourgeois schools. I came to feel that compared with the workers and peasants the unremoulded intellectuals were not clean and that, in the last analysis, the workers and peasants were the cleanest people and, even though their hands were soiled and their feet smeared with cow-dung, they were really cleaner than the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intellectuals. That is what is meant by a change in feelings, a change from one class to another. If our writers and artists who come from the intelligentsia want their works to be well received by the masses, they must change and remould their thinking and their feelings. Without such a change, without such remoulding, they can do nothing well and will be misfits.

The last problem is study, by which I mean the study of Marxism-Leninism and of society. Anyone who considers himself a revolutionary Marxist writer, and especially any writer who is a member of the Communist Party, must have a knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. At present, however, some comrades are lacking in the basic concepts of Marxism. For instance, it is a basic Marxist concept that being determines consciousness, that the objective realities of class struggle and national struggle determine our thoughts and feelings. But some of our comrades turn this upside down and maintain that everything ought to start from "love". Now as for love, in a class society there can be only class love; but these comrades are seeking a love transcending classes, love in the abstract and also freedom in the abstract, truth in the abstract, human nature in the abstract, etc. This shows that they have been very deeply influenced by the bourgeoisie. They should thoroughly rid themselves of this influence and modestly study Marxism-Leninism. It is right for writers and artists to study literary and artistic creation, but the science of Marxism-Leninism must be studied by all revolutionaries, writers and artists not excepted. Writers and artists should study society, that is to say, should study the various classes in society, their mutual relations and respective conditions, their physiognomy and their psychology. Only when we grasp all this clearly can we have a literature and art that is rich in content and correct in orientation.

I am merely raising these problems today by way of introduction; I hope all of you will express your views on these and other relevant problems.

CONCLUSION

May 23, 1942

Comrades! Our forum has had three meetings this month. In the pursuit of truth we have carried on spirited debates in which scores of Party and non-Party comrades have spoken, laying bare the issues and making them more concrete. This, I believe, will very much benefit the whole literary and artistic movement.

In discussing a problem, we should start from reality and not from definitions. We would be following a wrong method if we first looked up definitions of literature and art in textbooks and then used them to determine the guiding principles for the present-day literary and artistic movement and to judge the different opinions and controversies that arise today. We are Marxists, and Marxism teaches that in our approach to a problem we should start from objective facts, not from abstract definitions, and that we should derive our guiding principles, policies and measures from an analysis of these facts. We should do the same in our present discussion of literary and artistic work.

What are the facts at present? The facts are: the War of Resistance Against Japan which China has been fighting for five years; the world-wide anti-fascist war; the vacillations of China's big landlord class and big bourgeoisie in the War of Resistance and their policy of high-handed oppression of the people; the revolutionary movement in literature and art since the May 4th Movement — its great contributions to the revolution during the last twenty-three years and its many shortcomings; the anti-Japanese democratic base areas of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the integration of large numbers of writers and artists with these armies and with the workers and peasants in these areas; the difference in both environment and tasks between the writers and artists in the base areas and those in the Kuomintang areas; and the controversial issues concerning literature and art which have arisen in Yenan and the other anti-Japanese base areas. These are the actual, undeniable facts in the light of which we have to consider our problems.

What then is the crux of the matter? In my opinion, it consists fundamentally of the problems of working for the masses and how to work for the masses. Unless these two problems are solved, or solved properly, our writers and artists will be ill-adapted to their environment and their tasks and will come up against a series of difficulties from without and within. My concluding remarks will centre on these two problems and also touch upon some related ones.

I

The first problem is: literature and art for whom?

This problem was solved long ago by Marxists, especially by Lenin. As far back as 1905 Lenin pointed out emphatically that our literature and art should "serve . . . the millions and tens of millions of working people".[1] For comrades engaged in literary and artistic work in the anti-Japanese base areas it might seem that this problem is already solved and needs no further discussion. Actually, that is not the case. Many comrades have not found a clear solution. Consequently their sentiments, their works, their actions and their views on the guiding principles for literature and art have inevitably been more or less at variance with the needs of the masses and of the practical struggle. Of course, among the numerous men of culture, writers, artists and other literary and artistic workers engaged in the great struggle for liberation together with the Communist Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, a few may be careerists who are with us only temporarily, but the overwhelming majority are working energetically for the common cause. By relying on these comrades, we have achieved a great deal in our literature, drama, music and fine arts. Many of these writers and artists have begun their work since the outbreak of the War of Resistance; many others did much revolutionary work before the war, endured many hardships and influenced broad masses of the people by their activities and works. Why do we say, then, that even among these comrades there are some who have not reached a clear solution of the problem of whom literature and art are for? Is it conceivable that there are still some who maintain that revolutionary literature and art are not for the masses of the people but for the exploiters and oppressors?

Indeed literature and art exist which are for the exploiters and oppressors. Literature and art for the landlord class are feudal literature and art. Such were the literature and art of the ruling class in China's feudal era. To this day such literature and art still have considerable influence in China. Literature and art for the bourgeoisie are bourgeois literature and art. People like Liang Shih-chiu,[2] whom Lu Hsun criticized, talk about literature and art as transcending classes, but in fact they uphold bourgeois literature and art and oppose proletarian literature and art. Then literature and art exist which serve the imperialists — for example, the works of Chou Tso-jen, Chang Tzu-ping[3] and their like — which we call traitor literature and art. With us, literature and art are for the people, not for any of the above groups. We have said that China's new culture at the present stage is an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal culture of the masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. Today, anything that is truly of the masses must necessarily be led by the proletariat. Whatever is under the leadership of the bourgeoisie cannot possibly be of the masses. Naturally, the same applies to the new literature and art which are part of the new culture. We should take over the rich legacy and the good traditions in literature and art that have been handed down from past ages in China and foreign countries, but the aim must still be to serve the masses of the people. Nor do we refuse to utilize the literary and artistic forms of the past, but in our hands these old forms, remoulded and infused with new content, also become something revolutionary in the service of the people.

Who, then, are the masses of the people? The broadest sections of the people, constituting more than 90 per cent of our total popula-

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

tion, are the workers, peasants, soldiers and urban petty bourgeoisie. Therefore, our literature and art are first for the workers, the class that leads the revolution. Secondly, they are for the peasants, the most numerous and most steadfast of our allies in the revolution. Thirdly, they are for the armed workers and peasants, namely, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the other armed units of the people, which are the main forces of the revolutionary war. Fourthly, they are for the labouring masses of the urban petty bourgeoisie and for the petty-bourgeois intellectuals, both of whom are also our allies in the revolution and capable of long-term co-operation with us. These four kinds of people constitute the overwhelming majority of the Chinese nation, the broadest masses of the people.

Our literature and art should be for the four kinds of people we have enumerated. To serve them, we must take the class stand of the proletariat and not that of the petty bourgeoisie. Today, writers who cling to an individualist, petty-bourgeois stand cannot truly serve the masses of revolutionary workers, peasants and soldiers. Their interest is mainly focused on the small number of petty-bourgeois intellectuals. This is the crucial reason why some of our comrades cannot correctly solve the problem of "for whom?" In saying this I am not referring to theory. In theory, or in words, no one in our ranks regards the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers as less important than the petty-bourgeois intellectuals. I am referring to practice, to action. In practice, in action, do they regard petty-bourgeois intellectuals as more important than workers, peasants and soldiers? I think they do. Many comrades concern themselves with studying the petty-bourgeois intellectuals and analysing their psychology, and they concentrate on portraying these intellectuals and excusing or defending their shortcomings, instead of guiding the intellectuals to join with them in getting closer to the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers, taking part in the practical struggles of the masses, portraying and educating the masses. Coming from the petty bourgeoisie and being themselves intellectuals, many comrades seek friends only among intellectuals and concentrate on studying and describing them. Such study and description are proper if done from a proletarian position. But that is not what they do, or not what they do fully. They take the petty-bourgeois stand and produce works that are the self-expression of the petty bourgeoisie, as can be seen in quite a number of literary and artistic products. Often they show heartfelt sympathy for intellectuals of petty-bourgeois origin, to the extent of sympathizing with or even praising their shortcomings. On the other hand, these comrades seldom come into contact with the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers, do not understand or study them, do not have intimate friends among them and are not good at portraying them; when they do depict them, the clothes are the clothes of working people but the faces are those of petty-bourgeois intellectuals. In certain respects they are fond of the workers, peasants and soldiers and the cadres stemming from them; but there are times when they do not like them and there are some respects in which they do not like them: they do not like their feelings or their manner or their nascent literature and art (the wall newspapers, murals, folk songs, folk tales, etc.). At times they are fond of these things too, but that is when they are hunting for novelty, for something with which to embellish their own works, or even for certain backward features. At other times they openly despise these things and are partial to what belongs to the petty-bourgeois intellectuals or even to the bourgeoisie. These comrades have their feet planted on the side of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals; or, to put it more elegantly, their innermost soul is still a kingdom of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. Thus they have not yet solved, or not yet clearly solved, the problem of "for whom?" This applies not only to newcomers to Yenan; even among comrades who have been to the front and worked for a number of years in our base areas and in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, many have not completely solved this problem. It requires a long period of time, at least eight or ten years, to solve it thoroughly. But however long it takes, solve it we must and solve it unequivocally and thoroughly. Our literary and art workers must accomplish this task and shift their stand; they must gradually move their feet over to the side of the workers, peasants and soldiers, to the side of the proletariat, through the process of going into their very midst and into the thick of practical struggles and through the process of studying Marxism and society. Only in this way can we have a literature and art that are truly for the workers, peasants and soldiers, a truly proletarian literature and art.

This question of "for whom?" is fundamental; it is a question of principle. The controversies and divergences, the opposition and disunity arising among some comrades in the past were not on this fundamental question of principle but on secondary questions, or even on issues involving no principle. On this question of principle, however, there has been hardly any divergence between the two contending sides and they have shown almost complete agreement; to some extent, both tend to look down upon the workers, peasants and soldiers and divorce themselves from the masses. I say "to some extent" because, generally speaking, these comrades do not look down upon the workers, peasants and soldiers or divorce themselves from the masses in the same way as the Kuomintang does. Nevertheless, the tendency is there. Unless this fundamental problem is solved, many other problems will not be easy to solve. Take, for instance, the sectarianism in literary and art circles. This too is a question of principle, but sectarianism can only be eradicated by putting forward and faithfully applying the slogans, "For the workers and peasants!", "For the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies!" and "Go among the masses!" Otherwise the problem of sectarianism can never be solved. Lu Hsun once said:

> A common aim is the prerequisite for a united front. . . . The fact that our front is not united shows that we have not been able to unify our aims, and that some people are working only for small groups or indeed only for themselves. If we all aim at serving the masses of workers and peasants, our front will of course be united.[4]

The problem existed then in Shanghai; now it exists in Chungking too. In such places the problem can hardly be solved thoroughly, because the rulers oppress the revolutionary writers and artists and deny them the freedom to go out among the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers. Here with us the situation is entirely different. We encourage revolutionary writers and artists to be active in forming intimate contacts with the workers, peasants and soldiers, giving them complete freedom to go among the masses and to create a genuinely revolutionary literature and art. Therefore, here among us the problem is nearing solution. But nearing solution is not the same as a complete and thorough solution. We must study Marxism and study society, as we have been saying, precisely in order to achieve a complete and thorough solution. By Marxism we mean living Marxism which plays an effective role in the life and struggle of the masses, not Marxism in words. With Marxism in words transformed into Marxism in real life, there will be no more sectarianism. Not only will the problem of sectarianism be solved, but many other problems as well.

II

Having settled the problem of whom to serve, we come to the next problem, how to serve. To put it in the words of some of our comrades: should we devote ourselves to raising standards, or should we devote ourselves to popularization?

In the past, some comrades, to a certain or even a serious extent, belittled and neglected popularization and laid undue stress on raising standards. Stress should be laid on raising standards, but to do so one-sidedly and exclusively, to do so excessively, is a mistake. The lack of a clear solution to the problem of "for whom?", which I referred to earlier, also manifests itself in this connection. As these comrades are not clear on the problem of "for whom?", they have no correct criteria for the "raising of standards" and the "popularization" they speak of, and are naturally still less able to find the correct relationship between the two. Since our literature and art are basically for the workers, peasants and soldiers, "popularization" means to popularize among the workers, peasants and soldiers, and "raising standards" means to advance from their present level. What should we popularize among them? Popularize what is needed and can be readily accepted by the feudal landlord class? Popularize what is needed and can be readily accepted by the bourgeoisie? Popularize what is needed and can be readily accepted by the petty-bourgeois intellectuals? No, none of these will do. We must popularize only what is needed and can be readily accepted by the workers, peasants and soldiers themselves. Consequently, prior to the task of educating the workers, peasants and soldiers, there is the task of learning from them. This is even more true of raising standards. There must be a basis from which to raise. Take a bucket of water, for instance; where is it to be raised from if not from the ground? From mid-air? From what basis, then, are literature and art to be raised? From the basis of the feudal classes? From the basis of the bourgeoisie? From the basis of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals? No, not from any of these; only from the basis of the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers. Nor does this mean raising the workers, peasants and soldiers to the "heights" of the feudal classes, the bourgeoisie or the petty-bourgeois intellectuals; it means raising the level of literature and art in the direction in which the workers, peasants and soldiers are themselves advancing, in the direction in which the proletariat is advancing. Here again the task of learning from the workers, peasants and soldiers comes in. Only by starting from the workers, peasants and soldiers can we have a correct understanding of popularization and of the raising of standards and find the proper relationship between the two.

In the last analysis, what is the source of all literature and art? Works of literature and art, as ideological forms, are products of the reflection in the human brain of the life of a given society. Revolutionary literature and art are the products of the reflection of the life of the people in the brains of revolutionary writers and artists. The life of the people is always a mine of the raw materials for literature and art, materials in their natural form, materials that are crude, but most vital, rich and fundamental; they make all literature and art seem pallid by comparison; they provide literature and art with an inexhaustible source, their only source. They are the only source, for there can be no other. Some may ask, is there not another source in books, in the literature and art of ancient times and of foreign countries? In fact, the literary and artistic works of the past are not a source but a stream; they were created by our predecessors and the foreigners out of the literary and artistic raw materials they found in the life of the people of their time and place. We must take over all the fine things in our literary and artistic heritage, critically assimilate whatever is beneficial, and use them as examples when we create works out of the literary and artistic raw materials in the life of the people of our own time and place. It makes a difference whether or not we have such examples, the difference between crudeness and refinement, between roughness and polish, between a low and a high level, and between slower and faster work. Therefore, we must on no account reject the legacies of the ancients and the foreigners or refuse to learn from them, even though they are the works of the feudal or bourgeois classes. But taking over legacies and using them as examples must never replace our own creative work; nothing can do that. Uncritical transplantation or copying from the ancients and the foreigners is the most sterile and harmful dogmatism in literature and art. China's revolutionary writers and artists, writers and artists of promise, must go among the masses; they must for a long period of time unreservedly and whole-heartedly go among the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers, go into the heat of the struggle, go to the only source, the broadest and richest source, in order to observe, experience, study and analyse all the different kinds of people, all the classes, all the masses, all the vivid patterns of life and struggle, all the raw materials of literature and art. Only then can they proceed to creative work. Otherwise, you will have nothing to work with and you will be nothing but a phoney writer or artist, the kind that Lu Hsun in his will so earnestly cautioned his son never to become.[5]

Although man's social life is the only source of literature and art and is incomparably livelier and richer in content, the people are not satisfied with life alone and demand literature and art as well. Why? Because, while both are beautiful, life as reflected in works of literature and art can and ought to be on a higher plane, more intense, more concentrated, more typical, nearer the ideal, and therefore more universal than actual everyday life. Revolutionary literature and art should create a variety of characters out of real life and help the masses to propel history forward. For example, there is suffering from hunger, cold and oppression on the one hand, and exploitation and oppression of man by man on the other. These facts exist everywhere and people look upon them as commonplace. Writers and artists concentrate such everyday phenomena, typify the contradictions and struggles within them and produce works which awaken the masses, fire them with enthusiasm and impel them to unite and struggle to transform their environment. Without such literature and art, this task could not be fulfilled, or at least not so effectively and speedily.

What is meant by popularizing and by raising standards in works of literature and art? What is the relationship between these two tasks? Popular works are simpler and plainer, and therefore more readily accepted by the broad masses of the people today. Works of a higher quality, being more polished, are more difficult to produce and in general do not circulate so easily and quickly among the masses at present. The problem facing the workers, peasants and soldiers is this: they are now engaged in a bitter and bloody struggle with the enemy but are illiterate and uneducated as a result of long years of rule by the feudal and bourgeois classes, and therefore they are eagerly demanding enlightenment, education and works of literature and art which meet their urgent needs and which are easy to absorb, in order to heighten their enthusiasm in struggle and confidence in victory, strengthen their unity and fight the enemy with one heart and one mind. For them the prime need is not "more flowers on the brocade" but "fuel in snowy weather". In present conditions, therefore, popularization is the more pressing task. It is wrong to belittle or neglect popularization.

Nevertheless, no hard and fast line can be drawn between popularization and the raising of standards. Not only is it possible to popularize some works of higher quality even now, but the cultural level of the broad masses is steadily rising. If popularization remains at the same level for ever, with the same stuff being supplied month after month and year after year, always the same "Little Cowherd"[6] and the same "man, hand, mouth, knife, cow, goat",[7] will not the educators and those being educated be six of one and half a dozen of the other? What would be the sense of such popularization? The people demand popularization and, following that, higher standards; they demand higher standards month by month and year by year. Here popularization means popularizing for the people and raising of standards means raising the level for the people. And such raising is not from mid-air, or behind closed doors, but is actually based on popularization. It is determined by and at the same time guides popularization. In China as a whole the development of the revolution and of revolutionary culture is uneven and their spread is gradual. While in one place there is popularization and then raising of standards on the basis of popularization, in other places popularization has not even begun. Hence good experience in popularization leading to higher standards in one locality can be applied in other localities and serve to guide popularization and the raising of standards there, saving many twists and turns along the road. Internationally, the good experience of foreign countries, and especially Soviet experience, can also serve to guide us. With us, therefore, the raising of standards is based on popularization, while popularization is guided by the raising of standards. Precisely for this reason, so far from being an obstacle to the raising of standards, the work of popularization we are speaking of supplies the basis for the work of raising standards which we are now doing on a limited scale, and prepares the necessary conditions for us to raise standards in the future on a much broader scale.

Besides such raising of standards as meets the needs of the masses directly, there is the kind which meets their needs indirectly, that is, the kind which is needed by the cadres. The cadres are the advanced elements of the masses and generally have received more education; literature and art of a higher level are entirely necessary for them. To ignore this would be a mistake. Whatever is done for the cadres is also entirely for the masses, because it is only through the cadres that we can educate and guide the masses. If we go against this aim, if what we give the cadres cannot help them educate and guide the masses, our work of raising standards will be like shooting at random and will depart from the fundamental principle of serving the masses of the people.

To sum up: through the creative labour of revolutionary writers and artists, the raw materials found in the life of the people are shaped into the ideological form of literature and art serving the masses of the people. Included here are the more advanced literature and art as developed on the basis of elementary literature and art and as required by those sections of the masses whose level has been raised, or, more immediately, by the cadres among the masses. Also included here are elementary literature and art which, conversely, are guided by more advanced literature and art and are needed primarily by the overwhelming majority of the masses at present. Whether more advanced or elementary, all our literature and art are for the masses of the people, and in the first place for the workers, peasants and soldiers; they are created for the workers, peasants and soldiers and are for their use.

Now that we have settled the problem of the relationship between the raising of standards and popularization, that of the relationship between the specialists and the popularizers can also be settled. Our specialists are not only for the cadres, but also, and indeed chiefly, for the masses. Our specialists in literature should pay attention to the wall newspapers of the masses and to the reportage written in the army and the villages. Our specialists in drama should pay attention to the small troupes in the army and the villages. Our specialists in music should pay attention to the songs of the masses. Our specialists in the fine arts should pay attention to the fine arts of the masses. All these comrades should make close contact with comrades engaged in the work of popularizing literature and art among the masses. On the one hand, they should help and guide the popularizers, and on the other, they should learn from these comrades and, through them, draw nourishment from the masses to replenish and enrich themselves so that their specialities do not become "ivory towers", detached from the masses and from reality and devoid of content or life. We should esteem the specialists, for they are very valuable to our cause. But we should tell them that no revolutionary writer or artist can do any meaningful work unless he is closely linked with the masses, gives expression to their thoughts and feelings and serves them as a loyal spokesman. Only by speaking for the masses can he educate them and only by being their pupil can he be their teacher. If he regards himself as their master, as an aristocrat who lords it over the "lower orders", then, no matter how talented he may be, he will not be needed by the masses and his work will have no future.

Is this attitude of ours utilitarian? Materialists do not oppose utilitarianism in general but the utilitarianism of the feudal, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois classes; they oppose those hypocrites who attack utilitarianism in words but in deeds embrace the most selfish and short-sighted utilitarianism. There is no "ism" in the world that transcends utilitarian considerations; in class society there can be only the utilitarianism of this or that class. We are proletarian revolutionary utilitarians and take as our point of departure the unity of the present and future interests of the broadest masses, who constitute over 90 per cent of the population; hence we are revolutionary utilitarians aiming for the broadest and the most long-range objectives, not narrow utilitarians concerned only with the partial and the immediate. If, for instance, you reproach the masses for their utilitarianism and yet for your own utility, or that of a narrow clique, force on the market and propagandize among the masses a work which pleases only the few but is useless or even harmful to the majority, then you are not only insulting the masses but also revealing your own lack of self-knowledge. A thing is good only when it brings real benefit to the masses of the people. Your work may be as good as "The Spring Snow", but if for the time being it caters only to the few and the masses are still singing the "Song of the Rustic poor",[8] you will get nowhere by simply scolding them instead of trying to raise their level. The question now is to bring about a unity between "The Spring Snow" and the "Song of the Rustic Poor", between higher standards and popularization. Without such a unity, the highest art of any expert cannot help being utilitarian in the narrowest sense; you may call this art "pure and lofty" but that is merely your own name for it which the masses will not endorse.

Once we have solved the problems of fundamental policy, of serving the workers, peasants and soldiers and of how to serve them, such other problems as whether to write about the bright or the dark side of life and the problem of unity will also be solved. If everyone agrees on the fundamental policy, it should be adhered to by all our workers, all our schools, publications and organizations in the field of literature and art and in all our literary and artistic activities. It is wrong to depart from this policy and anything at variance with it must be duly corrected.

III

Since our literature and art are for the masses of the people, we can proceed to discuss a problem of inner-Party relations, *i.e.*, the relation between the Party's work in literature and art and the Party's work as a whole, and in addition a problem of the Party's external relations, *i.e.*, the relation between the Party's work in literature and art and the work of non-Party people in this field, a problem of the united front in literary and art circles.

Let us consider the first problem. In the world today all culture, all literature and art belong to definite classes and are geared to definite political lines. There is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above classes or art that is detached from or independent of politics. Proletarian literature and art are part of the whole proletarian revolutionary cause; they are, as Lenin said, cogs and wheels[9] in the whole revolutionary machine. Therefore, Party work in literature and art occupies a definite and assigned position in Party revolutionary work as a whole and is subordinated to the revolutionary tasks set by the Party in a given revolutionary period. Opposition to this arrangement is certain to lead to dualism or pluralism, and in essence amounts to "politics — Marxist, art — bourgeois", as with Trotsky. We do not favour overstressing the importance of literature and art, but neither do we favour underestimating their importance. Literature and art are subordinate to politics, but in their turn exert a great influence on politics. Revolutionary literature and art are part of the whole revolutionary cause, they are cogs and wheels in it, and though in comparison with certain other and more important parts they may be less significant and less urgent and may occupy a secondary position, nevertheless, they are indispensable cogs and wheels in the whole machine, an indispensable part of the entire revolutionary cause. If we had no literature and art even in the broadest and most ordinary sense, we could not carry on the revolutionary movement and win victory. Failure to recognize this is wrong. Furthermore, when we say that literature and art are subordinate to politics, we mean class politics, the politics of the masses, not the politics of a few so-called statesmen. Politics, whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary, is the struggle of class against class, not the activity of a few individuals. The revolutionary struggle on the ideological and artistic fronts must be subordinate to the political struggle because only through politics can the needs of the class and the masses find expression in concentrated form. Revolutionary statesmen, the political specialists who know the science or art of revolutionary politics, are simply the leaders of millions upon millions of statesmen — the masses. Their task is to collect the opinions of these mass statesmen, sift and refine them, and return them to the masses, who then take them and put them into practice. They are therefore not the kind of aristocratic "statesmen" who work behind closed doors and fancy they have a monopoly of wisdom. Herein lies the difference in principle between proletarian statesmen and decadent bourgeois statesmen. This is precisely why there can be complete unity between the political character of our literary and artistic works and their truthfulness. It would be wrong to fail to realize this and to debase the politics and the statesmen of the proletariat.

Let us consider next the question of the united front in the world of literature and art. Since literature and art are subordinate to politics and since the fundamental problem in China's politics today is resistance to Japan, our Party writers and artists must in the first place unite on this issue of resistance to Japan with all non-Party writers and artists (ranging from Party sympathizers and petty-bourgeois writers and artists to all those writers and artists of the bourgeois and landlord classes who are in favour of resistance to Japan). Secondly, we should unite with them on the issue of democracy. On this issue there is a section of anti-Japanese writers and artists who do not agree with us, so the range of unity will unavoidably be somewhat more limited. Thirdly, we should unite with them on issues peculiar to the literary and artistic world, questions of method and style in literature and art; here again, as we are for socialist realism and some people do not agree, the range of unity will be narrower still. While on one issue there is unity, on another there is struggle, there is criticism. The issues are at once separate and interrelated, so that even on the very ones which give rise to unity, such as resistance to Japan, there are at the same time struggle and criticism. In a united front, "all unity and no struggle" and "all struggle and no unity" are both wrong policies — as with the Right capitulationism and tailism, or the "Left" exclusivism and sectarianism, practised by some comrades in the past. This is as true in literature and art as in politics.

The petty-bourgeois writers and artists constitute an important force among the forces of the united front in literary and art circles in China. There are many shortcomings in both their thinking and their works, but, comparatively speaking, they are inclined towards the revolution and are close to the working people. Therefore, it is an especially important task to help them overcome their shortcomings and to win them over to the front which serves the working people.

IV

Literary and art criticism is one of the principal methods of struggle in the world of literature and art. It should be developed and, as comrades have rightly pointed out, our past work in this respect has been quite inadequate. Literary and art criticism is a complex question which requires a great deal of special study. Here I shall concentrate only on the basic problem of criteria in criticism. I shall also comment briefly on a few specific problems raised by some comrades and on certain incorrect views.

In literary and art criticism there are two criteria, the political and the artistic. According to the political criterion, everything is good that is helpful to unity and resistance to Japan, that encourages the masses to be of one heart and one mind, that opposes retrogression and promotes progress; on the other hand, everything is bad that is detrimental to unity and resistance to Japan, foments dissension and discord among the masses and opposes progress and drags people back. How can we tell the good from the bad — by the motive (the subjective intention) or by the effect (social practice)? Idealists stress motive and ignore effect, while mechanical materialists stress effect and ignore motive. In contradistinction to both, we dialectical materialists insist on the unity of motive and effect. The motive of serving the masses is inseparably linked with the effect of winning their approval; the two must be united. The motive of serving the individual or a small clique is not good, nor is it good to have the motive of serving the masses without the effect of winning their approval and benefiting them. In examining the subjective intention of a writer or artist, that is, whether his motive is correct and good, we do not judge by his declarations but by the effect of his actions (mainly his works) on the masses in society. The criterion for judging subjective intention or motive is social practice and its effect. We want no sectarianism in our literary and art criticism and, subject to the general principle of unity for resistance to Japan, we should tolerate literary and art works with a variety of political attitudes. But at the same time, in our criticism we must adhere firmly to principle and severely criticize and repudiate all works of literature and art expressing views in opposition to the nation, to science, to the masses and to the Communist Party, because these so-called works of literature and art proceed from the motive and produce the effect of undermining unity for resistance to Japan. According to the artistic criterion, all works of a higher artistic quality are good or comparatively good, while those of a lower artistic quality are bad or comparatively bad. Here, too, of course, social effect must be taken into account. There is hardly a writer or artist who does not consider his own work beautiful, and our criticism ought to permit the free competition of all varieties of works of art; but it is also entirely necessary to subject these works to correct criticism according to the criteria of the science of aesthetics, so that art of a lower level can be gradually raised to a higher and art which does not meet the demands of the struggle of the broad masses can be transformed into art that does.

There is the political criterion and there is the artistic criterion; what is the relationship between the two? Politics cannot be equated with art, nor can a general world outlook be equated with a method of artistic creation and criticism. We deny not only that there is an abstract and absolutely unchangeable political criterion, but also that there is an abstract and absolutely unchangeable artistic criterion; each class in every class society has its own political and artistic criteria. But all classes in all class societies invariably put the political criterion first and the artistic criterion second. The bourgeoisie always shuts out proletarian literature and art, however great their artistic merit. The proletariat must similarly distinguish among the literary and art works of past ages and determine its attitude towards them only after examining their attitude to the people and whether or not they had any progressive significance historically. Some works which politically are downright reactionary may have a certain artistic quality. The more reactionary their content and the higher their artistic quality, the more poisonous they are to the people, and the more necessary it is to reject them. A common characteristic of the literature and art of all exploiting classes in their period of decline is the contradiction between their reactionary political content and their artistic form. What we demand is the unity of politics and art, the unity of content and form, the unity of revolutionary political content and the highest possible perfection of artistic form. Works of art which lack artistic quality have no force, however progressive they are politically. Therefore, we oppose both the tendency to produce works of art with a wrong political viewpoint and the tendency towards the "poster and slogan style" which is correct in political viewpoint but lacking in artistic power. On questions of literature and art we must carry on a struggle on two fronts.

Both these tendencies can be found in the thinking of many comrades. A good number of comrades tend to neglect artistic technique; it is therefore necessary to give attention to the raising of artistic standards. But as I see it, the political side is more of a problem at present. Some comrades lack elementary political knowledge and consequently have all sorts of muddled ideas. Let me cite a few examples from Yenan.

"The theory of human nature." Is there such a thing as human nature? Of course there is. But there is only human nature in the concrete, no human nature in the abstract. In class society there is only human nature of a class character; there is no human nature above classes. We uphold the human nature of the proletariat and of the masses of the people, while the landlord and bourgeois classes uphold the human nature of their own classes, only they do not say so but make it out to be the only human nature in existence. The human nature boosted by certain petty-bourgeois intellectuals is also divorced from or opposed to the masses; what they call human nature is in essence nothing but bourgeois individualism, and so, in their eyes, proletarian human nature is contrary to human nature. "The theory of human nature" which some people in Yenan advocate as the basis of their so-called theory of literature and art puts the matter in just this way and is wholly wrong.

"The fundamental point of departure for literature and art is love, love of humanity." Now love may serve as a point of departure, but there is a more basic one. Love as an idea is a product of objective practice. Fundamentally, we do not start from ideas but from objective practice. Our writers and artists who come from the ranks of the intellectuals love the proletariat because society has made them feel that they and the proletariat share a common fate. We hate Japanese imperialism because Japanese imperialism oppresses us. There is absolutely no such thing in the world as love or hatred without reason or cause. As for the so-called love of humanity, there has been no such all-inclusive love since humanity was divided into classes. All the ruling classes of the past were fond of advocating it, and so were many so-called sages and wise men, but nobody has ever really practised it, because it is impossible in class society. There will be genuine love of humanity — after classes are eliminated all over the world. Classes have split society into many antagonistic groupings; there will be love of all humanity when classes are eliminated, but not now. We cannot love enemies, we cannot love social evils, our aim is to destroy them. This is common sense; can it be that some of our writers and artists still do not understand this?

"Literary and artistic works have always laid equal stress on the bright and the dark, half and half." This statement contains many muddled ideas. It is not true that literature and art have always done this. Many petty-bourgeois writers have never discovered the bright side. Their works only expose the dark and are known as the "literature of exposure". Some of their works simply specialize in preaching pessimism and world-weariness. On the other hand, Soviet literature in the period of socialist construction portrays mainly the bright. It, too, describes shortcomings in work and portrays negative characters, but this only serves as a contrast to bring out the brightness of the whole picture and is not on a so-called half-and-half basis. The writers and artists of the bourgeoisie in its period of reaction depict the revolutionary masses as mobs and themselves as saints, thus reversing the bright and the dark. Only truly revolutionary writers and artists can correctly solve the problem of whether to extol or to expose. All the dark forces harming the masses of the people must be exposed and all the revolutionary struggles of the masses of the people must be extolled; this is the fundamental task of revolutionary writers and artists.

"The task of literature and art has always been to expose." This assertion, like the previous one, arises from ignorance of the science of history. Literature and art, as we have shown, have never been devoted solely to exposure. For revolutionary writers and artists the targets for exposure can never be the masses, but only the aggressors, exploiters and oppressors and the evil influence the have on the people. The masses too have shortcomings, which should be overcome by criticism and self-criticism within the people's own ranks, and such criticism and self-criticism is also one of the most important tasks of literature and art. But this should not be regarded as any sort of "exposure of the people". As for the people, the question is basically one of education and of raising their level. Only counter-revolutionary writers and artists describe the people as "born fools" and the revolutionary masses as "tyrannical mobs".

"This is still the period of the satirical essay, and Lu Hsun's style of writing is still needed." Living under the rule of the dark forces and deprived of freedom of speech, Lu Hsun used burning satire and freezing irony, cast in the form of essays, to do battle; and he was entirely right. We, too, must hold up to sharp ridicule the fascists, the Chinese reactionaries and everything that harms the people; but in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines, where democracy and freedom are granted in full to the revolutionary writers and artists and withheld only from the counter-revolutionaries, the style of the essay should not simply be like Lu Hsun's. Here we can shout at the top of our voices and have no need for veiled and roundabout expressions, which are hard for the people to understand. When dealing with the people and not with their enemies, Lu Hsun never ridiculed or attacked the revolutionary people and the revolutionary Party in his "satirical essay period", and these essays were entirely different in manner from those directed against the enemy. To criticize the people's shortcomings is necessary, as we have already said, but in doing so we must truly take the stand of the people and speak out of whole-hearted eagerness to protect and educate them. To treat comrades like enemies is to go over to the stand of the enemy. Are we then to abolish satire? No. Satire is always necessary. But there are several kinds of satire, each with a different attitude, satire to deal with our enemies, satire to deal with our allies and satire to deal with our own ranks. We are not opposed to satire in general; what we must abolish is the abuse of satire.

"I am not given to praise and eulogy. The works of people who eulogize what is bright are not necessarily great and the works of those who depict the dark are not necessarily paltry." If you are a bourgeois writer or artist, you will eulogize not the proletariat but the bourgeoisie, and if you are a proletarian writer or artist, you will eulogize not the bourgeoisie but the proletariat and working people: it must be one or the other. The works of the eulogists of the bourgeoisie are not necessarily great, nor are the works of those who show that the bourgeoisie is dark necessarily paltry; the works of the eulogists of the proletariat are not necessarily not great, but the works of those who depict the so-called "darkness" of the proletariat are bound to be paltry — are these not facts of history as regards literature and art? Why should we not eulogize the people, the creators of the history of mankind? Why should we not eulogize the proletariat, the Communist Party, New Democracy and socialism? There is a type of person who has no enthusiasm for the people's cause and looks coldly from the side-lines at the struggles and victories of the proletariat and its vanguard; what he is interested in, and will never weary of eulogizing, is himself, plus perhaps a few figures in his small coterie. Of course, such petty-bourgeois individualists are unwilling to eulogize the deeds and virtues of the revolutionary people or heighten their courage in struggle and their confidence in victory. Persons of this type are merely termites in the revolutionary ranks; of course, the revolutionary people have no need for these "singers".

"It is not a question of stand; my class stand is correct, my intentions are good and I understand all right, but I am not good at expressing myself and so the effect turns out bad." I have already spoken about the dialectical materialist view of motive and effect. Now I want to ask, is not the question of effect one of stand? A person who acts solely by motive and does not inquire what effect his action will have is like a doctor who merely writes prescriptions but does not care how many patients die of them. Or take a political party which merely makes declarations but does not care whether they are carried out. It may well be asked, is this a correct stand? And is the intention here good? Of course, mistakes may occur even though the effect has been taken into account beforehand, but is the intention good when one continues in the same old rut after facts have proved that the effect is bad? In judging a party or a doctor, we must look at practice, at the effect. The same applies in judging a writer. A person with truly good intentions must take the effect into account, sum up experience and study the methods or, in creative work, study the technique of expression. A person with truly good intentions must criticize the shortcomings and mistakes in his own work with the utmost candour and resolve to correct them. This is precisely why Communists employ the method of self-criticism. This alone is the correct stand. Only in this process of serious and responsible practice is it possible gradually to understand what the correct stand is and gradually obtain a good grasp of it. If one does not move in this direction in practice, if there is simply the complacent assertion that one "understands all right", then in fact one has not understood at all.

"To call on us to study Marxism is to repeat the mistake of the dialectical materialist creative method, which will harm the creative mood." To study Marxism means to apply the dialectical materialist and historical materialist viewpoint in our observation of the world, of society and of literature and art; it does not mean writing philosophical lectures into our works of literature and art. Marxism embraces but cannot replace realism in literary and artistic creation, just as it embraces but cannot replace the atomic and electronic theories in physics. Empty, dry dogmatic formulas do indeed destroy the creative mood; not only that, they first destroy Marxism. Dogmatic "Marxism" is not Marxism, it is anti-Marxism. Then does not Marxism destroy the creative mood? Yes, it does. It definitely destroys creative moods that are feudal, bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, liberalistic, individualist, nihilist, art-for-art's sake, aristocratic, decadent or pessimistic, and every other creative mood that is alien to the masses of the people and to the proletariat. So far as proletarian writers and artists are concerned, should not these kinds of creative moods be destroyed? I think they should; they should be utterly destroyed. And while they are being destroyed, something new can be constructed.

V

The problems discussed here exist in our literary and art circles in Yenan. What does that show? It shows that wrong styles of work still exist to a serious extent in our literary and art circles and that there are still many defects among our comrades, such as idealism, dogmatism, empty illusions, empty talk, contempt for practice and aloofness from the masses, all of which call for an effective and serious campaign of rectification.

We have many comrades who are still not very clear on the difference between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. There are many Party members who have joined the Communist Party organizationally but have not yet joined the Party wholly or at all ideologically. Those who have not joined the Party ideologically still carry a great deal of the muck of the exploiting classes in their heads, and have no idea at all of what proletarian ideology, or communism, or the Party is. "Proletarian ideology?" they think. "The same old stuff!" Little do they know that it is no easy matter to acquire this stuff. Some will never have the slightest Communist flavour about them as long as they live and can only end up by leaving the Party.

Therefore, though the majority in our Party and in our ranks are clean and honest, we must in all seriousness put things in order both ideologically and organizationally if we are to develop the revolutionary movement more effectively and bring it to speedier success. To put things in order organizationally requires our first doing so ideologically, our launching a struggle of proletarian ideology against non-proletarian ideology. An ideological struggle is already under way in literary and art circles in Yenan, and it is most necessary. Intellectuals of petty-bourgeois origin always stubbornly try in all sorts of ways, including literary and artistic ways, to project themselves and spread their views, and they want the Party and the world to be remoulded in their own image. In the circumstances it is our duty to jolt these "comrades" and tell them sharply, "That won't work! The proletariat cannot accommodate itself to you; to yield to you would actually be to yield to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie and to run the risk of undermining our Party and our country." Whom then must we yield to? We can mould the Party and the world only in the image of the proletarian vanguard. We hope our comrades in literary and art circles will realize the seriousness of this great debate and join actively in this struggle, so that every comrade may become sound and our entire ranks may become truly united and consolidated ideologically and organizationally.

Because of confusion in their thinking, many of our comrades are not quite able to draw a real distinction between our revolutionary base areas and the Kuomintang areas and they make many mistakes as a consequence. A good number of comrades have come here from the garrets of Shanghai, and in coming from those garrets to the revolutionary base areas, they have passed not only from one kind of place to another but from one historical epoch to another. One society is semi-feudal, semi-colonial, under the rule of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, the other is a revolutionary new-democratic society under the leadership of the proletariat. To come to the revolutionary bases means to enter an epoch unprecedented in the thousands of years of Chinese history, an epoch in which the masses of the people wield state power. Here the people around us and the audience for our propaganda are totally different. The past epoch is gone, never to return. Therefore, we must integrate ourselves with the new masses without any hesitation. If, living among the new masses, some comrades, as I said before, are still "lacking in knowledge and understanding" and remain "heroes with no place to display their prowess", then difficulties will arise for them, and not only when they go out to the villages; right here in Yenan difficulties will arise for them. Some comrades may think, "Well, I had better continue writing for the readers in the Great Rear Area;[10] it is a job I know well and has 'national significance'." This idea is entirely wrong. The Great Rear Area is also changing. Readers there expect authors in the revolutionary base areas to tell about the new people and the new world and not to bore them with the same old tales. Therefore, the more a work is written for the masses in the revolutionary base areas, the more national significance will it have. Fadeyev in *The Debacle*[11] only told the story of a small guerrilla unit and had no intention of pandering to the palate of readers in the old world; yet the book has exerted world-wide influence. At any rate in China its influence is very great, as you know. China is moving forward, not back, and it is the revolutionary base areas, not any of the backward, retrogressive areas, that are leading China forward. This is a fundamental issue that, above all, comrades must come to understand in the rectification movement.

Since integration into the new epoch of the masses is essential, it is necessary thoroughly to solve the problem of the relationship between the individual and the masses. This couplet from a poem by Lu Hsun should be our motto:

> *Fierce-browed, I coolly defy a thousand pointing fingers,*
> *Head-bowed, like a willing ox I serve the children.*[12]

The "thousand pointing fingers" are our enemies, and we will never yield to them, no matter how ferocious. The "children" here symbolize the proletariat and the masses. All Communists, all revolutionaries, all revolutionary literary and art workers should learn from the example of Lu Hsun and be "oxen" for the proletariat and the masses, bending their backs to the task until their dying day. Intellectuals who want to integrate themselves with the masses, who want to serve the masses, must go through a process in which they and the masses come to know each other well. This process may, and certainly will, involve much pain and friction, but if you have the determination, you will be able to fulfil these requirements.

Today I have discussed only some of the problems of fundamental orientation for our literature and art movement; many specific problems remain which will require further study. I am confident that comrades here are determined to move in the direction indicated.

I believe that in the course of the rectification movement and in the long period of study and work to come, you will surely be able to bring about a transformation in yourselves and in your works, to create many fine works which will be warmly welcomed by the masses of the people, and to advance the literature and art movement in the revolutionary base areas and throughout China to a glorious new stage.

NOTES

[1] See V. I. Lenin, "Party Organisation and Party Literature", in which he described the characteristics of proletarian literature as follows:

> It will be a free literature, because the idea of socialism and sympathy with the working people, and not greed or careerism, will bring ever new forces to its ranks. It will be a free literature, because it will serve, not some satiated heroine, not the bored "upper ten thousand" suffering from fatty degeneration, but the millions and tens of millions of working people — the flower of the country, its strength and its future. It will be a free literature, enriching the last word in the revolutionary thought of mankind with the experience and living work of the socialist proletariat, bringing about permanent interaction between the experience of the past (scientific socialism, the completion of the development of socialism from its primitive, utopian forms) and the experience of the present (the present struggle of the worker comrades). (*Collected Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1962, Vol. X, pp. 48-49.)

[2] Liang Shih-chiu, a member of the counter-revolutionary National Socialist Party, for a long time propagated reactionary American bourgeois ideas on literature and art. He stubbornly opposed the revolution and reviled revolutionary literature and art.

[3] Chou Tso-jen and Chang Tzu-ping capitulated to the Japanese aggressors after the Japanese occupied Peking and Shanghai in 1937.

[4] Lu Hsun, "My View on the League of Left-Wing Writers" in the collection *Two Hearts*, *Complete Works*, Chin. ed., Vol. IV.

[5] See Lu Hsun's essay, "Death", in the "Addenda", *The Last Collection of Essays Written in a Garret in the Quasi-Concession*, *Complete Works*, Chin. ed., Vol. VI.

[6] The "Little Cowherd" is a popular Chinese folk operetta with only two people acting in it, a cowherd and a village girl, who sing a question and answer duet. In the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan, this form was used, with new words, for anti-Japanese propaganda and for a time found great favour with the public.

[7] The Chinese characters for these six words are written simply, with only a few strokes, and were usually included in the first lessons in old primers.

[8] "The Spring Snow" and the "Song of the Rustic Poor" were songs of the Kingdom of Chu in the 3rd century B.C. The music of the first was on a higher level than that of the second. As the story is told in "Sung Yu's Reply to the King

of Chu" in Prince Chao Ming's *Anthology of Prose and Poetry*, when someone sang "The Spring Snow" in the Chu capital, only a few dozen people joined in, but when the "Song of the Rustic Poor" was sung, thousands did so.

[9] See V. I. Lenin, "Party Organisation and Party Literature": "Literature must become *part* of the common cause of the proletariat, 'a cog and a screw' of one single great Social-Democratic mechanism set in motion by the entire politically-conscious vanguard of the entire working class." (*Collected Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1962, Vol. X, p. 45.)

[10] The Great Rear Area was the name given during the War of Resistance to the vast areas under Kuomintang control in southwestern and northwestern China which were not occupied by the Japanese invaders, as distinguished from the "small rear area", the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines under the leadership of the Communist Party.

[11] *The Debacle* by the famous Soviet writer Alexander Fadeyev was published in 1927 and translated into Chinese by Lu Hsun. The novel describes the struggle of a partisan detachment of workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals in Siberia against the counter-revolutionary brigands during the Soviet civil war.

[12] This couplet is from Lu Hsun's "In Mockery of Myself" in *The Collection Outside the Collection*, *Complete Works*, Chin. ed., Vol. VII.

A MOST IMPORTANT POLICY

September 7, 1942

Ever since the Central Committee of the Party put forward the policy of "better troops and simpler administration",[1] the Party organizations in many anti-Japanese base areas have been applying it, or making plans to apply it, in accordance with the directives of the Central Committee. The leading comrades of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan border area have really taken this work in hand, setting an example of "better troops and simpler administration". In some base areas, however, the comrades have not tried to do so very seriously because of their incomplete comprehension of this policy. They still fail to understand how it is related to the current situation and to other Party policies, or fail to regard it as most important. This matter has been discussed several times before in the *Liberation Daily* and we now wish to explain it further.

All the Party's policies aim at the defeat of the Japanese invaders. From the fifth year onward, the War of Resistance has in fact entered the final stage of the struggle for victory. In this stage the situation is different from that in the first and second years of the war, and also from that in the third and fourth. A feature of the fifth and sixth years of the war is that while victory is drawing near, there are very great difficulties ahead; in other words, we are in the "darkness before the dawn". This situation prevails at the present stage in all the anti-fascist countries, and in the whole of China as well; it is not confined to the base areas of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, although it is particularly acute here. We are striving to defeat the Japanese invaders in two years. They will be years of extreme difficulty, differing greatly from the first and second two years of the war. This particular point must be anticipated by

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This editorial was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the *Liberation Daily*, Yenan.

the leading personnel in the revolutionary party and revolutionary army. Should they fail to do so, they will simply drift with events and, no matter how hard they try, they will not be able to attain victory and may even jeopardize the cause of the revolution. Although the situation in the anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy rear is already several times as difficult as before, the difficulty is not yet extreme. If we do not have a correct policy now, then extreme difficulty will overtake us. People in general are liable to judge by past and present conditions and to be misled into thinking that the future will be much the same. They are unable to anticipate that the ship may encounter submerged rocks or to steer clear of these rocks with cool heads. What are the submerged rocks in the path of the ship of the War of Resistance? They are the extremely grave material difficulties of the final stage of the war. The Central Committee of the Party has pointed them out and called on us to be on the alert and steer clear of them. Many of our comrades already understand the point but some do not, and that is the first obstacle we must overcome. There is the need for unity in the War of Resistance, and unity involves difficulties. These difficulties are political; they have occurred in the past and may occur again in the future. For five years, our Party has been overcoming them gradually and with the utmost effort; our slogan is to strengthen unity, and we must keep on doing so. But there are difficulties of another kind, the material ones. They will grow more and more acute. Today some comrades are still taking it easy and are not alive to the situation, and we must therefore alert them. All comrades in all the anti-Japanese base areas must recognize that from now on the material difficulties are bound to grow graver, that we must overcome them and that one important way of doing so is “better troops and simpler administration”.

Why is the policy of better troops and simpler administration important for overcoming the material difficulties? It is clear that the present, and still more the future, war situation in the base areas will not permit us to cling to our past views. Our enormous war apparatus is suited to past conditions. It was then permissible and necessary. But things are different now, the base areas have shrunk and may continue to shrink for a period, and undoubtedly we cannot maintain the same enormous war apparatus as before. There is already a contradiction, which we must resolve, between our war apparatus and the war situation. The enemy’s objective is to aggravate this contradiction, hence his policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all". If we maintain our enormous apparatus, we shall fall right into his trap. If we reduce it and have better troops and simpler administration, our war apparatus, though reduced, will remain strong. By resolving the contradiction, which is that of "a big fish in shallow water", and by adapting our war apparatus to the war situation, we shall prove even stronger, and so far from being defeated by the enemy we shall finally defeat him. That is why we say that the policy of "better troops and simpler administration" put forward by the Central Committee of the Party is a most important policy.

But men's minds are liable to be fettered by circumstance and habit from which even revolutionaries cannot always escape. We created this enormous apparatus ourselves, little thinking that one day we ourselves would have to reduce it; and now that the time has come to do so, we feel reluctant and find it very difficult. The enemy is bearing down upon us with his enormous war apparatus, and how dare we reduce ours? If we do, we shall feel that our forces are too few to cope with him. Such misgivings are precisely the result of being fettered by circumstance and habit. When the weather changes, it becomes necessary to change one's clothing. Each year as spring turns into summer, summer into autumn, autumn into winter and winter into spring we have to make this change. But owing to the force of habit people sometimes fail to make it at the proper turn and they fall ill. Present conditions in the base areas already require us to shed our winter garments and put on summer clothing so that we can move about nimbly to fight the enemy, but we are still heavily padded and weighed down, and quite unfit for combat. As for the question of how to deal with the enemy's enormous apparatus, we can learn from the example of how the Monkey King dealt with Princess Iron Fan. The Princess was a formidable demon, but by changing himself into a tiny insect the Monkey King made his way into her stomach and overpowered her.[2] Liu Tsung-yuan's description of "The Donkey in Kweichow"[3] also contains a valuable lesson. A huge donkey was brought to Kweichow and the sight of him rather frightened a small tiger. But in the end this huge donkey was devoured by the small tiger. Our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are the Monkey King or the small tiger, and they are fully capable of dealing with the Japanese demon or donkey. Now it is imperative for us to do a little changing and make ourselves smaller but sturdier, and then we shall be invincible.

NOTES

[1] The phrase "better troops and simpler administration" is now widely used and is no longer confined to military matters. It suggests readjustment in organizations and their staff membership, and simplification of the administration and the work procedure.

[2] For the story of how Sun Wu-kung, the Monkey King, changed himself into a tiny insect and defeated Princess Iron Fan, see the Chinese novel, *Hsi Yu Chi* (*Pilgrimage to the West*), Chapter 59.

[3] Liu Tsung-yuan (773-819), a great Chinese writer of the Tang Dynasty. His *Three Parables* includes "The Donkey in Kweichow", which tells how a tiger in Kweichow was scared when he saw a donkey for the first time. But discovering that all the donkey could do was to bray and kick, the tiger fell upon it and devoured it.

THE TURNING POINT IN WORLD WAR II

October 12, 1942

The Battle of Stalingrad has been compared by the British and American press to the Battle of Verdun, and the "Red Verdun" is now famous all over the world. This comparison is not altogether appropriate. The Battle of Stalingrad is different in nature from the Battle of Verdun in World War I. But they have this in common — now, as then, many people are misled by the German offensive into thinking that Germany can still win the war. In 1916 the German forces launched several attacks on the French fortress of Verdun, two years before World War I ended in the winter of 1918. The commander-in-chief at Verdun was the German Crown Prince and the forces thrown into the battle were the cream of the German army. The battle was of decisive significance. After the ferocious German assaults failed, the entire German-Austrian-Turkish-Bulgarian bloc had no future, and from then on its difficulties mounted, it was deserted by its followers, it disintegrated, and finally collapsed. But at the time, the Anglo-American-French bloc did not grasp this situation, believing that the German army was still very powerful, and they were unaware of their own approaching victory. Historically, all reactionary forces on the verge of extinction invariably conduct a last desperate struggle against the revolutionary forces, and some revolutionaries are apt to be deluded for a time by this phenomenon of outward strength but inner weakness, failing to grasp the essential fact that the enemy is nearing extinction while they themselves are approaching victory. The rise of the forces of fascism and the war of aggression they have been conducting for some years are precisely the expression of such a last desperate struggle; and in this present war the attack on Stalingrad is the expression of the last desperate

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struggle of fascism itself. At this turning point in history, too, many people in the world anti-fascist front have been deluded by the ferocious appearance of fascism and have failed to discern its essence. For forty-eight days there raged an unprecedentedly bitter battle, unparalleled in the history of mankind — from August 23, when the entire German force crossed the bend of the River Don and began the all-out attack on Stalingrad, through September 15, when some German units broke into the industrial district in the northwestern section of the city, and right up to October 9, when the Soviet Information Bureau announced that the Red Army had breached the German line of encirclement in that district. Ultimately this battle was won by the Soviet forces. During those forty-eight days, the news of each setback or triumph from that city gripped the hearts of countless millions of people, now bringing them anxiety, now stirring them to elation. This battle is not only the turning point of the Soviet-German war, or even of the present anti-fascist world war, it is the turning point in the history of all mankind. Throughout these forty-eight days, the people of the world watched Stalingrad with even greater concern than they watched Moscow last October.

Until his victory on the western front, Hitler seems to have been cautious. When he attacked Poland, when he attacked Norway, when he attacked Holland, Belgium, and France, and when he attacked the Balkans, he concentrated all his strength on one objective at a time, not daring to disperse his attention. After his victory on the western front, he became dizzy with success and attempted to defeat the Soviet Union in three months. He launched an offensive against this huge and powerful socialist country along the whole front stretching from Murmansk in the north to the Crimea in the south, and in so doing dispersed his forces. The failure of his Moscow campaign last October marked the end of the first stage of the Soviet-German war, and Hitler's first strategic plan failed. The Red Army halted the German offensive last year and launched a counter-offensive on all fronts in the winter, which constituted the second stage of the Soviet-German war, with Hitler turning to retreat and the defensive. In this period, after dismissing Brauchitsch, his commander-in-chief, and taking over the command himself, he decided to abandon the plan for an all-out offensive, combed Europe for all available forces and prepared a final offensive which, though limited to the southern front, would, he imagined, strike at the vitals of the Soviet Union. Because it was in the nature of a final offensive on which the fate of fascism hung, Hitler concentrated the greatest possible forces and even moved in part of his aircraft and tanks from the North African battle front. With the German attack on Kerch and Sevastopol in May this year, the war entered its third stage. Massing an army of over 1,500,000, which was supported by the bulk of his air and tank forces, Hitler launched an offensive of unprecedented fury on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. He endeavoured to capture these two objectives at great speed for the twofold purpose of cutting the Volga and seizing Baku, intending subsequently to drive against Moscow to the north and break through to the Persian Gulf in the south; at the same time he directed the Japanese fascists to mass their troops in Manchuria in preparation for an attack on Siberia after the fall of Stalingrad. Hitler vainly hoped to weaken the Soviet Union to such an extent that he would be able to release the main forces of the German army from the Soviet theatre of war for dealing with an Anglo-American attack on the western front, and for seizing the resources of the Near East and effecting a junction with the Japanese; at the same time this would allow the main forces of the Japanese to be released from the north and, with their rear secure, to move west against China and south against Britain and the United States. That was how Hitler reckoned on winning victory for the fascist camp. But how did things turn out in this stage? Hitler came up against the Soviet tactics which sealed his fate. The Soviet Union adopted the policy of first luring the enemy in deep and then putting up a stubborn resistance. In five months of fighting the German army has failed either to penetrate to the Caucasian oil-fields or to seize Stalingrad, so that Hitler has been forced to halt his troops before high mountains and outside an impregnable city, unable to advance and unable to retreat, suffering immense losses and getting into an impasse. October is already here and winter is approaching; soon the third stage of the war will end and the fourth stage will begin. Not one of Hitler's strategic plans of attack against the Soviet Union has succeeded. In this period, bearing in mind his failure in the summer of last year when his forces were divided, Hitler concentrated his strength on the southern front. But as he still wanted to achieve the twofold purpose of cutting the Volga in the east and seizing the Caucasus in the south at a single stroke, he again divided his forces. He did not recognize that his strength did not match his ambitions, and he is now doomed — "when the carrying pole is not secured at both ends, the loads slip off". As for the Soviet Union, the more she fights the stronger she grows. Stalin's brilliant strategic direction has completely gained the initiative and is everywhere drawing Hitler towards destruction. The fourth stage of the war, beginning this winter, will mark the approach of Hitler's doom.

Comparing Hitler's position in the first and third stages of the war, we can see that he is on the threshold of final defeat. Both at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus the Red Army has now in fact stopped the German offensive; Hitler is now nearing exhaustion, having failed in his attacks on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The forces which he managed to assemble throughout the winter, from last December to May of this year, have already been used up. In less than a month winter will set in on the Soviet-German front, and Hitler will have to turn hastily to the defensive. The whole belt west and south of the Don is his most vulnerable area, and the Red Army will go over to the counter-offensive there. This winter, goaded on by the fear of his impending doom, Hitler will once again reorganize his forces. To meet the dangers on both the eastern and western fronts, he may perhaps be able to scrape together the remnants of his forces, equip them and form them into a few new divisions and, in addition, he will turn for help to his three fascist partners, Italy, Rumania and Hungary, and extort some more cannon-fodder from them. However, he will have to face the enormous losses of a winter campaign in the east and be ready to deal with the second front in the west, while Italy, Rumania and Hungary, becoming pessimistic as they see that it is all up with Hitler, will increasingly fall away from him. In short, after October 9 there is only one road open to Hitler, the road to extinction.

The Red Army's defence of Stalingrad in these forty-eight days has a certain similarity to the defence of Moscow last year. That is to say, Hitler's plan for this year has been foiled just as was his plan for last year. The difference, however, is that, although the Soviet people followed up their defence of Moscow with a winter counter-offensive, they had yet to face the summer offensive of the German army this year, partly because Germany and her European accomplices still had some fight left in them and partly because Britain and the United States delayed the opening of the second front. But now, following the battle for the defence of Stalingrad, the situation will be totally different from that of last year. On the one hand, the Soviet Union will launch a second winter counter-offensive on a vast scale, Britain and the United States will no longer be able to delay the opening of the second front (though the exact date cannot yet be foretold), and the people of Europe will be ready to rise up in response. On the other hand, Germany and her European accomplices no longer have the strength to mount large-scale offensives, and Hitler will have no alternative but to change his whole line of policy to the strategic defensive. Once Hitler is compelled to go over to the strategic defensive, the fate of fascism is as good as sealed. From its birth, a fascist state like Hitler's builds its political and military life on taking the offensive, and once its offensive stops its very life stops too. The Battle of Stalingrad will stop the offensive of fascism and is therefore a decisive battle. It-is decisive for the whole world war.

There are three powerful foes confronting Hitler, the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States, and the people in the German-occupied territories. On the eastern front stands the Red Army, firm as a rock, whose counter-offensives will continue through the whole of the second winter and beyond; it is this force which will decide the outcome of the whole war and the destiny of mankind. On the western front, even if Britain and the United States continue their policy of looking on and stalling, the second front will eventually be opened, when the time comes to belabour the slain tiger. Then there is the internal front against Hitler, the great uprising of the people which is brewing in Germany, in France and in other parts of Europe; they will respond with a third front the moment the Soviet Union launches an all-out counter-offensive and the guns roar on the second front. Thus, an attack from three fronts will converge on Hitler — such is the great historical process that will follow the Battle of Stalingrad.

Napoleon's political life ended at Waterloo, but the decisive turning point was his defeat at Moscow. Hitler today is treading Napoleon's road, and it is the Battle of Stalingrad that has sealed his doom.

These developments will have a direct impact on the Far East. The coming year will not be propitious for Japanese fascism either. As time goes on its headaches will grow, until it descends into its grave.

All those who take a pessimistic view of the world situation should change their point of view.

IN CELEBRATION OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

November 6, 1942

It is with the greatest optimism that we celebrate the anniversary of the October Revolution this year. I firmly believe that this anniversary marks the turning point not only of the Soviet-German war, but also of the victory of the world anti-fascist front over the fascist front.

Hitler was previously able to keep up the offensive without being defeated because the Red Army was alone in resisting fascist Germany and its accomplices in Europe. Now the Soviet Union has grown more powerful in the course of the war and Hitler's second summer offensive has failed. Henceforward the task of the world anti-fascist front is to take the offensive against the fascist front and inflict final defeat on fascism.

The warriors of the Red Army at Stalingrad have performed prodigies of heroism which will affect the destiny of mankind. They are the sons and daughters of the October Revolution. The banner of the October Revolution is invincible, and all the forces of fascism are doomed to extinction.

In celebrating the victory of the Red Army, we the Chinese people are also celebrating our own victory. Our War of Resistance Against Japan has been going on for more than five years, and although there are still difficulties ahead the dawn of victory is already in sight. Victory over the Japanese fascists is not only certain but is not far off.

It is the task of the Chinese people to concentrate every effort on beating the Japanese fascists.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

December 1942

The general policy guiding our economic and financial work is to develop the economy and ensure supplies. But many of our comrades place one-sided stress on public finance and do not understand the importance of the economy as a whole; engrossed in matters of revenue and expenditure as such, they cannot find solutions to any problem hard as they try. The reason is that an outmoded and conservative notion is doing mischief in their minds. They do not know that while a good or a bad financial policy affects the economy, it is the economy that determines finance. Without a well-based economy it is impossible to solve financial difficulties, and without a growing economy it is impossible to attain financial sufficiency. The financial problem in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region is that of supplying funds for the living and operating expenses of tens of thousands of troops and civilian personnel, in other words, the problem of supplying funds for waging the war. These funds come partly from taxes paid by the people and partly from production carried on by the tens of thousands of troops and civilian personnel themselves. We shall simply be resigning ourselves to extinction unless we develop both the private and the public sectors of the economy. Financial difficulties can be overcome only by down-to-earth and effective economic development. To neglect economic development and the

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This article, originally entitled "A Basic Summing-Up of Our Past Work". was the first chapter of *Economic and Financial Problems*, a report delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a conference of senior cadres of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. The years 1941 and 1942 were the hardest for the Liberated Areas in the War of Resistance Against Japan. The savage attacks by the Japanese invaders and the encirclement and blockade by the Kuomintang created enormous financial difficulties for the Liberated Areas. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that in order to overcome these difficulties it was necessary for the Party to exert opening up of sources of finance, and instead to hope for the solution of financial difficulties by curtailing indispensable expenditures, is a conservative notion which cannot solve any problem.

In the last five years we have passed through several stages. Our worst difficulties occurred in 1940 and 1941, when the Kuomintang created friction by its two anti-Communist drives. For a time we had a very acute scarcity of clothing, cooking oil, paper and vegetables, of footwear for our soldiers and of winter bedding for our civilian personnel. The Kuomintang tried to strangle us by cutting off the funds due to us and imposing an economic blockade; we were indeed in dire straits. But we pulled through. Not only did the people of the Border Region provide us with grain but, in particular, we resolutely built up the public sector of our economy with our own hands. The government established many industries to meet the needs of the Border Region, the troops engaged in an extensive production campaign and expanded agriculture, industry and commerce to supply their own needs, and the tens of thousands of people in the various organizations and schools also developed similar economic activities for their own support. This self-supporting economy, which has been developed by the troops and the various organizations and schools, is a special product of the special conditions of today. It would be unreasonable and incomprehensible in other historical conditions, but it is perfectly reasonable and necessary at present. It is by such means that we have been overcoming our difficulties. Do not these indisputable historical facts prove the truth that supplies can be ensured only through

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itself in leading the people in developing agriculture and other branches of production, and he called upon the government and other organizations, the schools and the army in the Liberated Areas to produce as much as possible for their own support. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's *Economic and Financial Problems* and his articles "Spread the Campaigns to Reduce Rent, Increase Production and 'Support the Government and Cherish the People' in the Base Areas" and "Get Organized!" formed the Party's basic programme for leading the production campaign in the Liberated Areas. Comrade Mao Tse-tung here severely criticizes the mistaken notion of concentrating on public revenue and expenditure to the neglect of economic development, and the wrong working style of making demands on the people without mobilizing and helping them to develop production and surmount difficulties, and he set forth the Party's correct policy of "developing the economy and ensuring supplies". With this policy great successes were achieved in the production campaign which was unfolded in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and in the Liberated Areas behind the enemy lines. It not only enabled the armed forces and the people of the Liberated Areas successfully to tide over the most difficult period of the war, but also provided the Party with a rich store of experience for guiding economic construction in later years.

economic development? While we still face many difficulties, the foundation of the public sector of our economy has already been laid. In another year, by the end of 1943, this foundation will be even firmer.

Developing the economy is the correct line, but development does not mean reckless or ill-founded expansion. Some comrades who disregard the specific conditions here and now are setting up an empty clamour for development; for example, they are demanding the establishment of heavy industry and putting forward plans for huge salt and armament industries, all of which are unrealistic and unacceptable. The Party's line is the correct line for development; it opposes outmoded and conservative notions on the one hand and grandiose, empty and unrealistic plans on the other. This is the Party's struggle on two fronts in financial and economic work.

While we must develop the public sector of our economy, we should not forget the importance of help from the people. They have given us grain, 90,000 *tan* in 1940, 200,000 in 1941 and 160,000 in 1942,[1] thus ensuring food for our troops and civilian personnel. Up to the end of 1941, the grain output of the public sector of our agriculture was meagre and we relied on the people for grain. We must urge the army to produce more grain, but for a time we shall still have to rely mainly on the people. Although the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region is in the rear and has not suffered direct war damage, it has only 1,500,000 inhabitants, a small population for so large an area, and the provision of such large quantities of grain is not easy. Besides, the people transport salt for us or pay a salt transport levy, and in 1941 they purchased five million yuan worth of government bonds; all of which represents no small burden. To meet the needs of the War of Resistance and national reconstruction, the people must shoulder such burdens, the necessity of which they very well realize. When the government is in very great difficulties, it is necessary to ask the people to bear a heavier burden, and they understand that too. But while taking from the people we must at the same time help them to replenish and expand their economy. That is to say, appropriate steps and methods must be adopted to help the people develop their agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, salt industry and commerce, so that they gain at the same time as they give and, moreover, gain more than they give; only thus can we sustain a long war against Japan.

Disregarding the needs of the war, some comrades insist that the government should adopt a policy of "benevolence". This is a mistake.

For unless we win the war against Japan, such "benevolence" will mean nothing to the people and will benefit only the Japanese imperialists. Conversely, although the people have to carry rather heavy burdens for the time being, things will get better for them as the difficulties confronting the government and the troops are overcome, the War of Resistance is sustained and the enemy is defeated; and this is where the true benevolence of the revolutionary government lies.

Another mistake is "draining the pond to catch the fish", that is, making endless demands on the people, disregarding their hardships and considering only the needs of the government and the army. That is a Kuomintang mode of thinking which we must never adopt. Although we have temporarily added to the people's burden, we have immediately set to work building the public sector of our economy. In the years 1941 and 1942 the army, the government and other organizations and the schools met most of their needs by their own efforts. This is a wonderful achievement without precedent in Chinese history, and it contributes to the material basis of our invincibility. The greater our self-supporting economic activities, the more we shall be able to lighten the people's tax burdens. In the first stage, from 1937 to 1939, we took very little from them; during this stage they were able to build up considerable strength. In the second stage, from 1940 to 1942, the burden on the people was increased. The third stage will begin in 1943. In the next two years, 1943 and 1944, if the public sector of our economy continues to grow and if all or most of our troops in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region are in a position to engage in farming, then by the end of 1944 the people's burden will again be lightened, and they will again be able to build up strength. This is a possibility which we should prepare to turn into actuality.

We must refute all one-sided views and advance the correct slogan of our Party, "Develop the economy and ensure supplies". With regard to the relation between public and private interests, our slogans are "Give consideration to both public and private interests" and "Give consideration to both troops and civilians". We consider only such slogans to be correct. We can guarantee our financial needs only by expanding both the public and the private sectors of our economy in a realistic and practical way. Even in difficult times we must take care to set a limit to taxation so that the burdens, though heavy, will not hurt the people. And as soon as we can, we should lighten the burdens so that the people can build up strength.

The Kuomintang die-hards regard construction in the Border Region as a hopeless undertaking and the difficulties here as insurmountable; they are expecting the Border Region to collapse any day. It is not worth arguing with such people; they will never see the day of our "collapse" and we shall unquestionably grow more and more prosperous. They do not understand that under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Border Region revolutionary government the masses always give their support to the Party and government. And the Party and the government will always find ways to get over economic and financial difficulties, however serious. In fact we have already pulled through some of our recent difficulties and will soon overcome others. We encountered difficulties many times greater in the past and surmounted them all. With intense fighting going on every day, our base areas in northern and central China are now facing much greater difficulties than the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, but we have already held out for five and a half years in these areas and can certainly continue to do so till victory. For us, there is no ground for pessimism; we can conquer any difficulty.

After the present conference of senior cadres of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region we shall put into effect the policy of "better troops and simpler administration".[2] It must be carried out strictly, thoroughly and universally, and not perfunctorily, superficially or partially. In carrying it out, we must attain the five objectives of simplification, unification, efficiency, economy and opposition to bureaucracy. These five objectives have a very important bearing on our economic and financial work. Simplification will reduce non-productive expenditures and increase our income from production; it will not only have a direct and healthy effect on our finances, but will lighten the people's burdens and benefit them economically. In our economic and financial set-up, we must overcome such evils as disunity, assertion of independence and lack of co-ordination, and must establish a working system which is unified and responsive to direction and which permits the full application of our policies and regulations. With the establishment of such a unified system working efficiency will rise. All our organizations, and particularly those engaged in economic and financial work, must pay attention to thrift. By practising thrift we can cut out a great deal of unnecessary and wasteful expenditure, which amounts possibly to tens of millions of yuan. Finally, people engaged in economic and financial work must overcome surviving bureaucratic practices, some of which, such as corruption and graft, over-elaborate organization, meaningless "standardization" and red tape, are very serious. If we fully attain these five objectives in the Party, the government and the army, our policy of "better troops and simpler administration" will achieve its purpose, our difficulties will surely be overcome, and we shall silence the gibes about our approaching "collapse".

NOTES

[1] These figures are the totals paid in agricultural tax (public grain) by the peasants of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region from 1940 to 1942.

[2] For "better troops and simpler administration" see "A Most Important Policy", pp. 99-102 of this volume.

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING METHODS OF LEADERSHIP

June 12, 1943

1. There are two methods which we Communists must employ in whatever work we do. One is to combine the general with the particular; the other is to combine the leadership with the masses.

2. In any task, if no general and widespread call is issued, the broad masses cannot be mobilized for action. But if persons in leading positions confine themselves to a general call — if they do not personally, in some of the organizations, go deeply and concretely into the work called for, make a break-through at some single point, gain experience and use this experience for guiding other units — then they will have no way of testing the correctness or of enriching the content of their general call, and there is the danger that nothing may come of it. In the rectification movement of 1942, for example, there were achievements wherever the method of combining the general call with particular and specific guidance was used, but there were no achievements wherever this method was not used. In the rectification movement of 1943, each bureau and sub-bureau of the Central Committee and each area and prefectural Party committee, in addition to making a general call (a rectification plan for the whole year), must do the following things, gaining experience in the process. Select two or three units (but not too many) from the organization itself and from other organizations, schools or army units in the vicinity. Make a thorough study of those units, acquire a detailed knowledge of the development of the rectification movement in them and a detailed knowledge of the political history, the ideological characteristics, the zeal in study and the strong and weak points in the work of some (again not too many) representative members of

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This decision on methods of leadership was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

their personnel. Furthermore, give personal guidance to those in charge to find concrete solutions for the practical problems facing those units. The leaders in every organization, school or army unit must do likewise, as each of these has a number of subordinate units. Moreover, this is the method by which the leaders combine leading and learning. No one in a leading position is competent to give general guidance to all the units unless he derives concrete experience from particular individuals and events in particular subordinate units. This method must be promoted everywhere so that leading cadres at all levels learn to apply it.

3. Experience in the 1942 rectification movement also proves it is essential for the success of the rectification that a leading group should be formed in each unit in the course of the movement, made up of a small number of activists and with the heads of the given unit as its nucleus, and that this leading group should link itself closely with the masses taking part in the movement. However active the leading group may be, its activity will amount to fruitless effort by a handful of people unless combined with the activity of the masses. On the other hand, if the masses alone are active without a strong leading group to organize their activity properly, such activity cannot be sustained for long, or carried forward in the right direction, or raised to a high level. The masses in any given place are generally composed of three parts, the relatively active, the intermediate and the relatively backward. The leaders must therefore be skilled in uniting the small number of active elements around the leadership and must rely on them to raise the level of the intermediate elements and to win over the backward elements. A leading group that is genuinely united and linked with the masses can be formed only gradually in the process of mass struggle, and not in isolation from it. In the process of a great struggle, the composition of the leading group in most cases should not and cannot remain entirely unchanged throughout the initial, middle and final stages; the activists who come forward in the course of the struggle must constantly be promoted to replace those original members of the leading group who are inferior by comparison or who have degenerated. One fundamental reason why the work in many places and many organizations cannot be pushed ahead is the lack of a leading group which is united, linked with the masses and kept constantly healthy. A school of a hundred people certainly cannot be run well if it does not have a leading group of several people, or a dozen or more, which is formed in accordance

with the actual circumstances (and not thrown together artificially) and is composed of the most active, upright and alert of the teachers, the other staff and the students. In every organization, school, army unit, factory or village, whether large or small, we should give effect to the ninth of Stalin's twelve conditions for the bolshevization of the Party, namely, that on the establishment of a nucleus of leadership.[1] The criteria for such a leading group should be the four which Dimitrov enumerated in his discussion of cadres policy — absolute devotion to the cause, contact with the masses, ability independently to find one's bearings and observance of discipline.[2] Whether in carrying out the central tasks — war, production, education (including rectification) — or in checking-up on work, examining the cadres' histories, or in other activities, it is necessary to adopt the method of linking the leading group with the masses, in addition to that of linking the general call with particular guidance.

4. In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily "from the masses, to the masses". This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge.

5. The concept of a correct relationship between the leading group and the masses in an organization or in a struggle, the concept that correct ideas on the part of the leadership can only be "from the masses, to the masses", and the concept that the general call must be combined with particular guidance when the leadership's ideas are being put into practice — these concepts must be propagated everywhere during the present rectification movement in order to correct the mistaken viewpoints among our cadres on these questions. Many comrades do not see the importance of, or are not good at, drawing together the activists to form a nucleus of leadership, and they do not see the importance of, or are not good at, linking this nucleus of leadership closely with the masses, and so their leadership becomes bureaucratic and divorced from the masses. Many comrades do not

see the importance of, or are not good at, summing up the experience of mass struggles, but fancying themselves clever, are fond of voicing their subjectivist ideas, and so their ideas become empty and impractical. Many comrades rest content with making a general call with regard to a task and do not see the importance of, or are not good at, following it up immediately with particular and concrete guidance, and so their call remains on their lips, or on paper or in the conference room, and their leadership becomes bureaucratic. In the present rectification movement we must correct these defects and learn to use the methods of combining the leadership with the masses and the general with the particular in our study, in the check-up on work and in the examination of cadres' histories; and we must also apply these methods in all our future work.

6. Take the ideas of the masses and concentrate them, then go to the masses, persevere in the ideas and carry them through, so as to form correct ideas of leadership — such is the basic method of leadership. In the process of concentrating ideas and persevering in them, it is necessary to use the method of combining the general call with particular guidance, and this is a component part of the basic method. Formulate general ideas (general calls) out of the particular guidance given in a number of cases, and put them to the test in many different units (not only doing so yourself, but by telling others to do the same); then concentrate the new experience (sum it up) and draw up new directives for the guidance of the masses generally. Comrades should do this in the present rectification movement, and also in every other kind of work. Better leadership comes with greater skill in doing this.

7. In relaying to subordinate units any task (whether it concerns the revolutionary war, production or education; the rectification movement, check-up on work or the examination of cadres' histories; propaganda work, organizational work or anti-espionage, or other work), a higher organization and its departments should in all cases go through the leader of the lower organization concerned so that he may assume responsibility; in this way both division of labour and unified centralized leadership are achieved. A department at a higher level should not go solely to its counterpart at the lower level (for instance, a higher department concerned with organization, propaganda or anti-espionage should not go solely to the corresponding department at the lower level), leaving the person in over-all charge of the lower organization (such as the secretary, the chairman, the

director or the school principal) in ignorance or without responsibility. Both the person in over-all charge and the person with specific responsibility should be informed and given responsibility. This centralized method, combining division of labour with unified leadership, makes it possible, through the person with over-all responsibility, to mobilize a large number of cadres — on occasion even an organization's entire personnel — to carry out a particular task, and thus to overcome shortages of cadres in individual departments and turn a good number of people into active cadres for the work in hand. This, too, is a way of combining the leadership with the masses. Take, for instance, the examining of cadres' histories. If the job is done in isolation, if it is done only by the few people in the organization department in charge of such work, it certainly cannot be done well. But if it is done through the administrative head of a particular organization or school, who mobilizes many or even all of his staff, or many or even all of his students, to take part in the work, while at the same time the leading members of the organization department at the higher level give correct guidance, applying the principle of linking the leadership with the masses, then undoubtedly the task of examining the cadres' histories will be satisfactorily accomplished.

8. In any given place, there cannot be a number of central tasks at the same time. At any one time there can be only one central task, supplemented by other tasks of a second or third order of importance. Consequently, the person with over-all responsibility in the locality must take into account the history and circumstances of the struggle there and put the different tasks in their proper order; he should not act upon each instruction as it comes from the higher organization without any planning of his own, and thereby create a multitude of "central tasks" and a state of confusion and disorder. Nor should a higher organization simultaneously assign many tasks to a lower organization without indicating their relative importance and urgency or without specifying which is central, for that will lead to confusion in the steps to be taken by the lower organizations in their work and thus no definite results will be achieved. It is part of the art of leadership to take the whole situation into account and plan accordingly in the light of the historical conditions and existing circumstances of each locality, decide correctly on the centre of gravity and the sequence of the work for each period, steadfastly carry through the decision, and make sure that definite results are achieved. This is also a problem of method of leadership, and care must be taken to

solve it when applying the principles of combining the leadership with the masses and the general with the particular.

9. Details concerning methods of leadership are not dealt with here; it is hoped that comrades in all localities will themselves do some hard thinking and give full play to their own creativeness on the basis of the principles here set forth. The harder the struggle, the greater the need for Communists to link their leadership closely with the demands of the vast masses, and to combine general calls closely with particular guidance, so as to smash the subjectivist and bureaucratic methods of leadership completely. All the leading comrades of our Party must at all times counterpose scientific, Marxist methods of leadership to subjectivist, bureaucratic methods of leadership and use the former to overcome the latter. Subjectivists and bureaucrats do not understand the principles of combining the leadership with the masses and the general with the particular; they greatly impede the development of the work of the Party. To combat subjectivist and bureaucratic methods of leadership, we must promote scientific, Marxist methods of leadership both extensively and intensively.

NOTES

[1] See J. V. Stalin, "The Prospects of the Communist Party of Germany and the Question of Bolshevization", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. VII, p. 39.

[2] See Georgi Dimitrov, "Unity of the Working Class Against Fascism", *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Eng. ed., Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1951, pp. 138-39.

SOME POINTED QUESTIONS FOR THE KUOMINTANG

July 12, 1943

The last few months have witnessed a most unusual and shocking event inside China's anti-Japanese camp, namely, the campaign launched by many Kuomintang-led party, government and army organizations to wreck unity and undermine the War of Resistance. It assumes the form of an attack on the Communist Party, but is in fact directed against the whole Chinese nation and people.

Consider first the Kuomintang armies. Of the Kuomintang-led armies throughout the country, as many as three group armies from the main forces are stationed in the Northwest — the 34th, 37th and 38th Group Armies, all under Hu Tsung-nan, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 8th War Zone. Of these, two have been used to encircle the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, while only one has been assigned defence duty along the Yellow River, from Yichuan to Tungkuan, against the Japanese invaders. This has been the situation for more than four years, and people became accustomed to it so long as there was no military clash. But in the last few days an unexpected change has taken place. Of the three army corps on defence duty along the river — the 1st, 16th and 90th Army Corps — two have been removed, the 1st Army Corps to the area of Pinchow and Chunhua and the 90th to the area of Lochuan, and both are actively preparing to attack the Border Region, while the greater part of the river defences is left unmanned against the Japanese invaders.

This inevitably makes people ask: What exactly are the relations between these Kuomintang people and the Japanese?

Day in day out many Kuomintang people have been brazenly spreading propaganda that the Communist Party is "sabotaging the

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this editorial for the *Liberation Daily*, Yenan.

War of Resistance" and "wrecking unity". Can the withdrawal of the main forces defending the river be called strengthening the War of Resistance? Can attacks on the Border Region be called strengthening unity?

We should like to ask the Kuomintang people who are doing all this: You are turning your backs on the Japanese while they are still facing you. What is going to happen if the Japanese start advancing on your heels?

What is the meaning of your abandonment of large sections of the river defences while the Japanese quietly look on from the other bank, without making any move other than to watch with glee through their field-glasses the gradually receding view of your backs? Why do the Japanese so greatly prefer seeing your backs? And what makes you feel so much at ease after abandoning the river defences and leaving large sections unmanned?

In a society based on private property, people usually bolt their doors at night before going to bed. Everybody knows that this is not fussiness but a precaution against burglars. Now, having left the front door wide open, are you not afraid of burglars coming? And if the front door is left wide open without the burglars coming, what then is the reason?

According to you, in China it is the Communists who are "sabotaging the War of Resistance", while you yourselves are most devoted to "the nation above all". Well now, what are you placing "above all" when you turn your backs on the enemy?

According to you, it is also the Communists who are "wrecking unity", while you are so very devoted to "unity in good faith". Well, you have sent a huge force of three group armies (minus one army corps), with fixed bayonets and heavy artillery, to march against the people of the Border Region; can this be counted as "unity in good faith"?

Or take another of your assertions — that you are very keen not on "unity" but on "unification" — and you therefore want to wipe out the Border Region, liquidate "feudal separatism" and kill off every Communist. Very well! How is it then you are not afraid that the Japanese will "unify" the Chinese nation, including you, out of existence?

Supposing that while you triumphantly "unify" the Border Region at one stroke and wipe out the Communists, you are able to keep the Japanese stupefied by some "sleeping-draught" or by some "spell" of yours, so that the nation and you yourselves both escape "unification" by them. Well, dear gentlemen of the Kuomintang, won't you give us some inkling of the secret of your sleeping-draught or spell?

But if you have no sleeping-draught or spell for dealing with the Japanese, and if you have not reached a secret understanding with them, then let us tell you plainly and formally: you should not and must not attack the Border Region. "When the snipe and the clam grapple, it is the fisherman who profits", "The mantis stalks the cicada, but behind them lurks the oriole" — there is truth in these two parables. The proper thing for you to do is to join forces with us to "unify" the territory occupied by the Japanese and drive the devils out. What is the reason for your anxiety and hurry to "unify" the span of land forming the Border Region? Though vast stretches of our beautiful country have fallen into the hands of the enemy, you are not anxious or in a hurry about this, but instead are anxious to attack the Border Region and in a hurry to crush the Communist Party. How painful! How disgraceful!

Next, consider the activities of the Kuomintang Party. To combat the Communist Party the Kuomintang has organized several hundred detachments of secret agents, into which it has recruited all kinds of scoundrels. For example, on July 6, 1943, in the 32nd year of the Chinese Republic, on the eve of the sixth anniversary of the War of Resistance, the Kuomintang Central News Agency released a news item stating that certain "cultural associations" in Sian, Shensi Province, had held a meeting and resolved to cable Mao Tse-tung, calling on him to use the opportunity of the dissolution of the Third International to "dissolve" the Communist Party of China and, in addition, to "abolish the separatist Border Region regime". The reader may well take this to be "news", but actually it is an old story.

It turns out that the whole thing was the handiwork of one of the several hundred detachments of secret agents. Acting on orders from headquarters (namely, "The Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Military Council of the National Government" and "The Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang"), this detachment gave instructions to the Trotskyite and traitor Chang Ti-fei, who is now Director of Discipline in the Sian concentration camp and notorious for his anti-Communist writings in *Resistance and Culture*, a traitorous periodical financed by the Kuomintang; on June 12, that is, twenty-five days before the Central News Agency released its news item, he mustered together nine people in a ten-minute meeting which "endorsed" the text of the so-called telegram.

This telegram has not reached Yenan to this day but its contents are clear. It says, we are told, that since the Third International has been dissolved, the Communist Party of China should likewise be "dissolved", that "Marxism-Leninism has been discredited", and so on and so forth.

There it is. This is the sort of thing the Kuomintang are saying! We have always believed that anything may issue from the mouths of the likes of these Kuomintang creatures (and like attracts like), and as one would expect, they have now let out this gust of foul air!

There are now many political parties in China — there are even two Kuomintangs. One is the Wang Ching-wei brand of Kuomintang, set up in Nanking and elsewhere, which also has a flag with a white sun against a blue sky and a so-called Central Executive Committee, as well as a collection of secret police detachments. In addition, everywhere in the occupied areas there are the fascist parties created by the Japanese.

Dear gentlemen of the Kuomintang! Why is it that since the dissolution of the Third International you have been so terribly busy plotting the "dissolution" of the Communist Party but will not even lift a finger to dissolve a few of the traitorous and Japanese-sponsored parties? When you directed Chang Ti-fei to draft the telegram, why is it that, besides demanding the dissolution of the Communist Party, you did not deign to add that the traitorous and Japanese-sponsored parties, too, ought to be dissolved?

Is it possible that you think there is one Communist Party too many? In the whole of China there is only one Communist Party, while there are two Kuomintangs. After all, of which party is there one too many?

Gentlemen of the Kuomintang! Have you ever given the following matter a thought? Why is it that, in addition to yourselves, both the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei are making frantic efforts to overthrow the Communist Party, asserting that the Communist Party alone is one too many and must therefore be crushed? And why is it that they feel there are too few Kuomintangs and there never can be too many, and that they are everywhere grooming and fostering the Wang Ching-wei brand of Kuomintang?

Gentlemen of the Kuomintang! We don't mind taking the trouble to tell you that the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei have a special love for the Kuomintang and the Three People's Principles because they find something in both they can turn to good account. The only time since World War I that the imperialists and traitors had no love for the Kuomintang but bitterly hated it and tried their utmost to abolish it was in the period of 1924-27, when it was reorganized by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, admitted Communists into its ranks and became a national alliance in which the Kuomintang and the Communist Party co-operated. The only time that the imperialists and traitors had no love for the Three People's Principles but bitterly hated them and tried their utmost to abolish them was also in the same period, when these principles were transformed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen into the revolutionary Three People's Principles as set out in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang. Save for that period, the Kuomintang has thrown out the Communists and the Three People's Principles have been emptied of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary spirit, and both have therefore earned the love of all the imperialists and traitors and, for the same reasons, have earned the love of the Japanese fascists and the traitor Wang Ching-wei, who are grooming and fostering them like treasured possessions. There used to be a yellow patch in the upper left-hand corner of the flag of Wang Ching-wei's brand of Kuomintang to distinguish it from the other Kuomintang, but now even that has been removed and everything is made to look the same so as not to offend the eye. What great love!

Kuomintang specimens of the Wang Ching-wei brand are numerous in the Great Rear Area as well as in the occupied areas. Some are under cover, forming the enemy's fifth column. Others are in the open, depending for their food and keep upon the Kuomintang or upon their work as police agents, doing nothing at all to resist Japan but specializing in anti-communism. Though they do not wear Wang Ching-wei labels, these people are really his men. They, too, are enemy fifth-columnists, only they use a somewhat different guise in order to conceal their identity and fool people.

The whole thing is now perfectly clear. When you instructed Chang Ti-fei to draft the telegram demanding the "dissolution" of the Communist Party, the reason why you would in no circumstances trouble to add that the Japanese-sponsored parties and traitor parties should also be dissolved is that you have much in common with them in ideology, policy and organization, and that the fundamental feature of your common ideology is opposition to communism and to the people.

We want to ask you Kuomintang people yet another question. Is it true that the only "discredited" *ism* in China and indeed in the whole world is Marxism-Leninism and that all the others are great stuff? Apart from Wang Ching-wei's brand of the Three People's Principles which we have just mentioned, what about the fascism of Hitler, Mussolini and Hideki Tojo? What about the Trotskyism of Chang Ti-fei? What about the counter-revolutionary doctrines of the various brands of counter-revolutionary secret services in China?

Dear gentlemen of the Kuomintang! Why is it that when you instructed Chang Ti-fei to draft the telegram, you did not add a single phrase or proviso about all these so-called *isms* which are about as much good as the plague, or bedbugs, or dog's droppings? Is it possible that in your eyes all this counter-revolutionary rubbish is flawless and perfect, while Marxism-Leninism alone is completely discredited?

To be blunt, we strongly suspect that you are working in collusion with the Japanese-sponsored and traitorous parties, and that is why you and they "breathe through the same nostrils", that is why you and the enemy and traitors are so exactly alike, indeed, identical and indistinguishable both in your words and in your deeds. The Japanese and the traitors wanted the New Fourth Army disbanded, and you ordered it to be disbanded; they want to dissolve the Communist Party, and so do you; they want to abolish the Border Region, and so do you; they do not want you to defend the Yellow River, and so you abandon its defence; they attack the Border Region (for the last six years the enemy forces along the river bank opposite the counties of Suiteh, Michih, Chiahsien, Wupao and Chingchien have never ceased shelling the Eighth Route Army's river defences), and you too intend to attack it; they are anti-Communist, and so are you; they bitterly revile communism and liberal ideas, and so do you; when they seize a Communist, they force him to make a public recantation in the press, and so do you; they send counter-revolutionary agents to worm their way into the Communist Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies for disruptive purposes, and so do you. How is it that you and they are so remarkably alike, identical and indistinguishable? As you and the enemy and the traitors are exactly alike, identical and indistinguishable in so many words and deeds, how can people help suspecting that you are working hand in glove with them or have come to some secret understanding with them?

We hereby make this formal protest to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang: Your action in withdrawing the main forces for river defence in preparation for attacking the Border Region and starting civil war is utterly wrong and impermissible. Your Central News Agency's publication of the news item of July 6, which is disruptive of unity and insulting to the Communist Party, is also utterly wrong and impermissible. Both these errors are towering crimes, indistinguishable from those committed by the enemy and the traitors. You must correct them.

We hereby make this formal demand to Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, Director-General of the Kuomintang: Please order Hu Tsung-nan's troops to return to the river defences, please discipline the Central News Agency and punish the traitor Chang Ti-fei.

We hereby appeal to all true patriots among the Kuomintang members who do not approve of the withdrawal of the river defence forces for the purpose of attacking the Border Region and do not approve of the demand for the dissolution of the Communist Party: please act now to avert the crisis of civil war. We are willing to co-operate with you to the very end to save the nation.

We believe that these are absolutely just demands.

SPREAD THE CAMPAIGNS TO REDUCE RENT, INCREASE PRODUCTION AND "SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT AND CHERISH THE PEOPLE" IN THE BASE AREAS

October 1, 1943

1. As the time for autumn harvest is come, the leading bodies in the base areas must ask Party and government organizations at all levels to check up on the application of our policy of rent reduction. Wherever it has not been carried out in earnest, rents must be reduced this year without any exception. Wherever this work has not been thorough, it must be done thoroughly this year. Party committees should immediately issue directives based on the agrarian policy of the Central Committee and conforming to local conditions, and they should inspect a few villages at first hand, pick out good examples and so expedite the work in other places. At the same time, the press should carry editorials on rent reduction and reports of good examples. As rent reduction is a mass struggle by the peasants, Party directives and government decrees should guide and help it instead of trying to bestow favours on the masses. To bestow rent reduction as a favour instead of arousing the masses to achieve it by their own action is wrong, and the results will not be solid. Peasant organizations should be formed or reconstituted in the struggle for rent reduction. The government's position should be one of enforcing the decree on rent reduction and adjusting the relative interests of the landlords and the tenants. Now that the base areas have shrunk in size, it is of more immediate importance than at any time in the past six years for the Party to win the masses there by patient,

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This inner-Party directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

conscientious and thorough work, and to share weal and woe with them. If during this autumn we check on how far the policy has been carried out and perform the task of rent reduction thoroughly, we shall be able to arouse the initiative of the peasant masses and, in the coming year, intensify our struggle against the enemy and give impetus to the production campaign.

2. In the base areas behind the enemy lines most cadres have not yet learned how to get the personnel of the Party and government organizations, the troops and the people (including everyone, men and women, old and young, soldiers and civilians, and people in public and private employment) to undertake production on a wide scale. During this autumn and winter the Party committee, the government and the army in each base area must get ready to launch a big area-wide production campaign next year, covering both public and private farming, industry, handicrafts, transport, animal husbandry and commerce, with the main emphasis on farming — a campaign for overcoming difficulties by our own efforts (the slogan of "ample food and clothing" should not be raised for the time being except in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region). There should be planning household by household and mutual aid in labour (known as labour-exchange teams in northern Shensi and once known as ploughing teams or mutual-aid working groups in the former Red areas in Kiangsi), labour heroes should be rewarded, emulation in production should be practised and co-operatives serving the masses should be promoted. In the financial and economic field, the Party and government personnel at the county and district levels should devote nine-tenths of their energy to helping the peasants increase production, and only one-tenth to collecting taxes from them. If pains are taken with the first task, the second will be easy. In the present war conditions all organizations, schools and army units must make great efforts to grow vegetables, breed pigs, collect firewood, make charcoal, expand handicrafts and raise part of their own grain supply. Apart from the development of collective production in all units, whether big or small, every individual (except for those in the army) should also be encouraged to engage in some spare-time agricultural or handicraft production (but not in trade), the proceeds of which he can keep for himself. Seven to ten-day training courses should be given on vegetable-growing and pig-farming, and on the preparation of better food by the cooks. Thrift should be stressed, waste combated and corrupt practices forbidden in all Party, government

and army organizations. At all levels, the leading personnel in the Party, government and army organizations and in the schools should master all the skills involved in leading the masses in production. No one who fails to study production carefully can be considered a good leader. Any soldier or civilian who is not serious about production and who likes to eat but does not like to work cannot be considered a good soldier or a good citizen. Village Party members who are not diverted from production should realize that one of the qualifications for becoming a model among the masses is to work well in increasing production. In the campaign for production, it is wrong to take a conservative and purely financial point of view which concentrates on revenue and expenditure to the neglect of economic development. It is wrong to have a handful of government functionaries busying themselves with collecting grain and taxes, funds and food supplies to the neglect of organizing the enormous labour power of the rank and file of the Party, the government and the army, and that of the people, for a mass campaign of production. It is wrong simply to demand grain and money from the masses (as does the Kuomintang) without making every effort to help them to increase production. It is wrong to have a few economic departments organizing a small number of people for production and to neglect the launching of extensive mass campaigns for production. It is wrong to consider it dishonourable and selfish either for Communists in the countryside to engage in household production in order to support their families or for Communists in government organizations and schools to engage in private spare-time production in order to improve their own living conditions, for all such activity is in the interests of the revolutionary cause. It is wrong simply to exhort people in any base area to endure hardship in the bitter struggle without encouraging them to increase production and thereby try to improve their material conditions. It is wrong to regard the co-operatives as money-making concerns run for the benefit of the small number of functionaries or as stores run by the government and not as economic organizations run by and for the masses. It is wrong not to introduce the model methods of work used by some of the agricultural labour heroes of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region (*e.g.*, mutual aid in labour, repeated ploughing, frequent hoeing and ample manuring) on the pretext that these methods are not applicable in certain base areas. It is wrong, in production campaigns, to shift the task of production to the heads of the local departments in charge of economic development, the army supply chiefs or the administration chiefs in governmental and other bodies, instead of ensuring that the leading cadres themselves assume responsibility and participate personally, that the leading group links itself closely with the masses and general calls are combined with particular and specific guidance, that investigation and study are undertaken and priority is given to what is urgent and important, that efforts are made to bring everyone into production — men and women, young and old, and even the loafers — and that cadres are trained and the masses given education. In the present circumstances the organization of labour power is the key to increasing production. In each of the base areas, even under present war conditions, it is possible and altogether necessary to organize the labour power of tens of thousands of men and women in the Party, the government offices and the army, and hundreds of thousands of the people for production purposes (*i.e.*, to organize on a voluntary basis all people who are capable of performing part-time or full-time labour, using the forms of household-by-household planning, labour-exchange teams, transport teams, mutual-aid working groups or co-operatives, and keeping to the principle of exchange of equal values). Communist Party members must attain a full grasp of all the principles and methods of organizing labour power. Rent reduction carried out universally and thoroughly in all the base areas this year will stimulate a broad increase in production next year. And the great production campaign that will be carried on next year by Party and government, soldiers and civilians, men and women, and young and old, to increase the supply of grain and other necessities and to prepare against natural disasters, will lay the material foundation for the continued maintenance of the anti-Japanese base areas. Otherwise, we will encounter grave difficulties.

3. For the Party, the government and the army to be at one with the people in developing next year's anti-Japanese struggle and campaign for production, the Party committees and the leading army and government bodies in every single base area should prepare to launch a large-scale mass campaign in the first month of the coming lunar year to "support the government and cherish the people" and to "support the army and give preferential treatment to the families of soldiers who are fighting the Japanese". The troops should publicly renew their pledge to "support the government and cherish the people", hold meetings for self-criticism, arrange get-togethers with the local people (to which representatives of the local Party and govern-

ment organizations should also be invited), and apologize and give compensation for any past infringements upon the interests of the masses. Under the leadership of the local Party, government and mass organizations, the masses on their side should publicly renew their pledge to support the army and give preferential treatment to the families of the soldiers fighting the Japanese, and should set going an ardent campaign for greetings and gifts to the army units. In the course of these campaigns, the army on its side and the Party and the government on theirs should thoroughly examine the shortcomings and mistakes of 1943, and should resolutely correct them in 1944. From now on, such campaigns should be launched everywhere in the first month of every lunar year, and in the course of them the pledges to "support the government and cherish the people" and "support the army and give preferential treatment to the families of the soldiers who are fighting the Japanese" should be read out time and again, and there should be repeated self-criticism before the masses of any high-handed behaviour by the troops in the base areas towards the Party or government personnel or towards civilians, or of any lack of concern for the troops shown by the Party or government personnel or the civilians (each side criticizing itself and not the other) in order that these shortcomings and mistakes may be thoroughly corrected.

A COMMENT
ON THE SESSIONS OF THE KUOMINTANG CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND OF THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL

October 5, 1943

The Kuomintang held the Eleventh Plenary Session of its Central Executive Committee from September 6 to 13, and the Kuomintang government held the Second Session of the Third People's Political Council from September 18 to 27. Now that all the documents of both these meetings are at hand, we can make a general comment.

The international situation is on the threshold of a great change, whose imminence is sensed on all sides. The European Axis Powers have sensed it, and Hitler is adopting a desperate last-ditch policy. In the main, it is the Soviet Union that is bringing this change about. The Soviet Union is now taking advantage of it — the Red Army has already fought its way to the Dnieper, sweeping all before it, and another winter offensive will bring it to the old, if not to the new, Soviet boundaries. Britain and the United States, too, are taking advantage of the change; Roosevelt and Churchill are waiting for the first sign of Hitler's downfall to thrust into France. In short, the German fascist war machine will soon fall apart, the problem of the anti-fascist war in Europe is on the eve of total solution, and the Soviet Union is the main force in annihilating fascism. As the world anti-fascist war has its pivot in Europe, once the problem there is solved, the fate of the two great world camps, the fascist and the anti-fascist camps, will be decided. The Japanese imperialists feel themselves cornered, and their policy, too, can only be to muster all possible strength for a desperate last-ditch struggle. In China, they

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This editorial was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the *Liberation Daily*, Yenan.

will try to "mop up" the Communists and entice the Kuomintang to capitulate.

The Kuomintang has also sensed the change. Faced with this situation it feels both joy and fear. Joy, because it imagines that with the war in Europe over, Britain and the United States will be left free to fight Japan on its behalf, and that it will be able to return to Nanking without any effort. Fear, because with the downfall of all three fascist powers the world will enter a great and unprecedented age of liberation, and the Kuomintang's comprador-feudal fascist dictatorship will become a small island in a vast ocean of freedom and democracy; it fears that its own brand of fascism with its "one party, one doctrine, one leader" will be buried beneath the waves.

Originally the Kuomintang hoped to have the Soviet Union fighting it out with Hitler single-handed and to instigate the Japanese to attack the Soviet Union, so that the land of socialism would be destroyed or at least badly mauled; it also hoped that Britain and the United States would shift all their forces to the East and first smash Japan and then wipe out the Chinese Communist Party, before bothering about any second or third front in Europe. It was for this ulterior purpose that the Kuomintang first clamoured for a strategy of "Asia before Europe" and then for "equal attention to Europe and Asia". In August this year, towards the end of the Quebec conference, when Roosevelt and Churchill summoned T. V. Soong, the foreign minister of the Kuomintang government, to Quebec and spoke a few words to him, the Kuomintang started shouting that "Roosevelt and Churchill are turning to the East", that "the 'Europe before Asia' plan is changed", that "Quebec is a conference of the three great powers, Britain, the United States and China", etc., and joyfully indulged in self-glorification. But this was the Kuomintang's last occasion to rejoice. Since then its mood has changed somewhat; "Asia before Europe" and "equal attention to Europe and Asia" have been consigned to the museum of history, and now the Kuomintang is probably cooking up new schemes. Perhaps the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and the Second Session of the Kuomintang-controlled People's Political Council mark the beginning of these new schemes.

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Kuomintang CEC slanderously accused the Communist Party of "sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state", and at the same time declared itself in favour of a "political solution" and of "preparations for constitutional government". Controlled and manipulated by its Kuomintang majority, the Second Session of the Third PPC passed resolutions against the Communist Party to roughly the same effect. In addition, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Kuomintang CEC "elected" Chiang Kai-shek president of the Kuomintang government in order to strengthen its dictatorial machine.

What can the Kuomintang be planning to do now, following the Eleventh Plenary Session? There are only three possibilities:

(1) capitulation to Japanese imperialism;
(2) dragging along on the old road; and
(3) a change in its political line.

Serving the Japanese imperialists' purpose of "hitting the Communists and courting the Kuomintang", the defeatists and capitulationists within the Kuomintang have all along advocated surrender. They have constantly endeavoured to unleash an anti-Communist civil war which, once started, would naturally make resistance to Japan impossible, leaving capitulation as the only alternative. The Kuomintang has concentrated 400,000 to 500,000 troops in northwestern China and is stealthily diverting still more forces there from other fronts. It is said that the generals are in good fettle and are proclaiming, "Taking Yenan is no problem." This is how they have been talking since Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's speech at the Eleventh Plenary Session in which he described the Communist problem as "a political one and should be solved politically" and since the Session's resolutions to roughly the same effect. Similar resolutions were adopted last year at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang CEC, and the ink was hardly dry before the generals were ordered to draw up military plans for liquidating the Border Region; in June and July this year forces were deployed in preparation for a blitz against the Border Region, and the scheme was temporarily shelved only because public opinion at home and abroad was against it. Now once again, no sooner have the resolutions of the Eleventh Plenary Session been put down in black and white than there are reports of the generals' braggadocio and of troop movements. "Taking Yenan is no problem" — what does this signify? It signifies a decision to capitulate to Japanese imperialism. Not all the Kuomintang members who favour "taking Yenan" are necessarily conscious and determined capitulationists. Some of them may think, "We shall still resist the Japanese while fighting the Communists." This is probably what many officers of the Whampoa clique[1] are thinking.

To these gentlemen we Communists would like to put the following questions. Have you forgotten the lessons of the ten years of civil war? Once another civil war starts, will the determined capitulationists allow you to continue the war against Japan? Will the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei allow you to continue the war against Japan? Are you really so strong that you can fight a civil war and a war against the foreign foe at the same time? You claim to have three million men, but your armies are so demoralized that people have compared them to two baskets of eggs on the ends of a carrying pole — one collision and they are finished. This is what has happened in all the campaigns in the Chungtiao Mountains, the Taihang Mountains, Chekiang and Kiangsi, western Hupeh and the Tapieh Mountains. The simple reason is that you have followed the fatal policy of being "active against the Communists" and "passive against the Japanese". A national enemy has penetrated deep into our country, and the more actively you fight the Communists and the more passively you resist the Japanese, the lower will be the morale of your troops. If you make such a poor show in fighting the foreign aggressor, can you expect your troops suddenly to become tough in fighting the Communists and the people? It is out of the question. Once you start civil war, you will have to give it your undivided attention and inevitably abandon all thought of "simultaneous resistance"; in the end you will inevitably find yourselves signing a treaty of unconditional surrender to Japanese imperialism, with capitulation as the only policy left to you. Those of you in the Kuomintang who do not really wish to capitulate will inevitably end up as capitulationists if you take an active part in instigating or prosecuting civil war. This will surely happen if you lend yourselves to the manoeuvres of the capitulationist clique and use the resolutions of the Eleventh Plenary Session and the People's Political Council as an instrument for mobilizing public opinion and preparing for anti-Communist civil war. Even if you do not want to capitulate in the first place, you will end up by surrendering in the wake of the capitulationist clique if you lend yourselves to their manoeuvres and take a wrong step. That is the first possibility concerning the direction the Kuomintang may take after the Eleventh Plenary Session, and there is an extremely serious danger that it may materialize. From the standpoint of the capitulationist clique, talk about a "political solution" and "preparations for constitutional government" is the best means of camouflaging its preparations for civil war, *i.e.*, for surrender; all Communists, all patriotic members of the Kuomintang, all anti-Japanese parties, and all our fellow-countrymen who are opposed to Japan should be sharply on the alert against this extremely grave danger and should not be fooled by the camouflage. It must be recognized that the danger of civil war has never been so great as it is now after the Kuomintang's Eleventh Plenary Session.

There is another direction in which these resolutions may lead, that of "stalling for a while and starting the civil war later". This course, which differs somewhat from that of the capitulationist clique, may be taken by those people who still want to keep up the appearance of resistance to Japan while absolutely refusing to abandon anti-communism and dictatorial rule. They may move in this direction since they see that great changes in the international situation are inevitable and Japanese imperialism is doomed; that civil war would mean capitulation and the people throughout the country are for resistance and against civil war; that the Kuomintang is in a state of serious crisis, having alienated itself from the masses, lost popular support and become more isolated than ever; and that the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union are all opposed to the launching of civil war by the Chinese government. All this may force them to postpone their civil-war schemes and play for time with empty talk about a "political solution" and "preparations for constitutional government". These people are past masters in the tactics of deception and stalling. Even in their dreams they do not forget their desire to "take Yenan" and "liquidate the Communist Party". On this point they are entirely at one with the capitulationist clique. Nevertheless they do wish to keep up the pretence of resistance to Japan, they do not wish the Kuomintang to forfeit its international standing, and they sometimes fear the censure of domestic and foreign public opinion; therefore they may stall behind the smokescreen of a "political solution" and "preparations for constitutional government" while waiting for more favourable conditions. They have no sincere desire for a "political solution" or "constitutional government", at least certainly not at the moment. Last year, about the time of the Tenth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang CEC, Comrade Lin Piao was sent to Chungking by the Central Committee of the Communist Party to confer with Mr. Chiang Kai-shek. He waited in Chungking for ten long months, but Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang had no desire to discuss a single concrete problem with him. In March this year, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek published his book

China's Destiny in which he emphasizes his opposition to communism and liberal ideas, shifts the blame for the ten years of civil war on to the Communist Party, slanders the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army as "warlords of a new type" and "separatists of a new type", and implies that he will finish off the Communists within two years. On June 28 this year, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek permitted Chou En-lai, Lin Piao and other comrades to return to Yenan, but at that very moment he ordered his defence forces on the Yellow River to march on the Border Region, and he also ordered the local authorities throughout the country to seize the opportunity of the dissolution of the Third International to demand, in the name of so-called people's organizations, that the Communist Party of China be dissolved. In these circumstances, we Communists were obliged to call on the Kuomintang and the whole nation to avert civil war, and we were obliged to expose all the Kuomintang's sinister schemes and conspiracies which were sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state. Our patience has been taxed to the limit, as the historical facts show. Ever since the fall of Wuhan, there has been no end to the anti-Communist battles, large or small, in northern and central China. It is now two years since the Pacific war broke out, and throughout this time the Kuomintang has been attacking the Communists in central and northern China, apart from the troops originally stationed there, it has dispatched the group armies under Wang Chung-lien and Li Hsien-chou to attack the Communists in Kiangsu and Shantung. Pang Ping-hsun's group army in the area of the Taihang Mountains is under orders to concentrate exclusively on the Communists; so are the Kuomintang troops in Anhwei and Hupeh. For a long time, we did not make even these facts public. The Kuomintang newspapers and periodicals have never for a moment stopped vilifying the Communist Party, but for a long time we did not say a word in reply. Without any justification, the Kuomintang disbanded the New Fourth Army which was heroically fighting Japan, wiped out over nine thousand men of its contingents in southern Anhwei, arrested Yeh Ting, killed Hsiang Ying[2] and imprisoned hundreds of its cadres; although this was a monstrous betrayal of the people and the nation, we maintained our forbearance for the country's sake, simply lodging a protest and demanding redress. When Mr. Chiang Kai-shek met Comrade Chou En-lai, the representative of the Communist Party, at Lushan in June and July 1937, he promised that the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region would be designated by decree as an administrative division under the direct jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan of the National Government and that its officials would receive formal appointments. Now Mr. Chiang Kai-shek has not only eaten his own words, he has gone so far as to encircle the Border Region with 400,000 to 500,000 men to enforce a military and economic blockade; he will not be happy with anything less than the destruction of the people of the Border Region as well as the rear headquarters of the Eighth Route Army. It is particularly notorious that promised supplies have been cut off from the Eighth Route Army and that the Communist Party is abused as the "traitor party", the New Fourth Army as the "rebel army", the Eighth Route Army as the "traitor army", etc. In short, all the Kuomintang people who are behaving in this way see the Communist Party as the enemy. To the Kuomintang, the Communist Party is ten times, nay, a hundred times more hateful than the Japanese. The Kuomintang concentrates its hatred on the Communist Party and has little, if any, to spare for the Japanese. This resembles the behaviour of the Japanese fascists, who treat the Kuomintang and the Communist Party differently. Concentrating their hatred on the Chinese Communist Party, the Japanese fascists have become more and more gentle with the Kuomintang; of their two slogans, "Oppose the Communists" and "Annihilate the Kuomintang", only the first now remains. The newspapers and periodicals controlled by the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei no longer print such slogans as "Down with the Kuomintang" and "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek". Japan is bearing down on the Communist Party with 58 per cent of her forces in China and is just using 42 per cent to keep watch on the Kuomintang; she has recently relaxed this watch and withdrawn many of her troops from Chekiang and Hupeh in order to make it easier to inveigle the Kuomintang into capitulation. The Japanese imperialists have never dared utter a single word to persuade the Communist Party to capitulate, but they have no hesitation in directing an endless stream of words to persuade the Kuomintang to do so. The Kuomintang is fierce only towards the Communist Party and the people, but it drops all its ferocity in the face of the Japanese. Not only has it changed from being a participant to being a mere spectator in the war as far as fighting is concerned, but even in words it dares not offer as much as a single sharp rebuff to the insults and blandishments of Japanese imperialism. The Japanese say, "There is nothing wrong with the line of argument in Chiang Kai-shek's *China's Destiny*." Has Mr.

Chiang or any member of his party ever rebutted this? No, they have not and dare not. How can the Japanese help despising the Kuomintang when they see that Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang use "military and governmental orders" and "discipline" only against the Communists, and neither desire nor dare to use them against the twenty members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and the fifty-eight Kuomintang generals who have deserted to the enemy? The people throughout the country and the friendly nations throughout the world have seen Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang disbanding the New Fourth Army and attacking the Eighth Route Army, encircling the Border Region, maligning them with such labels as "traitor party", "traitor army", "warlords of a new type", "a new type of separatist regime", "sabotaging the War of Resistance" and "endangering the state", and constantly invoking "military and governmental orders" and "discipline"; they have never seen Mr. Chiang and the Kuomintang enforcing any military orders, government decrees or disciplinary measures against the twenty members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and the fifty-eight Kuomintang generals who went over to the enemy. Similarly, the resolutions recently passed at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Kuomintang CEC and at the meeting of the People's Political Council are all directed against the Communist Party, while not a single one is directed against the many members of the Kuomintang CEC itself and the many army generals who have turned traitor and defected. What are the people throughout the country and the friendly nations throughout the world to think of the Kuomintang? As was to be expected, there was once again talk about a "political solution" and "preparations for constitutional government" at the Eleventh Plenary Session; well and good, we welcome such talk. But judging by the political line the Kuomintang has consistently followed all these years, we consider this talk to be just so many empty words designed to dupe the people, the real purpose being to gain time for preparing civil war so as to perpetuate its dictatorial rule over the people.

Is there a third direction in which the current situation may develop? Yes, there is. It is what a number of Kuomintang members, all the people and we Communists are hoping for. What is this third course? A just and reasonable political settlement of the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, a genuinely democratic and free constitutional government, the abolition of the

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

fascist dictatorship with its "one party, one doctrine, one leader" and the convening during the War of Resistance of a national assembly genuinely elected by the people. We Communists have advocated this course from the very beginning. A number of Kuomintang members will also agree to it. For a long time we hoped that even Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and his own faction in the Kuomintang might pursue this course. But judging from what has happened in the last few years and what is happening now, there is nothing to show that Mr. Chiang and the majority of the Kuomintang personages in power are willing to do so.

A number of conditions, international and domestic, are needed before this course can be realized. At the present time (with fascism in Europe on the eve of complete collapse) the international conditions are favourable to China's War of Resistance, but it is at this very moment that the capitulators are especially eager to instigate civil war so that they can capitulate, and that the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei, too, are particularly keen on civil war, so as to inveigle them into capitulation. Wang Ching-wei said (according to the Domei News Agency, October 1): "Devoted brothers always remain brothers, and Chungking will certainly follow our road, the sooner the better, we hope." What affection, confidence and eagerness! Thus in the present situation the best that can be expected from the Kuomintang is stalling, while the danger of a sudden deterioration is very grave indeed. The conditions necessary for the third course are not all present yet, and patriots of all parties and the people throughout China must make many-sided efforts to bring them into being.

Mr. Chiang Kai-shek announced at the Eleventh Plenary Session:

> It should be stated clearly that the central authorities make no demands upon the Communist Party other than that it should give up its armed separatist regime and cease its surprise attacks on the National Army, which sabotage the War of Resistance; it is to be hoped that the Communist Party will carry out its declaration made in the 26th year of the Republic [1937] calling for united efforts to save the nation and will put into effect the four pledges given in that declaration.

Mr. Chiang's talk of "surprise attacks on the National Army, which sabotage the War of Resistance" ought to be applied to the Kuomintang itself, and it is a pity that he is so prejudiced and malicious as to slander the Communist Party in this way. Since the fall of Wuhan the Kuomintang has launched three anti-Communist onslaughts, in each of which, as the facts show, the Kuomintang troops sprang surprise attacks on the Communist forces. In the first campaign, from the winter of 1939 to the spring of 1940, the Kuomintang troops in their surprise attacks captured five county towns garrisoned by the Eighth Route Army in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, Chunhua, Hsunyi, Chengning, Ninghsien and Chenyuan, even employing aircraft in these operations. In northern China, Chu Huai-ping's troops were dispatched to the Taihang Mountain region for a surprise attack on the Eighth Route Army forces, which only fought back in self-defence. The second campaign was launched in January 1941. Earlier, on October 19, 1940, Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi had telegraphed a categorical order to Chu Teh, Peng Teh-huai, Yeh Ting and Hsiang Ying, commanding all units of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies south of the Yellow River to move north of the river within a month. We promised that our troops in southern Anhwei would move north; as for the others, while it was impossible for them to be shifted in the circumstances, we promised that they would move to the assigned positions after victory in the anti-Japanese war. Yet, before our 9,000 men in southern Anhwei began moving north on January 5 in compliance with the order, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek had already issued another order to "catch them all in a dragnet". Between January 6 and 14, the Kuomintang troops in southern Anhwei actually did catch these New Fourth Army units in a dragnet. Moreover, on January 17, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek ordered the whole New Fourth Army to be disbanded and Yeh Ting to be court-martialled. The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have since been attacked wherever there are Kuomintang troops in the anti-Japanese base areas in central and northern China, and they have only fought back in self-defence. The third campaign began in March of this year and is still going on. The Kuomintang forces have continued their assaults on the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in central and northern China. In addition, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek has published his *China's Destiny*, which is a diatribe against communism and against the people. He has diverted many of his Yellow River defence forces for a lightning attack on the Border Region. He has instigated so-called people's organizations all over the country to demand the dissolution of the Communist Party. He has mobilized the Kuomintang majority in the People's Political Council to endorse Ho Ying-chin's military report vilifying the Eighth Route Army and to adopt anti-Communist resolutions. He has thus turned the Council, which should be a symbol of anti-Japanese unity, into a private agency of the Kuomintang for manufacturing anti-Communist public opinion in preparation for civil war, with the result that Comrade Tung Pi-wu, the Communist member of the Council, had to walk out in protest. These three anti-Communist onslaughts were deliberately planned and launched by the Kuomintang. We may well ask, what are they if not actions which "sabotage the War of Resistance"?

On September 22 of the 26th year of the Republic (1937), the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a declaration calling for united efforts to save the nation. In it we said:

> To strip the enemy of any pretext for his intrigues and to remove any misunderstanding among all well-intentioned doubters, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China finds it necessary to proclaim its heartfelt devotion to the cause of national liberation. Therefore, it once again solemnly declares to the whole nation: (1) that Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization; (2) that we shall discontinue the policies of insurrection to overthrow the Kuomintang regime and of forcible confiscation of the land of the landlords; (3) that we shall reorganize the present Red government as the democratic government of a special region in the hope that state power will be unified throughout the country; and (4) that the Red Army will change its name and designation, will be reorganized as part of the National Revolutionary Army and placed under the Military Council of the National Government, and will be ready for orders to march to the anti-Japanese front and do its duty.

We have completely fulfilled these four pledges; neither Mr. Chiang Kai-shek nor anyone else in the Kuomintang can charge us with having defaulted on a single one of them. In the first place, the policies practised by the Communist Party in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and in the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines are in keeping with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, and not a single one runs counter to them. In the second place, as long as the Kuomintang does not capitulate to the national enemy, disrupt Kuomintang-Communist co-operation or launch civil war against the Communists, we will always keep our promise not to overthrow the

Kuomintang regime or to confiscate the land of the landlords by force. We have kept this pledge in the past, are doing so now and will continue to do so in the future. That means that only when the Kuomintang capitulates to the enemy, disrupts co-operation and launches civil war will we be forced to cancel our pledge, for these are the only circumstances which would make it impossible for us to keep it. In the third place, the original Red government was reorganized in the very first year of the War of Resistance, and the !’three thirds system” of democratic government has long been in operation, but to this day the Kuomintang has not fulfilled its promise to recognize the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and, what is more, it accuses us of “feudal separatism”. Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and other members of the Kuomintang! You should know that what you call “separatism” — the state of affairs in which the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and other anti-Japanese base areas are not recognized by the Kuomintang government — is not of our seeking but has been entirely forced on us by yourselves. What reason do you have for accusing us of “separatism” while you go back on your own words, refuse the recognition you pledged to the Border Region and refuse to acknowledge its democratic government? Day in day out we ask for recognition and you refuse — who then is responsible? What reason does Mr. Chiang have for railing against “separatism” in his *China’s Destiny*, without showing the slightest sense of his own responsibility in the matter, though he himself is Director-General of the Kuomintang and head of its government? Availing ourselves of the occasion of the Eleventh Plenary Session at which Mr. Chiang Kai-shek has again demanded that we fulfil our promise, we demand that he fulfil his promise to give legal recognition to the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, where the Principle of Democracy has long been in practice, and to the anti-Japanese democratic base areas behind the enemy’s lines as well. If you persist in your policy of non-recognition, it will mean that you want us to continue with “separatism”, and that, as in the past, the blame will fall entirely on you and not on us. In the fourth place, it is a long time since the Red Army changed its “name and designation”, became “reorganized as part of the National Revolutionary Army” and was “placed under the Military Council of the National Government”; this pledge was fulfilled long ago. The only force directly under the Central Committee of the Communist Party and not under the Military Council of the National Government is the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army; the reason is that it was proscribed as a "rebel army" and "disbanded" on January 17, 1941 by the Military Council in a counter-revolutionary order sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state, and was, moreover, subjected to daily attacks by the Kuomintang troops. Yet this army has consistently fought the Japanese in central China and fulfilled the first three of the four pledges; furthermore, it is willing to come "under the Military Council of the National Government" once again, and asks Mr. Chiang Kai-shek to repeal the order for its disbandment and restore its designation so as to enable it to fulfil the fourth pledge.

The document concerning the Communist Party adopted at the Eleventh Plenary Session also stated:

> As for the other problems, they can all be raised at the national assembly for discussion and solution, since the present session has resolved that a national assembly should be convened and a constitution drawn up and promulgated within one year after the conclusion of the war.

The "other problems" here referred to are the abolition of the Kuomintang dictatorship, the abolition of the fascist secret service, the establishment of democratic rule throughout the country, the abolition of economic controls, exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies harmful to the people, the application on a nation-wide scale of the agrarian policy of reducing rent and interest and of the economic policy of helping small and medium scale industries and improving the workers' livelihood. In its declaration of September 22, 1937 calling for united efforts to save the nation our Party stated:

> Democracy should be put into effect and a national assembly convened to frame and adopt a constitution and draw up a policy of national salvation. To enable the Chinese people to lead a happy and prosperous life, effective measures must first be taken to provide famine relief, ensure a stable livelihood, develop defence industries, deliver the people from suffering and improve their living conditions.

Since this declaration was accepted in its entirety by Mr. Chiang Kai-shek in a statement on the very next day (September 23), he should not merely ask the Communist Party to keep the four pledges it set forth, he should also ask himself, the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang government to carry out the provisions we have quoted.

Mr. Chiang Kai-shek is not only the Director-General of the Kuomintang, he has also become president of the Kuomintang government (nominally the National Government); he should therefore conscientiously carry out these provisions about democracy and the people's livelihood, honour the innumerable promises he himself has made to us Communists and to the people throughout the country, and should stop repudiating his promises and acting high-handedly, saying one thing and doing another. Together with the whole people, we Communists want deeds and not more empty, deceitful words. If deeds are forthcoming, we shall rejoice; empty words without deeds will not deceive the people for long. What we ask of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang is the following: Carry the War of Resistance through to the end, avert the danger of capitulation; continue co-operation, avert the crisis of civil war; recognize the democratic government in the Border Region and in the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines, reinstate the New Fourth Army, stop the anti-Communist campaign, withdraw the 400,000 to 500,000 troops now encircling the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region; stop using the People's Political Council as a private agency of the Kuomintang for stirring up anti-Communist opinion, lift the ban on freedom of speech, assembly and association, abolish the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang; reduce rent and interest, improve the living and working conditions of the workers, help the small and medium scale industries; abolish the secret service, put an end to fascist education and introduce democratic education. You yourselves have promised to do most of these things. If you fulfil these demands and promises, we assure you that we shall continue to fulfil our promises. We are ready to resume the talks between the two parties at any time, if Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang are ready.

In short, of the three possible directions which the Kuomintang may take, the first, capitulation and civil war, is the road of destruction for Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. The second, demagogic deception for the purpose of gaining time while clinging to fascist dictatorship and actively conducting secret preparations for civil war, likewise offers no salvation for Mr. Chiang and the Kuomintang. Only the third direction, the complete abandonment of the erroneous course of fascist dictatorship and civil war and the pursuit of the correct course of democracy and co-operation, can bring Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang on to the road of salvation. However, Mr. Chiang and the Kuomintang have so far done nothing to convince the people that they intend to move in the third direction; hence, the people throughout the country must remain on guard against the extremely grave danger of capitulation and civil war.

Let all patriotic members of the Kuomintang unite and forbid the Kuomintang authorities to go in the first direction, prevent them from continuing in the second and demand that they take the third!

Let all patriotic anti-Japanese parties and people unite and forbid the Kuomintang authorities to go in the first direction, prevent them from continuing in the second and demand that they take the third!

An unparalleled change is imminent in the world. We hope that Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and the members of the Kuomintang will conduct themselves well at this great turning point of our era. We hope that all patriotic parties and patriotic people will conduct themselves well at this great turning point of our era.

NOTES

[1] The Whampoa clique refers to those Kuomintang generals and officers who had once been instructors or cadets at the Whampoa Military Academy. They were Chiang Kai-shek's closest followers in the Kuomintang army.

[2] Yeh Ting and Hsiang Ying were respectively Commander and Deputy Commander of the New Fourth Army.

GET ORGANIZED!

November 29, 1943

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party I would like to say a few words at this reception it is giving for the labour heroes and heroines and other model workers in production elected from the villages, the factories, the armed forces, the government and other organizations and the schools in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. What I want to say can be summed up in the words, "Get organized!" This year the peasant masses and the people in the army, the government and other organizations, the schools and the factories of the Border Region have been conducting a production campaign in accordance with the resolutions of the meeting of senior cadres convened last winter by the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee. Great achievements and advances have been scored in every field of production this year and the Border Region has taken on a new look. Facts have fully borne out the correctness of the policy adopted by the conference of senior cadres. The gist of this policy is to organize the masses, to mobilize and organize into a great army of labour all the available forces without exception — the people, the army, the government and other organizations and the schools — all men and women, young and old, who can contribute their labour power on a part-time or full-time basis. We have an army for fighting as well as an army for labour. For fighting we have the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies; but even they do a dual job, warfare and production. With these two kinds of armies, and with a fighting army skilled in these two tasks and in mass work, we can overcome our difficulties and defeat Japanese imperialism. If the achievements of our production campaign in the Border Region in recent years were not great or remarkable enough to prove this

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung made this speech at a reception in honour of the labour heroes of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

conclusively, our achievements this year have really done so, as we have all seen with our own eyes.

In all the armed units of the Border Region that have been allotted land this year, the soldiers have on the average cultivated eighteen *mou* per person; and they can produce or make practically everything — food (vegetables, meat and cooking oil), clothing (cotton-padded clothes, woollen knitwear and footwear), shelter (cave-dwellings, houses and meeting halls), articles of daily use (tables, chairs, benches and stationery), and fuel (firewood, charcoal and coal). By using our own hands we have attained the objective of "ample food and clothing". Every soldier needs to spend only three months of the year in production and can devote the remaining nine months to training and fighting. Our troops depend for their pay neither on the Kuomintang government, nor on the Border Region Government, nor on the people, but can fully provide for themselves. What a vitally important innovation for our cause of national liberation! During the last six and a half years of the War of Resistance, the anti-Japanese base areas have been subjected to the enemy's policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all", the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region has been tightly blockaded by the Kuomintang and we were reduced to the direst straits financially and economically; if our troops had been able to do nothing except fight, we would never have solved our problems. Now our troops in the Border Region have learned to produce, and so have some of the troops at the front, while others are learning. If every man in our heroic and combat-worthy Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies becomes able not only to fight and do mass work but also to produce, we need fear no difficulty and shall be "invincible under heaven",[1] to use the words of Mencius. Our organizations and schools have also taken a big step forward this year. Only a small part of their expenditure has come from the government, most of it being covered by their own production; they have grown 100 per cent of the vegetables they consume as compared with 50 per cent last year, considerably increased their consumption of meat by raising pigs and sheep, and established many workshops for making simple necessities. As the army, the organizations and the schools now meet their own material needs fully or for the most part, less is taken in taxation from the people, who can therefore enjoy more of the fruits of their labour. As soldiers and civilians are alike increasing production, all have ample food and clothing and are happy. In our factories, too, production has been stepped up, secret agents have been combed out and productivity has risen greatly. Throughout the Border Region, labour heroes have come forward in great numbers in agriculture and industry, in the organizations and the schools, and also in the army; we can say that production in the Border Region has been set on the right path. All this comes from organizing the strength of the masses.

To organize the strength of the masses is one policy. Is there a contrary policy? Yes, there is. It is one that lacks the mass viewpoint, fails to rely on the masses or organize them, and gives exclusive attention to organizing the small number of people working in the financial, supply or trading organizations, while paying no attention to organizing the masses in the villages, the army, the government and other organizations, the schools and factories; it treats economic work not as a broad movement or as an extensive front, but only as an expedient for meeting financial deficits. That is the other policy, the wrong policy. Such a policy formerly existed in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, but after the correct guidance given over these years, and especially after the senior cadres' conference last year and the mass movement this year, the number of people who still think this way is probably small. In the base areas in northern and central China, where fighting is intense and the leading bodies have not given it enough attention, the production campaign of the masses has not yet become widespread. However, since the Central Committee's directive of October 1[2] this year, preparations are being made everywhere for a production campaign next year. Conditions at the front are more difficult than in the Border Region; not only is there heavy fighting, but natural disasters have occurred in some places. Nevertheless, we must mobilize the entire Party, the government and the army and the civilian population both to fight against the enemy and to engage in production, in order to support the war, to cope with the enemy's policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all" and to provide disaster relief. With the experience already gained in the last few years in production at the front, and with the ideological, organizational and material preparations this winter, an extensive campaign can be and must be launched next year. In the front-line areas where fighting is going on, it is not yet possible to have "ample food and clothing" but quite possible and, indeed, imperative to "use our own hands and overcome difficulties".

The co-operatives are now the most important form of mass organization in the economic field. Although it is unnecessary to insist on attaching the label co-operative to the productive activities of the masses in our army, our government and other organizations and our schools, these activities are of a co-operative nature, being carried on under centralized leadership to meet the material needs of various departments, units and individuals through mutual help and joint labour. They are co-operatives of a sort.

Among the peasant masses a system of individual economy has prevailed for thousands of years, with each family or household forming a productive unit. This scattered, individual form of production is the economic foundation of feudal rule and keeps the peasants in perpetual poverty. The only way to change it is gradual collectivization, and the only way to bring about collectivization, according to Lenin, is through co-operatives.[3] We have already organized many peasant co-operatives in the Border Region, but at present they are only of a rudimentary type and must go through several stages of development before they can become co-operatives of the Soviet type known as collective farms. Ours is a new-democratic economy, and our co-operatives are still organizations for collective labour based on an individual economy (on private property). Furthermore, they are of several types. One type is the organization of agricultural labour for mutual aid, such as the "teams for the exchange of labour" and "teams for the exchange and hire of labour";[4] this kind of organization was known as the "mutual-aid working group" or "ploughing team"[5] in the Red areas in Kiangsi and is now called the "mutual-aid group" in some places at the front. So long as they are collective mutual-aid organizations which the people join voluntarily (compulsion must never be used), all of them are good, no matter how they are named, no matter whether they are each composed of a few, a few dozen or hundreds of people, or whether they are composed entirely or partly of people who can contribute full-time labour; no matter whether the members render each other mutual aid in terms of manpower, animal power or implements, or they live and eat together during the busy farming season; and no matter whether the organizations are temporary or permanent. These methods of collective mutual aid are the inventions of the masses themselves. In the past we summed up such experience among the masses in Kiangsi, and now we are summing it up in northern Shensi. In the Border Region mutual aid in labour has become much more systematic and better developed, after being encouraged by the meeting of senior cadres last year and put into practice all through the current year. Many labour-exchange teams in the Border Region have done their ploughing, planting, weeding and reaping collectively, and the harvest this year is double that of last. Now that the masses have seen these substantial results, undoubtedly more and more people will adopt the practice next year. We do not expect to organize into co-operatives in one year all the hundreds of thousands of people in the Border Region who can contribute full-time or part-time labour, but this objective can be realized within a few years. All women, too, should be mobilized to do a certain amount of productive work. All loafers must be reformed into good citizens through participation in production. Such collective mutual-aid producers' co-operatives should be extensively and voluntarily organized in all the anti-Japanese base areas in northern and central China.

Besides the collective mutual-aid co-operative for agricultural production, there are three other varieties: the multi-purpose co-operative like the Southern District Co-operative of Yenan, which combines the functions of producers', consumers', transport (salt transport) and credit co-operatives; the transport co-operative (salt transport team); and the handicraft co-operative.

With these four kinds of co-operatives among the masses and the collective labour co-operatives in the army, the schools and the government and other organizations, we can organize all the forces of the people into a great army of labour. This is the only road to liberation for the people, the only road from poverty to prosperity and the only road to victory in the War of Resistance. Every Communist must learn to organize the labour of the masses. Communists with an intellectual background must also learn to do so; once they have set their minds on it, they can learn in six months or a year. They can help the masses to organize production and to sum up experience. When our comrades have learned, among other skills, to organize the labour of the masses — to help the peasants draw up their household production plans, to set up labour-exchange teams, salt transport teams and multi-purpose co-operatives, to organize production in the army, the schools and the government and other organizations, to organize production in the factories, develop emulation in production, encourage and reward labour heroes, and arrange production exhibitions — when our comrades have learned to bring the creative power and initiative of the masses into play, we shall certainly be able to drive out the Japanese imperialists and, together with the whole people, build up a new China.

We Communists must be able to integrate ourselves with the masses in all things. If our Party members spend their whole lives sitting indoors and never go out to face the world and brave the storm, what good will they be to the Chinese people? None at all, and we do not need such people as Party members. We Communists ought to face the world and brave the storm, the great world of mass struggle and the mighty storm of mass struggle. "Three cobblers with their wits combined equal Chukeh Liang the master mind."[6] In other words, the masses have great creative power. In fact there are thousands upon thousands of Chukeh Liangs among the Chinese people; every village, every town has its own. We should go to the masses and learn from them, synthesize their experience into better, articulated principles and methods, then do propaganda among the masses, and call upon them to put these principles and methods into practice so as to solve their problems and help them achieve liberation and happiness. If our comrades doing local work are isolated from the masses, fail to understand their feelings and to help them organize their production and improve their livelihood, and if they confine themselves to collecting "public grain for national salvation" without realizing that 10 per cent of their energy is quite enough for this purpose provided they first devote 90 per cent to helping the masses solve the problem of "private grain for the people's own salvation", then these comrades are contaminated with the Kuomintang style of work and covered with the dust of bureaucracy. The Kuomintang only demands things from the people and gives them nothing in return. If a member of our Party acts in this way, his style of work is that of the Kuomintang, and his face, caked with the dust of bureaucracy, needs a good wash in a basin of hot water. In my opinion, this bureaucratic style is to be found in local work in all our anti-Japanese base areas, and there are comrades who are isolated from the masses because they lack the mass viewpoint. We must firmly do away with this style of work before we can have close ties with the masses.

In addition, a kind of warlord style is to be found in our army work, a style also characteristic of the Kuomintang whose army is divorced from the masses. Our troops must observe the correct principles that govern relations between the army and the people, between the army and the government, between the army and the Party, between officers and men, and between military work and political work, and relations among the cadres, and must never commit the errors of warlordism. Officers must cherish their men and must not be indifferent to their well-being or resort to corporal punishment; the army must cherish the people and never encroach upon their interests; the army must respect the government and the Party and never "assert independence". Our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are the armed forces of the people; they have always been very good, and are indeed the best in the country. But it is true that in recent years errors of warlordism of a certain kind have arisen, and some comrades in the army have become arrogant and high-handed in their behaviour towards the soldiers, the people, the government and the Party, always blaming the comrades doing local work but never themselves, always seeing their own achievements but never their own shortcomings, and always welcoming flattery but never criticism. Such phenomena are to be found, for example, in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. The tendency has been basically overcome as a result of the conference of senior cadres and the meeting of military and political cadres last year and of the campaigns to "support the government and cherish the people" and "support the army" during the Spring Festival[7] this year, but there is still a residue which we must make further efforts to eradicate. These faults are also to be found in the base areas in northern and central China, and the Party organizations and the army there must endeavour to eradicate them.

Whether it is the tendency towards bureaucracy in local work or towards warlordism in army work, the fault is of the same nature, namely, isolation from the masses. The overwhelming majority of our comrades are good comrades. Those who have this fault can correct it once they have been criticized and their mistakes pointed out. But self-criticism is imperative and wrong tendencies must be squarely faced and conscientiously corrected. If anyone fails to criticize the tendency towards bureaucracy in local work or towards warlordism in army work, it means that he wants to retain the Kuomintang style and keep the dust of bureaucracy or warlordism on his otherwise clean face, and he is not a good Communist. If these two tendencies are eliminated, all our work, including, of course, the production campaign, will proceed smoothly.

Our Border Region has taken on a totally different look because great results have been achieved here in production, whether among the peasant masses, or in the government and other organizations, the schools, the army or in the factories, and the relations between the army and the people have greatly improved. All this indicates that our comrades have a stronger mass viewpoint and have made great progress in becoming one with the masses. Nevertheless, we must not be complacent but continue our self-criticism and strive for further progress. We must strive for further progress in production, too. As our faces are apt to get dirty, we must wash them every day; as the floor is apt to gather dust, we must sweep it every day. Even though the tendencies towards bureaucracy in local work and warlordism in army work have been basically overcome, these bad tendencies may arise again. We are surrounded by the serried forces of Japanese imperialism and Chinese reaction, and we live in the midst of the undisciplined petty bourgeoisie, and hence great gusts of dirt of bureaucracy and warlordism blow in our faces daily. Therefore, we must not become complacent over every success. We should check our complacency and constantly criticize our shortcomings, just as we should wash our faces or sweep the floor every day to remove the dirt and keep them clean.

Labour heroes and model workers in production! You are leaders of the people, you have been very successful in your work, and I hope you, too, will not grow complacent. I hope that when you get back to the counties in the sub-regions of Kuanchung, Lungtung, Sanpien, Suiteh and Yenan,[8] when you get back to your organizations, schools, army units or factories, you will lead the people, lead the masses and work still better, and first of all get the masses organized on a voluntary basis into co-operatives, get them even better organized and in even greater numbers. I hope that, when you go back, you will do this work and propagate it, so that by next year's conference of labour heroes we shall have achieved still greater results.

NOTES

[1] From *Mencius*, Book III, "Kungsun Chou", Part I, Chapter 5.

[2] The Central Committee's directive of October 1 was "Spread the Campaign to Reduce Rent, Increase Production and 'Support the Government and Cherish the People' in the Base Areas", pp. 131-35 of this volume.

[3] See V. I. Lenin, "On Cooperation", *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1952, Vol. II, Part 2, pp. 715-23.

[4] "Teams for the exchange of labour" and "teams for the exchange and hire of labour" were both labour organizations for collective mutual aid in agriculture

in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. Labour-exchange is a means by which the peasants adjust labour power among themselves. Man-workdays were exchanged for man-workdays, ox-workdays for ox-workdays, man-workdays for ox-workdays, etc. Peasants who joined labour-exchange teams contributed their labour power or animal power to cultivate the land of each member-family collectively and in rotation. In settling accounts, the workday was taken as the unit of exchange; those who contributed more man-workdays or animal-workdays were paid for the difference by those who contributed less. "Teams for the exchange and hire of labour" were usually formed by peasants with insufficient land. Besides exchanging work among themselves for mutual aid, their members also hired themselves out collectively to families which were short of labour power.

[5] Mutual-aid working groups and ploughing teams, based on individual farming, were formed by peasants in the Red areas to facilitate production through a better organization of labour power. On the principle of voluntary participation and mutual benefit, the members did an equal amount of work for each other, or if one could not give another as much help as he received he made up the difference in cash. Apart from helping each other, the teams gave preferential treatment to the families of Red Army soldiers and worked for bereaved old folk without any pay except for meals during the work. As these measures of mutual aid were of great help to production and were carried out on a reasonable basis they won the warm support of the masses.

[6] Chukeh Liang was a statesman and strategist in the period of the Three Kingdoms (221-265), who became a symbol of resourcefulness and wisdom in Chinese folklore.

[7] The Spring Festival is New Year's Day in the Chinese lunar calendar.

[8] The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region was divided into these five sub-regions.

OUR STUDY AND THE CURRENT SITUATION

April 12, 1944

I

Since last winter, the senior cadres of our Party have been studying the question of the two lines that existed in the history of the Party. This has very greatly raised the political level of these numerous senior cadres. In the course of the study, comrades have brought up many questions, and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee has reached conclusions on some of the important ones. They are as follows:

1. On the question of what attitude to adopt in studying our historical experience. The Central Committee holds that we should enable the cadres to become perfectly clear ideologically on the questions which arose in the history of the Party and that at the same time we should adopt a lenient policy in arriving at decisions about comrades who formerly committed errors, so that on the one hand the cadres should thoroughly understand the historical experience of our Party and avoid repeating past errors, and on the other hand all comrades can be united for our common endeavour. In the history of our Party there were great struggles against the erroneous lines of Chen Tu-hsiu[1] and of Li-san, and they were absolutely necessary. But there were defects in the methods employed. For one thing, the cadres were not brought to a full ideological understanding of the

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From 1942 to 1944 the central organ and senior cadres of the Communist Party of China held discussions on the history of the Party, especially of the period from the beginning of 1931 to the end of 1934. These discussions greatly helped in bringing about ideological unity in the Party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. The enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at Tsunyi, Kweichow, in January 1935, had corrected the erroneous "Left" line pursued from early 1931 to late 1934, changed the composition of the central leading organ, established the leadership headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and set the Party line on the correct causes of these errors, the circumstances in which they were committed and the detailed ways and means of correcting them, so that errors of a similar nature came to be repeated; and for another, too much stress was placed on the responsibility of individuals, so that we failed to unite as many people as we could have done for our common endeavour. We should take warning from these two defects. This time, in dealing with questions of Party history we should lay the stress not on the responsibility of certain individual comrades but on the analysis of the circumstances in which the errors were committed, on the content of the errors and on their social, historical and ideological roots, and this should be done in the spirit of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones" and "curing the sickness to save the patient", in order to achieve the twofold objective of clarity in ideology and unity among comrades. The adoption of a careful attitude in handling cases of individual comrades, neither glossing things over nor doing harm to comrades, is a sign that our Party is vigorous and flourishing.

2. Treat all questions analytically; do not negate everything. The question concerning the line of the central leadership during the period from the Fourth Plenary Session[2] to the Tsunyi Meeting,[3] for example, should be analysed from two aspects. It should be pointed out on the one hand that the political tactics, the military tactics and the cadres policy which the central leading body adopted during that period were wrong in their main aspects, but on the other hand that on such fundamental issues as opposing Chiang Kai-shek and carrying on the Agrarian Revolution and the struggle of the Red Army there was no dispute between ourselves and the comrades who committed errors. And even the tactical side needs to be analysed.

Marxist-Leninist track; nevertheless, many Party cadres had not yet reached a thorough understanding of the character of the erroneous lines of the past. In order to raise the Marxist-Leninist ideological level of Party cadres still higher, in 1942-43 the Political Bureau held several discussions on the history of the Party, and then led the senior cadres of the whole Party in holding similar discussions during 1943-44. These discussions were an important preparation for the Seventh National Congress of the Party in 1945, enabling it to attain an ideological and political unity without precedent in the history of the Communist Party of China. "Our Study and the Current Situation" was a speech made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a meeting of senior cadres in Yenan on April 12, 1944 on the subject of these discussions. For the detailed conclusions arrived at by the Central Committee on the errors of the "Left" opportunist line that was pursued from the beginning of 1931 to the end of 1934, see "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party", which was adopted by the Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and which follows as an appendix to this article.

On the land question, for instance, their error consisted in the ultra-Left policy of allotting no land to the landlords and poor land to the rich peasants, but these comrades were at one with us on confiscating the land of the landlords for distribution among peasants who had little or no land. Concrete analysis of concrete conditions, Lenin said, is "the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism".[4] Lacking an analytical approach, many of our comrades do not want to go deeply into complex matters, to analyse and study them over and over again, but like to draw simple conclusions which are either absolutely affirmative or absolutely negative. The fact that our newspapers are lacking in analytical articles and that the habit of analysis is not yet fully cultivated in the Party shows that there are such shortcomings. From now on we should remedy this state of affairs.

3. On the discussion of the documents of the Sixth National Congress of the Party. It should be stated that the line of the Sixth National Congress was basically correct, since that Congress defined the character of the present revolution as bourgeois-democratic, defined the situation at that time as an interval between two revolutionary high tides, repudiated opportunism and putschism and promulgated the Ten-Point Programme.[5] All this was correct. The Congress also had its defects. For instance, among its other shortcomings or mistakes, it failed to point out the very protracted nature of the Chinese revolution and the very great importance of rural base areas in the revolution. Nonetheless, the Sixth National Congress played a progressive role in the history of our Party.

4. On the question of whether the provisional central leadership that was formed in Shanghai in 1931 and the Fifth Plenary Session[6] which it subsequently convened were legal or not. The Central Committee holds that both were legal, but it should be stated that the procedures for the election were inadequate and that this case should be taken as a historical lesson.

5. On the question of factions in the history of the Party. It should be stated that as a result of the series of changes since the Tsunyi Meeting the factions which formerly existed and played an unwholesome role in the history of our Party no longer exist. In our present study of the two lines within the Party, it is absolutely necessary to point out that these factions did exist and did play an unwholesome role. But it would be wrong to think that factions with the same erroneous political programmes and organizational forms still exist

in the Party, after all the changes brought about by so many inner-Party struggles — the Tsunyi Meeting of January 1935, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in October 1938, the enlarged session of the Political Bureau in September 1941,[7] the Party-wide rectification movement in 1942 and the campaign begun in the winter of 1943 for the study of the past struggles between the two lines within the Party. The old factions are gone. What is left is only the remnants of dogmatist and empiricist ideology, which can be overcome by continuing and intensifying our rectification movement. But what still exists in our Party to a serious extent, and almost everywhere, is a more or less blind "mountain-stronghold" mentality.[8] For instance, there is a lack of mutual understanding, mutual respect and unity among comrades of different units, which arises from differences in their background of struggle, differences in the areas in which they work (as between one base area and another and as between the Japanese-occupied areas, the Kuomintang areas and the revolutionary base areas) and differences in their departments of work (as between one army unit and another and as between one kind of work and another); this phenomenon seems quite commonplace but in fact it seriously obstructs the unity of the Party and the growth of its fighting capacity. The social and historical roots of the mountain-stronghold mentality lie in the fact that the Chinese petty bourgeoisie is particularly large and that for a long period our rural base areas have been cut off from one another by the enemy, while the subjective cause is the insufficiency of inner-Party education. The important task now confronting us is to point out these causes, to persuade our comrades to get rid of their blindness and raise the level of their political awareness, to break down the ideological barriers that separate comrades and to promote mutual understanding and respect, so as to bring about unity throughout the Party.

A clear understanding of these questions by the whole Party will not only assure the success of our present course of study within the Party, but will also assure the victory of the Chinese revolution.

II

The present situation has two characteristics: one is that the anti-fascist front is growing stronger and the fascist front is declining, and the second is that within the anti-fascist front the people's forces are growing stronger and the anti-popular forces are declining. The first characteristic is quite obvious and can readily be seen. Hitler will be defeated before long, and the Japanese aggressors, too, are heading for defeat. The second characteristic is not so obvious and cannot readily be seen, but it is daily becoming more manifest in Europe, in Britain and the United States and in China.

The growth of the people's forces in China has to be explained with our Party as the centre of the picture.

The growth of our Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan can be divided into three stages. The first stage was from 1937 to 1940. In 1937 and 1938, the first two years of this stage, the Japanese militarists took the Kuomintang seriously and the Communist Party lightly; therefore they threw their main forces against the Kuomintang front, and, in their policy towards the Kuomintang, military attack was primary and political blandishments to bring about capitulation were supplementary; they did not take the Communist-led anti-Japanese base areas seriously, believing that these amounted to only a handful of Communists engaged in guerrilla actions. But after occupying Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese imperialists began to change their policy and to take the Communist Party seriously and the Kuomintang lightly. In their policy towards the Kuomintang, political blandishments to bring about capitulation became primary and military attack supplementary, while at the same time they gradually shifted their main forces to deal with the Communists. For the Japanese imperialists now felt it was no longer the Kuomintang, but the Communist Party, that was to be feared. In 1937 and 1938, the Kuomintang put rather more effort into the War of Resistance, its relations with our Party were comparatively good and it permitted rather more freedom, although imposing many restrictions on the people's anti-Japanese movement. After the fall of Wuhan, however, because of its defeats in the war and its increasing hostility towards the Communist Party, the Kuomintang gradually became more reactionary, more active against the Communists and more passive in the war against Japan. In 1937, as a result of the setbacks in the civil war period, the Communist Party had only about 40,000 organized members and an army of 30,000 men; hence it was taken lightly by the Japanese militarists. But by 1940 the Party's membership had risen to 800,000, our army had grown to nearly 500,000, and the population of the base areas, including those paying grain tax only to us and those paying it both to us and to the Japanese and puppets,[9] totalled about 100,000,000. In the course of several years our Party had opened up such an extensive theatre of war, namely, the Liberated Areas, that for no less than five and a half years we were able to prevent any strategic offensive by the main forces of the Japanese invaders against the Kuomintang front, draw these forces around ourselves, extricate the Kuomintang from the crisis in its theatre of war and maintain the protracted War of Resistance. But during that stage some comrades in our Party committed an error; they underestimated Japanese imperialism (and so did not see the protracted and ruthless nature of the war, maintained that mobile warfare with large formations should be primary and belittled guerrilla warfare), placed reliance on the Kuomintang, and failed to pursue an independent policy soberly (hence their capitulationism towards the Kuomintang and their vacillation in applying the policy of boldly and freely arousing the masses to establish anti-Japanese democratic base areas behind the enemy lines and greatly expanding the armed forces led by our Party). Meanwhile our Party had recruited large numbers of new members who were still inexperienced, and all the base areas in the enemy's rear were newly established and not yet consolidated. During this stage, a kind of conceit appeared within the Party because of the favourable development of the general situation and the growth of our Party and armed forces, and many members became swelled-headed. During this stage, however, we overcame the Right deviation in the Party and carried out an independent policy; we not only hit Japanese imperialism hard, created base areas and expanded the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, but also repulsed the first large-scale anti-Communist onslaught by the Kuomintang.

The years 1941 and 1942 formed the second stage. In order to prepare and prosecute the war against Britain and the United States, the Japanese imperialists more actively pursued the policy to which they had switched after the fall of Wuhan, the policy of concentrating on the Communist Party and not on the Kuomintang. They massed a still larger part of their main forces around all the Communist-led base areas, conducted one "mopping-up" operation after another, and executed the ruthless policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all", concentrating their attacks on our Party. As a result, in the two years 1941-42, our Party was placed in an extremely difficult position. During this stage its base areas shrank in size, the population fell to under 50,000,000, the Eighth Route Army was reduced to 300,000, the loss of cadre was very great, and our finances and economy were very heavily strained. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang, finding its hands free, moved against our Party in a thousand and one ways, unleashed its second large-scale anti-Communist onslaught and attacked us in co-ordination with the Japanese imperialists. But this difficult position served to educate us Communists and we learned many things. We learned how to combat the enemy's "mopping-up" operations, his policy of "nibbling" our territory, his "tighten public security" campaign,[10] his policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all" and his policy of extorting political recantations. We learned or began to learn how to carry out the "three thirds system" in the state organs of the united front, how to carry out the land policy, the rectification movement to correct our style of study, style in Party relations and style of writing, the policy of better troops and simpler administration, the policy of unified leadership, the movement for supporting the government and cherishing the people, and the development of production. And we overcame many shortcomings, including the conceit of many people that had arisen during the first stage. Although our losses in the second stage were very heavy, we held our ground; we repulsed the offensives of the Japanese invaders on the one hand and the second large-scale anti-Communist onslaught of the Kuomintang on the other. The Kuomintang's attacks on the Communist Party and the struggles we had to wage in self-defence gave rise to a kind of ultra-Left deviation in the Party, one example being the belief that Kuomintang-Communist co-operation would soon break down, with the result that excessive attacks were made on the landlords and unity with public figures outside the Party was neglected. But we overcame this deviation also. In the struggle to counter the friction created by the Kuomintang we affirmed the principle of waging struggles "on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint", and in united front work we pointed out the necessity of "unity, struggle, unity through struggle". Thus we maintained the Anti-Japanese National United Front throughout the country as well as in the base areas.

The third stage extends from 1943 to the present. Our various policies have become more effective and, in particular, the rectification movement and the development of production have yielded results of a fundamental nature, thereby making our Party invincible both ideologically and materially. Moreover, last year we learned, or began to learn, how to carry out our policy on the examination of the histories of cadres and our policy on combating secret agents. It is in these circumstances that our base areas have again expanded, that the population has risen to over 80,000,000, including those paying the grain tax only to us and those paying it both to us and to the Japanese and puppets, that our army has grown to 470,000 and our people's militia to 2,270,000, and that our Party membership has reached 900,000 and more.

In 1943 the Japanese militarists made no appreciable change in their policy towards China and continued to direct their main attacks at the Communist Party. For more than three years, from 1941 to the present, over 60 per cent of the Japanese troops in China have been pressing hard on the anti-Japanese base areas led by our Party. During these years the several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops who were left behind the enemy lines have been unable to withstand the blows of Japanese imperialism; about half surrendered, about half were wiped out, and only a small number survived and withdrew. Those Kuomintang troops who surrendered have turned and attacked our Party, which has consequently had to resist over 90 per cent of the puppet troops. The Kuomintang has only had to resist less than 40 per cent of the Japanese forces and less than 10 per cent of the puppet troops. For fully five and a half years since the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese militarists have not launched a single strategic offensive on the Kuomintang front; there have been only a few relatively big operations (in Chekiang-Kiangsi, Changsha western Hupeh, southern Honan and Changteh), and even these were mere raids, while they concentrated their main attention on the anti-Japanese base areas led by our Party. In this situation, the Kuomintang has pursued the policy of "retreating into the mountains" and "watching others fight", simply staving off blows when the enemy advanced and looking on with folded arms when he withdrew. In 1943 the Kuomintang became even more reactionary in its domestic policy and made its third large-scale anti-Communist onslaught, which we again repulsed.

From 1943 to the spring of this year, the Japanese aggressors have been steadily losing ground in the Pacific theatre, the United States has been intensifying its counter-offensive, and now, in the West, Hitler is tottering under the heavy blows of the Soviet Red Army. In an effort to avert their doom, the Japanese imperialists have conceived the idea of forcing the Peiping-Hankow and Hankow-Canton Railways open for through traffic and, since they have not yet succeeded in their policy of inducing the Kuomintang in Chungking to capitulate, they have found it necessary to deal it another blow; hence their plan for a large-scale offensive on the Kuomintang front this year. The Honan campaign[11] has been going on for over a month. The enemy forces there amount to only a few divisions, yet several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops have collapsed without a battle, and only the troops of miscellaneous brands have been able to put up some sort of fight. In Tang En-po's command, utter disorder prevails, with the officers estranged from their men and the troops from the people, and more than two-thirds of his total forces have been lost. Likewise, the divisions which Hu Tsung-nan dispatched to Honan collapsed at their first encounter with the enemy. This is wholly the result of the reactionary policies which the Kuomintang has rigorously enforced for the past few years. During the five and a half years since the fall of Wuhan, the theatre of war of the Liberated Areas led by the Communist Party has borne the brunt of resisting the main forces of the Japanese and puppets; and although there may be some change in the future, it can only be temporary because the Kuomintang, rendered utterly degenerate by its reactionary policy of passive resistance to Japan and active opposition to the Communists, is bound to suffer serious reverses. When that happens, our Party's task in fighting the enemy and the puppets will become heavier still. What the Kuomintang has gained from looking on with folded arms for five and a half years is the loss of its fighting capacity. What the Communist Party has gained from fighting and struggling hard for five and a half years is the strengthening of its fighting capacity. This is what will decide China's destiny.

Comrades can see for themselves that in the seven years since July 1937 the people's democratic forces under the leadership of our Party have gone through three phases — a rise, a decline and a new rise. We have beaten back the ferocious attacks of the Japanese invaders, established extensive revolutionary base areas, greatly expanded the Party and the army, repulsed three large-scale anti-Communist onslaughts by the Kuomintang and overcome the erroneous Right and "Left" ideologies in the Party; and the whole Party has gained much valuable experience. This sums up our work over the past seven years.

Our present task is to prepare ourselves for a still greater responsibility. We must prepare to drive the Japanese invaders out of China, whatever the circumstances. To enable our Party to shoulder this responsibility, we must further expand and consolidate our Party, our army and base areas, pay attention to work in the big cities and along the main lines of communication and raise the work in the cities to a position of equal importance with that in the base areas.

As for out work in the base areas, during the first stage these areas were greatly expanded but not consolidated, and so in the second stage they contracted as soon as they came under the heavy blows of the enemy. In the second stage all the anti-Japanese base areas led by our Party went through a hard tempering process and improved greatly as compared with the first stage; the cadres and Party members considerably advanced their ideological and political level, and learned many things they did not know before. But it takes time to clarify thinking and to study policy, and we have still much to learn. Our Party is not yet sufficiently strong, not yet sufficiently united or consolidated, and so cannot yet take on greater responsibility than we now carry. From now on the problem is further to expand and consolidate our Party, our army and base areas in the continued prosecution of the War of Resistance; this is the first indispensable item in our ideological and material preparation for the gigantic work of the future. Without this preparation, we shall not be able to drive out the Japanese invaders and liberate the whole of China.

Our work in the big cities and along the main lines of communication has always been very inadequate. If now we do not strive to rally around our Party the tens of millions of the toiling masses and other people oppressed by the Japanese imperialists in the big cities and along the main lines of communication, and do not prepare armed mass insurrections, our army and rural base areas will face all sorts of difficulties for lack of co-ordination with the cities. For more than ten years we have been in the countryside and have had to encourage people to know the countryside well and to build the rural base areas. During these ten years and more the task of preparing insurrections in the cities, as decided by the Party's Sixth National Congress, was not and could not have been carried out. But now it is different, and the resolution of the Sixth National Congress will be carried out after the Seventh National Congress. This Congress will probably be held soon and will discuss the problems of strengthening our work in the cities and winning nation-wide victory.

The industrial conference of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, now in session, is of great significance. In 1937 the number of factory workers in the Border Region was only 700, it increased to 7,000 by 1942 and is now 12,000. These figures are not to be treated lightly. While we are in the base areas, we must learn how to administer the industry, commerce and communications of big cities, or otherwise we shall not know what to do when the time comes. Thus the second indispensable item in our ideological and material preparation for the future is to organize for armed insurrections in the big cities and along the main lines of communication and to learn how to administer industry and commerce. Without this preparation too, we shall not be able to drive out the Japanese invaders and liberate the whole of China.

III

In order to win new victories we must call on our Party cadres to get rid of the baggage and start up the machinery. "To get rid of the baggage" means to free our minds of many encumbrances. Many things may become baggage, may become encumbrances, if we cling to them blindly and uncritically. Let us take some illustrations. Having made mistakes, you may feel that, come what may, you are saddled with them and so become dispirited; if you have not made mistakes, you may feel that you are free from error and so become conceited. Lack of achievement in work may breed pessimism and depression, while achievement may breed pride and arrogance. A comrade with a short record of struggle may shirk responsibility on this account, while a veteran may become opinionated because of his long record of struggle. Worker and peasant comrades, because of pride in their class origin, may look down upon intellectuals, while intellectuals, because they have a certain amount of knowledge, may look down upon workers and peasants. Any specialized skill may be capitalized on and so may lead to arrogance and contempt of others. Even one's age may become ground for conceit. The young, because they are bright and capable, may look down upon the old; and the old, because they are rich in experience, may look down upon the young. All such things become encumbrances or baggage if there is no critical awareness. An important reason why some comrades are very lofty, isolating themselves from the masses and making repeated mistakes, is that they carry such baggage. Thus, a prerequisite for maintaining close links with the masses and making fewer mistakes is to examine one's baggage, to get rid of it and so emancipate the mind. There have been several occasions in the history of our Party when great conceit manifested itself and we suffered in consequence. The first was in the early half of 1927. The Northern Expeditionary Army had reached Wuhan, and some comrades became so proud and overweening as to forget that the Kuomintang was about to assault us. The result was the error of the Chen Tu-hsiu line, which brought defeat to the revolution. The second occasion was in 1930. Taking advantage of Chiang Kai-shek's large-scale war against Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan,[12] the Red Army won a number of battles, and again some comrades became proud and overweening. The result was the error of the Li-san line, again causing some losses to the revolutionary forces. The third occasion was in 1931. The Red Army had smashed the Kuomintang's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign and, immediately afterwards, faced with the Japanese invasion, the people throughout the country started the stormy and heroic anti-Japanese movement, and again some comrades became proud and overweening. The result was an even more serious error in the political line, which cost us about 90 per cent of the revolutionary forces that we had built up with so much toil. The fourth occasion was in 1938. The War of Resistance had begun and the united front had been established; and once again some comrades became proud and overweening. As a result they committed an error somewhat similar to the Chen Tu-hsiu line. This time the revolutionary work suffered serious damage in those places where the effects of these comrades' erroneous ideas were more especially pronounced. Comrades throughout the Party should take warning from these instances of pride and error. Recently we have reprinted Kuo Mo-jo's essay on Li Tzu-cheng,[13] so that comrades may also take warning from this story and not repeat the error of becoming conceited at the moment of success.

"To start up the machinery" means to make good use of the organ of thought. Although some people carry no baggage and have the virtue of close contact with the masses, they fail to accomplish anything because they do not know how to think searchingly or are unwilling to use their brains to think much and think hard. Others refuse to use their brains because they are carrying baggage which cramps their intellect. Lenin and Stalin often advised people to use their brains, and we should give the same advice. This mechanism, the brain, has the special function of thinking. Mencius said, "The office of the mind is to think."[14] He defined the function of the brain correctly. We should always use our brains and think everything over carefully. A common saying goes, "Knit the brows and you will hit upon a stratagem." In other words, much thinking yields wisdom. In order to get rid of the practice of acting blindly which is so common in our Party, we must encourage our comrades to think, to learn the method of analysis and to cultivate the habit of analysis. There is all too little of this habit in our Party. If we get rid of our baggage and start up the machinery, if we march with light packs and know how to think hard, then we are sure to triumph.

NOTES

[1] Chen Tu-hsiu was originally a professor at Peking University and became famous as an editor of *New Youth*. He was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. Because of his reputation at the time of the May 4th Movement and owing to the Party's immaturity in its initial period, he became General Secretary of the Party. In the last period of the revolution of 1924-27, the Rightist thinking in the Party represented by Chen Tu-hsiu developed into a line of capitulationism. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has observed that the capitulationists at that time "voluntarily gave up the Party's leadership of the peasant masses, urban petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie, and in particular gave up the Party's leadership of the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of the revolution" ("The Present Situation and Our Tasks", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1961, Vol. IV, p. 171). After the defeat of 1927 Chen Tu-hsiu and a handful of other capitulationists lost faith in the future of the revolution and became liquidationists. They took the reactionary Trotskyist stand and together with the Trotskyites formed a small anti-Party group. Consequently Chen Tu-hsiu was expelled from the Party in November 1929. He died in 1942.

[2] The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in January 1931.

[3] The Tsunyi Meeting was the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau called by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, in January 1935.

[4] See V. I. Lenin, "'Communism'", in which Lenin, criticizing the Hungarian Communist Bela Kun, said that he "gives up the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, the concrete analysis of concrete conditions" (*Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1950, Vol. XXXI, p. 143).

[5] The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in July 8 adopted the following Ten-Point Programme: (1) overthrow imperialist rule; (2) confiscate foreign capitalist enterprises and banks; (3) unify China and recognize the right of the nationalities to self-determination; (6) overthrow the Kuomintang warlord government; (5) establish a government of councils of workers, peasants and soldiers; (6) institute the eight-hour day, increase wages, and establish unemployment relief and social insurance; (7) confiscate the land of all landlords and distribute the land among the peasants; (8) improve the living conditions of the soldiers, give land and jobs to ex-soldiers; (9) abolish all exorbitant taxes and

miscellaneous levies and adopt a consolidated progressive tax; and (10) unite with the world proletariat, unite with the Soviet Union.

[6] The Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in January 1934.

[7] This session of the Political Bureau in September 1941 reviewed the question of the political line in the past history of the Party, especially during the Second Revolutionary Civil War.

[8] The "mountain-stronghold" mentality was a tendency to form cliques and arose mainly out of the circumstances of the protracted guerrilla war in which rural revolutionary bases were scattered and cut off from each other. Most of these bases were first established in mountain regions. Each tended to regard itself as a compact unit, like a single mountain stronghold, so this wrong tendency became known as mountain-stronghold mentality.

[9] In the relatively stable parts of the base areas the people paid the regular grain tax only to the anti-Japanese democratic government. But in the outlying parts of the base areas and the guerrilla zones, which were constantly harassed by the enemy, the people were often forced to pay another grain levy to the enemy's puppet government.

[10] In March 1941 the Japanese invaders and Chinese traitors in northern China proclaimed a "campaign for tightening public security", which included raiding the people's houses, establishing the neighbourhood guarantee system, making house-to-house check-ups and organizing puppet troops, all for the purpose of suppressing the anti-Japanese forces.

[11] In March 1944 the Japanese invaders launched their campaign in Honan Province with a force of 50,000 to 60,000 men. The 400,000 Kuomintang troops under Chiang Ting-wen, Tang En-po and Hu Tsung-nan melted away before the Japanese invaders. Thirty-eight counties, including Chengchow and Loyang, fell to the enemy one after another. Tang En-po lost 200,000 men.

[12] This large-scale war between the warlords, with Chiang Kai-shek on the one side and Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan on the other, was fought along the Lunghai and Tientsin-Pukow Railways. It lasted six months, from May to October. Casualties on both sides reached 300,000.

[13] Kuo Mo-jo wrote the essay "The Tercentenary of the 1644 Uprising" in 1944 to commemorate the victory of the peasant uprising led by Li Tzu-cheng in the last years of the Ming Dynasty. He explained that the uprising met with defeat in 1645 because, after the entry of the peasant forces into Peking in 1644, some of their leaders were corrupted by luxurious living, and factional strife arose. The essay first appeared in *New China Daily* in Chungking and was later published as a pamphlet in Yenan and elsewhere in the Liberated Areas.

[14] From *Mencius*, Book XI, "Kao Tzu", Part I.

APPENDIX: RESOLUTION ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS IN THE HISTORY OF OUR PARTY

Adopted on April 20, 1945
by the Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of
the Sixth Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China

I

Ever since its birth in 1921, the Communist Party of China has made the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution the guiding principle in all its work, and Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory and practice of the Chinese revolution represent this integration. With the founding of our Party a new stage of the Chinese revolution was immediately unfolded, the stage of the new-democratic revolution, as pointed out by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Throughout the twenty-four years of struggle for New Democracy (from 1921 to 1945), throughout the three historical periods — the First Great Revolution, the Agrarian Revolution and the War of Resistance Against Japan — our Party has consistently led the broad masses of the Chinese people in extremely arduous and bitter revolutionary struggles against their enemies, imperialism and feudalism, and has gained great successes and rich experience. In the course of its struggle the Party has produced its own leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Representing the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese people, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has creatively applied the scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism, the acme of human wisdom, to China, a large semi-feudal and semi-colonial country in which the peasantry constitutes the bulk of the masses and the immediate task is to fight against imperialism and feudalism, a country with a vast area and a huge population, where the situation is extremely complicated and the struggle extremely hard, and he has brilliantly developed the theories of Lenin and Stalin on the colonial and semi-colonial question as well as Stalin's theory concerning the Chinese revolution. It is only because the Party has firmly adhered to the correct Marxist-Leninist line and waged a victorious struggle against all erroneous ideas opposed to this line that it has scored great achievements in these three periods, has arrived at today's unprecedented ideological, political and organizational solidarity and unity, has developed into the powerful revolutionary force of today, having over 1,200,000 members and leading China's Liberated Areas with their population of nearly 100,000,000 and an army of nearly 1,000,000, and has become the centre of gravity for the whole nation in the War of Resistance Against Japan and in the cause of liberation.

II

In the first period of China's new-democratic revolution, from 1921 to 1927, and especially from 1924 to 1927, the great anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution of the Chinese people, correctly guided by the Communist International and influenced, impelled forward and organized by the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, advanced rapidly and won great victories. In this great revolution, the whole membership of the Communist Party of China carried out tremendous revolutionary work, developed the labour, youth and peasant movements throughout the country, pushed forward and assisted in the reorganization of the Kuomintang and the formation of the National Revolutionary Army, provided the political backbone of the Eastern Campaign[1] and the Northern Expedition, led the great nation-wide struggle against imperialism and feudalism, and so wrote a most glorious chapter in the history of the Chinese revolution. Nevertheless, this revolution ended in defeat because in 1927 the clique of reactionaries in the Kuomintang, which was then our ally, betrayed the revolution; because the combined forces of the imperialists and the reactionary Kuomintang clique were then too strong; and in particular because the Rightist ideology in our Party, represented by Chen Tu-hsiu, developed into a line of capitulation during the concluding period of this revolution (for about six months) and dominated the Party's leading body, which refused to carry out the many wise directives of the Communist International and of Comrade Stalin and

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refused to accept the correct views of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and other comrades, with the result that, when the Kuomintang betrayed the revolution and sprang a surprise attack on the people, the Party and the people were unable to organize effective resistance.

In the ten years from the defeat of the revolution in 1927 to the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan in 1937, it was the Communist Party of China, and the Communist Party of China alone, which continued in unity to hold aloft the great banner of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism under the counter-revolutionary reign of extreme terror and which led the broad masses of workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals and other revolutionaries in great political, military and ideological struggles. During these struggles the Communist Party of China created the Red Army, established the government of Councils of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers, set up revolutionary bases, distributed land to impoverished peasants and resisted both the attacks of the reactionary Kuomintang government and, after September 18, 1931, the aggression of Japanese imperialism. As a result, the Chinese people achieved great successes in their new-democratic cause of national and social liberation. Similarly, the whole Party fought in unity against the counter-revolutionary activities of the Trotskyist Chen Tu-hsiu clique and of Lo Chang-lung,[2] Chang Kuo-tao[3] and others who tried to split the Party and who betrayed it; thus the unity of the Party on the basis of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism was ensured. Over these ten years, this general policy of the Party and the heroic struggles to carry it out were entirely correct and necessary. Countless Party members, countless numbers of the people and many revolutionaries outside the Party carried on fiery revolutionary struggles on the various fronts, dauntlessly fighting and sacrificing themselves, indomitably stepping into the breach as others fell; by their spirit and deeds they have won immortality in our nation's history. Without all this, the War of Resistance Against Japan could not have been effected; or having been effected, it could not have been sustained and carried through to victory because it would not have had as its backbone a Communist Party which had accumulated a rich experience of people's war. This is beyond all doubt.

We rejoice especially in the fact that in those ten years our Party, with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its representative, made very great advances in creatively applying to Chinese conditions the revolutionary theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. At last, towards the end of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, our Party definitely established the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the central leading body and throughout the Party. This was the greatest achievement of the Communist Party of China in that period and it is the surest guarantee of the liberation of the Chinese people.

We must point out, however, that besides its great achievements in those ten years, our Party at certain times committed a number of errors. The gravest of all was the "Left" error in the political, military and organizational lines from the time of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party in January 1931 to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in January 1935 (the Tsunyi Meeting). That error caused serious losses to our Party and to the Chinese revolution.

In order to learn the historic lessons of the Chinese revolution, "to learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones and to cure the sickness to save the patient", to make "the overturning of the chariot in front a warning for the chariot behind" and in order, on the basis of a common Marxist-Leninist ideology, to unite the whole Party like one harmonious family, like solid steel, to fight for total victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and for the complete liberation of the Chinese people, this Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China considers it useful and necessary to set forth formal conclusions on certain questions of Party history during those ten years, and particularly on the line of the central leadership from the Fourth Plenary Session to the Tsunyi Meeting.

III

After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, both "Left" and Right deviations occurred in our Party.

The handful of capitulationists of the period of the First Great Revolution, with Chen Tu-hsiu as their representative, became pessimistic about the future of the revolution and gradually turned into liquidationists. They took the reactionary Trotskyist stand, holding that after the 1927 revolution the Chinese bourgeoisie was already victorious over imperialism and the feudal forces, that its rule over the people was being stabilized, and that Chinese society was already one in which capitalism was dominant and would develop peacefully.

Therefore, they arbitrarily asserted that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China had been completed and that the Chinese proletariat must wait until the future to make the "socialist revolution" and could engage for the time being only in a so-called legal movement centring on the slogan "For a National Assembly", thus liquidating the revolutionary movement. Therefore, they opposed all the revolutionary struggles waged by the Party and slandered the Red Army movement as a "movement of roving rebels". They not only refused to accept the Party's advice and abandon their opportunist, liquidationist anti-Party viewpoint, but even joined with the reactionary Trotskyites[4] and formed an anti-Party faction; as a result, they had to be expelled from the Party and later degenerated into counter-revolutionaries.

On the other hand, petty-bourgeois revolutionary impetuosity, which was aggravated by hatred of the Kuomintang's policy of massacre and by indignation at Chen Tu-hsiu's capitulationism, was also reflected in the Party and led to a rapid growth of "Left" sentiment. This "Left" sentiment first appeared at the emergency meeting of the Party's Central Committee on August 7, 1927. In the history of the Party the August 7th Meeting made a positive contribution. At a critical moment in the Chinese revolution, it resolutely corrected and ended the capitulationism of Chen Tu-hsiu, decided upon a general policy of Agrarian Revolution and armed resistance to the Kuomintang reactionaries' massacres and called on the Party and the masses to continue the revolutionary fight. All this was correct and constituted the main aspect of the meeting. But in combating Right errors the meeting paved the way for "Left" errors. Politically, it failed to realize that either appropriate counter-attacks or necessary tactical retreats had to be organized at that time, according to the different conditions in the different localities, in order to preserve revolutionary positions and muster the revolutionary forces in a planned way. Instead, it tolerated and fostered tendencies towards adventurism and commandism (especially the forcing of workers to strike). Organizationally, the meeting initiated excessive and sectarian inner-Party struggles, unduly or improperly stressed the importance of the leading cadres' being exclusively of working-class origin and brought about a rather serious state of ultra-democracy in the Party. After the August 7th Meeting this "Left" sentiment continued to grow until, at the enlarged meeting of the central leading body in November 1927, it took shape in a "Left" line of putschism (*i.e.*, adventurism) and for the first time brought the "Left" line into a dominant position in the central leading body of the Party. The putschists then maintained that the Chinese revolution was by nature a so-called permanent revolution (they confused the democratic with the socialist revolution) and that the Chinese revolution was in a situation of so-called permanent upsurge (they denied the defeat of the 1927 revolution). Consequently, they not only failed to organize an orderly retreat but, on the contrary, disregarding the enemy's strength and the state of the masses after the defeat of the revolution, they ordered handfuls of members and followers of the Party to stage local insurrections all over the country which had not the slightest hope of success. Along with this political adventurism, there also developed a sectarian organizational policy of attacking comrades. However, as this wrong line from its outset evoked correct criticism and objection on the part of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and many comrades working in the White areas, and as it caused many losses in practical work, it had ceased to be applied in many places by the beginning of 1928 and by April of the same year (less than six months from its beginning) it was virtually terminated in practical work throughout the country.

The line of the Sixth National Congress of the Party, held in July 1928, was basically correct. The Congress rightly affirmed that Chinese society was semi-colonial and semi-feudal, pointed out that none of the fundamental contradictions giving rise to the contemporary Chinese revolution had yet been resolved, and therefore defined the Chinese revolution at the present stage as still a bourgeois-democratic revolution and proclaimed a Ten-Point Programme[5] for that democratic revolution. The Congress correctly pointed out that the current political situation was an interval between two revolutionary high tides, that the development of the revolution was uneven and that the general task of the Party at the time was not to take the offensive or organize insurrections but to win over the masses. It waged a two front struggle, repudiating both Right Chen Tu-hsiuism and "Left" putschism, and in particular indicated that the most dangerous tendency in the Party consisted in putschism, military adventurism and commandism which alienate the masses. All this was absolutely necessary. On the other hand, the Sixth Congress also had its shortcomings and mistakes. It lacked correct estimates and policies concerning the dual character of the intermediate classes and the internal contradictions among the reactionary forces; it also lacked the necessary understanding of the Party's need for an orderly tactical retreat after the defeat of the Great Revolution, of the importance of rural base areas and of the protracted nature of the democratic revolution. Although these shortcomings and mistakes prevented the thorough eradication of the "Left" ideas existing after the August 7th Meeting, and although they were made more extreme and were greatly magnified by the subsequent "Left" ideas, nevertheless they cannot eclipse the correctness of the Congress in its main aspect. For some time after the Congress, the Party's work was fruitful. During that time, Comrade Mao Tse-tung not only, in practice, developed the correct aspect of the line of the Sixth Congress and correctly solved many problems which the Congress had either not solved or had solved incorrectly, but also, in theory, provided a fuller and more concrete, scientific Marxist-Leninist basis for the orientation of the Chinese revolution. Under his guidance and influence, the Red Army movement gradually developed into an important political factor in the country. In the White areas, too, Party organizations and Party work to some extent revived.

But during the second half of 1929 and the first half of 1930 certain "Left" ideas and policies that still existed in the Party once more gained some ground. From this basis they developed into the second "Left" line when events turned in favour of the revolution. Excited by the domestic situation after the outbreak of war in May 1930 between Chiang Kai-shek on the one side and Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan on the other, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, led by Comrade Li Li-san, adopted on June 11 the "Left" resolution, "The New Revolutionary High Tide and Winning Victory First in One or More Provinces", whereupon the "Left" line came to dominate the central leading body for the second time. This wrong line (the Li Li-san line) arose for a number of reasons. It arose because Li Li-san and other comrades failed to recognize that the revolution required adequate preparation by the building up of its own organizational strength, but held that "the masses want only big actions, not small ones", and therefore believed that the incessant wars among the warlords at the time, together with the initial unfolding of the Red Army movement and the initial revival of our work in the White areas, already provided conditions for "big actions" (armed insurrections) throughout the country. It arose because they failed to recognize the uneven development of the Chinese revolution but held that the revolutionary crisis was growing uniformly in all parts of the country, that preparations should be made everywhere for immediate insurrections and that the key cities in particular should take the lead and become centres of a nation-wide revolutionary upsurge; and they slandered as "utterly erroneous . . . localism and conservatism characteristic of peasant mentality" Comrade Mao Tse-tung's idea that for a long time we should employ our main strength to create rural base areas, use the rural areas to encircle the cities and use these bases to advance a high tide of nation-wide revolution. It arose because they failed to recognize the uneven development of world revolution but held that the general outbreak of the Chinese revolution would inevitably lead to a general outbreak of world revolution, without which the Chinese revolution could not possibly be successful. And it arose because they failed to recognize the protracted character of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution but held that the beginning of victory in one or more provinces would mark the beginning of the transition to socialist revolution, and so they formulated a number of untimely and "Left" policies. With these wrong views, the leaders of the Li Li-san line drew up an adventurist plan for organizing armed insurrections in the key cities throughout the country and for concentrating the whole of the Red Army to attack these cities. Then they merged the various leading bodies of the Party, the Youth League and the trade unions into action committees at corresponding levels for preparing armed insurrections, and thus brought all day-to-day work to a standstill. In the course of formulating and executing these wrong decisions, Comrade Li Li-san rejected the correct criticisms and suggestions of many comrades and stressed the fight within the Party against the so-called "Right deviation", under the slogan of which he wrongly attacked those cadres who disagreed with his views, thereby deepening inner-Party sectarianism. Thus, the Li Li-san line assumed a more fully developed form than did the first "Left" line.

However, the domination of the Li Li-san line in the Party was also short-lived (lasting less than four months). Since the Party and the revolutionary forces suffered losses wherever this line was put into practice, broad sections of cadres and Party members demanded that it should be corrected. Comrade Mao Tse-tung in particular never agreed with the Li Li-san line, and indeed most patiently corrected the "Left" mistakes of the First Front Army of the Red Army;[6] consequently, instead of suffering losses in this period, the Red Army in the revolutionary base in Kiangsi actually grew stronger by utilizing the favourable situation created by the war between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, and it successfully smashed the enemy's first campaign of "encirclement and suppression" in late 1930 and early 1931. With a few exceptions, the Red Army in the other revolutionary base areas achieved similar results. In the White areas also, there were many comrades engaged in practical work who opposed the Li Li-san line through the organizational channels of the Party.

The Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee held in September 1930 and the subsequent central leadership played a positive role in putting an end to the application of the Li Li-san line. Although the documents of this session showed a conciliatory and compromising spirit with regard to the Li Li-san line (for instance, in denying that it was a wrong line and in saying that it was only "wrong tactically") and although organizationally this session continued the error of sectarianism, it nevertheless corrected the ultra-Left appraisal of the situation of the Chinese revolution, dropped the plan for organizing a general nation-wide insurrection and concentrating the whole of the Red Army to attack key cities, and restored the independent organizations and the day-to-day work of the Party, the Youth League and the trade unions; it thereby terminated the most characteristic errors of the Li Li-san line. At the Third Plenary Session, Comrade Li Li-san himself admitted the mistakes that had been pointed out and then relinquished his leading position in the Political Bureau. The central leadership after the Third Plenary Session, going a step further, declared in its supplementary resolution of November 1930 and in Circular No. 96 of December that the line of Li Li-san and other comrades was wrong and that the conciliatory attitude of the plenary session was wrong too. Of course, both the Third Plenary Session and the subsequent central leadership failed to examine the ideological essence of the Li Li-san line thoroughly and to correct it, and so certain "Left" ideas and policies that had existed within the Party ever since the August 7th Meeting in 1927, and especially since 1929, strongly persisted at this session and afterwards. However, since both the Third Plenary Session and the subsequent central leadership did take the positive measures described above to end the Li Li-san line, all Party comrades should have made further efforts, on the basis of these measures, to carry through the struggle against the "Left" errors.

But at this time, a number of Party comrades who were inexperienced in practical revolutionary struggle and guilty of "Left dogmatist errors came forward, with Comrade Chen Shao-yu (Wang

Ming) at their head, and fought against the central leadership under the banners of "Against the Li Li-san Line" and "Against the Line of Conciliation", taking a sectarian stand even more violent than that of the Li Li-san line. Their fight was not designed to help the central leadership liquidate the ideological essence of the Li Li-san line and those "Left" ideas and policies which had existed in the Party since the August 7th Meeting in 1927, and particularly since 1929, and had never been thoroughly dealt with. They put forward what was actually a new political programme in Comrade Chen Shao-yu's pamphlet published at that time, *The Two Lines* or *The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China*, a programme that continued, revived or developed the Li Li-san line and other "Left" ideas and policies in a new guise. Thus, there was a further growth of "Left" ideas in the Party which took the form of a new "Left" line.

Although this new "Left" line under Comrade Chen Shao-yu's leadership criticized the "Left" errors of the Li Li-san line and the error of conciliation on the part of the Third Plenary Session, its distinctive feature was that it mainly criticized the Li Li-san line as "Rightist", that it accused the Third Plenary Session of "doing nothing to expose and attack the consistently Right opportunist theory and practice of the Li Li-san line" and that it blamed Circular No. 96 for failure to see that "the Right deviation is still the main danger in the Party at present". On the question of the nature of Chinese society and class relations, the new "Left" line exaggerated the relative weight of capitalism in China's economy, exaggerated the significance of the struggle against the bourgeoisie and the rich peasants and the significance of the "elements of socialist revolution" at the present stage of the Chinese revolution, and denied the existence of the intermediate camp and of third parties and groups. On the question of the revolutionary situation and the tasks of the Party, the new "Left" line continued to stress that there was a "revolutionary high tide" throughout the country and that the Party should have a "line of taking the offensive" on a national scale, and it held that an "immediate revolutionary situation" would soon occur in one or more major provinces containing key cities. From a "Left" viewpoint it slanderously asserted that in China there was as yet no "genuine" Red Army and no "genuine" government of Councils of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers and asserted with special emphasis that the main danger in the Party then consisted of "Right opportunism", "opportunism in practical work" and "the rich peasant line". Organizationally, the exponents of this new "Left" line violated discipline, refused the work assigned them by the Party, committed the error of joining with a number of other comrades in factional activities against the central leadership, wrongly called upon the Party membership to set up a provisional central leading body and demanded that "fighting cadres" who "actively support and pursue" their "Left" line should be used to "reform and strengthen the leading bodies at all levels"; they thereby created a serious crisis in the Party. Hence, generally speaking, the new "Left" line was more determined, more "theoretical", more domineering and more fully articulated in its "Leftism" than the Li Li-san line, even though it did not call for organizing insurrections in the key cities and, for a time, did not call for concentrating the Red Army to attack those cities.

In January 1931 the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party was convened under circumstances in which pressure was being applied from all directions by the "Left" dogmatist and sectarian elements headed by Comrade Chen Shao-yu and in which some comrades in the central leading body who had committed empiricist errors were compromising with these elements and supporting them. The convening of this session played no positive or constructive role; the outcome was the acceptance of the new "Left" line, its triumph in the central leading body and the beginning of the domination of a "Left" line in the Party for the third time during the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War. The Fourth Plenary Session immediately put into effect two interrelated and erroneous tenets in the programme of the new "Left" line: the fight against the alleged "Right deviation" as the "main danger in the Party at present", and the "reform and strengthening of the leading bodies at all levels". Ostensibly it still carried the banner of opposition to the Li Li-san line and to the "line of conciliation", but in essence its political programme was chiefly "against the Right deviation". In its resolutions, the Fourth Plenary Session did not analyse the current political situation or lay down concrete political tasks for the Party and merely opposed the so-called "Right deviation" and "opportunism in practical work" in a general way, but in fact it approved Comrade Chen Shao-yu's pamphlet, *The Two Lines* or *The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China*, the pamphlet which represented the "Left" ideas in the Party and was taken by people then, and for another ten years or more, to have played a "correct programmatic role", although, as can be seen from the above analysis, it was basically a completely wrong, "Left" opportunist general programme "against the Right deviation". Under this programme the Fourth Plenary Session and the subsequent central leadership promoted the "Left" dogmatist and sectarian comrades to responsible positions in the central leading body on the one hand; on the other, they excessively attacked those comrades who had committed the errors of the Li Li-san line, wrongly attacked those comrades headed by Chu Chiu-pai[7] who were alleged to have committed "the error of the line of conciliation", and immediately after the session the Central Committee wrongly attacked the great majority of the so-called "Rightist" comrades. In fact, the then "Rightists" were mainly the creation of the factionalist struggle "against the Right deviation" conducted at this session. Of course, among these people there was a handful of splitters headed by Lo Chang-lung, who later became real Rightists, degenerated into counter-revolutionaries and were permanently expelled from the Party, and who, beyond any doubt, had to be resolutely combated; their establishment of a duplicate Party organization and their persistence in maintaining it were absolutely impermissible according to Party discipline. But as for Lin Yu-nan,[8] Li Chiu-shih,[9] Ho Meng-hsiung[10] and some twenty other important Party cadres who were then attacked, they had done much useful work for the Party and the people and maintained close ties with the masses, and when they were arrested shortly afterwards, they stood firm and unyielding before the enemy and died as heroes. Comrade Chu Chiu-pai, who was alleged to have committed "the error of the line of conciliation", was then a Party leader of prestige, and after he was attacked, he continued to do much useful work (mainly in the cultural field) and died heroically in June 1935 at the hands of the enemy executioners. The memory of the proletarian heroism of all these comrades should be cherished for ever. The kind of "reform" which the Fourth Plenary Session carried out in the central body was likewise extended to the local organizations in all the revolutionary bases and White areas. As compared with the Third Plenary Session and the subsequent central leadership, the central leadership after the Fourth Plenary Session was more insistent and more systematic in sending its representatives, agencies or new leading cadres to all parts of the country to carry through its fight "against the Right deviation".

The resolutions issued by the central leadership on May 9, 1931, shortly after the Fourth Plenary Session, showed that the new "Left" line was already being concretely applied and developed in practical work. Then a series of major events occurred in China. Before the central leadership following the Fourth Plenary Session had time to carry through its erroneous line, the Red Army of the Central Area in Kiangsi, under the correct leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and through the vigorous efforts of all comrades, won great victories and smashed the enemy's second and third campaigns of "encirclement and suppression"; most of the other revolutionary base areas and Red Army units also won many victories and made much progress in the same period and under the same conditions. Meanwhile, the Japanese imperialist invasion, which began with the September 18th Incident in 1931, aroused a new upsurge in the national democratic movement throughout the country. From the very beginning, the new central leadership made an entirely wrong appraisal of the new situation created by these events. It greatly exaggerated both the current crisis of the Kuomintang regime and the growth of the revolutionary forces; it ignored the fact that after the September 18th Incident the national contradiction between China and Japan was mounting and that the intermediate classes were making demands for resistance to Japan and for democracy; it emphasized that Japanese imperialism and other imperialist powers would combine to attack the Soviet Union and that the imperialist powers, the Chinese counter-revolutionary cliques and even the intermediate groups would combine to attack the Chinese revolution; and it categorically asserted that the intermediate groups were the most dangerous enemy of the Chinese revolution. The new central leadership therefore continued to advocate "down with everything" and held that "the very heart of the political situation in China is a life-and-death struggle between counter-revolution and revolution"; hence it once again put forward many adventurist proposals, such as the seizure of key cities by the Red Army in order to win victory first in one or more provinces, the arming of workers and peasants everywhere in the White areas and the calling of general strikes there. These errors first found expression in its "Resolution on the Urgent Tasks Arising from the Smashing of the Enemy's Third Campaign of 'Encirclement and Suppression' by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and from the Gradual Maturing of the Revolutionary Crisis", dated September 20, 1931. They were repeated and given fuller expression in the following documents, which were drawn up either by the subsequent provisional central leadership or under its guidance:

"Resolution on the Forcible Occupation of Manchuria by Japanese Imperialism" (September 22, 1931);

"Resolution on the Struggle for the Victory of the Revolution First in One or More Provinces" (January 9, 1932);

"Resolution on the January 28th Incident" (February 26, 1932);

"Opportunist Vacillation Within the Communist Party of China in the Struggle for the Victory of the Chinese Revolution First in One or More Provinces" (April 4, 1932);

"Resolution of the Central Area Bureau of the Central Committee on Leadership of and Participation in a Campaign Week Against the Imperialist Attack on the Soviet Union and Against Partition of China and for Extending the National Revolutionary War" (May 11, 1932); and

"The Mounting Revolutionary Crisis and the Tasks of the Party in Northern China" (June 24, 1932).

The period from the establishment of the provisional central leadership headed by Comrade Chin Pang-hsien (Po Ku)[11] in September 1931 to the Tsunyi Meeting in January 1935 was one of continued development of the third "Left" line. During this period, because of the serious damage the incorrect line had done to the work in the White areas, the provisional central leadership moved to the southern Kiangsi base area early in 1933, and this move facilitated the further application of its incorrect line there and in the neighbouring base areas. Before that, the correct line followed in the base areas of southern Kiangsi and western Fukien had already been maligned by the Party congress of the southern Kiangsi base area in November 1931 and by the Ningtu Meeting of the Central Bureau of the Red Base Areas in August 1932, in accordance with the erroneous programme of the Fourth Plenary Session "against the Right deviation" and for "reforming the leading bodies at all levels" — the correct line had been called a "rich peasant line" and an "error of the most serious and consistent Right opportunism" and the correct Party and military leadership had been removed. Nevertheless, owing to the profound influence in the Red Army of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's correct strategic principles, the campaign against the fourth "encirclement and suppression" achieved victory in the spring of 1933 before the erroneous line of the provisional central leadership had been fully enforced in the army. On the other hand, an utterly wrong strategy gained complete control in the campaign against the fifth "encirclement and suppression", which started at the close of 1933. In many other policies, too, and particularly in the policy regarding the Fukien Incident, the erroneous "Left" line was fully applied.

The Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, convened by the provisional central leadership in January 1934, marked the peak of the development of the third "Left" line. Disregarding the setbacks which the "Left" line had caused the Chinese revolutionary movement and the people's anti-Japanese democratic movement in the Kuomintang areas after the incidents of September 18, 1931 and January 28, 1932, the Fifth Plenary Session blindly concluded that "the revolutionary crisis in China has reached a new acute stage — an immediate revolutionary situation exists in China" and that the struggle against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" was a "struggle for the complete victory of the Chinese revolution", which would decide for China "the question of 'who conquers whom', of the road of revolution or the road of colonialism". Repeating the views of the Li Li-san line, this session declared that "when we have extended the democratic revolution of the workers and peasants to important parts of China, the socialist revolution will become the basic task of the Communist Party; only on this basis can China be unified and the Chinese people achieve national liberation", etc., etc. Using the slogans of fighting "Right opportunism, the main danger", "fighting the conciliatory attitude towards Right opportunism" and fighting "the use of double-dealing to sabotage the Party line in practical work", it continued and developed the excessive factional struggles and the policy of attacking comrades.

In the revolutionary base areas the most disastrous consequence of the third "Left" line was the failure of the campaign against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" in the area where the central leading body was located and the withdrawal from there of the main forces of the Red Army. In the military operations during the withdrawal from Kiangsi and on the Long March, a different error, the error of flightism, was committed under the "Left" line, causing further losses to the Red Army. Similarly, on account of the domination of the "Left" line, the Party's work suffered defeat in most of the other revolutionary bases (the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi area, the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei area, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi area, the Hunan-Kiangsi area, the western Hunan-Hupeh area and the Szechuan-Shensi area) and in the vast White areas. As for the Chang Kuo-tao line, which once dominated the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei and the Szechuan-Shensi areas, it not only was a "Left" line of the general type but was also characterized by a particularly serious form of warlordism and by flightism in the face of enemy attacks.

Such was the main content of the erroneous "Left" line which dominated the whole Party for the third time and the leaders of which were the two dogmatists, Comrades Chen Shao-yu and Chin Pang-hsien.

Cloaking themselves in "Marxist-Leninist theory" and relying on the political and organizational prestige and influence built up by the Fourth Plenary Session, those comrades who were guilty of dogmatist errors were responsible for the domination of the third "Left" line in the Party for four long years, gave it the fullest and most systematic expression ideologically, politically, militarily and organizationally, and enabled it to exercise the most profound influence in the Party and consequently to do the greatest damage. Nevertheless, in defiance of the facts, the comrades guilty of this wrong line bragged long and hard about the "correctness" and the "immortal achievements" of the line of the central leadership following the Fourth Plenary Session, using such dogmatic phrases as "further bolshevization of the Communist Party of China" and "100 per cent Bolshevik". Thus they completely distorted the history of the Party.

The comrades who advocated the correct line, with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as their representative, were diametrically opposed to the third "Left" line during the period of its domination. They disagreed with the "Left" line and demanded that it should be corrected, and as a result their correct leadership was everywhere overthrown by the central leadership that followed the Fourth Plenary Session and by the agencies or representatives it dispatched. But the repeated failures of the "Left" line in practical work, and especially the repeated defeats in the campaign against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" in the area where the central leading body was located, had begun to reveal the wrongness of this line to more and more leading cadres and rank-and-file Party members and to arouse their doubt and dissatisfaction. After the Red Army in that area set out on the Long March, this doubt and dissatisfaction grew to such an extent that some comrades who had committed "Left" errors began to awaken and take a stand against them. Accordingly, large numbers of cadres and Party members who were opposed to the "Left" line rallied under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. It was therefore possible for the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, held under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung in January 1935 at the city of Tsunyi in Kweichow Province, triumphantly to put an end to the domination of the "Left" line in the central leading body and to save the Party at that most critical juncture.

The Tsunyi Meeting was entirely correct in concentrating all its efforts on rectifying the military and organizational errors, which at that time were of decisive significance. The meeting inaugurated a new central leadership, headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung — a historic change of paramount importance in the Chinese Communist Party. Precisely because of this change, our Party was able to conclude the Long March victoriously, to preserve and steel a hard core of cadres in the Party and the Red Army under the extremely difficult and dangerous conditions of the Long March, successfully to overcome the line of Chang Kuo-tao who insisted on retreating and fleeing and actually set up a duplicate Party, to save the northern Shensi revolutionary base area from the crisis brought about by the "Left" line,[12] to lead the national salvation movement of December 9, 1935 correctly, to settle the Sian Incident of 1936 correctly, to organize the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and to set in motion the sacred War of Resistance Against Japan.

Since the Tsunyi Meeting, the political line of the central leading body of the Party, led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has been entirely correct. The "Left" line has been gradually overcome politically, militarily and organizationally. Since 1942, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Party-wide movement for the rectification of subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing and also for the study of Party history has corrected, at their very ideological roots, the various "Left" and Right errors that have arisen in the history of the Party. The overwhelming majority of the comrades who committed "Left" or Right errors have made great progress through a long process of learning from experience and have done much good work for the Party and the people. They are now united with the masses of other comrades on the basis of a common political understanding. This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session is happy to point out that through its successes and reverses our Party has at last attained, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the unprecedentedly high level of solidarity and unity it now enjoys— ideologically, politically, organizationally and militarily. It is a Party that will soon win victory, a Party no force can conquer.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session holds that, since the stage of the War of Resistance is not yet concluded, it is appropriate to postpone to a future date the drawing of conclusions on certain questions in the history of the Party during the War of Resistance.

IV

In order that comrades may have a better understanding of the errors of the various "Left" lines, and particularly of the third "Left" line, so that, "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones", they may prevent the recurrence of such errors, we set forth the main content of these lines where they were contrary to the correct line politically, militarily, organizationally and ideologically.

1. Politically:

As Comrade Stalin pointed out[13] and as Comrade Mao Tse-tung has analysed in detail, China at the present stage is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country (reduced in some parts to a colony since the September 18th Incident), and the Chinese revolution since World War I has been a national democratic revolution in the era in which the international proletariat has won victory in the Soviet Union and the Chinese proletariat has awakened politically. This determines the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage as an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution under the leadership of the proletariat, with the workers and peasants forming the main body and with other broad social strata taking part, *i.e.*, it is a new-democratic revolution, distinct both from the old democratic revolution and from a socialist revolution. As China at the present stage is a large semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, dominated by a number of powerful yet conflicting imperialist countries and by the feudal forces of China, her economic and political development is extremely uneven and lacking in uniformity. This determines the extreme unevenness in the development of China's new-democratic revolution and renders it necessary for the revolution to go through a protracted, tortuous struggle before nation-wide victory can be achieved; at the same time, this renders it possible in the struggle to make extensive use of the enemy's contradictions and to set up and maintain armed revolutionary base areas, first in those vast territories where the enemy's control is comparatively weak. These basic characteristics and basic laws of the Chinese revolution, which have been verified by Chinese revolutionary practice, were not comprehended but were contravened both by the various Right lines and by the various "Left" lines, an especially by the third "Left" line. Therefore, the "Left" lines were wrong politically in three main respects.

First. The various "Left" lines were in error, above all, on the question of the task of the revolution and the question of class relations. As far back as the period of the First Great Revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, like Comrade Stalin, pointed out not only that the task of the Chinese revolution in its present stage is to fight imperialism and feudalism, but also, and more particularly, that the peasants' struggle for land is the fundamental content of the fight against imperialism and feudalism in China, that the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution is in essence a peasant revolution and that the basic task of the Chinese proletariat in the bourgeois-democrat revolution is therefore to lead the peasants' struggle.[14] In the early period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, Comrade Mao Tse-tung again pointed out that what China still needed was the bourgeois-democratic revolution and that China "must go through such a democratic revolution" before one could speak of the prospect of socialism.[15] He stated that the Agrarian Revolution was all the more important because of the defeat of the revolution in the cities and that "in the revolution in semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership of the workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the workers".[16] He pointed out that after the big bourgeoisie's betrayal of the revolution there was still a difference between the liberal bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie; that there were still broad strata of people who demanded democracy and especially demanded a fight against imperialism; that it was therefore necessary to treat the various intermediate classes correctly and do everything possible to make an alliance with them or neutralize them; and that in the countryside it was necessary to treat the middle and rich peasants correctly ("taking from those who have a surplus and giving to those who have a shortage and taking from those who have better and giving to those who have worse" while firmly uniting with the middle peasants, protecting the well-to-do middle peasants, providing certain economic opportunities for the rich peasants and also enabling the ordinary landlord to make a living).[17] These are all basic ideas of New Democracy, yet they were not understood and were opposed by the exponents of the "Left" line. Although many of the revolutionary tasks set by the various "Left" lines were democratic in character, the exponents of the "Left" lines were invariably confused about the definite distinction between the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution and subjectively were anxious to go beyond the democratic revolution; they invariably underestimated the decisive role of the peasants' anti-feudal struggle in the Chinese revolution; and they invariably advocated a struggle against the bourgeoisie as a whole, including even the upper petty bourgeoisie. The third "Left" line went further and put the struggle against the bourgeoisie on a par with the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, denied the existence of an intermediate camp and of third parties and groups and laid particular stress on the struggle against the rich peasants. Especially after the September 18th Incident in 1931, there was an obvious and great change in China's class relations, but, so far from recognizing this change, the third "Left" line categorically labelled as "the most dangerous enemy" those intermediate groups which had contradictions with the reactionary Kuomintang rule and were taking positive action. It should be said that the exponents of the third "Left" line did lead the peasants in distributing the land, in setting up political power and in offering armed resistance to the attacks of the Kuomintang government. All these undertakings were correct. However, owing to the "Left" views mentioned above, they were mistakenly afraid to acknowledge that the Red Army movement was a peasant movement led by the proletariat, and they mistakenly opposed what they called the "peculiar revolutionariness of the peasants", "peasant capitalism" and "the rich peasant line". Instead, they carried out a number of so-called "class-line" policies going beyond the democratic revolution, for instance, a policy of eliminating the rich peasant economy and other ultra-Left economic and labour policies; a state policy in which no exploiters had any political rights; a policy of popular education which in its content stressed communism; an ultra-Left policy towards the intellectuals; a policy of working among enemy troops to win over only the soldiers but not the officers; and an ultra-Left policy in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. Thus, the immediate tasks of the revolution were distorted, the revolutionary forces were isolated and the Red Army movement suffered setbacks. Similarly, it should be said that in the Kuomintang areas after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, our Party persevered in leading the people's national democratic movement, in leading the economic struggles of the workers and the other masses and the revolutionary cultural movement, and in fighting the Kuomintang government's policies of betraying the national interests and oppressing the people. After the September 18th Incident, in particular, our Party led the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, supported the war of January 28, 1932 and the Anti-Japanese Allied Army in northern Chahar, formed an anti-Japanese democratic alliance with the Fukien People's Government, put forward three conditions on which the Red Army would ally with the Kuomintang troops to resist Japan[18] and six conditions for forming a Committee for National Armed Self-Defence with all sections of the people,[19] and on August 1, 1935 issued "An Appeal to All Fellow-Countrymen for Resistance to Japan and for National Salvation" which called for the formation of a government of national defence and of an anti-Japanese united army. All this too was correct. But because the guiding policy was erroneous during the dominance of the various "Left" lines, and especially of the third, the Party was unable to solve problems correctly in practice and consequently, in the Kuomintang areas too, the Party's work either did not achieve such results as it should have, or ended in failure. On the question of resistance to Japan, of course it was not yet possible to foresee the changes that would take place after the Northern China Incident of 1935, and particularly after the Sian Incident of 1936, within the Kuomintang's chief ruling groups, which represented the main sections of China's big landlords and big bourgeoisie. But the intermediate strata and some local groups of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie were already changing into our allies against Japan. While this change was recognized by the broad ranks of our Party members and the people, it was either ignored or denied by the exponents of the third "Left" line, who thus created a serious state of closed-doorism and fell far behind the Chinese people in political life. This state of isolation and lagging behind, which resulted from the error of closed-doorism, remained basically unchanged until the Tsunyi Meeting.

Second. The various "Left" lines were in error on the question of revolutionary war and revolutionary base areas. Comrade Stalin said, "In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution."[20] Like Comrade Stalin, Comrade Mao Tse-tung had correctly pointed out as far back as the early period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War that, in the Chinese revolution, armed struggle is the main form of struggle and an army composed chiefly of peasants is the main form of organization, for the reason that semi-colonial and semi-feudal China is a large, non-uniform country which lacks democracy and industry. Comrade Mao Tse-tung also pointed out that the vast rural areas inhabited by the broad masses of the peasantry are the indispensable, vital positions of the Chinese revolution (revolutionary villages can encircle the cities, but revolutionary cities cannot detach themselves from the villages), and that China can and must establish armed revolutionary base areas as the starting point for country-wide victory (democratic unification of the whole country).[21] In the period of the 1924-27 revolution, when a coalition government had been formed through Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, the base areas had certain big cities as their centres, but even then, in order to consolidate the foundations of the base areas, it was necessary, under the leadership of the proletariat, to build a people's army with the peasants as the main body and solve the land problem in the rural areas. But in the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, since the cities were all occupied by powerful counter-revolutionary forces, base areas had to be set up, expanded and consolidated mainly by relying on peasant guerrilla warfare (not on positional warfare) and first of all in the countryside where counter-revolutionary rule was weak (and not in the key cities). Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that in China the historical conditions for the existence of such armed revolutionary rural base areas are the "localized agricultural economy (not a unified capitalist economy) and the imperialist policy of marking off spheres of influence in order to divide and exploit" and the resulting "prolonged splits and wars within the White regime".[22] He also pointed out the historic significance of such base areas for the Chinese revolution:

> Only thus is it possible to build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union has built it throughout the world. Only thus is it possible to create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their foundations and hasten their internal disintegration. Only thus is it really possible to create a Red Army which will become the chief weapon for the great revolution of the future. In short, only thus is it possible to hasten the revolutionary high tide.[23]

As for mass work in the cities during that period, the principal policies should have been those advocated by Comrade Liu Shao-chi, the exponent of the correct line for work in the White areas, namely, to act chiefly on the defensive (and not on the offensive); to utilize all possible legal opportunities for work (and not to reject the use of legality) so that the Party organizations could go deep among the masses, work under cover for a long time and accumulate strength; and always to be ready to send people to develop armed struggle in the rural areas, and thereby to co-ordinate with the struggle in the countryside and advance the development of the revolutionary situation. Therefore, until such time as the general situation again made it possible to form democratic governments in the cities, the Chinese revolutionary movement should have made rural work primary and urban work supplementary. Victories of the revolution in the countryside and temporary inability to win victories in the cities, offensives in the countryside and a general defensive position in the cities, even victory and the offensive in one rural area and defeat, retreat and the defensive in another — all these formed the criss-cross pattern of revolution and counter-revolution up and down the country during that period and accordingly determined the course from defeat to victory which the revolution had to follow. But the exponents of the various "Left" lines did not understand the specific features of semi-colonial and semi-feudal Chinese society, did not understand that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China was in essence a peasant revolution and did not understand the uneven, tortuous and protracted nature of the Chinese revolution; therefore they underestimated the importance of military struggle, and especially of peasant guerrilla warfare and rural base areas, and opposed what they called "the doctrine of the gun" and the "localism and conservatism characteristic of peasant mentality". They were for ever dreaming that the struggles of the workers and the other masses in the cities would suddenly break through the enemy's severe repression and surge forward, erupt into armed insurrections in key cities, achieve "victory first in one or more provinces", and bring about a so-called nation-wide revolutionary high tide and nation-wide victory; and they made this dream the basis on which all their work was planned and organized. In reality, however, given the general relation of class forces after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, the first result of this dream was none other than the failure of the urban work itself. This was how the first "Left" line met with defeat; the second "Left" line repeated the same error, the only difference being that now support was demanded from the Red Army, for the Red Army had become a considerable force. The second "Left" line too ended in failure, yet the third "Left" line continued to demand "real" preparations for armed insurrections in the big cities, the only difference being that now the main demand was for the Red Army to seize big cities, because it had grown even stronger, while the work in the cities had shrunk even further. The result of subordinating rural work to city work, instead of the other way round, was that after the work in the cities failed, most of the rural work failed too. It should be pointed out that after 1932 the actions aimed at capturing key cities had in fact come to a halt because the Red Army could not capture or hold them, and particularly because the Kuomintang was attacking on a large scale; furthermore, after 1933, owing to the still greater damage done to our city work, the provisional central leadership itself moved from the city to a rural base area. Thus a change did take place. But as far as the comrades pursuing the "Left" line were concerned, this change was not made consciously or as a result of correct conclusions reached through a study of the specific characteristics of the Chinese revolution; therefore they continued to direct all the work in the Red Army and the base areas from their erroneous urban viewpoint, and caused great damage to the work. The following instances are clear proof: they advocated positional warfare and opposed guerrilla warfare or mobile warfare of a guerrilla character; they wrongly stressed what they called "regularization" of the Red Army and opposed its so-called "guerrilla-ism"; they did not realize that they had to adapt themselves to dispersed rural areas and to protracted guerrilla warfare in areas cut off from one another by the enemy, and so they did not use the manpower and material resources in the base areas sparingly or take other necessary measures; in the campaign against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" they put forward the wrong slogans of "The decisive battle as between the two roads for China" and "Do not yield a single inch of territory in the base areas".

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session declares emphatically that a change in the situation is now imminent, the very change our rural work should have promoted and our city work should have awaited in the period discussed above. Only now, in the final stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan, when the army under our Party's leadership has grown strong and will grow still stronger, is it correct to place work in the Japanese-occupied cities on a par with work in the Liberated Areas, actively to prepare all the conditions for annihilating the Japanese aggressors in the key cities by co-ordinated attacks from within and without and then to shift the centre of gravity of our work to these cities. This will be a new change of historic significance for our Party, which shifted the centre of gravity of its work to the country-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

side with so much difficulty after the defeat of the revolution in 1927. All Party members should prepare for this change with full political awareness and should not repeat the error of the "Left" line on the matter of the shift from the cities to the countryside during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, an error which was manifested first in opposing and refusing a shift and then in shifting reluctantly under compulsion and without political awareness. In the Kuomintang areas, however, conditions are different; there our immediate tasks, whether in the countryside or in the cities, are to go all out to mobilize the masses, resolutely to oppose a split and civil war, to strive for unity and peace and to demand redoubled efforts in the war against Japan, the abolition of the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship and the formation of a unified democratic coalition government. When the Japanese-occupied cities are liberated by the people and a unified democratic coalition government is really established and consolidated, the rural base areas will have accomplished their historical task.

Third. The various "Left" lines were also in error on the directing of tactics for attack and defence. Correct direction of tactics, as Comrade Stalin points out, requires a correct analysis of the situation (a correct estimate of the relation of class forces and a correct judgement of the ebb and flow of the movement), requires correct forms of struggle and organization based thereon, and requires correctly "taking advantage of every rift in the camp of its enemies, and the ability to find allies";[24] and one of the best models is Comrade Mao Tse-tung's direction of the Chinese revolutionary movement. After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, Comrade Mao Tse-tung correctly pointed out that the tide of revolution was at a low ebb throughout the country, that the enemy was stronger than we in the country as a whole, and that adventurist attacks would court inevitable defeat, but that it was possible for "one or more small areas under Red political power" to emerge "in the midst of a White regime which encircles them"[25] in the general conditions in which there were incessant splits and wars within the reactionary regime and the demand of the people for revolution was gradually reviving and growing, and in the specific conditions in which the masses had gone through the struggles of the First Great Revolution, there was a Red Army possessing considerable strength and there was a Communist Party with correct policies. He also stated that in a period when there are splits within the ruling classes the expansion of Red political power "can be comparatively adventurous and the area carved out by military operations can be comparatively large", whereas in a period of relative stability for the ruling classes, such expansion

> must be one of gradual advance. In such a period, the worst thing in military affairs is to divide our forces for an adventurous advance, and the worst thing in local work (distributing land, establishing political power, expanding the Party and organizing local armed forces) is to scatter our personnel and neglect to lay a solid foundation in the central districts.[26]

Even within one and the same period, our tactics should vary according to our enemies' differences in strength; therefore, the area we carved out on the Hunan-Kiangsi border was "on the defensive against Hunan with its comparatively strong ruling power, and take the offensive against Kiangsi with its comparatively weak ruling power".[27] Later, when the Red Army of the Hunan-Kiangsi border reached the Fukien-Kiangsi border, a plan was proposed to "contend . . . for Kiangsi Province and also for western Fukien and western Chekiang".[28] An important basis for determining our varying tactics is the different impact of the revolution on the interests of different enemies. Consequently Comrade Mao Tse-tung has always advocated that we "utilize every conflict within the counter-revolution and take active measures to widen the cleavages within it",[29] and "oppose the policy of isolation, and affirm the policy of winning over all possible allies".[30] The application of the tactical principles, "make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one",[31] was brilliantly developed in the campaigns Comrade Mao Tse-tung led against "encirclement and suppression" and especially, after the Tsunyi Meeting, in the Long March and in the work of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Comrade Liu Shao-chi's ideas on tactics for work in the White areas are likewise a model. Correctly taking into account the glaring disparity between the enemy's strength and our own in the White areas, and particularly in the cities, after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, Comrade Liu Shao-chi advocated systematic organization of our retreat and defence and "the avoidance of decisive engagements with the enemy for the time being, while the situation and conditions are unfavourable to us", in order "to prepare for revolutionary attacks and decisive engagements in the future".[32] He also advocated that the Party's open organizations of the period of the 1924-27 revolution be transformed systematically and strictly into underground organizations, while "utilizing open legal means as far as possible" in mass work to enable the Party's underground organizations to conceal their strength for a long time in such mass work, go deep among the masses and "accumulate and strengthen the forces of the masses and heighten their political consciousness".[33] With respect to leadership in mass struggles, Comrade Liu Shao-chi held that it was necessary,

> in accordance with the situation and the specific conditions at a given time and place and the degree of political consciousness of the masses, to advance limited slogans, demands and forms of struggle acceptable to the masses in order to set the mass struggle in motion and then, in accordance with the changing conditions in the course of the struggle, either gradually to raise the mass struggle to a higher stage or, "knowing how far to go", temporarily to conclude the battle so as to prepare for the next battle at a higher stage and on a larger scale.

On the question of utilizing the enemy's internal contradictions and winning temporary allies, he held that it was necessary

> to push these contradictions to the breaking point and form a temporary alliance against the chief enemy with those elements in the enemy camp who may co-operate with us or who are not yet our chief enemy;

and

> to make necessary concessions to the allies who are willing to co-operate with us, induce them to join with us and participate in common action and then influence them and win over their mass following.[34]

The success of the December 9th Movement in 1935 proved the correctness of these tactical principles for work in the White areas. In contrast to such correct direction of tactics, the comrades taking the various "Left" lines failed to examine the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves objectively, failed to adopt corresponding forms of struggle and organization and did not recognize or pay sufficient attention to the enemy's internal contradictions. Therefore, not only did they meet with defeat as a result of blindly executing a so-called "offensive line" when they should have been on the defensive, they also met with defeat even when an offensive was timely, because they did not know how to organize a victorious offensive. Their way of "appraising a situation" was to take individual, incipient, indirect, one-sided and superficial phenomena favourable to their viewpoint and magnify them into something widespread, grave, direct, all-sided and essential, and they were afraid to acknowledge or were blind to all facts not in conformity with their viewpoint (such as the enemy's strength and temporary victory, our weakness and temporary defeat, the inadequate political consciousness of the masses, the enemy's internal contradictions and the progressive side of the middle-of-the-roaders). They never envisaged the most difficult and complex situations which might arise; they always dreamed about the most favourable and simplest situations which could not possibly arise. In the Red Army movement, they invariably described the enemy encircling the revolutionary base areas as "terribly shaky", "extremely panicky", "approaching final extinction", "collapsing at an accelerating speed", "totally collapsing", and so on. The exponents of the third "Left" line even held that the Red Army enjoyed superiority over the entire Kuomintang forces, which outnumbered it many times, and therefore kept on pressing the Red Army to make reckless advances regardless of the conditions and even without resting. They denied the unevenness of revolutionary development as between southern and northern China resulting from the 1924-27 revolution (a situation that was not reversed until the War of Resistance Against Japan), wrongly opposed what they called "the theory of the backwardness of the north" and demanded the establishment of Red regimes everywhere in the countryside of northern China and the organization of mutinies in all the White armies there so as to form Red Army units. They also denied the unevenness of development as between the central and border sections of the base areas and wrongly opposed what they called the "Lo Ming line".[35] They refused to make use of the contradictions among the warlords attacking the Red Army and to reach compromises with those forces which were willing to stop attacking. As for work in the White areas, they refused to take the necessary steps for retreat and defence or to make use of all legal possibilities in the cities where the revolutionary tide had ebbed and the counter-revolutionary ruling forces were very powerful. Instead, they continued to take the offensive in forms inadmissible under the prevailing conditions, they set up large unprotected Party organizations and various "Red mass organizations" divorced from the masses and duplicating the Party, they constantly and regardless of conditions called for and organized political strikes, joint strikes, and strikes of students, merchants, troops and policemen, and also parades and demonstrations, lightning meetings and even armed insurrections — actions which were unlikely or unable to win the participation or support of the masses — and they misrepresented the failures of these actions as "victories". To sum up, the comrades taking the various "Left" lines, and particularly the third, were versed in nothing but closed-doorism and adventurism, they believed blindly in "struggle above all and all for struggle" and in "continuously expanding the struggle and raising it to a higher level", and they therefore continuously met with defeats which should not have occurred and could have been avoided.

2. Militarily:

At the present stage of the Chinese revolution, military struggle is the main form of political struggle. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War it became the most urgent question in the Party line. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has applied Marxism-Leninism and formulated not only the correct political line for the Chinese revolution, but also, beginning with the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the correct military line subordinate to this political line. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's military line proceeds from two fundamental points. First, our army is and can be an army of only one kind; it must be an instrument subordinate to the ideological leadership of the proletariat and serving the struggle of the people and the building of revolutionary base areas. Second, our war is and can be a war of only one kind; it must be a war in which we recognize that the enemy is strong and we are weak, that the enemy is big and we are small, and in which therefore we fully utilize the enemy's weaknesses and our strong points and fully rely on the strength of the masses for survival, victory and expansion. From the first point, it follows that the Red Army (now the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other armed forces of the people) must fight whole-heartedly for the line, programme and policies of the Party, that is, for all the manifold interests of the whole people, and must combat the tendencies towards warlordism which run counter to this. Therefore, the Red Army must oppose the purely military point of view and the roving-rebel ideology, according to which the military does not obey the political, or even commands the political. The Red Army must simultaneously shoulder the threefold task of fighting, doing mass work and raising funds (which at present means production); doing mass work means becoming a propagandist and organizer for the Party and for the people's political power and means helping the local people in land distribution (at present, the reduction of rent and interest) and in establishing armed forces, organs of political power, and Party organizations. Hence, in its relations with the government and the people, it is required that the Red Army scrupulously respect the organs of the people's political power and the mass organizations, strengthen their prestige and strictly observe the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention.[36] Within the army it is necessary to establish a correct relationship between officers and men and to have both an appropriate democratic life and an authoritative military discipline based on political consciousness. In the work among the enemy troops, it is necessary to have a correct policy for disintegrating enemy forces and winning over prisoners. From the second point of departure, it follows that the Red Army had to recognize that, during the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character were the main forms of warfare, and must recognize that only a people's war, in which the main forces are integrated with regional forces, the regular army with guerrilla units and people's militia, and the armed masses with the unarmed masses, can bring victory over an enemy many times stronger than ourselves. Hence, in strategy, the Red Army must oppose a war of quick decision, and in tactics, must oppose protracted fighting; in strategy, it must adhere firmly to protracted warfare and in tactics, to quick decisions; in campaigns and battles it must oppose the use of the few to defeat the many and must adhere firmly to the use of the many to defeat the few. The Red Army must therefore carry out the following strategic and tactical principles:

> Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy.
>
> The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.
>
> To extend stable base areas, employ the policy of advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around.[37]
>
> Lure the enemy in deep.[38]
>
> Concentrate superior forces, pick out the enemy's weak spots, and fight when you are sure of wiping out part, or the greater part, of the enemy in mobile warfare, so as to crush the enemy forces one by one.[39]

Militarily, the various "Left" lines were diametrically opposed to the line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The putschism of the first "Left" line caused the Red Army to become alienated from the masses of the people; the second "Left" line led the Red Army into adventurist attacks. But neither was completely systematized militarily. A fully articulated system emerged only with the third "Left" line. On the question of building the army, the exponents of the third "Left" line reduced the Red Army's threefold task to the single one of fighting and neglected to educate the Red Army on the correct relations between army and people, between army and government and between officers and men; they demanded undue regularization and opposed the then sound guerrilla character of the Red Army as "guerrilla-ism"; furthermore, they fostered formalism in the political work in the army. On the question of military operations, they denied the premise that the enemy was strong and we were weak; they demanded positional warfare and so-called regular warfare, which relied solely on the main forces; they demanded the strategy of a war of quick decision and the tactics of protracted fighting; they demanded "attack on all fronts" and "strike with two fists"; they opposed luring the enemy in deep and regarded necessary shifts of troops as "retreat and flightism"; and they also demanded fixed battle lines and an absolutely centralized command. In brief, they negated guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character and did not understand how to conduct a people's war correctly. During the campaign against the fifth "encirclement and suppression", the exponents of the third "Left" line began with adventurism in attack, urging that we "engage the enemy outside the gates"; then they turned to conservatism in defence, calling for division of our forces to defend everything, for "short, swift thrusts" and for "a contest of attrition"; and they ended with real flightism, when they were compelled to withdraw from the Kiangsi base area. Such were the consequences of their attempt to substitute positional warfare for guerrilla and mobile warfare and to substitute "regular" warfare for a correctly conducted people's war.

During the stages of strategic retreat and strategic stalemate in the War of Resistance Against Japan, there has been an even greater disparity between the enemy's strength and our own, and so the correct principle for the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army has been: "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions." It would have been a mistake to press for too much mobile warfare. But in the approaching stage of strategic counter-offensive, just as the centre of gravity in the work of the whole Party will have to be shifted from the countryside to the cities, so in strategy it will be necessary to shift from guerrilla warfare as primary to mobile and positional warfare as primary, provided our forces obtain modern equipment. For this impending change, too, the whole Party must make preparations with full awareness.

3. Organizationally:

As Comrade Mao Tse-tung says, the correct political line should be "from the masses, to the masses". To ensure that the line really comes from the masses and in particular that it really goes back to the masses, there must be close ties not only between the Party and the masses outside the Party (between the class and the people), but above all between the Party's leading bodies and the masses within the Party (between the cadres and the rank and file); in other words, there must be a correct organizational line. Therefore, just as in each period of the Party's history Comrade Mao Tse-tung has laid down a political line representing the interests of the masses, so he has laid down an organizational line serving the political line and maintaining ties with the masses both inside and outside the Party. There were important developments in this respect during the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, which were crystallized in the resolution of the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army in 1929.[40] This resolution raised Party-building to the plane of ideological and political principle and firmly upheld the leading role of proletarian ideology; it fought in a correct manner against the purely military viewpoint, against subjectivism, individualism, equalitarianism, the roving-rebel ideology, putschism and other tendencies; and it pointed out the roots and harmfulness of these tendencies and the methods for correcting them. At the same time, the resolution firmly upheld strict democratic centralism, opposing improper restrictions either on democracy or on centralism. Proceeding from the interests of the unity of the whole Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung insisted that the part should obey the whole and, in accordance with the concrete characteristics of the Chinese revolution, he defined the proper relationships between new and old cadres, between outside and local cadres, between army cadres and other cadres working in the locality and between cadres of different departments or localities. Thus Comrade Mao Tse-tung provided us with a model of how to combine perseverance in truth as a matter of principle with submission to organization as a matter of discipline, a model of how to conduct inner-Party struggles in a correct way while maintaining inner-Party unity in a correct way. Conversely, whenever an erroneous political line became dominant, an erroneous organizational line inevitably emerged, and the longer the domination of the erroneous political line, the more the harm done by its organizational line. Accordingly, the various "Left" lines of the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War were opposed to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's organizational line as well as to his political line; they created a sectarianism which alienated the masses within the Party (that is, which did not subordinate the partial interests of some of the Party members to the interests of the whole Party and did not regard the leading body of the Party as the concentrator of the will of the whole Party) as well as one which alienated the masses outside the Party (that is, which did not regard the Party as the representative of the interests of the masses and the concentrator of their will). In particular, in order to enforce their will, the exponents of the third "Left" line invariably and indiscriminately branded all Party comrades who found the wrong line impracticable and who therefore expressed doubt, disagreement or dissatisfaction, or did not actively support the wrong line or firmly carry it out; they stigmatized these comrades with such labels as "Right opportunism", "the rich peasant line", "the Lo Ming line", "the line of conciliation" and "double-dealing", waged "ruthless struggles" against them and dealt them "merciless blows", and even conducted these "inner-Party struggles" as if they were dealing with criminals and enemies. This wrong kind of inner-Party struggle became the regular method by which the comrades who led or carried out the "Left" line raised their own prestige, enforced their own demands and intimidated the Party cadres. It violated the fundamental principle of democratic centralism within the Party, eliminated the democratic spirit of criticism and self-criticism, turned Party discipline into mechanical discipline and fostered tendencies to blind obedience and docility; thus the development of living and creative Marxism was hampered and damaged. A factionalist policy towards cadres was combined with this incorrect kind of inner-Party struggle. The factionalists did not regard veteran cadres as valuable assets of the Party; instead they attacked, punished and dismissed from the central and local organizations large numbers of veteran cadres who were experienced in work and had close ties with the masses but were uncongenial to the factionalists and unwilling to be their blind followers and yes-men. Nor did they give proper education to new cadres nor handle their promotion seriously (especially those of working-class origin); instead they rashly promoted new cadres and cadres from outside who lacked working experience and close ties with the masses but were congenial to the factionalists and were merely their blind followers and yes-men, substituting them for veterans in the central and local organizations. Thus, they not only attacked old cadres but spoiled new ones. Moreover, in many places where an incorrect policy for suppressing counter-revolutionaries became entangled with the factionalist policy towards cadres, large numbers of fine comrades were unjustly dealt with under false charges, and this caused the Party most grievous losses. Such factionalist errors very greatly weakened the Party, causing dislocation between higher and lower organizations and many other anomalies in the Party.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session hereby declares: Any penalty, or any part of a penalty, that was wrongly inflicted upon a comrade by the exponents of the erroneous line shall be rescinded in accordance with circumstances. Every comrade who upon investigation is proved to have fallen victim to false charges shall be exonerated and reinstated as a Party member, and his memory shall be held in honour by all comrades.

4. Ideologically:

The correctness or incorrectness of any political, military or organizational line has ideological roots — it depends on whether or not the line starts from Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism and historical materialism and whether or not the line starts from the objective realities of the Chinese revolution and the objective needs of the Chinese people. From the very day he embraced the cause of the Chinese revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has devoted himself to applying the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the investigation and study of the actual conditions of Chinese society; time and again during the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, he laid great stress on the principle, "No investigation, no right to speak", and time and again fought against the dangers of dogmatism and subjectivism. Indeed, the political, military and organizational lines then laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung were brilliant achievements which he made on the basis of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, of dialectical and historical materialism, by his concrete analysis of the actual situation and its characteristics inside and outside the country and inside and outside the Party and by his concrete summing up of the historical experience of the Chinese revolution, and especially of the 1924-27 revolution. For Chinese Communists, living and fighting in China, the purpose of studying dialectical materialism and historical materialism should be to apply them to the study and solution of the practical problems of the Chinese revolution, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung has done. But, of course, none of the comrades who committed "Left" errors was then able to understand or accept his method, and the exponents of the third "Left" line even slandered him as being a "narrow empiricist". The reason was that their ideology was rooted in subjectivism and formalism, which during the domination of the third "Left" line expressed itself in a still more pronounced form as dogmatism. It is characteristic of dogmatism that it starts not from actual conditions but from particular words and phrases taken out of books. The dogmatists did not base themselves on the Marxist-Leninist standpoint and method to make a serious study of China's past and present — political, military, economic and cultural — and of the practical experience of the Chinese revolution, to draw conclusions as a guide to action in the Chinese revolution and to test the validity of these conclusions in the practice of the masses. On the contrary, throwing away the essence of Marxism-Leninism, they transported particular words and phrases from Marxist-Leninist literature into the country and took them for dogma, without any study of the suitability of these quotations to the actual conditions of present-day China. Inevitably, therefore, the "theories" of the dogmatists were divorced from reality, their leadership was divorced from the masses, and instead of seeking truth from facts they were opinionated, arrogant, glib and afraid of proper criticism and self-criticism.

Empiricist ideology, which was the collaborator and assistant of dogmatism in the period of its domination, is likewise a manifestation of subjectivism and formalism. Empiricism differs from dogmatism in that it starts not from books but from narrow experience. It should be emphasized that all the useful experience gained by vast numbers of comrades in practical work is a most precious asset. It is definitely not empiricism, but Marxism-Leninism, to sum up such experience scientifically as the guide to future action, just as it is definitely not dogmatism, but Marxism-Leninism, to take the theories and principles of Marxism-Leninism as the guide to revolutionary action and not as dogma. But if there are some comrades among all those versed in practical work who remain satisfied with their own limited experience and with that alone, who take it for dogma that can be applied everywhere, who do not understand and moreover do not want to acknowledge the truth that "without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement"[41] and that "in order to lead, one must foresee",[42] and who consequently belittle the study of Marxism-

Leninism which is the summation of world revolutionary experience, and are infatuated with a narrow practicalism which is devoid of principle and with a brainless routinism that leads nowhere; and if they nevertheless sit and give orders from on high, if in their purblindness they style themselves heroes, put on the airs of veterans and refuse to heed the criticism of comrades or to practise self-criticism — then indeed these comrades have become empiricists. Thus, in spite of their different points of departure, the empiricists and the dogmatists were essentially one in their method of thinking. Both severed the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism from the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution; both violated dialectical and historical materialism and magnified partial and relative truths into universal and absolute truths; and the thinking of neither corresponded to the objective, actual situation as a whole. Hence they shared many misconceptions about Chinese society and the Chinese revolution (for instance, their erroneous views about the cities as the centre of gravity, about work in the White areas as the centre of gravity and their erroneous views about "regular" warfare, irrespective of actual conditions). Such were the ideological roots which made it possible for these two different sets of comrades to collaborate. On account of their limited and narrow experience, most of the empiricists lacked independent, clear-cut and systematic views on problems of a general nature and therefore they usually played second fiddle in their association with the dogmatists; but the history of our Party proves that it would not have been easy for the dogmatists to have "spread their poison throughout the Party" without the collaboration of the empiricists; and after the defeat of dogmatism, empiricism became the main obstacle to the development of Marxism-Leninism in the Party. Hence we must overcome subjectivist empiricism as well as subjectivist dogmatism. Only by completely overcoming both dogmatist and empiricist ideology can the Marxist-Leninist ideology, line and style of work spread far and wide and take deep root in the whole Party.

The errors discussed above in their four aspects, political, military, organizational and ideological, were the fundamental errors of the various "Left" lines, and especially of the third. And the political, military and organizational errors all stemmed ideologically from the violation of Marxist-Leninist dialectical and historical materialism, from subjectivism and formalism, from dogmatism and empiricism.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session points out that in negating the errors of the various "Left" lines we must bear in mind and carry out Comrade Mao Tse-tung's injunction, "Treat all questions analytically; do not negate everything."[43] It should be noted that the comrades who made these errors were not wrong in all their views; some of their views on fighting imperialism and feudalism, on the agrarian revolution and on the war against Chiang Kai-shek were in agreement with the views of the comrades who upheld the correct line. It should be further noted that, despite the especially long domination of the third "Left" line and the especially heavy losses it inflicted on the Party and the revolution, the Party in the same period scored great achievements in practical work in many areas and in many fields (for example, in warfare, in building the army, in war mobilization, in building political power and in the work in the White areas), thanks to the active work and heroic struggles of vast numbers of cadres and members, together with the masses of the soldiers and the people. It was precisely because of these achievements that over several years we were able to sustain the war against the attacks of the enemy and to hit him hard; and it was only because of the domination of the erroneous line that these achievements were in the end destroyed. The Party and the people will for ever revere all the leaders, leading personnel and cadres inside and outside the Party, all the members of the Party and the masses who heroically sacrificed their lives in the interests of the people during the domination of the various erroneous lines, just as they revere those who sacrificed their lives in other periods of the Party's history.

V

The errors of the "Left" line in the four aspects discussed above were not accidental; they had very deep social roots.

Just as the correct line represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung reflected the ideology of the advanced elements of the Chinese proletariat, so the "Left" line reflected the ideology of the Chinese petty-bourgeois democrats. Semi-colonial and semi-feudal China is a country with an enormous petty bourgeoisie. Not only is our Party surrounded by this vast stratum; within the Party too, people of petty-bourgeois origin make up most of the membership, the reason being that large numbers of petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats have turned to the proletariat for a way out of their predicament, because in China a strong petty-bourgeois political party has been rendered impossible by the great world victories of Marxism-Leninism following the October Revolution, by the existing social and political conditions in China, and especially by the historical development of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Moreover, in the economic conditions of China, even the masses of workers and Party members of working-class origin are liable to have a petty-bourgeois tinge. It is therefore not surprising but inevitable that petty-bourgeois ideology should frequently be reflected inside our Party in every shape and form.

Among the petty-bourgeois masses outside the Party, in addition to the peasants who form the main force in the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution, the urban petty bourgeoisie is also one of the motive forces of the revolution in the present stage because the great majority of its members are subjected to all kinds of oppression, are being constantly and rapidly driven to poverty, bankruptcy and unemployment, and very urgently demand economic and political democracy. But as a class in transition, the petty bourgeoisie has a dual character. As for its good and revolutionary side, the great majority of this class are receptive to the political and organizational influence of the proletariat and even to its ideological influence, at present they demand a democratic revolution and are capable of uniting and fighting for it, and in the future they can take the path of socialism together with the proletariat; but as for its bad and backward side, not only does this class have various weaknesses which distinguish it from the proletariat, but when deprived of proletarian leadership, it often veers and falls under the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie, or even of the big bourgeoisie, and becomes their prisoner. In the present stage, therefore, the proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party of China, should base themselves on a firm and broad alliance with the masses of the petty bourgeoisie outside the Party, and should, on the one hand, be lenient in dealing with them and tolerate their liberal ideas and style of work, insofar as these do not impede the struggle against the enemy or disrupt the social life we share in common and, on the other, give them appropriate education so as to strengthen our alliance with them.

But the case is entirely different with those people of petty-bourgeois origin who have voluntarily abandoned their original class stand and joined the party of the proletariat. The Party should adopt a policy towards them that differs in principle from that towards the petty-bourgeois masses outside the Party. Since such people were close to the proletariat to begin with and joined its party voluntarily, they can gradually become proletarian in their ideology through Marxist-Leninist education in the Party and steeling in mass revolutionary struggles, and they can be of great service to the proletarian forces. In fact, the overwhelming majority of the people of petty-bourgeois origin who have joined our Party have fought bravely, made sacrifices for the Party and the people and progressed ideologically, and many of them have already become Marxist-Leninists. It has to be emphasized, however, that the revolutionary character of the petty bourgeois who has not yet been proletarianized is essentially different from the revolutionary character of the proletarian, and that this difference can often develop into a state of antagonism. Party members with a petty-bourgeois revolutionary character have joined the Party organizationally, but they have not yet joined the Party ideologically, or have not done so fully, and they are often liberals, reformists, anarchists, Blanquists,[44] etc. in the guise of Marxist-Leninists. Such being the case, not only are they incapable of leading to victory China's communist movement of tomorrow, but they cannot even lead to victory her new-democratic movement of today. If the advanced elements of the proletariat do not draw a firm and sharp line between Marxist-Leninist ideology and the original ideology of those Party members who came from the petty bourgeoisie and do not educate them and struggle with them in a serious but appropriate and patient way, it will be impossible to overcome their petty-bourgeois ideology, and what is more, these members will inevitably strive to remould the vanguard of the proletariat in their own image and usurp Party leadership, thus damaging the cause of the Party and the people. The more numerous the petty bourgeoisie outside the Party and the more numerous the members of petty-bourgeois origin inside the Party, the more strictly must the Party preserve its purity as the vanguard of the proletariat; failing this, petty-bourgeois ideology will assail the Party the more violently and the damage will be the greater. In the history of our Party, the struggles between the correct line and the various erroneous lines have been in essence the acting out within the Party of the class struggle outside it, and the political, military, organizational and ideological errors of the "Left" lines discussed above have been reflections in the Party of precisely this petty-bourgeois ideology. This question may be analysed from three aspects.

First, the method of thinking. The petty-bourgeois method of thinking manifests itself basically in subjectivism and one-sidedness in viewing problems, that is, it does not proceed from an objective and comprehensive picture of the balance of class forces, but takes subjective wishes, impressions and empty talk for reality, takes a single aspect for all aspects, the part for the whole and the tree for the forest. Being detached from the actual process of production, petty-bourgeois intellectuals have only book knowledge and lack perceptual knowledge, and so their method of thinking is apt to manifest itself in the dogmatism discussed above. Though they have some perceptual knowledge, those petty-bourgeois elements associated with production suffer from the limitations characteristic of petty production — narrowness, diffuseness, isolation and conservatism — and so their method of thinking is apt to manifest itself in the empiricism discussed above.

Second, political tendency. The political tendency of the petty bourgeoisie is apt to manifest itself in vacillation between the "Left" and the Right because of its mode of life and the resulting subjectivism and one-sidedness of its method of thinking. Many representatives of the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries hope for an immediate victory of the revolution in order to bring about a radical change in their present status; therefore, they lack the patience needed for protracted revolutionary endeavour, are fond of "Left" revolutionary phrases and slogans and, in their sentiments and actions, are given to closed-doorism or adventurism. Reflected in the Party, this petty-bourgeois tendency gave rise to the various errors of the "Left" line on the questions discussed above, namely, the tasks of the revolution, the revolutionary base areas, the direction of tactics and the military line.

But the same petty-bourgeois revolutionaries when placed in a different set of circumstances — or another section of the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries — may become pessimistic and despondent and express Rightist sentiments and views, tailing after the bourgeoisie. The Chen Tu-hsiuism of the latter period of the 1924-27 revolution, the Chang Kuo-taoism of the latter period of the Agrarian Revolution and the flightism of the early period of the Long March were all reflections within the Party of such petty-bourgeois Rightist ideology. And during the War of Resistance Against Japan, capitulationist ideas appeared once again. Generally speaking, "Left" errors are more liable to occur in periods when there is a split between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (for instance, the "Left" line dominated the leading body of the Party no less than three times during the period of the Agrarian Revolution), while Rightist errors are more liable to occur in periods when there is an alliance between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (for instance, in the latter part of the 1924-27 revolution and in the early part of the War of Resistance Against Japan). But whether "Left" or Right, these tendencies benefit not the revolution but only the counter-revolution. Vacillation to the "Left" or to the Right, the fondness for going to extremes, flashiness without substance and slick opportunism, all of which occur under the stress of changing conditions, are features of the bad side of petty-bourgeois ideology. They are all reflections in the ideological sphere of the unstable economic status of the petty bourgeoisie.

Third, organizational life. Because of the limitations in the way of life and the method of thinking of the petty bourgeoisie in general, and particularly because of China's backward and decentralized social environment with its clans and guilds, the tendency of the petty bourgeoisie in organizational life is apt to manifest itself in individualism and sectarianism, which alienate the masses. This tendency, when reflected in the Party, led to the erroneous, "Left" organizational line, which was discussed above. The fact that the Party had for a long time been fighting a scattered guerrilla war in the countryside made it still easier for this tendency to grow. This tendency consisted not of working selflessly for the Party and the people, but of exploiting the strength of the Party and the people and undermining their interests for personal or sectarian ends; it was therefore incompatible with the Party's principle of close links with the masses, incompatible with the democratic centralism of the Party and with Party discipline. This tendency frequently took such forms as bureaucracy, patriarchalism, punitiveness, commandism, individualistic heroism, semi-anarchism, liberalism, ultra-democracy, assertion of "independence", the guild mentality, the "mountain-stronghold" mentality,[45] favouritism towards fellow-townsmen and schoolmates, factional squabbles and rascally tricks, all of which undermine the Party's ties with the masses and its internal unity.

These are the three aspects of petty-bourgeois ideology. The subjectivism in ideology, the "Left" and Right deviations in politics and the sectarianism in organization, which have all appeared on various occasions in our Party, are obviously anti-Marxist-Leninist and anti-proletarian manifestations of petty-bourgeois ideology, whether or not they crystallize into a line and gain control of the Party leadership. In the interests of the Party and the people, it is absolutely necessary to use the method of education to analyse and overcome petty-bourgeois ideology within the Party, and to help transform it into proletarian ideology.

VI

It can be seen from the above that the various “Left” lines, and especially the third “Left” line, which dominated the whole Party, were not accidental but were the products of specific social and historical conditions. Hence if we are to overcome erroneous “Left” or Right ideology, we cannot go about it either casually or impetuously, but must deepen Marxist-Leninist education and raise the ability of the whole Party to differentiate between proletarian and petty-bourgeois ideology; we must give full play to inner-Party democracy, develop criticism and self-criticism, proceed with the work of patient persuasion and education, make a concrete analysis of errors and their dangers and explain their historical and ideological roots as well as the means of correcting them. Such is the proper attitude for Marxist-Leninists in overcoming errors within the Party. This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session points out that the policy Comrade Mao Tse-tung has adopted for the present rectification movement throughout the Party and for the study of Party history, namely, “learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones and cure the sickness to save the patient”, and achieve “clarity in ideology and unity among comrades”,[46] is a model of the correct attitude for Marxist-Leninists in overcoming errors within the Party. Therefore it has led to great achievements in uniting and raising the level of the whole Party ideologically, politically and organizationally.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session points out that the struggles which the Party waged in the course of its history against Chen Tu-hsiuism and Li Li-sanism were absolutely necessary. The defect in these struggles was that they were not undertaken consciously as serious steps for correcting the petty-bourgeois ideology which existed on a serious scale in the Party; consequently they neither clarified the ideological essence and roots of the errors thoroughly nor properly indicated the methods of correcting them, and so it was easy for these errors to recur. Moreover, undue stress was placed on personal responsibility in the belief that once an erring comrade was attacked, the problem was solved. Having examined the errors committed during and after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, the Party considers that such defects must be avoided in all future inner-Party ideological struggles and that Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s policy must be resolutely applied. So long as any comrade who has erred in the past understands his errors and has begun to correct them, we should welcome him without prejudice and unite with him to work for the Party. We should take a sincere and comradely attitude even towards those comrades who have not yet properly understood and corrected their errors but who no longer persist in them, and we should help them to realize and correct these errors. The whole Party is now unanimous in its understanding of the erroneous lines of the past. The whole Party has rallied round the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Therefore, the task of the entire Party from now on is to strengthen unity by clarifying thinking and holding fast to principle, or, in the words of the second section of this Resolution, to "unite the whole Party like one harmonious family, like solid steel, to fight for total victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and for the complete liberation of the Chinese people". All our Party's analyses, criticisms and controversies concerning questions of Party history should start from the desire for unity and arrive at unity; any violation of this principle is wrong. Since petty-bourgeois ideology in the Party has its social roots and the Party has long been placed in an environment of protracted and scattered guerrilla warfare in the countryside, since ideological remnants of dogmatism and empiricism still exist and the criticism of empiricism in particular has been inadequate, and since the "mountain-stronghold" mentality with its sectarian tendencies is still quite widespread although serious sectarianism has been mainly overcome in the Party, the whole Party should be alert to the fact that a long process of continuous struggle to overcome wrong ideas is required if the Party is to achieve complete Marxist-Leninist ideological unity. This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session therefore resolves that the whole Party must strengthen its Marxist-Leninist ideological education and stress the linking of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution, so as further to develop a correct Party style of work and completely overcome such tendencies as dogmatism, empiricism, sectarianism and the "mountain-stronghold" mentality.

VII

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session emphatically declares that the practice of the Chinese revolution during the last twenty-four years has proved, and continues to prove, that the line represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the line of struggle of our Party and of the people of the whole country, is entirely correct. The great successes achieved by our Party in the present War of Resistance and the decisive role our Party has played testify most vividly to the correctness of this line. When viewed in relation to the Chinese revolution as a whole with its stormy development, great achievements and rich experience in the past twenty-four years under the leadership of our Party, the "Left" and Right errors in the Party during certain periods were only partial phenomena. It was difficult to avoid such phenomena completely at a time when the Party lacked adequate experience and political consciousness. Furthermore, it has been precisely through the struggle to overcome these errors that the Party has grown firmer and stronger. Today, with unprecedented unanimity the whole Party recognizes the correctness of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's line and with unprecedented political consciousness rallies under his banner. As Marxist-Leninist ideology, which Comrade Mao Tse-tung represents, more and more profoundly grips more and more of the cadres, the Party members and the masses of the people, the result will surely be tremendous progress and invincible strength for the Party and the Chinese revolution.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee is firmly convinced that under the correct leadership of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Communist Party of China, with the rich experience of the three revolutionary struggles — the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the War of Resistance Against Japan — will assuredly lead the Chinese revolution to complete victory.

NOTES

[1] In 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in alliance with the Communist Party and the revolutionary workers and peasants, defeated the "Merchants' Corps", an armed force of the compradors and landlords which engaged in counter-revolutionary activities in Canton in collaboration with the British imperialists. The revolutionary army, which had been founded on the basis of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, set out from Canton early in 1925, fought the Eastern Campaign and, with the support of the peasants, defeated the troops of the warlord Chen Chiung-ming. It then returned to Canton and overthrew the Yunnan and Kwangsi warlords who had entrenched themselves there. That autumn it conducted the Second Eastern Campaign and finally wiped out Chen Chiung-ming's forces. These cam-

paigns, in which members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League fought heroically in the van, brought about the political unification of Kwangtung Province and paved the way for the Northern Expedition.

[2] Lo Chang-lung, an early member of the Chinese Communist Party, later turned traitor to the revolution. At the time of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party in 1931, Lo Chang-lung, who was pessimistic about the future of the Chinese revolution, openly supported the counter-revolutionary stand of the Trotskyist Chen Tu-hsiu clique in opposition to the line of the Sixth National Congress of the Party, vilified the Red Army and the Red base areas, and distributed leaflets in which he betrayed the names of Communist cadres to Chiang Kai-shek's gang. To undermine the revolutionary struggle led by the Party, he set up the so-called "Emergency Central Committee", "Second Provincial Committees", "Second Regional Committees" and "Second Party Fractions in Trade Unions" and carried out splitting activities in the Party. He was expelled from the Party in January 1931.

[3] For Chang Kuo-tao, see "Rectify the Party's Style of Work", Note 5, p. 51 of this volume.

[4] After the failure of the Chinese revolution in 1927, a small number of Trotskyites appeared in China, too. Ganging up with Chen Tu-hsiu and other renegades, they formed a small counter-revolutionary clique in 1929 and spread such counter-revolutionary propaganda as that the Kuomintang had already completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and they became a dirty imperialist and Kuomintang instrument against the people. The Chinese Trotskyites shamelessly joined the Kuomintang secret service. After the September 18th Incident, to fulfil the order given by the criminal renegade Trotsky "not to impede the occupation of China by imperial Japan", they began collaborating with the Japanese secret agents, received subsidies from them and engaged in all kinds of activities facilitating Japanese aggression.

[5] For the Ten-Point Programme, see "Our Study and the Current Situation", Note 5, p. 175 of this volume.

[6] The First Front Army of the Red Army launched its second offensive against Changsha, capital of Hunan Province, in September 1930. As the enemy forces put up a stubborn defence behind fortifications and had the support of aircraft and warships, the Red Army failed to capture the city even after prolonged attacks. Meanwhile, enemy reinforcements were concentrating and the situation became unfavourable for the Red Army. Comrade Mao Tse-tung impressed upon the cadres of the First Front Army the need to withdraw the troops besieging Changsha, and then persuaded them to give up their idea of seizing the key city of Kiukiang in northern Kiangsi and attacking other big cities and to change their policy, divide their forces and capture Chaling, Yuhsien and Liling Counties in Hunan and Pinghsiang and Kian Counties in Kiangsi. This enabled the First Front Army to expand greatly.

[7] Comrade Chu Chiu-pai, one of the earliest members and leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, was elected to the Central Committee at the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth National Congresses of the Party in the years 1923-28. During the First Revolutionary Civil War he actively fought against the anti-Communist, anti-popular "Tai Chi-tao doctrine" of the Kuomintang's right-wing and against the Right opportunism represented by Chen Tu-hsiu in the Chinese Communist Party. After the Kuomintang's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, he called the emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Party on August 7, which ended the domination of Chen Tu-hsiuism in the Party. But from the winter of 1927 to the spring of 1928, while directing the work of the central leading body, he committed the "Left" error of

putschism. In September 1930 he conducted the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party, which put an end to the Li Li-san line that was harming the Party. However, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931, he was attacked by the "Left" dogmatists and factionalists and was pushed out of the central leading body. From that time to 1933 he worked in the revolutionary cultural movement in Shanghai in co-operation with Lu Hsun. In 1933 he arrived in the Red base area in Kiangsi and was made Commissioner of People's Education in the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Central Government. When the main forces of the Red Army embarked on the Long March, he was asked to stay behind in the Kiangsi base area. In March 1935 Comrade Chu Chiu-pai was arrested by the Chiang Kai-shek gang in the Fukien guerrilla area and on June 18 he died a martyr's death in Changting, Fukien Province.

[8] Comrade Lin Yu-nan, a member of the Chinese Communist Party and one of the early leaders and organizers of the Chinese trade union movement, was Director of the Wuhan office of the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat, a member of the Executive Committee and concurrently Secretary-General of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. In 1931 he was arrested by the Chiang Kai-shek gang and died a martyr's death at Lunghua in Shanghai.

[9] Comrade Li Chiu-shih, a member of the Chinese Communist Party, served in 1928 on the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League and was head of its Propaganda Department and chief editor of its organ, Chinese Youth In 1931, while working in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Party, he was arrested by the Chiang Kai-shek gang in Shanghai and died a martyr's death at Lunghua.

[10] Comrade Ho Meng-hsiung, a member of the Chinese Communist Party, was one of the early organizers of the trade union movement in northern China and founder of the Railway Workers' Union on the Peking-Suiyuan Line. After the Kuomintang betrayed the revolution in 1927, he served as a member of the Communist Party's Kiangsu Provincial Committee in Shanghai and as secretary of its Peasant Department. In 1931 he was arrested by the Chiang Kai-shek gang and died a martyr's death at Lunghua.

[11] Comrade Chin Pang-hsien, also known as Po Ku, was a member of the Chinese Communist Party. From September 1931 to January 1935 he was at the head first of the Party's provisional central leadership in Shanghai and then of its Central Bureau of the Red Base Areas. During this period he committed the serious error of the "Left" line. He worked in the Southern Bureau of the Party's Central Committee during the early period of the War of Resistance Against Japan. After 1941, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, he founded and directed the Liberation Daily and the Hsinhua News Agency in Yenan. He was re-elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress of the Party in 1945. In February 1946 he went to Chungking to take part in the negotiations with the Kuomintang. He died in April in an aeroplane crash on his way back to Yenan.

[12] Comrade Chu Li-chih, who committed "Left" errors, arrived in the autumn of 1935 in the northern Shensi revolutionary base area (comprising the Shensi-Kansu border area and northern Shensi) as a representative of the central leading body. In collaboration with Comrade Kuo Hung-tao, who was there and who also committed "Left" errors, he carried through the "Left" opportunist line in political, military and organizational work, and they pushed out Liu Chih-tan and the other comrades who had pursued the correct line and had built up the Red Army and the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi. Then, in the work of suppressing counter-revolu-

tionaries, they made the serious error of arresting a large number of cadres who were carrying out the correct line, and thus created a grave crisis in the northern Shensi revolutionary base area. The central leadership of the Party, which arrived in northern Shensi in November 1935 after the Long March, corrected these "Left" errors, released Liu Chih-tan and the other comrades from prison, and thus saved the northern Shensi revolutionary base area from its dangerous situation.

[13] See J. V. Stalin, "Questions of the Chinese Revolution" and "The Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Comintern", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. IX, pp. 224-34, 291-99, and "The Prospects of the Revolution in China", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 373-91.

[14] See "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 23-59.

[15] See "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 97-99.

[16] From the Letter of the Front Committee in the Chingkang Mountains to the Central Committee of the Party in April 1929, quoted in "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 123.

[17] See "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?" and "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 63-104.

[18] In January 1933, the Communist Party of China made a declaration proposing to all Kuomintang troops attacking the revolutionary base areas and the Red Army that a cease-fire agreement be concluded and joint resistance conducted against Japan on three conditions: (1) stop attacking the revolutionary base areas and the Red Army; (2) grant freedoms and rights to the people; and (3) arm the people.

[19] The six conditions were those contained in the "Chinese People's Basic Programme for Fighting Japan" put forward by the Chinese Communist Party in 1934 and published over the signatures of Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen) and others. They were: (1) mobilize all sea, land and air forces to fight Japan; (2) mobilize the people throughout the country; (3) arm all the people; (4) confiscate the property of the Japanese imperialists in China and of the traitors to defray war expenditure; (5) establish an all-China committee for national armed defence, to be elected by the representatives of workers, peasants, soldiers, students and businessmen; and (6) form an alliance with all the forces opposed to the Japanese imperialists, and establish friendly relations with all countries observing benevolent neutrality.

[20] J. V. Stalin, "The Prospects of the Revolution in China", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. VIII, p. 379.

[21] See "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?" and "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 63-72, 117-28.

[22] From "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 65.

[23] From "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 118.

[24] J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1953, Vol. VI, pp. 155-75, and "Notes on Contemporary Themes", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. IX, p. 346.

[25] From "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 73.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[28] From the Letter of the Front Committee in the Chingkang Mountains to the Central Committee of the Party in April 1929, quoted in "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 126.

[29] From "General Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Fight Against the Enemy's Fifth Campaign of 'Encirclement and Suppression'" (Resolution of the Tsunyi Meeting).

[30] From "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 200.

[31] See "On Policy", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II.

[32] From Liu Shao-chi's "Eliminate Closed-Doorism and Adventurism".

[33] From Liu Shao-chi's "Letter to the Central Committee on Past Work in the White Areas".

[34] From Liu Shao-chi's "Eliminate Closed-Doorism and Adventurism".

[35] Lo Ming, formerly a member of the Chinese Communist Party, was the acting secretary of the Fukien Provincial Committee of the Central Red Base Area in 1933. He was attacked by the "Leftists" because he held that as the Party was confronted with a rather difficult situation in Shanghang, Yungting and other outlying parts of western Fukien, its policy there should be different from that in the stable base areas. The "Leftists" wrongly and exaggeratedly represented his views as "a line of opportunist-liquidationist flight and retreat, due to pessimism and despair about the revolution", and, organizationally, waged the so-called "struggle against the Lo Ming line".

[36] The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention were drawn up by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army during the Agrarian Revolutionary War and were later adopted as rules of discipline by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and the present People's Liberation Army. As these rules varied slightly in content in the army units of different areas, the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in October 1947 issued a standard version as follows:

The Three Main Rules of Discipline:

(1) Obey orders in all your actions.
(2) Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.
(3) Turn in everything captured.

The Eight Points for Attention:

(1) Speak politely.
(2) Pay fairly for what you buy.
(3) Return everything you borrow.
(4) Pay for anything you damage.
(5) Do not hit or swear at people.
(6) Do not damage crops.
(7) Do not take liberties with women.
(8) Do not ill-treat captives.

[37] From the Letter of the Front Committee in the Chingkang Mountains to the Central Committee of the Party in April 1929, quoted in "A Single Spark Can

Start a Prairie Fire", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 124.

[38] See "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 205-49.

[39] From "The Conclusions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Breaking Through the Enemy's Fifth Campaign of 'Encirclement and Suppression'", February 1935.

[40] The resolution of the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army in 1929 refers to the article "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 105-16.

[41] V. I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?", *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1961, Vol. V, p. 369.

[42] J. V. Stalin, "The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission", Works, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. XI, p. 39.

[43] From "Our Study and the Current Situation", p. 164 of this volume.

[44] Blanquism is the ideology of revolutionary adventurism as represented in France by Auguste Blanqui (1805-81). The Blanquists denied class struggle and imagined that mankind could be delivered from the system of capitalist exploitation not through the class struggle by the proletariat, but through conspiracy by a handful of intellectuals.

[45] For the "mountain-stronghold" mentality, see "Our Study and the Current Situation", Note 8, p. 176 of this volume.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 164 of this volume.

SERVE THE PEOPLE

September 8, 1944

Our Communist Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies led by our Party are battalions of the revolution. These battalions of ours are wholly dedicated to the liberation of the people and work entirely in the people's interests. Comrade Chang Szu-teh[1] was in the ranks of these battalions.

All men must die, but death can vary in its significance. The ancient Chinese writer Szuma Chien said, "Though death befalls all men alike, it may be weightier than Mount Tai or lighter than a feather."[2] To die for the people is weightier than Mount Tai, but to work for the fascists and die for the exploiters and oppressors is lighter than a feather. Comrade Chang Szu-teh died for the people, and his death is indeed weightier than Mount Tai.

If we have shortcomings, we are not afraid to have them pointed out and criticized, because we serve the people. Anyone, no matter who, may point out our shortcomings. If he is right, we will correct them. If what he proposes will benefit the people, we will act upon it. The idea of "better troops and simpler administration" was put forward by Mr. Li Ting-ming,[3] who is not a Communist. He made a good suggestion which is of benefit to the people, and we have adopted it. If, in the interests of the people, we persist in doing what is right and correct what is wrong, our ranks will surely thrive.

We hail from all corners of the country and have joined together for a common revolutionary objective. And we need the vast majority of the people with us on the road to this objective. Today, we already lead base areas with a population of 91 million,[4] but this is not enough; to liberate the whole nation more are needed. In times of difficulty

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This speech was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a memorial meeting for Comrade Chang Szu-teh, held by departments directly under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

we must not lose sight of our achievements, must see the bright future and must pluck up our courage. The Chinese people are suffering; it is our duty to save them and we must exert ourselves in struggle. Wherever there is struggle there is sacrifice, and death is a common occurrence. But we have the interests of the people and the sufferings of the great majority at heart, and when we die for the people it is a worthy death. Nevertheless, we should do our best to avoid unnecessary sacrifices. Our cadres must show concern for every soldier, and all people in the revolutionary ranks must care for each other, must love and help each other.

From now on, when anyone in our ranks who has done some useful work dies, be he soldier or cook, we should have a funeral ceremony and a memorial meeting in his honour. This should become the rule. And it should be introduced among the people as well. When someone dies in a village, let a memorial meeting be held. In this way we express our mourning for the dead and unite all the people.

NOTES

[1] Comrade Chang Szu-teh was a soldier in the Guards Regiment of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. A member of Communist Party who loyally served the interests of the people, he joined the revolution in 1933, took part in the Long March and was wounded in service. On September 5, 1944, when making charcoal in the mountains of Ansai County, northern Shensi, he was killed by the sudden collapse of a kiln.

[2] Szuma Chien, the famous Chinese historian of the 2nd century B.C., was the author of the *Historical Records*. The quotation comes from his "Reply to Jen Shao-ching's Letter".

[3] Li Ting-ming, an enlightened landlord of northern Shensi Province, was at one time elected Vice-Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

[4] This was the total population of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and all other Liberated Areas in northern, central and southern China.

ON CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S SPEECH ON THE DOUBLE TENTH FESTIVAL

October 11, 1944

One of the distinguishing features of Chiang Kai-shek's Double Tenth[1] speech is its utter lack of content and its failure to answer any of the questions about which the people are deeply concerned. Chiang Kai-shek declares that the enemy is not to be feared because there are still vast territories in the Great Rear Area. So far the autocratic Kuomintang leaders have shown neither the desire nor the ability to introduce political reforms or keep the enemy at bay, and territory is the only "capital" they can fall back upon for resisting the enemy. But it is plain to all that without a correct policy and without human effort this capital is not enough, for Japanese imperialism is daily threatening the remaining territories. In all probability Chiang Kai-shek has acutely felt this threat, as is shown by the very fact that he is repeatedly assuring the people that no such threat exists and even says, "In the twenty years since I founded the army at the Whampoa Military Academy,[2] the revolutionary situation has never been so stable as at present." He also keeps repeating, "We must not lose our self-confidence," which actually indicates loss of confidence among many people within the ranks of the Kuomintang and among many prominent public figures in the Kuomintang areas. Chiang Kai-shek has been casting about for some means to restore that confidence. But instead of looking for such means by examining his policy and work in the political, military, economic and cultural fields, he resorts to the rejection of criticisms and the whitewashing of his mistakes. He says that all "foreign observers" are "ignorant of the heart of the matter" and that the "babel of foreign criticism of our military and political affairs" is entirely due to credulous acceptance of "the rumours and tricks of the invaders and the Chinese collaborators".

Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this commentary for the Hsinhua News Agency.

Curiously enough, such foreigners as Franklin D. Roosevelt as well as such Kuomintang members as Soong Ching Ling, many members of the People's Political Council, and all Chinese who are not devoid of conscience, disbelieve the plausible explanations offered by Chiang Kai-shek and his trusted followers and are also raising a "babel of criticism of our military and political affairs". Chiang Kai-shek is annoyed, but not until this year's Double Tenth Festival did he succeed in discovering what he regards as a compelling argument, *i.e.*, that these people believe "the rumours and tricks of the invaders and the Chinese collaborators". So in his speech Chiang Kai-shek vehemently denounces these "rumours and tricks of the invaders and the Chinese collaborators" at great length. He fancies that, having made this denunciation, he can silence all the Chinese and foreigners. And anyone who again raises a "babel of criticism" of his military and political affairs will be put down as a willing believer of "the rumours and tricks of the invaders and the Chinese collaborators"! We consider Chiang Kai-shek's accusations ridiculous in the extreme. For the invaders and the Chinese collaborators have never criticized, but on the contrary have warmly applauded, the Kuomintang for its autocracy, its half-hearted prosecution of the war, its corruption and incompetence, and the fascist decrees and defeatist military orders of its government. Chiang Kai-shek's *China's Destiny*, a book which has met with general disapproval, has won sincere and repeated praise from the Japanese imperialists. The invaders and the Chinese collaborators have never said a word about reorganization of the National Government and its supreme command, because it is their cherished wish that this government and supreme command which keep on oppressing the people and losing battles will be preserved. Is it not a fact that Chiang Kai-shek and his group have always been the target of Japanese inducements to surrender? Is it not also a fact that of the two slogans originally put forward by the Japanese imperialists, one, "Annihilate the Kuomintang!" has been dropped long ago and only the other, "Oppose the Communists!" remains? To this very moment the Japanese imperialists have not declared war on the Kuomintang government, and no state of war, so they say, exists between Japan and the Kuomintang government! To this very moment the invaders and the Chinese collaborators are taking good care of the property of the Kuomintang bigwigs in Shanghai, Nanking, Ningpo, etc. The enemy chieftain Shunroku Hata has sent his representatives to offer sacrifices at Chiang Kai-shek's ancestral tombs at

Fenghua. In Shanghai and elsewhere, emissaries secretly dispatched by Chiang Kai-shek's trusted followers are maintaining almost uninterrupted contact and carrying on clandestine negotiations with the Japanese invaders. These contacts and negotiations become more frequent whenever the Japanese intensify their offensives. Aren't all these things facts? Are those who raise a "babel of criticism" of the military and political affairs of Chiang Kai-shek and his group really "ignorant of the heart of the matter", or are they on the contrary only too well acquainted with it? After all, where is "the heart of the matter" to be found, in "the rumours and tricks of the invaders and the Chinese collaborators", or in Chiang Kai-shek himself and his own group?

In another statement in his speech, Chiang Kai-shek denies that civil war will break out in China. But he adds, "Certainly no one will ever again dare to rebel against the Republic and sabotage the War of Resistance, as Wang Ching-wei and his like have done." Here Chiang Kai-shek is seeking, and has in fact found, an excuse for civil war. Any Chinese whose memory is not too short will remember that in 1941, at the very moment when the betrayers of China were ordering the disbandment of the New Fourth Army and the Chinese people were rising to avert the crisis of civil war, Chiang Kai-shek made a speech in which he said that there would never be any war to "suppress the Communists" and that, should there be a war, it would only be a punitive one to put down rebels. Those who have read *China's Destiny* will also remember Chiang Kai-shek's remark that the Communist Party of China was "in league with" Wang Ching-wei in 1927 during the period of the Wuhan Government. In the resolutions of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in 1943, an eight-word label was attached to the Chinese Communist Party: "Sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state." After reading his present speech, one feels that the danger of civil war not only exists but is actually growing. From now on the Chinese people should firmly bear in mind that one fine morning Chiang Kai-shek will order a punitive expedition against so-called rebels and that the charge will be "rebellion against the Republic", "sabotaging the War of Resistance", and doing what "Wang Ching-wei and his like have done". Chiang is good at playing this game; he is no good at denouncing as rebels people like Pang Ping-hsun, Sun Liang-cheng and Chen Hsiao-chiang[3] or at launching punitive expeditions against them, but he is very good at denouncing as "rebels" the

New Fourth Army in central China and the Dare-to-Die Corps[4] in Shansi and is exceptionally good at launching punitive expeditions against them. The Chinese people must not forget that, while proclaiming that he will not fight a civil war, Chiang Kai-shek has already dispatched 775,000 troops who are now engaged exclusively in encircling or attacking the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the people's guerrillas in southern China.

Chiang Kai-shek's speech has nothing to show on the positive side, and he has in no way met the Chinese people's eager desire to strengthen the anti-Japanese front. On the negative side, the speech is fraught with dangerous possibilities. His attitude is becoming more and more anomalous, as witness his stubborn opposition to the people's demand for political change, his bitter hatred of the Chinese Communist Party and his hint at a pretext for the anti-Communist civil war he is preparing. However, he will succeed in none of his schemes. Unless he is willing to mend his ways, he will be lifting a rock only to drop it on his own toes. We sincerely hope he will change his ways, because his present course of action will get him absolutely nowhere. Since he has proclaimed that "a greater latitude will be allowed to the voicing of opinions",[5] he should not stifle the "babel of criticism" by threatening people with the slander that they are willingly accepting "the rumours and tricks of the invaders and the Chinese collaborators". Since he has proclaimed that "the period of political tutelage will be shortened", he should not reject the demand for reorganizing the government and the supreme command. Since he has proclaimed that "the Communist problem should be solved politically", he should not again seek a pretext for preparing civil war.

NOTES

[1] The Double Tenth, October 10, is the anniversary of the armed uprising in Wuhan which set off the Revolution of 1911.

[2] The Whampoa Military Academy, located at Whampoa near Canton, was established by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 after the reorganization of the Kuomintang with the help of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Before Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, the academy was run jointly by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Comrades Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Yun Tai-ying, Hsiao Chu-nu and others held responsible posts in the academy at one time or another. Many of the cadets were members of the Communist Party

or the Communist Youth League, and they formed the revolutionary core of the academy.

[3] Pang Ping-hsun, Sun Liang-cheng and Chen Hsiao-chiang were Kuomintang generals who openly deserted to the Japanese invaders.

[4] The Dare-to-Die Corps in Shansi was an anti-Japanese armed force of the people which developed under the leadership and influence of the Communist Party in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

[5] In April 1944 the Kuomintang announced that "a greater latitude will be allowed to the voicing of opinions". Its purpose was to fob off the people, because the demand that the Kuomintang dictatorship should be ended, democracy established, and freedom of speech guaranteed had become the general cry of the people in the Kuomintang areas from the beginning of the year. In May, the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang again declared that it would "protect freedom of speech". But the Kuomintang never fulfilled any of the promises it had been compelled to make, and as the people's movement for democracy surged forward, it multiplied its measures for the suppression of popular opinion.

THE UNITED FRONT IN CULTURAL WORK

October 30, 1944

The purpose of all our work is the overthrow of Japanese imperialism. Like Hitler, Japanese imperialism is approaching its doom. But we must continue our efforts, for only so can we achieve its final overthrow. In our work the war comes first, then production, then cultural work. An army without culture is a dull-witted army, and a dull-witted army cannot defeat the enemy.

The culture of the Liberated Areas already has its progressive side, but it still has a backward side. The Liberated Areas already have a new culture, a people's culture, but a good many vestiges of feudalism survive. Among the 1,500,000 people of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region there are more than 1,000,000 illiterates, there are 2,000 practitioners of witchcraft, and the broad masses are still under the influence of superstition. These are enemies inside the minds of the people. It is often more difficult to combat the enemies inside people's minds than to fight Japanese imperialism. We must call on the masses to arise in struggle against their own illiteracy, superstitions and unhygienic habits. For this struggle a broad united front is indispensable. And this united front has to be particularly broad in a place like the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, which has a sparse population, poor communications and a low cultural base to start from and in addition is fighting a war. Hence, in our education we must have not only regular primary and secondary schools but also scattered, irregular village schools, newspaper-reading groups and literacy classes. Not only must we have schools of the modern type but we must also utilize and transform the old-style village schools.

This speech was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a conference of cultural and educational workers of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

In the arts, we must have not only modern drama but also the Shensi opera and the *yangko* dance. Not only must we have new Shensi operas and new *yangko* dances, but we must also utilize and gradually transform the old opera companies and the old *yangko* troupes, which comprise 90 per cent of all *yangko* troupes. This approach is even more necessary in the field of medicine. In the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region the human and animal mortality rates are both very high, and at the same time many people still believe in witchcraft. In such circumstances, to rely solely on modern doctors is no solution. Of course, modern doctors have advantages over doctors of the old type, but if they do not concern themselves with the sufferings of the people, do not train doctors for the people, do not unite with the thousand and more doctors and veterinarians of the old type in the Border Region and do not help them to make progress, then they will actually be helping the witch doctors and showing indifference to the high human and animal mortality rates. There are two principles for the united front: the first is to unite, and the second is to criticize, educate and transform. In the united front, capitulationism is wrong, and so is sectarianism with its exclusiveness and contempt for others. Our task is to unite with all intellectuals, artists and doctors of the old type who can be useful, to help them, convert them and transform them. In order to transform them, we must first unite with them. If we do it properly, they will welcome our help.

Our culture is a people's culture; our cultural workers must serve the people with great enthusiasm and devotion, and they must link themselves with the masses, not divorce themselves from the masses. In order to do so, they must act in accordance with the needs and wishes of the masses. All work done for the masses must start from their needs and not from the desire of any individual, however well-intentioned. It often happens that objectively the masses need a certain change, but subjectively they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet willing or determined to make the change. In such cases, we should wait patiently. We should not make the change until, through our work, most of the masses have become conscious of the need and are willing and determined to carry it out. Otherwise we shall isolate ourselves from the masses. Unless they are conscious and willing, any kind of work that requires their participation will turn out to be a mere formality and will fail. The saying "Haste does not bring success" does not mean that we should not make haste, but that we should not be impetuous; impetuosity leads only to failure. This is true in any kind of work, and particularly in the cultural and educational work the aim of which is to transform the thinking of the masses. There are two principles here: one is the actual needs of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and the other is the wishes of the masses, who must make up their own minds instead of our making up their minds for them.

WE MUST LEARN TO DO ECONOMIC WORK

January 10, 1945

Heroes of Labour and Model Workers!

You have attended this conference and summed up your experience; we all welcome you and honour you. You have three good qualities and you play three roles. First, the role of initiators. In other words, by your outstanding efforts and your numerous innovations you have made your work a model for others, raising standards and inspiring others to learn from you. Second, the role of backbone. Most of you are not yet cadres, but you have become the backbone, the hard core of the masses; with you, it is easier to push our work forward. In the future you may become cadres; at present you are cadres in reserve. Third, the role of a bridge. You are a bridge between the leadership and the broad masses; through you the opinions of the masses are transmitted to the leadership and vice versa.

You have many good qualities and have rendered great service, but you must always remember not to become conceited. You are respected by all, and quite rightly, but this easily leads to conceit. If you become conceited, if you are not modest and cease to exert yourselves, and if you do not respect others, do not respect the cadres and the masses, then you will cease to be heroes and models. There have been such people in the past, and I hope you will not follow their example.

This conference has summed up your experience. The summary is a very good one and is applicable in the other Liberated Areas as well. However, I am not going to dwell upon that. I should just like to say a few words about our economic work.

In the past few years we have begun to learn how to do economic work and we have achieved substantial successes in this field, but it

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this speech at a conference of labour heroes and model workers of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

is still only a beginning. We must see to it that within two or three years the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Liberated Areas in the enemy's rear are completely or largely self-supporting in grain and manufactured goods, and even have a surplus. We must achieve still greater successes in agriculture, industry and trade. Only then can we regard ourselves as having learned more about economic work and as having learned to do it better. In places where there is no improvement in the living conditions of the troops and the people, where the material foundations for the counter-offensive remain unstable and agriculture, industry and trade stagnate or even decline instead of expanding year by year, it is evident that the personnel of the Party, government and army have not learned how to do economic work, and great difficulties will undoubtedly be encountered.

There is one point I must again bring to everybody's attention, namely, that our ideas should be adapted to our immediate environment. Our immediate environment is rural; it would seem that nobody has any doubt on that score, for who does not know that we are living in the countryside? Yet actually, that is not the case. Many comrades do not understand the countryside at all, or at any rate not profoundly, although they live there and imagine they understand it. They do not proceed from the fact that our environment is the countryside, which is based on individual economy, cut up by the enemy and involved in guerrilla warfare, and the result is that their handling of political, military, economic and cultural problems, or of Party matters and the workers', peasants', youth and women's movements is often incorrect or only partially correct. They approach rural affairs from an urban viewpoint and often run their heads against a brick wall because they draw up many inappropriate plans subjectively and enforce them arbitrarily. In recent years our comrades have made much progress, thanks both to the rectification campaign and to the failures they have met with in their work. But we must still take care to adapt our ideas fully to our environment before we can obtain results in every field of work and do so quickly. If we truly understand the fact that the rural base areas in which we find ourselves are founded on individual economy, cut up by the enemy and involved in guerrilla warfare and make it the starting point in everything we do, then the pertinent question is, how do our results, which may seem slow and unspectacular, compare with the results of taking some other starting point, for instance, the urban viewpoint? Far from being slow, they are actually quite fast. For if we were to start from the urban viewpoint and depart from our present-day realities, the question would be not of getting fast or slow results, but of running into endless snags and getting no results at all.

Clear proof of this fact is provided by the great success of the present form of the army and civilian production drive we have promoted.

We want to hit the Japanese aggressors hard and make preparations for seizing the cities and recovering our lost territories. But how can we attain this aim, situated as we are in a countryside founded on individual economy, cut up by the enemy and involved in guerrilla warfare? We cannot imitate the Kuomintang, which does not lift a finger itself but depends entirely on foreigners even for such necessities as cotton cloth. We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the entire people. But how do we go about it? By launching large-scale production campaigns simultaneously among the troops and the people.

Since we are in the countryside, where manpower and material resources are scattered, we have adopted the policy of "unified leadership and decentralized management" for production and supply.

Since we are in the countryside, where the peasants are scattered individual producers employing backward means of production and where most of the land is still owned by landlords and the peasants are subjected to feudal rent exploitation, we have adopted the policies of reducing rent and interest and of organizing mutual aid in labour to heighten the peasants' enthusiasm for production and to increase the productivity of agricultural labour. Rent reduction has heightened the peasants' enthusiasm in production and mutual aid has increased the productivity of agricultural labour. I have obtained data from various places in northern and central China, all of which show that after rent reduction the peasants take much greater interest in production and are willing to organize mutual-aid groups like our labour-exchange teams here, in which the productivity of three persons now equals that of four in the past. That being the case, 90 million people can do as much as 120 million. There are also instances of two persons doing what used to require the effort of three. If instead of coercion and commandism, which are self-defeating because of their quest for quick results, we adopt a policy of patiently persuading people by setting them good examples, then it will be possible for the majority of the peasants to be organized into mutual-aid groups for agricultural and handicraft production in the next few years. Once such production groups become the usual practice, not only will output increase and all kinds of innovations emerge, but there will also be political progress, a higher educational level, progress in hygiene, a remoulding of loafers and a change in social customs, and it will not take long before the implements of production will be improved, too. With all this happening, our rural society will gradually be rebuilt on new foundations.

If our cadres carefully study this sphere of work and most energetically help the rural people develop campaigns for production, there will be a plentiful supply of grain and other necessities in the countryside within a few years, and we shall be able not only to keep up the war and cope with crop failures but also to maintain a large reserve of grain and other necessities for future use.

We should organize the army units and the government and other organizations as well as the peasants for production.

Since we are in the countryside, which is constantly ravaged by the enemy and involved in protracted war, it is imperative for the army units and the government and other organizations to engage in production. And it is possible for them to do so because the guerrilla fighting is scattered over a wide area. Besides, the troops and government personnel in our Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region are very numerous in proportion to the total population, and they will go hungry if they themselves do not engage in production, while on the other hand the people will go hungry if too much is taken from them and the burden is too heavy for them to bear. These are the reasons why we are resolved to launch a large-scale production campaign. Take the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, for instance. The annual requirements of the army units and the government and other organizations total 260,000 *tan* (here 1 *tan* equals 300 *chin*) of husked grain (millet), of which they get 160,000 from the people and produce the rest themselves; if they did not engage in production themselves, either they or the people would go hungry. Thanks to our production campaigns, we are free from hunger, and in fact the troops and the people are quite well fed.

With the exception of grain, clothing and bedding, government and other organizations in the Border Region are self-supporting in most of their needs and some units are entirely self-supporting. Many units are partially self-supporting even in grain, clothing and bedding.

The achievements of the army units of the Border Region are even greater. Many are entirely self-supporting in grain, clothing, bedding and every other essential, that is, they are 100 per cent self-supporting and draw nothing from the government. This is the highest standard, the top grade, and it has been attained gradually over a period of several years.

This standard cannot be adopted at the front, where fighting has to be done. There a second and a third standard may be set up. The second standard requires that except for grain, clothing and bedding, which are supplied by the government, self-sufficiency through production should be achieved in the following items: cooking oil (0.5 *liang* per person per day), salt (0.5 *liang* per person per day), vegetables (1-1.5 *chin* per person per day), and meat (1-2 *chin* per person per month); the purchase of fuel, office supplies and miscellaneous items; subsidies for education and health; expenditures for the cleaning of weapons and for the provision of tobacco, shoes, socks, gloves, towels, tooth-brushes, etc.; these items amounting in all to some 50 per cent of the total expenditure. This standard can be gradually attained in two or three years. In some places it has already been attained. This standard may be adopted in the stable base areas.

The third standard applies to outlying districts and to the guerrilla zones where 50 per cent self-sufficiency is not possible but 15-25 per cent may be. Reaching this standard is good enough there.

In short, apart from those in exceptional circumstances, all army units and government and other organizations must engage in production in the intervals between fighting, training or work. In addition to using such intervals for collective production, they should organize some of their personnel specifically for production, assigning them to run farms, vegetable gardens, pastures, workshops, small factories, transport teams and co-operatives, or to grow grain and vegetables in partnership with the peasants. In our present circumstances, every organization or army unit should establish its own "domestic economy" to tide over the difficulties. Unwillingness to do so is a characteristic of loafers and is disgraceful. To stimulate production we should also institute a system of individual bonuses, graded according to the quality of the work, for all who participate in it directly. Further, as the effective way of pushing the work forward, the head of each organization must assume responsibility and personally take part, and must apply the method of linking the leading group with the masses and the general call with particular and specific guidance.

Some people say that if the army units go in for production, they will be unable to train or fight and that if the government and other organizations do so, they will be unable to do their own work. This is a false argument. In recent years our army units in the Border Region have undertaken production on a big scale to provide themselves with ample food and clothing and have simultaneously done their training and conducted their political studies and literacy and other courses much more successfully than before, and there is greater unity than ever within the army and between the army and the people. While there was a large-scale production campaign at the front last year, great successes were gained in the fighting and in addition an extensive training campaign was started. And thanks to production, the personnel of the government and other organizations live a better life and work with greater devotion and efficiency; this is the case both in the Border Region and at the front.

Thus it can be seen that in the context of guerrilla warfare in rural areas, those army units and government and other organizations which undertake production for self-support show greater energy and activity in their fighting, training and work, and improve their discipline and their unity both internally and with the civilians. Production for self-support is the outcome of our country's protracted guerrilla war and this is our glory. Once we master it, no material difficulty can daunt us. We shall grow in vigour and energy year by year and become stronger with every battle; we shall overwhelm the enemy and have no fear of his overwhelming us.

Here another point must be called to the attention of our comrades at the front. Some of our recently established areas are fairly rich in material resources and, counting on this, the cadres there are unwilling either to economize or to engage in production. This is very bad, and they are bound to suffer for it later. Wherever we happen to be, we must treasure our manpower and material resources, and must not take a short view and indulge in wastefulness and extravagance. Wherever we are, from the very first year of our work we must bear in mind the many years to come, the protracted war that must be maintained, the counter-offensive, and the work of reconstruction after the enemy's expulsion. On the one hand, never be wasteful or extravagant; on the other, actively expand production. Previously, in some places people suffered a great deal because they did not take the long view and neglected economy in manpower and material resources and the expansion of production. The lesson is there and attention must be called to it.

As regards manufactured goods, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region has decided to become completely self-supporting in cotton,

cotton yarn, cotton cloth, iron, paper and many other things within two years. We must grow, manufacture and supply whatever is not produced here or is produced only in small quantities, and must not depend on the outside at all. The whole task is to be accomplished by the public, private and co-operative enterprises. For all items, we demand not only quantity but also quality, that is, they must stand wear and tear. The Border Region Government, the Joint Defence Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party are absolutely right in giving close attention to these matters. I hope that the same thing will be done in all places at the front. In many places it is already being done, and I wish them success.

In our Border Region and the other Liberated Areas, it will take another two or three years for us to learn every branch of economic work. The day when we grow all or most of our own grain, manufacture all or most of our own goods and thus are completely or mainly self-supporting and even have a surplus will also be the day when we have mastered every branch of economic work in the countryside. After we have cleared the cities of the enemy, we shall be able to take up new branches of economic work. We must exert ourselves and learn, because China depends on us for her reconstruction.

PRODUCTION IS ALSO POSSIBLE IN THE GUERRILLA ZONES

January 31, 1945

It is already admitted and there is no longer any doubt that production campaigns can and must be conducted in the army and among the people in the relatively stable bases of the Liberated Areas behind the enemy lines. But whether they can be conducted in the guerrilla zones and in the furthermost areas behind the enemy lines has not yet been settled in many people's minds for want of proof.

But now we have proof. In 1944 production was undertaken on a considerable scale in many guerrilla zones and with excellent results, according to Comrade Chang Ping-kai's report on the production campaign of the guerrilla units in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area, published in the *Liberation Daily* of January 28. The districts and units listed in his report are: in central Hopei, the sixth sub-region, the fourth district contingent of the second sub-region, the eighth district contingent of the fourth sub-region, the Hsushui-Tinghsien detachment, the Paoting-Mancheng detachment and the Yunpiao detachment; and in Shansi, the troops in the counties of Taihsien and Kuohsien. Conditions in those areas are most unfavourable:

> The place bristles with enemy and puppet strongpoints and blockhouses and is criss-crossed with ditches, walls and roads, and taking advantage of his military superiority and communication facilities, the enemy often launches surprise attacks and encirclement and "mopping-up" campaigns against us. Under such conditions the guerrilla units often have to shift their positions several times a day.

Nevertheless, the guerrilla units have managed to carry on production in the intervals between fighting. The results are:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this editorial for the *Liberation Daily*, Yenan.

> Everybody is now better fed — each person has 0.5 *liang* of cooking oil and salt and 1 *chin* of vegetables per day, and 1.5 *chin* of meat per month. Furthermore, tooth-brushes, tooth-powder and reading primers, which for years were unavailable, are now all provided.

FROM MARX TO MAO

Just look! Who says that production is not possible in guerrilla zones?

Many people claim that there is no spare land in the densely populated areas. Is there really no spare land? Again please look at the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area:

> First, the land problem has been settled in accordance with the policy of giving primary attention to agriculture. They use nine methods in all: (1) razing walls and filling in ditches used by the enemy for blockade purposes; (2) destroying motor roads the enemy may use and planting crops along them; (3) making use of small pieces of waste land; (4) helping the people's militia by providing armed protection when, on moonlit nights, crops are planted in the fields around the blockhouses in defiance of the enemy; (5) ploughing the fields in partnership with peasants who are short of labour power; (6) ploughing the fields around the enemy's strongpoints or blockhouses more or less openly, using soldiers dressed as peasants; (7) making use of river banks by building dykes, removing the sand and turning the banks into fields; (8) helping peasants bring dry land under irrigation; and (9) helping in the farm work in every village in which they are active.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

But if agriculture is possible, perhaps handicrafts and other production remain impossible? Is that actually the case? Please look at the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area:

> The troops in the vicinity of the enemy's blockade lines or blockade ditches do not confine their production to agriculture but, as in the stable areas, have also developed handicrafts and transport. The fourth district contingent has set up a felt-cap workshop, an oil press and a flour mill, and in seven months has netted a profit of 500,000 yuan in local currency. Not only has it settled its own difficulties but it is satisfying the needs of the people in its guerrilla zone. The soldiers can now provide all their own woollen sweaters and socks.

Since military operations are so frequent in the guerrilla zones, perhaps fighting is affected if the troops engage in production? Is that really so? Please look at the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area:

> Applying the principle of integrating labour power and armed strength, they give equal importance to the tasks of production and fighting.

And

> Take, for instance, the fourth district contingent of the second sub-region. When they began their spring ploughing, they sent a special detachment to attack the enemy and at the same time launched a powerful political offensive. Precisely because of this, there was greater activity in the military sphere, too, and the combat effectiveness of the troops increased. From February to early September this small detachment fought 71 encounters, took the strongholds of Chutungsheh, Shangchuang, Yehchuang, Fengchiachai and Yaitou, inflicted 165 casualties on the enemy and puppet troops, and captured 91 puppet soldiers, 3 light machine-guns and 101 rifles and pistols.

And

> Co-ordinating military activity with propaganda for extensive production, they immediately launched a political offensive with the watchword: "Smash anyone who tries to wreck the great production drivel" In the county towns of Taihsien and Kuohsien the enemy asked the inhabitants: "Why has the Eighth Route Army become so tough recently?" They replied: "Because you are trying to wreck the great production drive in the border area." The puppet troops said to one another: "Better not go out while they are carrying out this great production drive."

Is it possible to get the people in the guerrilla zones to launch a production campaign too? Are the peasants interested in increasing production in such zones, where rents have perhaps not yet been reduced or the rent reduction has not been thorough? This has been answered in the affirmative in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area:

> Furthermore, the troops in the vicinity of the enemy's blockade lines or blockade ditches give direct help to the local people by spreading the production campaign. On the one hand, they provide armed protection for the masses engaged in production and, on

> the other, they render extensive help by their labour. Some units have made it a rule to assign 50 per cent of their manpower to provide free help for the masses during the busy farming seasons. Thus, the enthusiasm of the masses for production has become very much greater, the relations between the army and the people have become still more harmonious, and the masses have enough to eat. Hence the sympathy and support of the masses in the guerrilla zones for the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army have grown.

All doubts have thus been answered as to whether the army and the people in the guerrilla zones can and must conduct large-scale production campaigns. We demand of all Party, government and army cadres in the Liberated Areas, and especially in the guerrilla zones, that they should attain full comprehension of this point, for once the "can" and the "must" are understood, production will be set going everywhere. It was precisely from this point that the start was made in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area:

> In the production campaign the troops in the vicinity of the enemy's blockade lines or blockade ditches were not only able to fulfil their production plan on schedule in the short space of five months, but what is more, they introduced a number of practical innovations. This was because the cadres re-orientated their thinking, paid serious attention to production and to integrating labour power with armed strength, and brought forward labour heroes and model workers from among the masses (sixty-six labour heroes and model workers according to a preliminary summing-up).

In 1945, the Liberated Areas must carry out a bigger army and civilian production campaign than ever before through the united efforts of all, and in the coming winter we shall compare the achievements of all the areas.

War is not only a military and political contest but also an economic contest. In order to defeat the Japanese aggressors, in addition to all the other tasks we must apply ourselves to economic work and must master it within two or three years; in the present year, 1945, we must achieve greater results than ever before. This is what the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party eagerly expects of all our cadres and all the people throughout the Liberated Areas, and we hope this objective will be attained.

CHINA'S TWO POSSIBLE DESTINIES IN CHINESE SOCIETY

April 23, 1945

Comrades! The Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China opens today.

What is the significance of our congress? It is a congress, it should be said, that affects the destiny of China's 450 million people. China can have one of two destinies. Someone has written a book about one of them;[1] our congress represents China's other destiny and we, too, shall write a book about it.[2] The aim of our congress is the overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the liberation of all the people of China. Ours is a congress for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the building of a new China, for final victory through the unity of all the Chinese people and of the peoples of the whole world.

The times are very favourable. In Europe, Hitler will soon be overthrown. The chief theatre of the world anti-fascist war is in the West, where the fighting will soon end in victory, thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Red Army. The guns of the Red Army can already be heard in Berlin, which will probably fall before long. In the East, too, victory in the war to overthrow Japanese imperialism is nigh. Our congress is meeting on the eve of final victory in the anti-fascist war.

Two roads lie before the Chinese people, the road of light and the road of darkness. Two possible destinies await China, a destiny of light and a destiny of darkness. Japanese imperialism has not yet been defeated. But even after its defeat, the two prospects will still confront us. Either a China which is independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and strong, that is, a China full of light, a new China whose people have won liberation, or a China which is semi-colonial, semi-feudal, divided, poor and weak, that is, the old China. The

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This was the opening speech at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

new China or the old China — these are the two prospects facing the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China and our present congress.

Since Japan is not yet defeated and since the two prospects will still face us even after its defeat, how should we set about our work? What is our task? Our sole task is boldly to mobilize the masses, expand the people's forces and unite all the forces of the nation capable of being united in order to struggle under our Party's leadership to defeat the Japanese aggressors and build a bright new China, a China that is independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and strong. We must strive with all our might for a bright future, a destiny of light, and against a dark future, a destiny of darkness. This is our one and only task! Indeed, it is the task of our congress, of our whole Party, and of all the people of China.

Is it possible for our hopes to be realized? We believe it is. The possibility exists, because we already enjoy the following conditions:

(1) A powerful Communist Party with rich experience and a membership of 1,210,000.

(2) Powerful Liberated Areas with a population of 95,500,000, an army of 910,000 and a militia of 2,200,000.

(3) The support of the masses throughout the country.

(4) The support of the people of all countries, and especially of the Soviet Union.

With these conditions — a powerful Communist Party, powerful Liberated Areas, the support of the masses throughout the country and the support of the people of the world — can our hopes be realized? We believe they can. China has never enjoyed these conditions before. Some have been present for a number of years, but never so fully as today. Our Communist Party has never been so powerful, the revolutionary base areas have never had so large a population and so large an army, the prestige of the Communist Party is higher than ever among the people both in the Japanese-occupied and in the Kuomintang areas, and the revolutionary forces of the Soviet Union and the people of all countries are stronger than ever before. One must say that, with these conditions, it is entirely possible to defeat the aggressors and build a new China.

We must have a correct policy. The fundamental point of our policy is boldly to mobilize the masses and expand the people's forces so that, under the leadership of our Party, they will defeat the aggressors and build a new China.

In the twenty-four years of its existence since its birth in 1921 the Communist Party of China has gone through three historical periods of heroic struggle — the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the War of Resistance Against Japan — and has accumulated a wealth of experience. Now our Party has become the centre of gravity of the Chinese people's struggle to resist Japan and save the nation, the centre of gravity of their struggle for liberation and of their struggle to defeat the aggressors and build a new China. China's centre of gravity lies right here where we are and nowhere else.

We should be modest and prudent, guard against arrogance and rashness, and serve the Chinese people heart and soul, in order to unite them for defeating the Japanese aggressors in the present and for building a new-democratic state in the future. Provided we do so, provided we have the correct policy and provided we make a united effort, we can definitely fulfil our task.

Down with Japanese imperialism!

Long live the liberation of the Chinese people!

Long live the Communist Party of China!

Long live the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China!

NOTES

[1] This refers to Chiang Kai-shek's *China's Destiny* published in 1943.

[2] This refers to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's report "On Coalition Government" at the same congress.

ON COALITION GOVERNMENT

April 24, 1945

I. THE FUNDAMENTAL DEMANDS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

Our congress is being held in the following circumstances. A new situation has emerged after nearly eight years of resolute, heroic and indomitable struggle waged by the Chinese people with countless sacrifices and amid untold hardships against the Japanese aggressors; in the world as a whole, decisive victory has been gained in the just and sacred war against the fascist aggressors and the moment is near when the Japanese aggressors will be defeated by the Chinese people in co-ordination with the allied countries. But China remains disunited and is still confronted with a grave crisis. In these circumstances, what ought we to do? Beyond all doubt, the urgent need is to unite representatives of all political parties and groups and of people without any party affiliation and establish a provisional democratic coalition government for the purpose of instituting democratic reforms, surmounting the present crisis, mobilizing and unifying all the anti-Japanese forces in the country to fight in effective co-ordination with the allied countries for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors, and thus enabling the Chinese people to liberate themselves from the latter's clutches. After that it will be necessary to convene a national assembly on a broad democratic basis and set up a formally constituted democratic government, which will also be in the nature of a coalition and will have a still wider representation of people from all parties and groups or without any party affiliation, and which will lead the liberated people of the whole country in building an independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful new China. In short, we

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This was the political report made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

must take the line of unity and democracy, defeat the aggressors and build a new China.

We believe that this alone can give expression to the fundamental demands of the Chinese people. Therefore, my report will deal mainly with these demands. Whether or not a democratic coalition government should be set up has become a matter of deep concern for the Chinese people and for democratic public opinion in the allied countries. My report will therefore lay particular stress on elucidating this question.

In the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Communist Party of China has overcome many difficulties and achieved great successes, but as things stand serious difficulties still confront our Party and people. The present situation demands that our Party should work still more solidly and intensively and that it should continue to overcome the difficulties and strive to fulfil the fundamental demands of the Chinese people.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL AND THE DOMESTIC SITUATION

Can the Chinese people translate these basic demands into reality? This will depend on the level of their political consciousness, their unity and their efforts. At the same time, the present international and domestic situation offers extremely favourable opportunities. If the Chinese people can make good use of these opportunities and continue to fight on staunchly, vigorously and persistently, they will undoubtedly defeat the aggressors and build a new China. They must redouble their efforts in their struggle to accomplish their sacred tasks.

What is the present international situation?

The present military situation is that the Soviet Army is attacking Berlin, and the allied forces of Britain, the United States and France are attacking the Hitlerite remnants in co-ordination with this offensive, while the Italian people are launching uprisings. All this will eliminate Hitler once and for all. After Hitler is wiped out, the defeat of the Japanese aggressors will not be far distant. Contrary to the predictions of the Chinese and foreign reactionaries, the forces of fascist aggression will undoubtedly be overthrown and the people's democratic forces will undoubtedly triumph. The world will unquestionably take the road of progress and not the road of reaction. Of course, we must remain very much on the alert and reckon with the possibility of certain temporary or perhaps even serious twists and turns in the course of events; in many countries there are still strong reactionary forces which begrudge the people at home and abroad their unity, progress and liberation. Anyone who loses sight of this possibility will make political mistakes. The general trend of history, however, is already clearly decided and will not change. This is bad only for the fascists and for the reactionaries of all countries who are in fact their helpers, but it is a blessing for the people and for the organized democratic forces in all countries. The people, and the people alone, are the motive force of world history. The Soviet people have built up great strength and become the main force in the defeat of fascism. It is their efforts, plus those of the people in the other anti-fascist allied countries, which are making the destruction of fascism possible. War has educated the people and it is the people who will win the war, win the peace and win progress.

This new situation is very different from that in World War I. The Soviet Union was not yet in existence then and the people were not politically awakened as they are in many countries today. The two world wars represent two entirely different epochs.

This does not mean that there will be no more struggles after the defeat of the fascist aggressor countries, the end of World War II and the establishment of international peace. The remnant forces of fascism which are still widespread will certainly continue to make trouble, while within the camp now fighting fascist aggression there are forces which oppose democracy and oppress other nations, and they will continue to oppress the people in various countries and in the colonies and semi-colonies. Therefore, after international peace is established, there will still be numerous struggles over the greater part of the world — between the anti-fascist masses and the remnants of fascism, between democracy and anti-democracy, between national liberation and national oppression. The people will achieve the most extensive victory only through long and sustained efforts, when the remaining forces of fascism, the anti-democratic forces and all the imperialist forces are overcome. To be sure, that day will not come very quickly or easily, but come it surely will. Victory in the anti-fascist Second World War will pave the way for the victory of the people in their post-war struggles. A stable and lasting peace will be ensured only when victory is won in these struggles.

What is the present domestic situation?

China's protracted war has exacted and will continue to exact great sacrifices from the Chinese people, but at the same time this very war has tempered them. It has awakened and united the Chinese people to a greater degree than all their great struggles in the last hundred years. The Chinese people face not only a formidable national enemy but also powerful domestic reactionary forces which are in fact helping the enemy; this is one side of the picture. But the other side is that the Chinese people are not only more politically conscious than ever before but have built powerful Liberated Areas and a nation-wide democratic movement that is growing day by day. These constitute favourable domestic conditions. If the defeats and setbacks in the Chinese people's struggles of the last hundred years were due to the absence of certain necessary international and domestic conditions, then today the situation is different — all the necessary conditions are present. There is every possibility of avoiding defeat and winning victory. We shall be victorious if we can unite the whole people in resolute struggle and give them proper leadership.

The Chinese people now have much greater confidence that they can unite to defeat the aggressors and build a new China. The time has come for them to conquer all difficulties and achieve their fundamental demands, their great historic aspirations. Is there any doubt about it? I think not.

Such is the general international and domestic situation today.

III. TWO LINES IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

THE KEY TO CHINA'S PROBLEMS

In speaking of the domestic situation, we have also to make a specific analysis of China's War of Resistance.

China is one of the five biggest countries taking part in the war against fascism and it is the principal country fighting the Japanese aggressors on the continent of Asia. Not only have the Chinese people played a very great role in the war against Japan, but they will also play a very great role in safeguarding peace in the post-war world and the decisive one in safeguarding peace in the East. China has made very great efforts to liberate herself and to help the allied countries during the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan. These efforts have been made primarily by the people of China. Vast numbers of officers and men in China's armies have fought and shed their blood at the front; the workers, peasants, intellectuals and industrialists of China have worked hard in the rear; the Chinese overseas have made donations to support the war; and all the anti-Japanese political parties, except for such of their members as are opposed to the people, have played their part in the war. In short, with their blood and sweat, the Chinese people have heroically fought the Japanese aggressors for eight long years. But for a number of years the Chinese reactionaries have been spreading rumours and misleading public opinion in order to prevent the world from knowing the truth about the role played by the Chinese people in the war. Besides, there has as yet been no comprehensive summing-up of the varied experience gained by China during these eight years of war. Therefore, this congress should make a proper summing-up of all this experience in order to educate the people and provide our Party with a basis for the formulation of policy.

When it comes to such summing up, it is plain to all that there are two different guiding lines in China. One leads to the defeat of the Japanese aggressors, while the other not only makes their defeat impossible but in some respects actually helps them and undermines our War of Resistance.

The Kuomintang government's policy of passive resistance to Japan and its reactionary domestic policy of active repression of the people have resulted in military setbacks, enormous territorial losses, financial and economic crisis, oppression and hardship for the people and the disruption of national unity. This reactionary policy has been an obstruction to mobilizing and uniting all the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people for the effective prosecution of the war, and has hindered the awakening and unity of the people. Yet this political awakening and this unity have never ceased to develop, but have moved forward along a tortuous course, under the twofold repression of the Japanese aggressors and the Kuomintang government. Clearly, there have been two lines in China for a long time, the Kuomintang government's line of oppression of the people and of passive resistance, and the Chinese people's line of enhancing their own consciousness and unity for the waging of a people's war. Herein lies the key to all China's problems.

HISTORY FOLLOWS A TORTUOUS COURSE

To help people understand why this question of the two lines is the key to all of China's problems, it is necessary to trace the history of our War of Resistance Against Japan.

The Chinese people's War of Resistance has followed a tortuous course. It began as far back as 1931. On September 18 of that year, the Japanese aggressors occupied Shenyang, and within a few months they seized the three northeastern provinces. The Kuomintang government adopted a policy of non-resistance. But against the will of the Kuomintang government and led or assisted by the Chinese Communist Party, the people and a patriotic section of the troops of these provinces organized the Anti-Japanese Volunteers and the Anti-Japanese United Army and engaged in heroic guerrilla warfare. At one time this heroic guerrilla warfare grew to great dimensions and, despite many difficulties and setbacks, it has never been put down by the enemy. When the Japanese aggressors attacked Shanghai in 1932, a group of patriots in the Kuomintang once again defied the will of the Kuomintang government and led the 19th Route Army in resisting the Japanese aggressors. In 1933 the Japanese aggressors invaded Jehol and Chahar Provinces, and for the third time a group of patriots in the Kuomintang defied the will of the Kuomintang government and co-operated with the Communist Party in organizing the Anti-Japanese Allied Army to resist the enemy. But in all this fighting against Japan support came entirely from the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party, other democratic groups and the patriotic Chinese overseas, while the Kuomintang government with its policy of non-resistance contributed nothing. On the contrary, the anti-Japanese actions in Shanghai and Chahar were both wrecked by the Kuomintang government itself. In 1933 it also destroyed the people's government which had been established in Fukien by the 19th Route Army.

Why did the Kuomintang government of that day adopt a policy of non-resistance? The main reason was that it had wrecked Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and the unity of the Chinese people in 1927.

In 1924 Dr. Sun Yat-sen, accepting the proposals of the Chinese Communist Party, called the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in which Communists took part, adopted the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers, established the

Whampoa Military Academy and formed the national united front of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and all sections of the people. As a result, the reactionary forces in Kwangtung Province were destroyed in 1924-25, the triumphant Northern Expedition was carried out during 1926-27, most of the areas along the Yangtse and Yellow Rivers were taken over, the Northern warlord government was defeated, and the people's struggle for liberation was unfolded on a scale never before seen in Chinese history. But at a critical moment in the progress of the Northern Expedition, in the late spring and early summer of 1927, the treacherous and reactionary policies of "party purge" and massacre adopted by the Kuomintang authorities wrecked this national united front — the united front of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and all sections of the people, which embodied the Chinese people's cause of liberation — and all its revolutionary policies. Yesterday's allies, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, were now regarded as enemies, and yesterday's enemies, the imperialists and feudalists, were now regarded as allies. So it came about that a sudden attack was perfidiously launched against the Chinese Communist Party and the people, and the great, dynamic and vigorous revolution was crushed. Thereupon unity was replaced by civil war, democracy by dictatorship, and a China full of brightness by a China covered in darkness. But the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people were neither cowed nor conquered nor exterminated. They picked themselves up, wiped off the blood, buried their fallen comrades and went into battle again. Holding high the great standard of revolution, they rose in armed resistance and over a vast territory in China they set up people's governments, carried out land reform, built up a people's army — the Chinese Red Army — and preserved and expanded the revolutionary forces of the Chinese people. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles, which the Kuomintang reactionaries had discarded, were carried forward by the people, the Communist Party and other democrats.

After the invasion of the three northeastern provinces by the Japanese aggressors, the Chinese Communist Party in 1933 proposed to all the Kuomintang forces then attacking the revolutionary base areas and the Red Army that an armistice agreement be concluded to facilitate united resistance to Japan; this proposal was made with three conditions — that the attacks should stop, that the people should be granted democratic rights, and that the people should be armed. But the Kuomintang authorities rejected it.

From then on the Kuomintang government's policy of civil war became increasingly vicious, while the voice of the Chinese people grew increasingly powerful in its demand for an end to civil war and for united resistance to Japan. All kinds of popular patriotic organizations were formed in Shanghai and many other places. Between 1934 and 1936, under the leadership of the Central Committee of our Party, the main forces of the Red Army north and south of the Yangtse River went through untold hardships and moved to northwestern China, joining forces with the Red Army units there. It was in those two years that the Chinese Communist Party decided on, and carried out, a new and comprehensive political line in keeping with the new situation — the line of the National United Front Against Japan, with united resistance to Japan and the establishment of a new-democratic republic as the goal of struggle. On December 9, 1935, the student masses in Peiping launched a heroic patriotic movement under our Party's leadership; they formed the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard Corps[1] and spread this movement to all the big cities in China. On December 12, 1936, two patriotic Kuomintang groups which favoured resistance to Japan, the Northeastern Army and the 17th Route Army, together staged the famous Sian Incident in courageous opposition to the reactionary Kuomintang policy of compromising with Japan and massacring the people at home. Other patriots in the Kuomintang were likewise dissatisfied with the policy of the Kuomintang authorities at the time. These were the circumstances in which the Kuomintang authorities were forced to abandon their policy of civil war and to acknowledge the demands of the people. The peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident became the turning point; under the new circumstances internal co-operation took shape and the nation-wide War of Resistance Against Japan began. In May 1937, shortly before the Lukouchiao Incident,[2] our Party called the historic national conference at which the new political line followed by the Central Committee of the Party since 1935 was endorsed.

From the Lukouchiao Incident of July 7, 1937 to the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, the Kuomintang government was relatively active in the war against Japan. During that period the large-scale Japanese attacks and the mounting patriotic indignation of the whole people compelled the Kuomintang government to make resistance to the Japanese aggressors the centre of gravity of its policy, which made it easier to bring about an upsurge in the struggle of the whole army and people against Japan, and for a time there was a new and dynamic atmosphere. All the people, including the Communists and other democrats, earnestly hoped that the Kuomintang government would seize the opportunity, at a time when the nation was in peril and the people were filled with enthusiasm, to institute democratic reforms and put Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles into practice. But their hopes came to nought. Even in those two years of relatively active resistance, the Kuomintang authorities continued to oppose the mobilization of the masses for a people's war and to place restrictions on the people's spontaneous efforts to unite for anti-Japanese and democratic action. While the Kuomintang government had somewhat changed its previous attitude to the Chinese Communist Party and the other anti-Japanese parties, it continued to deny them equal status and restrict their activities in many ways. Patriotic political prisoners were still kept in jail in large numbers. Above all, the Kuomintang government still maintained the oligarchic dictatorship it had established after launching the civil war in 1927, so that it was impossible to set up a democratic coalition government representing the unanimous will of the nation.

At the very beginning of this period we Communists pointed out that there were two alternative lines for China's War of Resistance Against Japan, an all-embracing people's war leading to victory, or a partial war in which the people remained oppressed, leading to defeat. We also pointed out that the war would be protracted and would inevitably involve many obstacles and hardships, but that by their exertions the Chinese people were sure to win the final victory.

THE PEOPLE'S WAR

During the same period the main forces of the Communist-led Red Army, which had moved to northwestern China, were redesignated as the Eighth Route Army of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army, while the Chinese Red Army's guerrilla units, which had remained in various places on both sides of the Yangtse River, were redesignated as the New Fourth Army of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army. The former went to fight on the northern China front and the latter on the central China front. During the civil war period, the Chinese Red Army, which had preserved and developed the democratic tradition of the Whampoa Military Academy and of the National Revolutionary Army of the Northern Expedition days, had at one time grown to several hundred thousand men. But by the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan it had been reduced to a few tens of thousands as a result of the ruthless destruction wrought in our southern base areas by the Kuomintang government, our losses during the Long March, and other causes. Consequently there were some who looked down on this army and thought that the main reliance for resistance to Japan should be placed on the Kuomintang. But the people are the best judges. The people knew that despite their small number at the time, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies were of high quality, that they alone could wage a real people's war and that boundless prospects would open up before them once they reached the anti-Japanese fronts and joined with the broad masses there. And the people were right. By now, as I make this report, our army has already expanded to 910,000 men, and the number of our rural militia, who are not withdrawn from normal productive work, has grown to more than 2,200,000. Despite the fact that our regular army is still numerically much smaller than that of the Kuomintang (counting the Kuomintang units under local as well as central control), it has already become the main force in China's War of Resistance, judging by the number of Japanese and puppet forces it is engaging and the extent of its battle fronts, by its combat effectiveness, by the mass support it enjoys in its operations, and by its political quality, cohesion and unity.

This army is powerful because all its members have a discipline based on political consciousness, they have come together and they fight not for the private interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests of the broad masses and of the whole nation. The sole purpose of this army is to stand firmly with the Chinese people and to serve them whole-heartedly.

Guided by this purpose, this army has an indomitable spirit and is determined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield. No matter what the difficulties and hardships, so long as a single man remains, he will fight on.

Guided by this purpose, this army has achieved remarkable unity in its own ranks and with those outside its ranks. Internally, there is unity between officers and men, between the higher and lower ranks, and between military work, political work and rear service work; and externally, there is unity between the army and the people, between the army and government organizations, and between our army and the friendly armies. It is imperative to overcome anything that impairs this unity.

Guided by this purpose, this army has a correct policy for winning over enemy officers and men and for dealing with prisoners of war. Without exception all members of the enemy forces who surrender, who come over to our side or who, after laying down their arms, wish to join in fighting the common foe, are welcomed and given proper education. It is forbidden to kill, maltreat or insult any prisoner of war.

Guided by this purpose, this army has built up a system of strategy and tactics which is essential for the people's war. It is skilled in flexible guerrilla warfare conducted in accordance with the changing concrete conditions and is also skilled in mobile warfare.

Guided by this purpose, this army has built up a system of political work which is essential for the people's war and is aimed at promoting unity in its own ranks, unity with the friendly armies and unity with the people, and at disintegrating the enemy forces and ensuring victory in battle.

Guided by this purpose, the entire army, operating under conditions of guerrilla warfare, is able to utilize, and has in fact utilized, the intervals between battles and between training periods to produce grain and other necessities, thus becoming wholly, half or at least partly self-supporting, so that economic difficulties are overcome, living conditions improved and the burden on the people lightened. Every possibility has been exploited to establish a number of small-scale armament works in various military base areas.

Furthermore, this army is powerful because it has the people's self-defence corps and the militia — the vast armed organizations of the masses — fighting in co-ordination with it. In the Liberated Areas of China all men and women, from youth to middle age, are organized in the people's anti-Japanese self-defence corps on a voluntary and democratic basis and without giving up their work in production. The cream of the self-defence corps, except for those who join the army or the guerrilla units, is brought into the militia. Without the co-operation of these armed forces of the masses it would be impossible to defeat the enemy.

Finally, this army is powerful because of its division into two parts, the main forces and the regional forces, with the former available for operations in any region whenever necessary and the latter concentrating on defending their own localities and attacking the enemy there in co-operation with the local militia and the self-defence corps. This division of labour has won the whole-hearted support of the people. Without this correct division of labour — if, for example, attention were paid only to the role of the main forces while that of the regional forces were neglected — it would likewise be impossible to defeat the enemy in the conditions obtaining in China's Liberated Areas. Under the regional forces, numerous armed working teams have been organized, which are well trained and hence better qualified for military, political and mass work; they penetrate into the rearmost areas behind the enemy lines, strike at the enemy and arouse the masses to anti-Japanese struggle, thus giving support to the frontal military operations of the various Liberated Areas. In all this they have achieved great success.

Under the leadership of their democratic governments, all the anti-Japanese people in the Liberated Areas of China are called upon to join organizations of workers, peasants, youth and women, and cultural, professional and other organizations, which will wholeheartedly perform various tasks in support of the armed forces. These tasks are not limited to rallying the people to join the army, transporting grain for it, caring for soldiers' families and helping the troops in meeting their material needs. They also include mobilizing the guerrilla units, militia and self-defence corps to make widespread raids and lay land mines against the enemy, gather intelligence about him, comb out traitors and spies, transport and protect the wounded and take direct part in the army's operations. At the same time, the people in all the Liberated Areas are enthusiastically taking up various kinds of political, economic, cultural and health work. The most important thing in this connection is to mobilize everybody for the production of grain and other necessities and to ensure that all government institutions and schools, except in special cases, devote their free time to production for their own support in order to supplement the self-sufficiency production campaigns of the army and the people and thus help to create a great upsurge of production to sustain the protracted War of Resistance. In China's Liberated Areas, the enemy has wrought great havoc, and floods, droughts and damage by insect pests have been frequent. However, the democratic governments there have been leading the people in overcoming these difficulties in an organized way, and unprecedented results have been achieved by the great mass campaigns for pest extermination, flood control and disaster relief, thus making it possible to persevere in the protracted War of Resistance. In a word, everything for the front, everything for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and for the liberation of the Chinese people — this is the general slogan, the general policy for the whole army and the whole people in the Liberated Areas of China.

Such is a real people's war. Only by waging such a people's war can we defeat the national enemy. The Kuomintang has failed precisely because of its desperate opposition to a people's war.

Once it is equipped with modern weapons, the army of China's Liberated Areas will become still more powerful and will be able to accomplish the final defeat of the Japanese aggressors.

TWO BATTLE FRONTS

From the very beginning there have been two fronts in China's War of Resistance, the Kuomintang front and the front of the Liberated Areas.

After the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese aggressors stopped their strategic offensive against the Kuomintang front and gradually shifted their main forces to the front of the Liberated Areas; at the same time, taking advantage of the defeatist sentiments of the Kuomintang government, they declared their willingness to arrive at a compromise peace with it, and, adopting a policy designed to deceive the Chinese nation, they induced the traitor Wang Ching-wei to leave Chungking and establish a puppet government in Nanking. The Kuomintang government then began to change its policy, gradually shifting the emphasis from resistance to Japan to opposition to the Communist Party and the people. This shift first made itself apparent in the military sphere. To conserve its own military strength, the Kuomintang government adopted the policy of passive resistance to Japan; it threw the burden of fighting onto the front of the Liberated Areas by letting the Japanese invaders attack the Liberated Areas in force, while itself "sitting on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight".

In 1939, the Kuomintang government adopted the reactionary "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" and completely deprived the people and the anti-Japanese parties of whatever rights they had won during the early period of the War of Resistance. From then on, in the Kuomintang areas, all the democratic parties, and first and foremost the Communist Party of China, have been driven underground by the Kuomintang government. In every province in these areas the prisons and concentration camps are packed with Communists, young patriots and other fighters for democracy. In the five years from 1939 to the autumn of 1943, the Kuomintang government launched three large-scale anti-Communist onslaughts[3] to split national unity, and thus created serious danger of civil war. It was in this period that the "disbanding" of the New Fourth Army was ordered and more than nine thousand of its troops in southern Anhwei were annihilated — an event which shocked the world. To this very moment the attacks by Kuomintang troops on the forces of the Liberated Areas have not ceased, nor is there any sign that they will. At the same time, the Kuomintang reactionaries have been pouring out slanders and calumnies of all sorts. It is they who have fabricated such labels and expressions as "traitor party", "traitor army", "traitor areas", and "sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state", for the purpose of maligning the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the Liberated Areas. To meet the crisis, on July 7, 1939 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a manifesto setting forth the following slogans, "Persist in resistance and oppose capitulation! Persist in unity and oppose a split! Persist in progress and oppose retrogression!" In these five years, our Party, acting on these timely slogans, vigorously repulsed the three reactionary and anti-popular anti-Communist onslaughts and overcame the crisis on each occasion.

There was actually no serious fighting on the Kuomintang front during those years. The sword-edge of Japanese aggression was mainly directed against the Liberated Areas. By 1943, the army and the people of the Liberated Areas were pinning down 64 per cent of the Japanese forces invading China and 95 per cent of the puppet troops, while the Kuomintang front faced only 36 per cent of the former and 5 per cent of the latter.

In 1944 the Japanese aggressors launched operations to force China's north-south trunk railways open for through traffic;[4] panic-stricken, the Kuomintang forces were totally incapable of offering resistance. Within a few months extensive areas in Honan, Hunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung Provinces had fallen into the enemy's hands. It was not until then that some change took place in the proportion of enemy forces engaged on the two fronts. Even so, at the moment of making this report, of the 40 divisions comprising 580,000 Japanese soldiers in China (not counting those in the three northeastern provinces), 22½ divisions, comprising 320,000 men or 56 per cent of the total forces, are engaged on the front of the Liberated Areas, and no more than 17½ divisions, comprising 260,000 men or 44 per cent, are engaged on the Kuomintang front. As for the puppet troops engaged on the two fronts, the ratio has not changed at all.

It should also be pointed out that the puppet troops, numbering more than 800,000 men (in both the regular and the local forces), are chiefly composed either of units that surrendered under their Kuomintang commanders or of units organized by the Kuomintang officers after their surrender. The Kuomintang reactionaries have furnished these puppet troops in advance with a false and traitorous theory, namely, "saving the nation by a devious path", and have given them moral and organizational support since their surrender, directing them to attack the Chinese people's Liberated Areas in co-ordination with the Japanese aggressors. These reactionaries have also mustered large forces, totalling no less than 797,000 men, to blockade and attack the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and other Liberated Areas. This grave situation is being kept from the knowledge of many Chinese and foreigners by the Kuomintang government's policy of suppressing news.

CHINA'S LIBERATED AREAS

China's Liberated Areas, led by the Communist Party, now have a population of 95,500,000. They exist from Inner Mongolia in the north to Hainan Island in the south; almost everywhere the enemy goes, he finds the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army or some other people's forces in operation. This vast liberated territory consists of nineteen major Liberated Areas, covering greater or lesser parts of the provinces of Liaoning, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shensi, Kansu, Ningsia, Shansi, Hopei, Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangtung and Fukien. Yenan is the centre from which guidance is given to all these Liberated Areas. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region west of the Yellow River, with a population of only 1,500,000, is but one of the nineteen areas forming this vast liberated part of China and, indeed, the smallest in population except for one in eastern Chekiang Province and another on Hainan Island. Unaware of this, some people think China's liberated territory consists chiefly of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. This misconception arises from the Kuomintang government's blockade. In every one of the Liberated Areas, all the requisite policies of the Anti-Japanese National United Front have been put into practice, and popularly elected governments, that is, local coalition governments, have been or are being set up, in which Communists and representative personalities of other anti-Japanese parties or without any party affiliation are co-operating. The entire strength of the people has been mobilized in the Liberated Areas. As a result, despite the formidable pressure of the enemy, the Kuomintang's military blockade and attacks and the complete absence of outside help, China's Liberated Areas have stood firm and have grown steadily, reducing the territory occupied by the enemy and extending their own; they have become the model for a democratic China and the main force driving out the Japanese aggressors and liberating the Chinese people in military co-operation with the allied countries. The armed forces of China's Liberated Areas, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other armed forces of the people, have not only set a heroic example in fighting Japan, but have also set an example in carrying out the democratic policies of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. The declaration issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on September 22, 1937 affirming that "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization", has been completely carried into effect in China's Liberated Areas.

THE KUOMINTANG AREAS

Persisting in its dictatorial rule, the chief ruling clique of the Kuomintang has followed a policy of passive resistance to Japan and a domestic policy directed against the people. In consequence, its armed forces have shrunk to less than half their original size and most of them have virtually lost their combat effectiveness; there is a profound rift between this clique and the broad masses and a grave crisis of mass impoverishment, seething discontent and widespread revolt; not only has its role in the war been sharply reduced, but it has also become an obstacle to the mobilization and unity of all the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people.

Why has such a grave situation arisen under the leadership of the Kuomintang's chief ruling clique? It has arisen because that clique represents the interests of China's big landlords, big bankers and big compradors. The handful of people forming this reactionary stratum monopolize all the important military, political, economic and cultural organizations under the Kuomintang government. They place the safeguarding of their own interests above resistance to Japan. They too say "the nation above all", but their actions do not accord with the demands of the great majority of the nation. They too say "the state above all", but what they mean is the feudal-fascist dictatorship of the big landlords, big bankers and big compradors, and not a democratic state of the people. Therefore they are afraid of the rise of the people, afraid of the democratic movement and afraid of full mass mobilization for war against Japan. Herein lies the root cause of their policy of passive resistance to Japan and their reactionary domestic policy against the people, democracy and the Communist Party. They have a double-faced policy in everything. For instance, on the one hand they are resisting Japan but on the other they are pursuing a passive war policy, and moreover they are the constant target of Japanese inducements to surrender. They talk about developing China's economy, but in fact they build up their own bureaucrat-capital, *i.e.*, the capital of the big landlords, bankers and compradors, and monopolize the lifelines of China's economy, ruthlessly oppressing the peasants, the workers, the petty bourgeoisie and the non-monopoly bourgeoisie. They talk about putting "democracy" into practice and "handing state power back to the people", yet they ruthlessly suppress the people's movement for democracy and refuse to introduce the mildest democratic reform. They say that "the Communist problem is a political one and should be solved politically", yet they ruthlessly suppress the Chinese Communist Party militarily, politically and economically, regarding it as "enemy No. 1" and the Japanese aggressors as only "enemy No. 2", and day in and day out they busy themselves with preparations for a civil war and plots to annihilate the Communist Party. They say they will establish a "modern state", yet they work desperately to maintain the feudal-fascist dictatorship of the big landlords, bankers and compradors. While maintaining formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, they are in fact hostile to it. They chant "Asia before Europe" in chorus with the U.S. isolationists in order to prolong the life of fascist Germany, which amounts to prolonging the life of fascists everywhere, including their own fascist rule over the Chinese people, yet at the same time they indulge in diplomatic manoeuvres, masquerading as anti-fascist heroes. If you look for the root of these contradictory double-faced policies, you will find they all stem from the social stratum of the big landlords, bankers and compradors.

Nevertheless, the Kuomintang is not a homogeneous political party. Though it is controlled and led by the reactionary clique representing the stratum of the big landlords, bankers and compradors, it must not be entirely identified with this clique. Some Kuomintang leaders do not belong to this clique by which they are even slighted, pushed aside or attacked. Many of its cadres and rank and file and many members of the Three People's Principles Youth League are dissatisfied with the leadership of this clique, and some even oppose it. The same is true of all the Kuomintang armies, government organs and economic and cultural institutions which this reactionary clique controls. There are quite a number of democratic elements in all of them. Moreover, the reactionary clique itself, divided as it is into several contending factions, is not a close-knit body. Undoubtedly it is wrong to regard the Kuomintang as a homogeneous body of reactionaries.

A CONTRAST

The Chinese people have come to see the sharp contrast between the Liberated Areas and the Kuomintang areas.

Are not the facts clear enough? Here are two lines, the line of a people's war and the line of passive resistance, which is against a people's war; one leads to victory even in the difficult conditions in China's Liberated Areas with their total lack of outside aid, and the other leads to defeat even in the extremely favourable conditions in the Kuomintang areas with foreign aid available.

The Kuomintang government attributes its failures to lack of arms. Yet one may ask, which of the two are short of arms, the Kuomintang troops or the troops of the Liberated Areas? Of all China's forces, those of the Liberated Areas lack arms most acutely, their only weapons being those they capture from the enemy or manufacture under the most adverse conditions.

Is it not true that the forces directly under the Kuomintang central government are far better armed than the provincial troops? Yet in combat effectiveness most of the central forces are inferior to the provincial troops.

The Kuomintang commands vast reserves of manpower, yet its wrong recruiting policy makes manpower replenishment very difficult. Though cut off from each other by the enemy and engaged in constant fighting, China's Liberated Areas are able to mobilize inexhaustible manpower because the militia and self-defence corps system, which is well-adapted to the needs of the people, is applied everywhere, and because misuse and waste of manpower are avoided.

Although the Kuomintang controls vast areas abounding in grain and the people supply it with 70-100 million *tan* annually, its army is always short of food and its soldiers are emaciated because the greater part of the grain is embezzled by those through whose hands it passes. But although most of China's Liberated Areas, which are located in the enemy rear, have been devastated by the enemy's policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all", and although some regions like northern Shensi are very arid, we have successfully solved the grain problem through our own efforts by increasing agricultural production.

The Kuomintang areas are facing a very grave economic crisis; most industries are bankrupt, and even such necessities as cloth have to be imported from the United States. But China's Liberated Areas are able to meet their own needs in cloth and other necessities through the development of industry.

In the Kuomintang areas, the workers, peasants, shop assistants, government employees, intellectuals and cultural workers live in extreme misery. In the Liberated Areas all the people have food, clothing and work.

It is characteristic of the Kuomintang areas that, exploiting the national crisis for profiteering purposes, officials have concurrently become traders and habitual grafters without any sense of shame or decency. It is characteristic of China's Liberated Areas that, setting an example of plain living and hard work, the cadres take part in production in addition to their regular duties; honesty is held in high esteem while graft is strictly prohibited.

In the Kuomintang areas the people have no freedom at all. In China's Liberated Areas the people have full freedom.

Who is to blame for all the anomalies which confront the Kuomintang rulers? Are others to blame, or they themselves? Are foreign countries to blame for not giving them enough aid, or are the Kuomintang government's dictatorial rule, corruption and incompetence to blame? Isn't the answer obvious?

WHO IS "SABOTAGING THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AND ENDANGERING THE STATE"?

In the light of the indisputable evidence, is it not the Kuomintang government itself that has been sabotaging the Chinese people's War of Resistance and endangering our country? For fully ten years that government devoted itself wholly to civil war, turning the edge of its sword against the people while utterly neglecting national defence, and by its policy of non-resistance it gave away the four northeastern provinces. When the Japanese aggressors drove south of the Great

Wall, it put up a flurry of resistance and then retreated from Lukouchiao all the way to the province of Kweichow. Yet the Kuomintang alleges that "the Communist Party is sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state" (see resolutions of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, held in September 1943). Its only evidence is that the Communist Party has united with all sections of the people to create the Liberated Areas which are heroically resisting Japan. The logic of the Kuomintang is so different from that of the Chinese people that the failure to arrive at a common language on many problems is not to be wondered at.

Here are two questions.

First, what exactly has made the Kuomintang government abandon so vast and so well populated a territory, stretching from Heilungkiang Province to Lukouchiao and from Lukouchiao to Kweichow? Can it be anything other than its policy first of non-resistance and then of passive resistance to Japan, and its domestic policy of opposing the people?

Second, what exactly has enabled China's Liberated Areas to smash the ruthless and prolonged attacks of the Japanese and puppet forces, to recover such vast territories and liberate such an immense population from the grip of the national enemy? Can it be anything other than our correct line, the line of a people's war?

"DISOBEDIENCE TO GOVERNMENTAL AND MILITARY ORDERS"

The Kuomintang government also constantly accuses the Chinese Communist Party of "disobedience to governmental and military orders". All we need say is that fortunately the Chinese Communists, sharing the common sense of the Chinese people, have not obeyed such "governmental and military orders" as in fact would have meant handing over to the Japanese aggressors the Liberated Areas which the Chinese people had recaptured from them amid great difficulties and hardships. Some examples are the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" in 1939, the orders for the "disbandment of the New Fourth Army" and for its "withdrawal north of the old course of the Yellow River" in 1941, the order for the "dissolution of the Communist Party of China" in 1943, the order for us to "disband all the troops except for ten divisions within a definite time limit" in 1944, and the proposal which the Kuomintang government called "a concession" in the recent talks with us and which would require us to hand over our armed forces and local governments in exchange for a few posts in its dictatorial government, but without the formation of a coalition government. Fortunately we have not submitted to this sort of thing and have thus preserved an undefiled stretch of soil and a heroic anti-Japanese army for the Chinese people. Should not the Chinese people congratulate themselves on such "disobedience"? Does not the Kuomintang government feel it has done enough after presenting the Japanese aggressors with the vast populated area from Heilungkiang to Kweichow through its own fascist government decrees and defeatist military orders? The Japanese aggressors and the reactionaries welcome these "governmental and military orders", but can such things be welcomed by any upright Chinese patriot? Unless there is a coalition government, not in form but in fact, not a fascist dictatorship but a democratic government, is it conceivable that the Chinese people would permit the Chinese Communists to hand over the Liberated Areas where the people have won freedom as well as the people's armies that have performed signal service in the War of Resistance to the present Kuomintang government, which is defeatist, fascist and dictatorial? Without the Liberated Areas and the people's army, could the anti-Japanese cause of the Chinese people be what it is today? And can one possibly conceive what the future of the Chinese nation would be?

THE DANGER OF CIVIL WAR

To this day the chief ruling clique in the Kuomintang is persisting in its reactionary policy of dictatorship and civil war. There are many signs that it has long been making, and is now stepping up, preparations to unleash civil war as soon as the forces of a certain allied country have cleared a considerable part of the Chinese mainland of the Japanese aggressors. It also hopes that the generals of certain allied countries will do the same job in China as the British General Scobie[5] has been doing in Greece. It applauds the butchery perpetrated by Scobie and the reactionary Greek government. It is planning to plunge China once again into the maelstrom of civil war, as in 1927-37. Behind the smokescreen of "convening the national assembly" and "political settlement", it is secretly preparing civil war. If our fellow-countrymen fail to take note, fail to expose its schemes and put a stop to these preparations, then one fine morning they will hear the cannonade of civil war.

NEGOTIATIONS

After obtaining the consent of other democratic parties, the Communist Party of China put forward the demand at the People's Political Council in September 1944 that the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship be abolished immediately and a democratic coalition government be formed for the purpose of defeating the Japanese aggressors, building a new China and preventing civil war. This was undoubtedly a timely demand, and in the space of a few months it has won the warm response of the broad masses.

We have had many rounds of negotiations with the Kuomintang government on the question of abolishing the one-party dictatorship, forming a coalition government and instituting essential democratic reforms, but it has rejected all our proposals. Not only is the Kuomintang unwilling to abolish the one-party dictatorship and form a coalition government, it is unwilling to introduce a single one of the urgently needed democratic reforms, such as the abolition of the secret police, the annulment of the reactionary laws and decrees that suppress the people's freedom, the release of political prisoners, recognition of the legal status of the political parties, recognition of the Liberated Areas and the withdrawal of the armies blockading and attacking them. Consequently political relations in China have become very strained.

TWO PROSPECTS

In the light of the situation as a whole and of the above analysis of the actual international and domestic state of affairs, I would ask everyone here to be on the alert and not to expect that our cause will proceed smoothly and easily. No, it will not. Actually there are two possibilities, two prospects, one good and one bad. One possibility or prospect is that the fascist dictatorship will continue and democratic reforms will not be allowed, that the stress will be on opposing the people instead of the Japanese aggressors, and even that civil war may break out after the Japanese aggressors are defeated, dragging China back into her old miserable state, without independence, freedom, democracy, unity, prosperity or strength. This possibility or prospect is still there, and it has not ceased to exist or has not automatically vanished simply because of the favourable international situation and the increased political consciousness and organized strength of our people. Those who hope that this possibility or prospect will become a reality in China are the reactionary clique within the

Kuomintang at home and the imperialist-minded reactionaries abroad. This is one aspect which must be taken into account.

But there is another aspect and, again in the light of the situation as a whole and the foregoing analysis of the international and domestic state of affairs, we can gain added confidence and courage in striving for the second possibility or prospect. It is that of overcoming all difficulties, uniting the whole people, abolishing the Kuomintang's fascist dictatorship, carrying out democratic reforms, consolidating and expanding the anti-Japanese forces, thoroughly defeating the Japanese aggressors and building an independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful new China. Those who hope that this possibility or prospect will become a reality in China are the masses, the Communist Party and the other democratic parties at home, and all the nations that treat us as equals and the progressives and the masses abroad.

We know full well that we Communists together with the whole Chinese people still face great difficulties and many obstacles and have a long and tortuous road to travel. But we know equally well that, together with the whole Chinese people, we shall overcome all the difficulties and obstacles and accomplish the task which history has entrusted China. The great task for us and for the whole people is to avert the first possibility or prospect and work for the second with every ounce of our energy. Essentially the international and domestic situation favours us Communists together with the Chinese people as a whole. This I have already made quite clear. We hope that the Kuomintang authorities will have the courage to change their present wrong policies in view of the general world trend and the popular feeling in China, so that the war can be won, the sufferings of the Chinese people can be reduced and a new China can soon be brought into being. It must be understood that, however tortuous the road, the Chinese people will certainly accomplish the task of achieving independence and liberation, and that the time has come for them to do so. It falls to our generation to fulfil the great aspirations cherished by countless martyrs in the past century, and any attempt to stop us will undoubtedly end in failure.

IV. THE POLICY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

I have analysed the two lines in China's War of Resistance. Such an analysis is absolutely necessary. For up to this very moment many

Chinese people still do not know what is really going on in this war. Many people in the Kuomintang areas and in foreign countries are being kept in the dark by the Kuomintang government's policy of blockade. They knew practically nothing about China's Liberated Areas until a group of Chinese and foreign correspondents came here in 1944 on a tour of observation. As soon as this group returned, the Kuomintang government, which was very much afraid of the true situation in the Liberated Areas becoming known outside, bolted the door and refused to let any other correspondent come here. Similarly it has suppressed the truth about the Kuomintang areas. Therefore I feel that we have the duty to give the public as much of the true picture of "the two areas" as possible. Only when people see the whole situation in China clearly will they understand why there is such a difference in policy between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, the two biggest political parties in China, and why there is such a struggle between the two lines. Only then will people understand that the dispute between the two parties is not an unnecessary or unimportant or merely captious dispute, as some have alleged, but is one of principle on which the lives of hundreds of millions of people depend.

In China's present grave situation, the people, the democrats and democratic parties at home and the people in other countries who are concerned about the Chinese situation all hope that unity will replace disunity and that democratic reforms will be introduced, and they all want to know what the policy of the Chinese Communist Party is for solving the many vital problems of today. The members of our Party, of course, have a still deeper interest in these matters.

Our policies of the Anti-Japanese National United Front in the war have always been clear and definite, and they have been tested in the eight years of war. Our congress should draw conclusions from them as a guide for our future struggles.

Here I shall explain a number of the definite conclusions arrived at by our Party concerning the major policies for solving China's problems.

OUR GENERAL PROGRAMME

An agreed common programme is urgently needed by the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party and all the anti-Japanese democratic parties for the purpose of mobilizing and uniting all the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people, completely wiping out the

Japanese aggressors and building a new China that is independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful.

Such a common programme may be divided into two parts, the general and the specific. Let us consider first the general and then the specific programme.

On the major premise that the Japanese aggressors must be completely destroyed and a new China must be built, we Communists and the overwhelming majority of the population are agreed on the following fundamental propositions at the present stage of China's development. First, China should not have a feudal, fascist and anti-popular state system under the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, because eighteen years of government by the chief ruling clique of the Kuomintang have already proved its complete bankruptcy. Second, China cannot possibly establish the old type of democratic dictatorship — a purely national-bourgeois state — and therefore should not attempt to do so, because on the one hand the Chinese national bourgeoisie has proved itself very flabby economically and politically, and on the other, for a long time now a new factor has been present, namely, the awakened Chinese proletariat with its leader, the Chinese Communist Party, which has demonstrated great capacity in the political arena and assumed leadership of the peasant masses, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and other democratic forces. Third, it is likewise impossible for the Chinese people to institute a socialist state system at the present stage when it is still their task to fight foreign and feudal oppression and the necessary social and economic conditions for a socialist state are still lacking.

What then do we propose? We propose the establishment, after the thorough defeat of the Japanese aggressors, of a state system which we call New Democracy, namely, a united-front democratic alliance based on the overwhelming majority of the people, under the leadership of the working class.

It is this kind of state system that truly meets the demands of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population, because it can win and indeed has been winning the approval, first, of millions of industrial workers and tens of millions of handicraftsmen and farm labourers, second, of the peasantry, which constitutes 80 per cent of China's population, *i.e.*, 360 million out of a population of 450 million, and third, of the large numbers of the urban petty bourgeoisie as well as the national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and other patriots.

Of course, there are still contradictions among these classes, notably the contradiction between labour and capital, and consequently each has its own particular demands. It would be hypocritical and wrong to deny the existence of these contradictions and differing demands. But throughout the stage of New Democracy, these contradictions, these differing demands; will not grow and transcend the demands which all have in common and should not be allowed to do so; they can be adjusted. Given such adjustment, these classes can together accomplish the political, economic and cultural tasks of the new-democratic state.

The politics of New Democracy which we advocate consists in the overthrow of external oppression and of internal feudal and fascist oppression, and then the setting up not of the old type of democracy but of a political system which is a united front of all the democratic classes. These views of ours are completely in accord with the revolutionary views of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, Dr. Sun wrote:

> The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. On the other hand, the Kuomintang's Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.

This is a great political injunction of Dr. Sun's. The Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party and all other democrats must respect it, firmly put it into practice and wage a determined fight against all individuals and groups that violate or oppose it, and so defend and develop this perfectly correct political principle of New Democracy.

The organizational principle of the new-democratic state should be democratic centralism, with the people's congresses determining the major policies and electing the governments at the various levels. It is at once democratic and centralized, that is, centralized on the basis of democracy and democratic under centralized guidance. This is the only system that can give full expression to democracy with full powers vested in the people's congresses at all levels and, at the same time, guarantee centralized administration with the governments at each level exercising centralized management of all the affairs entrusted to them by the people's congresses at the corresponding level and safeguarding whatever is essential to the democratic life of the people.

The army and the other armed forces constitute an important part of the apparatus of the new-democratic state power, without which the state cannot be defended. As with all other organs of power, the armed forces of the new-democratic state belong to the people and protect the people; they have nothing in common with the army, police, etc. of the old type which belong to the few and oppress the people.

The economy of New Democracy which we advocate is likewise in accord with Dr. Sun's principles. On the land question, Dr. Sun championed "land to the tiller". On the question of industry and commerce, Dr. Sun stated in the Manifesto quoted above:

> Enterprises, such as banks, railways and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and administered by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: this is the main principle of the regulation of capital.

In the present stage, we fully agree with these views of Dr. Sun's on economic questions.

Some people suspect that the Chinese Communists are opposed to the development of individual initiative, the growth of private capital and the protection of private property, but they are mistaken. It is foreign oppression and feudal oppression that cruelly fetter the development of the individual initiative of the Chinese people, hamper the growth of private capital and destroy the property of the people. It is the very task of the New Democracy we advocate to remove these fetters and stop this destruction, to guarantee that the people can freely develop their individuality within the framework of society and freely develop such private capitalist economy as will benefit and not "dominate the livelihood of the people", and to protect all appropriate forms of private property.

In accordance with Dr. Sun's principles and the experience of the Chinese revolution, China's national economy at the present stage should be composed of the state sector, the private sector and the co-operative sector. But the state here must certainly not be one "privately owned by the few", but a new-democratic state "shared by all the common people" under the leadership of the proletariat.

The culture of New Democracy should likewise be "shared by all the common people", that is, it should be a national, scientific and mass culture, and must under no circumstances be a culture "privately owned by the few".

Such is the general or fundamental programme which we Communists advocate for the present stage, the entire stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. This is our minimum programme as against our future or maximum programme of socialism and communism. Its realization will carry the Chinese state and Chinese society a step forward, from a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal to a new-democratic state and society.

The political leadership of the proletariat and the proletarian-led state and co-operative sectors of the economy required by our programme are socialist factors. Yet the fulfilment of this programme will not turn China into a socialist society.

We Communists do not conceal our political views. Definitely and beyond all doubt, our future or maximum programme is to carry China forward to socialism and communism. Both the name of our Party and our Marxist world outlook unequivocally point to this supreme ideal of the future, a future of incomparable brightness and splendour. On joining the Party, every Communist has two clearly-defined objectives at heart, the new-democratic revolution now and socialism and communism in the future, and for these he will fight despite the animosity of the enemies of communism and their vulgar and ignorant calumny, abuse and ridicule, which we must firmly combat. As for the well-meaning sceptics, we should explain things to them with goodwill and patience and not attack them. All this is very clear, definite and unequivocal.

But all Communists and sympathizers with communism in China must struggle to achieve the objective of the present stage; they must struggle against foreign and feudal oppression to deliver the Chinese people from their miserable colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal plight and establish a proletarian-led new-democratic China whose main task is the liberation of the peasantry, a China of the revolutionary Three People’s Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a China which is independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful. This is what we have actually been doing. Together with the masses of the Chinese people, we Communists have been fighting heroically for this objective for the past twenty-four years.

If any Communist or Communist sympathizer talks about socialism and communism but fails to fight for this objective, if he belittles this bourgeois-democratic revolution, relaxes or slows down ever so slightly and shows the least disloyalty and coolness or is reluctant to shed his blood or give his life for it, then wittingly or unwittingly, such a person is betraying socialism and communism to a greater or lesser extent and is certainly not a politically conscious and staunch fighter for communism. It is a law of Marxism that socialism can be attained only via the stage of democracy. And in China the fight for democracy is a protracted one. It would be a sheer illusion to try to build a socialist society on the ruins of the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal order without a united new-democratic state, without the development of the state sector of the new-democratic economy, of the private capitalist and the co-operative sectors, and of a national, scientific and mass culture, *i.e.*, a new-democratic culture, and without the liberation and the development of the individuality of hundreds of millions of people — in short, without a thoroughgoing bourgeois-democratic revolution of a new type led by the Communist Party.

Some people fail to understand why, so far from fearing capitalism, Communists should advocate its development in certain given conditions. Our answer is simple. The substitution of a certain degree of capitalist development for the oppression of foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism is not only an advance but an unavoidable process.- It benefits the proletariat as well as the bourgeoisie, and the former perhaps more. It is not domestic capitalism but foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism which are superfluous in China today; indeed, we have too little of capitalism. Strangely enough, some spokesmen of the Chinese bourgeoisie fight shy of openly advocating the development of capitalism, but refer to it obliquely. There are other people who flatly deny that China should permit a necessary degree of capitalist development and who talk about reaching socialism in one stride and "accomplishing at one stroke" the tasks of the Three People's Principles and socialism. Obviously, these opinions either reflect the weakness of the Chinese national bourgeoisie or are a demagogic trick on the part of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. From our knowledge of the Marxist laws of social development, we Communists clearly understand that under the state system of New Democracy in China it will be necessary in the interests of social progress to facilitate the development of the private capitalist sector of the economy (provided it does not dominate the livelihood of the people) besides the development of the state sector and of the individual and co-operative sectors run by the labouring people. We Communists will not let empty talk or deceitful tricks befuddle us.

There are some people who doubt whether we Communists are sincere when we declare that "the Three People's Principles being what

China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization". This is the result of their failure to understand that the basic tenets of the Three People's Principles, which Dr. Sun Yat-sen enunciated in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924 and which we have accepted, coincide with certain basic tenets of our Party's programme for the present stage, that is, of our minimum programme. It should be pointed out that these Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen coincide with our Party's programme for the present stage only in certain basic tenets and not in everything. Our Party's programme of New Democracy is of course much more comprehensive than Dr. Sun's principles, particularly as our Party's theory, programme and practice of New Democracy have greatly developed with the development of the Chinese revolution in the twenty years since Dr. Sun's death, and will develop still further. In essence, however, these Three People's Principles are a programme of New Democracy, as distinguished from the previous, old Three People's Principles; naturally they are "what China needs today" and naturally "our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization". To us Chinese Communists, the struggle for our Party's minimum programme and the struggle for Dr. Sun's revolutionary, or new, Three People's Principles are basically (though not in every respect) one and the same thing. Therefore, as in the past and the present, the Chinese Communists will prove to be the most sincere and thoroughgoing executors of the revolutionary Three People's Principles in the future as well.

Some people are suspicious and think that once in power, the Communist Party will follow Russia's example and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and a one-party system. Our answer is that a new-democratic state based on an alliance of the democratic classes is different in principle from a socialist state under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Beyond all doubt, our system of New Democracy will be built under the leadership of the proletariat and of the Communist Party, but throughout the stage of New Democracy China cannot possibly have a one-class dictatorship and one-party government and therefore should not attempt it. We have no reason for refusing to co-operate with all political parties, social groups and individuals, provided their attitude to the Communist Party is co-operative and not hostile. The Russian system has been shaped by Russian history; in Russia the exploitation of man by man has been abolished as a social system, the political, economic and cultural system of the newest type of democracy, *i.e.*, socialism, has been put into effect, and the people support the Bolshevik Party alone, having discarded all the anti-socialist parties. All this has shaped the Russian system, which is perfectly necessary and reasonable there. But even in Russia, where the Bolshevik Party is the sole political party, the system practised in the organs of state power is still one of an alliance of workers, peasants and intellectuals and an alliance of Party members and non-Party people, and not a system in which the working class and the Bolsheviks alone may work in the organs of government. The Chinese system for the present stage is being shaped by the present stage of Chinese history, and for a long time to come there will exist a special form of state and political power, a form that is distinguished from the Russian system but is perfectly necessary and reasonable for us, namely, the new-democratic form of state and political power based on the alliance of the democratic classes.

OUR SPECIFIC PROGRAMME

Our Party must also have a specific programme for each period based on this general programme. Our general programme of New Democracy will remain unchanged throughout the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that is, for several decades. But from phase to phase during this stage, conditions have changed or are changing and it is only natural that we have to change our specific programme accordingly. For example, our general programme of New Democracy has remained the same throughout the periods of the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the War of Resistance Against Japan, but there have been changes in our specific programme because our friends and enemies have not remained the same in the three periods.

The Chinese people now find themselves in the following situation:

(1) the Japanese aggressors have not yet been defeated;

(2) the Chinese people urgently need to work together for a democratic change in order to achieve national unity, rapidly mobilize and unite all anti-Japanese forces, and defeat the Japanese aggressors in co-operation with the allies; and

(3) the Kuomintang government is disrupting national unity and obstructing such a democratic change.

What is our specific programme in the circumstances or, in other words, what are the immediate demands of the people?

We consider the following to be appropriate and minimum demands:

> Mobilize all available forces for the thorough defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the establishment of international peace in co-operation with the allies;
>
> Abolish the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship and establish a democratic coalition government and a joint supreme command;
>
> Punish the pro-Japanese elements, fascists and defeatists who are opposing the people and disrupting national unity, and so help to build national unity;
>
> Punish the reactionaries who are creating the danger of civil war, and so help to ensure internal peace;
>
> Punish the traitors, take punitive action against officers who surrender to the enemy, and punish the agents of the Japanese;
>
> Liquidate the reactionary secret service and all its repressive activities and abolish the concentration camps;
>
> Revoke all reactionary laws and decrees aimed at suppressing the people's freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, political conviction and religious belief and freedom of the person, and guarantee full civil rights to the people;
>
> Recognize the legal status of all democratic parties and groups;
>
> Release all patriotic political prisoners;
>
> Withdraw all troops encircling and attacking China's Liberated Areas and dispatch them to the anti-Japanese front;
>
> Recognize the anti-Japanese armed forces and popularly elected governments of China's Liberated Areas;
>
> Consolidate and expand the Liberated Areas and their armed forces, and recover all lost territory;
>
> Help the people in the Japanese-occupied areas to organize underground armed forces for armed uprisings;
>
> Allow the Chinese people to arm themselves and defend their homes and their country;
>
> Bring about the political and military transformation of those armies directly under the Kuomintang supreme command, which constantly lose battles, oppress the people and discriminate against armies not directly under it, and punish the commanders who are responsible for disastrous defeats;

Improve the recruiting system and the living conditions of the officers and men;

Give preferential treatment to the families of the soldiers fighting in the anti-Japanese war, so that the officers and men at the front are free from domestic worries;

Provide preferential treatment for disabled soldiers and for the families of the soldiers who give their lives for the country, and help demobilized soldiers to settle down and earn a living;

Develop war industries to facilitate the prosecution of the war;

Distribute the military and financial aid received from the allies impartially to all the armies fighting in the War of Resistance;

Punish corrupt officials and institute clean government;

Improve the pay of the middle and lower grade government employees;

Give the Chinese people democratic rights;

Abolish the oppressive *pao-chia* system;[6]

Provide the war refugees and the victims of natural disasters with relief;

Appropriate substantial funds after the recovery of China's lost territory for the extensive relief of people who have suffered under enemy occupation;

Abolish exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies and establish a consolidated progressive tax;

Introduce rural reforms, reduce rent and interest, provide suitable safeguards for the rights of tenants, grant low-interest loans to impoverished peasants and help the peasants to organize, in order to facilitate the expansion of agricultural production;

Outlaw bureaucrat-capital;

Abolish the present policy of economic controls;

Check the unbridled inflation and rocketing prices;

Assist private industry and provide it with facilities for obtaining loans, purchasing raw materials and marketing its products;

Improve the livelihood of the workers, provide relief for the unemployed and help the workers to organize, in order to facilitate the expansion of industrial production;

Abolish Kuomintang indoctrination in education and promote a national, scientific and mass culture and education;

> Guarantee the livelihood of the teachers and other staff members of educational institutions and guarantee academic freedom;
>
> Protect the interests of the youth, women and children — provide assistance to young student refugees, help the youth and women to organize in order to participate on an equal footing in all work useful to the war effort and to social progress, ensure freedom of marriage and equality as between men and women, and give young people and children a useful education;
>
> Give the minority nationalities in China better treatment and grant them autonomous rights;
>
> Protect the interests of the overseas Chinese and assist those who have returned to the motherland;
>
> Protect foreign nationals who have fled to China from the Japanese oppression and support their struggle against the Japanese aggressors;
>
> Improve Sino-Soviet relations.

To achieve these demands, the most important thing is the immediate abolition of the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship and the establishment of a democratic provisional central government, a coalition government enjoying nation-wide support and including representatives of all the anti-Japanese parties and people without party affiliation. Without this prerequisite it is impossible to make any genuine change in the Kuomintang areas, and therefore in the country as a whole.

These demands voice the desires of the Chinese masses and also of broad sections of democratic public opinion in the allied countries.

A minimum specific programme which is agreed upon by all the anti-Japanese democratic parties is absolutely indispensable, and we are prepared to consult with them on the basis of the programme outlined above. Different parties may have different demands, but all should reach agreement on a common programme.

As far as the Kuomintang areas are concerned, such a programme is still at the stage of being a demand of the people; as far as the Japanese-occupied areas are concerned, it is a programme whose fulfilment must await their recovery, except for the item on the organization of underground forces for armed uprisings; as far as the Liberated Areas are concerned, it is a programme which has already been, is being and should continue to be, put into practice.

The immediate demands or specific programme of the Chinese people outlined above involve many vital war-time and post-war problems which require further elucidation. In explaining these problems below we shall criticize some of the wrong viewpoints held by the chief ruling clique of the Kuomintang and at the same time answer some questions raised by other people.

1. Destroy the Japanese Aggressors Completely, Allow No Compromise Halfway

The Cairo conference[7] rightly decided that the Japanese aggressors must be made to surrender unconditionally. But the Japanese aggressors are now working behind the scenes for a compromise peace, while the pro-Japanese elements in the Kuomintang government are hitching up with Japan's secret emissaries through the Nanking puppet government, and no stop has been put to this. Hence the danger of a halfway compromise is not yet entirely over. The Cairo conference made another good decision, namely, that the four northeastern provinces,- Taiwan and the Penghu Islands should be returned to China. But, given its present policies, the Kuomintang government cannot possibly be relied upon to fight all the way to the Yalu River and recover all our lost territory. What should the Chinese people do in these circumstances? They should demand that the Kuomintang government should destroy the Japanese aggressors completely and allow no compromise halfway. All intrigues for a compromise must immediately be stopped. The Chinese people should demand that the Kuomintang government should change its present policy of passive resistance and employ all its military strength in active warfare against Japan. They should expand their own armed forces — the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other armed units of the people — and on their own initiative develop anti-Japanese armed forces on an extensive scale wherever the enemy has reached, and they should prepare to recover all the lost territory by fighting in direct co-operation with the allies; under no circumstances must they place their reliance solely on the Kuomintang. It is the sacred right of the Chinese people to defeat the Japanese aggressors. If the reactionaries try to deprive them of this right, suppress their anti-Japanese activities or undermine their strength, then the Chinese people should firmly strike back in self-defence if persuasion proves unavailing. For such acts of national treachery on the part of the Chinese reactionaries only aid and abet the Japanese aggressors.

2. Abolish the Kuomintang One-Party Dictatorship, Establish a Democratic Coalition Government

To wipe out the Japanese aggressors it is necessary to effect democratic reforms throughout the country. Yet this will be impossible unless the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang is abolished and a democratic coalition government is established.

The one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang is in reality the dictatorship of the anti-popular clique within the Kuomintang, and this dictatorship is the disruptor of China's national unity, the author of the defeats on the Kuomintang front in the war, and the basic obstacle to the mobilization and unification of the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people. The Chinese people have become fully aware of the evils of this dictatorship through eight years of bitter experience in the War of Resistance, and they naturally demand its immediate abolition. This reactionary dictatorship is also the breeder of civil war and, unless it is immediately abolished, it will again bring the calamity of civil war upon them.

So widespread and resounding is the outcry of the Chinese people for the abolition of the anti-popular dictatorship that the Kuomintang authorities themselves have been forced to agree publicly to the "earlier termination of political tutelage", which shows how far this "political tutelage" or one-party dictatorship has forfeited popular support and prestige. There is not a single person in China who still dares to assert that "political tutelage" or one-party dictatorship is any good or that it should not be abolished or "terminated", and that marks a great change in the situation.

It is definite and beyond all doubt that it should be "terminated". But opinions differ as to how to do it. Some say, terminate it at once and establish a provisional democratic coalition government. Others say, wait a bit, convene the "national assembly", and "hand state power back to the people" and not to a coalition government.

What does this mean?

It means there are two ways of doing things, the honest way and the dishonest way.

First, the honest way. The honest way is immediately to proclaim the abolition of the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship, to establish a provisional central government composed of representatives of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, the Democratic League and people with no party affiliation, and to promulgate a democratic programme of political action such as the immediate demands of the Chinese people which we have set forth above, with the aim of restoring national unity and defeating the Japanese aggressors. A round-table conference of the representatives of the various parties and people with no party affiliation should be convened to discuss and reach agreement on these matters, and action should then be taken accordingly. This is the road of unity, which the Chinese people will firmly support.

Second, the dishonest way. The dishonest way is to disregard the demands of the masses and of all the democratic parties and to insist on convening a so-called national assembly stage-managed by the anti-popular clique in the Kuomintang and have it adopt a "constitution" which in practice will be anti-democratic and will buttress the dictatorship of this clique, for the purpose of providing a cloak of legality for an illegal "National Government" — a government formed privately through the appointment of a few dozen Kuomintang members, imposed on the people and utterly devoid of any foundation in the popular will — thus making a pretence of "handing state power back to the people" while actually "handing it back" to the selfsame reactionary clique within the Kuomintang. Whoever disapproves will be accused of sabotaging "democracy" and "unity", which will then be a "reason" for ordering punitive action against him. This is the road of disruption, which the Chinese people will firmly oppose.

The steps our reactionary heroes are preparing to take in line with this splitting policy will probably lead them to destruction. They are putting a noose round their own necks and fastening it there, and this noose is the "national assembly". Their intention is to use the "national assembly" as a magic weapon, first, to prevent the formation of a coalition government, second, to maintain their dictatorship, and third, to prepare a justification of civil war. However, the logic of history runs counter to their wishes, and they will be "lifting a rock only to drop it on their own toes". For it is now obvious to all that the people in the Kuomintang areas have no freedom and the people in the Japanese-occupied areas cannot take part in elections, while the Liberated Areas which have freedom are not recognized by the Kuomintang government. Such being the case, how can there be national delegates? How can there be a "national assembly"? The national assembly they are clamouring for is the one the Kuomintang dictatorship rigged up in every detail eight years ago during the civil war period. If such an assembly is convened, the whole nation will inevitably rise up against it, and how, it may be asked, will our reactionary heroes get out of that predicament? All in all, the convening of the bogus national assembly will only lead them to destruction.

We Communists propose two steps for the termination of the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship. First, at the present stage, to establish a provisional coalition government through common agreement among representatives of all parties and people with no party affiliation. Second, in the next stage, to convene a national assembly after free and unrestricted elections and form a regular coalition government. In both cases there will be a coalition government in which the representatives of all classes and political parties willing to take part are united on a democratic common programme in the fight against Japan today and for national construction tomorrow.

This is the only course China can take, whatever the intentions of the Kuomintang or other parties, groups or individuals, whether they like it or not, and whether or not they are conscious of it. This is a historical law, an inexorable trend which no force can reverse.

On this and all other problems of democratic reform, we Communists declare that although the Kuomintang authorities are still stubbornly persisting in their wrong policies and using negotiations to play for time and allay public opinion, we are ready to resume negotiations with them the moment they show willingness to renounce their present wrong policies and agree to democratic reforms. But the negotiations must be based on the general principle of resistance, unity and democracy, and we will not agree to any so-called measures, plans or empty pronouncements that depart from this general principle, however pleasing they may sound.

3. Freedom for the People

At present the Chinese people's struggle for freedom is primarily directed against the Japanese aggressors. But the Kuomintang government is preventing them from fighting the Japanese aggressors by depriving them of their freedom and binding them hand and foot. Unless this problem is solved, it will be impossible to mobilize and unify all the anti-Japanese forces of the nation. It is precisely to untie the people's bonds so that they can have the freedom to resist Japan, to unite and to win democracy that our programme puts forward such demands as the abolition of the one-party dictatorship; the establishment of a coalition government; the liquidation of the secret police; the revocation of repressive laws and decrees; the punishment of traitors, spies, pro-Japanese elements, fascists and corrupt officials; the release of political prisoners; the recognition of the legal status of all the democratic parties; the withdrawal of troops encircling or attacking the Liberated Areas; the recognition of the Liberated Areas; the abolition of the *pao-chia* system; and the many other demands relating to the economy, culture and the mass movement.

Freedom is won by the people through struggle, it is not bestowed by anyone as a favour. The people in China's Liberated Areas have already won freedom, and the people can and must win freedom in the other areas too. The greater the freedom of the Chinese people and the stronger their organized democratic forces, the greater the possibility of forming a provisional and unified coalition government. Once formed, this coalition government will in its turn provide full freedom for the people and so consolidate its own foundations. Only then will it be possible to hold free and unrestricted elections throughout the land after the overthrow of the Japanese aggressors, to create a democratic national assembly and to establish a regular and unified coalition government. Unless the people have freedom, there can be no national assembly or government genuinely elected by the people. Is this not clear enough?

Freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, political conviction and religious belief and freedom of the person are the people's most important freedoms. In China only the Liberated Areas have given full effect to these freedoms.

In 1925 Dr. Sun Yat-sen declared in his deathbed Testament:

> For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution with the aim of winning freedom and equality for China. My experience during these forty years has firmly convinced me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common fight with those nations of the world who treat us as equals.

The unworthy successors of Dr. Sun, who have betrayed him, oppress the masses of the people instead of arousing them, and deprive them of all their freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, political conviction and religious belief and freedom of the person. They attach the labels "traitor party", "traitor army", and "traitor areas" to the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the Liberated Areas, which are all genuinely arousing the masses of the people and protecting their freedoms and rights. We hope that there will soon be an end to this reversal of right and wrong. If it lasts much longer, the Chinese people will lose all patience.

4. Unity of the People

It is imperative to turn a divided China into a united China in order to destroy the Japanese aggressors, prevent civil war and build a new China; such is the historical task of the Chinese people.

But how is China to be united? Through autocratic unification by a dictator or democratic unification by the people? From the time of Yuan Shih-kai[8] the Northern warlords concentrated on autocratic unification. But what was the result? Contrary to their desires, what they obtained was not unification but division, and finally they tumbled from power. Following in Yuan Shih-kai's footsteps, the anti-popular clique of the Kuomintang sought autocratic unification and waged civil war for fully ten years, only to let in the Japanese aggressors while they themselves withdrew to Mount Omei.[9] And now from their mountain top they are again shouting about their theory of autocratic unification. To whom are they shouting? Will any upright patriotic Chinese listen to them? Having lived through sixteen years of Northern warlord rule and eighteen years of dictatorial Kuomintang rule, the people have acquired ample experience and discerning eyes. They want democratic unification by the masses and not autocratic unification by a dictator. As early as 1935, we Communists put forward the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and we have fought for it ever since. In 1939, when the Kuomintang was enforcing its reactionary "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties", thus creating the imminent danger of capitulation, split and retrogression, and when it was shouting about its theory of autocratic unification, we again declared: There must be unification based on resistance and not on capitulation, on unity and not on splitting, on progress and not on retrogression. Only unification based on resistance, unity and progress is genuine and any other kind would be a sham. Six years have passed, but the issue remains the same.

Can there be unity if the people have no freedom or democracy? There will be unity as soon as they have both. The Chinese people's movement for freedom, democracy and a coalition government is at the same time a movement for unity. When we put forward many demands for freedom, democracy and a coalition government in our specific programme, we are at the same time aiming at unity. It is plain common sense that unless the dictatorship of the anti-popular

Kuomintang clique is abolished and a democratic coalition government is formed, not only will it be impossible to carry out any democratic reform in the Kuomintang areas or to mobilize the armies and the people there for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors, but the calamity of civil war will ensue. Why do so many democrats, with and without party affiliation, including many in the Kuomintang, unanimously demand a coalition government? Because they are clearly aware of the present crisis and realize that there is no other way to overcome it and achieve both unity against the enemy and unity for national construction.

5. The People's Army

Without an army standing on the people's side, it is impossible for the Chinese people to win freedom and unification, establish a coalition government, thoroughly defeat the Japanese aggressors and build a new China. At present the only armed forces that stand wholly on the people's side are the Liberated Areas' Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, which are not very large; they are far from sufficient. Yet the Kuomintang group which opposes the people is ceaselessly intriguing to undermine and destroy the armies of the Liberated Areas. In 1944 the Kuomintang government presented a so-called memorandum demanding that the Communist Party should "disband, within a definite time limit", four-fifths of the armed forces of the Liberated Areas. In 1945, during the most recent negotiations, it has further demanded the handing over of all the armed forces of the Liberated Areas by the Communist Party, after which it would grant the Communist Party "legal status".

These people tell the Communists, "Hand over your troops and we will grant you freedom." According to their theory, a political party that does not have any army should enjoy freedom. Yet whatever freedom the Chinese Communist Party enjoyed during 1924-27, when it had only a small armed force, vanished with the Kuomintang government's policies of "party purge" and massacre. And today, the China Democratic League and the democrats within the Kuomintang, who have no armed forces, have no freedom either. Let us take the workers, peasants and students and the progressively- inclined people in cultural, educational and industrial circles under the Kuomintang regime — for the last eighteen years none of them have had any armed forces, and none of them have had any freedom. Can it be that all these democratic parties and people have been denied freedom because they organized armies, perpetrated "feudal separatism", created "traitor areas" and violated "governmental and military orders"? Not in the least. On the contrary, they have been denied freedom precisely because they have done none of these things.

"The army belongs to the state" — that is perfectly true, and there is not an army in the world that does not belong to a state. But what kind of state? A state under the feudal and fascist dictatorship of the big landlords, big bankers and big compradors, or a new-democratic state of the broad masses of the people? The only kind of state for China to establish is a new-democratic state and, on this basis, she should establish a new-democratic coalition government; all the armed forces of China must belong to such a government of such a state so that they may safeguard the people's freedom and effectively fight foreign aggressors. The moment a new-democratic coalition government comes into being in China, the Liberated Areas of China will hand their armed forces over to it. But all the Kuomintang armed forces will have to be handed over to it at the same time.

In 1924 Dr. Sun Yat-sen said, "Today should mark the beginning of a new epoch in the national revolution. . . . The first step is to unite the armed forces with the people, and the next step is to turn them into the armed forces of the people."[10] It is because they have applied this policy that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have become "the armed forces of the people", that is, the people's army, and have been able to win victories. During the earlier period of the Northern Expedition, the Kuomintang armies took Dr. Sun's "first step", and hence won victories. In the latter period of the Northern Expedition they abandoned even the "first step", took a stand against the people, and hence from that time right down to the present they have become more and more corrupt and degenerate; in their element when fighting internal war, they cannot but be out of their element when it comes to fighting external war. Every patriotic officer in the Kuomintang army who has a conscience should set about reviving the Sun Yat-sen spirit and transforming his troops.

In the work of transforming the old armies, a suitable education should be given to all officers who are capable of being re-educated to help them to get rid of their obsolete outlook and acquire a correct outlook, so that they can remain and serve in the people's army.

It is the duty of the whole nation to struggle for the creation of the army of the Chinese people. Without a people's army the people have nothing. On this question there must be no empty theorizing whatsoever.

We Communists are ready to give our support to the task of transforming the Chinese army. All those military forces which are willing to unite with the people and to oppose the Japanese aggressors instead of opposing the armed forces of the Chinese Liberated Areas should be regarded as friendly troops and be given proper assistance by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

6. The Land Problem

To wipe out the Japanese aggressors and build a new China, it is imperative to reform the land system and emancipate the peasants. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's thesis of "land to the tiller" is correct for the present period of our revolution, which is bourgeois-democratic in nature.

Why do we say our revolution in the present period is bourgeois-democratic in nature? We mean that the target of this revolution is not the bourgeoisie in general but national and feudal oppression, that the measures taken in this revolution are in general directed not at abolishing but at protecting private property, and that as a result of this revolution the working class will be able to build up the strength to lead China in the direction of socialism, though capitalism will still be enabled to grow to an appropriate extent for a fairly long period. "Land to the tiller" means transferring the land from the feudal exploiters to the peasants, turning the private property of the feudal landlords into the private property of the peasants and emancipating them from feudal agrarian relations, thereby making possible the transformation of an agricultural country into an industrial country. Thus, "land to the tiller" is in the nature of a bourgeois-democratic and not a proletarian-socialist demand; it is the demand of all revolutionary democrats and not the demand of us Communists alone. The difference is that, in China's circumstances, we Communists alone treat this demand with special seriousness, and do not just talk about it but put it into practice. Who are the revolutionary democrats? Apart from the proletariat who are the most thoroughgoing of the revolutionary democrats, the peasants form by far the largest group. The overwhelming majority of the peasants, that is, all except the rich peasants who have a feudal tail, actively demand "land to the tiller". The urban petty bourgeoisie are also revolutionary democrats and "land to the tiller" will prove to be to their advantage as well, for it will help to develop the productive forces in agriculture. The national bourgeoisie are a vacillating class — they also approve of "land to the tiller" because they need markets, but many of them are afraid of it because for the most part they have ties with landed property. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was the earliest revolutionary democrat in China. Representing the revolutionary section of the national bourgeoisie as well as the urban petty bourgeoisie and the peasants, he carried out an armed revolution and put forward his thesis of "equalization of landownership" and "land to the tiller". But unfortunately he did not take the initiative and reform the land system when he was in power. And when the anti-popular clique of the Kuomintang took power, it completely betrayed what he stood for. It is this clique that is now stubbornly opposing "land to the tiller" because it represents the stratum of big landlords, bankers and compradors. As China has no political party exclusively representing the peasants and the political parties of the national bourgeoisie have no thoroughgoing land programme, the Chinese Communist Party has become the leader of the peasants and all the other revolutionary democrats, being the only party that has formulated and carried out a thoroughgoing land programme, fought earnestly for the peasants' interests and therefore won the overwhelming majority of the peasants as its great ally.

From 1927 to 1936, the Chinese Communist Party adopted various measures for the thorough reform of the land system and put Dr. Sun's "land to the tiller" into effect. It was precisely the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang, that gang of unworthy followers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who bared their teeth, showed their claws and fought against "land to the tiller" in ten years of war against the people.

The Communist Party has made a major concession in the anti-Japanese war period by changing the policy of "land to the tiller" to one of reducing rent and interest. This concession is a correct one, for it helped to bring the Kuomintang into the war against Japan and lessened the resistance of the landlords in the Liberated Areas to our mobilization of the peasants for the war. If no special obstacle arises, we are prepared to continue this policy after the war, first extending rent and interest reduction to the whole country and then taking proper measures for the gradual achievement of "land to the tiller".

However, those who have betrayed Dr. Sun oppose the reduction of rent and interest, let alone "land to the tiller". The Kuomintang government has not carried out the decree for a "25 per cent reduction in rent" and similar decrees which it has promulgated itself; only we in the Liberated Areas have enforced them, and for this crime the Liberated Areas have been labelled "traitor areas".

In the course of the anti-Japanese war a so-called theory of two stages, a stage of "national revolution" and a stage of "revolution for democracy and the people's livelihood", has made its appearance. This theory is wrong.

"Faced with a formidable enemy, we should not raise the question of democratic reforms or the people's livelihood; better wait until the Japanese are gone" — such is the absurd theory put forward by the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang for the purpose of preventing complete victory in the war. Yet there are people who have been echoing this theory and have become its servile adherents.

"Faced with a formidable enemy, it is impossible for us to build up bases against the Japanese and resist their attacks unless we settle the question of democracy and the people's livelihood" — this is what the Chinese Communist Party has been advocating and, moreover, has already put into practice with excellent results.

In the period of the anti-Japanese war, reduction of rent and interest and the other democratic reforms all serve the war. In order to lessen the landlords' resistance to the war effort we have abstained from abolishing their ownership of land and have only reduced rent and interest; at the same time, we have encouraged them to transfer their assets to industry and given the enlightened gentry the opportunity to take part in public activities for the war and in the work of government alongside other representatives of the people. As for the rich peasants, we have encouraged them to develop production. All this is part of the resolute line of democratic reforms in the rural areas and is absolutely necessary.

There are two lines. Either stubbornly oppose the Chinese peasants' endeavour to settle the problem of democracy and the people's livelihood, and become corrupt, ineffectual and utterly incapable of fighting Japan; or firmly support the Chinese peasants in their endeavour, and gain the greatest of allies, constituting 80 per cent of the population, thereby forging tremendous fighting strength. The former is the line of the Kuomintang government, the latter is the line of China's Liberated Areas.

The line of the opportunists is to vacillate between the two, to profess support for the peasants and yet lack the resolve to reduce rent and interest, arm the peasants or establish democratic political power in the rural areas.

Using all the forces at its command, the anti-popular clique of the Kuomintang has directed every kind of vicious attack, open and secret military and political, both with bloodshed and without, against the Chinese Communist Party. Taken in its social setting, the dispute between the two parties is essentially over this issue of agrarian relations. Where exactly did we give offence to the Kuomintang reactionary clique? Is it not on this score? Has it not been precisely by rendering the Japanese aggressors great help on this score that this clique has won favour and encouragement from them? Have not all the charges against the Chinese Communist Party — "sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state", "traitor party", "traitor army", "traitor areas", and "disobedience to governmental and military orders" — been levelled precisely because it has done conscientious work in the true interests of the nation in this sphere?

It is the peasants who are the source of China's industrial workers. In the future, additional tens of millions of peasants will go to the cities and enter factories. If China is to build up powerful national industries and many large modern cities, there will have to be a long process of transformation of rural into urban inhabitants.

It is the peasants who constitute the main market for China's industry. Only they can supply foodstuffs and raw materials in great abundance and absorb manufactured goods in great quantities.

It is the peasants who are the source of the Chinese army. The soldiers are peasants in military uniform, the mortal enemies of the Japanese aggressors.

It is the peasants who are the main political force for democracy in China at the present stage. Chinese democrats will achieve nothing unless they rely on the support of the 360 million peasants.

It is the peasants who are the chief concern of China's cultural movement at the present stage. If the 360 million peasants are left out, do not the "elimination of illiteracy", "popularization of education", "literature and art for the masses" and "public health" become largely empty talk?

In saying this, I am of course not ignoring the political, economic and cultural importance of the rest of the people numbering about 90 million, and in particular am not ignoring the working class, which is politically the most conscious and therefore qualified to lead the whole revolutionary movement. Let there be no misunderstanding.

It is absolutely necessary not only for Communists but for every democrat in China to grasp these points.

When there is reform of the land system — even such an elementary reform as reduction of rent and interest — the peasants become more interested in production. Then as the peasants are helped to organize farming and other co-operatives step by step on a voluntary basis, the productive forces will grow. The farming co-operatives at present can only be collective, mutual-aid labour organizations based on an individual peasant economy (*i.e.*, on private ownership by the peasants), such as labour-exchange teams, mutual-aid teams and work-exchange groups; even so the increase in labour productivity and output is already astonishing. Such organizations have been widely developed in China's Liberated Areas and from now on should be spread as much as possible.

It might be mentioned that co-operative organization of the labour-exchange team type has existed among the peasants for a long time, but in the past it was only a means by which they tried to alleviate their wretchedness. Today the labour-exchange teams in China's Liberated Areas are different both in form and in content; they have become a means by which the peasant masses increase production and strive for a better life.

In the last analysis, the impact, good or bad, great or small, of the policy and the practice of any Chinese political party upon the people depends on whether and how much it helps to develop their productive forces, and on whether it fetters or liberates these forces. The social productive forces of China can be liberated only by destroying the Japanese aggressors, carrying out land reform, emancipating the peasants, developing modern industry and establishing an independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful new China — and this will win the approbation of the Chinese people.

It should be pointed out further that it is not easy for city intellectuals who come to work in the countryside to understand the characteristics of the rural areas, *i.e.*, that they are still based on a scattered and backward, individual economy, and that, moreover, the Liberated Areas are temporarily cut off from one another by the enemy and involved in a guerrilla war. Failing to understand these characteristics, they often inappropriately approach and handle rural problems and rural work from the viewpoint of life and work in the cities, and so divorce themselves from the realities of the countryside and fail to identify themselves with the peasants. It is necessary to overcome this by education.

China's numerous revolutionary intellectuals must awaken to the necessity of becoming one with the peasants. The peasants need them and await their help. They should go to the countryside enthusiastically, doff their student garb and put on rough clothing, and willingly start with any work however trivial; they should learn what the peasants want and help to arouse and organize them in the struggle to accomplish the democratic revolution in the countryside, which is one of the most important tasks in China's democratic revolution.

After the Japanese aggressors are wiped out, we should confiscate the land usurped by them and the chief traitors and distribute it among those peasants who have little or no land.

7. The Problem of Industry

In order to defeat the Japanese aggressors and build a new China it is necessary to develop industry. But under the Kuomintang government there is dependence on foreign countries for everything, and its financial and economic policy is ruining the entire economic life of the people. A few small industrial enterprises are all that is to be found in the Kuomintang areas, and in most cases they have been unable to avoid bankruptcy. In the absence of political reforms all the productive forces are being ruined, and this is true both of agriculture and of industry.

By and large, it will be impossible to develop industry unless China is independent, free, democratic and united. To wipe out the Japanese aggressors is to seek independence. To abolish the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship, establish a democratic and united coalition government, transform all China's troops into a people's armed force, carry out land reform and emancipate the peasants is to seek freedom, democracy and unity. Without independence, freedom, democracy and unity it is impossible to build industry on a really large scale. Without industry there can be no solid national defence, no well-being for the people, no prosperity or strength for the nation. The history of the 105 years since the Opium War of 1840,[11] and especially of the eighteen years since the Kuomintang came to power, has brought this important point home to the Chinese people. A China that is not poor and weak but prosperous and strong implies a China that is not colonial or semi-colonial but independent, not semi-feudal but free and democratic, not divided but united. In semi-colonial, semi-feudal and divided China, many people have for years dreamed of developing industry, building up national defence, and bringing well-being to the people and prosperity and power to the nation, but all their dreams have been shattered. Many well-intentioned educators, scientists and students have buried themselves in their own work or studies and paid no attention to politics in the belief that they could serve the country with their knowledge, but this too has turned out to be a dream, a dream that has been shattered. This indeed is a good sign, for the shattering of these childish dreams marks a starting-point on China's road towards prosperity and strength. The Chinese people have learned many things in the war; they know that after the defeat of the Japanese aggressors they must build a new-democratic China enjoying independence, freedom, democracy, unity, prosperity and strength, all of which are interrelated and indispensable. If they do so, then a bright future lies before China. The productive forces of the Chinese people will be released and given every possibility to develop only when the political system of New Democracy obtains in all parts of China. More and more people are coming to understand this point every day.

When the political system of New Democracy is won, the Chinese people and their government will have to adopt practical measures in order to build heavy and light industry step by step over a number of years and transform China from an agricultural into an industrial country. The new-democratic state cannot be consolidated unless it has a solid economy as its base, a much more advanced agriculture than at present, and a large-scale industry occupying a predominant position in the national economy, with communications, trade and finance to match.

We Communists are ready to fight for this objective in co-operation with all the democratic parties and industrial circles throughout the country. The Chinese working class will play a great role in this undertaking.

Ever since World War I, the Chinese working class has consciously fought for the independence and liberation of China. The year witnessed the birth of the Communist Party of China, the vanguard of the working class, and China's struggle for liberation then entered a new stage. During the ensuing three periods, the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the War of Resistance Against Japan, the working class and Communist Party of China have worked extremely hard and made an invaluable contribution to the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people. In the struggle for the final defeat of the Japanese aggressors, and especially for the recovery of the big cities and important lines of communications, the Chinese working class will play a very great role. And it can be predicted that after the anti-Japanese war, the effort and contribution of the Chinese working class will be even greater. The task of the Chinese working class is to struggle not only for the establishment of a new-democratic state but also for China's industrialization and the modernization of her agriculture.

The policy of adjusting the interests of labour and capital will be adopted under the new-democratic state system. On the one hand, it will protect the interests of the workers, institute an eight- to ten-hour working day according to circumstances, provide suitable unemployment relief and social insurance and safeguard trade union rights; on the other hand, it will guarantee legitimate profits to properly managed state, private and co-operative enterprises — so that both the public and the private sectors and both labour and capital will work together to develop industrial production.

The enterprises and property in China of the Japanese aggressors and of the chief traitors will be confiscated and placed at the disposal of the government when Japan is defeated.

8. The Problem of Culture, Education and the Intellectuals

The calamities brought upon the Chinese people by foreign and feudal oppression also affect our national culture. The progressive cultural and educational institutions and progressive cultural workers and educators have particularly suffered. To sweep away foreign and feudal oppression and build a new-democratic China, we need large numbers of educators and teachers for the people, and also people's scientists, engineers, technicians, doctors, journalists, writers, men of letters, artists and rank-and-file cultural workers. They must be imbued with the spirit of serving the people and must work hard. Provided they serve the people creditably, all intellectuals should be esteemed and regarded as valuable national and social assets. The problem of the intellectuals becomes particularly important in China because the country is culturally backward as a result of foreign and feudal oppression and because intellectuals are urgently needed in the people's struggle for liberation. The numerous revolutionary intellectuals have played a very great role in the people's struggle for liberation in the past half-century, and especially since the May 4th Movement of 1919 and in the eight years of the anti-Japanese war. They will play an even greater role in the struggles to come. Therefore, the task of a people's government is systematically to develop all kinds of intellectually equipped cadres from among the ranks of the people and at the same time take care to unite with and re-educate all the useful intellectuals already available.

The elimination of illiteracy among 80 per cent of the population is a vital task for the new China.

Proper and firm steps should be taken to eliminate all enslaving feudal and fascist culture and education.

Vigorous action should be taken to prevent and cure endemic and other diseases among the people and to expand the people's medical and health services.

The old type of cultural and educational workers and doctors should be given suitable re-education so that they can acquire a new outlook and new methods to serve the people.

The Chinese people's culture and education should be new-democratic, that is to say, China should establish her own new national, scientific and mass culture and education.

As for foreign culture, it would be a wrong policy to shut it out, rather we should as far as possible draw on what is progressive in it for use in the development of China's new culture; it would also be wrong to copy it blindly, rather we should draw on it critically to meet the actual needs of the Chinese people. The new culture created in the Soviet Union should be a model for us in building our people's culture. Similarly, ancient Chinese culture should neither be totally rejected nor blindly copied, but should be accepted discriminatingly so as to help the progress of China's new culture.

9. The Problem of the Minority Nationalities

The anti-popular clique of the Kuomintang denies that many nationalities exist in China, and labels all excepting the Han nationality as "tribes". It has taken over the reactionary policy of the governments of the Ching Dynasty and of the Northern warlords in relation to the minority nationalities, oppressing and exploiting them in every possible way. Clear cases in point are the massacre of Mongolians of the Ikhchao League in 1943, the armed suppression of the minority nationalities in Sinkiang since 1944 and the massacres of the Hui people in Kansu Province in recent years. These are manifestations of a wrong Han-chauvinistic ideology and policy.

In 1924 Dr. Sun Yat-sen wrote in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang that "the Kuomintang's Principle of

Nationalism has a twofold meaning, first, the liberation of the Chinese nation, and second, the equality of all the nationalities in China" and that "the Kuomintang solemnly declares that it recognizes the right to self-determination of all the nationalities in China and that a free and united republic of China (a free union of all the nationalities) will be established when the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord revolution is victorious".

The Communist Party of China is in full agreement with Dr. Sun's policy on nationalities as stated here. Communists must actively help the people of all the minority nationalities to fight for it, and help them, including all their leaders who have ties with the masses, to fight for their political, economic and cultural emancipation and development and to establish their own armies which will safeguard the people's interests. Their spoken and written languages, their manners and customs and their religious beliefs must be respected.

The attitude which the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Liberated Areas in northern China have for years adopted towards the Mongolian and Hui nationalities is correct, and the work they have done has been fruitful.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

10. The Problem of Foreign Policy

The Communist Party of China agrees with the Atlantic Charter and with the decisions of the international conferences of Moscow, Cairo, Teheran and the Crimea,[12] because these decisions all contribute to the defeat of the fascist aggressors and the maintenance of world peace.

The fundamental principle of the foreign policy advocated by the Chinese Communist Party is as follows: China shall establish and strengthen diplomatic relations with all countries and settle all questions of common concern, such as co-ordination of military operations in the war, peace conferences, trade and investment, on the basic conditions that the Japanese aggressors must be completely defeated and world peace maintained, that there must be mutual respect for national independence and equality, and that there must be promotion of mutual interests and friendship between states and between peoples.

The Chinese Communist Party fully agrees with the proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and the decisions of the Crimea conference on the establishment of an organization to safeguard international peace and security after the war. It welcomes the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco.

It has appointed its own representative on China's delegation to this conference in order to express the will of the Chinese people.[13]

We hold that the Kuomintang government must cease its hostility towards the Soviet Union and speedily improve Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union was the first country to renounce the unequal treaties and sign new, equal treaties with China. At the time of the Kuomintang's First National Congress called by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 and the subsequent Northern Expedition, the Soviet Union was the only country to help China's war of liberation. When the anti-Japanese war broke out in 1937, the Soviet Union was again the first country to help China against the Japanese aggressors. The Chinese people are grateful to the Soviet government and people for this help. We believe that no final and thorough settlement of the problems of the Pacific is possible without the participation of the Soviet Union.

We ask the governments of all the allied countries, and of the United States and Britain in the first place, to pay serious attention to the voice of the Chinese people and not to impair friendship with them by pursuing foreign policies that run counter to their will. We maintain that if any foreign government helps the Chinese reactionaries and opposes the Chinese people's democratic cause, it will be committing a gross mistake.

The Chinese people welcome the steps taken by many foreign governments in renouncing their unequal treaties and concluding new, equal treaties with China. However, we maintain that the conclusion of equal treaties does not in itself mean that China has actually won genuine equality. Genuine and actual equality is never the gift of foreign governments, but must be won mainly by the Chinese people through their own efforts, and the way to win it is to build a new-democratic China politically, economically and culturally; otherwise there will be only nominal and not actual independence and equality. That is to say, China can never win genuine independence and equality by following the present policy of the Kuomintang government.

We consider that, after the defeat and unconditional surrender of the Japanese aggressors, it will be necessary to help all the democratic forces of the Japanese people to establish their own democratic system so that Japanese fascism and militarism may be thoroughly wiped out, together with their political, economic and social roots. Unless the Japanese people have a democratic system, it will be impossible thoroughly to wipe out Japanese fascism and militarism and impossible to ensure peace in the Pacific.

We consider the decision of the Cairo conference regarding the independence of Korea to be correct. The Chinese people should help the Korean people to win liberation.

We hope that India will attain independence. For an independent and democratic India is not only needed by the Indian people but is essential for world peace.

As regards the Southeast Asian countries — Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Viet Nam and the Philippines — we hope that after the defeat of the Japanese aggressors their people will exercise their right to establish independent and democratic states of their own. As for Thailand, she should be treated like the fascist satellite states in Europe.

* * *

So much for the major points of our specific programme.

To repeat, none of the points in this specific programme can be successfully carried out on a nation-wide scale without a democratic coalition government enjoying the support of the entire nation.

By its twenty-four years of struggle for the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China has attained a position such that any political party or social group or any Chinese or foreigner ignoring its opinion on questions concerning China will be making a serious mistake and courting certain failure. There were, and still are, people who try to ignore our opinions and to follow their own bigoted course, but they have all ended in a blind alley. Why? Simply because our opinions conform to the interests of the Chinese masses. The Chinese Communist Party is the most faithful spokesman of the Chinese people, and whoever fails to respect it in fact fails to respect the Chinese masses and is doomed to defeat.

THE TASKS IN THE KUOMINTANG AREAS

I have now given a detailed explanation of our Party's general and specific programmes. There is no doubt that these programmes will eventually be put into effect throughout China; this is the vista that the international and domestic situation as a whole has opened up for the Chinese people. However, at the moment conditions in the Kuomintang areas, the enemy-occupied areas and the Liberated Areas differ from each other, making it necessary for us to distinguish between them in implementing our programme. Different conditions give rise to different tasks. Some of these tasks I have already explained above, while others still need elaboration.

In the Kuomintang areas, the people are not free to engage in patriotic activity, and democratic movements are considered illegal, and yet various social strata, democratic parties and individuals are becoming increasingly active. The China Democratic League issued a manifesto in January this year demanding the termination of the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship and the establishment of a coalition government. Many sections of the people have made similar declarations. Within the Kuomintang, too, many people are showing increasing doubt and discontent over the policies of the leading bodies of their own party, are becoming increasingly aware of the danger of their party's isolation from the people, and are therefore demanding democratic reforms suited to the times. In Chungking and other places democratic movements are growing among the workers, the peasants, cultural circles, the students, educational circles, women, industrial and commercial circles, government employees and even among some of the soldiers and officers. These facts indicate that the democratic movements of all the oppressed strata are gradually converging on a common objective. One weakness of the present movements is that the basic sections of society have not yet joined it on a wide scale and that the most important forces, namely, the peasants, workers, soldiers and the lower-ranking government employees and teachers, who are all suffering so bitterly, are not yet organized. Another weakness is that many of the democratic personalities in the movement are still unclear and hesitant about the fundamental policy, namely, that a change in the situation must be sought through the waging of struggle on a democratic mass basis. However, the objective situation is compelling all the oppressed strata, political parties and social groups gradually to awaken and unite. No suppression by the Kuomintang government can stop the advance of this movement.

All the oppressed strata, political parties and social groups in the Kuomintang areas must extend their democratic movement on a broad scale and gradually weld their scattered forces together in order to fight for national unity, the establishment of a coalition government, the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the building of a new China. The Communist Party of China and the people of the Liberated Areas should give them every possible help.

In the Kuomintang areas the Communists should continue to pursue the policy of a broad National United Front Against Japan. In the fight for common objectives, we should co-operate with anyone who does not oppose us today, even though he might have done so yesterday.

THE TASKS IN THE JAPANESE-OCCUPIED AREAS

In the occupied areas, Communists should call on all who oppose Japan to follow the French and Italian examples and form organizations and underground forces to prepare armed uprisings, so that when the time comes they can act from the inside in co-ordination with the armies attacking from the outside and so wipe out the Japanese aggressors. The atrocities, plunder, rape and humiliation suffered by our brothers and sisters in the occupied areas at the hands of the Japanese aggressors and their servile lackeys have aroused the burning wrath of all Chinese, and the hour of revenge is fast approaching. The victories in the European theatre of war and the victories of our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have stimulated and heightened the anti-Japanese spirit of the people in the occupied areas. They urgently want to become organized so as to achieve liberation as quickly as possible. Therefore, we must raise our work in the occupied areas to the same level of importance as that in the Liberated Areas. Large numbers of our working personnel must be sent to work there Large numbers of activists among the people there must be trained and promoted and must take part in local work. We must intensify our underground work in the four northeastern provinces which have been occupied longer than any other region and which form a key industrial and troop concentration area for the Japanese aggressors. With a view to the recovery of these lost territories, we should strengthen our solidarity with the people who have fled south from the Northeast.

Communists should pursue the broadest united front policy in all the occupied areas. For the overthrow of the common enemy they must unite with anyone who is opposed to the Japanese aggressors and their servile lackeys.

We should warn all the puppet armies, the puppet police and others who are helping the enemy and opposing their countrymen that they must quickly recognize the criminal nature of their actions, repent in time and atone for their crimes by helping their countrymen against the enemy. Otherwise the nation will certainly call them to account the day the enemy collapses.

Communists should direct persuasive propaganda at all puppet organizations with a mass following so as to win the masses who have been misled over to our side against the national enemy. At the same time, evidence should be collected about those impenitent collaborators who have committed the most heinous crimes, so that they can be brought to justice when the lost territories are recovered.

Those Kuomintang reactionaries who have betrayed the nation by organizing open collaborators to fight the Chinese people, the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other armed forces of the people must be warned to repent in time. Otherwise, when the lost territories are recovered, they will certainly be punished for their crimes along with the collaborators with Japan and will be shown no mercy.

THE TASKS IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

Our Party has put its whole new-democratic programme into practice in the Liberated Areas with striking results, and so built up tremendous anti-Japanese strength, and from now on this strength should be developed and consolidated in every way.

In the prevailing circumstances, the troops of the Liberated Areas should launch extensive attacks on all places that can be captured from the Japanese and puppets in order to expand the Liberated Areas and reduce the occupied areas.

But at the same time it should be borne in mind that the enemy is still strong and may launch further attacks on the Liberated Areas. The army and the people of our areas must be ready at all times to smash his attacks and must work in every way to consolidate these areas.

We must expand the armies, the guerrilla units, the people's militia and the self-defence corps of the Liberated Areas, and increase their combat effectiveness by speeding up their training and consolidation in order to build up adequate strength for the final defeat of the aggressors.

The army in the Liberated Areas must support the government and cherish the people, while the democratic governments must lead the people in the work of supporting the army and taking good care of the families of soldiers fighting Japan. In this way relations between the army and the people will become still better.

In the work of the local coalition governments and mass organizations, Communists should continue to co-operate closely with all anti-Japanese democrats on the basis of the new-democratic programme.

Similarly in military work, Communists should co-operate closely with all anti-Japanese democrats who are willing to co-operate with us, whether or not they are members of the armies of the Liberated Areas.

To increase the enthusiasm of the masses of the workers, peasants and other working people for the war and for production, we must thoroughly apply the policy of reducing rent and interest and of increasing the pay of workers and office staff. The cadres of the Liberated Areas must diligently learn to do economic work. All available forces must be mobilized for the extensive development of agriculture, industry and trade and the improvement of the livelihood of the soldiers and the people. For this purpose there must be labour emulation campaigns, and rewards should be given to labour heroes and model workers. When the Japanese aggressors are driven out of the cities, our personnel must rapidly learn how to do urban economic work.

Our cultural and educational work must be developed in order to raise the level of political consciousness of the people in the Liberated Areas and, above all, of the masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers, and in order to train large numbers of cadres. In carrying forward this work, those engaged in it should adopt forms and select contents suited to the existing rural conditions and to the needs and wishes of the people in the countryside.

In all our work in the Liberated Areas, manpower and material resources must be used most sparingly, and in every held long-term plans must be made, and misuse and waste must be avoided. This is needed both for defeating the Japanese aggressors and for building up the new China.

In all our work in the Liberated Areas, we must take great care to help the local people administer local affairs and to cultivate many local cadres from among the best local people. It will be impossible to accomplish the great task of the democratic revolution in the rural areas unless comrades who come from other places identify themselves with the local people and help the local cadres whole-heartedly, painstakingly and in ways that fit the actual conditions, and unless they cherish them like their own brothers and sisters.

When a unit of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army or any other armed force of the people arrives at a place, it should immediately help the local people to organize forces led by the local cadres, including not only militia and self-defence corps but also local troops and regional forces. This will make possible the eventual creation of regular forces and regular army formations led by local people. This is an extremely important task. Unless it is accomplished, we can neither build stable anti-Japanese base areas nor expand the people's army.

Of course the local people for their part should warmly welcome and help the revolutionary workers and people's forces coming from other areas.

Everybody should be alerted on the question of dealing with covert wreckers. For it is easy to spot and handle overt enemies and wreckers of the national cause, but not those who work under cover. Therefore we should take up this matter in all seriousness and at the same time be very careful in dealing with such people.

All religions are permitted in China's Liberated Areas, in accordance with the principle of freedom of religious belief. All believers in Protestantism, Catholicism, Islamism, Buddhism and other faiths enjoy the protection of the people's government so long as they are abiding by its laws. Everyone is free to believe or not to believe; neither compulsion nor discrimination is permitted.

Our congress should propose to the people of the Liberated Areas that a people's conference of the Chinese Liberated Areas[14] be held in Yenan as soon as possible to discuss the questions of co-ordinating the activities of the various Liberated Areas, strengthening their work in the War of Resistance, helping the people's anti-Japanese democratic movement in the Kuomintang areas, helping the underground armed forces of the people in the occupied areas, and promoting national unity and the formation of a coalition government. Now that China's Liberated Areas have become the centre of gravity in the nationwide people's struggle to resist Japan and save the country, the broad masses throughout the country pin their hopes on us and it is our duty not to disappoint them. Such a conference would give great impetus to the Chinese people's cause of national liberation.

V. LET THE WHOLE PARTY UNITE AND FIGHT TO ACCOMPLISH ITS TASKS!

Comrades! Now that we understand our tasks and the policies for accomplishing them, what should be our attitude in carrying out these policies and performing these tasks?

The present international and domestic situation opens up bright prospects and provides unprecedentedly favourable conditions for us and the Chinese people as a whole; this is evident and beyond doubt. But at the same time there are still serious difficulties. Anyone who sees only the bright side but not the difficulties cannot fight effectively for the accomplishment of the Party's tasks.

Together with the Chinese people, our Party has built up immense strength for the Chinese nation in the twenty-four years of the Party's history, including the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the success of our work is obvious and beyond doubt. But at the same time there are still defects in our work. Anyone who sees only the successful side but not the defects likewise cannot fight effectively for the accomplishment of the Party's tasks.

In the twenty-four years since its birth in 1921, the Communist Party of China has gone through three great struggles — the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the War of Resistance Against Japan which is still going on. From its very beginning our Party has based itself on the theory of Marxism-Leninism, for Marxism-Leninism is the crystallization of the most correct and most revolutionary scientific thought of the world proletariat. When the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism began to be integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the Chinese revolution took on an entirely new complexion and the entire historical stage of New Democracy emerged. Armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, the Communist Party of China has brought a new style of work to the Chinese people, a style of work which essentially entails integrating theory with practice, forging close links with the masses and practising self-criticism.

The universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, which reflects the practice of proletarian struggle throughout the world, becomes an invincible weapon for the Chinese people when it is integrated with the concrete practice of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese proletariat and people. This the Communist Party of China has achieved. Our Party has grown and advanced through staunch struggle against every manifestation of dogmatism and empiricism, which runs counter to this principle. Dogmatism is divorced from concrete practice, while empiricism mistakes fragmentary experience for universal truth; both kinds of opportunist thinking run counter to Marxism. In the course of its twenty-four years of struggle our Party has successfully fought such wrong thinking and it is still doing so, thus greatly consolidating itself ideologically. Our Party now has 1,210,000 members. The overwhelming majority have joined during the War of Resistance, and there are various impurities in their ideology. The same is true of some of the members who joined the Party before the war. The work of rectification in the last few years has been most successful and has gone a long way towards removing these impurities. This work should be continued and ideological education within the Party should be developed still more extensively in the spirit of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones" and "curing the sickness to save the patient". We must enable the Party's leading cadres at all levels to understand that close integration of theory and practice is a hallmark distinguishing our Party from all other political parties. Therefore ideological education is the key link to be grasped in uniting the whole Party for great political struggles. Unless this is done, the Party cannot accomplish any of its political tasks.

Another hallmark distinguishing our Party from all other political parties is that we have very close ties with the broadest masses of the people. Our point of departure is to serve the people whole-heartedly and never for a moment divorce ourselves from the masses, to proceed in all cases from the interests of the people and not from the interests of individuals or groups, and to understand the identity of our responsibility to the people and our responsibility to the leading organs of the Party. Communists must be ready at all times to stand up for the truth, because truth is in the interests of the people; Communists must be ready at all times to correct their mistakes, because mistakes are against the interests of the people. Twenty-four years of experience tell us that the right task, policy and style of work invariably conform with the demands of the masses at a given time and place and invariably strengthen our ties with the masses, and the wrong task, policy and style of work invariably disagree with the demands of the masses at a given time and place and invariably alienate us from the masses. The reason why such evils as dogmatism, empiricism, commandism, tailism, sectarianism, bureaucracy and an arrogant attitude in work are definitely harmful and intolerable, and why anyone suffering from these maladies must overcome them, is that they alienate us from the masses. Our congress should call upon the whole Party to be vigilant and to see that no comrade at any post is divorced from the masses. It should teach every comrade to love the people and listen attentively to the voice of the masses; to identify himself with the masses wherever he goes and, instead of standing above them, to immerse himself among them; and, according to their present level, to awaken them or raise their political consciousness and help them gradually to organize themselves voluntarily and to set going all essential struggles permitted by the internal and external circumstances of the given time and place. Commandism is wrong in any type of work, because in overstepping the level of political consciousness of the masses and violating the principle of voluntary mass action it reflects the disease of impetuosity. Our comrades must not assume that everything they themselves understand is understood by the masses. Whether the masses understand it and are ready to take action can be discovered only by going into their midst and making investigations. If we do so, we can avoid commandism. Tailism in any type of work is also wrong, because in falling below the level of political consciousness of the masses and violating the principle of leading the masses forward it reflects the disease of dilatoriness. Our comrades must not assume that the masses have no understanding of what they themselves do not yet understand. It often happens that the masses outstrip us and are eager to advance a step when our comrades are still tailing behind certain backward elements, for instead of acting as leaders of the masses such comrades reflect the views of these backward elements and, moreover, mistake them for those of the broad masses. In a word, every comrade must be brought to understand that the supreme test of the words and deeds of a Communist is whether they conform with the highest interests and enjoy the support of the overwhelming majority of the people. Every comrade must be helped to understand that as long as we rely on the people, believe firmly in the inexhaustible creative power of the masses and hence trust and identify ourselves with them, no enemy can crush us while we can crush every enemy and overcome every difficulty.

Conscientious practice of self-criticism is still another hallmark distinguishing our Party from all other political parties. As we say, dust will accumulate if a room is not cleaned regularly, our faces will get dirty if they are not washed regularly. Our comrades' minds and our Party's work may also collect dust, and also need sweeping and washing. The proverb "Running water is never stale and a door-hinge is never worm-eaten" means that constant motion prevents the inroads of germs and other organisms. To check up regularly on our work and in the process develop a democratic style of work, to fear neither criticism nor self-criticism, and to apply such good popular Chinese maxims as "Say all you know and say it without reserve", "Blame not the speaker but be warned by his words" and "Correct mistakes if you have committed them and guard against them if you have not" —

this is the only effective way to prevent all kinds of political dust and germs from contaminating the minds of our comrades and the body of our Party. The reason for the great effectiveness of the rectification movement, the purpose of which was "to learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones and to cure the sickness to save the patient", was that the criticism and self-criticism we carried out were honest and conscientious, and not perfunctory and distorted. As we Chinese Communists, who base all our actions on the highest interests of the broadest masses of the Chinese people and who are fully convinced of the justice of our cause, never balk at any personal sacrifice and are ready at all times to give our lives for the cause, can we be reluctant to discard any idea, viewpoint, opinion or method which is not suited to the needs of the people? Can we be willing to allow political dust and germs to dirty our clean faces or eat into our healthy organism? Countless revolutionary martyrs have laid down their lives in the interests of the people, and our hearts are filled with pain as we the living think of them — can there be any personal interest, then, that we would not sacrifice or any error that we would not discard?

Comrades! When this congress is over, we shall go to the front and, guided by its resolutions, fight to bring about the final defeat of the Japanese aggressors and to build a new China. To achieve this aim, we shall unite with all the people of our country. Let me repeat: We shall unite with any class, any party, any group or individual if they are for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the building of a new China. To achieve this aim, we shall solidly unite all the forces of our Party on democratic centralist principles of organization and discipline. We shall unite with any comrade if he abides by the Party's Programme, Constitution and decisions. In the period of the Northern Expedition our Party had a membership of less than 60,000, most of whom were later dispersed by the enemy; in the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War we had a membership of less than 300,000, most of whom were likewise dispersed by the enemy. Now we have more than 1,200,000 members, this time we must in no circumstances allow ourselves to be dispersed by the enemy. If we can profit from the experience of these three periods, if we are modest and guard against conceit and are able to strengthen unity among all comrades inside the Party and with all the people outside the Party, we can rest assured that, far from being dispersed by the enemy, we shall destroy the Japanese aggressors and their servile running dogs resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely, and thereafter build a new-democratic China.

The experience of the three periods of the revolution, and especially that of the War of Resistance Against Japan, has convinced us and the whole Chinese people that without the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party, without the Chinese Communists as the mainstay of the Chinese people, China can never achieve independence or liberation, or industrialization and the modernization of her agriculture.

Comrades! I firmly believe that with the Communist Party of China armed with the experience of the three revolutions, we can accomplish our great political task.

Thousands upon thousands of martyrs have heroically laid down their lives for the people; let us hold their banner high and march ahead along the path crimson with their blood!

A new-democratic China will soon be born. Let us hail that great day!

NOTES

[1] The Chinese National Liberation Vanguard Corps, or to give its shorter name the National Vanguard Corps, was a revolutionary youth organization formed under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1936 by the progressive youth who participated in the December 9th Movement of 1935. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, many of its members saw action and took part in building base areas behind the enemy lines. The organizations of the National Vanguard Corps in the Kuomintang areas were forcibly dissolved by the Chiang Kai-shek government in 1938; those in the Liberated Areas were later merged into the Association of Youth for National Salvation, an organization of even broader scope.

[2] On July 7, 1937, the Japanese invading forces attacked the Chinese garrison at Lukouchiao, some ten kilometres southwest of Peking. Under the influence of the ardent and nation-wide anti-Japanese movement the Chinese troops put up resistance. This incident marked the beginning of the Chinese people's heroic War of Resistance Against Japan which lasted for eight years.

[3] For a fuller account of the three anti-Communist onslaughts, see "A Comment on the Sessions of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and of the People's Political Council", pp. 137-51 of this volume.

[4] These operations to force China's north-south trunk railways open for through traffic constituted the offensive launched in May 1944 by the Japanese army to seize the Canton-Hankow Railway along its entire length and thus secure an uninterrupted land link between northern and southern China.

[5] Scobie was the commander of the British imperialist forces of aggression in Greece. In October 1944, when the German invaders were retreating in defeat on the European continent, Scobie's troops entered the country, bringing with them the reactionary Greek government that had been in exile in London. Scobie directed and assisted this government in attacking the Greek People's Liberation Army, which

had waged a long and heroic struggle against the German invaders, and in massacring Greek patriots, and so plunged Greece into a blood bath.

[6] *Pao chia* was the administrative system by which the Kuomintang reactionary clique enforced its fascist rule at the primary level. On August 1, 1932, Chiang Kai-shek promulgated his "Regulations for the Organization of *Pao* and *Chia* and for a Population Census in the Counties", covering the provinces of Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei. The "Regulations" provided that "the *pao* and *chia* are to be organized on the basis of households, there is to be a head of each household, of each *chia*, which is made up of ten households, and of each *pao*, which is made up of ten *chia*". Neighbours were required to watch each other's activities and report them to the authorities, and all were punishable when one was found guilty; counter-revolutionary measures for exacting compulsory labour were also laid down. On November 7, 1934, the Kuomintang government officially announced that this system of fascist rule was to be established in all the provinces and municipalities under its rule.

[7] The Cairo conference, held by China, the United States and Britain in November 1943, issued the Cairo Declaration which clearly stipulated that Taiwan and certain other territories were to be returned to China. In June 1950 the U.S. government sent a fleet to control Taiwan in open repudiation of this agreement, in the attempt to deprive China of her sovereignty over it.

[8] Yuan Shih-kai was the head of the Northern warlords in the last years of the Ching Dynasty. After the Ching Dynasty was overthrown by the Revolution of 1911, he usurped the presidency of the Republic and organized the first government of the Northern warlords, which represented the big landlord and big comprador classes. He did this by relying on counter-revolutionary armed force and on the support of the imperialists and by taking advantage of the conciliationist character of the bourgeoisie, which was then leading the revolution. In 1915 he wanted to make himself emperor and, to gain the support of the Japanese imperialists, accepted the Twenty-one Demands with which Japan aimed at obtaining exclusive control of all China. In December of the same year an uprising against his assumption of the throne took place in Yunnan Province and promptly won nation-wide response and support. Yuan Shih-kai died in Peking in June 1916.

[9] Omei is a famous mountain in the southwestern part of Szechuan Province. Here it symbolizes the mountainous areas of Szechuan, the last refuge of the Chiang Kai-shek ruling clique in the War of Resistance Against Japan.

[10] From Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Statement on My Departure for the North", dated November 10, 1924.

[11] For many decades, beginning with the end of the 18th century, Britain exported an increasing quantity of opium to China. This traffic not only subjected the Chinese people to drugging but also plundered China of her silver. It aroused fierce opposition in China. In 1840, under the pretext of safeguarding its trade with China, Britain launched armed aggression against her. The Chinese troops led by Lin Tse-hsu put up resistance, and the people in Canton spontaneously organized the "Quell-the-British Corps", which dealt serious blows to the British forces of aggression. In 1842, however, the corrupt Ching regime signed the Treaty of Nanking with Britain. This treaty provided for the payment of indemnities and the cession of Hongkong to Britain, and stipulated that Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Ningpo and Canton were to be opened to British trade and that tariff rates for British goods imported into China were to be jointly fixed by China and Britain.

[12] The Atlantic Charter was issued jointly by the United States and Britain at the conclusion of their Atlantic conference in August 1941. The Moscow con-

ference was held in October 1943 by the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain. The Teheran conference of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain was held in the capital of Iran from November to December 1943. The Crimea conference of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain took place in February 1945 at Yalta. At all these international conferences the signatories recorded their resolve to defeat fascist Germany and Japan through common endeavour and, after the war, to prevent the revival of the forces of aggression and the remnants of fascism, maintain world peace and help the peoples of all countries to realize their aspirations for independence and democracy. But immediately after the war the U.S. and British governments violated all these international agreements.

[13] As the representative of China's Liberated Areas Comrade Tung Pi-wu attended the United Nations Conference on International Organization which was held at San Francisco from April to June 1945, with the participation of representatives from fifty countries. The proposals for the Organization of the United Nations were drafted at Dumbarton Oaks, U.S.A., where the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and China met from August to October 1944 in accordance with the decisions of the Moscow and Teheran conferences.

[14] With Japan's surrender the situation changed and the people's conference of the Chinese Liberated Areas was not convened, although a Preparatory Committee for this conference was formed in Yenan after the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and held an inaugural meeting which was attended by representatives from all the Liberated Areas.

THE FOOLISH OLD MAN WHO REMOVED THE MOUNTAINS

June 11, 1945

We have had a very successful congress. We have done three things. First, we have decided on the line of our Party, which is boldly to mobilize the masses and expand the people's forces so that, under the leadership of our Party, they will defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the whole people and build a new-democratic China. Second, we have adopted the new Party Constitution. Third, we have elected the leading body of the Party — the Central Committee. Henceforth our task is to lead the whole membership in carrying out the Party line. Ours has been a congress of victory, a congress of unity. The delegates have made excellent comments on the three reports. Many comrades have undertaken self-criticism; with unity as the objective unity has been achieved through self-criticism. This congress is a model of unity, of self-criticism and of inner-Party democracy.

When the congress closes, many comrades will be leaving for their posts and the various war fronts. Comrades, wherever you go, you should propagate the line of the congress and, through the members of the Party, explain it to the broad masses.

Our aim in propagating the line of the congress is to build up the confidence of the whole Party and the entire people in the certain triumph of the revolution. We must first raise the political consciousness of the vanguard so that, resolute and unafraid of sacrifice, they will surmount every difficulty to win victory. But this is not enough; we must also arouse the political consciousness of the entire people so that they may willingly and gladly fight together with us for victory. We should fire the whole people with the conviction that China belongs

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This was Comrade Mao Tse-tung's concluding speech at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

not to the reactionaries but to the Chinese people. There is an ancient Chinese fable called "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains". It tells of an old man who lived in northern China long, long ago and was known as the Foolish Old Man of North Mountain. His house faced south and beyond his doorway stood the two great peaks, Taihang and Wangwu, obstructing the way. He called his sons, and hoe in hand they began to dig up these mountains with great determination. Another greybeard, known as the Wise Old Man, saw them and said derisively, "How silly of you to do this! It is quite impossible for you few to dig up these two huge mountains." The Foolish Old Man replied, "When I die, my sons will carry on; when they die, there will be my grandsons, and then their sons and grandsons, and so on to infinity. High as they are, the mountains cannot grow any higher and with every bit we dig, they will be that much lower. Why can't we clear them away?" Having refuted the Wise Old Man's wrong view, he went on digging every day, unshaken in his conviction. God was moved by this, and he sent down two angels, who carried the mountains away on their backs. Today, two big mountains lie like a dead weight on the Chinese people. One is imperialism, the other is feudalism. The Chinese Communist Party has long made up its mind to dig them up. We must persevere and work unceasingly, and we, too, will touch God's heart. Our God is none other than the masses of the Chinese people. If they stand up and dig together with us, why can't these two mountains be cleared away?

Yesterday, in a talk with two Americans who were leaving for the United States, I said that the U.S. government was trying to undermine us and this would not be permitted. We oppose the U.S. government's policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists. But we must draw a distinction, firstly, between the people of the United States and their government and, secondly, within the U.S. government between the policy-makers and their subordinates. I said to these two Americans, "Tell the policy-makers in your government that we forbid you Americans to enter the Liberated Areas because your policy is to support Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists, and we have to be on our guard. You can come to the Liberated Areas if your purpose is to fight Japan, but there must first be an agreement. We will not permit you to nose around everywhere. Since Patrick J. Hurley[1] has publicly declared against co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party, why do you still want to come and prowl around in our Liberated Areas?"

The U.S. government's policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists shows the brazenness of the U.S. reactionaries. But all the scheming of the reactionaries, whether Chinese or foreign, to prevent the Chinese people from achieving victory is doomed to failure. The democratic forces are the main current in the world today, while reaction is only a counter-current. The reactionary counter-current is trying to swamp the main current of national independence and people's democracy, but it can never become the main current. Today, there are still three major contradictions in the old world, as Stalin pointed out long ago: first, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the imperialist countries; second, the contradiction between the various imperialist powers; and third, the contradiction between the colonial and semi-colonial countries and the imperialist metropolitan countries.[2] Not only do these three contradictions continue to exist but they are becoming more acute and widespread. Because of their existence and growth, the time will come when the reactionary anti-Soviet, anti-Communist and anti-democratic counter-current still in existence today will be swept away.

At this moment two congresses are being held in China, the Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang and the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party. They have completely different aims: the aim of one is to liquidate the Communist Party and all the other democratic forces in China and thus to plunge China into darkness; the aim of the other is to overthrow Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, the Chinese feudal forces, and build a new-democratic China and thus to lead China to light. These two lines are in conflict with each other. We firmly believe that, led by the Chinese Communist Party and guided by the line of its Seventh Congress, the Chinese people will achieve complete victory, while the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary line will inevitably fail.

NOTES

[1] Patrick J. Hurley, a reactionary Republican Party politician, was appointed U.S. ambassador to China towards the end of 1944. In November 1945 he was forced to resign because his support for Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist policy roused

the firm opposition of the Chinese people. Hurley's open declaration against co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party was made on April 2, 1945 at a U.S. State Department press conference in Washington. For details, see "The Hurley-Chiang Duet Is a Flop", pp. 281-84 of this volume.

[2] See J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", *Works*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1953, Vol. VI, pp. 74-82.

ON PRODUCTION BY THE ARMY FOR ITS OWN SUPPORT AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GREAT MOVEMENTS FOR RECTIFICATION AND FOR PRODUCTION

April 27, 1945

In the existing circumstances in which our army is facing extreme material difficulties and is engaged in dispersed operations, it is absolutely inadmissible for the leading bodies to assume full responsibility for provisioning the army, for to do so would both hamper the initiative of the large numbers of officers and men at the lower levels and fail to satisfy their needs. We should say, "Comrades, let us all go into action and overcome our difficulties!" If only the leadership at the higher levels sets the tasks well and gives the lower levels a free hand to overcome difficulties by their own efforts, the problem will be solved and, indeed, solved in a more satisfactory way. But if, instead, the higher levels always shoulder loads heavier than they can really carry, dare not give the lower levels a free hand and do not arouse enthusiasm for self-reliance among the broad masses, then in spite of all the efforts of the higher levels the result will be that both the higher and the lower levels will find themselves in a predicament, and the problem will never be solved in the existing circumstances. The experience of the last few years has amply borne this out. The principle of "unified leadership and decentralized management" has proved to be the correct one for organizing all economic activities in our Liberated Areas in the present circumstances.

The armed forces of the Liberated Areas already total more than 900,000 men. To defeat the Japanese aggressors, we must increase

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This was an editorial written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the *Liberation Daily*, Yenan.

them to several times this number. But we have so far received no outside aid. Even if we get it in the future, we shall still have to provide our own means of livelihood; on that score there must be no illusions whatsoever. In the near future we shall have to take the necessary number of military formations from the areas where they are now engaged in dispersed operations, and concentrate them for attack on particular enemy objectives. Such big formations for concentrated action will be unable to engage in production to support themselves, and, what is more, will need large supplies from the rear; only the local troops and regional formations remaining behind (and they will still be considerable) will be able both to fight and to engage in production as before. Such being the case, is there any doubt that, as long as fighting and training are not impeded, all troops without exception should use the present opportunity to learn how to be partially self-supporting through production?

In our circumstances, production by the army for its own support, though backward or retrogressive in form, is progressive in substance and of great historic significance. Formally speaking, we are violating the principle of division of labour. However, in our circumstances — the poverty and disunity of the country (resulting from the crimes of the chief ruling clique of the Kuomintang), and the protracted and dispersed people's guerrilla war — what we are doing is progressive. Look how pale and emaciated the Kuomintang soldiers are, and how robust and strong our soldiers of the Liberated Areas are! Look what difficulties we ourselves had before we started production for self-support, and how much better off we have been since! Let us ask two army units here, say two companies, to choose between the two methods, i.e., between the higher levels supplying them with all their means of livelihood and the higher levels supplying little or nothing but letting them produce for themselves all that they need, or the greater part, or half, or even less than half of what they need. Which method will yield better results? Which will they prefer? After a year's serious experiment in production for self-support, they will surely answer that the second method yields better results and be willing to adopt it, and they will surely answer that the first method yields poorer results and be unwilling to adopt it. The reason is that the second method can improve the living conditions of everyone in the army, whereas the first method can never satisfy their needs in the present difficult material circumstances, however hard the higher levels may try. Because we have adopted what seems to be a "backward" and "retrogressive" method, our troops are able to overcome shortages in the means of livelihood and improve their living conditions, so that every soldier is robust and strong; as a result, we are able to ease the tax burden on the people who are also in difficulties, thus winning their support, and we are able to keep up the protracted war and expand our armed forces, thus extending the Liberated Areas, reducing the enemy-occupied areas and attaining our objective of final victory over the aggressor and the liberation of the whole of China. Is this not of great historic significance?

Production by the army for its own support has not only improved the army's living conditions and lightened the burden on the people, thereby making it possible further to expand the army. In addition, it has had many immediate effects. They are as follows:

(1) Improved relations between officers and men. Officers and men work together in production and become like brothers.

(2) Better attitude to labour. What we now have is neither the old mercenary system nor universal military service, but a third system, the system of mobilizing volunteers. It is better than the mercenary system since it does not produce so many loafers, but it is not so good as universal military service. Nevertheless, our present conditions only allow us to adopt the system of mobilizing volunteers, and not that of universal military service. The mobilized soldiers have to lead an army life for a long time, which may impair their attitude to labour and so turn some of them into loafers or taint them with certain bad habits characteristic of the warlord armies. But since the army began to produce for its own support, the attitude to labour has improved and loafer ways have been overcome.

(3) Strengthened discipline. Far from weakening discipline in battle and in army life, labour discipline in production actually strengthens it.

(4) Improved relations between the army and the people. Once an armed force begins to "keep house" for itself, encroachments upon the property of the people seldom or never occur. As the army and the people exchange labour and help each other in production, the friendship between them is strengthened.

(5) Less grumbling in the army about the government and improved relations between the two.

(6) An impetus to the great production campaign of the people. Once the army engages in production, the need for government

> and other organizations to do likewise becomes more obvious, and they do so more energetically; also, the need for a universal campaign of the whole people to increase production naturally becomes more obvious, and this too is carried on more energetically.

The widespread movements for rectification and for production which began in 1942 and 1943 respectively have played and are still playing a decisive role, the one in our ideological and the other in our material life. Unless we grasp these two links at the right time, we shall be unable to grasp the whole chain of the revolution, and our struggle will not advance.

As we know, of the members who joined the Party before 1937, only a few tens of thousands are left, and most of our present membership of 1,200,000 come from the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The revolutionary fervour of these comrades is admirable and they wish to have Marxist training, but they have brought with them into the Party ideas which are out of keeping or not altogether in keeping with Marxism. The same is true of some people who joined the Party before 1937. It constitutes an extremely serious contradiction, an enormous difficulty. In these circumstances, could we have advanced smoothly if we had not started a widespread movement of Marxist education, that is, the rectification movement? Obviously not. But as we have solved or are in the process of solving this contradiction among large numbers of cadres — the contradiction, within the Party, between the proletarian ideology and non-proletarian ideologies (including those of the petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie and even of the landlord class, but mainly of the petty bourgeoisie), *i.e.*, the contradiction between the Marxist ideology and non-Marxist ideologies — our Party can go forward with great, firm strides in unprecedented (though not complete) ideological, political and organizational unity. From now on our Party can and should grow even larger and, guided by the principles of Marxist ideology, we shall be able to steer its further development still more effectively.

The other link is the movement for production. The War of Resistance has been going on for eight years. When it began we had food and clothing. But things got steadily worse until we were in great difficulty, running short of grain, short of cooking oil and salt, short of bedding and clothing, short of funds. This great difficulty, this great contradiction, came in the wake of the big Japanese offensives and the Kuomintang government's three large-scale attacks on the people (the "anti-Communist onslaughts") in 1940-43. Could our anti-Japanese struggle have progressed if we had not overcome this difficulty, solved this contradiction, grasped this link? Obviously not. But we have learned and are still learning to develop production, and so we are again full of vigour and vitality. Fearing no enemy, we shall prevail over them all in a few years.

Thus there can be no doubt of the historic importance of the two great movements for rectification and production.

Let us go forward and spread these two great movements everywhere as a foundation for the fulfilment of other tasks in our struggle. If we can do so, the complete liberation of the Chinese people will be assured.

Now is the season for spring ploughing, and it is hoped that the leading comrades, all the working personnel and the masses of the people in every Liberated Area will grasp the link of production in good time and strive for even greater achievements than those of last year. Greater efforts must be made this year, particularly in areas which have not yet learned to develop production.

THE HURLEY-CHIANG DUET IS A FLOP

July 10, 1945

Convened to camouflage Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorial regime, the Fourth People's Political Council opened in Chungking on July 7. It was the smallest opening session on record. Not only was nobody present from the Chinese Communist Party, but many members of the Council from other groups were absent too. Out of a total membership of 290, only 180 turned up. Chiang Kai-shek held forth at this opening session as follows:

> The government is not going to submit any specific proposal on questions relating to the convocation of the National Assembly, and you gentlemen can therefore discuss these matters fully. The government is ready to listen to your opinions on these questions in all honesty and sincerity.

This will probably be the end of the whole business about convoking the National Assembly on November 12 this year. The imperialist Patrick J. Hurley has had something to do with this business. At first he strongly encouraged Chiang Kai-shek to make such a move, and it was this that put some stiffening into Chiang Kai-shek's New Year's Day speech,[1] and a great deal more into his March 1 speech[2] in which he announced his determination to "hand state power back to the people" on November 12. In his speech of March I he flatly rejected the Chinese Communist Party's proposal, which voiced the general will of the Chinese people, that a conference of all parties be convened and a coalition government established. He gleefully played up the idea of forming a so-called Committee of Three, including an American, to "reorganize" the armed forces of the Chinese Communist Party. He had the audacity to say that the Chinese Communist Party must hand over its troops before he would bestow "legal status" upon it.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this comment for the Hsinhua New Agency.

In all this, the backing of His Worship Patrick J. Hurley was decisive. In a statement in Washington on April 2, Hurley did his best to boost Chiang Kai-shek's "National Assembly" and other such nasty schemes in addition to denying the role of the Chinese Communist Party, vilifying its activities, declaring against co-operation with it and uttering other such imperialist platitudes. Thus the duet between Hurley in the United States and Chiang Kai-shek in China reached its most raucous pitch, with the sacrifice of the Chinese people as the common objective. Since then the show seems to have flagged. Countless voices have been raised in protest everywhere, among both Chinese and foreigners, both inside and outside the Kuomintang, among people with party affiliations and without. The sole reason is that for all its high-sounding language, the Hurley-Chiang racket is designed to sacrifice the interests of the Chinese people, further wreck their unity, and as it were, lay a mine to set off large-scale civil war in China, thereby damaging the common interests of the people of the United States and other allied countries during the anti-fascist war and the prospects of peaceful coexistence afterwards. At the moment Hurley seems to be lying low, busying himself with no one knows what, with the result that Chiang Kai-shek has to talk twaddle before the People's Political Council. Previously, on March 1, Chiang Kai-shek said:

> The conditions in our country differ from those in other countries: prior to the convocation of the National Assembly, we have no responsible organization which is representative of the people and through which the government can consult the people for their opinions.

If that is so, why does our Generalissimo now go to the People's Political Council to "listen" to "opinions"? According to him, there is no "responsible organization" in the whole of China through which one "can consult the people for their opinions"; it follows that the People's Political Council as an "organization" exists merely to eat, and his "listening" to it has no legal basis. Be that as it may, if the People's Political Council says even a single word against the convocation of the bogus "National" Assembly, it will have done a good deed and merited divine grace, though by so doing it would have violated the Imperial Edict of March 1 and committed *lèse-majesté*. Of course, it is still premature to make any comment on the People's Political Council, as we have to wait a few days to see what it will produce for the Generalissimo to "listen" to. One thing, however, is certain: ever since the Chinese people began raising their voices in protest against this National Assembly, even the enthusiasts for "constitutional monarchy" have been worried about our "monarch", cautioning him not to stick his neck into a noose by convening a "Parliament of Pigs"[3] and warning him of the fate of Yuan Shih-kai. Who knows but that our "monarch" may stay his hand in consequence? But it is absolutely certain that he and his retinue will not allow the people to gain a particle of power, if that would cost them a single hair. The immediate proof is that His Majesty has described the people's justified criticism as "unbridled attacks". He said:

> . . . under war conditions a general election is obviously out of the question in the Japanese-occupied areas. Consequently two years ago the Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang resolved to convoke the National Assembly and institute constitutional government within a year after the conclusion of the war. However, in certain quarters unbridled attacks were made at that time.

And the grounds for these attacks were that this date might be too late. His Majesty thereupon proposed that "the National Assembly be convoked as soon as the war situation is stabilized, in view of the possibility that the final conclusion of the war may be delayed and that order may not be quickly restored everywhere even after the end of the war". Much to his surprise, these people again made "unbridled attacks". This has put His Majesty in a terrible fix. But the Chinese people must teach Chiang Kai-shek and his group a lesson and tell them: Whatever you say or do, no tricks in violation of the people's wishes will be tolerated. What the Chinese people demand is immediate democratic reforms, such as the release of political prisoners, the abolition of the secret service, and the granting of freedoms to the people and of legal status to the political parties. You are doing none of these things and instead are simply juggling with the pseudo-problem of the date of the "National Assembly"; this will not deceive even a three-year-old. Without a minimum of genuine democratic reforms, all your assemblies, large or small, will be thrown into the cesspit. Call this an "unbridled attack" if you like, but every deception of this kind must be exploded resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely, with not a trace allowed to remain. The reason is simply that it is a swindle. Whether or not there is a national assembly is one thing and whether or not there is a minimum of democratic reforms is quite another. The former can be dispensed with for the time being, but the latter must be introduced immediately. Since Chiang Kai-shek and his group are willing to "hand state power back to the people sooner", why are they unwilling to carry out a minimum of democratic reforms "sooner"? Gentlemen of the Kuomintang! When you come to these concluding lines, you will have to admit that the Chinese Communists are not in any sense making an "unbridled attack" on you, but are asking you one simple question. May we not even ask a question? Can you brush it aside? The question you must answer is: How is it that you are willing to "hand state power back to the people" but not willing to institute democratic reforms?

NOTES

[1] The radio speech made by Chiang Kai-shek on January 1, 1945 did not even mention the ignominious defeats of the Kuomintang troops at the hands of the Japanese aggressors in the previous year, but maligned the people and opposed the proposal for abolishing the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship and for setting up a coalition government and a joint supreme command, a proposal supported by all the people and all the anti-Japanese parties in the country. He insisted on continuing the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship and as a shield against the people's criticism he talked about convening a Kuomintang-controlled "National Assembly" which had been spurned by the whole nation.

[2] On March 1, 1945 Chiang Kai-shek made a speech in Chungking at the Association for the Establishment of Constitutional Government. Besides reiterating the reactionary views of his New Year's Day speech, Chiang proposed the formation of a Committee of Three, including a U.S. representative, to "reorganize" the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which amounted to an open invitation to the U.S. imperialists to intervene in China's domestic affairs.

[3] In 1923, the Northern warlord Tsao Kun had himself elected "President of the Republic of China" by giving members of parliament a bribe of 5,000 silver dollars each. He became notorious as the president elected through bribery, and the bribed members came to be called "members of the Parliament of Pigs". Comrade Mao Tse-tung's analogy here likens the Kuomintang's bogus "National Assembly" to the "Parliament of Pigs".

ON THE DANGER OF THE HURLEY POLICY

July 12, 1945

It has become increasingly obvious that the policy of the United States towards China as represented by its ambassador Patrick J. Hurley is creating a civil war crisis in China. Sticking to its reactionary policies, the Kuomintang government has lived on civil war ever since it was set up eighteen years ago; only at the time of the Sian Incident in 1936 and of the Japanese invasion south of the Great Wall in 1937 was it forced to abandon its nation-wide civil war for a time. Since 1939, however, civil war on a local scale has again been waged without interruption. "Fight the Communists first" is the mobilization slogan used by the Kuomintang government among its own people, while it relegates resistance to Japan to a secondary place. At present all its military dispositions are focused not on resisting the Japanese aggressors but on "recovering lost territory" from China's Liberated Areas and on wiping out the Chinese Communist Party. This situation must be taken into serious account in our struggle both for victory in the War of Resistance and for peaceful construction after the war. The late President Roosevelt did take it into account and consequently, in the interests of the United States, refrained from adopting a policy of helping the Kuomintang to undertake armed attacks on the Chinese Communist Party. When Hurley visited Yenan as Roosevelt's personal representative in November 1944, he expressed agreement with the Chinese Communist Party's plan for the abolition of the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship and the establishment of a democratic coalition government. But later he changed his tune and went back on what he had said in Yenan. This change was crudely revealed in his statement in Washington on April 2. In the interim, according to the selfsame Hurley, the Kuomintang government represented by Chiang Kai-shek seems to have turned into the Beauty

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This comment was written for the Hsinhua News Agency.

and the Chinese Communist Party into the Beast, and he flatly declared that the United States would co-operate with Chiang Kai-shek only and not with the Chinese Communist Party. This, of course, is not just Hurley's personal view but that of a whole group of people in the U.S. government. It is a wrong and dangerous view. At this juncture Roosevelt died, and Hurley returned to the U.S. embassy in Chungking in high spirits. The danger of the China policy of the United States as represented by Hurley is that it is encouraging the Kuomintang government to be still more reactionary and aggravating the civil war crisis. If the Hurley policy continues, the U.S. government will fall irretrievably into the deep stinking cesspool of Chinese reaction; it will put itself in the position of antagonizing the hundreds of millions of awakened and awakening Chinese people and will become a hindrance to the War of Resistance in the present and to world peace in the future. Isn't it clear that this would be the inevitable result? A section of U.S. public opinion is worried about the China policy of the Hurley type with its dangers and wants it changed, because as far as China's future is concerned, it sees clearly that the forces of the Chinese people which demand independence, freedom and unity are irresistible and are bound to burst forth and supplant foreign and feudal oppression. We cannot yet say whether or when the U.S. policy will be changed. But one thing is certain. If the Hurley policy of aiding and abetting the reactionary forces in China and antagonizing the Chinese people with their immense numbers continues unchanged, it will place a crushing burden on the government and people of the United States and plunge them into endless trouble. This point must be brought home to the people of the United States.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ON THE DANGER OF THE HURLEY POLICY

July 29, 1945

Comrade William Z. Foster and the National Committee of the Communist Party of the United States of America:

We are glad to learn that the special convention of the Communist Political Association of the United States has resolved to repudiate Browder's revisionist, that is, capitulationist line,[1] has re-established Marxist leadership and revived the Communist Party of the United States. We hereby extend to you our warm congratulations on this great victory of the working class and the Marxist movement in the United States. Browder's whole revisionist-capitulationist line (which is fully expressed in his book *Teheran*) in essence reflects the influence of reactionary U.S. capitalist groups on the U.S. workers' movement. These groups are now doing their utmost to extend their influence in China too; they are supporting the erroneous policy of the reactionary clique inside the Kuomintang, a policy which is against the interests of the nation and the people, and are thereby confronting the Chinese people with the grave danger of civil war and jeopardizing the interests of the peoples of our two great countries, China and the United States. Beyond all doubt the victory of the U.S. working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party of the United States, over Browder's revisionist-capitulationist line will contribute signally to the great cause in which the Chinese and American peoples are engaged, the cause of carrying on the war against Japan and of building a peaceful and democratic world after the war.

NOTES

[1] Earl Browder was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States of America from 1930 to 1944. During World War II, the Rightist ideas in the Communist Party of the U.S.A., of which Browder was the chief exponent, developed

into an anti-Marxist revisionist-capitulationist line. From December 1943 onward, Browder advocated this line in a number of speeches and articles and in April 1944 he published *Teheran* as his Right opportunist programme. Revising the basic Leninist thesis that imperialism is monopolistic, decadent and moribund capitalism, and denying the imperialist nature of U.S. capitalism, he declared that U.S. capitalism "retains some of the characteristics of a *young* capitalism" (Browder's italics) and that there is a "common interest" between the proletariat and the big bourgeoisie in the U.S.A. Thus he pleaded for the safeguarding of the system of monopolist trusts and dreamed about saving U.S. capitalism from inevitable crises by means of class conciliation. Basing himself on this absurd appraisal of U.S. capitalism and following a capitulationist line of class collaboration with monopoly capital, Browder in May 1944 presided over the dissolution of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., the party of the U.S. proletariat, and formed a non-Party organization, the Communist Political Association of the U.S.A. From the very beginning, Browder's wrong line met with opposition from many members of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. with Comrade William Z. Poster at their head. Under the leadership of Comrade Foster, the Communist Political Association in June 1945 passed a resolution denouncing Browder's line. In July the association held a special national convention and decided on the thorough liquidation of this line and the re-establishment of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. Browder was expelled from the Party in February 1946 because he persisted in his stand, which was a betrayal of the proletariat, and because he openly supported the imperialist policy of the Truman Administration and engaged in factional activities against the Party.

THE LAST ROUND WITH THE JAPANESE INVADERS

June 9, 1945

The Chinese people heartily welcome the Soviet government's declaration of war on Japan on August 8. The Soviet Union's action will very much shorten the war against Japan. The war is already in its last stage and the time has come to inflict final defeat on the Japanese aggressors and all their running dogs. In these circumstances, all the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people should launch a nation-wide counter-offensive in close and effective co-ordination with the operations of the Soviet Union and the other allied countries. The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other armed forces of the people should seize every opportunity to launch extensive attacks on all the invaders and their running dogs who refuse to surrender, annihilate their forces, capture their arms and *matériel*, vigorously expand the Liberated Areas and reduce the areas under enemy occupation. We must boldly form armed working teams which, by hundreds and by thousands, should penetrate deep into the rear of the enemy-occupied areas, organize the people to wreck the enemy's communication lines and fight in co-ordination with the regular armies. We must boldly arouse the people in the occupied areas in their tens of millions and immediately organize underground forces to prepare armed uprisings and to annihilate the enemy in co-ordination with the troops attacking from without. Meanwhile, the consolidation of the Liberated Areas must not be neglected. Among the 100 million people there, and among the people in all other areas as they are liberated, we should universally carry out the reduction of rent and interest this winter and next spring, increase production, build up the people's political power and armed forces, intensify militia work, strengthen army discipline, persistently develop the united front of all sections of the people and guard against waste of manpower and material resources. All this is designed to put more punch into our army's offensive against the enemy. The people of the whole country must be on their guard to avert the danger of civil war and make efforts to bring about the formation of a democratic coalition government. A new stage in China's war of national liberation has arrived, and the people of the whole country must strengthen their unity and struggle for final victory.

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FROM MARX TO MAO

CONTENTS

THE THIRD REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR PERIOD

THE SITUATION AND OUR POLICY AFTER THE VICTORY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 11

CHAING KAI-SHEK IS PROVOKING CIVIL WAR 27

TWO TELEGRAMS FROM THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE EIGHTEENTH GROUP ARMY TO CHAING KAI-SHEK 33

ON A STATEMENT BY CHAING KAI-SHEK'S SPOKESMAN 41

ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KUOMINTANG - CIRCULAR OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 47

ON THE CHUNGKING NEGOTIATIONS 53

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE KUOMINTANG'S ATTACKS 65

RENT REDUCTION AND PRODUCTION ARE TWO IMPORTANT MATTERS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE LIBERATED AREAS 71

POLICY FOR WORK IN THE LIBERATED AREAS FOR 1946 75

BUILD STABLE BASE AREAS IN THE NORTHEAST 81

SOME POINTS IN APPRAISAL OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 87

SMASH CHAING KAI-SHEK'S OFFENSIVE BY A WAR OF SELF-DEFENCE 89

TALK WITH THE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT ANNA LOUISE STRONG 97

CONCENTRATE A SUPERIOR FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ONE BY ONE 103

THE TRUTH ABOUT U.S. “MEDIATION” AND THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIL WAR IN CHINA 109

A THREE MONTHS' SUMMARY 113

GREET THE NEW HIGH TIDE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 119

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ON THE TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT OF YENAN AND THE DEFENCE OF THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGSIA BORDER REGION - TWO DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 129

THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NORTHWEST WAR THEATRE 133

THE CHAING KAI-SHEK GOVERNMENT IS BESIEGED BY THE WHOLE PEOPLE 135

STRATEGY FOR THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION 141

MANIFESTO OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY 147

ON THE REISSUE OF THE THREE MAIN RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND THE EIGHT POINTS FOR ATTENTION - INSTRUCTION OF THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY 155

THE PRESENT SITUATION AND OUR TASKS 157

ON SETTING UP A SYSTEM OF REPORTS 177

ON SOME IMPORTANT PROBLEMS OF THE PARTY'S PRESENT POLICY 181

THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN THE ARMY 191

DIFFERENT TACTICS FOR CARRYING OUT THE LAND LAW IN DIFFERENT AREAS 193

CORRECT THE "LEFT" ERRORS IN LAND REFORM PROPAGANDA 197

ESSENTIAL POINTS IN LAND REFORM IN THE NEW LIBERATED AREAS 201

ON THE POLICY CONCERNING INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE 203

ON THE QUESTION OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE AND THE ENLIGHTENED GENTRY 207

ON THE GREAT VICTORY IN THE NORTHWEST AND ON THE NEW TYPE OF IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION MOVEMENT IN THE LIBERATION ARMY 211

A CIRCULAR ON THE SITUATION 219

SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE OF CADRES IN THE SHANSI-SUIYUAN LIBERATED AREA 227

A TALK TO THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE *SHANSI-SUIYUAN DAILY* 241

TELEGRAM TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE LOYANG FRONT AFTER THE RECAPTURE OF THE CITY 247

TACTICAL PROBLEMS OF RURAL WORK IN THE NEW LIBERATED AREAS 251

THE WORK OF LAND REFORM AND OF PARTY CONSOLIDATION IN 1948 253

THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE LIAOHSI-SHENYANG CAMPAIGN 261

ON STRENGTHENING THE PARTY COMMITTEE SYSTEM 267

ON THE SEPTEMBER MEETING - CIRCULAR OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 269

THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE HUAI-HAI CAMPAIGN 279

REVOLUTIONARY FORCES OF THE WORLD UNITE, FIGHT AGAINST IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION! 283

THE MOMENTOUS CHANGE IN CHINA'S MILITARY SITUATION 287

THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE PEIPING-TIENTSIN CAMPAIGN 289

MESSAGE URGING TU YU-MING AND OTHERS TO SURRENDER 295

CARRY THE REVOLUTION THROUGH TO THE END 299

ON THE WAR CRIMINAL'S SUING FOR PEACE 309

STATEMENT ON THE PRESENT SITUATION BY MAO TSE-TUNG, CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 315

COMMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE NANKING EXECUTIVE YUAN 321

ON ORDERING THE REACTIONARY KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT TO RE-ARREST YASUJI OKAMURA, FORMER COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE JAPANESE FORCES OF AGGRESSION IN CHINA, AND TO ARREST THE KUOMINTANG CIVIL WAR CRIMINALS — STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 325

PEACE TERMS MUST INCLUDE THE PUNISHMENT OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS AND KUOMINTANG WAR CRIMINALS — STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 333

TURN THE ARMY INTO A WORKING FORCE 337

WHY DO THE BADLY SPLIT REACTIONARIES STILL IDLY CLAMOUR FOR "TOTAL PEACE"? 341

THE KUOMINTANG REACTIONARIES TURN FROM AN "APPEAL FOR PEACE" TO AN APPEAL FOR WAR 347
ON THE KUOMINTANG'S DIFFERENT ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 351
REPORT TO THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF THE SEVENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 361
METHODS OF WORK OF PARTY COMMITTEES 377
WHITHER THE NANKING GOVERNMENT? 383
ORDER TO THE ARMY FOR THE COUNTRY-WIDE ADVANCE 387
PROCLAMATION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY 397
ON THE OUTRAGES BY BRITISH WARSHIPS — STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN OF THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY 401
ADDRESS TO THE PREPARATORY MEETING OF THE NEW POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE 405
ON THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP 411
CAST AWAY ILLUSIONS, PREPARE FOR STRUGGLE 425
FAREWELL, LEIGHTON STUART! 433
WHY IT IS NECESSARY TO DISCUSS THE WHITE PAPER 441
"FRIENDSHIP" OR AGGRESSION? 447
THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY 451

THE THIRD REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR PERIOD

THE SITUATION AND OUR POLICY AFTER THE VICTORY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN*

August 13, 1945

These are days of tremendous change in the situation in the Far East. The surrender of Japanese imperialism is now a foregone conclusion. The decisive factor for Japan's surrender is the entry of the Soviet Union into the war. A million Red Army troops are entering China's Northeast; this force is irresistible. Japanese imperialism can no longer continue the fight.[1] The Chinese people's hard and bitter War of Resistance is crowned with victory. As a historical stage, the War of Resistance Against Japan is now over.

In these circumstances, what are the relations among the different classes in China and what are the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party at present? What will they be like in the future? What is the policy of our Party? These are questions of great concern to the people of the whole country and to all members of our Party.

What about the Kuomintang? Look at its past, and you can tell its present; look at its past and present, and you can tell its future. In the past, this party carried on a counter-revolutionary civil war for ten whole years. During the War of Resistance it launched three large-scale anti-Communist campaigns,[2] in 1940, 1941 and 1943, each time attempting to develop the attack into a country-wide civil war. It was only because of the correct policy adopted by our Party and the opposition of the people of the whole country that its attempts failed. As everyone knows, Chiang Kai-shek, the political representative of China's big landlords and big bourgeoisie, is a most brutal and treacherous fellow. His policy has been to look on with folded arms, wait for victory, conserve his forces and prepare for civil war. Indeed, the victory he has been waiting for has arrived, and now this "generalissimo" is about to "come down from the mountain".[3] In the past eight years we have changed places with Chiang Kai-shek — formerly we were on the mountain and he was by the water;[4] during the War of Resistance we were behind the enemy lines and he went up the mountain. Now he is coming down from the mountain, coming down to seize the fruits of victory.

During the past eight years the people and army of our Liberated Areas, receiving no aid whatsoever from outside and relying solely on their own efforts, liberated vast territories and resisted and pinned down the bulk of the Japanese invading forces and practically all the puppet troops. Only by our determined resistance and heroic struggle were the 200 million people in the Great Rear Area[5] saved from being trampled underfoot by the Japanese aggressors and the regions inhabited by these 200 million people saved from Japanese occupation. Chiang Kai-shek hid on Mount Omei with guards in front of him — the guards were the Liberated Areas, the people and army of the Liberated Areas. In defending the 200 million people of the Great Rear Area, we protected this "generalissimo" as well and gave him both the time and the space to sit around waiting for victory with folded arms. Time — eight years one month. Space — an area inhabited by 200 million people. These conditions we provided for him. But for us, he could not have stood by looking on. Is the "generalissimo" grateful to us, then? No, not he! This fellow has never known what it is to be grateful. How did Chiang Kai-shek climb to power? By the Northern Expedition,[6] by the first period of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party,[7] by the support given him by the people, who had not yet seen through him. Once in power, Chiang Kai-shek, far from being

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* This speech was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a meeting of cadres in Yenan. Based on the Marxist-Leninist method of class analysis, it presented a penetrating study of the fundamental political situation in China after victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and set forth the revolutionary tactics of the proletariat. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung had pointed out in his opening address at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China in April 1945, China after defeating Japanese imperialism still faced two destinies, two futures — either to become a new China or to remain the old China. The big landlords and big bourgeoisie of China, represented by Chiang Kai-shek, wanted to wrest the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance from the hands of the people and to keep China a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under their dictatorship. The Communist Party of China, representing the interests of the proletariat and the masses of the people, on the one hand strove for peace and opposed civil war with all its strength. On the other hand, it had to prepare fully against Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary plot of launching a

grateful to the people, knocked them down and plunged them into the bloodbath of ten years of civil war. You comrades are familiar with this segment of history. During the present War of Resistance the Chinese people again defended him. This war is now ending in victory and Japan is on the point of surrender, but he is not at all grateful to the people. On the contrary, thumbing through the records of 1927, he wants to act in the same old way.[8] He says there has never been any "civil war" in China, only "bandit suppression". Whatever he likes to call it, the fact is he wants to start a civil war against the people, he wants to slaughter the people.

Until a civil war breaks out all over the country, many of the people and many of our Party comrades will not have a very clear understanding of this question. Since civil war is not yet here on a large scale, since it is not yet widespread or out in the open and since the battles are not yet numerous, many people think, "Well, there may not be a civil war after all!" Many others are afraid of civil war. Their fear is not without reason. There were ten years of fighting and then another eight years of the War of Resistance; if the fighting keeps on, where will it all end? It is quite natural that such fears should arise. With regard to Chiang Kai-shek's plot to launch a civil war, our Party's policy has been clear and consistent, that is, resolutely to oppose civil war, be against civil war and prevent civil war. In the days to come, we shall continue, with the utmost effort and greatest patience, to lead the people in preventing civil war. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be soberly aware that the danger of civil war is extremely serious because Chiang Kai-shek's policy is already set. Chiang Kai-shek's policy is civil war. Our policy, the policy of the people, is against civil war. The opponents of civil war

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country-wide civil war and had to adopt the correct policy, that is to say, to harbour no illusions about imperialism and reaction, to have no fear of their threats, to resolutely safeguard the fruits of the people's struggle and strive to build a new China — a new-democratic China of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. The decisive struggle between the two destinies, the two futures facing China, constituted the content of the historical period from the conclusion of the War of Resistance Against Japan to the founding of the People's Republic of China, the historical period of the Chinese People's War of Liberation or Third Revolutionary Civil War. After the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek, supported by U.S. imperialism, tore up peace agreements again and again and launched a gigantic counter-revolutionary civil war without parallel in history in an attempt to wipe out the people's forces. Because of the correct leadership of the Communist Party of China it took the Chinese people only four years of struggle to win a great country-wide victory — the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek and the creation of a new China.

consist only of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people — it is a pity that they do not include Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. Here one side does not want to fight and the other does. If both did not want it, there would be no fighting. Now, since only one side is against it and this side is not yet strong enough to check the other, the danger of civil war is extremely grave.

Our Party pointed out in good time that Chiang Kai-shek would stick to his reactionary policy of dictatorship and civil war. Before, during and after the Seventh Party Congress,[9] we did fairly adequate work to call the people's attention to the danger of civil war, so that the whole people, our Party members and our troops should be mentally prepared well in advance. This is a very important point, and it makes a world of difference whether or not there is such preparedness. In 1927 our Party was still in its infancy and was mentally wholly unprepared for Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary surprise attack. Consequently the fruits of victory won by the people were soon lost, the people had to undergo long suffering, and a bright China was plunged into darkness. This time things are different; our Party has acquired the rich experience of three revolutions[10] and a much higher degree of political maturity. Time and again, the Central Committee of the Party has clearly explained the danger of civil war, and so the whole people, all Party members and the troops led by our Party are in a state of preparedness.

Chiang Kai-shek always tries to wrest every ounce of power and every ounce of gain from the people. And we? Our policy is to give him tit for tat and to fight for every inch of land. We act after his fashion. He always tries to impose war on the people, one sword in his left hand and another in his right. We take up swords, too, following his example. We found this method only after investigation and study. Such investigation and study are very important. When we see the other fellow holding something in his hands, we should do some investigating. What does he hold in his hands? Swords. What are swords for? For killing. Whom does he want to kill with his swords? The people. Having made these findings, investigate further-the Chinese people, too, have hands and can take up swords, they can forge a sword if there is none handy. The Chinese people have discovered this truth after long investigation and study. Warlords, landlords, local bullies and bad gentry and the imperialists all have swords in their hands and are out to kill. The people have come to understand this and so act after the same fashion. Some of us often neglect such investigation and study. Chen Tu-hsiu,[11] for example, did not understand that with swords one can kill people. Some say, this is a plain everyday truth; how can a leader of the Communist Party fail to know it? But you never can tell. Chen Tu-hsiu made no investigation and study and so did not understand this, hence we called him an opportunist. He who makes no investigation and study has no right to speak, and accordingly we deprived Chen Tu-hsiu of that right. We have adopted a course different from Chen Tu-hsiu's and enabled the people suffering from oppression and slaughter to take up swords. If ever again anybody wants to kill us, we will act after his fashion. Not long ago, the Kuomintang sent six divisions to attack our Kuanchung sub-region, and three of them drove in and seized an area measuring 20 by 100 *li*. We acted after their fashion and wholly, thoroughly and completely wiped out the Kuomintang troops in this area of 20 by 100 *li*.[12] Our policy is to give tit for tat and fight for every inch of land; we will never let the Kuomintang easily seize our land and kill our people. Of course, to fight for every inch of land does not mean following the old "Left" line of "not abandoning a single inch of land in the base area".[13] This time we abandoned an area of 20 by 100 *li*. Abandoned late in July, it was retaken early in August. After the Southern Anhwei Incident of 1941,[14] the Kuomintang liaison staff officer once asked me what we intended to do. I answered, "You are here in Yenan all the time and you don't know? If Ho goes for us, we'll go for him. If Ho stops, we'll stop too."[15] At that time Chiang Kai-shek was not named, only Ho Ying-chin. Today we say, "If Chiang goes for us, we'll go for him. If Chiang stops, we'll stop too." We will act after his fashion. As Chiang Kai-shek is now sharpening his swords, we must sharpen ours too.

The rights the people have won must never be lightly given up but must be defended by fighting. We don't want civil war. However, if Chiang Kai-shek insists on forcing civil war on the Chinese people, the only thing we can do is to take up arms and fight him in self-defence to protect the lives and property, the rights and well-being of the people of the Liberated Areas. This will be a civil war he forces on us. If we do not win, we will blame neither heaven nor earth but only ourselves. However, let no one think that the people can be easily robbed or defrauded of the rights they have won; that is impossible. Last year an American correspondent asked me, "Who has given you the power to act?" I replied, "The people." Who else indeed, if not the people? The ruling Kuomintang hasn't given us any power. It doesn't recognize us. We take part in the People's Political Council in the capacity of a "cultural organization"[16] as stipulated by its rules. But we are not a "cultural organization", we say, we have an army and are a "military organization". On March 1 this year Chiang Kai-shek stated that the Communist Party would have to turn over its army before it could acquire legal status. Chiang Kai-shek's statement still stands. We have not turned over our army, and so we have no legal status and are "defying laws human and divine". Our duty is to hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act and every policy must conform to the people's interests, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected — that is what being responsible to the people means. Comrades! The people want liberation and therefore entrust power to those who can represent them and work faithfully for them, that is, to us Communists. As representatives of the people, we must represent them well and not act like Chen Tu-hsiu. Confronted by counter-revolutionary attacks against the people, Chen Tu-hsiu did not adopt the policy of giving tit for tat and fighting for every inch of land; as a result, in 1927, within the space of a few months, he forfeited all the rights the people had won. This time we must be on our guard. Our policy is absolutely different from Chen Tu-hsiu's; no trickery can fool us. We must be clear-headed and have a correct policy; we must not make mistakes.

To whom should the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance belong? It is very obvious. Take a peach tree for example. When the tree yields peaches they are the fruits of victory. Who is entitled to pick the peaches? Ask who planted and watered the tree. Chiang Kai-shek squatting on the mountain did not carry a single bucket of water, and yet he is now stretching out his arm from afar to pick the peaches. "I, Chiang Kai-shek, own these peaches," he says, "I am the landlord, you are my serfs and I won't allow you to pick any." We have refuted him in the press.[17] We say, "You never carried any water, so you have no right to pick the peaches. We the people of the Liberated Areas watered the tree day in day out and have the most right to gather the fruit." Comrades! The victory of the War of Resistance has been won by the people with bloodshed and sacrifice, it should be the victory of the people and it is to the people that the fruits of the War of Resistance should go.

As for Chiang Kai-shek, he was passive in resisting Japan but active in anti-communism. He was a stumbling-block in the people's War of Resistance. Now this stumbling-block is coming forward to monopolize the fruits of victory, wants China after victory to relapse into her old pre-war state and does not tolerate the slightest change. This gives rise to struggle. Comrades! It is a most serious struggle.

That the fruits of victory of the War of Resistance should go to the people is one thing, but who will eventually get them and whether it will be the people is another. Don't be too sure that all the fruits of victory will fall into the hands of the people. Chiang Kai-shek will grab a lot of big peaches, such as Shanghai, Nanking, Hangchow and other big cities. He has ganged up with U.S. imperialism and in those places they have the upper hand, while so far the revolutionary people can by and large occupy only the rural areas. Another bunch of peaches will be contested by both sides. These are the medium and small towns situated along the section of the Tatung-Puchow Railway north of Taiyuan, the middle section of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, the section of the Peiping-Hankow Railway north of Chengchow, the Chengting-Taiyuan Railway, the Paikuei-Chincheng Railway,[18] the Tehchow-Shihchiachuang Railway, the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway and the section of the Lunghai Railway east of Chengchow. These medium and small towns must be contested; they are the medium and small peaches watered by the people of the Liberated Areas with their sweat and blood. It is difficult to say now whether these places will fall into the people's hands. Only two words can be said now: struggle hard. Are there places which are sure to fall into the hands of the people? Yes, there are. They are the vast rural areas and the numerous towns in the provinces of Hopei, Chahar and Jehol,[19] most of Shansi, Shantung and the northern part of Kiangsu, with villages linked together and with about a hundred towns in one area, seventy to eighty in another, forty to fifty in a third — altogether three, four, five or six such areas, big and small. What sort of towns? Medium and small towns. We are sure of them, we have the strength to pick these fruits of victory. In the history of the Chinese revolution this will be the first time that we have got such a bunch of fruit. Historically, it was only after we smashed the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign[20] in the latter half of 1931 that we had altogether as many as twenty-one county towns[21] in the Central Base Area in Kiangsi

Province, but there was not a single medium-sized town among them. With twenty-one small towns linked together, the total population at its height reached 2,500,000. Relying on this base, the Chinese people were able to continue the struggle for such a long time, win such big victories and smash such big "encirclement and suppression" campaigns. Later we were defeated, for which we should blame, not Chiang Kai-shek, but ourselves for not fighting well enough. This time, if scores of big and small towns are linked in a single contiguous area and if there are three, four, five or six such areas, then the Chinese people will have three, four, five or six revolutionary bases, each larger than the Central Base Area in Kiangsi Province, and the situation for the Chinese revolution will be very promising indeed.

If one looks at the situation as a whole, the stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan is over and the new situation and task is domestic struggle. Chiang Kai-shek talks about "building the country". From now on the struggle will be, build what sort of country? To build a new-democratic country of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat? Or to build a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under the dictatorship of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie? This will be a most complicated struggle. At present it takes the form of a struggle between Chiang Kai-shek who is trying to usurp the fruits of victory of the War of Resistance and ourselves who oppose his usurpation. If there is any opportunism during this period, it will lie in failing to struggle hard and in making a voluntary gift to Chiang Kai-shek of the fruits which should go to the people.

Will an open and total civil war break out? That depends on internal and international factors. The internal factors consist chiefly of our strength and the degree of our political consciousness. Given the general trend of the international and internal situation and the feelings of the people, is it possible, through our own struggles, to localize the civil war or delay the outbreak of a country-wide civil war? There is this possibility.

Chiang Kai-shek will face many difficulties if he tries to let loose a civil war. First, in the Liberated Areas there are a hundred million people, a million troops and over two million people's militia. Second, the politically conscious people in the Kuomintang areas are against civil war, and this is some kind of check on Chiang Kai-shek. Third, inside the Kuomintang also there is a section which is not in favour of civil war. The situation today is vastly different from that in 1927. In particular, the condition of our Party today is vastly different from what it was in 1927. In those days our Party was still in its infancy and did not have a clear head or experience in armed struggle or the policy of giving tit for tat. Today the level of political consciousness in our Party is very much higher.

Apart from our own political consciousness, the political consciousness of the vanguard of the proletariat, there is the question of the political consciousness of the masses of the people. When the people are not yet politically conscious, it is entirely possible that their revolutionary gains may be handed over to others. This happened in the past. Today the level of political consciousness of the Chinese people is likewise very much higher. The prestige of our Party among the people has never been so great. Nevertheless, among the people, and chiefly among those living in the Japanese-occupied and Kuomintang areas, there are still a good many who believe in Chiang Kai-shek and have illusions about the Kuomintang and the United States of America, illusions which Chiang Kai-shek is working hard to spread. The fact that a section of the Chinese people is not yet politically conscious shows that much remains to be done in our propaganda and organizational work. The political awakening of the people is not easy. It requires much earnest effort on our part to rid their minds of wrong ideas. We should sweep backward ideas from the minds of the Chinese people, just as we sweep our rooms. Dust never vanishes of itself without sweeping. We must carry on extensive propaganda and education among the masses, so they will understand the real situation and trend in China and have confidence in their own strength.

It is up to us to organize the people. As for the reactionaries in China, it is up to us to organize the people to overthrow them. Everything reactionary is the same; if you don't hit it, it won't fall. It is like sweeping the floor; where the broom does not reach, the dust never vanishes of itself. There is a river called the Chiehtse, south of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. South of the river is Lochuan County and north of it, Fuhsien County. North and south of the river are two different worlds. The south is under the Kuomintang; since we have not reached there, the people are unorganized, and there is much filth and rottenness. Some of our comrades put their faith only in political influence, fancying that problems can be solved merely by influence. That is blind faith. In

1936, we were in Pao-an.[22] Forty to fifty *li* away, there was a fortified village held by a landlord despot. The Central Committee of the Party was then in Pao-an and our political influence could be considered very great indeed, but the counter-revolutionaries in this village obstinately refused to surrender. We swept to the south, we swept to the north, all in vain. Not until our broom swept right into the village did the landlord cry out, "Ow, I give up!"[23] That is how things are in this world. Bells don't ring till you strike them. Tables don't move till you shift them. Japan would not surrender until after the Red Army of the Soviet Union entered northeastern China. The enemy and puppet troops never handed over their arms until our troops fought them. Only where the broom reaches can political influence produce its full effect. Our broom is the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Broom in hand, you must learn to sweep; don't lie in bed, fancying that a gust of wind will somehow rise and blow all the dust away. We Marxists are revolutionary realists and never indulge in idle dreams. There is an old saying in China, "Rise at dawn and sweep the courtyard."[24] Dawn is the breaking of a new day. Our forefathers told us to rise and start sweeping at the very break of day. They were setting us a task. Only by thinking and acting in this way will we benefit and find work to do. China has a vast territory, and it is up to us to sweep it clean inch by inch.

On what basis should our policy rest? It should rest on our own strength, and that means regeneration through one's own efforts. We are not alone; all the countries and people in the world opposed to imperialism are our friends. Nevertheless, we stress regeneration through our own efforts. Relying on the forces we ourselves organize, we can defeat all Chinese and foreign reactionaries. Chiang Kai-shek, on the contrary, relies entirely on the aid of U.S. imperialism, which he looks upon as his mainstay. The trinity of dictatorship, civil war and selling out the country has always been the basis of his policy. U.S. imperialism wants to help Chiang Kai-shek wage civil war and turn China into a U.S. dependency, and this policy, too, was set long ago. But U.S. imperialism while outwardly strong is inwardly weak. We must be clear-headed, that is, we must not believe the "nice words" of the imperialists nor be intimidated by their bluster. An American once said to me, "You should listen to Hurley and send a few men to be officials in the Kuomintang government."[25] I replied: "It is no easy job to be an official bound hand and foot; we won't do it. If we become officials, our hands and feet must be unfettered, we must be free to act, that is, a coalition government must be set up on a democratic basis." He said, "It will be bad if you don't." I asked him, "Why bad?" He said, "First, the Americans will curse you; secondly, the Americans will back Chiang Kai-shek." I replied: "If you Americans, sated with bread and sleep, want to curse people and back Chiang Kai-shek, that's your business and I won't interfere. What we have now is millet plus rifles, what you have is bread plus cannon. If you like to back Chiang Kai-shek, back him, back him as long as you want. But remember one thing. To whom does China belong? China definitely does not belong to Chiang Kai-shek, China belongs to the Chinese people. The day will surely come when you will find it impossible to back him any longer." Comrades! This American was trying to scare people. Imperialists are masters at this sort of stuff, and many people in the colonial countries do get scared. The imperialists think that all people in the colonial countries can be scared, but they do not realize that in China there are people who are not afraid of that sort of stuff. In the past we have openly criticized and exposed the U.S. policy of aiding Chiang Kai-shek to fight the Communists; it was necessary, and we shall continue to do so.

The Soviet Union has sent its troops, the Red Army has come to help the Chinese people drive out the aggressor; such an event has never happened before in Chinese history. Its influence is immeasurable. The propaganda organs of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek hoped to sweep away the Red Army's political influence with two atom bombs.[26] But it can't be swept away; that isn't so easy. Can atom bombs decide wars? No, they can't. Atom bombs could not make Japan surrender. Without the struggles waged by the people, atom bombs by themselves would be of no avail. If atom bombs could decide the war, then why was it necessary to ask the Soviet Union to send its troops? Why didn't Japan surrender when the two atom bombs were dropped on her and why did she surrender as soon as the Soviet Union sent troops? Some of our comrades, too, believe that the atom bomb is all-powerful; that is a big mistake. These comrades show even less judgement than a British peer. There is a certain British peer called Lord Mountbatten. He said the worst possible mistake is to think that the atom bomb can decide the war.[27] These comrades are more backward than Mountbatten. What influence has made these comrades look upon the atom bomb as something miraculous? Bourgeois influence. Where does it come from? From their education in bourgeois schools, from the bourgeois press and news agencies. There are two world outlooks and two methodologies, the proletarian world outlook and methodology and the bourgeois world outlook and methodology. These comrades often cling to the bourgeois world outlook and methodology and often forget the proletarian world outlook and methodology. The theory that "weapons decide everything", the purely military viewpoint, a bureaucratic style of work divorced from the masses, individualist thinking, and the like — all these are bourgeois influences in our ranks. We must constantly sweep these bourgeois things out of our ranks just as we sweep out dust.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the war has decided Japan's surrender and the situation in China is entering a new period. Between the War of Resistance and the new period there is a transitional stage. The struggle during this transitional stage is to oppose Chiang Kai-shek's usurpation of the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance. Chiang Kai-shek wants to launch a country-wide civil war and his policy is set; we must be prepared for this. No matter when this country-wide civil war breaks out, we must be well prepared. If it comes early, say, tomorrow morning, we should also be prepared. That is point one. In the present international and domestic situation it is possible that for a time the civil war may be kept restricted in scale and localized. That is point two. Point one is what we should prepare for, point two is what has existed for a long time. In short, we must be prepared. Being prepared, we shall be able to deal properly with all kinds of complicated situations.

NOTES

[1] On August 8, 1945, the Soviet government declared war on Japan. On August 10 the Mongolian government declared war on Japan. The Soviet Red Army moved by land and sea into China's Northeast and into Korea and swiftly routed the Japanese Kwantung Army. The joint Soviet-Mongolian armies crossed the Inner Mongolian desert and entered Jehol and Chahar Provinces. On August 10 the Japanese government was compelled to send a note begging to surrender and on the 14th it formally announced its unconditional surrender. The Kwantung Army was the cream of the main force of the Japanese army and constituted Japan's general strategic reserve. The Japanese imperialists had dreamed of relying on this force to carry on a long-drawn-out war from their favourable strategic position in China's Northeast and in

Korea. This scheme was completely wrecked by the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, and the Japanese government had to admit defeat and surrender.

[2] For details, see "A Comment on the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee and the Second Session of the Third People's Political Council", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. III.

[3] "Mountain" here refers to Mount Omei in Szechuan Province and more generally to the mountainous areas in southwestern and northwestern China. After Wuhan was occupied by the Japanese army in 1938, Chiang Kai-shek and the main force under his command took refuge in these mountainous areas and sat there watching the bitter struggle against the Japanese aggressors which was being waged behind the enemy lines by the army and people of the Liberated Areas.

[4] Prior to the War of Resistance Against Japan, most of the revolutionary base areas led by the Communist Party of China were in mountainous regions. At that time Chiang Kai-shek's rule was centred in the large cities along the big rivers and the coast. Accordingly, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said "we were on the mountain and he was by the water".

[5] During the War of Resistance the front lines were in northern, eastern, central and southern China. People usually referred to the Kuomintang areas in southwestern and northwestern China which were not occupied by the Japanese invaders as the Great Rear Area.

[6] The Northern Expedition was the punitive war against the Northern warlords launched by the revolutionary army which marched north from Kwangtung Province in May-July 1926. The Northern Expeditionary Army, with the Communist Party of China taking part in its leadership and under the Party's influence (the political work in the army was at that time mostly under the charge of Communist Party members), gained the warm support of the broad masses of workers and peasants. In the second half of 1926 and the first half of 1927 it occupied most of the provinces along the Yangtse and Yellow Rivers and defeated the Northern warlords. In April 1927 this revolutionary war failed as a result of betrayal by the reactionary clique under Chiang Kai-shek within the revolutionary army.

[7] In 1924, with the help of the Communist Party of China, Sun Yat-sen reorganized the Kuomintang and effected co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The Revolutionary War of 1924-27 was launched on the basis of this co-operation. This first co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was wrecked as a result of betrayals by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei in 1927.

[8] This refers to Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution in 1927. After betraying the revolution, Chiang Kai-shek massacred great numbers of Communists, workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals and unleashed a counter-revolutionary war against the revolutionary masses.

[9] This Congress was held in Yenan in April 1945 It was there that Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered the political report "On Coalition Government" (see *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. III).

[10] The first revolution was the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolutionary struggle waged from 1924 to 1927 by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China; the Northern Expedition was the main content of this revolution. The second revolution was the revolutionary struggle from 1927 to 1937 to create and develop Red political power. The third revolution was the War of Resistance Against Japan from 1937 to 1945.

[11] Chen Tu-hsiu was originally a professor at Peking University and became famous as an editor of *New Youth*. He was one of the founders of the Communist

Party of China. Owing to his reputation at the time of the May 4th Movement and owing to the Party's immaturity in its initial period, he became General Secretary of the Party. In the last period of the revolution of 1924-27, the Rightist thinking in the Party represented by Chen Tu-hsiu developed into a line of capitulationism. In "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Comrade Mao Tse-tung said that the capitulationists at that time "voluntarily gave up the Party's leadership of the peasant masses, urban petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie, and in particular gave up the Party's leadership of the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of the revolution" (p. 171 of this volume). After the defeat in 1927 Chen Tu-hsiu and a handful of other capitulationists lost faith in the future of the revolution and became liquidationists. They took the reactionary Trotskyist stand and together with the Trotskyites formed a small anti-Party group. Consequently Chen Tu-hsiu was expelled from the Party in November 1929. He died in 1942. With reference to Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism, see the introductory notes to "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" and to "Report on the Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. I, and "Introducing *The Communist*", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II.

[12] On July 21, 1945, the Provisional 59th Division and 2nd Cavalry Division under Hu Tsung-nan, Commander of the Kuomintang's 1st War Zone, suddenly attacked Yehtai Mountain in Chunhua County in the Kuanchung sub-region of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. On July 23 Hu Tsung-nan sent his 3rd Reserve Division to join in the attack. On July 27 our forces withdrew on their own initiative from Yehtai Mountain and forty-one villages west of it. The Kuomintang forces continued their attacks on Hsunyi, Yaohsien and other points. On August 8 our forces struck back at the invading Kuomintang troops and recovered the Yehtai mountain area.

[13] This slogan was raised by the "Left" opportunists during the period from October 1933 to October 1934 when the Red Army of the Central Base Area was repulsing the Kuomintang's fifth encirclement campaign. The slogan was diametrically opposed to the strategy formulated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, which was to lure the enemy deep into our territory, concentrate a superior force and select the enemy's weak points in order to wipe him out in mobile warfare.

[14] In January 1941, as demanded by Chiang Kai-shek, the Headquarters of the New Fourth Army led by the Communist Party of China and the units under the direct command of this headquarters moved north from southern Anhwei Province to cross the Yangtse River. While on the march they were encircled and ambushed by Chiang Kai-shek's troops and lost more than 9,000, killed, wounded and captured. Subsequently Chiang Kai-shek announced the cancellation of the designation of the New Fourth Army and ordered attacks against its other units. The event was called the Southern Anhwei Incident.

[15] During the War of Resistance the Kuomintang kept a staff officer in Yenan for liaison. "Ho" refers to Ho Ying-chin, Chief of the Kuomintang General Staff. On October 19 and December 8, 1940, Chiang Kai-shek sent two telegrams in the names of Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi, Deputy Chief of the Kuomintang General Staff, outrageously slandering the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which were fighting stubbornly behind the Japanese lines, and arbitrarily ordering the people's anti-Japanese armed forces operating south of the Yellow River to withdraw north of the river within a definite time-limit. The Kuomintang reactionaries then launched a sudden attack on units of the New Fourth Army which were moving north and thus created the Southern Anhwei Incident. At that time the Communist Party of China pointed to Ho Ying-chin as the representative of the Kuomintang reactionaries who

had launched the large-scale anti-Communist campaign, but actually Chiang Kai-shek was meant.

[16] The "People's Political Council" was an advisory body set up by the Kuomintang government after the start of the War of Resistance. Its members were all "selected" by the Kuomintang government; the majority belonged to the Kuomintang, and only a very few belonged to the Communist Party of China and other political parties. Moreover, the Kuomintang government did not recognize the equal and legal status of the parties which were opposed to Japanese aggression, nor did it allow their members to sit in the "People's Political Council" as representatives of their parties. One of the stipulations of the "Organic Rules of the People's Political Council" promulgated by the Kuomintang government was that those persons might become members of the Council "who have served in important cultural or economic organizations for three years or more and enjoy prestige, or those who devote themselves to affairs of state and have long enjoyed prestige". It was on the basis of this stipulation that the Kuomintang "selected" some councillors from the Communist Party of China.

[17] This refers to the commentary, "Chiang Kai-shek Is Provoking Civil War" written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Hsinhua News Agency, pp. 27-31 of this volume.

[18] An unfinished railway line in southeastern Shansi Province, between Paikuei in Chihsien County and Chincheng.

[19] The province of Chahar was abolished in 1952. The province of Jehol was abolished in 1955. The territories originally under their jurisdiction were transferred to Hopei, Shansi and Liaoning Provinces and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

[20] From July to September 1931 Chiang Kai-shek personally held the post of commander-in-chief and moved 300,000 reactionary troops in an encirclement campaign against the Kiangsi Red Base Area. The Red Army smashed this encirclement campaign and won a great victory. For details, see "Strategic Problems of the Chinese Revolutionary War", Chapter 5, Section 5, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. I.

[21] The twenty-one county towns here referred to were Juichin, Huichang, Hsunwu, Anyuan, Hsinfeng, Yutu, Hsingkuo, Ningtu, Kuangchang, Shihcheng and Lichuan in Kiangsi Province, and Chienning, Taining, Ninghua, Chingliu, Kueihua, Lungyen, Changting, Liencheng, Shanghang and Yungting in Fukien Province.

[22] Pao-an was a county in the northwestern part of Shensi Province. It is now called Chihtan County. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had its headquarters there from early July 1936 to January 1937. Later it moved to Yenan.

[23] The fortified village referred to was Tanpachai in the southwest of Pao-an County. There were over two hundred households in the village, which occupied a highly strategic position. Tsao Chun-chang, a landlord despot who headed a reactionary local armed band of over a hundred men, had long entrenched himself in this village. The Chinese Red Army repeatedly besieged the village but failed to capture it. In August 1936 the Red Army, while surrounding Tanpachai with the local armed forces, proceeded to win over the basic masses in the village and disintegrate the enemy from within. In December of the same year the bandit Tsao fled with a handful of his men, and Tanpachai was liberated.

[24] From *Maxims for the Good Household*, written by Chu Po-lu in the 17th century.

[25] The American referred to was Colonel David D. Barrett, head of the U.S. Army Observer Group in Yenan. With the consent of the Communist Party of China, this group was sent to Yenan in 1944 by the U.S. forces fighting against Japan. Patrick J. Hurley, a reactionary politician of the Republican Party, came to China in September 1944 as the personal representative of the U.S. president and at the end of the year became U.S. ambassador to China. See "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains", Note 1, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. III.

[26] The United States dropped an atom bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and another on Nagasaki on August 9. The propaganda organs of the United States and of the Kuomintang made much of the event, alleging that the Japanese government had surrendered because it was afraid of the U.S. atom bombs. By such propaganda they hoped to belittle the decisive role played by the entry of the Soviet Union into the war in compelling Japan to surrender.

[27] Mountbatten, then Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Southeast Asia, made a statement on August 9, 1945, welcoming the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. He also said that the worst possible mistake would be to believe that the atom bomb could end the war in the Far East.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK IS PROVOKING CIVIL WAR*

August 13, 1945

A spokesman for the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee has made a statement describing as "a presumptuous and illegal act" the order[1] setting a time-limit for the surrender of the enemy and the puppets,[2] which was issued by Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighteenth Group Army, on August 10 from the General Headquarters in Yenan. This comment is absolutely preposterous. Its logical implication is that it was wrong of Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh to act in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration[3] and with the enemy's declared intention of surrendering and to order his troops to effect the surrender of the enemy and the puppets, and that on the contrary it would have been right and legitimate to advise the enemy and puppets to refuse to surrender. No wonder that even before the enemy's actual surrender, Chiang Kai-shek, China's fascist ringleader, autocrat and traitor to the people, had the audacity to "order" the anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas to "stay where they are, pending further orders", that is, to tie their own hands and let the enemy attack them. No wonder this selfsame fascist ringleader dared to "order" the so-called underground forces (who are, in fact, puppet troops "saving the nation by a devious path"[4] and Tai Li's[5] secret police collaborating with the Japanese and puppets) as well as other puppet troops to "be responsible for maintaining local order", while forbidding the anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas to "take presumptuous action on their own" against enemy and puppet forces. This transposition of the enemy and the Chinese is in truth a confession by Chiang Kai-shek; it gives a vivid picture of his whole psychology, which is one of consistent collusion with the enemy and puppets and of liquidation of all those not of his ilk. However, the people's anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas will never be taken in by this venomous scheme. They know that Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh's order is precisely the resolute fulfilment of the provision in paragraph 2 of the Potsdam Declaration, "prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist". On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek's so-called "orders" are precisely violations of the Potsdam Declaration which he himself signed. One has only to make the comparison to see at once who is not "adhering faithfully to the provisions of the common agreements of the Allies".

Both the comment by the spokesman for the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Chiang Kai-shek's "orders" are from beginning to end provocations to civil war; at this moment, when attention at home and abroad is focussed on Japan's unconditional surrender, their aim is to find a pretext for switching to civil war as soon as the War of Resistance ends. In reality, the Kuomintang reactionaries are pitifully stupid. They have sought their pretext in Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh's order for the surrender and disarming of the enemy and puppet troops. Can this be considered a clever pretext? No. That they seek a pretext in this way proves only that the Kuomintang reactionaries are fonder of the enemy and puppets than of their fellow-countrymen and that they hate their fellow-countrymen more than they do the enemy and puppets. The Chunhua Incident[6] was plainly an invasion of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region by Hu Tsung-nan's troops to provoke civil war, and yet the Kuomintang reactionaries said it was a "rumour offensive" by the Communist Party of China. The Kuomintang reactionaries found their long-sought-for pretext in the Chunhua Incident, but Chinese and foreign public opinion saw through it at once. So now they are saying that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should not demand that the enemy and puppet troops surrender their guns. In the eight years of the War of Resistance, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army have suffered enough from the attacks and encirclements of both Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese. And now, with the War of Resistance coming to an end, Chiang Kai-shek is hinting to the Japanese (and to his beloved puppet troops) that they should not surrender their guns to the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army but "only to me, Chiang Kai-shek". One thing, however, Chiang Kai-shek has left unsaid, ". . . so that I can use these guns to kill the Communists and wreck the peace of China

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* This was a commentary written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Hsinhua News Agency.

and the world." Isn't this the truth? What will be the result of telling the Japanese to hand over their guns to Chiang Kai-shek and telling the puppet troops to "be responsible for maintaining local order"? The result can only be that a merger of the Nanking and Chungking regimes[7] and co-operation between Chiang Kai-shek and the puppets will take the place of "Sino-Japanese collaboration" and of co-operation between the Japanese and the puppets, and that Chiang Kai-shek's "anti-communism and national reconstruction" will take the place of the "anti-communism and national reconstruction" of the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei.[8] Isn't this a violation of the Potsdam Declaration? Can there be any doubt that the grave danger of civil war will confront the people of the whole country the moment the War of Resistance is over? We now appeal to all our fellow-countrymen and to the Allied countries to take action, together with the people of the Liberated Areas, resolutely to prevent a civil war in China, which would endanger world peace.

After all, who has the right to accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppets? Relying solely on their own efforts and the support of the people, the anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas, to whom the Kuomintang government refused all supplies and recognition, have succeeded by themselves in liberating vast territories and more than 100 million people and have resisted and pinned down 56 per cent of the invading enemy troops in China and 95 per cent of the puppet troops. If not for these armed forces, the situation in China would never have been what it is today! To speak plainly, in China only the anti-Japanese armed forces of the Liberated Areas have the right to accept the surrender of the enemy and puppet troops. As for Chiang Kai-shek, his policy has been to look on with folded arms and sit around and wait for victory; indeed he has no right at all to accept the surrender of the enemy and the puppets.

We declare to all our fellow-countrymen and to the people of the whole world: The Supreme Command in Chungking cannot represent the Chinese people and those Chinese armed forces which have really fought Japan; the Chinese people demand the right of the anti-Japanese armed forces of China's Liberated Areas under Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh to send their representatives directly in order to participate in the acceptance of Japan's surrender and in the military control over Japan by the four Allied Powers and also to participate in the future peace conference. If this is not done, the Chinese people will deem it most improper.

NOTES

[1] On August 10, 1945, Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh issued an order from the General Headquarters in Yenan to all armed forces in the Liberated Areas concerning the surrender of the Japanese invaders. The order reads as follows:

> Japan has announced her unconditional surrender, and the Allies will meet to discuss measures for accepting the surrender on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. I hereby issue the following order to all our armed forces in the Liberated Areas:
>
> (1) In accordance with the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, any anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas may serve notice on enemy troops and headquarters in cities and towns or along communication lines in the vicinity, requiring them to hand over all their arms to our fighting forces within a given time; when they have handed over their arms, our forces will protect their lives in accordance with our regulations on the lenient treatment of prisoners of war.
>
> (2) Any anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas may serve notice on all the puppet troops and puppet government organs in the vicinity, requiring them to come over with their troops to our side before the signing of the surrender by the Japanese invaders and to wait for reorganization and disbandment; those who fail to comply within the time allowed shall hand over all their arms.
>
> (3) All anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas should resolutely wipe out all those enemy and puppet armed forces which refuse to surrender and hand over their arms.
>
> (4) Our armed forces have full authority to send their units to take over and occupy any city, town or communication line held by the enemy and the puppets, to set up military control, to maintain order and to appoint commissioners to take charge of all administrative matters there; in case of any act of sabotage or resistance, the culprits shall be punished as traitors.

Then, on August 11 the General Headquarters in Yenan issued six successive orders, under which the armed forces of the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area (led by Comrade Ho Lung), the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area (led by Comrade Nieh Jung-chen) and the Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning Liberated Area were to march on Inner Mongolia and the Northeast; the armed forces of the Shansi Liberated Area were to mop up the Japanese and puppet troops along the Tatung-Puchow Railway and in the Fenho River valley; and the armed forces of all the Liberated Areas were to launch vigorous offensives on all the main communication lines under enemy control to compel the Japanese and puppet troops to surrender. The units of the People's Liberation Army in all the Liberated Areas resolutely carried out these orders and won important victories.

[2] Here "enemy" refers to the Japanese invading forces, and "puppets" refers to the puppet governments set up by the Japanese invaders and to the troops of these puppet governments, consisting largely of former Kuomintang officials and of troops who had surrendered to Japan.

[3] This refers to the declaration made by China, Britain and the United States at the Potsdam conference on July 26, 1945, requiring Japan to surrender. The main points of the declaration were that Japanese militarism must be eliminated for good and all; Japan's military forces must be completely disarmed; Japan's war industries must be dismantled; Japanese war criminals must be tried; the Cairo Declaration must be carried out, that is, Japan must renounce the territories she had stolen, such

as Korea and China's Manchuria, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, and Japan's territory must be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and various minor islands; and that the armed forces of the Allies were to occupy Japan until the establishment of a democratic Japanese government. The Soviet Union also signed the Potsdam Declaration after it declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945.

[4] This refers to the dastardly practice of capitulating to Japan and fighting communism followed by the Kuomintang reactionaries during the War of Resistance Against Japan. The Kuomintang reactionaries directed part of their troops and government officials to surrender to the Japanese invaders and then, as puppet troops and officials, to join the Japanese troops in attacking the Liberated Areas, this was what they cunningly named "saving the nation by a devious path".

[5] Tai Li was the Director of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Military Council of the Kuomintang, one of the Kuomintang's huge secret service agencies.

[6] The invasion by Kuomintang troops of Chunhua, Hsunyi and Yaohsien in the Kuanchung sub-region of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region in July 1945. See "The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan", Note 12, p. 24 of this volume.

[7] Wang Ching-wei's puppet regime was in Nanking and Chiang Kai-shek's regime was in Chungking. The "merger of the Nanking and Chungking regimes" was a political plot hatched by Japanese imperialism and the pro-Japanese elements within the Kuomintang.

[8] Wang Ching-wei was a notorious Kuomintang leader and pro-Japanese traitor. He openly surrendered to the Japanese invaders in December 1938 when he was vice-chairman of the Kuomintang and chairman of its People's Political Council. In March 1940 he became president of the puppet central government then formed in Nanking. He died in Japan in November 1944.

TWO TELEGRAMS FROM THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE EIGHTEENTH GROUP ARMY TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK*

August 1945

I. TELEGRAM OF AUGUST 13

We have received through the Chungking radio two Central News Agency dispatches, one carrying the order you sent us and the other your order to the officers and men in various war zones. Your order to us reads, "All units of the Eighteenth Group Army should stay where they are, pending further orders." In addition, it talks about such things as forbidding us to take over the enemy's arms. Your order to the officers and men in various war zones was reported as follows in the Central News Agency dispatch from Chungking, dated August 11: "The Supreme Command today sent telegrams to the officers and men in various war zones, ordering them to step up the war effort and in accordance with existing military plans and orders actively to push forward without the slightest relaxation." We hold that these two orders contradict each other. According to the first, our units should "stay where they are, pending further orders" and should no longer attack or fight. Why do you tell us not to fight at this moment when the Japanese aggressors have not yet actually surrendered, when every hour and every minute they are killing Chinese people and fighting Chinese troops as well as Soviet, U.S. and British troops, and when, in their turn, the Soviet, U.S. and British troops are fighting the Japanese aggressors every hour and every minute? As to the second order, we consider it very good. "Step up the war effort and actively push forward without the slightest relaxation" — that's more like it! But what a pity you have given this order only to your own troops, and not to us, and that you have given us something quite different. Chu Teh issued an order on August 10 to all anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas[1] precisely to the effect that they should "step up the war effort". His order said further that while stepping up their war effort they must order the Japanese aggressors to surrender to them and must take over the arms and other equipment of the enemy and puppet troops. Isn't this very good? Undoubtedly it is very good; undoubtedly it is in the interest of the Chinese nation. But to "stay where they are, pending further orders" is definitely not in the national interest. We hold that you have given a wrong order, an order so wrong that we have to inform you we firmly reject it. For your order to us is not only unjust but also runs counter to China's national interest and benefits only the Japanese aggressors and the traitors to the motherland.

II. TELEGRAM OF AUGUST 16

At a time when our common enemy, the Japanese government, has accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and already announced its surrender but has not yet actually surrendered, I hereby address to you the following statement and demands on behalf of all the anti-Japanese armed forces and all the 260 million people in China's Liberated Areas and Japanese-occupied areas.

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* These telegrams were written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighteenth Group Army. At that time, when the Japanese aggressors had announced their surrender but had not yet actually surrendered, the Chiang Kai-shek government, with the armed assistance of U.S. imperialism, monopolized the right to accept the Japanese surrender and was actively preparing a counter-revolutionary civil war by sending large forces to advance on the Liberated Areas on the pretext of accepting the Japanese surrender. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's purpose in writing the first telegram was to unmask the counter-revolutionary face of Chiang Kai-shek and teach the whole people to be on guard against his civil war plot. The second telegram further exposed the plot of the Chiang Kai-shek clique for preparing civil war and put forward the six-point proposal of the Communist Party of China for preventing civil war. For the same purpose, Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote for the Hsinhua News Agency two commentaries, "Chiang Kai-shek Is Provoking Civil War" and "On a Statement by Chiang Kai-shek's Spokesman", which are included in this volume. Owing to the firm, determined stand of the Communist Party of China in refusing to be cowed by Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary bluster, both the Liberated Areas and the Liberation Army expanded quickly; and, under strong political pressure from the forces at home and abroad opposed to civil war in China, Chiang Kai-shek had to change his tactics, assume a posture of peace and invite Comrade Mao Tse-tung to Chungking for peace negotiations.

With the War of Resistance Against Japan coming to a victorious close, I call your attention to this fact in the China war theatre today, namely, that in the vast occupied areas abandoned by you and seized by the enemy and puppets we have, against your will, by our eight years of bitter fighting recaptured nearly 1,000,000 square kilometres of territory; liberated over 100,000,000 people; organized over 1,000,000 regular troops and over 2,200,000 people's militia; established nineteen large Liberated Areas in the nineteen provinces of Liaoning, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Hopei, Shansi, Shensi, Kansu, Ningsia, Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Fukien and Kwangtung;[2] and encircled most of the cities and towns, vital communication lines and sections of the sea coast seized by the enemy and puppets since the July 7th Incident of 1937,[3] except in a few areas. In addition, in China's Japanese-occupied areas (with a population of 160 million) we have organized extensive underground forces to strike at the enemy and puppets. In the fighting we are continuing to resist and encircle 69 per cent of the Japanese troops invading China (not counting those in the Northeast) and 95 per cent of the puppet troops. Your government and armed forces, on the contrary, have all along followed a policy of looking on with folded arms, sitting around and waiting for victory, conserving your forces and preparing for civil war, and have not only refused recognition and supplies to our Liberated Areas and armies but encircled and attacked us with a huge force of 940,000 men. Although all the troops and civilians in China's Liberated Areas have suffered enough from being attacked by the enemy and puppet forces on the one side and by your troops on the other, we have never in the least weakened in our determination to persevere in the War of Resistance, in unity and in democracy. The people of China's Liberated Areas and the Communist Party of China have proposed many times to you and your government that a conference of all parties be convened and that a democratic coalition government of the whole country be formed in order to stop internal strife, mobilize and unite the people's anti-Japanese forces throughout China, lead the War of Resistance to victory and ensure peace after the war. But our proposals have invariably been rejected by you and your government. We are extremely dissatisfied with all this.

The enemy country will soon sign its surrender, but you and your government have continued to ignore our opinions, issued a most outrageous order to me on August 11 and ordered your troops to press against the Liberated Areas on a large scale under the pretext of disarming the enemy; the danger of civil war is therefore more serious than ever. All of which compels us to make the following demands on you and your government:

1. I demand that you consult with us, so that we may reach common views before you, your government and your Supreme Command accept the surrender of the Japanese and the puppets and conclude any post-surrender agreements or treaties. For you and your government have aroused the dissatisfaction of the people and cannot represent the broad masses or any of the people's anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas and Japanese-occupied areas. We reserve our right to speak out, if the agreements or treaties include, without our prior consent, anything that concerns the people's anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas and Japanese-occupied areas.

2. All the people's anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas and Japanese-occupied areas have the right, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and the measures laid down by the Allies for accepting the enemy surrender,[4] to accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppet troops encircled by us, take over their arms and materiel and assume the responsibility for carrying out all stipulations laid down by the Allies after Japan's surrender has been accepted. On August 10 I ordered the armed forces of China's Liberated Areas to make all efforts to attack the enemy troops and be prepared to accept their surrender. On August 15, I ordered the enemy commander-in-chief, Yasuji Okamura, to surrender with his troops;[5] this order, however, applies only to the sphere of operations of the armed forces of the Liberated Areas, and not to any other. I consider my orders very reasonable and very much in the common interest of China and the Allies.

3. The broad masses and all the anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas and Japanese-occupied areas have the right to send their representatives to participate in the Allies' acceptance of the enemy surrender and in the work of dealing with the enemy country after its surrender.

4. China's Liberated Areas and all the anti-Japanese armed forces have the right to select their own delegation to participate in the future peace conference concerned with Japan and any United Nations meetings.

5. I ask you to prevent civil war. The way to do this is for the armed forces of the Liberated Areas to accept the surrender of the

enemy and puppet troops they have encircled, while your armed forces accept the surrender of the enemy and puppet troops you have encircled. Not only is this the established practice in all wars, it is particularly imperative in order to avert civil war. If you act otherwise, it will lead to adverse consequences. I am now giving you a serious warning on this matter and I ask you not to treat this warning casually.

6. I ask you immediately to abolish the one-party dictatorship, call a conference of all parties to set up a democratic coalition government, dismiss corrupt officials and all reactionaries from their posts, punish the traitors, abolish the secret services, recognize the legal status of the various parties (the Communist Party of China and all democratic parties have up to now been regarded as illegal by you and your government), annul all reactionary laws and decrees that suppress the liberties of the people, recognize the popularly elected governments and the anti-Japanese armed forces of China's Liberated Areas, withdraw the troops encircling the Liberated Areas, release political prisoners and carry out economic and other democratic reforms.

Apart from this, I sent you a telegram on August 13 in reply to your order to me of August 11, and presumably you have received it. I now declare again, your order was completely wrong. On August 11 you ordered my troops to "stay where they are, pending further orders" and not to attack the enemy any more. However, not only was it true on August 11, but it is equally true even today (August 16) that the Japanese government has surrendered only in words, and not in deeds; no instrument of surrender has been signed, no actual surrender has taken place. My view is completely in accord with that of the Allies, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. On August 11, the very day you issued your order to me, the British Army Command on the Burma front announced that the war with Japan was still in progress. Nimitz,[6] the commander of the U.S. forces, declared that not only did a state of war continue but the war with all its devastating consequences must be carried on. The Far Eastern Command of the Red Army of the Soviet Union announced, "The enemy must be ruthlessly smashed." On August 15, Colonel-General Antonov, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, made the following statement:

> The message concerning Japan's surrender issued by the Japanese Emperor on August 14 is only a general declaration concerning unconditional surrender. The order to the armed forces to cease hostilities has not yet been issued and the Japanese troops are

> continuing their resistance. Hence there is still no actual surrender by the armed forces of Japan. The surrender of the armed forces of Japan can be considered to have taken place only from the moment the Japanese Emperor orders his armed forces to discontinue hostilities and lay down their arms and when this order is carried out in practice. In view of the above, the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East will continue their offensive operations against Japan.

It can be seen that you alone, of all the high commanders of the Allied forces, have given an absolutely wrong order. I consider that your error stems from your self-seeking and is of an extremely serious nature; that is to say, your order serves the interest of the enemy. Therefore, taking my stand on the common interest of China and the Allies, I shall firmly and completely oppose your order so long as you do not openly admit your error and countermand this wrong order. At present I am still ordering the armed units under my command to make determined attacks on the enemy, in co-ordination with the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain, until the enemy actually stops hostilities and surrenders his arms and all the territory of the motherland has been fully recovered. I declare to you, I am a patriotic soldier, I cannot act otherwise.

With regard to the above I request your early reply.

NOTES

[1] See "Chiang Kai-shek Is Provoking Civil War", Note 1, p. 30 of this volume.

[2] The nineteen Liberated Areas were: Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia, Shansi-Suiyuan, Shansi-Chahar-Hopei, Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning, Shansi-Hopei-Honan, Hopei-Shantung-Honan, Shantung, Northern Kiangsu, Central Kiangsu, Southern Kiangsu, Huai River North, Huai River South, Central Anhwei, Chekiang, Kwangtung, Chiungyai (Hainan Island), Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi, Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei and Honan.

[3] On July 7, 1937, Japanese invading forces attacked the Chinese garrison at Lukouchiao, ten kilometres southwest of Peking. Under the influence of the ardent anti-Japanese movement of the whole people, the Chinese troops there put up resistance. This incident marked the beginning of the Chinese people's heroic War of Resistance Against Japan which lasted for eight years.

[4] On August 10, 1945, the Japanese government notified the Soviet Union, China, the United States and Britain of its desire to surrender. On August 11 the governments of the four countries replied that "all the Japanese military, naval and air authorities" and "all the forces under their control wherever located" must "cease active operations" and "surrender their arms".

[5] Yasuji Okamura was then commander-in-chief of the Japanese invading forces in China. The order from Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh to Yasuji Okamura reads as follows:

(1) The Japanese government has formally accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and announced its surrender.

(2) You are to order all the troops under your command to cease all military operations; all of them, except those encircled by the troops of the Kuomintang government, must surrender to us upon orders from the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army and Southern China Anti-Japanese Column of China's Liberated Areas.

(3) With regard to the surrender of the Japanese troops in northern China, you are to order General Sadamu Shimomura to appoint a representative to go to the Eighth Route Army's Fuping area to receive orders from General Nieh Jung-chen; with regard to the surrender of the Japanese troops in eastern China, you yourself are to appoint a representative to go to the Tienchang area, where the Headquarters of the New Fourth Army is located, to receive orders from General Chen Yi; with regard to the surrender of the Japanese troops in Hupeh and Honan Provinces, you are to order your representative in Wuhan to go to the Tapieh mountain area of the 5th Division of the New Fourth Army to receive orders from General Li Hsien-nien; with regard to the surrender of the Japanese troops in Kwangtung, you are to instruct your representative in Canton to go to the Tungkuan area of the Southern China Anti-Japanese Column to receive orders from General Tseng Sheng.

(4) All the Japanese troops in northern, eastern, central and southern China (except those encircled by the Kuomintang troops) must keep all arms and materiel intact, pending our army's acceptance of their surrender, and must not take orders except from the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army or the Southern China Anti-Japanese Column.

(5) All the aircraft and vessels in northern and eastern China are to stay where they are, but the vessels anchored along the Chinese coast of the Yellow Sea and the Pohai Gulf should be assembled at Lienyunkang, Tsingtao, Weihaiwei and Tientsin.

(6) There must be no destruction of any materiel or installations.

(7) You and the commanders of the Japanese army in northern, eastern, central and southern China will be held completely responsible for the execution of this order.

[6] Chester W. Nimitz was then Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific War Theatre.

ON A STATEMENT BY CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S SPOKESMAN*

August 16, 1945

A spokesman for Chiang Kai-shek, commenting on the alleged violation by the Communist Party of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's order to Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh, said at a press conference in Chungking on the afternoon of August 15, "The orders of the generalissimo must be obeyed" and "Those who violate them are enemies of the people." A Hsinhua News Agency correspondent states: This is an open signal by Chiang Kai-shek for all-out civil war. On August 11, at the critical moment when the Japanese invaders were being finally wiped out, Chiang Kai-shek issued an order of national betrayal forbidding the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and all the other armed forces of the people to fight the Japanese and the puppet troops. Of course, this order absolutely cannot and should not be accepted. Soon afterwards, Chiang Kai-shek through his spokesman proclaimed the armed forces of the Chinese people to be "enemies of the people". This shows that Chiang Kai-shek has declared civil war against the Chinese people. Chiang Kai-shek's plotting of civil war did not of course begin with his order of August 11; it has been his consistent plan throughout the eight years of the War of Resistance. During those eight years, Chiang Kai-shek launched three large-scale anti-Communist campaigns, in 1940, 1941 and 1943,[1] each time attempting to develop the attack into a country-wide civil war, and only the opposition of the Chinese people and of public figures in the Allied countries prevented its occurrence, much to Chiang's regret. Thus he was forced to postpone the country-wide civil war until the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and so came the order of August 11 and the statement of August 15. For the purpose of unleashing civil war, Chiang Kai-shek had already invented many terms, such as "alien party", "traitor party", "traitor army", "rebel army", "traitor areas", "bandit areas", "disobedience to military and government orders", "feudal separatism", "undermining the War of Resistance" and "endangering the state"; and he had alleged that, since in the past there had been only "suppression of Communists" in China and not "civil war", there would be no "civil war" in the future either, and so on and so forth. The slight difference this time is the addition of a new term, "enemy of the people". But people will perceive that this is a foolish invention. For whenever the term, "enemy of the people", is used in China, everyone knows who is meant. There is a person in China who betrayed Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles[2] and the Great Revolution of 1927. He plunged the Chinese people into the bloodbath of ten years of civil war and thereby invited aggression by Japanese imperialism. Then, scared out of his wits, he took to his heels and led a flock of people in a flight all the way from Heilungkiang to Kweichow Province. He became an onlooker and sat around, waiting with folded arms for victory to come. Now that victory has come, he tells the people's armies to "stay where they are, pending further orders" and tells the enemy and the traitors to "maintain order" so that he can swagger back to Nanking. One need only mention these facts for the Chinese people to know that this person is Chiang Kai-shek. After all he has done, can there be any dispute as to whether Chiang Kai-shek is an enemy of the people? Dispute there is. The people say "Yes". The enemy of the people says "No". And that is the only dispute. Among the people it is becoming less and less a matter of dispute. The problem now is that this enemy of the people wants to start a civil war. What are the people to do? The Hsinhua News Agency correspondent says: The policy of the Communist Party of China in regard to Chiang Kai-shek's launching a civil war is clear and consistent, namely, to oppose it. As far back as the time when Japanese imperialism began to invade China, the Communist Party of China demanded an end to civil war and unity against foreign aggression. In 1936-37 the Party made tremendous efforts, forced Chiang Kai-shek to accept its proposal and so carried out the War of Resistance Against Japan. During the eight years of resistance, the Communist Party of China never once relaxed its efforts to alert the people to check the danger of civil war. Since last year, the Communist Party has time and again called the people's attention to the huge plot being hatched by Chiang Kai-shek to unleash

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* This commentary was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Hsinhua News Agency.

a country-wide civil war as soon as the War of Resistance ended. The Communist Party, like the rest of the Chinese people and all the people in the world concerned for peace in China, holds that a new civil war would be a calamity. But the Communist Party maintains that civil war can still be prevented and must be prevented. It is in order to prevent civil war that the Communist Party has advocated the formation of a coalition government. Now Chiang Kai-shek has rejected this proposal, and so civil war is touch-and-go. But there is definitely a way of checking this move of Chiang Kai-shek's. The people's democratic forces must strive to expand resolutely and rapidly; the people must liberate the big cities under enemy occupation and disarm the enemy and puppet troops; and if an autocrat and traitor to the people dares to attack them, the people must act in self-defence and resolutely strike back to frustrate the designs of the instigator of civil war. That is the way, the only way. The Hsinhua News Agency correspondent calls on the whole nation and the whole world to repudiate the utterly hypocritical and shameless lie which asserts that, on the contrary, civil war in China can be averted if Chiang Kai-shek forbids the Chinese people to liberate the enemy-occupied big cities, forbids them to disarm enemy and puppet forces and forbids them to establish democracy, and if he himself goes to these big cities to "inherit" (not to smash) the enemy and puppet regimes. This is a lie, the Hsinhua News Agency correspondent points out, and this lie obviously runs counter to the national and democratic interests of the Chinese people and also flies in the face of all the facts of modern Chinese history. It must always be remembered that it was not because the big cities were in the hands of the Communist Party rather than in his own hands that Chiang Kai-shek waged the ten-year civil war from 1927 to 1937; on the contrary, since 1927 none of the big cities has been in the hands of the Communist Party but all have been in Chiang's hands or have been yielded by him to the Japanese and the traitors, and this is the very reason why the civil war lasted for ten years on a country-wide scale and has continued on a local scale to this day. It must always be remembered that the ten-year civil war was stopped and that the three large-scale anti-Communist campaigns and countless other provocations during the War of Resistance were checked (up to and including Chiang Kai-shek's recent invasion of the southern part of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region[3]), not because Chiang Kai-shek was strong, but on the contrary because Chiang was relatively not strong enough, while the Communist Party and the people were relatively strong. The ten-year civil war was stopped, not by the appeals of public figures throughout the country who desired peace and feared war (such as those of the former "League for Banning Civil War"[4] and similar bodies), but by the armed demand of the Communist Party of China and the armed demands of the Northeastern Army under Chang Hsueh-liang and the Northwestern Army under Yang Hu-cheng.[5] The three large-scale anti-Communist campaigns and countless other provocations were not beaten back by unlimited concessions and submission by the Communist Party; they were beaten back by the Communist Party's persistence in a just, stern attitude of self-defence — "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack."[6] If the Communist Party had been utterly powerless and spineless and had not fought to the finish for the interests of the nation and the people, how could the ten-year civil war have been ended? How could the War of Resistance Against Japan have started? And even though started, how could it have been carried on resolutely until victory today? How else could Chiang Kai-shek and his ilk be alive now, issuing orders and making statements from a mountain retreat so far from the front lines? The Communist Party of China is firmly opposed to civil war. The Soviet Union, the United States and Britain declared in the Crimea, "establish conditions of internal peace" and "form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people".[7] That is exactly what the Communist Party of China has persistently advocated — the formation of a "coalition government". The carrying out of this proposal can prevent civil war. But there is one precondition — strength. If all the people unite and increase their strength, civil war can be prevented.

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[1] See "A Comment on the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee and the Second Session of the Third People's Political Council", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. III.

[2] The Three People's Principles were the principles and programmes put forward by Sun Yat-sen on the questions of nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood in the bourgeois democratic revolution in China. In 1924, in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, a congress characterized by co-operation

between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Sun Yat-sen restated the Three People's Principles, interpreted nationalism as opposition to imperialism and expressed active support for the movements of the workers and peasants. The old Three People's Principles thus developed into the new Three People's Principles with the Three Great Policies, that is, alliance with the Soviet Union, alliance with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. The new Three People's Principles provided the political basis for the co-operation between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang during the First Revolutionary Civil War period.

[3] This refers to the attack in July 1945 by Kuomintang troops on Chunhua, Hsunyi and Yaohsien in the Kuanchung sub-region of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. See "The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan", Note 12, p. 24 of this volume.

[4] The "League for Banning Civil War" was formed in Shanghai in August 1932 with a mainly bourgeois membership. It issued a declaration calling for "ending the civil war and uniting to resist foreign aggression".

[5] In 1936 the Kuomintang's Northeastern Army headed by Chang Hsueh-liang and the Kuomintang's Northwestern Army headed by Yang Hu-cheng were stationed in and around Sian; they were charged with the task of attacking the Chinese Red Army which had arrived in northern Shensi. Influenced by the Chinese Red Army and the people's anti-Japanese movement, they agreed to the Anti-Japanese National United Front put forward by the Communist Party of China and demanded that Chiang Kai-shek unite with the Communist Party to resist Japan. Chiang Kai-shek turned down the demand, became even more active in his military preparations for the "suppression of the Communists" and massacred the anti-Japanese youth of Sian. Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng took joint action and arrested Chiang Kai-shek. This was the famous Sian Incident of December 12, 1936. Chiang Kai-shek was forced to accept the terms of unity with the Communist Party and resistance to Japan and was then set free to return to Nanking.

[6] See "Talk with the Correspondents of the Central News Agency, the *Sao Tang Pao* and the *Hsin Min Pao*", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II.

[7] From the communique of the Crimea (Yalta) conference of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, February 11, 1945.

ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KUOMINTANG — CIRCULAR OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA*

August 26, 1945

The speedy surrender of the Japanese invaders has changed the whole situation. Chiang Kai-shek has monopolized the right to accept the surrender, and for the time being (for a stage) the big cities and important lines of communication will not be in our hands. Nevertheless, in northern China we should still fight hard, fight with all our might to take all we can. In the past two weeks our army has recovered fifty-nine cities of various sizes and vast rural areas, and including those already in our hands we now control 175 cities, thus winning a great victory. In northern China, we have recovered Weihaiwei, Yentai, Lungkou, Itu, Tsechuan, Yangliuching, Pikechi, Po-ai, Changchiakou, Chining and Fengchen. The might of our army has shaken northern China and, together with the sweeping advance of the Soviet and Mongolian forces to the Great Wall, has created a favourable position for our Party. In the coming period we should continue the offensive and do our best to capture the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, the northern section of the Tatung-Puchow Railway and the Chengting-Taiyuan, Tehchow-Shihchiachuang, Paikuei-Chincheng and Taokou-Chinghua Railways; and also to cut up the Peiping-Liaoning, Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, Tsingtao-Tsinan, Lunghai and Shanghai-Nanking Railways. We should gain control of whatever we can, even though temporarily. At the same time, the necessary forces should be employed to take as many villages, county and higher administrative centres and small towns as possible. For example, a highly favourable situation has been created because the New Fourth Army has occupied many county towns lying between Nanking, Taihu Lake and the Tienmu Mountains and between the

Yangtse and the Huai Rivers, because our forces in Shantung have occupied the whole of the Eastern Shantung Peninsula and because our forces in the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region have occupied many cities and towns north and south of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway. After another period of offensive operations, it will be possible for our Party to control most of the areas north of the lower Yangtse River and the Huai River, most of Shantung, Hopei, Shansi and Suiyuan Provinces, all of Jehol and Chahar Provinces and a part of Liaoning Province.

At present the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain all disapprove of civil war in China;[1] at the same time our Party has put forward the three great slogans of peace, democracy and unity[2] and is sending Comrades Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Wang Jo-fei to Chungking to discuss with Chiang Kai-shek the great issues of unity and national reconstruction; thus it is possible that the civil war plot of the Chinese reactionaries may be frustrated. The Kuomintang has now strengthened its position by recovering Shanghai, Nanking and other places, reopening sea communications, taking over the arms of the enemy and incorporating the puppet troops into its own forces. Nevertheless, it is riddled with a thousand gaping wounds, torn by innumerable inner contradictions and beset with great difficulties. It is possible that after the negotiations the Kuomintang, under domestic and foreign pressure, may conditionally recognize our Party's status. Our Party too may conditionally recognize the status of the Kuomintang. This would bring about a new stage of co-operation between the two parties (plus the Democratic League,[3] etc.) and of peaceful development. In that event, our Party should

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* This inner-Party circular was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China two days before he went to Chungking for peace negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. Because the Chinese Communist Party and the broad masses of the Chinese people firmly opposed Chiang Kai-shek's civil war plot and because U.S. imperialism still had to pay some heed to world-wide democratic public opinion, which unanimously condemned his policy of civil war and dictatorship, Chiang sent three telegrams to Comrade Mao Tse-tung on August 14, 20 and 23, 1945, inviting him to Chungking for peace negotiations, and for the same purpose Patrick J. Hurley, then U.S. ambassador to China, came to Yenan on August 27. The Communist Party of China decided to send Comrades Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Wang Jo-fei to Chungking for peace negotiations with the Kuomintang in order to make every possible effort for peace and also, in the process of struggling for peace, to show U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek in their true colours and so help unite and educate the masses of the people. This circular drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung analysed developments in China during the fortnight after Japan announced her surrender. It set forth the policy of the Central Committee of

strive to master all methods of legal struggle and intensify its work in the Kuomintang areas in the three main spheres, the cities, the villages and the army (all weak points in our work there). During the negotiations, the Kuomintang is sure to demand that we drastically reduce the size of the Liberated Areas, cut down the strength of the Liberation Army and stop issuing currency. We on our side are prepared to make such concessions as are necessary and as do not damage the fundamental interests of the people. Without such concessions, we cannot explode the Kuomintang's civil war plot, cannot gain the political initiative, cannot win the sympathy of world public opinion and the middle-of-the-roaders within the country and cannot obtain in exchange legal status for our Party and a state of peace. But there are limits to such concessions; the principle is that they must not damage the fundamental interests of the people.

If the Kuomintang still wants to launch civil war after our Party has taken the above steps, it will put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and our Party will be justified in waging a war of self-defence to crush its attacks. Moreover, our Party is powerful, and if anyone attacks us and if the conditions are favourable for battle, we will certainly act in self-defence to wipe him out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely (we do not strike rashly, but when we do strike, we must win). We must never be cowed by the bluster of reactionaries. But we must at all times firmly adhere to, and never forget, these principles: unity, struggle, unity through struggle; to wage struggles with good reason, with advantage and with restraint; and to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one.[4]

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the Communist Party of China on the peace negotiations, certain concessions the Party was prepared to make in the negotiations and policies for coping with the two possible outcomes of the negotiations. It contained directives concerning the principles to be followed in the struggles in the Liberated Areas of northern and eastern China and of central and southern China respectively. And it warned the whole Party that it must absolutely not relax its vigilance or its struggle against Chiang Kai-shek because negotiations were to take place. Comrade Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues arrived in Chungking on August 28 and held negotiations with the Kuomintang for forty-three days. Although the negotiations resulted only in the publication of the "Summary of Conversations Between the Representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China" (also known as the "October 10th Agreement"), they were nevertheless successful in that politically they enabled the Chinese Communist Party to gain the initiative to a great extent and put the Kuomintang in a passive position. Comrade Mao Tse-tung returned to Yenan on October 11. Comrades Chou En-lai and Wang Jo-fei remained in Chungking to continue the negotiations. For the results see "On the Chungking Negotiations", the next article in this volume.

In Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, Honan and some other provinces our Party forces are in a more difficult position than in northern China and the area between the Yangtse and the Huai Rivers. The comrades in those places are much in the thoughts of the Central Committee. But the Kuomintang has many weak spots and its areas are vast; our comrades will be fully able to deal with the situation, provided they make no big mistakes in military policy (movements and operations) and in the policy of uniting with the people, and provided they are modest and prudent, not conceited or rash. Besides receiving the necessary directives from the Central Committee, the comrades in these areas must use their own judgement to analyse the situation, solve their problems, surmount difficulties, maintain themselves and expand their forces. When the Kuomintang becomes unable to do anything with you, it may be compelled in the negotiations between the two parties to give your forces recognition and agree to arrangements advantageous to both sides. But you must definitely not rely on the negotiations, must definitely not hope that the Kuomintang will be kind-hearted, because it will never be kind-hearted. You must rely on your own strength, on correct guidance of activities, on brotherly unity within the Party and good relations with the people. Firmly rely on the people, that is your way out.

To sum up, our Party is confronted with many difficulties which must not be ignored, and all Party comrades must be well prepared mentally. But the general trend of the international and internal situation is favourable to our Party and to the people. So long as the whole Party is united as one, we shall be able to overcome all difficulties step by step.

NOTES

[1] Around the time of Japan's surrender, the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain for a period all expressed disapproval of civil war in China. Events soon demonstrated, however, that the U.S. statement about its so-called disapproval of civil war in China was only a screen for actively helping the reactionary Kuomintang government prepare for a counter-revolutionary civil war.

[2] The three great slogans of peace, democracy and unity were put forward in the "Declaration on the Current Situation" by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on August 25, 1945. The declaration pointed out that after the surrender of Japanese imperialism, "the important task confronting the whole nation is to consolidate unity in the country, safeguard domestic peace, bring about democracy and

improve the people's livelihood so as, on the basis of peace, democracy and unity, to achieve national unification and build a new China, independent, free, prosperous and powerful".

[3] The Democratic League was formed in 1941 under the name of the China Federation of Democratic Political Groups. It was reorganized under the name of the China Democratic League in 1944.

[4] See "Problems of Tactics in the Present Anti-Japanese United Front" and "On Policy", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II.

ON THE CHUNGKING NEGOTIATIONS*

October 17, 1945

Let us talk about the present situation. That is what our comrades are interested in. This time the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party at Chungking have lasted forty-three days. The results have already been published in the newspapers.[1] The representatives of the two parties are continuing to negotiate. The negotiations have borne fruit. The Kuomintang has accepted the principles of peace and unity, recognized certain democratic rights of the people and agreed that civil war should be averted and that the two parties should co-operate in peace to build a new China. On these points agreement has been reached. There are other points on which there is no agreement. The question of the Liberated Areas has not been solved, and that of the armed forces has not really been solved either. The agreements reached are still only on paper. Words on paper are not equivalent to reality. Facts have shown that a very great effort must still be made before they can be turned into reality.

The Kuomintang is negotiating with us on the one hand, and is vigorously attacking the Liberated Areas on the other hand. Not counting the forces surrounding the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, 800,000 Kuomintang troops are already directly engaged in these attacks. Wherever there are Liberated Areas, fighting is going on or being prepared. The very first article of the "October 10th Agreement" is on "peace and national reconstruction"; don't these words on paper contradict reality? Yes, they do. That is why we say it still requires effort on our part to turn what is on paper into reality. Why does the Kuomintang mobilize so many troops to attack us? Because long ago it made up its mind to wipe out the people's forces, to wipe us out. Best of all, it would like to wipe us out quickly or, failing that, to worsen our situation and improve its own. Peace, though written into the agreement, has not in fact been realized. In places like the Shangtang area in Shansi Province there is fighting on a fairly large scale. The Shangtang area, rimmed by the Taihang, Taiyueh and Chungtiao Mountains, is like a tub. This tub contains fish and meat, and Yen Hsi-shan sent thirteen divisions to grab it. Our policy also was set long ago — to give tit for tat, to fight for every inch of land. This time we gave tit for tat, fought and made a very good job of it. In other words, we wiped out all thirteen divisions. Their attacking forces had 38,000 men, and we employed 31,000 men. Of their 38,000 men, 35,000 were destroyed, 2,000 fled and 1,000 scattered.[2] Such fighting will continue. They want desperately to grab our Liberated Areas. This seems hard to explain. Why are they so anxious to grab? Isn't it good for the Liberated Areas to be in our hands, in the hands of the people? Yes, but that is only what we think, what the people think. If they thought so too, there would be unity and we would all be "comrades". But they won't think this way; they will oppose us stubbornly. They can't see why they shouldn't oppose us. It is quite natural that they should attack us. For our part, we can't see why we should let them seize our Liberated Areas. It is also quite natural that we should counter-attack. When two "can't-see-whys" come together, they fight. Since there are two can't-see-whys, why have they negotiated? And why have they concluded the "October 10th Agreement"? In this world, things are complicated and are decided by many factors. We should look at problems from different aspects, not from just one. In Chungking, some people think that Chiang Kai-shek is unreliable and deceitful and that negotiations with him can lead nowhere. So I was told by many people I met, including some members of the Kuomintang. I told them that what they said was justified and well-founded and that we were firmly convinced by eighteen years of experience[3] that this would be the case. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party are sure to fail in their negotiations, sure to start fighting and sure to break with each other, but that is only one aspect of the matter. Another aspect is that many other factors are bound to make Chiang Kai-shek have misgivings. Among these factors, the three main ones are the might of the Liberated Areas, the opposition to civil war by the people in the Great Rear Area and the international situation. In our Liberated Areas there are 100 million people, one million troops and two million people's militia, a force no one dares to belittle. Our

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* This report was made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to a meeting of cadres in Yenan after his return from Chungking.

Party's place in the nation's political life is no longer what it was in 1927, nor what it was in 1937. The Kuomintang, which has always refused to recognize the equal status of the Communist Party, is now forced to do so. Our work in the Liberated Areas has already influenced all China and the whole world. The people in the Great Rear Area desire peace and need democracy. When in Chungking, I had a profound sense of the warm support given us by the broad masses of the people. They are dissatisfied with the Kuomintang government and place their hopes on us. I also met many foreigners, including Americans, who sympathize with us. The broad masses of the people in foreign countries are dissatisfied with the reactionary forces in China and sympathize with the Chinese people's forces. They also disapprove of Chiang Kai-shek's policies. We have many friends in all parts of the country and of the world; we are not isolated. Those who oppose civil war in China and stand for peace and democracy include not only the people in our Liberated Areas but also the masses in the Great Rear Area and throughout the world. The subjective desire of Chiang Kai-shek is to maintain his dictatorship and destroy the Communist Party, but many objective difficulties stand in his way. Therefore, he has to be a little realistic. He is being realistic, and we are realistic too. He was realistic in inviting us and we were realistic in going to negotiate with him. We arrived in Chungking on August 28. On the evening of the 29th, I told the Kuomintang representatives that the country had needed peace and unity ever since the September 18th Incident in 1931.[4] We had asked for peace and unity, but they had not materialized. Peace and unity materialized only after the Sian Incident of 1936[5] before the outbreak of the War of Resistance on July 7, 1937. During the eight years of that war we fought together against Japan. But civil war never stopped; there were continuous frictions, big and small. To say that there was no civil war is deception and does not square with facts. In the past eight years we repeatedly expressed our willingness to negotiate. At the Seventh Congress of our Party we declared that "we are willing to resume negotiations with the Kuomintang authorities as soon as they are willing to renounce their present erroneous policies and agree to democratic reforms".[6] In the negotiations we declared that, first, China needs peace and, second, China needs democracy. Chiang Kai-shek could find no reason to object and had to agree. On the one hand, the policy of peace and the agreements on democracy published in the "Summary of Conversations" are words on paper and not yet reality; on the other hand, they have been determined by a variety of forces. The forces of the people in the Liberated Areas, the forces of the people in the Great Rear Area, the international situation — the general trend has forced the Kuomintang to accept these things.

How to give "tit for tat" depends on the situation. Sometimes, not going to negotiations is tit-for-tat; and sometimes, going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat. We were right not to go before, and also right to go this time; in both cases we have given tit for tat. We did well to go this time, for we exploded the rumour spread by the Kuomintang that the Communist Party did not want peace and unity. They sent three successive telegrams to invite us, and we went. But they were totally unprepared, and we had to make all the proposals. As a result of the negotiations, the Kuomintang has accepted the general policy of peace and unity. That's fine. If the Kuomintang launches civil war again, it will put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and we shall have all the more reason to smash its attacks by a war of self-defence. Now that the "October 10th Agreement" has been concluded, our task is to uphold the agreement, to demand that the Kuomintang honour it and to continue to strive for peace. If they fight, we will wipe them out completely. This is the way things are: if they attack and we wipe them out, they will have that satisfaction; wipe out some, some satisfaction; wipe out more, more satisfaction; wipe out the whole lot, complete satisfaction. China's problems are complicated, and our brains must also be a little complicated. If they start fighting, we fight back, fight to win peace. Peace will not come unless we strike hard blows at the reactionaries who dare to attack the Liberated Areas.

Some comrades have asked why we should concede eight Liberated Areas.[7] It is a great pity to concede these eight areas, but it is better to do so. Why is it a pity? Because these Liberated Areas have been created and arduously built up by the people, with sweat and blood. Therefore, we must explain matters clearly to the people and make appropriate arrangements in the areas we are going to concede. Why should we concede those areas? Because otherwise the Kuomintang will not feel easy. They are going back to Nanking, but some Liberated Areas in the south are right by their beds or in their corridor. So long as we are there, they will not be able to sleep easily and will therefore fight for those places at all costs. Our concession on this point will help frustrate the Kuomintang's plot for civil war and win us the sympathy of the numerous middle elements at home and abroad. All the means of propaganda in China, except the Hsinhua News Agency, are now controlled by the Kuomintang. They are all rumour factories. Concerning the current negotiations, they have spread the rumour that the Communist Party just wants territory and will make no concessions. Our policy is to protect the fundamental interests of the people. Subject to the principle of not damaging the fundamental interests of the people, it is permissible to make certain concessions in exchange for peace and democracy, which the people of the whole country need. In our past dealings with Chiang Kai-shek we also made concessions, and even larger ones. In 1937, to bring about the nation-wide War of Resistance, we voluntarily dropped the name, "Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government", changed the name of our Red Army to "National Revolutionary Army" and altered our policy of confiscating the land of the landlords to one of reducing rent and interest. This time, by conceding certain areas in the south, we have completely exploded the Kuomintang's rumours before the people of all China and the whole world. It is the same with the problem of armed forces. Kuomintang propaganda has been saying that the Communist Party is just scrambling for guns. But we have said we are ready to make concessions. First, we proposed cutting our present armed strength to 48 divisions. As the Kuomintang has 263 divisions, this means our strength would be about a sixth of the total. Later, we proposed a further reduction to 43 divisions, about a seventh of the total. The Kuomintang then said they would reduce to 120 divisions. We said we would reduce by the same proportion to 24 or even 20 divisions, which would still be only a seventh of the total. In the Kuomintang army the proportion of officers as compared to soldiers is unduly large and the complement of a division is under 6,000. By their standard, we could form 200 divisions out of our 1,200,000 men. But we are not going to do so. Therefore the Kuomintang can say nothing more and all their rumours are bankrupt. Does this mean that we are going to hand over our guns to the Kuomintang? Not that either. If we hand over our guns, won't the Kuomintang have too many? The arms of the people, every gun and every bullet, must all be kept, must not be handed over.

The above is what I want to say to the comrades about the present situation. Its development shows many contradictions. In the negotiations between the Kuomintang and our Party, why is there agreement on some questions and not on others? Why does the "Summary of Conversations" speak of peace and unity, while fighting is actually going on? Some comrades just can't understand such contradictions. What I have said is meant to answer these questions. Some comrades can't understand why we should be willing to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek, who has always been anti-Communist and against the people. Was our Party right or wrong in deciding at its Seventh Congress that we were willing to negotiate with the Kuomintang, provided they changed their policy? It was absolutely right. The Chinese revolution is a long one and victory can only be won step by step. China's future depends on our exertions. The situation will remain in flux for six months or so. We must redouble our efforts to make it develop in a direction favourable to the people of the whole country.

Now, a few more words about our work. Some comrades present will be leaving for the front. Many, full of enthusiasm, are vying with each other for the opportunity to go to work there, and this active and fervent spirit is very valuable. But there are also a few comrades who have mistaken ideas, who don't think of the many difficulties to be overcome, but believe that everything will be plain sailing at the front and that they will have an easier time than in Yenan. Are there people who think that way? I believe there are. I advise such comrades to correct their ideas. If one goes, it is to work. What is work? Work is struggle. There are difficulties and problems in those places for us to overcome and solve. We go there to work and struggle to overcome these difficulties. A good comrade is one who is more eager to go where the difficulties are greater. The work in those places is hard. Hard work is like a load placed before us, challenging us to shoulder it. Some loads are light, some heavy. Some people prefer the light to the heavy; they pick the light and leave the heavy to others. That is not a good attitude. Some comrades are different; they leave ease and comfort to others and carry the heavy loads themselves; they are the first to bear hardships, the last to enjoy comforts. They are good comrades. We should all learn from their communist spirit.

Many local cadres will be leaving their native places for the front. And many southern-born cadres who came to Yenan are also going to the front. All comrades going to the front should be mentally prepared, once there, to take root, blossom and bear fruit. We Communists are like seeds and the people are like the soil. Wherever we go, we must unite with the people, take root and blossom among them.

Wherever our comrades go, they must build good relations with the masses, be concerned for them and help them overcome their difficulties. We must unite with the masses; the more of the masses we unite with, the better. We must go all out to mobilize the masses, expand the people's forces and, under the leadership of our Party, defeat the aggressor and build a new China. This is the policy laid down by the Party's Seventh Congress.[8] We must strive to carry it out. China depends on the Communist Party and the people to run her affairs. We have the will and the way to achieve peace and democracy. Provided we unite even more closely with the whole people, China's affairs can be run well.

The world after World War II has a bright future. This is the general trend. Does the failure of the Five Power Conference of Foreign Ministers in London[9] mean that a third world war is about to break out? No. Just think, how is it possible for a third world war to break out right after the end of World War II? The capitalist and the socialist countries will yet reach compromises on a number of international matters, because compromise will be advantageous.[10] The proletariat and the people of the whole world are firmly opposed to an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist war. In the past thirty years two world wars have been fought. Between World Wars I and II there was an interval of more than twenty years. In the half million years of human history, it is only in the last thirty years that world wars have been fought. After World War I the world made great progress. After World War II the world is sure to make even faster progress. Following World War I the Soviet Union was born and scores of Communist Parties were founded — they did not exist before. After the end of World War II the Soviet Union is much stronger, the face of Europe is changed, the political consciousness of the proletariat and the people of the world is much higher and the progressive forces throughout the world are more closely united. Our China is also undergoing rapid and drastic change. The general trend of China's development is certainly for the better, not the worse. The world is progressing, the future is bright and no one can change this general trend of history. We should carry on constant propaganda among the people on the facts of world progress and the bright future ahead so that they will build their confidence in victory. At the same time, we must tell the people and tell our comrades that there will be twists and turns in our road. There are still many obstacles and difficulties along the road of revolution. The Seventh

Congress of our Party assumed that the difficulties would be many, for we preferred to assume there would be more difficulties rather than less. Some comrades do not like to think much about difficulties. But difficulties are facts; we must recognize as many difficulties as there are and should not adopt a "policy of non-recognition". We must recognize difficulties, analyse them and combat them. There are no straight roads in the world; we must be prepared to follow a road which twists and turns and not try to get things on the cheap. It must not be imagined that one fine morning all the reactionaries will go down on their knees of their own accord. In a word, while the prospects are bright, the road has twists and turns. There are still many difficulties ahead which we must not overlook. By uniting with the entire people in a common effort, we can certainly overcome all difficulties and win victory.

NOTES

[1] This refers to the "Summary of Conversations", also known as the "October 10th Agreement", which was signed by representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China on October 10, 1945. In the summary, Chiang Kai-shek had to feign agreement with the "basic policy of peace and national reconstruction" put forward by the Communist Party of China and accept "long-term co-operation on the basis of peace, democracy, solidarity and unity . . . resolute avoidance of civil war and the building of a new China, independent, free, prosperous and powerful" and "democratization of political life, nationalization of troops and equality and legality of political parties as ways and means absolutely essential for achieving peace and national reconstruction". He also had to agree to bring the Kuomintang's political tutelage to a speedy conclusion, convene a political consultative conference, "guarantee the freedoms of person, belief, speech, the press, assembly and association as enjoyed by the people in all democratic countries in peacetime, and abolish or amend existing laws and decrees according to this principle", abolish the secret services, "strictly prohibit all organs other than those of the judiciary and police from making arrests, conducting trials and imposing punishment", "release political prisoners", "actively carry out local self-government and conduct general elections from the lower level upward" etc. The Chiang Kai-shek government, however, stubbornly refused to recognize the legal status of the people's army and the democratic governments in the Liberated Areas and, on the pretexts of "unifying the military command" and "unifying government administration", insolently tried to eliminate altogether the people's army and the Liberated Areas led by the Communist Party of China; consequently no agreement could be reached on this question. The following are excerpts from the "Summary of Conversations" concerning the negotiations on the problem of the armed forces and political power in the Liberated Areas; in the "Summary" the so-called "Government" refers to Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government.

"On the nationalization of troops. The Communist Party of China proposed that with a view to unifying the military command the Government should effect an equitable and rational reorganization of the armed forces of the whole country, draw up a programme for carrying it out in stages, make a fresh delimitation of the military zones and establish a conscription and replenishment system. The Communist Party of China stated that, given such a programme, it was ready to reduce the anti-Japanese troops under its command to twenty-four divisions or to a minimum of twenty divisions and to take prompt action to demobilize its anti-Japanese troops now distributed in the eight areas of Kwangtung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei, Hunan, Hupeh and Honan (not including northern Honan). The troops to be reorganized would be gradually withdrawn from the above areas to assemble in the Liberated Areas north of the Lunghai Railway and in northern Kiangsu and northern Anhwei. The Government stated that the programme for the reorganization of troops on a country-wide basis was under way and that the Government was willing to consider the reorganization of the anti-Japanese troops led by the Communist Party of China into twenty divisions, if the issues coming up in the present negotiations could all be settled. As to the question of the stationing of these troops, it stated further that the Communist Party of China could submit plans for discussion and decision. The Communist Party of China proposed that the Communist Party and its local military personnel should participate in the work of the National Military Council and its various departments, that the Government should preserve the existing personnel system and commission the existing personnel as officers of various ranks in the reorganized units, that officers not receiving appointment after reorganization should be assigned to different areas for training and that a fair and reasonable system for filling vacancies and a plan for political education should be adopted. The Government indicated that it had no objection to these proposals and was willing to discuss details. The Communist Party of China proposed that all the militiamen in the Liberated Areas should be organized into local self-defence corps. The Government indicated that such organization could be considered only where local conditions would so require or permit. In order to formulate concrete plans in regard to all the questions mentioned in this section, both sides agreed that a sub-committee of three be formed, with one representative each from the Board of Military Operations of the National Military Council, the Ministry of War and the Eighteenth Group Army."

"On local governments in the Liberated Areas. The Communist Party of China proposed that the Government should recognize the legal status of the popularly elected governments at all levels in the Liberated Areas. The Government indicated that, since Japan had surrendered, the term 'Liberated Area' should have become obsolete and that government administration throughout the country should be unified. The initial formula advanced by the Communist Party of China was that the provincial and administrative areas were to be delimited afresh in the light of the existence of eighteen Liberated Areas and that, for the sake of unifying government administration, it would submit a list of all the popularly elected government personnel at various levels for reappointment by the Government. The Government indicated that, as Chairman Chiang had stated to Mr. Mao, the Central Government, after the unification of the military command and government administration throughout the country, would give consideration to the administrative personnel nominated by the Communist Party of China. The Government would consider retaining a due proportion of the administrative personnel who had served in the areas recovered during the War of Resistance, taking account of their record of ability and service, irrespective of Party affiliation. Thereupon, a second formula was proposed by the Communist Party of China, asking the Central Government to appoint nominees of the Communist Party of China as chairmen and members of the provincial governments of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the five provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Hopei, Shantung and Shansi, and to appoint the Communist Party's nominees as deputy chairmen and members of the six provincial governments of Suiyuan, Honan, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh and Kwangtung (because in the aforesaid eleven provinces there were extensive Liberated Areas or sections thereof). The Communist Party of China also requested the appointment of its nominees as deputy mayors of the four special municipalities of Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao and Shanghai and the participation of its nominees in the administration of the northeastern provinces. After many discussions on this matter, the Communist Party of China modified the aforesaid proposals by requesting the appointment of its nominees as chairmen and members of the provincial governments of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the four provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Hopei and Shantung, as deputy chairmen and members of the two provincial governments of Shansi and Suiyuan and as deputy mayors of the three special municipalities of Peiping, Tientsin and Tsingtao. In reply the Government stated that while the Communist Party of China might nominate those of its members who had rendered distinguished service during the War of Resistance and who possessed administrative ability to the Government for appointment, the Communist Party would not be sincerely endeavouring to achieve unity of military command and government administration if it should insist upon nominating a chairman or deputy chairman or members of any specific provincial government. The Communist Party of China then said it would withdraw its second suggestion and proposed a third formula. It suggested that general elections be held under the existing popularly elected governments at all levels in the Liberated Areas, and members of all other political parties as well as people in different walks of life would be welcome to return to their native places to take part in the elections to be held under the supervision of persons designated by the Political Consultative Conference. A popular election was to be held in any county where more than half the districts and townships had already held popular elections. Likewise, a popular election was to be held in any province or administrative area where more than half the counties had already held popular elections. In the interest of unity of government administration, the names of all the officials so elected in the provincial, administrative area and county governments should be submitted to the Central Government for appointment by confirmation. The Government replied that this formula of government confirmation of appointments in provinces and areas was not in the interest of unity of government administration. The Government might, however, consider holding popular elections for county officials, but popular elections for the provincial governments could be held only after the promulgation of a national constitution, when the status of the province would have been defined. For the time being, only those provincial government officials who had been appointed by the Central Government should proceed to take up their posts so that conditions in the recovered areas might be restored to normal at the earliest possible moment. At this point, a fourth formula was proposed by the Communist Party of China, namely, that the status quo in all the Liberated Areas should temporarily be maintained until the constitutional provision for the popular election of provincial governments had been adopted and put into effect and that, for the time being, an interim arrangement be worked out in order to guarantee the restoration of peace and order. The Communist Party of China stated that meanwhile this particular problem might be submitted to the Political Consultative Conference for settlement. The Government insisted that unity of government administration must be carried out first, because this problem, if left unsolved, might become an obstacle to peace and reconstruction, and it expressed the hope that a concrete formula with regard to this matter could be agreed upon soon. The Communist Party of China agreed to hold further discussions."

[2] Shangtang was an ancient name for the southeastern part of Shansi Province with Changchih as its centre. Its mountainous sections were the base of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army during the War of Resistance Against Japan and formed part of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area. In September 1945 the Kuomintang warlord, Yen Hsi-shan, mustered thirteen divisions and, in co-ordination with Japanese and puppet troops, moved in successively from Linfen, Fushan and Yicheng and from Taiyuan and Yutse to invade Hsiangyuan, Tunliu and Lucheng in the Southeastern Shansi Liberated Area. In October the army and people of this Liberated Area counter-attacked this invading force, wiped out 35,000 men and captured several high-ranking officers, including corps and division commanders.

[3] This refers to the experience gained by the Communist Party of China in its struggles with the Kuomintang from 1927, when the Kuomintang betrayed the revolution, to 1945.

[4] On September 18, 1931, the Japanese "Kwantung Army" quartered in northeastern China seized Shenyang. Under Chiang Kai-shek's order of "absolute non-resistance", the Chinese troops at Shenyang and elsewhere in the Northeast (the Northeastern Army) withdrew to the south of the Great Wall, and consequently the Japanese forces rapidly occupied the provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang. The Chinese people called this act of aggression committed by the Japanese invaders the "September 18th Incident".

[5] See "On a Statement by Chiang Kai-shek's Spokesman", Note 5, p. 45 of this volume.

[6] Quoted from "On Coalition Government", Part IV, Section "Our Specific Programme", Item 2, *Selected Work of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. III.

[7] This refers to the bases of the people's army scattered over Kwangtung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei, Hunan, Hupeh and Honan (not including northern Honan).

[8] See "China's Two Possible Destinies" and "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. III.

[9] From September 11 to October 2, 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, China, the United States, Britain and France met in London to discuss peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, countries which had taken part in the war of aggression started by fascist Germany, and to discuss the disposal of the Italian colonies. No agreement was reached because the United States, Britain and France rejected the reasonable proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and persisted in their imperialist policy of aggression aiming at overthrowing the people's governments set up in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria after victory in the and-fascist war.

[10] See "Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation", pp. 87-88 of this volume.

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE KUOMINTANG ATTACKS*

November 5, 1945

In a dispatch from Chungking, dated November 3, the United Press reported that Wu Kuo-chen, Director of the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, had declared that "the government is entirely on the defensive in this war" and had proposed measures for "restoring communications".[1] A Hsinhua News Agency reporter asked the spokesman for the Communist Party of China about this.

The spokesman for the Communist Party of China replied to the reporter as follows: What Wu Kuo-chen said about being "on the defensive" is a complete lie. The Kuomintang, besides occupying the five Liberated Areas evacuated by our troops in eastern Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, central and southern Anhwei and Hunan and trampling on the people there, has moved more than seventy divisions of its regular troops into or close to most of the other Liberated Areas — for example, those in Kwangtung, Hupeh, Honan, northern Kiangsu, northern Anhwei, Shantung and Hopei — and has been oppressing the people there and attacking or preparing to attack our troops. Furthermore, scores of other Kuomintang divisions are heading for the Liberated Areas. Can this be described as being on the defensive? Of the eight Kuomintang divisions which reached the Hantan area in their drive northward from Changteh, two opposed civil war and favoured peace, while the other six (including three U.S.-equipped divisions) were compelled to lay down their arms after the troops and people of the Liberated Areas counter-attacked in self-defence. Many officers of these Kuomintang troops, including war-zone deputy commanders, corps commanders and deputy corps commanders, are now in the Liberated Areas[2] and can confirm the whole truth about where they came from and how they were ordered to attack. Can this, too, be described as being on the defensive? Our troops in the Liberated Areas in Honan and Hupeh Provinces are now completely encircled by more than twenty Kuomintang divisions from the 1st, 5th and 6th War Zones, with Liu Chih as field commander in charge of the "suppression of Communists". Our Liberated Areas in western and central Honan and southern, eastern and central Hupeh have all been invaded and occupied by the Kuomintang forces, which burned and killed so wantonly that our troops commanded by Li Hsien-nien and Wang Shu-sheng could find no shelter and had to seek quarters on the Honan-Hupeh border in order to survive. But there again they have been closely pursued and attacked by Kuomintang troops.[3] Can this, too, be described as being on the defensive? It is the same in the three provinces of Shansi, Suiyuan and Chahar. In early October, Yen Hsi-shan ordered thirteen divisions to attack the Hsiangyuan-Tunliu sector in the Shangtang Liberated Area. Fighting in self-defence, our troops and the people there disarmed them all, and several commanders of corps and divisions were among the captured. They are now in the Taihang Liberated Area, every one alive, and can confirm the whole truth about where they came from and how they were ordered to attack. In Chungking recently, Yen Hsi-shan told all sorts of lies about how he had been attacked and how he had merely been "on the defensive". Probably he had forgotten all about his generals: Shih Tse-po, Commander of the 19th Corps; Kuo Jung, Commander of the Provisional 46th Division; Chang Hung, Commander of the Provisional 49th Division; Li Pei-ying, Commander of the 66th Division; Kuo Tien-hsing, Commander of the 68th Division and Yang Wen-tsai, Commander of the Provisional 37th Division.[4] They are now living in our Liberated Areas and can refute any lies told by Wu Kuo-chen, Yen Hsi-shan and all the other reactionary instigators of civil war. General Fu Tso-yi, under orders, has been attacking our Liberated Areas in Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol for over two months and on one occasion pushed right to the gates of Changchiakou and occupied our entire Suiyuan Liberated Area and western Chahar. Can this, too, be described as being on the defensive and not firing "the first shot"? Our troops and people in Chahar and Suiyuan rose in self-defence and in their counter-attacks also captured

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* This statement prepared by Comrade Mao Tse-tung was issued in the name of the spokesman for the Communist Party of China. By this time Chiang Kai-shek had already torn up the "October 10th Agreement", and the civil war against the Liberated Areas was expanding daily.

large numbers of officers and men who can all testify where they came from, how they attacked, and so on.[5] In various battles of self-defence we have captured piles of "bandit suppression" and anti-Communist documents, among which are the *Handbook on Bandit Suppression*, orders for "bandit suppression"[6] and other anti-Communist documents issued by the highest Kuomintang authorities but dismissed as a "joke" by Wu Kuo-chen; these are now being forwarded to Yenan. All these documents are iron-clad proofs that Kuomintang troops have attacked the Liberated Areas.

The Hsinhua News Agency reporter went on to ask the spokesman for the Communist Party of China about his views on the measures proposed by Wu Kuo-chen for restoring communications. The spokesman replied: These are nothing but stalling tactics. The Kuomintang authorities are mustering large forces and are trying to swamp all the Liberated Areas as in a great flood. Following the failure of several attacks in September and October, they are preparing new attacks on an even larger scale. And one way to obstruct these attacks and effectively check the civil war is not to let them transport their troops by rail. Like everybody else, we advocate speedy restoration of the lines of communication, but this can be done only after the settlement of the three problems of accepting the Japanese surrender, disposing of the puppet troops and realizing self-government in the Liberated Areas. Which should be settled first, the problem of communications or these three problems? Why are the troops of the Liberated Areas, which fought strenuously and bitterly against Japan for eight years, not qualified to accept the Japanese surrender? And why should other troops be put to the trouble of coming from afar to accept it? Every citizen has the right to punish the puppet troops; why are they all being incorporated into the "national army" and ordered to attack the Liberated Areas? Local self-government is explicitly stipulated in the "October loth Agreement", and Dr. Sun Yat-sen long ago advocated the popular election of provincial governors; why does the Kuomintang government still insist on dispatching local officials? The problem of communications should be speedily settled, but even more so, the three major problems should be speedily settled. To talk of restoring communications without first settling the three major problems can only serve to spread and prolong the civil war and help its instigators achieve their purpose of swamping the Liberated Areas. In order quickly to stop the anti-popular and anti-democratic civil war which has now spread all over the country, we advocate the following:

(1) All the Kuomintang government forces that have entered the Liberated Areas in northern China, northern Kiangsu, northern Anhwei, central China and nearby regions to accept the Japanese surrender and to attack us should be withdrawn immediately to their original positions; the troops of the Liberated Areas should accept the Japanese surrender and garrison the cities and lines of communication; and the Liberated Areas which have been invaded and occupied should be restored.

(2) All puppet troops should be immediately disarmed and disbanded, and in northern China, northern Kiangsu and northern Anhwei the Liberated Areas should take charge of such disarming and disbanding.

(3) The people's democratic self-government in all the Liberated Areas should be recognized; the Central Government should not appoint and send out local officials; the provisions of the "October 10th Agreement" should be carried out.

The spokesman said: Only in this way can civil war be averted otherwise there is absolutely no safeguard against it. The documents captured during the three battles we fought in self-defence in Suiyuan, Shangtang and Hantan and such concrete actions as massive troop movements and attacks all give the lie to the claim of the Kuomintang authorities that the so-called restoration of communications is for the sake of the people and not of civil war. The Chinese people have been fooled long enough and can be fooled no longer. At present, the central problem is for the people of the whole country to mobilize to stop the civil war by every means.

NOTES

[1] At the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan, most of China's railways were either under the control of the army and people of the Liberated Areas or surrounded by them. Under the pretext of "restoring communications", the Kuomintang reactionaries tried to utilize these railways to cut the Liberated Areas apart, transport millions of Kuomintang troops to northeastern, northern, eastern and central China, attack the Liberated Areas and grab the big cities.

[2] In September 1945, Kuomintang troops from the region of Chengchow and Hsinhsiang advanced along the Peiping-Hankow Railway to attack the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area. In late October their vanguard, comprising three corps, invaded the region of Tsehsien and Hantan. The army and people of the

Liberated Area rose bravely in self-defence, and after a week's bitter fighting General Kao Shu-hsun, Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's 11th War Zone and concurrently Commander of the New 8th Corps, revolted against the Kuomintang at Hantan and came over to us with the New 8th Corps and one column, totalling over ten thousand men. The other two corps retreated in confusion but were surrounded and disarmed. Many high-ranking officers were compelled to surrender, including Ma Fa-wu, another Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's 11th War Zone and concurrently Commander of the 40th Corps, Liu Shih-jung, its Deputy Commander, Li Hsu-tung, its Chief of Staff, Liu Shu-sen, a Deputy Division Commander.

[3] After Japan's surrender the Kuomintang gathered more than twenty divisions from three war zones to launch large-scale attacks on the Liberated Areas in Honan and Hupeh Provinces. Part of the forces of Hu Tsung-nan, Commander of the Kuomintang's 1st War Zone, advanced from the northwest to the east along both sides of the Lunghai Railway to invade the Liberated Areas in western Honan; the forces of Liu Chih, Commander of the 5th War Zone, advanced from the north to the south along both sides of the Peiping-Hankow Railway to invade the Liberated Areas in central Honan and central and eastern Hupeh; the forces of the 6th War Zone advanced from southern Hupeh to the north in concert. Most of these Kuomintang forces were under the command of Liu Chih. The people's army of the Liberated Areas in Honan and Hupeh put up a stubborn fight against the invaders, conserved its strength and moved in late October 1945 to an area on the Honan-Hupeh border in the Tahung and the Tungpai Mountains and around Tsaoyang. The army later shifted to Hsuanhuatien, east of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, because the Kuomintang continued to pursue and attack.

[4] About the Shangtang battle, see "On the Chungking Negotiations", Note 2, p. 63 of this volume. The captured Kuomintang officers here mentioned were all high-ranking generals in Yen Hsi-shan's army.

[5] The province of Suiyuan was abolished on March 6, 1954, and became part of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. General Fu Tso-yi was in 1945 Commander of the Kuomintang's 12th War Zone. His troops had been stationed at and around Wuyuan and Linho in western Suiyuan during the War of Resistance Against Japan. After Japan's surrender he was ordered to attack the Liberated Areas in Suiyuan, Jehol and Chahar Provinces. In August 1945 he occupied Kueisui (now Huhehot), Chining and Fengchen. In early September he occupied Hsingho, Shangyi, Wuchuan, Taolin, Hsintang and Liangcheng, launched massive attacks on the Liberated Areas in Chahar and pushed to the neighbourhood of Changchiakou. In self-defence our army repulsed these attacks and captured large numbers of his officers and men.

[6] The *Handbook on Bandit Suppression* was a counter-revolutionary pamphlet compiled by Chiang Kai-shek in 1933 dealing exclusively with methods of attacking the Chinese people's forces and the revolutionary bases. In 1945, after the conclusion of the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek had it reprinted and issued to Kuomintang officers together with a confidential order, saying: "The present campaign for the suppression of the bandits, on which the happiness of the people depends, must be speedily completed. You should urge your officers and men to do their utmost to suppress the bandits in the spirit of the resistance against Japanese aggression and in accordance with the *Handbook on Bandit Suppression* which I have compiled. Any meritorious action in the service of the state shall be richly rewarded, and those responsible for delays or mistakes shall be court-martialled. This order should be made known to and obeyed by all officers and men under your command engaged in suppressing the bandits."

RENT REDUCTION AND PRODUCTION ARE TWO IMPORTANT MATTERS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE LIBERATED AREAS*

November 7, 1945

1. The Kuomintang, aided by the United States, is mobilizing all its forces to attack our Liberated Areas. Country-wide civil war is already a fact. Our Party's present task is to mobilize all forces, take the stand of self-defence, smash the attacks of the Kuomintang, defend the Liberated Areas and strive for the realization of peace. To achieve this aim the following have become very urgent tasks. See to it that in the Liberated Areas the peasants generally get the benefits of rent reduction and that the workers and other labouring people benefit by appropriate wage increases and improved conditions; at the same time, see to it that the landlords can still make a living and that the industrial and commercial capitalists can still make profits. Unfold a large-scale production drive next year, increase the output of food and daily necessities, improve the people's livelihood, provide relief for victims of famine and for refugees and meet the needs of the army. Only when the two important matters of rent reduction and production are well handled can we overcome our difficulties, support the war and win victory.

2. As the scale of the war is now very large, many leading comrades are in command at the front and cannot divert their attention to rent reduction and production. Hence there must be division of labour. Those leading comrades who remain in the rear areas, in addition to doing a great deal of work in direct support of the front, must not miss the opportune time for organizing these two important tasks of rent reduction and production. In the next few months of the winter and spring, they must launch large-scale rent reduction campaigns and carry out rent reduction universally in all the Liberated Areas, and particularly in the vast newly liberated areas, so as to arouse

the revolutionary fervour of the great majority of the peasant masses. Meanwhile they must see to it that there is a new development of agricultural and industrial production in all the Liberated Areas in 1946. Do not neglect rent reduction and production because of the new large-scale war; on the contrary, it is precisely in order to defeat the Kuomintang offensive that rent reduction and production must be stepped up.

3. Rent reduction must be the result of mass struggle, not a favour bestowed by the government. On this depends the success or failure of rent reduction. In the struggle for rent reduction, excesses can hardly be avoided; as long as it is really a conscious struggle of the broad masses, any excesses that have occurred can be corrected afterwards. Only then can we persuade the masses and enable them to understand that it is in the interest of the peasants and the people as a whole to allow the landlords to make a living so that they will not help the Kuomintang. The present policy of our Party is still to reduce rents, not to confiscate land. During and following rent reduction we must help the great majority of the peasants to organize themselves into peasant associations.

4. The key to victory in the production drive is to organize the great majority of the producers into mutual-aid production groups. An indispensable measure is to provide government credits for agriculture and industry. It is also very important to do farm work in the right season and reduce loss of working time. At present we must mobilize civilian manpower to support the war; on the other hand, we must so far as possible not miss any season for farming; hence we should study methods of adjustments. Army units, government organs and schools should continue to take part in production to an appropriate extent, provided it does not interfere with the war, with work and with study. Only thus can they better their livelihood and lighten the burden on the people.

5. We already hold some large and many medium cities. It has become an important task for our Party to take control of the economy of these cities and to develop their industry, commerce and finance. For this purpose, it is very necessary to use all the qualified persons available and persuade Party members to co-operate with them and learn technique and methods of management from them.

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

6. Tell all Party members to stand firmly together with the people, to have concern for their economic difficulties and to regard the carrying out of the two important tasks of rent reduction and production as the key to helping the people overcome their difficulties; by so doing, we shall win the heartfelt support of the people and be able to defeat attacks by any reactionaries. Everything must still be considered from the standpoint of a long-term effort, manpower and material resources must be used sparingly, everything must be planned on a long-term basis; thus we will be sure to win victory.

POLICY FOR WORK IN THE LIBERATED AREAS FOR 1946*

December 15, 1945

In the past few months our Party has gained great successes in leading the people in fierce struggles to clean up the Japanese and puppet forces and smash the attacks of the Kuomintang on the Liberated Areas. All our Party comrades have worked as one man and made marked achievements in every field. The year 1945 will soon be over, and in 1946 we must pay attention to the following points in the work in all the Liberated Areas:

1. Smash new attacks. Since our army smashed the large-scale attacks on our Liberated Areas in Suiyuan, Shansi and southern Hopei, the Kuomintang has been moving up larger forces and making preparations for new attacks. If no new development makes the Kuomintang stop its civil war quickly, the fighting in the spring of 1946 will be intense. Therefore, the central task of all the Liberated Areas is still to take a stand of self-defence and do their utmost to smash the Kuomintang attacks.

2. Spread the Kao Shu-hsun movement.[1] In order to smash the Kuomintang attacks our Party must work to disintegrate the Kuomintang troops which are preparing to attack or are already attacking. On the one hand, our army must carry on extensive, open political propaganda and political offensives to undermine the will to fight of the Kuomintang troops engaged in the civil war. On the other hand, we must prepare and organize uprisings within the Kuomintang army and spread the Kao Shu-hsun movement so that, at crucial moments in the fighting, large numbers of Kuomintang troops will follow Kao Shu-hsun's example and come over to the people, oppose the civil war and take a stand for peace. In order to do this work in a practical way and produce speedy results, every

area must, in compliance with the Central Committee directive, set up a special department and assign a large number of cadres to devote themselves to it whole-heartedly and exclusively. The leading bodies of each area must give this work close direction.

3. Train the troops. The field armies of the Liberated Areas have already been formed in the main, and the regional troops are also quite numerous. Hence, for the time being, we should generally stop expanding the number of troops and should make use of the intervals between battles to stress the training of troops. This applies to field armies, regional troops and people's militia. As for the training courses, the main objective should still be to raise the level of technique in marksmanship, bayoneting, grenade-throwing and the like and the secondary objective should be to raise the level of tactics, while special emphasis should be laid on night operations. As for the method of training, we should unfold the mass training movement in which officers teach soldiers, soldiers teach officers and the soldiers teach each other. During 1946 we must further improve the political work in the army, overcome any dogmatic and formalist working styles existing in the army and strive to unite officers and soldiers, unite the army and the people, unite with friendly troops, disintegrate the enemy troops and ensure that the tasks of training, supply and fighting are accomplished. The local people's militia should be reorganized in accordance with present conditions. The army's rear services should be readjusted. Everything possible should be done to organize and expand the artillery and engineer units in all areas. The military academies should continue their work, with stress on the training of technical personnel.

4. Reduce rent. In accordance with the November 7, 1945 directive of the Central Committee,[2] all areas must launch movements in 1946 for the reduction of rent and interest in their newly liberated areas, movements on a large scale, of a mass character, but with leadership. As for the workers, their wages should be appropriately raised. Through these movements the broad masses should be able to emancipate themselves, organize, and become the conscious masters of the Liberated Areas. Without these determined measures, the masses in the newly liberated areas will not be able to tell which of the two parties, the Communist Party or the Kuomintang, is good and which is bad; they will waver and will not

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

give firm support to our Party. In the old Liberated Areas the work of rent and interest reduction should be rechecked in order to consolidate those areas further.

5. Production. All areas must follow the directive of November 7 and promptly make every preparation to ensure that in 1946 both public and private production in all Liberated Areas should surpass any previous year in scale and in achievements. The feeling of weariness which has appeared among the people can be overcome only after the two tasks of rent reduction and production are carried out in earnest and with marked success. Whether or not these two tasks are fulfilled will finally decide victory or defeat in the political and military struggles of the Liberated Areas. They must not be neglected in any area.

6. Finance. In 1946 the financial burden, which has become heavier to cover the intensive work of the recent period, must be brought back to normal in a planned and systematic way. There must be appropriate reductions for those whose burdens are too heavy. In the interest of the long-term effort, the number of people diverted from production in any area must not exceed the limits of local financial capacity. Troops are valued for quality rather than for number; in building the army this remains one of our principles. To develop production, ensure supply, centralize leadership, decentralize management, give consideration to both army and people and to both public and private interests, and stress both production and economy — all these are still the proper guiding principles for solving our financial and economic problems.

7. Support the government and cherish the people; support the army and give preferential treatment to the families of the armymen who fought in the War of Resistance.[3] In 1946 we must perform these two tasks better than in the past few years. This will be of great significance for smashing the Kuomintang attacks and consolidating the Liberated Areas. In the army it should be handled through the ideological education of every commander and fighter, so that all thoroughly understand the importance of supporting the government and cherishing the people. As long as the army on its part does this job well, the local government and the people will also improve their relations with the army.

8. Relief. In the Liberated Areas there are many victims of natural disasters, refugees, unemployed and partially unemployed, who urgently need relief. Whether this problem is solved well or

badly has a great and widespread influence. Relief should depend mainly on mutual aid by the masses themselves, in addition to government measures. The Party and the government should encourage the masses to organize relief through mutual aid.

9. Take good care of local cadres. In every Liberated Area today there are large numbers of cadres from other areas doing the leading work at all levels. This is especially true in the northeastern provinces. The leading bodies of each area must tirelessly counsel these cadres to take good care of the local cadres and treat them with great warmth and goodwill. Cadres from outside should make the selection, training and promotion of local cadres an important task for themselves. Only thus can our Party take root in the Liberated Areas. The working style of people from outside who look down on local people should be criticized.

10. Calculate everything on a long-term basis. No matter how the situation develops, our Party must always calculate on a long-term basis, if our position is to be invincible. At present, our Party on the one hand persists in its stand for self-government and self-defence in the Liberated Areas, firmly opposes attacks by the Kuomintang and consolidates the gains won by the people of these areas. On the other hand, we support the democratic movement now developing in the Kuomintang areas (as marked by the student strike in Kunming[4]) in order to isolate the reactionaries, win numerous allies for ourselves and expand the national democratic united front under our Party's influence. Moreover, a delegation of our Party will soon attend the Political Consultative Conference of various parties and public figures without party affiliation, reopen negotiations with the Kuomintang and strive for peace and democracy throughout the country. However, there may yet be twists and turns. Ahead of us lie many difficulties. For example, our new areas and our new troops are still not consolidated, and we have problems in finance. We must face all these difficulties squarely and overcome them, arrange all our work on a long-term basis, pay the closest attention to the economical use of manpower and material resources and guard against any wishful thinking about easy success through good luck.

These ten points should receive special attention in our work in 1946, and particularly in the first half of the year. It is hoped that comrades in different places will carry out these policies flexibly in the light of local conditions. As for the work in various areas, such as building local political authority, doing united front work, spreading education on current affairs inside and outside the Party and doing work in cities and towns near the Liberated Areas — all this is important but we shall not dwell on it here.

NOTES

[1] On October 30, 1945, Kao Shu-hsun, Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's 11th War Zone, revolted at the civil war front in Hantan, southern Hopei Province, and came over to our side with one corps and one column. This had a great influence throughout the country. In order to intensify the work of dividing and disintegrating the Kuomintang troops and arousing them to revolt, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to start a propaganda campaign calling upon other Kuomintang officers and men to follow the example of Kao Shu-hsun and his troops, refuse to attack the Liberated Areas, sabotage the civil war at the front, fraternize with the People's Liberation Army, rise in revolt and come over to the side of the people. This was known as the Kao Shu-hsun movement.

[2] See "Rent Reduction and Production Are Two Important Matters for the Defence of the Liberated Areas", pp. 71-73 of this volume.

[3] "Support the government and cherish the people" was a slogan of the People's Liberation Army, while "Support the army and give preferential treatment to the families of the armymen who fought in the War of Resistance" was a slogan of the Party organizations, government bodies, people's organizations and the masses of the people in the Liberated Areas. The second slogan was later changed into "Support the army and give preferential treatment to the families of the revolutionary armymen".

[4] On the evening of November 25, 1945, more than six thousand college and middle school students in Kunming, capital of Yunnan Province, assembled at the Southwest Associated University to discuss current affairs and protest against the civil war. The Kuomintang reactionaries sent troops who surrounded the assembly, fired on the students with light artillery, machine-guns and rifles and placed guards around the university to prevent teachers and students from going home. Subsequently, students from Kunming's schools and colleges joined in a strike. On December 1 the Kuomintang reactionaries dispatched a large number of soldiers and secret agents to the Southwest Associated University and the Teachers College where they threw hand-grenades, killing four people and wounding over ten. This incident was known as the "December 1st Massacre".

BUILD STABLE BASE AREAS IN THE NORTHEAST*

December 28, 1945

1. Our Party's present task in the Northeast is to build base areas, stable military and political base areas in eastern, northern and western Manchuria.[1] To build such base areas is no easy job; it requires hard and bitter struggle. Three or four years are needed to build such base areas. But a solid preliminary groundwork must be laid in the year 1946. Otherwise we may not be able to stand our ground.

2. It should now be made clear that these base areas are not to be built in the big cities or along the main communication lines that are or will be occupied by the Kuomintang; under present conditions this is not practicable. Nor are they to be built in regions close to big cities or main communication lines held by the Kuomintang. The reason is that the Kuomintang, having seized the big cities and the main communication lines, will not let us build stable base areas in regions very close to them. Our Party should do adequate work and set up our first line of military defence in these regions, which must never be lightly abandoned. But they will be guerrilla zones for both parties and not our stable base areas. Therefore, the regions in which to build stable bases are the cities and vast rural areas comparatively remote from the centres of Kuomintang occupation. Those regions should now be designated so that we can dispose our forces accordingly and lead the whole Party towards this goal.

3. After we have decided on the location of our stable base areas and disposed our forces and after our army's numerical strength has greatly increased, mass work will be the centre of gravity of our Party's work in the Northeast. All cadres must be made to understand that the Kuomintang will be stronger than our Party in the

Northeast for some time and that unless our starting point is to arouse the masses to struggle, solve their problems and rely on them in every way and unless we mobilize all forces to work painstakingly among the masses and lay a solid preliminary foundation within a year, and particularly in the next few critical months, we shall become isolated in the Northeast, be unable to build stable base areas or defeat the attacks of the Kuomintang and indeed may encounter immense difficulties or even fail. Conversely, if we rely firmly on the masses, we shall overcome all difficulties and reach our goal step by step. Mass work consists in arousing the masses for struggles to settle accounts with traitors and in launching campaigns for rent reduction and wage increases and campaigns for production. In these struggles we should form various kinds of mass organizations, set up Party nuclei, build armed units of the masses and organs of people's political power, speedily raise mass economic struggles to the level of political struggles and lead the masses to take part in building the base areas. The directive on arousing mass struggles recently issued by the Jehol Provincial Party Committee[2] may be applied in the Northeast. Our Party must bring tangible material benefits to the people in the Northeast; only then will the masses support us and oppose the

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* This directive, drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was addressed to its Northeast Bureau. As soon as the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and the Soviet Red Army entered the Northeast, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese People's Liberation Army sent large numbers of cadres and troops to the Northeast to lead the people in wiping out the remnants of the Japanese invaders and the puppet "Manchukuo" regime, cleaning out traitors, eradicating bandits and establishing democratic local governments at various levels. But at the same time the Kuomintang reactionaries, bent on exclusive control over the entire Northeast, transported large numbers of troops there by land, sea and air with the aid of U.S. imperialism and seized key places like Shanhaikuan and Chinchow which had already been liberated by the People's Liberation Army. A stern struggle was already inevitable in the Northeast, and this struggle was obviously going to be of special significance for the situation in the whole country. In this directive Comrade Mao Tse-tung foresaw how arduous the struggle in the Northeast would be and pointed out in good time that the centre of gravity of the work there should be in the cities and vast rural areas comparatively remote from the centres of Kuomintang occupation; that is, we should "leave the high road alone and seize the land on both sides" in order to arouse the masses in earnest, build stable base areas, gradually accumulate strength and prepare for the future shift to the counter-offensive. This correct policy of the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung was effectively carried out by the Northeast Bureau headed by Comrade Lin Piao; hence the great victory, the liberation of the entire Northeast three years later in November 1948.

Kuomintang attacks. Otherwise, the masses will be unable to see clearly which of the two parties, the Kuomintang or the Communist Party, is good and which is bad, may be taken in for a time by deceitful Kuomintang propaganda and may even turn against our Party, and thus an extremely unfavourable situation would be created for us in the Northeast.

4. At present there is a subjective difficulty for our Party in the Northeast. Large numbers of our cadres and armed forces in the Northeast are newcomers, unfamiliar with the place and the people. Cadres are dissatisfied because we cannot occupy large cities and they are impatient with the arduous work of arousing the masses and building base areas. These circumstances are in contradiction with the present situation and the tasks of the Party. Again and again we must teach all cadres from other areas to pay attention to investigation and study, to acquaint themselves with the place and the people and to resolve to become one with the people of the Northeast, and we must train large numbers of activists and cadres from among the masses. We should explain to the cadres that although the big cities and the communication lines are in the hands of the Kuomintang, the situation in the Northeast is nevertheless favourable to us. So long as we spread among all cadres and soldiers the idea of arousing the masses and of building our base areas and so long as we mobilize all forces and quickly undertake the great struggle to build these base areas, we shall be able to establish ourselves firmly in the Northeast and in Jehol and be sure of victory. We must tell the cadres that they should on no account underestimate the strength of the Kuomintang or become impatient with arduous work because they think the Kuomintang is going to attack eastern and northern Manchuria anyhow. Of course, in making these explanations we should not lead the cadres to believe that the Kuomintang is terribly strong and that its attacks cannot be smashed. It should be pointed out that the Kuomintang has no deep, organized foundation in the Northeast and that its attacks can be smashed; it is therefore possible for our Party to build base areas. But the Kuomintang troops are now attacking the Jehol-Liaoning border, and if no blows are dealt them, they will attack eastern and northern Manchuria before long. All our Party members must therefore resolve to undertake the most difficult tasks, swiftly arouse the masses, build our base areas and smash the Kuomintang attacks in western Manchuria and Jehol

resolutely and in a planned way. In eastern and northern Manchuria we should quickly prepare the conditions for smashing the Kuomintang attacks. We must thoroughly clear away all ideas among our cadres of winning easy victories through good luck, without hard and bitter struggle, without sweat and blood.

5. Promptly delimit military areas and sub-areas in western, eastern and northern Manchuria and divide our forces into field armies and regional troops. Distribute a considerable part of the regular troops among the military sub-areas to arouse the masses, wipe out bandits, set up organs of political power, organize guerrillas, people's militia and self-defence forces so as to make our areas secure, co-ordinate with the field armies and smash the Kuomintang attacks. All troops must be assigned to specific areas and specific tasks; only in this way can they quickly unite with the people and build stable base areas.

6. This time over 100,000 of our troops have entered the Northeast and Jehol; the army there has recently expanded by more than 200,000, and the trend is to keep on expanding. Adding Party and government workers, we estimate that the total will exceed 400,000 within a year. A situation in which such a large number of personnel, divorced from production, depends solely on the people of the Northeast for supplies certainly cannot last long and is very dangerous. Therefore, all army units and government organs must take part in production when not fighting or doing their regular work, except for those field armies which are concentrated and charged with major military actions. The year 1946 must not pass without results; the entire Northeast must promptly make plans accordingly.

7. In the Northeast the direction in which the workers and intellectuals move is vitally important to building our base areas and winning future victories. Our Party should therefore give its full attention to work in the big cities and along the main communication lines and especially to winning over the workers and intellectuals. In view of the fact that in the early years of the War of Resistance our Party did not pay sufficient attention to winning over the workers and intellectuals to come to the base areas, the Party organizations in the Northeast should now do everything possible to draw workers and intellectuals into our army and into the various construction tasks in the base areas, besides paying attention to underground work in the Kuomintang areas.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTES

[1] The eastern Manchuria base area included Kirin, Hsi-an, Antu, Yenchi, Tunhua and other places east of the Shenyang-Changchun section of the Chinese Changchun Railway. The northern Manchuria base area included Harbin, Mutankiang, Pei-an and Kiamusze, among others. The western Manchuria base area included Tsitsihar, Tao-an, Kailu, Fuhsin, Chengchiatun, Fuyu and other places west of the Shenyang-Changchun section of the Chinese Changchun Railway. The Party also built a base area in southern Manchuria. It included Antung, Chuangho, Tunghua, Linchiang and Chingyuan and other places east of the Shenyang-Talien section of the Chinese Changchun Railway and Liaochung, southwest of Shenyang. The persistent struggle against the enemy in southern Manchuria played an important role in the building of base areas in the Northeast.

[2] This refers to the "Directive on Arousing the Masses" issued by the Jehol Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1945. It pointed out that the central task in arousing the masses then was to launch a mass campaign of accusation and retribution to settle accounts with traitors and secret agents, that through the campaign the enthusiasm of the masses should be heightened, their social, political and economic status should be raised, and that trade unions, peasant associations and other mass organizations should be organized and that preparations should be made to proceed, when this campaign was over, to a mass campaign for the reduction of rent and interest. In arousing the masses in the cities, we had to arouse the workers first so that they could play the vanguard and leading role in the campaign to settle accounts with traitors and secret agents. The directive also called for learning the entire work of city administration, for making economical use of manpower and for planning everything on a long-term basis.

SOME POINTS IN APPRAISAL OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION*

April 28, 1946

1. The forces of world reaction are definitely preparing a third world war, and the danger of war exists. But the democratic forces of the people of the world have surpassed the reactionary forces and are forging ahead; they must and certainly can overcome the danger of war. Therefore, the question in the relations between the United States, Britain and France and the Soviet Union is not a question of compromise or break, but a question of compromise earlier or compromise later. "Compromise" means reaching agreement through peaceful negotiation. "Earlier or later" means several years, or more than ten years, or even longer.

2. The kind of compromise mentioned above does not mean compromise on all international issues. That is impossible so long as the United States, Britain and France continue to be ruled by reactionaries. This kind of compromise means compromise on some issues, including certain important ones. But there will not be many such compromises in the near future. There is, however, a possibility that the trade relations of the United States, Britain and France with the Soviet Union will expand.

3. Such compromise between the United States, Britain and France and the Soviet Union can be the outcome only of resolute, effective struggles by all the democratic forces of the world against the reactionary forces of the United States, Britain and France. Such compromise does not require the people in the countries of the capitalist world to follow suit and make compromises at home. The people in those countries will continue to wage different struggles in accordance with their different conditions. The principle of the reactionary forces in dealing with the democratic forces of the people is definitely to destroy all they can and to prepare to destroy later whatever they

cannot destroy now. Face to face with this situation, the democratic forces of the people should likewise apply the same principle to the reactionary forces.

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* This document was written to counter a pessimistic appraisal of the international situation at that time. In the spring of 1946, imperialism headed by the United States of America, together with the reactionaries in various countries, was daily intensifying its anti-Soviet, anti-Communist and anti-popular activities and trumpeting that "war between the United States and the Soviet Union is inevitable" and that "the outbreak of a third world war is inevitable". In these circumstances, since some comrades overestimated the strength of imperialism, underestimated the strength of the people, feared U.S. imperialism and feared the outbreak of a new world war, they showed weakness in the face of the armed attacks of the U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek reactionary gang and dared not resolutely oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war. In this document Comrade Mao Tse-tung was combating such erroneous thinking. He pointed out that if the forces of the people throughout the world waged resolute, effective struggles against the forces of world reaction, they could overcome the danger of a new world war. At the same time, he pointed out that it was possible for the imperialist countries and the socialist countries to reach certain compromises but that such compromises do "not require the people in the countries of the capitalist world to follow suit and make compromises at home", and that "the people in those countries will continue to wage different struggles in accordance with their different conditions". This document was not made public at the time and was circulated only among some leading comrades of the Central Committee. It was distributed at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in December 1947. Since the comrades present unanimously agreed with its contents, the full text was later included in "A Circular on the Decisions Made at the Central Committee Meeting of December 1947", issued by the Central Committee in January 1948.

SMASH CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S OFFENSIVE BY A WAR OF SELF-DEFENCE*

July 20, 1946

1. Chiang Kai-shek, after violating the truce agreement,[1] violating the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference[2] and occupying Szepingkai, Changchun and other cities of ours in the Northeast, is now launching another large-scale offensive against us in eastern and northern China; later, he may again attack the Northeast. Only after completely smashing Chiang's offensive in a war of self-defence can the Chinese people regain peace.

2. Our Party and our army are making every preparation to smash Chiang Kai-shek's offensive and thus to win peace. Although Chiang Kai-shek has U.S. aid, the feelings of the people are against him, the morale of his troops is low, and his economy is in difficulty. As for us, although we have no foreign aid, the feelings of the people are for us, the morale of our troops is high, and we can handle our economy. Therefore, we can defeat Chiang Kai-shek. The whole Party should be fully confident of this.

3. For defeating Chiang Kai-shek the general method of fighting is mobile warfare. Therefore, the temporary abandonment of certain places or cities is not only unavoidable but also necessary. Certain places or cities are temporarily abandoned in order to win final victory, which would otherwise be impossible. We must make all Party members and all the people in the Liberated Areas understand this so that they will be mentally prepared.

4. In order to smash Chiang Kai-shek's offensive we must co-operate closely with the masses of the people and win over all who can be won over. In the rural areas, on the one hand, we should resolutely solve the land problem, rely firmly on the farm labourers and poor peasants and unite with the middle peasants; on the other hand, when solving the land problem, we should distinguish the

ordinary rich peasants and middle and small landlords from the traitors, bad gentry and local tyrants. We should be more strict in our treatment of the traitors, bad gentry and local tyrants, and more lenient in our treatment of the rich peasants and middle and small landlords. In places where the land problem has already been solved, we should change to a moderate attitude towards the landlord class as a whole, with the exception of a few reactionaries. In order to reduce the number of hostile elements and to consolidate the Liberated Areas, we should help all those landlords who have difficulty in making a living and induce runaway landlords to return and give them an opportunity to earn a living. In the cities, besides uniting with the working class, the petty bourgeoisie and all progressives, we should take care to unite with all the middle elements and isolate the reactionaries. Among the Kuomintang troops, we should win over all the possible opponents of civil war and isolate the bellicose elements.

5. In order to smash Chiang Kai-shek's offensive we must plan on a long-term basis. We must use our manpower and material

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Chiang Kai-shek tore up the "October 10th Agreement" in the winter of 1945, but his preparations for an all-out civil war were not complete, mainly because large numbers of Kuomintang troops had not yet been moved to the civil war fronts. Consequently, in January 1946, under the pressure of the demand of the entire people for peace and democracy, the Kuomintang government had to convene the Political Consultative Conference with the participation of the Communist Party of China and other democratic parties. The Conference adopted a series of resolutions favourable to peace and democracy, and on January 10 the Kuomintang government issued an order to cease fire. Chiang Kai-shek was not willing to observe the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and the cease-fire order. In the first half of 1946 the Kuomintang troops continued to attack the Liberated Areas at many points, the attack in the Northeast being on a particularly large scale, and a situation was created with small-scale fighting south of the Great Wall and large-scale fighting north of it. Meanwhile the United States made very great efforts to transport and equip the Kuomintang troops. By the end of June 1946 Chiang Kai-shek and his U.S. masters thought that they were fully prepared and could wipe out the whole People's Liberation Army in three to six months. Accordingly, they launched an all-out offensive against the Liberated Areas, which began on June 26 with a massive encircling attack on the Central Plains Liberated Area. Between July and September the Kuomintang troops started successive large-scale attacks against the Liberated Areas of Kiangsu-Anhwei, Shantung, Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan, Shansi-Chahar-Hopei and Shansi-Suiyuan. In October they launched another large-scale attack on the Northeast Liberated Area. At the same time they continued to encircle the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Liberated Area with large numbers of troops. When the country-wide civil war broke out, the Kuomintang employed 193 brigades (divisions), or some 1,600,000 of its regular troops,

resources with the utmost economy and do everything possible to avoid waste. We must investigate and clean up the petty graft which has appeared in some places. We must work hard in production in order to become completely self-sufficient in all necessities and first of all in grain and cloth. We must promote the extensive planting of cotton and encourage every family to spin and every village to weave. We should start to promote this even in the Northeast. In the spheres of finance and supplies, we must meet the material needs of the war of self-defence and at the same time lighten the burden on the people, so that there will be some improvement in the livelihood of the people in our Liberated Areas even under war-time conditions. To sum up, we rely entirely on our own efforts, and our position is invincible; this is the very opposite of Chiang Kai-shek who depends entirely on foreign countries. We live plainly and work hard, we take care of the needs of both the army and the people; this is the very opposite of the situation in Chiang Kai-shek's areas, where those at the top are corrupt and degenerate, while the people under them are destitute. Under these circumstances, we shall surely be victorious.

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to attack the Liberated Areas; they constituted 80 per cent of its total strength of 248 regular brigades (divisions), or 2,000,000 men. Under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and its bureaus and sub-bureaus, the army and people in the Liberated Areas fought heroically against the offensive of Chiang Kai-shek's troops. At that time there were six major theatres of war in the Liberated Areas. These six theatres of war and the forces of the People's Liberation Army fighting there were:

The Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area with People's Liberation Army forces led by Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and other comrades.

The Eastern China Liberated Area (including the Shantung and the Kiangsu-Anhwei Liberated Areas) with People's Liberation Army forces led by Chen Yi, Su Yu, Tan Chen-lin and other comrades.

The Northeast Liberated Area with People's Liberation Army forces led by Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan and other comrades.

The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area with People's Liberation Army forces led by Nieh Jung-chen and other comrades.

The Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area with People's Liberation Army forces led by Ho Lung and other comrades.

The Central Plains Liberated Area with People's Liberation Army forces led by Li Hsien-nien, Cheng Wei-san and other comrades.

The People's Liberation Army, then totalling about 1,200,000 troops, was outnumbered by the enemy. It correctly carried out the strategy laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and struck incessant, powerful blows at the invading enemy. After wiping out 66 regular brigades and some irregular units of the enemy, totalling more than 710,000 men, in about eight months, the People's Liberation Army halted the enemy's all-out offensive. Then, step by step, it unfolded its strategic counter-offensive.

6. Difficulties lie ahead of us but they can and must be overcome. All Party comrades and all the troops and people in the Liberated Areas must unite as one, completely smash Chiang Kai-shek's offensive and build an independent, peaceful and democratic new China.

NOTES

[1] The "truce agreement" was the agreement concluded on January 10, 1946 between representatives of the Communist Party of China and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government. It stipulated that the troops of both parties should cease military operations from their respective positions as of midnight, January 13. But in fact Chiang Kai-shek used this agreement as a smoke-screen behind which he made arrangements for a major war; at the very time the cease-fire order was being transmitted, he ordered the Kuomintang troops "to seize strategic points" and from then on moved up troops continuously to attack the Liberated Areas. By July Chiang Kai-shek had openly torn up the truce agreement and launched an all-out offensive against the Liberated Areas.

[2] The Political Consultative Conference was attended by representatives of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party of China and other political parties, and by personages without party affiliation and was held in Chungking from January 10 to 31, 1946. The Conference adopted five agreements:

(1) Agreement on Government Organization. This agreement affirmed that "the Organic Law of the National Government shall be revised with a view to strengthening the National Government Council". It increased the number of National Government Councillors and provided that "the National Government Councillors shall be chosen by the President of the National Government from both Kuomintang and non-Kuomintang members"; that "the appointment of members of various parties as National Government Councillors by the President of the National Government shall be made on the recommendation of the parties concerned, which, in case of the President's disapproval, shall make new recommendations"; that "when the President of the National Government nominates as Government Councillor any personage without party affiliation, whose appointment is opposed by one-third of the Councillors already appointed, the President must reconsider the matter and make a new nomination for appointment"; and that "half the National Government Councillors shall be Kuomintang members and the other half members of other political parties and public personages". The National Government Council was nominally defined as "the supreme government organ in charge of state affairs", with powers to discuss and decide legislative principles, administrative policies and major military measures, financial plans and the budget as well as matters submitted by the President of the National Government for consideration; yet at the same time the President of the National Government was vested with great powers, including the power of nominating persons for office, the power of veto (which, though nominally limited, was virtually absolute, for it required a majority of three-fifths to override a veto, while the President's own party, the Kuomintang, had half the seats) and emergency powers. The agreement also provided that "seven or eight members

of the Executive Yuan shall be non-Kuomintang members who shall either hold the portfolios of existing ministries or hold the proposed posts of ministers of state without portfolio".

(2) The Programme for Peace and National Reconstruction. This programme was composed of nine sections, namely, General Principles, Rights of the People, Political Affairs, Military Affairs, Foreign Relations, Economic and Financial Affairs, Education and Culture, Relief and Rehabilitation, and Overseas Chinese Affairs. The section on "General Principles" provided that all political parties of the country shall "unite closely to build a new China, united, free and democratic"; that there shall be "political democratization, nationalization of troops, and equality and legality for all political parties"; and that "political disputes shall be settled by political means in order to ensure peace and national development". The section on "Rights of the People" provided that "the freedoms of person, thought, religious belief, speech, the press, assembly, association, residence, movement and correspondence shall be guaranteed to the people" and that "any organ or person other than the judiciary and the police is strictly forbidden to arrest, try and punish people, and anyone who violates this provision shall be punished". The section on "Political Affairs" provided that "all levels of the administration shall be overhauled, their powers and responsibilities unified and clearly defined, all duplicated agencies abolished, administrative procedures simplified and each level of administration charged with definite responsibilities"; that "competent office-holders shall be protected, appointments to government posts based not on party affiliation but on competency and seniority, and the holding of concurrent posts and the practice of favouritism forbidden"; that "the supervisory system shall be strictly enforced, corruption severely punished and facilities given to the people freely to lodge accusations against corrupt officials"; that "local self-government shall be actively promoted and elections from the lower level upwards through universal suffrage carried out"; and that "the powers of the central and local governments shall be defined according to the principle of fair distribution of powers, that the local governments may take such measures as are suitable to local circumstances, but those enacted by a province or county must not contradict those of the central government". The section on "Military Affairs" provided that "the military organizations shall be adapted to the needs of national defence, the miliary system reformed in line with a democratic system of government and the conditions in the country, military power separated from political parties, military authority separated from civil authority, military education improved, equipment be adequate and personnel and financial systems be improved in order to build a modernized national army" and that "the numerical strength of the nation's troops shall be effectively reduced and reorganized in accordance with the provisions of the Military Reorganization Plan". The section on "Economic and Financial Affairs" provided that "the development of bureaucrat-capital shall be curbed and government officials strictly forbidden to make use of their official position and influence to engage in speculation, monopoly, tax evasion, smuggling, embezzlement of public funds and unlawful use of the means of transport", that "rents and rates of interest shall be reduced, the rights of lessees protected, the payment of farm rents ensured, agricultural credits expanded, usury strictly prohibited in order to better the life of the peasants and an agrarian law to attain the objective of 'land to the tillers' shall be put into effect"; that "labour laws shall be put into effect to improve working conditions"; that "the administration of finance shall be made public, the

budget system and the system of financial reports strictly adhered to, budget expenditures drastically reduced, revenues and expenditures balanced, central and local government finances defined, the currency in circulation contracted and the monetary system stabilized and the raising of both domestic and foreign loans and their uses made public and subject to supervision by public bodies"; and that "the system of taxation shall be reformed and all exorbitant and miscellaneous levies and illegal exactions completely abolished". The section on "Education and Culture" provided that "academic freedom shall be guaranteed, and there shall be no interference with school and college administration for reasons of religious belief or political thought"; that "the proportion of the national budget allocated to education and culture shall be increased"; and that "the war-time censorship of the press, publications, motion pictures, the drama, posts and telegrams shall be abolished".

(3) Agreement on the National Assembly. This agreement provided that "there shall be added to the National Assembly seven hundred delegates from various parties and from among public personages" and that "the duty and power of the first National Assembly shall be to frame and adopt a constitution".

(4) Agreement on the Draft Constitution. This agreement provided for the establishment of a review committee to revise the draft constitution prepared by the Kuomintang and laid down the principles for revision. In addition to prescribing the principles governing the duties and powers of the National Assembly and government organizations, special provisions were made regarding "local government" and "the rights and duties of the people". With respect to "local government", it provided that "the province shall be the highest unit of local self-government"; that "the powers of the provincial government in relation to those of the central government shall be defined according to the principle of a fair distribution of powers"; that "the provincial governor shall be elected by the people"; and that "the province may have a provincial constitution which, however, must not contravene the provisions of the national constitution". With respect to "the rights and duties of the people", it provided that "all freedoms and rights which are generally enjoyed by the people of a democratic country shall be protected by the constitution against illegal violation"; that "if any provision is made by law regarding the freedom of the people, it shall be aimed at the protection of such freedom and not at its restriction"; that "drafting of labour may be provided for in local laws, but not in the national constitution"; and that "the right of self-government shall be guaranteed to minority nationalities who live together in specific communities".

(5) Agreement on Military Affairs. This agreement provided that "the military system shall be reformed in line with a democratic system of government and the conditions in our country"; that "military conscription shall be improved"; that "military education shall be conducted on the basis of the principles governing the building of the army and shall for ever be dissociated from political parties and personal relationships"; that "military power shall be separated from political parties" and "all political parties and individuals shall refrain from using the army as an instrument of political struggle"; and that "military authority shall be separated from civil authority" and "no soldier in active service may serve concurrently as a civil official". With regard to the reorganization of the Kuomintang troops and the troops of the Liberated Areas, it provided that "the three-man military sub-committee proceed as planned with all possible speed to reach an agreement on measures for reorganizing the troops of the Communist Party of China and to complete their reorganization"; that the Kuomintang troops shall

> "be reorganized according to the plan already laid down by the Ministry of War into ninety divisions and this reorganization shall be completed at the highest possible speed within six months"; and that "when the above-mentioned two items of reorganization have been completed, all troops of the entire nation shall be unified and further reorganized into fifty or sixty divisions".

These Political Consultative Conference agreements were, in varying degrees, favourable to the people and unfavourable to Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary rule. While expressing his approval of these agreements in an attempt to use them to carry out his peace fraud, Chiang Kai-shek actively made military preparations for launching a country-wide civil war. These Political Consultative Conference agreements were soon torn up by him one after another.

TALK WITH THE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT ANNA LOUISE STRONG*

August 1946

Strong: Do you think there is hope for a political, a peaceful settlement of China's problems in the near future?

Mao: That depends on the attitude of the U.S. government. If the American people stay the hands of the American reactionaries who are helping Chiang Kai-shek fight the civil war, there is hope for peace.

Strong: Suppose the United States gives Chiang Kai-shek no help, besides that already given,[1] how long can Chiang Kai-shek keep on fighting?

Mao: More than a year.

Strong: Can Chiang Kai-shek keep on that long, economically?

Mao: He can.

Strong: What if the United States makes it clear that it will give Chiang Kai-shek no more help from now on?

Mao: There is no sign yet that the U.S. government and Chiang Kai-shek have any desire to stop the war within a short time.

Strong: How long can the Communist Party keep on?

Mao: As far as our own desire is concerned, we don't want to fight even for a single day. But if circumstances force us to fight, we can fight to the finish.

Strong: If the American people ask why the Communist Party is fighting, what should I reply?

Mao: Because Chiang Kai-shek is out to slaughter the Chinese people, and if the people want to survive they have to defend themselves. This the American people can understand.

Strong: What do you think of the possibility of the United States starting a war against the Soviet Union?

Mao: There are two aspects to the propaganda about an anti-Soviet war. On the one hand, U.S. imperialism is indeed preparing a war against the Soviet Union; the current propaganda about an anti-Soviet war, as well as other anti-Soviet propaganda, is political preparation for such a war. On the other hand, this propaganda is a smoke-screen put up by the U.S. reactionaries to cover many actual contradictions immediately confronting U.S. imperialism. These are the contradictions between the U.S. reactionaries and the American people and the contradictions of U.S. imperialism with other capitalist countries and with the colonial and semi-colonial countries. At present, the actual significance of the U.S. slogan of waging an anti-Soviet war is the oppression of the American people and the expansion of the U.S. forces of aggression in the rest of the capitalist world. As you know, both Hitler and his partners, the Japanese warlords, used anti-Soviet slogans for a long time as a pretext for enslavement of the people at home and aggression against other countries. Now the U.S. reactionaries are acting in exactly the same way.

To start a war, the U.S. reactionaries must first attack the American people. They are already attacking the American people — oppressing the workers and democratic circles in the United States politically and economically and preparing to impose fascism

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* This is a very important statement made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on the international and domestic situation not long after the conclusion of World War II. Here, Comrade Mao Tse-tung put forward his famous thesis, "All reactionaries are paper tigers." This thesis armed the people of our country ideologically, strengthened their confidence in victory and played an exceedingly great role in the People's War of Liberation. Just as Lenin considered imperialism a "colossus with feet of clay", so Comrade Mao Tse-tung regards imperialism and all reactionaries as paper tigers; both have dealt with the essence of the matter. This thesis is a fundamental strategic concept for the revolutionary people. Since the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has repeatedly pointed out: strategically, with regard to the whole, revolutionaries must despise the enemy, dare to struggle against him and dare to seize victory; at the same time, tactically, with regard to each part, each specific struggle, they must take the enemy seriously, be prudent, carefully study and perfect the art of struggle and adopt forms of struggle suited to different times, places and conditions in order to isolate and wipe out the enemy step by step. On December 1, 1958, at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held at Wuchang, Comrade Mao Tse-tung stated:

> Just as there is not a single thing in the world without a dual nature (this is the law of the unity of opposites), so imperialism and all reactionaries have a dual nature — they are real tigers and paper tigers at the same time. In past history before they won state power and for some time afterwards, the slave-owning class, the feudal landlord class and the bourgeoisie were vigorous, revolutionary and progressive; they were real tigers. But with the lapse of time, because their opposites — the slave class, the peasant class and the proletariat — grew in strength

there. The people of the United States should stand up and resist the attacks of the U.S. reactionaries. I believe they will.

The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the question. In the Pacific the United States now controls areas larger than all the former British spheres of influence there put together; it controls Japan, that part of China under Kuomintang rule, half of Korea, and the South Pacific. It has long controlled Central and South America. It seeks also to control the whole of the British Empire and Western Europe. Using various pretexts, the United States is making large-scale military arrangements and setting up military bases in many countries. The U.S. reactionaries say that the military bases they have set up and are preparing to set up all over the world are aimed against the Soviet Union. True, these military bases are directed against the Soviet Union. At present, however, it is not the Soviet Union but the countries in which these military bases are located that are the first to suffer U.S. aggression. I believe it won't be long before these countries come

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> step by step, struggled against them and became more and more formidable, these ruling classes changed step by step into the reverse, changed into reactionaries, changed into backward people, changed into paper tigers. And eventually they were overthrown, or will be overthrown, by the people. The reactionary, backward, decaying classes retained this dual nature even in their last life-and-death struggles against the people. On the one hand, they were real tigers; they ate people, ate people by the millions and tens of millions. The cause of the people's struggle went through a period of difficulties and hardships, and along the path there were many twists and turns. To destroy the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism in China took the Chinese people more than a hundred years and cost them tens of millions of lives before the victory in 1949. Look! Were these not living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers? But in the end they changed into paper tigers, dead tigers, bean-curd tigers. These are historical facts. Have people not seen or heard about these facts? There have indeed been thousands and tens of thousands of them! Thousands and tens of thousands! Hence, imperialism and all reactionaries, looked at in essence, from a long-term point of view, from a strategic point of view, must be seen for what they are — paper tigers. On this we should build our strategic thinking. On the other hand, they are also living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers which can eat people. On this we should build our tactical thinking.

For the necessity of despising the enemy strategically and taking full account of him tactically, see "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War", Chapter 5, Section 6, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. I, and "On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy", Section 1, pp. 181-82 of this volume.

to realize who is really oppressing them, the Soviet Union or the United States. The day will come when the U.S. reactionaries find themselves opposed by the people of the whole world.

Of course, I do not mean to say that the U.S. reactionaries have no intention of attacking the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is a defender of world peace and a powerful factor preventing the domination of the world by the U.S. reactionaries. Because of the existence of the Soviet Union, it is absolutely impossible for the reactionaries in the United States and the world to realize their ambitions. That is why the U.S. reactionaries rabidly hate the Soviet Union and actually dream of destroying this socialist state. But the fact that the U.S. reactionaries are now trumpeting so loudly about a U.S.-Soviet war and creating a foul atmosphere, so soon after the end of World War II, compels us to take a look at their real aims. It turns out that under the cover of anti-Soviet slogans they are frantically attacking the workers and democratic circles in the United States and turning all the countries which are the targets of U.S. external expansion into U.S. dependencies. I think the American people and the peoples of all countries menaced by U.S. aggression should unite and struggle against the attacks of the U.S. reactionaries and their running dogs in these countries. Only by victory in this struggle can a third world war be avoided; otherwise it is unavoidable.

Strong: That is very clear. But suppose the United States uses the atom bomb? Suppose the United States bombs the Soviet Union from its bases in Iceland, Okinawa and China?

Mao: The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon.

All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful. In Russia, before the February Revolution in 1917, which side was really Strong? On the surface the tsar was Strong but he was swept away by a single gust of wind in the February Revolution. In the final analysis, the strength in Russia was on the side of the Soviets of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers. The tsar was just a paper tiger. Wasn't Hitler once considered very Strong? But history proved that he was a paper tiger. So was Mussolini, so was Japanese imperialism. On the contrary, the strength of the Soviet Union and of the people in all countries who loved democracy and freedom proved much greater than had been foreseen.

Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters, the U.S. reactionaries, are all paper tigers too. Speaking of U.S. imperialism, people seem to feel that it is terrifically Strong. Chinese reactionaries are using the "strength" of the United States to frighten the Chinese people. But it will be proved that the U.S. reactionaries, like all the reactionaries in history, do not have much strength. In the United States there are others who are really Strong — the American people.

Take the case of China. We have only millet plus rifles to rely on, but history will finally prove that our millet plus rifles is more powerful than Chiang Kai-shek's aeroplanes plus tanks. Although the Chinese people still face many difficulties and will long suffer hardships from the joint attacks of U.S. imperialism and the Chinese reactionaries, the day will come when these reactionaries are defeated and we are victorious. The reason is simply this: the reactionaries represent reaction, we represent progress.

NOTES

[1] To help Chiang Kai-shek start civil war against the people, U.S. imperialism gave his government a very great amount of aid. By the end of June 1946 the United States had equipped 45 Kuomintang divisions. It had trained 150,000 Kuomintang military personnel — army, naval and air forces, secret agents, communications police, staff officers, medical officers, supply personnel, etc. U.S. warships and aircraft transported to the front against the Liberated Areas 14 Kuomintang corps (41 divisions) and 8 regiments of the communications police corps, or over 540,000 men in all. The U.S. government landed 90,000 of its marines in China and stationed them at such important cities as Shanghai, Tsingtao, Tientsin, Peiping and Chinwangtao. They guarded the lines of communication for the Kuomintang in northern China. According to data disclosed in *United States Relations with China* (The White Paper), released by the State Department on August 5, 1949, the total value of various kinds of U.S. aid given to the Chiang Kai-shek government from the time of the War of Resistance Against Japan to 1948 was more than 4,500 million dollars (the overwhelming bulk of U.S. aid given during the War of Resistance had been hoarded by the Kuomintang for the ensuing civil war against the people). But the actual amount of U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek far exceeded this total. The U.S. White Paper admitted that U.S. aid was equivalent to "more than 50 percent of the monetary expenditures" of the Chiang Kai-shek government and was of "proportionately greater magnitude in relation to the budget of that Government than the United States has provided to any nation of Western Europe since the end of the war".

CONCENTRATE A SUPERIOR FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ONE BY ONE*

September 16, 1946

1. The method of fighting by concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces[1] one by one must be employed not only in the disposition of troops for a campaign but also in the disposition of troops for a battle.

2. With regard to the disposition for a campaign, when the enemy employs many brigades[2] (or regiments) and advances against our army from several directions, our army must concentrate an absolutely superior force — six, five, four or at least three times the enemy strength — and pick an opportune moment to encircle and wipe out one enemy brigade (or regiment) first. It should be one of the enemy's weaker brigades (or regiments), or one that has less support, or one stationed where the terrain and the people are most favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy. We should tie down the rest of the enemy brigades (or regiments) with small forces in order to prevent them from rushing reinforcements to the brigade (or regiment) we are encircling and attacking so that we can destroy it first. When this has been achieved, we should, according to the circumstances, either wipe out one or several more enemy brigades or retire to rest and consolidate for further fighting. (Here are two examples of the former. Our troops under the command of Su Yu and Tan Chen-lin wiped out five thousand of the enemy's communications police corps[3] near Jukao on August 22, one enemy brigade on August 26 and one and a half brigades on August 27.[4] Our troops under Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping annihilated one enemy brigade near Tingtao between September 3 and 6, another in the afternoon of September 6 and two more on September 7-8.[5]) In the disposition for a campaign, we must reject the wrong method of fighting, which underrates

the enemy and therefore divides our forces to deal with all the enemy detachments, for by this method we cannot destroy even one enemy detachment but will land ourselves in a passive position.

3. In the disposition for a battle, when we have concentrated an absolutely superior force and encircled one of the enemy detachments (a brigade or regiment), our attacking formations (or units) should not attempt to wipe out all the encircled enemy simultaneously at one swoop and thus divide themselves and strike everywhere without enough strength anywhere, losing time and making it hard to get results. Instead, we should concentrate an absolutely superior force, that is to say, a force six, five, four or at least three times that of the enemy, concentrate the whole or the bulk of our artillery, select one (not two) of the weak spots in the enemy's positions, attack it fiercely and be sure to win. This accomplished, swiftly exploit the victory and destroy the enemy forces one by one.

4. The effects of this method of fighting are, first, complete annihilation and, second, quick decision. Only complete annihilation can deal the most telling blows to the enemy, for when we wipe out one regiment, he will have one regiment less, and when we wipe out one brigade, he will have one brigade less. This method is most useful when employed against an enemy lacking second-line troops. Only complete annihilation can replenish our own forces to the greatest possible extent. It is now not only the main source of our arms and ammunition, but also an important source of our manpower. Complete annihilation demoralizes the enemy's troops and depresses his followers; it raises the morale of our troops and inspires our people. A quick decision makes it possible for our troops either to wipe out the enemy reinforcements one by one or evade them. Quick decision in battle and campaign is a necessary condition for the strategy of a protracted war.

5. Among our military cadres there are still many who, when not in action, approve the principle of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one, but often fail to apply it in action. That is due to underestimation of the enemy and to lack of intensive education and study. It is necessary to cite detailed cases of past battles to explain again and again the advantages of this method of fighting and to point out that it is the chief method of

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

defeating Chiang Kai-shek's attacks. Using this method we shall win. Acting counter to it we shall lose.

6. The principle of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one has been a fine tradition of our army ever since its founding more than a decade ago; this is not the first time it has been put forward. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, however, the dispersal of our forces for guerrilla warfare was primary, and the concentration of our forces for mobile warfare was supplementary. In the present civil war, as conditions have changed, so should the method of fighting. The concentration of our forces for mobile warfare should be primary, and the dispersal of our forces for guerrilla warfare should be supplementary. Now that Chiang Kai-shek's army has acquired more powerful weapons, it is necessary for our army to lay special stress on the method of concentrating a superior force to wipe out the enemy forces one by one.

7. When the enemy is on the offensive and we are on the defensive, this method must be employed. However, when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive, we should distinguish between two kinds of situations and adopt different methods. When our force is big and the enemy in that locality is rather weak, or when we are making a surprise attack on the enemy, we may strike at several of his units simultaneously. For example, between June 5 and 10, our troops in Shantung Province simultaneously attacked and captured more than ten towns on the Tsingtao-Tsinan and the Tientsin-Pukow Railways.[6] Or to take another example, between August 10 and 21, our troops under Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping attacked and captured more than ten towns along the section of the Lunghai Railway between Kaifeng and Hsuchow.[7] On the other hand, when we do not have enough forces, we should seize the enemy-occupied towns one by one and should not attack the enemy at several towns simultaneously. That was how our forces in Shansi Province took the towns along the Tatung-Puchow Railway.[8]

8. When the main force of our troops is concentrated to annihilate the enemy, it must co-ordinate its operations with vigorous activities by the regional formations, local guerrillas and people's militia. When regional formations (or troops) attack an enemy regiment, battalion or company, they should also adopt the principle of concentrating our forces to annihilate the enemy forces one by one.

9. The principle of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one is aimed chiefly at annihilating the enemy's effective

strength, not at holding or seizing a place. In some circumstances, it is permissible to abandon certain places for the purpose of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy or of enabling our main force to avoid heavy enemy attacks and to facilitate rest and consolidation for further fighting. So long as we are able to wipe out the enemy's effective strength on a large scale, it will be possible to recover lost territory and seize new territory. Therefore, all those who succeed in destroying the enemy's effective strength should be commended. This applies not only to those who destroy the enemy's regular forces but also to those who destroy his peace preservation corps, home-going contingents[9] and other reactionary local armed bands. However, we must hold or seize territory wherever the relative strength of the enemy and our own forces makes this possible or wherever such territory is significant for our campaigns or battles; to do otherwise would be a mistake. Therefore, those who succeed in holding or seizing such territory should also be commended.

NOTES

[1] The expressions "to destroy the enemy", "to wipe out the enemy" and "to annihilate the enemy" are used as synonyms in this book. They all include enemy troops killed, wounded and captured. To wipe out (annihilate, destroy) an enemy force means either to wipe it out completely or to wipe out the major part of that force.

[2] A regular corps of the Kuomintang army originally consisted of three (sometimes two) divisions, each with three regiments. Beginning in May 1946 the Kuomintang regular troops south of the Yellow River were reorganized in stages; what had been a corps became a reorganized division and former divisions became brigades, each with three (sometimes two) regiments. Part of the Kuomintang troops north of the Yellow River were not reorganized, and their designations remained the same. Some of the reorganized divisions later reverted to their original designation of corps.

[3] The communications police corps of the Kuomintang was formed in March 1945. Following Japan's surrender, the corps was deployed along communication lines for "garrison duties" under the pretext of guarding the railways, but actually to carry on secret police activities. It was one of the forces the Kuomintang used for fighting the civil war.

[4] In July 1946 the Kuomintang forces began a large-scale invasion of the Kiangsu-Anhwei Liberated Area, and our army fought bravely in self-defence. The Kuomintang troops attacking the Central Kiangsu Liberated Area consisted of fifteen brigades with about 120,000 men under Tang En-po. From July 13 to August 27, eighteen regiments of the Eastern China People's Liberation Army, commanded by Su Yu, Tan Chen-lin and other comrades, concentrated superior forces and fought seven successive battles in the region of Taihsing, Jukao, Hai-an and Shaopai in central Kiangsu. Our forces

wiped out six enemy brigades and five battalions of the enemy's communications police corps. The text refers to the results of two of these battles.

[5] In August 1946 the Kuomintang forces advanced along two routes from the Hsuchow and Chengchow sectors and attacked the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area. The People's Liberation Army of this area, under the command of Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and other comrades, concentrated superior forces to engage the enemy detachment advancing from Chengchow. Between September 3 and 8 they wiped out four enemy brigades in succession in the region of Hotse, Tingtao and Tsaohsien in Shantung Province.

[6] Early in June 1946 the Shantung People's Liberation Army sent an expedition against the puppet troops along the Tsingtao-Tsinan and Tientsin-Pukow Railways and liberated more than ten towns, including Chiaohsien, Changtien, Choutsun, Tehchow, Tai-an and Tsaochuang.

[7] From August 10 to 21, 1946, the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army, supporting the Central Plains and Eastern China People's Liberation Armies, moved by several routes and attacked the enemy troops stationed along the Kaifeng-Hsuchow section of the Lunghai Railway, capturing more than ten towns, including Tangshan, Lanfeng, Huangkou, Lichuang and Yangchi.

[8] In July 1946 the Kuomintang forces under Hu Tsung-nan and Yen Hsi-shan jointly attacked the Southern Shansi Liberated Area. The Taiyueh units of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army and a part of the Shansi-Suiyuan People's Liberation Army counter-attacked and beat back the enemy in southern Shansi. In August they started an offensive against the enemy between Linfen and Lingshih along the Tatung-Puchow Railway and liberated the towns of Hungtung, Chaocheng, Huohsien, Lingshih and Fenhsi.

[9] During the People's War of Liberation some landlords and local tyrants in the Liberated Areas fled to the Kuomintang areas. They were organized by the Kuomintang into "home-going contingents", "home-going legions" and other reactionary armed bands to attack the Liberated Areas together with the Kuomintang troops. Everywhere they robbed, killed and committed all kinds of atrocities.

THE TRUTH ABOUT U.S. “MEDIATION” AND THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIL WAR IN CHINA

Talk with the American Correspondent A. T. Steele

September 29, 1946

Steele: Sir, do you consider that the U.S. effort to mediate in the Chinese civil war has failed? If the policy of the United States continues as at present, what will it lead to?

Mao: I doubt very much that the policy of the U.S. government is one of “mediation”.[1] Judging by the large amount of aid the United States is giving Chiang Kai-shek to enable him to wage a civil war on an unprecedented scale, the policy of the U.S. government is to use the so-called mediation as a smoke-screen for strengthening Chiang Kai-shek in every way and suppressing the democratic forces in China through Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of slaughter so as to reduce China virtually to a U.S. colony. The continuation of this policy will certainly arouse the firm resistance of all patriotic people throughout China.

Steele: How long will the Chinese civil war go on? What will be its outcome?

Mao: If the U.S. government abandons its present policy of aiding Chiang Kai-shek, withdraws its forces now stationed in China and carries out the agreement reached at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain,[2] the Chinese civil war is sure to end at an early date. Otherwise it may turn into a long war. This would of course bring suffering to the Chinese people, but on the other hand, the Chinese people would certainly unite, fight for survival and decide their own fate. Whatever the difficulties and hardships, the Chinese people will certainly fulfil their task of achieving independence, peace and democracy. No forces of suppression, domestic or foreign, can prevent the fulfilment of this task.

Steele: Sir, do you consider Chiang Kai-shek the "natural leader" of the Chinese people? Is the Communist Party of China going to reject Chiang Kai-shek's five demands[3] in all circumstances? If the Kuomintang tries to convene a National Assembly without the participation of the Communist Party,[4] what action will the Communist Party take?

Mao: There is no such thing in the world as a "natural leader". If Chiang Kai-shek deals with the political, military, economic and other problems of China in accordance with the truce agreement[5] signed last January and the joint resolutions then adopted by the Political Consultative Conference,[6] and not in accordance with the so-called "five demands" or ten demands, which are one-sided and run counter to the agreement and joint resolutions, we will still be willing to work with him. The National Assembly must be convened jointly by various political parties, in line with the resolutions adopted by the Political Consultative Conference; otherwise we will firmly oppose it.

NOTES

[1] In December 1945 the U.S. government sent George C. Marshall to China as the president's special representative and used "mediation in the hostilities between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China" as a cover for strengthening the U.S. forces of aggression and the reactionary Kuomintang rule in various ways. To gain time to prepare for his civil war, Chiang Kai-shek, prompted by U.S. imperialism, pretended to accept the demand of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people to stop the civil war. In January 1946 representatives of the Kuomintang government and the Chinese Communist Party signed a truce agreement, issued a cease-fire order and formed the "Committee of Three" and the "Peiping Executive Headquarters" with the participation of U.S. representatives. During the "mediation", Marshall resorted to all kinds of ruses to help the Kuomintang forces attack the Liberated Areas, first in northeastern China and later in northern, eastern and central China; he actively trained and equipped the Kuomintang troops and supplied Chiang Kai-shek with a vast amount of arms and other war materiel. By June 1946 Chiang Kai-shek had massed 80 per cent of his regular forces (which were about two million men) at the front for attacks on the Liberated Areas; more than 540,000 of these troops were transported directly by the warships and planes of the U.S. armed forces. In July, when the disposition of his troops had

been completed, Chiang Kai-shek launched a country-wide counter-revolutionary war. Subsequently, on August 10, Marshall and Leighton Stuart, U.S. ambassador to China, issued a joint statement declaring that "mediation" had failed in order to give Chiang Kai-shek a free hand to wage civil war.

[2] This refers to the agreement on China reached at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain in December 1945. In the conference communique the three foreign ministers "reaffirmed their adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China". The foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that Soviet and U.S. forces should be withdrawn from China at the earliest possible time. The Soviet Union faithfully carried out the terms of this agreement. It was only because of repeated requests from the Kuomintang government that the Soviet forces postponed the date of withdrawal. On May 3, 1946, the armed forces of the Soviet Union completed their withdrawal from northeastern China. But the U.S. government broke its promise completely, refused to withdraw its troops and stepped up its interference in China's internal affairs.

[3] On two occasions, in June and August 1946, Chiang Kai-shek put forward his "five demands" to the Chinese Communist Party, declaring that only if the Communist Party accepted them would the Kuomintang consider stopping the civil war. The five demands stipulated that the Chinese People's Liberation Army withdraw from the following places: (1) all areas south of the Lunghai Railway; (2) the entire length of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway; (3) Chengteh and the area south of it; (4) most of northeastern China; and (5) all areas liberated since June 7, 1946, from the puppet troops in Shantung and Shansi Provinces by the people's armed forces of the Liberated Areas. The Chinese Communist Party categorically rejected all these counter-revolutionary demands.

[4] According to the resolution of the Political Consultative Conference held in January 1946, the National Assembly was to be an assembly of democracy and unity, in which various political parties would take part, and was to be convened under the auspices of a reorganized government after the terms of the agreements reached at the Political Consultative Conference had been carried out. On October 11, 1946, the Kuomintang troops occupied Changchiakou, and this "victory" turned the heads of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. On that very afternoon it openly violated the terms of the PCC resolution and ordered the convening of a divisive and dictatorial "National Assembly" controlled exclusively by the Kuomintang. Officially opened in Nanking on November 15, 1946, this "National Assembly" was firmly opposed and boycotted by the Chinese Communist Party, the democratic parties and the entire people.

[5] See "Smash Chiang Kai-shek's Offensive by a War of Self-Defence", Note 1, p. 92 of this volume.

[6] See the same article, Note 2, pp. 92-95 of this volume.

A THREE MONTHS' SUMMARY*

October 1, 1946

1. The Central Committee's directive of July 20 on the current situation[1] stated: "We can defeat Chiang Kai-shek. The whole Party should be fully confident of this." The fighting in July, August and September has proved this judgement to be correct.

2. Apart from the fundamental political and economic contradictions which Chiang Kai-shek cannot resolve and which are the basic cause rendering our victory certain and Chiang's defeat inevitable, a sharp contradiction has arisen in the military sphere between Chiang's over-extended battle lines and his shortage of troops. That contradiction is bound to be the direct cause of our victory and Chiang Kai-shek's defeat.

3. The total of Chiang Kai-shek's regular troops attacking the Liberated Areas, not counting the puppet troops, the peace preservation corps and communications police corps, is more than 190 brigades. Besides this total, the most he can do is again to move part of his troops from the south to the north as reinforcements; but after that it will be hard for him to send any more reinforcements. Of the 190 odd brigades, 25 have been wiped out by our army in the past three months. This does not include the forces we wiped out in the Northeast from February to June this year.

4. Of Chiang Kai-shek's more than 190 brigades, nearly half must perform garrison duties; only a little more than half can be put into the field. And when these field forces advance to certain regions, part or even a majority will have to switch over to garrison duty. The enemy's field forces are bound to dwindle as the fighting goes on because, first, they will be continually wiped out by us and, second, many will have to perform garrison duties.

5. Of the 25 brigades we destroyed in the past three months, 7 were under the command of Tang En-po (previously under Li Mo-an),

2 under Hsueh Yueh, 7 under Ku Chu-tung (previously under Liu Chih), 2 under Hu Tsung-nan, 4 under Yen Hsi-shan, 2 under Wang Yao-wu and 1 under Tu Yu-ming. Only the 4 groups under Li Tsung-jen, Fu Tso-yi, Ma Hung-kuei and Cheng Chien have not yet received crushing blows from our army; all the remaining 7 groups have received serious blows or initial blows. Those who have received serious blows are Tu Yu-ming (taking into account the fighting in the Northeast from February to June this year), Tang En-po, Ku Chu-tung and Yen Hsi-shan. Those who have received initial blows are Hsueh Yueh, Hu Tsung-nan and Wang Yao-wu. All this proves that our army can defeat Chiang Kai-shek.

6. In the coming period our task is to wipe out some 25 more enemy brigades. The completion of this task will make it possible to halt Chiang Kai-shek's offensive and recover part of our lost territory. It can be predicted that after wiping out this second batch of 25 brigades our army will certainly be able to seize the strategic initiative and go over from the defensive to the offensive. Our task then will be to destroy a third batch of 25 enemy brigades. If we achieve that, we can recover most or even all of the lost territory and expand the Liberated Areas. By that time a tremendous change will surely have taken place in the relative military strength of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. To attain this we must follow up our great achievement of wiping out 25 brigades in the past three months and destroy about 25 more in the coming three months or so. This is the key to changing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves.[2]

7. In the past three months we have lost a few dozen medium and small towns, such as Huaiyin, Hotse, Chengteh and Chining. The abandonment of most of these towns was unavoidable and it was right to abandon them temporarily on our own initiative. Some others we were forced to abandon because we did not fight well. In any case, we shall be able to recover our lost territory, provided we fight

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It summed up in detail the series of experiences in the three months of fighting beginning with the outbreak of the country-wide civil war in July 1946, set forth the strategy and fighting tasks of the People's Liberation Army from then on and pointed out that after overcoming a period of difficulties we were certain to win victory in the People's War of Liberation. The directive also explained in principle the problems which needed to be solved for the support of and in co-ordination with the People's War of Liberation, such as land reform, the development of production in the Liberated Areas, the strengthening of leadership in the mass struggles in the Kuomintang areas and other relevant problems.

well from now on. In the future there may still be places we cannot prevent the enemy from taking, but we shall be able to recover all of them later. All areas should critically review their past experience in fighting in order to draw lessons and avoid repeating mistakes.

8. In the past three months our Central Plains Liberation Army has shown matchless stamina in overcoming difficulties and hardships and, aside from that part of the army which has moved into the old Liberated Areas, its main force has established two guerrilla bases in southern Shensi and western Hupeh.[3] Moreover, in both eastern and central Hupeh our troops are persisting in guerrilla warfare. All this has greatly helped, and is still helping, the fighting in the old Liberated Areas, and it will play a greater role in the long war ahead.

9. In the past three months of war we have pinned down south of the Great Wall several of Chiang Kai-shek's crack forces, which he had originally planned to send to the Northeast, and have thus gained time for resting and consolidating our troops and for arousing the masses in the Northeast. This, too, is of great significance for our future struggles.

10. To concentrate a superior force to wipe out the enemy forces one by one is the only correct method of fighting, the method we have used in the past three months to destroy 25 enemy brigades. Only by concentrating a force six, five, four or at least three times as strong as the enemy's force can we be effective in wiping it out. This must be done both in campaigns and in battles. This method of fighting must be mastered not only by all high-ranking commanders but also by all middle and lower-ranking cadres.

11. In the past three months, in addition to 25 regular brigades of the enemy, our army has destroyed considerable numbers of reactionary forces, such as puppet troops, peace preservation corps and communications police corps; this also is a great achievement. We should continue to annihilate such troops in large numbers.

12. The experience of the past three months has proved that in order to wipe out 10,000 enemy troops we have to pay a price of 2,000 to 3,000 casualties of our own. This is unavoidable. To cope with a long war (and everything, everywhere should be considered with such a war in mind) we must expand our army in a planned way, ensure that our main forces are always kept at full strength and train large numbers of military cadres. We must develop production and regulate finances according to plan and firmly put into effect the principles of developing our economy and ensuring supply, of unified

leadership and decentralized management and of giving consideration to both the army and the people and to both public and private interests.

13. The experience of these three months has proved that higher fighting efficiency was shown by all troops who, during the period of the truce from January to June, intensified their military training according to the directives of the Central Committee (which has repeatedly instructed the various areas to regard troop training, production and land reform as their three central tasks). It has also proved that all troops not so trained showed much lower fighting efficiency. From now on, all areas must utilize the intervals between battles for intensified military training. All army units must strengthen their political work.

14. The experience of these three months has proved that the peasants stood with our Party and our army against the attacks of Chiang Kai-shek's troops wherever the Central Committee's directive of May 4[4] was carried out firmly and speedily and the land problem was solved radically and thoroughly. The peasants took a wait-and-see attitude wherever the "May 4th Directive" was not carried out firmly or the arrangements were made too late, or wherever this work was mechanically divided into stages or land reform was neglected on the excuse of preoccupation with the war. In the coming few months all areas, no matter how busy they are with the war, must resolutely lead the peasant masses to solve the land problem and, on the basis of the land reform, make arrangements for large-scale production work next year.

15. The experience of these three months has proved that wherever the regional armed forces, including the people's militia, the guerrillas and the armed working teams,[5] are well organized, we can control vast rural areas even though many points and lines are temporarily occupied by the enemy. But wherever the regional armed forces are weak and the leadership is poor, the enemy is given a much easier time. From now on, in areas temporarily occupied by the enemy, we must strengthen the Party's leadership, develop the regional armed forces, persevere in guerrilla warfare, safeguard the interests of the masses and strike blows at the activities of the reactionaries.

16. Three months of war have almost exhausted the reserve forces of the Kuomintang and seriously weakened its military strength in its own areas. At the same time, the Kuomintang's resumption of conscription and grain levies[6] has aroused popular discontent and created a situation favourable for the development of mass struggles.

The whole Party must strengthen its leadership of the mass struggles in the Kuomintang areas and intensify the work of disintegrating the Kuomintang army.

17. The Kuomintang reactionaries, under the direction of the United States, have violated the truce agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference of January this year and are determined to wage the civil war in their attempt to destroy the people's democratic forces. All their fine words are nothing but humbug; we must expose all the plots of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek.

18. In these three months the broadest strata of the people in the Kuomintang areas, including the national bourgeoisie,[7] have quickly arrived at a better understanding of the fact that the Kuomintang and the United States government are working in collusion, have started the civil war and are oppressing the people. More and more people now realize the truth that Marshall's mediation is a fraud and that the Kuomintang is the arch-criminal of the civil war. The broad masses, disillusioned with the United States and the Kuomintang, now place their hopes on the victory of our Party. This domestic political situation is extremely favourable. The reactionary policy of U.S. imperialism is rousing increasing discontent among the broad masses of the people in all countries. The level of political consciousness of the people in all countries is rising every day. The people's democratic struggle is mounting in all capitalist countries, the strength of the Communist Parties in many countries has greatly increased, and it will be impossible for the reactionaries to reduce them to submission. The might of the Soviet Union and its prestige among the peoples are growing daily. The U.S. reactionaries and the reactionaries whom they support in other countries are bound to become more and more isolated. This international political situation is extremely favourable. The situation both at home and abroad differs greatly from that after World War I. The revolutionary forces have grown tremendously since World War II. We can defeat the Chinese and foreign reactionaries, no matter how rampant they are (this rampancy is historically inevitable and not at all strange). Leading comrades in all areas should explain this fully to those comrades in the Party who are gloomy about the future of the struggle owing to their inadequate understanding of the favourable situation at home and abroad. It must be made clear that the enemy still has strength, that we ourselves still have some weaknesses and that the struggle is still a long and cruel one. But we can certainly

win victory. This understanding and conviction must be firmly established throughout the Party.

19. The coming few months will be an important and difficult period. We must strenuously mobilize the whole Party, undertake meticulously planned military operations and radically change the military situation. All areas must resolutely carry out the above policies and strive for a radical change in the military situation.

NOTES

[1] See "Smash Chiang Kai-shek's Offensive by a War of Self-Defence", pp. 89-95 of this volume.

[2] Later developments showed that the situation between the enemy and ourselves began to change in July 1947, when the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army forced the Yellow River and marched towards the Tapieh Mountains. By then the People's Liberation Army had fought for twelve months and wiped out about a hundred enemy brigades, averaging eight a month. This exceeded the estimate made in this article because, with the support of U.S. imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek had used all his available forces in the offensive.

[3] At the end of June 1946 the Central Plains Liberation Army led by Li Hsien-nien, Cheng Wei-san and other comrades initiated a strategic shift of its forces and victoriously broke through an encirclement by 300,000 Kuomintang troops. The units mentioned by Comrade Mao Tse-tung as having moved into the old Liberated Areas were those led by Wang Chen and other comrades; they entered the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region after breaking through the encirclement. The guerrilla base in southern Shensi was founded by a part of the main force of the Central Plains Liberation Army and included Lushih and Hsichuan in western Honan and Lonan and Shanyang in southern Shensi. The guerrilla base in western Hupeh was set up by another part of the same army with the Wutang Mountains in northwestern Hupeh as its centre.

[4] This refers to the "Directive on the Land Question" issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on May 4, 1946. After Japan's surrender, in view of the peasants' eager demand for land, the Central Committee decided to change the land policy of the period of the War of Resistance, that is, to change from the reduction of rent and interest to confiscation of the land of the landlords and its distribution among the peasants. The "May 4th Directive" marked this change.

[5] The armed working teams were small working teams which went deep into the enemy-occupied areas to organize the masses and strike blows at the enemy. Such a team consisted of cadres drawn from various organizations — the Communist Party, the governments in the Liberated Areas, the people's army and mass organizations — and was equipped with some weapons. This was a convenient form of organization for carrying out activities in the enemy-occupied areas.

[6] This refers to land taxes in kind.

[7] The national bourgeoisie is the section of the bourgeoisie which has little or no connection with imperialism, as distinguished from that section of the bourgeoisie which is closely dependent on imperialism and is comprador in character, that is, the big bourgeoisie or bureaucrat-capitalists.

GREET THE NEW HIGH TIDE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION*

February 1, 1947

1. All circumstances now show that the situation in China is about to enter a new stage of development. This new stage is one in which the country-wide struggle against imperialism and feudalism will develop into a great new people's revolution. We are now on the eve of this revolution. The task of our Party is to struggle for the advent of this high tide and its triumph.

2. The military situation has now developed in a direction favourable to the people. In seven months of fighting, from last July to this January, we wiped out 56 brigades of Chiang Kai-shek's regular forces which invaded the Liberated Areas, a monthly average of 8 brigades, not counting the numerous puppet troops and the peace preservation corps which were wiped out and those of Chiang's regular forces which were routed. Although Chiang Kai-shek's offensive continues in southern and western Shantung, in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, along the northern section of the Peiping-Hankow Railway and in southern Manchuria, it has become much feebler than it was last autumn. Chiang Kai-shek's army does not have enough troops to dispose and cannot fulfil its conscription quotas; this fact is in serious contradiction with its extended battle lines and the enormous drain on its manpower. The morale of Chiang's army is sinking lower every day. During the recent fighting in northern Kiangsu, southern and western Shantung and western Shansi, the morale of many of Chiang's forces sank to a very low level. On several fronts our armies are beginning to seize the initiative, while Chiang Kai-shek's armies are beginning to lose it. We can foresee that in the next few months we may achieve the objective of wiping out a grand total of 100 of Chiang's brigades, including those previously destroyed. Chiang Kai-shek has altogether 93 regular infantry and cavalry divisions

(corps), composed of 248 brigades (divisions), totalling 1,916,000 men, not counting the puppet troops, police, local peace preservation corps, communications police corps, rear services and technical arms. The forces attacking the Liberated Areas number 78 divisions (corps), composed of 218 brigades (divisions), totalling 1,713,000 men, or about 90 per cent of Chiang Kai-shek's regular troops. Only 15 divisions, with 30 brigades, totalling 203,000 men, or about 100 per cent of the total, remain in the Kuomintang rear areas. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek can no longer send large combat-worthy reinforcements from his rear areas to attack the Liberated Areas. We have already wiped out more than a quarter of the 218 brigades attacking the Liberated Areas. Although some have been replenished and restored under their original designations after having been wiped out, their combat effectiveness is very low. Some have been wiped out a second time. Some have not been replenished at all. If our armies can wipe out another 40 to 50 brigades in the next few months and bring the grand total up to about 100, there will be an important change in the military situation.

3. Meanwhile, a great people's movement is unfolding in the Kuomintang areas. The riots of the people in Shanghai,[1] which began on November 30 of last year as a result of the Kuomintang's persecution of the street vendors, and the student movement in Peiping, which began last December 30 as a result of the rape of a Chinese girl student by U.S. soldiers,[2] both mark a new upsurge in the struggle of the people in the Chiang Kai-shek areas. The student movement which began in Peiping has spread to other big cities all over the country, with hundreds of thousands taking part and on a larger scale than the December 9th Student Movement against Japanese imperialism.[3]

4. The victories of the People's Liberation Army in the Liberated Areas and the development of the people's movement in the Kuomintang areas foretell that a great new people's revolution against imperialism and feudalism is surely approaching and can be victorious.

5. The circumstances in which this situation has arisen are that U.S. imperialism and its running dog Chiang Kai-shek have replaced Japanese imperialism and its running dog Wang Ching-wei and adopted the policies of turning China into a U.S. colony, launching a civil war and strengthening the fascist dictatorship. Confronted by these reactionary policies of U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek,

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

the Chinese people have no way out except through struggle. The struggle for independence, peace and democracy still constitutes the basic demand of the Chinese people in the present period. As far back as April 1945, our Party's Seventh National Congress foresaw the possibility that U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek would carry out these reactionary policies and formulated a complete and fully correct political line to defeat them.

6. These reactionary policies of U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek have forced all strata of the Chinese people to unite for their own salvation. These strata include the workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, enlightened gentry, other patriotic elements, the minority nationalities and overseas Chinese. This is a very broad united front of the whole nation. In comparison with the united front in the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, it is not only as broad in scope but has even deeper foundations. All Party comrades must strive to consolidate and develop this united front. In the Liberated Areas the policy of the "three thirds system"[4] is to remain unchanged, on the condition that the policy of land to the tillers is carried out resolutely and unhesitatingly. In addition to Communists, we should continue to draw the broad ranks of progressives outside the Party and the middle elements (such as the enlightened gentry) into the organs of political power and into social undertakings. In the Liberated Areas, all citizens, irrespective of class, sex or belief, have the right to elect and stand for election, except traitors and those reactionaries who have opposed the interests of the people and incurred their bitter hatred. After the system of land to the tillers has been thoroughly carried out, the right to private property of the people in the Liberated Areas will continue to be guaranteed.

7. Because the Chiang Kai-shek government has pursued reactionary financial and economic policies for a long time and because Chiang Kai-shek's bureaucrat-comprador capital[5] has become linked with U.S. imperialist capital through the notorious and treasonable Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce,[6] malignant inflation has swiftly developed; the industry and commerce of China's national bourgeoisie are daily going bankrupt; the livelihood of the working masses, government employees and teachers is deteriorating every day; large numbers of middle class elements are losing their savings and becoming penniless; and therefore strikes of workers and students and other struggles are constantly occurring. An economic crisis more serious than China has ever faced before is threatening all strata of the people.

In order to carry on the civil war, Chiang Kai-shek has restored the extremely vicious system of conscription and grain levies of the period of the War of Resistance; this makes life impossible for the vast rural population, particularly the poverty-stricken peasants; as a result, peasant revolts have already started and will continue to spread. Hence, the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek ruling clique will become more and more discredited in the eyes of the broad masses of the people and be confronted with serious political and military crises. On the one hand, this situation is daily pushing forward the people's anti-imperialist, anti-feudal movement in the areas under Chiang Kai-shek's control; on the other hand, it is further demoralizing Chiang's troops and increasing the possibility of victory by the People's Liberation Army.

8. The illegal and divisive "National Assembly", which was convened by Chiang Kai-shek in order to isolate our Party and other democratic forces, and the bogus constitution fabricated by that body enjoy no prestige at all among the people. Instead of isolating our Party and other democratic forces, they have isolated the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek ruling clique itself. Our Party and other democratic forces adopted the policy of refusing to participate in the bogus National Assembly; this was perfectly correct. The reactionary Chiang Kai-shek ruling clique has brought over to its side the Youth Party[7] and the Democratic Socialist Party,[8] two small parties which never had the slightest prestige in Chinese society, as well as certain so-called "public personages",[9] and it can be foreseen that some of the middle-of-the-roaders may also go over to the side of reaction. The reason is that the democratic forces in China are getting stronger and stronger while the reactionary forces are becoming more and more isolated, and therefore the line between the enemy and ourselves has to be so sharply drawn. All elements which hide in the democratic front and deceive the people will eventually be revealed in their true colours and be cast aside by the people; and the people's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal ranks will grow even stronger because they have drawn a clear line of demarcation between themselves and these hidden reactionaries.

9. The development of the international situation is extremely favourable for the Chinese people's struggle. The growing might of the Soviet Union and the successes of its foreign policy, the growing radicalization of the peoples of the world and their ever-developing struggles against reactionary forces both at home and abroad — these

two great factors have forced U.S. imperialism and its running dogs in various countries into ever greater isolation and will continue to do so. If one adds the factor of an inevitable economic crisis in the United States, then U.S. imperialism and its running dogs will be forced into an even worse predicament. The power of U.S. imperialism and its running dog Chiang Kai-shek is only temporary; their offensives can be smashed. The myth that the offensives of the reactionaries cannot be smashed should have no place in our ranks. The Central Committee has pointed this out time and again, and the development of the international and domestic situation has increasingly borne out the correctness of this judgement.

10. In order to gain a respite in which to replenish his troops and launch a fresh offensive, to obtain new loans and munitions from the United States and to allay the indignation of the people, Chiang Kai-shek is perpetrating a new hoax by demanding the resumption of so-called peace negotiations with our Party.[10] Our Party's policy is not to refuse negotiations and in this way expose his deception.

11. In order to smash Chiang Kai-shek's offensive thoroughly, we must wipe out another forty to fifty of his brigades in the next few months; this is the key that will decide everything. To achieve this objective, we must put into full effect the Central Committee's directive of October 1 last year, "A Three Months' Summary",[11] and the Military Commission's directive of September 16 last year on concentrating our forces to destroy the enemy forces one by one.[12] Here, we are once again emphasizing a few points for the attention of the comrades in all areas:

(a) The Military Problem. In the past seven months of bitter fighting our army has proved that it can certainly smash Chiang Kai-shek's offensive and win final victory. Our army has improved in both equipment and tactics. From now on, the central task in building our armed forces is to make every effort to step up the building of our artillery and engineer corps. All military areas, big and small, and all field armies should solve the concrete problems involved in strengthening the artillery and engineer corps and, first of all, the two problems of training cadres and manufacturing ammunition.

(b) The Land Problem. In about two-thirds of the territory in each Liberated Area, the Central Committee's directive of May 4, 1946,[13] has been put into effect, the land problem has been solved and the policy of land to the tillers has been carried out; this is a great victory. There remains around one-third of the territory, however, where further efforts must be made to arouse the masses fully and put the policy of land to the tillers into effect. In places where the policy of land to the tillers has been carried out, there are still shortcomings insofar as the solution was not thorough — mainly because the masses were not fully aroused, so that the confiscation and the distribution of land were not thorough and the masses became dissatisfied. In such places, we must check carefully and must "even up"[14] to ensure that the peasants with little or no land obtain some and the bad gentry and local tyrants are punished. In the entire process of carrying out the policy of land to the tillers, we must unite firmly with the middle peasants, and it is absolutely impermissible to encroach on the interests of the middle peasants (including the well-to-do middle peasants); if cases occur where the interests of the middle peasants are encroached upon, there must be compensation and apology. Moreover, during and after the land reform, appropriate consideration in accordance with the will of the masses should be given to ordinary rich peasants and middle and small landlords, and it should be given in accordance with the "May 4th Directive". To sum up, in the land reform movement in the rural areas we must unite with the more than 90 per cent of the masses who support the reform and isolate the small number of feudal reactionaries who oppose it so that we can speedily realize the policy of land to the tillers.

(c) The Production Problem. All places must plan on a long-term basis, work hard at production, practise economy and correctly solve the financial problem on the basis of production and economy. The first principle here is to develop production and ensure supply. For this reason, we must oppose the wrong view which lays one-sided emphasis on finance and commerce and neglects agricultural and industrial production. The second principle is to give consideration to both the army and the people, to both public and private interests. Therefore, we must oppose the wrong view which takes only one side into account and neglects the other. The third principle is unified leadership and decentralized management. Therefore, except where conditions call for centralized management, we must oppose the wrong view which favours centralizing everything, regardless of circumstances, and which dares not give full rein to decentralized management.

12. Our Party and the Chinese people have every assurance of final victory; there is not the slightest doubt about it. But that does not mean there are no difficulties before us. China's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle is protracted in nature, Chinese and foreign

reactionaries will continue to oppose the Chinese people with all their strength, fascist rule in the areas under Chiang Kai-shek's control will be intensified; certain parts of the Liberated Areas will temporarily become enemy-occupied areas or guerrilla zones, some of the revolutionary forces may suffer temporary losses, and there will be losses of manpower and material resources in a long war. The comrades throughout the Party must take all this fully into account and be prepared to overcome all difficulties with an indomitable will and in a planned way. The reactionary forces and we both have difficulties. But the difficulties of the reactionary forces are insurmountable because they are forces on the verge of death and have no future. Our difficulties can be overcome because we are new and rising forces and have a bright future.

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[1] Beginning in August 1946 the Kuomintang authorities in Shanghai forbade the street vendors in the Whangpoo and Louza districts to carry on their business. In late November nearly a thousand who were still operating were arrested. On November 30 three thousand street vendors demonstrated and surrounded the Whangpoo district police station. The Kuomintang authorities gave the order to fire; seven demonstrators were killed and a great many were wounded and arrested. On December 1, the street vendors continued their struggle. Despite the fact that ten more were killed and over a hundred wounded, the number taking part in the struggle grew to over five thousand. All shops in Shanghai closed down to show sympathy. Thus the incident developed into a city-wide mass movement against Chiang Kai-shek.

[2] This incident occurred in Peiping on December 24, 1946. A girl student of Peking University was raped by U.S. soldiers. Consequently, from December 30 through January 1947, students in scores of big and medium cities in the Kuomintang areas struck and demonstrated against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from China. More than half a million students took part in this movement.

[3] In 1935 a new upsurge began in the patriotic movement of the people of the whole country. Students in Peking, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, were the first to hold a patriotic demonstration on December 9, putting forward such slogans as "Stop the civil war and unite to resist foreign aggression" and "Down with Japanese imperialism!" This movement broke open the long reign of terror imposed by the Kuomintang government in league with the Japanese invaders and soon won the support of the people throughout the country. It is known as the "December 9th Movement". As a consequence, new changes became manifest in the relations among various classes in the country, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front proposed by the Communist Party of China became the openly advocated policy of

all patriotic people. The Kuomintang government became very isolated with its traitorous policy.

[4] The "three thirds system" was the Chinese Communist Party's policy for united front organs of political power in the Liberated Areas during the War of Resistance Against Japan. According to this policy, the proportion of personnel in the anti-Japanese democratic political organs was about one-third each for Communist Party members, for left progressives, and for middle elements and others.

[5] See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Section 6, pp. 167-69 of this volume.

[6] The "Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce" or "Sino-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" was concluded between the Chiang Kai-shek government and the U.S. government on November 4, 1946, in Nanking. This treaty, which sold out a large part of China's sovereignty to the United States, contains thirty articles, the main contents of which are as follows:

> (1) U.S. nationals shall enjoy in "the whole extent of . . . the territories" of China the rights to reside, travel, carry on commercial, manufacturing, processing, scientific, educational, religious and philanthropic activities, explore and exploit mineral resources, lease and hold land, and follow various occupations and pursuits. In regard to economic rights U.S. nationals in China shall be accorded the same treatment as Chinese.
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> (2) In respect of taxation, sale, distribution and use in China, U.S. commodities shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the commodities of any third country or to Chinese commodities. "No prohibition or restriction shall be imposed" by China on the importation from the United States of any article grown, produced or manufactured in the United States, or on the exportation to the United States of any Chinese article.
>
> (3) U.S. vessels shall have the freedom of sailing in any of the ports, places or waters in China which are open to foreign commerce or navigation, and their personnel and freight shall have freedom of transit through Chinese territory "by the routes most convenient". On the pretext of "any . . . distress", U.S. vessels, including warships, can sail into "any of the ports, places or waters" of China which are "not open to foreign commerce or navigation".

Wellington Koo, then Chiang Kai-shek's ambassador to the United States, openly and shamelessly stated that this treaty meant "the opening of the entire territory of China to U.S. merchants".

[7] The Youth Party was the shortened name of the Chinese Youth Party, also called the *Étatiste* Party; its predecessor was the Chinese *Étatiste* Youth League. This party was composed of a handful of fascist politicians. They made counter-revolutionary careers for themselves by opposing the Communist Party and the Soviet Union and therefore received subsidies from various groups of reactionaries in power and from the imperialists.

[8] The Democratic Socialist Party was formed in August 1946 through the merger of the Democratic Constitutional Party and the National Socialist Party. It consisted mainly of reactionary politicians and feudal dregs from the time of the Northern warlords.

[9] "Certain so-called public personages" refers to shameless politicians like Wang Yun-wu, Fu Sze-nien and Hu Cheng-chih, who posed as persons with no party affiliation and served as a window-dressing for Chiang Kai-shek's "National Assembly".

[10] On January 16, 1947, because of repeated setbacks in its military offensives and because of its worsening military situation, the Kuomintang government, in an

attempt to gain a respite and prepare a fresh offensive, asked the Chinese Communist Party, through the U.S. ambassador to China, Leighton Stuart, for permission to send delegates to Yenan for "peace negotiations". This new U.S.-Chiang deception was promptly and thoroughly exposed by the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party pointed out that negotiations could be renewed only if two minimum conditions were fulfilled: (1) the bogus constitution framed and adopted by the Kuomintang in violation of the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference had to be abolished, and (2) Kuomintang troops had to evacuate all the territory of the Liberated Areas they had occupied since the truce agreement went into effect on January 13, 1946; otherwise, there would be no guarantee that the Kuomintang would not again tear up any agreement reached in renewed negotiations. The Kuomintang government realized that the ruse of "peace" did not work and on February 27 and 28 it notified all the representatives of the Chinese Communist Party stationed in Nanking, Shanghai and Chungking for negotiations and liaison that they had to leave and announced the complete breakdown of the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

[11] This refers to the article, "A Three Months' Summary", pp. 113-18 of this volume.

[12] This refers to the article, "Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One", pp. 103-07 of this volume.

[13] This refers to the "Directive on the Land Question" of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party dated May 4, 1946. See "A Three Months' Summary", Note 4, p. 118 of this volume.

[14] "Evening up" was a policy adopted in the old Liberated Areas, where a comparatively thorough land reform had been carried out. The purpose was to solve the problem of insufficient land and other means of production among some of the poor peasants and farm labourers and other problems left over from the reform. The method was, on a limited scale, to take from those who had better and give to those who had worse, to take from those who had a surplus and give to those who had a shortage, so that the distribution of land and other means of production could be rationally readjusted.

ON THE TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT OF YENAN AND THE DEFENCE OF THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGSIA BORDER REGION — TWO DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA*

November 1946 and April 1947

I. DIRECTIVE OF NOVEMBER 18, 1946

Chiang Kai-shek is at the end of his rope. He wants to strike at our Party and strengthen himself by two methods, by convening the "National Assembly" and by attacking Yenan. Actually, he will accomplish the very opposite. The Chinese people resolutely oppose the "National Assembly" stage-managed by Chiang Kai-shek to split the nation; the opening day of that assembly marked the beginning of the self-destruction of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. Now that we have wiped out thirty-five brigades[1] of Chiang Kai-shek's troops and their offensive power is nearly exhausted, even if his troops should occupy Yenan by means of a sudden thrust, it would not damage the general prospect of victory in the People's War of Liberation, nor could it save Chiang Kai-shek from the doom awaiting him. In short, Chiang Kai-shek has taken the road to ruin; as soon as he makes these two moves of convening the "National Assembly" and attacking Yenan, all his trickery will be exposed; this will help the progress of the People's War of Liberation. In every area we should fully explain to people inside and outside the Party these two actions of Chiang Kai-shek, the convening of the "National Assembly" and the attack on Yenan, and unite the whole Party, the whole army and the whole people in the fight to smash Chiang Kai-shek's offensive and build a democratic China.

II. CIRCULAR OF APRIL 9, 1947

In order to save its moribund regime, the Kuomintang, besides taking such steps as convening the bogus National Assembly, drawing up the bogus constitution, driving out the representative agencies of our Party from Nanking, Shanghai and Chungking and proclaiming a break between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party,[2] has taken the further step of attacking Yenan, the seat of our Party's Central Committee and the General Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army, and of attacking the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

The fact that the Kuomintang has taken these steps does not in the least indicate that its regime is strong but rather that the crisis of the Kuomintang regime has become extremely deep. Its attack on Yenan and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region is moreover a vain attempt to settle the Northwest question first, cut off our Party's right arm, drive our Party's Central Committee and the General Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army from the Northwest, then move its troops to attack northern China and so achieve the objective of defeating our forces one by one.

In these circumstances, the Central Committee has decided as follows:

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* The first of these two documents was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in Yenan in the winter of 1946 when Kuomintang troops were preparing to attack that city, and the second at Chingyangcha, Hengshan County, northern Shensi, twenty days after Kuomintang troops occupied Yenan on March 19, 1947. After the bankruptcy of Chiang Kai-shek's plan for an all-out offensive against the Liberated Areas, he adopted frantic measures to save his dying regime, convened a bogus National Assembly, expelled the representatives of the Communist Party of China from the Kuomintang areas and launched an attack on Yenan, the seat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. As these documents pointed out, the outcome of Chiang Kai-shek's measures was his complete self-destruction politically. Militarily, he concentrated his forces on the eastern and western flanks of the Liberated Areas that is, the Shantung Liberated Area and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Liberated Area in an attempt to carry out "attacks against key sectors"; and again the outcome was complete failure. The Kuomintang troops attacking the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region were more than 230,000 strong, while the Northwest People's Liberation Army had only some 20,000 in that region. Therefore the enemy forces were able to occupy Yenan and all the region's county towns, which we abandoned on our own initiative. The enemy, however, failed to achieve his objective of destroying the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Northwest People's Liberation Army or of driving them east of the Yellow River. On the contrary, he suffered many heavy blows from our army, lost about 100,000 men and finally had to flee in confusion from the Border Region, while our army triumphantly went

1. We must defend and expand the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Liberated Areas in the Northwest with a firm fighting spirit; it is entirely possible to achieve this objective.
2. The Central Committee of our Party and the General Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army must remain in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. It is an area where we have a favourable mountainous terrain, a good mass base, plenty of room for manoeuvre, and full guarantee for security.
3. At the same time, to facilitate our work, we have set up a Working Committee of the Central Committee to proceed to northwestern Shansi or some other suitable place to carry out the tasks entrusted to it by the Central Committee.

These three decisions were made last month and have already been put into effect. You are hereby notified.

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over to the offensive for the liberation of the Great Northwest. Moreover, our army in the Northwest theatre, employing a very small force, pinned down and destroyed large numbers of the enemy's main force, and thereby strongly supported the operations of our troops in other theatres, particularly in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan theatre, and helped them go over more quickly to the offensive. Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army remained in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region the whole time from March 1947, when our army withdrew from Yenan, to a year later when we went over to the offensive in the Northwest theatre. This fact was of great political significance. It greatly inspired and strengthened the will to fight and the confidence in victory of the army and the people in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and in other Liberated Areas throughout the country. While in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, Comrade Mao Tse-tung not only continued to direct the People's War of Liberation on all fronts throughout the country but also took personal command in the Northwest theatre and successfully achieved the aim set forth in the present document, "defend and expand the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Liberated Areas in the Northwest with a firm fighting spirit". Concerning the operations in the Northwest theatre, see "The Concept of Operations for the Northwest War Theatre", pp. 133-34 and "On the Great Victory in the Northwest and on the New Type of Ideological Education Movement in the Liberation Army", pp. 211-17, of this volume.

NOTES

[1] The statistics were for the period from early July to November 13, 1946.

[2] On February 27-28, 1947, the representatives and personnel of the Chinese Communist Party stationed in Nanking, Shanghai and Chungking for negotiations and liaison were forced by the Kuomintang government to leave within a stated time. On March 15, 1947, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang convened its third plenary session, at which Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed the Kuomintang's break with the Communist Party and his determination to fight the civil war to the finish.

THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NORTHWEST WAR THEATRE*

April 15, 1947

1. The enemy is now quite tired, but not yet tired out. He is in considerable difficulties with his food supply, but not yet in extreme difficulties. Although our army has not destroyed any large number of the enemy's forces since wiping out his 31st Brigade,[1] in the last twenty days we have achieved the objective of tiring him and considerably reducing his food supplies, thus creating favourable conditions for tiring him out completely, cutting off all his food supplies and finally wiping him out.

2. At present, despite the enemy's fatigue and shortage of food, his policy is to drive our main force east across the Yellow River, then seal off Suiteh and Michih and divide his forces for "mopping-up" operations. The enemy troops reached Chingchien on March 31 but did not advance north immediately; their purpose was to leave us a clear passage. Their advance west towards Wayaopao was designed to drive us to Suiteh and Michih. Having discovered our troops, they are now veering to the south and west of Wayaopao and then they will again advance towards that town to drive us northward.

3. Our policy is to continue our former method, that is, to keep the enemy on the run in this area for a time (about another month); the purpose is to tire him out completely, reduce his food supplies drastically and then look for an opportunity to destroy him. There is no need for our main force to hurry north to attack Yulin or south to cut off the enemy's retreat. It should be made clear to the commanders and fighters and also to the masses that this method of our army is the necessary road to the final defeat of the enemy. Unless we reduce the enemy to extreme fatigue and complete starvation, we cannot win final victory. This may be called the tactics of "wear and

tear", that is, of wearing the enemy down to complete exhaustion and then wiping him out.

4. As you are now in localities east and north of Wayaopao, it would be best to induce the enemy to move to the north of Wayaopao; then you may attack the weaker part of Liao Ang's[2] forces and induce the enemy to move east; afterwards you may turn towards Ansai, and induce the enemy to move west again.

5. But within a few days you must order the entire 359th Brigade to complete its preparations for a southward drive, so that a week from now it can be sent southward to make a surprise attack on the area south of the Yenchang-Yenan line and north of the Yichuan-Lochuan line and cut the enemy's food transport line.

6. Please reply whether you consider the above views sound.

NOTES

[1] Having withdrawn from Yenan on its own initiative, the Northwest People's Liberation Army sent out a small force to lure the enemy's main force as far as Ansai, northwest of Yenan, while leaving its main force to ambush the enemy in the Chinghuapien sector, northeast of Yenan. On March 25, 1947, a Kuomintang regiment of the 31st Brigade of Hu Tsung-nan's Reorganized 27th Division, led by the brigade headquarters, walked right into this trap and was completely destroyed in a battle lasting just over an hour.

[2] Liao Ang, Commander of the Reorganized 76th Division of the Kuomintang forces under Hu Tsung-nan, was later captured in a battle at Chingchien on October 11, 1947.

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* This telegram was sent by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the Northwest Field Army, which was then composed of the People's Liberation Army forces of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia and Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Areas and commanded by Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung, Hsi Chung-hsun and other comrades.

THE CHIANG KAI-SHEK GOVERNMENT IS BESIEGED BY THE WHOLE PEOPLE*

May 30, 1947

The Chiang Kai-shek government, hostile to the whole people, now finds itself besieged by the whole people. On both the military and political fronts, it has met defeats, is now besieged by the forces it has declared to be its enemies and can find no way of escape.

The traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique and its master, U.S. imperialism, have wrongly appraised the situation. They overestimated their own strength and underestimated the strength of the people. They regarded China and the world after World War II as being the same as in the past; they would permit nothing to change nor anyone to go against their will. After Japan's surrender they were determined to restore the old order in China. And having gained time by such deceptions as political consultation and military mediation, the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek government mustered two million troops and launched an all-out offensive.

There are now two battle fronts in China. The war between Chiang Kai-shek's invading troops and the People's Liberation Army constitutes the first front. Now a second front has emerged, that is, the sharp struggle between the great and righteous student movement and the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek government.[1] The slogan of the student movement is "Food, Peace, Freedom" or "Against Hunger, Against Civil War, Against Persecution". Chiang Kai-shek has promulgated the "Provisional Measures for the Maintenance of Public Order".[2] Everywhere his army, police, gendarmes and secret agents are clashing with the student masses. Chiang Kai-shek is using brute force against unarmed students, subjecting them to arrest, imprisonment, beating and slaughter; as a result the student movement is daily growing in strength. Public sympathy is all on the side of the students, Chiang Kai-shek and his running dogs are completely isolated, and his ferocious features have been completely unmasked. The student movement is part of the whole people's movement. The upsurge of the student movement will inevitably promote an upsurge of the whole people's movement. This is borne out by the historical experience of the May 4th Movement of 1919[3] and the December 9th Movement of 1935.

Since U.S. imperialism and its running dog Chiang Kai-shek have taken the place of Japanese imperialism and its running dog Wang Ching-wei and adopted the policies of turning China into a U.S. colony, launching a civil war and strengthening the fascist dictatorship, they have declared themselves to be enemies of the entire Chinese people and driven all strata of the people to the brink of starvation and death. This has compelled all strata of the people to unite in a life-and-death struggle against the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek government and brought about the speedy development of that struggle. For the people there is no other way out. The strata of the Chinese people oppressed by the reactionary policies of the Chiang Kai-shek government and united for their own salvation include the workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, enlightened gentry, other patriotic elements, the minority nationalities and overseas Chinese. This is a very broad national united front.

The extremely reactionary financial and economic policies long pursued by the Chiang Kai-shek government have now been aggravated by the Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce, the most treasonable treaty ever known. On the basis of this treaty, U.S. monopoly capital and Chiang Kai-shek's bureaucrat-comprador capital have become tightly intertwined and control the economic life of the whole country. The results are unbridled inflation, unparalleled soaring prices, ever-spreading bankruptcy of the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie and daily deterioration in the livelihood of the working masses, government employees and teachers. In these circumstances all strata of the people cannot but unite and fight for their very survival.

Military suppression and political deception have been the two main instruments by which Chiang Kai-shek maintains his reactionary

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* This commentary was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Hsinhua News Agency. It pointed out that the march of events in China was faster than people had expected and called upon the people to prepare speedily all necessary conditions for the country-wide victory of the Chinese revolution. This prediction was soon confirmed. Both this commentary and "The Concept of Operations for the Northwest War Theatre" were written at Wangchiawan, Chingpien County, northern Shensi.

rule. People are now witnessing the rapid collapse of both these instruments.

On every battlefield Chiang Kai-shek's army has met with defeat. About ninety brigades of his regular troops alone have been wiped out in the eleven months since last July. His troops no longer display the overweening pride of last year when they occupied Changchun, Chengteh, Changchiakou, Hotse, Huaiyin and Antung, or even of this year when they occupied Linyi and Yenan. Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng made a wrong appraisal of the strength and fighting methods of the People's Liberation Army. Mistaking our retreats for cowardice and our abandonment of a number of cities for defeats, they had fondly hoped to finish us off south of the Great Wall in three months or at most six, and then proceed to finish us off in the Northeast. But after ten months, all Chiang Kai-shek's invading troops are in desperate straits; they are completely besieged by the people of the Liberated Areas and the People's Liberation Army and find it very difficult to escape.

As more and more news of the defeats of Chiang Kai-shek's troops at the front reaches his rear areas, the broad masses of the people there, suffocating under the oppression of his reactionary government, see more and more hope of ending their sufferings and winning their emancipation. At this very time, all Chiang Kai-shek's political tricks are failing as fast as he plays them. Everything has gone against the expectations of the reactionaries. Such steps as convening a "National Assembly" to adopt a "constitution", reorganizing the one-party government into a "multi-party government" and what not, were originally aimed at isolating the Communist Party and other democratic forces. They have produced the opposite result; it is not the Communist Party or any other democratic forces that are isolated but the reactionaries themselves. After this the Chinese people know from their own experience what Chiang Kai-shek's "National Assembly", "constitution" and "multi-party government" really are. Previously, many Chinese people, mainly those of the middle strata, had illusions to a greater or lesser extent about these manoeuvres of Chiang Kai-shek. It is the same with his "peace negotiations". Now that Chiang Kai-shek has torn several solemn truce agreements to shreds and used bayonets against the student masses demanding peace and opposing civil war, nobody will any longer believe in his so-called peace negotiations except those bent on deceiving people or those absolutely inexperienced politically.

All events have proved our appraisal to be correct. We have repeatedly pointed out that the Chiang Kai-shek government is nothing but a government of treason, civil war and dictatorship. It seeks to wipe out the Chinese Communist Party and all other democratic forces by civil war in order to turn China into a U.S. colony and maintain its own dictatorial rule. Because it has adopted these reactionary policies, this government has lost all prestige and strength politically. The power of the Chiang Kai-shek government is only temporary and superficial; in fact, it is a government outwardly strong but inwardly weak. Its offensives can be smashed no matter where or on what fronts they are launched. Its inevitable end will be rebellion by the masses, desertion by its followers and the total destruction of its army. All events have borne out and will continue to bear out the correctness of this appraisal.

The march of events in China is faster than people expected. On the one hand, there are the victories of the People's Liberation Army; on the other, there is the advance of the people's struggle in the areas under Chiang Kai-shek's control; both are moving at high speed. The Chinese people should quickly prepare all the necessary conditions for the establishment of a peaceful, democratic and independent new China.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTES

[1] After December 1946 the democratic and patriotic movement of the broad masses of students in the Kuomintang areas against hunger, civil war and persecution gathered new momentum with the development of the People's War of Liberation and gradually became a second front in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary rule. In late December 1946 and early January 1947, more than 500,000 students in scores of big and medium cities, including Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai and Nanking, went on strike and held demonstrations in protest against the atrocity of the raping of a Peking University girl student perpetrated by U.S. soldiers and demanded the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from China. This struggle won the immediate support of workers, teachers and other people. On May 4, 1947, students in Shanghai demonstrated against the civil war. At the same time eight thousand workers and students besieged the Kuomintang police headquarters. The patriotic movement soon spread to Nanking, Peiping, Hangchow, Shenyang, Tsingtao, Kaifeng and many other cities. The Kuomintang reactionaries resorted to extremely brutal measures to suppress the students' patriotic and democratic movement. On May 20 more than a hundred students were wounded and arrested in Nanking and Tientsin in the notorious "Bloody Incident of May 20th". Nevertheless, the patriotic student movement, supported by the broad masses of the people, could not be quelled. The

students' strikes and demonstrations under the slogan, "Against Hunger, Against Civil War, Against Persecution", and the people's anti-U.S. and anti-Chiang Kai-shek struggles, such as strikes of workers and teachers, spread to more than sixty large and medium cities. In May 1948 the students in Shanghai, together with cultural workers, journalists, and people from other walks of life, started a patriotic movement against the revival of the Japanese forces of aggression fostered by the United States, a movement which also spread rapidly to many other cities. The patriotic struggles of the students never ceased until the country-wide victory; they struck heavy blows at the Kuomintang.

[2] Promulgated on May 18, 1947 by the Chiang Kai-shek government, these measures strictly prohibited the presentation of petitions by more than ten persons together and forbade all strikes by workers and students and all demonstrations. They also authorized the Kuomintang local authorities to take "necessary steps" and "emergency measures" for the sanguinary suppression of the patriotic and democratic movements of the people.

[3] On May 4, 1919, students in Peking demonstrated against the handing over to Japan of many of China's sovereign rights in Shantung by Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Italy and other imperialist countries then in conference in Paris. This student movement evoked an immediate response throughout the country. After June 3, it developed into a country-wide anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary movement embracing large numbers of the proletariat, the urban petty bourgeoisie and even the national bourgeoisie.

STRATEGY FOR THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION*

September 1, 1947

1. In the first year's fighting (from July last year to June this year), we wiped out 97½ regular brigades, or 780,000 men, and puppet troops, peace preservation corps and others totalling 340,000 — altogether 1,120,000 of the enemy. This was a great victory. It dealt the enemy a heavy blow, created profound defeatism in the whole enemy camp, elated the people throughout the country and laid the foundation for the complete annihilation of the enemy by our army and for final victory.

2. In the first year's fighting, the enemy launched a large-scale offensive against the Liberated Areas, using 218 of his 248 regular brigades, or more than 1,600,000 men, and nearly 1,000,000 men from the special arms (navy, air force, artillery, engineer corps and armoured units) and from the puppet troops, communications police corps and peace preservation corps. Our army rightly adopted the strategy of fighting on interior lines, and in order to hold the initiative at all times and places it did not balk at paying the price of over 300,000 casualties and of enemy occupation of large tracts of territory. Consequently, we succeeded in wiping out 1,120,000 enemy troops, forced the enemy to disperse his troops, steeled and strengthened our own forces, launched strategic counter-offensives in the Northeast, Jehol, eastern Hopei, southern Shansi and northern Honan, recovered large territories and liberated vast new areas.[1]

3. In the second year of fighting, our army's basic task is to launch a country-wide counter-offensive, that is, to use our main forces to fight our way to exterior lines, carry the war into the Kuomintang areas, wipe out large numbers of the enemy on the exterior lines and completely wreck the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary strategy, which is, on the contrary, to continue to carry the war into the Liberated

Areas, further damage and drain our manpower and material resources and make it impossible for us to hold out very long. In the second year's fighting, a partial task of our army is to use a portion of our main forces and large numbers of our regional troops to continue fighting on interior lines, wipe out the enemy there and recover lost territory.

4. Our army will of course meet many difficulties in carrying out the policy of fighting on exterior lines and bringing the war into the Kuomintang areas. For it takes time to build new bases in the Kuomintang areas and we can build stable bases only when we have wiped out large numbers of the enemy in many back-and-forth mobile operations, aroused the masses, distributed land, established our political power and built up the people's armed forces. Until then, there will be quite a few difficulties. But they can and must be overcome. For the enemy will be forced to spread out even more, and vast territories will be available to our army as battlefields for mobile operations, and so we will be able to wage mobile warfare; the broad masses in those territories hate the Kuomintang and support us; and though part of the enemy forces still has a comparatively high combat effectiveness,

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China when he and the Central Committee were at Chukuanchai, Chiahsien County, northern Shensi. The directive formulated the basic task for the second year of the War of Liberation. This task was to carry the war into the Kuomintang areas with our main forces and to switch from fighting on interior lines to fighting on exterior lines, that is, to pass from the stage of the strategic defensive to that of the strategic offensive. In accordance with the strategic plan laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the People's Liberation Army went over to the offensive on a country-wide scale during July-September 1947. The Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Field Army forced the Yellow River in southwestern Shantung on June 30, crossed the Lunghai Railway early in August and thrust into the Tapieh Mountains. The Taiyueh Army of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Field Army forced the Yellow River from southern Shansi in late August and thrust into western Honan. The Eastern China Field Army thrust into southwestern Shantung early in September after smashing a concentrated attack by the enemy. In the same month the Shantung Army of the Eastern China Field Army started an offensive against the enemy in eastern Shantung. The Northwest Field Army went over to the offensive late in August. The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Field Army started an offensive against the enemy along the northern section of the Peiping-Hankow Railway early in September. Immediately after its summer offensive throughout the Northeast, the Northeast Field Army, beginning in September, launched a large-scale autumn offensive in the Changchun-Kirin-Szepingkai region and in the Chinhsi-Ihsien sector along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. The offensives in all these theatres of war constituted a general offensive by the entire People's Liberation Army. This large-scale offensive led to a turning point in the War of Liberation, marking a radical change in the war situation. See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", pp. 157-76 of this volume.

on the whole the enemy's morale and combat effectiveness are much lower than a year ago.

5. The keys to victory in fighting in the Kuomintang areas are, first, to be good at seizing the opportunities for fighting, to be brave and determined and win as many battles as possible; and, second, to carry out resolutely the policy of winning the masses and enable the broad masses to benefit so that they side with our army. If these two points are carried out, we shall win victory.

6. Up to the end of August this year, the distribution of enemy forces, including those which had been wiped out or dealt crushing blows, was 157 brigades on the southern front, 70 on the northern front and 21 in the Kuomintang rear areas. The total in the whole country was still 248 brigades and the actual number of troops was about 1,500,000. Troops in the special arms, puppet troops, communications police and peace preservation corps numbered about 1,200,000. Non-combatants in the military institutions in the enemy rear were about 1,000,000. The entire enemy forces totalled about 3,700,000 men. Of the troops on the southern front, 117 brigades belong to Ku Chu-tung's group, 7 to Cheng Chien's group and others, and 33 to Hu Tsung-nan's group. Of the 117 brigades of Ku Chu-tung's group, 63 have been wiped out or have received crushing blows. Of these, some have not been replenished; others, although they are being replenished, have few men and low combat effectiveness; and others, although their manpower and arms have been fairly well replenished and their combat effectiveness has to some extent been restored, are still far weaker than before. There are only 54 brigades which have neither been wiped out nor received crushing blows. Of Ku Chu-tung's entire forces, 82 to 85 brigades are employed for garrison duty and can be used only for local manoeuvres, and no more than 32 to 35 brigades can be used for strategic manoeuvres. The 7 brigades of Cheng Chien's group and others can in the main be used only for garrison duty, and one has already received a crushing blow. Of the 33 brigades of Hu Tsung-nan's group (including those east of Lanchow, south of Ningsia and Yulin, and west of Linfen and Loyang), 12 have been wiped out or received crushing blows, only 7 can be used for strategic manoeuvres, and the rest are on garrison duty. On the northern front the enemy has 70 brigades altogether. Of these, the Northeast group has 26 brigades, of which 16 have been wiped out or have received crushing blows; Sun Lien-chung's group has 19 brigades, of which 8 have been wiped out or received crushing

blows; Fu Tso-yi has 10 brigades, of which 2 have received crushing blows; and Yen Hsi-shan has 15 brigades, of which 9 have been wiped out or received crushing blows. These enemy troops are now mainly on the defensive and only a small part is available for mobile operations. In the Kuomintang rear areas there are only 21 brigades on garrison duty. Of these, 8 brigades are in Sinkiang and western Kansu, 7 in Szechuan and Sikang, 2 in Yunnan, 2 in Kwangtung (that is, the 69th Division that was wiped out) and 2 in Taiwan. There are no regular troops at all in the six provinces of Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Fukien, Chekiang and Kiangsi. The Kuomintang is planning, with U.S. assistance, to draft 1,000,000 men this year to replenish the front and to train a number of new brigades and replacement regiments. However, if our army can wipe out an average of 8 enemy brigades a month, as it did in the first year of fighting, and wipe out another 96 to 100 brigades in the second year (already in July and August 16½ brigades were wiped out), then the enemy army will be further and greatly weakened, its strategic reserve will be reduced to the minimum, and it will be forced into a defensive position in all parts of the country and will be attacked by us everywhere. Although the Kuomintang has this plan of drafting 1,000,000 men and training new brigades and replacement regiments, it will be of no avail. Since its only methods of recruiting are pressganging and hiring, to reach a million will certainly be difficult and many will desert. Moreover, by carrying out the policy of fighting on exterior lines our army will be able to reduce the enemy's manpower and material resources.

7. The operational principles of our army are still the same as those laid down before:

> Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first (this applies also to a large-scale campaign of annihilation directed against several brigades, such as the Laiwu campaign[2] in February and the Southwestern Shantung campaign[3] in July this year); attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later.
>
> Take medium and small cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.
>
> Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a place our main objective. Holding or seizing a place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.

> In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force, encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing crushing blows to the enemy, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and also to attack one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces.
>
> On the one hand, be sure to fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves. On the other hand, give full play to our fine style of fighting — courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time).
>
> Strive to draw the enemy into mobile warfare, but at the same time lay great stress on learning the tactics of positional attack and on stepping up the building of the artillery and engineer corps in order to capture enemy fortified points and cities on a large scale.
>
> Resolutely attack and seize all fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. Attack and seize at opportune moments all fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. For the time being, leave alone all fortified points and cities which are strongly defended.
>
> Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the soldiers captured from the enemy (80-90 per cent of the men and a small number of the junior officers). Seek replenishment chiefly from the enemy and from the Kuomintang areas and only partly from the old Liberated Areas; this applies especially to the armies on the southern front.

In all the new and old Liberated Areas, we must resolutely carry through the land reform (which is the most fundamental requirement for supporting a long war and winning country-wide victory), develop production, practise economy and strengthen the building of war industry — all for victory at the front. Only by doing this can we support a long war and win victory in the whole country. If we do so, we shall certainly be able to support a long war and win victory throughout the country.

8. The above sums up the year’s fighting and sets forth the principles for future fighting. Leading comrades in all areas are requested

to pass the contents on to all cadres of regimental rank and above, of the level of prefectural Party committee and above and of the level of prefectural commissioner's office and above, so that everyone will understand his own task and carry it out resolutely and unwaveringly.

NOTES

[1] This strategic counter-offensive in the Northeast, Jehol and eastern Hopei was the 1947 summer offensive of the Northeast People's Liberation Army. On May 13 the People's Liberation Army began simultaneous offensives on these fronts and by July 1 had wiped out over 80,000 enemy troops and recovered more than 40 county towns. The enemy plan of cutting up the Liberated Areas in northeastern China was thus completely wrecked. The enemy troops, driven into two narrow corridors along the Chinese Changchun Railway and the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, were forced into the "defence of key points". This changed the whole situation in northeastern China. The strategic counter-offensive in southern Shansi and northern Honan comprised the offensives launched by the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army in northern Honan and on the flanks of the Tatung-Puchow Railway in southern Shansi between March and May 1947. Our army in northern Honan started attacking on March 23. After taking Yenchin, Yangwu, Puyang and Fengchiu one after another, our army turned north to exploit these successes. By May 28 it had captured Tsihsien, Chunhsien, Huahsien and Tangyin and wiped out over 45,000 enemy troops. Our troops in southern Shansi began offensive operations on April 4. By May 4 they had captured twenty-two county towns, including Chuwo, Hsinchiang and Yungtsi, and two important ferry crossings on the Yellow River, Yumenkou and Fenglingtu, and had wiped out over 18,000 enemy troops.

[2] The Laiwu campaign was a campaign of mobile warfare fought by the Eastern China People's Liberation Army in the Laiwu region, southeast of Tsinan, Shantung Province. Towards the end of January 1947 the Kuomintang troops launched an offensive against the Shantung Liberated Areas from both the north and the south. From the south, eight Kuomintang reorganized divisions drove northward by three routes along the Yiho and Shuho Rivers towards Linyi and from the north, in co-ordination with them, three Kuomintang corps belonging to the Li Hsien-chou group advanced southward on Laiwu and Hsintai from Mingshui, Tsechuan and Poshan, seeking to engage the main force of the Eastern China People's Liberation Army in a decisive battle in the Yi-Meng mountain area. Our army used part of its forces to block the enemy from the south but marched its main force north towards Laiwu to destroy the Li Hsien-chou group. All the enemy troops, over 60,000 men, were wiped out in a battle which started on February 20 and ended on the afternoon of February 23. Li Hsien-chou, Deputy Commander of the 2nd Pacification Zone of the Kuomintang's Hsuchow Pacification Headquarters, was captured, and thirteen towns were recovered.

[3] This Southwestern Shantung campaign was the campaign fought by the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army in July 1947 in the region of Hotse, Yuncheng, Chuyeh, Tingtao, Chinhsiang and Tsaohsien, in southwestern Shantung Province. In this campaign 4 Kuomintang division headquarters and 9½ brigades totalling more than 56,000 men, were wiped out.

MANIFESTO OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY*

October 1947

The Chinese People's Liberation Army, having smashed Chiang Kai-shek's offensive, has now launched a large-scale counter-offensive. Our armies on the southern front are advancing on the Yangtse River valley, our armies on the northern front are advancing on the Chinese Changchun Railway and the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. Wherever our troops go, the enemy flees pell-mell before us and the people give thunderous cheers. The whole situation between the enemy and ourselves has fundamentally changed as compared with a year ago.

The aim of our army in this war, as proclaimed time and again to the nation and the world, is the liberation of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. And today, our aim is to carry out the urgent demand of the people of the whole country, that is, to overthrow the arch-criminal of the civil war, Chiang Kai-shek, and form a democratic coalition government in order to attain the general goal of liberating the people and the nation.

For eight long years the Chinese people fought heroically against Japanese imperialism for their own liberation and national independence. After the Japanese surrender the people longed for peace, but Chiang Kai-shek wrecked all their peace efforts and forced on them the disaster of an unprecedented civil war. Hence the people of all strata throughout the country were forced to unite to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek, having no other way out.

Chiang Kai-shek's present policy of civil war is no accident but is the inevitable outcome of the anti-popular policy which he and his reactionary clique have consistently followed. As far back as 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, devoid of all gratitude, betrayed the revolutionary alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party[1] and betrayed the revolutionary Three People's Principles and the Three

Great Policies of Sun Yat-sen,[2] then he set up a dictatorship, capitulated to imperialism, fought ten years of civil war and brought on the aggression of the Japanese bandits. In the Sian Incident of 1936, the Communist Party of China returned good for evil and, acting together with Generals Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng, set Chiang Kai-shek free in the hope that he would repent, turn over a new leaf and join in the fight against the Japanese aggressors. But once again he proved devoid of all gratitude; he was passive against the Japanese invaders, active in suppressing the people and extremely hostile to the Communist Party. The year before last (1945), Japan surrendered and the Chinese people once more forgave Chiang Kai-shek, demanding that he should stop the civil war he had already started, put democracy into practice and unite with all parties and groups for peace and national reconstruction. But no sooner had the truce agreement been signed, the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference adopted and the four pledges[3] proclaimed than the utterly faithless Chiang Kai-shek went back on his word completely. Time and again the people showed themselves forbearing and conciliatory for the sake of the common good but, aided by U.S. imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek was determined to launch an unprecedented all-out offensive against the people, in utter disregard of the fate of the country and the nation. From January last year (1946), when the truce agreement was announced, up to the present, Chiang Kai-shek has mobilized more than 220 brigades of his regular troops and nearly a million miscellaneous troops[4] and launched large-scale attacks against the Liberated Areas which the Chinese people wrested from Japanese imperialism after bloody battles; he has seized successively the cities of Shenyang, Fushun, Penki, Szepingkai, Changchun, Yungchi, Chengteh, Chining, Changchiakou, Huaiyin, Hotse, Linyi, Yenan and Yentai and vast rural areas. Wherever Chiang Kai-shek's troops go, they murder and burn, rape and loot, carry out the policy of three atrocities[5] and behave exactly like the Japanese bandits. In November last year Chiang Kai-shek convened the bogus National Assembly and proclaimed the bogus constitution. In March this year he expelled the

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* This political manifesto was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. It analysed the political situation in China at the time, raised the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and liberate all China!" and announced the eight basic policies of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which were also those of the Communist Party of China. The manifesto was issued on October 10, 1947, and was known as the "October 10th Manifesto". It was drafted at Shenchuanpao, Chiahsien County, northern Shensi.

representatives of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang areas. In July he issued an order of general mobilization against the people.[6] Towards the just movement of the people in different parts of the country against civil war, against hunger and against U.S. imperialist aggression and towards the struggle for existence waged by the workers, peasants, students, townspeople, government employees and teachers, Chiang Kai-shek's policy is one of repression, arrest and massacre. Towards our country's minority nationalities, his policy is one of Han chauvinism, of persecution and repression by every possible means. In all the areas under Chiang Kai-shek's rule corruption is rife, secret agents run amuck, taxes are innumerable and crushing, prices are skyrocketing, the economy is bankrupt, all business languishes, conscription and the grain levy are imposed and voices of discontent are heard everywhere; all this has plunged the overwhelming majority of people throughout the country into an abyss of suffering. Meanwhile the financial oligarchs, corrupt officials, local bullies and bad gentry, all headed by Chiang Kai-shek, have amassed vast fortunes. Chiang Kai-shek and his like made these fortunes by using their dictatorial powers to extort taxes and levies and promote their private interests under the guise of serving the public. To maintain his dictatorship and carry on the civil war, Chiang Kai-shek has not hesitated to sell out our country's sovereign rights to foreign imperialism, to collude with the U.S. armed forces so that they should remain in Tsingtao and elsewhere and to procure advisers from the United States to take part in directing the civil war and training troops to slaughter his own fellow-countrymen. Aircraft, tanks, guns and ammunition for the civil war are shipped from the United States in great quantities. Funds for the civil war are borrowed from the United States on a large scale. In return for its favours, Chiang Kai-shek has presented U.S. imperialism with military bases and the rights of air flight and navigation and concluded with it a commercial treaty of enslavement[7] — acts of treason many times worse than those of Yuan Shih-kai.[8] In a word, Chiang Kai-shek's twenty-year rule has been traitorous, dictatorial and against the people. Today, the overwhelming majority of the people throughout the country, north and south, young and old, know his towering crimes and hope that our army will quickly launch the counter-offensive, overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and liberate all China.

We are the army of the Chinese people and in all things we take the will of the Chinese people as our will. The policies of our army represent the urgent demands of the Chinese people and chief among them are the following:

(1) Unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, democratic parties, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and establish a democratic coalition government.

(2) Arrest, try and punish the civil war criminals headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

(3) Abolish the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship, carry out the system of people's democracy and guarantee freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of association for the people.

(4) Abolish the rotten institutions of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, clear out all corrupt officials and establish clean government.

(5) Confiscate the property of the four big families[9] of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and the Chen Li-fu brothers, and the property of the other chief war criminals; confiscate bureaucrat-capital, develop the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie, improve the livelihood of workers and employees, and give relief to victims of natural calamities and to poverty-stricken people.

(6) Abolish the system of feudal exploitation and put into effect the system of land to the tillers.

(7) Recognize the right to equality and autonomy of the minority nationalities within the borders of China.

(8) Repudiate the traitorous foreign policy of Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorial government, abrogate all the treasonable treaties and repudiate all the foreign debts contracted by Chiang Kai-shek during the civil war period. Demand that the U.S. government withdraw its troops stationed in China, which are a menace to China's independence, and oppose any foreign country's helping Chiang Kai-shek to carry on civil war or trying to revive the forces of Japanese aggression. Conclude treaties of trade and friendship with foreign countries on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Unite in a common struggle with all nations which treat us as equals.

The above are the basic policies of our army. They will be put into practice at once wherever our army goes. These policies conform with the demands of more than 90 per cent of the people in our country.

Our army does not reject all Chiang Kai-shek's personnel but adopts a policy of dealing with each case on its merits. That is, the chief criminals shall be punished without fail, those who are accomplices under duress shall go unpunished and those who perform deeds of merit shall be rewarded. As for Chiang Kai-shek, the arch-criminal who started the civil war and who has committed most heinous crimes, and as for all his hardened accomplices who have trampled the people underfoot and are branded as war criminals by the broad masses, our army will hunt them down, even to the four corners of the earth, and will surely bring them to trial and punishment. Our army warns all officers and men in Chiang Kai-shek's army, all officials in his government and all members of his party whose hands are not yet stained with the blood of innocent people that they should strictly refrain from joining these criminals in their evil-doing. Those who have been doing evil should immediately stop, repent and start anew and break with Chiang Kai-shek, and we will give them a chance to make amends for their crimes by good deeds. Our army will not kill or humiliate any of Chiang Kai-shek's army officers and men who lay down their arms, but will accept them into our service if they are willing to remain with us or send them home if they wish to leave. As for those troops of Chiang Kai-shek who rise in revolt and join our army and those who work for our army openly or in secret, they shall be rewarded.

In order to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and form a democratic coalition government at an early date, we call on our fellow-countrymen in all walks of life to co-operate actively with us wherever our army goes in cleaning up the reactionary forces and setting up a democratic order. In places we have not yet reached, they should take up arms on their own, resist pressganging and the grain levy, distribute the land, repudiate debts and take advantage of the enemy's gaps to develop guerrilla warfare.

In order to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and form a democratic coalition government at an early date, we call on the people in the Liberated Areas to carry through the land reform, consolidate the foundations of democracy, develop production, practise economy, strengthen the people's armed forces, eliminate the remaining strongholds of the enemy and support the fighting at the front.

All comrade commanders and fighters of our army! We are shouldering the most important, the most glorious task in the history of our country's revolution. We should make great efforts to accomplish our task. Our efforts will decide the day when our great motherland will emerge from darkness into light and our beloved fellow-countrymen will be able to live like human beings and to choose the government they wish. All officers and fighters of our army must improve their military art, march forward courageously towards sure victory in the war and resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely wipe out all enemies. They must all raise their level of political consciousness, learn the two skills of wiping out the enemy forces and arousing the masses, unite intimately with the masses and rapidly build the new Liberated Areas into stable areas. They must heighten their sense of discipline and resolutely carry out orders, carry out policy, carry out the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention — with army and people united, army and government united, officers and soldiers united, and the whole army united-and permit no breach of discipline. All our officers and fighters must always bear in mind that we are the great People's Liberation Army, we are the troops led by the great Communist Party of China. Provided we constantly observe the directives of the Party, we are sure to win.

Down with Chiang Kai-shek!

Long live New China!

NOTES

[1] See "The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan", Note 7, p. 23 of this volume.

[2] See "On a Statement by Chiang Kai-shek's Spokesman", Note 2, pp. 44-45 of this volume.

[3] The "four pledges" were made by Chiang Kai-shek at the opening session of the Political Consultative Conference in 1946. They were, to guarantee freedom of the people, to guarantee the legal status of political parties, to hold a general election and to release political prisoners.

[4] By miscellaneous troops are meant the Kuomintang's irregular troops which included the local peace preservation corps, communications police corps, gendarmes, the puppet troops taken over and reorganized by the Kuomintang, etc.

[5] The Japanese invaders carried out the policy of three atrocities — burn all, kill all, loot all — against the Liberated Areas in China.

[6] On July 4, 1947, the reactionary Kuomintang government adopted Chiang Kai-shek's "General Mobilization Bill" and immediately afterwards issued the "Order for General Mobilization to Suppress the Insurrection of the Communist Bandits". In fact, Chiang Kai-shek had carried out a general mobilization for his counter-revolutionary civil war much earlier. By that time the Chinese People's Liberation Army had begun to shift to a country-wide offensive. Chiang Kai-shek himself

admitted that his regime was in a "serious crisis". The "Order for General Mobilization" was merely his dying kick.

[7] This refers to the "Sino-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" concluded between the Chiang Kai-shek government and the U.S. government on November 4, 1946. The treaty sold out China's sovereign rights to the United States. See "Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution", Note 6, p. 126 of this volume.

[8] Yuan Shih-kai was the head of the Northern warlords in the last years of the Ching Dynasty. After the Ching Dynasty was overthrown by the Revolution of 1911, he usurped the presidency of the Republic and organized the first government of the Northern warlords, which represented the big landlord and big comprador classes; he did this by relying on a counter-revolutionary armed force and the support of the imperialists and by taking advantage of the compromising nature of the bourgeoisie then leading the revolution. In 1915 he wanted to make himself emperor and, to gain the support of the Japanese imperialists, he accepted Japan's Twenty-one Demands which were designed to obtain exclusive control of all China. In December of the same year an uprising against his assumption of the throne took place in Yunnan Province and promptly won country-wide response and support. Yuan Shih-kai died in June 1916.

[9] This refers to the four big monopoly capitalist groups of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and Chen Li-fu. See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Section 6, pp. 167-69 of this volume.

ON THE REISSUE OF THE THREE MAIN RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND THE EIGHT POINTS FOR ATTENTION

— INSTRUCTION OF THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

October 10, 1947

1. Our Army's Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention[1] have been practised for many years, but their contents vary slightly in army units in different areas. They have now been unified and are hereby reissued. It is expected that you will take this version as the standard one for thorough education and strict enforcement. As to other matters needing attention, the high command of the armed forces in different areas may lay down additional points in accordance with specific conditions and order their enforcement.

2. The Three Main Rules of Discipline are as follows:
   (1) Obey orders in all your actions.
   (2) Don't take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.
   (3) Turn in everything captured.

3. The Eight Points for Attention are as follows:
   (1) Speak politely.
   (2) Pay fairly for what you buy.
   (3) Return everything you borrow.
   (4) Pay for anything you damage.
   (5) Don't hit or swear at people.
   (6) Don't damage crops.
   (7) Don't take liberties with women.
   (8) Don't ill-treat captives.

NOTES

[1] The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention were the rules of discipline laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. They formed an important part of the political work of the Red Army and played a great role in building the people's armed forces, handling relations within the army correctly, forging unity with the masses of the people and laying down the correct policy of the people's army towards captives. From the earliest days of the Red Army, Comrade Mao Tse-tung required the soldiers to speak politely to the masses, pay fairly for all purchases and never impress people into forced labour or hit or swear at people. In the spring of 1928, when the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was in the Chingkang Mountains, Comrade Mao Tse-tung set down Three Rules of Discipline: (1) Obey orders in your actions; (2) Don't take anything from the workers and peasants; and (3) Turn in all things taken from local bullies. In the summer of 1928 he set forth Six Points for Attention: (1) Put back the doors you have taken down for bed-boards; (2) Put back the straw you have used for bedding; (3) Speak politely; (4) Pay fairly for what you buy; (5) Return everything you borrow; and (6) Pay for anything you damage. After 1929 Comrade Mao Tse-tung made the following changes: Rule 2 became "Don't take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses", and Rule 3 was changed first to "Turn in all money raised" and then to "Turn in everything captured". To the Six Points for Attention he added two more: "Don't bathe within sight of women" and "Don't search the pockets of captives". This was the origin of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention.

THE PRESENT SITUATION AND OUR TASKS*

December 25, 1947

I

The Chinese people's revolutionary war has now reached a turning point. That is, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has beaten back the offensive of several million reactionary troops of Chiang Kai-shek, the running dog of the United States of America, and gone over to the offensive. Already in the first year of the present war, from July 1946 to June 1947, the People's Liberation Army beat back Chiang Kai-shek's offensive on several fronts and forced him onto the defensive. And beginning with the first quarter of the second year of the war, July-September 1947, the People's Liberation Army went over to the offensive on a national scale and wrecked Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary plan of continuing to carry the war into the Liberated Areas in order to destroy them completely. Now the war is no longer being fought chiefly in the Liberated Areas but in the Kuomintang areas; the main forces of the People's Liberation Army have carried the fight into the Kuomintang areas.[1] In this land of China, the People's Liberation Army has turned back the wheel of counter-revolution — of U.S. imperialism and its lackey, the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang — and sent it down the road to destruction and has pushed the wheel of revolution forward along the road to victory. This is a turning point in history. It is the turning point from growth to extinction for Chiang Kai-shek's twenty-year counter-revolutionary rule. It is the turning point from growth to extinction for imperialist rule in China, now over a hundred years old. This is a momentous event. It is momentous because it is occurring in a country with a population of 475 million and, having occurred, it will certainly culminate in victory throughout the country. Furthermore, it is momentous because it is occurring in the East, where over 1,000 million people — half of mankind — suffer under imperialist oppression. The turn of the Chinese People's War of Liberation from the defensive to the offensive cannot but gladden and inspire these oppressed nations. It is also of assistance to the oppressed people now struggling in many countries in Europe and the Americas.

II

From the day Chiang Kai-shek started his counter-revolutionary war we said that we not only must defeat him but can defeat him. We must defeat him because the war he started is a counter-revolutionary war directed by U.S. imperialism against the independence of the Chinese nation and the liberation of the Chinese people. After the conclusion of World War II and the overthrow of Japanese imperialism, the task of the Chinese people was to complete the new-democratic transformation politically, economically and culturally, to achieve national unification and independence and to change China from an agricultural into an industrial country. But at that time, after the victorious conclusion of the anti-fascist Second World War, U.S. imperialism and its lackeys in various countries stepped into the shoes of German and Japanese imperialism and their lackeys and formed a reactionary camp against the Soviet Union, against the People's Democracies in Europe, against the workers' movements in the capitalist

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* This report was made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held on December 25-28, 1947, at Yangchiakou, Michih County, northern Shensi. In addition to those members and alternate members of the Central Committee able to attend, responsible comrades of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region were present. The meeting discussed and adopted this report and also another document written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, "Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation" (see pp. 87-88 of this volume). Concerning Comrade Mao Tse-tung's report, the decision adopted at the meeting stated, "This report is a programmatic document in the political, military and economic fields for the entire period of the overthrow of the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek ruling clique and of the founding of a new-democratic China. The whole Party and the whole army should carry on intensive education around, and strictly apply in practice, this document and, in connection with it, the documents published on October 10, 1947 [namely, 'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army', 'Slogans of the Chinese People's Liberation Army', 'Instruction on the Reissue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention', 'Outline Land Law of China' and 'Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Promulgation of the

countries, against the national movements in the colonies and semi-colonies and against the liberation of the Chinese people. At such a time the Chinese reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek acted as the running dog for U.S. imperialism, just as Wang Ching-wei had done for Japanese imperialism, sold out China to the United States and unleashed a war against the Chinese people to check the advance of their liberation. At such a time, if we had shown weakness or given ground and had not dared to rise resolutely to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, China would have become a world of darkness and the future of our nation would have been forfeited. The Communist Party of China has led the Chinese People's Liberation Army in firmly waging a patriotic, just and revolutionary war against Chiang Kai-shek's offensive. The Communist Party of China, having made a clear-headed appraisal of the international and domestic situation on the basis of the science of Marxism-Leninism, recognized that all attacks by the reactionaries at home and abroad not only had to be defeated but could be defeated. When dark clouds appeared in the sky, we pointed out that this was only temporary, that the darkness would soon pass and the sun break through. When the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang launched the country-wide counter-revolutionary war in July 1946, they thought it would take them only three to six months to defeat the People's Liberation Army. They reckoned that they had a regular army of two million, more than a million irregulars and another million or more men in the military establishments and armed units in the rear, making a total military strength

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Outline Land Law of China']. In carrying out policies in different places any departure from the principles laid down in the report should be rectified at once." Other important decisions taken at the meeting were:

(1) That every effort should be made to carry the Chinese people's revolutionary war forward uninterruptedly to complete victory, and that the enemy should not be allowed to use stalling tactics (peace negotiations) to gain time for rest and reorganization for a fresh attack on the people.

(2) That the time was not yet ripe for the formation of a revolutionary central government, which was to be considered only when our army had won greater victories, and that the promulgation of a constitution was even more a question for the future.

The meeting also discussed in detail current tendencies in the Party and certain specific policies in the land reform and the mass movements. The results of these discussions were subsequently set forth by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the article "On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy" (see pp. 181-89 of this volume). All the articles in this book starting with this report and ending with "A Circular on the Situation", dated March 20, 1948 (pp. 219-26), were written at Yangchiakou, Michih County, northern Shensi.

of more than four million; that they had taken time to complete their preparations for the offensive; that they had regained control of the big cities; that they had a population of more than 300 million; that they had taken over all the equipment of a million Japanese invading troops; and that they had received huge military and financial aid from the U.S. government. They also reckoned that the People's Liberation Army was tired after fighting for eight years in the War of Resistance Against Japan and was far inferior to the Kuomintang army in numbers and equipment; that the population of the Liberated Areas was only a little more than 100 million; and that in most of these areas the reactionary feudal forces had not yet been cleaned up and the land reform had not yet been universally and thoroughly carried out, namely, that the rear area of the People's Liberation Army had not yet been consolidated. Proceeding from this appraisal, the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang ignored the Chinese people's desire for peace, finally tore up the truce agreement signed by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in January 1946 as well as the resolutions adopted by the Political Consultative Conference of all parties and launched an adventurist war. We said then that Chiang Kai-shek's superiority in military forces was only transient, a factor which could play only a temporary role, that U.S. imperialist aid was likewise a factor which could play only a temporary role, while the anti-popular character of Chiang Kai-shek's war and the feelings of the people were factors that would play a constant role, and that in this respect the People's Liberation Army was in a superior position. Patriotic, just and revolutionary in character, the war waged by the People's Liberation Army was bound to win the support of the people of the whole country. That was the political foundation for victory over Chiang Kai-shek. The experience of eighteen months of war has fully confirmed our judgement.

III

In seventeen months of fighting (from July 1946 to November 1947; December figures are not yet available), we killed, wounded and captured 1,690,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's regular and irregular troops — 640,000 killed and wounded and 1,050,000 captured. Thus we were able to beat back Chiang Kai-shek's offensive, preserve the main territories of the Liberated Areas and go over to the offensive. Speaking from the military aspect, we were able to do this because we employed the correct strategy. Our principles of operation are:

1. Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later.
2. Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.
3. Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a city or place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.
4. In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing crushing blows to the enemy, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and also to attack one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although we are inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we are absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy.
5. Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves.
6. Give full play to our style of fighting — courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest).
7. Strive to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities.
8. With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. Seize at opportune moments all enemy fortified points and cities defended

with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. As for strongly defended enemy fortified points and cities, wait till conditions are ripe and then take them.

9. Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main sources of manpower and materiel are at the front.

10. Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolidation should in general not be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.

These are the main methods the People's Liberation Army has employed in defeating Chiang Kai-shek. They are the result of the tempering of the People's Liberation Army in long years of fighting against domestic and foreign enemies and are completely suited to our present situation. The Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang and the U.S. imperialist military personnel in China are very well acquainted with these military methods of ours. Seeking ways to counter them, Chiang Kai-shek has often assembled his generals and field officers for training and distributed for their study our military literature and the documents captured in the war. The U.S. military personnel have recommended to Chiang Kai-shek one kind of strategy and tactics after another for destroying the People's Liberation Army; they have trained Chiang Kai-shek's troops and supplied them with military equipment. But none of these efforts can save the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang from defeat. The reason is that our strategy and tactics are based on a people's war; no army opposed to the people can use our strategy and tactics. On the basis of a people's war and of the principles of unity between army and people, of unity between commanders and fighters and of disintegrating the enemy troops, the People's Liberation Army has developed its vigorous revolutionary political work, which is an important factor in winning victory over the enemy. When we abandoned many cities on our own initiative in order to evade fatal blows from superior enemy forces and shift our forces to destroy the enemy in mobile warfare, our enemies were jubilant. They took this to be their victory and our defeat. They became dizzy with this momentary "victory". On the afternoon of the day he seized Changchiakou, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the convening of his reactionary National Assembly, as though his reactionary regime had from that moment become as stable as Mount Taishan. The U.S. imperialists, too, danced with joy, as though their wild scheme for converting China into a U.S. colony could now be realized without obstruction. But with the lapse of time, Chiang Kai-shek and his U.S. masters began to change their tune. Now all our enemies, domestic and foreign, are gripped by pessimism. They heave great sighs, wail about a crisis and no longer show any sign of joy. In the past eighteen months, most of Chiang Kai-shek's high-ranking field commanders have been replaced for losing battles. Among them are Liu Chih (Chengchow), Hsueh Yueh (Hsuchow), Wu Chi-wei (northern Kiangsu), Tang En-po (southern Shantung), Wang Chung-lien (northern Honan), Tu Yu-ming and Hsiung Shih-hui (Shenyang) and Sun Lien-chung (Peiping). Chen Cheng, too, was relieved of his post as Chiang Kai-shek's chief of staff in over-all command of operations and demoted to command a single front in the Northeast.[2] However, it was in the very period when Chiang Kai-shek himself assumed over-all command in Chen Cheng's place that the situation changed and that his armies shifted from the offensive to the defensive, while the People's Liberation Army went over from the defensive to the offensive. By now the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique and its U.S. masters should have realized their mistake. They had regarded as signs of cowardice and weakness all the efforts for peace and against civil war which the Communist Party of China, representing the wishes of the Chinese people, had made over a long period after the surrender of Japan. They had overestimated their own strength, underestimated the strength of the revolution and rashly unleashed the war and so were caught in their own trap. Our enemy's strategic calculations failed completely.

IV

The rear areas of the People's Liberation Army are much more consolidated now than eighteen months ago. The reason is that our Party, standing resolutely on the side of the peasants, has carried out the land reform. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, our Party, on its own initiative and for the sake of forming an anti-Japanese united front with the Kuomintang and uniting with those who could still oppose Japanese imperialism, changed its pre-war policy of confiscating the land of the landlords and distributing it among the peasants to the policy of reducing rent and interest. This was entirely necessary. After the Japanese surrender, the peasants urgently demanded land, and we made a timely decision to change our land policy from reducing rent and interest to confiscating the land of the landlord class for distribution among the peasants. The directive issued by the Central Committee of our Party on May 4, 1946,[3] marked this change. In September 1947 our Party called the National Land Conference and drew up the Outline Land Law of China,[4] which was promptly carried out in all areas. This measure not only reaffirmed the policy set forth in last year's "May 4th Directive" but also explicitly corrected a certain lack of thoroughness in that directive. The Outline Land Law provides for equal distribution of land per head,[5] based on the principle of abolishing the land system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation and putting into effect the system of land to the tillers. This is a method which most thoroughly abolishes the feudal system and fully meets the demands of the broad masses of China's peasants. To carry out the land reform resolutely and thoroughly, it is necessary to organize in the villages, as lawful bodies for carrying out the reform, not only peasant associations on the broadest mass basis, including farm labourers, poor peasants and middle peasants and their elected committees, but first of all poor peasant leagues composed of poor peasants and farm labourers and their elected committees; and these poor peasant leagues should be the backbone of leadership in all rural struggles. Our policy is to rely on the poor peasants and unite solidly with the middle peasants to abolish the feudal and semi-feudal system of exploitation by the landlord class and by the old-type rich peasants. Landlords or rich peasants must not be allotted more land and property than the peasant masses. But there should be no repetition of the wrong ultra-Left policy, which was carried out in 1931-34, of "allotting no land to the landlords and poor land to the rich peasants". Although the proportion of landlords and rich peasants in the rural population varies from place to place, it is generally only about 8 per cent (in terms of households), while their holdings usually amount to 70 to 80 per cent of all the land. Therefore the targets of our land reform are very few, while the people in the villages who can and should take part in the united front for land reform are many — more than 90 per cent (in terms of households). Here two fundamental principles must be observed. First, the demands of the poor peasants and farm labourers must be satisfied; this is the most fundamental task in the land reform. Second, there must be firm unity with the middle peasants, and their interests must not be damaged. As long as we grasp these two basic principles, we can certainly carry out our tasks in the land reform successfully. The reason why, under the principle of equal distribution, the surplus land and part of the property of the old-type rich peasants should be handed over for distribution is that the rich peasants in China generally and to a great degree have the character of feudal and semi-feudal exploiters; most of them also rent out land and practise usury and they hire labour on semi-feudal terms.[6] Furthermore, as the rich peasants have more and better land,[7] the demands of the poor peasants and farm labourers cannot be satisfied unless this land is distributed. However, in accordance with the Outline Land Law, rich peasants should generally be treated differently from landlords. In the land reform, the middle peasants show approval of equal distribution because it does no harm to their interests. Under equal distribution, the land of one section of the middle peasants remains unchanged and that of another is increased; only the section of well-to-do middle peasants has a little surplus land, and they are willing to hand it over for equal distribution because their burden of land tax will then be lightened. Nevertheless, in carrying out equal distribution of land in different places, it is necessary to listen to the opinions of the middle peasants and make concessions to them if they object. During the confiscation and distribution of the land and property of the feudal class, the needs of certain middle peasants should receive attention. In determining class status care must be taken to avoid the mistake of classifying middle peasants as rich peasants. The active middle peasants must be drawn into the work of the peasant association committees and the government. With respect to the burdens of the land tax and of supporting the war, the principle of being fair and reasonable must be observed. These are the specific policies our Party must follow in carrying out its strategic task of uniting solidly with the middle peasants. The whole Party must understand that thoroughgoing reform of the land system is a basic task of the Chinese revolution in its present stage. If we can solve the land problem universally and completely, we shall have obtained the most fundamental condition for the defeat of all our enemies.

V

To carry out the land reform resolutely and thoroughly and to consolidate the rear areas of the People's Liberation Army, it is necessary to educate and reorganize the ranks of our Party. On the whole, the rectification movement[8] inside the Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan was successful. Its main success was that our leading bodies and large numbers of cadres and Party members obtained a firmer grasp of our basic orientation, which is to unite the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. In this respect our Party has taken a big stride forward as compared with all the historical stages before the War of Resistance. However, in the Party's local organizations, especially the organizations at the primary level in the countryside, the problem of impurities in the class composition of our ranks and in our style of work is still unsolved. During the eleven years 1937-47 the membership of our Party has grown from several tens of thousands to 2,700,000, and this is a very big leap forward. This has made our Party a more powerful party than any in Chinese history. It has enabled us to defeat Japanese imperialism, beat back Chiang Kai-shek's offensives, lead the Liberated Areas with a population of more than 100 million and lead a People's Liberation Army two million strong. But shortcomings have also cropped up. Many landlords, rich peasants and riffraff have seized the opportunity to sneak into our Party. In the rural areas they control a number of Party, government and people's organizations, tyrannically abuse their power, ride roughshod over the people, distort the Party's policies and thus alienate these organizations from the masses and prevent the land reform from being thorough. This grave situation sets us the task of educating and reorganizing the ranks of our Party. We cannot make headway in the countryside unless we perform this task. The Party's National Land Conference discussed this problem thoroughly and laid down the proper measures and methods. These are now being resolutely applied everywhere, together with the decision on the equal distribution of land. First and foremost comes the unfolding of criticism and self-criticism within the Party and the thorough exposure of mistaken ideas and serious situations in the local organizations, which are departures from the Party line. All Party members must realize that a decisive link in the solution of the land problem and for the support of the long-drawn-out war is the removal of impurities from Party organizations and the education and reorganization of the Party's ranks, so that the Party and the broadest masses of working people can all march in the same direction and the Party can lead the masses forward.

VI

Confiscate the land of the feudal class and turn it over to the peasants. Confiscate monopoly capital, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and Chen Li-fu, and turn it over to the new-democratic state. Protect the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie. These are the three major economic policies of the new-democratic revolution. During their twenty-year rule, the four big families, Chiang, Soong, Kung and Chen, have piled up enormous fortunes valued at ten to twenty thousand million U.S. dollars and monopolized the economic lifelines of the whole country. This monopoly capital, combined with state power, has become state-monopoly capitalism. This monopoly capitalism, closely tied up with foreign imperialism, the domestic landlord class and the old-type rich peasants, has become comprador, feudal, state-monopoly capitalism. Such is the economic base of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary regime. This state-monopoly capitalism oppresses not only the workers and peasants but also the urban petty bourgeoisie, and it injures the middle bourgeoisie. This state-monopoly capitalism reached the peak of its development during the War of Resistance and after the Japanese surrender; it has prepared ample material conditions for the new-democratic revolution. This capital is popularly known in China as bureaucrat-capital. This capitalist class, known as the bureaucrat-capitalist class, is the big bourgeoisie of China. Besides doing away with the special privileges of imperialism in China, the task of the new-democratic revolution at home is to abolish exploitation and oppression by the landlord class and by the bureaucrat-capitalist class (the big bourgeoisie), change the comprador, feudal relations of production and unfetter the productive forces. The upper petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie, oppressed and injured by the landlords and big bourgeoisie and their state power, may take part in the new-democratic revolution or stay neutral, though they are themselves bourgeois. They have no ties, or comparatively few, with imperialism and are the genuine national bourgeoisie. Wherever the state power of New Democracy extends, it must firmly and unhesitatingly protect them. In Chiang Kai-shek's areas, there are a small number of people among the upper petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, the right wing of these classes, who have reactionary political tendencies, spread illusions about U.S. imperialism and the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique and oppose the people's democratic revolution. As long as their reactionary tendencies can affect the masses, we should unmask them before the people under their political influence, attack this influence and liberate the masses from it. But political attack and economic annihilation are two different matters, and we shall make mistakes if we confuse the two. The new-democratic revolution aims at wiping out only feudalism and monopoly capitalism, only the landlord class and the bureaucrat-capitalist class (the big bourgeoisie), and not at wiping out capitalism in general, the upper petty bourgeoisie or the middle bourgeoisie. In view of China's economic backwardness, even after the country-wide victory of the revolution, it will still be necessary to permit the existence for a long time of a capitalist sector of the economy represented by the extensive upper petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie. In accordance with the division of labour in the national economy, a certain development of all parts of this capitalist sector which are beneficial to the national economy will still be needed. This capitalist sector will still be an indispensable part of the whole national economy. The upper petty bourgeoisie referred to here are small industrialists and merchants employing workers or assistants. In addition, there are also great numbers of small independent craftsmen and traders who employ no workers or assistants and, needless to say, they should be firmly protected. After the victory of the revolution all over the country, the new-democratic state will possess huge state enterprises taken over from the bureaucrat-capitalist class and controlling the economic lifelines of the country, and there will be an agricultural economy liberated from feudalism which, though it will remain basically scattered and individual for a fairly long time, can later be led to develop, step by step, in the direction of co-operatives. In these circumstances the existence and development of these small and middle capitalist sectors will present no danger. The same is true of the new rich peasant economy which will inevitably emerge in the rural areas after the land reform. It is absolutely impermissible to repeat such wrong ultra-Left policies towards the upper petty bourgeois and middle bourgeois sectors in the economy as our Party adopted during 1931-34 (unduly advanced labour conditions, excessive income tax rates, encroachment on the interests of industrialists and merchants during the land reform, and the adoption as a goal of the so-called "workers' welfare", which was a short-sighted and one-sided concept, instead of the goal of developing production, promoting economic prosperity, giving consideration to both public and private interests and benefiting both labour and capital). To repeat such mistakes would certainly damage the interests both of the working masses and of the new-democratic state. One of the provisions in the Outline Land Law of China reads, "The property and lawful business of industrialists and merchants shall be protected from encroachment." "Industrialists and merchants" refers to all small independent craftsmen and traders as well as all small and middle capitalist elements. To sum up, the economic structure of New China will consist of: (1) the state-owned economy, which is the leading sector; (2) the agricultural economy, developing step by step from individual to collective; and (3) the economy of small independent craftsmen and traders and the economy of small and middle private capital. These constitute the whole of the new-democratic national economy. The principles guiding the new-democratic national economy must closely conform to the general objective of developing production, promoting economic prosperity, giving consideration to both public and private interests and benefiting both labour and capital. Any principle, policy or measure that deviates from this general objective is wrong.

VII

The People's Liberation Army issued a manifesto in October 1947 which stated in part:

> Unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, democratic parties, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and establish a democratic coalition government.

That is the fundamental political programme of the People's Liberation Army and of the Communist Party of China. On the surface, our revolutionary national united front appears to have narrowed in the present period as compared with the period of the War of Resistance. As a matter of fact, it has been precisely in the present period, after Chiang Kai-shek sold out the nation's interests to U.S. imperialism and launched the country-wide civil war against the people and after the crimes of U.S. imperialism and the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique were completely exposed before the Chinese people, that our national united front has really broadened. During the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were not yet completely discredited among the Chinese people and were still able to deceive them in many ways. Now it is different; all their deceptions have been shown up by their own deeds, they no longer have any mass following, they are completely isolated. In contrast to the Kuomintang, the Communist Party of China not only has the confidence of the broadest masses of the people in the Liberated Areas but has also won the support of the broad masses in the areas and big cities under Kuomintang control. If in 1946 a section of the upper petty bourgeois and middle bourgeois intellectuals under Chiang Kai-shek's rule still cherished the idea of a so-called third road,[9] this idea is now bankrupt. Because our Party adopted a thoroughgoing land policy, it has won whole-hearted support from much broader masses of peasants than during the War of Resistance. As a result of U.S. imperialist aggression, Chiang Kai-shek's oppression and our Party's correct policy of firmly protecting the interests of the masses, our Party has won the sympathy of the broad masses of the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty and middle bourgeoisie in Chiang Kai-shek's areas. Driven by hunger, political oppression and Chiang Kai-shek's civil war against the people, which has made life impossible, the masses have been waging incessant struggles against U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary government; their basic slogans are against hunger, against persecution, against civil war and against U.S. interference in China's internal affairs. Never before has their awakening reached such a level, neither before nor during the War of Resistance, nor in the period immediately after the Japanese surrender. That is why we say that our new-democratic revolutionary united front is now broader and more consolidated than ever. This development is not only linked with our land and urban policies but is also closely linked with the whole political situation — with the victories of the People's Liberation Army, with Chiang Kai-shek's turn from the offensive to the defensive, with the People's Liberation Army's turn from the defensive to the offensive, with the period of a new high tide in the Chinese revolution. Realizing that Chiang Kai-shek's regime is inevitably doomed, people now place their hopes on the Communist Party of China and the People's Liberation Army, and this is quite natural. Without the broadest united front of the overwhelming majority of the population, it will be impossible to win victory in China's new-democratic revolution. Moreover, this united front must be under the firm leadership of the Communist Party of China. Without the Party's firm leadership, no revolutionary united front can win victory. When the Northern Expedition reached its climax in 1927, the capitulationists in our Party's leading body voluntarily gave up the Party's leadership of the peasant masses, urban petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie, and in particular gave up the Party's leadership of the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of the revolution. During the War of Resistance, our Party combated ideas similar to those of the capitulationists, that is, such ideas as making concessions to the Kuomintang's anti-popular policies, having more confidence in the Kuomintang than in the masses, not daring to arouse and give full rein to mass struggles, not daring to expand the Liberated Areas and the people's armies in the Japanese-occupied areas, and handing over the leadership in the War of Resistance to the Kuomintang. Our Party waged a resolute struggle against such impotent and degenerate ideas, which run counter to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, resolutely carried out its political line of "developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle forces and isolating the die-hard forces" and resolutely expanded the Liberated Areas and the People's Liberation Army. This ensured not only that our Party was able to defeat Japanese imperialism in the period of its aggression, but also that, in the period after the Japanese surrender when Chiang Kai-shek launched his counter-revolutionary war our Party was able to switch smoothly and without loss to the course of opposing Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary war with a people's revolutionary war and to win great victories in a short time. All Party comrades must keep these lessons of history firmly in mind.

VIII

When the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique launched the country-wide civil war against the people in 1946, the reason they dared take this risk was that they relied not merely on their own superior military strength but mainly on the U.S. imperialists with their atom bombs, whom they regarded as "exceptionally powerful" and "matchless in the world". On the one hand, they thought U.S. imperialism could meet their military and financial needs with a stream of supplies. On the other hand, they wildly speculated that "war between the United States and the Soviet Union is inevitable" and that "the outbreak of a third world war is inevitable". This dependence on U.S. imperialism is the common feature of the reactionary forces in all countries since World War II. It reflects the severity of the blows world capitalism received in World War II; it reflects the weakness of the reactionary forces in all countries, their panic and loss of confidence; and it reflects the might of the world revolutionary forces — all of which make reactionaries in all countries feel that there is no way out except to rely on U.S. imperialist support. But, in fact, is U.S. imperialism after World War II as powerful as Chiang Kai-shek and the reactionaries of other countries imagine? Can it really pour out a stream of supplies for them? No, that is not so. The economic power of U.S. imperialism, which grew during World War II, is confronted with unstable and daily shrinking domestic and foreign markets. The further shrinking of these markets will cause economic crises to break out. The war boom in the United States of America was only temporary. The strength of the United States of America is only superficial and transient. Irreconcilable domestic and international contradictions, like a volcano, menace U.S. imperialism every day. U.S. imperialism is sitting on this volcano. This situation has driven the U.S. imperialists to draw up a plan for enslaving the world, to run amuck like wild beasts in Europe, Asia and other parts of the world, to muster the reactionary forces in all countries, the human dregs cast off by their peoples, to form an imperialist and anti-democratic camp against all the democratic forces headed by the Soviet Union, and to prepare for war in the hope that in the future, at a distant time, some day, they can start a third world war to defeat the democratic forces. This is a preposterous plan. The democratic forces of the world must defeat this plan and certainly can defeat it. The strength of the world anti-imperialist camp has surpassed that of the imperialist camp. It is we, not the enemy, who are in the superior position. The anti-imperialist camp headed by the Soviet Union has already been formed. The socialist Soviet Union is free from crises, on the ascendant and cherished by the world's broad masses; its strength has already surpassed that of the imperialist United States, which is seriously menaced by crises, on the decline and opposed by the world's broad masses. The People's Democracies in Europe are consolidating themselves internally and are uniting with each other. In the European capitalist countries the people's anti-imperialist forces are developing, with those in France and Italy taking the lead. Within the United States, there are people's democratic forces which are getting stronger every day. The peoples of Latin America are not slaves obedient to U.S. imperialism. In the whole of Asia a great national liberation movement has arisen. All the forces of the anti-imperialist camp are uniting and forging ahead. The Communist and Workers' Parties of nine European countries have established their Information Bureau and issued a call to the people of the world to rise against the imperialist plan of enslavement.[10] This call to battle has inspired the oppressed people of the world, charted the course of their struggle and strengthened their confidence in victory. It has thrown world reaction into panic and confusion. All the anti-imperialist forces in the countries of the East, too, should unite together, oppose oppression by imperialism and by their domestic reactionaries and make the goal of their struggle the emancipation of the more than 1,000 million oppressed people of the East. We certainly should grasp our own destiny in our own hands. We should rid our ranks of all impotent thinking. All views that overestimate the strength of the enemy and underestimate the strength of the people are wrong. If everyone makes strenuous efforts, we, together with all the democratic forces of the world, can surely defeat the imperialist plan of enslavement, prevent the outbreak of a third world war, overthrow all reactionary regimes and win lasting peace for mankind. We are soberly aware that on our way forward there will still be all kinds of obstacles and difficulties and that we should be prepared to deal with the maximum resistance and desperate struggle by all our enemies, domestic and foreign. But so long as we can grasp the science of Marxism-Leninism, have confidence in the masses, stand closely together with the masses and lead them forward, we shall be fully able to surmount any obstacle and overcome any difficulty. Our strength will be invincible. This is the historic epoch in which world capitalism and imperialism are going down to their doom and world socialism and people's democracy are marching to victory. The dawn is ahead, we must exert ourselves.

NOTES

[1] For the circumstances of how the People's Liberation Army went over to the offensive on various fronts in succession and carried the war into the Kuomintang areas, see "On the Great Victory in the Northwest and on the New Type of Ideological Education Movement in the Liberation Army", Note 4, pp. 215-16 of this volume.

[2] Liu Chih, Director of the Kuomintang's Pacification Headquarters in Chengchow, Honan Province, was dismissed in November 1946 for his defeat in the battle of Tingtao, southwestern Shantung Province, in September. Hsueh Yueh, Director of the Kuomintang's Pacification Headquarters in Hsuchow, Kiangsu Province, was dismissed in March 1947 for a series of heavy defeats suffered by the Kuomintang troops under his command: in the campaign in the area north of Suchien, Kiangsu Province, in December 1946; in the campaign in southern Shantung in January 1947; and in the Laiwu campaign, central Shantung, in February 1947. Wu Chi-wei, Deputy Director of the Kuomintang's Pacification Headquarters in Hsuchow, was dismissed in March 1947 for his defeat in the campaign in the area north of Suchien in December 1946. Tang En-po, Commander of the Kuomintang's 1st Army, was dismissed in June 1947 because the Kuomintang's Reorganized 94th Division was wiped out in the battle of Mengliangku, southern Shantung, in May. Wang Chung-lien, Commander of the Kuomintang's 4th Army, was dismissed in August 1947 for his defeat in the Southwestern Shantung campaign in July. Tu Yu-ming, Commander of the Kuomintang's Peace Preservation Headquarters in the Northeast, and Hsiung Shih-hui, Director of the Kuomintang Generalissimo's Headquarters in the Northeast, were both dismissed for being severely defeated by the People's Liberation Army in its summer offensive in the Northeast in June 1947. Sun Lien-chung, Commander of the Kuomintang's 11th War Zone, was demoted to Director of the Pacification Headquarters in Paoting, Hopei Province, for his defeats in the Ching-Tsang campaign and the campaign in the Hsushui area north of Paoting in June 1947. Chen Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek's chief of general staff, was demoted to governor-general of the Northeast in August 1947 because of the successive defeats of the campaigns he directed in Shantung Province.

[3] For the directive, see "A Three Months' Summary", Note 4, p. 118 of this volume.

[4] The National Land Conference of the Communist Party of China was held in September 1947 in Hsipaipo Village, Pingshan County, Hopei Province. The Outline Land Law of China, adopted by the conference on September 13, was published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on October 10, 1947. It stipulated the following:

> Abolish the land system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation and put into effect the system of land to the tillers.
>
> All the land of the landlords and the public land in the villages is to be taken over by the local peasant associations and, together with all other land there, is to be equally distributed among the entire rural population, regardless of sex or age.
>
> The peasant associations of the villages shall take over the draught animals, farm tools, houses, grain and other property of the landlords, requisition the surplus of such property of the rich peasants, distribute all this property among the peasants and other poor people who are in need of it and allot the same share to the landlords.

Thus the Outline Land Law not only confirmed the principle of "confiscation of the land of the landlords and its distribution among the peasants" laid down in the "May 4th Directive" of 1946 but also made up for the lack of thoroughness in that directive, which had shown too much consideration for certain landlords.

[5] Subsequently in the implementation some changes were made in the method of equal distribution of land provided in the Outline Land Law of China. In February 1948 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China specified in its "Directive on the Work of Land Reform and of Party Consolidation in the Old and

Semi-Old Areas" that in the old and semi-old Liberated Areas where the feudal system had already been overthrown, there would be no further equal distribution of land, but that the poor peasants and farm labourers who had not yet completely shaken off the feudal yoke should, if circumstances so required, be given a certain amount of land and other means of production through readjustment, by the method of taking from those who had a surplus and giving to those who had a shortage and taking from those who had better and giving to those who had worse, while the middle peasants would be allowed to keep more land than the average poor peasant. In areas where the feudal system still existed, equal distribution was confined mainly to the land and property of landlords and the surplus land and property of old-type rich peasants. In all areas, it was permissible to take the surplus land of middle peasants and new-type rich peasants for purposes of readjustment only if this was actually necessary and if the owners really consented. In the land reform in the new Liberated Areas, no land was to be taken from any middle peasant.

[6] The question of the rich peasants in China's land reform was a peculiar one arising from her specific historical and economic conditions. China's rich peasants differed from those in many capitalist countries in two respects: first, they generally and to a great degree had the character of feudal and semi-feudal exploiters and, second, this rich peasant economy did not occupy an important place in the country's agricultural economy. In the struggle against feudal exploitation by the landlord class in China, the broad masses of poor peasants and farm labourers also demanded the abolition of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation by the rich peasants. During the War of Liberation, the Communist Party of China adopted the policy of requisitioning the surplus land and property of rich peasants for distribution among the peasants, and thus satisfied the demands of the masses of poor peasants and farm labourers and ensured victory in the People's War of Liberation. As the war progressed towards victory, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in February 1948 laid down new policies for the land reform in the new Liberated Areas. The reform was to be divided into two stages: in the first stage, neutralize the rich peasants and concentrate the blows on the landlords, primarily the big landlords; in the second stage, while distributing the land of the landlords, also distribute the land rented out by rich peasants and their surplus land, but continue to treat the rich peasants differently from the landlords (see "Essential Points in Land Reform in the New Liberated Areas", pp. 201-02 of this volume). After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Central People's Government in June 1950 promulgated the Land Reform Law, which provided that in the land reform only the land rented out by the rich peasants should partly or wholly be requisitioned, while the rest of their land and property was to be protected. In the subsequent stage of socialist revolution, the rich peasant economy disappeared as the movement for agricultural co-operation deepened and the rural economy developed.

[7] That is to say, a rich peasant household owned on the average more and better land than a poor peasant household. Taking the country as a whole, the quantity of the means of production owned by China's rich peasants and the volume of their farm produce were both very small. The rich peasant economy did not occupy an important place in China's rural economy.

[8] This refers to the movement for rectifying the style of work conducted by the Communist Party of China in 1942-43 throughout the Party; its content was the combating of subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped writing. Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, this rectification movement adopted the principles of "learning from past mistakes to avoid their repetition, curing the sickness to save the patient" and "clearing up wrong thinking while uniting with

comrades". Through the method of criticism and self-criticism, the movement corrected the "Left" and Right errors which had occurred on various occasions in the history of the Party by getting down to their ideological roots, greatly raised the ideological level of the broad ranks of Party cadres, helped immensely to unify thinking within the Party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and thus brought about a high degree of unity in the whole Party.

[9] In the early stage of the People's War of Liberation some democratic personages fancied that they could find a so-called third road, apart from the Kuomintang dictatorship of big landlords and big bourgeoisie and apart from the people's democratic dictatorship led by the Communist Party of China. This third road was in fact the road of a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie on the British and U.S. pattern.

[10] The Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties was founded at a meeting held in Warsaw, Poland, in September 1947 by representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Yugoslavia. Later, at a meeting in Rumania in June 1948, the Bureau announced the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party because the latter persisted in its anti-Marxist-Leninist stand and adopted an attitude opposed to the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. The Information Bureau's call to the people of the world to rise against the imperialist plan of enslavement, mentioned here by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, was the "Declaration on the International Situation" adopted at the September 1947 meeting of the Information Bureau.

ON SETTING UP A SYSTEM OF REPORTS*

January 7, 1948

In order to provide the Central Committee with timely information so that it can help all areas, either before or after the event, to avoid mistakes or commit fewer mistakes and win even greater victories in the revolutionary war, the following system of reports is instituted, beginning with this year.

1. For each bureau or sub-bureau of the Central Committee, the secretary is responsible for submitting to the Central Committee and its chairman a comprehensive bi-monthly report (written by himself, not by his assistants). The report should cover military, political, land reform, Party consolidation, economic, propaganda and cultural activities, the problems and tendencies that have arisen in these activities and the methods of dealing with them. Each report should be limited to about a thousand words and, except in special cases, should not exceed two thousand words. When all questions cannot be covered in one report, write two. Or the first report may concentrate on certain questions and deal briefly with the rest, and the next report may concentrate on the latter and deal briefly with the former. The comprehensive report should be concise in content and succinct in wording and point out the problems or controversial issues. It should be written and telegraphed early in every odd month. This is to be the regular report and request for instructions which the secretary of each bureau or sub-bureau is personally responsible for submitting to the Central Committee and its chairman. When the secretary is at the front directing military operations, he should, in addition to submitting his own reports, authorize the acting secretary or deputy secretary to report on rear-area activities. The above does not include occasional reports and requests for instructions which the bureaus or sub-bureaus should continue to submit to the Central Committee.

We are instituting this system of regular comprehensive policy reports and requests for instructions because, after the Seventh

National Congress of our Party, some (not all) comrades in the bureaus or sub-bureaus still do not realize the necessity and importance of submitting reports to the Central Committee and asking for instructions before or after the event, or they send reports and requests for instructions only on technical points; and, as a result, the Central Committee is not clear or is not sufficiently clear about their major activities and policies (not those of secondary importance or of a technical nature), and therefore certain things have occurred that cannot be remedied or are hard to remedy, or can be remedied but have already caused losses. Those bureaus and sub-bureaus that have asked for prior instructions and submitted reports afterwards have avoided or reduced such losses. Beginning with this year, the Party's leading bodies at all levels must correct the bad habit of neither asking the higher level for prior instructions nor submitting reports afterwards. The bureaus and sub-bureaus, being organs appointed by the Central Committee to carry out on its behalf the tasks entrusted to them, must keep in the closest possible contact with the Central Committee. Also, the provincial or area Party committees must keep in close contact with the bureaus and sub-bureaus of the Central Committee. At a time when the revolution has entered a period of new high tide, it is imperative to strengthen these contacts.

2. Leaders of field armies and military areas, apart from their obligation to submit reports and requests for instructions on matters of strategy when necessary and their obligation to submit, as previously required, monthly reports on combat gains, on losses and munitions consumed and on the actual strength of their forces, must

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The system of reports instituted in the directive was a development under new conditions in the long struggle of the Central Committee firmly to uphold democratic centralism and combat tendencies of indiscipline and anarchy. The problem was especially important at that time because there had been tremendous progress in the revolutionary situation. Many Liberated Areas had been linked together, many cities had been or were about to be liberated, the People's Liberation Army had become much more of a regular army, the People's War of Liberation had become much more of a regular war, and country-wide victory was in sight. This situation demanded that the Party should speedily overcome any conditions of indiscipline or anarchy existing in the Party and the army and should concentrate in the Central Committee all the powers that had to be and could be centralized. The setting up of a strict system of reports was an important step taken by the Party for this purpose. On this question, see also "The Work of Land Reform and of Party Consolidation in 1948", Section 6, p. 258 and "On the September Meeting — Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", Point 4, pp. 273-74, of this volume.

also submit comprehensive policy reports and requests for instructions every two months, beginning this year. These should cover the discipline of the troops, their living conditions, the morale of commanders and fighters, any deviations that have arisen among commanders and fighters and the methods for overcoming them, the progress or retrogression in technique and tactics, the strong and weak points of the enemy forces and whether their morale is high or low, the political work of our army, its implementation of land policy, urban policy and policy concerning captives and the methods of overcoming deviations from these policies, the relations between the army and the people and the trends among different strata of the people. The length, method of writing and time of dispatch of these reports should be the same as those laid down for reports by the bureaus and sub-bureaus of the Central Committee. If intense fighting is going on when a report is due (that is, early in every odd month), its submission may be advanced or postponed a few days, but the reasons must be given. The section dealing with political work should be drafted by the director of the army's political department, examined and corrected by the commander and political commissar and then jointly signed by all three. These reports should be telegraphed to the Chairman of the Party's Military Commission. We require these comprehensive policy reports for the same reasons as we require such reports from the bureaus and sub-bureaus.

ON SOME IMPORTANT PROBLEMS OF THE PARTY'S PRESENT POLICY*

January 18, 1948

I. THE PROBLEM OF COMBATING ERRONEOUS TENDENCIES WITHIN THE PARTY

Oppose overestimation of the enemy's strength. For example: fear of U.S. imperialism; fear of carrying the battle into the Kuomintang areas; fear of wiping out the comprador-feudal system, of distributing the land of the landlords and of confiscating bureaucrat-capital; fear of a long-drawn-out war; and so on. All these are incorrect. Imperialism throughout the world and the rule of the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique in China are already rotten and have no future. We have reason to despise them and we are confident and certain that we shall defeat all the domestic and foreign enemies of the Chinese people. But with regard to each part, each specific struggle (military, political, economic or ideological), we must never take the enemy lightly; on the contrary, we should take the enemy seriously and concentrate all our strength for battle in order to win victory. While we correctly point out that, strategically, with regard to the whole, we should take the enemy lightly, we must never take the enemy lightly in any part, in any specific struggle. If, with regard to the whole, we overestimate the strength of our enemy and hence do not dare to overthrow him and do not dare to win victory, we shall be committing a Right opportunist error. If, with regard to each part, each specific problem, we are not prudent, do not carefully study and perfect the art of struggle, do not concentrate all our strength for battle and do not pay attention to winning over all the allies that should be won over (middle peasants, small independent craftsmen and traders, the middle bourgeoisie, students, teachers, professors and ordinary intellectuals, ordinary government employees, professionals and enlightened gentry), we shall be committing a "Left" opportunist error.

In combating "Left" and Right deviations within the Party, we must decide on our policy according to specific circumstances. For example, the army must guard against "Left" deviations in times of victory and guard against Right deviations in times of defeat or when we are unable to win many battles. In land reform, Right deviations must be combated where the masses have not yet been aroused in earnest and the struggle has not yet unfolded, and "Left" deviations must be guarded against where the masses have been aroused in earnest and the struggle has already unfolded.

II. SOME CONCRETE PROBLEMS OF POLICY IN THE LAND REFORM AND MASS MOVEMENTS

1. The interests of the poor peasants and farm labourers and the forward role of the poor peasant leagues must be our first concern. Our Party must launch the land reform through the poor peasants and farm labourers and must enable them to play the forward role in the peasant associations and in the government organs of the rural districts. This forward role consists in forging unity with the middle peasants for common action and not in casting aside the middle peasants and monopolizing the work. The position of the middle peasants is especially important in the old Liberated Areas where the middle peasants are the majority and the poor peasants and farm labourers a minority. The slogan, "the poor peasants and farm labourers conquer the country and should rule the country", is wrong. In the villages, it is the farm labourers, poor peasants, middle peasants and other working people, united together under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, who conquer the country and should rule the country, and it is not the poor peasants and farm labourers alone who conquer the country and should rule the country. In the country as a whole, it is the workers, peasants (including the new rich peasants), small independent craftsmen and traders, middle and small capitalists oppressed and injured by the reactionary forces, the students, teachers,

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. See the introductory note to "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", pp. 158-59 of this volume.

professors and ordinary intellectuals, professionals, enlightened gentry, ordinary government employees, oppressed minority nationalities and overseas Chinese, all united together under the leadership of the working class (through the Communist Party), who conquer the country and should rule the country, and it is not merely some of the people who conquer the country and should rule the country.

2. We must avoid adopting any adventurist policies towards the middle peasants. In the cases of middle peasants and persons of other strata whose class status has been wrongly determined, correction should be made without fail, and any of their belongings that have been distributed should be returned, as far as that is possible. The tendency to exclude middle peasants from the ranks of the peasants' representatives and from the peasants' committees and the tendency to counterpose them to the poor peasants and farm labourers in the land reform struggle must be corrected. Peasants with an income from exploitation should be classified as middle peasants if such income is less than 25 per cent of their total income, and classified as rich peasants if it is more.[1] The land of well-to-do middle peasants must not be distributed without the owner's consent.

3. We must avoid adopting any adventurist policies towards middle and small industrialists and merchants. The policy, adopted in the past in the Liberated Areas, of protecting and encouraging the development of all private industry and commerce beneficial to the national economy was correct and should be continued in the future. The policy of encouraging landlords and rich peasants to switch to industry and commerce, adopted during the period of rent and interest reduction, was also correct; it is wrong to regard such switching as a "disguise" and therefore to oppose it and confiscate and distribute the property so switched. The industrial and commercial holdings of landlords and rich peasants should in general be protected; the only industrial and commercial holdings that may be confiscated are those of bureaucrat-capitalists and of real counter-revolutionary local tyrants. Among the industrial and commercial enterprises which should be confiscated, those beneficial to the national economy must continue to operate after they have been taken over by the state and the people and must not be allowed to break up or close down. The transactions tax on the industry and commerce which are beneficial to the national economy should be levied only to the extent that it does not hamper their development. In each public enterprise, the administration and the trade union must set up a joint management committee to strengthen

the work of management in order to reduce costs, increase output and see that both public and individual interests are benefited. Private capitalist enterprises should also try out this method in order to reduce costs, increase output and benefit both labour and capital. The workers' livelihood must be appropriately improved, but unduly high wages and benefits must be avoided.

4. We must avoid adopting any adventurist policies towards students, teachers, professors, scientific workers, art workers and ordinary intellectuals. The experience of China's student movements and revolutionary struggles has proved that the overwhelming majority of these people can take part in the revolution or remain neutral; the die-hard counter-revolutionaries are a tiny minority. Our Party should, therefore, adopt a careful attitude towards students, teachers, professors, scientific workers, art workers and ordinary intellectuals. We should unite with them, educate them and give them posts according to the merits of each case, and only a tiny number of die-hard counter-revolutionaries among them will have to be appropriately dealt with through the mass line.

5. On the question of the enlightened gentry. Our Party's co-operation with the enlightened gentry in government bodies (consultative councils and governments) in the Liberated Areas during the War of Resistance Against Japan was entirely necessary and also successful. Those enlightened gentry who went through hardships and tribulations together with our Party and actually made some contribution should be given consideration according to the merits of each case, provided that this does not interfere with land reform. Those who are fairly good politically and are competent should remain in the higher government bodies and be given appropriate work. Those who are fairly good politically but are not competent should have their livelihood assured. As for those who are of landlord or rich peasant origin but who have not incurred the people's deep resentment, their feudal landholdings and feudal property should be distributed according to the Land Law, but it should be seen to that they do not become targets of mass struggles. Those who have sneaked into our government bodies, who have in reality always been evil, who can be of no use to the people and who have incurred the extreme hatred of the broad masses, are to be handed over to the people's courts to be tried and punished like local tyrants.

6. We must distinguish between the new rich peasants and the old rich peasants.[2] The encouragement given to new rich peasants

and well-to-do middle peasants during the period of rent and interest reduction proved effective in reassuring the middle peasants and in developing agricultural production in the Liberated Areas. After the equal distribution of land, we must call on the peasants to develop production so that they will be well-fed and well-clothed, and advise them to set up organizations for mutual aid and co-operation in agriculture, such as labour-exchange teams, mutual-aid teams and work-exchange groups.[3] In the equal distribution of land the new rich peasants in the old Liberated Areas should be treated like well-to-do middle peasants, and their land should not be distributed without the owner's consent.

7. Among those landlords and rich peasants in the old Liberated Areas who changed their mode of living during the period of rent and interest reduction, the landlords who have engaged in physical labour for five years or more and the rich peasants whose condition has been reduced to that of middle or poor peasants for three years or more may now have their class status changed in accordance with their present condition, provided their behaviour has been good. Those who still possess a large amount of surplus property (not a small amount) should hand over the surplus in accordance with the peasants' demands.

8. The heart of land reform is the equal distribution of the land of the feudal classes and of their property in grain, animals and farm implements (rich peasants hand over only their surplus property); we should not overemphasize the struggle to unearth hidden wealth[4] and in particular should not spend too much time on this matter lest it should interfere with the main work.

9. In dealing with landlords and rich peasants we should distinguish between them in accordance with the Outline Land Law.

10. Within the framework of the principle of equal distribution of land, we should also distinguish among the big, middle and small landlords, as well as between those landlords and rich peasants who are local tyrants and those who are not.

11. After the people's courts have given the handful of arch-criminals who are really guilty of the most heinous crimes a serious trial and sentenced them and the sentences have been approved by appropriate government organizations (committees organized by local governments at county or sub-regional level), it is entirely necessary for the sake of revolutionary order to shoot them and announce their execution. That is one side of the matter. The other side is that we

must insist on killing less and must strictly forbid killing without discrimination. To advocate killing more or killing without discrimination is entirely wrong; this would only cause our Party to forfeit sympathy, become alienated from the masses and fall into isolation. Trial and sentence by the people's courts, a form of struggle provided in the Outline Land Law, must be carried out in earnest; it is a powerful weapon of the peasant masses for striking at the worst elements among the landlords and rich peasants, it also avoids the mistake of beating and killing without discrimination. At the proper time (after the land struggle has reached its height), we should teach the masses to understand their own long-term interests — to regard those landlords and rich peasants who do not persist in wrecking the war effort or the land reform and who number tens of millions in the country as a whole (as many as 36 million out of a rural population of about 360 million) as a labour force for the country and to save and remould them. Our task is to abolish the feudal system, to wipe out the landlords as a class, not as individuals. In accordance with the Land Law we must give them means of production and means of livelihood, but not more than to the peasants.

12. We must criticize and struggle with certain cadres and Party members who have committed serious mistakes and certain bad elements among the masses of workers and peasants. In such criticism and struggle we should persuade the masses to adopt correct methods and forms and to refrain from rough actions. This is one side of the matter. The other side is that these cadres, Party members and bad elements should be made to pledge that they will not retaliate against the masses. It should be announced that the masses not only have the right to criticize them freely but also have the right to dismiss them from their posts when necessary or to propose their dismissal, or to propose their expulsion from the Party and even to hand the worst elements over to the people's courts for trial and punishment.

III. ON THE PROBLEM OF STATE POWER

1. The new-democratic state power is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal state power of the masses of the people led by the working class. Here, the masses of the people include the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie

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who are oppressed and injured by imperialism and by the reactionary Kuomintang regime and the classes it represents, namely, the bureaucrat-capitalist class (the big bourgeoisie) and the landlord class. The main body of the masses consists of the workers, peasants (soldiers being chiefly peasants in uniform) and other working people. The masses of the people form their own state (the People's Republic of China) and establish a government (the Central Government of the People's Republic of China) to represent this state. The working class through its vanguard, the Communist Party of China, exercises the leadership in this state belonging to the masses of the people and in its government. The enemies this People's Republic and its government oppose are foreign imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries at home and the classes they represent — the bureaucrat-capitalist class and landlord class.

2. The organs of state power of the People's Republic of China are the people's congresses at different levels and the governments at different levels which these congresses elect.

3. In the rural areas in the present period, we can and should, in accordance with the demands of the peasants, convene village peasant meetings to elect the village governments, and convene district peasant congresses to elect the district governments. Since the governments at or above county or municipal level represent not only the peasants in the countryside but also the people of all strata and occupations in the towns, county seats, provincial capitals and big industrial and commercial cities, we should convene people's congresses at county, municipal, provincial or border region levels to elect the governments at corresponding levels. In the future after the revolution triumphs throughout the whole country, the central government and the local governments at all levels should be elected by the people's congresses at corresponding levels.

IV. THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THOSE WHO LEAD AND THOSE WHO ARE LED IN THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT

The leading class and the leading party must fulfil two conditions in order to exercise their leadership of the classes, strata, political parties and people's organizations which are being led:

(a) Lead those who are led (allies) to wage resolute struggles against the common enemy and achieve victories;

(b) Bring material benefits to those who are led or at least not damage their interests and at the same time give them political education.

Without both these conditions, or with only one, leadership cannot be realized. As an example, the Communist Party, in order to lead the middle peasants, must lead them to struggle resolutely together with us against the feudal classes and achieve victories (destroying the landlords' armed force and dividing up their land). If there is no resolute struggle or if there is struggle but no victory, the middle peasants will vacillate. Furthermore, we must allot part of the land and other property of the landlords to those middle peasants who are relatively poor and must not damage the interests of the well-to-do middle peasants. In the peasant associations and the village and district governments we must draw the activists among the middle peasants into the work and must provide suitable quotas for them (for instance, one-third of the committee members). Do not make mistakes in determining the class status of middle peasants and be fair to them in regard to the land tax and civilian war service. At the same time, give the middle peasants political education. If we do not do all these things, we will lose the support of the middle peasants. In the cities, the same holds true for the working class and the Communist Party in exercising their leadership of the middle bourgeoisie, democratic parties and people's organizations oppressed and injured by the reactionary forces.

NOTES

[1] For the criteria for class identification in the rural areas, see "How to Analyse the Classes in the Rural Areas", *Selected Work of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. I, and "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", Chapter 2, Section 4, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II.

[2] The new rich peasants were those who had developed from middle peasants or poor peasants in the revolutionary base areas. The old rich peasants were those who had already been rich peasants before the revolutionary base areas were established. The old rich peasants generally and to a great degree had the character of feudal and semi-feudal exploiters. See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Note 6, p. 175 of this volume.

[3] Labour-exchange teams and work-exchange groups were organizations for mutual aid and co-operation in agriculture. "Labour-exchange" or "work-exchange" was a means by which the peasants adjusted labour-power among themselves and took such forms as the exchange of man-workdays for man-workdays, ox-workdays for ox-workdays and man-workdays for ox-workdays. Peasants who joined labour-exchange teams contributed their labour-power or animal-power to cultivate the land of each member-family in rotation or collectively. In settling accounts the workday was taken as the unit of exchange; those who contributed more man-workdays or animal-workdays were paid for the difference by those who contributed less.

[4] This refers to the valuables buried by the landlords.

THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN THE ARMY*

January 30, 1948

The policy for political work in our army units is fully to arouse the masses of soldiers, the commanders and all working personnel in order to achieve, through a democratic movement under centralized leadership, three major objectives, namely, a high degree of political unity, an improvement in living conditions and a higher level of military technique and tactics. The Three Check-ups and Three Improvements[1] now being enthusiastically carried out in our army units are intended to attain the first two of these objectives through the methods of political and economic democracy.

With regard to economic democracy, the representatives elected by the soldiers must be ensured the right to assist (but not to bypass) the company leadership in managing the company's supplies and mess.

With regard to military democracy, in periods of training there must be mutual instruction as between officers and soldiers and among the soldiers themselves; and in periods of fighting the companies at the front must hold big and small meetings of various kinds. Under the direction of the company leadership, the masses of soldiers should be roused to discuss how to attack and capture enemy positions and how to fulfil other combat tasks. When the fighting lasts several days, several such meetings should be held. This kind of military democracy was practised with great success in the battle of Panlung[2] in northern Shensi and in the battle of Shihchiachuang[3] in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area. It has been proved that the practice can only do good and can do no harm whatsoever.

The masses of soldiers should have the right to expose the errors and misdeeds of bad elements among the cadres. We should be confident that the soldiers will cherish all the good and comparatively good cadres. Moreover, the soldiers should have the right, when necessary, to nominate those whom they trust from their own ranks for lower-level cadre posts, subject to appointment by the higher level. When there is an acute shortage of lower-level cadres, this kind of nomination is very useful. It is not to be the rule, however, but is to be done only when necessary.

NOTES

[1] The "Three Check-ups" and "Three Improvements" constituted an important movement for Party consolidation and for ideological education in the army which was carried out by our Party in conjunction with the land reform during the People's War of Liberation. In the localities, the "Three Check-ups" meant checking on class origin, ideology and style of work; in the armed units, the check-ups were on class origin, performance of duty and will to fight. The "Three Improvements" meant organizational consolidation, ideological education and rectification of style of work.

[2] Panlung, northeast of Yenan, was a town where the Northwest People's Liberation Army surrounded and wiped out over 6,700 Kuomintang troops under the command of Hu Tsung-nan in May 1947.

[3] Shihchiachuang was liberated by units of the People's Liberation Army of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region on November 12, 1947. Its enemy garrison of more than 24,000 men was totally destroyed. It was the first important city liberated by the People's Liberation Army in northern China.

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

DIFFERENT TACTICS FOR CARRYING OUT THE LAND LAW IN DIFFERENT AREAS

February 3, 1948

In carrying out the Land Law, it is necessary to distinguish three kinds of areas and to adopt different tactics for each.

1. Old Liberated Areas established before the Japanese surrender. In general, land in these areas has long been distributed, and only a part of the distribution needs to be readjusted. Our work here should centre on educating and consolidating the ranks of the Party and solving the contradictions between the Party and the masses by combining the efforts of Party and non-Party people according to the experience gained in Pingshan County.[1] In these old Liberated Areas what should be done is not to distribute the land a second time under the Land Law, or artificially and arbitrarily to organize poor peasant leagues to lead the peasant associations, but to organize poor peasant groups within the peasant associations. Activists in these groups can hold leading posts in the peasant associations and in the organs of political power in the rural areas, but it should not be made the rule that such posts go to the poor peasants to the exclusion of the middle peasants. In these areas the leading posts in the peasant associations and the organs of political power should be assumed by those activists among the poor and middle peasants who are correct in their thinking and fair and just in running affairs. The great majority of former poor peasants in these areas have developed into middle peasants, and the middle peasants now form the bulk of the rural population; therefore we must draw in the activists among the middle peasants to participate in the leadership of these rural areas.

2. Areas liberated between the Japanese surrender and the time of the general counter-offensive, that is, in the two years between September 1945 and August 1947. These now form the largest part of the Liberated Areas and can be called the semi-old Liberated Areas.

In these areas, through the struggle to settle accounts during the last two years and through the carrying out of the "May 4th Directive",[2] the level of political consciousness and the degree of organization of the masses have been raised considerably, and there has been a preliminary solution of the land problem. But the political consciousness and the organization of the masses have not yet reached a high level, and the land problem is not yet thoroughly solved. In these areas the Land Law is entirely applicable, the distribution of land should be universal and thorough, and if it is not done well the first time, we should be prepared for a second distribution with one or two check-ups afterwards. In these areas the middle peasants are a minority and are taking a wait-and-see attitude. The poor peasants are the majority and are eagerly demanding land. Poor peasant leagues must therefore be organized and their leading position established in the peasant associations and the organs of political power in the rural areas.

3. Areas newly liberated since the general counter-offensive. In these areas the masses have not yet been aroused, the Kuomintang, the landlords and the rich peasants still have great influence, and all our work has not yet taken root. Therefore, we should not try to enforce the Land Law all at once but should do it in two stages. The first stage is to neutralize the rich peasants and strike blows exclusively at the landlords. This stage should be further sub-divided into several steps, namely, propaganda, preliminary organization, distribution of the movable property[3] of the big landlords, distribution of the land of the big and middle landlords with some consideration being given to the small landlords, and finally the distribution of the land of the landlord class. During this stage, poor peasant leagues should be organized as the backbone of leadership, and peasant associations may also be organized with the poor peasants as the main body. The second stage is to distribute the land rented out by the rich peasants, their surplus land[4] and part of their other property, and to distribute that portion of the land of the landlords which was not thoroughly distributed in the first stage. The first stage should take about two years and the second a year. Haste will certainly do no good. Land reform and Party consolidation in the old and semi-old Liberated Areas should also take three, years (counting from this January); here haste will do no good either.

NOTES

[1] Pingshan County, situated in western Hopei Province, was then part of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area. The experience of Pingshan here referred to consisted in inviting non-Party people to attend Party meetings so as to help the consolidation of the Party's primary organizations in the rural areas during the land reform.

[2] This refers to the "Directive on the Land Question" issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on May 4, 1946. See "A Three Months' Summary", Note 4, p. 118 of this volume.

[3] "Movable property" refers to grain, money, clothing, etc.

[4] See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Note 6, p. 175 of this volume.

CORRECT THE "LEFT" ERRORS IN LAND REFORM PROPAGANDA*

February 11, 1948

In the past few months our news agency and newspapers in many places have publicized without discrimination or analysis many unsound reports and articles containing "Left" deviationist errors. Here are some examples.

1. They did not propagate the line of relying on the poor peasants and farm labourers and firmly uniting with the middle peasants in order to abolish the feudal system, but one-sidedly propagated a poor peasant-farm labourer line. They did not propagate the view that the proletariat should unite with all working people and others who are oppressed, the national bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and other patriots (including the enlightened gentry who do not oppose land reform) in order to overthrow the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism and establish a People's Republic of China and a people's democratic government, but one-sidedly propagated the view that the poor peasants and farm labourers conquer the country and should rule the country, or that the democratic government should be a government of the peasants only, or that the democratic government should listen only to the workers, poor peasants and farm labourers, while no mention at all was made of the middle peasants, the independent craftsmen, the national bourgeoisie and the intellectuals. This is a serious error of principle. Yet reports of this kind have been circulated by our news agency, newspapers and radio stations. And the propaganda departments of the Party committees in various places have failed to report these errors to the higher levels. In the past few months such propaganda, though not widespread, has been fairly frequent and has created an atmosphere in which people have been misled into believing that it might represent the correct leading ideas. Because the Northern Shensi Radio Station broadcast some incorrect items, people even

mistakenly believed that these were views approved by the Central Committee.

2. On the question of Party consolidation, there has not been sufficiently vigorous propaganda in some areas either against taking no account of class origin or against taking account of class origin alone, and there has even been erroneous propaganda which advocates taking account of class origin alone.

3. On the question of land reform, in some areas propaganda against both hesitation and rashness has been taken well in hand; but in many areas rashness has been encouraged and articles praising it have even been published. On the question of the relationship between the leadership and the masses, attention has been given in some areas to conducting propaganda against both commandism and tailism, but in many areas there has been an erroneous emphasis on "doing everything as the masses want it done" and an accommodation to wrong views existing among the masses. Even wrong views held not by the masses but only by a few individuals have been uncritically accepted. This negates the leading role of the Party and encourages tailism.

4. With regard to policies concerning industry and commerce and the working-class movement, serious "Left" deviations existing in certain Liberated Areas have been either praised or ignored.

To sum up, in the past few months our propaganda work has correctly reflected and guided the great struggles — the war, the land reform, Party consolidation, production and support for the front — and contributed to their great achievements; this is the major aspect of our propaganda work, and it must be affirmed first of all. But some errors and shortcomings must also be noted. They are of an ultra-Left character. A few run completely counter to the principles and standpoint of Marxism-Leninism and depart completely from the line of the Central Committee. It is expected that the bureaus and sub-bureaus of the Central Committee, their propaganda departments, the central and regional head offices of the Hsinhua News Agency and the comrades working on all the newspapers will check up on the propaganda work of the last few months on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles and the line of the Central Committee, extend their achievements, correct their errors and see to it that their work

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

helps to ensure victory in these great struggles — the war, the land reform, Party consolidation, the working-class movement — and to ensure victory in the whole anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution. The propaganda departments of the Party committees in all areas and the central office of the Hsinhua News Agency should assume the main responsibility for this check-up and should submit, in their own names, policy reports on its results to the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee.

ESSENTIAL POINTS IN LAND REFORM IN THE NEW LIBERATED AREAS*

February 15, 1948

1. Do not be impetuous. The speed of land reform should be determined according to the circumstances, the level of political consciousness of the masses and the strength of leading cadres. Do not attempt to complete the land reform in a few months, but prepare to complete it in each area in two or three years. This also applies to the old or semi-old Liberated Areas.

2. Land reform in a new Liberated Area should be divided into two stages. In the first stage strike blows at the landlords and neutralize the rich peasants. This stage is to be sub-divided into several steps; strike blows at the big landlords first, and then at the other landlords. Treatment must be different for those who are local tyrants and those who are not, and different also for big, middle and small landlords. The second stage is the equal distribution of land, including the land rented out by the rich peasants and their surplus land. However, the treatment of rich peasants should differ from that of landlords. The total scope of attack should generally not exceed 8 per cent of the households or 10 per cent of the population. In the semi-old Liberated Areas the differences in treatment and the total scope of attack should be the same. These questions do not arise in the old Liberated Areas, where in general only minor adjustments in the distribution of land[1] are needed.

3. Organize poor peasant leagues first and then, after a few months, peasant associations. Strictly prohibit landlords and rich peasants from sneaking into the peasant associations and poor peasant leagues. Activists in the poor peasant leagues should become the backbone of leadership in peasant associations, but a section of the activists among the middle peasants must also be drawn into the committees of peasant associations. In the land reform struggle, the

middle peasants must be drawn in to participate, and their interests should be given consideration.

4. Do not start the work in all places at the same time, but choose strong cadres to carry it out first in certain places to gain experience, then spread the experience step by step and expand the work in waves. This applies to a whole strategic area as well as to a single county. It also applies to the old and the semi-old Liberated Areas.

5. Distinguish between consolidated Liberated Areas and guerrilla zones. In the former, land reform can proceed step by step. In the latter, we should confine ourselves to propaganda, covert organizational work and the distribution of a certain amount of movable property. Mass organizations should not be openly set up and land reform should not be carried out, lest the enemy should persecute the masses.

6. The reactionary armed bands of the landlords and the reactionary secret police must be destroyed and must not be utilized.

7. Reactionaries must be suppressed, but killing without discrimination is strictly forbidden; the fewer killings, the better. Death sentences should be reviewed and approved by a committee formed at the county level. The power to try and to deal with the cases of political suspects is vested in committees at the district Party committee level. This applies in the old as well as the semi-old Liberated Areas.

8. Local revolutionary intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who come from landlord or rich peasant families but support land reform should be utilized and drawn into the work of building the base areas. But we must intensify our educational work among them and prevent them from entrenching themselves in power and hindering land reform. In general we should not let them work in their native districts or townships. Emphasis should be placed on employing intellectuals or semi-intellectuals from peasant families.

9. Pay strict attention to the protection of industry and commerce. Take a long-term view in the planning and management of economic and financial affairs. The armed forces and district and township governments should all guard against waste.

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[1] See "Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution", Note 14, p. 127 of this volume.

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

ON THE POLICY CONCERNING INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE*

February 27, 1948

1. Party organizations in certain places have violated the policy of the Central Committee of the Party concerning industry and commerce and seriously damaged both. These mistakes must be speedily corrected. In correcting them the Party committees in these places must make a careful check-up from the two aspects of guiding policies and methods of leadership.

2. Guiding policies. Precautions should be taken against the mistake of applying in the cities the measures used in rural areas for struggling against landlords and rich peasants and for destroying the feudal forces. A sharp distinction should be made between the feudal exploitation practised by landlords and rich peasants, which must be abolished, and the industrial and commercial enterprises run by landlords and rich peasants, which must be protected. A sharp distinction should also be made between the correct policy of developing production, promoting economic prosperity, giving consideration to both public and private interests and benefiting both labour and capital, and the one-sided and narrow-minded policy of "relief", which purports to uphold the workers' welfare but in fact damages industry and commerce and impairs the cause of the people's revolution. Education should be conducted among comrades in the trade unions and among the masses of workers to enable them to understand that they should not see merely the immediate and partial interests of the working class while forgetting its broad, long-range interests. Under the local government's leadership, workers and capitalists should be led to organize joint committees for the management of production and to do everything possible to reduce costs, increase output and stimulate sales so as to attain the objectives of giving consideration to both public and private interests, benefiting both labour and capital and

supporting the war. The mistakes committed in many places are due to the failure to grasp all, most or some of the above policies. The bureaus and sub-bureaus of the Central Committee should raise this question clearly, analyse, check up, formulate correct policies and issue inner-Party directives and government decrees.

3. Methods of leadership. After policies have been fixed and directives issued, a bureau or sub-bureau of the Central Committee should keep in close contact with its area and prefectural Party committees[1] or with its own working teams by telegraph or telephone, by couriers on vehicles or on horseback, or by personal interviews; it should use the newspaper as an important instrument of organization and leadership. It should constantly have a grip on the progress of the work, exchange experience and correct mistakes; it should not wait several months, half a year or a year before holding summing-up meetings for a general check-up and a general correction of mistakes. Waiting leads to great loss, while correcting mistakes as soon as they occur reduces loss. In ordinary circumstances a bureau of the Central Committee should strive to keep in close contact with its subordinate organizations, always take care to draw a sharp line between what should and what should not be done, and constantly remind its subordinate organizations of this so that they may make as few mistakes as possible. All these are questions of methods of leadership.

4. All comrades in the Party should understand that the enemy is now completely isolated. But his isolation is not tantamount to our victory. If we make mistakes in policy, we shall still be unable to win victory. To put it concretely, we shall fail if we make, and do not correct, mistakes of principle with regard to any of the five policies — on the war, Party consolidation, land reform, industry and commerce, and the suppression of counter-revolution. Policy is the starting-point of all the practical actions of a revolutionary party and manifests itself in the process and the end-result of that party's actions. A revolutionary party is carrying out a policy whenever it takes any action. If it is not carrying out a correct policy, it is carrying out a wrong policy; if it is not carrying out a given policy consciously, it is doing so blindly. What we call experience is the process and the end-result of carrying out a policy. Only through the practice of the people, that is, through experience, can we verify whether a policy is correct or wrong and determine to what extent it is correct or wrong. But

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

people's practice, especially the practice of a revolutionary party and the revolutionary masses, cannot but be related to one policy or another. Therefore, before any action is taken, we must explain the policy, which we have formulated in the light of the given circumstances, to Party members and to the masses. Otherwise, Party members and the masses will depart from the guidance of our policy, act blindly and carry out a wrong policy.

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[1] The prefectural Party committee was a leading body lower than the provincial Party committee or Border Region Party committee but higher than the county Party committee.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE AND THE ENLIGHTENED GENTRY*

March 1, 1948

The Chinese revolution at the present stage is in its character a revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism waged by the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. By the broad masses of the people is meant all those who are oppressed, injured or fettered by imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, namely, workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals, businessmen and other patriots, as clearly stated in the Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army of October 1947.[1] In the manifesto "intellectuals" means all intellectuals who are persecuted and fettered. "Businessmen" means all the national bourgeois who are persecuted and fettered, that is, the middle and petty bourgeois. "Other patriots" refers primarily to the enlightened gentry. The Chinese revolution at the present stage is a revolution in which all these people form a united front against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism and in which the working people are the main body. By working people are meant all those engaged in manual labour (such as workers, peasants, handicraftsmen, etc.) as well as those engaged in mental labour who are close to those engaged in manual labour and are not exploiters but are exploited. The aim of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is to overthrow the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism and to establish a new-democratic republic of the broad masses of the people with the working people as the main force; its aim is not to abolish capitalism in general.

We should not abandon the enlightened gentry who co-operated with us in the past and continue to co-operate with us at present, who approve of the struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek and who approve of the land reform. Take, for instance, people like Liu Shao-pai of the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region and Li Ting-ming of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.[2] Since they gave us considerable help in the hard times during and after the War of Resistance Against Japan and did not obstruct or oppose the land reform when we were carrying it out, we should continue the policy of uniting with them. But uniting with them does not mean treating them as a force that determines the character of the Chinese revolution. The forces that determine the character of a revolution are the chief enemies on the one side and the chief revolutionaries on the other. At present our chief enemies are imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, while the main forces in our struggle against these enemies are the people engaged in manual and mental labour, who make up 90 per cent of the country's population. And this determines that our revolution at the present stage is a new-democratic, a people's democratic revolution in character and is different from a socialist revolution such as the October Revolution.

The few right-wingers among the national bourgeoisie who attach themselves to imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism and oppose the people's democratic revolution are also enemies of the revolution, while the left-wingers among the national bourgeoisie who attach themselves to the working people and oppose the reactionaries are also revolutionaries, as are the few enlightened gentry who have broken away from the feudal class. But the former are not the main body of the enemy any more than the latter are the main body among the revolutionaries; neither is a force that determines the character of the revolution. The national bourgeoisie is a class which is politically very weak and vacillating. But the majority of its members may either join the people's democratic revolution or take a neutral stand, because they too are persecuted and fettered by imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. They are part of the broad masses of the people but not the main body, nor are they a force that determines the character of the revolution. However, because they are important economically and may either join in the struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek or remain neutral in that struggle, it is possible and necessary for us to unite with them. Before the birth of the Communist Party of China, the Kuomintang headed by Sun Yat-sen represented the national bourgeoisie and acted as the leader of the Chinese revolution of that time (a non-thorough demo-

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

cratic revolution of the old type). But after the Communist Party of China was born and demonstrated its ability, the Kuomintang could no longer be the leader of the Chinese revolution (a new-democratic revolution). The national bourgeoisie joined the 1924-27 revolutionary movement[3] and during the years 1927-31 (before the September 18th Incident of 1931) quite a few of them sided with the reaction under Chiang Kai-shek. But one must not on this account think that we should not have tried during that period to win over the national bourgeoisie politically or to protect it economically, or that our ultra-Left policy towards the national bourgeoisie was not adventurist. On the contrary, in that period our policy should still have been to protect the national bourgeoisie and win it over so as to enable us to concentrate our efforts on fighting the chief enemies. In the period of the War of Resistance the national bourgeoisie was a participant in the war, wavering between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. At the present stage the majority of the national bourgeoisie has a growing hatred of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek; its left-wingers attach themselves to the Communist Party and its right-wingers to the Kuomintang, while its middle elements take a hesitant, wait-and-see attitude between the two parties. These circumstances make it necessary and possible for us to win over the majority of the national bourgeoisie and isolate the minority. To achieve this aim, we should be prudent in dealing with the economic position of this class and in principle should adopt a blanket policy of protection. Otherwise we shall commit political errors.

The enlightened gentry are individual landlords and rich peasants with democratic leanings. Such people have contradictions with bureaucrat-capitalism and imperialism and to a certain extent also with the feudal landlords and rich peasants. We unite with them not because they are a political force to be reckoned with nor because they are of any economic importance (their feudal landholdings should be handed over with their consent to the peasants for distribution) but because they gave us considerable help politically during the War of Resistance and during the struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. During the period of land reform, it will help the land reform throughout the country if some of the enlightened gentry favour it. In particular, it will help win over the intellectuals (most of whom come from landlord or rich peasant families), the national bourgeoisie (most of whom have ties with the land) and the enlightened gentry throughout the country (who number several hundred thousand) and help isolate the chief enemy of the Chinese revolution, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries. It is precisely because they have this role that the enlightened gentry also constitute an element in the revolutionary united front against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism; therefore, attention must also be paid to the question of uniting with them. During the period of the War of Resistance, what we required of the enlightened gentry was that they should favour resistance against Japan, favour democracy (not be anti-Communist) and favour reduction of rent and interest; at the present stage, what we require of them is that they favour the struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, favour democracy (not be anti-Communist) and favour the land reform. If they can meet these requirements, we should unite with them without exception and while uniting with them educate them.

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[1] See the first of the eight policies listed in "Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army", p. 150 of this volume.

[2] Liu Shao-pai, an enlightened landlord of the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region, had been elected Vice-Chairman of the Provisional Council of the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region. Li Ting-ming, an enlightened landlord of northern Shensi Province, had been elected Vice-Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

[3] See "The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan", Note 10, p. 23 of this volume.

ON THE GREAT VICTORY IN THE NORTHWEST AND ON THE NEW TYPE OF IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION MOVEMENT IN THE LIBERATION ARMY*

March 7, 1948

Commenting on the recent great victory of the Northwest People's Liberation Army, a spokesman for the General Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army said: This victory has changed the situation in the Northwest and will affect the situation in the Central Plains. It has proved that through the new type of ideological education movement in the army by the methods of "pouring out grievances" and of the "three check-ups" the People's Liberation Army will make itself invincible.

The spokesman said: On this occasion, the Northwest People's Liberation Army suddenly encircled an enemy brigade at Yichuan, and Hu Tsung-nan ordered Liu Kan, Commander of his 29th Corps, to rush 4 brigades of 2 reorganized divisions from the Lochuan-Yichun line to the relief of Yichuan. They were the 31st and 47th Brigades of the Reorganized 27th Division and the 53rd and 61st Brigades of the Reorganized 90th Division, totalling more than 24,000 men; they reached the area southwest of Yichuan on February 28. The Northwest People's Liberation Army started a battle of annihilation and in thirty hours of fighting on February 29 and March 1 completely wiped out these reinforcements, letting none escape from the net. More than 18,000 men were captured, and more than 5,000 were killed and wounded; Liu Kan himself, Yen Ming, Commander of the 90th Division, and other officers were killed. Then on March 3 we captured Yichuan and here again wiped out over 5,000 men of the 24th Brigade of the enemy's Reorganized 76th Division which was defending the city. In this campaign we wiped out, all told, 1 corps headquarters, 2 division headquarters and 5 brigades of the enemy, a total of 30,000 men. This is our first great victory in the Northwest theatre.

Analysing the situation in the Northwest theatre, the spokesman said: Of the 28 brigades of the so-called "Central Army" directly commanded by Hu Tsung-nan, 8 belonged to his, crack divisions, the Reorganized 1st, 36th and 90th Divisions. Of these divisions, the 1st Brigade of the Reorganized 1st Division had been wiped out[1] by us once before at Fushan, southern Shansi, in September 1946 and the main force of the same division's 167th Brigade had been wiped out once at Panlung town, northern Shensi, in May last year; the 123rd and 165th Brigades of the Reorganized 36th Division had been wiped out once at Shachiatien in Michih County, northern Shensi, in August last year; and this time the Reorganized 90th Division was also completely wiped out. Of the remainder of Hu Tsung-nan's main force, only the 78th Brigade of the Reorganized 1st Division and the 28th Brigade of the Reorganized 36th Division have not yet been wiped out. Hu Tsung-nan's whole army can therefore be said to have practically no more crack units. As a result of the Yichuan battle of annihilation, of the 28 regular brigades formerly under Hu Tsung-nan's direct command, only 23 are left. These 23 brigades are distributed in the following areas: 1 brigade at Linfen in southern Shansi is immobilized and doomed, 9 brigades are on the Shensi-Honan border and along the Loyang-Tungkuan line to cope with our field army under Chen

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* This commentary was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the spokesman of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. At that time the enemy offensive in the Northwest theatre of war had been smashed, and our army had gone over to its own offensive. This commentary analysed the situation in the Northwest theatre and also outlined conditions in the other theatres of war. More important, it stressed the great significance of the new type of ideological education movement in the army, carried out by the methods of "pouring out grievances" and of the "three check-ups". This new type of movement was an important development of the political work and the democratic movement in the People's Liberation Army. It was the reflection in the army of the movements for land reform and Party consolidation then vigorously proceeding in all the Liberated Areas. This movement greatly enhanced the political consciousness, discipline and combat effectiveness of all officers and soldiers. At the same time it most effectively speeded the process of reforming large numbers of captured Kuomintang soldiers into Liberation Army fighters. Thus it played an important role in consolidating and expanding the People's Liberation Army and in ensuring victories in the field. For the significance of this movement, see also "The Democratic Movement in the Army", pp. 191-92, "Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area", pp. 227-39, and "On the September Meeting — Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", pp. 269-77, of this volume.

Keng and Hsieh Fu-chih, and another brigade in southern Shensi is guarding the Hanchung area. The remaining 12 brigades are distributed along the T-shaped communication lines from Tungkuan to Paoki and from Hsienyang to Yenan. Of these, 3 are "reserve brigades" composed entirely of recruits, 2 have been completely wiped out by our army and replenished recently, another 2 have received crushing blows from us and 5 have received relatively few blows. It can be seen that not only are these forces very weak but also they are mostly on garrison duty. In addition to Hu Tsung-nan's army, there are 2 brigades under Teng Pao-shan defending Yulin, while 9 brigades under Ma Hung-kuei of Ningsia Province and Ma Pu-fang of Chinghai Province are distributed in the Sanpien and Lungtung areas.[2] All the regular troops under Hu Tsung-nan, Teng Pao-shan and the two Mas now total 34 brigades, including the units replenished after having been wiped out once or twice.

That is how things stand with the enemy in the Northwest. To return to the T-shaped communication lines, of those 5 brigades which have received relatively few blows, 2 are hemmed in at Yenan and 3 are in the Greater Kuanchung Area.[3] As for the other brigades there, most of them have been recently replenished, and a few have received crushing blows. In other words, the enemy's forces in the whole Greater Kuanchung Area and especially in Kansu Province are very sparse and weak and cannot possibly stop the offensive of the People's Liberation Army. This situation is bound to affect some of the dispositions of Chiang Kai-shek's forces on the southern front and, first of all, his dispositions vis-à-vis our field army under Chen Keng and Hsieh Fu-chih on the Honan-Shensi border. In its present southward drive the Northwest People's Liberation Army has won victory as soon as its banner was displayed, gained resounding fame and changed the relation of forces between the enemy and ourselves in the Northwest; from now on it will be able to fight even more effectively in co-ordination with the forces of the People's Liberation Army on the southern fronts.

The spokesman said: Since last summer and autumn our three field armies, commanded respectively by Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping, Chen Yi and Su Yu, and Chen Keng and Hsieh Fu-chih, have advanced south across the Yellow River, swept through the length and breadth of the territory enclosed by the Yangtse, Huai, Yellow and Han Rivers, wiped out large numbers of enemy troops, manipulated and drawn towards themselves some 90 out of the 160 odd brigades which

Chiang Kai-shek has on the southern front, forced his armies into a passive position, played a decisive strategic role and won the acclaim of the people all over the country.[4] In its winter offensive our Northeast Field Army braved bitter cold of 30 degrees below zero, annihilated most of the enemy troops, captured one well-known city after another and won resounding fame throughout the country.[5] After wiping out large numbers of enemy troops in heroic battles last year,[6] our field armies in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area, Shantung, northern Kiangsu and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan area completed their training and consolidation last winter, and they will soon unfold their spring offensive.[7] A review of the whole situation proves one truth. Provided we firmly oppose conservatism, fear of the enemy and fear of difficulties, and provided we follow the general strategy of the Central Committee of the Party and its directive on the ten major principles of operation,[8] we can unfold our offensives, wipe out vast numbers of enemy troops and strike such blows at the forces of the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang that they can only parry them for a time without being able to hit back, or that they cannot even parry our blows and will be completely wiped out, one after another.

The spokesman emphatically pointed out: The combat effectiveness of our Northwest Field Army is far higher than at any time last year.[9] In last year's fighting the Northwest Field Army could destroy at most two enemy brigades at a time; now in the Yichuan campaign it has been able to wipe out five enemy brigades at one time. The reasons for this outstanding victory were many, among which we should point out the firm yet flexible command of the leading comrades at the front, the energetic support given by the leading comrades and the broad masses in the rear, the relative isolation of the enemy troops and a terrain favourable to us. What is most noteworthy, however, is the new type of ideological education movement in the army, which was carried out for more than two months last winter by the methods of pouring out grievances and the three check-ups. The correct unfolding of the movement for pouring out grievances (the wrongs done to the labouring people by the old society and by the reactionaries) and the three check-ups (on class origin, performance of duty and will to fight) greatly heightened the political consciousness of commanders and fighters throughout the army in the fight for the emancipation of the exploited working masses, for nation-wide land reform and for the destruction of the common enemy of the people, the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang. It also greatly strengthened the firm unity of all commanders and fighters under the leadership of the Communist Party. On this basis, the army achieved greater purity in its ranks, strengthened discipline, unfolded a mass movement for training and further developed its political, economic and military democracy in a completely well-led and orderly way. Thus the army has become united as one man, with everybody contributing his ideas and his strength, fearless of sacrifice and capable of overcoming material difficulties, an army which displays mass heroism and daring in destroying the enemy. Such an army will be invincible.

The spokesman said: It is not only in the Northwest that this new type of ideological education movement in the army has been carried out; it has been, or is being, carried on in the People's Liberation Army throughout the country. Conducted between battles, the movement does not interfere with fighting. Taking in conjunction with the movement for Party consolidation and the land reform movement now being correctly carried out by our Party, taking in co-ordination with our Party's correct policy of narrowing the scope of attack by opposing only imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, by strictly forbidding beating and killing without discrimination (the fewer killings, the better) and by firmly uniting the masses of the people who make up over 90 per cent of the country's population, and taking in co-ordination with the application of our Party's correct urban policy and its policy of firmly protecting and developing the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie, this ideological education movement is bound to make the People's Liberation Army invincible. However desperate the exertions of the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang and its master, U.S. imperialism, against the great struggle of the Chinese people's democratic revolution, victory will certainly be ours.

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[1] See "Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One", Note 1, p. 106 of this volume.

[2] Sanpien is an area in northwestern Shensi Province. Lungtung is the eastern part of Kansu Province. Both Sanpien and Lungtung were then prefectures in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Liberated Area.

[3] This refers to central Shensi and northwestern Kansu taken together.

[4] Starting from June 30, 1947, 7 columns of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Field Army led by Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and other comrades forced the

Yellow River and pushed towards the Tapieh Mountains, thus ushering in the strategic offensive of the People's Liberation Army. By the end of March 1948, more than 100,000 enemy troops had been wiped out, and new base areas had been built on the Hupeh-Honan border, in western Anhwei, in the Tungpai mountain area on the Hupeh-Honan border, the plains between the Yangtse and Han Rivers and other places. Eight columns of the Eastern China Field Army led by Chen Yi, Su Yu and other comrades, having smashed the enemy's concentrated attacks on Shantung Province in August 1947, swept into southwestern Shantung and the Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu Border Region, wiped out over 100,000 enemy troops, built the Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu Liberated Area and isolated the enemy's strategic centres of Kaifeng and Chengchow. Two columns and one corps of the Taiyueh Army of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan area, commanded by Chen Keng, Hsieh Fu-chih and other comrades, forced the Yellow River in southern Shansi in August 1947, advanced into western Honan, wiped out more than 40,000 enemy troops and built base areas on the Honan-Shensi-Hupeh border and in southern Shensi, completely isolating Loyang, the enemy's strategic centre in western Honan Province, and threatening Tungkuan.

[5] Fighting continuously for ninety days from December 15, 1947 to March 15, 1948, 10 columns and 12 independent divisions of the Northeast Field Army led by Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan and other comrades waged a winter offensive on an unprecedented scale along the Szepingkai-Tashihchiao section of the Chinese Changchun Railway and the Shanhaikuan-Shenyang section of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway; they wiped out more than 156,000 enemy troops and captured the enemy's heavily-fortified strategic centre of Szepingkai and eighteen other cities. One enemy division garrisoning Yingkow revolted and came over to our side. The enemy force defending the city of Kirin fled towards Changchun. After this, the area under enemy control in the Northeast shrank to only 1 per cent of the whole, and the enemy lairs in the cities along the Changchun-Shenyang-Chinchow line were isolated.

[6] From early September to mid-November 1947, 5 columns of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Field Army led by Nieh Jung-chen and other comrades fought successive battles in the area north of the Taching River and in the Chingfengtien area and the battle for the liberation of Shihchiachuang, wiping out a total of nearly 50,000 enemy troops and linking up the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei and Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Areas into one contiguous territory. From September to December 1947, columns of the Shantung Army belonging to the Eastern China Field Army and regional armed forces fought the Eastern Shantung campaign under the command of Hsu Shih-yu, Tan Chen-lin and other comrades, wiping out more than 63,000 of the enemy and recovering more than ten county towns; this changed the whole situation in Shantung Province. From August to December 1947, units of the Eastern China Field Army in northern Kiangsu, in successive battles at Yencheng, Lipao and other points, annihilated more than 24,000 enemy troops and recovered a wide area in northern Kiangsu. In December 1947, units of the Shansi-Hopei-shantung-Honan Field Army led by Hsu Hsiang-chien and other comrades fought in co-ordination with units of the Northwest Field Army and captured Yuncheng, destroying more than 13,000 enemy troops; they wiped out all the enemy forces in southwestern Shansi and isolated the enemy at Linfen.

[7] In the spring of 1948, following a period of training and consolidation in the previous winter, the field armies of the People's Liberation Army launched successive offensives. Between March and May, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Field Army and units of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan and Shansi-Suiyuan Field Armies campaigned in southern Chahar, eastern Suiyuan and the Linfen area of Shansi, wiping out more

than 43,000 enemy troops and recovering much territory. Between March 7 and May 29, units of the Central Plains and Eastern China Field Armies fought successive battles at Loyang and Sungho and in the sectors west and east of Nanyang, wiped out more than 56,000 enemy troops and thus crushed the enemy's defence system on the Central Plains and expanded and consolidated the Liberated Area there. Between March 11 and May 8, the Shantung Army of the Eastern China Field Army fought battles first on the western section of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway and then at Weihsien, wiping out more than 84,000 enemy troops. Thus, except for a few strong-points, such as Tsinan, Tsingtao, Linyi and Yenchow, which were held by the Kuomintang, Shantung Province was liberated. In March the Northern Kiangsu Army fought a successful battle at Yilin.

[8] For the ten major principles of operation, see "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Section 3, pp. 160-63 of this volume.

[9] The Northwest Field Army led by Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung, Hsi Chung-hsun and other comrades employed a main force of 2 columns and 2 brigades, totalling more than 25,000 men, in the fighting in northern Shensi in the summer of 1947. By the spring of 1948 the main force had increased to 5 columns, totalling more than 75,000 men. After having been steeled by a year's fighting and by the new type of ideological education movement in the army in the winter of 1947, the political consciousness of the broad masses of officers and soldiers and the combat effectiveness of the military units rose to unprecedented heights. This created the necessary conditions for the Northwest Field Army to turn to fighting on exterior lines in March 1948. On April 12, following its major victory at Yichuan, the Northwest Field Army launched a campaign in Hsifu (the area west of Sian and between the Chingshui and Weishui Rivers) and eastern Kansu, pushed forward into the broad area between the Chingshui and Weishui Rivers, cut the Sian-Lanchow highway, and on April 22 recovered Yenan.

A CIRCULAR ON THE SITUATION*

March 20, 1948

1. In recent months the Central Committee has concentrated on solving, in the new conditions, problems concerning specific policies and tactics for land reform, industry and commerce, the united front, Party consolidation and the work in the new Liberated Areas; it has also combated Right and "Left" deviations within the Party, mainly "Left" deviations. The history of our Party shows that Right deviations are likely to occur in periods when our Party has formed a united front with the Kuomintang and that "Left" deviations are likely to occur in periods when our Party has broken with the Kuomintang. At present the "Left" deviations consist chiefly in encroaching on the interests of the middle peasants and the national bourgeoisie; laying one-sided stress in the labour movement on the immediate interests of the workers; making no distinctions in the treatment of landlords and rich peasants; making no distinctions in the treatment of big, middle and small landlords, or of landlords who are local tyrants and those who are not; not leaving the landlords the necessary means of livelihood as required by the principle of equal distribution; overstepping certain demarcation lines of policy in the struggle to suppress counter-revolution; not wanting political parties which represent the national bourgeoisie; not wanting the enlightened gentry; neglecting the tactical importance of narrowing the scope of attack in the new Liberated Areas (that is, neglecting to neutralize the rich peasants and small landlords); and lacking the patience to work step by step. During the past two years or so, these "Left" deviations have occurred to a greater or lesser extent in all the Liberated Areas and in some cases have developed into serious adventurist tendencies. Fortunately, they are not very difficult to correct, in the main they have been corrected in the past few months, or are being corrected now. But leaders at all levels must make

strenuous efforts before deviations of this kind can be thoroughly corrected. The Right deviations consist chiefly in overestimating the strength of the enemy, being afraid of large-scale U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek, being somewhat weary of the long war, having certain doubts about the strength of the world democratic forces, not daring to arouse the masses fully in order to abolish feudalism, and being indifferent to impurities in the Party's class composition and style of work. Such Right deviations, however, are not the main ones at present; they too are not difficult to correct. In recent months our Party has made achievements in the war, in land reform, in Party consolidation, in ideological education in the army, in building new Liberated Areas and in winning over the democratic parties; and it has emphatically corrected, or is correcting, deviations that occurred in these fields of work. This will enable the entire revolutionary movement in China to advance along the path of sound development. Only when all the policies and tactics of the Party are on the correct path will it be possible for the Chinese revolution to win victory. Policy and tactics are the life of the Party; leading comrades at all levels must give them full attention and must never on any account be negligent.

2. Certain democratic personages, who had believed that a so-called "third road"[1] was still possible and had placed themselves midway between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party because of certain illusions about the United States and Chiang Kai-shek and because of their scepticism as to whether our Party and the people had the strength to defeat all enemies at home and abroad, found themselves in a passive position in the face of the sudden Kuomintang offensive; eventually, in January 1948, they accepted our Party's slogans and declared themselves against Chiang Kai-shek and the United States and for unity with the Communist Party and the Soviet Union.[2] We should pursue a policy of uniting with these persons, while suitably criticizing their erroneous views. In the future, when the Central People's Government is formed, it will be necessary and beneficial to invite some of them to take part in the work of the government. It is characteristic of these persons that they have always been unwilling

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* This inner-Party circular was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Subsequently, the Central Committee moved from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area by way of the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area and in May 1948 reached Hsipaipo Village, Pingshan County, in western Hopei Province.

to have contact with the working people, are accustomed to life in the big cities and hesitate to come to the Liberated Areas. Even so, the social base they represent, the national bourgeoisie, has its importance and should not be ignored. Therefore it is necessary to win them over. Our estimate is that, after we achieve bigger victories and capture a number of cities like Shenyang, Peiping and Tientsin and after it becomes perfectly obvious that the Communist Party will win and that the Kuomintang will lose, these persons may be willing to come to the Liberated Areas to work with us if they are invited to take part in the Central People's Government.

3. We do not contemplate setting up the Central People's Government this year, because the time is not yet ripe. After the bogus National Assembly elects Chiang Kai-shek president[3] later in the year and he is even more thoroughly discredited, after we score bigger victories and expand our territories, preferably after the capture of one or two of the country's largest cities, and after northeastern China, northern China, Shantung, northern Kiangsu, Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei are all linked together in one contiguous area, it will be entirely necessary to establish the Central People's Government. The time will probably be in 1949. At present, we are merging the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area, the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan area and the Pohai area in Shantung under the direction of a single Party committee (the Northern China Bureau), a single government and a single military command[4] (the inclusion of the Pohai area may be delayed for a while). These three areas comprise the broad expanse north of the Lunghai Railway, west of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and the Pohai Gulf, east of the Tatung-Puchow Railway and south of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway. They are already linked together in one contiguous area with a total population of fifty million, and their merger will probably be completed soon. This will enable us to give strong support to the war on the southern front and transfer large numbers of cadres to the new Liberated Areas. The leading centre of the merged area will be at Shihchiachuang.[5] The Central Committee is also preparing to move to northern China, and its Working Committee will merge with it.

4. Our troops on the southern front have all had rest and consolidation from December to February; these troops comprise the 9 brigades of the Shantung Army, 7 brigades of the Northern Kiangsu Army, 21 brigades of the army in the area between the Yellow and Huai Rivers, 10 brigades of the army in the Honan-Hupeh-Shensi area, 19 brigades of the army in the area between the Yangtse, Huai

and Han Rivers, 12 brigades of the army in northwestern China and 12 brigades of the army in southern Shansi and northern Honan. The only exception was the main force of the army under Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping in the area between the Yangtse, Huai and Han Rivers, which had had no rest and consolidation because Pai Chung-hsi concentrated his troops to attack the Tapieh Mountains;[6] it was not until the end of February that this force was able to send some of its units north of the Huai River for rest and consolidation. That was our first period of rest and consolidation on a large scale in the past twenty months of fighting. During that period the methods we adopted were: pouring out grievances by the masses (the wrongs done to the labouring people by the old society and by the reactionaries), the three check-ups (on class origin, performance of duty and will to fight) and mass training (officers teaching soldiers, soldiers teaching officers and soldiers teaching each other). By these methods we developed high revolutionary enthusiasm among the commanders and fighters of the whole army; reformed or weeded out the landlords, rich peasants and bad elements found in some army units; heightened discipline; clearly explained various policies in the land reform and the policies concerning industry and commerce and the intellectuals; developed the democratic style of work in the army; and raised the level of our military technique and tactics. As a result, our army has greatly enhanced its combat effectiveness. Except for that part of the army under Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping, which is still having rest and consolidation, all our armies in succession have started new military operations since late February or early March and in two weeks have wiped out 9 enemy brigades. Of our troops on the northern front, comprising the 46 brigades of the army in the Northeast, 18 brigades of the army in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area and 2 brigades of the army in the Shansi-Suiyuan area, the greater part fought through the winter, while a part was having rest and consolidation. Taking advantage of the freezing of the Liaoho River, our army in the Northeast fought for three months, wiped out 8 brigades and won over 1 brigade, occupied Changwu, Faku, Hsinlitun, Liaoyang, Anshan, Yingkow and Szepingkai, and recaptured Kirin. This army has now begun its rest and consolidation. Afterwards, it is to attack either Changchun or the enemy along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. The army in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area has had more than a month of rest and consolidation and is moving towards the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway. The army in the Shansi-Suiyuan area is comparatively small, and its main task is to tie down Yen Hsi-shan's troops. To sum up, we now have two fronts, the northern and the southern, with 10 armies, large and small, comprising 50 columns of regular troops (each equivalent to a Kuomintang reorganized division), or 156 brigades (each equivalent to a Kuomintang reorganized brigade), each brigade (3 regiments) averaging about 8,000 men — making a total of more than 1,322,000 men. In addition, there are more than 1,168,000 irregulars (of whom 800,000 are combat troops), including regional formations, regional troops, guerrilla detachments, rear-area military organizations and military academies. Our entire army thus totals more than 2,491,000 men. But before July 1946 we had only 28 columns of regular troops, or 118 brigades, each brigade (3 regiments) averaging less than 5,000 men — a total of 612,000; with the addition of more than 665,000 irregulars, the grand total was 1,278,000. It can be seen that our army has grown. The number of brigades has not increased much, but the number of men in each brigade has increased very much. After twenty months of war, our combat effectiveness has also increased greatly.

5. From July 1946 to the summer of 1947, the regular army of the Kuomintang was composed of 93 divisions with 248 brigades; now it has designations for 104 divisions with 279 brigades. Its dispositions are as follows. On the northern front there are 29 divisions with 93 brigades, totalling about 550,000 men (13 divisions with 45 brigades under Wei Li-huang in Shenyang, 11 divisions with 33 brigades under Fu Tso-yi in Peiping, 5 divisions with 15 brigades under Yen Hsi-shan in Taiyuan). On the southern front there are 66 divisions with 158 brigades, totalling about 1,060,000 men (38 divisions with 86 brigades under Ku Chu-tung in Chengchow, 14 divisions with 33 brigades under Pai Chung-hsi in Kiukiang, and 14 divisions with 39 brigades under Hu Tsung-nan in Sian). On the second line there are 9 divisions with 28 brigades, totalling about 196,000 men (4 divisions with 8 brigades in the northwestern area, *i.e.*, the region west of Lanchow; 4 divisions with 10 brigades in the southwestern area, *i.e.*, Szechuan, Sikang, Yunnan and Kweichow Provinces; 8 brigades in the southeastern area, *i.e.*, the provinces south of the Yangtse River; and 1 division with 2 brigades in Taiwan). The reason the number of unit designations of the Kuomintang regular army has increased is that after large numbers of its troops had been wiped out by our army and after they had turned from the strategic offensive to the strategic defensive, the Kuomintang felt its shortage of troops acutely and therefore upgraded or reorganized many local armed units and puppet troops into its regular

army. Thus, on the northern front, 3 divisions with 14 brigades were added to Wei Li-huang's command and 2 divisions with 6 brigades to Pu Tso-yi's command; on the southern front, 6 divisions with 9 brigades were added to Ku Chu-tung's command and 2 brigades to Hu Tsung-nan's. The total increase was 11 divisions, or 31 brigades. As a result, the Kuomintang army now has 104 divisions instead of 93, and 279 brigades instead of 248. But, in the first place, the 6 divisions with 29 brigades which we wiped out in recent months (up to March 20) now exist only in name; there has been no time to rebuild or replenish them, and probably some can never be rebuilt or replenished. So, in fact, the Kuomintang army now has only 98 divisions with 250 brigades, an increase of only 5 divisional designations and 2 actual brigades since last summer. In the second place, of the 250 brigades which actually exist, only 118 have not received crushing blows from our army. All the remaining 132 brigades have been wiped out by our army once, twice or even thrice and then been replenished; or they have received one, two or even three crushing blows from our army (in the case of a brigade, to wipe it out means to destroy it completely or destroy the greater part, while to deal it a crushing blow means to destroy one or more of its regiments but not its main strength); and their morale and combat effectiveness are very low. Of the 118 brigades which have not yet received crushing blows, some are composed of recruits being trained at the second line and some are local armed units and puppet troops which have been upgraded or reorganized; their combat effectiveness is very low. In the third place, the Kuomintang armed forces have declined in numbers also. Before July 1946 they had 2,000,000 regulars, 738,000 irregulars, 367,000 men in the special arms, 190,000 men in the navy and air force and 1,010,000 men in rear-service establishments and military academies — a total of 4,305,000. In February 1948 they had 1,810,000 regulars, 560,000 irregulars, 280,000 men in the special arms, 190,000 men in the navy and air force and 810,000 men in rear-service establishments and military academies — a total of 3,650,000. That means a decrease of 655,000 men. In the nineteen months from July 1946 to January 1948, our army wiped out altogether 1,977,000 Kuomintang troops (the statistics for February and the first half of March have not been compiled, but the number is roughly 180,000). In other words, the Kuomintang has lost not only the more than 1,000,000 men it recruited in the course of the war but also a large number of its original troops. Under these circumstances, the Kuomintang has adopted a policy opposite to ours, a policy not of bringing its brigades to full strength but of cutting down the number of men in each brigade and increasing the number of brigade designations. While in 1946 the average strength of a Kuomintang brigade was approximately 8,000 men, at present it is only about 6,500. From now on, the area taken by our army will daily expand, and the Kuomintang's sources of troops and food supplies will daily contract; we estimate that by next spring, after another full year's fighting, our army and the Kuomintang army will be roughly equal in numbers. Our policy is to go ahead steadily and strike sure blows, not to seek quick results; all we are trying to do is to wipe out, on the average, about 8 brigades of the Kuomintang regular army each month, or about 100 brigades a year. Actually, since last autumn this number has been exceeded, and from now on it can be still further exceeded. It should be possible to wipe out the entire Kuomintang army in about we years (counting from July 1946).[7]

6. At present, there are two sectors on the southern and northern fronts where the enemy still has a fairly large striking force and can wage offensive campaigns, temporarily placing our troops there in a difficult position. The first sector is in the Tapieh Mountains, where the enemy has approximately 14 brigades which can be used as a striking force. The second is north of the Huai River, where the enemy has about 12 such brigades. In these two sectors the Kuomintang troops still hold the initiative (they hold the initiative in the sector north of the Huai River because we have moved 9 of our crack brigades to the north of the Yellow River for rest and consolidation, in preparation for use on other sectors). The enemy troops in all other theatres of war are in a passive position and are taking a beating. The theatres of war where the situation is particularly favourable to us are the Northeast, Shantung, the Northwest, northern Kiangsu, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area, the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan area and the vast area west of the Chengchow-Hankow Railway, north of the Yangtse and south of the Yellow River.

NOTES

[1] See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Note 9, p. 176 of this volume.

[2] In October 1947 the reactionary Kuomintang government ordered the dissolution of the Democratic League. Under pressure from the Kuomintang reactionaries, some wavering members of the Democratic League dissolved it and ceased activities.

Other democratic parties, also being persecuted by the Kuomintang reactionaries, were then unable to function openly in the Kuomintang areas. In January 1948 Shen Chun-ju and other leaders of the Democratic League at a meeting in Hongkong decided to re-establish the League's leading body and resume the League's activities. In the same month Li Chi-shen and other members of the democratic wing of the Kuomintang established the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang in Hongkong. Both these bodies agreed with the position of the Communist Party of China about the current situation and issued declarations calling for unity with the Communist Party and other democratic parties, the overthrow of the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship and opposition to U.S. armed intervention in China's internal affairs. The wavering members of the Democratic League also accepted these slogans at that time.

[3] The Kuomintang reactionaries held a bogus "National Assembly" in Nanking from March 29 to May 1, 1948, at which Chiang Kai-shek and Li Tsung-jen were "elected" "president" and "vice-president".

[4] In May 1948 the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area were merged, and the Northern China Joint Administrative Council and the Northern China Military Area were established. In August of the same year the Northern China Joint Administrative Council was renamed the Northern China People's Government.

[5] Shihchiachuang in western Hopei Province was the first major city in northern China liberated by the People's Liberation Army.

[6] In December 1947 Pai Chung-hsi began attacking the Tapieh mountain area with 33 brigades.

[7] At that time the estimate was that the entire Kuomintang army would be wiped out in about five years. The estimated time was later reduced to about three and a half years. See "The Momentous Change in China's Military Situation", pp. 287-88 of this volume.

SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE OF CADRES IN THE SHANSI-SUIYUAN LIBERATED AREA

April 1, 1948

Comrades! Today I wish to speak chiefly on some problems relating to our work in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area and also on some problems relating to our work in the country as a whole.

I

In my opinion, the work of land reform and of Party consolidation carried out during the past year in the area led by the Shansi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has been successful.

This can be viewed from two aspects. On the one hand, the Shansi-Suiyuan Party organization has combated Right deviations, initiated mass struggles and has completed, or is completing, the land reform and the Party consolidation among two million several hundred thousand people out of the area's total population of over three million. On the other hand, it has also corrected several "Left" deviations which occurred in these campaigns and has thereby put its entire work on the path of sound development. It is from these two aspects that I consider the work of land reform and of Party consolidation in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area to have been successful.

"From now on," the people of the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area are saying, "no one will ever again dare to be feudalist, to bully others or indulge in corruption." That is their conclusion about our work of land reform and Party consolidation. When they say, "No one will ever again dare to be feudalist," they mean that we have led them in initiating struggles through which the system of feudal exploitation in must insist on killing less and must strictly forbid killing without discrimination. To advocate killing more or killing without discrimination is entirely wrong; this would only cause our Party to forfeit sympathy, become alienated from the masses and fall into isolation. Trial and sentence by the people's courts, a form of struggle provided in the Outline Land Law, must be carried out in earnest; it is a powerful weapon of the peasant masses for striking at the worst elements among the landlords and rich peasants, it also avoids the mistake of beating and killing without discrimination. At the proper time (after the land struggle has reached its height), we should teach the masses to understand their own long-term interests — to regard those landlords and rich peasants who do not persist in wrecking the war effort or the land reform and who number tens of millions in the country as a whole (as many as 36 million out of a rural population of about 360 million) as a labour force for the country and to save and remould them. Our task is to abolish the feudal system, to wipe out the landlords as a class, not as individuals. In accordance with the Land Law we must give them means of production and means of livelihood, but not more than to the peasants.

12. We must criticize and struggle with certain cadres and Party members who have committed serious mistakes and certain bad elements among the masses of workers and peasants. In such criticism and struggle we should persuade the masses to adopt correct methods and forms and to refrain from rough actions. This is one side of the matter. The other side is that these cadres, Party members and bad elements should be made to pledge that they will not retaliate against the masses. It should be announced that the masses not only have the right to criticize them freely but also have the right to dismiss them from their posts when necessary or to propose their dismissal, or to propose their expulsion from the Party and even to hand the worst elements over to the people's courts for trial and punishment.

III. ON THE PROBLEM OF STATE POWER

1. The new-democratic state power is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal state power of the masses of the people led by the working class. Here, the masses of the people include the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie

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a most important strategic principle was forgotten, namely, that in the land reform we can and must unite about 92 per cent of the households or about 90 per cent of the population in the villages, in other words, unite all the rural working people to establish a united front against the feudal system. Now this deviation has been corrected. Consequently, people are very much reassured and the revolutionary united front has been consolidated. Secondly, in the land reform work, the industrial and commercial enterprises of landlords and rich peasants were encroached upon; in the struggle to uncover counter-revolution in the economic field, the prescribed scope of investigation was overstepped; and in tax policy, industry and commerce were harmed. These were the "Left" deviations in dealing with industry and commerce. Now they, too, have been corrected, and so industry and commerce can recover and develop. Thirdly, in the fierce struggles in the land reform of the past year, the Shansi-Suiyuan Party organization failed to adhere unequivocally to the Party's policy of strictly forbidding beating and killing without discrimination. As a result, in certain places some landlords and rich peasants were needlessly put to death, and the bad elements in the rural areas were able to exploit the situation to take revenge and foully murdered a number of working people. We consider it absolutely necessary and proper to sentence to death, through the people's courts and the democratic governments, those major criminals who have actively and desperately opposed the people's democratic revolution and sabotaged the land reform, that is, the most heinous counter-revolutionaries and local tyrants. If this were not done, democratic order could not be established. We must, however, forbid the killing without discrimination of ordinary personnel on the Kuomintang side, the common run of landlords and rich peasants and lesser offenders. Moreover, in trying criminals, a people's court or democratic government must not use physical violence. Deviations of this kind which occurred in the past year in the Shansi-Suiyuan area have likewise been corrected.

Now that all these deviations have been corrected in earnest, we can say on good evidence that the entire work under the leadership of the Shansi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee is on the path of sound development.

The most fundamental method of work which all Communists must firmly bear in mind is to determine our working policies according to actual conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have made, we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation at a given time and place and were subjective in our working policies. This should be a lesson for all comrades.

As for the consolidation of Party organizations at the primary level, you have drawn upon the experience of Pingshan County in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area in accordance with the Central Committee's directive on the work of land reform and Party consolidation in the old and semi-old Liberated Areas;[1] that is, you have invited activists from the non-Party masses to participate in Party branch meetings, unfolded criticism and self-criticism in order to remove the impurities in the class composition and style of work in Party organizations and enabled the Party to forge closer ties with the masses. This will enable you to accomplish the whole job of consolidating Party organizations in a sound way.

Those Party members and cadres who have made mistakes but can still be educated and are different from the incorrigibles should all be educated and not abandoned, whatever their class origin. It is likewise correct that you have carried out, or are carrying out, this policy.

In the struggle against the feudal system, the experience of setting up people's representative conferences at district and village (or township) levels on the basis of the poor peasant leagues and peasant associations is extremely valuable. The only true people's representative conference is one based on the will of really broad masses of the people. It is now possible for such people's representative conferences to emerge in all the Liberated Areas. Such a conference, once set up, should become the local organ of people's power, and all due authority must be vested in it and in the government council it elects. The poor peasant league and the peasant association will then become its helping hands. At one time we thought of setting up people's representative conferences in the rural districts only after the land reform had been completed in the main. Now that your own experience and that of other Liberated Areas have proved that it is possible and necessary to set up these people's representative conferences and their elected government councils at the district and village levels in the midst of the struggle for the land reform, that is the way you should continue to do it. All the Liberated Areas should do likewise. After the conferences have been generally set up at district and village levels, they can be established at the county level. When people's representative conferences are established up to the county level, it will be easy to set them up at higher levels. In people's representative conferences at various levels we must, wherever possible, include representatives of all democratic strata — workers, peasants, independent craftsmen, professionals, intellectuals, national bourgeois industrialists and merchants and enlightened gentry. Of course, it should not be done mechanically; we should distinguish between rural areas with towns and rural areas without towns, among towns of different sizes and between cities and rural areas, so as to fulfil naturally, and not mechanically, the task of uniting all democratic strata.

The great mass struggles for land reform and Party consolidation have taught and brought to the fore tens of thousands of activists and cadres. They are linked with the masses and will be a most precious asset of the People's Republic of China. Henceforth, we should strengthen their education so that they will make constant progress in their work. Meanwhile they should be warned not to let success and commendation make them conceited and self-satisfied.

In view of all this, in view of the successes in these various respects, we can say that the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area is now more consolidated than ever before. Other Liberated Areas which have worked along the same lines have likewise become consolidated.

II

As far as leadership is concerned, the successes of the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area are due mainly to the following causes:

1. Helped by the work done by Comrade Kang Sheng in the administrative village of Hochiapo in Linhsien County last spring and summer, the Shansi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau held a conference of secretaries of prefectural Party committees last June. The conference criticized Right deviations which had existed in past work, thoroughly exposed the serious phenomenon of various departures from the Party line and decided on the policy of starting the land reform and Party consolidation in earnest. In the main, the conference was a success. Without it, land reform and Party consolidation on such a scale could not have been successful. The

shortcomings of the conference were that it failed to decide on working policies varying with the different conditions in the old, semi-old and new Liberated Areas; that on the question of identifying class status it adopted an ultra-Left policy; that on the question of how to destroy the feudal system it laid too much stress on unearthing the landlords' hidden property; and that on the question of dealing with the demands of the masses it failed to make a sober analysis and raised the sweeping slogan, "Do everything as the masses want it done". With respect to the latter point, which is a question of the Party's relationship with the masses, the Party must lead the masses to carry out all their correct ideas in the light of the circumstances and educate them to correct any wrong ideas they may entertain. The conference only emphasized that the Party should carry out the ideas of the masses but neglected to point out that the Party should also educate and lead the masses, and thus eventually exerted a wrong influence on the comrades in some districts and aggravated their mistakes of tailism.

2. In January this year the Shansi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau took proper measures to correct the "Left" deviations. These measures were carried out after the comrades of the Sub-Bureau returned from the December meeting of the Central Committee.[2] For this purpose the Sub-Bureau issued a five-point directive.[3] These corrective measures were so well adapted to the wishes of the masses and were carried out with such speed and thoroughness that almost all the "Left" deviations were rectified within a short time.

III

The line of leadership of the Shansi-Suiyuan Party organization during the War of Resistance Against Japan was basically correct. This was shown in the reduction of rent and interest; in the substantial restoration and development of agricultural production, home spinning and weaving, war industries and some light industries; in the laying of the foundation of Party organizations; and in the establishment of a democratic government and of people's armed forces numbering nearly a hundred thousand men. All this work formed the basis on which we victoriously fought the War of Resistance and repelled the attacks of

Yen Hsi-shan and other reactionaries. Of course, the Party and the government during that period had their shortcomings; as is now entirely clear to us all, these consisted in a certain degree of impurity in class composition and style of work, which had undesirable effects on our work. But, taken as a whole, the work during the War of Resistance was fruitful. We were thus provided with favourable conditions for defeating Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary attacks after the Japanese surrender. The shortcomings or mistakes of the leadership of the Shansi-Suiyuan Party organization during the War of Resistance consisted mainly in the failure to rely on the broadest masses to overcome a certain degree of impurity in class composition and style of work in Party and government organizations and the undesirable effect it had on the work. That task is left for you to fulfil now. One reason for that situation was that certain leading comrades in Shansi and Suiyuan then lacked understanding of a number of the actual conditions concerning the Party and the masses. This should also be a lesson to the comrades.

IV

The task before the Shansi-Suiyuan Party organization is to make the greatest effort to complete the land reform and Party consolidation, to continue and support the People's War of Liberation, to refrain from any further increase in the people's burden but appropriately to lighten it, and to restore and develop production. You are now holding a conference on production. For the next few years the aim of restoring and developing production will be to improve the people's livelihood on the one hand and to support the People's War of Liberation on the other. You have a widespread agriculture and handicraft industry as well as some light and heavy industries using machinery. I hope you will do a good job in leading these productive enterprises, otherwise you cannot be called good Marxists. In agriculture, those labour-exchange teams and co-operatives,[4] which were in the grip of bureaucrats and which harmed the people instead of benefiting them, have all collapsed. This is entirely understandable and should occasion no regret. Your task is carefully to preserve and develop those labour-exchange teams, co-operatives and other necessary economic organizations that have won mass support and to spread them everywhere.

V

The national situation is a matter of concern for our comrades. Following the Party's National Land Conference last year, which resolved to adopt a new policy and unfold land reform and Party consolidation, large conferences of cadres were held in practically all the Liberated Areas on Party consolidation and land reform. At these conferences, Rightist ideas existing in the Party were criticized, and the serious phenomenon of a certain degree of impurity in the Party's class composition and style of work was exposed. Afterwards, appropriate measures were taken in many areas, and the "Left" deviations have been or are being corrected. Thus, confronted with the new political situation and new political tasks, our Party has been able to set its work in the whole country on the path of sound development. In the last few months almost all the People's Liberation Army has made use of the intervals between battles for large-scale training and consolidation. This has been carried out in a fully guided, orderly and democratic way. It has therefore aroused the revolutionary fervour of the great masses of commanders and fighters, enabled them clearly to comprehend the aim of the war, eliminated certain incorrect ideological tendencies and undesirable manifestations in the army, educated the cadres and fighters and greatly enhanced the combat effectiveness of the army. From now on, we must continue to carry on this new type of ideological education movement in the army, a movement which has a democratic and mass character. You can see clearly that neither the Party consolidation, nor the ideological education in the army, nor the land reform, all of which we have accomplished and all of which have great historic significance, could be undertaken by our enemy, the Kuomintang. On our part, we have been very earnest in correcting our own shortcomings; we have united the Party and army virtually as one man and forged close ties between them and the masses of the people; we are effectively carrying out all the policies and tactics formulated by the Central Committee of our Party and are successfully waging the People's War of Liberation. With our enemy, everything is just the opposite. They are so corrupt, so torn by ever-increasing and irreconcilable internal quarrels, so spurned by the people and utterly isolated and so frequently defeated in battle that their doom is inevitable. This is the whole situation of revolution versus counter-revolution in China.

In this situation, all comrades must firmly grasp the general line of the Party, that is, the line of the new-democratic revolution. The new-democratic revolution is not any other revolution, but can only be and must be a revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism waged by the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. This means that leadership in this revolution can and must be assumed by no class and party other than the proletariat and the Communist Party of China. This means that the united front of those joining this revolution is very broad, embracing the workers, peasants, independent craftsmen, professionals, intellectuals, the national bourgeoisie and the section of the enlightened gentry which has broken away from the landlord class. All these are what we refer to as the broad masses of the people. The state and the government to be founded by the broad masses of the people will be the People's Republic of China and the democratic coalition government of the alliance of all democratic classes under the leadership of the proletariat. The enemies to be overthrown in this revolution can only be and must be imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. The concentrated expression of all these enemies is the reactionary regime of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang.

Feudalism is the ally of imperialism and bureaucrat-capitalism and the foundation of their rule. Therefore, the reform of the land system is the main content of China's new-democratic revolution. The general line in the land reform is to rely on the poor peasants, unite with the middle peasants, abolish the system of feudal exploitation step by step and in a discriminating way, and develop agricultural production. The basic force to be relied upon in the land reform can only be and must be the poor peasants. Together with the farm labourers, they make up about 70 per cent of China's rural population. The main and immediate task of the land reform is to satisfy the demands of the masses of poor peasants and farm labourers. In the land reform it is necessary to unite with the middle peasants; the poor peasants and the farm labourers must form a solid united front with the middle peasants, who account for about 20 per cent of the rural population. Otherwise, the poor peasants and farm labourers will find themselves isolated and the land reform will fail. One of the tasks in the land reform is to satisfy the demands of certain middle peasants. A section of the middle peasants must be allowed to keep some land over and above the average obtained by the poor peasants. We support the peasants' demand for equal distribution of land in order to help arouse the broad masses of peasants speedily to abolish the system of landownership by the feudal landlord class, but we do not advocate absolute equalitarianism. Whoever advocates absolute equalitarianism is wrong. There is a kind of thinking now current in the countryside which undermines industry and commerce and advocates absolute equalitarianism in land distribution. Such thinking is reactionary, backward and retrogressive in nature. We must criticize it. The target of the land reform is only and must be the system of feudal exploitation by the landlord class and by the old-type rich peasants, and there should be no encroachment either upon the national bourgeoisie or upon the industrial and commercial enterprises run by the landlords and rich peasants. In particular, care must be taken not to encroach upon the interests of the middle peasants, independent craftsmen, professionals and new rich peasants, all of whom engage in little or no exploitation. The aim of the land reform is to abolish the system of feudal exploitation, that is, to eliminate the feudal landlords as a class, not as individuals. Therefore a landlord must receive the same allotment of land and property as does a peasant and must be made to learn productive labour and join the ranks of the nation's economic life. Except for the most heinous counter-revolutionaries and local tyrants, who have incurred the bitter hatred of the broad masses, who have been proved guilty and who therefore may and ought to be punished, a policy of leniency must be applied to all, and any beating or killing without discrimination must be forbidden. The system of feudal exploitation should be abolished step by step, that is, in a tactical way. In launching the struggle we must determine our tactics according to the circumstances and the degree to which the peasant masses are awakened and organized. We must not attempt to wipe out overnight the whole system of feudal exploitation. In accordance with the actual conditions of the system of feudal exploitation in China's villages, the total scope of attack in the land reform should generally not exceed about 8 per cent of the rural households or about 10 per cent of the rural population. In the old and semi-old Liberated Areas the percentage should be even smaller. It is dangerous to depart from actual conditions and mistakenly enlarge the scope of attack. In the new Liberated Areas, moreover, it is necessary to distinguish between different places and different stages. By distinguishing between places we mean that in those places which we can hold securely we should concentrate our efforts on carrying out appropriate land reform work that accords with the wishes of the local masses, while in those places which for the time being are difficult to hold securely, until there is a change in the situation we should not be in a hurry to start the land reform but should confine ourselves to activities which are feasible and beneficial to the masses in the present circumstances. By distinguishing between stages we mean that in places recently occupied by the People's Liberation Army we should put forward and carry out the tactics of neutralizing the rich peasants, of neutralizing the middle and small landlords, and thus narrow the scope of the attack so as to destroy only the reactionary Kuomintang armed forces and deal blows at the bad gentry and local tyrants. We should concentrate all our efforts on accomplishing this task as the first stage of work in the new Liberated Areas. We should then advance step by step to the stage of total abolition of the feudal system, in accordance with the rising level of political consciousness and organization of the masses. In the new Liberated Areas we should distribute movable property and land only when conditions are relatively secure and the overwhelming majority of the masses have been fully roused to action; to act otherwise would be adventurist and undependable and would do harm rather than good. In the new Liberated Areas the experience gained during the War of Resistance must be fully utilized. By abolishing feudalism in a discriminating way we mean that we should distinguish between landlords and rich peasants, among big, middle and small landlords and between those landlords and rich peasants who are local tyrants and those who are not, and that, subject to the major premise of the equal distribution of land and the abolition of the feudal system, we should not decide on and give the same treatment to them all, but should differentiate and vary the treatment according to varying conditions. When we do this, people will see that our work is completely reasonable. The development of agricultural production is the immediate aim of the land reform. Only by abolishing the feudal system can the conditions for such development be created. In every area, as soon as feudalism is wiped out and the land reform is completed, the Party and the democratic government must put forward the task of restoring and developing agricultural production, transfer all available forces in the countryside to this task, organize cooperation and mutual aid, improve agricultural technique, promote seed selection and build irrigation works — all to ensure increased production. Party organizations in the rural areas must devote the greatest energy to restoring and developing agricultural production and also industrial production in small towns. In order to speed up this restoration and development, we must do our utmost, in the course of our struggle for the abolition of the feudal system, to preserve all useful means of production and of livelihood, take resolute measures against anyone's destroying or wasting them, oppose extravagant eating and drinking and pay attention to thrift and economy. In order to develop agricultural production, we must advise the peasants to organize, voluntarily and step by step, the various types of producers' and consumers' co-operatives based on private ownership, which are permissible under present economic conditions. The abolition of the feudal system and the development of agricultural production will lay the foundation for the development of industrial production and the transformation of an agricultural country into an industrial one. This is the ultimate goal of the new-democratic revolution.

You comrades know that our Party has laid down the general line and general policy of the Chinese revolution as well as various specific lines for work and specific policies. However, while many comrades remember our Party's specific lines for work and specific policies, they often forget its general line and general policy. If we actually forget the Party's general line and general policy, then we shall be blind, half-baked, muddle-headed revolutionaries, and when we carry out a specific line for work and a specific policy, we shall lose our bearings and vacillate now to the left and now to the right, and the work will suffer.

Let me repeat:

The revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism waged by the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat — this is China's new-democratic revolution, and this is the general line and general policy of the Communist Party of China at the present stage of history.

To rely on the poor peasants, unite with the middle peasants, abolish the system of feudal exploitation step by step and in a discriminating way, and develop agricultural production — this is the general line and general policy of the Communist Party of China in the work of land reform during the period of the new-democratic revolution.

NOTES

[1] Issued on February 22, 1948, this directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China summed up the experience of work in the land reform and Party consolidation in various Liberated Areas, laid down a series of policies and methods for the land reform and Party consolidation and stressed the correction of "Left" deviations which had occurred during the execution of these two tasks in certain areas.

[2] See the introductory note to "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", pp. 158-59 of this volume.

[3] This refers to the "Directive on Correcting Mistakes in the Determination of Class Status and on Uniting with the Middle Peasants" issued by the Shansi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on January 13, 1948. The directive is divided into five sections. The following are its main points:

(1) Because the criteria for class identification had not been well-defined quite a few persons were wrongly classified as bankrupt landlords or rich peasants on the spontaneous demands of the peasants, and in particular, well-to-do middle peasants were wrongly classified as rich peasants. This had an adverse effect on the effort to unite with the middle peasants and was wrong.

(2) Proper measures were to be taken resolutely to persuade the peasants to correct these mistakes. Suitable restitution was to be made of property that had been taken.

(3) It was to be explained to the peasants and the cadres that the only criterion in class identification should be the relationship of exploitation. Mistakes in determining class status were to be corrected.

(4) The principle of relying on poor peasants and farm labourers and uniting with middle peasants had to be grasped. The middle peasants were to be enabled to have one-third of the members of the peasant representative conferences and of the leading bodies of the peasant associations, and consideration was to be given to their interests in taxation and in the land reform.

(5) Responsible cadres were to make a serious study of the Party's class policy for the rural areas. Mistakes that departed from the Party's policies concerning the middle peasants had to be corrected; they had to be corrected through the masses.

Simultaneously with the issuance of this five-point directive, the Shansi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau issued the "Directive on the Protection of Industry and Commerce" to correct the deviations of encroaching on industry and commerce during the land reform.

[4] This refers to the supply and marketing co-operatives.

A TALK TO THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE *SHANSI-SUIYUAN DAILY*

April 2, 1948

Our policy must be made known not only to the leaders and to the cadres but also to the broad masses. Questions concerning policy should as a rule be given publicity in the Party papers or periodicals. We are now carrying out the reform of the land system. The policies on land reform should be published in the papers and broadcast on the radio so that the broad masses all know them. Once the masses know the truth and have a common aim, they will work together with one heart. This is like fighting a battle; to win a battle the fighters as well as the officers must be of one heart. After the troops in northern Shensi went through training and consolidation and poured out their grievances against the old social order, the fighters heightened their political consciousness and became clear on why they were fighting and how they should fight; every one of them rolled up his sleeves for battle, their morale was very high and as soon as they went into action they won a victory. When the masses are of one heart, everything becomes easy. A basic principle of Marxism-Leninism is to enable the masses to know their own interests and unite to fight for their own interests. The role and power of the newspapers consists in their ability to bring the Party programme, the Party line, the Party's general and specific policies, its tasks and methods of work before the masses in the quickest and most extensive way.

There are people in our leading organs in some places who think that it is enough for the leaders alone to know the Party's policies and that there is no need to let the masses know them. This is one of the basic reasons why some of our work cannot be done well. For over twenty years our Party has carried on mass work every day, and for the past dozen years it has talked about the mass line every day. We have always maintained that the revolution must rely on the masses of the people, on everybody's taking a hand, and have opposed relying merely on a few persons issuing orders. The mass line, however, is still not being thoroughly carried out in the work of some comrades; they still rely solely on a handful of people working coolly and quietly by themselves. One reason is that, whatever they do, they are always reluctant to explain it to the people they lead and that they do not understand why or how to give play to the initiative and creative energy of those they lead. Subjectively, they too want everyone to take a hand in the work, but they do not let other people know what is to be done or how to do it. That being the case, how can everyone be expected to get moving and how can anything be done well? To solve this problem the basic thing is, of course, to carry out ideological education on the mass line, but at the same time we must teach these comrades many concrete methods of work. One such method is to make full use of the newspapers. To run a newspaper well, to make it interesting and absorbing, to give correct publicity in the newspapers to the Party's general and specific policies and to strengthen the Party's ties with the masses through the newspapers — this is an important question of principle in our Party's work which is not to be taken lightly.

You comrades are newspapermen. Your job is to educate the masses, to enable the masses to know their own interests, their own tasks and the Party's general and specific policies. Running a newspaper is like all other work, it must be done conscientiously if it is to be done well, if it is to be lively. With our newspapers, too, we must rely on everybody, on the masses of the people, on the whole Party to run them, not merely on a few persons working behind closed doors. Our papers talk about the mass line every day, yet frequently the mass line is not carried out in the work of the newspaper office itself. For instance, misprints often crop up in the papers simply because their elimination has not been tackled as a serious job. If we apply the method of the mass line, then when misprints appear, we should assemble the entire staff of the paper to discuss nothing but this matter, tell them clearly what the mistakes are, explain why they occur and how they can be got rid of and ask everyone to give the matter serious attention. After this has been done three times, or five times, such mistakes can certainly be overcome. This is true of small matters, and of big matters, too.

To be good at translating the Party's policy into action of the masses, to be good at getting not only the leading cadres but also the broad masses to understand and master every movement and every struggle we launch — this is an art of Marxist-Leninist leadership. It is also the dividing line that determines whether or not we make mistakes in our work. If we tried to go on the offensive when the masses are not yet awakened, that would be adventurism. If we insisted on leading the masses to do anything against their will, we would certainly fail. If we did not advance when the masses demand advance, that would be Right opportunism. Chen Tu-hsiu's opportunist error consisted precisely in lagging behind the awakening of the masses, being unable to lead the masses forward and even opposing their forward march. There are many comrades who still don't understand these questions. Our papers should propagate these ideas well so that everyone can understand them.

To teach the masses, newspaper workers should first of all learn from the masses. You comrades are all intellectuals. Intellectuals are often ignorant and often have little or no experience in practical matters. You can't quite understand the pamphlet "How to Analyse the Classes in the Rural Areas"[1] issued in 1933; on this point, the peasants are more than a match for you, for they understand it fully as soon as they are told about it. Over 180 peasants in two districts of Kuohsien County met for five days and settled many problems concerning the distribution of land. If your editorial department were to discuss those problems, I am afraid you would discuss them for two weeks without settling them. The reason is quite simple; you do not understand those problems. To change from lack of understanding to understanding, one must do things and see things; that is learning. Comrades working on the newspapers should go out by turns to take part in mass work, in land reform work for a time; that is very necessary. When not going out to participate in mass work, you should hear a great deal and read a great deal about the mass movements and devote time and effort to the study of such material. Our slogan in training troops is, "Officers teach soldiers, soldiers teach officers and soldiers teach each other". The fighters have a lot of practical combat experience. The officers should learn from the fighters, and when they have made other people's experience their own, they will become more capable. Comrades working on the newspapers, too, should constantly study the material coming from below, gradually enrich their practical knowledge and become experienced. Only thus will you be able to do your work well, will you be able to shoulder your task of educating the masses.

The *Shansi-Suiyuan Daily* made very great progress following the conference of secretaries of prefectural Party committees last June. Then the paper was rich in content, sharp, pungent and vigorous; it reflected the great mass struggles, it spoke for the masses. I liked reading it very much. But since January this year, when we began to correct "Left" deviations, your paper seems to have lost some of its spirit; it is not clear-cut enough, not pungent enough, has become less informative and does not have much appeal for the reader. Now you are examining your work and summing up your experience; this is very good. When you have summed up your experience in combating Right and "Left" deviations and become more clear-headed, your work will improve.

The struggle against Right deviations waged by the *Shansi-Suiyuan Daily* from last June on was completely correct. In that struggle you did a very conscientious job and fully reflected the actual situation in the mass movement. You made comments, in the form of editorial notes, on the viewpoints and materials which you regarded as wrong. There were shortcomings too in some of your later comments, but the conscientious spirit was good. Your shortcomings lay chiefly in drawing the bow-string much too tight. If a bow-string is too taut, it will snap. The ancients said, "The principle of Kings Wen and Wu was to alternate tension with relaxation."[2] Now "relax" a bit and the comrades will become more clear-headed. You achieved successes in your work, but there were also shortcomings, mainly "Left" deviations. Now you are making an over-all summing-up and, after correcting the "Left" deviations, you will achieve greater successes.

When we are correcting deviations, some people look on the work of the past as utterly fruitless and all wrong. That is not right. These people fail to see that the Party has led a huge number of peasants to obtain land, overthrown feudalism, consolidated the Party organizations and improved the cadres' style of work, and that now it has also corrected the "Left" deviations and educated the cadres and masses. Are all these not great achievements? We should be analytical with regard to our work and the undertakings of the masses, and should not negate everything. In the past "Left" deviations arose because people had no experience. Without experience it is hard to avoid mistakes. From inexperience to experience, one must go through a process. Through the struggles against the Right and "Left" deviations in the short period since June last year, people have come to understand what struggle against Right deviations means and what struggle against "Left" deviations means. Without this process, people would not understand.

After you have examined your work and summed up your experience, I am sure that your paper will be run even better. You must retain the former merits of your paper- it should be sharp, pungent and clear-cut, and it should be run conscientiously. We must firmly uphold the truth, and truth requires a clear-cut stand. We Communists have always disdained to conceal our views. Newspapers run by our Party and all the propaganda work of our Party should be vivid, clear-cut and sharp and should never mutter and mumble. That is the militant style proper to us, the revolutionary proletariat. Since we want to teach the people to know the truth and arouse them to fight for their own emancipation, we need this militant style. A blunt knife draws no blood.

NOTES

[1] See "How to Analyse the Classes in the Rural Areas", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. I.

[2] From the *Book of Rites*, "Miscellaneous Records", Part II. "Kings Wen and Wu could not keep a bow in permanent tension without relaxation. Nor would they leave it in a permanent state of relaxation without tension. The principle of Kings Wen and Wu was to alternate tension with relaxation." Wen and Wu were the first two kings of the Chou Dynasty (12th-3rd century B.C.).

TELEGRAM TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE LOYANG FRONT AFTER THE RECAPTURE OF THE CITY*

April 8, 1948

Loyang is now recaptured[1] and can probably be securely held. In our urban policy, pay attention to the following points:

1. Be very prudent in the liquidation of the organs of Kuomintang rule, arrest only the chief reactionaries and do not involve too many persons.

2. Set a clear line of demarcation in defining bureaucrat-capital; do not designate as bureaucrat-capital and do not confiscate all the industrial and commercial enterprises run by Kuomintang members. The principle should be laid down that the democratic government should take over and operate all industrial and commercial enterprises which are definitely verified as having been run by the Kuomintang's central, provincial, county or municipal governments, that is, enterprises operated wholly by official bodies. But if, for the time being, the democratic government is not yet ready to take them over or is unable to do so, the individuals previously in charge should be temporarily entrusted with the responsibility of management so that these enterprises can function as usual until the democratic government appoints people to take over. The workers and technicians in these industrial and commercial enterprises should be organized to participate in management, and their competence should be trusted. If the Kuomintang personnel have fled and the enterprise has suspended operations, a management committee of representatives elected by the workers and technicians should be set up, pending the appointment by the democratic government of managers and directors who will manage it together with the workers. Enterprises run by notorious big bureaucrats of the Kuomintang should be dealt with in conformity with the principles and measures stated above. Industrial

and commercial enterprises run by small bureaucrats or by landlords, however, are not subject to confiscation. Encroachment on any enterprise run by the national bourgeoisie is strictly prohibited.

3. Forbid peasant organizations to enter the city to seize landlords and settle scores with them. Landlords whose land is in the villages but who live in the city should be dealt with by the democratic municipal government according to law. Upon the request of the village peasant organizations those who have committed the most heinous crimes may be sent back to the villages to be dealt with.

4. On entering the city, do not lightly advance slogans of raising wages and reducing working hours. In war time it is good enough if production can continue and existing working hours and original wage levels can be maintained. Whether or not suitable reductions in working hours and increases in wages are to be made later will depend on economic conditions, that is, on whether the enterprises thrive.

5. Do not be in a hurry to organize the people of the city to struggle for democratic reforms and improvements in livelihood. These matters can be properly handled in the light of local conditions only when the municipal administration is in good working order, public feeling has become calm, careful surveys have been made, a clear idea of the situation has been gained and appropriate measures have been worked out.

6. In the big cities, food and fuel are now the central problems; they must be handled in a planned way. Once a city comes under our administration, the problem of the livelihood of the city poor must be solved step by step and in a planned way. Do not raise the slogan, "Open the granaries to relieve the poor". Do not foster among them the psychology of depending on the government for relief.

7. Members of the Kuomintang and its Three People's Principles Youth League must be properly screened and registered.

8. Plan everything on a long-term basis. It is strictly forbidden to destroy any means of production, whether publicly or privately owned, and to waste consumer goods. Extravagant eating and drinking are forbidden, and attention should be paid to thrift and economy.

9. Appoint as secretaries of the Party's municipal committee and

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* This telegram was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Since its contents were applicable not only to Loyang but, in the main, to all newly liberated cities, it was sent concurrently to the leading comrades on other fronts and in other areas.

as mayor and deputy mayors only persons who have a grasp of policy and are capable. They should train all their personnel and explain urban policies and tactics to them. Now that the city belongs to the people, everything should proceed in the spirit that the people themselves are responsible for managing the city. It would be entirely wrong to apply our policies and tactics for cities under Kuomintang administration to a city under the people's own administration.

NOTES

[1] Loyang was an important stronghold of the Kuomintang troops in the western part of Honan Province. The People's Liberation Army first took Loyang on March 14, 1948, subsequently evacuated the city on its own initiative to facilitate the wiping out of the enemy's effective strength and recaptured Loyang on April 5. 1948.

TACTICAL PROBLEMS OF RURAL WORK IN THE NEW LIBERATED AREAS

May 24, 1948

It is necessary to give over-all consideration to the tactical problems of rural work in the new Liberated Areas. In these areas we must make full use of the experience gained in the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan; for a considerable period after their liberation we should apply the social policy of reducing rent and interest and properly adjusting the supplies of seed and food grains and the financial policy of reasonable distribution of burdens; we should aim our main blows only at the important counter-revolutionaries who side politically with the Kuomintang and stubbornly oppose our Party and our army, just as we only arrested the traitors and confiscated their property during the period of the War of Resistance, and we should not immediately apply the social reform policy of distributing movable property and land. The reason is that only a few bolder elements would welcome the premature distribution of movable property and that the basic masses would not get anything and would therefore be dissatisfied. Moreover, hasty dispersal of social wealth is to the disadvantage of the army. Premature distribution of land would prematurely place the entire burden of military requirements on the peasants instead of on the landlords and rich peasants. In the sphere of social reform, it is better not to distribute movable property and land but instead to reduce rent and interest universally so that the peasants will receive tangible benefits, and in financial policy we should effect a reasonable distribution of burdens so that the landlords and rich peasants will pay more. In this way, social wealth will not be dispersed and public order will be comparatively stable, and this will help us concentrate all our forces on destroying the Kuomintang reactionaries. After one, two or even three years, when the Kuomintang reactionaries have been wiped out in extensive base areas, when conditions have become stable, when the masses have awakened and organized themselves and when the war has moved far away, we can enter the stage of land reform — the distribution of movable property and land as in northern China. The stage of rent and interest reduction cannot be skipped in any new Liberated Area, and we shall make mistakes if we skip it. The above tactics must also be carried out in those parts of the large Liberated Areas in northern, northeastern and northwestern China which border on enemy territory.

THE WORK OF LAND REFORM AND OF PARTY CONSOLIDATION IN 1948*

May 25, 1948

I

It is necessary to pay attention to the seasons. In areas designate by the bureaus or sub-bureaus of the Central Committee, the whole of next autumn and winter, that is, the seven months from this September to next March, must be devoted to carrying out the following tasks in the proper order:

1. Make an investigation of rural conditions.
2. Carry out the initial work for Party consolidation in accordance with correct policy. A working corps or working team sent by a higher organ to a rural district must first of all unite with all the activists and better members in the local Party branch and together with them lead the work of land reform.
3. Organize or reorganize or strengthen the poor peasant leagues and the peasant associations and launch the land reform struggle.
4. Identify class status according to correct criteria.
5. Distribute feudal land and property in accordance with correct policy. The final result of the distribution must be such that it is considered fair and reasonable by all the main strata and that the landlords too feel that there is a way for them to make a living and that this is assured.
6. Form people's representative conferences and elect government councils at the township (or village), district and county levels.
7. Issue land certificates fixing the ownership of land.
8. Adjust or revise the rates of the agricultural tax (*i.e.*, public grain). These rates must conform to the principle of giving

consideration to both public and private interests; in other words, they must on the one hand help support the war and on the other get the peasants interested in restoring and developing production, which will help improve their livelihood.

9. Complete the work of the organizational consolidation of the Party branches in accordance with correct policy.

10. Shift our work from land reform to rallying all the rural working people and to organizing the labour power of the landlords and rich peasants in a general struggle to restore and develop agricultural production. Start organizing small-scale work-exchange groups and other co-operative units according to the principles of voluntary participation and exchange of equal values; prepare seed, fertilizer and fuel; work out production plans; issue agricultural credits (chiefly loans for means of production, to be definitely repaid and to be strictly distinguished from relief grants) when necessary and possible; draw up plans, where possible, for building water conservancy works.

This is the whole process of work from land reform to production, a process which all comrades directly engaged in land reform must be brought to understand so that they can avoid one-sidedness in their work and, without missing the seasons, accomplish all the above tasks in the coming autumn and winter.

II

To achieve these aims, it is necessary to get the following work done in the next three months — from June through August:

1. Designate the areas for land reform. Each such area must meet the following three conditions:

   a. All the enemy armed forces must have been wiped out and conditions must have become stable; it must not be an unstable guerrilla zone.

   b. The overwhelming majority of the basic masses (the farm labourers, poor peasants and middle peasants), not

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* This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

just a minority, must already be demanding the distribution of land.

c. Party cadres must be adequate both in numbers and in quality to grasp the work of land reform and must not leave it to the spontaneous activity of the masses.

An area where any one of these three conditions is lacking should not be designated for land reform in 1948. For instance, since they do not meet the first condition, we should not include in this year's plan for land reform those parts of the Liberated Areas in northern and eastern China, the Northeast and the Northwest, which border on enemy territory, nor most of the area enclosed by the Yangtse, Huai, Yellow and Han Rivers, which is under the jurisdiction of the Central Plains Bureau of the Central Committee. Whether they are to be included in next year's plan will depend on circumstances. In these areas we should make full use of the experience acquired during the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan and put into effect the social policy of reducing rent and interest and of properly adjusting supplies of seed and food grains, as well as the financial policy of reasonable distribution of burdens, so as to unite with or neutralize all social forces that can be united with or can be neutralized, help the People's Liberation Army to wipe out all the Kuomintang armed forces and strike blows at the local tyrants who are politically the most reactionary. Neither land nor movable property should be distributed in these areas, because they are newly liberated and border on enemy territory, and distribution there would not be of advantage to uniting with or neutralizing all social forces that can be united with or neutralized for the accomplishment of the basic task of wiping out the Kuomintang forces of reaction.

2. Make cadres' conferences a success. At cadres' conferences concerned with the work of land reform and Party consolidation, all the correct policies relating to these two tasks must be fully explained and a clear line must be drawn between what is and what is not permitted. All cadres working on land reform and Party consolidation are required to study seriously and understand fully the important documents issued by the Central Committee; cadres must be enjoined to adhere to them all and must not make any unauthorized change. In case parts of the documents do not suit local conditions, cadres may and should propose amendments,

but they must secure the approval of the Central Committee before actually making any change. The higher leading organs of the various areas must make adequate and proper preparations beforehand for the cadres' conferences which are to be held at different levels this year. That is to say, before a conference is convened, there should be discussions among a few persons (with one of them taking the main responsibility), in the course of which questions are raised and analysed and an outline is written; this outline must be carefully worked out in content and wording (be sure to make it clear and concise and avoid long-windedness). Then a report should be made at the conference, discussion should be unfolded, the outline should be supplemented, revised and finalized in the light of the views expressed in the discussion, and the final document should be circulated in the whole Party and published, as far as possible, in the newspapers. It is necessary to oppose holding meetings in an empiricist way, that is, with no advance preparations, no problems raised or analysed and no report, carefully prepared and well-weighed in content and wording, submitted to the cadres' conference, but with the participants allowed to indulge in pointless, random talk so that the sessions drag on without reaching any clear, well-considered conclusion. Pay attention to eliminating this harmful empiricist way if it is found in the leadership work of any bureau or sub-bureau of the Central Committee, or in any area, provincial or prefectural Party committee. Conferences to discuss policy should not be attended by too many people and can be shortened if there is enough preparation. Generally it is proper for a dozen or so people, or twenty to thirty, or forty to fifty — the number varying according to circumstances — to meet for about a week. Meetings for transmitting policy may have a larger attendance but must not last too long either. The only conferences which may have a larger attendance and may last longer are those for Party consolidation among senior and middle-rank cadres.

3. By the first half or at the latest the second half of Septem er, all cadres who are to take a direct part in the land reform must arrive in the villages and start work. Otherwise, it will be impossible to utilize the whole of the coming autumn and winter to complete the land reform, the Party consolidation and the formation of organs of political power and to prepare for spring ploughing.

III

At cadres' conferences as well as in their work, cadres must be taught how to analyse concrete situations and how, proceeding from the concrete situations in different areas with different historical conditions, to decide on their tasks and methods of work in a given place and time. Distinctions must be drawn between the cities and the rural areas and among the old Liberated Areas, semi-old Liberated Areas, areas bordering on enemy territory and new Liberated Areas; otherwise mistakes will be made.

IV

The land problem should be considered solved and the question of land reform should not be raised again in areas where the feudal system has been fundamentally abolished, where the poor peasants and farm labourers have all acquired roughly the average amount of land and where there is still a difference (which is permissible) between their holdings and those of the middle peasants, but where the difference is not great. In these areas the central tasks are to restore and develop production, to complete the Party consolidation and the formation of organs of political power and to support the front. If, in certain villages in these areas, some land is still to be distributed or readjusted, the class status of some individuals still needs to be revised and some land certificates still have to be issued, these tasks should of course be completed in accordance with the actual circumstances.

V

In all the Liberated Areas, whether or not the land reform has been completed, we must direct the peasants to cultivate the wheat fields and to plough part of the land this autumn. In the winter, the peasants should be called upon to collect fertilizer. All this is vitally important to agricultural production and the 1949 harvests in the

Liberated Areas and must be accomplished through administrative measures co-ordinated with mass work.

VI

It is necessary resolutely to overcome certain manifestations of indiscipline or anarchy existing in many places. There are people who, without authorization, modify the policies and tactics adopted by the Central Committee or other higher Party committees and apply extremely harmful policies and tactics, which go against the united will and discipline but which they opinionatedly believe to be correct. There are also people who, on the pretext of pressure of work, adopt the wrong attitude of neither asking for instructions before an action is taken nor submitting a report afterwards and who regard the area they administer as an independent realm. All this is extremely harmful to the interests of the revolution. Party committees at every level must discuss this matter again and again and work earnestly to overcome such indiscipline and anarchy so that all the powers that can and must be centralized will be concentrated in the hands of the Central Committee and its agencies.[1]

VII

The Central Committee, its bureaus (or sub-bureaus), the area (or provincial) Party committees and the prefectural, county and district Party committees down to the level of Party branches must establish close contact with each other in order to have a good grasp of trends in the various movements, constantly exchange information and experience, and promptly correct mistakes and spread successes. For these purposes, they should make full use of such means of communication as the radio, telegraph, telephone, posts and couriers; of such methods of consultation as small meetings (of four or five persons), joint local conferences (of a few counties) and personal talks; of such inspection tours as may be made by small groups (of three to five persons) or by individual committee members with prestige; and of the news agency and newspapers. There should be no waiting for several months, half a year or even longer before a lower organization submits its summary report to the one above, or before a higher organization issues general directives to those below. For such reports and directives often become out of date, losing all or part of their usefulness. And mistakes are made and cannot be corrected in time, causing serious damage. What the whole Party urgently needs is reports and directives that are timely, lively and concrete.

VIII

In exercising their leadership, the bureaus and sub-bureaus of the Central Committee and the area, provincial, prefectural and municipal Party committees must give proper attention to both urban and rural work, to the tasks of both industrial and agricultural production. That is to say, they should not, on account of directing the land reform and agricultural production, neglect to give leadership to urban work and industrial production or slacken their efforts in this regard. Since we now have many big, medium and small cities and a vast network of industries, mines and communications, we shall make mistakes if any of the leading organizations concerned becomes negligent or slackens its efforts in this respect.

NOTES

[1] The agencies of the Central Committee, as referred to here, were its bureaus and sub-bureaus.

THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE LIAOHSI-SHENYANG CAMPAIGN[1]*

September and October 1948

I. THE TELEGRAM OF SEPTEMBER 7

We are prepared to bring about the fundamental overthrow of the Kuomintang in about five years, counting from July 1946.[2] This is possible. Our objective can be attained provided we destroy about 100 brigades of Kuomintang regular troops every year, or some 500 brigades over the five years. In the past two years our army has annihilated a total of 191 brigades of enemy regulars, an average of 95½ brigades a year, or nearly 8 brigades a month. In the next three years it is required that our army should wipe out 300 or more brigades of enemy regulars. Between July this year and June next year we expect to destroy some 115 brigades of enemy regulars. This total is apportioned among our various field armies and armies.[3] The Eastern China Field Army is required to wipe out about 40 brigades (including the 7 already wiped out in July) and capture Tsinan and a number of large, medium and small cities in northern Kiangsu, eastern Honan and northern Anhwei. The Central Plains Field Army is required to wipe out about 14 brigades (including the 2 brigades wiped out in July) and capture a number of cities in the provinces of Hupeh, Honan and Anhwei. The Northwest Field Army is required to wipe out about 12 brigades (including the 1½ brigades wiped out in August). The army in northern China commanded by Hsu Hsiang-chien and Chou Shih-ti is required to wipe out about 14 brigades under Yen Hsi-shan (including the 8 brigades annihilated in July) and capture Taiyuan. You are required, in co-ordination with the 2 armies commanded by Lo Jui-ching and Yang Cheng-wu, to wipe out about 35 brigades of the 2 army groups under Wei Li-huang and Fu Tso-yi (including 1 brigade wiped out by Yang Cheng-wu in July) and capture all the cities along the Peiping-Liaoning, Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Chengteh and Peiping-Paoting Railways, except Peiping, Tientsin and Shenyang. The decisive factors for the achievement of this objective are the proper disposition and command of troops in campaigns and a proper balance between fighting and rest. If in the two months of September and October, or a little longer, you can wipe out the enemy along the line from Chinchow to Tangshan and take Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan, you will have achieved the task of wiping out some 18 enemy brigades. In order to wipe them out, you must now prepare to employ your main force on this line, leaving the enemy forces at Changchun and Shenyang alone. When you are attacking Chinchow, be prepared also to wipe out the enemy forces that may come to its rescue from Changchun and Shenyang. Because the enemy forces in and near Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan are isolated from each other, success in attacking and wiping them out is pretty certain, and there is also a fair hope of success in capturing Chinchow and in attacking enemy reinforcements. If, however, you were to dispose your main force at Hsinmin and its northern environs in preparation for attacking the enemy forces which might come out from Changchun and Shenyang, then the enemy might not dare come out at all because you would be too great a menace. On the one hand, the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang might not come out. And, on the other hand, because the forces you dispatch towards Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan would be too small, the enemy in and near these three cities (comprising 18 brigades) would probably fall back on

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* These telegrams addressed to Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan and other comrades were drawn up by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The concept of operations he set forth here for the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was fully carried out later. The results of the campaign were as follows:

(1) The destruction of 470,000 enemy troops, plus the victories in other theatres during that period, made the qualitatively superior People's Liberation Army superior to the Kuomintang army in numbers as well.

(2) The entire territory of northeastern China was liberated, and the conditions were created for the liberation of Peiping, Tientsin and all northern China.

(3) Our army gained experience in fighting large-scale campaigns of annihilation.

(4) As a result of the liberation of northeastern China, a strategically secure rear area with a fair industrial base was won for the War of Liberation, and the Party and the people obtained favourable conditions for gradually turning to economic rehabilitation.

Chinchow and Tangshan, and you would find it rather difficult and yet necessary to attack them, wasting time and energy and thus perhaps landing yourselves in a passive position. For these reasons, it will be better to leave the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang alone and focus your attention on the enemy at Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan. Another point: you must prepare to fight three big campaigns in the ten months from September to next June and to spend about two months on each campaign, making a total of about six months and leaving four months for rest. During the Chinchow-Shanhaikuan-Tangshan campaign (the first big campaign), if the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang sallies forth in full strength to rescue Chinchow (because your main force will be disposed not at Hsinmin but around Chinchow, Wei Li-huang will be emboldened to come to the rescue), then, without leaving the Chinchow-Shanhaikuan-Tangshan line, you can follow up immediately with large-scale annihilating attacks on the enemy reinforcements and strive to wipe out all Wei Li-huang's troops on the spot. This would be the ideal situation. Hence, you should pay attention to the following:

(1) Be firmly determined to attack and capture Chinchow, Shanhaikuan and Tangshan and to take control of the entire line.

(2) Be firmly determined to fight a battle of annihilation on a scale larger than you have ever fought before, that is, dare to fight all Wei Li-huang's army when it comes to the rescue.

(3) In keeping with these two resolves, reconsider your plan of operations, make arrangements to meet the military requirements

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The Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was the first of the three greatest campaigns of decisive significance in the Chinese People's War of Liberation. The other two were the Huai-Hai and the Peiping-Tientsin campaigns. In these three great campaigns, which lasted four months and nineteen days, 144 divisions (brigades) of the enemy's regular troops and 29 divisions of its irregular troops, or more than 1,540,000 men in all, were wiped out. During this period the People's Liberation Army also launched offensives on other fronts, destroying large numbers of the enemy. In the first two years of the war, the People's Liberation Army had wiped out an average of about 8 enemy brigades per month. Now the number of enemy troops destroyed by the People's Liberation Army no longer averaged 8 brigades per month but 38 brigades. These three major campaigns virtually annihilated the crack troops on which the Kuomintang relied for waging the counter-revolutionary civil war and greatly speeded victory in the War of Liberation all over the country. For the Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin campaigns, see "The Concept of Operations for the Huai-Hai Campaign", pp. 279-82 and "The Concept of Operations for the Peiping-Tientsin Campaign", pp. 289-93, of this volume.

of your whole force (food, ammunition, recruits, and so on) and to handle captives.

Please consider the above and telegraph your reply.

II. THE TELEGRAM OF OCTOBER 10

1. From the day you start attacking Chinchow, there will be a period when the tactical situation will be very tense. We hope that you will inform us by radio every two or three days of the enemy's situation (the strength of the resistance by his forces defending Chinchow, the progress of his reinforcements from Hulutao and Chinhsi and from Shenyang and the probable course of action of his troops in Changchun) and of our own situation (the progress of our attack on the city and the casualties sustained in attacking the city and holding off enemy reinforcements).

2. It is highly possible that, as you have said, the tactical situation during this period will develop most favourably, that is, that you will be able to wipe out not only the enemy's forces defending Chinchow but also a part of his reinforcements from Hulutao and Chinhsi and some or most of his forces fleeing from Changchun. If the enemy's reinforcements from Shenyang advance to the area north of the Taling River just after you have taken Chinchow and when you are thus able to shift your forces to encircle them, then it will be possible to wipe out these reinforcements as well. The key to all this lies in striving to capture Chinchow in about a week.

3. Decide on the disposition of your troops for checking the enemy reinforcements according to your progress in attacking Chinchow and their progress in advancing both from the east and from the west. In case the enemy reinforcements from Shenyang advance rather slowly (as may happen if, during your attack on Chinchow, the enemy besieged in Changchun breaks out but is caught and crushed by our 12th Column and other forces, in which case the enemy reinforcements from Shenyang may be so bewildered as to advance rather slowly or halt or turn back to rescue the Changchun forces) while the enemy reinforcements from Hulutao and Chinhsi advance rather quickly, you should be ready to throw in your general reserves to help the 4th and 11th Columns wipe out part of the latter reinforcements and, first of all, to check their advance. If the enemy reinforcements from Hulu-

tao and Chinhsi are being tied down and checked by our 4th and 11th Columns and other forces and therefore advance rather slowly or halt, if the enemy forces in Changchun do not break out, if the enemy reinforcements from Shenyang advance rather quickly, and if most of the Chinchow enemy forces have been wiped out and the capture of the city is imminent, then you should let the enemy forces from Shenyang advance deep into the area north of the Taling River, so that you can make a timely shift of your forces to encircle them and wipe them out at your convenience.

4. You must centre your attention on the operations in Chinchow and strive to capture this city as quickly as possible. Even if none of the other objectives is attained and Chinchow alone is captured, you will have won the initiative, which in itself will be a great victory. It is hoped that you will give due attention to all the above points. Especially during the first few days of the battle for Chinchow, the enemy reinforcements from both the east and the west will not make any major moves, and you should concentrate all your energies on the operations on the Chinchow front.

NOTES

[1] The Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was a gigantic campaign fought by the Northeast People's Liberation Army in the western part of Liaoning Province and in the Shenyang-Changchun area between September 12 and November 2, 1948. On the eve of the campaign, the total strength of the Kuomintang forces in northeastern China consisted of 4 armies, made up of 14 corps, or 44 divisions. These forces had shortened their lines and dug themselves in at three sectors isolated from each other, Changchun, Shenyang and Chinchow. With the aim of completely wiping out the enemy troops in the Northeast and quickly liberating the whole of the Northeast, the People's Liberation Army in this region, supported by the broad masses of the local people, began the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign in September 1948 with a main force of 12 columns, 1 artillery column and regional armed forces, altogether totalling 53 divisions or over 700,000 men. Chinchow, on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, was the strategic link between northeastern and northern China. The enemy forces garrisoning the Chinchow sector consisted of 8 divisions, with more than 100,000 men under Fan Han-chieh, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang's Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters. The capture of Chinchow was the key to the success of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign. Acting on the directives of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Northeast People's Liberation Army used 1 column and 7 independent divisions to continue the siege operations against Changchun; 6 columns, 1 artillery column and 1 tank battalion to surround and attack Chinchow; and 2 columns, placed in the Tashan-Kaochiao sector southwest of Chinchow, along with 3 columns in the Heishan-Tahushan-Changwu sector

to intercept any reinforcements the enemy might send from Chinhsi and Hulutao and from Shenyang to relieve Chinchow. The fighting in the Chinchow area started on September 12. Just as our army was mopping up the enemy in the outskirts of Chinchow after taking Ihsien, Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly flew to the Northeast to take personal charge of the operations and urgently summoned 5 enemy divisions from the Northern China "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway and 2 divisions from Shantung Province to join the 4 divisions in Chinhsi, all these 11 divisions began a furious attack on our positions at Tashan on October 10 but could not break through. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang 9th Army under Liao Yao-hsiang, with 11 divisions and 3 cavalry brigades, which had sallied out from Shenyang to rescue Chinchow, was intercepted by our army northeast of Heishan and Tahushan. Our army began the assault on Chinchow on October 14 and, after thirty-one hours of fierce fighting, completely wiped out the defending enemy forces, capturing Fan Han-chieh, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, Lu Chun-chuan, Commander of the 6th Army, and more than 100,000 men under their command. The liberation of Chinchow impelled part of the enemy forces at Changchun to revolt against the Kuomintang and the rest to surrender. The complete collapse of the Kuomintang troops in the Northeast then became a foregone conclusion. But Chiang Kai-shek, still dreaming of recapturing Chinchow and of reopening the line of communications between northeastern and northern China, gave strict orders to the army under Liao Yao-hsiang to continue its advance towards Chinchow. After taking Chinchow, the People's Liberation Army immediately swung back to the northeast and closed in on Liao's army from the north and south of Heishan and Tahushan. On October 26 the People's Liberation Army succeeded in surrounding the enemy in the Heishan-Tahushan-Hsinmin sector and, after stiff fighting lasting two days and one night, completely wiped them out, capturing army commander Liao Yao-hsiang, corps commanders Li Tao, Pai Feng-wu and Cheng Ting-chi, and more than 100,000 men. Our army vigorously followed up this victory and liberated Shenyang and Yingkow on November 2, wiping out over 149,000 enemy troops. The whole of the Northeast was thus liberated. A total of more than 470,000 enemy troops were wiped out in the campaign.

[2] See "A Circular on the Situation", Note 7, p. 226 of this volume.

[3] On November 1, 1948, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China classified all troops in the big strategic areas into field, regional and guerrilla forces in accordance with decisions made at the September meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. The field forces were organized into field armies. A field army was composed of armies, an army of corps (originally called columns), a corps of divisions, and a division of regiments. In accordance with their locations, the field armies were designated the Northwest Field Army, Central Plains Field Army, Eastern China Field Army, Northeast Field Army and Northern China Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The number of armies, corps and divisions in each field army differed according to the concrete conditions in each big strategic area. Later, the Northwest Field Army was renamed the First Field Army, comprising 2 armies; the Central Plains Field Army was renamed the Second Field Army, comprising 3 armies; the Eastern China Field Army was renamed the Third Field Army, comprising 4 armies; and the Northeast Field Army was renamed the Fourth Field Army, comprising 4 armies. The 3 armies making up the Northern China Field Army were placed under the direct command of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

ON STRENGTHENING THE PARTY COMMITTEE SYSTEM*

September 20, 1948

The Party committee system is an important Party institution for ensuring collective leadership and preventing any individual from monopolizing the conduct of affairs. It has recently been found that in some (of course not all) leading bodies it is the habitual practice for one individual to monopolize the conduct of affairs and decide important problems. Solutions to important problems are decided not by Party committee meetings but by one individual, and membership in the Party committee has become nominal. Differences of opinion among committee members cannot be resolved and are left unresolved for a long time. Members of the Party committee maintain only formal, not real, unity among themselves. This situation must be changed. From now on, a sound system of Party committee meetings must be instituted in all leading bodies, from the bureaus of the Central Committee to the prefectural Party committees; from the Party committees of the fronts to the Party committees of brigades and military areas (sub-commissions of the Revolutionary Military Commission or leading groups); and the leading Party members' groups in government bodies, people's organizations, the news agency and the newspaper offices. All important problems (of course, not the unimportant, trivial problems, or problems whose solutions have already been decided after discussion at meetings and need only be carried out) must be submitted to the committee for discussion, and the committee members present should express their views fully and reach definite decisions which should then be carried out by the members concerned. The same procedure should be followed by Party committees below the prefectural and brigade levels. In the higher leading bodies there should also be meetings of the leading cadres in the departments (for example, the propaganda department and the organizational department), commissions (for example, the labour, women's and youth commissions), schools (for example, Party schools) and offices (for example, the research offices). Of course, we must see to it that the meetings are not too long or too frequent and they must not get bogged down in discussion of petty matters lest the work be hindered. On important problems which are complicated and on which opinions differ, there must, in addition, be personal consultations before the meeting to enable the members to think things over, lest decisions by the meeting become a mere formality or no decision can be reached. Party committee meetings must be divided into two categories, standing committee meetings and plenary sessions, and the two should not be confused. Furthermore, we must take care that neither collective leadership nor personal responsibility is overemphasized to the neglect of the other. In the army, the person in command has the right to make emergency decisions during battle and when circumstances require.

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* This decision was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

ON THE SEPTEMBER MEETING — CIRCULAR OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA*

October 10, 1948

1. In September 1948 the Central Committee convened a meeting of the Political Bureau, attended by seven members of the Political Bureau, fourteen members and alternate members of the Central Committee and ten important functionaries, including principal leading comrades in the Party and army in northern China, eastern China, the Central Plains and northwestern China. This meeting convened by the Central Committee had the largest attendance of any since the Japanese surrender. The meeting examined the work of the past period and set the tasks for the period ahead.

2. Since the Party's Seventh National Congress in April 1945, the Central Committee and the leading cadres of the whole Party have displayed even greater unity than during the War of Resistance Against Japan. This unity has enabled our Party to cope with many important events at home and abroad in the three years since the Japanese surrender; and in the course of these events our Party has pushed the Chinese revolution a big step forward, shattered the political influence of U.S. imperialism among the broad masses of the Chinese people, combated the new betrayal by the Kuomintang,[1] repulsed its military attacks and enabled the People's Liberation Army to shift from the defensive to the offensive.

In the last two years of fighting, from July 1946 to June 1948, the People's Liberation Army has wiped out 2,640,000 enemy troops, including 1,630,000 captured. The main war booty of the two years amounts to nearly 900,000 rifles, over 64,000 heavy and light machine-guns, 8,000 pieces of light artillery, 5,000 pieces of infantry artillery and 1,100 heavy mountain and field guns. In these two years the People's Liberation Army has grown from 1,200,000 men to 2,800,000. Our regular troops have increased from 118 brigades to 176, that is, from 610,000 men to 1,490,000. The Liberated Areas now cover 2,350,000 square kilometres, or 24.5 per cent of China's total area of 9,597,000 square kilometres; their population is 168 million, or 35.3 per cent of China's total of 475 million; and they have 586 large, medium and small cities, from county towns up, or 29 per cent of China's total of 2,009 such cities.

Because our Party has firmly led the peasants in carrying out the reform of the land system, the land problem has been thoroughly solved in areas having about 100 million people, and the land of the landlord class and of the old-type rich peasants has been more or less equally distributed among the rural population and, first of all, among the poor peasants and farm labourers.

Our Party membership has increased from 1,210,000 in May 1945 to 3,000,000 at present. (In 1927, before the Kuomintang betrayal of the revolution, it was 50,000; after the Kuomintang betrayal of that year, it dropped to about 10,000; in 1934, as a result of the successful development of the agrarian revolution, it rose to 300,000; in 1937, owing to the defeat of the revolution in the south,[2] it dropped again to about 40,000; in 1945, because of the successful development of the War of Resistance Against Japan, it rose to 1,210,000; and now, because of the successful development of the anti-Chiang Kai-shek war and the agrarian revolution, it has reached 3,000,000.) On the one hand, the Party has in the past year basically overcome, and is continuing to overcome, some unhealthy phenomena which existed to a certain degree in its ranks; these were impurities in class composition (landlord and rich peasant elements), impurities in ideology (landlord and rich peasant ideology) and impurities in style of work (bureaucracy and commandism). On the other hand, the Party has in the past year overcome, and is continuing to overcome, some "Left" mistakes which accompanied the large-scale mobilization of the peasant masses in the struggles to solve the land problem; these were the partial but fairly numerous encroachments on the interests of the middle peasants, the

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* This inner-Party circular was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The September 1948 meeting was held in Hsipaipo Village, Pingshan County, Hopei Province. This meeting convened by the Central Committee had the largest attendance of any since the Japanese surrender. Previously it had not been possible to hold such large meetings, because the great majority of Central Committee members were in various Liberated Areas directing the tense War of Liberation and communications were extremely difficult.

damage done to some private industrial and commercial enterprises and the overstepping in some places of certain lines of demarcation in the policy for suppressing counter-revolutionaries. Through the great, fierce revolutionary struggles of the past three years, and especially of the past year, and the conscientious correction of our own mistakes, the whole Party has made a big step forward in political maturity.

The Party's work in the Kuomintang areas has been crowned with tremendous success. This can be seen from the fact that in the big cities we have won over to the side of our Party the broad masses of workers, students, teachers, professors, cultural workers, ordinary residents and national capitalists as well as all the democratic parties and people's organizations, and have thus resisted Kuomintang oppression and completely isolated the Kuomintang. In several large areas in the south (the Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi, the Hunan-Kwangtung-Kiangsi, the Kwangtung-Kwangsi and the Kwangsi-Yunnan border areas, southern Yunnan, the Anhwei-Chekiang-Kiangsi border area and eastern and southern Chekiang), bases for guerrilla warfare have been established, and their guerrilla forces have grown to more than 30,000.

During the past two years and especially last year, we have carried out an orderly, well-led democratic movement in the People's Liberation Army, with all fighters and commanders taking part. In this movement we have unfolded self-criticism, have overcome and are continuing to overcome bureaucracy in the army and have restored the Party committee system at various levels of the army and the soldiers' committee system in the companies, both of which produced good results from 1927 to 1932 but were later abolished. All this has greatly heightened the political enthusiasm and consciousness of commanders and fighters, strengthened their combat effectiveness and discipline and helped us to absorb some 800,000 captured Kuomintang soldiers and change them into liberated fighters[3] who have turned their guns against the Kuomintang. During the past two years, in the Liberated Areas, we have mobilized some 1,600,000 of the peasants who obtained land to join the People's Liberation Army.

We already have quite a number of railways, mines and industries, and our Party is learning on a large scale how to manage industry and carry on trade. In the past two years our war industries have grown considerably. But they are not yet adequate to meet the needs of the war. We lack some important raw materials and machines and, generally speaking, still cannot make steel.

In areas in northern China with a population of 44 million we have set up a unified people's government in which our Party co-operates with non-Party democrats. In order to facilitate support to the front, we have decided to entrust this government with the task of unifying the work of leading and administering the economy, finance, trade, banking, communications and war industries in three regions, northern China, eastern China (with a population of 43 million) and the Northwest (with a population of 7 million), and we are prepared in the near future to extend the unification of this work to two additional regions, the Northeast and the Central Plains.

3. In the light of our successes in the past two years' fighting and of the general situation as between the enemy and ourselves, the meeting convened by the Central Committee considered it fully possible to build a People's Liberation Army of five million in a period of about five years (beginning from July 1946), to wipe out a total of some 500 brigades (divisions) of the enemy's regular forces (an average of about 100 brigades a year), to wipe out a total of some 7,500,000 men of his regular and irregular forces and of the special arms (an average of about 1,500,000 men a year) and to overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang completely.

The military strength of the Kuomintang was 4,300,000 men in July 1946. In the past two years, 3,090,000 of its men have either been wiped out or have deserted, and 2,440,000 have been recruited. Its present strength is 3,650,000 men. It is estimated that in the coming three years the Kuomintang may still be able to recruit 3,000,000 men and that some 4,500,000 will probably be wiped out or desert. Thus, as a result of five years' fighting, the remaining military strength of the Kuomintang will probably be only some 2,000,000. Our army now has 2,800,000 men. In the coming three years we plan to admit into our forces 1,700,000 captured soldiers (estimated at 60 per cent of the total we shall capture) and to mobilize 2,000,000 peasants to join the army. Allowing for depletion, our army, as a result of five years' fighting, will probably approach 5,000,000 men. If five years' fighting brings these results, then it may be said that we have overthrown the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang completely.

To fulfil this task, we must wipe out each year about 100 brigades (divisions) of the enemy's regular forces, making a total of about 500 brigades (divisions) in five years. This is the key to the solution of all problems. In view of the fact that the enemy's regular forces we wiped out amounted to 97 brigades (divisions) in the first year and to 94 brigades (divisions) in the second year, our targets can be fulfilled and even overfulfilled. Of the Kuomintang's existing military strength totalling 3,650,000 men, 70 per cent are at the fronts (north of the line of the Yangtse River and the Pashan Mountains, east of the line of Lanchow and the Holan Mountains and south of the Chengteh-Changchun line); only about 30 per cent are in the rear (including those south of the line of the Yangtse River and the Pashan Mountains and those west of the line of Lanchow and the Holan Mountains). Of all the existing Kuomintang regular forces, which consist of 285 brigades or 1,980,000 men, 249 brigades or 1,742,000 men are at the fronts (99 brigades or 694,000 men on the northern front, and 150 brigades or 1,048,000 men on the southern front). Only 36 brigades or 238,000 men are in the rear, and most of them are newly formed troops of low combat effectiveness. Therefore, the Central Committee has decided that during the third year the whole of the People's Liberation Army will continue to operate north of the Yangtse River and in northern China and the Northeast. To accomplish the task of wiping out the enemy, it is necessary to utilize large numbers of captured soldiers in addition to mobilizing people in the Liberated Areas, in a planned and prudent way, to join the army.

4. Because our Party and our army were long in a position in which we were cut apart by the enemy, were waging guerrilla warfare and were in the rural areas, we allowed very considerable autonomy to the leading organs of the Party and army in the different areas. This enabled the Party organizations and armed forces to bring their initiative and enthusiasm into play and to come through long periods of grave difficulties, but at the same time it gave rise to certain phenomena of indiscipline and anarchy, localism and guerrilla-ism, which were harmful to the cause of the revolution. The present situation demands that our Party should do its utmost to overcome these phenomena of indiscipline and anarchy, localism and guerrilla-ism and centralize all the powers that can and must be concentrated in the hands of the Central Committee and its agencies, so as to bring about the transition in the form of the war from guerrilla to regular warfare. In the past two years both the army and its operations have become more regular in character, but this is not enough and in the third year another big step forward must be made. For this purpose, we must do everything possible to repair and operate modern means of communications, such as railways, highway transport and steamships, to strengthen the administration of cities and industry and to shift the

centre of gravity of our Party work step by step from the rural areas to the cities.

5. The task of seizing political power throughout the country demands that our Party should quickly and systematically train large numbers of cadres to administer military, political, economic, Party, cultural and educational affairs. In the third year of the war, we must prepare thirty to forty thousand cadres of lower, middle and higher ranks, so that in the fourth year when the army advances they can march with it and bring orderly administration to newly liberated areas with a population of some 50 to 100 million. China's territory is very large, her population is very numerous, and the revolutionary war is developing very rapidly; but our supply of cadres is very inadequate — this is a very great difficulty. In preparing cadres during the third year, while we should rely on the old Liberated Areas to supply the greater part, we must also pay attention to enrolling cadres from the big cities controlled by the Kuomintang. In the big cities in Kuomintang areas there are many workers and intellectuals who can take part in our work and who have, generally speaking, a higher cultural level than the workers and peasants in the old Liberated Areas. We should make use of large numbers of working personnel from the Kuomintang's economic, financial, cultural and educational institutions, excluding the reactionary elements. School education in the Liberated Areas must be restored and developed.

6. The slogan of convening a political consultative conference[4] has rallied around our Party all democratic parties and people's organizations and all democrats without party affiliation in the Kuomintang areas. We are arranging for representatives of these parties and organizations to come to the Liberated Areas and are preparing to convene a conference in 1949 of the representatives of all China's democratic parties, people's organizations and democrats without party affiliation, in order to establish the provisional central government of the People's Republic of China.

7. The restoration and development of industrial and agricultural production in the Liberated Areas is an important link in supporting the war and in defeating the Kuomintang reactionaries. The meeting convened by the Central Committee held that, on the one hand, the People's Liberation Army must develop its victorious offensive into the Kuomintang areas and obtain from the Kuomintang forces and areas the large supply of manpower and material resources needed for the war; and that, on the other hand, in the old Liberated Areas

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every effort must be made to restore and develop industrial and agricultural production so as to raise their level to some extent. Only if these two tasks are fulfilled will it be possible to ensure the overthrow of the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang; otherwise, that will not be possible.

We will have many difficulties in carrying out these two tasks. When our armies enter the Kuomintang areas in force to make war with no rear area or with no adequate rear area, they will have to get all or most of their military supplies themselves on the spot. The restoration and development of industrial and agricultural production requires good organizational work, good leadership of markets in the Liberated Areas, control of trade with outside areas, the overcoming of shortages of certain machinery and raw materials and, first of all, the solution of the problems of communications, transport and the repair of railways, highways and waterways. At present there are great difficulties in the economic and financial situation in the Liberated Areas. Although our difficulties are much smaller than those of the Kuomintang, they do exist. The main ones are that our material resources and manpower are inadequate for the needs of the war and that inflation has developed to a considerable degree. And one cause of these difficulties is the inadequacy of our organizational work, especially in the financial and economic sphere. We believe these difficulties can be overcome and must be overcome. In the struggle to do so, we must fight waste and practise economy. At the front we must see to it that everything captured is handed in, must cherish our effective strength, take good care of weapons, use ammunition sparingly and protect captured soldiers. In the rear we must reduce government expenses, reduce the mobilization of manpower and draught animals not urgently needed, reduce time taken by meetings, observe agricultural seasons so that farm work is done on time, reduce costs in industrial production, raise labour productivity, mobilize the whole Party to learn to manage industrial and agricultural production and carry on trade, make the greatest possible efforts to organize the economies of the Liberated Areas properly, overcome disorder in the markets and wage the necessary struggles against all speculators and manipulators. By getting down to all these jobs, we can certainly overcome the difficulties facing us.

8. Raising the cadres' theoretical level and broadening inner-arty democracy are important links in the fulfilment of the above tasks. The meeting convened by the Central Committee adopted a

special decision on broadening inner-Party democracy.[5] It also discussed the problem of raising the cadres' theoretical level and drew the attention of all comrades present to the problem.

9. The Sixth National Labour Congress has been successfully held and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions[6] has been founded. In the first half of next year a National Women's Congress will be convened to form the All-China Federation of Democratic Women,[7] a National Youth Congress will be convened to form the All-China Youth Federation,[8] and the New Democratic Youth League will be established.[9]

NOTES

[1] The first betrayal by the Kuomintang was in 1927. The betrayal here mentioned is the all-out counter-revolutionary civil war launched by the Kuomintang after the conclusion of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

[2] The defeat of the revolution in the south was the defeat of the Chinese Red Army's fifth campaign against the Kuomintang's "encirclement and suppression" and the withdrawal of our main force from the southern revolutionary bases in 1934; this was the consequence of the third "Left" deviationist line represented in the Party by Wang Ming.

[3] This refers to Kuomintang soldiers who were liberated through capture by the People's Liberation Army and joined its ranks after having been educated.

[4] The slogan of convening a political consultative conference was put forward by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. At his suggestion, one of the "May Day Slogans" for 1948 issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China stated, "All democratic parties, people's organizations and public personages should quickly call a political consultative conference to discuss and carry out the convening of a people's congress and the formation of a democratic coalition government." This slogan won an immediate warm response from the democratic parties, people's organizations and democrats without party affiliation in the Kuomintang areas. The political consultative conference was later renamed the New Political Consultative Conference and finally the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. See "Address to the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference", Note 1, pp. 408-09 of this volume.

[5] This refers to "The Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Convening of Congresses and Conferences of the Party at Various Levels". The resolution made the following provisions for the broadening and building of regular democratic life within the Party: Party committees at various levels should regularly convene Party congresses and conferences at their respective levels, as required by the Party Constitution. These congresses and conferences should be vested with all the powers stipulated in the Party Constitution, and there must be no infringement. Adequate preparations should be made before meetings. Inner-Party controversies should be reported promptly and truthfully to the higher levels and important controversies must be reported to the Central Committee.

The resolution also provided for strengthening the Party committee system and required that the rule that important questions must be decided collectively after discussion by the Party committee should be enforced by Party committees at all levels, that no decisions on important matters should be made by an individual and that neither collective leadership nor individual responsibility should be overemphasized to the neglect of the other.

[6] The Sixth National Labour Congress was held in Harbin in August 1948. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the unified national organization of the Chinese working class, was re-established at the congress. The previous five National Labour Congresses were held in 1922, 1925, 1926, 1927 and 1929 respectively.

[7] The First National Women's Congress was held in March 1949 in Peiping. The All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the leading body for the organizations of the masses of women throughout the country, was founded at this congress. It was later renamed the National Women's Federation of the People's Republic of China.

[8] The first session of the National Youth Congress was held in May 1949 in Peiping. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth was founded at this session. It was later renamed the All-China Youth Federation.

[9] The New Democratic Youth League was founded in January 1949 in accordance with a decision by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Its First National Congress was held in Peiping in April 1949. It was renamed the Communist Youth League at its Third National Congress in May 1957.

THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE HUAI-HAI CAMPAIGN*

October 11, 1948

Here are a few points for your consideration concerning the dispositions for the Huai-Hai campaign.[1]

1. In the first stage of this campaign, the central task is to concentrate forces to wipe out Huang Po-tao's army, effect a breakthrough in the centre and capture Hsinanchen, the Grand Canal Railway Station, Tsaopachi, Yihsien, Tsaochuang, Lincheng, Hanchuang, Shuyang, Pihsien, Tancheng, Taierhchuang and Linyi. To achieve these objectives, you should use two columns to wipe out each enemy division, that is to say, use six or seven columns to cut up and wipe out the enemy's 25th, 63rd and 64th Divisions. Use five or six columns to hold off and attack enemy reinforcements. Use one or two columns to annihilate the one brigade under Li Mi at Lincheng and Hanchuang and strive to capture those two towns in order to menace Hsuchow from the north so that the two armies under Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi will not dare move east in full strength as reinforcements. Use one column plus regional formation in southwestern Shantung to make a flank attack on the Hsuchow-Shangchiu section of the railway in order to tie down a portion of Chiu Ching-chuan's army (as three enemy divisions under Sun Yuan-liang are about to move east, it is hoped that Liu Po-cheng, Chen Yi and Teng Hsiao-ping will dispose their troops at once to attack the Chengchow-Hsuchow line and so tie down Sun Yuan-liang's army). Use one or two columns to operate in the Suchien-Suining-Lingpi area to hold down Li Mi's army. These dispositions mean that before the objective of annihilating the three divisions of Huang Po-tao's army can be achieved, more than half our total force has to be employed against the two armies under Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi to tie down, check and destroy part of them. The dispositions should, by and large, be similar to those of last

September for capturing Tsinan and attacking the enemy's reinforcements;[2] otherwise it will be impossible to achieve the objective of annihilating the three divisions of Huang Po-tao's army. You must strive to conclude the first stage two to three weeks after the start of the campaign.

2. In the second stage, use about five columns to attack and wipe out the enemy in Haichow, Hsinpu, Lienyunkang and Kuanyun and capture these towns. It is calculated that by then the enemy's 54th and 32nd Divisions will very likely have been transported by sea from Tsingtao to the Haichow-Hsinpu-Lienyunkang area.[3] Altogether three enemy divisions will be in that area, including the one division already there; therefore we must use five columns to attack them and employ the remaining forces (our main strength) to tie down the two armies under Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi, again on the principle underlying the dispositions made in September for capturing Tsinan and attacking the enemy's reinforcements. You must strive to conclude this stage also in two to three weeks.

3. In the third stage, it may be assumed that the battle will be fought around Huaiyin and Huai-an. By that time the enemy will have increased his strength by about one division (the Reorganized 8th Division in Yentai is being shipped south); therefore we must be prepared again to use about five columns as the attacking force, while using the rest of our main force to strike at and hold down the enemy's reinforcements. This stage will also take about two to three weeks.

These three stages will take about a month and a half to two months.

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* This telegram, addressed to the Eastern China and Central Plains Field Armies and the Bureaus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in those two areas, was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Party's Central Committee. The Huai-Hai campaign was one of the three greatest campaigns of decisive significance in the Chinese People's War of Liberation. The campaign was fought jointly by the Eastern China and Central Plains Field Armies and the regional troops of the eastern China and Central Plains areas. In this campaign over 555,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out. The concept of operations set forth by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in this telegram led to complete success; in fact, the campaign proceeded more smoothly than expected, and the victory was therefore quicker and greater. After this campaign, Nanking, the capital of the reactionary Kuomintang government, became subject to direct threat by the People's Liberation Army. The Huai-Hai campaign was concluded on January 10, 1949, and on January 21 Chiang Kai-shek announced his "retirement"; after that, the reactionary Kuomintang ruling clique in Nanking fell apart.

4. You are to complete the Huai-Hai campaign in two months, November and December. Rest and consolidate your forces next January. From March to July you will be fighting in co-ordination with Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping to drive the enemy to points along the Yangtse River, where he will dig in. By autumn your main force will probably be fighting to cross the Yangtse.

NOTES

[1] The Huai-Hai campaign was a campaign of decisive importance fought by the People's Liberation Army over a large territory in Kiangsu, Shantung, Anhwei and Honan Provinces, centring on Hsuchow, and extending as far as Haichow in the east Shangchiu in the west, Lincheng (now renamed Hsuehcheng) in the north and the Huai River in the south. The Kuomintang forces massed in this theatre of war consisted of 5 armies and the troops of three Pacification Zones — the 4 armies and the troops of three Pacification Zones under Liu Chih and Tu Yu-ming (respectively Commander and Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters at Hsuchow) and the army under Huang Wei, which was later dispatched there from central China as reinforcements. On the side of the People's Liberation Army, a force more than 600,000 strong took part in the campaign — it included 16 columns from the Eastern China Field Army, 7 columns from the Central Plains Field Army and regional armed forces from the Eastern China Military Area, the Central Plains Military Area and the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Military Area (then a part of the Northern China Military Area). The campaign lasted sixty-five days, from November 6, 1948 to January 10, 1949; 22 corps, or 56 divisions, of the Kuomintang's crack forces, comprising 555,000 men, were completely wiped out (including 4½ divisions which revolted and came over), and 2 armies under Liu Ju-ming and Li Yen-nien (reinforcements from Nanking) were repulsed. As a result of the campaign, those parts of the eastern China and Central Plains areas north of the Yangtse River were almost entirely liberated. The campaign took place in three stages. During the first stage, November 6-22, the Eastern China Field Army, in co-ordination with the Central Plains Field Army, surrounded and wiped out the army under Huang Po-tao in the Hsinanchen-Nienchuang sector east of Hsuchow, killing Huang Po-tao and liberating large territories on both sides of the Lunghai Railway east of Nienchuang, on both sides of the Hsuchow-Pengpu section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, and to the west and north of Hsuchow. In the Taierhchuang-Tsaochuang sector, 3½ divisions of the Kuomintang 3rd Pacification Zone, totalling over 23,000 men, revolted and came over to us. During the second stage, from November 23 to December 15, the Central Plains Field Army, in co-ordination with the main force of the Eastern China Field Army, surrounded and wiped out the army under Huang Wei at and around Shuangtuichi, southwest of Suhsien, capturing Huang Wei and Wu Shao-chou, the commander and deputy commander of the army; 1 division of this army revolted and came over to us. At the same time, our forces wiped out the army under Sun Yuan-liang which was fleeing west from Hsuchow. Only Sun Yuan-liang managed to escape. During the third stage, from January 6 to 10, 1949, the Eastern China Field Army,

in co-ordination with the Central Plains Field Army, surrounded and annihilated in the Chinglungchi-Chenkuanchuang sector, northeast of Yungcheng, 2 Kuomintang armies which were fleeing westward from Hsuchow and were commanded respectively by Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi, under the personal command of Tu Yu-ming. Tu Yu-ming was captured, Chiu Ching-chuan was killed and Li Mi barely escaped. This marked the successful end of the great Huai-Hai campaign.

[2] "Capturing Tsinan and attacking the enemy's reinforcements" refers to the tactics employed by the People's Liberation Army during the Tsinan campaign in the middle of September 1948. Tsinan, a strategic position of the Kuomintang in Shantung Province, was garrisoned by over 110,000 men of the Kuomintang 2nd Pacification Zone. In addition, 23 brigades of the Kuomintang's main forces, with some 170,000 men, which were disposed in the Hsuchow area, were ready to move north to relieve Tsinan. Our Eastern China Field Army formed a group of 7 columns to assault the city and another group of 8 columns to strike at the enemy's reinforcements. The onslaught against Tsinan started on the evening of September 16, 1948. On September 24, after eight days and nights of continuous fighting, the enemy garrison was completely wiped out (1 corps revolted and came over to us), and Wang Yao-wu, Commander of the Kuomintang 2nd Pacification Zone, was captured. Our forces took Tsinan so rapidly that the enemy at Hsuchow did not dare to go north to its rescue.

[3] In fact, these 2 enemy divisions did not dare to come.

REVOLUTIONARY FORCES OF THE WORLD UNITE, FIGHT AGAINST IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!*

November 1948

At this time, when the awakened working class and all genuine revolutionaries of the world are jubilantly celebrating the thirty-first anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution of the Soviet Union, I recall a well-known article by Stalin, written in 1918 on the first anniversary of that revolution. In that article Stalin said:

> The great world-wide significance of the October Revolution chiefly consists in the fact that:
>
> 1) It has widened the scope of the national question and converted it from the particular question of combating national oppression in Europe into the general question of emancipating the oppressed peoples, colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism;
>
> 2) It has opened up wide possibilities for their emancipation and the right paths towards it, has thereby greatly facilitated the cause of the emancipation of the oppressed peoples of the West and the East, and has drawn them into the common current of the victorious struggle against imperialism;
>
> 3) *It has thereby erected a bridge between the socialist West and the enslaved East*, having created a new front of revolutions against world imperialism, extending from the proletarians of the West, through the Russian revolution, to the oppressed peoples of the East.[1]

History has developed in the direction pointed out by Stalin. The October Revolution has opened up wide possibilities for the emancipation of the peoples of the world and opened up the realistic paths towards it; it has created a new front of revolutions against world imperialism, extending from the proletarians of the West, through the Russian revolution, to the oppressed peoples of the East. This front of revolutions has been created and developed under the brilliant guidance of Lenin and, after Lenin's death, of Stalin.

If there is to be revolution, there must be a revolutionary party. Without a revolutionary party, without a party built on the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and in the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary style, it is impossible to lead the working class and the broad masses of the people to defeat imperialism and its running dogs. In the more than one hundred years since the birth of Marxism, it was only through the example of the Russian Bolsheviks in leading the October Revolution, in leading socialist construction and in defeating fascist aggression that revolutionary parties of a new type were formed and developed in the world. With the birth of revolutionary parties of this type, the face of the world revolution has changed. The change has been so great that transformations utterly inconceivable to people of the older generation have come into being amid fire and thunder. The Communist Party of China is a party built and developed on the model of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. With the birth of the Communist Party of China, the face of the Chinese revolution took on an altogether new aspect. Is this fact not clear enough?

The world revolutionary united front, with the Soviet Union at its head, defeated fascist Germany, Italy and Japan. This was a result of the October Revolution. If there had been no October Revolution, if there had been no Communist Party of the Soviet Union, no Soviet Union and no anti-imperialist revolutionary united front in the West and in the East led by the Soviet Union, could one conceive of victory over fascist Germany, Italy, Japan and their running dogs? If the October Revolution opened up wide possibilities for the emancipation of the working class and the oppressed peoples of the world and opened up realistic paths towards it, then the victory of the anti-fascist Second World War has opened up still wider possibilities for the emancipation of the working class and the oppressed peoples of the world and has opened up still more realistic paths towards it. It will be a very great mistake to underestimate the significance of the victory of World War II.

Since the victory of World War II, U.S. imperialism and its running dogs in various countries have taken the place of fascist Germany,

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* This article was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in commemoration of the thirty-first anniversary of the October Revolution for the organ of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, *For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy*. It appeared in the 21st issue of the publication in 1948.

Italy and Japan and are frantically preparing a new world war and menacing the whole world; this reflects the utter decay of the capitalist world and its fear of imminent doom. This enemy still has strength; therefore, all the revolutionary forces of each country must unite, and the revolutionary forces of all countries must likewise unite, must form an anti-imperialist united front headed by the Soviet Union and follow correct policies; otherwise, victory will be impossible. This enemy has a weak and fragile foundation, he is disintegrating internally, he is alienated from the people, he is confronted with inextricable economic crises; therefore, he can be defeated. It will be a very great mistake to overestimate the enemy's strength and underestimate the strength of the revolutionary forces.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, tremendous victories have now been won in the great Chinese people's democratic revolution directed against the frenzied aggression of U.S. imperialism in China and against the traitorous, dictatorial and reactionary Kuomintang government that has been slaughtering the Chinese people by civil war. During the two years from July 1946 to June 1948, the People's Liberation Army led by the Communist Party of China beat back the attacks of 4,300,000 troops of the reactionary Kuomintang government and went over from the defensive to the offensive. During those two years of fighting (not including developments since July 1948), the People's Liberation Army captured and wiped out 2,640,000 Kuomintang troops. China's Liberated Areas now cover 2,350,000 square kilometres, or 24.5 per cent of the country's 9,597,000 square kilometres; they have a population of 168 million, or 35.3 per cent of the country's 475 million; and they contain 586 cities and towns, or 29 per cent of the 2,009 in the whole country. Because our Party has resolutely led the peasants to carry out the reform of the land system, the land problem has been thoroughly solved in areas with a population of about 100 million, and the land of the landlords and old-type rich peasants has been more or less equally distributed among the peasants, primarily among the poor peasants and farm labourers. The membership of the Communist Party of China has grown from 1,210,000 in 1945 to 3,000,000 today. The task of the Communist Party of China is to unite the revolutionary forces of the whole country to drive out the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism, overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang and establish a united, democratic people's republic. We know that there are still many difficulties ahead. But we are not afraid of them. We believe that difficulties must be and can be overcome.

The radiance of the October Revolution shines upon us. The long-suffering Chinese people must win their liberation, and they firmly believe they can. Always isolated in the past, China's revolutionary struggle no longer feels isolated since the victory of the October Revolution. We enjoy the support of the Communist Parties and the working class of the world. This point was understood by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, forerunner of the Chinese revolution, who established the policy of alliance with the Soviet Union against imperialism. On his death-bed he wrote a letter to the Soviet Union as part of his testament. It is the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang of the Kuomintang that is betraying Sun Yat-sen's policy, standing on the side of the imperialist counter-revolutionary front and opposing the people of their own country. But before long, people will witness the complete destruction of the whole reactionary regime of the Kuomintang by the Chinese people. The Chinese people are brave, so is the Communist Party of China, and they are determined to liberate all China.

NOTES

[1] From "The October Revolution and the National Question", Section III, "The World-wide Significance of the October Revolution", J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1953, Vol. IV, pp. 169-70.

THE MOMENTOUS CHANGE IN CHINA'S MILITARY SITUATION*

November 14, 1948

The military situation in China has reached a new turning point and the balance of forces between the two sides in the war has undergone a fundamental change. The People's Liberation Army, long superior in quality, has now become superior in numbers as well. This is a sign that the victory of the Chinese revolution and the realization of peace in China are at hand.

At the end of the second year of the war, that is, at the end of June this year, the Kuomintang army still had a total of some 3,650,000 men. This was 650,000 less than the 4,300,000 men the Kuomintang had in July 1946 when it started the country-wide civil war. The Kuomintang recruited about 2,440,000 men during the two years of war, which is the reason why the decrease was only 650,000, although in that period approximately 3,090,000 were wiped out or captured, or deserted (2,640,000 were wiped out or captured). Recently a sudden change took place. In the first four months of the third year of the war, from July 1 to November 2 when Shenyang was liberated, the Kuomintang army lost 1,000,000 men. Its replacements during these four months have not yet been ascertained; supposing it was able to recruit 300,000 men, then the net decrease would be 700,000. Thus the whole of the Kuomintang's armed forces — army, navy and air force, regulars and irregulars, combat troops and men in the rear-ervice establishments — are now only some 2,900,000. On the other hand, the People's Liberation Army, which had 1,200,000 men in June 1946, grew to 2,800,000 in June 1948 and has now increased to more than 3,000,000. Thus, the numerical superiority long enjoyed by the Kuomintang army has rapidly turned into inferiority. This is the result of heroic fighting by the People's Liberation Army during the past four months in all the war theatres of the country; it is especially the result of the Sui-Ki and Tsinan campaigns[1] on the southern front and of the Chinchow, Changchun, Liaohsi and Shenyang campaigns[2] on the northern front. Up to the end of June this year, the Kuomintang still had designations for 285 divisions because it had frantically incorporated its irregulars into its regular forces. In these four months, the battalions and larger units wiped out by the People's Liberation Army totalled 83 divisions, including 63 whole divisions.

Accordingly, the war will be much shorter than we originally estimated. The original estimate was that the reactionary Kuomintang government could be completely overthrown in about five years, beginning from July 1946. As we now see it, only another year or so may be needed to overthrow it completely. A longer time will be needed, however, to eliminate the reactionary forces in all parts of the country and complete the liberation of the people.

The enemy is collapsing rapidly, but the Communists, the People's Liberation Army and people of all walks of life throughout the country must continue to unite as one man and redouble their efforts; only thus can we finally and completely wipe out the reactionary forces and build a united, democratic people's republic in the whole country.

NOTES

[1] The Sui-Ki campaign, also known as the Eastern Honan campaign, was fought by the People's Liberation Army in the sector comprising Kaifeng, Suihsien and Kihsien. The campaign started on June 17, 1948. On June 22 our army captured Kaifeng. To save his critical military situation, Chiang Kai-shek went to the front, took personal command and mustered 3 armies under Chiu Ching-chuan, Ou Shou-nien and Huang Po-tao to start an attack on Kaifeng from several directions. Six columns of our Eastern China Field Army, 2 columns of our Central Plains Field Army and our Kwangtung-Kwangsi Column surrounded the armies under Ou Shou-nien and Huang Po-tao in the Suihsien-Kihsien sector and, after nine days and nights of fierce fighting (June 27-July 6), they wiped out 2 divisions, or 6 brigades, of Ou Shou-nien's army and a part of Huang Po-tao's army, a total of over 90,000 men. Ou Shou-nien, army commander, and Shen Cheng-nien, Commander of the Reorganized 75th Division, were captured. For the Tsinan campaign, see "The Concept of Operations for the Huai-Hai Campaign", Note 2, p. 282 of this volume.

[2] The Chinchow, Changchun, Liaohsi and Shenyang campaigns in northeastern China, taken together, were called the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign. See "The Concept of Operations for the Liaohsi-Shenyang Campaign", Note 1, pp. 265-66 of this volume.

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* This commentary was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Hsinhua News Agency. Here Comrade Mao Tse-tung, basing himself on the new situation, that is, the change in the relation of forces between the enemy and ourselves after the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign, made a new estimate of the time needed to win victory in the People's War of Liberation and pointed out that the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang could be overthrown in no more than a year from November 1948. Subsequent developments in China's military situation fully confirmed his prediction.

THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE PEIPING-TIENTSIN CAMPAIGN[1]*

December 11, 1948

1. The enemy forces in Changchiakou, Hsinpao-an and Huailai and in the entire area of Peiping, Tientsin, Tangku and Tangshan — except a few units, such as certain divisions of the 35th, 62nd and 94th Corps, which still have a fairly high combat effectiveness for the defence of fortified positions — have little offensive spirit; they are like birds startled by the mere twang of a bow-string. This is especially the case since you advanced south of the Great Wall. You should on no account overrate the enemy's combat effectiveness. Some of our comrades have suffered through overrating the enemy's combat effectiveness, but they have arrived at a correct understanding after being criticized. The enemy at both Changchiakou and Hsinpao-an is definitely encircled and will in all probability find it extremely difficult to break through and escape. About half the 16th Corps has been speedily wiped out. The enemy's 104th Corps at Huailai has hurriedly fled south and will probably be wiped out today or tomorrow. After that is done, you will be ready to dispatch the 4th Column from the southwest[2] to the northeast to cut the link between Nankow and Peiping. We think this may not be easy to accomplish; for, either the remnants of the 94th and 16th Corps will quickly withdraw to Peiping, or the 94th, 16th and 92nd Corps will concentrate in the Nankow-Changping-Shahochen region for joint defence. But this move by our 4th Column will directly menace the northwestern and northern suburbs of Peiping and tie down those enemy forces so that they dare not move. If they should dare to move further west to reinforce the 35th Corps, we could either directly cut off their retreat or launch a direct attack on Peiping; therefore they will probably not dare to move further west. The army in northern China commanded by Yang Teh-chih, Lo Jui-ching and Keng Piao is employing 9 divisions

to encircle 3 divisions of the enemy's 35th Corps; this is absolute superiority. They have proposed to wipe out these enemy divisions at an early date, but we intend to ask them not to attack for the time being so as to lure the enemy at Peiping and Tientsin and make it difficult for him to come to a decision to flee by sea. They have employed 2 columns to encircle the 35th Corps and 1 column to check the 104th Corps and have beaten back both these enemy forces.

2. We now agree to your sending the 5th Column immediately to the vicinity of Nankow to menace the enemy at Peiping, Nankow and Huaijou from the northeast. This column will remain there so that later (in about ten or fifteen days, that is, when the army in northern China commanded by Yang Teh-chih, Lo Jui-ching and Keng Piao has annihilated the 35th Corps) your 4th Column can be released for service in the east. Therefore, please order the 5th Column to continue its march west today.

3. The 3rd Column should on no account go to Nankow but, in accordance with our telegram of the 9th, should move to the region east of Peiping and south of Tunghsien to threaten Peiping from the east and, together with the 4th, 11th and 5th Columns, form an encirclement around Peiping.

4. But our real aim is not to encircle Peiping first but rather to encircle Tientsin, Tangku, Lutai and Tangshan first.

5. We estimate that your 10th, 9th, 6th and 8th Columns, your Artillery Column and your 7th Column will have assembled in the region around Yutien by about December 15. We propose that, in the few days between December 20 and 25, you move with lightning speed and employ the 6 columns — the 3rd (which is to march east from the eastern suburbs of Peiping), the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th — to encircle the enemy at Tientsin, Tangku, Lutai and Tangshan, provided that the enemy's situation at those points remains roughly the same as now. The method is to place 2 columns around Wuching — at Langfang, Hohsiwu and Yangtsun — and to use 5 columns as wedges to be driven

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* This was a telegram drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and addressed to Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan and other comrades. The Peiping-Tientsin campaign was the last of the three greatest campaigns of decisive significance in the Chinese People's War of Liberation. In this campaign, we wiped out or reorganized over 520,000 Kuomintang troops, liberated the important cities of Peiping, Tientsin and Changchiakou and concluded, in the main, the fighting for the liberation of northern China. The concept of operations for the campaign, set forth here by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, was fully realized in practice.

between enemy positions at Tientsin, Tangku, Lutai, Tangshan and Kuyeh and so cut off contacts between the enemy forces. All these columns should build two-way blocking positions to ensure that the enemy cannot escape. Then they should rest and consolidate their troops and, after recovering from fatigue, attack and wipe out some small enemy groups. In the meantime the 4th Column should move from northwest to east of Peiping. Before the 4th Column starts to move, the army in northern China commanded by Yang Teh-chih, Lo Jui-ching and Keng Piao should wipe out the enemy in Hsinpao-an. In the east, according to circumstances, every effort should be made to wipe out the enemy in Tangku first and control that seaport. If these two points, Tangku (the most important) and Hsinpao-an, are captured, you will have the initiative on the whole chessboard. The above dispositions constitute, in reality, the wholesale encirclement of the enemy in Changchiakou, Hsinpao-an, Nankow, Peiping, Huaijou, Shunyi, Tunghsien, Wanping (Chohsien and Lianghsiang have been captured), Fengtai, Tientsin, Tangku, Lutai, Tangshan and Kaiping.

6. This method is generally the same as that you used in the fighting along the line through Ihsien, Chinchow, Chinhsi, Hsingcheng, Suichung, Shanhaikuan and Luanhsien.[3]

7. In the two weeks beginning from today (December 11-25), the basic principle is to encircle without attacking (in the case of Changchiakou and Hsinpao-an) and, in some cases, to cut off without encircling (in the case of Peiping, Tientsin and Tungchow, to make only a strategic encirclement and cut the links between the enemy forces, but not to make a tactical encirclement) in order to wait for the completion of our dispositions and then wipe out the enemy forces one by one. In particular, you must not wipe out all the enemy forces at Changchiakou, Hsinpao-an and Nankow because that would compel the enemy east of Nankow to make a quick decision to bolt. Please make sure you understand this point.

8. In order not to prompt Chiang Kai-shek quickly to decide to ship his troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area south by sea, we are going to order Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping, Chen Yi and Su Yu, after they have wiped out Huang Wei's army, to spare the remainder of Tu Yu-ming's armies under Chiu Ching-chuan, Li Mi and Sun Yuan-liang (about half of which have already been destroyed) and for two weeks to make no dispositions for their final annihilation.

9. To prevent the enemy from fleeing towards Tsingtao, we are going to order our troops in Shantung to mass certain forces to control

a section of the Yellow River near Tsinan and to make preparations along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway.

10. There is little or no possibility that the enemy will flee towards Hsuchow, Chengchow, Sian or Suiyuan.

11. The main or the only concern is that the enemy might flee by sea. Therefore, in the coming two weeks the general method should be to encircle without attacking or to cut off without encircling.

12. This plan is beyond the enemy's range of expectation, and it will be very difficult for him to discern it before you complete your final dispositions. At present, the enemy is probably calculating that you will attack Peiping.

13. The enemy always underrates the energy of our army and overrates his own strength, though at the same time he is like a bird startled by the mere twang of a bow-string. The enemy at Peiping and Tientsin will never expect you to be able to complete the above dispositions by December 25.

14. In order to complete these dispositions by December 25, you should inspire your troops in the next two weeks to ignore fatigue, to have no fear of depletion of numbers and have no fear of cold and hunger; after these dispositions have been made, they can rest and consolidate and take their time in attacking.

15. The sequence of attacks will be roughly the following: first, the Tangku-Lutai sector; second, Hsinpao-an; third, the Tangshan sector; fourth, the Tientsin and Changchiakou sectors; and, lastly, the Peiping sector.

16. What are your views on this plan? What are its shortcomings? Are there any difficulties in its execution? Please consider all this and reply by telegraph.

NOTES

[1] The Peiping-Tientsin campaign, fought by the Northeast Field Army and two armies of the Northern China People's Liberation Army under the command of Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan, Nieh Jung-chen and other comrades, began early in December 1948, immediately after the victorious conclusion of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign in the Northeast. Acting upon Comrade Mao Tse-tung's instructions, the Northeast Field Army, immediately after it had victoriously fulfilled its task of liberating the whole Northeast, swept south of the Great Wall and joined the armies of the People's Liberation Army in northern China in co-ordinated actions to

encircle and wipe out the Kuomintang troops in northern China. Greatly alarmed by the victory of the People's Liberation Army in the Northeast, more than 600,000 Kuomintang troops under Fu Tso-yi, Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang's Northern China "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, hurriedly shortened their lines of defence with the intention of fleeing south by sea or west to Suiyuan Province. Our army, moving with lightning speed, cut apart the enemy forces and surrounded them separately at five strong-points — Peiping, Tientsin, Changchiakou, Hsinpao-an and Tangku — thus blocking their escape routes to the south and west. On December 22, the enemy's main force at Hsinpao-an (the headquarters of his 35th Corps and 2 divisions) was surrounded and wiped out. On the 24th, Changchiakou was taken and a corps headquarters and 7 divisions of the enemy's 11th Army, over 54,000 men in all, were wiped out. On January 14, 1949, our troops surrounding Tientsin launched a general offensive against the city after Chen Chang-chieh, commander of the enemy garrison, refused to surrender. The city was liberated after twenty-nine hours' fierce fighting, the enemy garrison of over 130,000 men was wiped out and Chen Chang-chieh was captured. As a result, more than 200,000 enemy troops garrisoning Peiping were tightly surrounded by our troops and their fate was sealed. Owing to the efforts we made to win it over, the enemy's Peiping garrison, commanded by General Fu Tso-yi, accepted peaceful reorganization. On January 31, our troops entered Peiping, the city was proclaimed peacefully liberated and the Peiping-Tientsin campaign came to a victorious close. During this campaign, with the exception of the enemy garrison of over 50,000 men in Tangku, which fled by sea, over 520,000 Kuomintang troops were put out of action and reorganized by our army. In September 1949 the Kuomintang troops in Suiyuan Province declared by telegram that they had revolted and come over to the people and that they would accept reorganization.

[2] This means the area southwest of Nankow.

[3] In September 1948, to prevent the enemy forces in Ihsien, Chinchow, Chinhsi Hsingcheng, Suichung, Shanhaikuan, Luanhsien and Changli, all points along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, from shortening their lines and concentrating, the Northeast Field Army, then operating along that railway, adopted the method of first using part of its troops to encircle and cut apart the enemy units at these points and then wiping them out one by one.

MESSAGE URGING TU YU-MING AND OTHERS TO SURRENDER*

December 17, 1948

General Tu Yu-ming, General Chiu Ching-chuan, General Li Mi and all corps, division and regiment commanders of the two armies under Generals Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi:

You are now at the end of your rope. Huang Wei's army was completely wiped out on the night of the 15th, Li Yen-nien's army has taken to its heels and fled south, and it is hopeless for you to think of joining them. Are you hoping to break through? How can you break through when the People's Liberation Army is all around? During the last few days you have tried to break through, but what came of it? Your planes and tanks, too, are useless. We have more planes and tanks than you, that is, artillery and explosives which people call our home-made planes and tanks. Aren't they ten times more formidable than your foreign-made planes and tanks? Your army under Sun Yuan-liang is finished, and more than half the men in your two remaining armies have been wounded or captured. You have brought many miscellaneous and idle personnel of various organizations and many young students from Hsuchow and forced them into your army, but how can these people fight? For more than ten days, you have been surrounded ring upon ring and received blow upon blow, and your position has shrunk greatly. You have such a tiny place, only a little more than ten *li* square, and so many people are crowded together that a single shell from us can kill a lot of you. Your wounded soldiers and the families who have followed the army are complaining to high heaven. Your soldiers and many of your officers have no stomach for any more fighting. You, as deputy commander-in-chief, as commanders of armies, corps, divisions and regiments, should understand and sympathize with the feelings of your subordinates and families, hold their lives dear, find a way out for them as early as possible and stop sending them to a senseless death.

Now that Huang Wei's army has been completely wiped out and Li Yen-nien's army has fled towards Pengpu, we are able to concentrate an attacking force several times your strength. This time we have fought for only forty days, and you have already lost 10 divisions under Huang Po-tao, II under Huang Wei, 4 under Sun Yuan-liang, 4 under Feng Chih-an, 2 under Sun Liang-cheng, 1 under Liu Ju-ming, 1 division in Suhsien and another in Lingpi - altogether you have lost 34 whole divisions. Of these, 27½ divisions were completely wiped out by our army; the only exceptions were the 3½ divisions led by Ho Chi-feng and Chang Ke-hsia and 1 division led by Liao Yun-chou, which revolted and came over to our side, and 1 division led by Sun Liang-cheng and the 2 half-divisions led by Chao Pi-kuang and Huang Tse-hua, which surrendered.[1] You have seen with your own eyes the fate of the 3 armies under Huang Po-tao, Huang Wei and Sun Yuan-liang. You should learn from the example of General Cheng Tung-kuo in Changchun[2] and from the current example of corps commander Sun Liang-cheng and division commanders Chao Pi-kuang and Huang Tse-hua and immediately order all your troops to lay down their arms and cease resistance. Our army will guarantee life and safety to you, high-ranking officers, and to all officers and men. This is your only way out. Think it over! If you feel this is right, then do it. If you still want to fight another round, you can have it, but you will be finished off anyway.[3]

Headquarters of the Central Plains
People's Liberation Army

Headquarters of the Eastern China
People's Liberation Army

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* This broadcast message was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Headquarters of the Central Plains and the Eastern China People's Liberation Armies.

NOTES

[1] Ho Chi-feng and Chang Ke-hsia, Deputy Commanders of the Kuomintang's 3rd Pacification Zone, revolted against the Kuomintang in the Chiawang sector, northeast of Hsuchow, on November 8, 1948, during the first stage of the Huai-Hai campaign, and came over to the People's Liberation Army with 1 corps headquarters, 3 divisions and 1 regiment, totalling more than 20,000 men. Liao Yun-chou, Commander of the 110th Division of the Kuomintang's 85th Corps, revolted against the Kuomintang at Lochi, southwest of Suhsien, Anhwei Province, on November 27, 1948, during the second stage of the Huai-Hai campaign, and came over to the People's Liberation Army with his division headquarters and 2 full regiments, totalling 5,500 men. Sun Liang-cheng, Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's 1st Pacification Zone and Commander of the 107th Corps, came over to the People's Liberation Army with his corps headquarters and 1 division, totalling 5,800 men, northwest of Suining, Kiangsu Province, on November 13, 1948, during the first stage of the Huai-Hai campaign. Chao Pi-kuang, Commander of the 150th Division of the Kuomintang's 44th Corps, came over to the People's Liberation Army with over 2,000 of his remaining troops in the Nienchuang sector, east of Hsuchow, Kiangsu Province, on November 18, 1948, during the first stage of the Huai-Hai campaign. Huang Tse-hua, Commander of the 23rd Division of the Kuomintang's 85th Corps, came over to the People's Liberation Army with his division headquarters and the remnants of 2 regiments at Shuangtuichi, northeast of Mengcheng Anhwei Province, in December 1948, during the second stage of the Huai-Hai campaign.

[2] Changchun had been besieged by the Northeast People's Liberation Army since the winter of 1947. After the capture of Chinchow by our army, when all the enemy troops in the Northeast were in a shaky position, Cheng Tung-kuo, Kuomintang commander in Changchun and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang's Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, led the army troops of the 1st Army and the officers and men of the New 7th Corps to surrender on October 19, 1948.

[3] After receiving this message, Tu Yu-ming, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang's Hsuchow "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, Chiu Ching-chuan, Commander of the Kuomintang's 2nd Army, and Li Mi, Commander of the Kuomintang's 13th Army, continued to resist desperately with the result that all their troops were wiped out by our army's powerful offensive. Tu Yu-ming was captured, Chiu Ching-chuan was killed and only Li Mi managed to escape.

CARRY THE REVOLUTION THROUGH TO THE END*

December 30, 1948

The Chinese people will win final victory in the great War of Liberation. Even our enemy no longer doubts the outcome.

The war has followed a tortuous course. When the reactionary Kuomintang government started the counter-revolutionary war, it had approximately three and a half times as many troops as the People's Liberation Army; the equipment, manpower and material resources of its army were far superior to those of the People's Liberation Army; it had modern industries and modern means of communication, which the People's Liberation Army lacked; it had received large-scale military and economic aid from U.S. imperialism and had made long preparations. Therefore, during the first year of the war July 1946-June 1947) the Kuomintang was on the offensive and the People's Liberation Army on the defensive. In 1946 in the Northeast, the Kuomintang occupied Shenyang, Szepingkai, Changchun, Kirin, Antung and other cities and most of Liaoning, Liaopei and Antung Provinces;[1] south of the Yellow River, it occupied the cities of Huaiyin and Hotse and most of the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei, Kiangsu-Anhwei, Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu and Southwestern Shantung Liberated Areas; and north of the Great Wall, it occupied the cities of Chengteh, Chining and Changchiakou and most of Jehol, Suiyuan and Chahar Provinces. The Kuomintang blustered and swaggered like a conquering hero. The People's Liberation Army adopted the correct strategy, which had as its main objective to wipe out the Kuomintang's effective strength rather than to hold territory, and in each month destroyed an average of some eight brigades of the Kuomintang regular troops (the equivalent of eight present-day divisions). As a result, the Kuomintang was finally compelled to abandon its plan for the over-all offensive and by the first half of 1947 it had to limit the major targets of its attack to the two wings of the southern front, *i.e.*, Shantung and northern Shensi. In the second year (July 1947-June 1948) a fundamental change took place in the war. Having wiped out large numbers of Kuomintang regulars, the People's Liberation Army went over from the defensive to the offensive on the southern and northern fronts, while the Kuomintang had to turn from the offensive to the defensive. The People's Liberation Army not only recovered most of the territories lost in northeastern China, Shantung and northern Shensi but also extended the battle front into the Kuomintang areas north of the Yangtse and Weishui Rivers. Moreover, in the course of attacking and capturing Shihchiachuang, Yuncheng, Szepingkai, Loyang, Yichuan, Paoki, Weihsien, Linfen and Kaifeng, our army mastered the tactics of storming heavily fortified points.[2] The People's Liberation Army formed its own artillery and engineer corps. Don't forget that the People's Liberation Army had neither aircraft nor tanks, but once it had formed an artillery and an engineer corps superior to those of the Kuomintang army, the defensive system of the Kuomintang, with all its aircraft and tanks, appeared negligible by contrast. The People's Liberation Army was already able to conduct not only mobile warfare but positional warfare as well. In the first half of the third year of the war (July-December 1948), another fundamental change has occurred. The People's Liberation Army, so long outnumbered, has gained numerical superiority. It has been able not only to capture the Kuomintang's heavily fortified cities but also to surround and destroy strong formations of Kuomintang crack troops, a hundred thousand or several hundred thousand at a time. The rate at which the People's Liberation Army is wiping out Kuomintang troops has become much faster. Look at the statistics on the number of Kuomintang regular units of battalion level and above which we have destroyed (including enemy troops who have revolted and come over to our side). In the first year, 97 brigades, including 46 brigades entirely wiped out; in the second year, 94 brigades, including 50 brigades entirely wiped out; and in the first half of the third year, according to incomplete figures, 147 divisions, including 111 divisions entirely wiped out.[3] In these six months, the number of enemy divisions entirely wiped out was 15 more than the grand total for the previous two years. The enemy front as a whole has completely crumbled. The enemy troops in the Northeast have been entirely wiped out; those in northern China will soon be entirely wiped out, and in eastern China and the Central Plains only a few enemy forces are left. The annihilation of the Kuomintang's main forces north of the Yangtse River greatly facilitates the forthcoming crossing of the Yangtse by the People's Liberation Army and its southward drive to liberate all China. Simultaneously with victory on the military front, the Chinese people have scored tremendous victories on the political and economic fronts. For this reason public opinion the world over, including the entire imperialist press, no longer disputes the certainty of the country-wide victory of the Chinese People's War of Liberation.

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* This New Year message for 1949 was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Hsinhua News Agency.

The enemy will not perish of himself. Neither the Chinese reactionaries nor the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism in China will step down from the stage of history of their own accord. Precisely because they realize that the country-wide victory of the Chinese People's War of Liberation can no longer be prevented by purely military struggle, they are placing more and more importance each day on political struggle. On the one hand, the Chinese reactionaries and the U.S. aggressors are using the existing Kuomintang government for their "peace" plot; on the other hand, they are scheming to use certain persons who have connections both with them and with the revolutionary camp, inciting and instigating these persons to work artfully, strive to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and form a so-called opposition faction within it. The purpose is to preserve the reactionary forces and undermine the revolutionary forces. According to reliable information, the U.S. government has decided on this scheme and begun to carry it out in China. The U.S. government has changed its policy of simply backing the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary war to a policy embracing two forms of struggle:

1. Organizing the remnants of the Kuomintang's armed forces and the so-called local forces to continue to resist the People's Liberation Army south of the Yangtse River and in the remote border provinces, and
2. Organizing an opposition faction within the revolutionary camp to strive with might and main to halt the revolution where it is or, if it must advance, to moderate it and prevent it from encroaching too far on the interests of the imperialists and their running dogs.

The British and French imperialists support this U.S. policy. Many people do not yet see this situation clearly, but it probably will not be long before they do.

The question now facing the Chinese people, all democratic parties and all people's organizations is whether to carry the revolution through to the end or to abandon it half-way. If the revolution is to be carried through to the end, we must use the revolutionary method to wipe out all the forces of reaction resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely; we must unswervingly persist in overthrowing imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism; and we must overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang on a country-wide scale and set up a republic that is a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat and with the worker-peasant alliance as its main body. In this way, the Chinese nation will completely throw off the oppressor; the country will be transformed from a semi-colony into a genuinely independent state; the Chinese people will be fully emancipated, overthrowing once and for all both feudal oppression and oppression by bureaucrat-capital (Chinese monopoly capital) and will thus achieve unity, democracy and peace, create the prerequisites for transforming China from an agricultural into an industrial country and make it possible for her to develop from a society with exploitation of man by man into a socialist society. If the revolution is abandoned half-way, it will mean going against the will of the people, bowing to the will of the foreign aggressors and Chinese reactionaries and giving the Kuomintang a chance to heal its wounds, so that one day it may pounce suddenly to strangle the revolution and again plunge the whole country into darkness. That is how clearly and sharply the question is now posed. Which of these two roads to choose? Every democratic party, every people's organization in China must consider this question, must choose its road and clarify its stand. Whether China's democratic parties and people's organizations can sincerely co-operate without parting company half-way depends on whether they are agreed on this question and take unanimous action to overthrow the common enemy of the Chinese people. What is needed here is unanimity and co-operation, not the setting up of any "opposition faction" or the pursuit of any "middle road".[4]

In the long period of more than twenty years from the counter-revolutionary coup d'état of April 12, 1927[5] to this day, have the Chinese reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek and his ilk not given proof enough that they are a gang of blood-stained executioners, who slaughter people without blinking? Have they not given proof enough that they are a band of professional traitors and the running dogs of imperialism? Think it over, everybody! How magnanimous the Chinese people have been towards this gang of bandits in the hope of achieving internal peace with them, since the Sian Incident of December 1936, since the Chungking negotiations of October 1945 and since the Political Consultative Conference of January 1946! But has all this goodwill changed their class nature by one jot or title? In their history not a single one of these bandits can be separated from U.S. imperialism. Relying on U.S. imperialism, they have plunged 475 million of our compatriots into a huge civil war of unprecedented brutality and slaughtered millions upon millions of men and women, young and old, with bombers, fighter planes, guns, tanks, rocket-launchers, automatic rifles, gasoline bombs, gas projectiles and other weapons, all supplied by U.S. imperialism. And relying on these criminals, U.S. imperialism on its part has seized China's sovereign rights over her own territory, waters and air space, seized inland navigation rights and special commercial privileges, seized special privileges in China's domestic and foreign affairs and even seized the privilege of killing people, beating them up, driving cars over them and raping women, all with impunity. Can it be said that the Chinese people, who have been compelled to fight such a long and bloody war, should still show affection and tenderness towards these most vicious enemies and should not completely destroy or expel them? Only by completely destroying the Chinese reactionaries and expelling the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism can China gain independence, democracy and peace. Isn't this truth clear enough by now?

What deserves attention is that all of a sudden the enemies of the Chinese people are doing their best to assume a harmless and even a pitiable look (readers, please remember that in the future they will try to look pitiable again). Didn't Sun Fo, who has now become president of the Kuomintang's Executive Yuan, state in June last year that a "settlement will finally come, provided militarily we fight to the end"? But this time, the moment he took office he talked glibly about an "honourable peace" and said that "the Government has been striving for peace and only resorted to fighting because peace could not be realized, but the ultimate objective of fighting is still to restore peace". Immediately afterwards, on December 21, a United Press dispatch from Shanghai predicted that Sun Fo's statement would meet with widespread approval in U.S. official quarters and among the

Kuomintang liberals. At present, U.S. officials have not only become deeply interested in "peace" in China but also repeatedly assert that ever since the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain in December 1945, the United States has adhered to a "policy of non-interference in China's internal affairs". How are we to deal with these worthies from the "Land of Gentlemen"? Here, it is fitting to quote an ancient Greek fable. One winter's day, a farmhand found a snake frozen by the cold. Moved by compassion, he picked it up and put it in his bosom. The snake was revived by the warmth, its natural instincts returned, and it gave its benefactor a fatal bite. The dying farmhand said, "I've got what I deserve for taking pity on an evil creature."[6] Venomous snakes, foreign and Chinese, hope that the Chinese people will die like the farmhand, that like him the Chinese Communist Party and all Chinese revolutionary democrats will be kind-hearted to them. But the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party and the genuine revolutionary democrats of China have heard the labourer's dying words and will well remember them. Moreover, the serpents infesting most of China, big or small, black or white, baring their poisonous fangs or assuming the guise of beautiful girls, are not yet frozen by the cold, although they already sense the threat of winter.

The Chinese people will never take pity on snake-like scoundrels, and they honestly believe that no one is their true friend who guilefully says that pity should be shown these scoundrels and says that anything else would be out of keeping with China's traditions, fall short of greatness, etc. Why should one take pity on snake-like scoundrels? What worker, what peasant, what soldier, says that such scoundrels should be pitied? True, there are "Kuomintang liberals" or non-Kuomintang "liberals" who advise the Chinese people to accept the "peace" offered by the United States and the Kuomintang, that is, to enshrine and worship the remnants of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism so that these treasures shall not become extinct on earth. But they are decidedly not workers, peasants or soldiers, nor are they the friends of workers, peasants and soldiers.

We hold that the Chinese people's revolutionary camp must be expanded and must embrace all who are willing to join the revolutionary cause at the present stage. The Chinese people's revolution needs a main force and also needs allies, for an army without allies cannot defeat the enemy. The Chinese people, now at the high tide of revolution, need friends and they should remember their friends and not forget them. In China there are undoubtedly many friends faithful to the people's revolutionary cause, who try to protect the people's interests and are opposed to protecting the enemy's interests, and undoubtedly none of these friends should be forgotten or cold-shouldered. Also, we hold that we must consolidate the Chinese people's revolutionary camp and not allow bad elements to sneak in or wrong views to prevail. Besides keeping their friends in mind, the Chinese people, now at the high tide of revolution, should also keep their enemies and the friends of their enemies firmly in mind. As we said above, since the enemy is cunningly using the method of "peace" and the method of sneaking into the revolutionary camp to preserve and strengthen his position, whereas the fundamental interests of the people demand that all reactionary forces be destroyed thoroughly and that the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism be driven out of China, those who advise the people to take pity on the enemy and preserve the forces of reaction are not friends of the people, but friends of the enemy.

The raging tide of China's revolution is forcing all social strata to decide their attitude. A new change is taking place in the balance of class forces in China. Multitudes of people are breaking away from Kuomintang influence and control and coming over to the revolutionary camp; and the Chinese reactionaries have fallen into hopeless straits, isolated and abandoned. As the People's War of Liberation draws closer and closer to final victory, all the revolutionary people and all friends of the people will unite more solidly and, led by the Communist Party of China, resolutely demand the complete destruction of the reactionary forces and the thoroughgoing development of the revolutionary forces until a people's democratic republic on a country-wide scale is founded and a peace based on unity and democracy is achieved. The U.S. imperialists, the Chinese reactionaries and their friends, on the contrary, are incapable of uniting solidly and will indulge in endless squabbles, mutual abuse, recrimination and betrayal. On one point, however, they will co-operate — in striving by every means to undermine the revolutionary forces and preserve the reactionary forces. They will use every means, open and secret, direct and indirect. But it can definitely be stated that their political intrigues will meet with the same defeats as their military attacks. Having had plenty of experience, the Chinese people and their general staff, the Communist Party of China, are certain to smash the enemy's political intrigues, just as they have shattered his military attacks, and to carry the great People's War of Liberation through to the end.

In 1949, the Chinese People's Liberation Army will advance south of the Yangtse River and will win even greater victories than in 1948.

In 1949, on the economic front we shall achieve even greater successes than in 1948. Our agricultural and industrial production will rise to a higher level than before, and rail and highway traffic will be completely restored. In their operations the main formations of the People's Liberation Army will discard certain survivals of guerrilla habits and reach a higher level of regularization.

In 1949, the Political Consultative Conference, with no reactionaries participating and having as its aim the fulfilment of the tasks of the people's revolution, will be convened, the People's Republic of China will be proclaimed, and the Central Government of the Republic will be established. This government will be a democratic coalition government under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, with the participation of appropriate persons representing the democratic parties and people's organizations.

These are the main concrete tasks which the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China and all the democratic parties and people's organizations in China should strive to fulfil in 1949. We shall brave all difficulties and unite as one to fulfil these tasks.

In our struggle we shall overthrow once and for all the feudal oppression of thousands of years and the imperialist oppression of a hundred years. The year 1949 will be a year of tremendous importance. We should redouble our efforts.

NOTES

[1] Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Kuomintang government divided the three northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang into nine provinces, Liaoning, Liaopei, Antung, Kirin, Hokiang, Sungkiang, Heilungkiang, Nunkiang and Hsingan. In 1949 our Northeast Administrative Commission redivided the area into five provinces, Liaotung, Liaohsi, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Sungkiang. Together with Jehol, these provinces were then referred to as the six northeastern provinces. In 1954 the Central People's Government Council merged the two provinces of Liaotung and Liaohsi into the one province of Liaoning and the two provinces of Sungkiang and Heilungkiang into the one province of Heilungkiang, while Kirin remained unchanged. In 1955 Jehol Province was abolished and the area previously under its jurisdiction was divided and incorporated into the provinces of Hopei and Liaoning and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

[2] The dates of the taking of these key points were: Shihchiachuang, November 12, 1947; Yuncheng, December 28, 1947; Szepingkai, March 13, 1948; Loyang first on March 1,1948, and again on April 5, 1948; Yichuan, March 3, 1948; Paoki, April 26, 1948; Weihsien, April 27, 1948; Linfen, May 17, 1948; and Kaifeng, June 22, 1948. All these cities were fortified with many groups of blockhouses, and some had high, thick city walls; also, they all had auxiliary defence works, including multiple lines of trenches barbed-wire entanglements and abatis. Our army at the time had neither planes nor tanks, and little or no artillery. In attacking and taking these cities, our army learned a complete set of tactics for taking strong fortifications. These tactics were:

(1) successive demolition — using explosives to demolish the enemy's different defence installations in succession;

(2) tunnel operations — secretly digging tunnels to and under the enemy's blockhouses or city walls, then blowing them up with explosives and following up with fierce attacks;

(3) approach trench operations — digging trenches towards the enemy's fortifications, then approaching under cover to make sudden attacks;

(4) explosive package projectors — shooting packages of explosives from missile-projectors or mortars to destroy the enemy's defences;

(5) "sharp knife" tactics — concentrating manpower and firepower to effect a breakthrough and to cut up the enemy forces.

[3] The brigades mentioned here were those designated as brigades after the reorganization of the Kuomintang army, while the divisions were pre-reorganization divisions (which were practically the same as the reorganized brigades).

[4] The "middle road" was also called the "third road". See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Note 9, p. 176 of this volume.

[5] See "The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan", Note 8, p. 23 of this volume.

[6] "Evil for Good" in *Aesop's Fables*.

ON THE WAR CRIMINAL'S SUING FOR PEACE*

January 5, 1949

In order to preserve the forces of Chinese reaction and U.S. aggression in China, Chiang Kai-shek, China's No. 1 war criminal and chieftain of the Kuomintang bandit gang, issued a statement on New Year's Day suing for peace. The war criminal Chiang Kai-shek says:

> I have no desire of my own other than that the peace negotiations should not impair the country's independence and integrity but instead should help the rehabilitation of the people; that the sacred constitution should not be violated by my action and that democratic constitutionalism should not be thereby undermined; that the form of government of the Republic of China should be guaranteed and the legally constituted authority of the Republic of China should not be interrupted; that the armed forces should be definitely preserved and that the people should be allowed to continue their free way of life and maintain their present minimum standard of living.
>
> . . . If only peace can be realized, I certainly do not care whether I remain in office or retire, but will abide by the common will of the people.

People should not think that there is something ridiculous about a war criminal suing for peace, nor should they think that such a bid for peace is really disgusting. It should be understood that for the No. 1 war criminal and chieftain of the Kuomintang bandit gang to sue personally for peace and issue such a statement is obviously of some benefit to the Chinese people, because it enables them to see through the plots of the Kuomintang bandit gang and the U.S. imperialists. For the Chinese people can tell from this that the "peace" about which there has lately been so much clamour is exactly what this Chiang Kai-shek gang of murderers and their U.S. master urgently need.

Chiang Kai-shek has confessed the gang's whole plot. The main points of this plot are as follows:

"The peace negotiations should not impair the country's independence and integrity" — this is first in importance. "Peace" is all right, but "peace" is a million times wrong if it impairs the "independence and integrity" of the state of the four big families and the comprador and landlord classes. "Peace" is absolutely all wrong if it impairs such treaties as the Sino-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, the Sino-U.S. Air Transport Agreement[1] and the Sino-U.S. bilateral agreement,[2] or if it impairs such prerogatives enjoyed by the United States in China as the stationing of ground, naval and air forces, the building of military bases, the exploitation of mines and the monopoly of trade, or if it interferes with China's becoming a U.S. colony — in short, if it impairs any such measures as protect the "independence and integrity" of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary state.

"Help the rehabilitation of the people" — that is, "peace" must help the rehabilitation of the Chinese reactionaries, who have been defeated but not yet wiped out, so that, once rehabilitated, they can stage a comeback and extinguish the revolution. This is exactly what "peace" is for. The war has been going on for two and a half years, "the running dog can no longer run" and the Americans are angry; a rest-cure, however brief, is better than none.

"The sacred constitution should not be violated by my action and democratic constitutionalism should not be thereby undermined; the form of government of the Republic of China should be guaranteed and the legally constituted authority of the Republic of China should not be interrupted" — all this means guaranteeing the ruling position of China's reactionary classes and reactionary government and guaranteeing that the "legally constituted authority" of these classes and their government will not be "interrupted". This "legally constituted authority" certainly must not be "interrupted", for to "interrupt" it would be very dangerous — it would mean the finish of the whole of the comprador and landlord classes, the end of the Kuomintang

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* This commentary was the first of a series written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Hsinhua News Agency to expose the Kuomintang's use of peace negotiations in order to preserve the counter-revolutionary forces. Other commentaries in the series included "Why Do the Badly Split Reactionaries Still Idly Clamour for 'Total Peace'?", "The Kuomintang Reactionaries Turn from an 'Appeal for Peace' to an Appeal for War", "On the Kuomintang's Different Answers to the Question of Responsibility for the War" and "Whither the Nanking Government?"

gang of bandits and the arrest and punishment of all the war criminals, big, medium and small.

"The armed forces should be definitely preserved" — they are the lifeline of the comprador and landlord classes, and although several millions have been wiped out by the detested People's Liberation Army, there still remain one million several hundred thousand troops which must be "preserved", and "definitely" so. If they were "preserved", but not "definitely", the comprador and landlord classes would lose their capital, their "legally constituted authority" would still be "interrupted", the Kuomintang bandit gang would still be finished, all the war criminals, big, medium and small, would still be arrested and punished. Just as the life of Chia Pao-yu of the Grand View Garden depended upon a piece of jade in his necklace,[3] the life of the Kuomintang depends upon its army, so how can one say that its army should not be "preserved", or should only be "preserved" but not "definitely" so?

"The people should be allowed to continue their free way of life and maintain their present minimum standard of living" — this means the Chinese comprador and landlord classes must preserve their freedom to oppress and exploit the people of the whole country and their freedom to maintain their present standard of lordly, luxurious, loose and idle living, while the Chinese working people must preserve their freedom to be oppressed and exploited and maintain their present standard of living, a life of cold and hunger. That is the ultimate aim of the war criminals in suing for peace. What is the use of peace, if the war criminals and the classes to which they belong cannot preserve their freedom to oppress and exploit and cannot maintain their standard of lordly, luxurious, loose and idle living? To preserve all this, it is of course necessary for the workers, peasants, intellectuals, government employees and teachers to maintain their present "free way of life and minimum standard of living", a life of cold and hunger. Once our beloved President Chiang puts forward this condition, the tens of millions of workers, handicraftsmen and professionals, the hundreds of millions of peasants, and the millions of intellectuals, government employees and teachers can only clap their hands in unison, prostrate themselves and shout, "Long live the President!" If the Communist Party still refuses peace, so that this wonderful way of life and standard of living cannot be maintained, then it will be guilty of a crime for which it deserves to die ten thousand deaths, and "the Communist Party will be held responsible for all the consequences".

In saying all this, however, we have not exhausted the whole treasury of wonderful ideas in the war criminal's statement of January 1 suing for peace. Here is another gem — what Chiang Kai-shek in his New Year message calls "a decisive battle in the Nanking-Shanghai sector". Where is the strength for such a "decisive battle"? Chiang Kai-shek says, "It must be understood that today the strength of the government in the military, political, economic or any other field is several times or even tens of times greater than that of the Communist Party." Oh! Ho! How can people not be scared to death by such immense strength? Leaving political and economic strength aside and taking only military strength, one sees that the People's Liberation Army now has over three million men, that two times "greater" than this number is over six million and that ten times "greater" is over thirty million. And how many will "tens of times" be? All right, let's take twenty times, which gives over sixty million men; no wonder President Chiang says he has "full confidence in winning the decisive battle". Why then should he beg for peace? Certainly not because he can no longer fight. For if he were to bring the pressure of over sixty million troops to bear, could there be any chance of survival for the Communist Party or any other party in the world? All of course would be crushed to powder. It is clear then that when he begs for peace, it is certainly for no other reason than "to plead for the life of the people".

But is everything going well, without any hitch? There is a hitch, it is said. What is the hitch? President Chiang says:

> It is regrettable that there are people in our government who have come under the influence of malicious Communist propaganda and are consequently in a wavering state of mind, having almost lost their self-confidence. Spiritually menaced by the Communists, they see only the enemy's strength but not our own huge strength, which is tens of times greater than the enemy's.

Well, every year brings its crop of news, but this year's is something very special. Isn't it an extra-special piece of news that members of the Kuomintang, with their sixty million odd officers and men, see only the People's Liberation Army of three million odd men but not their own army of over sixty million?

One may ask, "Is there a market for such news?" and "Is it worth even a glance?" According to information received from inside the city of Peiping, "On New Year's Day prices dropped slightly in the morning but recovered in the afternoon." And a foreign news agency reports, "Shanghai's response to Chiang Kai-shek's New Year message is cold." This answers the question as to whether the war criminal Chiang Kai-shek has any market. As we said long ago, Chiang Kai-shek has lost his soul, is merely a corpse, and no one believes him any more.

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[1] The "Sino-U.S. Air Transport Agreement" between the Chiang Kai-shek government and U.S. imperialism was signed on December 20, 1946. In this agreement, Chiang Kai-shek completely sold out China's sovereignty over her air space. According to its provisions, U.S. aircraft were allowed to fly, load and unload or trans-ship anywhere within China, and the United States gained complete control of the country's air transport. U.S. aircraft were also accorded the right of "non-traffic stop" that is, of military landings on Chinese territory.

[2] The "Sino-U.S. bilateral agreement" was the so-called Sino-U.S. Economic Aid Agreement signed at Nanking on July 3, 1948 between the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek government and U.S. imperialism. It stipulated that U.S. imperialism was to have supreme authority to supervise and decide the financial and economic affairs of the Chiang Kai-shek government, that U.S. personnel exercising direct control in China were to enjoy "extraterritorial rights", and that U.S. imperialism could obtain from China any strategic materials it needed and was to be kept informed regularly by the Chiang Kai-shek government about their availability. In this agreement the Chiang Kai-shek government also guaranteed that U.S. goods could be dumped in China.

[3] Chia Pao-yu was a character in *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, an 18th century Chinese novel, and the Grand View Garden was his family garden. It was said that Chia Pao-yu was born with a piece of jade in his mouth. This jade was "the root of his life" and had to be worn constantly around his neck. He was not to part with it. If he lost it, he would lose his wits.

STATEMENT ON THE PRESENT SITUATION BY MAO TSE-TUNG, CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

January 14, 1949

Two and a half years have gone by since July 1946, when the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government, with the aid of the U.S. imperialists, violated the will of the people, tore up the truce agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and launched the country-wide counter-revolutionary civil war. In these two and a half years of war, the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government has, in violation of the will of the people, convened a bogus National Assembly, promulgated a bogus constitution, elected a bogus president and issued a bogus decree on the so-called "mobilization for putting down the rebellion"; sold out the national interest wholesale to the U.S. government and received loans amounting to thousands of millions of U.S. dollars; invited the U.S. navy and air force to occupy China's territory and territorial sea and air; signed a large batch of treasonable treaties with the U.S. government and accepted the U.S. Military Advisory Group's participation in China's civil war; and obtained from the U.S. government huge quantities of aircraft, tanks, light and heavy artillery, machine-guns, rifles, shells, bullets and other war materiel for slaughtering the Chinese people. And it was on the basis of these reactionary and traitorous basic policies, domestic and foreign, that the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government ordered millions of troops to launch ruthless attacks on the Chinese People's Liberated Areas and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. All the People's Liberated Areas in eastern China, the Central Plains, northern China, the Northwest and the Northeast were, without exception, trampled upon by the Kuomintang troops. The leading cities in the Liberated Areas, such as Yenan, Changchiakou, Huaiyin, Hotse, Taming, Linyi, Yentai, Chengteh, Szepingkai, Changchun, Kirin and Antung, were all occupied by these bandit troops at one time or another. Wherever they went, they massacred and raped, burned and looted, and stopped at nothing. In the areas under its rule, the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government sucks the life-blood of the broad masses of the people — the workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen — by exacting grain levies, taxes and forced labour for "putting down the rebellion and suppressing the bandits". The reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government deprives the people of all their freedoms and rights; it oppresses all the democratic parties and the people's organizations, denying them their legal status; it suppresses the righteous movement of the students against civil war, hunger and persecution and against U.S. interference in China's internal affairs and U.S. fostering of the forces of aggression in Japan; it floods the country with the bogus national currency and the bogus gold yuan notes, thus ruining the economic life of the people and reducing the broad masses to bankruptcy; and by various means of expropriation it concentrates the greatest part of the nation's wealth in the hands of the bureaucrat-capitalists headed by the four big families of Chiang, Soong, Kung and Chen. In short, the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government has plunged the whole nation into dire suffering by waging a civil war based on its reactionary and traitorous basic policies, domestic and foreign; it absolutely cannot escape full responsibility. In contrast to the Kuomintang, the Communist Party of China did all it could after Japan's surrender to press the Kuomintang government to prevent and stop the civil war and realize domestic peace. Basing itself on this policy, the Communist Party of China struggled steadfastly and, with the support of the people of the whole country, first secured the signing of the Summary of Conversations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in October 1945. In January 1946 the Party again signed a truce agreement with the Kuomintang and, in co-operation with the democratic parties, forced the Kuomintang to accept the joint resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference. From then on the Communist Party of China, together with the democratic parties and people's organizations, strove to uphold the agreement and the resolutions. But it is regrettable that the reactionary Kuomintang government showed no respect for any of the actions we took in defence of internal peace and the democratic rights of the people. On the contrary, they were taken as signs of weakness and as beneath notice.

The reactionary Kuomintang government thought that the people could be bullied, that the truce agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference could be torn up at will, that the People's Liberation Army could not withstand even a single blow while its own troops several million strong could overrun the country, and that aid from the U.S. government was inexhaustible. Therefore, the reactionary Kuomintang government had the audacity to violate the will of the people of the whole country and unleash the counter-revolutionary war. In these circumstances, the Communist Party of China had no choice but to rise resolutely against the Kuomintang government's reactionary policies and fight to safeguard the country's independence and the people's democratic rights. Since July 1946, the Communist Party of China has led the heroic People's Liberation Army to repulse the attacks of 4,300,000 troops of the reactionary Kuomintang government and then to go over to the counter-offensive, recover all the lost territories of the Liberated Areas and liberate many large cities, such as Shihchiachuang, Loyang, Tsinan, Chengchow, Kaifeng, Shenyang, Hsuchow and Tangshan. The People's Liberation Army has overcome unparalleled difficulties, grown in strength and equipped itself with huge quantities of arms given to the Kuomintang government by the U.S. government. In two and a half years, it has wiped out the main military forces of the reactionary Kuomintang government and all its crack divisions. Today the People's Liberation Army is superior to the remnant military forces of the reactionary Kuomintang government in numbers, morale and equipment. It is only now that the Chinese people can begin to breathe freely. The present situation is quite clear — the whole structure of the reactionary Kuomintang regime will crumble and perish if the People's Liberation Army launches a few more powerful attacks against its remnant forces. Having pursued a policy of civil war, the reactionary Kuomintang government is now reaping what it has sown, the masses are in rebellion, its close followers are deserting, and it can no longer maintain itself. In these circumstances, in order to preserve the remnant forces of the Kuomintang government and in order to gain a breathing space before making new onslaughts to destroy the revolutionary forces, Chiang Kai-shek, China's No. 1 war criminal, chieftain of the Kuomintang bandit gang and bogus president of the Nanking government, advanced the proposal on January 1 of this year that he was willing to hold peace negotiations with the Communist Party of China. The Communist Party of China considers this proposal hypocritical. The reason is that Chiang Kai-shek has proposed as the basis for the peace negotiations such terms as preserving the bogus constitution, preserving the bogus "constituted authority" and preserving the armed forces of reaction, terms which the people throughout the country cannot accept. These are terms for continuing the war, not for peace. In the last ten days the people throughout the country have made their will clear. They eagerly hope for an early peace, but they do not approve the so-called peace of the war criminals, do not approve their reactionary terms. Basing itself on the will of the people, the Communist Party of China declares that although the People's Liberation Army has ample strength and abundant reason to wipe out completely the remnant armed forces of the reactionary Kuomintang government in not too long a period and has full confidence that it can do so, nevertheless, in order to hasten the end of the war, bring about genuine peace and alleviate the people's sufferings, the Communist Party of China is willing to hold peace negotiations with the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government or with any local governments or military groups of the Kuomintang on the basis of the following terms:

(1) Punish the war criminals;
(2) Abolish the bogus constitution;
(3) Abolish the bogus "constituted authority";
(4) Reorganize all reactionary troops on democratic principles;
(5) Confiscate bureaucrat-capital;
(6) Reform the land system;
(7) Abrogate treasonable treaties;
(8) Convene a political consultative conference without the participation of reactionary elements, and form a democratic coalition government to take over all the powers of the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government and of its subordinate governments at all levels.[1]

The Communist Party of China holds that the above terms express the common will of the people throughout the country and that only a peace based on these terms can be called a genuine democratic peace. If the persons in the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government wish to achieve a genuine democratic peace, and not a false reactionary peace, they should give up their reactionary terms and accept the eight terms put forth by the Communist Party of China as the basis for peace negotiations. Otherwise their so-called peace will prove to be nothing but a fraud. We hope that the people throughout the country and all democratic parties and people's organizations will rise to fight for a genuine democratic peace and against a false reactionary peace. The patriots in the Nanking Kuomintang governmental system should also support this peace proposal. Comrade commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army, attention! You should not slacken your fighting efforts in the slightest until the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government has accepted a genuine democratic peace and carried it out. Any reactionaries who dare to resist must be resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely annihilated.

NOTES

[1] The eight terms for peace put forward by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in this statement became the basis for the peace negotiations held in April 1949 between the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang government delegation headed by Chang Chih-chung. The Agreement on Internal Peace, drafted in the course of these negotiations, set forth concrete provisions for the eight peace terms. For details, see "Order to the Army for the Country-wide Advance", Note 1, pp. 390-96 of this volume.

COMMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE NANKING EXECUTIVE YUAN

January 21, 1949

The Central News Agency, the official news agency of the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government, said in a dispatch of January 19 that the Executive Yuan, at a meeting at 9 a.m. on the same day, had extensively discussed the current situation and passed the following resolution:

> In deference to the desire of the people of the whole country to realize an early peace, the Government hereby expresses its considered wish, first, together with the Communist Party of China, to effect an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities, and then, to appoint delegates to enter into peace negotiations.

The spokesman for the Communist Party of China states: This resolution of the Nanking Executive Yuan makes no mention of the statement proposing peace negotiations issued on January 1 by Chiang Kai-shek, the bogus Nanking president, or of the statement proposing peace negotiations issued on January 14 by Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China; nor does it indicate which of the two statements it supports and which it opposes, but instead puts forward a proposal of its own, as if neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party had made any proposals on January 1 and January 14; all this is utterly incomprehensible. As a matter of fact, the Nanking Executive Yuan has not only completely ignored the Chinese Communist Party's proposal of January 14 but has also flatly repudiated the proposal made on January 1 by the bogus President Chiang Kai-shek. He said in his January 1 proposal:

> As soon as the Communist Party has a sincere desire for peace and can give definite indications of this, the Government will certainly meet it in all sincerity and be willing to discuss concrete measures for ending hostilities and restoring peace.

Now, nineteen days later, an organ of this selfsame government, that is, the "Executive Yuan" of the Nanking government, repudiates the statement made by the "president" of that government and, instead of saying that the government "will certainly meet" the Communist Party "in all sincerity and be willing to discuss concrete measures for ending hostilities and restoring peace", it says, "first, effect an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities, and then, appoint delegates to enter into peace negotiations." We should like to ask the gentlemen of the "Executive Yuan" at Nanking: after all, which proposal stands, yours or that of your "president"? Your "president" regarded "ending hostilities and restoring peace" as one and the same thing and professed sincerity and willingness to discuss concrete measures for doing so with the Communist Party of China, whereas you divorce war from peace as two separate things and are reluctant to appoint delegates to discuss with us concrete measures for ending hostilities and, instead, indulge in the wildest fantasy, proposing "first, to effect an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities" and then to appoint delegates to "enter into peace negotiations". Which proposal is right, yours or that of your "president"? We hold that the bogus Executive Yuan at Nanking has acted beyond its authority; it has no right to cast aside the proposal of its bogus president and arbitrarily make a new proposal of its own. We regard this new proposal as unreasonable; having fought such a large-scale, protracted and cruel war, both sides should as a matter of course appoint delegates to discuss basic peace terms and work out a mutually acceptable truce agreement; only thus can the war be stopped. Not only do the people desire this, even on the Kuomintang side many persons have expressed this desire. If the absolutely groundless "resolution" of the Nanking Executive Yuan is followed and the Kuomintang is unwilling to carry on peace negotiations unless there is first a cessation of hostilities, then where is its sincere desire for peace? The "resolution" of the Nanking Executive Yuan has been adopted, there can be no peace negotiations unless there is first a cessation of hostilities, and from now on the door to peace is shut tight; if there are to be negotiations, the only thing to do is to annul this absolutely groundless "resolution". It must be one or the other. If the Nanking Executive Yuan is unwilling to annul its own "resolution", this will only show that the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government has no sincere desire to hold peace negotiations with the opposing side. People will ask, if Nanking is sincere, why is it unwilling to discuss concrete peace terms? Hasn't the conclusion been confirmed that Nanking's peace proposal is hypocritical? The spokesman for the Communist Party says: Nanking has now fallen into a state of anarchy, the bogus president has one proposal and the bogus Executive Yuan has another. With whom is one to deal?

ON ORDERING THE REACTIONARY KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT TO RE-ARREST YASUJI OKAMURA, FORMER COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE JAPANESE FORCES OF AGGRESSION IN CHINA, AND TO ARREST THE KUOMINTANG CIVIL WAR CRIMINALS — STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

January 28, 1949

The Central News Agency of the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government reported in a dispatch dated January 26:

> A Government spokesman made the following statement. In the past month the Government has taken various measures and steps for an early conclusion of the war in order to alleviate the sufferings of the people. Furthermore, on the 22nd of this month, the Government formally appointed a delegation[1] to the peace negotiations. During the last few days, the Government has only been waiting for the Communist Party of China to appoint its delegation and agree on a meeting place so that the negotiations may proceed. But in the statement broadcast from northern Shensi by the Hsinhua News Agency on the 25th,[2] a spokesman for the Communist Party of China, while indicating willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Government, resorted to unbridled insults and vilification and used absurd and offensive language. He also said that the place for the negotiations could not be fixed until Peiping was completely liberated. We should like to ask, if the Communist Party of China, on the pretext of

> awaiting the so-called complete liberation of Peiping, does not immediately appoint its delegation and agree on a meeting place and furthermore does not stop military operations, is it not stalling for time and prolonging the disaster of war? One should know that the hope of the people of the whole country to put an end to the disaster of war brooks no delay. To demonstrate its profound sincerity, the Government once again expresses the wish that the Communist Party of China will clearly realize that the salvation of the people should be the primary consideration today and that it will therefore appoint a delegation to the negotiations as soon as possible, so that peace can be realized at an early date.

In another dispatch dated January 26, Nanking's Central News Agency reported from Shanghai:

> Following a review of his case on the 26th by the National Defence Ministry's Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, the Japanese war criminal General Yasuji Okamura, former Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, was declared not guilty at 4 o'clock this afternoon by Shih Mei-yu, the president of the court. The atmosphere in the courtroom was tense. Okamura, standing at attention, smiled a little on hearing the verdict.

In view of the above, the spokesman for the Communist Party of China makes the following statement:

1. The Communist Party of China and the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army declare that it is impermissible for the Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals set up by the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government to return a verdict of "not guilty" on the Japanese war criminal General Yasuji Okamura, former Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China and the arch-criminal among all war criminals in the Japanese Expeditionary Forces of aggression against China.[3] The Chinese people, after untold human and material sacrifices during the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, finally won victory and captured this war criminal, and they will never allow the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government arbitrarily to declare him not guilty. The people of the whole country, all the democratic parties and people's organizations and also the patriots in the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang governmental system must rise at once

to oppose the criminal act of that government in betraying the national interests and collaborating with the Japanese fascist militarists. We hereby give a serious warning to the gentlemen of the reactionary Nanking government. You must re-arrest Yasuji Okamura immediately and return him to prison without fail. This matter is closely related to your request for negotiations with us. We hold that all your present actions are an attempt to use fake peace negotiations to cover up your new preparations for war, which include your conspiracy to induce Japanese reactionaries to come to China and join you in massacring the Chinese people; it is exactly for this purpose that you have set Yasuji Okamura free. Therefore, we absolutely will not permit you to do it. We have the right to order you to re-arrest Yasuji Okamura and be responsible for turning him over to the People's Liberation Army at a time and place to be specified by us. As to the other Japanese war criminals, they are to be in your temporary custody, pending further instructions, and you must not take it upon yourselves to release any of them or let any escape; those of you who disobey will be severely punished.

2. We have learned from the January 26 statement of the spokesman for the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government that you gentlemen of Nanking are all so very tense, eager, solicitous and anxious about peace negotiations, all, it is said, for the sake of "shortening the duration of the war", "alleviating the sufferings of the people" and "treating the salvation of the people as the primary consideration"; we have also learned that you feel that the Communist Party of China is so very untense, uneager, unsolicitous and unanxious in its response to your wish and "furthermore does not stop military operations" and is in reality "stalling for time and prolonging the disaster of war". We tell you gentlemen of Nanking frankly: you are war criminals, you will be brought to trial. We have no faith in your mouthings about "peace" or "the will of the people". You relied on the power of the United States, violated the will of the people, tore up the truce agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and launched this most ruthless, anti-popular, anti-democratic, counter-revolutionary civil war. You were then so tense, eager, solicitous and anxious that you would not listen to advice from anybody. And when you convened a bogus National Assembly, drew up a bogus constitution, elected a bogus president and promulgated a bogus decree of "mobilization for putting down the rebellion", you were again so tense, eager, solicitous and anxious about it all that

again you would not listen to advice from anybody. At that time in Shanghai, Nanking and other major cities, the so-called consultative councils, chambers of commerce, trade unions, peasant associations, women's organizations and cultural organizations, all of which are either run by your government or serve as your tools, kicked up such a fuss about "supporting the mobilization for putting down the rebellion" and "annihilating the Communist bandits" and once again were so tense, eager, solicitous and anxious about it all that they would not listen to advice from anybody. Two and a half years have now passed, and during this period the number of people slaughtered by you has run into many millions, and the villages burned down, the women raped and the wealth plundered by you, as well as the lives and property destroyed by your air force, are beyond count; you have committed heinous crimes, and we must settle accounts with you. We hear that you are quite opposed to the struggle for settling accounts. But this time there is good cause for the struggle to settle accounts, there must be an accounting, there must be a settlement, there must be a fight, there must be a struggle. You are defeated. You have enraged the people. And the people have all risen against you in a life-and-death struggle. The people do not like you, the people condemn you, the people have risen, and you are isolated; that is why you have been defeated. You proposed five terms[4] for peace negotiations and we proposed eight;[5] the people at once gave their support to our eight terms, not to your five. You don't dare to rebut our eight terms or insist upon your five. You declare that you are willing to take our eight terms as the basis for the negotiations. Isn't that fine? Then why not hurry up and negotiate? So it seems that you are very tense, eager, solicitous and anxious and that you are very much for "unconditional cessation of hostilities", for "shortening the duration of the war", for "alleviating the sufferings of the people" and for "treating the salvation of the people as the primary consideration". And we? We, obviously, are not tense, not eager, not solicitous nor anxious and we are "stalling for time and prolonging the disaster of war". But wait a moment, gentlemen of Nanking. We are going to be tense, eager, solicitous and anxious; the duration of the war will surely be shortened; and the sufferings of the people will surely be alleviated. Since you have already agreed to our eight terms as the basis for the negotiations, you and we are both going to be busy. The carrying out of these eight terms will keep you, us, all the democratic parties, people's organizations and people in all walks of life through-

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out the country busy for several months, half a year, a whole year, or several years — perhaps even then we shall not have finished the job! Listen, gentlemen of Nanking! The eight terms are not abstract items, they must have concrete content; during the present short period it is important for everybody to do some thinking, and the people will forgive us a little delay. To speak frankly, the opinion of the people is that we should prepare well for these negotiations. There will certainly be negotiations, and it absolutely will not be permitted that anyone break them off in the middle and refuse to negotiate. Therefore your delegates must get ready to come. But we still need some time to complete our preparations and we will not allow war criminals to set the date of the negotiations for us. We and the people of Peiping are now doing an important job; we are working out a peaceful settlement of the Peiping question on the basis of the eight terms. Your men in Peiping, such as General Fu Tso-yi, are also participating in this work, which you admitted to be proper in the communiqué of your news agency.[6] This will not only provide a place for the peace negotiations, but will set an example of peaceful settlement for Nanking, Shanghai, Wuhan, Sian, Taiyuan, Kueisui, Lanchow, Tihua, Chengtu, Kunming, Changsha, Nanchang, Hangchow, Foochow, Canton, Taiwan, Hainan Island, etc. This work is therefore praiseworthy, and you gentlemen of Nanking should not adopt a casual attitude towards it. We are now discussing with the democratic parties, people's organizations and the democrats without party affiliation in both our areas and yours the problem of drawing up a list of war criminals and working out the concrete details of the first of our eight terms. It will probably not be long before this list is officially issued. Gentlemen of Nanking, as you know, we have not yet had time to discuss such a list with the democratic parties and people's organizations and officially publish it. For this we beg your pardon. The reason for the delay is that your request for peace negotiations came a little late. Had it come earlier, our preparations might have been completed by now. But this does not mean you have nothing to do. Besides arresting the Japanese war criminal Yasuji Okamura, you must at once set about arresting a batch of civil war criminals and, first of all, those in Nanking, Shanghai, Fenghua and Taiwan who were among the forty-three war criminals listed in the statement by an authoritative person in the Communist Party of China on December 25, 1948. The most important among them are Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, Chen Cheng, Ho Ying-chin, Ku Chu-tung, Chen Li-fu, Chen Kuo-fu, Chu Chia-hua, Wang Shih-chieh, Wu Kuo-chen, Tai Chuan-hsien, Tang En-po, Chou Chih-jou, Wang Shu-ming and Kuei Yung-ching.[7] Of particular importance is Chiang Kai-shek, who has now fled to Fenghua[8] and will very likely flee abroad and seek the protection of U.S. or British imperialism; therefore, you must quickly arrest this criminal and not let him escape. You shall assume full responsibility for this matter. Should there be any escapes, you shall be punished for the crime of setting bandits free, and no leniency whatsoever shall be shown. Let no one say he has not been warned. We hold that only by arresting these war criminals will one do a serious job in shortening the duration of the war and alleviating the people's sufferings. As long as the war criminals are at large, the duration of the war will be lengthened and the sufferings of the people will be aggravated.

3. We demand that the reactionary Nanking government reply to the above two points.

4. Nanking will be notified at another time concerning the preparations both sides should make in connection with the remainder of the eight terms.

NOTES

[1] The delegation appointed by the reactionary Kuomintang government for the peace negotiations consisted of Shao Li-tse, Chang Chih-chung, Huang Shao-hung, Peng Chao-hsien and Chung Tien-hsin.

[2] On January 25, 1949, a spokesman for the Chinese Communist Party pointed out in his statement concerning the peace negotiations: "We have permitted the reactionary Nanking government to send a delegation for peace negotiations with us not because we recognize that government as still qualified to represent the Chinese people, but because it still has some remnants of the reactionary armed forces. If that government feels that it has completely forfeited the people's confidence and that the remnants of its reactionary armed forces are unable to resist the powerful People's Liberation Army and if that government is willing to accept the eight terms for peace proposed by the Chinese Communist Party, then it is of course preferable and beneficial to the cause of the liberation of the people to settle the matter by negotiations, so as to lessen the people's sufferings." As to the meeting place, the statement said, "It can be decided only after the complete liberation of Peiping and will probably be Peiping." As to the Nanking delegates, it stated, "Peng Chao-hsien is one of the key figures of the Kuomintang CC clique, which has been most vehemently clamouring for war, and people consider him a war criminal; the Chinese Communist Party cannot receive such a delegate."

[3] Yasuji Okamura was one of the Japanese war criminals with the longest and blackest record of crimes of aggression against China. From 1925 to 1927, he was military adviser to Sun Chuan-fang, one of the Northern warlords. In 1928, as

commanding officer of a Japanese infantry regiment, he took part in the war in which Japan attacked and seized Tsinan and was the butcher in the Tsinan Massacre. In 1932 he served as deputy chief of staff of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces which attacked and occupied Shanghai. In 1933 he represented the Japanese government at the signing of the "Tangku Agreement" with the traitorous Kuomintang government. From 1937 to 1945, he was successively the Commander of Japan's 11th Corps, Northern China Front Army and 6th Front Army and the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China. He enforced the extremely brutal policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all" in China. He was among the chief Japanese war criminals on the list published at Yenan in August 1945. During the People's War of Liberation he was Chiang Kai-shek's secret military adviser and planned Chiang's attacks on the Liberated Areas. In January 1949 he was declared not guilty and set free by the reactionary Kuomintang government and returned to Japan. In 1950 he accepted Chiang Kai-shek's offer of the post of senior training officer in the so-called Research Institute of Revolutionary Practice. Since 1955 he has organized ex-servicemen of the Japanese army and navy into the "League of Comrades in Arms" (later called the League of Retired Comrades in Arms) and has played a vigorous role in the reactionary activities to revive Japanese militarism.

[4] The "five terms" proposed by the reactionary Kuomintang government for the peace negotiations were put forward in Chiang Kai-shek's statement on New Year's Day, 1949. They were: 1. The peace negotiations "should not impair the country's independence and integrity". 2. The peace negotiations "should help the rehabilitation of the people". 3. "The sacred constitution should not be violated by my action and democratic constitutionalism should not be thereby undermined; the form of government of the Republic of China should be guaranteed and the legally constituted authority of the Republic of China should not be interrupted". 4. "The armed forces should be definitely preserved". 5. "The people should be allowed to continue their free way of life and maintain their present minimum standard of living". Comrade Mao Tse-tung promptly and sternly refuted these five terms. See "On the War Criminal's Suing for Peace", pp. 309-13 of this volume.

[5] The "eight terms" proposed by the Communist Party of China for the peace negotiations were put forward in Comrade Mao Tse-tung's statement of January 14, 1949, on the current situation. See "Statement on the Present Situation by Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", pp. 315-319 of this volume.

[6] According to a Kuomintang Central News Agency dispatch dated January 27, 1949, the Ministry of National Defence of the Nanking government stated: "In northern China, in order to shorten the war, secure peace and thereby preserve the foundations of the ancient capital, Peiping, and its cultural objects and historic monuments, Commander-in-Chief Fu Tso-yi issued a proclamation on January 22 to the effect that hostilities were to cease as from 10 o'clock that day. On orders from General Headquarters, the bulk of our troops in Peiping have withdrawn from the city limits to certain designated areas." It further stated, "Cessation of hostilities will be effected also in Suiyuan and Tatung."

[7] T. V. Soong, a plutocrat of the Kuomintang regime, had served as minister of finance, president of the Executive Yuan, minister of foreign affairs and special emissary of the Kuomintang government in the United States. Chen Cheng, formerly chief of the general staff, was then the Kuomintang governor of Taiwan Province. Ho Ying-chin had been the Kuomintang's chief of the general staff and minister of national defence. Ku Chu-tung was then chief of the general staff of the

Kuomintang army. Chen Li-fu, Chen Kuo-fu and Chu Chia-hua were all chieftains of the Kuomintang CC clique. Wang Shih-chieh had been Kuomintang minister of foreign affairs. Wu Kuo-chen was the Kuomintang mayor of Shanghai. Tai Chuan-hsien, also known as Tai Chi-tao, had long been a member of Chiang Kai-shek's "brain trust" and was then a member of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. Tang En-po was commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang garrison forces in the Nanking-Shanghai-Hangchow area. Chou Chih-jou was commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's air force. Wang Shu-ming was deputy commander-in-chief and chief of staff of the air force. Kuei Yung-ching was commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang navy.

[8] A county in Chekiang Province, the birthplace of Chiang Kai-shek.

PEACE TERMS MUST INCLUDE THE PUNISHMENT OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS AND KUOMINTANG WAR CRIMINALS

— STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

February 5, 1949

The statement on the question of peace negotiations made on January 28 by the spokesman for the Communist Party of China was answered on January 31 by a spokesman of the reactionary traitorous Kuomintang government. In his reply, the spokesman of the reactionary traitorous Kuomintang government quibbled about the points raised by the spokesman for the Communist Party of China. Concerning the demand of the Communist Party of China that the reactionary traitorous Kuomintang government should be responsible for re-arresting Yasuji Okamura, the chief criminal in Japan's invasion of China, turning him over to the People's Liberation Army, keeping the other Japanese war criminals in custody and preventing their escape, the Kuomintang spokesman said, "This is a judicial question. It has nothing whatsoever to do with peace negotiations, much less can it be made a precondition for peace negotiations." Concerning the demand of the Communist Party of China that the reactionary traitorous Kuomintang government should be responsible for arresting Chiang Kai-shek and other war criminals, the Kuomintang spokesman said, "For genuine peace, no preconditions should be imposed." The statement of the spokesman for the Communist Party of China, he added, "does not seem to be serious enough in its attitude" and, moreover, "causes complications". On this, the spokesman for the Communist Party of China states: As recently as January 28, our attitude was indeed not serious enough insofar as we still spoke of the reactionary traitorous Kuomintang government as a government.

Does this so-called "government" still really exist? Does it exist in Nanking? There is no longer any administrative organ in Nanking. Does it exist in Canton? There is no administrative head in Canton. Does it exist in Shanghai? There is neither an administrative organ nor an administrative head in Shanghai. Does it exist in Fenghua? In Fenghua there is only a bogus president, who has already announced his "retirement"; there is nothing else. Therefore, speaking seriously, we should not have regarded it as a government; it is, at most, a hypothetical or token government. But let us go on supposing that there is such a token "government" and that there is a spokesman who can speak for that "government". Then its spokesman should realize that this hypothetical, token, reactionary, traitorous Kuomintang government has not only contributed nothing towards peace negotiations, but has in fact caused endless complications. Didn't you cause complication, for instance, by suddenly declaring Yasuji Okamura not guilty at a time when you were so anxious for negotiations? Didn't you cause further complication by sending him to Japan, along with 260 other Japanese war criminals, after the Communist Party of China had demanded his re-arrest? Who rules Japan today? Can it be said that the Japanese people rule Japan, and not the imperialists? Japan is a place you love so much that you believe the Japanese war criminals will enjoy greater security and comfort and receive more appropriate treatment there than in the areas you rule. Is that a judicial question? And why has this judicial question arisen? Can it be that you have forgotten that the Japanese aggressors fought against us for eight whole years? Does this question have nothing whatsoever to do with peace negotiations? When the Communist Party of China put forward the eight terms for peace negotiations on January 14, the release of Yasuji Okamura had not yet occurred. That occurred on January 26, and so it should be raised; it is certainly relevant to the peace negotiations. On January 31 you obeyed MacArthur's orders and sent 260 Japanese war criminals to Japan, together with Yasuji Okamura; the matter thus became even more relevant to the peace negotiations. Why do you sue for peace? Because you have been defeated in war. And why have you been defeated? Because you launched a civil war against the people. And when did you launch this civil war? After the Japanese surrender. And against whom did you launch this war? Against the People's Liberation Army and the People's Liberated Areas, which had rendered extraordinary service in the War of Resistance Against Japan. And by what means have you waged the civil war? In addition to U.S. aid by means of the men you have snatched and the wealth you have plundered from the people in the areas under your rule. No sooner had the Chinese people's great decisive fight with the Japanese aggressors ended, no sooner had the external war ended, than you launched this civil war. You were defeated and you asked for negotiations, but suddenly you declared the chief Japanese war criminal Yasuji Okamura not guilty. And no sooner had we lodged a protest, demanding that you put him back in prison and be ready to hand him over to the People's Liberation Army, than you hurriedly sent him to Japan with 260 other Japanese war criminals. Gentlemen of the reactionary traitorous Kuomintang government, this action of yours is too unreasonable and is too gross a violation of the people's will. We have now deliberately added the word "traitorous" to your title, and you ought to accept it. Your government has long been traitorous, and it was only for the sake of brevity that we sometimes omitted the word; now we can omit it no longer. In addition to all the crimes of treason you committed in the past, you have now committed another, and a very serious one, which must be discussed at the meeting for peace negotiations. Whether or not you call it causing complication, the matter must be discussed; and since it happened after January 14 and was not included in the eight terms we originally presented, we therefore deem it necessary to add to the first term a new item, the punishment of Japanese war criminals. So the first term now contains two items, (a) the punishment of Japanese war criminals and (b) the punishment of civil war criminals. We are justified in adding this new item; it reflects the will of the people of the whole country. The people of the whole country demand that the Japanese war criminals be punished. Even within the Kuomintang, many think that the punishment of Yasuji Okamura and other Japanese war criminals and the punishment of Chiang Kai-shek and other civil war criminals are both natural and right. Whether you say we are sincere about peace or not, the question of these two types of war criminal must be negotiated, and both types must be punished. As to our demand that you arrest a batch of civil war criminals before the negotiations begin and prevent their escape, you hold that "no preconditions should be imposed". Gentlemen of the reactionary traitorous Kuomintang government, this is not a precondition but a demand which follows naturally from your acceptance of the term concerning the punishment of war criminals as a basis for negotiations.

We instructed you to arrest them for fear that they would escape. At this time, when we have not yet completed preparations for the negotiations, you are pathetically anxious to negotiate and you are restless because you have too much leisure; therefore we have assigned you a reasonable job. These war criminals have to be arrested; even if they flee to the remotest corners of the globe, they must be arrested. Since you are all infinitely compassionate and merciful saviours of afflicted mankind, since you desire to “shorten the duration of the war”, !’alleviate the sufferings of the people” and “treat the salvation of the people as the primary consideration”, and since you are great-hearted people, you should not cherish those who are responsible for the slaughter of millions of our fellow-countrymen. Judging by your willingness to accept the punishment of war criminals as part of the basis for negotiations, it seems you do not cherish these creatures very much. But, since you state that you find it rather difficult to arrest them immediately — all right, then, prevent them from escaping; under no circumstances must you let these creatures run away. Just imagine, gentlemen, after you have taken all the trouble to send a delegation to discuss with us the question of punishing these war criminals, what would we talk about if it should turn out that they have escaped? What a loss of face for the gentlemen of your delegation! How then would you show your great “sincerity for peace”? How then could you gentlemen prove that you really wish to “shorten the duration of the war”, “alleviate the sufferings of the people” and “treat the salvation of the people as the primary consideration”, and that you are not at all hypocritical? The Kuomintang spokesman also talked a great deal of other nonsense; such nonsense can fool nobody, and we consider it unnecessary to reply. Gentlemen of the hypothetical, token, reactionary, traitorous Kuomintang “government” (mind you, the word government is in inverted commas) at Nanking or Canton or Fenghua or Shanghai! If you think that our attitude in this statement is again not serious enough, please excuse us, for it is the only attitude we can take towards you.

TURN THE ARMY INTO A WORKING FORCE*

February 8, 1949

Your telegram of the 4th has been received. It is very good that you are speeding training and consolidation and preparing to start moving one month ahead of schedule.[1] Please proceed along these lines and do not slacken. Actually, however, training and consolidation must continue in March; the study of policy must be stressed and preparations must be made to take over and administer the large cities. From now on, the formula followed in the past twenty years, "first the rural areas, then the cities", will be reversed and changed to the formula, "first the cities, then the rural areas". The army is not only a fighting force, it is mainly a working force. All army cadres should learn how to take over and administer cities. In urban work they should learn how to be good at dealing with the imperialists and Kuomintang reactionaries, good at dealing with the bourgeoisie, good at leading the workers and organizing trade unions, good at mobilizing and organizing the youth, good at uniting with and training cadres in the new Liberated Areas, good at managing industry and commerce, good at running schools, newspapers, news agencies and broadcasting stations, good at handling foreign affairs, good at handling problems relating to the democratic parties and people's organizations, good at adjusting the relations between the cities and the rural areas and solving the problems of food, coal and other daily necessities and good at handling monetary and financial problems. In short, all urban problems, with which in the past our army cadres and fighters were unfamiliar, should from now on be shouldered by them. You are to advance and occupy four or five provinces, and in addition to the cities you will have to attend to vast rural areas. Since in the south all the rural areas will be newly liberated, the work will be fundamentally different from that in the old Liberated Areas of the north. In the first year, the policy of reducing rent and interest cannot be applied, and rent and interest will have to be paid in roughly the same way as before. Our rural work will have to proceed under these conditions. Therefore, rural work must also be learned afresh. However, as compared with urban work, rural work is easy to learn. Urban work is more difficult and is the main subject you are studying. If our cadres cannot quickly master the administration of cities, we shall encounter extreme difficulties. Consequently you must settle all other problems in February and use the whole month of March to learn how to work in the cities and in the new Liberated Areas. The Kuomintang has only one million several hundred thousand troops, scattered over a huge territory. Of course, there are still many battles to fight, but there is little possibility of such large-scale fighting as in the Huai-Hai campaign, and it may even be said that there is no such possibility and that the period of severe fighting is over. The army is still a fighting force, and in this respect there must be absolutely no relaxing; to relax would be a mistake. Nevertheless, the time has come for us to set ourselves the task of turning the army into a working force. If we do not now set ourselves this task and resolve to perform it, we shall be making an extremely big mistake. We are preparing to send 53,000 cadres south with the army, but this is a very small number. The occupation of eight or nine provinces and scores of big cities will require a huge number of working cadres, and to solve this problem the army must rely chiefly on itself. The army is a school. Our field armies of 2,100,000 are equivalent to several thousand universities and secondary schools. We have to rely chiefly on the army to supply our working cadres. You must understand this point clearly. Since severe fighting is basically over, replenishment of the army's manpower and equipment should be kept within suitable limits, and too much must

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* This telegram was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in reply to one from the Second and Third Field Armies. It was sent also to the other field armies concerned and to the bureaus of the Central Committee concerned. Considering that the period of severe fighting had ended after the three great campaigns of Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin, Comrade Mao Tse-tung in this telegram pointed out in good time that the People's Liberation Army was not only a fighting force but at the same time had to be a working force and that under certain conditions it should function mainly as a working force. This policy played a very important role in solving the cadre problem of that period in the new Liberated Areas and in ensuring the smooth development of the people's revolutionary cause. On the nature of the People's Liberation Army as both a fighting and a working force, see also "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", Section 2, pp. 362-63 of this volume.

not be demanded as regards quantity, quality and completeness, lest this should cause financial crisis. That is another point you should seriously consider. The above policies apply fully to the Fourth Field Army, and Comrades Lin Piao and Lo Jung-huan are likewise asked to pay attention to them. We have talked at length with Comrade Kang Sheng and asked him to hurry to your place by the 12th to confer with you. After conferring, please inform us promptly by telegram of your views and what you propose to do. The Eastern China Bureau and the Eastern China Military Area Headquarters should move at once to Hsuchow to work jointly with the General Front Committee[2] and with the Front Committee of the Third Field Army in a concentrated effort to plan the march to the south. Turn all your rear-area work over to the Shantung Sub-Bureau.

NOTES

[1] The Second and Third Field Armies had planned to advance the date of crossing the Yangtse River from April to March 1949. The crossing was postponed to late April because of the peace negotiations with the reactionary Kuomintang government.

[2] In order to meet the needs of the Huai-Hai campaign, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided on November 16, 1948 to form a General Front Committee consisting of Comrades Liu Po-cheng, Chen Yi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Su Yu and Tan Chen-lin, with Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping as secretary, to assume unified leadership of the Central Plains Field Army and the Eastern China Field Army and to exercise command over military affairs and operations on the Huai-Hai front.

WHY DO THE BADLY SPLIT REACTIONARIES STILL IDLY CLAMOUR FOR "TOTAL PEACE"?

February 15, 1949

The reactionary Kuomintang rule is collapsing more rapidly than was expected. It is only a little over four months since the People's Liberation Army captured Tsinan and only a little over three months since it captured Shenyang, but all the remnant forces of the Kuomintang in the military, political, economic, cultural and propaganda fields are already hopelessly split and disintegrated. The general collapse of Kuomintang rule began with the Liaohsi-Shenyang and Peiping-Tientsin campaigns on the northern front and the Huai-Hai campaign on the southern front. In less than four months, from early October last year to the end of January this year, these three campaigns cost the Kuomintang a total of more than 1,540,000 men, including 144 entire divisions of its regular army. The general collapse of Kuomintang rule is the inevitable outcome of the great victories of the Chinese People's War of Liberation and of the revolutionary movement of the Chinese people, but the clamour for "peace" by the Kuomintang and its U.S. masters has played a considerable part in hastening this collapse. On January 1 of this year, the Kuomintang reactionaries began to lift a rock called the "peace offensive"; they intended to hurl it at the Chinese people, but now it has dropped on their own feet. To be more exact, the rock has smashed the Kuomintang to pieces. Besides General Fu Tso-yi, who has helped the People's Liberation Army to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Peiping question, there are plenty of people everywhere who hope for a peaceful settlement. The Americans are looking on in impotent fury because their brats have failed them. In fact, this magic weapon, the peace offensive, was made in U.S. factories and was delivered to the Kuomintang more than half a year ago. It was Leighton Stuart himself who let out the secret. After Chiang Kai-shek issued his so-called New Year's Day message, Stuart told a correspondent of the Central News Agency that this was "what I myself have consistently worked for". According to U.S. news agencies, that correspondent lost his rice bowl for publishing this "off the record" remark. The reason the Chiang Kai-shek clique did not dare to obey this American order for quite a long time was clearly explained in a directive issued by the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee on December 27, 1948:

> If we cannot fight, we cannot make peace. If we can fight, then to talk about peace will only demoralize the troops and the people. Hence, whether we can fight or not, we have everything to lose and nothing to gain by talking about peace.

The Kuomintang issued this directive at that time because some Kuomintang factions other than Chiang's were already advocating peace talks. Last December 25, Pai Chung-hsi and the Hupeh Provincial Council under his direction raised the question of a "peaceful settlement"[1] with Chiang Kai-shek, who was compelled to issue a statement on January 1 about holding peace negotiations on the basis of his five terms. He hoped to snatch the patent for inventing the peace offensive from Pai Chung-hsi and to continue his old rule under a new trade mark. On January 8 he sent Chang Chun to Hankow to enlist the support of Pai Chung-hsi and on the same day he asked the governments of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union to intervene in China's civil war.[2] But all these moves failed completely. The statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on January 14 dealt a fatal blow to Chiang Kai-shek's plot for a sham peace and compelled him to "retire" backstage a week later. Although Chiang Kai-shek and Li Tsung-jen and the Americans had made all kinds of arrangements for this plot and hoped to put on a fairly good puppet show, the result was contrary to their expectations; not only did the audience dwindle, but even the actors themselves vanished from the stage one after another. In Fenghua, Chiang Kai-shek continues to direct his remnant forces in his "status of retirement", but he has lost his legal status and those people who believe in him are getting fewer and fewer. On its own initiative, Sun Fo's "Executive Yuan" has proclaimed "the moving of the Government to Canton"; it has broken away not only from the "president" and "acting president" of the government but also from the "Legislative Yuan" and "Control Yuan". Sun Fo's "Executive Yuan" calls for war,[3] but the "Ministry of National Defence", which is charged with conducting the war, is neither in Canton nor in Nanking, and the only thing that is known of it is that its spokesman is in Shanghai. Thus, all that is left for Li Tsung-jen to see from the ramparts of the "Stone City" is,

> *The sky brooding low over the land of Wu and Chu,*
> *With nothing between to meet the eye.*[4]

None of the orders issued by Li Tsung-jen since he assumed office on January 21 has been carried out. Although the Kuomintang no longer has any "total" "government" and although activities for local peace are going on in many places, the Kuomintang die-hards oppose local peace and demand a so-called "total peace", and they actually aim at rejecting peace in the vain hope of carrying on the war; they are terribly afraid that these local peace activities will spread and get out of hand. The farce of the badly split and disintegrating Kuomintang's demand for a "total peace" reached its climax in the statement issued on February 9 in Shanghai by the war criminal Teng Wen-yi, head of the Bureau for Political Work of the bogus Ministry of National Defence. Like Sun Fo, Teng Wen-yi repudiated Li Tsung-jen's January 22 statement, which accepted the eight terms of the Communist Party of China as the basis for peace negotiations; instead he demanded a so-called "peace on an equal footing, a total peace", failing which, he said, "we will stop at no sacrifices in order to fight the Communists to the bitter end". But Teng Wen-yi failed to mention with whom we, his opponents, should now negotiate for a "peace on an equal footing, a total peace". It seems that to approach Teng Wen-yi will get us nowhere and that not to approach Teng Wen-yi or anyone else will also get us nowhere. How very trying this is! According to a Central News Agency dispatch from Shanghai on February 9:

> Teng Wen-yi was asked by a reporter, "Has Acting President Li approved the four points in your public statement?"[5] Teng Wen-yi answered, "I am speaking from the stand of the Ministry of National Defence, and the four points made today were not submitted beforehand to Acting President Li."

Here, Teng Wen-yi is not only inventing a partial stand of the bogus Ministry of National Defence, as distinct from the total stand of the bogus Kuomintang government, but is in fact inventing a smaller partial stand of the Bureau for Political Work of the bogus Ministry of National Defence, as distinct from the larger partial stand of the bogus Ministry of National Defence. For Teng Wen-yi openly opposes and maligns the peaceful settlement in Peiping, while the bogus Ministry of National Defence hailed it on January 27 as an act “to shorten the war, secure peace and thereby preserve the foundations of the ancient capital, Peiping, and its cultural objects and historic monuments” and declared that “cessation of hostilities will be effected” in the same way in places like Tatung and Suiyuan.[6] From this it can be seen that those reactionaries who are the most energetic in their clamour for “total peace” are the very reactionaries with the least total stand. A Bureau for Political Work of the Ministry of National Defence can contradict the Ministry of National Defence as well as the acting president. These reactionaries are the greatest obstacle to the realization of peace in China today. They dream of agitating for a total war under the slogan of a “total peace”; in their own words, “if there is to be war, let it be a total war; if there is to be peace, let it be a total peace.” But as a matter of fact they have neither the power to bring about a total peace nor the power to wage a total war. Total power is in the hands of the Chinese people, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the Communist Party of China and the other democratic parties, not in the hands of the badly split and disintegrating Kuomintang. One side wields total power, while the other is hopelessly split and disintegrated, and this is the result of the prolonged struggle of the Chinese people and the prolonged evil-doing of the Kuomintang. No serious person can ignore this basic fact of the political situation in China today.

NOTES

[1] Taking advantage of the extremely unfavourable situation then facing Chiang Kai-shek, Pai Chung-hsi, Commander-in-Chief of the Central China “Bandit Suppression’ Headquarters of the Kuomintang, proposed a “peaceful settlement” of the civil war to Chiang, with the purpose of forcing him to step down and of raising the position of the Kwangsi clique to which Pai belonged. Under Pai Chung-hsi’s direction the bogus Hupeh Provincial Council sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, warning him that “if the disaster of war continues to spread and no attempt is made to change the course immediately, both the state and the people will be ruined”, and advising him to “follow the normal course of political settlement and seek ways to resume peace negotiations”.

[2] The request for intervention was rejected by the governments of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. In its *aide-mémoire* to the Kuomintang government on January 12, the U.S. government explained that the United States had rejected the request of the Kuomintang government because "it is not believed that any useful purpose would be served". This meant that the U.S. government was already aware that it could no longer avert the doom of the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek regime it had fostered.

[3] On February 6 and 7, 1949, Sun Fo, president of the bogus Executive Yuan of the Kuomintang government, made two statements at Canton opposing Li Tsung-jen's statement about accepting the eight terms for peace put forward by the Communist Party of China as the basis for negotiations. He said that "the Government has begun functioning in Canton where it has moved, and we should make a critical review of our past". He also said that "the term on the punishment of war criminals proposed by the Communists is absolutely unacceptable".

[4] Lines from an ode by the 14th century Chinese poet, Sadul, of the Yuan Dynasty. The first half of the ode reads:

From the ramparts of the Stone City
One sees the sky brooding low over the land of Wu and Chu,
With nothing between to meet the eye.
Pointing to strategic points famous in the Six Dynasties,
Only the green bills stand like walls.
Where army flags blotted the sun
And masts of war vessels touched the clouds
Snow-white skeletons lie scattered.
North and south of the River
How many warriors died!

The "Stone City" was an ancient name for Nanking.

[5] In his written statement on the "Development of Peace and War", Teng Wen-yi set forth the following "four points": (1) "The Government wants peace"; (2) "The Chinese Communist Party wants war"; (3) "The local peace at Peiping has become a hoax"; (4) "We will stop at no sacrifices in order to fight the Communists to the bitter end".

[6] After the liberation of Tientsin and Peiping, only a few isolated strong-points in northern China remained in the hands of the Kuomintang forces. They included Taiyuan, Tatung, Hsinhsiang, Anyang and Kueisui. The enemy at Taiyuan was completely wiped out on April 24, 1949. The enemy at Tatung submitted to peaceful reorganization on May 1. The enemy at Hsinhsiang surrendered on May 5. The enemy at Anyang was wiped out on May 6. Kueisui was peacefully liberated on September 19.

THE KUOMINTANG REACTIONARIES TURN FROM AN "APPEAL FOR PEACE" TO AN APPEAL FOR WAR

February 16, 1949

From the time the bandit Chiang Kai-shek launched his peace offensive on January 1, the heroes of the reactionary Kuomintang clique kept on repeating at great length their willingness to "shorten the duration of the war", "alleviate the sufferings of the people" and "treat the salvation of the people as the primary consideration". But early in February they suddenly began to play down their peace tune and strike up the old tune of "fighting the Communists to the bitter end". This has been especially so in the last few days. On February 13 the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee issued a "Special Directive for Propaganda" to "all party headquarters and party papers" which stated:

> Yeh Chien-ying has been spreading propaganda over our rear areas about the Chinese Communist Party's good faith in seeking peace, while condemning the Government's military moves as showing a lack of good faith in seeking peace. All our papers must emphatically refute this, directly and indirectly, in accordance with the following points.

The "Special Directive" gives quite a number of reasons why this "refutation" should be made:

> Rather than surrender unconditionally, the Government should fight to the bitter end.
>
> The eight terms Mao Tse-tung put forward in his January 14 statement would ruin the nation, and the Government should not have accepted them.
>
> The Communist Party of China should bear the responsibility for wrecking peace. Instead, it has now drawn up a list of

> so-called war criminals which includes all the Government leaders and has even demanded that the Government first arrest them; this clearly shows how truculent and unreasonable the Communist Party is. Unless the Communist Party of China changes this behaviour, it will indeed be difficult to find a way to peace negotiations.

There is no more of the pathetic anxiety for peace negotiations of two weeks ago. There is no further mention of those famous phrases, "shorten the duration of the war", "alleviate the sufferings of the people" and "treat the salvation of the people as the primary consideration", phrases which gladdened the heart and spread everywhere. If the Communist Party of China is unwilling to change its "behaviour" and insists on the punishment of the war criminals, then peace talks will be impossible. Which, then, is the primary consideration — the salvation of the people or the salvation of the war criminals? According to the "Special Directive for Propaganda" issued by these heroes of the Kuomintang, they prefer the latter. The Communist Party of China is still consulting the democratic parties and people's organizations about the list of war criminals, and opinions have now been received from several quarters. Judging by the opinions so far received, they all disapprove of the list put forward on December 25 last year by an authoritative person in the Communist Party of China. They consider that a list containing the names of only forty-three war criminals is too short; they consider that those to be held responsible for launching the counter-revolutionary war and butchering several million people should certainly not be limited to forty-three, but should be well over a hundred. For the time being, let us suppose that the number of war criminals will be set at well over a hundred. Then we should like to ask the heroes of the Kuomintang, why do you oppose the punishment of war criminals? Aren't you willing to "shorten the duration of the war" and "alleviate the sufferings of the people"? If the war continues because of this opposition of yours, won't that be stalling for time and prolonging the disaster of war? "Stalling for time and prolonging the disaster of war" was the very accusation you made against the Communist Party of China in the statement issued in the name of the Nanking government spokesman on January 26, 1949; can it be that now you want to take it back, write it on a placard and hang it on yourselves as a badge of honour? You are men of infinite compassion and mercy, who profess to "treat the salvation of the people as the primary consideration". Then why do you suddenly change and treat the salvation of the war criminals as the primary consideration? According to the statistics of your government's Ministry of the Interior, the number of the Chinese people is not 450 million, but 475 million; compare that with 100 odd war criminals — which number is bigger? You heroes have studied arithmetic; please do a careful sum in accordance with your arithmetic textbook and then draw your conclusion. If, without doing this sum, you hastily change your original formula of "treating the salvation of the people as the primary consideration" — a good formula with which we agree and the people of the whole country agree — into the formula of "treating the salvation of more than a hundred war criminals as the primary consideration", then be careful, for you certainly will not be able to maintain your ground. After having "appealed for peace" over several weeks, those individuals who have repeatedly mouthed the phrase, "treat the salvation of the people as the primary consideration", are no longer "appealing for peace" but are appealing for war. The reason the Kuomintang die-hards are in trouble is this: they have stubbornly opposed the people, ridden roughshod over them and thus have isolated themselves on the pinnacle of a pagoda; moreover, they will not repent, even unto death. All you broad masses of the people of the Yangtse valley and the south — workers, peasants, intellectuals, urban petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, enlightened gentry and Kuomintang members with a conscience — your attention, please! The days of the Kuomintang die-hards who have been riding roughshod over you are numbered. You and we are on the same side. The handful of die-hards will soon topple from their pinnacle, and a people's China will soon emerge.

ON THE KUOMINTANG'S DIFFERENT ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR

February 18, 1949

> "After the conclusion of the War of Resistance, the Government, following a policy of peace and national reconstruction, endeavoured to solve peacefully the problem of the Communist Party of China. For a period of a year and a half the Communist Party of China broke every agreement and therefore it should bear the responsibility for wrecking peace. Instead, it has now drawn up a list of so-called war criminals which includes all the Government leaders and has even demanded that the Government first arrest them; this clearly shows how truculent and unreasonable the Communist Party is. Unless the Communist Party of China changes this behaviour, it will indeed be difficult to find a way to peace negotiations."

The above is the entire argument on the question of the responsibility for the war which the Propaganda Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang advanced in a "Special Directive for Propaganda", issued on February 13, 1949.

It is the argument of none other than War Criminal No. 1, Chiang Kai-shek. In his New Year's Day statement he said:

> As a devoted adherent of the Three People's Principles and the teachings of the Father of the Republic, I was reluctant to follow the conclusion of the war against Japan with the armed suppression of the bandits and thereby to aggravate the sufferings of the people. Therefore, as soon as the War of Resistance came to an end, our Government proclaimed its policy of peace and national reconstruction and moreover sought to solve the Communist problem by means of political consultation and military

> mediation. But contrary to our expectations, the Communist Party for a period of a year and a half wilfully obstructed all agreements and proposals and made it impossible to carry them out by the measures which were originally intended. Finally, it even started an all-out armed rebellion which threatened the very existence of the state. This Government was thus driven to the painful necessity of mobilization to put down the rebellion.

On December 25, 1948, seven days before Chiang Kai-shek made this statement, an authoritative person in the Communist Party of China put forward a list of forty-three war criminals and illustrious at the head of the list was none other than this same Chiang Kai-shek. The war criminals, who want both to sue for peace and to shirk their responsibility, have no alternative but to shift the blame onto the Communist Party. But the two are irreconcilable. Since the Communist Party should bear the responsibility for launching the war, then the Communist Party should be punished. Since the Communists are "bandits", then the "bandits" should be "suppressed". Since they "started an all-out armed rebellion", then the "rebellion" should be "put down". "Bandit suppression" and "the putting down of rebellion" are a hundred per cent right, so why should they be abandoned? Why has the term "Communist bandits" been changed into "Communist Party" in all Kuomintang public documents issued since January 1, 1949?

Sun Fo, feeling that something was amiss, put forward a different argument about the responsibility for the war in a speech broadcast on the evening of the same day Chiang Kai-shek issued his New Year's Day statement. Sun Fo said:

> We remember that in the early period following the victory of the War of Resistance, three years ago, because the people needed rehabilitation, the country needed active reconstruction and there was still common understanding of these needs among the various parties, we called together representatives from various quarters and public personages for a Political Consultative Conference. After three weeks' effort and thanks especially to the kind mediation of Mr. Marshall, President Truman's special envoy, we agreed upon a programme for peace and national reconstruction and upon specific measures for settling various disputes. If we had then carried out all these measures in good time, just think how prosperous China would be today, and how happy her people would

> be! Unfortunately, at the time none of the various parties concerned would entirely forgo its selfish interests, the people throughout the country did not exert themselves to the utmost to promote the success of the peace movement, and so the disaster of war again occurred, plunging the people into misery and suffering.

Sun Fo is a little bit more "fair" than Chiang Kai-shek. You see, unlike Chiang Kai-shek, he does not shift the responsibility for the war entirely onto the Communist Party, but divides the blame equally among "the various parties concerned" by the method of "equalization of landownership".[1] Those involved are the Kuomintang, also the Communist Party, also the Democratic League and also the public personages. That isn't all; "the people throughout the country" are also involved; not one of our 475 million fellow-countrymen can escape responsibility. While Chiang Kai-shek caned the Communist Party alone, Sun Fo canes all the parties, all the people without party affiliation, every one of his fellow-countrymen; even Chiang Kai-shek, and perhaps even Sun Fo himself, will get a caning. Here you see two Kuomintangites at loggerheads, Sun Fo and Chiang Kai-shek.

A third Kuomintangite has come forward, saying, "No, in my opinion, the responsibility should be borne entirely by the Kuomintang." His name is Li Tsung-jen. On January 22, 1949, Li Tsung-jen issued a statement in his capacity as "acting president". Regarding the responsibility for the war, he said:

> The three years' civil war that followed the eight years' War of Resistance has not only completely destroyed the country's last hope of recovery after the victory in the War of Resistance but has also spread ruin everywhere north and south of the Yellow River, devastating innumerable farmsteads and houses, killing and wounding thousands upon thousands of innocent people, breaking up countless families and causing people everywhere to lament in hunger and cold. Such a terrible holocaust is really without parallel in the history of civil wars in our country.

Here Li Tsung-jen makes a statement but names no names; he fixes the responsibility neither on the Kuomintang, nor on the Communist Party, nor on any other quarter; yet he has stated one fact, that this "terrible holocaust" has occurred in no other place than "north and south of the Yellow River". Wherefore, let us examine who caused this "terrible holocaust" in the area from the Yellow River south to the Yangtse River and north to the Sungari River. Could it have been caused by the people and the people's army there, fighting among themselves? Since Li Tsung-jen was once Chief of Chiang Kai-shek's Peiping Headquarters and since the troops of his Kwangsi clique together with Chiang's troops once fought into the Yi-Meng mountain area in Shantung Province,[2] he has reliable information about where and how this "holocaust" took place. If there is nothing else good about Li Tsung-jen, at least it is good that he has made this one honest statement. What is more, instead of speaking about "putting down the rebellion" or "suppressing the bandits", he calls the war a "civil war", and this, for the Kuomintang, may be said to be quite novel.

Following his own logic, Li Tsung-jen declared in the same statement that "the Government is willing to start negotiations immediately on the basis of the eight terms proposed by the Communist Party of China". Li Tsung-jen knows that the first of the eight terms is the punishment of war criminals and that his own honourable name is among them. That the war criminals should be punished is a logical conclusion from the "holocaust". For this reason the Kuomintang die-hards are even now muttering complaints against Li Tsung-jen, saying that "the eight terms Mao Tse-tung put forward in his January 14 statement would ruin the nation, and the Government should not have accepted them".

There are reasons why the die-hards can only mutter and dare not speak out openly. Before Chiang Kai-shek "retired", the die-hards had thought of rejecting our eight terms, but then Chiang Kai-shek on second thoughts decided not to do so, probably because he considered that to reject them would leave no way out; this was the state of affairs on January 19. On that morning, Chang Chun-mai[3] upon his return-to Shanghai from Nanking said that "the Government may issue another statement soon in reply to the eight terms put forward by the Communist Party of China", whereupon the Central News Agency sent a service message the same evening, saying:

> Add the following note to the Shanghai dispatch on Chang Chun-mai's statement that has just come through. As regards his assertion that the Government will soon issue another statement, a Central News Agency correspondent has just learned from the quarters concerned that the Government has no intention of making another statement.

In the January 21 statement on his "retirement", Chiang Kai-shek said not a single word in criticism of the eight terms and even revoked his own five terms, changing them into "attaining peace on the principle that the integrity of territory and sovereignty is maintained, that the historic culture and social order are not destroyed and that the people's livelihood and right to freedom are safeguarded". He no longer dared raise such matters as the constitution, the legally constituted authority or the army. That is why on January 22 Li Tsung-jen dared to accept the eight terms of the Communist Party of China as the basis for negotiations and why the Kuomintang die-hards dared not openly reject them, but could only mutter that "the Government should not have accepted them".

Did Sun Fo consistently maintain his policy of "equalization of landownership"? No. After he "moved the Government to Canton" on February 5, 1949, he made a speech on February 7 about the question of war responsibility, saying:

> In the last six months the spread of the disaster of war has brought about serious changes in the situation and inflicted untold suffering on the people. All this has its origin in past mistakes, failures and unreasonableness, and today's grave situation is the consequence. We are all convinced that China needs the Three People's Principles. So long as the Three People's Principles are not put into effect, China's problems can never be solved. It may be recalled that twenty years ago the *Tsungli* of our party personally entrusted the Three People's Principles to our party as his legacy in the hope that they would be put into effect step by step. If they had been put into effect, the situation would never have developed into such a hopeless mess.

People will please note that here the president of the Executive Yuan of the Kuomintang government is not apportioning responsibility for the war equally among the various parties and all his fellow-countrymen but is putting it on the Kuomintang itself. It makes people feel exceedingly good to see Sun Fo applying the cane to the backside of the Kuomintang alone. What about the Communist Party? President Sun says:

> We can see that the Communist Party of China has been able to lure and dupe the people merely by appealing for the equalization of landownership, which is one part of the Three People's Principles, the Principle of the People's Livelihood. We ought to

> feel deeply ashamed, sharpen our vigilance and examine afresh our past mistakes.

Thank you, dear President! Although the Communist Party is still charged with the crime of "luring and duping the people", at least it is innocent of other horrible crimes and hence escapes a caning and is let off with its head and its backside unscathed.

Nor is President Sun lovable for this reason alone. In the same speech, he says:

> The spread of Communist influence today is a result of our failure to put into effect the principles we believe in. Our party's greatest mistake in the past was that certain members worshipped force too much and scrambled for power among themselves, thus giving the enemy opportunities to sow dissension in our ranks. The conclusion of the eight years' War of Resistance should have been the occasion for realizing the country's peaceful unification, an opportunity of a thousand years, and originally the Government had a plan of settling domestic disputes by political means, but unfortunately it was not carried out. After years of war and chaos the people urgently needed rehabilitation. The renewal of armed conflict made life impossible for the people, and the suffering was great; it also lowered the morale of the troops and caused repeated military setbacks. In deference to the feelings of the people and because he realized that military means had failed to solve the problem, President Chiang issued a New Year's Day message calling for peace.

Good! Here this war criminal Sun Fo has made a voluntary confession, and a frank and truthful one too, although he has not been arrested or caned. Who was it who worshipped force, launched the war and sued for peace only after military means had failed to solve the problem? None other than the Kuomintang, none other than Chiang Kai-shek himself. President Sun is very precise in his choice of words when he says that "certain members" of his party worshipped force too much. This conforms with the demand of the Communist Party of China that only a certain number of Kuomintang members be punished and branded as war criminals, but no more than this number, and of course not its entire membership.

So we have no dispute with Sun Fo over the number. We differ with him as to the conclusion to be drawn. We hold that "certain members" of the Kuomintang must be punished as war criminals because they "worshipped force" and caused the "renewal of armed conflict", which "made life impossible for the people". But Sun Fo does not agree. He says:

> In delaying the appointment of its delegation and constantly stalling for time, the Communist Party has shown that it also worships force, believes it has now become full-fledged and can conquer the whole country by force; it therefore refuses to cease hostilities as a first step. Its motive is all too clear. I hereby propose in all seriousness that in order to obtain lasting peace negotiations should be conducted by the two parties on an equal footing and that the terms should be fair and reasonable and acceptable to the people of the whole country.

From this you can see that President Sun is not quite so lovable. He seems to think that the punishment of war criminals is not a fair and reasonable term. On the question of war criminals, his words reveal an attitude similar to that of the "Special Directive for Propaganda" issued by the Kuomintang Propaganda Department on February 13, and similarly he only mutters and dares not openly object. He differs sharply from Li Tsung-jen who dares to accept the punishment of war criminals as one of the basic terms for negotiations.

But there is still something lovable about President Sun, for he says that although the Communist Party "also worships force", as shown by two points, "delaying the appointment of its delegation" and "refusing to cease hostilities as a first step", yet it is not like the Kuomintang, which worshipped force as early as 1946 and unleashed a most cruel war. Well, the Communist Party has "delayed the appointment of its delegation" because making a list of war criminals is an important matter, it must be "acceptable to the people of the whole country" and a list that is too long or too short would be unrealistic and unacceptable to "the people of the whole country" (whose ranks do not include the war criminals and their accomplices). This requires consultation with the democratic parties and people's organizations; it has therefore caused some "stalling", and we were not able to appoint our delegates quickly, thus arousing the displeasure of Sun Fo and his like. But from this, one cannot jump to the conclusion that the Communist Party "also worships force". It is probable that before long the list of war criminals will be published, our delegates named and the negotiations started; and then President Sun will not be able to say that we "worship force".

As for "refusing to cease hostilities as a first step", this is a correct attitude adopted in obedience to President Chiang's New Year's Day message. In that message President Chiang said:

> As soon as the Communist Party has a sincere desire for peace and can give definite indications of this, the Government will certainly meet it in all sincerity and be willing to discuss concrete measures for ending hostilities and restoring peace.

On January 19 Sun Fo's Executive Yuan passed a resolution in violation of Chiang Kai-shek's message, saying "first, effect an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities, and then, appoint delegates to enter into peace negotiations". On January 21 a Chinese Communist Party spokesman sternly criticized this absurd resolution.[4] Curiously enough, the president of the Executive Yuan turned a deaf ear to the criticism and on February 7 again nonsensically said that the Communist Party's "refusal to cease hostilities as a first step" was proof that it "also worships force". Even such a war criminal as Chiang Kai-shek knows that without negotiations it is impossible to cease hostilities and restore peace; on this point Sun Fo is far behind Chiang Kai-shek.

As is generally known, Sun Fo is listed as a war criminal because he has all along supported Chiang Kai-shek in launching and continuing the war. As late as June 22, 1947, he was still saying that a "settlement will finally come, provided militarily we fight to the end" and that "at present peace negotiations are out of the question, and the Government must crush the Communist Party of China or be overthrown by it".[5] Sun Fo himself is one of those "certain members" of the Kuomintang who worshipped force. But now he is making irresponsible and carping comments from the side-lines, as if he himself had never worshipped force and bore no responsibility for the failure to carry out the Three People's Principles. This is dishonest. Whether tried according to the law of the state or judged according to the party discipline of the Kuomintang, Sun Fo cannot escape the caning he deserves.

NOTES

[1] A famous slogan of Sun Yat-sen. (See "On New Democracy", Section 6, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II.) Here it is used as a pun in ridicule of Sun Fo.

[2] This refers to the region of the Yi and Meng Mountains in Shantung Province. It was the 46th Army of the Kwangsi clique which attacked this region jointly with Chiang Kai-shek's troops. This army had been brought from Hainan Island by sea and landed at Tsingtao in October 1946. It was completely wiped out in February in the Laiwu region of Shantung Province.

[3] A reactionary politician, the head of the small reactionary Democratic Socialist Party. See "Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution", Note 8, p. 126 of this volume and "On New Democracy", Note 9, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II.

[4] See "Comment by the Spokesman for the Communist Party of China on the Resolution of the Nanking Executive Yuan", pp. 321-23 of this volume.

[5] This refers to the remarks made in Nanking on June 22, 1947 by Sun Fo, then vice-president of the Kuomintang government, when he received reporters of the Associated Press, the Kuomintang *Central Daily News* and the *Hsin Min Pao*.

REPORT TO THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF THE SEVENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA*

March 5, 1949

I

With the conclusion of the Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin campaigns, the main force of the Kuomintang army has been destroyed. Only a million odd of its combat troops are left, dispersed over vast areas from Sinkiang to Taiwan and over extremely long fronts. From now on there can be only three patterns for disposing of these Kuomintang troops — the Tientsin pattern, the Peiping pattern or the Suiyuan pattern.[1] To dispose of the enemy forces by fighting, as we did in Tientsin, must still be the primary object of our attention and preparations. The commanders and fighters of the entire Chinese People's Liberation Army absolutely must not relax in the least their will to fight; any thinking that relaxes the will to fight and belittles the enemy is wrong. The possibility has increased for solutions on the Peiping pattern, that is, to compel enemy troops to reorganize peacefully, quickly and thoroughly into the People's Liberation Army in conformity with the latter's system. For the purpose of rapidly eliminating the vestiges of counter-revolution and liquidating its political influence, this solution is not quite as effective as the solution by fighting. However, it is bound to occur and is unavoidable after the main force of the enemy has been destroyed; furthermore, it is advantageous to our army and the people because casualties and destruction can be avoided. Therefore, the leading comrades of the various field armies should all pay attention to this form of struggle and learn how to use it. This is one form of struggle, a form of struggle without bloodshed; it does not mean that problems can be solved without struggle. The Suiyuan pattern is deliberately to keep part of the Kuomintang troops wholly or nearly intact, that is, to make temporary concessions to these troops in order to help win them over to our side or neutralize them politically. Thereby, we can concentrate our forces to finish off the main part of the remnant Kuomintang forces first and then, after a certain period (say, a few months, half a year or a year later), proceed to reorganize these troops into the People's Liberation Army in conformity with its system. That is another form of struggle. It will preserve more of the vestiges and political influence of counter-revolution than the Peiping form and for a longer period. But there is not the slightest doubt that they will eventually be eliminated. It must never be assumed that, once they yield to us, the counter-revolutionaries turn into revolutionaries, that their counter-revolutionary ideas and designs cease to exist. Definitely not. Many of the counter-revolutionaries will be remoulded, some will be sifted out, and certain die-hard counter-revolutionaries will be suppressed.

II

The People's Liberation Army is always a fighting force. Even after country-wide victory, our army will remain a fighting force during the historical period in which classes have not been abolished in our country and the imperialist system still exists in the world. On this point there should be no misunderstanding or wavering. The People's Liberation Army is also a working force; this will be the case especially when the Peiping or the Suiyuan pattern of solution is used in the

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* The Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held its Second Plenary Session in Hsipaipo Village, Pingshan County, Hopei Province, from March 5 to 13, 1949. Thirty-four members and nineteen alternate members of the Central Committee were present. This session, which was convened on the eve of the country-wide victory of the Chinese people's revolution, was extremely important. In his report at the session, Comrade Mao Tse-tung set forth policies to promote the speedy achievement of the country-wide victory of the revolution and to organize this victory. He explained that with this victory the centre of gravity of the Party's work should be shifted from the village to the city, defined the basic political, economic and foreign policies the Party should adopt after victory and set the general tasks and main course for transforming China from an agricultural into an industrial country, from a new-democratic into a socialist society. In particular, he analysed the current conditions in the different sectors of China's economy and the correct policies the Party had to adopt, pointed out the necessary ways to realize the socialist transforma-

south. With the gradual decrease in hostilities, its function as a working force will increase. There is a possibility that before very long the entire People's Liberation Army will be turned into a working force, and we must take this possibility into account. The 53,000 cadres now ready to leave with the army for the south are very inadequate for the vast new areas we shall soon hold, and we must prepare to turn all the field armies, 2,100,000 strong, into a working force. In that event, there will be enough cadres and the work can develop over large areas. We must look upon the field armies with their 2,100,000 men as a gigantic school for cadres.

III

From 1927 to the present the centre of gravity of our work has been in the villages — gathering strength in the villages, using the villages in order to surround the cities and then taking the cities. The period for this method of work has now ended. The period of "from the city to the village" and of the city leading the village has now begun. The centre of gravity of the Party's work has shifted from the village to the city. In the south the People's Liberation Army will occupy first the cities and then the villages. Attention must be given to both city and village and it is necessary to link closely urban and rural work, workers and peasants, industry and agriculture. Under no circumstances should the village be ignored and only the city given attention; such thinking is entirely wrong. Nevertheless, the centre of gravity of the work of the Party and the army must be

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tion in China, criticized various "Left" and Right deviations on this question and expressed the firm conviction that China's economy would develop at a comparatively high speed. Comrade Mao Tse-tung appraised the new situation in the class struggle both at home and abroad following the victory of the Chinese people's democratic revolution and gave timely warning that the "sugar-coated bullets" of the bourgeoisie would become the main danger to the proletariat. All this gives the document great significance for a long historical period. This report and his article *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship*, written in June of the same year, formed the basis for the policies embodied in the Common Programme adopted by the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which served as a provisional constitution after the founding of New China. The Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party adopted a resolution based on Comrade Mao Tse-tung's report. After the session, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China moved from Hsipaipo, Pingshan County, Hopei Province to Peiping.

in the cities; we must do our utmost to learn how to administer and build the cities. In the cities we must learn how to wage political, economic and cultural struggles against the imperialists, the Kuomintang and the bourgeoisie and also how to wage diplomatic struggles against the imperialists. We must learn how to carry on overt struggles against them, we must also learn how to carry on covert struggles against them. If we do not pay attention to these problems, if we do not learn how to wage these struggles against them and win victory in the struggles, we shall be unable to maintain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail. After the enemies with guns have been wiped out, there will still be enemies without guns; they are bound to struggle desperately against us; we must never regard these enemies lightly. If we do not now raise and understand the problem in this way, we shall commit very grave mistakes.

IV

On whom shall we rely in our struggles in the cities? Some muddle-headed comrades think we should rely not on the working class but on the masses of the poor. Some comrades who are even more muddle-headed think we should rely on the bourgeoisie. As for the direction of industrial development, some muddle-headed comrades maintain that we should chiefly help the development of private enterprise and not state enterprise, whereas others hold the opposite view that it suffices to pay attention to state enterprise and that private enterprise is of little importance. We must criticize these muddled views. We must whole-heartedly rely on the working class, unite with the rest of the labouring masses, win over the intellectuals and win over to our side as many as possible of the national bourgeois elements and their representatives who can co-operate with us — or neutralize them — so that we can wage a determined struggle against the imperialists, the Kuomintang and the bureaucrat-capitalist class and defeat these enemies step by step. Meanwhile we shall set about our task of construction and learn, step by step, how to administer cities and restore and develop their production. Regarding the problem of restoring and developing production we must be clear about the following: first comes the production of state industry, second the production of private industry and third handicraft production. From the very first day we take over a city, we should direct our attention to restoring and developing its production. We must not go about our work blindly and haphazardly and forget our central task, lest several months after taking over a city its production and construction should still not be on the right track and many industries should be at a standstill, with the result that the workers are unemployed, their livelihood deteriorates and they become dissatisfied with the Communist Party. Such a state of affairs is entirely impermissible. Therefore, our comrades must do their utmost to learn the techniques of production and the methods of managing production as well as other closely related work such as commerce and banking. Only when production in the cities is restored and developed, when consumer-cities are transformed into producer-cities, can the people's political power be consolidated. Other work in the cities, for example, in Party organization, in organs of political power, in trade unions and other people's organizations, in culture and education, in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, in news agencies, newspapers and broadcasting stations — all this work revolves around and serves the central task, production and construction. If we know nothing about production and do not master it quickly, if we cannot restore and develop production as speedily as possible and achieve solid successes so that the livelihood of the workers, first of all, and that of the people in general is improved, we shall be unable to maintain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail.

V

Conditions in the south are different from those in the north, and the Party's tasks must also be different. The south is still under Kuomintang rule. There, the tasks of the Party and the People's Liberation Army are to wipe out the Kuomintang's reactionary armed forces in city and countryside, set up Party organizations, set up organs of political power, arouse the masses, establish trade unions, peasant associations and other people's organizations, build the people's armed forces, mop up the remnant Kuomintang forces and restore and develop production. In the countryside, our first tasks are to wage struggles step by step, to clean out the bandits and to oppose the local tyrants (the section of the landlord class in power) in order to complete preparations for the reduction of rent and interest; this reduction can then be accomplished within a year or two after the arrival of the People's Liberation Army, and the precondition for the distribution of land will thus be created. At the same time care must be taken to maintain the present level of agricultural production as far as possible and to prevent it from declining. In the north, except for the few new Liberated Areas, conditions are completely different. Here the Kuomintang rule has been overthrown, the people's rule has been established and the land problem has been fundamentally solved. Here the central task of the Party is to mobilize all forces to restore and develop production; this should be the centre of gravity in all work. It is also necessary to restore and develop cultural and educational work, wipe out the remnants of the reactionary forces, consolidate the entire north and support the People's Liberation Army.

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VI

We have already carried out extensive economic construction, and the Party's economic policy has been implemented in practice and has achieved marked success. However, there are still many muddled views within the Party on the question of why we should adopt this kind of economic policy and not another, *i.e.*, on a question of theory and principle. How should this question be answered? In our opinion, the answer should be as follows. Before the War of Resistance Against Japan, the proportions of industry and agriculture in the entire national economy of China were, modern industry about 10 per cent, and agriculture and handicrafts about 90 per cent. This was the result of imperialist and feudal oppression; this was the economic expression of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of the society of old China; and this is our basic point of departure for all questions during the period of the Chinese revolution and for a fairly long period after victory. This gives rise to a series of problems regarding our Party's strategy, tactics and policy. An important task for our Party at present is to reach a clearer understanding of these problems and their solution. That is to say:

1. China already has a modern industry constituting about 10 per cent of her economy; this is progressive, this is different from

ancient times. As a result, China has new classes and new political parties — the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, proletarian and bourgeois parties. The proletariat and its party, because they have been oppressed by manifold enemies, have become steeled and are qualified to lead the Chinese people's revolution. Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will commit Right opportunist mistakes.

2. China still has scattered and individual agriculture and handicrafts, constituting about 90 per cent of her entire economy; this is backward, this is not very different from ancient times — about 90 per cent of our economic life remains the same as in ancient times. We have abolished, or will soon abolish, the age-old feudal ownership of land. In this respect, we have become, or will soon become, different from what we were in ancient times, and have or will soon have the possibility of modernizing our agriculture and handicrafts step by step. In their basic form, however, our agriculture and handicrafts today are still scattered and individual, somewhat as they were in ancient times, and they will remain so for a fairly long time to come. Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will commit "Left" opportunist mistakes.

3. China's modern industry, though the value of its output amounts to only about 10 per cent of the total value of output of the national economy, is extremely concentrated; the largest and most important part of the capital is concentrated in the hands of the imperialists and their lackeys, the Chinese bureaucrat-capitalists. The confiscation of this capital and its transfer to the people's republic led by the proletariat will enable the people's republic to control the economic lifelines of the country and will enable the state-owned economy to become the leading sector of the entire national economy. This sector of the economy is socialist, not capitalist, in character. Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will commit Right opportunist mistakes.

4. China's private capitalist industry, which occupies second place in her modern industry, is a force which must not be ignored. Because they have been oppressed or hemmed in by imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, the national bourgeoisie of China and its representatives have often taken part in the people's democratic revolutionary struggles or maintained a neutral stand. For this reason and because China's economy is still backward, there will be need, for a fairly long period after the victory of the revolution, to make use of the positive qualities of urban and rural private capitalism as far as possible, in the interest of developing the national economy.

In this period, all capitalist elements in the cities and countryside which are not harmful but beneficial to the national economy should be allowed to exist and expand. This is not only unavoidable but also economically necessary. But the existence and expansion of capitalism in China will not be unrestricted and uncurbed as in the capitalist countries. It will be restricted from several directions — in the scope of its operation and by tax policy, market prices and labour conditions. We shall adopt well-measured and flexible policies for restricting capitalism from several directions according to the specific conditions in each place, each industry and each period. It is necessary and useful for us to apply Sun Yat-sen's slogan of "regulation of capital".[2] However, in the interest of the whole national economy and in the present and future interest of the working class and all the labouring people, we must not restrict the private capitalist economy too much or too rigidly, but must leave room for it to exist and develop within the framework of the economic policy and planning of the people's republic. The policy of restricting private capitalism is bound to meet with resistance in varying degrees and forms from the bourgeoisie, especially from the big owners of private enterprises, that is, from the big capitalists. Restriction versus opposition to restriction will be the main form of class struggle in the new-democratic state. It is entirely wrong to think that at present we need not restrict capitalism and can discard the slogan of "regulation of capital"; that is a Right opportunist view. But the opposite view, which advocates too much or too rigid restriction of private capital or holds that we can simply eliminate private capital very quickly, is also entirely wrong; this is a "Left" opportunist or adventurist view.

5. Scattered, individual agriculture and handicrafts, which make up 90 per cent of the total value of output of the national economy, can and must be led prudently, step by step and yet actively to develop towards modernization and collectivization; the view that they may be left to take their own course is wrong. It is necessary to organize producers', consumers' and credit co-operatives and leading organs of the co-operatives at national, provincial, municipal, county and district levels. Such co-operatives are collective economic organizations of the labouring masses, based on private ownership and under the direction of the state power led by the proletariat. The fact that the Chinese people are culturally backward and have no tradition of organizing co-operatives may confront us with difficulties, but co-operatives can and must be organized and must be promoted and

developed. If there were only a state-owned economy and no co-operative economy, it would be impossible for us to lead the individual economy of the labouring people step by step towards collectivization, impossible to develop from the new-democratic society to the future socialist society and impossible to consolidate the leadership of the proletariat in the state power. Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will also commit extremely serious mistakes. The state-owned economy is socialist in character and the co-operative economy is semi-socialist; these plus private capitalism, plus the individual economy, plus the state-capitalist economy in which the state and private capitalists work jointly, will be the chief sectors of the economy of the people's republic and will constitute the new-democratic economic structure.

6. The restoration and development of the national economy of the people's republic would be impossible without a policy of controlling foreign trade. When imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and the concentrated expression of all three, the Kuomintang regime, have been eliminated in China, the problem of establishing an independent and integrated industrial system will remain unsolved and it will be finally solved only when our country has greatly developed economically and changed from a backward agricultural into an advanced industrial country. It will be impossible to achieve this aim without controlling foreign trade. After the country-wide victory of the Chinese revolution and the solution of the land problem, two basic contradictions will still exist in China. The first is internal, that is, the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie. The second is external, that is, the contradiction between China and the imperialist countries. Consequently, after the victory of the people's democratic revolution, the state power of the people's republic under the leadership of the working class must not be weakened but must be strengthened. The two basic policies of the state in the economic struggle will be regulation of capital at home and control of foreign trade. Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will commit extremely serious mistakes.

7. China has inherited a backward economy. But the Chinese people are brave and industrious. With the victory of the Chinese people's revolution and the founding of the people's republic, and with the leadership of the Communist Party of China, plus the support of the working class of the countries of the world and chiefly the support of the Soviet Union, the speed of China's economic construction will

not be very slow, but may be fairly fast. The day is not far off when China will attain prosperity. There is absolutely no ground for pessimism about China's economic resurgence.

VII

Old China was a semi-colonial country under imperialist domination. Thoroughly anti-imperialist in character, the Chinese people's democratic revolution has incurred the bitter hatred of the imperialists who have done their utmost to help the Kuomintang. This has aroused the Chinese people to even deeper indignation against the imperialists and deprived them of their last shred of prestige among the Chinese people. At the same time the whole imperialist system is very much weakened after World War II, while the strength of the world anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union is greater than ever before. In these circumstances, we can and should adopt a policy of systematically and completely destroying imperialist domination in China. This imperialist domination manifests itself in the political, economic and cultural fields. In each city or place where the Kuomintang troops are wiped out and the Kuomintang government is overthrown, imperialist political domination is overthrown with it, and so is imperialist economic and cultural domination. But the economic and cultural establishments run directly by the imperialists are still there, and so are the diplomatic personnel and the journalists recognized by the Kuomintang. We must deal with all these properly in their order of urgency. Refuse to recognize the legal status of any foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel of the Kuomintang period, refuse to recognize all the treasonable treaties of the Kuomintang period, abolish all imperialist propaganda agencies in China, take immediate control of foreign trade and reform the customs system — these are the first steps we must take upon entering the big cities. When they have acted thus, the Chinese people will have stood up in the face of imperialism. As for the remaining imperialist economic and cultural establishments, they can be allowed to exist for the time being, subject to our supervision and control, to be dealt with by us after country-wide victory. As for ordinary foreign nationals, their legitimate interests will be protected and not encroached upon. As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries, we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after country-wide victory. We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China. As for doing business with foreigners, there is no question; wherever there is business to do, we shall do it and we have already started; the businessmen of several capitalist countries are competing for such business. So far as possible, we must first of all trade with the socialist and people's democratic countries; at the same time we will also trade with capitalist countries.

VII

All the conditions are ripe for convening the Political Consultative Conference and forming a democratic coalition government. All the democratic parties, people's organizations and democrats without party affiliation are on our side. The bourgeoisie in Shanghai and in the Yangtse valley are trying to establish contacts with us. Navigation and postal communications between north and south have been resumed. The disintegrating Kuomintang has alienated itself from all the masses. We are preparing to have negotiations with the reactionary Nanking government.[3] Its moving forces for negotiating with us are the warlords of the Kwangsi clique, those factions of the Kuomintang favouring peace and the Shanghai bourgeoisie. Their aims are to obtain a share in the coalition government, retain as many troops as possible, preserve the interests of the bourgeoisie in Shanghai and the south and do their best to moderate the revolution. These groups recognize our eight terms as the basis for negotiations, but they want to bargain so that their losses will not be too great. Those trying to wreck the negotiations are Chiang Kai-shek and his sworn followers. Chiang Kai-shek still has sixty divisions south of the Yangtse and they are preparing to fight. Our policy is not to refuse negotiations, but to demand that the other side accept the eight terms in their entirety and to allow no bargaining. In return, we would refrain from fighting the Kwangsi clique and the other Kuomintang factions which favour peace, postpone the reorganization of their troops for about a year, allow some individuals in the Nanking government to take part in the Political Consultative Conference and the coalition government and agree to protect certain interests of the bourgeoisie in Shanghai and in the south. The negotiations are to be on an over-all basis and, if successful, they will reduce many obstacles to our advance into the south and to the take-over of the big cities there, which will have great advantages. If they are not successful, then separate negotiations on a local basis will be held after our army advances. The negotiations on an over-all basis are tentatively fixed for late March. We hope to occupy Nanking by April or May, then convene the Political Consultative Conference in Peiping, form a coalition government and make Peiping the capital. Since we have agreed to hold negotiations, we should be prepared for the many troubles which will arise after the success of the negotiations, and we should be ready with clear heads to deal with the tactics the other side will adopt, the tactics of the Monkey who gets into the stomach of the Princess of the Iron Fan to play the devil.[4] As long as we are fully prepared mentally, we can beat any devilish Monkey. Whether the peace negotiations are over-all or local, we should be prepared for such an eventuality. We should not refuse to enter into negotiations because we are afraid of trouble and want to avoid complications, nor should we enter into negotiations with our minds in a haze. We should be firm in principle; we should also have all the flexibility permissible and necessary for carrying out our principles.

IX

The people's democratic dictatorship, led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant alliance, requires that our Party conscientiously unite the entire working class, the entire peasantry and the broad masses of revolutionary intellectuals; these are the leading and basic forces of the dictatorship. Without this unity, the dictatorship cannot be consolidated. It is also required that our Party unite with as many as possible of the representatives of the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie who can co-operate with us and with their intellectuals and political groups, so that, during the revolutionary period, we can isolate the counter-revolutionary forces and completely overthrow both the counter-revolutionary and imperialist forces in China and so that, after the victory of the revolution, we can speedily restore and develop production, cope with foreign imperialism, steadily transform China from an agricultural into an industrial country and build China into a great socialist state. Therefore, our Party's policy of long-term co-operation with non-Party democrats should be clearly established in the thinking and work of the whole Party. We must regard the majority of non-Party democrats as we do our own cadres, consult with them sincerely and frankly to solve those problems that call for consultation and solution, give them work, entrust them with the responsibility and authority that should go with their posts and help them do their work well. Proceeding from the desire to unite with them, we should carry out serious and appropriate criticism or struggle against their errors and shortcomings in order to attain the objective of unity. It would be wrong to adopt an accommodating attitude towards their errors or shortcomings. It would also be wrong to adopt a closed-door or perfunctory attitude towards them. In each big or medium city, each strategic region and each province, we should develop a group of non-Party democrats who have prestige and can co-operate with us. The incorrect attitude towards non-Party democrats, fostered by the closed-door style in our Party during the War of Agrarian Revolution, was not entirely overcome during the War of Resistance Against Japan, and it reappeared in 1947 during the high tide of the land reform in the base areas. This attitude would serve only to isolate our Party, prevent the consolidation of the people's democratic dictatorship and enable the enemy to obtain allies. Now that China's first Political Consultative Conference under the leadership of our Party will soon be convened, that a democratic coalition government will soon be formed and that the revolution will soon be victorious throughout the country, the whole Party must make a serious and self-critical examination of this problem and understand it correctly; it must oppose the two deviations, the Right deviation of accommodation and the closed-door and perfunctory "Left" deviation, and adopt an entirely correct attitude.

IX

Very soon we shall be victorious throughout the country. This victory will breach the eastern front of imperialism and will have great international significance. To win this victory will not require much more time and effort, but to consolidate it will. The bourgeoisie doubts our ability to construct. The imperialists reckon that eventually we will beg alms from them in order to live. With victory, certain moods may grow within the Party — arrogance, the airs of a self-styled hero, inertia and unwillingness to make progress, love of pleasure and distaste for continued hard living. With victory, the people will be grateful to us and the bourgeoisie will come forward to flatter us. It has been proved that the enemy cannot conquer us by force of arms. However, the flattery of the bourgeoisie may conquer the weak-willed in our ranks. There may be some Communists, who were not conquered by enemies with guns and were worthy of the name of heroes for standing up to these enemies, but who cannot withstand sugar-coated bullets; they will be defeated by sugar-coated bullets. We must guard against such a situation. To win country-wide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand *li*. Even if this step is worthy of pride, it is comparatively tiny; what will be more worthy of pride is yet to come. After several decades, the victory of the Chinese people's democratic revolution, viewed in retrospect, will seem like only a brief prologue to a long drama. A drama begins with a prologue, but the prologue is not the climax. The Chinese revolution is great, but the road after the revolution will be longer, the work greater and more arduous. This must be made clear now in the Party. The comrades must be taught to remain modest, prudent and free from arrogance and rashness in their style of work. The comrades must be taught to preserve the style of plain living and hard struggle. We have the Marxist-Leninist weapon of criticism and self-criticism. We can get rid of a bad style and keep the good. We can learn what we did not know. We are not only good at destroying the old world, we are also good at building the new. Not only can the Chinese people live without begging alms from the imperialists, they will live a better life than that in the imperialist countries.

NOTES

[1] On September 19, 1949, Tung Chi-wu, Kuomintang governor of Suiyuan Province, and Sun Lan-feng, Kuomintang army commander, revolted and came over with more than forty thousand men. The regrouping of these units began on February 21, 1950, under the leadership of the Suiyuan Military Command of the People's Liberation Army. They were reorganized into the People's Liberation Army on April 10.

[2] "Regulation of capital" was one of Sun Yat-sen's well-known slogans. The Manifesto of the Kuomintang's First National Congress, in which the Kuomintang and the Communist Party co-operated, was published on January 23, 1924 and gave the following interpretation to this slogan: "Private industries, whether of Chinese or of foreign nationals, which are either of a monopolistic nature or are beyond the capacity of private individuals to develop, such as banking, railways, and navigation, shall be undertaken by the state, so that privately owned capital shall not control the economic life of the people."

[3] Concerning peace negotiations with the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made the following decisions on March 26, 1949:

(1) Time for the negotiations to begin, April 1;

(2) Place for the negotiations, Peiping;

(3) Chou En-lai, Lin Po-chu, Lin Piao, Yeh Chien-ying and Li Wei-han are appointed as delegates (on April 1, the Central Committee decided to add Nieh Jung-chen to the list of delegates), with Chou En-lai as chief delegate, to negotiate with the Nanking delegation on the basis of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Statement on the Present Situation made on January 14 and the eight terms set forth therein;

(4) The reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government is to be immediately notified of the aforesaid by radio broadcast and told to send its delegation to the specified place, at the specified time and, in order to facilitate the negotiations, to bring all necessary material relating to the eight terms.

[4] For the story of how Sun Wu-kung, the Monkey, changed himself into a tiny insect, found his way into the stomach of the Princess of the Iron Fan and thus defeated her, see the Chinese novel, *Pilgrimage to the West*, Chapter 59.

METHODS OF WORK OF PARTY COMMITTEES*

March 13, 1949

1. The secretary of a Party committee must be good at being a "squad leader". A Party committee has ten to twenty members; it is like a squad in the army, and the secretary is like the "squad leader". It is indeed not easy to lead this squad well. Each bureau or sub-bureau of the Central Committee now leads a vast area and shoulders very heavy responsibilities. To lead means not only to decide general and specific policies but also to devise correct methods of work. Even with correct general and specific policies, troubles may still arise if methods of work are neglected. To fulfil its task of exercising leadership, a Party committee must rely on its "squad members" and enable them to play their parts to the full. To be a good "squad leader", the secretary should study hard and investigate thoroughly. A secretary or deputy secretary will find it difficult to direct his "squad" well if he does not take care to do propaganda and organizational work among his own "squad members", is not good at handling his relations with committee members or does not study how to run meetings successfully. If the "squad members" do not march in step, they can never expect to lead tens of millions of people in fighting and construction. Of course, the relation between the secretary and the committee members is one in which the minority must obey the majority, so it is different from the relation between a squad leader and his men. Here we speak only by way of analogy.

2. Place problems on the table. This should be done not only by the "squad leader" but by the committee members too. Do not talk behind people's backs. Whenever problems arise, call a meeting, place the problems on the table for discussion, take some decisions and the problems will be solved. If problems exist and are not placed on the table, they will remain unsolved for a long time and even drag on for years. The "squad leader" and the committee members should show understanding in their relations with each other.

Nothing is more important than mutual understanding, support and friendship between the secretary and the committee members, between the Central Committee and its bureaus and between the bureaus and the area Party committees. In the past this point received little attention, but since the Seventh Party Congress much progress has been made in this respect and the ties of friendship and unity have been greatly strengthened. We should continue to pay constant attention to this point in the future.

3. "Exchange information." This means that members of a Party committee should keep each other informed and exchange views on matters that have come to their attention. This is of great importance in achieving a common language. Some fail to do so and, like the people described by Lao Tzu, "do not visit each other all their lives, though the crowing of their cocks and the barking of their dogs are within hearing of each other".[1] The result is that they lack a common language. In the past some of our high-ranking cadres did not have a common language even on basic theoretical problems of Marxism-Leninism, because they had not studied enough. There is more of a common language in the Party today, but the problem has not yet been fully solved. For instance, in the land reform there is still some difference in the understanding of what is meant by "middle peasants" and "rich peasants".

4. Ask your subordinates about matters you don't understand or don't know, and do not lightly express your approval or disapproval. Some documents, after having been drafted, are withheld from circulation for a time because certain questions in them need to be clarified and it is necessary to consult the lower levels first. We should never pretend to know what we don't know, we should "not feel ashamed to ask and learn from people below"[2] and we should listen carefully to the views of the cadres at the lower levels. Be a pupil before you become a teacher; learn from the cadres at the lower levels before you issue orders. In handling problems, this should be the practice of all bureaus of the Central Committee and Party committees of the fronts, except in military emergencies or when the facts of the matter are already clear. To do this will not lower one's prestige, but can only raise it. Since our decisions incorporate the correct views of the cadres at the lower levels, the latter will naturally support them. What the cadres at the lower levels say may or may not be correct; we must analyse it.

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* This was part of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's concluding speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

We must heed the correct views and act upon them. The reason why the leadership of the Central Committee is correct is chiefly that it synthesizes the material, reports and correct views coming from different localities. It would be difficult for the Central Committee to issue correct orders if the localities did not provide material and put forward opinions. Listen also to the mistaken views from below; it is wrong not to listen to them at all. Such views, however, are not to be acted upon but to be criticized.

5. Learn to "play the piano". In playing the piano all ten fingers are in motion; it won't do to move some fingers only and not others. But if all ten fingers press down at once, there is no melody. To produce good music, the ten fingers should move rhythmically and in co-ordination. A Party committee should keep a firm grasp on its central task and at the same time, around the central task, it should unfold the work in other fields. At present, we have to take care of many fields; we must look after the work in all the areas, armed units and departments, and not give all our attention to a few problems, to the exclusion of others. Wherever there is a problem, we must put our finger on it, and this is a method we must master. Some play the piano well and some badly, and there is a great difference in the melodies they produce. Members of Party committees must learn to "play the piano" well.

6. "Grasp firmly." That is to say, the Party committee must not merely "grasp", but must "grasp firmly", its main tasks. One can get a grip on something only when it is grasped firmly, without the slightest slackening. Not to grasp firmly is not to grasp at all. Naturally, one cannot get a grip on something with an open hand. When the hand is clenched as if grasping something but is not clenched tightly, there is still no grip. Some of our comrades do grasp the main tasks, but their grasp is not firm and so they cannot make a success of their work. It will not do to have no grasp at all, nor will it do if the grasp is not firm.

7. "Have a head for figures." That is to say, we must attend to the quantitative aspect of a situation or problem and make a basic quantitative analysis. Every quality manifests itself in a certain quantity, and without quantity there can be no quality. To this day many of our comrades still do not understand that they must attend to the quantitative aspect of things - the basic statistics, the main percentages and the quantitative limits that determine the qualities of things. They have no "figures" in their heads and as a result cannot

help making mistakes. For instance, in carrying out the land reform it is essential to have such figures as the percentages of landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants and poor peasants among the population and the amount of land owned by each group, because only on this basis can we formulate correct policies. Whom to call a rich peasant, whom a well-to-do middle peasant, and how much income derived from exploitation makes a person a rich peasant as distinct from a well-to-do middle peasant — in all these cases too, the quantitative limits must be ascertained. In all mass movements we must make a basic investigation and analysis of the number of active supporters, opponents and neutrals and must not decide problems subjectively and without basis.

8. "Notice to Reassure the Public." Notice of meetings should be given beforehand; this is like issuing a "Notice to Reassure the Public", so that everybody will know what is going to be discussed and what problems are to be solved and can make timely preparations. In some places, meetings of cadres are called without first preparing reports and draft resolutions, and only when people have arrived for the meeting are makeshifts improvised; this is just like the saying, "Troops and horses have arrived, but food and fodder are not ready", and that is no good. Don't call a meeting in a hurry if the preparations are not completed.

9. "Fewer and better troops and simpler administration." Talks, speeches, articles and resolutions should all be concise and to the point. Meetings also should not go on too long.

10. Pay attention to uniting and working with comrades who differ with you. This should be borne in mind both in the localities and in the army. It also applies to relations with people outside the Party. We have come together from every corner of the country and should be good at uniting in our work not only with comrades who hold the same views as we but also with those who hold different views. There are some among us who have made very serious mistakes; we should not be prejudiced against them but should be ready to work with them.

11. Guard against arrogance. For anyone in a leading position, this is a matter of principle and an important condition for maintaining unity. Even those who have made no serious mistakes and have achieved very great success in their work should not be arrogant. Celebration of the birthdays of Party leaders is forbidden. Naming places, streets and enterprises after Party leaders is likewise forbidden. We must keep to our style of plain living and hard work and put a stop to flattery and exaggerated praise.

12. Draw two lines of distinction. First, between revolution and counter-revolution, between Yenan and Sian.[3] Some do not understand that they must draw this line of distinction. For example, when they combat bureaucracy, they speak of Yenan as though "nothing is right" there and fail to make a comparison and distinguish between the bureaucracy in Yenan and the bureaucracy in Sian. This is fundamentally wrong. Secondly, within the revolutionary ranks, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between right and wrong, between achievements and shortcomings and to make clear which of the two is primary and which secondary. For instance, do the achievements amount to 30 per cent or to 70 per cent of the whole? It will not do either to understate or to overstate. We must have a fundamental evaluation of a person's work and establish whether his achievements amount to 30 per cent and his mistakes to 70 per cent, or vice versa. If his achievements amount to 70 per cent of the whole, then his work should in the main be approved. It would be entirely wrong to describe work in which the achievements are primary as work in which the mistakes are primary. In our approach to problems we must not forget to draw these two lines of distinction, between revolution and counter-revolution and between achievements and shortcomings. We shall be able to handle things well if we bear these two distinctions in mind; otherwise we shall confuse the nature of the problems. To draw these distinctions well, careful study and analysis are of course necessary. Our attitude towards every person and every matter should be one of analysis and study.

The members of the Political Bureau and I personally feel that only by using the above methods can Party committees do their work well. In addition to conducting Party congresses well, it is most important for the Party committees at all levels to perform their work of leadership well. We must make efforts to study and perfect the methods of work so as to raise further the Party committees' level of leadership.

NOTES

[1] The quotation is from *Lao Tzu*, Chapter LXXX.

[2] The quotation is from the *Confucian Analects*, Book V, "Kungyeh Chang".

[3] Yenan was the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China from January 1937 to March 1947; Sian was the centre of the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang in northwestern China. Comrade Mao Tse-tung cited the two cities as symbols of revolution and counter-revolution.

WHITHER THE NANKING GOVERNMENT?

April 4, 1949

Two roads are open to the Nanking Kuomintang government and its military and administrative personnel. Either they cling to the Chiang Kai-shek clique of war criminals and its master, U.S. imperialism, that is, continue to be the enemy of the people and so perish together with the Chiang Kai-shek clique of war criminals in the People's War of Liberation. Or they come over to the people, that is, break with the Chiang Kai-shek clique of war criminals and U.S. imperialism, perform meritorious service in the People's War of Liberation to atone for their crimes and so obtain clemency and understanding from the people. There is no third road.

There are three different groups of people in the government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin at Nanking.[1] One group stubbornly persist in following the first road. No matter how plausible they are in words, in deeds they are continuing to prepare for war, to betray the nation and to oppress and massacre the people who are demanding genuine peace. They are Chiang Kai-shek's followers even unto death. Another group want to follow the second road but have not yet been able to take any decisive action. The third group are hesitating at the crossroads, and it is uncertain which way they will go. They do not want to offend Chiang Kai-shek and the U.S. government, yet they hope that they will be understood and admitted by the camp of people's democracy. But this is an illusion and is impossible.

The Nanking government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin is mainly a mixture of people from the first and third groups, with only a handful from the second. To this day, this government remains a tool of Chiang Kai-shek and the U.S. government.

The massacre which occurred in Nanking on April 1[2] was no accident. It was the inevitable result of the actions taken by the government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin to protect Chiang Kai-shek, his sworn followers and the forces of U.S. aggression. It was the result of the absurd trumpeting about "honourable peace on an equal footing" by the government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin and by the sworn followers of Chiang Kai-shek, which had the purpose of countering the Chinese Communist Party's eight terms for peace, and particularly the punishment of war criminals. Now that the government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin has sent its delegation to Peiping to negotiate peace with the Communist Party of China and has indicated its willingness to accept the Communist Party's eight terms as the basis for negotiations, it should, if it has the slightest good faith, start by dealing with the Nanking Massacre, arrest and severely punish the chief criminals, Chiang Kai-shek, Tang En-po and Chang Yao-ming, arrest and severely punish the thugs of the secret police in Nanking and Shanghai and arrest and severely punish the chief counter-revolutionaries, who are obstinately opposing peace, actively disrupting the peace negotiations and actively preparing to resist the advance of the People's Liberation Army to the south of the Yangtse River. "Until Ching Fu is done away with, the crisis in the state of Lu will not be over."[3] Until the war criminals are eliminated, there will be no peace in the country. Isn't this truth clear enough by now?

We should like to speak plainly to the Nanking government. If you are unequal to this job, you should at least help the People's Liberation Army do it, as our army will soon cross the Yangtse River and advance south. At this late hour, you should not indulge in idle talk and had better do some real work to atone for your crimes. In that case you will not have to flee for your lives, you will not have to submit to the bullying of Chiang Kai-shek's sworn followers, and you will not be spurned for ever by the people. This is your last chance. Don't lose it. The People's Liberation Army will soon advance south of the Yangtse River. We are not bluffing. The People's Liberation Army will advance, whether or not you sign the agreement accepting the eight terms. An agreement signed before our army advances, will be advantageous to many — to the people, to the People's Liberation Army, to all those in the Kuomintang government who wish to atone for their crimes by performing meritorious service, and to the broad ranks of officers and men in the Kuomintang army; it will be disadvantageous only to Chiang Kai-shek, his sworn followers and the imperialists. If the agreement is not signed, the situation will be about the same; solutions can be achieved by local negotiations. There may yet be some fighting, but not much. Over the vast area and long front extending from Sinkiang to Taiwan, the Kuomintang has only about 1,100,000 combat troops left, and so there will not be much fighting. Whether a general agreement is signed, or whether no such agreement is signed but instead many local agreements are signed, it will be all the same for Chiang Kai-shek, for his sworn followers and for U.S. imperialism, in a word, for all those reactionaries who will not change even unto death; they are irrevocably doomed. Perhaps it will be slightly more advantageous to Nanking, as well as to ourselves, to sign rather than not to sign a general agreement, and that is why we are still striving to conclude it. But if a general agreement is to be signed, we must be prepared as a consequence to deal with many messy matters. It would be very much neater for us not to sign a general agreement but instead to sign many local agreements. Nevertheless, we are still ready to sign a general agreement. If the Nanking government and its delegation are also willing to do so, they must make up their minds in the next few days; all illusions and all empty talk should be discarded. We are not forcing you to make up your minds. The Nanking government and its delegation are free to make up their minds or not to. That is to say, you may either listen to Chiang Kai-shek and Leighton Stuart and side with them irrevocably, or listen to us and side with us; you are free to choose. But there is not much time for you to make your choice. The People's Liberation Army will soon start its march, and there is no opportunity left for hesitation.

NOTES

[1] After Sun Fo's resignation, Li Tsung-jen appointed Ho Ying-chin to succeed him as president of the bogus Executive Yuan on March 12, 1949.

[2] On April 1, 1949, over six thousand students from eleven colleges and universities in Nanking demonstrated, demanding that the reactionary Kuomintang government should accept the eight peace terms of the Chinese Communist Party. On the instructions of Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Yao-ming, commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang garrison forces at Nanking, ordered soldiers, policemen and secret agents to beat the students brutally; two were killed and more than a hundred wounded.

[3] According to *Tso Chuan*, an ancient Chinese historical work dealing with the important events of the Spring and Autumn Era (770-475 B.C.), Ching Fu, a noble in the state of Lu, repeatedly stirred up internal strife and murdered two reigning princes of that state. The saying in the text was then current among the people of Lu, and Ching Fu's name has since become a byword for those who stir up internal strife.

ORDER TO THE ARMY FOR THE COUNTRY-WIDE ADVANCE*

April 21, 1949

Comrade commanders and fighters of all field armies, comrades of the People's Liberation Army in the guerrilla areas of the south!

The Agreement on Internal Peace, drafted after long negotiations between the delegation of the Communist Party of China and the delegation of the Nanking Kuomintang government, has been rejected by that government.[1] The responsible members of the Nanking Kuomintang government have rejected the agreement because they are still obeying the orders of U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, the chieftain of the Kuomintang bandit gang, and because they are trying to block the progress of the cause of the Chinese people's liberation and prevent the internal problem from being solved by peaceful means. The Agreement on Internal Peace, comprising eight sections with twenty-four articles formulated by the two delegations in the negotiations, is lenient on the problem of war criminals, is lenient towards the Kuomintang officers, soldiers and government personnel and provides appropriate solutions for other problems, all proceeding from the interests of the nation and the people. The rejection of this agreement shows that the Kuomintang reactionaries are determined to fight to the finish the counter-revolutionary war which they started. The rejection of this agreement shows that in proposing peace negotiations on January 1 of this year the Kuomintang reactionaries were only trying to check the advance of the People's Liberation Army and thus gain a breathing space for a later comeback to crush the revolutionary forces. The rejection of this agreement shows that the Li Tsung-jen government at Nanking was utterly hypocritical in professing to accept the Chinese Communist Party's eight terms for peace as the basis for negotiations. Inasmuch as the Li Tsung-jen government had already accepted such fundamental terms as the punishment of war criminals, the reorganization of all the reactionary Kuomintang troops on democratic principles and the handing over of all power and authority by the Nanking government and its subordinate governments at all levels, it had no reason to reject the specific measures which were drawn up on the basis of these fundamental terms and which are most lenient. In these circumstances, we order you as follows:

1. Advance bravely and annihilate resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely all the Kuomintang reactionaries within China's borders who dare to resist. Liberate the people of the whole country. Safeguard China's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.

2. Advance bravely and arrest all the incorrigible war criminals. No matter where they may flee, they must be brought to justice and punished according to law. Pay special attention to arresting the bandit chieftain Chiang Kai-shek.

3. Proclaim to all Kuomintang local governments and local military groups the final amended version of the Agreement on Internal Peace. In accordance with its general ideas, you may conclude local

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* This order was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. After the reactionary Kuomintang government refused to sign the Agreement on Internal Peace, the People's Liberation Army acted on this order issued by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh and embarked upon a general advance, unprecedented in scale, into the vast areas which had not yet been liberated. On the morning of April 21, 1949, the Second Field Army led by Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and other comrades and the Third Field Army led by Chen Yi, Su Yu, Tan Chen-lin and other comrades, forced the Yangtse River on a front extending more than five hundred kilometres from Hukou (northeast of Kiukiang) in the west to Kiangyin in the east and completely destroyed the defence line along the Yangtse which the enemy had painstakingly built in three and a half months. On April 23 these forces liberated Nanking, which had been the centre of the counter-revolutionary rule of the Kuomintang for twenty-two years, and proclaimed the downfall of the reactionary Kuomintang regime. Then they thrust south along separate routes, liberated Hangchow on May 3 and Nanchang on May 22 and captured Shanghai, China's biggest city, on May 27. In June they began their march into Fukien Province; they liberated Foochow on August 17 and Amoy on October 17. On May 14 the Fourth Field Army led by Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan and other comrades forced the Yangtse on a front of more than one hundred kilometres in the Tuanfeng-Wuhsueh sector east of Wuhan. On May 16 and 17 it liberated Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow, cities of strategic importance in central China. Then it marched south into Hunan. Cheng Chien, Kuomintang governor of Hunan Province, and Chen Ming-jen, Commander of the 1st Army, renounced their allegiance to the Kuomintang on August 4, and Hunan Province was peacefully liberated. The Fourth Field Army fought the Hengyang-Paoching campaign in September and October, wiped out the main force of the Kuomintang troops under Pai Chung-hsi and then pushed on to Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces.

agreements with those who are willing to cease hostilities and to settle matters by peaceful means.

4. After the People's Liberation Army has encircled Nanking, we are willing to give the Li Tsung-jen government at Nanking another opportunity to sign the Agreement on Internal Peace, if that government has not yet fled and dispersed and desires to sign it.

Mao Tse-tung

Chairman of the Chinese People's
Revolutionary Military Commission

Chu Teh

Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army

It liberated Canton on October 14, Kweilin on November 22 and Nanning on December 4. While the Second and Third Field Armies were forcing the Yangtse River, the armies in northern China led by Nieh Jung-chen, Hsu Hsiang-chien and other comrades captured Taiyuan on April 24, 1949. The First Field Army led by Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung and other comrades, after liberating Sian on May 20, continued its march into the Kuomintang areas in the Northwest together with two armies from northern China. They captured Lanchow on August 26, liberated - on September 5 and Yinchuan on September 23 and completely annihilated the Kuomintang troops under Ma Pu-fang and Ma Hung-kuei. Late in September Tao Chih-yueh, Kuomintang Garrison Commander-in-Chief of Sinkiang Province, and Burhan, the governor, renounced their allegiance to the Kuomintang, and Sinkiang was peacefully liberated. At the beginning of November the Second Field Army led by Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and other comrades, together with the 18th Army of the Northern China Field Army and part of the First Field Army led by Ho Lung, Li Ching-chuan and other comrades, began their march into southwestern China. They liberated Kweiyang on November 15 and Chungking on November 30. On December 9 Lu Han, Kuomintang governor of Yunnan Province, Liu Wen-hui, Kuomintang governor of Sikang Province, and Teng Hsi-hou and Pan Wen-hua, deputy directors of the Kuomintang Bureau of Military and Administrative Affairs in the Southwest, renounced their allegiance to the Kuomintang, and the two provinces of Yunnan and Sikang were peacefully liberated. In late December the People's Liberation Army which had entered the Southwest fought the Chengtu campaign, completely wiped out the Kuomintang troops under Hu Tsung-nan and liberated Chengtu on December 27. By the end of December 1949 the People's Liberation Army had wiped out all the Kuomintang troops on China's mainland and liberated the entire mainland except Tibet.

NOTES

[1] On April 1, 1949, the Kuomintang government delegation headed by Chang Chih-chung arrived in Peiping to negotiate peace with the delegation of the Communist Party of China. An Agreement on Internal Peace was drafted after a half month of negotiations. The agreement (final amended version) was handed to the Nanking government delegation by the delegation of the Communist Party of China on April 15 and was rejected by the Nanking government on April 20. The full text of the agreement (final amended version) is as follows:

In the 35th year of the Republic of China, the National Government at Nanking, with the aid of the Government of the United States of America, defied the will of the people, wrecked the truce agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and, on the pretext of opposing the Communist Party of China, launched a country-wide civil war against the Chinese people and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. This war has lasted two years and nine and a half months. It has brought untold disaster to the people throughout the country. The country has suffered tremendous losses of financial and material resources, and its sovereignty has been further infringed. The people of the whole country have always expressed dissatisfaction with the National Government at Nanking for its violation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles and of his correct policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers, and for its violation of his revolutionary testament. In particular, the whole people have voiced their opposition to the launching of the present unprecedented large-scale civil war by the National Government at Nanking and to the erroneous political, military, financial, economic, cultural and foreign policies and measures which that government has adopted in its pursuit of the civil war. The National Government at Nanking has completely forfeited the confidence of the entire people. In the present civil war its troops have already been defeated by the People's Liberation Army led by the Communist Party of China and commanded by the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission. Finding itself in this situation, the National Government at Nanking proposed to the Communist Party of China on January 1 of the 38th year of the Republic of China that negotiations should be held for the cessation of the civil war and the restoration of peace. On January 14 of the same year, the Communist Party of China issued a statement agreeing to this proposal of the Kuomintang government at Nanking and putting forward eight terms as the basis for the peace negotiations between the two sides. These terms are as follows: punish the war criminals; abolish the bogus constitution; abolish the bogus "constituted authority"; reorganize all reactionary troops on democratic principles; confiscate bureaucrat-capital; reform the land system; abrogate treasonable treaties; convene a New Political Consultative Conference without the participation of reactionary elements and form a democratic coalition government to take over all the power and authority of the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government and of its subordinate governments at all levels. These eight basic terms were agreed to by the National Government at Nanking. Thereupon, the Communist Party of China and the National Government at Nanking appointed their respective delegations, fully empowered to conduct negotiations and to sign an agreement. The delegates of both parties met in Peiping, have affirmed first of all that the National Government at Nanking should bear the full responsibility for the present civil war and for all its erroneous policies and have agreed to conclude this agreement.

SECTION ONE

Article 1. In order to distinguish between right and wrong and to establish responsibility, the delegation of the Communist Party of China and the delegation of the National Government at Nanking (hereinafter referred to as both sides) affirm that, as a matter of principle, punishment shall be meted out to the war criminals of the National Government at Nanking who are held responsible for launching and prosecuting the present civil war, but that they will be dealt with on the merits of each case in accordance with the following conditions:

Item 1. All war criminals, no matter who they are, may be cleared of the charge of being war criminals and treated with leniency, provided they show by actual deeds that they are really sincere in distinguishing right from wrong and are determined to make a clean break with their past, thus facilitating the progress of the cause of the Chinese people's liberation and the peaceful settlement of the internal problem.

Item 2. All incorrigible war criminals, no matter who they are, shall be severely punished if they obstruct the progress of the cause of the people's liberation, hinder the peaceful settlement of the internal problem, or go so far as to instigate rebellion. The Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission will be responsible for suppressing the ringleaders of rebellion.

Article 2. Both sides affirm that the National Government at Nanking was wrong in pronouncing General Yasuji Okamura, war criminal in the Japanese aggression against China, not guilty and releasing him on January 26 of the 38th year of the Republic of China and in granting permission on January 31 of the same year for the repatriation to Japan of 260 other Japanese war criminals. The cases of all these Japanese war criminals shall be reopened as soon as the Democratic Coalition Government of China, the new central government representing the people throughout China, is formed.

SECTION TWO

Article 3. Both sides affirm that the "Constitution of the Republic of China", adopted by the "National Assembly" convened by the National Government at Nanking in November of the 35th year of the Republic of China, shall be abolished.

Article 4. After the abolition of the "Constitution of the Republic of China", the fundamental law to be observed by the state and the people shall be determined in accordance with the resolutions of the New Political Consultative Conference and the Democratic Coalition Government.

SECTION THREE

Article 5. Both sides affirm that the entire legally constituted authority of the National Government at Nanking shall be abolished.

Article 6. After the Democratic Coalition Government is formed, the people's democratic constituted authority shall be established, and all reactionary laws and decrees shall be annulled in all places entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army.

SECTION FOUR

Article 7. Both sides affirm that all armed forces under the Nanking National Government (all the ground, naval and air forces, gendarmerie, communications police corps, local troops, all military institutions, academies, factories, rear-service establishments, etc.) shall be reorganized into the People's Liberation Army on democratic principles. After the signing of the Agreement on Internal Peace, a national reorganization committee shall be established at once to take charge of this work of reorganization. The reorganization committee is to consist of seven to nine members, four to five of whom shall be appointed by the People's Revolutionary Military Commission, and three to four by the National Government at Nanking, with one of the members appointed by the People's Revolutionary Military Commission serving as chairman and one of the members appointed by the National Government at Nanking serving as vice-chairman. In places entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army, regional sub-committees of the reorganization committee may be established as required. The proportion of the members of both sides in the sub-committees and the allocation of the posts of chairmen and vice-chairmen shall be the same as in the national reorganization committee. A reorganization committee shall be established for the navy and another for the air force. All matters relating to the People's Liberation Army's entry into, and taking over of, the areas at present administered by the National Government at Nanking shall be decided by orders issued by the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission. The armed forces of the National Government at Nanking must not resist the entry of the People's Liberation Army.

Article 8. Both sides agree that the reorganization plan in each region shall be carried out in two stages:

Item 1. The first stage — assembling and regrouping.

Point 1. All the armed forces under the Nanking National Government (ground, naval and air forces, gendarmerie, communications police corps, local troops, etc.) shall be assembled and regrouped. The principle of regrouping shall be as follows: the reorganization committee shall, on the basis of the actual local conditions, order such armed forces in the areas entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army to move, area by area and stage by stage, to the designated places for assembling and regrouping, according to their original designations, formations and numerical strength.

Point 2. Before the People's Liberation Army enters and takes over, all the armed forces under the Nanking National Government shall be held responsible for maintaining local order and preventing any acts of sabotage where they are stationed: in all large and small cities, along important lines of communication and rivers, at seaports and in the villages.

Point 3. In the above-mentioned places, when the People's Liberation Army enters and takes over, the armed forces under the Nanking National Government shall, in accordance with the orders of the reorganization committee and its sub-committees, hand over peacefully and move to the designated places. While moving to the designated places and after arriving there, the armed forces under the Nanking National Government shall observe strict discipline and shall not disturb local order.

Point 4. When, in compliance with the orders of the reorganization committee and its sub-committees, the armed forces under the Nanking National Government leave their original stations, the local police or peace preservation corps stationed in those places shall not withdraw, but shall be responsible for maintaining local peace and order and shall obey the directions and orders of the People's Liberation Army.

Point 5. The reorganization committee, its sub-committees and the local governments shall be responsible for providing all the armed forces of the Nanking National Government which are being moved or assembled with necessary supplies, such as grain, fodder, bedding and clothing.

Point 6. The reorganization committee and its sub-committees shall, according to the actual conditions in various areas, order the authorities of the Nanking National Government to hand over, area by area and stage by stage, all its military establishments (institutions, schools, factories, storehouses and the like, belonging to all its organizations ranging from the Ministry of National Defence to the Combined Rear-Service Headquarters), all its military installations (naval ports, forts, air bases and the like) and all its military supplies to the People's Liberation Army and the latter's Military Control Commissions in various places.

Item 2. The second stage — reorganization area by area.

Point 1. After the ground forces under the Nanking National Government (infantry, cavalry, special arms, gendarmerie, communications police corps and local troops) have moved to the designated places and have been assembled and regrouped, area by area and stage by stage, the reorganization committee shall, according to the actual conditions in different areas, draw up plans for their reorganization area by area and carry out these plans at specified times. The principle of reorganization shall be that all the above-mentioned ground forces, after being assembled and regrouped, shall be reorganized into regular units of the People's Liberation Army in conformity with its democratic system and regular structure. The reorganization committee and its sub-committees shall be responsible for handling the cases of those soldiers who have been found eligible for retirement because of age or disability and who wish to retire, as well as the cases of those officers and non-commissioned officers who wish to retire or take up other occupations; the committees shall provide them with facilities to return home and with means of livelihood, so that everyone will be properly placed and no one will commit misdeeds because he lacks means of support.

Point 2. After the naval and air forces under the Nanking National Government have moved to the designated places and been assembled and regrouped, area by area and stage by stage, they shall be reorganized according to their original designations, formations and numerical strength by the navy and air force reorganization committees, in conformity with the democratic system of the People's Liberation Army.

Point 3. All the armed forces under the Nanking National Government, after being reorganized into the People's Liberation Army, must strictly observe the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention of the People's Liberation Army and loyally abide by the military and political systems of the People's Liberation Army, without any violation.

Point 4. The officers and men who have retired after reorganization must respect the local people's governments and obey the laws and decrees of the People's Government. The people's governments and the people of various localities shall be considerate of these retired officers and men and shall not discriminate against them.

Article 9. After the signing of the Agreement on Internal Peace, all the armed forces under the Nanking National Government must cease conscripting or recruiting soldiers or other personnel. They must be responsible for protecting all their arms and ammunition, equipment, military institutions and installations and military materiel, and must not destroy, conceal, transfer or sell any of them.

Article 10. After the signing of the Agreement on Internal Peace, the National Government at Nanking must, in case any of its armed forces refuses to carry out the reorganization plan, assist the People's Liberation Army to enforce the reorganization plan and ensure its thorough execution.

SECTION FIVE

Article 11. Both sides agree that all bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises and property (including banks, factories, mines, vessels, companies and shops) acquired or seized during the rule of the National Government at Nanking through the use of political prerogatives and the influence of wealth and position shall be confiscated and become the property of the state.

Article 12. In areas not yet entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army, the National Government at Nanking shall be held responsible for supervising the bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises and property mentioned in Article 11 so that no theft or concealment, damage, transfer or secret sale shall occur. Assets which have already been moved shall be frozen wherever found, and their being subsequently removed, transported abroad or damaged shall not be permitted. Bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises and property located abroad shall be declared the property of the state.

Article 13. In areas already entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army, the bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises and property mentioned in Article 11 shall be confiscated by the local Military Control Commissions or institutions authorized by the Democratic Coalition Government. Private shares in them, if any, shall be investigated; after they have been verified as being in fact private and not secretly transferred bureaucrat-capital, they shall be recognized, and their owners shall be permitted to remain shareholders or to withdraw their shares.

Article 14. Bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises dating from the period prior to the rule of the National Government at Nanking, as well as those dating from the period of the rule of the National Government at Nanking, which are neither large nor harmful to the national economy and the people's livelihood, shall not be confiscated. But among these, the enterprises and property of certain persons who have committed criminal offences, such as reactionaries guilty of heinous crimes which have been reported by the people and confirmed, shall be confiscated.

Article 15. In cities not yet entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army, the provincial, municipal and county governments under the National Government at Nanking shall be responsible for protecting the people's democratic forces and their activities in the locality and must not suppress or injure them.

SECTION SIX

Article 16. Both sides affirm that the feudal system of landownership in the rural areas of China shall be reformed step by step. After the entry of the People's Liberation Army, reduction of rent and interest shall generally be carried out first and distribution of land later.

Article 17. In areas not yet entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army, the local governments under the National Government at Nanking shall be responsible for protecting the organizations of the peasant masses and their activities and must not suppress or damage them.

SECTION SEVEN

Article 18. Both sides agree that all treaties and agreements concluded with foreign states during the rule of the National Government at Nanking and other diplomatic documents and archives, open or secret, shall be handed over by the National Government at Nanking to the Democratic Coalition Government and examined by the Democratic Coalition Government. All treaties or agreements which are detrimental to the Chinese people and their state, especially those which are in the nature of selling out the rights of the state, shall be either abrogated, or revised, or new treaties and agreements shall be concluded instead, as the case may be.

SECTION EIGHT

Article 19. Both sides agree that after the signing of the Agreement on Internal Peace and before the formation of the Democratic Coalition Government, the National Government at Nanking and its *yuan*, ministries, commissions and other organs shall temporarily continue to function but must consult the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission in the conduct of affairs and assist the People's Liberation Army in matters relating to the taking over and handing over of the various areas. After the formation of the Democratic Coalition Government, the National Government at Nanking shall immediately hand over to the Democratic Coalition Government and proclaim its own termination.

Article 20. Upon the handing over of the National Government at Nanking and its local governments at various levels and all their subordinate organs, the People's Liberation Army, the local people's governments and the Democratic Coalition Government of China shall take care to enlist all the patriotic and useful persons among the former's personnel, give them democratic education and assign them to suitable posts so that they will not become destitute and homeless.

Article 21. Before the People's Liberation Army enters and takes over, the National Government at Nanking and its subordinate local governments in the provinces, cities and counties shall be responsible for maintaining peace and order in their respective areas, looking after and protecting all government organizations and state-owned enterprises (including banks, factories, mines, railways, postal and telegraph offices, aircraft, vessels, companies, warehouses and all communications facilities) and other movable and immovable properties belonging to the state; and no destruction, loss, removal, concealment, or sale is permitted. Books, archives, antiques, valuables, bullion, foreign currencies and all properties and assets which have been removed or concealed shall be frozen at once wherever they are found, pending their take-over. As for those properties which have been sent abroad or were originally abroad, the National Government at Nanking shall be responsible for their recovery and safekeeping and be prepared to hand them over.

Article 22. All the powers as well as the properties and assets of the state in areas already entered and taken over by the People's Liberation Army shall be taken over by the local Military Control Commissions, the local people's governments or institutions authorized by the Coalition Government.

Article 23. After the Agreement on Internal Peace has been signed by the delegation of the National Government at Nanking and carried out by that government, the delegation of the Communist Party of China will take the responsibility of proposing to the preparatory committee of the New Political Consultative Conference that the National Government at Nanking should be permitted to send a number of patriotic persons as representatives to the Conference; after securing the approval of its preparatory committee, the representatives of the National Government at Nanking may attend the New Political Consultative Conference.

Article 24. After the National Government at Nanking has sent its representatives to the New Political Consultative Conference, the Communist Party of China will take the responsibility of proposing to the Conference that in the interests of co-operation there should be included in the Democratic Coalition Government a number of patriotic persons from the National Government at Nanking.

The delegations of both sides declare: We hereby assume the responsibility of signing this agreement for the sake of the liberation of the Chinese people and the independence and freedom of the Chinese nation and for the sake of an early conclusion of the war and the restoration of peace so that the commencement of the great task of production and construction on a nation-wide scale will be facilitated and so that our country and people will steadily attain prosperity, strength and well-being. It is hoped that the people of the entire country will unite as one to struggle for the complete fulfilment of this agreement. This agreement shall enter into force immediately upon signature.

PROCLAMATION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

April 25, 1949

The Kuomintang reactionaries have rejected the terms for peace and persist in their stand of waging a criminal war against the nation and the people. The people all over the country hope that the People's Liberation Army will speedily wipe out the Kuomintang reactionaries. We have ordered the People's Liberation Army to advance courageously, wipe out all reactionary Kuomintang troops who dare to resist, arrest all the incorrigible war criminals, liberate the people of the whole country, safeguard China's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and bring about the genuine unification of the country, which the whole people long for. We earnestly hope that people in all walks of life will assist the People's Liberation Army wherever it goes. We hereby proclaim the following eight-point covenant by which we, together with the whole people, shall abide.

1. Protect the lives and property of all the people. People in all walks of life, irrespective of class, belief or occupation, are expected to maintain order and adopt a co-operative attitude towards the People's Liberation Army. The People's Liberation Army on its part will adopt a co-operative attitude towards people in all walks of life. Counter-revolutionaries or other saboteurs who seize the opportunity to create disturbances, loot or sabotage shall be severely dealt with.

2. Protect the industrial, commercial, agricultural and livestock enterprises of the national bourgeoisie. All privately owned factories, shops, banks, warehouses, vessels, wharves, farms, livestock farms and other enterprises will without exception be protected against any encroachment. It is hoped that workers and employees in all

occupations will maintain production as usual and that all shops will remain open as usual.

3. Confiscate bureaucrat-capital. All factories, shops, banks and warehouses, all vessels, wharves and railways, all postal, telegraph, electric light, telephone and water supply services, and all farms, livestock farms and other enterprises operated by the reactionary Kuomintang government and the big bureaucrats shall be taken over by the People's Government. In such enterprises the private shares held by national capitalists engaged in industry, commerce, agriculture or livestock raising shall be recognized, after their ownership is verified. All personnel working in bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises must remain at their posts pending the take-over by the People's Government and must assume responsibility for the safekeeping of all assets, machinery, charts, account books, records, etc., in preparation for the check-up and take-over. Those who render useful service in this connection will be rewarded; those who obstruct or sabotage will be punished. Those desiring to go on working after the take-over by the People's Government will be given employment commensurate with their abilities so that they will not become destitute and homeless.

4. Protect all public and private schools, hospitals, cultural and educational institutions, athletic fields and other public welfare establishments. It is hoped that all personnel in these institutions will remain at their posts; the People's Liberation Army will protect them from molestation.

5. Except for the incorrigible war criminals and counter-revolutionaries who have committed the most heinous crimes, the People's Liberation Army and the People's Government will not hold captive, arrest or subject to indignity any officials, whether high or low, in the Kuomintang's central, provincial, municipal and county governments, deputies to the "National Assembly", members of the Legislative and Control Yuans, members of the political consultative councils, police officers and district, township, village and *pao-chia*[1] officials, so long as they do not offer armed resistance or plot sabotage. All these persons are enjoined, pending the take-over, to stay at their posts, abide by the orders and decrees of the People's Liberation Army and the People's Government and assume responsibility for the safekeeping of all the assets and records of their offices. The People's Government will permit the employment of those among them who can make themselves useful in some kind of work and have not committed

any grave reactionary act or other flagrant misdeed. Punishment shall be meted out to those who seize the opportunity to engage in sabotage, theft or embezzlement, or abscond with public funds, assets or records, or refuse to give an accounting.

6. In order to ensure peace and security in both cities and rural areas and to maintain public order, all stragglers and disbanded soldiers are required to report and surrender to the People's Liberation Army or the People's Government in their localities. No action will be taken against those who voluntarily do so and hand over their arms. Those who refuse to report or who conceal their arms shall be arrested and investigated. Persons who shelter stragglers and disbanded soldiers and do not report them to the authorities shall be duly punished.

7. The feudal system of landownership in the rural areas is irrational and should be abolished. To abolish it, however, preparations must be made and the necessary steps taken. Generally speaking, the reduction of rent and interest should come first and land distribution later; only after the People's Liberation Army has arrived at a place and worked there for a considerable time will it be possible to speak of solving the land problem in earnest. The peasant masses should organize themselves and help the People's Liberation Army to carry out the various initial reforms. They should also work hard at their farming so as to prevent the present level of agricultural production from falling and should then raise it step by step to improve their own livelihood and supply the people of the cities with commodity grain. Urban land and buildings cannot be dealt with in the same way as the problem of rural land.

8. Protect the lives and property of foreign nationals. It is hoped that all foreign nationals will follow their usual pursuits and observe order. All foreign nationals must abide by the orders and decrees of the People's Liberation Army and the People's Government and must not engage in espionage, act against the cause of China's national independence and the people's liberation, or harbour Chinese war criminals, counter-revolutionaries or other law-breakers. Otherwise, they shall be dealt with according to law by the People's Liberation Army and the People's Government.

The People's Liberation Army is highly disciplined; it is fair in buying and selling and is not allowed to take even a needle or a piece of thread from the people. It is hoped that the people throughout the country will live and work in peace and will not give credence to rumours or raise false alarms. This proclamation is hereby issued in all sincerity and earnestness.

Mao Tse-tung

Chairman of the Chinese People's
Revolutionary Military Commission

Chu Teh

Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army

NOTES

[1] *Pao chia* was the administrative system by which the Kuomintang reactionary clique enforced its fascist rule at the primary level. On August 1, 1932, Chiang Kai-shek promulgated the "Regulations for the Organization of *Pao* and *Chia* and for a Population Census in the Counties" covering the provinces of Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei. The "Regulations" provided that "the *pao* and *chia* are to be organized on the basis of households; there is to be a head of each household, of each *chia*, which is made up of ten households, and of each *pao*, which is made up of ten *chia*". Neighbours were required to watch and report each other's activities to the authorities, and all were punishable when one was found guilty: various counter-revolutionary measures for exacting compulsory labour were also laid down. On November 7, 1934, the Kuomintang government officially announced that this system of fascist rule was to be established in all the provinces and municipalities under its rule.

ON THE OUTRAGES BY BRITISH WARSHIPS[1] — STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN OF THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY*

April 30, 1949

We denounce the preposterous statement of the warmonger Churchill.[2] In the British House of Commons on April 26, Churchill demanded that the British government should send two aircraft carriers to the Far East for "effective power of retaliation". What are you "retaliating" for, Mr. Churchill? British warships together with Kuomintang warships intruded into the defence area of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and fired on the People's Liberation Army, causing no less than 252 casualties among our loyal and gallant fighters. Since the British have trespassed on Chinese territory and committed so great a crime, the People's Liberation Army has good reason to demand that the British government admit its wrongdoing, apologize and make compensation. Isn't this what you should do, instead of dispatching forces to China to "retaliate" against the Chinese People's Liberation Army? Prime Minister Attlee's statement is also wrong.[3] Britain, he said, has the right to send her warships into China's Yangtse River. The Yangtse is an inland waterway of China. What right have you British to send in your warships? You have no such right. The Chinese people will defend their territory and sovereignty and absolutely will not permit encroachment by foreign governments. Attlee said that the People's Liberation Army "would be prepared to allow the ship [the *Amethyst*] to proceed to Nanking but only on condition that she should assist the People's Liberation Army to cross the Yangtse". Attlee lied. The People's Liberation Army gave no permission to the *Amethyst* to proceed to Nanking. The People's Liberation Army does not want the armed forces of any foreign country to help it cross the Yangtse or to do anything else. On the contrary, the People's Liberation Army demands that Britain, the United States and France quickly withdraw their armed forces — their warships, military aircraft and marines stationed in the Yangtse and Whangpoo Rivers and other parts of China — from China's territorial inland waters, seas, land and air and that they refrain from helping the enemy of the Chinese people to wage civil war. The Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission and the People's Government have so far not established diplomatic relations with any foreign government. The Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission and the People's Government will protect those foreign nationals in China who are engaged in legitimate pursuits. They are willing to consider the establishment of diplomatic relations with foreign countries; such relations must be based on equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and, first of all, on no help being given to the Kuomintang reactionaries. They will tolerate no act of intimidation by any foreign government. A foreign government which wishes to consider establishing diplomatic relations with us must sever relations with the remnant Kuomintang forces and withdraw its armed forces from China. Attlee complained that the Communist Party of China, having no diplomatic relations with foreign countries, was unwilling to have contacts with the old diplomatic personnel of foreign governments (consuls recognized by the Kuomintang). Such complaints are groundless. In the past few years, the governments of the United States, Britain, Canada, etc. have helped the Kuomintang to oppose us. Can Mr. Attlee have forgotten this? Can it also be that Mr. Attlee does not know which country gave the Kuomintang the *Chungking*,[4] the heavy cruiser which was recently sunk?

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* This statement was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the spokesman of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. It expressed the solemn stand of the Chinese people who fear no threats and resolutely oppose imperialist aggression; it also set forth the foreign policy of the new China which was soon to be established.

NOTES

[1] On April 20-21, 1949, while the People's Liberation Army was fighting its way across the Yangtse, the *Amethyst* and three other British warships intruded into the river, an inland waterway of China, and, together with Kuomintang warships, fired on our army, causing 252 casualties. The People's Liberation Army returned the fire; the *Amethyst* was disabled and forced to anchor near Chinkiang; the other three British warships escaped. The British authorities requested that the *Amethyst* should be allowed to leave, and its captain, acting on the orders of Brind, Commander-in-Chief of the British Far Eastern Fleet, conducted negotiations with the representative of our army. During these negotiations, the British side consistently prevaricated and refused to admit its criminal acts of aggression. While the negotiations were continuing, on the night of July 30, the *Amethyst* forced her way alongside a passenger ship, the *Liberated Chiangling*, which was going downstream off Chinkiang, and escaped by using that ship as a shield. When our army signalled a warning to the *Amethyst* to stop, she opened fire, collided with and sank a number of junks and escaped from the Yangtse River.

[2] On April 26, 1949, speaking in the British House of Commons, Churchill, the chieftain of the British Conservative Party, slandered as an "atrocious outrage" the action taken by the Chinese People's Liberation Army in counter-attacking the British warships which had fired on our army, and demanded that the British government "get in Chinese waters one aircraft carrier, if not two, capable of . . . effective power of retaliation".

[3] On April 26, 1949, British Prime Minister Attlee declared in the House of Commons that British naval vessels had been within their rights in going up the Yangtse on their "peaceful missions", because they had the permission of the Kuomintang government of China. At the same time, when speaking about the negotiations which the British representative was holding with the representative of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Attlee lied, saying that the Chinese People's Liberation Army "would be prepared to allow the ship [the *Amethyst*] to proceed to Nanking but only on condition that she should assist the People's Liberation Army to cross the Yangtse".

[4] It was the British government which in February 1943 gave the Kuomintang the heavy cruiser *Chungking*, the largest cruiser in the Kuomintang navy. On February 25, 1949, the officers and men of the cruiser revolted, renounced their allegiance to the reactionary Kuomintang government and joined the Chinese People's Navy. On March 19 the U.S. imperialists and the Kuomintang bandits sent heavy bombers and sank the *Chungking* off Hulutao, in Liaotung Gulf in northeastern China.

ADDRESS TO THE PREPARATORY MEETING OF THE NEW POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE

June 15, 1949

Fellow Delegates,

Today we are holding the inaugural session of the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference.[1] The task of this meeting is to complete all necessary preparations and speedily convene the New Political Consultative Conference, which will form a democratic coalition government in order to lead the people of the whole country in eliminating the remnant forces of Kuomintang reaction and unifying all China as swiftly as possible, and in carrying out, systematically and step by step, country-wide construction in the political, economic and cultural fields and in national defence. This is what the people of the whole country expect us to do, and we must do it.

The convening of the New Political Consultative Conference was proposed to the people of the whole country by the Communist Party of China on May 1, 1948.[2] The proposal obtained a quick response from the democratic parties, people's organizations, democratic personages in all walks of life throughout China, the country's minority nationalities and the overseas Chinese. The Communist Party of China, the democratic parties, people's organizations, democratic personages in all walks of life, minority nationalities and overseas Chinese all hold that we must overthrow the rule of imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and the Kuomintang reactionaries, convene a Political Consultative Conference of representatives of all the democratic parties, people's organizations, democratic personages in all walks of life, minority nationalities and overseas Chinese, proclaim the founding of the People's Republic of China and elect a democratic coalition government to represent it. Only thus can our great motherland free herself from a semi-colonial and semi-feudal fate and take the road of independence, freedom, peace, unity, strength and prosperity. This is a common political basis. It is the common political basis for the united struggle of the Communist Party of China, the democratic parties, people's organizations, democratic personages in all walks of life, minority nationalities and overseas Chinese; it is also the common political basis for the united struggle of the whole people. So firm is this political basis that no serious-minded democratic party, people's organization or democratic personage has expressed any differences of opinion, and all hold that this is the only road which leads in the right direction for solving all China's problems.

The people of the whole country supporting their own People's Liberation Army have won the war. This great People's War of Liberation, begun in July 1946, has now lasted three years. The war was launched by the Kuomintang reactionaries with the help they received from foreign imperialism. In unleashing this civil war against the people the Kuomintang reactionaries perfidiously and unscrupulously tore up the truce agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference of January 1946. But in three short years they have been defeated by the heroic People's Liberation Army. Not long ago, after the Kuomintang reactionaries' peace plot was exposed, the People's Liberation Army bravely advanced and crossed the Yangtse River. Nanking, the capital of the Kuomintang reactionaries, is now in our hands. Shanghai, Hangchow, Nanchang, Wuhan and Sian have been liberated. At this very moment, the field armies of the People's Liberation Army are conducting a great march unprecedented in Chinese history into the southern and northwestern provinces. In three years the People's Liberation Army has wiped out a total of 5,590,000 of the reactionary Kuomintang troops. Now the remnants of the Kuomintang forces number only about 1,500,000, including regulars, irregulars and those in the military establishments and academies in the rear. It will still take some time to mop up these enemy remnants, but not long.

This is a victory for the people of all China, and also a victory for the peoples of the whole world. The whole world, except the imperialists and the reactionaries in various countries, is elated and inspired by this great victory of the Chinese people. The struggle of the Chinese people against their own enemies and the struggles of the peoples of the world against their own enemies have the same meaning. The people of China and the peoples of the world have all witnessed the fact that the imperialists have directed the Chinese reactionaries ruthlessly to oppose the Chinese people by means of a counter-revolutionary war and that the Chinese people have triumphantly overthrown the reactionaries by means of a revolutionary war.

Here, I think it is necessary to call people's attention to the fact that the imperialists and their running dogs, the Chinese reactionaries, will not resign themselves to defeat in this land of China. They will continue to gang up against the Chinese people in every possible way. For example, they will smuggle their agents into China to sow dissension and make trouble. That is certain; they will never neglect these activities. To take another example, they will incite the Chinese reactionaries, and even throw in their own forces, to blockade China's ports. They will do this as long as it is possible. Furthermore, if they still hanker after adventures, they will send some of their troops to invade and harass China's frontiers; this, too, is not impossible. All this we must take fully into account. Just because we have won victory, we must never relax our vigilance against the frenzied plots for revenge by the imperialists and their running dogs. Whoever relaxes vigilance will disarm himself politically and land himself in a passive position. In view of these circumstances, the people all over the country must unite to smash resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely every plot against the Chinese people by the imperialists and their running dogs, the Chinese reactionaries. China must be independent, China must be liberated, China's affairs must be decided and run by the Chinese people themselves, and no further interference, not even the slightest, will be tolerated from any imperialist country.

The Chinese revolution is a revolution of the broad masses of the whole nation. Everybody is our friend, except the imperialists, the feudalists and the bureaucrat-capitalists, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their accomplices. We have a broad and solid revolutionary united front. This united front is so broad that it includes the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. This united front is so solid that it possesses the resolute will and the inexhaustible capacity to defeat every enemy and overcome every difficulty. The epoch we are living in is an epoch in which the imperialist system is heading for total collapse, the imperialists have fallen inextricably into crisis and, no matter how they continue to oppose the Chinese people, the Chinese people will always have a way to win final victory.

At the same time, we proclaim to the whole world that what we oppose is exclusively the imperialist system and its plots against the Chinese people. We are willing to discuss with any foreign government the establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, provided it is willing to sever relations with the Chinese reactionaries, stops conspiring with them or helping them and adopts an attitude of genuine, and not hypocritical, friendship towards People's China. The Chinese people wish to have friendly co-operation with the people of all countries and to resume and expand international trade in order to develop production and promote economic prosperity.

Fellow Delegates, all the conditions are ripe for us to convene the New Political Consultative Conference and to form a democratic coalition government. The people throughout the country are most eagerly expecting us to convene the conference and form the government. I believe the work we have now begun will fulfil this hope, and do so before long.

Upon the formation of China's democratic coalition government, its central tasks will be: (1) to mop up the remnants of the reactionaries and suppress their trouble-making; and (2) to do everything possible and make the utmost effort to restore and develop the people's economy and, at the same time, to restore and develop the people's culture and education.

The Chinese people will see that, once China's destiny is in the hands of the people, China, like the sun rising in the east, will illuminate every corner of the land with a brilliant flame, swiftly clean up the mire left by the reactionary government, heal the wounds of war and build a new, powerful and prosperous people's republic worthy of the name.

Long live the People's Republic of China!

Long live the democratic coalition government!

Long live the great unity of the people of the whole country!

NOTES

[1] The meeting was held at Peiping from June 15 to 19, 1949. It was attended by 134 representatives from twenty-three organizations and groups, including the Communist Party of China, the various democratic parties, the people's organizations, democratic personages in all walks of life, the minority nationalities of the country

and the overseas Chinese. It adopted the "Organic Rules of the Preparatory Committee of the New Political Consultative Conference" and the "Provisions Regarding the Organizations and Groups Participating in the New Political Consultative Conference and the Size of Their Delegations" and elected a Standing Committee headed by Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The Conference was called the New Political Consultative Conference to distinguish it from the Political Consultative Conference which had opened at Chungking on January 10, 1946. Its name was changed to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference at its first plenary session on September 21, 1949.

[2] See "On the September Meeting — Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", Note 4, p. 276 of this volume.

ON THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP

In Commemoration of the Twenty-eighth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China

June 30, 1949

The first of July 1949 marks the fact that the Communist Party of China has already lived through twenty-eight years. Like a man, a political party has its childhood, youth, manhood and old age. The Communist Party of China is no longer a child or a lad in his teens but has become an adult. When a man reaches old age, he will die; the same is true of a party. When classes disappear, all instruments of class struggle — parties and the state machinery — will lose their function, cease to be necessary, therefore gradually wither away and end their historical mission; and human society will move to a higher stage. We are the opposite of the political parties of the bourgeoisie. They are afraid to speak of the extinction of classes, state power and parties. We, on the contrary, declare openly that we are striving hard to create the very conditions which will bring about their extinction. The leadership of the Communist Party and the state power of the people's dictatorship are such conditions. Anyone who does not recognize this truth is no communist. Young comrades who have not studied Marxism-Leninism and have only recently joined the Party may not yet understand this truth. They must understand it — only then can they have a correct world outlook. They must understand that the road to the abolition of classes, to the abolition of state power and to the abolition of parties is the road all mankind must take; it is only a question of time and conditions. Communists the world over are wiser than the bourgeoisie, they understand the laws governing the existence and development of things, they understand dialectics and they can see farther. The bourgeoisie does not welcome this truth because it does not want to be overthrown. To be overthrown is painful and is unbearable to contemplate for those overthrown, for example, for the Kuomintang reactionaries whom we are now overthrowing and for Japanese imperialism which we together with other peoples overthrew some time ago. But for the working class, the labouring people and the Communist Party the question is not one of being overthrown, but of working hard to create the conditions in which classes, state power and political parties will die out very naturally and mankind will enter the realm of Great Harmony.[1] We have mentioned in passing the long-range perspective of human progress in order to explain clearly the problems we are about to discuss.

FROM MARX TO MAO

As everyone knows, our Party passed through these twenty-eight years not in peace but amid hardships, for we had to fight enemies, both foreign and domestic, both inside and outside the Party. We thank Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin for giving us a weapon. This weapon is not a machine-gun, but Marxism-Leninism.

In his book "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder* written in 1920, Lenin described the quest of the Russians for revolutionary theory.[2] Only after several decades of hardship and suffering did the Russians find Marxism. Many things in China were the same as, or similar to, those in Russia before the October Revolution. There was the same feudal oppression. There was similar economic and cultural backwardness. Both countries were backward, China even more so. In both countries alike, for the sake of national regeneration progressives braved hard and bitter struggles in their quest for revolutionary truth.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

From the time of China's defeat in the Opium War of 1840,[3] Chinese progressives went through untold hardships in their quest for truth from the Western countries. Hung Hsiu-chuan,[4] Kang Yu-wei,[5] Yen Fu[6] and Sun Yat-sen were representative of those who had looked to the West for truth before the Communist Party of China was born. Chinese who then sought progress would read any book containing the new knowledge from the West. The number of students sent to Japan, Britain, the United States, France and Germany was amazing. At home, the imperial examinations[7] were abolished and modern schools sprang up like bamboo shoots after a spring rain; every effort was made to learn from the West. In my youth, I too engaged in such studies. They represented the culture of Western bourgeois democracy, including the social theories and natural sciences of that period, and they were called "the new learning" in contrast to

Chinese feudal culture, which was called "the old learning". For quite a long time, those who had acquired the new learning felt confident that it would save China, and very few of them had any doubts on this score, as the adherents of the old learning had. Only modernization could save China, only learning from foreign countries could modernize China. Among the foreign countries, only the Western capitalist countries were then progressive, as they had successfully built modern bourgeois states. The Japanese had been successful in learning from the West, and the Chinese also wished to learn from the Japanese. The Chinese in those days regarded Russia as backward, and few wanted to learn from her. That was how the Chinese tried to learn from foreign countries in the period from the 1840s to the beginning of the 20th century.

Imperialist aggression shattered the fond dreams of the Chinese about learning from the West. It was very odd — why were the teachers always committing aggression against their pupil? The Chinese learned a good deal from the West, but they could not make it work and were never able to realize their ideals. Their repeated struggles, including such a country-wide movement as the Revolution of 1911,[8] all ended in failure. Day by day, conditions in the country got worse, and life was made impossible. Doubts arose, increased and deepened. World War I shook the whole globe. The Russians made the October Revolution and created the world's first socialist state. Under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, the revolutionary energy of the great proletariat and labouring people of Russia, hitherto latent and unseen by foreigners, suddenly erupted like a volcano, and the Chinese and all mankind began to see the Russians in a new light. Then, and only then, did the Chinese enter an entirely new era in their thinking and their life. They found Marxism-Leninism, the universally applicable truth, and the face of China began to change.

It was through the Russians that the Chinese found Marxism. Before the October Revolution, the Chinese were not only ignorant of Lenin and Stalin, they did not even know of Marx and Engels. The salvoes of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism. The October Revolution helped progressives in China, as throughout the world, to adopt the proletarian world outlook as the instrument for studying a nation's destiny and considering anew their own problems. Follow the path of the Russians — that was their conclusion. In 1919, the May 4th Movement took place in China. In 1921, the Communist Party of China was founded. Sun Yat-sen, in the depths of despair, came across the October Revolution and the Communist Party of China. He welcomed the October Revolution, welcomed Russian help to the Chinese and welcomed co-operation of the Communist Party of China. Then Sun Yat-sen died and Chiang Kai-shek rose to power. Over a long period of twenty-two years, Chiang Kai-shek dragged China into ever more hopeless straits. In this period, during the anti-fascist Second World War in which the Soviet Union was the main force, three big imperialist powers were knocked out, while two others were weakened. In the whole world only one big imperialist power, the United States of America, remained uninjured. But the United States faced a grave domestic crisis. It wanted to enslave the whole world; it supplied arms to help Chiang Kai-shek slaughter several million Chinese. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese people, after driving out Japanese imperialism, waged the People's War of Liberation for three years and have basically won victory.

Thus Western bourgeois civilization, bourgeois democracy and the plan for a bourgeois republic have all gone bankrupt in the eyes of the Chinese people. Bourgeois democracy has given way to people's democracy under the leadership of the working class and the bourgeois republic to the people's republic. This has made it possible to achieve socialism and communism through the people's republic, to abolish classes and enter a world of Great Harmony. Kang Yu-wei wrote *Ta Tung Shu*, or the *Book of Great Harmony*, but he did not and could not find the way to achieve Great Harmony. There are bourgeois republics in foreign lands, but China cannot have a bourgeois republic because she is a country suffering under imperialist oppression. The only way is through a people's republic led by the working class.

All other ways have been tried and failed. Of the people who hankered after those ways, some have fallen, some have awakened and some are changing their ideas. Events are developing so swiftly that many feel the abruptness of the change and the need to learn anew. This state of mind is understandable and we welcome this worthy desire to learn anew.

The vanguard of the Chinese proletariat learned Marxism-Leninism after the October Revolution and founded the Communist Party of China. It entered at once into political struggles and only now, after a tortuous course of twenty-eight years, has it won basic victory. From our twenty-eight years' experience we have drawn a conclusion similar to the one Sun Yat-sen drew in his testament from his "experience of forty years"; that is, we are deeply convinced that to win victory, "we must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals". Sun Yat-sen had a world outlook different from ours and started from a different class standpoint in studying and tackling problems; yet, in the 1920s he reached a conclusion basically the same as ours on the question of how to struggle against imperialism.

Twenty-four years have passed since Sun Yat-sen's death, and the Chinese revolution, led by the Communist Party of China, has made tremendous advances both in theory and practice and has radically changed the face of China. Up to now the principal and fundamental experience the Chinese people have gained is twofold:

> (1) Internally, arouse the masses of the people. That is, unite the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, form a domestic united front under the leadership of the working class, and advance from this to the establishment of a state which is a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.
>
> (2) Externally, unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front.

"You are leaning to one side." Exactly. The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road. We oppose the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries who lean to the side of imperialism, and we also oppose the illusions about a third road.

"You are too irritating." We are talking about how to deal with domestic and foreign reactionaries, the imperialists and their running dogs, not about how to deal with anyone else. With regard to such reactionaries, the question of irritating them or not does not arise. Irritated or not irritated, they will remain the same because they are reactionaries. Only if we draw a clear line between reactionaries and revolutionaries, expose the intrigues and plots of the reactionaries, arouse the vigilance and attention of the revolutionary ranks, heighten our will to fight and crush the enemy's arrogance can we isolate the reactionaries, vanquish them or supersede them. We must not show the slightest timidity before a wild beast. We must learn from Wu Sung[9] on the Chingyang Ridge. As Wu Sung saw it, the tiger on Chingyang Ridge was a man-eater, whether irritated or not. Either kill the tiger or be eaten by him — one or the other.

"We want to do business." Quite right, business will be done. We are against no one except the domestic and foreign reactionaries who hinder us from doing business. Everybody should know that it is none other than the imperialists and their running dogs, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, who hinder us from doing business and also from establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries. When we have beaten the internal and external reactionaries by uniting all domestic and international forces, we shall be able to do business and establish diplomatic relations with all foreign countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.

"Victory is possible even without international help." This is a mistaken idea. In the epoch in which imperialism exists, it is impossible for a genuine people's revolution to win victory in any country without various forms of help from the international revolutionary forces, and even if victory were won, it could not be consolidated. This was the case with the victory and consolidation of the great October Revolution, as Lenin and Stalin told us long ago. This was also the case with the overthrow of the three imperialist powers in World War II and the establishment of the People's Democracies. And this is also the case with the present and the future of People's China. Just imagine! If the Soviet Union had not existed, if there had been no victory in the anti-fascist Second World War, if Japanese imperialism had not been defeated, if the People's Democracies had not come into being, if the oppressed nations of the East were not rising in struggle and if there were no struggle of the masses of the people against their reactionary rulers in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and other capitalist countries — if not for all these in combination, the international reactionary forces bearing down upon us would certainly be many times greater than now. In such circumstances, could we have won victory? Obviously not.

And even with victory, there could be no consolidation. The Chinese people have had more than enough experience of this kind. This experience was reflected long ago in Sun Yat-sen's death-bed statement on the necessity of uniting with the international revolutionary forces.

"We need help from the British and U.S. governments." This, too, is a naive idea in these times. Would the present rulers of Britain and the United States, who are imperialists, help a people's state? Why do these countries do business with us and, supposing they might be willing to lend us money on terms of mutual benefit in the future, why would they do so? Because their capitalists want to make money and their bankers want to earn interest to extricate themselves from their own crisis — it is not a matter of helping the Chinese people. The Communist Parties and progressive groups in these countries are urging their governments to establish trade and even diplomatic relations with us. This is goodwill, this is help, this cannot be mentioned in the same breath with the conduct of the bourgeoisie in the same countries. Throughout his life, Sun Yat-sen appealed countless times to the capitalist countries for help and got nothing but heartless rebuffs. Only once in his whole life did Sun Yat-sen receive foreign help, and that was Soviet help. Let readers refer to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's testament; his earnest advice was not to look for help from the imperialist countries but to "unite with those nations of the world which treat us as equals". Dr. Sun had experience; he had suffered, he had been deceived. We should remember his words and not allow ourselves to be deceived again. Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help, not to the side of the imperialist front.

"You are dictatorial." My dear sirs, you are right, that is just what we are. All the experience the Chinese people have accumulated through several decades teaches us to enforce the people's democratic dictatorship, that is, to deprive the reactionaries of the right to speak and let the people alone have that right.

Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. These classes, led by the working class and the Communist Party, unite to form their own state and elect their own government; they enforce their dictatorship over the running dogs of imperialism — the landlord class and bureaucrat-bourgeoisie, as well as the representatives of those classes, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their accomplices — suppress them, allow them only to behave themselves and not to be unruly in word or deed. If they speak or act in an unruly way, they will be promptly stopped and punished. Democracy is practised within the ranks of the people, who enjoy the rights of freedom of speech, assembly, association and so on. The right to vote belongs only to the people, not to the reactionaries. The combination of these two aspects, democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries, is the people's democratic dictatorship.

Why must things be done this way? The reason is quite clear to everybody. If things were not done this way, the revolution would fail, the people would suffer, the country would be conquered.

"Don't you want to abolish state power?" Yes, we do, but not right now; we cannot do it yet. Why? Because imperialism still exists, because domestic reaction still exists, because classes still exist in our country. Our present task is to strengthen the people's state apparatus-mainly the people's army, the people's police and the people's courts — in order to consolidate national defence and protect the people's interests. Given this condition, China can develop steadily, under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, from an agricultural into an industrial country and from a new-democratic into a socialist and communist society, can abolish classes and realize the Great Harmony. The state apparatus, including the army, the police and the courts, is the instrument by which one class oppresses another. It is an instrument for the oppression of antagonistic classes; it is violence and not "benevolence". "You are not benevolent!" Quite so. We definitely do not apply a policy of benevolence to the reactionaries and towards the reactionary activities of the reactionary classes. Our policy of benevolence is applied only within the ranks of the people, not beyond them to the reactionaries or to the reactionary activities of reactionary classes.

The people's state protects the people. Only when the people have such a state can they educate and remould themselves by democratic methods on a country-wide scale, with everyone taking part, and shake off the influence of domestic and foreign reactionaries (which is still very strong, will survive for a long time and cannot be quickly destroyed), rid themselves of the bad habits and ideas acquired in the old society, not allow themselves to be led astray by the reactionaries, and continue to advance — to advance towards a socialist and communist society.

Here, the method we employ is democratic, the method of persuasion, not of compulsion. When anyone among the people breaks the law, he too should be punished, imprisoned or even sentenced to death; but this is a matter of a few individual cases, and it differs in principle from the dictatorship exercised over the reactionaries as a class.

As for the members of the reactionary classes and individual reactionaries, so long as they do not rebel, sabotage or create trouble after their political power has been overthrown, land and work will be given to them as well in order to allow them to live and remould themselves through labour into new people. If they are not willing to work, the people's state will compel them to work. Propaganda and educational work will be done among them too and will be done, moreover, with as much care and thoroughness as among the captured army officers in the past. This, too, may be called a "policy of benevolence" if you like, but it is imposed by us on the members of the enemy classes and cannot be mentioned in the same breath with the work of self-education which we carry on within the ranks of the revolutionary people.

Such remoulding of members of the reactionary classes can be accomplished only by a state of the people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the Communist Party. When it is well done, China's major exploiting classes, the landlord class and the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie (the monopoly capitalist class), will be eliminated for good. There remain the national bourgeoisie; at the present stage, we can already do a good deal of suitable educational work with many of them. When the time comes to realize socialism, that is, to nationalize private enterprise, we shall carry the work of educating and remoulding them a step further. The people have a powerful state apparatus in their hands — there is no need to fear rebellion by the national bourgeoisie.

The serious problem is the education of the peasantry. The peasant economy is scattered, and the socialization of agriculture, judging by the Soviet Union's experience, will require a long time and painstaking work. Without socialization of agriculture, there can be no complete, consolidated socialism. The steps to socialize agriculture must be co-ordinated with the development of a powerful industry having state enterprise as its backbone.[10] The state of the people's democratic dictatorship must systematically solve the problems of industrialization. Since it is not proposed to discuss economic problems in detail in this article, I shall not go into them further.

In 1924 a famous manifesto was adopted at the Kuomintang's First National Congress, which Sun Yat-sen himself led and in which Communists participated. The manifesto stated:

> The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. On the other hand, the Kuomintang's Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.

Apart from the question of who leads whom, the Principle of Democracy stated above corresponds as a general political programme to what we call People's Democracy or New Democracy. A state system which is shared only by the common people and which the bourgeoisie is not allowed to own privately — add to this the leadership of the working class, and we have the state system of the people's democratic dictatorship.

Chiang Kai-shek betrayed Sun Yat-sen and used the dictatorship of the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie and the landlord class as an instrument for oppressing the common people of China. This counter-revolutionary dictatorship was enforced for twenty-two years and has only now been overthrown by the common people of China under our leadership.

The foreign reactionaries who accuse us of practising "dictatorship" or "totalitarianism" are the very persons who practise it. They practise the dictatorship or totalitarianism of one class, the bourgeoisie, over the proletariat and the rest of the people. They are the very persons Sun Yat-sen spoke of as the bourgeoisie of modern states who oppress the common people. And it is from these reactionary scoundrels that Chiang Kai-shek learned his counter-revolutionary dictatorship.

Chu Hsi, a philosopher of the Sung Dynasty, wrote many books and made many remarks which are now forgotten, but one remark is still remembered, "Deal with a man as he deals with you."[11] This is just what we do; we deal with the imperialists and their running dogs, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, as they deal with us. That is all there is to it!

Revolutionary dictatorship and counter-revolutionary dictatorship are by nature opposites, but the former was learned from the latter. Such learning is very important. If the revolutionary people do not master this method of ruling over the counter-revolutionary classes, they will not be able to maintain their state power, domestic and foreign reaction will overthrow that power and restore its own rule over China, and disaster will befall the revolutionary people.

The people's democratic dictatorship is based on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and mainly on the alliance of the workers and the peasants, because these two classes comprise 80 to 90 per cent of China's population. These two classes are the main force in overthrowing imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries. The transition from New Democracy to socialism also depends mainly upon their alliance.

The people's democratic dictatorship needs the leadership of the working class. For it is only the working class that is most far-sighted, most selfless and most thoroughly revolutionary. The entire history of revolution proves that without the leadership of the working class revolution fails and that with the leadership of the working class revolution triumphs. In the epoch of imperialism, in no country can any other class lead any genuine revolution to victory. This is clearly proved by the fact that the many revolutions led by China's petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie all failed.

The national bourgeoisie at the present stage is of great importance. Imperialism, a most ferocious enemy, is still standing alongside us. China's modern industry still forms a very small proportion of the national economy. No reliable statistics are available, but it is estimated, on the basis of certain data, that before the War of Resistance Against Japan the value of output of modern industry constituted only about 10 per cent of the total value of output of the national economy. To counter imperialist oppression and to raise her backward economy to a higher level, China must utilize all the factors of urban and rural capitalism that are beneficial and not harmful to the national economy and the people's livelihood, and we must unite with the national bourgeoisie in common struggle. Our present policy is to regulate capitalism, not to destroy it. But the national bourgeoisie cannot be the leader of the revolution, nor should it have the chief role in state power. The reason it cannot be the leader of the revolution and should not have the chief role in state power is that the social and economic position of the national bourgeoisie determines its weakness; it lacks foresight and sufficient courage and many of its members are afraid of the masses.

Sun Yat-sen advocated "arousing the masses of the people" or "giving assistance to the peasants and workers". But who is to "arouse" them or "give assistance" to them? Sun Yat-sen had the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie in mind. As a matter of fact, they cannot do so. Why did forty years of revolution under Sun Yat-sen end in failure? Because in the epoch of imperialism the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie cannot lead any genuine revolution to victory.

Our twenty-eight years have been quite different. We have had much valuable experience. A well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party; a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a Party — these are the three main weapons with which we have defeated the enemy. They distinguish us from our predecessors. Relying on them, we have won basic victory. We have travelled a tortuous road. We have struggled against opportunist deviations in our Party, both Right and "Left". Whenever we made serious mistakes on these three matters, the revolution suffered setbacks. Taught by mistakes and setbacks, we have become wiser and handle our affairs better. It is hard for any political party or person to avoid mistakes, but we should make as few as possible. Once a mistake is made, we should correct it, and the more quickly and thoroughly the better.

To sum up our experience and concentrate it into one point, it is: the people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class (through the Communist Party) and based upon the alliance of workers and peasants. This dictatorship must unite as one with the international revolutionary forces. This is our formula, our principal experience, our main programme.

Twenty-eight years of our Party are a long period, in which we have accomplished only one thing — we have won basic victory in the revolutionary war. This calls for celebration, because it is the people's victory, because it is a victory in a country as large as China. But we still have much work to do; to use the analogy of a journey, our past work is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand *li*. Remnants of the enemy have yet to be wiped out. The serious task of economic construction lies before us. We shall soon put aside some of the things we know well and be compelled to do things we don't know well. This means difficulties. The imperialists reckon that we will not be able to manage our economy; they are standing by and looking on, awaiting our failure.

We must overcome difficulties, we must learn what we do not know. We must learn to do economic work from all who know how, no matter who they are. We must esteem them as teachers, learning from them respectfully and conscientiously. We must not pretend to know when we do not know. We must not put on bureaucratic airs. If we dig into a subject for several months, for a year or two, for three or five years, we shall eventually master it. At first some of the Soviet Communists also were not very good at handling economic matters and the imperialists awaited their failure too. But the Communist Party of the Soviet Union emerged victorious and, under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, it learned not only how to make the revolution but also how to carry on construction. It has built a great and splendid socialist state. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher and we must learn from it. The situation both at home and abroad is in our favour, we can rely fully on the weapon of the people's democratic dictatorship, unite the people throughout the country, the reactionaries excepted, and advance steadily to our goal.

NOTES

[1] Also known as the world of Great Harmony. It refers to a society based on public ownership, free from class exploitation and oppression — a lofty ideal long cherished by the Chinese people. Here the realm of Great Harmony means communist society.

[2] See V. I. Lenin, "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, Chapter 2. Lenin said: "For nearly half a century — approximately from the 'forties to the 'nineties — advanced thinkers in Russia, under the oppression of an unparalleled, savage and reactionary tsardom, eagerly sought for the correct revolutionary theory and followed each and every 'last word' in Europe and America in this sphere with astonishing diligence and thoroughness. Russia achieved Marxism, the only correct revolutionary theory, veritably through *suffering*, by half a century of unprecedented torment and sacrifice, of unprecedented revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, devoted searching, study, testing in practice, disappointment, verification and comparison with European experience."

[3] Faced with the opposition of the Chinese people to her traffic in opium, Britain sent forces in 1840-42 to invade Kwangtung and other coastal regions of China under the pretext of protecting trade. The troops in Kwangtung, led by Lin Tse-hsu, fought a war of resistance.

[4] Hung Hsiu-chuan (1814-64), who was born in Kwangtung, was the leader of a peasant revolutionary war in the middle of the 19th century. In 1851 he led a mass uprising in Kwangsi and proclaimed the establishment of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, which held many provinces and fought the Ching Dynasty for fourteen years. In 1864 this revolutionary war failed and Hung Hsiu-chuan committed suicide by poison.

[5] Kang Yu-wei (1858-1927), of Nanhai County, Kwangtung Province. In 1895, after China had been defeated by Japanese imperialism in the previous year, he led thirteen hundred candidates for the third grade in the imperial examinations at Peking in submitting a "ten thousand word memorial" to Emperor Kuang Hsu, asking for "constitutional reform and modernization" and asking that the autocratic monarchy be changed into a constitutional monarchy. In 1898, in an attempt to introduce reforms, the emperor promoted Kang Yu-wei together with Tan Sze-tung, Liang Chi-chao and others to key posts in the government. Later, the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, representing the die-hards, again took power and the reform movement failed. Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao fled abroad and formed the Protect-the-Emperor Party, which became a reactionary political faction in opposition to the bourgeois and petty bourgeois revolutionaries represented by Sun Yat-sen. Among Kang's works were *Forgeries in the Classics of the Confucian Canon*, *Confucius as a Reformer*, and *Ta Tung Shu* or the *Book of Great Harmony*.

[6] Yen Pu (1853-1921), of Foochow, Fukien Province, studied at a naval academy in Britain. After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, he advocated constitutional monarchy and reforms to modernize China. His translations of T. H. Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, J. S. Mill's *System of Logic*, Montesquieu's *L'Esprit des Lois*, and other works were vehicles for the spread of European bourgeois thought in China.

[7] A system of examinations adopted by China's autocratic dynasties. It was a method used by the feudal ruling class for selecting personnel to govern the people and also for enticing the intellectuals. The system, dating from the 7th century, persisted into the early 20th century.

[8] The Revolution of 1911 overthrew the autocratic regime of the Ching Dynasty. On October 10 of that year, a section of the New Army, at the urging of the revolutionary societies of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, staged an uprising in Wuchang. This was followed by uprisings in other provinces, and very soon the rule of the Ching Dynasty crumbled. On January 1, 1912, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China was set up in Nanking, and Sun Yat-sen was elected Provisional President. The revolution achieved victory through the alliance of the bourgeoisie, peasants, workers and urban petty bourgeoisie. But because the group which led the revolution was compromising in nature, failed to bring real benefits to the peasants and yielded to the pressure of imperialism and the feudal forces, state power fell into the hands of the Northern warlord Yuan Shih-kai, and the revolution failed.

[9] A hero in the novel, *Shui Hu Chuan* (*Heroes of the Marshes*), who killed a tiger with his bare hands on the Chingyang Ridge. This is one of the most popular episodes in that famous novel.

[10] For the relation between the socialization of agriculture and the industrialization of the country, see *On the Question of Agricultural Co-operation* (Sections 7 and 8), a report made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on July 31, 1955 at the Conference of the Secretaries of the Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Committees of the Chinese Communist Party. In this report Comrade Mao Tse-tung, on the basis of Soviet experience and our own country's practice, greatly developed the thesis that socialization of agriculture should proceed in step with socialist industrialization.

[11] The quotation is from Chu Hsi's commentary on the *Confucian Doctrine of the Mean*, Chapter 13.

CAST AWAY ILLUSIONS, PREPARE FOR STRUGGLE*

August 14, 1949

It is no accident that the U.S. State Department's White Paper on China-U.S. Relations and Secretary of State Acheson's Letter of Transmittal to President Truman[1] have been released at this time. The publication of these documents reflects the victory of the Chinese people and the defeat of imperialism, it reflects the decline of the entire world system of imperialism. The imperialist system is riddled with insuperable internal contradictions, and therefore the imperialists are plunged into deep gloom.

Imperialism has prepared the conditions for its own doom. These conditions are the awakening of the great masses of the people in the colonies and semi-colonies and in the imperialist countries themselves. Imperialism has pushed the great masses of the people throughout the world into the historical epoch of the great struggle to abolish imperialism.

Imperialism has prepared the material as well as the moral conditions for the struggle of the great masses of the people.

The material conditions are factories, railways, firearms, artillery, and the like. Most of the powerful equipment of the Chinese People's Liberation Army comes from U.S. imperialism, some comes from Japanese imperialism and some is of our own manufacture.

The British aggression against China in 1840[2] was followed by the wars of aggression against China by the Anglo-French allied forces,[3] by France,[4] by Japan,[5] and by the allied forces of the eight powers (Britain, France, Japan, tsarist Russia, Germany, the United States, Italy and Austria);[6] by the war between Japan and tsarist Russia on Chinese territory;[7] by Japan's war of aggression against China in China's Northeast, which began in 1931; by Japan's war of aggression against all China, which began in 1937 and lasted eight long years; and, finally, by the latest war of aggression against the Chinese people, which has gone on for three years, waged to all appearances by Chiang Kai-shek but in reality by the United States. As stated in Acheson's Letter, the United States in this last war has given the Kuomintang government material aid to the value of "more than 50 percent" of the latter's "monetary expenditures" and "furnished the Chinese armies" (meaning the Kuomintang armies) with "military supplies". It is a war in which the United States supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek supplies the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people. All these wars of aggression, together with political, economic and cultural aggression and oppression, have caused the Chinese to hate imperialism, made them stop and think, "What is all this about?" and compelled them to bring their revolutionary spirit into full play and become united through struggle. They fought, failed, fought again, failed again and fought again and accumulated 109 years of experience, accumulated the experience of hundreds of struggles, great and small, military and political, economic and cultural, with bloodshed and without bloodshed — and only then won today's basic victory. These are the moral conditions without which the revolution could not be victorious.

To serve the needs of its aggression, imperialism created the comprador system and bureaucrat-capital in China. Imperialist aggression stimulated China's social economy, brought about changes in it and created the opposites of imperialism — the national industry and national bourgeoisie of China, and especially the Chinese proletariat working in enterprises run directly by the imperialists, those run by bureaucrat-capital and those run by the national bourgeoisie. To serve the needs of its aggression, imperialism ruined the Chinese peasants by exploiting them through the exchange of unequal values and thereby created great masses of poor peasants, numbering hundreds of millions and comprising 70 per cent of China's rural population. To serve the needs of its aggression, imperialism created for China

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* This article and the four that follow — "Farewell, Leighton Stuart!", "Why It Is Necessary to Discuss the White Paper", "'Friendship' or Aggression?" and "The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History" — were commentaries written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Hsinhua News Agency on the U.S. State Department's White Paper and Dean Acheson's Letter of Transmittal. They exposed the imperialist nature of United States policy towards China, criticized the illusions about U.S. imperialism harboured by some of the bourgeois intellectuals in China and gave a theoretical explanation of the reasons for the rise of the Chinese revolution and for its victory.

millions of big and small intellectuals of a new type, differing from the old type of *literatus* or scholar-bureaucrat. But imperialism and its running dogs, the reactionary governments of China, could control only a part of these intellectuals and finally only a handful, such as Hu Shih, Fu Sze-nien and Chien Mu;[8] all the rest got out of control and turned against them. Students, teachers, professors, technicians, engineers, doctors, scientists, writers, artists and government employees, all are revolting against or parting company with the Kuomintang. The Communist Party is the party of the poor and is described in the Kuomintang's widespread, all-pervasive propaganda as a band of people who commit murder and arson, who rape and loot, who reject history and culture, renounce the motherland, have no filial piety or respect for teachers and are impervious to all reason, who practise community of property and of women and employ the military tactics of the "human sea" — in short, a horde of fiendish monsters who perpetrate every conceivable crime and are unpardonably wicked. But strangely enough, it is this very horde that has won the support of several hundred million people, including the majority of the intellectuals, and especially the student youth.

Part of the intellectuals still want to wait and see. They think: the Kuomintang is no good and the Communist Party is not necessarily good either, so we had better wait and see. Some support the Communist Party in words, but in their hearts they are waiting to see. They are the very people who have illusions about the United States. They are unwilling to draw a distinction between the U.S. imperialists, who are in power, and the American people, who are not. They are easily duped by the honeyed words of the U.S. imperialists, as though these imperialists would deal with People's China on the basis of equality and mutual benefit without a stern, long struggle. They still have many reactionary, that is to say, anti-popular, ideas in their heads, but they are not Kuomintang reactionaries. They are the middle-of-the-roaders or the right-wingers in People's China. They are the supporters of what Acheson calls "democratic individualism". The deceptive manoeuvres of the Achesons still have a flimsy social base in China.

Acheson's White Paper admits that the U.S. imperialists are at a complete loss as to what to do about the present situation in China. The Kuomintang is so impotent that no amount of help can save it from inevitable doom; the U.S. imperialists are losing grip over things and feel helpless. Acheson says in his Letter of Transmittal:

> The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not.

According to logic, Acheson's conclusion should be, as some muddle-headed Chinese intellectuals think or say, to act like "the butcher who lays down his knife and at once becomes a Buddha" or "the robber who has a change of heart and becomes a virtuous man", that is, he should treat People's China on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and stop making trouble. But no, says Acheson, trouble-making will continue, and definitely so. Will there be any result? There will, says he. On what group of people will he rely? On the supporters of "democratic individualism". Says Acheson:

> . . . ultimately the profound civilization and the democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke. I consider that we should encourage all developments in China which now and in the future work toward this end.

How different is the logic of the imperialists from that of the people! Make trouble, fail, make trouble again, fail again . . . till their doom; that is the logic of the imperialists and all reactionaries the world over in dealing with the people's cause, and they will never go against this logic. This is a Marxist law. When we say "imperialism is ferocious", we mean that its nature will never change, that the imperialists will never lay down their butcher knives, that they will never become Buddhas, till their doom.

Fight, fail, fight again, fail again, fight again . . . till their victory; that is the logic of the people, and they too will never go against this logic. This is another Marxist law. The Russian people's revolution followed this law, and so has the Chinese people's revolution.

Classes struggle, some classes triumph, others are eliminated. Such is history, such is the history of civilization for thousands of years. To interpret history from this viewpoint is historical materialism; standing in opposition to this viewpoint is historical idealism.

The method of self-criticism can be applied only within the ranks of the people; it is impossible to persuade the imperialists and the Chinese reactionaries to show kindness of heart and turn from their evil ways. The only course is to organize forces and struggle against them, as in our People's War of Liberation and the agrarian revolution, to expose the imperialists, "irritate"[9] them, overthrow them, punish them for offences against the law and "allow them only to behave themselves and not to be unruly in word or deed". Only then will there be any hope of dealing with imperialist foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Only then will there be any hope that those landlords, bureaucrat-capitalists, members of the reactionary Kuomintang clique and their accomplices, who have laid down their arms and surrendered, can be given education for transforming the bad into the good and be transformed, as far as possible, into good people. Many Chinese liberals — the old-type democratic elements, *i.e.*, the supporters of "democratic individualism", whom Truman, Marshall, Acheson, Leighton Stuart and the like count on and have been trying to win over — often find themselves in a passive position and are often wrong in their judgements on the U.S. rulers, on the Kuomintang, on the Soviet Union and also on the Communist Party of China. The reason is precisely that they do not look at, or disapprove of looking at, problems from the standpoint of historical materialism.

It is the duty of progressives - the Communists, members of the democratic parties, politically conscious workers, the student youth and progressive intellectuals — to unite with the intermediate strata, middle-of-the-roaders and backward elements of various strata, with all those in People's China who are still wavering and hesitating (these people will waver for a long time to come and, even after they have once become steady, will waver again as soon as they meet difficulties), give them sincere help, criticize their wavering character, educate them, win them over to the side of the masses, prevent the imperialists from pulling them over and tell them to cast away illusions and prepare for struggle. Let no one think that there is no more work to do now that victory is won. We still have to work, to do a great deal of patient work, before we can truly win these people over. When they are won over, imperialism will be entirely isolated, and Acheson will no longer be able to play any of his tricks.

The slogan, "Prepare for struggle", is addressed to those who still cherish certain illusions about the relations between China and the imperialist countries, especially between China and the United States. With regard to this question, they are still passive, their minds are still not made up, they are still not determined to wage a long struggle against U.S. (and British) imperialism because they still have illusions about the United States. There is still a very wide, or fairly wide, gap between these people and ourselves on this question.

The publication of the U.S. White Paper and Acheson's Letter of Transmittal is worthy of celebration, because it is a bucket of cold water and a loss of face for those who have ideas of the old type of democracy or democratic individualism, who do not approve of, or do not quite approve of, or are dissatisfied with, or are somewhat dissatisfied with, or even resent, people's democracy, or democratic collectivism, or democratic centralism, or collective heroism, or patriotism based on internationalism — but who still have patriotic feelings and are not Kuomintang reactionaries. It is a bucket of cold water particularly for those who believe that everything American is good and hope that China will model herself on the United States.

Acheson openly declares that the Chinese democratic individualists will be "encouraged" to throw off the so-called "foreign yoke". That is to say, he calls for the overthrow of Marxism-Leninism and the people's democratic dictatorship led by the Communist Party of China. For this "ism" and this system, it is alleged, are "foreign", with no roots in China, imposed on the Chinese by the German, Karl Marx (who died sixty-six years ago), and the Russians, Lenin (who died twenty-five years ago) and Stalin (who is still alive); this "ism" and this system, moreover, are downright bad, because they advocate the class struggle, the overthrow of imperialism, etc.; hence they must be got rid of. In this connection, it is alleged, "the democratic individualism of China will reassert itself" with the "encouragement" of President Truman, the backstage Commander-in-Chief Marshall, Secretary of State Acheson (the charming foreign mandarin responsible for the publication of the White Paper) and Ambassador Leighton Stuart who has scampered off. Acheson and his like think they are giving "encouragement", but those Chinese democratic individualists who still have patriotic feelings, even though they believe in the United States, may quite possibly feel this is a bucket of cold water thrown on them and a loss of face; for instead of dealing with the authorities of the Chinese people's democratic dictatorship in the proper way, Acheson and his like are doing this filthy work and, what is more, they have openly published it. What a loss of face! What a loss of face! To those who are patriotic, Acheson's statement is no "encouragement" but an insult.

China is in the midst of a great revolution. All China is seething with enthusiasm. The conditions are favourable for winning over and uniting with all those who do not have a bitter and deep-seated hatred for the cause of the people's revolution, even though they have mistaken ideas. Progressives should use the White Paper to persuade all these persons.

NOTES

[1] The U.S. White Paper, *United States Relations with China*, was published by the U.S. State Department on August 5, 1949. Acheson's Letter of Transmittal to Truman was dated July 30, 1949. The main body of the White Paper, divided into eight chapters, deals with Sino-U.S. relations in the period from 1844, when the United States forced China to sign the "Treaty of Wanghia", to 1949, when victory was basically won throughout the country in the Chinese people's revolution. The White Paper goes into particular detail about how, in the five years from the last part of the War of Resistance Against Japan to 1949, the United States pursued a policy of support for Chiang Kai-shek and of anti-communism, opposed the Chinese people by every possible means and finally met with defeat. The White Paper and Acheson's Letter of Transmittal are full of distortions, omissions and fabrications, and also of venomous slanders and deep hatred against the Chinese people. In the quarrel within the U.S. reactionary camp over its policy towards China, imperialists like Truman and Acheson were compelled to reveal publicly through the White Paper some of the truth about their counter-revolutionary activities in an attempt to convince their opponents. Thus, in its objective effect, the White Paper became a confession by U.S. imperialism of its crimes of aggression against China.

[2] See "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", Note 3, p. 423 of this volume.

[3] From 1856 to 1860 Britain and Prance jointly carried on a war of aggression against China, with the United States and tsarist Russia supporting them from the side-lines. The government of the Ching Dynasty was then devoting all its energy to suppressing the peasant revolution of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and adopted a policy of passive resistance towards the foreign aggressors. The Anglo-French allied forces occupied such major cities as Canton, Tientsin and Peking, plundered and burned down Yuan Ming Yuan Palace in Peking and forced the Ching government to conclude the "Treaty of Tientsin" and the "Treaty of Peking". The main provisions of these treaties included the opening as treaty ports of Tientsin, Newchwang, Tengchow, Taiwan, Tanshui, Chaochow, Chiungchow, Nanking, Chinkiang, Kiukiang and Hankow and the granting to foreigners of the special privileges of travel and missionary activities in China's interior and of inland navigation. From then on foreign forces of aggression extended over all China's coastal provinces and penetrated deep into the hinterland.

[4] In 1884-85 the French aggressors invaded Vietnam and the Chinese provinces of Kwangsi, Fukien, Taiwan and Chekiang. Chinese troops resisted vigorously and won a series of victories. Notwithstanding the victories in the war, the corrupt

Ching government signed the humiliating "Treaty of Tientsin", which recognized the occupation of Vietnam by the French and permitted their forces of aggression to penetrate southern China.

[5] The Sino-Japanese War of 1894. The war broke out as a result of Japan's aggression against Korea and her provocations to the Chinese land and naval forces. In this war the Chinese forces put up a heroic fight, but China suffered defeat owing to the corruption of the Ching government and its lack of preparation for resistance. As a result, the Ching government concluded the shameful "Treaty of Shimonoseki" with Japan, under which it ceded Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, paid war reparations of 200 million taels of silver, permitted the Japanese to set up factories in China, opened Shasi, Chungking, Soochow and Hangchow as treaty ports and recognized Japan's domination over Korea.

[6] In 1900 eight imperialist powers, Britain, France, Japan, tsarist Russia, Germany, the United States, Italy and Austria, sent a joint force to attack China in an attempt to suppress the Yi Ho Tuan Uprising of the Chinese people against aggression. The Chinese people resisted heroically. The allied forces of the eight powers captured Taku and occupied Tientsin and Peking. In 1901 the Ching government concluded a treaty with the eight imperialist countries; its main provisions were that China had to pay those countries the enormous sum of 450 million taels of silver as war reparations and grant them the special privilege of stationing troops in Peking and in the area from Peking to Tientsin to Shanhaikuan.

[7] This was the imperialist war fought between Japan and tsarist Russia in 1904-05 to grab China's Northeast and Korea. As the war was fought mainly in the area of Fengtien (now Shenyang) and Liaoyang and around the port of Lushun in China's Northeast, it caused enormous losses to the Chinese people. As a result of the war tsarist Russia was defeated and supplanted by Japanese imperialism in the dominant role in China's Northeast. Under the peace treaty (the Treaty of Portsmouth) concluded at the end of this war tsarist Russia also recognized Japan's exclusive control over Korea.

[8] Hu Shih, who was formerly a university professor, university president and ambassador of the Kuomintang government to the United States, is a well-known apologist for U.S. imperialism among Chinese bourgeois intellectuals. Fu Sze-nien and Chien Mu, also university professors, were scholars serving the reactionary Kuomintang government.

[9] See "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", pp. 415-16 of this volume.

FAREWELL, LEIGHTON STUART!

August 18, 1949

It is understandable that the date chosen for the publication of the U.S. White Paper was August 5, a time when Leighton Stuart[1] had departed from Nanking for Washington but had not yet arrived there, since Leighton Stuart is a symbol of the complete defeat of the U.S. policy of aggression. Leighton Stuart is an American born in China; he has fairly wide social connections and spent many years running missionary schools in China; he once sat in a Japanese gaol during the War of Resistance; he used to pretend to love both the United States and China and was able to deceive quite a number of Chinese. Hence, he was picked out by George C. Marshall, was made U.S. ambassador to China and became a celebrity in the Marshall group. In the eyes of the Marshall group he had only one fault, namely, that the whole period when he was ambassador to China as an exponent of their policy was the very period in which that policy was utterly defeated by the Chinese people; that was no small responsibility. It is only natural that the White Paper, which is designed to evade this responsibility, should have been published at a time when Leighton Stuart was on his way to Washington but had not yet arrived.

The war to turn China into a U.S. colony, a war in which the United States of America supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, has been an important component of the U.S. imperialist policy of world-wide aggression since World War II. The U.S. policy of aggression has several targets. The three main targets are Europe, Asia and the Americas. China, the centre of gravity in Asia, is a large country with a population of 475 million; by seizing China, the United States would possess all of Asia. With its Asian front consolidated, U.S. imperialism could concentrate its forces on attacking Europe. U.S. imperialism considers its front in the Americas relatively secure. These are the smug over-all calculations of the U.S. aggressors.

But in the first place, the American people and the peoples of the world do not want war. Secondly, the attention of the United States has largely been absorbed by the awakening of the peoples of Europe, by the rise of the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe, and particularly by the towering presence of the Soviet Union, this unprecedentedly powerful bulwark of peace bestriding Europe and Asia, and by its strong resistance to the U.S. policy of aggression. Thirdly, and this is most important, the Chinese people have awakened, and the armed forces and the organized strength of the people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China have become more powerful than ever before. Consequently, the ruling clique of U.S. imperialism has been prevented from adopting a policy of direct, large-scale armed attacks on China and instead has adopted a policy of helping Chiang Kai-shek fight the civil war.

U.S. naval, ground and air forces did participate in the war in China. There were U.S. naval bases in Tsingtao, Shanghai and Taiwan. U.S. troops were stationed in Peiping, Tientsin, Tangshan, Chinwangtao, Tsingtao, Shanghai and Nanking. The U.S. air force controlled all of China's air space and took aerial photographs of all China's strategic areas for military maps. At the town of Anping near Peiping, at Chiutai near Changchun, at Tangshan and in the Eastern Shantung Peninsula, U.S. troops and other military personnel clashed with the People's Liberation Army and on several occasions were captured.[2] Chennault's air fleet took an extensive part in the civil war.[3] Besides transporting troops for Chiang Kai-shek, the U.S. air force bombed and sank the cruiser *Chungking*, which had mutinied against the Kuomintang.[4] All these were acts of direct participation in the war, although they fell short of an open declaration of war and were not large in scale, and although the principal method of U.S. aggression was the large-scale supply of money, munitions and advisers to help Chiang Kai-shek fight the civil war.

The use of this method by the United States was determined by the objective situation in China and the rest of the world, and not by any lack of desire on the part of the Truman-Marshall group, the ruling clique of U.S. imperialism, to launch direct aggression against China. Moreover, at the outset of its help to Chiang Kai-shek in fighting the civil war, a crude farce was staged in which the United

States appeared as mediator in the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; this was an attempt to soften up the Communist Party of China, deceive the Chinese people and thus gain control of all China without fighting. The peace negotiations failed, the deception fell through and the curtain rose on the war.

Liberals or "democratic individualists" who cherish illusions about the United States and have short memories! Please look at Acheson's own words:

> When peace came the United States was confronted with three possible alternatives in China: (1) it could have pulled out lock, stock and barrel; (2) it could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists; (3) it could, while assisting the Nationalists to assert their authority over as much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a compromise between the two sides.

Why didn't the United States adopt the first of these policies? Acheson says:

> The first alternative would, and I believe American public opinion at the time so felt, have represented an abandonment of our international responsibilities and of our traditional policy of friendship for China before we had made a determined effort to be of assistance.

So that's how things stand: the "international responsibilities" of the United States and its "traditional policy of friendship for China" are nothing but intervention against China. Intervention is called assuming international responsibilities and showing friendship for China; as to non-intervention, it simply won't do. Here Acheson defiles U.S. public opinion; his is the "public opinion" of Wall Street, not the public opinion of the American people.

Why didn't the United States adopt the second of these policies? Acheson says:

> The second alternative policy, while it may look attractive theoretically and in retrospect, was wholly impracticable. The Nationalists had been unable to destroy the Communists during the 10 years before the war. Now after the war the Nationalists were, as indicated above, weakened, demoralized, and unpopular. They had quickly dissipated their popular support and prestige in the areas liberated from the Japanese by the conduct of their civil

> and military officials. The Communists on the other hand were much stronger than they had ever been and were in control of most of North China. Because of the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist forces which was later to be tragically demonstrated, the Communists probably could have been dislodged only by American arms. It is obvious that the American people would not have sanctioned such a colossal commitment of our armies in 1945 or later. We therefore came to the third alternative policy. . . .

What a splendid idea! The United States supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, to "destroy the Communists" and turn China into a U.S. colony, so that the United States may fulfil its "international responsibilities" and carry out its "traditional policy of friendship for China".

Although the Kuomintang was corrupt and incompetent, "demoralized and unpopular", the United States nevertheless supplied it with money and guns and made it fight. Direct armed intervention was all right, "theoretically". It also seems all right "in retrospect" to the rulers of the United States. For direct armed intervention would really have been interesting and it might "look attractive". But it would not have worked in practice, for "it is obvious that the American people would not have sanctioned" it. Not that the imperialist group of Truman, Marshall, Acheson and their like did not desire it — they very much desired it — but the situation in China, in the United States and in the world as a whole (a point Acheson does not mention) did not permit it; they had to give up their preference and take the third way.

Let those Chinese who believe that "victory is possible even without international help" listen. Acheson is giving you a lesson. Acheson is a good teacher, giving lessons free of charge, and he is telling the whole truth with tireless zeal and great candour. The United States refrained from dispatching large forces to attack China, not because the U.S. government didn't want to, but because it had worries. First worry: the Chinese people would oppose it, and the U.S. government was afraid of getting hopelessly bogged down in a quagmire. Second worry: the American people would oppose it, and so the U.S. government dared not order mobilization. Third worry: the people of the Soviet Union, of Europe and of the rest of the world would oppose it, and the U.S. government would face universal condemnation. Acheson's charming candour has its limits and he is unwilling to mention the third worry. The reason is he is afraid of losing face before the Soviet Union, he is afraid that the Marshall Plan in Europe,[5] which is already a failure despite pretences to the contrary, may end dismally in total collapse.

Let those Chinese who are short-sighted, muddle-headed liberals or democratic individualists listen. Acheson is giving you a lesson; he is a good teacher for you. He has made a clean sweep of your fancied U.S. humanity, justice and virtue. Isn't that so? Can you find a trace of humanity, justice or virtue in the White Paper or in Acheson's Letter of Transmittal?

True, the United States has science and technology. But unfortunately they are in the grip of the capitalists, not in the hands of the people, and are used to exploit and oppress the people at home and to perpetrate aggression and to slaughter people abroad. There is also "democracy" in the United States. But unfortunately it is only another name for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by itself. The United States has plenty of money. But unfortunately it is willing to give money only to the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, who are rotten to the core. The United States, it is said, is and will be quite willing to give money to its fifth column in China, but is unwilling to give it to the ordinary run of liberals or democratic individualists, who are much too bookish and do not know how to appreciate favours, and naturally it is even more unwilling to give money to the Communists. Money may be given, but only conditionally. What is the condition? Follow the United States. The Americans have sprinkled some relief flour in Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai to see who will stoop to pick it up. Like Chiang Tai Kung fishing,[6] they have cast the line for the fish who want to be caught. But he who swallows food handed out in contempt[7] will get a bellyache.

We Chinese have backbone. Many who were once liberals or democratic individualists have stood up to the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs, the Kuomintang reactionaries. Wen Yi-to rose to his full height and smote the table, angrily faced the Kuomintang pistols and died rather than submit.[8] Chu Tse-ching, though seriously ill, starved to death rather than accept U.S. "relief food".[9] Han Yu of the Tang Dynasty wrote a "Eulogy of Po Yi",[10] praising a man with quite a few "democratic individualist" ideas, who shirked his duty towards the people of his own country, deserted his post and opposed the people's war of liberation of that time, led by King Wu. He lauded the wrong man. We should write eulogies of Wen Yi-to and Chu Tse-ching who demonstrated the heroic spirit of our nation.

What matter if we have to face some difficulties? Let them blockade us! Let them blockade us for eight or ten years! By that time all of China's problems will have been solved. Will the Chinese cower before difficulties when they are not afraid even of death? Lao Tzu said, "The people fear not death, why threaten them with it?"[11] U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, have not only "threatened" us with death but actually put many of us to death. Besides people like Wen Yi-to, they have killed millions of Chinese in the last three years with U.S. carbines, machine-guns, mortars, bazookas, howitzers, tanks and bombs dropped from aeroplanes. This situation is now coming to an end. They have been defeated. It is we who are going in to attack them, not they who are coming out to attack us. They will soon be finished. True, the few problems left to us, such as blockade, unemployment, famine, inflation and rising prices, are difficulties, but we have already begun to breathe more easily than in the past three years. We have come triumphantly through the ordeal of the last three years, why can't we overcome these few difficulties of today? Why can't we live without the United States?

When the People's Liberation Army crossed the Yangtse River, the U.S. colonial government at Nanking fled helter-skelter. Yet His Excellency Ambassador Stuart sat tight, watching wide-eyed, hoping to set up shop under a new signboard and to reap some profit. But what did he see? Apart from the People's Liberation Army marching past, column after column, and the workers, peasants and students rising in hosts, he saw something else — the Chinese liberals or democratic individualists turning out in force, shouting slogans and talking revolution together with the workers, peasants, soldiers and students. In short, he was left out in the cold, "standing all alone, body and shadow comforting each other".[12] There was nothing more for him to do, and he had to take to the road, his briefcase under his arm.

There are still some intellectuals and other people in China who have muddled ideas and illusions about the United States. Therefore we should explain things to them, win them over, educate them and unite with them, so they will come over to the side of the people and not fall into the snares set by imperialism. But the prestige of U.S. imperialism among the Chinese people is completely bankrupt, and the White Paper is a record of its bankruptcy. Progressives should make good use of the White Paper to educate the Chinese people.

Leighton Stuart has departed and the White Paper has arrived. Very good. Very good. Both events are worth celebrating.

NOTES

[1] John Leighton Stuart, who was born in China in 1876, was always a loyal agent of U.S. cultural aggression in China. He started missionary work in China in 1905 and in 1909 became president of Yenching University, which was established by the United States in Peking. On July 11, 1946, he was appointed U.S. ambassador to China. He actively supported the Kuomintang reactionaries in prosecuting the civil war and carried out various political intrigues against the Chinese people. On August 2, 1949, because all the efforts of U.S. imperialism to obstruct the victory of the Chinese people's revolution had completely failed, Leighton Stuart had to leave China quietly.

[2] Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the armed forces of the United States, with the purpose of aggression against China's territory and sovereignty and of interference in her domestic affairs, landed in China and stationed themselves at Peiping, Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, Tangshan, Kaiping, Chinwangtao, Chinghai, Tsingtao and other places. In addition, they repeatedly invaded the Liberated Areas. On July 29, 1946, U.S. troops in Tientsin, in co-ordination with Chiang Kai-shek's bandit troops, assaulted the town of Anping, Hsiangho County, Hopei Province; this is the Anping Incident referred to in the text. On March 1, 1947, U.S. troops made a military reconnaissance of the position of the People's Liberation Army at Hohsipao, situated between Changchun and Chiutai in northeastern China. On June 16, 1946, U.S. troops at Tangshan, Hopei Province, raided Sungchiaying and other places; in July they raided Sanho Village, Luanhsien County, and Hsihonan Village, Changli County, both near Tangshan. Of the numerous attacks on the Eastern Shantung Peninsula, the most widely-known were two, one by U.S. aircraft and warships on Langnuankou and Hsiaoli Island, Mouping County, on August 28, 1947, and the other by U.S. forces on Wanglintao Village, north of Chimo County, on December 25, 1947 in co-ordination with Chiang Kai-shek's bandit troops. In all these cases in which the U.S. forces committed acts of aggression by invading the Liberated Areas, the Chinese People's Liberation Army or the local people's armed forces took just action in self-defence.

[3] Claire Lee Chennault was at one time U.S. adviser to the Kuomintang government's air force. After the Japanese surrender, he organized a group of the U.S. 14th Air Force personnel into an air transport corps to help the Kuomintang fight the civil war. His air transport corps took a direct part in the criminal reconnoitring and bombing of the Liberated Areas.

[4] See "On the Outrages by British Warships — Statement by the Spokesman of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army", Note 4, p. 403 of this volume.

[5] On June 5, 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall made a speech at Harvard University, putting forward a plan for so-called U.S. "aid" to rehabilitate Europe. The "European Recovery Programme" subsequently drawn up by the U.S. government on the basis of the speech was known as the "Marshall Plan".

[6] Chiang Tai Kung lived in the Chou Dynasty. According to a legend, he once fished in the Weishui River, holding a rod without hook or bait three feet above the water, and saying, "The fish that is destined to be caught will come up." (From *Stories About King Wu's Expedition Against the Yin Dynasty*.)

[7] "Food handed out in contempt" refers to alms handed out as an insult. It is an allusion to a story in the *Book of Rites*, which tells of a hungry man in the State of Chi, who would rather starve to death than accept food given him insultingly.

[8] Wen Yi-to (1899-1946), famed Chinese poet, scholar and university professor. In 1943 he began to take an active part in the struggle for democracy out of bitter hatred for the reaction and corruption of the Chiang Kai-shek government. After the War of Resistance Against Japan, he vigorously opposed the Kuomintang's conspiracy with U.S. imperialism to start civil war against the people. On July 15, 1946, he was assassinated in Kunming by Kuomintang thugs.

[9] Chu Tse-ching (1898-1948), Chinese man of letters and university professor. After the War of Resistance, he actively supported the student movement against the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In June 1948 he signed a declaration protesting against the revival of Japanese militarism, which was being fostered by the United States, and rejecting "U.S. relief" flour. He was then living in great poverty. He died in Peiping on August 12, 1948, from poverty and illness, but even on his death-bed he enjoined his family not to buy the U.S. flour rationed by the Kuomintang government.

[10] Han Yu (768-824) was a famous writer of the Tang Dynasty. "Eulogy of Po Yi" was a prose piece written by him. Po Yi, who lived towards the end of the Yin Dynasty, opposed the expedition of King Wu of Chou against the House of Yin. After the downfall of the House of Yin, he fled to the Shouyang Mountain and starved to death rather than eat of Chou grain.

[11] A quotation from *Lao Tzu*, Chapter LXXIV.

[12] A quotation from Li Mi's "Memorial to the Emperor".

WHY IT IS NECESSARY TO DISCUSS THE WHITE PAPER

August 28, 1949

We have criticized the U.S. White Paper and Acheson's Letter of Transmittal in three articles ("A Confession of Helplessness",[1] "Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle" and "Farewell, Leighton Stuart!"). Our criticism has aroused widespread attention and discussion in all democratic parties, people's organizations, the press, universities and schools, and among democratic personages in all walks of life throughout the country; they have issued many correct and useful declarations, statements and comments. Forums on the White Paper are being held and the entire discussion is still developing. The discussion covers Sino-U.S. relations, Sino-Soviet relations, China's foreign relations in the past hundred years, the mutual relation between the Chinese revolution and the revolutionary forces of the world, the relation between the Kuomintang reactionaries and the Chinese people, the proper attitude to be adopted by the democratic parties, people's organizations and democratic personages in all walks of life in the struggle against imperialism, the proper attitude to be adopted by liberals or so-called democratic individualists on the country's internal and external relations as a whole, the ways of dealing with new imperialist intrigues, and so on. All this is very good and is of great educational value.

The whole world is now discussing the Chinese revolution and the U.S. White Paper. This is no accident, this shows the great significance of the Chinese revolution in world history. As for us Chinese, though we have basically won victory in our revolution, we have had no opportunity for a long time to discuss thoroughly the interrelations of this revolution and various forces at home and abroad. Such a discussion is necessary, and now an opportunity has been found in the discussion of the U.S. White Paper. We had no opportunity for this kind of discussion before because we had not won basic victory in the revolution, because Chinese and foreign reactionaries had cut off the big cities from the People's Liberated Areas and because some aspects of the contradictions had not yet been fully revealed by the development of the revolution. Now the situation is different. The greater part of China has been liberated, all aspects of the internal and external contradictions have been fully revealed, and just at this moment the United States has published the White Paper. Thus the opportunity for the discussion has been found.

The White Paper is a counter-revolutionary document which openly demonstrates U.S. imperialist intervention in China. In this respect, imperialism has departed from its normal practice. The great, victorious Chinese revolution has compelled one section or faction of the U.S. imperialist clique to reply to attacks from another by publishing certain authentic data on its own actions against the Chinese people and drawing reactionary conclusions from the data, because otherwise it could not get by. The fact that public revelation has replaced concealment is a sign that imperialism has departed from its normal practice. Until a few weeks ago, before the publication of the White Paper, the governments of the imperialist countries, though they engaged in counter-revolutionary activities every day, had never told the truth in their statements or official documents but had filled or at least flavoured them with professions of humanity, justice and virtue. This is still true of British imperialism, an old hand at trickery and deception, as well as of several other smaller imperialist countries. Opposed by the people on the one hand and by another faction in their own camp on the other, the newly arrived, upstart and neurotic U.S. imperialist group — Truman, Marshall, Acheson, Leighton Stuart and others — have considered it necessary and practicable to reveal publicly some (but not all) of their counter-revolutionary doings in order to argue with opponents in their own camp as to which kind of counter-revolutionary tactics is the more clever. In this way they have tried to convince their opponents so that they can go on applying what they regard as the cleverer counter-revolutionary tactics. Two factions of counter-revolutionaries have been competing with each other. One said, "Ours is the best method." The other said, "Ours is the best." When the dispute was at its hottest, one faction suddenly laid its cards on the table and revealed many of its treasured tricks of the past — and there you have the White Paper.

And so the White Paper has become material for the education of the Chinese people. For many years, a number of Chinese (at one time a great number) only half-believed what we Communists said on many questions, mainly on the nature of imperialism and of socialism, and thought, "It may not be so." This situation has undergone a change since August 5, 1949. For Acheson gave them a lesson and he spoke in his capacity as U.S. Secretary of State. In the case of certain data and conclusions, what he said coincides with what we Communists and other progressives have been saying. Once this happened, people could not but believe us, and many had their eyes opened — "So that's the way things really were!"

Acheson begins his Letter of Transmittal to Truman with the story of how he compiled the White Paper. His White Paper, he says, is different from all others, it is very objective and very frank:

> This is a frank record of an extremely complicated and most unhappy period in the life of a great country to which the United States has long been attached by ties of closest friendship. No available item has been omitted because it contains statements critical of our policy or might be the basis of future criticism. The inherent strength of our system is the responsiveness of the Government to an informed and critical public opinion. It is precisely this informed and critical public opinion which totalitarian governments, whether Rightist or Communist, cannot endure and do not tolerate.

Certain ties do exist between the Chinese people and the American people. Through their joint efforts, these ties may develop in the future to the point of the "closest friendship". But the obstacles placed by the Chinese and U.S. reactionaries were and still are a great hindrance to these ties. Moreover, because the reactionaries of both countries have told many lies to their peoples and played many filthy tricks, that is, spread much bad propaganda and done many bad deeds, the ties between the two peoples are far from close. What Acheson calls "ties of closest friendship" are those between the reactionaries of the two countries, not between the peoples. Here Acheson is neither objective nor frank, he confuses the relations between the two peoples with those between the reactionaries. For the peoples of the two countries the victory of the Chinese revolution and the defeat of the Chinese and U.S. reactionaries are the most joyful events that have ever happened, and the present period is the happiest of their lives. Conversely, it is only for Truman, Marshall, Acheson, Leighton Stuart and other U.S. reactionaries and for Chiang Kai-shek, H. H.

Kung, T. V. Soong, Chen Li-fu, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi and other Chinese reactionaries that it is truly "an extremely complicated and most unhappy period" in their lives.

In considering public opinion, the Achesons have mixed up the public opinion of the reactionaries with that of the people. Towards the public opinion of the people, the Achesons have no "responsiveness" whatsoever and are blind and deaf. For years they have turned a deaf ear to the opposition voiced by the people of the United States, China and the rest of the world to the reactionary foreign policy of the U.S. government. What does Acheson mean by "informed and critical public opinion"? Nothing but the numerous instruments of propaganda, such as the newspapers, news agencies, periodicals and broadcasting stations which are controlled by the two reactionary parties in the United States, the Republicans and the Democrats, and which specialize in the manufacture of lies and in threats against the people. Of these things Acheson says rightly that the Communists "cannot endure and do not tolerate" them (nor do the people). That is why we have closed down the imperialist offices of information, stopped the imperialist news agencies from distributing their dispatches to the Chinese press and forbidden them the freedom to go on poisoning the souls of the Chinese people on Chinese soil.

To say that a government led by the Communist Party is a "totalitarian government" is also half true. It is a government that exercises dictatorship over domestic and foreign reactionaries and does not give any of them any freedom to carry on their counter-revolutionary activities. Becoming angry, the reactionaries rail: "Totalitarian government!" Indeed, this is absolutely true so far as the power of the people's government to suppress the reactionaries is concerned. This power is now written into our programme; it will also be written into our constitution. Like food and clothing, this power is something a victorious people cannot do without even for a moment. It is an excellent thing, a protective talisman, an heirloom, which should under no circumstances be discarded before the thorough and total abolition of imperialism abroad and of classes within the country. The more the reactionaries rail "totalitarian government", the more obviously is it a treasure. But Acheson's remark is also half false. For the masses of the people, a government of the people's democratic dictatorship led by the Communist Party is not dictatorial or autocratic but democratic. It is the people's own government. The working personnel of this government must respectfully heed the voice of the people. At the same time, they are teachers of the people, teaching the people by the method of self-education or self-criticism.

As to what Acheson calls a "Rightist totalitarian government", the U.S. government has ranked first in the world among such governments since the downfall of the fascist governments of Germany, Italy and Japan. All bourgeois governments, including the governments of the German, Italian and Japanese reactionaries which are being shielded by imperialism, are governments of this type. The Tito government of Yugoslavia has now become an accomplice of this gang. The U.S. and British governments belong to the type in which the bourgeoisie, and this class alone, exercises dictatorship over the people. Contrary in all respects to the people's government, this type of government practises so-called democracy for the bourgeoisie but is dictatorial towards the people. The governments of Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, Franco and Chiang Kai-shek discarded the veil of democracy for the bourgeoisie or never used it because the class struggle in their countries was extremely intense and they found it advantageous to discard, or not to use, this veil lest the people too should make use of it. The U.S. government still has a veil of democracy, but it has been cut down to a tiny patch by the U.S. reactionaries and become very faded, and is not what it used to be in the days of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln.[2] The reason is that the class struggle has become more intense. When the class struggle becomes still more intense, the veil of U.S. democracy will inevitably be flung to the four winds.

As everybody can see, Acheson makes a great many mistakes the moment he opens his mouth. This is inevitable because he is a reactionary. As to how much of a "frank record" the White Paper is, we think it is frank and not frank at the same time. The Achesons are frank where they imagine that frankness will benefit their party or faction. Otherwise, they are not. To feign frankness is a ruse of war.

NOTES

[1] A commentary by the editorial department of the Hsinhua News Agency published on August 12, 1949.

[2] George Washington (1732-99), Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) and Abraham Lincoln (1809-65) were well-known bourgeois statesmen in the early days of the

United States. Washington was the commander-in-chief of the revolutionary army of the colonies during the American War of Independence (1775-83) and the first president of the United States. Jefferson drafted the American Declaration of Independence and became president of the United States. Lincoln advocated the abolition of Negro slavery in the United States and during his presidency led the war against the slave-owners of the southern states (1861-65); he issued the "Emancipation Proclamation" in 1862.

"FRIENDSHIP" OR AGGRESSION?

August 30, 1949

Seeking to justify aggression, Dean Acheson harps on "friendship" and throws in lots of "principles".

Acheson says:

> The interest of the people and the Government of the United States in China goes far back into our history. Despite the distance and broad differences in background which separate China and the United States, our friendship for that country has always been intensified by the religious, philanthropic and cultural ties which have united the two peoples, and has been attested by many acts of good will over a period of many years, including the use of the Boxer indemnity for the education of Chinese students, the abolition of extraterritoriality during the Second World War, and our extensive aid to China during and since the close of the War. The record shows that the United States has consistently maintained and still maintains those fundamental principles of our foreign policy toward China which include the doctrine of the Open Door, respect for the administrative and territorial integrity of China, and opposition to any foreign domination of China.

Acheson is telling a bare-faced lie when he describes aggression as "friendship".

The history of the aggression against China by U.S. imperialism, from 1840 when it helped the British in the Opium War to the time it was thrown out of China by the Chinese people, should be written into a concise textbook for the education of Chinese youth. The United States was one of the first countries to force China to cede extraterritoriality[1] — witness the Treaty of Wanghia[2] of 1844, the first treaty ever signed between China and the United States, a treaty to which the White Paper refers. In this very treaty, the United States compelled China to accept American missionary activity, in addition to imposing such terms as the opening of five ports for trade. For a very long period, U.S. imperialism laid greater stress than other imperialist countries on activities in the sphere of spiritual aggression, extending from religious to "philanthropic" and cultural undertakings. According to certain statistics, the investments of U.S. missionary and "philanthropic" organizations in China totalled 41,900,000 U.S. dollars, and 14.7 per cent of the assets of the missionary organizations were in medical service, 38.2 per cent in education and 47.1 per cent in religious activities.[3] Many well-known educational institutions in China, such as Yenching University, Peking Union Medical College, the Huei Wen Academies, St. John's University, the University of Nanking, Soochow University, Hangchow Christian College, Hsiangya Medical School, West China Union University and Lingnan University, were established by Americans.[4] It was in this field that Leighton Stuart made a name for himself; that was how he became U.S. ambassador to China. Acheson and his like know what they are talking about, and there is a background for his statement that "our friendship for that country has always been intensified by the religious, philanthropic and cultural ties which have united the two peoples". It was all for the sake of "intensifying friendship", we are told, that the United States worked so hard and deliberately at running these undertakings for 105 years after the signing of the Treaty of 1844.

Participation in the Eight-Power Allied Expedition to defeat China in 1900, the extortion of the "Boxer indemnity" and the later use of this fund "for the education of Chinese students" for purposes of spiritual aggression — this too counts as an expression of "friendship".

Despite the "abolition" of extraterritoriality, the culprit in the raping of Shen Chung was declared not guilty and released by the U.S. Navy Department on his return to the United States[5] — this counts as another expression of "friendship".

"Aid to China during and since the close of the War", totalling over 4,500 million U.S. dollars according to the White Paper, but over 5,914 million U.S. dollars according to our computation, was given to help Chiang Kai-shek slaughter several million Chinese — this counts as yet another expression of "friendship".

All the "friendship" shown to China by U.S. imperialism over the past 109 years (since 1840 when the United States collaborated with Britain in the Opium War), and especially the great act of "friendship" in helping Chiang Kai-shek slaughter several million Chinese in the last few years — all this had one purpose, namely, it "consistently maintained and still maintains those fundamental principles of our foreign policy toward China which include the doctrine of the Open Door, respect for the administrative and territorial integrity of China, and opposition to any foreign domination of China".

Several million Chinese were killed for no other purpose than first, to maintain the Open Door, second, to respect the administrative and territorial integrity of China and, third, to oppose any foreign domination of China.

Today, the only doors still open to Acheson and his like are in small strips of land, such as Canton and Taiwan, and only in these places is the first of these sacred principles "still maintained". In other places, in Shanghai for instance, the door was open after liberation, but now some one is using U.S. warships and their big guns to enforce the far from sacred principle of the Blockaded Door.

Today, it is only in small strips of land, such as Canton and Taiwan, that thanks to Acheson's second sacred principle administrative and territorial "integrity" is "still maintained". All other places are out of luck, and administration and territory have fallen to pieces.

Today, it is only in places such as Canton and Taiwan that thanks to Acheson's third sacred principle all "foreign domination", including U.S. domination, has been successfully done away with through the "opposition" of Acheson and his like; therefore such places are still dominated by the Chinese. The rest of the land of China — the mere mention makes one weep — is all gone, all dominated by foreigners, and the Chinese there have one and all been turned into slaves. Up to this point in his writing, His Excellency Dean Acheson did not have time to indicate what country these foreigners came from, but it becomes clear as one reads on, so there is no need to ask.

Whether non-interference in China's domestic affairs also counts as a principle, Acheson didn't say; probably it does not. Such is the logic of the U.S. mandarins. Anyone who reads Acheson's Letter of Transmittal to the end will attest to its superior logic.

NOTES

[1] "Extraterritoriality" here refers to consular jurisdiction. It was one of the special privileges for aggression which the imperialists wrested from China. Under the so-called consular jurisdiction, nationals of imperialist countries residing in China

were not subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese law; when they committed crimes or became defendants in civil lawsuits, they could be tried only in their respective countries' consular courts in China, and the Chinese government could not intervene.

[2] The "Treaty of Wanghia" was the first unequal treaty signed as a result of U.S. aggression against China. The United States, taking advantage of China's defeat in the Opium War, compelled the Ching Dynasty to sign this treaty, also called the "Sino-American Treaty on the Opening of Five Ports for Trade", in Wanghia Village near Macao in July 1844. Its thirty-four articles stipulated that whatever rights and privileges, including consular jurisdiction, were gained by Britain through the Treaty of Nanking and its annexes would also accrue to the United States.

[3] See C. F. Remer, *Foreign Investments in China*, Chapter 15.

[4] Yenching University was in Peiping; the Huei Wen Academies, in Peiping and Nanking; St. John's University, in Shanghai; Hsiangya Medical School (Yale in China), in Changsha; West China Union University, in Chengtu; and Lingnan University, in Canton.

[5] William Pierson, a corporal, and other U.S. marines raped Shen Chung, a girl student of Peking University, in Peiping on December 24, 1946. This aroused the great indignation of the people throughout the country against the atrocities of the U.S. forces. In January 1947, brushing aside the people's protests, the Kuomintang government handed over the chief criminal, Pierson, to the Americans to be dealt with at their discretion. In August the U.S. Navy Department set this criminal free with a verdict of "not guilty".

THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

September 16, 1949

The Chinese should thank Acheson, spokesman of the U.S. bourgeoisie, not merely because he has explicitly confessed to the fact that the United States supplied the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people and because he has thus given Chinese progressives evidence with which to convince the backward elements. You see, hasn't Acheson himself confessed that the great, sanguinary war of the last few years, which cost the lives of millions of Chinese, was planned and organized by U.S. imperialism? The Chinese should thank Acheson, again not merely because he has openly declared that the United States intends to recruit the so-called "democratic individualists" in China, organize a U.S. fifth column and overthrow the People's Government led by the Communist Party of China and has thus alerted the Chinese, especially those tinged with liberalism, who are promising each other not to be taken in by the Americans and are all on guard against the underhand intrigues of U.S. imperialism. The Chinese should thank Acheson also because he has fabricated wild tales about modern Chinese history; and his conception of history is precisely that shared by a section of the Chinese intellectuals, namely, the bourgeois idealist conception of history. Hence, a refutation of Acheson may benefit many Chinese by widening their horizon. The benefit may be even greater to those whose conception is the same, or in certain respects the same, as Acheson's.

What are Acheson's wild fabrications about modern Chinese history? First of all, he tries to explain the occurrence of the Chinese revolution in terms of economic and ideological conditions in China. Here he has recounted many myths.

Acheson says:

> The population of China during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries doubled, thereby creating an unbearable pressure upon the land. The first problem which every Chinese Government has had to face is that of feeding this population. So far none has succeeded. The Kuomintang attempted to solve it by putting many land-reform laws on the statute books. Some of these laws have failed, others have been ignored. In no small measure, the predicament in which the National Government finds itself today is due to its failure to provide China with enough to eat. A large part of the Chinese Communists' propaganda consists of promises that they will solve the land problem.

To those Chinese who do not reason clearly the above sounds plausible. Too many mouths, too little food, hence revolution. The Kuomintang has failed to solve this problem and it is unlikely that the Communist Party will be able to solve it either. "So far none has succeeded."

Do revolutions arise from over-population? There have been many revolutions, ancient and modern, in China and abroad; were they all due to over-population? Were China's many revolutions in the past few thousand years also due to over-population? Was the American Revolution against Britain 174 years ago[1] also due to over-population? Acheson's knowledge of history is nil. He has not even read the American Declaration of Independence. Washington, Jefferson and others made the revolution against Britain because of British oppression and exploitation of the Americans, and not because of any over-population in America. Each time the Chinese people overthrew a feudal dynasty it was because of the oppression and exploitation of the people by that feudal dynasty, and not because of any over-population. The Russians made the February Revolution and the October Revolution because of oppression and exploitation by the tsar and the Russian bourgeoisie, not because of any over-population, for to this day in Russia there is a great abundance of land as compared with people. In Mongolia, where the land is so vast and the population so sparse, a revolution would be inconceivable according to Acheson's line of reasoning, yet it took place some time ago.[2]

According to Acheson, China has no way out at all. A population of 475 million constitutes an "unbearable pressure" and, revolution or no revolution, the case is hopeless. Acheson pins great hope on this; although he has not voiced this hope, it has often been revealed by a number of American journalists — through the allegation that the Communist Party of China will not be able to solve its economic problems, that China will remain in perpetual chaos and that her only way out is to live on U.S. flour, in other words, to become a U.S. colony.

Why did the Revolution of 1911 not succeed and why did it not solve the problem of feeding the population? Because it overthrew only the Ching Dynasty but did not overthrow imperialist and feudal oppression and exploitation.

Why did the Northern Expedition of 1926-27 not succeed and why did it not solve the problem of feeding the population? Because Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution, surrendered to imperialism and became the chieftain of the counter-revolution which oppressed and exploited the Chinese.

Is it true that "so far none has succeeded"? In the old Liberated Areas in northwestern, northern, northeastern and eastern China, where the land problem has already been solved, does the problem of "feeding this population", as Acheson puts it, still exist? The United States has kept quite a number of spies or so-called observers in China. Why have they not ferreted out even this fact? In places like Shanghai, the problem of unemployment, or of feeding the population, arose solely because of cruel, heartless oppression and exploitation by imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and the reactionary Kuomintang government. Under the People's Government, it will take only a few years for this problem of unemployment, or of feeding the population, to be solved as completely as in the northern, northeastern and other parts of the country.

It is a very good thing that China has a big population. Even if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution; the solution is production. The absurd argument of Western bourgeois economists like Malthus[3] that increases in food cannot keep pace with increases in population was not only thoroughly refuted in theory by Marxists long ago, but has also been completely exploded by the realities in the Soviet Union and the Liberated Areas of China after their revolutions. Basing itself on the truth that revolution plus production can solve the problem of feeding the population, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has issued orders to Party organizations and the People's Liberation Army throughout the country not to dismiss but to retain all former Kuomintang personnel, provided they can make themselves useful and are not confirmed reactionaries or notorious scoundrels. Where things are very difficult, food and housing will be shared. Those who have been dismissed and have no means of support will be reinstated and provided with a living. According to the same principle, we shall maintain all Kuomintang soldiers who have revolted and come over to us or been captured. All reactionaries, except the major culprits, will be given a chance to earn their living, provided they show repentance.

Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed. We are refuters of Acheson's counter-revolutionary theory. We believe that revolution can change everything, and that before long there will arise a new China with a big population and a great wealth of products, where life will be abundant and culture will flourish. All pessimistic views are utterly groundless.

"The impact of the West" is given by Acheson as the second reason why the Chinese revolution occurred. Acheson says:

> For more than three thousand years the Chinese developed their own high culture and civilization, largely untouched by outside influences. Even when subjected to military conquest the Chinese always managed in the end to subdue and absorb the invader. It was natural therefore that they should come to look upon themselves as the center of the world and the highest expression of civilized mankind. Then in the middle of the nineteenth century the heretofore impervious wall of Chinese isolation was breached by the West. These outsiders brought with them aggressiveness, the unparalleled development of Western technology, and a high order of culture which had not accompanied previous foreign incursions into China. Partly because of these qualities and partly because of the decay of Manchu rule, the Westerners, instead of being absorbed by the Chinese, introduced new ideas which played an important part in stimulating ferment and unrest.

To those Chinese who do not reason clearly, what Acheson says sounds plausible — the influx of new ideas from the West gave rise to the revolution.

Against whom was the revolution directed? Because there was "decay of Manchu rule" and because it is the weak point that is attacked, it would seem that the revolution was directed against the Ching Dynasty. But what Acheson says here is not quite right. The Revolution of 1911 was directed against imperialism. The Chinese directed the revolution against the Ching regime because it was the running dog of imperialism. The war against Britain's opium aggression, the war against the aggression of the Anglo-French allied forces, the war against the Ching regime, the running dog of imperialism, by the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom,[4] the war against French aggression, the war against Japanese aggression and the war against the aggression of the allied forces of the eight powers - all ended in failure; hence the Revolution of 1911 broke out against the running dog of imperialism, the Ching Dynasty. That is modern Chinese history up to 1911. What is the "impact of the West", as Acheson calls it? It is the effort of the Western bourgeoisie, as Marx and Engels said in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* of 1848,[5] to remould the world after its own image by means of terror. In the process of this impact or remoulding, the Western bourgeoisie, which needed compradors and flunkeys familiar with Western customs, had to let countries like China open schools and send students abroad, and thus "new ideas were introduced" into China. Concurrently the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat were born in countries like China. At the same time, the peasantry was bankrupted, and a huge semi-proletariat was brought into existence. Thus the Western bourgeoisie created two categories of people in the East, a small minority, the flunkeys of imperialism, and a majority which is opposed to imperialism and consists of the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the intellectuals coming from these classes. Those in the majority group are all grave-diggers of imperialism, who were created by imperialism itself, and the revolution originates from them. It was not that the so-called influx of ideas from the West stirred up "ferment and unrest", but that imperialist aggression provoked resistance.

For a long time in the course of this resistance movement, that is, for over seventy years from the Opium War of 1840 to the eve of the May 4th Movement of 1919, the Chinese had no ideological weapon with which to defend themselves against imperialism. The ideological weapons of the old die-hard feudalism were defeated, had to give way and were declared bankrupt. Having no other choice, the Chinese were compelled to arm themselves with such ideological weapons and political formulas as the theory of evolution, the theory of natural rights and of the bourgeois republic, which were all borrowed from the arsenal of the revolutionary period of the bourgeoisie in the West, the native home of imperialism. The Chinese organized political parties and made revolutions, believing that they could thus resist foreign powers and build a republic. However, all these ideological weapons, like those of feudalism, proved very feeble and in their turn had to give way and were withdrawn and declared bankrupt.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 awakened the Chinese, and they learned something new, Marxism-Leninism. In China, the Communist Party was born, an epoch-making event. Sun Yat-sen, too, advocated "learning from Russia" and "alliance with Russia and the Communist Party". In a word, from that time China changed her orientation.

Being the spokesman of an imperialist government, Acheson naturally does not want to breathe even a word about imperialism. He describes imperialist aggression thus: "These outsiders brought with them aggressiveness. . . ." "Aggressiveness" — what a beautiful name! Having learned this "aggressiveness", the Chinese did not aggress into Britain or the United States but only created "ferment and unrest" inside China, *i.e.*, carried out revolutions against imperialism and its running dogs. But unfortunately they never once succeeded; each time, they were defeated by the imperialists, the inventors of "aggressiveness". The Chinese therefore turned around to learn something else and, strangely enough, they immediately found that it worked.

The Chinese Communist Party "had been organized in the early twenties under the ideological impetus of the Russian revolution". Here Acheson is right. This ideology was none other than Marxism-Leninism. This ideology is immeasurably superior to that of the Western bourgeoisie, which Acheson calls a "high order of culture which had not accompanied previous foreign incursions into China". The clinching proof of the effectiveness of this ideology is that Western bourgeois culture, which the Achesons can boast of as a "high order of culture" compared with China's old feudal culture, was defeated the moment it encountered the new Marxist-Leninist culture, the scientific world outlook and the theory of social revolution, which the Chinese people had acquired. In its first battle, this scientific and revolutionary new culture acquired by the Chinese people defeated the Northern warlords, the running dogs of imperialism; in the second, it defeated the attempts by another running dog of imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek, to intercept the Chinese Red Army during its 25,000-*li* Long March;[6] in the third, it defeated Japanese imperialism and its running dog, Wang Ching-wei; and in the fourth, it finally put an end to the domination of China by the United States and all other imperialist powers as well as to the rule of their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and all the other reactionaries.

The reason why Marxism-Leninism has played such a great role in China since its introduction is that China's social conditions call for it, that it has been linked with the actual practice of the Chinese people's revolution and that the Chinese people have grasped it. Any ideology — even the very best, even Marxism-Leninism itself — is ineffective unless it is linked with objective realities, meets objectively existing needs and has been grasped by the masses of the people. We are historical materialists, opposed to historical idealism.

Oddly enough, "Soviet doctrine and practice had a measurable effect upon the thinking and principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, particularly in terms of economics and Party organization". What was the effect produced on Dr. Sun by the "high order of culture" of the West, of which Acheson and his like are so proud? Acheson doesn't say. Was it an accident that Dr. Sun, who devoted the greater part of his life to seeking from Western bourgeois culture the truth that would save the nation, was finally disappointed and turned to "learning from Russia"? Obviously not. Of course it was no accident that Dr. Sun and the long suffering Chinese people he represented were all infuriated by the "impact of the West" and resolved to form an "alliance with Russia and the Communist Party" in order to wage a life-and-death struggle against imperialism and its running dogs. Acheson dare not say here that the Soviet people are imperialist aggressors and that Sun Yat-sen learned from aggressors. Well, then, if Sun Yat-sen could learn from the Soviet people and the Soviet people are not imperialist aggressors, why can't his successors, the Chinese who live after him, learn from the Soviet people? Why are the Chinese, Sun Yat-sen excepted, described as "dominated by the Soviet Union" and as "the fifth column of the Comintern" and "lackeys of Red imperialism" for learning the scientific world outlook and the theory of social revolution through Marxism-Leninism, linking these with China's specific characteristics, starting the Chinese People's War of Liberation and the great people's revolution and founding a republic of the people's democratic dictatorship? Can there be such superior logic anywhere in the world?

Since they learned Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese people have ceased to be passive in spirit and gained the initiative. The period of modern world history in which the Chinese and Chinese culture were looked down upon should have ended from that moment. The great, victorious Chinese People's War of Liberation and the great people's revolution have rejuvenated and are rejuvenating the great culture of the Chinese people. In its spiritual aspect, this culture of the Chinese people already stands higher than any in the capitalist world. Take U.S. Secretary of State Acheson and his like, for instance. The level of their understanding of modern China and of the modern world is lower than that of an ordinary soldier of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Up to this point, Acheson, like a bourgeois professor lecturing on a tedious text, has pretended to trace the causes and effects of events in China. Revolution occurred in China, first, because of over-population and, second, because of the stimulus of Western ideas. You see, he appears to be a champion of the theory of causation. But in what follows, even this bit of tedious and phoney theory of causation disappears, and one finds only a mass of inexplicable events. Quite unaccountably, the Chinese fought among themselves for power and money, suspecting and hating each other. An inexplicable change took place in the relative moral strength of the two contending parties, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; the morale of one party dropped sharply to below zero, while that of the other rose sharply to white heat. What was the reason? Nobody knows. Such is the logic inherent in the "high order of culture" of the United States as represented by Dean Acheson.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTES

[1] The bourgeois revolution of 1775-83, known as the War of Independence, in which the people of North America opposed British colonial rule.

[2] In their struggle for liberation in 1921-24 the Mongolian people, under the leadership of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, drove out the Russian Whiteguard bandit troops and the armed forces of the Northern warlords of China, both of which were backed by Japanese imperialism, overthrew Mongolian feudal rule and founded the Mongolian People's Republic.

[3] T. R. Malthus (1766-1834), Anglican clergyman and reactionary economist. In his *Essay On Population* (1798), he wrote that "population unchecked . . . increases in

geometrical ratio . . . [while] the means of subsistence . . . could not possibly be made to increase faster than in an arithmetical ratio". Basing himself on this arbitrary assumption, he came to the conclusion that all poverty and all evils in human society are permanent phenomena of nature. According to him, the only ways to solve the problem of poverty of the working people were to shorten their life-span, reduce the population or stop its increase. He regarded famine, pestilence and war as means to cut down population.

[4] The War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was a peasant revolutionary war waged against the feudal rule and national oppression of the Ching Dynasty in the middle of the 19th century. Hung Hsiu-chuan, Yang Hsiu-ching and others, the leaders of this revolution, staged an uprising in Kwangsi in January 1851 and proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In 1852 the peasant army proceeded northward from Kwangsi and marched through Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei and in 1853 it captured Nanking, the main city on the lower Yangtse. Part of its forces then continued the drive north and pushed to the vicinity of Tientsin, a major city in northern China. Because the Taiping army failed to build stable base areas in the places it occupied and also because, after establishing its capital in Nanking, the leading group in the army committed many political and military errors, it could not withstand the joint attack of the counter-revolutionary troops of the Ching government and the aggressors, Britain, the United States and France, and suffered defeat in 1864.

[5] See *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Chapter I, "Bourgeois and Proletarians". The bourgeoisie "compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, *i.e.*, to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image".

[6] In October 1934 the First, Third and Fifth Army Groups of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (that is, the First Front Army of the Red Army, also known as the Central Red Army) set out from Changting and Ninghua in western Fukien and from Juichin, Yutu and other places in southern Kiangsi and started a major strategic movement. In traversing the eleven provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi, crossing perpetually snow-capped mountains and trackless grasslands, sustaining untold hardships and frustrating the enemy's repeated encirclements, pursuits, obstructions and interceptions, the Red Army covered 25,000 *li* (12,500 kilometres) on this march and finally arrived triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi in October 1935.

毛泽東選集
第四卷

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FROM MARX
TO MAO

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SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSETUNG

Volume V

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

毛澤东

From Marx to Mao

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SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSETUNG

Volume V

FROM MARX
TO MAO

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The present volume is the authorized English translation of the first Chinese edition of the fifth volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, published in April 1977 by the People's Publishing House, Peking.

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PUBLICATION NOTE

The works of our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao Tsetung are immortal monuments of Marxism-Leninism. In accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Volume V of the *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung* has now been published and the subsequent volumes will come out in succession.

The previously published Volumes I to IV of the *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung* contain important writings from the period of the new-democratic revolution. Volume V and succeeding volumes contain important writings from the period of the socialist revolution and socialist construction.

In the new historical period since the founding of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Mao Tsetung, consistently upholding the principle of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolution, inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism as he led our Party and our people in a series of struggles; these were struggles to carry out the socialist revolution and socialist construction, to oppose the revisionist lines of Kao-Jao, Peng Teh-huai, Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao, to fight against imperialism and the reactionaries of all countries and to combat modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as its centre. During this period Comrade Mao Tsetung's greatest contributions to theory were to sum up systematically the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat in China and abroad, analyse the contradictions, classes and class struggle in socialist society by means of the fundamental concept of materialist dialectics, the unity of opposites, and thereby to reveal the law of development of socialist society and create the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The new ideas, new theses, of Comrade Mao Tsetung concerning the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat have greatly enriched the treasure-house of Marxist-Leninist theory in the realms of philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism. They not only chart the Chinese people's true road for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and building socialism, but are also of great and lasting world significance.

Volume V of the *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung* contains important writings from September 1949 through 1957. It was in these writings that Comrade Mao Tsetung for the first time put forward: the scientific thesis that the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the socialist road and the capitalist road, will still exist for a long time after the basic completion of the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production; the teachings about correctly distinguishing and handling the two types of contradictions in socialist society that are different in nature, those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people; the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat; and the ideas underlying the general line for building socialism. Later, particularly during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Comrade Mao Tsetung continued to enrich and develop this body of brilliant thought on the basis of the practical experience of the revolution.

Comrade Mao Tsetung was the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time. Mao Tsetung Thought is the victorious banner under which our Party, our army and our people will fight in unity and continue the revolution; it is a treasure shared in common by the international proletariat and the revolutionary people of all countries. Comrade Mao Tsetung's thought and teachings will live for ever.

Some of Comrade Mao Tsetung's writings from the period of the socialist revolution and socialist construction contained in the *Selected Works* have been published before; others have not, and they include documents drafted by him, his manuscripts and official records of his speeches. Some necessary technical editing of the records of the speeches was done in the course of compilation.

Committee for Editing and Publishing
the Works of Chairman Mao Tsetung,
Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China

March 1, 1977

FROM MARX TO MAO

CONTENTS

THE PERIOD OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION (I)

THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE STOOD UP! (*September 21, 1949*) 15

LONG LIVE THE GREAT UNITY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE! (*September 30, 1949*) 19

ETERNAL GLORY TO THE HEROES OF THE PEOPLE! (*September 30, 1949*) 22

ALWAYS KEEP TO THE STYLE OF PLAIN LIVING AND HARD STRUGGLE (*October 26, 1949*) 23

REQUEST FOR OPINIONS ON THE TACTICS FOR DEALING WITH RICH PEASANTS (*March 12, 1950*) 24

FIGHT FOR A FUNDAMENTAL TURN FOR THE BETTER IN THE NATION'S FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION (*June 6, 1950*) 26

DON'T HIT OUT IN ALL DIRECTIONS (*June 6, 1950*) 33

BE A TRUE REVOLUTIONARY (*June 23, 1950*) 37

YOU ARE MODELS FOR THE WHOLE NATION (*September 25, 1950*) 41

ORDER TO THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS (*October 8, 1950*) 43

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS SHOULD CHERISH EVERY HILL, EVERY RIVER, EVERY TREE AND EVERY BLADE OF GRASS IN KOREA (*January 19, 1951*) 44

MAIN POINTS OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE ENLARGED MEETING OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (*February 18, 1951*) 45

  I. Twenty-two Months for Preparation 45
  II. Propaganda and Education Campaign for Resisting U.S. Aggression and Aiding Korea 45
  III. Agrarian Reform 46
  IV. Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries 46
  V. Urban Work 47

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VI. Party Consolidation and Party Building 47

VII. United Front Work 48

VIII. Rectification Movement 49

THE PARTY'S MASS LINE MUST BE FOLLOWED IN SUPPRESSING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES (*May 1951*) 50

STRIKE SURELY, ACCURATELY AND RELENTLESSLY IN SUPPRESSING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES (*December 1950 - September 1951*) 53

PAY SERIOUS ATTENTION TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE FILM THE LIFE OF WU HSUN (*May 20, 1951*) 57

GREAT VICTORIES IN THREE MASS MOVEMENTS (*October 23, 1951*) 59

ON THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE "THREE EVILS" AND THE "FIVE EVILS" (*November, 1951 - March, 1952*) 64

TAKE MUTUAL AID AND CO-OPERATION IN AGRICULTURE AS A MAJOR TASK (*December 15, 1951*) 71

NEW YEAR'S DAY MESSAGE (*January 1, 1952*) 72

ON THE POLICIES FOR OUR WORK IN TIBET — DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (*April 6, 1952*) 73

THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE WORKING CLASS AND THE BOURGEOISIE IS THE PRINCIPAL CONTRADICTION IN CHINA (*June 6, 1952*) 77

LET US UNITE AND CLEARLY DISTINGUISH BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE ENEMY (*August 4, 1952*) 78

HAIL THE SIGNAL VICTORY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS! (*October 24, 1952*) 82

COMBAT BUREAUCRACY, COMMANDISM AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW AND OF DISCIPLINE (*January 5, 1953*) 84

CRITICIZE HAN CHAUVINISM (*March 16, 1953*) 87

SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE "FIVE EXCESSES" (*March 19, 1953*) 89

LIU SHAO-CHI AND YANG SHANG-KUN CRITICIZED FOR BREACH OF DISCIPLINE IN ISSUING DOCUMENTS IN THE NAME OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION (*May 19, 1953*) 92

REFUTE RIGHT DEVIATIONIST VIEWS THAT DEPART FROM THE GENERAL LINE (*June 15, 1953*) 93

THE YOUTH LEAGUE IN ITS WORK MUST TAKE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUTH INTO CONSIDERATION (*June 30, 1953*) 95

ON STATE CAPITALISM (*July 9, 1953*) 101

THE PARTY'S GENERAL LINE FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD (*August 1953*) 102

COMBAT BOURGEOIS IDEAS IN THE PARTY (*August 12, 1953*) 103

THE ONLY ROAD FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF CAPITALIST INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE (*September 7, 1953*) 112

OUR GREAT VICTORY IN THE WAR TO RESIST U.S. AGGRESSION AND AID KOREA AND OUR FUTURE TASKS (*September 12, 1953*) 115

CRITICISM OF LIANG SHU-MING'S REACTIONARY IDEAS (*September 16-18, 1953*) 121

TWO TALKS ON MUTUAL AID AND CO-OPERATION IN AGRICULTURE (*October and November 1953*) 131

I. The Talk of October 15 131

II. The Talk of November 4 135

ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (*June 14, 1954*) 141

STRIVE TO BUILD A GREAT SOCIALIST COUNTRY (*September 15, 1954*) 148

LETTER CONCERNING THE STUDY OF *THE DREAM OF THE RED CHAMBER* (*October 16, 1954*) 150

THE CHINESE PEOPLE CANNOT BE COWED BY THE ATOM BOMB (*January 5, 1955*) 152

SPEECHES AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (*March 1955*) 154

Opening Speech 154

Concluding Speech 158

1. Evaluation of the Present Conference 158
2. On the First Five-Year Plan 160
3. On the Anti-Party Alliance 161
4. On the Current Situation 167
5. Strive for the Successful Convocation of the Eighth National Congress of the Party 169

IN REFUTATION OF "UNIFORMITY OF PUBLIC OPINION" (*May 24, 1955*) 172

PREFACE AND EDITOR'S NOTES TO *MATERIAL ON THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY HU FENG CLIQUE* (*May and June 1955*) 176

Preface 176

Editorial Notes (Selections) 178

ON THE CO-OPERATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE (*July 31, 1955*) 184

RELY ON PARTY AND LEAGUE MEMBERS AND POOR AND LOWER-MIDDLE PEASANTS IN THE CO-OPERATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE (*September 7, 1955*) 208

THE DEBATE ON THE CO-OPERATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE AND THE CURRENT CLASS STRUGGLE (*October 11, 1955*) 211

I. The Relationship Between Agricultural Co-operation and the Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce 212

II. A Summing-up of the Debate on the Question of Co-operation 216

III. On The Question of Comprehensive Planning and More Effective Leadership 218

IV. On Ideological Struggle 223

V. Other Questions 226

PREFACES TO *SOCIALIST UPSURGE IN CHINA'S COUNTRYSIDE* (*September and December 1955*) 235

Preface I 235

Preface II 238

EDITOR'S NOTES FROM *SOCIALIST UPSURGE IN CHINA'S COUNTRYSIDE* (*September and December 1955*) 242

REQUEST FOR OPINIONS ON THE SEVENTEEN-ARTICLE DOCUMENT CONCERNING AGRICULTURE (*December 21, 1955*) 277

SPEED UP THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF HANDICRAFTS (*March 5, 1956*) 281

ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS (*April 25, 1956*) 284

I. The Relationship Between Heavy Industry on the One Hand and Light Industry on the Other 285

II. The Relationship Between Industry in the Coastal Regions and Industry in the Interior 286

III. The Relationship Between Economic Construction and Defense Construction 288

IV. The Relationship Between the State, the Units of Production and the Producers 289

V. The Relationship Between the Central and the Local Authorities 292

VI. The Relationship Between the Han Nationality and the Minority Nationalities 295

VII. The Relationship Between Party and Non-Party 296

VIII. The Relationship Between Revolution and Counter-Revolution 298
IX. The Relationship Between Right and Wrong 301
X. The Relationship Between China and Other Countries 303

U.S. IMPERIALISM IS A PAPER TIGER (*July 14, 1956*) 308

STRENGTHEN PARTY UNITY AND CARRY FORWARD PARTY TRADITIONS (*August 30, 1956*) 312

SOME EXPERIENCES IN OUR PARTY'S HISTORY (*September 25, 1956*) 324

IN COMMEMORATION OF DR. SUN YAT-SEN (*November 12, 1956*) 330

SPEECH AT THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (*November 15, 1956*) 332

TALKS AT A CONFERENCE OF SECRETARIES OF PROVINCIAL, MUNICIPAL AND AUTONOMOUS REGION PARTY COMMITTEES (*January 1957*) 350
I. The Talk of January 18 350
II. The Talk of January 27 359

ON THE CORRECT HANDLING OF CONTRADICTIONS AMONG THE PEOPLE (*February 27, 1957*) 384
I. Two Types of Contradictions Differing in Nature 384
II. The Question of Eliminating Counter-Revolutionaries 396
III. The Question of the Co-operative Transformation of Agriculture 399
IV. The Question of the Industrialists and Businessmen 402
V. The Question of the Intellectuals 404
VI. The Question of the Minority Nationalities 406
VII. Over-all Consideration and Proper Arrangement 407
VIII. On "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend" and "Long-Term Coexistence and Mutual Supervision" 408
IX. On the Question of Disturbances Created by Small Numbers of People 414
X. Can Bad Things Be Turned into Good Things? 416
XI. On Practising Economy 417
XII. China's Path to Industrialization 419

SPEECH AT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PROPAGANDA WORK (*March 12, 1957*) 422

PERSEVERE IN PLAIN LIVING AND HARD STRUGGLE, MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES WITH THE MASSES (*March 1957*) 436

THINGS ARE BEGINNING TO CHANGE (*May 15, 1957*) 440

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IS THE CORE OF LEADERSHIP OF THE WHOLE CHINESE PEOPLE (*May 25, 1957*) 447

MUSTER OUR FORCES TO REPULSE THE RIGHTISTS' WILD ATTACKS (*June 8, 1957*) 448

WEN HUI PAO'S BOURGEOIS ORIENTATION SHOULD BE CRITICIZED (*July 1, 1957*) 451

BEAT BACK THE ATTACKS OF THE BOURGEOIS RIGHTISTS (*July 9, 1957*) 457

THE SITUATION IN THE SUMMER OF 1957 (*July 1957*) 473

BE ACTIVISTS IN PROMOTING THE REVOLUTION (*October 9, 1957*) 483

HAVE FIRM FAITH IN THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE (*October 13, 1957*) 498

A DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO INNER-PARTY UNITY (*November 18, 1957*) 514

ALL REACTIONARIES ARE PAPER TIGERS (*November 18, 1957*) 517

THE PERIOD OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION (I)

THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE STOOD UP!

September 21, 1949

Fellow Delegates,

The Political Consultative Conference so eagerly awaited by the whole nation is herewith inaugurated.

Our conference is composed of more than six hundred delegates, representing all the democratic parties and people's organizations of China, the People's Liberation Army, the various regions and nationalities of the country and the overseas Chinese. This shows that ours is a conference embodying the great unity of the people of the whole country.

It is because we have defeated the reactionary Kuomintang government backed by U.S. imperialism that this great unity of the whole people has been achieved. In a little more than three years the heroic Chinese People's Liberation Army, an army such as the world has seldom seen, crushed all the offensives launched by the several million troops of the U.S.-supported reactionary Kuomintang government and turned to the counter-offensive and the offensive. At present the field armies of the People's Liberation Army, several million strong, have pushed the war to areas near Taiwan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan and Sinkiang, and the great majority of the Chinese people have won liberation. In a little more than three years the people of the whole country have closed their ranks, rallied to support the People's Liberation Army, fought the enemy and won basic victory. And it is on this foundation that the present People's Political Consultative Conference is convened.

Our conference is called the Political Consultative Conference because some three years ago we held a Political Consultative Conference with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang.[1] The results of that

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Opening address at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

conference were sabotaged by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang and its accomplices; nevertheless the conference left an indelible impression on the people. It showed that nothing in the interest of the people could be accomplished together with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, the running dog of imperialism, and its accomplices. Even when resolutions were reluctantly adopted, it was of no avail, for as soon as the time was ripe, they tore them up and started a ruthless war against the people. The only gain from that conference was the profound lesson it taught the people that there is absolutely no room for compromise with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, the running dog of imperialism, and its accomplices — overthrow these enemies or be oppressed and slaughtered by them, either one or the other, there is no other choice. In a little more than three years the Chinese people, led by the Chinese Communist Party, have quickly awakened and organized themselves into a nation-wide united front against imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and their general representative, the reactionary Kuomintang government, supported the People's War of Liberation, basically defeated the reactionary Kuomintang government, overthrown the rule of imperialism in China and restored the Political Consultative Conference.

The present Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is convened on an entirely new foundation; it is representative of the people of the whole country and enjoys their trust and support. Therefore, the conference proclaims that it will exercise the functions and powers of a National People's Congress. In accordance with its agenda, the conference will enact the Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; it will elect the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Central People's Government Council of the People's Republic of China; it will adopt the national flag and national emblem of the People's Republic of China; and it will decide on the seat of the capital of the People's Republic of China and adopt the chronological system in use in most countries of the world.

Fellow Delegates, we are all convinced that our work will go down in the history of mankind, demonstrating that the Chinese people, comprising one quarter of humanity, have now stood up. The Chinese have always been a great, courageous and industrious nation;

it is only in modern times that they have fallen behind. And that was due entirely to oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments. For over a century our forefathers never stopped waging unyielding struggles against domestic and foreign oppressors, including the Revolution of 1911 led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, our great forerunner in the Chinese revolution. Our forefathers enjoined us to carry out their unfulfilled will. And we have acted accordingly. We have closed our ranks and defeated both domestic and foreign oppressors through the People's War of Liberation and the great people's revolution, and now we are proclaiming the founding of the People's Republic of China. From now on our nation will belong to the community of the peace-loving and freedom-loving nations of the world and work courageously and industriously to foster its own civilization and well-being and at the same time to promote world peace and freedom. Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up. Our revolution has won the sympathy and acclaim of the people of all countries. We have friends all over the world.

Our revolutionary work is not completed, the People's War of Liberation and the people's revolutionary movement are still forging ahead and we must keep up our efforts. The imperialists and the domestic reactionaries will certainly not take their defeat lying down; they will fight to the last ditch. After there is peace and order throughout the country, they are sure to engage in sabotage and create disturbances by one means or another and every day and every minute they will try to stage a come-back. This is inevitable and beyond all doubt, and under no circumstances must we relax our vigilance.

Our state system, the people's democratic dictatorship, is a powerful weapon for safeguarding the fruits of victory of the people's revolution and for thwarting the plots of domestic and foreign enemies for restoration, and this weapon we must firmly grasp. Internationally, we must unite with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries and peoples, and first of all with the Soviet Union and the New Democracies, so that we shall not stand alone in our struggle to safeguard these fruits of victory and to thwart the plots of domestic and foreign enemies for restoration. As long as we persist in the people's democratic dictatorship and unite with our foreign friends, we shall always be victorious.

The people's democratic dictatorship and solidarity with our foreign friends will enable us to accomplish our work of construction rapidly. We are already confronted with the task of nation-wide economic construction. We have very favourable conditions: a population of 475 million people and a territory of 9,600,000 square kilometres. There are indeed difficulties ahead, and a great many too. But we firmly believe that by heroic struggle the people of the country will surmount them all. The Chinese people have rich experience in overcoming difficulties. If our forefathers, and we also, could weather long years of extreme difficulty and defeat powerful domestic and foreign reactionaries, why can't we now, after victory, build a prosperous and flourishing country? As long as we keep to our style of plain living and hard struggle, as long as we stand united and as long as we persist in the people's democratic dictatorship and unite with our foreign friends, we shall be able to win speedy victory on the economic front.

An upsurge in economic construction is bound to be followed by an upsurge of construction in the cultural sphere. The era in which the Chinese people were regarded as uncivilized is now ended. We shall emerge in the world as a nation with an advanced culture.

Our national defence will be consolidated and no imperialists will ever again be allowed to invade our land. Our people's armed forces must be maintained and developed with the heroic and steeled People's Liberation Army as the foundation. We will have not only a powerful army but also a powerful air force and a powerful navy.

Let the domestic and foreign reactionaries tremble before us! Let them say we are no good at this and no good at that. By our own indomitable efforts we the Chinese people will unswervingly reach our goal.

The heroes of the people who laid down their lives in the People's War of Liberation and the people's revolution shall live for ever in our memory!

Hail the victory of the People's War of Liberation and the people's revolution!

Hail the founding of the People's Republic of China!

Hail the triumph of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference!

NOTES

[1] "Smash Chiang Kai-shek's Offensive by a War of Self-Defence", Note 2, *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Vol. IV.

LONG LIVE THE GREAT UNITY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE!

September 30, 1949

Fellow-Countrymen,

The First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference has successfully fulfilled its tasks.

This session has been attended by delegates from all the democratic parties and people's organizations of China, the People's Liberation Army, the various regions and nationalities of the country, the overseas Chinese and other patriotic democrats; it represents the will of the people of the whole country and demonstrates their unprecedented great unity.

This great unity of the whole people has been achieved only after long years of heroic struggle, only after the Chinese people and the People's Liberation Army, led by the Communist Party of China, defeated Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary Kuomintang government backed by U.S. imperialism. For over a century, the pioneers of the Chinese people, including such outstanding men as the great revolutionary Dr. Sun Yat-sen who led the Revolution of 1911, have guided the masses in their unceasing struggles to overthrow oppression by the imperialists and reactionary Chinese regimes; this goal has now been finally attained through their dauntless and persistent efforts. We are holding this session at a time when the Chinese people have triumphed over their enemies, changed the face of their country and founded the People's Republic of China. We the 475 million Chinese people have now stood up and the future of our nation is infinitely bright.

The First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference entrusted Comrade Mao Tsetung with the drafting of this declaration. On the proposal of the delegates the phrase "under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tsetung, the leader of our people" was inserted in the declaration at the time of its adoption.

Under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tsetung, the leader of our people, our session, working with one mind and in accordance with the principle of New Democracy, has enacted the Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; decided on Peking as the capital of the People's Republic of China; adopted a flag with five stars on a field of red as the national flag of the People's Republic of China and the *March of the Volunteers* as the present national anthem;- adopted the Christian era as the chronological system of the People's Republic of China; and elected the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Central People's Government Council of the People's Republic of China. Thus begins a new era in the history of China.

Fellow-countrymen, the founding of the People's Republic of China is proclaimed, and the Chinese people now have their own Central Government. In accordance with the Common Programme, the government will exercise the people's democratic dictatorship over the length and breadth of China. It will direct the People's Liberation Army to carry the revolutionary war through to the end, wipe out the remnant enemy troops and liberate the entire territory of the country to fulfil the great task of unifying China. It will lead the people of the whole country in surmounting all difficulties and undertaking large-scale construction in the economic and cultural spheres to eliminate the poverty and ignorance inherited from the old China and improve the material and cultural life of the people step by step. It will protect the interests of the people and stamp out all the conspiracies of counter-revolutionaries. It will strengthen the people's army, navy and air force, consolidate national defence, safeguard our territorial integrity and sovereignty and oppose aggression by any imperialist country. It will unite and ally itself with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries, nations and peoples, and first of all with the Soviet Union and the New Democracies, and together with them fight against imperialist plots to provoke war and so strive for lasting world peace.

Fellow-countrymen, we should get ourselves better organized. We should organize the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people in political, military, economic, cultural and other organizations and put an end to the disorganized state characterizing the old China, so that the great collective strength of the masses may be tapped both to support the People's Government and the People's Liberation Army and to build a new China, independent, democratic, peaceful, unified, prosperous and strong.

The heroes of the people who laid down their lives in the People's War of Liberation and the people's revolution shall live for ever in our memory!

Long live the great unity of the Chinese people!

Long live the People's Republic of China!

Long live the Central People's Government!

ETERNAL GLORY TO THE HEROES OF THE PEOPLE!

September 30, 1949

Eternal glory to the heroes of the people who laid down their lives in the people's war of liberation and the people's revolution in the past three years!

Eternal glory to the heroes of the people who laid down their lives in the people's war of liberation and the people's revolution in the past thirty years!

Eternal glory to the heroes of the people who from 1840 laid down their lives in the many struggles against domestic and foreign enemies and for national independence and the freedom and well-being of the people!

Epitaph on the Monument to the Heroes of the People drafted by Comrade Mao Tsetung.

ALWAYS KEEP TO THE STYLE OF PLAIN LIVING AND HARD STRUGGLE

October 26, 1949

Comrades in Yenan and Fellow-Countrymen in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region:

I am very happy and grateful to receive your message of greetings. From 1936 to 1948 Yenan and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region were the seat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the general rear area of the Chinese people's struggle for liberation. The people of Yenan and the Border Region have made great contributions to the whole nation. I wish you continued unity, speedy recovery from the wounds of war and progress in your economic and cultural construction. And I hope that the revolutionary personnel of the whole country will always keep to the style of plain living and hard struggle maintained for more than a decade by the working personnel in Yenan and the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

Mao Tsetung

October 26, 1949

REQUEST FOR OPINIONS ON THE TACTICS FOR DEALING WITH RICH PEASANTS

March 12, 1950

At your current meeting of leading provincial comrades please gather opinions on the tactics for dealing with the rich peasants and telegraph these opinions to us. The tactics in question are to leave untouched not only the capitalist rich peasants but also the semi-feudal ones in the agrarian reform scheduled for this winter in southern provinces and some regions in the Northwest and to defer the solution of the problem of the semi-feudal rich peasants for several years. Please consider whether this way is not more advantageous. The reasons for taking this course are: First, the agrarian reform is unprecedented in scale and ultra-Left deviations are likely to occur. If we touch only the landlords and not the rich peasants, we can more effectively isolate the landlords, protect the middle peasants and guard against indiscriminate beating and killing, which would be very hard to prevent otherwise. Second, the agrarian reform in the north was carried out in wartime, with the atmosphere of war prevailing over that of agrarian reform; but now, with the fighting practically over, the agrarian reform stands out in sharp relief, and the shock to society will be particularly great and the landlords' outcries particularly shrill. If we leave the semi-feudal rich peasants untouched for the time being and deal with them a few years later, we will stand on stronger ground, that is to say, politically we will have more initiative. Third, we have formed a united front with the national bourgeoisie politically, economically and organizationally; and since the national bourgeoisie is closely tied up with the land problem, it seems better not to touch the semi-feudal rich peasants

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Circular to the Central-South Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and concurrently to the East China Bureau, the South China Sub-Bureau, the Southwest Bureau and the Northwest Bureau.

for the time being in order to set the minds of the national bourgeoisie at rest.

At the meeting of the Political Bureau last November, I raised the question of not touching the rich peasants for the time being, but neither a detailed analysis nor a decision was made then. Now is the time to make a decision. Following that, the Land Law and other documents related to agrarian reform will have to be revised and promulgated for the agrarian reform cadres in the recently liberated provinces to study, so that we can facilitate the agrarian reform which is due to begin after the autumn harvest. Otherwise, we would be letting the right moment slip by and lose the initiative. Therefore, it is most important for the comrades not only of the Central-South Bureau but also of the East China Bureau, the South China Sub-Bureau, the Southwest Bureau and the Northwest Bureau to discuss this question, forward this telegram to the provincial and municipal committees under them for discussion, collect opinions, pro and con, and promptly telegraph them to the Central Committee for our consideration in making the decision.

FIGHT FOR A FUNDAMENTAL TURN FOR THE BETTER IN THE NATION'S FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION

June 6, 1950

The present international situation is favourable to us. The world front of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union is stronger than it was last year. The people's movement for peace and against war has made headway in all countries. The national liberation movements to throw off the yoke of imperialism have greatly expanded, and the emerging mass movements of the Japanese and the German people against U.S. occupation and the growing people's liberation struggles of the oppressed nations in the East are especially noteworthy. At the same time, contradictions have developed between the imperialist countries, primarily between the United States and Britain. Quarrels among the different groups of the U.S. bourgeoisie and of the British bourgeoisie have also increased. In contrast, there is strong unity between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies and among the latter. The new treaty between China and the Soviet Union,[1] which is of great and historic significance, has strengthened the friendly relations between the two countries; it enables us to carry on our national construction more freely and more speedily and at the same time promotes the mighty struggle of the people of the world for peace and democracy and against war and oppression. The threat of war from the imperialist camp still exists, and so does the possibility of a third world war. However, the forces fighting to check the danger of war and prevent the outbreak of a third world war are growing rapidly, and the level of political consciousness of most of the world's people is rising. A new world war can be averted,

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Written report to the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

provided the Communist Parties of the world continue to unite all possible forces for peace and democracy and help their further development. The war rumours spread by the Kuomintang reactionaries are designed to deceive the people, they are groundless.

The present situation in our country is as follows. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and local people's governments at all levels have been set up. The Soviet Union, the People's Democracies and a number of capitalist countries have successively established diplomatic relations with our country. Basically the war has ended on the mainland, and only Taiwan and Tibet remain to be liberated, but this task still involves serious struggle. In certain areas on the mainland the Kuomintang reactionaries have resorted to bandit guerrilla warfare and incited some backward elements against the People's Government. They have organized many secret agents and spies to oppose our government and spread rumours among the people in an attempt to undermine the prestige of the Communist Party and the People's Government and to disrupt the unity and co-operation of the various nationalities, democratic classes, democratic parties and people's organizations. These secret agents and spies are also engaged in sabotaging the people's economic undertakings, assassinating the personnel of the Party and government organizations and collecting intelligence for the imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries. All these counter-revolutionary activities are directed from behind the scenes by imperialism, and particularly by U.S. imperialism. All these bandits, secret agents and spies are imperialist lackeys. In the thirteen and a half months since the operations mounted to cross the Yangtse, which began on April 21, 1949 after the decisive victories in the three great campaigns of Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin in the winter of 1948, the People's Liberation Army has completed the occupation of all Chinese territory except Tibet and Taiwan and a number of other islands and wiped out 1,830,000 troops of the reactionary Kuomintang and 980,000 of its bandit guerrilla forces; during this time the people's public security organs have uncovered large numbers of reactionary secret service groups and agents. In the new liberated areas, the present task of the People's Liberation Army is to continue to wipe out the remnant bandits and that of the people's public security organs is to continue to strike at the enemy's secret service groups. The great majority of the people throughout the country warmly support the Communist Party, the People's Government and the

People's Liberation Army. In recent months, the People's Government has exercised unified control and unified leadership over financial and economic work on a national scale and has been successful in balancing budgetary revenues and expenditures, checking inflation and stabilizing prices. The whole people have supported the government by delivering grain, paying taxes and buying state bonds.[2] Last year our country was hit by natural calamities over wide areas; about 120 million *mou* of farmland and 40 million people were affected by flood or drought to a greater or lesser degree. The People's Government has organized extensive relief for the victims and in many places has initiated large-scale water conservancy work. This year's crops are better than last year's and in general the summer harvest looks good. If the autumn harvest is also good, still better prospects for next year may be envisaged. Long years of imperialist and reactionary Kuomintang rule left our economy in a chaotic state and caused widespread unemployment. Since our victory in the revolution, there have been reorganizations of varying degrees in the whole of the old economic structure and the number of unemployed has further increased. This is a serious matter, and the People's Government has begun to adopt measures to give relief to the unemployed and find jobs for them so as to solve the problem step by step. It has done extensive work in the spheres of culture and education, and large numbers of intellectuals and students have undertaken either studies of the new knowledge or revolutionary work. It has already done something towards properly readjusting industry and commerce and improving the relations between the state sector and the private sector of the economy and between labour and capital, and it is devoting great efforts towards these ends.

China is a vast country and conditions are very complex; moreover the revolution triumphed first in certain areas and only later throughout the country. Accordingly, in the old liberated areas (with a population of approximately 160 million), agrarian reform has been completed, public order has been established, the work of economic construction has started on the right track, the life of most of the working people has improved, and the problem of unemployed workers and intellectuals has been solved (as in the Northeast) or is nearing solution (as in North China and Shantung Province). In particular, planned economic construction has begun in the Northeast. On the other hand, in the new liberated areas (with a population of approximately 310 million), since liberation occurred only a few months ago, or half a year or one year ago, the more than 400,000 bandits scattered in remote regions have yet to be wiped out, the land problem has not been solved, industry and commerce have not been properly readjusted, unemployment has remained serious, and public order has not been established. In a word, the conditions for carrying out planned economic construction are still lacking. That is why I said some time ago that we had achieved a number of successes on the economic front, for example, budgetary revenues and expenditures were nearly balanced, inflation was being checked and prices were tending towards stability — all this indicated that the financial and economic situation was beginning to take a turn for the better, but not yet a fundamental turn for the better. Three conditions are required for the fundamental turn for the better in the financial and economic situation, namely, (1) completion of agrarian reform; (2) proper readjustment of existing industry and commerce; and (3) large-scale retrenchment in government expenditures. The fulfilment of these three conditions will take some time, say three years or a little longer. The whole Party and nation must strive to bring about these conditions. I believe, and so do you all, that we can surely do this in about three years. By that time, we shall be able to witness a fundamental turn for the better in the entire financial and economic situation of our country.

To this end, the whole Party and nation must unite and carry out the following tasks:

(1) The work of agrarian reform should proceed step by step and in a systematic way.[3] As the war has basically ended on the mainland and the situation is entirely different from that in the period from 1946 to 1948 (when the People's Liberation Army was locked in a life-and-death struggle with the Kuomintang reactionaries and the issue had not yet been decided), it is now possible for the state to extend loans to the poor peasants to help them out of their difficulties and thus make up for the drawback that they are to receive less land. Accordingly, there should be a change in our policy towards the rich peasants, a change from the policy of requisitioning their surplus land and property to one of maintaining the rich peasant economy in order to facilitate the early rehabilitation of rural production and the better to isolate the landlords and protect the middle peasants and lessors of small plots.

(2) Unified control and unified leadership in our financial and economic work should be consolidated, and so too should the balancing of budgetary revenues and expenditures and the stabilization of prices.

In accordance with this principle, taxes should be readjusted and the people's burden appropriately lightened. In line with the principle of making over-all plans and taking all factors into consideration, drifting and anarchy in our economic work should be gradually eliminated existing industry and commerce should be properly readjusted, and relations between the state sector and the private sector and between labour and capital should be effectively and suitably improved; thus under the leadership of the socialist state sector all sectors of the economy will function satisfactorily with a due division of labour to promote the rehabilitation and development of the whole economy. The view held by certain people that it is possible to eliminate capitalism and realize socialism at an early date is wrong, it does not tally with our national conditions.

(3) While preserving its main forces, the People's Liberation Army should be partially demobilized in 1950, provided that the forces must be adequate to liberate Taiwan and Tibet, consolidate national defence and suppress counter-revolutionaries. This demobilization must be carried out carefully so as to enable the demobilized soldiers to return home and settle down to productive work. Readjustment is also necessary in administrative organizations, and here too the excess personnel should be dealt with appropriately so that they have the opportunity either to take up work or to study.

(4) Reform of the old school education and of the old cultural institutions in our society should be conducted carefully step by step, and all patriotic intellectuals should be won over to the service of the people. On this question, procrastination or reluctance to introduce reforms is wrong, and so is rashness or any attempt to push them through arbitrarily.

(5) Relief for unemployed workers and intellectuals must be carried out in earnest, and they must be helped to get work in a planned way. Serious efforts to provide relief for people stricken by natural calamities must continue.

(6) We must earnestly unite with the democratic personages in all circles, help them solve the problem of work and study, and overcome any tendency towards either closed-doorism or excessive accommodation in united front work. We must endeavour to make a success of the conferences of people from all circles[4] so that people from every walk of life can unite in a common effort. All matters of importance to the people's governments should be submitted to these conferences for discussion and decision. Representatives at these conferences must have

the right to express their views fully; any attempt to hinder such expression is wrong.

(7) Bandits, secret agents, local tyrants and other counter-revolutionaries, all of whom are menaces to the people, must be resolutely rooted out. On this question it is necessary to follow a policy of combining suppression with leniency without stressing one to the neglect of the other, that is, a policy of certain punishment for the main culprits, no punishment for those accomplices who act under duress and rewards for those who render positive services. The whole Party and nation must heighten their vigilance against the conspiratorial activities of counter-revolutionaries.

(8) The Central Committee's directives on consolidating and expanding the Party organization, on strengthening the ties between the Party and the masses, on conducting criticism and self-criticism and on launching a rectification movement throughout the Party should all be strictly carried out. Since the membership of our Party has grown to 4,500,000, we must henceforth follow a prudent policy in expanding the Party organization, be strict in preventing political speculators from gaining Party membership and take proper measures to clear out those already in. We must pay attention to admitting politically conscious workers into the Party in a planned way in order to increase the proportion of workers in the Party organizations. In the old liberated areas, in general Party recruiting in the villages should stop. In the new liberated areas, in general the Party organizations in the villages should not expand until agrarian reform is completed in order to prevent political speculators from worming their way into the Party. During the summer, autumn and winter of 1950, the whole Party must carry out a large-scale rectification movement in close co-ordination with its other tasks, not in isolation from them. Such methods as reading selected documents, summing up work, analysing the situation and making criticism and self-criticism should be used to raise the ideological and political level of cadres and rank-and-file Party members, correct mistakes in work, overcome the conceit and complacency of the self-styled distinguished veterans, eliminate bureaucracy and commandism and improve the relations between the Party and the people.

NOTES

[1] This refers to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed on February 14, 1950.

[2] This refers to the People's Victory Parity Bonds floated by the Central People's Government in 1950.

[3] Beginning from the winter of 1950, the new liberated areas, one after another, unfolded a large-scale agrarian reform movement. By the winter of 1952 agrarian reform was basically completed, except in some minority nationality areas. In the old and new liberated areas throughout the country, about 300 million landless or land-deficient peasants received some 700 million *mou* of land.

[4] Before the election and convocation of the local people's congresses at all levels, conferences of people from all circles were convened, in accordance with the stipulations of the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference of 1949, to exercise the functions and powers of the people's congresses step by step.

DON'T HIT OUT IN ALL DIRECTIONS

June 6, 1950

Since the Second Plenary Session of the Party's Seventh Central Committee, nation-wide victory has been won in the new-democratic revolution led by our Party, and the People's Republic of China has been founded. This is a great victory, a great victory without parallel in the history of China, a great victory of world significance following the October Revolution. Comrade Stalin and many other foreign comrades all consider the victory of the Chinese revolution an extremely great one. And yet many of our comrades don't realize this because they have become so inured to the struggle. We should widely publicize the tremendous significance of the victory of the Chinese revolution inside the Party and among the masses.

In the midst of this great victory we are confronted with very complex struggles and many difficulties.

We have completed agrarian reform in the northern parts of the country with a population of 160 million, and this must be affirmed as an immense achievement. We won the War of Liberation by relying mainly on these 160 million people. It was the victory of the agrarian reform that made possible our victory in overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek. In the autumn we shall start agrarian reform in vast areas with a population of some 310 million in order to topple the entire landlord class. In the agrarian reform our enemies are as numerous as they are powerful. Against us are arrayed, first, the imperialists, second, the reactionaries in Taiwan and Tibet, third, the remnant Kuomintang forces, the secret agents and the bandits, fourth, the landlord class and, fifth, the reactionary forces in the missionary schools established

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Part of a speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It throws light on the written report "Fight for a Fundamental Turn for the Better in the Nation's Financial and Economic Situation" and on its strategic and tactical ideas in China by the imperialists and in religious circles and those in the cultural and educational institutions taken over from the Kuomintang. These are our enemies. We have to fight them one and all and accomplish the agrarian reform in an area much larger than before. This is a very acute struggle, unprecedented in history.

In the meantime our victory in the revolution has led to the reorganization of our social economy. While necessary, this reorganization puts heavy burdens on us for the time being. Many people are dissatisfied with us because of this reorganization and because of a certain disruption of industry and commerce wrought by the war. At present our relations with the national bourgeoisie are very strained; they are on tenterhooks and are very disgruntled. Unemployed intellectuals and workers are dissatisfied with us and so are a number of small handicraftsmen. The peasants in most rural areas are complaining too because agrarian reform has not yet been carried out there and besides they have to deliver grain to the state.

What is our general policy at present? It is to eliminate the remnant Kuomintang forces, the secret agents and the bandits, overthrow the landlord class, liberate Taiwan and Tibet and fight imperialism to the end. In order to isolate and attack our immediate enemies, we must convert those among the people who are dissatisfied with us into our supporters. Although this task is fraught with difficulties at present, we must overcome them by every possible means.

We should make proper readjustments in industry and commerce so that factories can resume operation and the problem of unemployment can be solved, and we should provide 2,000 million catties of grain for the jobless workers and gain their support. When we reduce rent and interest, suppress the bandits and local tyrants and carry out agrarian reform, the masses of the peasantry will support us. We should also help the small handicraftsmen find ways to earn a living. We should introduce suitable readjustments in industry and commerce and in taxation to improve our relations with the national bourgeoisie rather than aggravate these relations. We should run training courses of various kinds, military and political colleges and revolutionary institutes for the intellectuals and educate and remould them while availing ourselves of their services. We should have them study the history of social development, historical materialism and other subjects. We can induce even those who are idealists not to oppose us. Let them say that man was created by God, we say man evolved from the ape.

Some intellectuals are advanced in age, they are over seventy, and we should provide for them so long as they support the Party and the People’s Government.

The whole Party should try earnestly and painstakingly to make a success of its united front work. We should rally the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie under the leadership of the working class and on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance. The national bourgeoisie will eventually cease to exist, but at this stage we should rally them around us and not push them away. We should struggle against them on the one hand and unite with them on the other. We should make this clear to the cadres and show by facts that it is right and necessary to unite with the national bourgeoisie, the democratic parties, democratic personages and intellectuals. Many of them were our enemies before, but now that they have broken with the enemy camp and come over to our side, we should unite with all these people, who can be more or less united with. It is in the interest of the working people to unite with them. We need to adopt these tactics now.

It is of vital importance to unite with the minority nationalities. There are about thirty million of them in the whole country. Social reforms in their areas are a matter of great importance and must be handled cautiously. On no account must we be impetuous, for impatience will lead to trouble. No reform is to be instituted unless the conditions are ripe. Neither should any major reform be introduced where only one of the conditions is ripe while the others are not. Of course, this is not to say that no reform at all is to be carried out. As stipulated by the Common Programme, customs and folk-ways in the minority nationality areas may be reformed. But the minority nationalities themselves should do the reforming. Without popular support, without the people’s armed forces and without the minority nationalities’ own cadres, no reform of a mass character should be attempted. We must help them train their own cadres and we must unite with the masses of the minority nationalities.

In short, we must not hit out in all directions. It is undesirable to hit out in all directions and cause nation-wide tension. We must definitely not make too many enemies, we must make concessions and relax the tension a little in some quarters and concentrate our attack in one direction. We must do our work well so that all the workers, peasants and small handicraftsmen will support us and the overwhelming majority of the national bourgeoisie and intellectuals will not oppose us. In this way, the remnant Kuomintang forces, the secret agents and the bandits will be isolated, as will the landlord class and the reactionaries in Taiwan and Tibet, and the imperialists will find themselves isolated before the people of our country. This is our policy, our strategy and tactics, and it is the line of the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party.

BE A TRUE REVOLUTIONARY

June 23, 1950

The present session has summed up our experience in the past period and laid down various guiding principles.

We have done this work jointly at this gathering of representatives of all the nationalities, democratic classes, democratic parties, people's organizations and democratic personages from every walk of life. Not only have the members of the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference taken part in the discussions, many cadres of the Central People's Government and of the people's governments (or military and administrative commissions) of the greater administrative areas,[1] provinces and municipalities as well as representatives from the consultative committees of the provincial and municipal conferences of people from all circles[2] and many specially invited patriotic personages have also sat in and joined the discussions. Thus we have been able to draw together opinions from all quarters, review our past work and set forth guiding principles for the future. I hope that we will continue to use this method and that the people's governments (or military and administrative commissions) of the greater administrative areas, provinces and municipalities will adopt it too. So far our committee sessions have been advisory in nature. But in practice the Central People's Government will as a matter of course adopt and put into effect the decisions made at our sessions, as it should.

We have unanimously approved the report on the work of the National Committee and the various reports on the work of the Central People's Government. These are the reports on agrarian reform, on political, military, economic and financial work, on taxation, culture and education, and on the work of the judiciary. All of them are good. In these reports the experience of our work in the past has been

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Closing address at the Second Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

properly summed up and the guiding principles for our work in the future have been laid down. There were many items on the agenda of our session, because work has started or expanded in every held since the founding of our new state. Throughout the country the people are vigorously unfolding a great and genuine people's revolutionary struggle on all fronts, a struggle that is as great as it is unprecedented on the military, economic, ideological and agrarian reform fronts, and the work in every field awaits summing up and needs guiding principles. That is why we had so many items on the agenda. We shall hold two sessions yearly as required by law, one with a full and the other with a less full agenda. This is what we are called on to do, for China is a large country with a population actually exceeding 475 million and, what is more, it finds itself in a historic period of people's revolution. And this is what we have been doing, and I think we have done right.

Our present session had many subjects for discussion, the central one being the question of transforming the old land system. We have endorsed the Draft Agrarian Reform Law[3] proposed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to which we have made a number of useful amendments and supplements. This is fine. I am glad and wish to congratulate the hundreds of millions of new China's rural population on winning the opportunity for emancipation and the nation on winning the basic condition for industrialization. The peasants form the bulk of China's population. It was with their help that victory was won in the revolution, and it is again their help that will make the industrialization of the country possible. Therefore, the working class should actively help the peasants carry out the agrarian reform; the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie should also give their support, and still more so should all the democratic parties and people's organizations. War and agrarian reform are two tests everyone and every political party in China must go through in the historical period of New Democracy. Whoever sides with the revolutionary people is a revolutionary. Whoever sides with imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism is a counter-revolutionary. Whoever sides with the revolutionary people in word only but not in deed is a revolutionary in word. Whoever sides with the revolutionary people in deed as well as in word is a true revolutionary. The test of war is basically over, and we have all come through well, to the satisfaction of the people of the whole country. Now it is the test of agrarian reform that we have to pass, and I hope we shall acquit ourselves just as well as we did in the test of war. Let us give this matter more thought, have more

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

consultation, straighten out our thinking, march in step and form a great anti-feudal united front, and then we shall be able to lead the people and help them pass this test successfully. When the tests of war and agrarian reform are passed, the remaining test will be easy to pass, that is, the test of socialism, of country-wide socialist transformation. As for those who have made contributions in the revolutionary war and in the revolutionary transformation of the land system and who continue to do so in the coming years of economic and cultural construction, the people will not forget them when the time comes for nationalizing private industry and socializing agriculture (which is still quite far off), and they will have a bright future. This is how our country steadily advances; it has passed through the war and is undergoing new-democratic reforms, and in the future it will enter the new era of socialism unhurriedly and with proper arrangements when our economy and culture are flourishing, when conditions are ripe and when the transition has been fully considered and endorsed by the whole nation. I think it is necessary to make this point clear so that people will have confidence and stop worrying: "Don't know when I'll no longer be wanted and be given the chance to serve the people even if I wish to." No, that won't happen. The people and their government have no reason to reject anyone or deny him the opportunity of making a living and rendering service to the country, provided he is really willing to serve the people and provided he really helped and did a good turn when the people were faced with difficulties and keeps on doing good without giving up halfway.

With this great aim in mind, in the international sphere we must firmly unite with the Soviet Union, the People's Democracies and the forces of peace and democracy everywhere, and there should not be the slightest hesitation or wavering on this question. At home, we must unite all the nationalities, democratic classes, democratic parties, people's organizations and patriotic democrats and consolidate the great, prestigious revolutionary united front already in existence. Whoever contributes to the consolidation of this revolutionary united front is doing right, and we welcome him; whoever harms this consolidation is doing wrong, and we oppose him. To consolidate the revolutionary united front, we must use the method of criticism and self-criticism. The main criterion in the application of this method is our present fundamental law — the Common Programme. We have carried out criticism and self-criticism at this session, basing ourselves on the Common Programme. This is an excellent method, which impels everyone of us to uphold truth and rectify error, and it is the only correct method for all revolutionary people to educate and remould themselves in a people's state. The people's democratic dictatorship uses two methods. Towards the enemy, it uses the method of dictatorship, that is, for as long a period of time as is necessary it does not permit them to take part in political activity and compels them to obey the law of the People's Government, to engage in labour and, through such labour, be transformed into new men. Towards the people, on the contrary, it uses the method of democracy and not of compulsion, that is, it must necessarily let them take part in political activity and does not compel them to do this or that but uses the method of democracy to educate and persuade. Such education is self-education for the people, and its basic method is criticism and self-criticism. I hope that this method will be used by all the nationalities, democratic classes, democratic parties, people's organizations and patriotic democrats in the country.

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[1] At that time, the country was divided into six greater administrative areas, namely, the Northeast, North China, East China, the Central South, the Southwest and the Northwest, with a bureau in each representing the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Each of the five areas except North China had its administrative organ. That of the Northeast was called the people's government, while in the other four it was known as the military and administrative commission. In November 1952 these were all renamed administrative councils, and one such council was also established in North China. In 1954 all the administrative councils were abolished.

[2] The consultative committees of conferences of people from all circles at the provincial and municipal level were elected by conferences of people from all circles at the same level. When the latter were not in session, the former were charged with the function of assisting the people's governments in carrying out the conferences' resolutions.

[3] This refers to the "Draft Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China". The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party presented the draft to the Second Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on June 14, 1950 for discussion. After it had been discussed and endorsed by the session, the Central People's Government Council approved the draft. On June 30 of the same year, Mao Tsetung, Chairman of the Central People's Government, promulgated the "Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China".

YOU ARE MODELS FOR THE WHOLE NATION

September 25, 1950

Comrade Delegates to the National Conferences of Combat Heroes and of Model Workers in Industry, Agriculture and the Army:

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sends your conferences warm greetings and wishes to thank and salute you for the work you have done.

You have overcome a host of difficulties and hardships and demonstrated immense courage, wisdom and enthusiasm in the struggle to wipe out the enemy and in the struggle to restore and increase industrial and agricultural production. You are models for the whole Chinese nation, activists propelling the people's cause forward to triumph in all spheres of endeavour, a firm pillar of support to the People's Government and a bridge linking the People's Government with the masses.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party calls on the whole Party and nation to learn from you and at the same time calls on you, dear comrade delegates, and on all the combat heroes and model workers of the country, to keep on learning through struggle and from the masses. Only by guarding against conceit and complacency and continuing to learn tirelessly can you go on making outstanding contributions to the great People's Republic of China and thus live up to your names.

China must build a powerful national defence force and a powerful economy — two tasks of major importance. Fulfilment of these tasks depends on you comrades forging close ties of unity and making concerted efforts together with all the commanders and fighters of the

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Message of greetings delivered on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the National Conferences of Combat Heroes and of Model Workers in Industry, Agriculture and the Army.

People's Liberation Army and all the workers, peasants and other sections of the people. As the first anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China is approaching, your meeting here is of signal importance. We wish you success in your conferences and great victories in your work in the days to come.

ORDER TO THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS

October 8, 1950

To leading comrades of the Chinese People's Volunteers at all levels:

1. In order to support the Korean people's war of liberation and to resist the attacks of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, thereby safeguarding the interests of the people of Korea, China and all the other countries in the East, I herewith order the Chinese People's Volunteers to march speedily to Korea and join the Korean comrades in fighting the aggressors and winning a glorious victory.

2. While in Korea, the Chinese People's Volunteers must show fraternal feelings and respect for the people, the People's Army, the Democratic Government, the Workers' Party and the other democratic parties of Korea as well as for Comrade Kim Il Sung, the leader of the Korean people, and strictly observe military and political discipline. This is a most important political basis for ensuring the fulfilment of your military task.

3. You must fully anticipate various possible and inevitable difficulties and be prepared to overcome them with great enthusiasm, courage, care and stamina. At present, the international and domestic situation as a whole is favourable to us, not to the aggressors. So long as you comrades are firm and brave and are good at uniting with the people there and at fighting the aggressors, final victory will be ours.

Mao Tsetung

Chairman of the Chinese People's
Revolutionary Military Commission

October 8, 1950, Peking

Excerpts from an order issued by Comrade Mao Tsetung to the Chinese People's Volunteers.

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS SHOULD CHERISH EVERY HILL, EVERY RIVER, EVERY TREE AND EVERY BLADE OF GRASS IN KOREA

January 19, 1951

The Chinese and Korean comrades should unite as closely as brothers, go through thick and thin together, stick together in life and death and fight to the end to defeat their common enemy. The Chinese comrades must consider Korea's cause as their own and the commanders and fighters must be instructed to cherish every hill, every river, every tree and every blade of grass in Korea and take not a single needle or a single thread from the Korean people, just the way we feel about our own country and treat our own people. This is the political basis for winning victory. So long as we act this way, final victory will be assured.

Directive to the Chinese People's Volunteers.

MAIN POINTS OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE ENLARGED MEETING OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

February 18, 1951

The Political Bureau convened a meeting in mid-February at which responsible comrades from the bureaus of the Central Committee were present and various important questions were discussed. We herewith notify you of the main points of the resolution.

I. TWENTY-TWO MONTHS FOR PREPARATION

The idea of "three years for preparation and ten years for planned economic construction" must be made clear to all cadres from the provincial and municipal level upwards. Counting from now, we have twenty-two months left for making preparations and so we must step up our work in all fields.

II. PROPAGANDA AND EDUCATION CAMPAIGN FOR RESISTING U.S. AGGRESSION AND AIDING KOREA

Persistent efforts must be made to push this campaign throughout the country, to deepen it where it is already under way and spread it

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Inner-Party circular drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

where it is not, so as to make sure that this education reaches everyone in every part of the country.

III. AGRARIAN REFORM

1. During the busy farming season, agrarian reform in every place should stop for a while and experience should be summed up.
2. Strive for a good harvest this year.
3. Rely on the county conferences of peasant representatives and on the training classes.
4. Work hard to prepare the necessary conditions. Whenever and wherever they are not ripe, don't force the agrarian reform through.
5. As soon as agrarian reform is completed, switch over to the two major tasks of production and education.
6. East China's method of returning security money in instalments[1] is approved.
7. Persuade the peasants that it is to our advantage to refrain from using torture, which is illegal.
8. After the agrarian reform establish more districts and townships and reduce the area under the jurisdiction of each district and township.

IV. SUPPRESSION OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES

1. As a general rule, before passing a death sentence, refer the case to the masses and consult democratic personages.
2. Exercise strict control, guard against indiscriminate action and avoid mistakes.
3. Pay attention to the "middle layer",[2] and carefully weed out counter-revolutionaries hiding among the old personnel and among the intellectuals recently drawn into our work.
4. Pay attention to the "inner layer", carefully weed out counter-revolutionaries who have sneaked into the Party, and strengthen to the maximum our work of safeguarding secret information.
5. In addition, give education to the cadres and back them up in their work.

V. URBAN WORK

1. Every bureau and sub-bureau of the Central Committee and every Party committee at the level of province, municipality and administrative region must call two meetings on urban work during the year with the agenda set by the Central Committee and report twice on this subject to the Central Committee.

2. Strengthen the leadership of the Party committees over urban work and carry out the resolution adopted at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee.

3. Educate the cadres so that they are clear in their minds about relying on the working class.

4. In factories, the Party should exercise unified leadership over the work of the Party organization, the management, the trade union and the Youth League, with the fulfilment of production plans as the central task.

5. Strive for a gradual improvement in the workers' living conditions on the basis of increased production.

6. The idea of serving the needs of production and of the workers should permeate the planning of urban construction.

7. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the higher levels of each trade union should lay stress on solving the specific problems of the lower levels.

8. Party committees and trade unions should make a point of creating models and promptly spread their experience to other places.

VI. PARTY CONSOLIDATION AND PARTY BUILDING

1. Ours is a Party that is great, glorious and correct; this is the principal aspect which must be affirmed and made clear to cadres at all levels. However, it must also be made clear to them that there are problems which have to be straightened out and that in the new liberated areas a prudent attitude should be adopted towards Party building.

2. The consolidation and building of the Party should proceed under the strict control of the Central Committee and its bureaus, and organizations at lower levels must in no case act as they please.

3. The consolidation of the Party should be accomplished in three years. The steps to be taken are as follows. Devote one year (1951) to extensive education on what is required of a Communist, so that the entire membership will know the standards a Communist should live up to, and to the training of personnel for organizational work. At the same time experiment with typical units to serve as models. Then in the light of the experience gained, proceed with consolidation; in cities, however, this can start in 1951. In Party consolidation, first clear out the "persons in the fourth category".[3] Then differentiate between the "persons in the second category" and the "persons in the third category", and persuade those who, after education, are still not up to the standards of Party membership to withdraw from the Party, but make sure that they withdraw of their own free will and that their feelings are not hurt. Don't repeat the practice of "removing rocks"[4] as in 1948.

4. A policy of prudence must be adopted in building the Party in the cities and the new liberated areas. In the cities Party organizations should be set up primarily among the industrial workers. In the rural areas it is only after the completion of the agrarian reform that Party branches can be set up by admitting those who prove themselves qualified for Party membership as a result of education, and for the first two years the membership of a rural Party branch should in general not exceed ten. In city and countryside alike, education on how to be a Communist should be conducted among activists who are ready to receive it, and after such education those really qualified for Party membership should be admitted.

VII. UNITED FRONT WORK

1. The bureaus and sub-bureaus of the Central Committee and Party committees at the level of province, municipality and administrative region are required to call two meetings in 1951 to discuss united front work and report twice on this subject to the Central Committee.

2. It must be made clear to the cadres why our united front work needs to be strengthened.

3. It is necessary to unite intellectuals, industrialists and businessmen, leading religious figures, the democratic parties and democratic personages on the basis of the struggle against imperialism and feudalism and to carry out education among them.

4. Work conscientiously among the minority nationalities, the two central tasks being to push for regional autonomy and to train cadres from these nationalities.

VIII. RECTIFICATION MOVEMENT

This movement should be carried out once every winter for a short period; the aim is to review our work, sum up experience, enhance achievements and overcome mistakes and shortcomings, and thus educate the cadres.

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[1] Before liberation the peasants who rented land from the landlords had to pay a considerable sum of security money in advance for their tenancy. During the agrarian reform the peasants demanded reimbursement of this money by the landlords, and this was known as the return of security money. Those landlords who were also running industrial and commercial enterprises or who were unable to repay the sum all at once were allowed to return it in instalments.

[2] In the work of suppressing counter-revolutionaries, there are three layers to be swept clean, the outer, middle and inner layers. To sweep clean the "outer layer" refers to uncovering counter-revolutionaries lying low in society at large; to sweep clean the "middle layer" refers to uncovering counter-revolutionaries lying low in our army units and government organizations; and to sweep clean the "inner layer" refers to uncovering counter-revolutionaries lying low in our Party.

[3] During the 1951 Party consolidation, Party members were classified into four categories: first, those who were qualified members, second, those who were not fully qualified or had fairly serious shortcomings and who had to be remoulded and to raise their political consciousness; third, inactive and backward elements who did not measure up to the standards for Party membership; and fourth, alien class elements, renegades, political speculators and degenerates who had hidden in the Party.

[4] "Removing rocks" was advocated by Liu Shao-chi in 1948 during the agrarian reform and Party consolidation in the liberated areas. He maligned large numbers of rural cadres as "rocks" weighing down on the peasants and wanted to have them removed from their posts and expelled from the Party.

THE PARTY'S MASS LINE MUST BE FOLLOWED IN SUPPRESSING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES

May 1951

1. The movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries now going on throughout the country is a great, intense and complex struggle. The line for this work that has proved effective everywhere is the Party's mass line. This means leadership by Party committees, mobilization of the entire Party membership, mobilization of the masses, participation by the democratic parties and by personages from all circles, unified planning, unified action, strict examination of the lists of persons to be arrested or executed, attention to tactics in different phases of the struggle, widespread propaganda and education (holding various kinds of conferences, cadre meetings, forums and mass rallies, at all of which victims can bring their accusations and evidence of crimes can be displayed, and making propaganda through films, lantern-slides, stage performances, newspapers, pamphlets and leaflets, in order to make the movement known to every household and individual), a break with the practice of working behind closed doors and being secretive, and determined opposition to the deviation of rashness. Wherever this line is completely adhered to, the work is completely correct. Wherever this line is not adhered to, the work is wrong. Wherever this line is adhered to generally but not completely, the work is generally but not completely correct. We believe this line for the work is a guarantee for deepening the struggle to suppress counter-revolutionaries and for achieving full success. In the days ahead it is essential to adhere completely to this line in suppressing counter-revolutionaries. What is most important here is strictly to examine the

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Instructions added by Comrade Mao Tsetung when he revised the draft resolution of the Third National Conference on Public Security.

lists of persons to be arrested or executed and to do a good job of widespread propaganda and education. Do both well and mistakes will be avoided.

2. The number of counter-revolutionaries to be killed must be kept within certain proportions. The principle to follow here is that those who owe blood debts or are guilty of other extremely serious crimes and have to be executed to assuage the people's anger and those who have caused extremely serious harm to the national interest must be unhesitatingly sentenced to death and executed without delay. As for those whose crimes deserve capital punishment but who owe no blood debts and are not bitterly hated by the people or who have done serious but not extremely serious harm to the national interest, the policy to follow is to hand down the death sentence, grant a two-year reprieve and subject them to forced labour to see how they behave. In addition, it must be explicitly stipulated that in cases where it is marginal whether to make an arrest, under no circumstances should there be an arrest and that to act otherwise would be a mistake, and that in cases where it is marginal whether to execute, under no circumstances should there be an execution and that to act otherwise would be a mistake.

3. To prevent "Left" deviations in the heat of the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries, it has been decided that as of June 1, in all localities across the country, including those places where very few executions have so far been carried out, the power to sanction arrests shall without exception revert to the prefectural authorities and the power to sanction executions shall without exception revert to the provincial authorities, who shall send representatives to deal with such cases in places remote from the provincial capital. No locality is to ask for modification of this decision.

4. As of now it is necessary to start a planned screening of counter-revolutionaries hidden in the "middle layer" and the "inner layer". In accordance with the directive of the Central Committee it has been decided that a preliminary screening in the form of rectification will be conducted this summer and autumn among all the personnel who have been retained since liberation and among the intellectuals recently drawn into our work. The aim is to size up the situation and deal with a number of conspicuous cases. The procedure to follow is to study documents on the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, call on those among the above-mentioned personnel and intellectuals (not all of them) whose records are questionable to adopt a sincere and honest

attitude, give a clear account of their history and make a clean breast of what they have hitherto kept to themselves. This campaign to "clear oneself" must be put in charge of the leading member of the organization concerned; the voluntary principle must be applied and coercion must not be used. For each organization the duration should be short, not drawn out. The tactics to adopt are to win over the many and isolate the few, in preparation for a further screening in the winter. This screening must first be conducted in the leading organs, the public security organs and other sensitive departments, and then the experience gained should be popularized. During such screening in government departments, schools and factories, it is necessary to have non-Party people sit on the committees in charge of this work so as to avoid having Party members act in isolation.

5. In the current great struggle to suppress counter-revolutionaries public security committees must be organized among the masses everywhere. Such committees should be elected by the people in every township in the countryside and in every department and organization, school, factory and neighbourhood in the cities. The number of committee members may be as small as three and as large as eleven and must include reliable non-Party patriots so as to make the committee a united front type of organization for safeguarding public security. Under the leadership of the government and public security organs at the basic level, such committees have the responsibility of assisting the people's government in eliminating counter-revolutionaries, guarding against traitors and spies and safeguarding our national and public security. Their establishment must proceed in a well-guided way in those rural areas where the agrarian reform has been completed or in cities where the work of suppressing counter-revolutionaries is well under way, so as to prevent bad elements from seizing the opportunity to worm their way in.

STRIKE SURELY, ACCURATELY AND RELENTLESSLY IN SUPPRESSING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES

December 1950 — September 1951

1

Please make certain that you strike surely, accurately and relentlessly in suppressing the counter-revolutionaries.

(December 19, 1950)

2

One batch of bandit chieftains, local tyrants and secret agents has been executed in twenty-one counties in western Hunan, and another batch is to be executed by local authorities this year. I think measures of this kind are absolutely necessary. For only thus can we deflate the enemy's arrogance and raise the people's morale. If we are weak and irresolute, if we are tolerant and indulgent, it will bring harm to the people and alienate us from the masses.

To strike surely means to pay attention to tactics. To strike accurately means to avoid wrong executions. To strike relentlessly means resolutely to kill all such reactionary elements as deserve the death penalty (of course, those who don't will not be executed). So long as we avoid wrong executions, we don't have to worry even if the bourgeoisie raises an outcry.

(January 17, 1951)

Important directives concerning the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

3

In Shantung there is lethargy in some places and rashness in others. Generally speaking, both these deviations are to be found in all the provinces and cities in the country and attention should be paid to setting them right. In particular, rashness presents the major danger. For by education and persuasion those who are lethargic can eventually become active, and it doesn't make much difference if a counter-revolutionary is put to death a few days sooner or a few days later. But being rash and making wrong arrests and executions will produce very bad effects. Please exercise strict control over the work of suppressing counter-revolutionaries, and be sure to proceed with caution and correct any deviation of rashness in handling the job. We must suppress all counter-revolutionaries, but on no account should we make wrong arrests or executions.

(March 30, 1951)

4

In regard to the counter-revolutionaries ferreted out in the Communist Party, People's Liberation Army and organs of the People's Government and in educational, industrial and commercial and religious circles, democratic parties and people's organizations, the Central Committee has decided as follows. Whereas those whose crimes do not deserve the death penalty shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or various prison terms or put under public supervision and surveillance, with respect to all counter-revolutionaries deserving capital punishment execution shall be confined to those who owe blood debts, or who have committed other major crimes which evoke public indignation, such as frequent rape or the plundering of large amounts of property, or who have done extremely serious harm to the national interest, while the policy towards the rest shall be one of passing the death sentence, granting a two-year reprieve and subjecting them to forced labour during this period to see how they behave. This is a prudent policy, a policy that can avoid mistakes. It can win a favourable response from people in all walks of life. It can disintegrate the counter-revolutionary forces and contribute towards the thorough elimination of counter-revolution. Moreover, it can save a large pool of labour-power, which will be conducive to our national construction. Therefore it is a correct policy. Of all the counter-revolutionaries deserving death who are ferreted out in the above-mentioned Party, government, military, educational, industrial and commercial and people's organizations, it is estimated that those who owe blood debts, those who have committed other crimes which evoke public indignation and those who have done extremely serious harm to the national interest make up only a small number, roughly 10 to 20 per cent, while those to be sentenced to death but to be granted a reprieve probably account for 80 to 90 per cent, that is to say, 80 to 90 per cent may be saved. These counter-revolutionaries differ from the bandit chieftains, hardened brigands and local tyrants in the rural areas, from the local tyrants, bandit chieftains, hardened brigands, leaders of criminal gangs and heads of reactionary secret societies in the cities, and also from certain secret agents who have done extremely serious harm to the national interest in that they have contracted no blood debts or committed no other major crimes that incur the deep hatred of the masses. The harm they did to the national interest, while serious enough, had not yet reached an extreme. They have committed capital offences, but the masses were not the direct victims. If we have such people executed, it will not be easily understood by the masses, nor will the response from public figures be so favourable; at the same time it will deprive us of a large pool of labour-power and will not serve to split the enemy ranks; besides, we may make mistakes on this question. Therefore, towards such persons the Central Committee has decided on a policy of passing the death sentence with a reprieve and subjecting them to forced labour to see how they behave. If some are beyond reform and continue their wrongdoing, they can be executed later on, as the initiative is in our hands. All the local authorities are asked to adhere to the foregoing principle in dealing with the counter-revolutionaries uncovered in the Party, government, military, educational, industrial and commercial and people's organizations. As a precaution, the very small number of executions to be carried out (amounting to roughly 10 to 20 per cent of all those sentenced to death) must without exception be reported to the greater administrative areas or the greater military areas for approval. As for prominent figures whose execution might affect our united front work, approval must be obtained from the central authorities. In the case of counter-revolutionaries in the rural areas, we shall likewise put to death only those whose execution is necessary to assuage the people's anger, and none shall be executed unless the people so demand. To some we should similarly apply the policy of passing the death sentence with a reprieve. But persons whose death is demanded by the people must be executed so as to assuage their anger and help production.

(May 8, 1951)

5

In no circumstances should the policy of "granting a two-year reprieve" be taken to mean not executing those criminals who owe blood debts or are guilty of other major crimes when their execution is demanded by the people. This would be wrong. We must make it clear to the district and village cadres and the masses that persons who have incurred the bitter hatred of one and all for their heinous crimes and have to be executed to assuage the people's anger must be put to death for this purpose. It is only on those counter-revolutionaries who are guilty of capital offences but have not incurred deep popular hatred and whose execution is not demanded by the people that we shall pass the death sentence with a two-year reprieve and impose forced labour to see how they behave.

(June 15, 1951)

6

The work of suppressing counter-revolutionaries must be placed entirely under the unified leadership of the Party committees at all levels, and the responsible comrades of all public security and other organs associated with this work must, as always, unreservedly accept this leadership.

(September 10, 1951)

PAY SERIOUS ATTENTION TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE FILM *THE LIFE OF WU HSUN*

May 20, 1951

The question raised by *The Life of Wu Hsun* is fundamental in nature. A fellow like Wu Hsun,[1] living as he did towards the end of the Ching Dynasty in an era of great struggle by the Chinese people against foreign aggressors and domestic reactionary feudal rulers, did not lift a finger against the feudal economic base or its superstructure; on the contrary, he strove fanatically to spread feudal culture and, in order to gain a position for this purpose previously beyond his reach, he fawned in every way on the reactionary feudal rulers — ought we to praise such disgusting behaviour? How can we tolerate praising it to the masses, especially when such praise flaunts the revolutionary banner of "serving the people" and when the failure of revolutionary peasant struggles is used as a foil to accentuate the praise? To approve or tolerate such praise is to approve or tolerate abuse of the revolutionary struggles of the peasants, abuse of Chinese history, abuse of the Chinese nation, and to regard such reactionary propaganda as justified.

The appearance of the film *The Life of Wu Hsun*, and particularly the spate of praise lavished on Wu Hsun and the film, show how ideologically confused our country's cultural circles have become!

In the view of many writers, history proceeds not by the new superseding the old, but by preserving the old from extinction through all kinds of exertion, not by waging class struggle to overthrow the reactionary feudal rulers who ought to be overthrown, but by negating the class struggle of the oppressed and submitting to these rulers in the manner of Wu Hsun. Our writers do not bother to study history

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Abridged text of an editorial written for the *People's Daily*.

and learn who were the enemies oppressing the Chinese people and whether there was anything commendable about those who submitted to these enemies and worked for them. Nor do they bother to find out what new economic formations of society, new class forces, new personalities and ideas have emerged in China during the century and more since the Opium War of 1840 in the struggle against the old economic formations and their superstructures (politics, culture, etc.) before they decide what to commend and praise, what not to, and what to oppose.

Certain Communists who have allegedly grasped Marxism merit special attention. They have studied the history of social development — historical materialism — but when it comes to specific historical events, specific historical figures (like Wu Hsun) and specific ideas which run counter to the trend of history (as in the film *The Life of Wu Hsun* and the writings about Wu Hsun), they lose their critical faculties, and some have even capitulated to these reactionary ideas. Isn't it a fact that reactionary bourgeois ideas have found their way into the militant Communist Party? Where on earth is the Marxism which certain Communists claim to have grasped?

For the above reasons, it is imperative to unfold discussion on the film *The Life of Wu Hsun* and on the essays and other writings about Wu Hsun and thereby thoroughly clarify the confused thinking on this question.

NOTES

[1] Wu Hsun (1838-96), born in Tangyi, Shantung Province, was originally a vagrant. Using the slogan of "schools through alms", he went about cheating people out of their money, bought land and lent money and eventually became a big landlord and usurer. He ganged up with despotic landlords to set up a few so-called "tuition-free schools" in which he fanatically spread feudal culture and trained lackeys for the exploiting class, thus winning praise from reactionary rulers of successive regimes.

GREAT VICTORIES IN THREE MASS MOVEMENTS

October 23, 1951

Fellow Committee Members and Comrades,

The Third Session of the First National Committee of our People's Political Consultative Conference is now open. Besides members of the National Committee, there are present at this session specially invited representatives of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the People's Liberation Army, model workers in industry and agriculture, delegates from the old base areas, workers in education, literature and art, industrialists and businessmen, experts in various fields, representatives of religious circles, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese, women and youth, representatives from provincial and municipal consultative committees, etc., as well as many government personnel. The members attending this session and those invited to sit in include many publicly acclaimed combat heroes and model workers in industry, agriculture and other fields. The size and scope of this session amply indicate that the People's Republic of China has registered tremendous achievements and progress on every front.

Since last year we have unfolded three large-scale movements in the country, the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, the agrarian reform movement and the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries, and we have won great victories. By and large, the remnant counter-revolutionaries on the mainland will soon be eliminated. Agrarian reform will be completed in 1952, except in some areas inhabited by minority nationalities. In the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, the Chinese people are more broadly united than ever before and are waging a determined struggle against

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Opening address at the Third Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

the U.S. imperialist forces of aggression. Embodying the mighty will of the Chinese people, the Chinese People's Volunteers have joined forces with the Korean People's Army in smashing U.S. imperialism's mad scheme to overrun and occupy the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and then to invade China's mainland; thus the peace-loving people of Korea, China, Asia and the world have been inspired and made more confident in their defence of peace and resistance to aggression. We should extend our congratulations and pay tribute to the heroic Chinese People's Volunteers and Korean People's Army!

Thanks to victories in these three mass movements and to the joint efforts of the people's governments at all levels and of every section of the population, our country has achieved unprecedented unity. The question of Tibet has been solved by peaceful means. Our national defence has been strengthened. The people's democratic dictatorship has been consolidated. Our currency and commodity prices have remained stable, and our work of rehabilitation and development in the spheres of economic construction, culture and education has also taken a big stride forward.

On the industrial and agricultural fronts the growing patriotic movement to increase production is a new phenomenon in our country which calls for rejoicing. The agrarian reform in the countryside and the democratic reform in factories and other enterprises enable our workers and peasants both to display tremendous enthusiasm in their patriotic efforts to increase production and to improve their material and cultural life. If we are good at uniting with the workers and peasants, educating and relying on them, there is bound to be a nation-wide upsurge in the patriotic movement to increase production.

On our cultural and educational front and among all types of intellectuals, a movement for self-education and self-remoulding is unfolding on a broad scale in accordance with the principles laid down by the Central People's Government, and this too is a new phenomenon in our country which calls for rejoicing. At the close of the Second Session of the National Committee I suggested the use of criticism and self-criticism in self-education and self-remoulding. This suggestion is being steadily translated into action. Ideological remoulding, primarily that of all types of intellectuals, is an important condition for the completion of democratic reforms in all fields and the gradual industrialization of our country. We therefore wish still greater successes to the movement for self-education and self-remoulding as it goes steadily forward.

All facts prove that this system of ours, the people's democratic dictatorship, is vastly superior to the political systems of the capitalist countries. Under this system, the people of our country are able to tap their inexhaustible strength. And such strength is invincible before any enemy.

The great struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea is going on and must go on until the U.S. government is willing to come to a peaceful settlement. We have no intention of encroaching on any country; it is aggression against our country by the imperialists that we oppose. As everyone knows, the Chinese people would not be fighting the U.S. forces if they had not occupied our Taiwan, invaded the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and pushed on to our northeastern borders. But since the U.S. aggressors have launched their attack against us, we cannot but raise the banner of resistance to aggression. This is absolutely necessary and perfectly just, and the whole nation understands that it is so. To press on with this struggle, which is as necessary as it is just, we must continue to stiffen our efforts in resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea and must increase production and practise economy to support the Chinese People's Volunteers. This is the central task of the Chinese people today and accordingly the central task of our present session.

We have long been on record as maintaining that the Korean question should be settled by peaceful means, and this is still our position. If the U.S. government is willing to settle the question on a fair and reasonable basis instead of undermining and obstructing the progress of the negotiations in various underhand ways as it has done in the past, it will be possible for the Korean armistice negotiations to be concluded successfully; otherwise it will be impossible.

In the two years since the founding of the People's Republic of China, we have won great victories in all fields of work. We have won these victories by relying on all the forces that can be united. Within the country, we have relied on the firm unity of all the nationalities, democratic classes, democratic parties, people's organizations and patriotic democrats under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party. Internationally, we have relied on the firm unity of the camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union and on the profound sympathy of the peace-loving people throughout the world. Hence our great victories in all spheres of work, which was not what our enemies had expected. Our enemies thought that since the new-born People's Republic of China was faced with a lot of difficulties and since on top of that they were launching a war of aggression against us, we would not be able to overcome our difficulties or deal counter-blows to the aggressors. Contrary to their expectation, we have proved able to overcome our difficulties, deal counter-blows to the aggressors and win great victories. Our enemies are short-sighted, they fail to realize that our great domestic and international unity is strong and that the founding of the People's Republic of China has once and for all put an end to the days when the Chinese people could be bullied by foreign imperialists. Nor do they realize that the birth of the socialist Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the People's Democracies, the firm unity between the two great countries of China and the Soviet Union anchored in the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the firm unity of the entire camp of peace and democracy and the profound sympathy of the peace-loving people of the world for this great camp have ended for good the era in which imperialism could dominate the world. Our enemies fail to see all this and still want to bully the People's Republic of China and dominate the world. But, comrades, I can say with confidence that their design is futile, crazy, impossible of achievement. Contrary to their thinking, the People's Republic of China will brook no bullying, the great peace camp headed by the Soviet Union will brook no encroachment, and the peace-loving people of the world will not be deceived. Comrades, the victory of the great October Socialist Revolution has made it certain that the people of the world will win victory, and today this prospect becomes nearer and more certain with the birth of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democracies. It is true that, in the historical period following World War I and the October Revolution in Russia, three imperialist states — Germany, Italy and Japan — made attempts to dominate the world; this happened before the founding of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democracies. But what came of it? Didn't the attempts of the three imperialist states prove to be futile and crazy? Didn't the results turn out to be just the opposite of what they wanted? Didn't the imperialists who aimed at domination get struck down themselves? Today things are entirely different; the great People's Republic of China has been founded, the People's Democracies have been established, the level of political consciousness of the people of the world has been raised, the struggle for national liberation has been surging ahead all over Asia and in North Africa, the strength of the imperialist bloc as a whole has been profoundly weakened and, what is of vital importance, the strength of the Soviet Union, our closest ally, has been greatly enhanced. In these circumstances, isn't the outcome quite predictable if any imperialist country tries to follow in the footsteps of the three aggressors, Germany, Italy and Japan? In a word, the world from now on must be a world that belongs to the people, with the people of each country governing themselves, and definitely not a world where imperialism and its lackeys can continue to ride roughshod. I hope that the people of our country will closely unite, that they will closely unite with our ally the Soviet Union, with all the People's Democracies and with all nations and peoples of the world that sympathize with us, and march forward to victory in the struggle against aggression, to victory in building our great country, to victory in the defence of a lasting world peace. Comrades, I am confident that, so long as we do all this, victory will decidedly be ours.

ON THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE "THREE EVILS" AND THE "FIVE EVILS"[1]

November 1951 — March *1952*

1

The struggle against corruption and waste is a major issue which concerns the whole Party, and we have told you to give it your serious attention. We need to have a good clean-up in the whole Party, which will thoroughly uncover all cases of corruption, whether major, medium or minor, and aim the main blows at the most corrupt, while following the policy of educating and remoulding the medium and minor embezzlers so that they will not relapse. Only thus can we check the grave danger of many Party members being corroded by the bourgeoisie, put an end to a situation already foreseen at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee and carry out the principle of combating corrosion then laid down. Be sure to give all this your attention.

(November 30, 1951)

2

Particular attention must be paid to the fact that the corrosion of cadres by the bourgeoisie results in serious cases of corruption. Be sure to detect, expose and punish those involved and to take this as a major struggle.

(November 30, 1951)

Important directives drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

3

The struggle against corruption, waste and bureaucracy should be stressed as much as the struggle to suppress counter-revolutionaries. As in the latter, the broad masses, including the democratic parties and also people in all walks of life, should be mobilized, the present struggle should be given wide publicity, the leading cadres should take personal charge and pitch in, and people should be called on to make a clean breast of their own wrongdoing and to report on the guilt of others. In minor cases the guilty should be criticized and educated; in major ones the guilty should be dismissed from office, punished, or sentenced to prison terms (to be reformed through labour), and the worst among them should be shot. The problem can only be solved in these ways.

(December 8, 1951)

4

In all cities, and first of all in the big and medium-sized cities, we should rely on the working class and unite with the law-abiding capitalists and other sections of the urban population to wage a large-scale, resolute and thoroughgoing struggle against those capitalists who are violating the law by bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing economic information; we should co-ordinate this struggle with that against corruption, waste and bureaucracy, which is being waged inside the Party, government, army and mass organizations. This is both imperative and very timely. In the struggle, Party organizations in all cities must carefully dispose the forces of the classes and masses and adopt the tactics of utilizing contradictions, effecting splits, uniting with the many and isolating the few so that in the process a united front against the “five evils” will speedily take shape. In a big city, as the struggle against the “five evils” gets into full swing, such a united front may well come into being within about three weeks. Once this united front is formed, those reactionary capitalists guilty of the worst crimes will be isolated, and the state will be in a strong position to mete out due punishment, such as fines, confiscation, arrest, imprisonment or execution, without much opposition. All our big cities (including provincial capitals) should start the struggle against the "five evils" in the first ten days of February. Please make prompt arrangements.

(January 26, 1952)

5

(1) In the movement against the "five evils" the basic principles in dealing with industrial and commercial units are: leniency for past offences and severity for new ones (for instance, payment of taxes that have been evaded is generally retroactive only to 1951); leniency towards the many and severity towards the few; leniency towards those owning up to their crimes and severity towards those refusing to do so; leniency for industry and severity for commerce; and leniency for commerce in general and severity for commercial speculation. The Party committees at all levels are asked to adhere to these principles in the movement against the "five evils".

(2) For the purpose of the movement against the "five evils" private industrial and commercial units should be classified into five categories: the law-abiding, the basically law-abiding, those that partly abide by the law and partly break it, those that break the law on a serious scale, and those that completely violate the law. As far as the big cities are concerned, the first three categories make up about 95 per cent and the last two about 5 per cent. The percentages for different big cities are roughly the same, with only small variations. As for medium-sized cities, the percentages differ considerably from these figures.

(3) These five categories apply to the capitalists and the non-capitalist independent handicraftsmen and family traders, but not to the street vendors. In big cities the street vendors may be left alone for the time being, but the independent handicraftsmen and family traders had better be dealt with. In medium-sized cities it would be better to deal with both the independent handicraftsmen and traders and the street vendors in this movement. In our big and medium-sized cities there are large numbers of independent handicraftsmen and traders who do not employ workers or shop assistants (though some have apprentices). Many of them are law-abiding, many others basically abide by the law but partly break it (*i.e.*, they have minor offences

to account for, such as small-scale evasion of taxes), and a small number partly abide by the law and partly break it and have evaded taxes on a larger scale. In the current movement against the "five evils" we must deal with a considerable number of small capitalists and pass judgment on them, and as far as possible do likewise with the independent handicraftsmen and traders, who roughly equal the small capitalists in number. This will be to the advantage of the current movement and to economic construction in the days ahead. The small capitalists as well as the independent handicraftsmen and traders are generally innocent of serious offences, and it is not difficult to pass judgment on them. In so acting, we shall win support from the masses. However, if a few cities think it convenient to pass judgment first on industrial and commercial units other than the independent handicraftsmen and traders and defer judgment on the latter, that is in order, too.

(4) In view of the actual situation in the cities we have decided to reclassify industrial and commercial units into five categories instead of four as in the past, *i.e.*, those in the law-abiding category are to be reclassified into law-abiding and basically law-abiding, while the other three categories remain unchanged. Out of the fifty thousand industrial and commercial units in Peking (including the independent handicraftsmen and traders, but not the street vendors), the law-abiding ones make up about 10 per cent, the basically law-abiding ones about 60 per cent, those that partly abide by the law and partly break it about 25 per cent, those that break the law on a serious scale about 4 per cent and those that completely violate the law about 1 per cent. To distinguish between the strictly law-abiding ones and the basically law-abiding ones with minor offences and, furthermore, to treat the basically law-abiding units guilty of small-scale tax evasion differently from those guilty on a larger scale may prove to have important educational value.

(5) In some big and medium-sized cities, the city Party committees launched the movement against the "five evils" in a hurry, when they were not at all acquainted with the situation with respect to the different categories of industrial and commercial units and were not clear about the tactics of differential treatment, and when the work teams (or investigation groups) sent by the trade unions and the government had been organized and trained in a very slipshod way. As a result some confusion has arisen. It is hoped that the city Party committees concerned will pay attention to this situation and see to its correction without delay.

Moreover, the investigation of industrial and commercial units which break the law must be made under the strict control of the city Party committee and the city government. No other organization is allowed to send out people to investigate on its own, much less to haul capitalists into its office for interrogation. Whether in the movement against the "three evils" or in that against the "five evils", the use of torture to extort confessions is forbidden and strict precautions must be taken to prevent suicides. Where suicides have occurred, measures for preventing their further occurrence should be worked out immediately to ensure that both movements will develop soundly and on the right track and that complete victory will be won.

(6) The movements against the "three evils" and against the "five evils" are not to be launched at present in counties, districts and townships. Further notice will be given by the Central Committee as to when and how to carry them out. In the few instances where the movement against the "five evils" has been launched at county seats and that against the "three evils" in districts, in both cases experimentally, strict control must be exercised and spring farming and other economic activities must not be hampered. The movement against the "five evils" should not begin in all the medium-sized cities at the same time but should be staggered and strictly controlled.

(March 5, 1952)

6

During and also after the struggle against the "five evils", we must achieve the following aims:

(1) Get thoroughly clear about the situation in private industry and commerce so as the better to unite with and control the bourgeoisie and develop the country's planned economy. Planned economy is impossible unless we are clear about the situation.

(2) Draw a clear line of distinction between the working class and the bourgeoisie, and in trade unions eliminate corruption and bureaucracy which alienates the masses and weed out the capitalists' hirelings. Such hirelings and the middle elements vacillating between labour and capital are to be found in trade unions everywhere, and in the struggle we must educate and win over the middle elements, whereas those hirelings guilty of serious crimes should be expelled.

(3) Reorganize the trade councils and associations of industry and commerce, remove from their leading bodies persons guilty of all the "five evils" and those who have been totally discredited, and in their stead draw in those who have acquitted themselves fairly well in the struggle against these evils. With the exception of those who have completely violated the law, there should be representation of all categories of industrialists and traders.

(4) Help leaders of the China Democratic National Construction Association to conduct a shake-up, to expel those guilty of all the "five evils" and those who have disgraced themselves in the public eye and to recruit a number of better individuals, so that it can become a political organization capable of representing the legitimate interests of the bourgeoisie, mainly the industrial bourgeoisie, and of educating them in the spirit of the Common Programme and in the principles governing the struggle against the "five evils". Take measures to disband the secret organizations of different groups of capitalists, such as the "Thursday Dinner Club".[2]

(5) Eradicate the "five evils" and eliminate commercial speculation so that the entire bourgeoisie will obey the laws and decrees of the state and engage in industrial and commercial activities beneficial to the nation's economy and the people's livelihood. Develop private industry within the limits set by the state (provided the capitalists so wish and its operations conform with the Common Programme), and reduce private commerce step by step. Expand the state's plan to monopolize the sales and contracts of private industry year by year and at the same time extend the coverage of our plan over private industry and commerce. Set new percentages of profit for private capital so that it will be able to make some profits but not exorbitant ones.

(6) Do away with hidden accounts, make the accounts public and gradually establish a system under which the workers and shop assistants supervise production and management.

(7) Recover the greater part of the economic losses to the state and the people through the payment of evaded taxes, restitution, fines and confiscation.

(8) Set up Party branches among workers and shop assistants in all large and medium-sized private enterprises and strengthen Party work.

(March 5, 1952)

NOTES

[1] The movement against the "three evils" was the struggle against corruption, waste and bureaucracy launched at the end of 1951 among the personnel of government departments and state enterprises. The movement against the "five evils" was the struggle against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing of economic information started at the beginning of 1952 among owners of private industrial and commercial enterprises.

[2] The "Thursday Dinner Club" was a secret organization of some capitalists in Chungking, which engaged in surreptitious activities in grave violation of the law. It was exposed and banned in the movement against the "five evils".

TAKE MUTUAL AID AND CO-OPERATION IN AGRICULTURE AS A MAJOR TASK

December 15, 1951

Herewith is the Draft Resolution on Mutual Aid and Co-operation in Agricultural Production which you are requested to print for distribution right down to the county and district Party committees. Please give prompt explanations inside and outside the Party in the spirit of this draft and arrange for its implementation. This is to be done in all areas where the agrarian reform has been completed, and please take it as a major task. This draft resolution may appear in inner-Party publications but not in newspapers and periodicals for general circulation, as it is still a draft.

Inner-Party circular of historic significance to rebuff Liu Shao-chi's opposition to the co-operative transformation of agriculture. In July 1951, behind the backs of Comrade Mao Tsetung and the Party Central Committee, Liu Shao-chi wrote and distributed a comment in his own name, wantonly attacking a report submitted by the Shansi Provincial Party Committee on promoting mutual aid and co-operation in agricultural production. In this comment, he opposed Comrade Mao Tsetung's line on the socialist transformation of agriculture, maligning it as an "erroneous, dangerous and utopian notion of agrarian socialism". In September of the same year, Comrade Mao Tsetung personally took charge of drafting the "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Mutual Aid and Co-operation in Agricultural Production (Draft)", and on December 15 when the draft resolution was to be distributed he wrote this circular and instructed the whole Party to take mutual aid and co-operation in agriculture as a major task.

NEW YEAR'S DAY MESSAGE

January 1, 1952

May all of us — the cadres of the People's Government, the commanders and fighters of the People's Volunteers and the People's Liberation Army, the democratic parties, the people's organizations, the minority nationalities and the people of the entire country — win victory on every front of our work!

May we win victory on the front of our movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea!

Victory on the national defence front!

Victory on the agrarian reform front!

Victory on the front of our movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries!

Victory on the economic and financial front!

Victory on the cultural and educational front!

Victory on the front of the ideological remoulding of people in all walks of life, and primarily of the intellectuals!

I would also like to wish victory to a new front, that is, to the large-scale struggle in which all the people and cadres of the country are called upon to fight vigorously and resolutely against corruption, waste and bureaucracy, so as to cleanse our society of all the filth and poison left over from the old!

Comrades, in 1951 we scored victories, many of them very great ones, on all these fronts. We hope that by our common efforts we shall win still greater victories in all these tasks in 1952.

Long live the People's Republic of China!

ON THE POLICIES FOR OUR WORK IN TIBET — DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

April 6, 1952

The Central Committee essentially approves the instructions which the Southwest Bureau and the Southwest Military Area cabled on April 2 to the Working Committee and Military Area in Tibet. It holds that the basic policies (except the point about reorganizing the Tibetan troops) and the various specific steps set forth in the telegram are correct. Only by following them can our army establish itself in an invulnerable position in Tibet.

Conditions in Tibet are different from those in Sinkiang. Tibet compares poorly with Sinkiang, whether politically or economically. But even in Sinkiang, the first thing the army units under Wang Chen did when they got there was to pay the utmost attention to strict budgeting, self-reliance and production for their own needs. They have now gained a firm foothold and won the warm support of the minority nationalities. They are carrying out the reduction of rent and interest and will proceed to agrarian reform this winter, and by then we can be sure of even greater support from the masses. Sinkiang is well connected with the heartland of the country by motor roads, and this is of great help in improving the material welfare of the minority nationalities. As for Tibet, neither rent reduction nor agrarian reform can start for at least two or three years. While several hundred thousand Han people live in Sinkiang, there are hardly any in Tibet, where our army finds itself in a totally different minority nationality

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Inner-Party directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was sent to the Southwest Bureau and the Working Committee in Tibet and communicated to the Northwest Bureau and the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau.

area. We depend solely on two basic policies to win over the masses and put ourselves in an invulnerable position. The first is strict budgeting coupled with production for the army's own needs, and thus the exertion of influence on the masses; this is the key link. Even when highways are built, we cannot count on moving large quantities of grain over them. India will probably agree to send grain and other goods to Tibet on the basis of exchange, but the stand we must take is that our army should be able to carry on even if India stops sending them some day. We must do our best and take proper steps to win over the Dalai and the majority of his top echelon and to isolate the handful of bad elements in order to achieve a gradual, bloodless transformation of the Tibetan economic and political system over a number of years; on the other hand, we must be prepared for the eventuality of the bad elements leading the Tibetan troops in rebellion and attacking us, so that in this contingency our army could still carry on and hold out in Tibet. It all depends on strict budgeting and production for the army's own needs. Only with this fundamental policy as the cornerstone of our work can we achieve our aim. The second policy, which can and must be put into effect, is to establish trade relations with India and with the heartland of our country and to attain a general balance in supplies to and from Tibet so that the standard of living of the Tibetan people will in no way fall because of our army's presence but will improve through our efforts. If we cannot solve the two problems of production and trade, we shall lose the material base for our presence, the bad elements will cash in and will not let a single day pass without inciting the backward elements among the people and the Tibetan troops to oppose us, and our policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few will become ineffectual and fail.

Of all the views set forth in the Southwest Bureau's telegram of April 2 there is only one that calls for further consideration; what I refer to is the feasibility and advisability of reorganizing the Tibetan troops and setting up a military and administrative commission fairly soon. It is our opinion that the Tibetan troops should not be reorganized at present, nor should formal military sub-areas or a military and administrative commission be established. For the time being, leave everything as it is, let this situation drag on, and do not take up these questions until our army is able to meet its own needs through production and wins the support of the masses a year or two from now. In the meantime there are two possibilities. One is that our united front policy towards the upper stratum, a policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few, will take effect and that the Tibetan people will gradually draw closer to us, so the bad elements and the Tibetan troops will not dare to rebel. The other possibility is that the bad elements, thinking we are weak and can be bullied, may lead the Tibetan troops in rebellion and that our army will counter-attack in self-defence and deal them telling blows. Either will be favourable for us. As the top echelon in Tibet sees it, there is no sufficient reason now for implementing the Agreement[1] in its entirety or for reorganizing the Tibetan troops. But things will be different in a few years. By then they will probably and that they have no choice but to carry out the Agreement to the full and to reorganize the Tibetan troops. If the Tibetan troops start one or even several rebellions and are repulsed by our army each time, we will be all the more justified in reorganizing them. Apparently not only the two Silons[2] but also the Dalai and most of his clique were reluctant to accept the Agreement and are unwilling to carry it out. As yet we don't have a material base for fully implementing the Agreement, nor do we have a base for this purpose in terms of support among the masses or in the upper stratum. To force its implementation will do more harm than good. Since they are unwilling to put the Agreement into effect, well then, we can leave it for the time being and wait. The longer the delay, the stronger will be our position and the weaker theirs. Delay will not do us much harm; on the contrary, it may be to our advantage. Let them go on with their insensate atrocities against the people, while we on our part concentrate on good deeds — production, trade, road-building, medical services and united front work (unity with the majority and patient education) so as to win over the masses and bide our time before taking up the question of the full implementation of the Agreement. If they are not in favour of the setting up of primary schools, that can stop too.

The recent demonstration in Lhasa should be viewed not merely as the work of the two Silons and other bad elements but as a signal to us from the majority of the Dalai clique. Their petition is very tactful because it indicates not a wish for a break with us but only a wish for concessions from us. One of the terms gives the hint that the practice of the Ching Dynasty should be restored, in other words, that no Liberation Army units should be stationed in Tibet, but this is not what they are really after. They know full well that this is impossible; their attempt is to trade this term for other terms. The Fourteenth Dalai is criticized in the petition so as to absolve him from any political responsibility for the demonstration. They pose as protectors of the interests of the Tibetan nationality, being aware that while they are inferior to us in military strength, they have an advantage over us in social influence. We should accept this petition in substance (not in form) and put off the full implementation of the Agreement. The timing of the demonstration to take place before the Panchen's arrival in Lhasa was deliberate. After his arrival they will probably go all out to work on him to join their clique. If on our part we do our work well and the Panchen does not fall into their trap but reaches Shigatse safe and sound, the situation will then become more favourable to us. Nevertheless, since neither our lack of a material base nor their advantage over us in social influence will change for the time being, neither will the unwillingness of the Dalai clique to carry out the Agreement fully. At present, in appearance we should take the offensive and should censure the demonstration and the petition for being unjustifiable (for undermining the Agreement), but in reality we should be prepared to make concessions and to go over to the offensive in the future (*i.e.*, put the Agreement into force) when conditions are ripe.

What are your views? Please consider and wire your reply.

NOTES

[1] This refers to the Agreement Between the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, May 23, 1951.

[2] The "Silons" were the highest ranking administrative officials under the Dalai. The two Silons referred to here were the reactionary serf-owners Lukhangwa and Lozang Tashi.

THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE WORKING CLASS AND THE BOURGEOISIE IS THE PRINCIPAL CONTRADICTION IN CHINA

June 6, 1952

With the overthrow of the landlord class and the bureaucrat-capitalist class, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie has become the principal contradiction in China; therefore the national bourgeoisie should no longer be defined as an intermediate class.

Written comment on a document drafted by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Comrade Mao Tsetung criticized the head of this department for his error in regarding the national bourgeoisie as an intermediate class.

LET US UNITE AND CLEARLY DISTINGUISH BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE ENEMY

August 4, 1952

We have been simultaneously waging war, holding negotiations and working towards stability for a whole year.

The war situation in Korea became stable after July last year, but at the time we were not sure whether the financial and economic situation at home could be stabilized. We had said, "Prices are basically stable and revenues and expenditures are almost balanced," meaning that prices could not yet be stabilized and that revenues and expenditures were not yet balanced. Expenditures were in excess of revenues, and that was a problem. That is why the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened a meeting last September and called for increased production and strict economy. In October, I repeated this call at the Third Session of the First National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference. The subsequent campaign to increase production and practise economy brought to light rather serious cases of corruption, waste and bureaucracy. In December the movement against the "three evils" was launched, and this was followed by the movement against the "five evils". Both these movements have come to a successful conclusion, the situation is now perfectly clear and general stability has been achieved.

Last year, what we spent on the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea more or less equalled our expenditures for national construction; it was fifty-fifty. This year it will be different. It is estimated that the outlays for war will come to only half last year's figure. Our troops are fewer in number but they are better equipped.

Salient points of a speech delivered at the thirty-eighth meeting of the Standing Committee of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

For more than two decades we fought without an air force and we were always on the receiving end of enemy bombing. Now we have an air force of our own, and anti-aircraft guns, artillery and tanks too. The war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea is a big school for large-scale military exercises, and such exercises are better than a military academy. If the fighting continues through next year, all our land forces will have had their spell of military training in Korea.

In this war we were confronted with three problems at the start: first, our ability to fight, second, our ability to hold out and, third, our ability to feed ourselves.

The problem of our ability to fight was solved within the first two or three months. The enemy had more artillery, but their morale was low; they were rich in metal but poor in morale.

The problem of our ability to hold out was also solved last year. Our answer was to dig tunnels. We constructed two tiers of defence works. When the enemy attacked, we got into the tunnels. Sometimes the enemy occupied the positions overhead, but what lay below remained in our hands. When they were in our positions, we counter-attacked, inflicting heavy casualties on them. We used this homespun method to collect foreign guns. The enemy was entirely at a loss as to how to cope with us.

It was quite some time before the problem of food supplies, that is, the problem of ensuring provisions, was solved. At first we did not know that tunnels could be dug to store grain in. Now we know. Each division has grain reserves for three months, its own storage area and a meeting hall to boot, and our men are making a go of life in the tunnels.

Today, our policy is clear and definite, our positions are secure, our provisions ensured, and every soldier knows that he must fight to the end.

Just how long will the fighting go on, and just when will the negotiations draw to a close? I say negotiations will continue, fighting will go on but there will be a truce.

Why is it that there will be a truce? A thirty years' war or a hundred years' war is highly improbable, because a long war is very much against the interests of the United States.

First, the war costs lives. They fought on to hold some ten thousand prisoners of war, only to lose over thirty thousand more lives. After all, they have far fewer men than we.

Second, the war costs money. They are spending far more than ten billion U.S. dollars a year. We spend very much less, and this year we are going to cut our expenditures to half last year's. The money that came from the settling of accounts in the movements against the "three evils" and the "five evils" can see us through another eighteen months of war. And all the money that comes from increased production and the practice of economy can be used for national construction.

Third, they are confronted with insuperable contradictions at home and abroad.

Fourth, there is the strategic problem too. The focus of U.S. strategy is in Europe. They did not anticipate that we would send volunteers to aid Korea when they dispatched forces to invade it.

With us, things are easier to manage. In internal affairs we are masters of our own house. But we are not the chief of staff of the United States. The United States has its own chief of staff. So on the question of whether the Korean war will continue, we and the Koreans have only half the say.

In a word, under the pressure of the general trend, the United States will find it against its interest to refuse to come to a truce.

All the talk about the imminence of a third world war is just to scare people. We must strive to gain a period of ten years for building our industry and laying solid foundations.

We must close our ranks and clearly distinguish between ourselves and the enemy. It is because of the unity of the whole nation and the co-operation of all those present and of all the democratic parties and people's organizations that we are strong today. It is of vital importance that we unite and distinguish between ourselves and the enemy. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was a man of integrity, but why did the Revolution of 1911 he led end in failure? The reasons were: first, failure to distribute land; second, failure to recognize the necessity of suppressing counter-revolutionaries; and, third, failure to wage sharp struggles against imperialism. Apart from distinguishing between ourselves and the enemy, there is the need to distinguish between right and wrong within our own ranks. Compared with the former, the latter is secondary. For instance, with most of the embezzlers, it is just a matter of right and wrong, for they are different from counter-revolutionaries and can be reformed.

It is necessary to carry out education among the democratic parties and in religious circles so that they will not be taken in by the imperialists and stand on the enemy's side. Take Buddhism for example. It has not much contact with imperialism and its ties are chiefly with feudalism. As the struggle against feudalism involves the land problem, it affects the monks, and those who come under attack are the abbots and elders of the monasteries. Once this small number is overthrown, ordinary monks like "Lu Chih-shen"[1] will be emancipated. Though no believer in Buddhism, I am not against forming an association of Buddhists to get them united and enable them to distinguish clearly between the people and the enemy. Will the united front be abolished some day? I for one am not for its abolition. We should unite with everyone provided he truly makes a clear distinction between the people and the enemy and serves the people.

Our country has a bright future and is full of hope. In the past we wondered if the economy could recover in three years. As a result of two and a half years of hard struggle, it already has, and what is more, planned construction is under way. Let us all unite, clearly distinguish between ourselves and the enemy and strive for the steady progress of our country.

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[1] A character in the classical Chinese novel *Water Margin*, who is an ordinary Buddhist monk before he joins the peasant army on Liangshan Mountain.

HAIL THE SIGNAL VICTORY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS!

October 24, 1952

Beginning on September 18, our Volunteers, together with the Korean People's Army, initiated tactical counter-attacks on all fronts and have won a signal victory by annihilating and wounding more than thirty thousand enemy troops in the space of a month. The Central Committee and its Military Commission send you and all commanders and fighters hearty congratulations. The operations can be summed up as follows: first, concentrating superior forces and firepower on a number of selected tactically critical points, springing surprise attacks and wiping out the enemy by whole platoons, whole companies, whole battalions or by the larger part of such units; second, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy in repeated operations as he mounts counter-attacks; and, third, firmly holding those captured strong-points which can be held and abandoning those which cannot according to circumstances, so as to keep the initiative in our hands in preparation for future counter-attacks. If such operations are kept up, we will have the enemy by the throat and force him to come to terms and end the Korean war. The losses inflicted on the enemy since July last year when our forces started tenacious positional warfare have far exceeded those inflicted on him in the many campaigns of mobile warfare before then. On the other hand, our losses have greatly diminished. So far as casualties are concerned, the monthly average, to speak only of our Volunteers, has been reduced by over two-thirds in the fifteen months since July last year, as compared with that in the previous eight months. This is due to the kind of operation mentioned above which is carried out by relying on our positions. In the period since September 18, operations of

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Directive to the leading members of the Chinese People's Volunteers drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and its Military Commission.

this kind have been carried out on the whole front more extensively and in a more organized way and therefore they deserve special attention.

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the Chinese People's Volunteers' entry into the war in Korea, we hope you will sum up your experience, further enhance your sense of organization, raise your tactical level and save ammunition, unite more closely with the Korean comrades and people and strive for still greater victories in future operations.

COMBAT BUREAUCRACY, COMMANDISM AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW AND OF DISCIPLINE

January 5, 1953

The task of combating bureaucracy, commandism and violations of the law and of discipline should arouse the attention of our leading bodies at all levels.

In the movement against the "three evils", our Party has basically solved the two problems of corruption and waste among many of our cadres at four levels, the central, the greater administrative area, the provincial and municipal, and the prefectural. It has also basically overcome one kind of bureaucracy, namely, that which alienates many leading cadres from those working under them. But the problem of the following kind of bureaucracy has not been basically solved in many areas, departments and fields of work. Some leading cadres are ignorant of the people's hardships, of the conditions in subordinate units only a short distance from their offices, and of the fact that among the cadres at the county, district and township levels there are many bad people guilty of commandism and violations of the law and of discipline. Or they may have some knowledge of such bad people and bad deeds, but turn a blind eye to them, feel no indignation, are not aware of the seriousness of the matter and so take no positive measure to back up good people and punish the bad or to encourage good deeds and stop bad ones. To cite the handling of letters from the masses as an example. Reports say that a certain provincial people's government has sat on well over seventy thousand letters; as for the number of letters shelved by Party and government organizations below the provincial level, we have no idea as yet, but presumably it is by no means small. Most of the letters

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Inner-Party directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

appeal to us to help solve problems, and many contain accusations against certain cadres whose lawless behaviour requires prompt attention.

For our Party and government, bureaucracy and commandism are a big problem not only for today but for a long time to come. In terms of social origin, it reflects the survival in our Party and government of the reactionary style of work (an anti-popular style of work, a Kuomintang style of work) of the reactionary ruling classes in dealing with the people. As far as the role and methods of leadership of our Party and government organizations are concerned, it means failure to make clear the policy limits and the proper style of work when giving assignments, in other words, failure to give the cadres at the middle and lower levels receiving assignments thorough instructions on these matters. It means failure to make a proper examination, or indeed any examination at all, of cadres at the various levels, particularly at the county, district and township levels. It means failure to carry out Party consolidation work at these three levels or, in cases where Party consolidation has started, failure to launch a struggle to combat commandism and comb out violators of the law and of discipline. It means failure to combat and stamp out the kind of bureaucracy still existing among cadres in the leading organizations at the prefectural level and above, which finds expression in ignorance of and callousness to both the hardships of the masses and the conditions in the grass-roots organizations. If we strengthen and improve our role and methods of leadership, then bureaucracy and commandism, which are harmful to the people, will gradually diminish and many of our Party and government organizations will be able to break away sooner from this Kuomintang style of work. And the sooner will the many bad people who have infiltrated our Party and government organizations be combed out and the many bad deeds still evident today be eliminated.

Therefore, in 1953 starting with the handling of letters from the masses, please make an investigation into bureaucracy, commandism and violations of the law and of discipline and wage a resolute struggle against them in co-ordination with Party consolidation, Party building and other spheres of work. Typical cases of bureaucracy, commandism and violations of the law and of discipline should be widely exposed in the press. Serious offenders should be punished by law, and when they are Party members they should also be dealt with according to Party discipline. Party committees at all levels should make a determined effort to punish and clear out of Party and government organizations those violators of the law and of discipline who are bitterly hated by the masses, and the worst among them should be executed so as to assuage the people's anger and help educate the cadres and the masses. However, at an appropriate stage of the broad struggle against bad people and bad deeds, we should look into, evaluate and praise models of good people and good deeds in various places so that all Party members will strive to measure up to these fine models and what is upright will prevail over what is evil. We believe that a substantial number of such models are certain to be found in various parts of the country.

CRITICIZE HAN CHAUVINISM

March 16, 1953

In some places the relations between nationalities are far from normal. For Communists this is an intolerable situation. We must go to the root and criticize the Han chauvinist ideas which exist to a serious degree among many Party members and cadres, namely, the reactionary ideas of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie, or the ideas characteristic of the Kuomintang, which are manifested in the relations between nationalities. Mistakes in this respect must be corrected at once. Delegations led by comrades who are familiar with our nationality policy and full of sympathy for our minority nationality compatriots still suffering from discrimination should be sent to visit the areas where there are minority nationalities, make a serious effort at investigation and study and help Party and government organizations in the localities discover and solve problems. The visits should not be those of "looking at flowers on horseback".

Judging from the mass of information on hand, the Central Committee holds that wherever there are minority nationalities the general rule is that there are problems calling for solution, and in some cases very serious ones. On the surface all is quiet, but actually there are some very serious problems. What has come to light in various places in the last two or three years shows that Han chauvinism exists almost everywhere. It will be very dangerous if we fail now to give timely education and resolutely overcome Han chauvinism in the Party and among the people. The problem in the relations between nationalities which reveals itself in the Party and among the people in many places is the existence of Han chauvinism to a serious degree and not just a matter of its vestiges. In other words, bourgeois ideas dominate the minds of those comrades and people who have had

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Inner-Party directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

no Marxist education and have not grasped the nationality policy of the Central Committee. Therefore, education must be assiduously carried out so that this problem can be solved step by step. Moreover, the newspapers should publish more articles based on specific facts to criticize Han chauvinism openly and educate the Party members and the people.

SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE "FIVE EXCESSES"

March 19, 1953

1. In our work in the rural areas there are problems involving the serious alienation of our Party and government organizations from the peasant masses and violations of the interests of the peasants and peasant activists; these are known as the "five excesses". The "five excesses" consist of an excess of assignments, an excess of meetings and training courses, an excess of documents, written reports and statistical forms, an excess of organizations, and an excess of side jobs for activists. These problems have existed for a long time; with regard to some of them the Central Committee has issued directives to Party committees at various levels, urging them to give such problems proper attention and find solutions. But far from being solved, the problems are becoming more and more serious. This is because the issue has never been systematically raised in its totality and, what is more important, no struggle has ever been waged against decentralism and bureaucracy on the part of the leading Party and government organs at the five levels — central, greater administrative area, provincial (municipal), prefectural and county. For, generally speaking, the "five excesses" in the districts and townships are not a local product but stem from above and are the consequences of decentralism and bureaucracy existing to a serious degree in the leading Party and government organs at the county level and above. Some of the "five excesses" are a legacy of the periods of the revolutionary war and agrarian reform and have remained unchanged to this day. Therefore, in carrying out the Central Committee's directive to combat bureaucracy, commandism and violations of the law and of discipline, we must put stress on overcoming bureaucracy and decentralism in the leading organs during 1953, and alter those rules and

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Inner-Party directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

practices which have outlived their usefulness. Only thus can the problems be solved. As for the authority of the leading organs at various levels to assign tasks, call meetings and organize training courses, send out documents and statistical forms or ask for reports from subordinate units, determine the organizational structure of districts and townships and use the activists in the villages, from now on it is up to the leading comrades in charge of the Party committee and government at the county level and above to define the proper limits in the light of what is feasible; in some cases it is up to the central authorities to define the limits for all concerned. In the past, many departments of the Party, government and people's organizations at all levels, each on its own, gave assignments to the subordinate units, casually summoned subordinates and village activists to meetings or training courses, issued floods of documents and statistical forms and thoughtlessly demanded reports from subordinates and villages. All these undesirable rules and practices must be resolutely abolished and replaced by ones that are standardized under the leadership and suited to the needs of the actual situation. As for the great variety of committees in every township and the excess of side jobs for activists, these too should be changed firmly but gradually since they hamper production and alienate the masses.

2. With regard to the departments of the Party, government and people's organizations at the national level, the Central Committee charges the responsible comrades of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, the Administration Council of the Central People's Government and its subsidiary financial and economic, cultural and educational, and political and judicial committees with the task of quickly clearing away all practices that have given rise to the "five excesses", working out appropriate rules and practices and reporting to the Central Committee.

3. In the greater administrative areas and the provinces and municipalities, the comrades in charge of Central Committee bureaus and sub-bureaus, provincial and municipal Party committees and the administrative apparatuses at the corresponding levels are held responsible for tackling the problem of the "five excesses", working out solutions and reporting to the Central Committee. To this end, the Central Committee bureaus and sub-bureaus and the provincial and municipal Party committees are each requested to send out an inspection team for the specific purpose of looking into this problem of the "five excesses" and to review the situation in one or two districts and town-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ships (and in the city, one or two districts and neighbourhoods) under their administration, so as to gather reference material for solutions.

4. The provincial Party committees are held accountable for giving guidance to the prefectures and counties in solving their problem of the "five excesses".

5. Agricultural production is the overriding task in the countryside; to it all other tasks play a supporting role. Any assignment or method of work that hinders the production of the peasants must be avoided. Our present-day agricultural economy remains basically a scattered small peasant economy where old-fashioned implements are used; this is vastly different from the mechanized collective farming of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in the present transition period we cannot introduce unified and planned production in agriculture, except on the state farms, and interfere too much with the peasants. We can only guide agricultural production and co-ordinate it with industrial production by our pricing policy and necessary and practicable economic and political work so that it can be integrated into the national economic plan. Any "plan" for agriculture or any "assignment" for the rural areas which goes beyond this is bound to be unworkable and is certain to evoke peasant opposition and alienate our Party from the peasant masses who constitute over 80 per cent of our population. This can be very dangerous indeed. The problem of the "five excesses" in our work in the districts and townships is in a large measure a reflection of such excessive interference with the peasants (and in a smaller measure a survival of practices that arose out of the needs of the revolutionary war and the agrarian reform). It has aroused their dissatisfaction, so there must be a change.

LIU SHAO-CHI AND YANG SHANG-KUN CRITICIZED FOR BREACH OF DISCIPLINE IN ISSUING DOCUMENTS IN THE NAME OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION

May 19, 1953

1

From now on, all documents and telegrams sent out in the name of the Central Committee can be dispatched only after I have gone over them, *otherwise they are invalid*. Please take note.

2

(1) Please assume responsibility for checking on the telegrams and documents dispatched in the name of the Central Committee or the Military Commission in the period from August 1 last year (those issued before August 1 have been checked) to May 5 this year to see if there are any which I have not gone over and if so how many (not counting those issued during my absence on tours of inspection or on sick leave), and let me know the results.

(2) On several occasions resolutions adopted at meetings called by the Central Committee, which I had not gone over, were issued without authorization. This is a mistake and a breach of discipline.

Comrade Mao Tsetung's written criticisms of Liu Shao-chi and Yang Shang-kun.

REFUTE RIGHT DEVIATIONIST VIEWS THAT DEPART FROM THE GENERAL LINE

June 15, 1953

The general line or the general task of the Party for the transition period[1] is basically to accomplish the industrialization of the country and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce in ten to fifteen years, or a little longer. This general line is a beacon illuminating our work in all fields. Do not depart from this general line, otherwise "Left" or Right mistakes will occur.

Some people think the period of transition is too long and give way to impatience. This will lead to "Left" deviationist mistakes. Others have remained where they were after the victory of the democratic revolution. They fail to realize there is a change in the character of the revolution and they go on pushing their "New Democracy" instead of socialist transformation. This will lead to Right deviationist mistakes. Take our agriculture for instance, the socialist road is the only road for it. The Party's central task in the rural areas is to develop the mutual-aid and co-operative movement and constantly raise productivity in agriculture.

The Right deviation manifests itself in three remarks:

"Firmly establish the new-democratic social order." That's a harmful formulation. In the transition period changes are taking place all the time and socialist factors are emerging every day. How can this "new-democratic social order" be "firmly established"? It would be very difficult indeed to "establish" it "firmly"! For instance, private industry and commerce are being transformed, and if an order is "established"

Part of a speech at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Here Comrade Mao Tsetung refuted the Right opportunist views, such as "firmly establish the new-democratic social order", put forward by Liu Shao-chi and others.

in the second half of the year, it will no longer hold "firm" next year. And changes are taking place in mutual aid and co-operation in agriculture from year to year too. The period of transition is full of contradictions and struggles. Our present revolutionary struggle is even more profound than the revolutionary armed struggle of the past. It is a revolution that will bury the capitalist system and all other systems of exploitation once and for all. The idea, "Firmly establish the new-democratic social order", goes against the realities of our struggle and hinders the progress of the socialist cause.

"Move from New Democracy towards socialism." That's a vague formulation. Moving towards the goal and nothing more, moving towards it year in year out and still moving towards it after a lapse of fifteen years? Merely moving towards it means that the goal has not been reached. The formulation sounds plausible but does not bear scrutiny.

"Sustain private property." Since the middle peasants are afraid of "becoming too conspicuous" and having their property "communized", some people have raised this slogan to put them at ease. But that is not right.

We have proposed a step-by-step transition to socialism. This is a better formulation. When we say "step-by-step", we mean that the steps are to be spread out over fifteen years and over the twelve months in each year. Going too fast means erring to the "Left"; standing still means erring too much to the Right. We must oppose "Left" and Right deviations and make a step-by-step transition until the whole process is completed.

NOTES

[1] Here "the transition period" refers to the period from the founding of the People's Republic of China to the basic completion of socialist transformation. The general line or the general task of the Party for this transition period was basically to accomplish the industrialization of China and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce over a fairly long period of time. This transition period is different in meaning from the transition period Comrade Mao Tsetung spoke of at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Party's Eighth Central Committee in September 1962 and thereafter, which denotes the entire historical period of transition from capitalism to communism.

THE YOUTH LEAGUE IN ITS WORK MUST TAKE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUTH INTO CONSIDERATION

June 30, 1953

The Youth League's assertion of independence from the Party is already a thing of the past. Today, the trouble with the Youth League is its lack of independent activities, not its assertion of independence.

The Youth League must co-ordinate its activities with the Party's central tasks, but in so doing it must have its own independent activities and take the characteristics of youth into consideration. In 1952, in a talk with comrades of the Central Committee of the Youth League, I raised two questions for it to think over: first, how the Party should lead the League's work, and second, how the League should do its work. Both involve consideration for the characteristics of youth. In various places the Party committees have expressed satisfaction with the Youth League because the latter has co-ordinated its work with the Party's central tasks. Now it is time to express dissatisfaction, that is, dissatisfaction with the Youth League's failure to arrange for independent activities that suit the characteristics of youth. The leading organs of the Party and the League should learn how to lead the League in its work and, in order to organize and educate the mass of young people, they should be good at co-ordinating its activities with the Party's central tasks and taking the characteristics of youth into consideration.

Under the Party's leadership, the Youth League has been active in every field of revolutionary work and has a great deal to its credit. Our revolutionary cause, whether in the factories, on the farms, in the army units or in the schools, cannot succeed without the young people.

Talk by Comrade Mao Tsetung when he received the Presidium of the Second National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League of China.

China's youth are well disciplined and they have fulfilled all the tasks assigned them by the Party. Now that the war is coming to an end in Korea and the agrarian reform is completed, the emphasis in our work at home is being switched over to socialist transformation and socialist construction. This makes study imperative. The Youth League must know how to lead the young people in making a common effort with older people to do a good job in agriculture in the countryside, in industry in the cities, in studying at school, in performing their duties in offices as well as in training in army units to turn our national defence forces into a modernized army.

Young people between fourteen and twenty-five need to study and work, but as youth is the age of physical growth, much is imperilled if their health is neglected. The young need to study much more, for they have to learn many things older people already know. However, they must not be overloaded with either study or work. And the fourteen- to eighteen-year-olds in particular should not be made to work with the same intensity as grown-ups. Young people, being what they are, need more time for play, recreation and sports. Otherwise they won't be happy. And in time they will fall in love and get married. In all this they are different from older people.

I would like to say a few words to our young people: first, I wish them good health; second, I wish them success in their study; and third, I wish them success in their work.

I would suggest that all students be given an additional hour of sleep. They are supposed to have eight hours of sleep, but actually they take only six or seven and generally feel they don't have enough. Young people at school are prone to nervous tension and so often find it hard to go to sleep and then hard to wake up. Be sure to make nine hours of sleep a rule. An order to this effect should be issued and enforced, there should be no argument about it. Let young people have enough sleep, and the teachers too.

The revolution has brought us many fine things but also one thing which is not so good. Everybody is much too active and enthusiastic, often getting tired out. Now we must make sure that everybody, including workers, peasants, soldiers, students and cadres, can keep fit. Of course, it does not necessarily mean that if you are good in health you will be good in study, for study must be done in the proper way.

At present the classes in junior middle schools take too much of the students' time, and it would be preferable if they were cut down to suitable proportions. Meetings for activists are too frequent and should also be reduced. Study on the one hand and recreation, rest and sleep on the other should both receive adequate attention. Young workers, peasants and soldiers learn while they work, and so adequate attention should also be paid to their work and study as well as to their recreation, rest and sleep.

We should grasp the matter firmly at both ends, with study and work at one end and sleep, rest and recreation at the other. In the past, we firmly grasped one end, leaving the other end either not grasped at all or only half-heartedly so. Now it is necessary to arrange some recreation, for which there must be time and facilities, and this end should be firmly grasped too. The Party Central Committee has decided to cut down the number of meetings and study hours, and you must see to it that this decision is carried out. Challenge anyone who refuses to do so.

In short, young people should be enabled to keep fit, study well and work well. Some leading comrades are interested only in getting work out of young people and pay little attention to their health. You can quote the above to their faces. You are on firm ground, namely, you are protecting the younger generation so that it can grow sturdily. We of the older generation were deprived of our due, for adults simply didn't bother themselves about their children. Adults had a table to eat their meals at while children had to do without one. Children had no say in the family, and if they cried they were sure to get slapped. In the new China of today we must change our approach and think more in the interest of our children and youth.

Young cadres must be elected to the League Central Committee. At the time of the Three Kingdoms, Tsao Tsao led his huge army to the Yangtse River to attack the Kingdom of Wu in eastern China. Chou Yu, who was then a "Youth League member" in age, was appointed commanding general of the Wu army. Cheng Pu and other battle-seasoned generals protested but were later persuaded into accepting his command, and in the end the battle was won. Now we want the present-day "Chou Yus" to sit on the League Central Committee, and yet people won't hear of it! For the League Central Committee only older people are candidates — very few young. Will that do? Of course, we can't judge by age alone, ability also counts. Originally there were only nine people under thirty on the list of candidates for the League Central Committee, but after discussion by the Party Central Committee their number has been increased to more than sixty, and even so that makes up only a little over one-fourth. Those over thirty still form almost three-fourths of the total, and yet some comrades complain that this number is not big enough. I think it's quite enough. Some comrades say they are not so sure whether all these sixty-odd young people are competent in every way. We should have full confidence in our young people, most of them will prove equal to their jobs. A few may prove incompetent, but there is no need to worry, they can be replaced by later elections. In this way the basic orientation will not be wrong. The young are not our inferiors. Old people have more experience, which of course is a strong point, but on the other hand their physical powers are declining, their eyesight and hearing are not so sharp as before and their limbs not so agile as those of the young. This is a law of nature. It is necessary to convince those comrades who disagree.

The Youth League organizations should give consideration to the characteristics of youth and have their own sphere of work, but at the same time they should submit to the leadership of the Party committees at the corresponding levels. This is nothing new but something of long standing and has always been a tenet of Marxism. This is to proceed from reality. After all, youth is youth, or else why bother to have a Youth League? Young people are different from adults and so are young women from young men. Disregard these characteristics and you will alienate yourselves from the masses. Now you have nine million League members, and if you neglect the characteristics of youth, probably only one million will support you and eight million will not.

In its work the Youth League must make allowance for the majority of its members and at the same time pay attention to the advanced ones. This may not satisfy some of the advanced elements, for they want the League organization to make stricter demands on the entire membership. This is not really proper, you must try to convince them. The draft constitution of the League lays down far too many obligations and too few rights; there should be some leeway so that the majority can keep in step. You should focus your attention on the many and not just on the few.

It is stipulated in your draft constitution that a member will be considered to have automatically withdrawn from the League if he fails to take part in its regular cell meetings for four months; this is much too severe. Even the Party Constitution allows six months, can't you do the same? Don't put into the League constitution what is impossible to carry out or what is possible for only one million members, not for the other eight million. There must be flexibility in applying principles. There is a gap between what ought to be and what actually is. It takes years for some laws to be fully carried out. For instance, many of the articles in the Marriage Law are programmatic and their thorough implementation will take at least a period of three five-year plans. The article “don’t gossip behind people’s back”, while correct in principle, need not be put into the League constitution. To combat liberalism is a long-term task, and it exists even in the Party to no small extent. You may prohibit backbiting, but actually it won’t work. Don’t impose too narrow limits. The essential thing is to make a clear distinction between ourselves and the enemy.

Prestige is built up gradually. There was a time when some people in the army made up ditties to abuse others. We imposed no ban nor made any investigation, yet our army was not wrecked. We had a firm grip on a few major things only, such as the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention, and our armed forces were steadily led onto the correct path. The true admiration the masses feel for their leaders derives from what they come to know of them in the course of revolutionary practice. Trust comes out of real understanding. Now the League Central Committee already enjoys a fairly high prestige. Although some people do not yet admire it, they will in the course of time. When a young man first takes office and is not rated high, there is no need to worry, for it is only to be expected that there will be some criticism and abuse. “Whispers” exist for lack of “an open outlet for views”. If there is full democracy and you allow others to touch you on the raw in face-to-face encounters, then even if you want people to go on whispering, they will say they have no time for that now and want to call it a day. Nevertheless, problems will always crop up, and don’t imagine that they can be solved once and for all; there are problems today and there will be problems tomorrow.

The Party’s general task for the transition period is basically to accomplish socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce in the course of three five-year plans. Three five-year plans cover a period of fifteen years. Make a small step each year and a big stride every five years, and with three big strides the work is almost done. “Basically accomplished” does not mean “completely accomplished”. To say it is basically accomplished is a prudent way of speaking; it is always better to be prudent in everything we do.

At this stage China’s agricultural economy is by and large individual in nature, and it needs step-by-step socialist transformation.

The principle of voluntary participation must be adhered to in promoting the mutual-aid and co-operative movement in agriculture. Failure to promote it will lead to the capitalist road, and that will be a Right deviation. To push it too hard won't do either, for that will be a "Left" deviation. The movement must proceed step by step after due preparation. We are always against fighting a battle without being prepared and being sure of victory, or fighting a battle when prepared but not sure of victory. In the days when we fought Chiang Kai-shek, some people erred on the side of subjectivism at the outset, but later when this subjectivism was overcome through rectification, we emerged the victors. We are now engaged in the battle for socialism, fighting to accomplish socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce. This is the general task set for the whole nation. As to how the Youth League is to carry out this general task, you should lay down appropriate guidelines in the light of the characteristics of youth.

ON STATE CAPITALISM

July 9, 1953

The present-day capitalist economy in China is a capitalist economy which for the most part is under the control of the People's Government and which is linked with the state-owned socialist economy in various forms and supervised by the workers. It is not an ordinary but a particular kind of capitalist economy, namely, a state-capitalist economy of a new type. It exists not chiefly to make profits for the capitalists but to meet the needs of the people and the state. True, a share of the profits produced by the workers goes to the capitalists, but that is only a small part, about one quarter, of the total. The remaining three quarters are produced for the workers (in the form of the welfare fund), for the state (in the form of income tax) and for expanding productive capacity (a small part of which produces profits for the capitalists). Therefore, this state-capitalist economy of a new type takes on a socialist character to a very great extent and benefits the workers and the state.

Written comment on a document of the National Conference on Financial and Economic Work held in the summer of 1953.

THE PARTY'S GENERAL LINE FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD

August 1953

The time between the founding of the People's Republic of China and the basic completion of socialist transformation is a period of transition. The Party's general line or general task for the transition period is basically to accomplish the country's industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce over a fairly long period of time. This general line should be the beacon illuminating all our work, and wherever we deviate from it, we shall make Right or "Left" mistakes.

Many policies under this general line were already set forth and decided upon in principle in the resolution adopted at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee held in March 1949. Nevertheless, many comrades were not inclined to work in accordance with the decisions of the Second Plenary Session and on some matters preferred to go their own way contrary to the session's decisions or even openly violated its principles.

Important directive written by Comrade Mao Tsetung when he went over the summing-up to be made by Comrade Chou En-lai at the National Conference on Financial and Economic Work held in the summer of 1953.

COMBAT BOURGEOIS IDEAS IN THE PARTY

August 12, 1953

Our conference has been a success, and Premier Chou has made a fine summing-up.

It is now clear that since the movements against the "three evils" and the "five evils" two kinds of mistake which are different in nature have been found in the Party. One kind is of an ordinary nature, for instance, the "five excesses", mistakes which anyone can make and which may crop up at any time; the "five excesses" may also turn into the "five deficiencies". The other kind is mistakes of principle, such as the tendency towards capitalism. This kind is a reflection of bourgeois ideas within the Party and a matter of stand that is contrary to Marxism-Leninism.

The movements against the "three evils" and the "five evils" dealt heavy blows to bourgeois ideas inside the Party. But at the time only bourgeois ideas related to corruption and waste got a good thrashing, while those manifesting themselves in questions concerning the Party line were not dealt with. The latter are to be found not only in our financial and economic work but also in political and judicial, cultural and educational and other fields, and among comrades in the localities as well as at the national level.

Mistakes in our financial and economic work have been severely criticized ever since last December when Comrade Po I-po came out with his new tax system entailing "equality between public and private enterprises"[1] and also at the present conference. That system, if allowed to develop, would have led inevitably to capitalism, in contravention of Marxism-Leninism and the Party's general line for the transition period.

Speech at the National Conference on Financial and Economic Work held in the summer of 1953.

What will the transition period lead to, socialism or capitalism? The Party's general line prescribes transition to socialism. This requires a period of struggle of considerable length. Unlike that of Chang Tzu-shan,[2] the mistake made in the new tax system involves a question of ideology and a departure from the Party's general line. We must unfold a struggle in the Party against bourgeois ideas. Ideologically, the Party membership falls into three categories: some comrades are firm and unwavering and are Marxist-Leninist in their thinking; quite a number are essentially Marxist-Leninist but infected with non-Marxist-Leninist ideas; and a small number are no good, their thinking is non-Marxist-Leninist. In criticizing Po I-po's erroneous ideas, some say his mistake stems from petty-bourgeois individualism; that's not quite right. He should be criticized mainly for his bourgeois ideas, which are favourable to capitalism and harmful to socialism. Only such criticism is correct. "Left" opportunist mistakes, as we said before, are a reflection of petty-bourgeois fanaticism within the Party; they occurred in times when we broke with the bourgeoisie. On the three occasions when we have co-operated with the bourgeoisie, namely, in the first period of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, in the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan and in the present period, it has been bourgeois ideology that has influenced a number of people in the Party, and they have vacillated. That was how Po I-po came to make his mistake.

Po I-po's mistake is not an isolated case. Such mistakes are found not only at the national level but also at those of the greater administrative areas and the provinces and municipalities. Each greater administrative area, each province and municipality, should call a meeting to review its work in the light of the resolution of the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee and of the summing-up of the present conference, so as to educate the cadres.

Recently I made a trip to Wuhan and Nanking and learned a lot, which was very helpful. Practically nothing comes to my ear in Peking, and therefore I shall go on tour from time to time. The central leading organ is a factory which turns out ideas as its products. If it does not know what is going on at the lower levels, gets no raw material or has no semi-processed products to work on, how can it turn out any products? Sometimes finished products are turned out by the localities, and the central leading organ need only popularize them throughout the country. For instance, take the movements against the old and new "three evils".[3] Both were initiated in the localities. The departments under the central authorities issue directives arbitrarily. The products from these departments ought to be top grade, but actually they are inferior in quality and there are large numbers of completely worthless rejects. Leading organs in the greater administrative areas and the provinces and municipalities are local factories for turning out ideas, and their products should be top grade too.

Po I-po's mistake is a manifestation of bourgeois ideas. It benefits capitalism and harms socialism and semi-socialism and runs counter to the resolution of the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee.

On whom should we rely? On the working class, or on the bourgeoisie? The resolution of the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee made it clear long ago: "We must wholeheartedly rely on the working class." The resolution also says that in the rehabilitation and development of production the following must be the rule: the production of state industry comes first, that of private industry second and handicraft production third. The emphasis is on industry, and first of all on heavy industry, which is owned by the state. Of the five sectors of our present-day economy, the state-owned economy is the leading sector. Capitalist industry and commerce must be gradually guided towards state capitalism.

The resolution of the Second Plenary Session says that the livelihood of the workers and other working people is to improve on the basis of increased production. People with bourgeois ideas pay no attention to this point, and Po I-po is typical in this respect. We must lay emphasis on the development of production, but consideration must be given to both the development of production and the improvement of the people's livelihood. Something must be done for their material well-being, but neither too much nor nothing at all. At present there are quite a few cadres who ignore the people's livelihood and couldn't care less about their sufferings. There was a regiment in Kweichow Province which occupied large tracts of peasant farmland. That was a serious encroachment on the people's interests. It is wrong to ignore the people's livelihood, but the emphasis must be laid on production and construction.

The question of utilizing, restricting and transforming the capitalist sector of the economy was also made quite clear at the Second Plenary Session. The resolution it adopted says that the private capitalist economy must not be allowed to expand uncurbed but should be restricted from several directions — in the scope of its operations, by tax policy and by market prices and working conditions. The relationship of the socialist economy to the capitalist economy is that of the leader to the led. Restriction versus opposition to restriction is the main form of class struggle in the new-democratic state. Now the new tax system talks about "equality between public and private enterprises"; that is at variance with the line which makes the state-owned economy the leading sector.

As for the co-operative transformation of individual farming and handicrafts, the resolution of the Second Plenary Session puts it clearly:

> Such co-operatives are collective economic organizations of the working people, based on private ownership and under the direction of the state power led by the proletariat. The fact that the Chinese people are culturally backward and have no tradition in organizing co-operatives makes it quite difficult for us to promote and develop the co-operative movement, but co-operatives can and must be organized and they must be promoted and developed. If we had only a state-owned economy and no co-operative economy, it would be impossible for us to lead the individual economy of the working people step by step towards collectivization, impossible to develop from the new-democratic state to the socialist state of the future and impossible to consolidate the leadership of the proletariat in the state power.

This resolution was adopted in March 1949, but quite a few comrades have failed to take note of it and what is no longer news strikes them as novel. In his article "Strengthen the Party's Political Work in the Rural Areas", Po I-po said that the individual peasants' road to collectivization through mutual aid and co-operation "is sheer fantasy because the present mutual-aid teams, based as they are on the individual economy, cannot develop gradually into collective farms, still less can such a road lead to the collectivization of agriculture as a whole". This runs counter to the Party's resolution.

There are now two united fronts, two alliances. One is the alliance of the working class and the peasants; this is the foundation. The other is the alliance of the working class and the national bourgeoisie. As the peasants are labourers and not exploiters, the alliance of the working class and the peasants is a long-term one. Nevertheless, there are contradictions between the working class and the peasants. We should guide the peasants step by step from individual ownership to collective ownership in accordance with the voluntary principle. In the future there will also be contradictions, between state ownership and collective ownership. These contradictions are all non-antagonistic. On the other hand, the contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie are antagonistic.

The bourgeoisie is sure to corrode people and aim its sugar-coated bullets at them. Its sugar-coated bullets are of two kinds, material and spiritual. A spiritual one hit its target, Po I-po. He made his mistake because he succumbed to the influence of bourgeois ideas. The editorial preaching the new tax system was applauded by the bourgeoisie, and Po I-po was pleased. Before the new tax system was initiated, he solicited suggestions from the bourgeoisie and reached a gentleman's agreement with them, but he failed to report to the Central Committee. The Ministry of Commerce and the Federation of Supply and Marketing Co-operatives objected at the time, and the Ministry of Light Industry was dissatisfied too. Of the 1,100,000 cadres and employees working in the financial, economic and trade fields, the overwhelming majority are good and only a small number are not. Those who are not fall into two categories: counter-revolutionaries, who should be weeded out; and revolutionaries, including Party members and non-Party personnel, who have made mistakes and who should therefore be remoulded through criticism and education.

To ensure the triumph of the cause of socialism, we must combat erroneous Right opportunist tendencies, that is, bourgeois ideas, throughout the Party, and first of all in the leading bodies of the Party, government, army and mass organizations at the national level and at those of the greater administrative areas and the provinces and municipalities. The greater administrative areas and the provinces and municipalities should call meetings in due time with the participation of secretaries of prefectural Party committees and commissioners of prefectures[4] to unfold criticism and discussion and to clarify the question of the socialist road versus the capitalist road.

To ensure the triumph of the cause of socialism, we must exercise collective leadership and oppose decentralism and subjectivism.

At present we must combat subjectivism, not only in the form of rash advance but also in the form of conservatism. In the days of the new-democratic revolution both Right and "Left" subjectivist mistakes occurred. Chen Tu-hsiu and Chang Kuo-tao made Right mistakes and Wang Ming first "Left" mistakes and then Right ones. The rectification movement in Yenan concentrated its efforts on combating dogmatism and opposed empiricism in passing. Both dogmatism and empiricism are forms of subjectivism. No revolution can triumph unless theory is integrated with practice. The problem was solved in that rectification movement. We were right in adopting the policy of learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient. This time the unrelenting and thoroughgoing criticism of Po I-po is designed to help those who have erred correct their mistakes and to ensure the victorious advance of socialism. In the present period of the socialist revolution subjectivism is still in evidence. Rash advance and conservatism both disregard the actual state of affairs, both are subjectivist. The revolution and construction cannot succeed unless subjectivism is overcome. In the days of the democratic revolution rectification served to correct the error of subjectivism and in consequence the whole Party was united, including both the comrades who had adhered to the correct line and those who had made mistakes. From Yenan they set out for different war theatres, and the whole Party, pulling its weight as one man, went on to win nation-wide victory. Today, the cadres are more mature and their political level is higher, and it is hoped that it will not take long for them basically to overcome subjectivism in their task of leadership and bring the subjective into correspondence with the objective through their efforts.

The solution of all these problems hinges on strengthening collective leadership and opposing decentralism. We have all along opposed decentralism. The directive issued by the Central Committee to its bureaus and the army commanders on February 2, 1941 stipulated that all circular telegrams, declarations and inner-Party directives bearing on the country as a whole must have the prior approval of the Central Committee. In May, the Central Committee issued a directive calling for unified external propaganda by the various base areas. On July 1 of the same year, on the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Party, the Central Committee issued its decision on strengthening Party spirit with the emphasis on combating decentralism. In 1948 the Central Committee issued more directives to the same effect. It issued a directive on setting up a system of reports on January 7 and a supplementary directive in March. The Political Bureau met in September and adopted a resolution on rules governing reports to and requests for instructions from the Central Committee. On September 20, the Central Committee made a decision on strengthening the Party committee system. On March 10, 1953 the Central Committee adopted a decision on strengthening its leadership over the work of the government in order to avert the danger of government departments drifting away from its leadership.

Centralization and decentralization are in constant contradiction with each other. Decentralism has grown since we moved into the cities. To resolve this contradiction all the principal and important issues must first be discussed and decided on by the Party committee before its decisions are referred to the government for implementation. For instance, such important decisions as the erection of the Monument to the Heroes of the People in Tien An Men Square and the demolition of Peking's city walls were made by the Central Committee and carried out by the government. Matters of secondary importance can be left to the leading Party groups in government departments. It just won't do for the Central Committee to monopolize everything. Combating decentralism will win maximum popular approval because most comrades in the Party care about collective leadership. Party members fall into three categories in their attitude towards collective leadership. Those in the first category care about collective leadership. Those in the second do not care so much, maintaining that the Party committees had better leave them alone, but they don't mind being supervised. "Better leave me alone" reveals a lack of Party spirit, while "don't mind being supervised" shows some measure of Party spirit. We must seize on this "don't mind being supervised" and help such comrades by education and persuasion to overcome their lack of Party spirit. Otherwise, each ministry would go its own way and the Central Committee could not supervise the ministries, the ministers could not supervise the department and bureau heads, and the division heads could not supervise the section chiefs — no one, in short, could supervise anyone. In consequence, independent kingdoms would proliferate and hundreds of feudal princes would emerge. Those in the third category are only a handful. They flatly reject collective leadership and always prefer to be left alone. The decision on strengthening Party spirit puts the stress on the strict observance of discipline under democratic centralism, in other words, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the individual to the organization, the lower level to the higher level and the entire Party to the Central Committee (a case of subordinating the majority to the minority, as this minority represents the majority). Opinions are welcome, but to undermine Party unity would be a most shameful thing. It is reliance on the political experience and wisdom of the collective that can guarantee the correct leadership of the Party and the state and the unshakable unity of the ranks of the Party.

At this conference Liu Shao-chi said he had made mistakes of a sort, and Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping said he too had made some mistakes. Whoever makes a mistake must make a self-criticism, and everybody without exception must put himself under the Party's supervision and the leadership of Party committees at various levels. This is a prime requirement for fulfilling the Party's tasks. Throughout the country there are quite a number of people who thrive on anarchy, and Po I-po is one such person. To some extent he has been corrupted both politically and ideologically and it is absolutely necessary to criticize him.

One final point. We must foster modesty, willingness to learn and perseverance.

We must have perseverance. In the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, for instance, we hit U.S. imperialism where it hurt and struck fear into its heart. This was an asset, an important factor, in our country's construction. What was of the utmost importance was that our armed forces were thus steeled, the fighters displaying valour and the commanders resourcefulness. True, we suffered casualties and incurred a cost; we paid a price. But we had absolutely no fear of sacrifice; once we set our mind on doing something, we saw it through. When Hu Tsung-nan attacked the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, we did not pull out although we had only one county seat left, and we thought nothing of it when we had to live on the leaves of the trees. This is the kind of fortitude we must have.

We must study and must not become conceited or look down on others. Goose eggs don't think much of chicken eggs and the ferrous metals don't think much of rare metals — such a disdainful attitude is not scientific. Although China is a big country and ours is a big Party, there is no reason to look down on small countries or small parties. We must always be ready to learn from the people of fraternal countries and maintain a genuine internationalist spirit. In our foreign trade some people are arrogant and overweening, and this is wrong. Education must be conducted in the whole Party, and particularly among people working abroad. We must study hard and work hard so as basically to accomplish socialist industrialization and socialist transformation in fifteen years or a little longer. By then our country will have become strong, yet we should still be modest and should always be ready to learn.

There are several regulations which were adopted at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee but not written into its resolution. The first is a ban on birthday celebrations. Birthday celebrations don't beget longevity. The important thing is to do our work well. The second is a ban on gifts, at least in the Party. The third is to keep toasts to a minimum. Toasts may be allowed on certain occasions. The fourth is to keep applause to a minimum. There should be no ban and no pouring of cold water on the masses who applaud out of enthusiasm. The fifth is a ban on naming places after persons. The sixth is a ban on placing Chinese comrades on a par with Marx, Engels, Lenin or Stalin. Our relationship to them is one of pupils to teachers and that is how it should be. Observance of these regulations is true modesty.

In short, we must remain modest, be willing to learn, retain our perseverance and adhere to the system of collective leadership so as to achieve socialist transformation and attain victory for socialism.

NOTES

[1] This new tax system was introduced in December 1952 and put into effect in January 1953. Though nominally entailing "equality between public and private enterprises", in reality it lightened the tax burdens on private industrial and commercial enterprises and increased those on state and co-operative enterprises, thus serving the interests of the capitalists at the expense of the latter. Soon after Comrade Mao Tsetung made his criticism, this error was corrected.

[2] Chang Tzu-shan was at one time secretary of the Tientsin Prefectural Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Corroded by the bourgeoisie, he degenerated and became a big embezzler and was sentenced to death during the movement against the "three evils".

[3] The movement against the old "three evils" was the struggle launched in 1951 against corruption, waste and bureaucracy. The movement against the new "three evils" was the struggle launched in 1953 against bureaucracy, commandism and violations of the law and of discipline.

[4] These commissioners were the administrative heads of the commissioners' offices, which were agencies of the provincial and autonomous region people's councils and had jurisdiction over several counties.

THE ONLY ROAD FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF CAPITALIST INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

September 7, 1953

The transformation of capitalism into socialism is to be accomplished through state capitalism.

1. In the last three years or so we have done some work on this, but as we were otherwise occupied, we didn't exert ourselves enough. From now on we should make a bigger effort.

2. With more than three years of experience behind us, we can say with certainty that accomplishing the socialist transformation of private industry and commerce by means of state capitalism is a relatively sound policy and method.

3. The policy laid down in Article 31 of the Common Programme[1] should now be clearly understood and concretely applied step by step. "Clearly understood" means that people in positions of leadership at the central and local levels should first of all have the firm conviction that state capitalism is the only road for the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce and for the gradual completion of the transition to socialism. So far this has not been the case either with members of the Communist Party or with democratic personages. The present meeting[2] is being held to achieve that end.

4. Make steady progress and avoid being too hasty. It will take at least three to five years to lead the country's private industry and commerce basically onto the path of state capitalism, so there should be no cause for alarm or uneasiness.

5. Joint state-private management; orders placed by the state with private enterprises to process materials or manufacture goods, with the state providing all the raw materials and taking all the finished products; and similarly placed orders, with the state taking not all but

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Outline for a talk to representative personages from the democratic parties and industrial and commercial circles on September 7, 1953.

most of the finished products — these are the three forms of state capitalism to be adopted in the case of private industry.

6. State capitalism can also be applied in the case of private commerce, which cannot possibly be dismissed by "excluding it". Here our experience is limited and further study is needed.

7. With approximately 3,800,000 workers and shop assistants, private industry and commerce are a big asset to the state and play a large part in the nation's economy and the people's livelihood. Not only do they provide the state with goods, but they can also accumulate capital and train cadres for the state.

8. Some capitalists keep themselves at a great distance from the state and have not changed their profits-before-everything mentality. Some workers are advancing too fast and won't allow the capitalists to make any profit at all. We should try to educate these workers and capitalists and help them gradually (but the sooner the better) adapt themselves to our state policy, namely, to make China's private industry and commerce mainly serve the nation's economy and the people's livelihood and partly earn profits for the capitalists and in this way embark on the path of state capitalism.

The following table shows the distribution of profits in state-capitalist enterprises:

Income Tax	34.5%
Welfare fund	15.0%
Accumulation fund	30.0%
Dividends to capitalists	20.5%
Total	100.0%

9. It is necessary to go on educating the capitalists in patriotism, and to this end we should systematically cultivate a number of them who have a broader vision and are ready to lean towards the Communist Party and the People's Government, so that most of the other capitalists may be convinced through them.

10. Not only must the implementation of state capitalism be based on what is necessary and feasible (see the Common Programme), but it must also be voluntary on the part of the capitalists, because it is a co-operative undertaking and co-operation admits of no coercion. This is different from the way we dealt with the landlords.

11. Considerable progress has been made in the last few years by the various nationalities, democratic classes, democratic parties and

people's organizations, and still greater progress will, in my opinion, be made in the next three to five years. So it is possible basically to accomplish the task of leading private industry and commerce onto the path of state capitalism in three to five years. The preponderance of state enterprises affords the material guarantee for the fulfilment of this task.

12. As for the completion of the task for the entire transition period, which consists of the basic accomplishment of the country's industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce, this cannot be done in three to five years, but will instead take a period of several five-year plans. On this question it is necessary to oppose both the idea of leaving things to the indefinite future and the idea of rushing things through.

13. One is the leader while the other is the led; one seeks no private profit while the other still seeks a certain amount of private profit, and so on and so forth; that's where the differences lie. But under our present conditions, private industry and commerce in the main serve the nation's economy and the people's livelihood (which, as far as the distribution of profits is concerned, take roughly three-fourths of the total). Therefore we can and should persuade the workers in private enterprises to act in the same way as those in state enterprises, namely, to increase production and practise economy emulate one another in labour, raise labour productivity, reduce costs of production and raise both quantity and quality, thus serving the interest of both the state sector and the private sector and that of labour and capital.

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[1] Article 31 of the Common Programme stipulates: "Enterprises jointly operated by state and private capital are enterprises of a state-capitalist character. Whenever necessary and feasible, private capital shall be encouraged to develop in the direction of state capitalism by such means as undertaking processing work for state enterprises, operating enterprises jointly with the state, or, in the form of concessions, operating state enterprises and exploiting national resources, etc."

[2] This refers to the forty-ninth meeting (enlarged) of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference, September 8-11, 1953.

OUR GREAT VICTORY IN THE WAR TO RESIST U.S. AGGRESSION AND AID KOREA AND OUR FUTURE TASKS

September 12, 1953

After three years we have won a great victory in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. It has now come to a halt.

To what was this victory due? Just now fellow members put it down to correct leadership. Leadership is one factor; nothing can succeed without correct leadership. But we won mainly because ours was a people's war, the whole nation gave it support and the people of China and Korea fought shoulder to shoulder.

We fought U.S. imperialism, an enemy wielding weapons many times superior to ours, and yet we were able to win and compelled it to agree to a truce. Why was the truce possible?

First, militarily the U.S. aggressors were in an unfavourable position and were on the receiving end. If they had not accepted the truce, their whole battle line would have been broken through and Seoul would have fallen into the hands of the Korean people. This situation became evident in the summer of last year.

Each belligerent calls his own battle line a bastion of iron. Ours is truly a bastion of iron. Our soldiers and cadres are resourceful and brave and dare to look death in the face. In contrast the U.S. aggressor troops are afraid of death, and their officers are rather rigid, not very flexible. Their battle line is not solid and is anything but a bastion of iron.

The problems facing our side were first whether we could fight, then whether we could hold our lines, later whether we could ensure the flow of supplies, and finally whether we could foil the germ warfare. These four problems came one after the other and were all

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Speech at the twenty-fourth Session of the Central People's Government Council.

solved. Our troops grew from strength to strength in fighting. This summer, we were already able to break through an enemy position with its front of twenty-one kilometres within an hour, fire several hundred thousand shells in a concentrated attack and penetrate the enemy area up to eighteen kilometres. If we had kept this up and mounted two, three or four more attacks, his whole battle line would have been cut to pieces.

Second, politically the enemy had many insoluble internal contradictions, and the people the world over demanded peace.

Third, economically the enemy spent vast sums in the war of aggression against Korea, and his budgetary revenues and expenditures were not balanced.

All these causes combined to force the enemy to come to terms. The first was the primary cause, and in its absence a truce with the enemy would have been difficult. The U.S. imperialists are very arrogant; if at all possible, they always refuse to talk reason, and will do so after a fashion only when driven into a tight corner.

In the Korean war the enemy suffered 1,090,000 in killed and wounded. Naturally we paid a price too. Nevertheless, our casualties were far fewer than anticipated and they became still fewer after tunnels were built. We grew stronger and stronger through fighting. The Americans failed to undermine our positions; on the contrary, their units were always wiped out by us.

Just now you all mentioned the factor of leadership. In my view, leadership is one factor, but the most important factor is the contribution of ideas by the masses. Our cadres and soldiers thought up all sorts of ways to fight the enemy. Let me give one example. In the first month of the war our losses in trucks were tremendous. What was to be done? While the leadership devised counter-measures, we relied mainly on the masses to come up with ideas. Over ten thousand people were posted on both sides of the highway to fire signal shots to warn of approaching enemy planes. On hearing these signals, our drivers would dodge or find places in which to hide their trucks. In the meantime the roads were widened and many new ones built so that trucks could run in both directions unimpeded. Thus the losses in trucks dropped from 40 per cent at the beginning to less than 1 per cent. Later on, underground storehouses and even underground auditoriums were built. While enemy bombs fell from overhead, we went on with our meetings underground. When they picture the Korean battlefield, people living in Peking feel it must have been very dangerous. True, there was danger, but it was not so terrible as long as everyone contributed ideas.

Our experience is that reliance on the people together with a fairly correct leadership enables us to defeat a better-equipped enemy with our inferior equipment.

The victory in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea is a great one and has major significance.

First, together with the Korean people we have fought our way back to the 38th Parallel and held on there. This is very important. If we had not fought back to the 38th Parallel and our front lines had remained along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, it would have been impossible for the people in Shenyang, Anshan and Fushun to carry on production free from worry.

Second, we have gained military experience. The ground, air and naval forces, the infantry, artillery, engineer, tank, railway, air defence and signal corps and also the medical and logistic units, etc. of the Chinese People's Volunteers have all gained practical experience in fighting the U.S. aggressor troops. This time we have taken the measure of the U.S. armed forces. If you have never taken them on, you are liable to be scared of them. We have fought them for thirty-three months and got to know them for what they are worth. U.S. imperialism is not terrifying, nothing to make a fuss about. Such is our experience, indeed an invaluable piece of experience.

Third, the people of the whole country have heightened their political awareness.

From the above three points a fourth can be deduced: a new imperialist war of aggression against China and a third world war have been put off.

The imperialist aggressors ought to bear this in mind: the Chinese people are now organized, they are not to be trifled with. Once they are provoked to anger, things can get very tough.

The enemy may resume the war, and even if he doesn't, he is sure to make trouble in all sorts of ways, such as by sending in secret agents to carry out wrecking activities. He has set up a vast network of secret services in places like Taiwan, Hongkong and Japan. But we have gained experience in the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, and so long as we mobilize the masses and rely on the people, we know how to cope with the enemy.

For us the present situation is different from that in the winter of 1950. Were the U.S. aggressors then on the other side of the 38th

Parallel? No, they were not. They were on the other side of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Did we then have any experience in fighting the U.S. aggressors? No, we did not. Did we then know much about the U.S. troops? No, we did not. Now, all this has changed. Supposing U.S. imperialism does not put off its new war of aggression and says: "I'll fight!", then we can cope with it by relying on the first three points. But supposing it says: "I'll not fight!", then the fourth point will hold good. Here is proof of the superiority of our people's democratic dictatorship.

Are we going to invade others? No, we will invade no one anywhere. But if others invade us, we will fight back and fight to a finish.

The Chinese people adhere to this stand: we are for peace, but are not afraid of war; we are ready for both. We have the support of the people. In the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, people fell over each other to join up. The conditions for enrolment were stiff, only one in a hundred was chosen. People said the conditions were stricter than those for choosing a husband for one's daughter. If U.S. imperialism wants to resume the fighting, we will take it on again.

War costs money. Yet the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea did not cost us too much. It went on for several years, but the expenses incurred were less than a single year's industrial and commercial taxes. Of course, it would have been better if we had not had to fight the war and spend this money. For construction in the country today calls for expenditure and the peasants still have difficulties. Last year and the year before last, the agricultural tax was a shade on the heavy side, and so this set some friends talking. They demanded a "policy of benevolence", as if they represented the interests of the peasants. Did we favour this view? No, we didn't. At that time we had to do our utmost to win victory in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. For the peasants, for the people of the whole country, which was in their interest? To endure austerity for the time being and strive for victory? Or not to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and so save a few coppers? Undoubtedly winning the war was in their interest. It was because the war required money that we collected a bit more in agricultural tax last year and the year before. This year it is different. We have not increased the agricultural tax and have put a ceiling on its volume.

Speaking of the "policy of benevolence", we are of course for it. But what was the policy of maximum benevolence? To resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. To carry out this policy of maximum benevolence sacrifices had to be made, money spent and more collected in agricultural tax. Just because more was collected, some people raised an outcry. They even claimed to represent the interests of the peasants. I just don't approve of such talk.

To resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea was to implement the policy of benevolence, and to carry on industrial construction today is likewise to implement this policy.

Policies of benevolence are of two kinds. One is concerned with the people's immediate interests. The other is concerned with their long-term interests, such as resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea and building heavy industry. The first is a policy of lesser benevolence and the second a policy of greater benevolence. Both must be taken into consideration and it is wrong not to do so. Where then is the emphasis to be placed? On the policy of greater benevolence. At present the emphasis in our policy of benevolence should be on the construction of heavy industry. Construction takes money. Therefore, much as the livelihood of the people needs to be improved, this cannot be done to any great extent for the time being. In other words, while we have to improve the people's livelihood, we must not try to do too much, and while we have to make some allowance for it, we must not make too much. To make allowance for the policy of lesser benevolence at the expense of the policy of greater benevolence is to go off the right track.

Now some friends put lop-sided stress on the policy of lesser benevolence; in effect, they wanted us to give up the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, and now they want us to give up the building of heavy industry. We must criticize this erroneous view. It is also to be found in the Communist Party; we came across it in Yenan. In 1941 we collected 200,000 piculs[1] of grain in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, and some people began to yell that the Communist Party was not being considerate of the peasants. A few leading cadres in the Party also brought up this issue of the policy of benevolence. I criticized this view even then. What was the policy of maximum benevolence at that time? To overthrow Japanese imperialism. If we had slashed the amount of grain to be collected from the peasants, we would have had to cut down the size of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. That would have been to the advantage of Japanese imperialism. So those who held this view were actually speaking on behalf of Japanese imperialism and doing it a service.

Now the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea has come to a halt. If the United States wants to resume the war, we will fight on. In that case, we will have to collect grain from the peasants, do work on them and persuade them to make their contribution. To act thus would be truly to serve the interests of the peasants. To raise outcries would actually be to serve the interests of U.S. imperialism.

There are major as well as minor principles. The people's standard of living in the whole country should be raised yearly, but not too much. If it had been raised too much, we could not have fought the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, or at least not in such grim earnest. We have fought this war resolutely and earnestly and with all our might. Whatever was available at home the Korean front could have for the asking. That has been the case for the last few years.

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[1] The picul, a weight for grain, was 150kg. in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, but the standard varied in different places.

CRITICISM OF LIANG SHU-MING'S REACTIONARY IDEAS

September 16-18, 1953

1. Is Mr. Liang Shu-ming a "man of integrity"? What part did he play during the peace negotiations?

Mr. Liang styles himself a "man of integrity", the reactionary press in Hongkong describes Mr. Liang as "one man of the highest integrity" on the mainland, and Taiwan's broadcasts go all out to puff you up, too. Do you really have "integrity"? If you do, then make a clean breast of your past history — how you opposed the Communist Party and the people, how you assassinated people with your pen, and what sort of relations you had with Han Fu-chu, Chang Tung-sun, Chen Li-fu and Chang Chun. You have had them all as close friends. I just don't have that many friends. They were so pleased with you, addressing you as Mister while maligning me as a "bandit". I wonder which party, which faction, you are with! I am not alone, many others have the same suspicions.

From the speech Premier Chou has just made, everybody can see that during our two peace negotiations with the Kuomintang Mr. Liang's position was one of backing Chiang Kai-shek to the hilt at critical junctures. Chiang Kai-shek was only shamming when he agreed to hold peace negotiations. With us here today there are representatives who came to Peking for the peace negotiations and they all know whether Chiang Kai-shek was really for peace or not.

To tell the truth, Chiang Kai-shek is an assassin with a gun and Liang Shu-ming an assassin with a pen. There are two ways of killing people: one is to kill with the gun and the other with the pen. The

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Essential parts of Comrade Mao Tsetung's criticism of Liang Shu-ming at the Twenty-seventh Session of the Central People's Government Council held in Peking. September 16-18, 1953. Members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference who were in Peking at the time sat in on the session.

way which is most artfully disguised and draws no blood is to kill with the pen. That is the kind of murderer you are.

Liang Shu-ming is utterly reactionary, yet he flatly denies it, he says he is a paragon. He is not like Mr. Fu Tso-yi. Mr. Fu openly admits that he was utterly reactionary, yet he did a service to the people in the peaceful liberation of Peking. What service did you do, Liang Shu-ming? In all your life what service have you ever done to the people? Not the slightest, not the least bit. Nevertheless, you describe yourself as an incomparable beauty, outshining Hsi Shih and Wang Chao Chun and rivalling Yang Kuei Fei.

2. Liang Shu-ming has used the expression "the ninth heaven and the ninth hell", alleging that "the workers are up in the ninth heaven whereas the peasants are down in the ninth hell" and that "the workers have the trade unions to fall back on whereas the peasant associations cannot be counted on, nor can the Party, the Youth League, the Women's Federation, and so on; they are all below standard qualitatively and quantitatively and even inferior to the Federation of Industry and Commerce — hence no confidence". Can this be called "support for the general line"? No! It is an *out-and-out reactionary conception*, every bit of it, it is a reactionary proposition, not a rational one. Can the People's Government accept this kind of proposition? I don't think it can.

3. Mr. Liang asks "to be given more information about the plans". I am against this too. On the contrary, we shouldn't let a man like Mr. Liang know much about our confidential matters, the less he knows the better.

Liang Shu-ming is not a man to be trusted. We can let others have more confidential information, but not you. When somewhat restricted meetings of the democratic parties are held, Liang Shu-ming, there is no need for you to attend either.

4. Mr. Liang also asks us not to put him in the non-progressive category and says he belongs to the progressive category. What should we do about it? I think we should be cautious and not make any promise offhand. Otherwise we shall be duped.

5. Mr. Liang paints a very beautiful picture of himself, claiming that several decades ago he already cherished a grand dream for building up our country with a plan which, according to him, came *very close* to New Democracy or socialism.

Is he really so beautiful? Hardly. I know him rather well, and we never met without my having to criticize his erroneous ideas. I once told him to his face, "I never believe in your stuff." To all his talk, such as that "China is without classes", "China's problem is one of cultural maladjustment", it needs "a colourless, transparent government"[1] and "the Chinese revolution has no internal but only external causes", one must now add his brilliant talk about "the ninth heaven and the ninth hell" and about "the Communist Party having abandoned the peasants", "the Communist Party not being as reliable as the Federation of Industry and Commerce", and so on and so forth. Can I believe all this? No! I told him, China's characteristic is that it is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. Since you don't admit this, you are helping imperialism and feudalism. Therefore, nobody believes in your stuff. The people believe in the Communist Party. Nobody reads your books or listens to you except reactionaries and some muddleheads. Besides, it seems Mr. Liang is not opposed to Chiang Kai-shek either. Now I can leave it to you to go into the question of whether he has ever publicly opposed Chiang Kai-shek and his reactionary Kuomintang, since I haven't read all he has written or heard all he has said.

Is such a man entitled to request a people's state to allow him access to more of its plans and confidential matters? I think he is not. Ought we to grant him the request? I think not.

6. Mr. Liang has another request, that we place him in the category of progressives or revolutionaries and not in the category of non-progressives or reactionaries. This is a question of "defining status", what should we do about it? In view of the above circumstances, can we put him in the progressive or the revolutionary category? What progressiveness is there in him? When, if ever, did he take part in the revolution? So we should not readily grant this request either. We'll have to wait and see.

7. In the last few years I have received a number of letters from the people asking why the Communist Party co-operates with reactionaries and have also heard some talk to the same effect. The reactionaries referred to are those who have never been willing to commit themselves, whether in the press or on public occasions, to opposing imperialism, feudalism, Chiang Kai-shek and his reactionary Kuomintang, and whose stand falls short of the minimum requirements of a government worker. Since these persons are particularly unwilling to oppose Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan broadcasts and Hongkong newspapers have gone out of their way to express their appreciation, never abusing them but describing them as "men of the highest integrity" on the mainland. Liang Shu-ming is one of this bunch. On the other

hand, these broadcasts and newspapers pull out all the stops in slandering and vilifying some of our friends. The individuals extolled or never abused by Taiwan are of course *few in number but deserve close attention*.

There are certain persons who to this day would rather die than say a word against Chiang Kai-shek, though they don't mind saying a few words against imperialism. Whether in the press or in public statements, they dare not bring up the past, for they are still tender-hearted about it. I guess there are quite a few of them.

There are three kinds of patriotism, genuine patriotism, sham patriotism, and half-genuine and half-sham, vacillating, patriotism. Everybody knows which kind he comes under and so does Liang Shu-ming. We welcome all those who have truly broken their ties with imperialism and the Taiwan gang, no matter how backward they may be. They are genuine patriots. Sham patriots put on a fine mask, but underneath they are quite different. Vacillating elements are the third kind, they are half-genuine and half-sham in their patriotism, and shift and switch as the trend changes. If a third world war doesn't break out and Chiang Kai-shek doesn't come back, then they will go along with the Communist Party. If a third world war does break out, they will reconsider their course of action. Which of the three kinds makes up the majority? The genuine patriots. The genuine patriots have been on the increase in the last few years, the half-genuine and half-sham ones are small in number, and the sham patriots are only a handful but they do exist. It's up to you to look into the accuracy of this estimate.

8. There is a job I think Liang Shu-ming should do. It's a job not of "representing the peasants" and "appealing for their liberation" to the People's Government but of giving a clear account of the development over the years of his reactionary ideas against the people. He should make clear how he opposed the Communist Party and the people on behalf of the landlords in the past, and how he has now changed his stand from one of representing the landlords to one of "representing the peasants" — only when he is able to explain how this change has occurred, and make it convincing into the bargain, can we determine which category to put him in. He gives me the impression that he has never contemplated changing his reactionary stand. Nevertheless, to cure the sickness and save the patient, I suggest that he be given time for self-examination and that we refer the matter

to the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference instead of passing judgment on him now.

9. "All men have a sense of shame,"[2] and if a man has no sense of shame, it's hopeless. Mr. Liang says that he is wiser than the Communist Party on the peasant question — will anybody believe that? This is like showing off one's proficiency with the axe before Lu Pan the master carpenter. If, for instance, it should be said that "Mao Tsetung excels Mr. Mei Lan-fang in acting, or the Volunteers in digging tunnels, or the air force hero Chao Pao-tung in flying", wouldn't that be the acme of shamelessness? So the question posed by Mr. Liang is both serious and not serious and smacks of the ridiculous. He asserts that he is better qualified than the Communist Party to represent the peasants, isn't that ridiculous?

Now there are so many "representatives of the peasants", and who in the world do they represent? Do they represent the peasants? I don't think they look the part, nor do the peasants think so. They represent the landlord class and render it service. And the most prominent of them all is Liang Shu-ming, who with sweet words on his lips is actually helping the enemy. Some others among them are muddle-headed and have said stupid things, yet they are patriots and have China in their hearts. This is one type. Liang Shu-ming is another type. And there are others like him who pose as "representatives of the peasants". Fakes do exist, and now we are coming across them. Each of these persons has a tail like a fox, that's plain to all. The Monkey Sun Wu-kung is able to make seventy-two metamorphoses, but there is always one difficulty, changing his tail. He changes himself into a temple and turns his tail into a flagstaff, but the warrior god Yang Erh-lang spots the trick. And how? By spotting his tail. There is in fact a type of person who cannot hide his tail no matter how he disguises himself.

Liang Shu-ming is an ambitious schemer, a hypocrite. He lies when he says he takes no interest in politics and seeks no office. He used to engage in what he called "rural construction", and what sort of "rural construction" was it? Construction for the landlords, rural destruction and national ruin!

10. If you have dealings with that man you can't take him seriously. You can never thrash out any problem with him, for he follows no logic and only talks drivel. So I suggest that his problem be referred to the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference

for discussion at its bi-weekly forum. At the same time I should like to warn you not to entertain any hope of finding a real solution. That is absolutely impossible. The outcome can only be, "No decision after deliberation, no action even with a decision, and no fruitful result on adjournment." Even so, I advise you to try it out at the bi-weekly forum, for that is better than "sending a couple of people" to listen to his rigmarole.

II. Are we going to take this opportunity to break with him and have nothing more to do with him? No, we are not. So long as he wishes to have relations with us, we are ready to reciprocate. I still hope that he will be re-elected to the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference at its Second Plenary Session. That's because there are still people who are prone to be deceived by him and do not know him well, and he still has a role to play as live teaching material; he is therefore qualified for re-election, unless he himself has lost the desire to use the platform of the Political Consultative Conference to spread his reactionary ideas.

As I have said earlier, Liang Shu-ming has performed no service whatsoever and is good for nothing. Is he any good for providing us with products and paying income tax like the industrialists and businessmen? No, he is not. Is he any good for developing production and making the economy prosperous? No, he is not. Did he ever rebel? No, he did not. When, if ever, did he oppose Chiang Kai-shek or imperialism? Never. When, if ever, did he do anything to co-operate with the Chinese Communist Party in overthrowing imperialism and feudalism? Never. Therefore, he has performed no service. The man refused to nod his head in favour but shook it in disapproval of such a great struggle as the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. Then, why is it that he is on the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference? Why is it that the Chinese Communist Party has nominated him for membership of this committee? Precisely because he can still deceive a number of people and has a certain deceptiveness. His credentials are deception, that's exactly what he has.

For Liang Shu-ming, whoever nods in recognition of his being correct is "magnanimous" and whoever fails to do so isn't. I am afraid we don't have such "magnanimity". But we have at least this much, that is, Liang Shu-ming, you can continue as a member of the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference.

12. Confucius, I hold, had the faults of not being democratic and of lacking a self-critical spirit, in a way rather like Mr. Liang. Confucius said, "Since I took Tzu Lu as a disciple, I have never heard ill of myself";[3] his school "thrice filled up and thrice emptied",[4] and he "executed Shaocheng Mao within three months of taking office"[5] — he came close to being a despot and reeked of fascism. I hope my friends, and you Mr. Liang in particular, won't follow Confucius' example, and if you don't it will be most gratifying.

13. If Mr. Liang's lofty programme were followed, not only would socialism be impossible in China, but our parties (the other parties as well as the Communist Party) and our country would all be ruined. His line is the bourgeois line. Po I-po's mistake is a reflection of bourgeois ideas inside our Party. But Po I-po is better than Liang Shu-ming.

Liang Shu-ming says that the workers are "up in the ninth heaven" and the peasants are "down in the ninth hell". What are the facts? There is indeed a gap, with the workers earning more than the peasants, but after the agrarian reform the peasants now have land and houses and their life is improving every day. Some peasants fare even better than workers. Some workers are still in difficulty. What can be done to help the peasants earn more? Have you any suggestion, Liang Shu-ming? In your view, "the trouble lies not in scarcity but in uneven distribution".[6] Your idea is not to have the peasants increase their income through their own efforts in production but to equalize the earnings of the workers and peasants by taking away part of the former's earnings to distribute among the latter. If your idea were adopted, wouldn't that spell the destruction of China's industry? Such a diversion of the workers' earnings would mean the ruin of our country and our parties. Don't think that ruin would befall the Communist Party alone, the democratic parties would be in it too.

You say the workers are "up in the ninth heaven", then in which heaven are you, Liang Shu-ming? You are up in the tenth heaven, the eleventh, the twelfth, nay, the thirteenth heaven, because you get a salary far bigger than a worker's wage! Yet what you propose to cut first is not your own salary but the workers' wages. I take this to be unfair. If you want to be fair, cut your own salary first because you are far above "the ninth heaven"!

Our Party has stood for the worker-peasant alliance for more than three decades. Marxism-Leninism stands precisely for alliance and co-operation between workers and peasants. There are two alliances in China: one is the alliance of the working class with the peasantry, and the other is the alliance of the working class with the capitalists, professors, senior technical personnel, Kuomintang generals who have come over to our side, religious leaders, democratic parties and democrats without party affiliation. Both alliances are necessary and must continue. Which of the two is the base, which of the two is of primary importance? The alliance of the working class with the peasantry. Liang Shu-ming asserts that the worker-peasant alliance is in ruins and there is no hope for national construction. In other words, unless his ideas are adopted, the worker-peasant alliance has no hope of success, national construction cannot make headway, and there will be no hope for socialism! Indeed, there is no hope for the sort of "worker-peasant alliance" Liang Shu-ming has in mind. Yours is the bourgeois line. If your line were followed, the result would be the ruin of our country, China would be back on the old road of semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism, and there would be a rally in Peking to welcome Chiang Kai-shek and Eisenhower. Let me repeat, we'll never adopt your line!

Since we moved into the cities, Liang Shu-ming asserts, we have "forgotten" the countryside and it has become a "void". That's an attempt to foment discord. In the last three years we have devoted our main effort to rural work. It was only this year that we started diverting large numbers of leading cadres to urban work, but the bulk of our cadres are still working in the counties, districts and townships. How can it be asserted that we have forgotten the countryside!

Liang Shu-ming also accuses our rural work of being "backward" and our grass-roots cadres of "violating the law and discipline". What are known as backward townships do exist in the rural areas. But how many are there? Only 10 per cent. Why are they backward? Chiefly because reactionary elements, enemy gendarmes and agents, heads of reactionary secret societies, hooligans and ruffians, landlords and rich peasants have wormed their way in, become cadres and usurped the power of village governments, and some have even sneaked into the Communist Party. These types account for 80 to 90 per cent of the cadres guilty of serious violations of the law and of discipline, and degenerate cadres make up the rest. Therefore, the main problem in the backward townships is to strike at the counter-revolutionaries, but the degenerate cadres must be weeded out too. What is the proportion of the good and fairly good townships in the country as a whole? Ninety per cent. We must have a clear idea about this situation and not be fooled by Liang Shu-ming.

14. Do we reject representations and gloss over errors? If the sort of idea advanced by Mr. Liang can be called a "representation", I declare that we do "reject representations". But we do not gloss over errors. We firmly stand for the leadership of the proletariat over all and sundry (workers, peasants, industrialists and businessmen, the nationalities, democratic parties and people's organizations, industry, agriculture, political and military affairs, in short, everything) and for both unity and struggle. If you want to sound us out, then this is one thing you will learn, a thing which is fundamental in nature. This is no trifling matter, is it?

15. Liang Shu-ming's problem has significance for the whole country and, like the case of Po I-po, should be taken up and discussed by the whole Party and the whole nation. Look for typical examples and unfold criticism and self-criticism. Let the whole nation discuss the general line.

There are two ways of making criticism: one is by self-criticism and the other by criticism. How shall we have it in your case, Liang Shu-ming? Will it be self-criticism? No, it will be criticism.

Our criticism of Liang Shu-ming is not directed against him alone, it is through him that we expose the reactionary ideas he represents. Reactionary as Liang Shu-ming is, we nevertheless treat his case as falling within the scope of ideological remoulding. Whether or not he can be remoulded is another question. Most likely he cannot be remoulded. It doesn't matter if he is beyond remoulding, for he is just one individual. However, a debate with him is useful. Don't think that we are making a mountain out of a molehill and that it is not worth the effort. Our debate with him will help clarify the question. If he is at all useful, this is where his usefulness lies. What's the question now under debate? Isn't it that of the general line? To clarify this question will be good for all of us.

NOTES

[1] By advocating "a colourless, transparent government" Liang Shu-ming was preaching that the government should be free of any party or faction coloration and should be a "colourless, transparent entity" transcending classes.

[2] *Mencius*, "Kao Tzu", Part I.

[3] This quotation is from the *Historical Records*, an ancient Chinese historical work. Tzu Lu was Confucius' disciple and attendant. After Tzu Lu became his attendant, no adverse opinions ever reached Confucius.

[4] "Confucius' school thrice filled up and thrice emptied" is a quotation from "On Happy Omens" in the *Critical Essays* by Wang Chung of the Han Dynasty. Confucius ran a school in the state of Lu to glorify the reactionary slave system. Shaocheng Mao also ran a school, and Confucius' disciples frequently flocked to hear him. As a result, Shaocheng Mao's school was packed while Confucius' school was often empty.

[5] According to the *Historical Records*, Confucius served as Minister of Justice and then as acting Prime Minister of the state of Lu. He put his rival Shaocheng Mao to death within three months of assuming the latter post.

[6] *Confucian Analects*, Book XVI, "Chi Shih".

TWO TALKS ON MUTUAL AID AND CO-OPERATION IN AGRICULTURE

October and November 1953

I. THE TALK OF OCTOBER 15

Make a success of the agricultural producers' co-operatives and a big expansion of the mutual-aid teams will follow.

In the new liberated areas every county, whether large, medium-sized or small, should set up one or two successful co-operatives this winter and next spring after full preparations; there should be at least one, on the average one to two and at most three, depending on how well the work has been done. Quotas should be allotted. To make the quota too big would mean rash advance and to make it too small would be a Right deviation. To make the quota optional would be to let things drift. Can there be more than three? So long as the co-operatives meet the requirements, conform to the regulations and resolutions, are set up on a voluntary basis, have strong leading cadres (their two chief qualifications being fair-mindedness and competence) and are well run, then the more the better, as Han Hsin said about the number of troops he could command.[1]

The prefectural and county Party committees should be urged to make vigorous efforts and do a good job. The rural work departments of the Central Committee bureaus and of the provincial and municipal Party committees should keep a firm grasp on this matter and make it the pivot of their work.

There should be control figures and an allotment of quotas. Allotment without compulsion — this is not commandism. After the October

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Two talks to the responsible members of the Rural Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party before and during the Third Conference on Mutual Aid and Co-operation in Agriculture, which was convened by the Central Committee and held from October 26 to November 5, 1953.

conference, there are four or five months to go, that is, November and December this year, January and February next year, and in the north the month of March as well. We give clear notice now that early next year another meeting will be called to check up on the work. There will definitely be a check-up then to see- how it is getting on.

Certain minority nationality areas where the agrarian reform has not been completed can be exempted from setting up co-operatives. The small number of poorly managed counties, for instance, counties where backward townships account for 30 to 40 per cent of the total, where Party secretaries are incompetent and where the work cannot start without leading to trouble, can be exempted for the time being and given no quota. Nevertheless, the provincial and prefectural Party committees should assume responsibility for helping them to straighten things out and to create the conditions for starting the work next winter after the autumn harvest.

The general pattern is to proceed from the mutual-aid team to the co-operative, but it is also permissible to try and set up the co-operative directly. If you take the direct path and succeed, that will speed up the work. So why can't it be tried? It can.

The rural work departments at all levels should look upon mutual aid and co-operation as a matter of vital importance. Peasants working on their own cannot raise production to any great extent, therefore we must promote mutual aid and co-operation. If socialism does not occupy the rural positions, capitalism inevitably will. Is it possible to take any road other than the capitalist or the socialist road? The capitalist road can also lead to increased production, but the time required would be longer and the course painful. We will not practise capitalism, that's settled. Yet capitalism is bound to spread unchecked unless we go in for socialism.

The general line, the general programme, industrialization and socialist transformation should be discussed at the forthcoming October conference.

Both "sustain private property" and the "four big freedoms"[2] benefit the rich peasants and the well-to-do middle peasants. Why then are there relevant stipulations in the law? The law stipulates protection of private property, but the word "sustain" is not in it. Some peasants are selling their land now, which is not good, though the law does not prohibit it, we should make efforts to prevent them from doing so. Setting up co-operatives is the solution. Mutual-aid teams by themselves are not enough to stop peasants selling their land, only co-operatives, and big ones at that, can do so. Moreover, big co-operatives can eliminate the need of some peasants to rent out land, for a big co-operative of one or two hundred households can solve the problem by taking in households of widows, orphans and others not provided for. The question of whether small co-operatives can likewise take in a few has to be studied. The mutual-aid teams should also help widows, orphans and others not provided for. If you can't set up a big co-operative, try a medium-sized one; if you can't set up a medium-sized co-operative, try a small one. But go for a medium-sized or big co-operative wherever possible, and don't be upset at the sight of a big one. A co-operative of one or two hundred households can be counted big, but a co-operative of even three or four hundred households is also possible. Setting up several sub-co-operatives under a big co-operative is an innovation, and it is by no means necessary to dissolve it. Running a co-operative well does not mean bringing everything to perfection. Absorb all kinds of experience, and don't impose the same pattern everywhere.

More co-operatives should be established in the old liberated areas. But some new liberated areas may set up co-operatives at a faster tempo than some old ones. For instance, the central Shensi plain may develop faster than northern Shensi, the Chengtu plain faster than Fuping and other such places. We must dispel the idea that the new liberated areas are destined to go slow. In fact the Northeast is not an old liberated area, its southern part not differing much from the new liberated areas south of the Great Wall. Kiangsu and the Hangchow-Chiahsing-Huchow region will probably overtake the mountainous old liberated areas in Shantung and North China, and so they should. Generally speaking, the new liberated areas may be allowed more time for their work, but in those places where the cadres are strong, the population is dense and the terrain level, co-operatives are likely to grow fairly quickly once a few models are set up.

There are now six thousand co-operatives in North China. If the figure is to be doubled, quotas can be allotted straight away. If the figure is to be tripled, those concerned should be consulted. We should allot quotas reasonably and have control figures, otherwise we shall be working without clear aims. The Northeast should increase its co-operatives by 100, 150 or 200 per cent, and so should North China. The control figures should not be too high, so that the localities may surpass them. Overfulfilment will greatly enhance people's enthusiasm.

In developing co-operatives, we should strive for quantity, quality and economy. By economy we mean no failures; failures are a waste of the peasants' energy, with the bad end-result of losses both politically and in the production of grain. Our final objective is to produce more grain, cotton, sugar-cane, vegetables, and so on. There will be no way out unless grain production is increased, otherwise neither the state nor the people will benefit.

Nor will there be a way out unless more vegetables are produced in the suburbs, otherwise neither the state nor the people will benefit. Since the outlying districts of the cities have rich soil and flat farmlands which moreover are publicly owned, big co-operatives may be set up there first. Of course, the work needs to be quite painstaking, and there is even less room for sloppiness, because growing vegetables is different from growing grain. We must set up pilot co-operatives and guard against rash advance.

To meet the urban demand for vegetables, we cannot rely on peasants working on their own to bring their produce to the market. Ways must be worked out at the production end as well as by the supply and marketing co-operatives. As regards vegetables for the large cities, there is a big contradiction between supply and demand at present.

There are also big contradictions between supply and demand in the cases of grain and cotton, and others will soon emerge in the cases of meat, fats and edible oils. Demand is growing fast and cannot be met.

To resolve the contradiction between supply and demand, it is necessary to resolve the contradiction between ownership and the productive forces. Should ownership be individual or collective? Capitalist ownership or socialist ownership? Abundant supplies and the relations of production under individual ownership are utterly incompatible with each other. There must be a transition from individual ownership to collective ownership, to socialism. There are elementary co-operatives where land is pooled as shares, and there are advanced co-operatives in which land is owned in common, that is, by the co-operative.

In a sense the purpose of the general line is the solution of the problem of ownership. State ownership is to be expanded by building new state enterprises and renovating and enlarging old ones. The two kinds of private ownership, that of the working people and that of the bourgeoisie, are to be changed respectively into collective ownership and state ownership (integration into socialism through joint state-private management). Only thus can the productive forces be expanded and China's industrialization accomplished. Only when the productive forces have developed can the contradiction between supply and demand be resolved.

II. THE TALK OF NOVEMBER 4

Whatever we do must accord with reality, otherwise it is wrong. In order to do what accords with reality we must consider what is imperative and what is possible, and what is possible depends on political and economic conditions and the cadre situation. At present, it is at once imperative and possible to develop agricultural producers' co-operatives, for which there is a great potential. Failure to tap this potential means to mark time and make no advance. Our legs are for walking, and it is wrong to stand still all the time. It is not right to force the dissolution of co-operatives which meet the requirements, this is wrong no matter what the circumstances. The campaign to "check impetuosity and rash advance" was a gust of wind, wasn't it? As it blew from above, it brought down a number of agricultural producers' co-operatives that should have survived. An investigation should be made about such co-operatives, the findings made known and the mistake admitted, otherwise the township cadres and activists in those places will have pent-up grievances.

We must work for socialism. "Sustain private property" is a bourgeois concept. "To be together all day long and never talk about fundamentals but take pleasure only in giving small favours — indeed it's a hopeless case!" "Never talk about fundamentals" means never talking about socialism, never working for socialism. Agricultural credits, relief grain, taxation according to fixed rates, tax reduction and exemption according to law, small-scale water conservancy projects, wells and canals, deep ploughing and close planting, proper application of fertilizer, popularization of new-type walking ploughs, water-wheels, sprayers, insecticides, etc. — all these things are fine. But to do all this on the basis of the small peasant economy instead of by relying on socialism is to give the peasants small favours. Once these fine things are linked to the general line and to socialism, the case will be different, and they will no longer be small favours. We must work for socialism and link these fine things with it. As for "sustain private property" and the "four big freedoms", there is all the more reason to call them small favours, and besides, they are favours to the rich and well-to-do middle peasants. To lay one's hopes for greatly increased grain production and for a solution of the food problem and of the all-important problem of the nation's economy and the people's livelihood not on socialism but on making much of the small peasant economy and on giving small favours on the basis of the individual economy — "indeed it's a hopeless case"!

As an old saying goes, "Once the headrope of a fishing net is pulled up, all its meshes open." It is only by taking hold of the key link that everything else will fall into its proper place. The key link means the main theme. The contradiction between socialism and capitalism and the gradual resolution of this contradiction — that is the main theme, the key link. Grasp this key link, and all kinds of political and economic work to help the peasants will fall under it.

There are contradictions both inside and outside the agricultural producers' co-operatives. The present co-operatives are semi-socialist, whereas peasants working on their own outside the co-operatives are entirely under the system of private ownership. Hence there is a contradiction between the two. The mutual-aid teams are different from the agricultural producers' co-operatives in that the former engage only in collective labour and do not affect ownership. The present-day co-operatives are built on the basis of private ownership, with privately owned land, draught animals and large farm implements pooled as shares. Hence there is also a contradiction inside the co-operatives between the socialist factors and private ownership, a contradiction which must gradually be resolved. In the future, when our present-day semi-public, semi-private ownership advances to collective ownership, this contradiction will be resolved. We are taking steady steps, moving first from mutual-aid teams which contain rudiments of socialism to semi-socialist and later to fully socialist co-operatives (which we still call agricultural producers' co-operatives, not collective farms). Generally speaking, the mutual-aid teams remain the foundation of the agricultural producers' co-operatives.

At one time, no mention was made of mutual aid and co-operation in several of our documents, and to all of them I added words to the effect that mutual aid and co-operation were to be developed or that necessary and feasible political and economic work was to be done. Some people wanted to make much of the small peasant economy, and this was why they concentrated on opposing excessive meddling with the peasants. True, there was some excessive meddling at that time. The "five excesses" from higher up were rammed through various channels down to the lower levels, causing a lot of trouble. The "five excesses" should never be tolerated, whether in the villages, factories or army units. The Central Committee has issued several documents to combat excessive meddling, and this has done some good. What is meant by excessive meddling? Drawing up subjective plans at variance with reality and regardless of what is imperative and possible, or carrying out plans, even realistic ones, by means of commandism. Subjectivism and commandism are always bad and will be so even ten thousand years hence. They are bad for the scattered small peasant economy and no less so for the co-operatives. But to do what is both imperative and possible and moreover do it by means other than commandism — this cannot be called excessive meddling. The above ought to be the yardstick when reviewing our work. Whatever is subjectivist and unrealistic is wrong. Whatever is done through commandism is likewise wrong. To mark time and make no advance is a deviation to the Right; to go beyond what is practicable is a deviation to the "Left". Both are manifestations of subjectivism. Rash advance is wrong, failure to set up co-operatives when they can be set up is also wrong, and forcible dissolution of co-operatives even worse.

"Life is hard in the villages, all is not well and the measures adopted do not suit the small peasant economy." Such complaints exist inside as well as outside the Party. True, life is a bit hard in the villages, but we ought to make a proper analysis. In fact, life is not all that hard, the grain-deficient households account for only 10 per cent or so, and half of them are those of widows, orphans and other people without a provider, who are in great difficulty for lack of labour-power, but the mutual-aid teams and the co-operatives can give them some help. After all, things are much better for them than in Kuomintang days, and land has been distributed to them. Life is indeed hard for people in areas stricken by natural calamities, but they have received relief grain. The life of the peasants in general is good and is getting better; that is why 80 to 90 per cent of them feel happy and support the government. About 7 per cent of the rural population, the landlords and rich peasants, are dissatisfied with the government. "Life is hard in the villages, and things are terrible there" — certainly this has not been my view. Some people speak of the scattered nature as well as the hardships of the villages, that is, the scattered nature of the small peasant economy; but in doing so, they fail to mention forming co-operatives. To carry out the socialist transformation of the individual economy, to promote mutual aid and co-operation and to set up co-operatives — this is not merely the direction to take but the immediate task before us.

But for the Conference on Financial and Economic Work held in July and August, the question of the general line would have remained unsettled for many comrades. The aim of that conference was mainly to settle this question. We criticized Po I-po precisely for his mistake in departing from the general line. In short, the general line means the gradual accomplishment of the socialist industrialization of our country and of the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce. The planned purchase and supply of grain recently put into effect has given a big impetus to socialism. The present Conference on Mutual Aid and Co-operation, coming shortly after as it does, will give it another big impetus. In view of the fact that the campaign for mutual aid and co-operation has been held back for the better part of this year, the present conference should be more active in this respect. But our policies must be made clear. It is very important to make our policies known.

"Active leadership and steady development" — this is well put. The campaign has been held back for the better part of this year and has marked time without making any advance. This is not quite right. However, there is a positive side to it. It is like fighting battles. After each battle there should be time for rest and consolidation before starting the next. The trouble is that in some places too many of our positions have been given up, while in others it has not been a matter of giving up too many positions but failure to develop where development was possible and failure to allow any development or give it approval so that it became illegal. In this world it often happens that many new-born things which are correct are considered illegal. We ourselves were "illegal" in the past while the Kuomintang was "legal". But these illegal co-operatives have held on to this day and are doing quite well. Can you still withhold recognition? You have to admit that they are legal, after all they have won out.

The conference has discussed active leadership and steady development, but you should anticipate some troubles. You may talk about being active and steady, and yet in practice you may fail to give active leadership or achieve steady development. Being active and steady entails setting control figures, assigning tasks and then checking whether they are fulfilled. Failure to fulfil what can be fulfilled is impermissible, it shows a lack of enthusiasm for socialism. According to the findings of our check-up, 5 to 10 per cent of the co-operatives have shown a drop in output and are not doing so well. This is due to lack of active leadership. Of course, it is inevitable that a few co-operatives should show a fall in production because of poor management. However, if 20 per cent of the co-operatives, or even more, were to show a fall in production, that would be quite a problem.

The general line means a gradual change in the relations of production. According to Stalin, the system of ownership is the basis of the relations of production.[3] Comrades must have a clear understanding of this point. At present, both private ownership and socialist public ownership are legal, but private ownership will gradually become illegal. To "sustain private ownership" of three *mou* of land and practise the "four big freedoms" is to facilitate the growth of a small number of rich peasants and follow the capitalist road.

County and district cadres must gradually switch their work to mutual aid and co-operation in agricultural production, to the promotion of socialism. If they are not working for socialism, what are they working for? For the individual economy? Secretaries of county and district Party committees must look upon working for socialism as a matter of major importance. Party secretaries must take charge, and I am the secretary of the Central Committee. Secretaries of the Central Committee bureaus, secretaries of the provincial, prefectural, county and district Party committees and secretaries at all levels must take charge and attend to the job in person. At present, the Central Committee is devoting 70 to 80 per cent of its efforts to the socialist transformation of agriculture. Similarly, to transform capitalist industry and commerce is also to work for socialism. Comrades of the rural work departments at all levels and all those present at this conference must become experts in the socialist transformation of agriculture and well versed in theory, line, policy and method.

To provide the cities with vegetables depends chiefly on planned supply. There are dense populations in the large and rising cities, and how can they possibly manage without vegetables? This problem must be solved. If it is not possible to ensure the production and supply of vegetables by setting up mutual-aid teams in the suburban areas, you can bypass that stage and set up semi-socialist or even fully socialist co-operatives. This question needs going into.

A plan for the development of the producers' co-operatives has been put forward. Over 32,000 co-operatives are to be set up this winter and next spring and right up to the time of the autumn harvest. By 1957, the number will have reached 700,000. But a sudden increase at one time or another should be expected, and the number of co-operatives may rise to a million, or perhaps more. In short, set up co-operatives in large numbers and manage them well, give active leadership and achieve steady development.

This conference has been fruitful. If we had not held it and waited till next January, it would have been too late, and this winter would have slipped by. We shall hold another conference on March 26 next year and check up on how our plan has been carried out. It is a good idea for this conference to fix the date of the next meeting and to decide that it will review the implementation of the resolution adopted here. Next autumn we shall hold still another conference to discuss and decide on the tasks for the following winter.

NOTES

[1] Han Hsin was a leading general under Liu Pang, first emperor of the Han Dynasty. According to the *Historical Records*, Liu Pang once asked Han Hsin how many troops he could command. "The more the better," he answered.

[2] See p. 224 below.

[3] J. V. Stalin, "Dialectical and Historical Materialism".

ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

June 14, 1954

This Draft Constitution obviously has popular support. From the discussions by more than five hundred people in Peking and by activists from various circles in the provinces and municipalities, that is, from the extensive discussions by over eight thousand people representative of the whole country, we can tell that the preliminary text was quite good and won general approval and support. At today's session many have also spoken in approval.

Why organize these extensive discussions? There are several advantages. First, will what has been worked out by the few meet the approval of the many? The discussions indicate that there is general approval of the main provisions and the basic principles of the preliminary text. All that is sound in the preliminary text has been retained. The fact that the ideas of a few leaders have won the approval of several thousand people shows that these ideas are well grounded, suitable and feasible. This gives us confidence. Second, in the discussions over 5,900 suggestions (not including queries) have been collected. They are of three kinds. The first consists of suggestions that are incorrect. The second consists of suggestions that are not so much wrong as unsuitable and that had better not be adopted. If they are not going to be adopted, why collect them? Does it do any good to collect these suggestions? Yes, it does. It enables us to know that such views about the constitution exist among the eight thousand people and to make comparisons. The third consists of those suggestions that have been adopted. These are of course very good and necessary. But for these suggestions, the preliminary text, although basically sound, would have remained imperfect, faulty and not well thought out. The draft in its present form may still

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Speech at the Thirtieth Session of the Central People's Government Council.

have faults and imperfections, and we shall have to ask the people throughout the country for their opinions. As far as we can tell now, this draft is relatively free from imperfections, and that is the result of adopting rational suggestions.

Why has the Draft Constitution won popular support? I think one reason is that in drafting it we adopted the method of integrating the ideas of the leading body with those of the masses. This Draft Constitution combines the ideas of a few leaders with those of more than eight thousand people and, after publication, it will be discussed by the entire nation so that the ideas of the Central Committee will be integrated with those of the whole people. This is the way to integrate the leadership with the masses and with the large numbers of activists. We adopted this method in the past, and we shall do so in future. It should be used in all important legislation. By this method we have now produced a Draft Constitution which is fairly good and relatively free from imperfections.

Why do all of you here and the vast numbers of activists support the Draft Constitution and find it satisfactory? There are two main reasons: one is that it sums up the experience of the past and the other is that it combines principle with flexibility.

First, it sums up the experience of the past, especially that in our revolution and construction over the last five years. It sums up our experience in the people's revolution led by the proletariat against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism as well as our experience in social reform, economic construction, cultural construction and government work over the last few years. Besides, it sums up the experience in constitution-making since the last years of the Ching Dynasty, that is, from the Nineteen Constitutional Articles[1] in the final days of the Ching Dynasty to the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China[2] in 1912, the various constitutions and draft constitutions under the governments of the Northern warlords,[3] the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China in the Period Under Political Tutelage of the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek regime and right up to Chiang Kai-shek's bogus constitution. One of these was positive in nature and the others negative. Thus the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China in 1912 was a fairly good one for its time. Of course it had its imperfections and faults and was bourgeois in nature, but there was something revolutionary and democratic about it. It was concise and is said to have been drafted in haste, taking only a month from the time of its framing to its adoption. As for the other constitutions and draft constitutions, they were altogether reactionary. This Draft Constitution of ours is chiefly a summing-up of our experience in revolution and construction, but at the same time it is a synthesis of domestic and international experience. Our constitution is of a socialist type. It is based mainly on our own experience but has drawn upon what is good in the constitutions of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Speaking of constitutions, the bourgeoisie was the forerunner. The bourgeoisie, whether in Britain, France or the United States, was revolutionary for a period, and it was during this period that the bourgeoisie began making constitutions. We should not write off bourgeois democracy with one stroke of the pen and deny bourgeois constitutions a place in history. All the same, present-day bourgeois constitutions are no good at all, they are bad, particularly the constitutions of the imperialist countries, which are designed to deceive and oppress the majority of the people. Our constitution is of a new, socialist type, different from any of the bourgeois type. It is far more progressive than the constitutions of the bourgeoisie even in its revolutionary period. We are superior to the bourgeoisie.

Second, our Draft Constitution combines principle with flexibility.- There are two basic principles, the principle of democracy and the principle of socialism. Our democracy is not bourgeois democracy but people's democracy, that is, a people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant alliance. The principle of people's democracy runs through the whole constitution. The other principle is that of socialism. Socialism already exists in our country today. The constitution stipulates that socialist transformation must be- accomplished and the socialist industrialization of the country realized.- That's our principle. To carry out this principle of socialism, are we to put socialism into practice overnight in every sphere throughout the country? This might seem very revolutionary, but for lack of flexibility it just won't work, it will meet with opposition and end in failure. So, what cannot be done for the moment must be given time to be done gradually. For instance, state capitalism, as stipulated, is to be put into practice gradually. It takes various forms, not just that of joint state-private management. Note the words "gradually" and "various". That is to say, state capitalism in various forms is to be put into practice gradually so as to attain socialist ownership by the whole people. Socialist ownership by the whole people is the principle, but in order to realize this principle we should combine it with flexibility. And flexibility means state capitalism, which takes not one but "various" forms, and which is to be realized not overnight but "gradually". That makes for flexibility. We write into our constitution what is feasible now and exclude what is not. Let us take for instance the material guarantees for civil rights. They will certainly expand when production grows in future, but the wording in the constitution is only "gradually expand". This, too, means flexibility. Take another instance, the united front. This was written into the Common Programme. And now it is again written into the Preamble to the Draft Constitution. It is necessary to have a "broad people's democratic united front composed of all democratic classes, democratic parties and groups, and people's organizations". This will serve to reassure the various social strata, the national bourgeoisie and the democratic parties as well as the peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie. And then there is the question of the minority nationalities, which has both its generality and its particularity. The general provisions in the constitution apply to its generality and the particular provisions to its particularity. The minority nationalities have characteristics of their own politically, economically and culturally. What are the characteristics of their economy? To cite one example. Article 5 of our Draft Constitution states that four forms of ownership of the means of production exist in the People's Republic of China. In fact, there are other forms of ownership in our minority nationality areas. Does primitive communal ownership still exist in our country? I'm afraid it does among some minority nationalities. Similarly, slave ownership and feudal ownership still exist. From a contemporary standpoint the slave system, the feudal system and the capitalist system are all bad, but historically they were more progressive than the primitive communal system. These systems were progressive at first but not later on and were therefore supplanted in their turn. Article 70 of our Draft Constitution stipulates that the minority nationality areas "may, in the light of the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in a given area, make regulations on the exercise of autonomy as well as specific regulations". All these are instances of the integration of principle and flexibility.

This Draft Constitution has won general praise and support precisely for these two reasons: it correctly and properly sums up past experience, and it correctly and properly integrates principle and flexibility. Otherwise, I don't think people would praise and support it.

It is entirely possible and it is necessary to put this Draft Constitution into force. Of course, it is still a draft today, but a few months from now, after it has been approved by the National People's Congress, it will be the formal constitution. We should be getting ready now to enforce it. Once it is approved, the whole nation, one and all, should observe it. State personnel particularly, and in the first place those present here, should take the lead in observing it. To fail to observe the constitution is to violate it.

When promulgated, our Draft Constitution will win the unanimous support of the whole people and enhance their enthusiasm. An organization must have rules, and so must a state. A constitution is a set of general rules, it is the fundamental law. To codify the principles of people's democracy and socialism in the form of a fundamental law, in the form of the constitution, so that there will be a clear course before the people of the whole country and they will feel sure they have a clear, definite and correct path to follow — this will heighten their enthusiasm.

Will this Draft Constitution produce an impact on the world when it is promulgated? Yes, it will, both on the democratic camp and on the capitalist countries. People in the democratic camp will be glad to see that we have charted a clear, definite and correct path. They will be glad because we Chinese are glad. The oppressed and exploited people in the capitalist countries will also be glad when they come to know about it. Of course there are some who will not be pleased, neither the imperialists nor Chiang Kai-shek will. Do you think Chiang Kai-shek will be happy? I say you know without asking him that he won't. We know Chiang Kai-shek only too well, he will definitely be against it. And President Eisenhower will not be happy either, he will say it's no good. They will say that this constitution of ours has charted a clear and definite but very bad path, a wrong path, and that socialism and people's democracy are blunders. Nor will they approve of our flexibility. What they would like best would be for us to conjure up socialism overnight and make a mess of everything. That would make them really happy. Also, they won't like China having a united front, they want us to play "a one-party game". Our constitution has national characteristics but at the same time has an international character; it's a national and also an international phenomenon. Many nations are oppressed by imperialism and feudalism, as we were once, and they are a majority of the world's population. It will be helpful to the people of these countries that we have a revolutionary constitution, a people's democratic constitution, and a clear, definite and correct path.

Our general objective is to strive to build a great socialist country. Ours is a big country of 600 million people. How long will it really take to accomplish socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation and mechanization of agriculture and make China a great socialist country? We won't set a rigid time-limit now. It will probably take a period of three five-year plans, or fifteen years, to lay the foundation. Will China then become a great country? Not necessarily. I think for us to build a great socialist country, about fifty years, or ten five-year plans, will probably be enough. By then China will be in good shape and quite different from what it is now. What can we make at present? We can make tables and chairs, teacups and teapots, we can grow grain and grind it into flour, and we can make paper. But we can't make a single motor car, plane, tank or tractor. So we mustn't brag and be cocky. Of course I don't mean we can become cocky when we turn out our first car, more cocky when we make ten cars, and still more cocky when we make more and more cars. That won't do. Even after fifty years, when our country is in good shape, we should remain as modest as we are now. If by then we should become conceited and look down on others, it would be bad. We mustn't be conceited even a hundred years from now. We must never be cocky.

This constitution of ours is of a socialist type, but it is not yet a completely socialist constitution. It is a constitution for the transition period. We must now unite the people of the whole country and unite all the forces that can and should be united in the struggle to build a great socialist country. And the constitution has been drawn up specifically for this purpose.

Finally, a word by way of explanation. Some say that it is out of exceptional modesty on the part of certain individuals that some articles have been deleted from the Draft Constitution. This is not the way to put it. It is not out of modesty but because inclusion of these articles would be improper, unjustifiable and unscientific. In a people's democratic state like ours such improper articles ought not to be written into the constitution. We have not omitted, out of modesty, what ought to have been included. With science, modesty or immodesty is not the issue. Constitution-making is a matter of science. We must believe in science and nothing else, that is to say, we must not have blind faith in anything. What is right is right and what is wrong is wrong, whether it concerns the Chinese or foreigners, whether it concerns the dead or the living. To believe otherwise is blind faith. We must do away with blind faith. We should believe in what is correct and not in what is incorrect, be it ancient or modern. Not only that, we should criticize what is incorrect. This alone is the scientific approach.

NOTES

[1] This refers to the Nineteen Constitutional Articles promulgated by the Ching government in November 1911.

[2] The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China was promulgated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen when he took office as Provisional President of the Republic of China after the 1911 Revolution.

[3] These refer to the Yuan Shih-kai government's Temple of Heaven Draft Constitution of 1913 and its Provisional Constitution of 1914, the Tsao Kun government's Constitution of 1923 and Tuan Chi-jui's provisional government's Draft Constitution of 1925.

STRIVE TO BUILD A GREAT SOCIALIST COUNTRY

September 15, 1954

Fellow Deputies,

The First Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China opens today in our capital, Peking.

The total number of deputies is 1,226, of whom 1,211 have registered for attendance and 15 were unable to register on account of illness or for other reasons and asked for leave of absence; 70 who registered cannot take part today on account of illness or for other reasons. The actual number of deputies present at today's meeting is 1,141, which constitutes a quorum.

The First Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China is charged with important tasks.

The tasks of the present session are:

To adopt a constitution;

To enact a number of important laws;

To adopt the report on the work of the government; and

To elect the new leading personnel of the state.

Our present session is of great and historic significance. It is a milestone marking the new victories and advances of our people since the founding of our People's Republic in 1949. The constitution to be adopted at this session will tremendously promote the socialist cause in our country.

Our general task is to unite the whole people and win the support of all our friends abroad in the struggle to build a great socialist country, defend world peace and advance the cause of human progress.

The people of our country should work hard, do their best to draw on advanced experience in the Soviet Union and other fraternal coun-

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Opening address at the First Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China.

tries, be honest and industrious, encourage and help each other, guard against boastfulness and arrogance and gird themselves to build our country, which is at present economically and culturally backward, into a great industrialized country with a high standard of modern culture in the course of several five-year plans.

Ours is a just cause. A just cause is invincible before any enemy.

The force at the core leading our cause forward is the Chinese Communist Party.

The theoretical basis guiding our thinking is Marxism-Leninism.

We are fully confident that we can overcome all difficulties and hardships and make our country a great socialist republic.

We are advancing.

We are now engaged in a great and most glorious cause, never undertaken by our forefathers.

Our goal must be attained.

Our goal can unquestionably be attained.

Let all the 600 million people of our country unite and strive for our common cause!

Long live our great motherland!

LETTER CONCERNING THE STUDY OF *THE DREAM OF THE RED CHAMBER*

October 16, 1954

Enclosed are two articles refuting Yu Ping-po. Please read them. It is the first time in over thirty years that a serious attack has been levelled against the erroneous views of the so-called authorities on *The Dream of the Red Chamber*. The authors are two Youth League members. At first they wrote to the *Literary Gazette* to ask whether it was all right to criticize Yu Ping-po, but they were ignored. In the circumstances, they were obliged to write to their teacher at Shantung University, their alma mater, and they received support. Their article refuting "An Essay on *The Dream of the Red Chamber*" was published in the university journal *Literature, History and Philosophy*. Then the matter came up again in Peking. It was suggested that the *People's Daily* reprint the article in order to start a debate and carry on the criticism. This, too, came to naught because certain persons objected for a variety of reasons (the main ones being that it was "an article written by nobodies" and that "the Party paper is not a platform for free debate"). In the end a compromise was reached and the article was allowed to be reprinted in the *Literary Gazette*. Later, the "Literary Legacy" page of the *Kuangming Daily* carried another article by the two young men refuting Yu Ping-po's book, Studies on "*The Dream of the Red Chamber*". It seems that a struggle may now be able to get under way against the Hu Shih school of bourgeois idealism in the field of classical literature, which has poisoned the minds of the young for more than thirty years. The whole thing has been set going by two "nobodies", while the "bigwigs" have ignored and obstructed it as is their wont; they go in for a united front with bourgeois writers on the question of idealism and become willing captives of the bourgeoisie.

Letter to the comrades of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and other comrades concerned.

The case is almost the same as with the films *Inside Story of the Ching Court*[1] and *The Life of Wu Hsun* when they were shown. *Inside Story of the Ching Court*, which has been described by certain people as a film of patriotism but is in fact one of national betrayal, has never been criticized since it was shown all over the country. *The Life of Wu Hsun* has been criticized, but up to now no lessons have been drawn; what is more, such strange things have happened as tolerating Yu Ping-po's idealism while suppressing the lively critical essays by the "nobodies". This deserves our attention.

Towards such bourgeois intellectuals as Yu Ping-po, our attitude should naturally be one of uniting with them, but we should criticize their erroneous ideas which poison the minds of the young, and we certainly should not surrender to them.

NOTES

[1] *Inside Story of the Ching Court* was a reactionary film which vilified the patriotic Yi Ho Tuan Movement of 1900 and preached capitulation to imperialism. This film of national betrayal was extolled by Liu Shao-chi as one of "patriotism".

THE CHINESE PEOPLE CANNOT BE COWED BY THE ATOM BOMB

January 28, 1955

China and Finland are friendly countries. Our relations are based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

China and Finland have never come into conflict. In the past, China's wars with European countries were only with Britain, France, Germany, tsarist Russia, Italy, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Holland; these countries all came from afar to commit aggressions against China, as in the invasions by the Anglo-French allied forces and by the allied forces of the eight powers, including the United States and Japan. Sixteen countries took part in the war of aggression against Korea, including Turkey and Luxembourg. All these aggressor countries claimed to be peace-loving while branding Korea and China as aggressors.

Today, the danger of a world war and the threats to China come mainly from the warmongers in the United States. They have occupied our Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and are contemplating an atomic war. We have two principles: first, we don't want war; second, we will strike back resolutely if anyone invades us. This is what we teach the members of the Communist Party and the whole nation. The Chinese people are not to be cowed by U.S. atomic blackmail. Our country has a population of 600 million and an area of 9,600,000 square kilometres. The United States cannot annihilate the Chinese nation with its small stack of atom bombs. Even if the U.S. atom bombs were so powerful that, when dropped on China, they would make a hole right through the earth, or even blow it up, that would hardly mean anything to the universe as a whole, though it might be a major event for the solar system.

Main points of a conversation with Ambassador Carl-Johan (Cay) Sundstrom, the first Finnish envoy to China, when he presented his credentials.

We have an expression, millet plus rifles. In the case of the United States, it is planes plus the A-bomb. However, if the United States with its planes plus the A-bomb is to launch a war of aggression against China, then China with its millet plus rifles is sure to emerge the victor. The people of the whole world will support us. As a result of World War I, the tsar, the landlords and the capitalists in Russia were wiped out; as a result of World War II, Chiang Kai-shek and the landlords were overthrown in China and the East European countries and a number of countries in Asia were liberated. Should the United States launch a third world war and supposing it lasted eight or ten years, the result would be the elimination of the ruling classes in the United States, Britain and the other accomplice countries and the transformation of most of the world into countries led by Communist Parties. World wars end not in favour of the warmongers but in favour of the Communist Parties and the revolutionary people in all lands. If the warmongers are to make war, then they mustn't blame us for making revolution or engaging in "subversive activities", as they keep saying all the time. If they desist from war, they can survive a little longer on this earth. But the sooner they make war, the sooner they will be wiped from the face of the earth. Then a people's united nations would be set up, maybe in Shanghai, maybe somewhere in Europe, or it might be set up again in New York, provided the U.S. warmongers had been wiped out.

SPEECHES AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

March 1955

OPENING SPEECH

March 21, 1955

Comrade Delegates to the National Conference of the Communist Party of China,

There are three items on the agenda of our present National Conference: (1) the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy and a report on this plan; (2) a report on the anti-Party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih; and (3) the establishment of a central control commission.

Basing itself on Lenin's teachings on the transition period, the Central Committee summed up the experience gained after the founding of the People's Republic of China and in 1952 put forward the Party's general line for the transition period at the time when the stage of the rehabilitation of China's national economy was coming to an end. This general line means the accomplishment step by step of the socialist industrialization of the country together with the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce in a period of roughly three five-year plans and thus the attainment of the goal of building a socialist society in China. Practice has borne out the correctness of the Party's general line and of the important policies and measures adopted to implement it. There have been great achievements in our work thanks to the efforts of all comrades in the Party and of the people of the whole country. But there have also been shortcomings and mistakes. It is impossible for many of the measures we devised to be appropriate in all respects, and they have to be supplemented and revised in the light of new experience in the process of being carried out.

The First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy is a major step towards the realization of the Party's general line. The present National Conference should discuss this draft plan conscientiously in the light of our practical experience so as to make it relatively sound in content and therefore workable.

It is no easy job to build a socialist society in a large country like ours with its complicated conditions and its formerly very backward economy. We may be able to build a socialist society over three five-year plans, but to build a strong, highly industrialized socialist country will require several decades of hard work, say, fifty years, or the entire second half of the present century. Our task requires us to handle the relations among the people well, particularly those between the working class and the peasantry; it requires us to handle the relations among our different nationalities well. At the same time, it requires us to do a good job in furthering close co-operation with the Soviet Union, which is a great and advanced socialist country, and with the People's Democracies and also to promote co-operation with all the peace-loving countries and people in the capitalist world.

We often say that we should not become conceited because we have done well in our work and that we comrades should remain modest and learn from the advanced countries, from the masses and from each other so as to make fewer mistakes. I think all this still needs to be repeated at the present Party conference. We can see from the anti-Party case of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih that conceit and complacency do exist in our Party and indeed to a serious extent among certain comrades. Failure to overcome them will hinder the accomplishment of our great task of building a socialist society.

As you comrades all know, the emergence of the anti-Party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih was by no means accidental, but was an acute manifestation of the intense class struggle in our country at the present stage. The criminal aim of this anti-Party alliance was to split our Party and seize supreme power in the Party and the state by conspiratorial means, and thus pave the way for a counter-revolutionary come-back. Under the unified leadership of the Central Committee, our Party has smashed the anti-Party alliance and become still more united and consolidated. This is an important victory in our struggle for the cause of socialism.

The case of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih serves as an important lesson for our Party, and all the members should take warning and make sure that similar cases will not recur in the Party. Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih schemed and conspired, operated clandestinely in the Party and surreptitiously sowed dissension among comrades, but in public they put up a front to camouflage their activities. These were precisely the kind of vile activities the landlord class and the bourgeoisie usually resorted to in the past. In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* Marx and Engels say, "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims." As Communists, let alone as senior Party cadres, we must all be open and above-board politically, always ready to express our political views openly and take a stand, for or against, on each and every important political issue. We must never follow the example of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih and resort to scheming.

For the purpose of building a socialist society, the Central Committee deems it necessary at this juncture to set up a central control commission in accordance with the Party Constitution to replace the old Discipline Inspection Commission. Its aim is to tighten Party discipline in the new period of intense class struggle, step up the struggle against all kinds of violations of the law and of discipline and in particular guard against the recurrence of cases like the Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance which seriously jeopardizes the interests of the Party.

In view of the various lessons of the past and the fact that only through being integrated with collective wisdom can individual wisdom be turned to better account so that fewer mistakes are made in our work, the Central Committee and the Party committees at all levels must adhere to the principle of collective leadership and continue to oppose two deviations, personal dictatorship and decentralism. We must understand that collective leadership and personal responsibility are two aspects which are not opposed but are linked to each other. And personal responsibility and personal dictatorship, which violates the principle of collective leadership, are two entirely different things.

Internationally, conditions at present are favourable to our socialist construction. The socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union is strong and its ranks are united, while the imperialist camp is weak and beset by numerous insurmountable contradictions and crises. Even so, we should realize that we are still surrounded by imperialist forces and must be prepared against all possible emergencies. If the imperialists should unleash a war in the future, very likely they would launch a surprise attack, as in World War II. Therefore, we must be prepared, mentally and materially, to avoid being caught unawares by such a sudden turn. This is one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is that the remaining counter-revolutionary forces inside the country are still very active, and, basing ourselves on the facts, we must deal them more blows in a planned and discriminating way so as to further weaken these hidden counter-revolutionaries and ensure the safety of our socialist construction. If we take proper measures with regard to these two aspects, we can prevent our enemies from doing us serious harm; otherwise, we may make mistakes.

Comrades, we are now in a new historical period. For a country in the Orient with a population of 600 million to make socialist revolution, to change its face and the course of its history, to accomplish its basic industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce in a period of roughly three five-year plans and to catch up with or surpass the most powerful capitalist countries in the world in several decades — in doing all this it will inevitably encounter difficulties as numerous as or perhaps even greater than those encountered in the period of the democratic revolution. Nevertheless, comrades, we Communists are known for our dauntlessness before difficulties. Tactically, we must take all difficulties seriously. We must adopt a serious attitude towards each specific difficulty, create the necessary conditions, study the methods for coping with them and overcome them one by one and batch by batch. Our experience over the past decades shows that we did succeed in overcoming every difficulty encountered. Every kind of difficulty has to give way before Communists, just as in the saying, “Mountains bow their heads and rivers make way.” The lesson derived from this is that we can scorn difficulties. Here we are talking of strategy, of the situation as a whole. However great the difficulty, we can readily take its measure. Difficulties are nothing but what both our enemies in society and Nature put in our way. We know that the imperialists, the domestic counter-revolutionaries, their agents in our Party, and so on, are mere moribund forces, while we ourselves constitute the new-born forces with truth on our side. Against them we are always invincible. A review of our history will enable us to see the point. When our Party was first founded in 1921, it was very small and had only a few score members, yet later it grew in strength and succeeded in overthrowing its powerful domestic enemy. Nature as an enemy can be conquered, too. In Nature as in society, all new-born forces are intrinsically invincible. Conversely, all the old forces, however numerous, are bound to be eliminated. Therefore, we can and must scorn all the difficulties we encounter in this world, however immense they may be, and regard them as beneath contempt. Such is our optimism. It is based on scientific grounds. Provided that we know more about Marxism-Leninism and the natural sciences, in short, more about the laws of the objective world and make fewer mistakes of a subjectivist kind, we are sure to attain our goals in revolution and construction.

CONCLUDING SPEECH

March 31, 1955

Comrades,

The speeches from the floor have ended. Now I'll say a few words on the following questions: an evaluation of the present conference, the Five-Year Plan, the case of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, the current situation, and the Eighth Congress.

1. EVALUATION OF THE PRESENT CONFERENCE

Most comrades agree that the conference has been a great success and that it has been another rectification meeting, following the rectification of the Yenan days. Democracy has been promoted and criticism and self-criticism carried out, which has enabled us to know each other better, think more along the same lines and arrive at a common understanding. There was common understanding among us, but on some questions opinions differed, and this conference has enabled us to unify our understanding. Our Party will be better united on this basis, that is, on the basis of our common understanding of ideology, politics and various policies. As Comrade Chou En-lai put it, if the Seventh National Congress of the Party and the all-Party ideological and political rectification in the period preceding it laid the foundation of our Party's ideological unity, a unity on which we proceeded to win victory in the democratic revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, then the present conference will enable us to win victory for socialism.

This conference has proved that our Party has attained a much higher level. Our Party has made great strides not only since the Seventh Congress ten years ago, but also since the Second and Third Plenary Sessions of the Seventh Central Committee in 1949 and 1950. This is good, the conference indicates our progress.

We have entered a period, a new period in our history, in which what we have set ourselves to do, think about and dig into is socialist industrialization, socialist transformation and the modernization of our national defence, and we are beginning to do the same thing with atomic energy. So far as the Party as a whole is concerned, some comrades are digging deep into their jobs while others are not, and this is true of the comrades present at this conference. As is the case with doctors, some can perform operations, others can't. Some can give intravenous injections while others can't and know only how to give subcutaneous injections. And there are doctors who don't dare to go beneath the skin and can work only on the surface. Although some are not digging into their jobs, most comrades are, and quite a few seem to have learned their trade and are becoming rather expert at it. This has been borne out at this conference and is a very good thing. For we are now confronted with new problems, socialist industrialization, socialist transformation, a new defence system and other new fields of work. It is our task to adapt ourselves to this new situation, dig into our jobs and become experts. It is therefore necessary to educate those who have failed to dig into their jobs and remained on the surface, so that they will all turn into experts.

The struggle against the anti-Party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih will take our Party a big step forward.

We must propagate dialectical materialism among the five million intellectuals inside and outside the Party and among cadres at all levels so that they will grasp it and combat idealism, and we shall then be able to organize a powerful corps of theoretical workers, which we urgently need. That again will be a very good thing.

We must draw up a plan for the formation of such a corps with several million people taking up the study of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, the theoretical basis of Marxism, and combating all shades of idealism and mechanical materialism. At present there are many cadres doing theoretical work, but there is still no corps of theoretical workers, much less a powerful one. Without such a corps, the cause of the entire Party, the socialist industrialization and socialist transformation of our country, the modernization of our national defence and our research in atomic energy cannot move along or succeed. I therefore recommend that you comrades read philosophy. Quite a few people are not interested in philosophy and have not cultivated the habit of reading it. They can begin by reading pamphlets or short articles and, after their interest is thus aroused, tackle books running to a length of seventy thousand or eighty thousand and then even several hundred thousand words. Marxism consists of several branches of learning: Marxist philosophy, Marxist economics and Marxist socialism, that is, the theory of class struggle, but the foundation is Marxist philosophy. If this is not grasped, we will not have a common language or any common method, and we may keep on arguing back and forth without making things any clearer. Once dialectical materialism is grasped, a lot of trouble will be saved and many mistakes avoided.

2. ON THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Comrades say that during the discussion of the Five-Year Plan most speeches were good and they all feel satisfied with them. Some speeches were exceptionally good, for the speakers gave thorough expositions and sounded rather like experts. But some of the speeches delivered on behalf of the central departments were rather poor in content and left something to be desired in the way of analysis and criticism. The same holds for some of the speeches by comrades from different localities. Then there is something else. In certain speeches the grave problem of waste and other errors were exposed for what they are, but nothing was said about ways to tackle them. Some comrades are dissatisfied with these speeches. I think there is cause for such dissatisfaction.

I hope that all secretaries of provincial, municipal and prefectural Party committees and the comrades in charge of the central departments will strive to become expert in political and economic work on the basis of a higher level of Marxism-Leninism. They must do well both in political and ideological work and in economic construction. As for the latter, we must really get to know how to do it.

In regard to the many problems submitted by the local authorities at this conference to the central authorities for solution, efforts should be made to solve them in those cases where guidelines have been laid down by the Central Committee. As for the other problems, the secretariat of the conference should work out solutions with the comrades who raised them and submit reports to the Central Committee for decision.

Then there are also many matters in which the central departments would like to enlist the co-operation of the local authorities. The local Party committees are requested to supervise and help the enterprises of the central departments in different localities, particularly in regard to political and ideological work. It is incumbent upon the local Party committees to help these enterprises to fulfil their tasks. Therefore, not only do the local authorities have demands on the central authorities, but the same is true the other way round. The First Five-Year Plan can be successfully carried out only when the central departments and the local Party committees bend their efforts in a single direction and work in co-operation with a due division of labour.

3. ON THE ANTI-PARTY ALLIANCE OF KAO KANG AND JAO SHU-SHIH

The first point. Some ask, "Was there or was there not such an alliance? Were there perhaps two independent kingdoms or two go-it-alone firms, and not an alliance?" Some comrades say that they have not come across any document and that if Kao and Jao had an alliance, there must be some kind of agreement, and an agreement must be in black and white. To be sure, there is no written agreement, it's nowhere to be found. We say Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih did have an alliance. How did we find this out? First, we found it out when Kao Kang worked hand in glove with Jao Shu-shih during the Conference on Financial and Economic Work. Second, we found it out when Jao Shu-shih collaborated with Chang Hsiu-shan in their anti-Party activities during the Conference on Organizational Work. Third, we found it out from Jao Shu-shih's own words. He said, "From now on Kuo Feng will serve as the pivot of the Organization Department of the Central Committee." Jao Shu-shih was director of the Organization Department and Kuo Feng, Kao Kang's confidant, was to be the pivot there. Very fine! What perfect unity! Fourth, we found it out when Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih spread far and wide a list of prospective Political Bureau members illicitly drawn up by An Tzu-wen. For this An Tzu-wen was given disciplinary warning. Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih and others spread this list to all those attending the Conference on Organizational Work and even had it circulated in the southern provinces. What was their motive in giving it such wide currency? Fifth, we found it out when Kao Kang twice expressed to me his wish to have Jao Shu-shih protected, while Jao Shu-shih went on protecting Kao Kang right up to the end. Kao Kang said that Jao Shu-shih was now in hot water and wanted me to help him out. Why, I asked, are you speaking for him? I'm in Peking and so is Jao Shu-shih. Why does he want you to speak for him and not come to me direct? Even if he were in Tibet, he could send a telegram. He is right here in Peking and he's got legs. The other occasion was the day before Kao Kang was exposed, and he tried once more to protect Jao Shu-shih. Jao Shu-shih persisted to the end in protecting Kao Kang and wanted to redress the "injustices" done to Kao Kang. At an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to expose Kao Kang, I said there were two headquarters in Peking. The first headed by me stirred up an open wind and lit an open fire. The second headed by others stirred up a sinister wind and lit a sinister fire; it was operating underground. Did political leadership come from one or more sources? Judged by the many facts mentioned above, they did have an anti-Party alliance and were not two independent kingdoms or two go-it-alone firms which had nothing to do with each other.

Now about the doubts expressed by some comrades to the effect that since there was no written agreement, perhaps there wasn't an alliance after all. This is putting anti-Party alliances knocked together by schemers on a par with open and formal political and economic alliances in general and regarding the two as of the same kind. They were conspiring. Does a conspiracy need a written agreement? If no written agreement means no alliance, then how about each of the two anti-Party cliques headed separately by Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih? Kao Kang didn't sign any covenant with Chang Hsiu-shan, Chang Ming-yuan, Chao Teh-tsun, Ma Hung and Kuo Feng who were in his clique. Anyway we have not seen any written agreement of theirs. Then is the existence of this anti-Party clique, too, to be denied? Neither have we seen any covenant signed by Jao Shu-shih with Hsiang Ming and Yang Fan. So it is wrong to say that no alliance can exist without a written agreement.

The second point. What should be the attitude of comrades who fell under the influence of Kao and Jao and of those who did not? Those who did were influenced in varying degrees. Some were influenced in a general way, Kao and Jao brushed them with their wings. A few comrades were deeply influenced, they talked over many things with Kao and Jao, carried on clandestine activities and spread their views. There is a difference between these two categories of people. But whatever the degree of such influence, most comrades have made their attitude clear at this conference. Some were very good in their attitude and this was welcomed by all. Some others were fairly good in their attitude and this was welcomed by most of the comrades, though what they said was not free from shortcomings. Some didn't go far enough but have followed up with supplementary remarks today. Some speeches were good on the whole, but had parts that were not quite right. In any case, all of them have more or less indicated where they stand, and we should welcome that. After all they have done something to make their positions clear. A few comrades who wanted to speak but didn't for lack of time can send in written reports to the Central Committee. With those who have not spoken the problem is not serious, they just got grazed and were privy to some of the doings of Kao and Jao but failed to reveal them. As for those who have spoken, aren't there some who are still holding something back? Well, let it now be decided that comrades can get back their speeches and reports for revision, whether they were on the Five-Year Plan or on the anti-Party alliance of Kao and Jao. These comrades may go over their wording carefully and have five days to change whatever they had said inadequately or not quite correctly. Don't get a handle on anyone to make things hard for him in the future merely because he said something not quite right at this conference. You are allowed to make corrections and your revised text will be taken as final.

We should take this attitude towards these comrades, that is, we should not only observe but also help them, in the hope that they will correct their mistakes. In other words, we should not only observe them to see whether they are going to correct their mistakes but also help them to do so. Everybody needs help. With all its beauty the lotus needs the green of its leaves to set it off. A fence needs the support of three stakes, an able fellow needs the help of three other people. To go it alone is no good, and help from others is always necessary. And this is all the more necessary on the matter in question. It is necessary to observe these people, to see whether they are going to mend their ways. But merely to observe them is passive, it is also necessary to give them help. As for those comrades who fell under the influence of Kao and Jao, regardless of the extent, we should be glad to see them mend their ways and should not only observe but also help them. Such is the positive attitude towards comrades who have made mistakes.

Comrades who did not come under their influence should not become conceited but should guard against this sort of disease. This is extremely important. Among the comrades mentioned earlier, probably some were duped and others rather deeply involved. But having made mistakes, these comrades may become more or less alert and avoid similar mistakes in future. You become immune to some diseases after having them. Vaccination has a preventive effect. But it is not a sure guarantee and you may still get smallpox. Therefore it is better to have another vaccination — in our case another meeting of the present kind — after a lapse of three or five years. Other comrades should not be conceited, but should guard against making mistakes. Why didn't Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih approach these people? There are several categories. The first category consists of those they regarded as their enemies, and naturally they would not try to influence them. The second consists of those they looked down upon as of no consequence, and they felt no need to influence them at this stage, thinking that these people would automatically come over when the "country was well under control". The third category consists of those they did not dare to approach, probably because these people were better immunized and didn't look like the sort of people they wanted; although they didn't regard them as enemies or as of no consequence, nevertheless they did not dare to approach them. The fourth category consists of those they hadn't had time to influence. This sort of plague takes time to spread. Defer the exposure for another year and you can't be sure that some more might not have become infected. So don't play the braggart and say, "Look, haven't you got smirched? But see how clean I am!" If the exposure had been put off for another year, I dare say quite a few people would have been affected.

The above, I believe, should arouse the attention of both the comrades who fell under the influence of Kao and Jao and those who did not.

The third point. On matters of principle, we should constantly be on our guard and keep a certain distance from comrades when their remarks or actions run counter to Party principles. Whenever their remarks and actions do run counter to Party principles and repel us, we should not identify ourselves with them on such matters and in such circumstances. As for their remarks and actions which conform to Party principles, on such matters as the Five-Year Plan, the resolution and report on the anti-Party alliance of Kao and Jao, our correct policies and Party rules and regulations, we should of course give them strong backing and identify ourselves with them. We should keep a certain distance from whatever is inconsistent with Party principles, in other words, we should draw a clear line of demarcation and rebuff it then and there. We should not fail to keep this distance merely because someone is an old friend, an old superior, an old subordinate, an old colleague, a schoolmate or a fellow townsman. We have repeatedly had this experience in the current anti-Party case of Kao and Jao and in the previous two-line struggles in the Party: when on account of an old and intimate relationship with certain people you find it difficult to speak out and fail to keep a certain distance, give any rebuff and draw a clear line of demarcation, you'll find yourself more and more deeply involved and haunted by their "ghosts". Therefore we must take a stand and adhere to principle.

The fourth point. Some comrades say, "We knew of some of the bad deeds of Kao and Jao, but did not discern their plot." I would say there are two categories. First, there are those who heard Kao and Jao say many things which were against Party principles, and furthermore Kao and Jao consulted with them on some of their anti-Party activities. These people should have discerned their plot. Second, there are those who learned of their bad deeds in a general way but did not realize they had a plot. These people are not to blame, for it was not easy to discern. It was only in 1953 that the Central Committee detected their anti-Party conspiracy. After what happened at the Conferences on Financial and Economic Work and on Organizational Work and after all the goings-on prior to the Conference on Financial and Economic Work, we realized that they were not behaving normally. During the Conference on Financial and Economic Work their unusual activities were discovered and on each occasion they were rebuked. So from then on they switched over completely to undercover activities. It was not until the autumn and winter of 1953 that we detected this conspiracy, the conspirators and the cliques. For quite some time we had no idea that Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih were bad types. This kind of thing had happened before. During the Chingkang Mountains period there were a few renegades, and we never suspected that they would betray the revolution. Very likely you have all had similar experiences.

We should draw a lesson here: Don't be misled by false appearances. Some of our comrades are easily misled by them. There is contradiction between appearance and essence in everything. It is by analysing and studying the appearance of a thing that people come to know its essence. Hence the need for science. Otherwise, if one could get at the essence of a thing by intuition, what would be the use of science? What would be the use of study? Study is called for precisely because there is contradiction between appearance and essence. There is a difference, though, between the appearance and the false appearance of a thing, because the latter is false. Hence we draw the lesson: Try as far as possible not to be misled by false appearances.

The fifth point. The danger of conceit. Don't play the braggart. Our cause depends on the many for its success and the few play only a limited role. While the few, that is, the leaders and cadres, play a role that should be recognized, it is not a role of signal importance. The role of signal importance is played by the masses. The correct relationship between the cadres and the masses is such that, necessary as the cadres are, it is the masses who do the actual work, with the cadres giving leadership, a role which should not be exaggerated. Would things be in a mess without you? Things can get along without you, as history and many facts of life can testify. Have things been in a mess, say, without Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih? Well, things are going quite well, aren't they? Without Trotsky, without Chang Kuo-tao, without Chen Tu-hsiu, things have gone quite well, too. They were all bad characters. Confucius has been dead for ages and today we have a Communist Party in China, which is surely wiser than Confucius; this goes to show that we can do better without Confucius. As for good people, they are not indispensable either. Would the earth stop turning without them? The earth will go on turning all the same. Things will proceed as usual or perhaps even better.

We have two kinds of people. The first are the veterans, and many of you here are high in seniority; the second are the new blood, the young people. Which of the two holds out greater promise? Certainly the new blood, as Comrade Chou En-lai said today. Some comrades are swollen with pride just because they are veterans of the revolution. This is quite unwarranted. If allowance is to be made for being proud of oneself, it is rather the young people who have something to be proud of. As for people over forty or fifty, the older they are and the more experience they have, the more modest they should be. Leave it to the young people to realize that we are really experienced: "These veterans do have some experience. We should not underrate them.

Look, how modest they are!" If people over forty or fifty became conceited in spite of their rich experience, what sorry figures they would cut! That would start the young talking, "All your experience is nothing, you are behaving just like kids." Young kids may like to show off a bit, that's understandable. But for people who are getting on in years and have so much experience behind them to be conceited and so cocky, that's quite uncalled for. As the saying goes, "Behave yourself and tuck your tail between your legs." Human beings have no tails, but why talk about tucking the tail between the legs? Let a dog illustrate our point. There are times when a dog sticks its tail up and there are times when it tucks its tail between its legs. Generally, it tucks its tail between its legs when beaten and sticks its tail up when doing fine. I hope all our comrades, and veteran comrades most of all, will, so to speak, tuck their tails between their legs rather than stick them up, guard against conceit and rashness, always remain modest and keep forging ahead.

The sixth point. Guard against "Left" and Right deviations. Some people say, "It is better to be on the 'Left' than on the Right," a remark repeated by many comrades. In fact, there are many who say to themselves that "It is better to be on the Right than on the 'Left'", but they don't say it aloud. Only those who are honest say so openly. So there are these two opinions. What is "Left"? To move far ahead of the times, to outpace current developments, to be rash in action and in matters of principle and policy and to hit out indiscriminately in struggles and controversies — these are "Left" deviations and are no good. To fall behind the times, to fail to keep pace with current developments and to be lacking in militancy — these are Right deviations and are no good either. In our Party there are people who prefer to be on the "Left", and then there are also quite a few who prefer to be on the Right or to take a position right of centre. Neither is good. We must wage a struggle on both fronts, combating both "Left" and Right deviations.

That's all I want to say about the anti-Party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih.

4. ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

How do things stand with respect to the international situation, the situation at home and that in the Party? Which is predominant — the bright side or the dark? It must be affirmed that the bright side predominates over the dark whether internationally, at home or in the Party. Likewise with our conference. Don't think that everything is dark merely because so many people have made a self-criticism. These comrades laid the emphasis on their shortcomings and mistakes and did not touch on their positive points, leaving out such things as the time when they joined the revolution, the battles they won and the successes they achieved in their work. If you judge by their self-criticism alone, then there is nothing but darkness. In fact this is only one side of the story and for many comrades the secondary one. The case is different with Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih and their five lieutenants, Chang Hsiu-shan, Chang Ming-yuan, Chao Teh-tsun, Ma Hung and Kuo Feng. The estimate that the bright side is predominant cannot apply to them. What predominant bright side is there in Kao Kang's case? There is darkness through and through, a mass of murkiness which neither moonlight nor sunlight can penetrate. Things are quite different with our comrades. They are stained with a few dark spots which can be removed by the repeated use of soap.

Why do we call for preparedness against a sudden turn of events, against a counter-revolutionary come-back and against the recurrence of an incident of the Kao-Jao kind? Because we have nothing to lose if we are prepared for the worst. Whatever work we do, we must envisage the worst possibilities and plan accordingly. The worst that might happen can only be the following: a new world war unleashed by the imperialists, Chiang Kai-shek back in the saddle in Peking, and the recurrence of such incidents as the Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance, and what is more, not just one of these events may occur but as many as ten or even a hundred. But whatever their number, as long as we are prepared beforehand there is no cause for alarm. If ten happen, that means only five pair and there is nothing to make a fuss about since we have anticipated them all. Imperialism brandishes its atom bomb and hydrogen bomb to scare us and that doesn't frighten us either. The world is so constituted that there is always one thing to conquer another. When one thing is used for attack, there is bound to be another to conquer it. If you read the novel *Apotheosis of Heroes*,[1] you will know that there is no such thing as an invincible "magic weapon". Hosts of "magic weapons" have in fact been defeated. We believe that so long as we rely on the people there is no invincible "magic weapon" in this world.

5. STRIVE FOR THE SUCCESSFUL CONVOCATION OF THE EIGHTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE PARTY

The Central Committee has decided to convene the Eighth National Congress of the Party in the second half of 1956. There will be three items on the agenda: (1) a report on the work of the Central Committee; (2) the revision of the Party Constitution; and (3) the election of a new Central Committee. The election of delegates and the preparation of documents should be completed before July next year. We call for a big step forward within a little over a year in all fields of work: the economy, culture and education, military affairs, the Party, politics and ideology, mass organizations, the united front and the minority nationalities.

In passing, a few words about minority nationality work. We must combat Han chauvinism. Don't get the idea that it is the Han nationality that has been helping the minority nationalities. In fact, the minority nationalities have been helping the Han nationality a great deal. Some comrades like to brag about the help given to the minority nationalities, but they don't realize that we can't do without the minority nationalities. Who is it that inhabits 50 to 60 per cent of our territory, the Hans or the other nationalities? The minority nationalities. Rich resources and hidden wealth abound in these areas. Till now we have given the minority nationalities little help and in some places no help at all, whereas the minority nationalities have rendered help to the Hans. Some minority nationalities, however, must have our help first before they can help us. Politically the minority nationalities have given the Han nationality big help; their participation in the community of the Chinese nation constitutes political help to the Han nationality. The people of the whole country are pleased that the minority nationalities and the Hans are united. So the minority nationalities have been a great help politically, economically and in national defence to the whole country, the whole Chinese nation. It is wrong to think that only the Hans have helped the minority nationalities while the minority nationalities have not helped the Hans, or to swell with pride over the little help given to the minority nationalities.

When we say that a big step forward must be taken in all fields within a year, we mean that the shortcomings and mistakes exposed must be remedied. Don't just make promises at this conference and leave these shortcomings and mistakes intact and uncorrected when the Eighth Congress is convened next year. What we mean by striving for the convocation of the Eighth Congress is precisely to have our shortcomings and mistakes remedied. For instance, we must make conscientious efforts to do away with extravagance and waste and the big-roof style of architecture. Don't make promises here and the moment you are home, stretch out and go to sleep.

Some people suggest that a conference of this kind should be held either annually or every other year so that there can be mutual supervision among comrades. I think the suggestion is worth considering. Who is to exercise supervision over people like us? Mutual supervision is a good idea, it will promote the rapid progress of the cause of the Party and the state. We need rapid progress, not slow. We haven't had a Party congress for ten years. Of course, in the first five years it would not have been right to call another congress because the war was going on with all its stresses and strains and because the Seventh Congress had met. During the second five years a congress could have been held but it wasn't. Still something was gained by not convening it. It was better to get to the bottom of the case of Kao and Jao before the congress, or otherwise they would have made full use of the Eighth Congress for their own ends. In the meantime, our Five-Year Plan is well under way, we have put forward the general line for the transition period and through this conference we have achieved greater unity in thinking, thus paving the way for the Eighth National Congress of the Party. While not every delegate will be required to make a self-criticism at the forthcoming congress, there should be open criticism and self-criticism of shortcomings and mistakes in our work. It is wrong not to apply this Marxist principle.

Criticism should be sharp. I don't find the criticism made by some comrades at this conference very sharp; they seem to be afraid of offending others. If you are not sharp enough, if the sting doesn't reach home, the person criticized will not feel any pain and take any heed. Identify by name the person and the department involved. You have done a poor job and I am not satisfied, and if you feel offended, so be it. Fear of offending others is only fear of losing votes and of an uneasy relationship in work. Will I lose my rice-bowl if you don't vote for me? Nothing of the kind. Actually, if you speak your mind and lay the issues on the table sharply, you'll find it easier to get along with others. Don't draw in your horns. Why does an ox have two horns? They are for fighting, for self-defence and attack. I often ask comrades if they have "horns" on their heads. Comrades, touch and feel if you have any. I can see some comrades have horns, some have horns but not very sharp ones, and others have no horns at all. In my opinion, it is better to have them, for that goes well with Marxism. One of the tenets of Marxism is criticism and self-criticism.

So to hold meetings at regular intervals for conducting criticism and self-criticism is a good measure for exercising mutual supervision among comrades and promoting the rapid progress of the cause of the Party and the state. I suggest that you comrades of the provincial and municipal Party committees think it over and see if you can do likewise. You want to follow the example of the Central Committee, don't you? I think on this score you can.

Finally, I call on you comrades here and all Party members:

Strive for the successful convocation of the Eighth National Congress of the Party in 1956!

Strive for the successful fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan!

NOTES

[1] A Chinese mythological novel with the conflict between the ancient states of Shang and Chou as background.

IN REFUTATION OF “UNIFORMITY OF PUBLIC OPINION”

May 24, 1955

What Hu Feng calls “uniformity of public opinion” actually means that counter-revolutionaries are not allowed to express counter-revolutionary views. Indeed this is true, our system does deprive all counter-revolutionaries of freedom of speech and allows this freedom only among the people. We allow opinions to be varied among the people, that is, there is freedom to criticize, to express different views and to advocate theism or atheism (*i.e.*, materialism). In any society and at any time, there are always two kinds of people and views, the advanced and the backward, that exist as opposites struggling with each other, with the advanced views invariably prevailing over the backward ones; it is neither possible nor right to have “uniformity of public opinion”. Society can progress only if what is advanced is given full play and prevails over what is backward. But in an era in which classes and class struggle still exist both at home and abroad, the working class and the masses who have seized state power must suppress the resistance to the revolution put up by all counter-revolutionary classes, groups and individuals, thwart their activities aimed at restoration and prohibit them from exploiting freedom of speech for counter-revolutionary purposes. Thus Hu Feng and counter-revolutionaries of his kind find “uniformity of public opinion” inconvenient for them. Their inconvenience is exactly what we want and is exactly what is convenient for us. Public opinion in our country is at once uniform and non-uniform. Among the people, both the advanced and the backward are free to use our newspapers, periodicals, forums, etc. to compete with each other, so that the former can educate the latter by the democratic method of persuasion and backward ideas and systems can be overcome. When a contradic-

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Article criticizing the counter-revolutionary Hu Feng clique.

tion is resolved, new contradictions emerge, and competition takes place again. In this way, society constantly progresses. The existence of contradictions means non-uniformity. The resolution of contradictions results in temporary uniformity, but new contradictions soon emerge, which means non-uniformity, and they, in turn, have to be resolved. As for the contradiction between the people and the counter-revolutionaries, that is a matter of dictatorship over the counter-revolutionaries by the people under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party. Here the dictatorial, not the democratic, method is used; in other words, the counter-revolutionaries must behave themselves and are not allowed to be unruly in word or deed. In this respect, it is not only public opinion that is uniform, but the law too. On this question, the arguments of Hu Feng and other counter-revolutionaries may seem plausible, and on hearing such counter-revolutionary remarks some muddleheads feel themselves somewhat in the wrong. Well, you see, "uniformity of public opinion", or "absence of public opinion", or "suppression of freedom" — don't they sound awful? These people cannot distinguish clearly between two different categories, between what is within the ranks of the people and what is without. Within the ranks of the people, it is criminal to suppress freedom, to suppress the people's criticism of the shortcomings and mistakes of the Party and the government or to suppress free discussion in academic circles. This is our system. However, all this is legitimate in capitalist countries. Outside the ranks of the people, it is criminal to allow counter-revolutionaries to be unruly in word or deed and it is legitimate to exercise dictatorship over them. This is our system. The opposite is true of capitalist countries, where the bourgeoisie exercises a dictatorship under which revolutionary people are not allowed to be "unruly in word or deed" but must "behave themselves". Exploiters and counter-revolutionaries are always and everywhere in the minority while the exploited and revolutionaries are invariably in the majority. Therefore, dictatorship by the latter is perfectly right, while dictatorship by the former is invariably wrong. Hu Feng also said, "The great majority of readers belong to some organization where the atmosphere is coercive." Among the people, we reject the coercive method of commandism and adhere to the democratic method of persuasion; here the atmosphere should be free, "coercion" is wrong. "The great majority of readers belong to some organization" — this is excellent. In thousands of years nothing like this had ever happened. It was only after the Communist

Party led the people in waging a long and arduous struggle that they were able to change to being united from being like loose sand, a condition which favoured the reactionaries' exploitation and oppression, and that the people achieved this great unity among themselves within a few years after victory in the revolution. By "coercion" Hu Feng means our coercing those on the side of counter-revolution. Yes, they tremble with fear, feeling "like the miserable daughter-in-law always afraid of being beaten", or worrying that "a mere cough is being recorded". We consider this excellent too. Nothing like this had ever happened in thousands of years either. Only after the Communist Party led the people through a long and arduous struggle were these scoundrels made to feel so uncomfortable. In a word, the day of joy for the people is a day of woe for the counter-revolutionaries. This, above all, is what we celebrate each year when National Day comes around. Hu Feng also said, "When it comes to literature and art, mechanism is really the easiest thing." Here "mechanism" is a derogatory term for dialectical materialism, and to call it "the easiest thing" is sheer nonsense. Idealism and metaphysics are the easiest things in the world, because, being neither based on objective reality nor submitted to its test, they permit people to talk as much nonsense as they like. Materialism and dialectics, on the other hand, demand effort. They must be based on and submitted to the test of objective reality. Unless one makes the effort, one is liable to drift into idealism and metaphysics. In his letter[1] Hu Feng raised three questions of principle, which we have deemed it necessary to repudiate at some length. In addition, Hu Feng wrote in the letter, "At present there is a desire to resist everywhere, there are further demands everywhere"; this was in 1950. At the time, the bulk of Chiang Kai-shek's military forces had just been wiped out on the mainland, many of the counter-revolutionary armed forces who had turned into bandits were yet to be eliminated, the large-scale movements of agrarian reform and suppression of counter-revolutionaries had not yet begun, nor had the work of readjustment in the fields of culture and education. What Hu Feng said did reflect the situation then, but he left something unsaid. To spell it out, it should have read: At present there is a desire on the part of counter-revolutionaries to resist the revolution everywhere, there are further demands of all sorts from counter-revolutionaries everywhere seeking to make trouble for the revolution.

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[1] This refers to a counter-revolutionary confidential letter Hu Feng wrote on August 13, 1950 to his follower Chang Chung-hsiao.

PREFACE AND EDITOR'S NOTES TO *MATERIAL ON THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY HU FENG CLIQUE*

May and June 1955

PREFACE

June 15, 1955

To meet the needs of the broad reading public, we have made a compilation of the material on the counter-revolutionary Hu Feng clique which appeared in three instalments in the *People's Daily* between May 13 and June 10, 1955 and also the *People's Daily* editorial of June 10, and are having it issued by the People's Publishing House under the title *Material on the Counter-Revolutionary Hu Feng Clique*. In this book we have also reprinted Hu Feng's "My Self-Criticism" as source material, but in an appendix coming after the material supplied by Shu Wu,[1] so that readers can study this double-dealing counter-revolutionary. We have made a few verbal changes in the editor's notes and the footnotes to the three instalments of the material. We have revised some footnotes, added others and inserted two more editor's notes in the second instalment. For the sake of consistency, the term "anti-Party clique" in the title of the first and second instalments has been changed to "counter-revolutionary clique", as in the third instalment. Otherwise, the text is unchanged.

It may be expected that, as with the publication of the material in the *People's Daily*, the publication of this book will attract the attention of two kinds of people. On the one hand, counter-revolutionaries will pay attention to it. On the other, the masses of the people will give it even more attention.

Counter-revolutionaries and those with certain counter-revolutionary sentiments will find that the correspondence of the Hu Feng elements strikes a sympathetic chord. Hu Feng and his clique are indeed spokesmen for all counter-revolutionary classes, groups and individuals, and the curses they hurl at the revolution and the tactics they use in their activities will be appreciated by all those counter-revolutionaries who can get hold of this book, from which they can derive some counter-revolutionary education about class struggle. Nevertheless, this will in no way save them from their doom. Like all the counter-revolutionary writings of their backers, the imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, which were directed against the Chinese people, these writings of the Hu Feng elements are records not of success but of failure. They did not save their own clique from destruction.

The masses of the people are very much in need of this material. How do counter-revolutionaries employ their double-dealing tactics? How do they succeed in deceiving us by their false appearances, while furtively doing the things we least expect? All this is a blank to thousands upon thousands of well-intentioned people. On this account, many counter-revolutionaries have wormed their way into our ranks. The eyes of our people are not keen, they are not adept at distinguishing good people from bad types. When people operate in normal conditions, we know how to tell the bad from the good, but we are not adept at seeing through those who operate in unusual conditions. The Hu Feng elements are counter-revolutionaries who put on a disguise to hide their true features and to give a false impression. But since they oppose the revolution, it is impossible for them to cover up their true features entirely. As for the leading spirits of the Hu Feng clique, they have had disputes with us on many occasions before and since liberation. They are different in word and deed not only from Communists but also from vast numbers of non-Party revolutionaries and democrats. They were recently exposed to the full simply because we got hold of a mass of solid evidence against them. As for many of the individuals in the Hu Feng clique, they were able to deceive us because our Party organizations, state organs, people's organizations, cultural and educational institutions or enterprises failed to make a strict examination of their records before admitting them. It was also because we were in a stormy period of revolution in the recent past and people of all sorts tried to get close to us as we emerged the victors; so inevitably the waters were muddied, the bad became mixed with the good, and we have not yet got around to sifting them thoroughly. Furthermore, success in spotting and clearing out bad elements depends on a combination of correct guidance from the leading organs with a high degree of political consciousness on the part of the masses, but in this regard our work in the past was not without shortcomings. These are all lessons for us.

We attach importance to the Hu Feng case because we want to use it to educate the masses of the people, and first those cadres who can read and also the intellectuals; to them we recommend this *Material* for raising their level of political consciousness. The *Material* is striking for its extreme sharpness and clarity. Counter-revolutionaries will naturally pay attention to it and revolutionary people even more so. If the masses of the revolutionary people learn something from this case and this material and thereby increase their revolutionary ardour and their ability to discriminate, we shall have all sorts of hidden counter-revolutionaries gradually uncovered.

EDITOR'S NOTES (Selections)

May and June 1955

1

A faction — called "coterie" by our forefathers and "ring" or "outfit" by people today — is something quite familiar to us. To attain their political ends people who pursue factional activities often accuse others of being factional, and being factional, they say, is not upright; for themselves, they claim to be upright, and upright people just don't have anything to do with factions. Those who followed Hu Feng's lead were said to be "young writers" and "revolutionary writers" "hated" and "persecuted" by the Communist Party, the faction that had "bourgeois theories" and "formed an independent kingdom"; therefore, Hu Peng and company wanted revenge. The question of the *Literary Gazette*[2] was "merely a breach that has been seized upon" and was "by no means an isolated one", it was most necessary to "extend and generalize" it and "show that the question was one of factionalist rule", and "factionalist and warlord rule" at that. The matter was so serious that they "fired off" a lot of ammunition to mop us up. In so doing Hu Feng and company attracted attention. After careful investigation of many of these persons, this clique was found to be of some size.

Previously they were known as "a small group". No, that's not so, there are quite a few of them. Previously they were known simply as a group of men of letters. No, that's not so, they have wormed their way into political, military, economic, cultural and educational departments. Previously, they seemed to be a group of revolutionaries operating in broad daylight. No, that's not so, most of them have a very shady background. The main force of the clique consists of imperialist and Kuomintang secret agents, Trotskyites, reactionary army officers, or renegades from the Communist Party; with these persons serving as the backbone, a counter-revolutionary faction hidden in the revolutionary camp, an underground independent kingdom, was formed. This counter-revolutionary faction, this underground kingdom, has set itself the task of overthrowing the People's Republic of China and restoring imperialist and Kuomintang rule. Whenever and wherever possible, they go nosing around for our shortcomings which they use as pretexts for sabotage. Wherever they have their men, strange things happen. After liberation, this counter-revolutionary clique expanded and, if unchecked, would go on expanding. Now that the truth about Hu Feng and company has come to light, many phenomena can be satisfactorily explained and their activities stopped.

2

Sure enough, Hu Feng subsequently acted on Lu Tien's suggestion to use offensive tactics for defence. Thus he came to Peking to ask for a job, requested that his case be discussed, submitted the 300,000-word memo to the Central Committee, and finally seized upon the question of the *Literary Gazette* to open fire. Generally, when things are going badly for them, all kinds of representatives of the exploiting classes use offensive tactics as a means of defence in order to survive today and grow tomorrow. Rumours are fabricated out of thin air and lies told point-blank; certain superficial phenomena are seized on for attacking the essence of things; some people are lauded while others are condemned; and matters are distorted and exaggerated to "make a breakthrough at certain points" so as to put us in a difficult position. In short, they are assiduous in studying what tactics to use against us and "spying out the land" in order to attain their end. Sometimes they "play possum" and wait for a chance to "spring a counter-attack". They have long years of experience in class struggle and are skilful in different forms of struggle, legal and illegal. We revolutionaries must know their tricks and study their tactics in order to defeat them. Never be so bookish and naive as to treat complex class struggle as a simple matter.

3

It is conceit, self-complacency, lack of vigilance and absorption in the day-to-day job to the neglect of politics on our part as revolutionaries that have made it possible for many counter-revolutionaries to "penetrate" our "liver". They are by no means confined to the men of the Hu Feng clique, many other secret agents and bad elements have also sneaked in.

4

When a Party member is criticized for his liberalistic tendencies, Hu Feng elements say he is "being attacked". If his "fighting will is rather weak", that is, if he does not cling to his liberalistic stand but is willing to accept Party criticism and come over to the correct stand, then he is not much of a hope to the Hu Feng clique and cannot be dragged away. On the contrary, if his "fighting will" to cling to his liberalistic stand is not "rather weak" but "rather strong", he is in danger of being dragged away. Hu Feng elements are sure to "have a go" at it, and they are already calling him "comrade". Shouldn't this be taken as a warning? What then should be the attitude of a Party member when he is criticized for having made ideological and political mistakes? There is a choice of two courses before him: one is to correct his mistakes and be a good Party member, the other is to slide further down the path and even fall into the pit of counter-revolution. The second alternative really exists and counter-revolutionaries may be beckoning him on.

5

Just as we constantly appraise the balance of forces in the international and domestic class struggle, so does the enemy. But, being backward and decadent reactionaries, our enemies are doomed; they are ignorant of the laws of the objective world, are subjective and metaphysical in their thinking, and thus are invariably wrong in their judgments. They are inexorably driven by their class instinct to believe that they are very superior and that the revolutionary forces can never amount to much. They invariably overestimate their own strength and underestimate ours. We have witnessed many counter-revolutionaries toppled one by one — the Ching Dynasty government, the Northern warlords, the Japanese militarists, Mussolini, Hitler and Chiang Kai-shek; they made mistakes in thought and deed and could not do otherwise. All contemporary imperialists are bound to repeat such mistakes. Isn't it ludicrous? According to the Hu Feng elements, the Chinese people's revolutionary forces led by the Communist Party are "doomed", and they are nothing but "the sere, the yellow leaf" and "a rotting corpse". And how about the counter-revolutionary forces represented by the Hu Feng elements? Although "some fragile sprouts may be smothered", large numbers of sprouts "are breaking through" and will "grow sturdily". If to this day Royalist representatives are found in the bourgeois French National Assembly, then it is highly probable that some representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek dynasty will remain active here and there years after the complete elimination of all exploiting classes from the face of the earth. The worst die-hards among them will never admit defeat. That's because they need to deceive themselves as well as others, or else they could not carry on.

6

In this letter, the phrase "those veiled feudal forces are madly killing people" indicates that the counter-revolutionary Hu Feng clique is terror-stricken by the great struggle of our people's revolutionary forces to suppress the counter-revolutionary forces, and this feeling is typical of all counter-revolutionary classes, groups and individuals. What strikes terror into their hearts is precisely what makes the revolutionary masses jubilant. "Unprecedented in history" — that's correct too. Except for the revolution which replaced the primitive communal system by the slave system, that is, a system of non-exploitation by one of exploitation, all revolutions in the past ended in the replacement of one system of exploitation by another, and it was neither imperative nor possible to do a thorough job of suppressing counter-revolutionaries. Only our revolution, the revolution of the masses of the people led by the proletariat and the Communist Party aims at the final elimination of all systems of exploitation and all classes; therefore, the exploiting classes which are being eliminated are bound to come out and put up resistance through their counter-revolutionary political parties and groups or through certain individuals, and the masses of the people on their part must unite and suppress these forces of resistance resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely. Only at this time is such suppression imperative and possible. "The struggle has inevitably deepened" — this is quite correct, too. The expression "veiled feudal forces", however, is wrong; it is a derogatory expression for "the people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and the Communist Party and based on the worker-peasant alliance", just as the word "mechanism" used by this clique is a derogatory term for "dialectical materialism".

7

Here again we come across this Chang Chung-hsiao. He has a pretty good counter-revolutionary nose and outmatches many in our revolutionary ranks, including a number of Communists, in level of class consciousness and keenness of political sense of smell. Compared with men of the Hu Feng clique, many of our own people are vastly inferior in these respects. We must study and heighten our class vigilance and make our political sense of smell keener. If there is anything positive the Hu Feng clique can offer, it is that through the present soul-stirring struggle we shall raise our own political consciousness and sensitivity much higher, firmly suppress all counter-revolutionaries and greatly strengthen our revolutionary dictatorship; we shall thus carry the revolution through to the end and achieve the objective of building a great socialist country.

NOTES

[1] This refers to "Some Material About the Counter-Revolutionary Hu Feng Clique" submitted by Shu Wu, a member of the clique. It contains excerpts from a number of counter-revolutionary confidential letters Hu Feng wrote to Shu Wu before and after liberation.

[2] From the end of October to the beginning of December 1954, the presidiums of the Federation of Literary and Art Circles of China and of the Union of Chinese Writers held enlarged joint meetings to examine the mistakes of the *Literary Gazette* in suppressing the criticism by young writers of the bourgeois ideas prevalent in studies of *The Dream of the Red Chamber*. Hu Feng believed his opportunity had come and began attacking the Communist Party. He said in a confidential letter to one of his followers, "This is merely a breach that has been seized upon, and it is most necessary to extend and generalize the matter."

ON THE CO-OPERATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE

July 31, 1955

I

An upsurge in the new, socialist mass movement is imminent throughout the countryside. But some of our comrades, tottering along like a woman with bound feet, are complaining all the time, "You're going too fast, much too fast." Too much carping, unwarranted complaints, boundless anxiety and countless taboos — all this they take as the right policy to guide the socialist mass movement in the rural areas.

No, this is not the right policy, it is the wrong one.

The high tide of social transformation in the countryside, the high tide of co-operation, has already swept a number of places and will soon sweep the whole country. It is a vast socialist revolutionary movement involving a rural population of more than 500 million, and it has tremendous, world-wide, significance. We should give this movement active, enthusiastic and systematic leadership, we should not drag it back by whatever means. Some errors are unavoidable in the process, which is understandable, and they will not be hard to correct. Shortcomings or mistakes among cadres and peasants can be remedied or overcome provided we actively help them. The cadres and the peasants are advancing under the leadership of the Party and, fundamentally, the movement is healthy. In some places they have made certain mistakes in their work; for example, poor peasants have been barred from the co-operatives in disregard of their difficulties, while well-to-do middle

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Report at a conference of secretaries of provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party committees called by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

peasants have been forced into the co-operatives in violation of their interests. These mistakes should be corrected by educating the cadres and peasants and not by simply dressing them down. Blunt reprimands solve no problem. We must guide the movement boldly and must not "fear dragons ahead and tigers behind". Both cadres and peasants will remould themselves in the course of the struggles they themselves experience. Let them go into action and let them learn and become more competent as they go along. In this way many fine people will come to the fore. "Fearing dragons ahead and tigers behind" will not produce cadres. Large groups of cadres with short-term training should be sent to the countryside from above to guide and assist the co-operative movement, but they must also take part in the movement itself if they are to learn how to work. One does not necessarily learn how to do a job just by listening to a lecturer explain a few dozen points in a training class.

In short, the leadership should never lag behind the mass movement. Yet, as things stand now, it is the mass movement which is running ahead, while the leadership cannot keep pace with it. This state of affairs must change.

II

The nation-wide co-operative movement is now taking tremendous strides forward, and yet we still have to argue such questions as: Can the co-operatives grow? Can they be consolidated? As far as certain comrades are concerned, the crux of the matter seems to be their worry as to whether it is possible to consolidate the several hundred thousand existing semi-socialist co-operatives, which are generally rather small, averaging twenty-odd peasant households each. Of course, unless they can be consolidated, growth is out of the question. Certain comrades remain unconvinced despite the record of the growth of co-operation in the last few years and want to wait and see how things shape up in 1955. They may even want to wait and see for another year, and only if more co-operatives are consolidated by the end of 1956 will they be truly convinced that the co-operative transformation of agriculture is possible and that the policy of the Central Committee of our Party is correct. That is why the work in these two years is crucial.

In order to show the feasibility of agricultural co-operation and the soundness of the Party Central Committee's policy on this matter, it is perhaps not without some value for us to review the history of the agricultural co-operative movement in our country.

In the twenty-two years of revolutionary wars preceding the founding of the People's Republic of China, our Party had already acquired experience in guiding the peasants, after agrarian reform, to set up agricultural producers' mutual-aid organizations containing certain rudiments of socialism. In those days, there were mutual-aid working groups and ploughing teams in Kiangsi Province, labour-exchange teams in northern Shensi and mutual-aid teams in northern, eastern and northeastern China. In isolated cases, agricultural producers' co-operatives of a semi-socialist or socialist nature also came into being. For instance, during the War of Resistance Against Japan an agricultural producers' co-operative of a socialist nature appeared in Ansai County in northern Shensi. But such co-operatives were not widely promoted then.

It was after the founding of the People's Republic of China that our Party led the peasants in setting up agricultural producers' mutual-aid teams more extensively and in initiating the formation of large numbers of agricultural producers' co-operatives on the basis of these teams. By now nearly six years more have been spent on this work.

By December 15, 1951, when the Central Committee of our Party adopted the first Draft Resolution on Mutual Aid and Co-operation in Agricultural Production and issued it to local Party organizations to be tried out, there were already three hundred or more agricultural producers' co-operatives. (The document was not published in the press as a formal Party resolution till March 1953.) Two years later, when our Central Committee issued its Resolution on Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives on December 16, 1953, the number had grown to more than 14,000, a 46-fold increase in the space of two years.

This resolution called for an increase of agricultural producers' co-operatives from 14,000 odd to 35,800 between the winter of 1953 and the autumn harvest of 1954, that is, an increase of merely 150 per cent. As it turned out, during the year the number actually rose to 100,000, or an increase of more than 600 per cent.

In October 1954 the Central Committee of our Party decided on an increase of 500 per cent, from 100,000 to 600,000. Actually, the number reached 670,000. By June 1955, after a preliminary readjustment, it was cut by 20,000, leaving 650,000, or 50,000 more than the planned target. The number of peasant households in the co-operatives was 16,900,000, or an average of 26 households in each.

These co-operatives are to be found mainly in the northern provinces, which were liberated earlier. As for the other provinces liberated later, which constitute the majority, each has a number of agricultural producers' co-operatives, but with the exception of Anhwei and Chekiang, they do not have many yet.

These co-operatives are generally small, but a few are large, some with 70 to 80 households, some with over 100, and some with several hundred.

They are mostly semi-socialist, but a few have developed into higher-stage co-operatives of a socialist nature.

Along with the growth of the peasants' co-operative movement in agricultural production, a small number of socialist state farms have been established in our country. By 1957 we shall have 3,038 state farms cultivating 16,870,000 *mou* of land. Of these, 141 will be mechanized farms (counting both those existing in 1952 and those to be set up in the course of the First Five-Year Plan) with 7,580,000 *mou* under cultivation, and 2,897 will be non-mechanized state farms under local administration, cultivating 9,290,000 *mou*. There will be a big growth in state-operated agriculture during the period covered by the Second and Third Five-Year Plans.

In the spring of 1955 the Central Committee of our Party decided that the number of agricultural producers' co-operatives should grow to a million. This means an increase of only 350,000 over the existing 650,000, or a little more than 50 per cent. It seems to me this may be a bit too small. Probably the figure of 650,000 ought to be roughly doubled, that is, to rise to something like 1,300,000, so that, except in some of the border areas, there will be one or more small agricultural producers' co-operatives of a semi-socialist nature to serve as models in each of the country's 200,000-odd townships. In a year or two these co-operatives will gain experience and become old ones, and people will learn from them. There are still fourteen months to go between now and the autumn harvest of October 1956, and it should be possible to accomplish this plan for establishing co-operatives. I hope that on their return the responsible comrades of the various provinces and autonomous regions will look into the matter, work out appropriate plans in accordance with the concrete conditions and report to the Central Committee within two months. We shall then discuss the matter again and make a final decision.

The question is whether the co-operatives can be consolidated. Some people say that last year's plan to set up 500,000 was too big and too rash and so is this year's plan to set up another 350,000. They doubt that so many co-operatives, once formed, can be consolidated.

Is it possible to consolidate them?

True, neither socialist industrialization nor socialist transformation is easy. To change some 110 million peasant households from individual farming to collective farming and then to accomplish the technical transformation of agriculture certainly involves a host of difficulties. But we should be confident of our Party's ability to lead the masses in overcoming them.

On the question of agricultural co-operation, I think we should be confident, firstly, that both the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants among the new and old middle peasants[1] are enthusiastic about taking the socialist road and are eagerly responding to our Party's call for co-operative transformation — this being particularly the case among those with a higher level of political consciousness — because the poor peasants are in a difficult economic position and because the lower-middle peasants are still not well off, although their economic position is better than before liberation.

I think we should be confident, secondly, that the Party is capable of leading the people of the whole country to socialism. Having led the great people's democratic revolution to victory and established the people's democratic dictatorship headed by the working class, our Party can certainly lead the whole nation in basically accomplishing socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce in the course of roughly three five-year plans. In agriculture no less than in other spheres we already have powerful and convincing proof of this. Witness the first batch of 300 co-operatives, the second of 13,700 and the third of 86,000, or a total of 100,000, all established before the autumn of 1954 and all consolidated since. Why, then, can't the fourth batch of 550,000 co-operatives formed in 1954-55 and the fifth batch to be established in 1955-56 (the provisional control figure is 350,000, subject to final confirmation) also be consolidated?

We must have faith in the masses and we must have faith in the Party. These are two cardinal principles. If we doubt these principles, we shall accomplish nothing.

III

To achieve co-operation step by step throughout our rural areas, we must conscientiously check up on and strengthen the co-operatives already in existence.

We must put emphasis on the quality of the co-operatives and oppose any tendency to concentrate solely on increasing their number and membership to the neglect of their quality. We must therefore give serious attention to the work of checking up on the co-operatives.

This check-up should be done not just once, but two or three times, a year. A certain number of co-operatives have had one in the first half of this year (in certain places, apparently, a very slipshod one, done without serious effort). I suggest a second check-up for these co-operatives in the autumn and winter of this year, and a third in the spring and summer of next. Of the 650,000 existing co-operatives, 550,000 are new, having been set up last winter or this spring, and they include a number of Class I co-operatives[2] which are more or less consolidated. If the 100,000 old and consolidated co-operatives are added, the number now consolidated is by no means small. Can these co-operatives help to bring about the gradual consolidation of the others? The answer should certainly be yes.

We should treasure every spark of socialist enthusiasm shown by the peasants and cadres, and not thwart such enthusiasm. We should identify ourselves heart and soul with the members and cadres of the co-operatives and with the county, district and township cadres, and not thwart their enthusiasm.

No decision should be made to dissolve co-operatives unless all, or nearly all, their members are determined not to carry on. If some members are determined to give up, let them withdraw while the majority stays in and carries on. If the majority is firmly against carrying on but the minority is willing to do so, let the majority withdraw while the minority stays in and continues. Even if things come to such a pass, it will be all right. In one very small co-operative of only six households in Hopei Province, the three old middle peasant households firmly refused to carry on and were allowed to withdraw, but the three poor peasant households[3] said they would continue whatever happened. They did and the co-operative was preserved. As a matter of fact, the direction taken by these three poor peasant households is the direction the 500 million peasants of the country will take. All peasants now farming individually will eventually take the road resolutely chosen by these three poor peasant households.

With the adoption of a policy that was called "resolute contraction" in Chekiang (not by decision of the Chekiang Provincial Party Committee), out of the 53,000 co-operatives in the province 15,000 (comprising 400,000 peasant households) were dissolved at a single stroke. This caused great dissatisfaction among the masses and the cadres, and it was altogether the wrong thing to do. This policy of "resolute contraction" was decided on in a state of panic. To take such a major step without the approval of the Central Committee was wrong too. Moreover, in April 1955 the Central Committee had already issued a warning: "Do not repeat the mistake of mass dissolution of co-operatives made in 1953, or otherwise you will again have to make a self-criticism." And yet certain comrades preferred not to heed this warning.

It seems to me that there are two tendencies in the face of success, both undesirable. One is to become dizzy with success, which leads to swelled heads and "Left" deviationist mistakes. Of course, that's bad. The second is to be scared of success, which leads to "resolute contraction" and Right deviationist mistakes. That's just as bad. The trouble now is of the latter kind, for some comrades have become scared of the several hundred thousand small co-operatives.

IV

Before co-operatives are set up, preparatory work must be done seriously and well.

We must pay attention to quality from the very start and oppose the tendency to go after quantity alone.

Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning. This was the celebrated slogan of our Party during the revolutionary wars. It can be applied to the work of building socialism as well. To be sure of success, one must be prepared, and what is more, fully prepared. A great deal of preparatory work is necessary before a new batch of agricultural producers' co-operatives can be set up in a province, prefecture or county. In the main, this work should consist of the following:

(1) Criticize wrong ideas and sum up the experience gained in past work.

(2) Conduct propaganda systematically and repeatedly among the peasant masses concerning our Party's principles, policies and measures on agricultural co-operation. In so doing, we should not only explain the advantages of co-operative transformation, we should also point out the difficulties which will be encountered on the way, so that the peasants may be mentally well prepared.

(3) Draw up a comprehensive plan for expanding agricultural co-operation in the entire province, prefecture, county, district or township in the light of actual conditions and work out an annual plan accordingly.

(4) Train cadres for the setting up of co-operatives in short-term courses.

(5) Develop agricultural producers' mutual-aid teams on a wide scale and in large numbers and, whenever possible, get these teams to join together and form combined mutual-aid teams, thus laying the foundation for further combination into co-operatives.

If all this is done, it will be possible basically to solve the problem of the unity of quantity and quality in the development of co-operatives. But it will still be necessary to follow through with an immediate check-up after each batch of co-operatives is formed.

Whether or not a batch of co-operatives, once formed, can be consolidated depends, firstly, on how well the preparatory work is done and, secondly, on how well the check-up is carried out afterwards.

In the work of establishing and checking up on the co-operatives reliance must be placed on the Party and Youth League branches in the township. For this reason, both tasks must be closely linked with building and consolidating the Party and Youth League organizations in the rural areas.

Whether in establishing co-operatives or in checking up on them, the local cadres in the rural areas should be the main force, and they should be encouraged and asked to take responsibility, while cadres sent from above should be the auxiliary force, whose function is to guide and help and not to take everything into their own hands.

V

In production the agricultural producers' co-operatives must achieve higher crop yields than the individual peasants and mutual-aid teams. Output must not remain at the individual peasant or mutual-aid team level, for that would mean failure; what point, then, in having co-operatives at all? Still less can yields be allowed to fall. Over 80 per cent of the 650,000 agricultural producers' co-operatives which have already been set up have increased their crop yields. This is very good, showing that the members are very keen on production and that co-operatives are superior to mutual-aid teams and far superior to individual farming.

To increase crop yields it is necessary:

(1) to adhere to the principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefit;

(2) to improve management (planning and administration of production, organization of labour, etc.);

(3) to improve farming techniques (deep ploughing and intensive cultivation, close planting in small clusters, extending the area of double or triple cropping, introduction of better strains of seed, popularization of new types of farm implements, the fight against plant diseases and insect pests, etc.); and

(4) to increase the means of production (land under cultivation, fertilizer, water conservancy works, draught animals, farm implements, etc.).

These are indispensable conditions for consolidating the co-operatives and ensuring increased production.

In adhering to the principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefit, we must at present give our attention to the following problems:

(1) Whether or not it is better to delay for a year or two the turning in of draught animals and larger farm implements as shares in the co-operative, and whether or not the prices fixed are fair and the payments to the owners are spread over too long a time.

(2) Whether or not there is a proper ratio between the payment based on land shares and the payment for labour.

(3) How the co-operative should raise the funds it needs.

(4) Whether or not certain members may devote part of their labour to certain kinds of side-line production.

(Since the agricultural producers' co-operatives we are now setting up are generally still semi-socialist in nature, care must be taken to solve these four problems properly so as not to violate the principle of mutual benefit as between the poor and the middle peasants, without which there can be no basis for voluntary participation.)

(5) How much land should be set aside for members to cultivate for their personal needs.

(6) The question of the class composition of the co-operative membership.

And so on.

Here I would like to deal with the question of the class composition of the co-operative membership. I think that, in the next year or two, wherever the movement for co-operation has just begun to spread or has only recently spread, as in most areas at present, we should first get the active elements of the following sections of the people to organize themselves: (1) the poor peasants, (2) the lower-middle peasants among the new middle peasants, and (3) the lower-middle peasants among the old middle peasants. However, those among them who are not enthusiastic for the time being should not be dragged in against their will. They can be drawn into the co-operatives batch by batch when their political consciousness has risen and they have become interested in co-operatives. These sections are more or less similar in their economic status. Either they are still leading a hard life (to wit, the poor peasants, who, though they have received land and are much better off than in pre-liberation days, are still in difficulty for lack of manpower, draught animals and farm implements), or they are still not well off (to wit, the lower-middle peasants). Therefore, they are all enthusiastic about forming co-operatives. Nevertheless, for one reason or another, their enthusiasm varies in degree — some are very keen, some are not so keen for the time being, and others prefer to wait and see. Therefore, we should devote a period of time to educating all those who do not want to join co-operatives yet, even though they are poor or lower-middle peasants, we should patiently wait until they are politically more conscious, and we must not violate the voluntary principle by dragging them in against their will.

As for the new and old upper-middle peasants, that is, the middle peasants who are economically better off, with the exception of those who are politically conscious enough to take the socialist road and are really willing to join, they should not be admitted into the co-operatives for the time being, still less be dragged in against their will. The reason is that they are not yet politically conscious enough to take the socialist road; they will make up their minds to join the co-operatives only after the majority in the rural areas have joined, or when yields per *mou* of the co-operatives equal or even surpass theirs and they realize that it is to their disadvantage in every respect to continue working on their own, and that they cannot further their interests except by joining.

So the first thing to do is to group the people who are poor or not well off according to their level of political consciousness (together they form about 60 to 70 per cent of the rural population) and get them to organize co-operatives in batches in the next few years, and only then should the well-to-do middle peasants be drawn in. In this way we will avoid commandism.

For the next few years in all areas where co-operative transformation has not been basically completed, landlords and rich peasants must definitely not be admitted into the co-operatives. In areas where it has been basically completed, however, the consolidated co-operatives may, on certain conditions, admit by stages and in groups former landlords and rich peasants who have long since given up exploitation, who engage in labour and are law-abiding, and may allow them to take part in collective labour while continuing to reform them through labour.

VI

As for the development of the co-operatives, the problem now is not one of having to criticize rash advance. It is wrong to say that the present development of the co-operatives has "gone beyond the real possibilities" or "gone beyond the level of political consciousness of the masses". This is how things stand: China has an enormous population with insufficient cultivated land (only three *mou* per head, taking the country as a whole, and one *mou* or even less on the average in many parts of the southern provinces), natural calamities are frequent (every year large areas of farmland suffer from flood, drought, gales, frost, hail or insect pests in varying degrees), and farming methods are backward. Consequently, although the life of the peasant masses has improved since the agrarian reform or even improved a good deal, many are still in difficulty or not well off and those who are well off are relatively few, and hence most of the peasants are enthusiastic about the socialist road. Their enthusiasm is being constantly heightened by China's socialist industrialization and its achievements. For them socialism is the only way out. These peasants make up 60 to 70 per cent of the entire rural population. In other words, the only way for the majority of the peasants to shake off poverty, improve their livelihood and fight natural calamities is to unite and go forward along the high road of socialism. This awareness is growing rapidly among the masses of the poor peasants and of those who are not well off. The well-to-do or fairly well-to-do peasants, who make up only 20 to 30 per cent of the rural population, are vacillating, with some trying hard to go the capitalist way. As I have already said, there are also many among the poor peasants and those not well off who take a wait-and-see attitude for the time being because of their low political consciousness, and they too are wavering; however, it is easier for them than for the well-to-do peasants to accept socialism. That is how things really stand. But some of our comrades ignore these facts and think that the several hundred thousand newly established small semi-socialist agricultural producers' co-operatives have "gone beyond the real possibilities" or "gone beyond the level of political consciousness of the masses". This shows that their eyes are on the comparatively small number of well-to-do peasants to the neglect of the great majority, the poor peasants and those not well off. This is one kind of wrong thinking.

Furthermore, these comrades underrate the strength of the Communist Party's leadership in the countryside and the peasant masses' whole-hearted support for the Party. They believe it is difficult enough as it is for the Party to consolidate the several hundred thousand small co-operatives already in existence and therefore a large-scale expansion is simply inconceivable. They pessimistically picture the Party's present work in leading agricultural co-operation as having "gone beyond the level of the cadres' experience". True, the socialist revolution is a revolution of a new kind. Previously, our experience was confined to the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and we had no experience in socialist revolution. Yet how can we gain such experience? By sitting back and waiting for it? Or by plunging into the struggles of the socialist revolution and learning in the process? How can we gain experience in industrialization without carrying out the Five-Year Plan, or without pushing ahead with the work of socialist industrialization? One section of the Five-Year Plan deals with agricultural co-operation. If we do not lead the peasants in organizing one or more agricultural producers' co-operatives in every township or village, where will "the level of the cadres' experience" come from, and how will it rise? Clearly, the idea that the present development of the agricultural producers' co-operatives has "gone beyond the level of the cadres' experience" is mistaken. This is another kind of wrong thinking.

The way these comrades look at problems is wrong. They do not look at the essential or main aspects but emphasize the non-essential or minor ones. It should be pointed out that these non-essential or minor aspects must not be overlooked and must be dealt with one by one. But they should not be taken as the essential or main aspects, or we will lose our bearings.

We must have faith, first, that the peasant masses are willing to take the road of socialism step by step under the leadership of the Party and, second, that the Party is capable of leading the peasants onto this road. These two points are the essence of the matter, the main current. If we lack this conviction, it will be impossible for us basically to accomplish the building of socialism within roughly three five-year plans.

VII

The great historical experience of the Soviet Union in building socialism inspires our people with full confidence in the building of socialism in China. However, even on this subject of international experience there are different views. Some comrades disapprove of our Central Committee's policy of keeping the development of agricultural co-operation in step with our socialist industrialization, although the validity of such a policy has been borne out in the Soviet Union. While conceding that the speed of industrialization as set at present is all right, they maintain that agricultural co-operation should proceed at an extremely slow pace and need not keep in step. This is to disregard the experience of the Soviet Union. These comrades fail to understand that socialist industrialization cannot be carried out in isolation from the co-operative transformation of agriculture. In the first place, as everyone knows, China's current level of production of commodity grain and raw materials for industry is low, whereas the state's need for them is growing year by year, and this presents a sharp contradiction. If we cannot basically solve the problem of agricultural co-operation within roughly three five-year plans, that is to say, if our agriculture cannot make a leap from small-scale farming with animal-drawn farm implements to large-scale mechanized farming, along with extensive state-organized land reclamation by settlers using machinery (the plan being to bring 400 to 500 million *mou* of waste land under cultivation in the course of three five-year plans), then we shall fail to resolve the contradiction between the ever-increasing need for commodity grain and industrial raw materials and the present generally low output of staple crops, and we shall run into formidable difficulties in our socialist industrialization and be unable to complete it. The Soviet Union, which had to face the same problem in the course of building socialism, solved it by leading and developing the collectivization of agriculture in a planned way. And we can solve ours only by the same method. In the second place, some of our comrades have not given any thought to the connection between the following two facts, namely, that heavy industry, the most important branch of socialist industrialization, produces for agricultural use tractors and other farm machinery, chemical fertilizers, modern means of transport, oil, electric power, etc., and that all these things can be used, or used extensively, only on the basis of an agriculture where large-scale co-operative farming prevails. We are now carrying out a revolution not only in the social system, the change from private to public ownership, but also in technology, the change from handicraft to large-scale modern machine production, and the two revolutions are interconnected. In agriculture, with conditions as they are in our country, co-operation must precede the use of big machinery (in capitalist countries agriculture develops capitalistically). Therefore we must on no account regard industry and agriculture, socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture as disconnected or isolated things, and on no account must we emphasize the one and play down the other. In this matter too, Soviet experience points the way, yet some of our comrades pay no attention and always see these questions as isolated and unconnected. In the third place, some of our comrades have also failed to give any thought to the connection between two other facts, namely, that large funds are needed to accomplish both national industrialization and the technical transformation of agriculture, and that a considerable part of these funds has to be accumulated through agriculture. Apart from the direct agricultural tax, this is done by developing light industry to produce the great quantities of consumer goods needed by the peasants and exchanging them for the peasants' commodity grain and the raw materials for light industry, so that the material requirements of both the peasants and the state are met and funds are accumulated for the state. Moreover, large-scale expansion of light industry requires the development of agriculture as well as of heavy industry. For it cannot be brought about on the basis of a small peasant economy; it has to await large-scale farming, which in our country means socialist co-operative agriculture. Only this type of agriculture can give the peasants far greater purchasing power than they now possess. Here again the Soviet Union has provided us with experience, but some of our comrades take no notice of it. Taking the stand of the bourgeoisie, the rich peasants, or the well-to-do middle peasants with their spontaneous tendencies towards capitalism, they always think in terms of the interests of the few and fail to take the working-class stand and think in terms of the interests of the whole country and people.

VIII

Then again, some comrades have dug up an argument of a sort from the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union against what they call impetuosity and rashness in our present work of agricultural co-operation in China. Does not the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, *Short Course* tell us that at a certain period many local Party organizations in the Soviet Union committed the error of impetuosity and rashness on the question of the pace of collectivization? Should we not take note of this international experience?

I think we should take note of this Soviet experience and must oppose any impetuous and rash thinking which ignores preparatory work and disregards the level of political consciousness of the peasant masses, but on no account should we allow these comrades to use the Soviet experience as a cover for their idea of moving at a snail's pace.

How has the Central Committee of our Party decided to carry through agricultural co-operation in China?

First, it intends to accomplish the plan, in the main, in eighteen years. The period of a little over three years from the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 to 1952 was spent on rehabilitating the national economy. In the sphere of agriculture, in addition to agrarian reform and the restoration of production, during this period we greatly extended the organization of agricultural producers' mutual-aid teams in all the old liberated areas, where we also began to form semi-socialist agricultural producers' co-operatives and gained some experience. Next followed the First Five-Year Plan, which began in 1953; nearly three years have elapsed since then, during which our agricultural co-operative movement has been spreading all over the country and our experience growing. The period from the founding of the People's Republic of China to the end of the Third Five-Year Plan covers eighteen years. In that period, we intend basically to accomplish the socialist transformation of agriculture together with socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce. Is this possible? Soviet experience tells us that it is entirely possible. In the Soviet Union the Civil War ended in 1920 and the collectivization of agriculture was completed in the seventeen years from 1921 to 1937, the main part of this work being done in the six years from 1929 to 1934. Although, as the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course* records, some local Party organizations in the Soviet Union became "dizzy with success" during this period, the error was quickly corrected. Eventually, by a great effort the Soviet Union successfully accomplished the socialist transformation of the whole of its agriculture and at the same time achieved a massive technical reconstruction of agriculture. This road traversed by the Soviet Union is our model.

Secondly, the method we are using in the socialist transformation of agriculture is one of step-by-step advance. The first step was to call on the peasants, in accordance with the principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefit, to organize agricultural producers' mutual-aid teams, which had only certain rudiments of socialism and comprised only a few to a dozen or so households each. The second step has been to call on the peasants, likewise in accordance with the principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefit, to organize small agricultural producers' co-operatives on the basis of these mutual-aid teams, co-operatives which are semi-socialist in nature and are characterized by the pooling of land as shares and by unified management. Then the third step will be to call on the peasants, in accordance with the same principles, to combine further on the basis of these small semi-socialist co-operatives and organize large fully socialist agricultural producers' co-operatives. These steps make it possible for the peasants gradually to raise their socialist consciousness through personal experience and gradually to change their mode of life, thus lessening the feeling of abrupt change. Generally, these steps can avoid a fall in crop production during, say, the first year or two; indeed, they must ensure an increase each year, and this can be done. More than

80 per cent of the existing 650,000 agricultural producers' co-operatives have increased their output, while over 10 per cent have broken even, and less than 10 per cent have shown a decrease. In the two latter categories the state of affairs is bad, particularly in the case of the last category where production has fallen, and a great effort must be made to check up on and strengthen these co-operatives. Since more than 80 per cent of all the co-operatives have increased their output (by anything from 10 to 30 per cent), since over 10 per cent have shown neither an increase nor a decrease in their first year but may show an increase in their second year after having had a check-up, and since the less than 10 per cent registering a fall in output may also show an increase in their second year or at least break even after the check-up, it can be said that on the whole our progress in co-operation is healthy and that generally we can ensure increased production and avoid falling output. Moreover, these steps are a splendid course for training cadres. In this way administrative and technical personnel for the co-operatives can be gradually trained in large numbers.

Thirdly, a control figure for the extension of agricultural co-operation should be fixed once a year in the light of the actual situation, while during the year there should be several inspections of how the work of co-operation is being carried out. Concrete measures for extending co-operation in each province, county and township can thus be decided upon every year according to changing conditions and the degree of success in the work. Expansion may be halted for a while in some places in order to carry out a check-up; in others, expansion and check-up can proceed simultaneously. In certain co-operatives some of the members may be allowed to withdraw, and in individual cases a co-operative may even be allowed to dissolve temporarily. In some places new co-operatives should be set up in large numbers, while in others there should be no increase except in the number of peasant households in the existing co-operatives. In every province or county, whenever a batch of co-operatives is established, expansion must be halted to allow time for a check-up before setting up a new batch. The idea of never allowing any pause, any intermission, is wrong. As for the inspection of the progress of the co-operative movement, the Central Committee and the provincial, autonomous region, municipal and prefectural committees of the Party must take it firmly in hand and make sure that it is done not once but several times every year. Whenever a problem crops up, tackle it right away; don't let problems pile up and then try to settle them all at one go. Make criticism in good time; don't get into the habit of criticizing only after the event. In the first seven months of this year, for instance, the Central Committee alone has called three conferences, including the present one, of leading comrades from various parts of the country to discuss the question of rural co-operation. This method of suiting our measures to local conditions and of giving timely guidance ensures that fewer mistakes will be made in our work and that those made will be quickly put right.

Taking all the above into consideration, can't we say that the guiding policy of the Central Committee of our Party on agricultural co-operation is the right one and therefore guarantees the healthy development of the movement? I think we can and should say so; to evaluate this policy as "rash advance" is utterly wrong.

IX

Some comrades take a wrong approach to the vital question of the worker-peasant alliance, proceeding as they do from the stand of the bourgeoisie, the rich peasants, or the well-to-do middle peasants with their spontaneous tendencies towards capitalism. They think that the present situation in the co-operative movement is very dangerous, and they advise us to "get off the horse quickly" in our present advance along the road of co-operation. "If you don't," they warn us, "there will be the danger of breaking up the worker-peasant alliance." We think exactly the opposite is true. There will be the danger of breaking up the worker-peasant alliance, if you don't get on the horse quickly. There is a difference of only a single word here — one says "off" while the other says "on" — yet it demonstrates the difference between the two lines. As everybody knows, we already have a worker-peasant alliance built on the basis of the bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism, a revolution which took the land from the landlords and distributed it to the peasants in order to free them from the bondage of feudal ownership. But this revolution is over, and feudal ownership has been abolished. What exists in the countryside today is capitalist ownership by the rich peasants and a vast sea of ownership by individual peasants. As is clear to everyone, the spontaneous forces of capitalism have been steadily growing in the countryside in recent years, with new rich peasants springing up everywhere and many well-to-do middle peasants striving to become rich peasants. On the other hand, many poor peasants are still living in poverty for shortage of the means of production, with some getting into debt and others selling or renting out their land. If this tendency goes unchecked, it is inevitable that polarization in the countryside will get worse day by day. Those peasants who lose their land and those who remain in poverty will complain that we are doing nothing to save them from ruin or to help them out of their difficulties. Nor will the well-to-do middle peasants who are heading in the capitalist direction be pleased with us, for we shall never be able to satisfy their demands unless we intend to take the capitalist road. Can the worker-peasant alliance continue to hold firm in these circumstances? Obviously not. There is no solution to this problem except on a new basis. And that means to bring about, step by step, the socialist transformation of the whole of agriculture together with socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce; in other words, it means to carry out co-operation and eliminate the rich peasant economy and the individual economy in the countryside so that all the rural people will become increasingly well off together. We maintain that this is the only way to consolidate the worker-peasant alliance. Otherwise, this alliance will be in real danger of breaking up. The comrades who advise us to "get off the horse" are completely wrong in their thinking on this question.

XI

We must now realize that there will soon be a nation-wide high tide of socialist transformation in the countryside. This is inevitable. By the spring of 1958, at the end of the final year of the First Five-Year Plan and the beginning of the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan, co-operatives of a semi-socialist nature will embrace some 250 million people, about 55 million peasant households (averaging four and a half persons each), which will mean half the rural population. By that time many counties and some provinces will have basically completed the semi-socialist transformation of the agricultural economy, and in every part of the country a small number of semi-socialist co-operatives will have become fully socialist. By 1960, that is, during the first half of the Second Five-Year Plan, we shall in the main have achieved the semi-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

socialist transformation of the remainder of the agricultural economy involving the other half of the rural population. By then the number of fully socialist co-operatives developed from the semi-socialist ones will have increased. All through the First and Second Five-Year Plans, the transformation of the countryside will continue to be primarily social, and only secondarily technical, the number of big farm machines will certainly increase, but not to any great extent. During the Third Five-Year Plan, the social and the technical transformation of the rural areas will proceed simultaneously; more big farm machinery will be employed each year, while in the field of social transformation, from 1960 on the semi-socialist co-operatives will be gradually developing into fully socialist ones, batch by batch and stage by stage. The social and economic features of China will not be completely changed until the socialist transformation of the social and economic system is completely accomplished and, in the technical field, machinery is used in all possible branches and places. The country's economic conditions being what they are, the technical transformation will take longer than the social. It is estimated that the basic completion of the nation-wide technical transformation of agriculture will take roughly four or five five-year plans, that is, twenty to twenty-five years. The whole Party must fight for the fulfilment of this great task.

XI

There must be comprehensive planning and more effective leadership.

There must be national, provincial, prefectural, county, district and township plans for the stage-by-stage development of co-operation. And as the work proceeds, these plans must constantly be revised in the light of the actual conditions. All Party and Youth League organizations at the provincial, prefectural, county, district and township levels must pay serious attention to rural problems and earnestly improve their leadership in rural work. The leading comrades in charge of local Party and Youth League committees at various levels should apply themselves to studying the work of agricultural co-operation and become expert at it. In short, they must not remain passive but take the initiative, not abandon leadership but strengthen it.

XII

In August 1954 (this, of course, is no longer news), the Heilungkiang Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China reported:

> With the rise and spread of rural co-operation, mutual-aid and co-operative organizations of various types and the people of various strata in the rural areas are all on the move to a greater or lesser degree. The existing agricultural producers' co-operatives are planning and preparing to enlarge their membership, and the agricultural producers' mutual-aid teams which are scheduled to become co-operatives are planning and preparing to draw in more households, while those which have not yet reached that level are anxious to go forward and reach a higher stage. Some people are busy preparing to join new co-operatives, others to join existing ones. Those not ready to join co-operatives this year are actively considering joining mutual-aid teams. The stir is very broad in scope. A mass movement has come into being. This is a new and striking feature in the great development of agricultural co-operation. But because some of the leading comrades in certain counties and districts have not kept abreast of this new feature and have not given more effective leadership in good time, certain unhealthy phenomena have begun to appear in a number of *tsun* and *tun*. [N.B. In Heilungkiang Province the *tsun* is the administrative unit corresponding to the township in the provinces south of the Great Wall, while the *tun*, which is not an administrative unit, is equivalent to the village in the latter provinces.] For instance, when people start looking for fellow members, the strong seek out the strong and elbow aside the badly-off peasants, there are squabbles over backbone activists and members which give rise to disunity, there is blind concentration of backbone activists in one place, and the rich peasants and those well-to-do peasants with fairly strong tendencies towards capitalism seize the opportunity to rig up mutual-aid teams of poor quality or rich peasants' co-operatives of their own. All this clearly demonstrates that, with the immense growth of agricultural co-operation, it is not enough to think only in terms of setting up new co-operatives when carrying out the Party's policy and guiding the movement. It is necessary to think in terms of the entire *tsun* [*i.e.*, the entire township] and of promoting the agricultural co-operative movement as a whole and

> to give consideration both to enlarging the old co-operatives and to setting up new ones, both to developing the co-operatives and to bringing the mutual-aid teams to a higher stage, both to what is being done this year and to what is to be done next year, and even the year after. This is the only way to carry out the Party's policy to the full and to ensure the healthy growth of the agricultural co-operative movement.

Is it only in Heilungkiang Province that "some of the leading comrades in certain counties and districts have not kept abreast of this new feature and have not given more effective leadership in good time"? Is it only in certain counties and districts? I think it very likely that there are people in many leading organizations all over the country who typify this serious state of affairs in which the leadership lags behind the movement.

The report of the Heilungkiang Provincial Party Committee went on to say:

> Hsichin Township, Shuangcheng County, has worked out a comprehensive plan for the whole township on the basis of leadership by the Party combined with the voluntary participation of the masses. This is an innovation in the method of leading the large-scale expansion of co-operation. Its importance lies first and foremost in the fact that through this kind of planning the Party's class line in the countryside has been fully translated into life, so that the unity between the poor and the middle peasants has been strengthened and a vigorous struggle has been waged against the rich peasant tendency. Backbone activists have been properly allocated to serve the general advance of the agricultural co-operative movement. Relations between the various co-operatives and between the co-operatives and the mutual-aid teams have been readjusted and strengthened, and the agricultural co-operative movement has consequently advanced along the whole front according to plan. Secondly, through this kind of planning the work of expanding agricultural co-operation on a large scale has been specifically assigned right down to the leading bodies at the basic level and to the masses, so that the township Party branch knows how to lead, the old co-operatives how to go forward, the new co-operatives how to establish themselves and the mutual-aid teams how to find their particular path towards further advance. In this way, the initiative and enthusiasm of the township Party branch

> and of the masses have been brought into full play, and the correct principle of relying on the Party branch and on the experience and wisdom of the masses has been thoroughly applied. Finally, it is precisely through this kind of planning that we have been better able to ascertain the true situation in the township and to carry out the Party's policy concretely and fully. Therefore, it has been possible to avoid impetuosity and rashness on the one hand and conservatism and drift on the other, and thus correctly apply the Central Committee's policy of "active leadership and steady advance".

How were the "certain unhealthy phenomena" mentioned in the report of the Heilungkiang Provincial Party Committee actually dealt with? The report itself did not give a direct answer to this question. But the report of the Shuangcheng County Party Committee, appended to the Provincial Party Committee's report, did. It said:

> As a result of comprehensive planning based on combining leadership by the Party branch and voluntary participation by the masses, the deviation of barring badly-off peasant households from the co-operatives has been corrected, the practice of concentrating too many backbone activists in one place has been stopped, the squabbles over cadres and members have disappeared, the links between the co-operatives and the mutual-aid teams have grown closer, the attempts of the rich peasants and the well-to-do middle peasants to rig up rich peasants' co-operatives or mutual-aid teams of poor quality have failed, and the plan of the Party branch has in the main been put into effect. The membership of the two older co-operatives has gone up 40 per cent, skeleton organizations for six new co-operatives have been set up, and two mutual-aid teams have been organized. If things go well, we estimate that next year [*i.e.*, in 1955] the whole township will go co-operative. At present, it is working energetically to fulfil this year's plan for expanding agricultural co-operation, increase production and ensure a good harvest. The general opinion among the township cadres is: "It is fortunate that we did all this, or things would have been in a mess. Not only would there have been trouble this year but next year as well."

Let us work the way they do.

Comprehensive planning and more effective leadership — that is our policy.

NOTES

[1] During the co-operative transformation of agriculture those who were formerly poor peasants but rose to middle peasant status after the agrarian reform were called new middle peasants. Those who were formerly middle peasants and whose economic status remained unchanged were called old middle peasants.

[2] At that time agricultural producers' co-operatives which were well run, middling and poorly run were usually called Class I, Class II and Class III co-operatives respectively.

[3] The three poor peasant households here referred to were those of Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang in Nanwangchuang Village, Anping County, Hopei Province. The agricultural producers' co-operative they set up was the predecessor of the present Nanwangchuang Brigade of the people's commune of the same name.

RELY ON PARTY AND LEAGUE MEMBERS AND POOR AND LOWER-MIDDLE PEASANTS IN THE CO-OPERATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE

September 7, 1955

At present, the slogan "Rely on the poor peasants (including all the new middle peasants who were formerly poor peasants) and firmly unite with the middle peasants" remains basically correct. However, (1) well-to-do middle peasants (that is, upper-middle peasants) have emerged from among the new middle peasants, and, except for some with a higher political consciousness, they are unwilling to join the co-operatives for the time being; (2) the lower-middle peasants among the old middle peasants are generally interested in joining the co-operatives, because in economic status they are more or less similar to the lower-middle peasants among the new middle peasants, as they were not well off to start with and the interests of some were improperly encroached upon at the time of the agrarian reform. For these two reasons, in all places where co-operation has not yet reached high tide and the well-to-do middle peasants are lacking in political consciousness, it is proper first to draw into the co-operatives the following three sections of people (in batches according to the level of their political consciousness, beginning with those with a higher consciousness): (1) the poor peasants; (2) the lower-middle peasants among the new middle peasants (In the revised version of Comrade Mao Tsetung's report the middle peasants are divided into two sections only, the upper- and the lower-middle peasants, and no mention is made of the intermediate-middle peasants so as to avoid a classification too fine for drawing distinctions. The lower-middle peasants

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Inner-Party directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

as now defined actually cover the originally defined lower- and intermediate-middle peasants among the new middle peasants.); and (3) the lower-middle peasants among the old middle peasants. All those well-to-do middle peasants, that is, the upper-middle peasants among both the new and old middle peasants, who are as yet unwilling to join the co-operatives, should not be dragged in against their will. At present, in many places there are cases of forcing the well-to-do middle peasants into the co-operatives with an eye to obtaining their draught animals and farm implements (at too low a price and with payments over too long a period). This is actually an encroachment on their interests and a violation of the principle of "firmly uniting with the middle peasants". And we must never go against this Marxist principle. At present, in all places where co-operatives have just been set up or are not yet in a dominant position, it would be most disadvantageous if those well-to-do middle peasants with deep-seated bourgeois ideas are dragged in, or if, by their own efforts, they worm their way in to seize the leadership (rather than join out of genuine political consciousness) or form such co-operatives of poor quality as those found in Shuangcheng County, Heilungkiang Province. This would be most disadvantageous to the establishment of the leadership of the poor and lower-middle peasants, whereas it is imperative to establish this leadership in all co-operatives. (Of course exceptions should be made of a few well-to-do middle peasants who are fair-minded and competent and have a higher political consciousness.) Some say that the slogan "Rely on the poor peasants and firmly unite with the middle peasants" seems to have been discarded in our present formulation; this is not true. We have not discarded the slogan but rather made it more specific in the light of the new conditions, that is, we count the lower-middle peasants among the old middle peasants as a section of the people on whom to rely, but not those new middle peasants who have risen to become well-to-do middle peasants. This distinction is made according to their economic status and to whether they take an active attitude towards the co-operative movement. In other words, we take the poor peasants and the two sections of lower-middle peasants, who correspond to the old poor peasants, as people to rely on, and the two sections of upper-middle peasants who correspond to the old middle peasants as people firmly to unite with, and at present one way of uniting with them is to refrain from forcing them to join the co-operatives and encroaching on their interests.

Some additional points must be made clear with regard to the question of whom to rely on in the rural areas. First of all, we should rely on Party and League members. It is wrong for our Party committees from the district level up or for cadres sent to direct work in the rural areas not to rely primarily on the Party and League members there but to lump them together with the non-Party and non-League people. Second, we should rely on the more active elements among the non-Party people, who should account for some 5 per cent of the rural population (for example, there should be some 125 such activists in a township of about 2,500 people). We should do our best to cultivate a group of such activists, and we should not lump them together with the masses either. Third, we should then rely on the masses, on the poor peasants and the two sections of lower-middle peasants. Failure to be clear about whom to rely on and how to rely on them will lead to mistakes in the co-operative movement.

THE DEBATE ON THE CO-OPERATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE AND THE CURRENT CLASS STRUGGLE

October 11, 1955

Our present session has been a great debate. This debate concerns the question of whether our Party's general line for the period of transition from capitalism to socialism is entirely correct or not. This all-Party debate was triggered by the question of our policy on the co-operative transformation of agriculture, on which your discussion has also centred. However, the debate covers a wide range of subjects, bearing on the work of the departments of agriculture, industry, communications, transport, finance, monetary affairs, trade, culture, education, science, public health, etc., on the transformation of handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce, the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, the armed forces and foreign affairs; in short, it touches on the whole range of our work, the work of the Party, the government, the armed forces and the people's organizations. There should be a great debate of this kind. For nothing like it has been conducted in our Party since the promulgation of the general line. We must unfold the debate in the countryside and in the cities as well so that our work in every sphere and its tempo and quality will fit the tasks set by the general line and be covered by a comprehensive plan.

Now I shall speak on a number of questions.

Concluding speech at the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CAPITALIST INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

The relationship between agricultural co-operation and the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, which is the relationship between the two tasks of basically and simultaneously accomplishing the socialist transformation of agriculture and of capitalist industry and commerce in a period of about three five-year plans, is in fact the relationship between agricultural co-operation and the bourgeoisie.

We believe that only when the alliance of the working class and the peasantry is gradually consolidated on a new basis, that of socialism, in the course of the thoroughgoing socialist transformation of agriculture, will it be possible to sever all the ties between the urban bourgeoisie and the peasantry, completely isolate the bourgeoisie and facilitate the thoroughgoing transformation of capitalist industry and commerce. The purpose of our socialist transformation of agriculture is to cut off the source of capitalism in the vast countryside.

We have not yet accomplished agricultural co-operation, the working class has not yet consolidated its alliance with the peasantry on a new basis, and the alliance remains unstable. The peasants are no longer satisfied with the alliance we formed with them in the past on the basis of the agrarian revolution. They are beginning to forget about the benefits they reaped from that alliance. They should now be given new benefits, which means socialism. The peasants have not yet attained collective prosperity, and grain and industrial raw materials are far from sufficient. In these circumstances it is likely that the bourgeoisie will find fault with us and attack us on this score. But in a few years we shall witness an entirely new situation, namely, an alliance between the working class and the peasantry on a new basis, an alliance more consolidated than ever.

The old alliance to oppose the landlords, overthrow the local despots and distribute land was a temporary one; it has become unstable after a period of stability. Since the agrarian reform polarization has taken place among the peasants. If we have nothing new to offer them and cannot help them raise their productivity, increase their income and attain collective prosperity, the poor ones will no longer trust us and will feel that there is no point in following the Communist Party. Since they remain poor after land has been distributed to them, why do they still have to follow you? As for the well-to-do ones, namely, those who have become rich peasants or grown quite well off, they won't trust us either and will invariably find the policies of the Communist Party not to their taste. As a result, neither the one nor the other, neither the poor nor the rich, will trust us, and the worker-peasant alliance will become quite shaky. To consolidate this alliance, we have to lead the peasants onto the road of socialism, enabling them to attain collective prosperity; not only the poor peasants but all of them must prosper and, what is more, they must become far better off than the present-day well-to-do peasants. Once the countryside goes co-operative, the life of the entire rural population will get better and better as the years go by and there will be more commodity grain and more industrial raw materials. By then the bourgeoisie will be silenced and find themselves completely isolated.

We now have two alliances, one with the peasants and the other with the national bourgeoisie. Both are indispensable to us, and Comrade Chou En-lai has also spoken of this. What advantage is there in our alliance with the bourgeoisie? It enables us to obtain more manufactured goods to exchange for farm produce. This was precisely what Lenin had in mind at one phase after the October Revolution. Since the state had no manufactured goods to exchange, the peasants refused to sell their grain and wouldn't take mere paper money for it. So Lenin intended to have the proletarian state power form an alliance with state capitalism in order to secure more manufactured goods to cope with the spontaneous capitalist forces in the countryside.[1] It is precisely for the purpose of securing more manufactured goods to meet the needs of the peasants and overcome their reluctance to sell their grain and even some of their industrial raw materials that we have entered into an alliance with the bourgeoisie and refrained from confiscating capitalist enterprises for the time being, and have instead adopted a policy of utilizing, restricting and transforming them. This means using our alliance with the bourgeoisie to overcome the peasants' reluctance to sell their produce. On the other hand, we rely on our alliance with the peasants to secure grain and industrial raw materials with which to bring the bourgeoisie under control. The capitalists have no raw materials, whereas the state has. If they want raw materials, they will have to sell manufactured goods to the state and go in for state capitalism. If they refuse to do so, we will deny them raw materials. In either case, they will be held in check. This will block the capitalist road the bourgeoisie wants to follow, namely, the opening of free markets, the free acquisition of raw materials and the free sale of manufactured goods, and will in addition isolate the bourgeoisie politically. Such is the interaction between these two alliances. Of the two, our alliance with the peasants is principal, basic and primary, while our alliance with the bourgeoisie is temporary and secondary. To an economically backward country like ours both alliances are indispensable at present.

The agrarian reform enabled us to form an alliance with the peasants on the basis of democracy and enabled them to obtain land. The procuring of land by the peasants was a bourgeois-democratic revolution in nature, for it destroyed feudal ownership only, not capitalist ownership or individual ownership. That alliance made the bourgeoisie feel isolated for the first time. At the Third Plenary Session in 1950, I spoke against hitting out in all directions. The agrarian reform had not yet been carried out in vast areas of the country, nor had peasants come over entirely to our side. If we had opened fire on the bourgeoisie then, it would have been out of order. After the agrarian reform, when the peasants had entirely come over to our side, it was possible and necessary for us to start the movements against the "three evils" and the "five evils". Agricultural co-operation will enable us to consolidate our alliance with the peasants on the basis of proletarian socialism and not of bourgeois democracy. That will isolate the bourgeoisie once and for all and facilitate the final elimination of capitalism. On this matter we are quite heartless! On this matter Marxism is indeed cruel and has little mercy, for it is determined to exterminate imperialism, feudalism, capitalism, and small production to boot. In this respect, it is better not to have much mercy. Some of our comrades are too kind, they are not tough enough, in other words, they are not so Marxist. It is a very good thing, and a significant one too, to exterminate the bourgeoisie and capitalism in China, a country with a population of 600 million. Our aim is to exterminate capitalism, obliterate it from the face of the earth and make it a thing of the past. What emerges in history is bound to die out. Everything in the world is a historical phenomenon; as there is life, so there must be death. As a historical phenomenon, capitalism must also die out, and it has a very nice place to go to, that is, underground, there to "sleep".

The present international situation is favourable to our fulfilment of the general task for the transition period. We need three five-year plans basically to accomplish socialist industrialization and socialist transformation. We must strive to secure this length of time for peaceful construction. Three of the fifteen years have already elapsed, and twelve more will do the job. It seems likely that we will gain this time, and we must strive hard for it. We should redouble our efforts in foreign affairs and in building up national defence.

During this fifteen-year period, the class struggle at home and abroad will be very tense. We have already seen this to be the case. We have won many victories in this struggle and will continue to do so. In the internal class struggle, we have done four main things in the last twelve months: one, we have fought idealism, two, we have suppressed counter-revolutionaries, three, we have settled the question about grain, and four, we have tackled the question of agricultural co-operation. The struggles waged on these four issues were all in the nature of a struggle against the bourgeoisie; we have dealt them severe blows and are continuing to deal them crushing ones.

The struggle against idealism has been going on for a year, beginning with the question of *The Dream of the Red Chamber* and including the criticism of the *Literary Gazette* and the subsequent criticism of Hu Shih and Liang Shu-ming. We must carry out an effective campaign against idealism and we intend to devote a period of three five-year plans to the struggle. In the course of this struggle it is necessary to build up contingents of cadres well versed in Marxism and dialectical materialism, so that large numbers of our cadres and people can be armed with the fundamental theories of Marxism. With regard to the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, we plan to spend the rest of this year and the whole of next on the work of eliminating them from state factories, state commercial enterprises, co-operatives and various organizations at the county, district and township levels as well as from among army cadres and factory workers — that is from among the ranks of roughly twelve million people. Talking about counter-revolutionaries, it may seem that there aren't many left and that there are hardly any to be seen. Yet when we dig into the matter, we find that they do exist, and we have just ferreted out a batch. A big battle has also been fought on the question of grain. The bourgeoisie used the grain problem as a pretext for attacking us, a spate of rumours also emerged inside the Party, and we therefore countered by unfolding criticism. We have waged many struggles on the question of agricultural co-operation and the present session has also concentrated on it. We have launched momentous struggles on these four issues, countered the resistance and offensive of the bourgeoisie and gained the initiative.

The bourgeoisie are afraid of our struggles against them on these issues and especially of our suppression of counter-revolutionaries. We have done a good job of suppressing counter-revolutionaries. In this work we must pay attention to the criteria, if we don't, it will be very dangerous. Only those who meet the criteria are to be labelled counter-revolutionaries, that is to say, we must ferret out genuine counter-revolutionaries and not phoney ones. It is to be expected that cases of phoney counter-revolutionaries will occur. It is very difficult to exclude this possibility. But we demand that there should be fewer such cases and preferably none at all. The counter-revolutionaries must be out-and-out and unmistakable ones who completely meet the criteria; we mustn't wrong innocent people. On the other hand, some genuine counter-revolutionaries may slip through our net. You say you will make a clean sweep of them this time. Not very likely. Such cases of wriggling through are hard to avoid, but we should do our best to keep the number to a minimum.

II. A SUMMING-UP OF THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF CO-OPERATION

With regard to agricultural co-operation, the numerous innovations of the masses have shattered many illusions and erroneous views. This time the discussion has settled quite a few questions which many people did not clearly understand a few months ago.

First, there is the question of which is better, a big or a small expansion. This has been a major issue generating much controversy and now it is settled. The masses demand a big expansion, and the general task for the transition period demands that agriculture should adapt itself to industry; therefore, the view in favour of a small expansion is wrong.

Second, the question whether expansion is possible in areas which were liberated late, in mountain areas, in backward townships and in areas affected by natural disasters. Now this question is settled. It is possible in all such places.

Third, the question whether co-operatives can be set up in minority nationality areas. Now it has been proved that they can be set up wherever conditions are ripe. In some places, such as Tibet and the

Taliang and Hsiaoliang Mountains, where conditions are not yet ripe, co-operatives should not be set up.

Fourth, the question whether co-operatives can be set up without funds, carts and oxen or without the well-to-do middle peasants. Now this has been proved possible too.

Fifth, the fallacy that "it is easy to set up a co-operative but hard to consolidate it" has been exploded. Setting one up is not so easy and consolidating it is not necessarily so hard. If you insist that it is easy to set up but hard to consolidate a co-operative, you are actually speaking for setting up few or none.

Sixth, the question whether co-operatives can be set up without farm machinery. The view that there have to be machines before co-operatives can be set up is no longer popular, but it lingers on. This fallacy can also be exploded.

Seventh, the question whether poorly run co-operatives should all be dissolved. Of course a few that definitely cannot carry on may revert to mutual-aid teams, but generally the so-called poorly run co-operatives should not be dissolved, for they can take a turn for the better after a check-up.

Eighth, the statement that "if you don't get off the horse quickly, there will be the danger of breaking up the worker-peasant alliance" is probably an "argument" relayed down from the Rural Work Department of the Central Committee. This department not only manufactures rumours but also produces a lot of "arguments". I think that this statement is in the main "correct" — only a single word needs to be changed, that is, the word "off" be changed into "on". You comrades of the Rural Work Department do not have to feel discouraged, for I have accepted almost all your words and changed only one. The difference lies in a single word, our controversy is over just one word — you want to get off the horse while I want to get on. "If you don't get on the horse quickly, there will be the danger of breaking up the worker-peasant alliance", and danger there certainly will be.

Ninth, the charge that "the co-operatives are to blame for the loss of oxen" is not quite in keeping with the actual conditions. The chief cause of the loss of oxen is to be found not in the co-operatives but in floods, in the high price of ox hides and in the shortage of fodder, while some oxen are too old and have to be slaughtered.

Tenth, it is wrong to say that "the fundamental cause of the tense situation in the countryside is that too many co-operatives have been set up". The tense situation in the countryside last spring was chiefly due to the grain problem. The so-called grain shortage was in most cases fictitious; the clamour about it was raised by landlords, rich peasants and well-to-do middle peasants. We didn't have time to conduct extensive education among the peasant masses to counter it; besides, there were shortcomings in our work regarding grain. We over-purchased 7,000 million catties last year, not knowing at the time the proper amount of grain we should purchase. Now we are making an adjustment and plan to purchase 7,000 million catties less. Coupled with this year's good harvest, this will ease the tense situation in the countryside.

Eleventh, there is still another remark in circulation, "The superiority of the co-operatives can last only three years"; this is pessimistic. In my view, their superiority will certainly not be limited to three years, for socialism will last a very long time. In the future, when socialism is no longer the embodiment of superiority, communism with its superiority will take its place.

Twelfth, should we set up a number of co-operatives of the advanced type in the near future? In the past people were not clear about this question, and it has been raised at the present session. A batch of such co-operatives should be set up. As for the number, that's for you to consider.

Thirteenth, it is also wrong to say that "no co-operatives can be set up with junks and animal-drawn carts". As we see it now, the millions of working people engaged in junk or animal-drawn cart transport should also be organized into co-operatives.

We have settled all these questions in the light of your discussions. This is a tremendous achievement on the part of the present plenary session of the Central Committee.

III. ON THE QUESTION OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND MORE EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP

Comprehensive planning should include, first, a plan for co-operatives, second, a plan for agricultural production and, third, an over-all economic plan. An over-all economic plan for the countryside embraces side-line production, handicrafts, diversified economic undertakings, multi-purpose undertakings, nearby land reclamation and population shifts, supply and marketing co-operatives, credit co-operatives, banks and technique popularization stations, etc., as well as afforestation of barren mountains and villages. I think the barren mountains in the north in particular should be afforested, and they undoubtedly can be. Do you comrades from the north have courage enough for this? Many places in the south need afforestation too. It will be fine if in a number of years we can see various places in the south and north clothed with greenery. This will benefit agriculture, industry and all other spheres.

What other plans should be made? A plan for culture and education. It should embrace eliminating illiteracy, opening primary schools, setting up middle schools geared to the needs of the rural areas, adding a few courses in agriculture to the middle school curriculum, publishing popular pamphlets and books suited to the needs of the peasants, establishing rural broadcasting networks and film projection teams, arranging cultural and recreational activities, and so on. There should also be plans for the consolidation and building of the Party and Youth League organizations, for women's work and for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. All these should be included in a comprehensive plan.

Plans should be of the following kinds: (1) A plan for a village co-operative. Every co-operative, however small, should make a plan and learn how to do so. (2) A plan for an entire township. Our country has over 220,000 townships, each of which should have a plan. (3) A plan for an entire county. We hope every county will make one. Some counties have already made good plans that are interesting to read. The minds of the comrades there are emancipated, they defy heaven and earth and are not fettered by shackles and manacles, and their plans are dynamic. (4) A plan for an entire province (or an autonomous region, or the suburban areas of a municipality). Here the stress should be put on plans for entire townships and for entire counties. These two links should be grasped, and a number of such plans should be drawn up promptly. For instance, in each province plans for three or four counties should be made and distributed as examples.

Plans for co-operative transformation should specify different rates of development for different areas. There are three kinds of areas. The first comprises the greater part of our rural areas, the second a section of the smaller part of our rural areas and the third the remainder. For the greater part of our rural areas the development should be in three waves, that is, three winters and springs. The three waves consist of this winter and next spring, next winter and the following spring, and another winter and spring. Three winters and springs make three waves, one wave surging after another, and in between there should be an interval. There is a valley between two mountains and there is a trough between two waves. The first kind of area will have basically completed semi-socialist co-operative transformation by the spring of 1958. For the second kind of area, such as areas in North China and the Northeast and also some suburban areas, two winters and springs, or two waves, will suffice. Among them a few will have basically gone co-operative by next spring, and thus they will reach the goal in only one wave. The third kind of area, that is, the remainder of the smaller part of our rural areas, will need four, five or even six winters and springs. This does not include some of the minority nationality areas, namely, the Taliang and Hsiaoliang Mountains, Tibet and other minority nationality areas where conditions are not yet ripe, and no co-operative should be set up under such circumstances. What is meant by the basic completion of semi-socialist co-operation? That 70 to 80 per cent of the rural population have joined semi-socialist co-operatives. Here a margin is allowed, 70 per cent will be all right, and so will 75 or 80 per cent or slightly over 80 per cent — this is what we call the basic completion of semi-socialist co-operation. For the rest of the rural population, co-operation will come about later. Being too slow is not good, nor is being overhasty, both are opportunistic. There are two kinds of opportunism, being slow and being hasty. Putting it in this way will make it easier for ordinary people to understand.

Province (municipality or autonomous region), prefecture and county — all three levels must constantly acquaint themselves with the development of the movement and tackle any problem as it arises. Make sure that you don't wait until problems pile up before making a reckoning, that would be firing belated shots. In the past, much of our work was done in this way, problems were left to pile up instead of being solved as they arose, and a reckoning or criticism was made only at the very end. Some comrades made this mistake during the movements against the "three evils" and the "five evils". Don't go in for criticism after the event. Of course, criticisms have to be made after the event, but it will be best to make them the moment a mistake begins to show itself. It is not good to go in for criticism after the event and fail to give guidance according to the changing circumstances.

What is to be done when things turn out unfavourably? When this happens, put on the brakes at once, or in other words, make a halt. It is like driving a car, we put on the brakes at once when we meet with danger in going down a steep slope. The provincial, prefectural and county authorities all have the power to put on the brakes. Attention must be paid to guarding against the "Left" deviation. To guard against the "Left" deviation is Marxism, not opportunism. Marxism does not call for "Left" deviations, and "Left" opportunism is not Marxism.

In setting up co-operatives what should we compete in from now on? In quality, in measuring up to norms. As for quantity or speed, what we specified earlier will do, and the emphasis now is on competition in quality. And what are the criteria for quality? They are increased production and no loss of livestock. How can production be increased and loss of livestock be avoided? To this end, it is necessary to observe the principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefit, make comprehensive plans and give flexible guidance. Given these conditions, the co-operatives, I think, will be able to achieve better quality, increase production and prevent the loss of livestock. We must by all means avoid the mistake once made in the Soviet Union which led to the slaughtering of livestock in large numbers. The next two years are crucial, and chiefly the next five months, namely, this winter and next spring. I would ask the comrades here to see to it that, starting from November this year and up to March next year, no serious trouble nor any loss of oxen in large numbers occurs. Since we have only a few tractors, oxen are a treasure, they are the chief implement in agricultural production.

In the next five months, the leading cadres at the provincial, prefectural, county, district and township levels, and first of all the Party secretaries and deputy secretaries, must immerse themselves in the question of co-operatives and familiarize themselves with the various problems connected with them. Is the time too short? I think five months will do, if you make a serious effort. Of course it is very important for comrades at the provincial level to do so, but it will be very dangerous if comrades at the county, district and township levels in particular do not go into this question and know practically nothing about co-operatives when many are being set up. What if a comrade simply can't dig in? He should be given a different job. The Central Committee will probably call a similar conference five months hence, that is, after next March. We shall then have a competition in quality, and speakers at the conference will not be expected to repeat their present speeches, for there must be something new, that is, the emphasis should be on questions of comprehensive planning, management and methods of leadership. They should speak on efficient methods of setting up more and better co-operatives faster. In other words, they should deal with the question of quality.

Methods of leadership are very important. To avoid mistakes, one must pay attention to these methods and strengthen leadership. Here are some suggestions about methods of leadership, see if they are feasible. One is to hold several large or small meetings yearly to solve current problems, as we are doing now. When a problem crops up, you should be able to see what is universal in a particular case. You don't have to catch all the sparrows and dissect them before you can prove the fact that "small as it is, the sparrow has all the vital organs". No scientist has ever acted this way. Once you are clear about a few co-operatives, you will be able to draw proper conclusions. Besides the method of holding meetings, you can use the telegram and the telephone and go on inspection tours, these too are very important methods of leadership. In addition, every province should select suitable personnel to run publications well and improve them for the prompt exchange of experience. Here is another suggestion which I would like you to try out. I spent eleven days reading 120-odd reports, making corrections and writing notes to them. In this manner I have "travelled all the kingdoms" and gone farther than Confucius, "travelling" as far as Yunnan and Sinkiang.[2] Perhaps each province and autonomous region might compile a book every year or every six months, with one article from each county, so that the experience of all counties can be exchanged; this will facilitate the rapid spread of the co-operative movement. Still another method is to issue bulletins. The county Party committee should submit bulletins to the prefectural Party committee, the prefectural to the provincial or autonomous region Party committee, and the latter to the Central Committee, reporting on the number of co-operatives set up and on the problems that have arisen. The leadership at various levels will acquaint itself with the situation through these bulletins and be able to find solutions to problems when they arise. These are a few suggestions concerning methods of leadership for the comrades present to consider.

IV. ON IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

All past experience has demonstrated one point: ideological struggle must hit the mark. There must be confrontation of ideas, to use a current expression. As in fighting, you thrust your sword at me and I thrust mine back, and the two swords must cross — this is confrontation. Without a confrontation of ideas no clarity and thoroughness can be attained, and that's not good. At this session we have had confrontation, thus attaining clarity and thoroughness in our thinking. The first advantage of this method is that it helps most comrades to get clear on questions, and the second that it helps those comrades who have erred to correct their mistakes.

For comrades who have erred, I think there are only two requirements: one, they themselves must be willing to make revolution; two, other people must allow them to go on making revolution. There are individuals who don't want to go on making revolution themselves, for example, Chen Tu-hsiu did not want to, nor did Chang Kuo-tao, nor Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, but such individuals are a mere handful. Most people want to go on making revolution. Then there is the other requirement: they must be allowed to make revolution. We should not act like the bogus foreign devil in *The True Story of Ah Q*, who bars Ah Q from revolution, nor should we ape Wang Lun the scholar-in-white[3] in *Water Margin*, who also bars other people from revolution. Whoever bars others from revolution will find himself in a very perilous position. Wang Lun, the scholar-in-white, who bars other people from revolution, ends up losing his life. Kao Kang barred other people from revolution, and didn't he end up losing his life too?

Historical experience shows that most people who have committed errors of dogmatism or empiricism can correct them. But this calls for two pre-conditions, serious criticism on the one hand and a forbearing attitude on the other. It is not good to do without the latter, for its absence would lead to unnatural relations. Who doesn't make some mistake or other? Everyone without exception makes mistakes, only some make major mistakes and others minor ones. In any case the incorrigible are few, such as Chen Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-tao, Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih and also Chen Kuang and Tai Chi-ying. Except for a few persons like them, all the others who have erred can be saved and can correct their mistakes with the help of their comrades. We should act in this way and have confidence. On their part, people who have erred should have confidence too.

Some comrades in the Rural Work Department of the Central Committee, and principally Comrade Teng Tzu-hui, have made mistakes. The mistakes he has made this time are Right deviationist and empiricist in nature. Comrade Teng Tzu-hui has made a self-criticism. Though some comrades at group meetings felt that it was not thorough enough, we of the Political Bureau and other comrades have talked it over and found it satisfactory on the whole. For the present the understanding he has shown is good enough. It should be acknowledged that Comrade Teng Tzu-hui did a lot of work during the long revolutionary struggle and made contributions. But he should not have allowed his contributions to become a handicap. He himself has admitted this, saying that he has to some extent flaunted his seniority. One must be modest. Provided Comrade Teng Tzu-hui is modest and ready to accept the help of his comrades, we believe he will be able to correct his mistakes.

Comrade Teng Tzu-hui once advanced the kind of programmatic formulation which advocated reliance on the businessmen (that is, on the bourgeoisie) and the "four big freedoms". That formulation was wrong and was a veritable bourgeois programme in nature, a capitalist programme, not a proletarian one, and it ran counter to the decision of the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee on the restriction of the bourgeoisie. We are now following a policy of restriction towards both the urban bourgeoisie and the rural bourgeoisie (the rich peasants). Therefore, the "four big freedoms", under which no restrictions are placed on hiring labourers, trading, money-lending and renting out land, must be called in question. I would say there are "four little freedoms". Here the difference is between big and little. With restrictions, the bourgeoisie have a bit of these freedoms, just a tiny bit. We must prepare the conditions for depriving the bourgeoisie of these little freedoms, too. Towards the urban bourgeoisie we adopt a policy of utilization, restriction and transformation. We must utilize it, but at the same time we must restrict that aspect which is detrimental to the nation's economy and the people's livelihood. Such a policy is neither "Left" nor Right. No restriction at all would mean leaning too much to the Right. Extreme restriction, which bars the bourgeoisie from any undertaking whatever, would mean leaning too much to the "Left". Lenin said it would be not only foolish but suicidal for a political party to try to eradicate capitalism at one stroke when millions upon millions of small producers still exist.[4] But Comrade Teng Tzu-hui's formulation was incorrect because he made no mention of restriction, and it differed from that of the Central Committee and of the Second Plenary Session.

Some comrades take almost no heed of the Party's resolutions and the policies advocated by the Party over long periods, as if they had never read or heard of them — I don't know why. For instance, the mutual-aid and co-operative movement went on for many years in the central revolutionary base area, in Yenan and in each and every base area, and yet these comrades don't seem to have seen or heard anything about it. Back in the winter of 1951, the Central Committee adopted a resolution on mutual aid and co-operation in agricultural production, which they likewise ignore. As late as 1953, they still did not talk about fundamentals but took pleasure in giving small favours. By their not talking about fundamentals we mean they never talked about socialism, and by taking pleasure in giving small favours we mean they took pleasure in giving the "four big freedoms". That is to say, some comrades take no heed at all of the Party's resolutions or of some of the policies and programmes it has long advocated; instead they go their own way. They never try to find out whether and how questions of a similar nature have been discussed before. Some historians take pains to study even oracle bones, inscriptions on bronzes and stone tablets and other relics of the ancient past which have been unearthed, whereas these comrades pay not the least heed to our recent past and don't bother to look into it. In short, they completely ignore what is going on beyond their immediate surroundings and just write and speak as they like; for instance, they have prated about the "four big freedoms", and well, they have ended up running their heads against a wall.

Some other comrades always prefer decentralism, they assert their independence and even set up independent kingdoms, finding dictatorship very much to their taste. At the outset it was in order to be comfortable that they set up kingdoms and proclaimed themselves kings. But what was the result? In the end they found themselves very uncomfortable as they came under criticism. Isn't there an opera called *Ascending the Throne*? Look what great comfort Hsueh Ping-kuei enjoyed on becoming king, for in those days there was no self-criticism. That was not good. Many people are always reluctant to consult others. Many comrades pay lip-service to collective leadership, but actually they are inordinately fond of personal dictatorship, as if they would not look like leaders unless they were dictatorial. One does not have to be dictatorial to be a leader, don't you know that? The bourgeoisie has bourgeois democracy, it stresses class dictatorship. The proletariat and the Communist Party must likewise exercise class dictatorship, it is bad to practise personal dictatorship. When a problem comes up, it is always advisable to consult with others, have it solved by the collective and pool the wisdom of the many; that's the better way.

Still another point needs to be taken up here. Many comrades bury themselves in office work and do not study problems. Mustn't office work be attended to? Certainly it must. It won't do to neglect such work, but it would be dangerous to attend to it exclusively without studying problems. If you don't go among the cadres and the masses, or if, when among them, you are always taking them to task instead of consulting and exchanging views with them, saying "What do you think of my ideas? Please tell me your opinions", you won't be able to sense the political climate, your nose will become insensitive and you will catch cold politically. Once your nose is stopped up, you can't tell what the climate is at a given time. Today Comrade Chen Yi said that one must be able to grasp a thing when it is in the bud. A person must be most slow-witted if he fails to see what is already widespread and abundant. This situation calls for attention. It is very bad for anyone to be occupied solely with office work to the neglect of studying problems, going among the masses and cadres and consulting with them.

V. OTHER QUESTIONS

Most of the questions I am now going to discuss have been raised by the comrades here.

First, with regard to removing well-to-do middle peasants from leading positions in the co-operatives, it is necessary to pay attention to the steps to be taken and the methods to be used; do not dismiss them all at once. Although they are not fit to be leaders, they are nevertheless working people. Each case should be decided on its merits, depending on how the person acquits himself. Some well-to-do middle peasants must be removed, for it simply won't do to let them continue at their posts. But it must be made clear to the masses (for example, the members of the co-operative) as well as to the well-to-do middle peasant concerned that he is not really fit to go on serving as a leader. There is another condition, namely, he is not to be removed until a better qualified person is ready to succeed him or has been trained to take his place. Some of the well-to-do middle peasants may continue at their posts after making a self-criticism and correcting their mistakes, others may be made deputy leaders or committee members. Of course those who have done a good job should not be removed, even though they are well-to-do middle peasants. Do not treat well-to-do middle peasants as rich peasants, they are not. Do not remove them all at once. This question must be approached with care and properly settled. The provinces and localities are expected to consider whether the various ways mentioned above are feasible.

Second, it must be made clear at the Party branches and among the masses that when we now say that the lower-middle peasants and the upper-middle peasants are two different social strata, it is not because we are redefining class status but because different social strata actually take different attitudes towards co-operative transformation, some active, some passive, and a similar difference exists among individuals within the same stratum. For instance, even among the poor peasants there are people who do not want to join the co-operatives for the time being. This fact can be used to convince the well-to-do middle peasants: "Look! Among the poor and lower-middle peasants there are also people who are rather passive. They don't want to come in, so we won't ask them to join. As you well-to-do middle peasants don't want to come in now, you may stay out too." We should first draw in those who are keen on joining, then make propaganda among a second group until they become keen enough to join, and then among a third group. This should be done by stages and in batches. In time all will join the co-operatives. So it is not a question of redefining class status.

Third, on the question of landlords and rich peasants joining the co-operatives. Perhaps we can try the following way: take the county together with the township as a unit (it is not enough to take the county alone as the unit, for a county may have basically gone co-operative while there may still be no co-operatives at all in some of its townships). When a county and township have basically gone co-operative, that is, when 70 to 80 per cent of the peasant households have joined, the consolidated co-operatives can start dealing with the landlords and rich peasants in groups and by stages according to their behaviour. Those who have a good record and are honest and law-abiding may be given co-operative membership. Others may join in collective labour in the co-operative and receive their share of remuneration but without co-operative membership, being actually members on probation; if they do well, they too can become members, and so they will have something to look forward to. Those in a third group will not be allowed to join the co-operative for the time being, the question will be taken up later and settled on an individual basis. None of the landlords or rich peasants admitted to the co-operative are to be appointed to posts in it. As for educated young people from landlord or rich peasant families who have been through some testing, can't they be given such jobs as literacy teachers in the villages? In places where there are very few other intellectuals, there is a need to have them serve as literacy teachers under the leadership and supervision of the Party branch and the co-operative management committee. At present, there are still a fair number of such educated young people among the primary school teachers. These young people from landlord or rich peasant families are only seventeen or eighteen years old and have just finished primary or junior middle school, and I think it unnecessarily strict not to let them serve even as literacy teachers. We can enlist them in teaching the peasants to read and write, in wiping out illiteracy. Please consider whether this is feasible. However, assigning them to such work as bookkeeping would be rather risky.

Fourth, as regards the conditions for establishing co-operatives of the advanced type and how many to establish, I shan't say anything today but ask you comrades to study these conditions and then we'll discuss the matter next year. Different localities can act according to the existing conditions. In short, such co-operatives can be set up where the conditions are ripe and not otherwise, and you may start with only a few and later increase their number step by step.

Fifth, as to the time for establishing co-operatives, perhaps you can consider whether it must be concentrated in winter and spring each year and whether a number can also be set up in summer or autumn, as is actually being done in some places already. But it must be pointed out that there has to be an interval for rest and consolidation between two waves and that after a batch of co-operatives has been set up, there should be check-ups and consolidation before more are established. It is like fighting battles, there should be rest and consolidation between two battles. It is entirely wrong to do without, leave no interval and allow no breathing space. There was once the view in the army that rest and consolidation were dispensable, that a respite was unnecessary and that what was necessary was to march on and fight all the time, which, as a matter of fact, is impossible. Men must sleep.

If the meeting we are holding today should not adjourn but go on and on indefinitely, everybody would be against this, including me. Men need a long rest and consolidation every day — seven or eight, or at least five or six, hours of sleep, not counting the shorter rests during the day. To say that the establishment of co-operatives, a matter of such major importance, can dispense with rest and consolidation is most naive.

Sixth, "Run co-operatives with diligence and thrift" is a very good slogan. It has been put forward by people at the grass-roots level. It is necessary to practise strict economy and combat waste. A vigorous campaign against waste is now under way in the cities and also in the villages. We must encourage diligence and thrift in running the household, running the co-operative and building the country. Our nation must be first diligent and second thrifty; we must not be lazy and extravagant. Laziness leads to decay, that is not good. To run co-operatives with diligence and thrift it is necessary to raise labour productivity, practise strict economy, reduce costs of production, institute economic accounting and combat extravagance and waste. All co-operatives must raise labour productivity and reduce costs of production. As for economic accounting, it is to be taken up gradually. As the co-operatives grow in size, they cannot manage without economic accounting; they must learn to do it step by step.

Seventh, it is a shortcoming of this session that no one has spoken on the subject of state farms. I hope the Rural Work Department of the Central Committee as well as the Ministry of Agriculture will study this question. In future the proportion of state farms will grow year by year.

Eighth, we must go on opposing Han chauvinism. It is one kind of bourgeois ideology. The Han people are so numerous, they are liable to look down on the minority nationalities and not to help them wholeheartedly, so we must relentlessly fight Han chauvinism. Naturally, narrow nationalism may arise among the minority nationalities, that also is to be opposed. But of the two the chief one, the one to be opposed first, is Han chauvinism. So long as the comrades of Han nationality take the correct attitude and treat the minority nationalities with real fairness, so long as the nationality policy they follow and the stand they take on the question of nationality relations are entirely Marxist and do not reflect bourgeois viewpoints, that is to say, so long as they are free from Han chauvinism, it is comparatively easy to overcome narrow nationalist views among the minority nationalities. At present, there is still a good deal of Han chauvinism, for example, monopolizing the affairs of the minority nationalities, showing no respect for their customs and folk-ways, being self-righteous, looking down on them and saying how backward they are. At the National Conference of our Party last March, I said that China could not do without its minority nationalities. There are scores of nationalities in China. The regions inhabited by the minority nationalities are more extensive in area than those inhabited by the Han nationality and abound in material wealth of all kinds. Our national economy cannot do without the economy of the minority nationalities.

Ninth, as for the campaign to wipe out illiteracy, I think we had better get it going. In some places, this campaign has itself been wiped out. This is not good. It is illiteracy and not the campaign that should be wiped out in the course of co-operative transformation, that is, we should wipe out illiteracy and not the campaign to wipe it out.

Tenth, some people ask, what is meant by "Left" and Right deviations? As we have said on previous occasions, everything moves in space and time. Here I'll chiefly deal with the question of time. If the observation you make of the movement of things does not agree with reality, it is a "Left" deviation if your judgment is premature, and it is a Right deviation if your judgment lags behind. Take the co-operative movement for example. Although the conditions are already ripe, such as the masses' enthusiasm, the widespread presence of mutual-aid teams and the leadership of the Party, some comrades still deny this. When it is already possible (not several years ago, but right now) for the co-operative movement to develop in a big way, they still say it is impossible. All this is a Right deviation. On the other hand, it is a "Left" deviation if it is demanded that 80 per cent of the whole nation should go co-operative in a very short time, when such conditions as the level of political consciousness of the peasants and the leadership of the Party are not yet ripe. As the old Chinese sayings go, "When a melon is ripe, it falls off its stem," and "When water flows, a channel is formed." We should act in accordance with specific conditions and achieve our aims naturally instead of forcing their attainment. Take childbirth for instance. It requires nine months. If, in the seventh month, the doctor should exert pressure and force the child out, that would not be good, that would be a "Left" deviation. If, on the other hand, the unborn child is already nine months old and very much wants to come out and yet you don't allow it, that would be a Right deviation. In short, everything moves in time. When the right time comes for something to be done, it has to be done. If you don't allow it, that is a Right deviation. If the right time has not come for something and yet you try to force it through, that is a "Left" deviation.

Eleventh, some people ask, isn't it possible that "Left" deviationist mistakes will occur? Our reply is that it is entirely possible. If the leadership in a given locality, whether a township Party branch or a district, county, prefectural or provincial Party committee, does not take note of the level of political consciousness of the masses and the development of the mutual-aid teams, and if instead of drawing up plans, exercising control and establishing co-operatives by stages and in batches, it only seeks quantity and does not care for quality, serious "Left" deviationist mistakes are bound to appear. When there is an upsurge of enthusiasm among the masses, when everyone asks to join the co-operative, it is imperative to envisage all kinds of difficulties and every unfavourable condition conceivable, openly make them known to the masses and let the masses consider the matter fully. If they are not afraid, they can join up; if they are afraid, they don't have to. Of course, we must not frighten people away. I suppose I won't scare you away today, for we have been in session for so many days. It is necessary to cool people's heads at the right moment so that they won't become hot-headed.

We are opposed to boundless anxiety and countless taboos and regulations. Does this mean that we should have no anxiety at all? Not a single taboo? Not a single regulation? Of course that is not the case. Who is there who does not have anxiety, the necessary anxiety, the warranted anxiety? And we should have the necessary taboos and regulations too. Without a few taboos, without a few regulations, how can we carry on? It is absolutely right to have the necessary anxiety, taboos and regulations, and the necessary pauses, intermissions, putting on of brakes and cut-offs.

Here is one method: when people are on the point of becoming conceited, when they are about to get cocky, they should be assigned a new task (for instance, we have now proposed a competition in quality and next year when you come here, the results will be compared; by then the question of quantity will have become secondary) so that they won't have a chance to become conceited, as they won't have the time. We have tried this method before. When an army unit won a battle and some comrades started talking about it with gusto to people around them and got too cocky, you set them a new task — to fight another battle. No sooner was a new task set than they had to start considering the problems it entailed and make preparations, so that they stopped being cocky and had no time for conceit.

Twelfth, some comrades have suggested that the county level might perhaps be given the right to a margin of manoeuvre of 10 per cent. Take the establishment of co-operatives, their number might be either 10 per cent less or 10 per cent more. I think this suggestion can be adopted, it is a good one, so don't make things too rigid. Please give the matter further thought.

Thirteenth, aren't there people who want to reverse our decision? There are quite a number. They think the co-operatives will come to nothing and what we are doing will be entirely reversed, and they say we are not Marxists, but opportunists. But, in my view, as the general trend indicates, this decision is irreversible.

Fourteenth, some people ask, what will be the trend in the future? It will be the basic accomplishment of socialist industrialization as well as of the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce within a period of about three five-year plans. So far as I can see, that will be the trend. Besides, it may be added, as I indicated at the last National Conference of our Party, that in about fifty to seventy-five years, that is, within a period of ten to fifteen five-year plans, we shall be able to make China a powerful socialist country.

During this period of fifty to seventy-five years, many serious and complicated conflicts and struggles will certainly take place abroad, at home and inside the Party, and we are bound to meet with a lot of difficulties. In our own experience, we have lived through I don't know how many conflicts, armed and peaceful, with bloodshed and without, so how can you guarantee that there will be none in future? There will certainly be conflicts, and not a few, but a lot. Among them there will be the outbreak of a world war, the dropping of atom bombs on our heads, and the appearance of Berias, Kao Kangs, Chang Kuo-taos and Chen Tu-hsius. Many things cannot be foreseen now. But, as we Marxists see it, it is definite that all difficulties can be overcome and that a powerful socialist China will emerge. Is that certain? I think it is. According to Marxism it is. The bourgeoisie has prepared a grave-digger for itself. Its grave is ready. How can it not die? Speaking of trends, this is roughly the trend.

Fifteenth, you have made many suggestions for the revision of the two documents — the resolution and the regulations. That is very good.

We'll have your suggestions collected for consideration. After its adoption today, the resolution will be revised and published in a few days by the Political Bureau. The regulations will take a longer time. The democratic personages will have to be consulted and the legislative procedure will have to be followed. Or, like the Draft Bill, the regulations may first be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for discussion and then sent to the State Council for publication in order to get opinions. Tentatively and for a period of time, localities may act in accordance with the regulations until they are submitted to the National People's Congress for adoption next year.

Finally, in passing I would ask you to pay attention to writing. I hope all present will become "teachers of composition". Your articles are well written, except, perhaps, for a few shortcomings. You should take care to help other people improve their style of writing. Now, of the articles written by many comrades, some are long-winded and devoid of substance, but these are relatively few; the chief defects are an overuse of classical Chinese and too strong a flavour of the semi-literary, semi-vernacular style. In writing articles one must pay attention to logic. That is to say, one must pay attention to the structure of an article or speech as a whole, and there must be some sort of relation between the beginning, the middle and the end, a sort of inner relationship, and the three must not be at variance with one another. One must also observe the rules of grammar. Many comrades tend to omit the subject or the object of a sentence when it should not be omitted, or use adverbs as verbs or even leave out verbs. All this is ungrammatical. Attention must also be paid to rhetoric, to how to write more vividly. In short, to be logical, to be grammatical and to have a better command of rhetoric — these are the three points I would like you to bear in mind when you write.

NOTES

[1] V. I. Lenin, "The Tax in Kind".

[2] This refers to the compilation of *How to Run Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives* by Comrade Mao Tsetung, who undertook it after reading the reports on agricultural co-operation sent in by various localities. See "Prefaces to *Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside*" below.

[3] In the classical Chinese novel *Water Margin*, Wang Lun (nicknamed "the scholar-in-white") becomes head of the peasant rebels when they seize Liangshan Mountain, and he wants to remain head. When Lin Chung, chief instructor to the capital garrison, is forced to rebel against the authorities and seeks shelter on Liangshan Mountain, Wang Lun first tries to turn him away and then makes things hard for him. Later, he refuses to allow Chao Kai, a rebel peasant leader, and his followers to join forces with the Liangshan Mountain rebels. In the end Wang Lun is killed by Lin Chung.

[4] V. I. Lenin, *op. cit.*

PREFACE TO *SOCIALIST UPSURGE IN CHINA'S COUNTRYSIDE*

September and December 1955

PREFACE I

September 25, 1955

The general line of the Chinese Communist Party for the period of transition from capitalism to socialism is basically to accomplish the industrialization of China together with the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce. This transition period will cover roughly eighteen years, that is, the three years of rehabilitation plus the span of three five-year plans. On the surface there has been a consensus in our Party on this formulation of the general line and the specification of the time-limit, but in reality there have been differences of opinion. At present, these differences manifest themselves chiefly on the question of the socialist transformation of agriculture, or agricultural co-operation.

Some people say that in the last few years there seems to have been a certain rule operating in agricultural co-operation, namely, expansion is encouraged in winter but is bound to be opposed in the spring by certain persons as rash advance. There are reasons for that remark, for they have seen opposition to the alleged rash advance on several occasions. For example, there was an expansion in the winter of 1952, only to be opposed as a rash advance in the spring of 1953; again there was an expansion in the winter of 1954, only to be opposed once more as a rash advance in the following spring. Opposition to the alleged rash advancement not only halting the expansion but compulsorily dissolving (or "axing") large numbers of co-operatives already set up, thus rousing dissatisfaction among the cadres and peasant masses. Some peasants were so disgusted that they refused to eat, or kept to their beds, or skipped work a dozen days in a row. They said, "You were the ones who told us to set up the co-operatives, and now you are the ones who tell us to disband them." Dissolution gladdened the well-to-do middle peasants but saddened the poor peasants. When the news about the halting of expansion or the dissolution reached the poor peasants in Hupeh Province, they were "chilled to the bone", but some middle peasants said, "This is as good as a pilgrimage to Mulan Hill." (On Mulan Hill in Huangpi County, Hupeh Province, there stands the Mulan Temple, a place peasants like to visit on pilgrimage.)

Why this wavering on the part of some comrades which most people find absolutely uncalled for? Because they have fallen under the influence of some of the middle peasants. At the initial stage of the co-operative movement some of the middle peasants, especially the well-to-do middle peasants who had strong leanings towards capitalism, were averse to socialist transformation. Here what makes the difference is the Party's policy and method of work with respect to the middle peasants in the co-operative movement. Many middle peasants, mainly the new and old lower-middle peasants, who are not so well off and have a higher level of political consciousness, are willing to join the co-operatives, provided we pursue a policy which benefits both strata, that is, the poor and also the middle peasants, and not a policy exclusively beneficial to the former, and provided our method of work is good. However, even if we follow this policy, some middle peasants will still prefer to stay outside the co-operatives for the time being and "to remain free if only for a year or two". This is perfectly understandable, for co-operation means a change in the peasants' private ownership of the means of production and the entire mode of management; for them this is a fundamental change, so naturally they want to give the matter careful consideration and for some time may find it difficult to make a decision. Some of our comrades failed to tackle problems in accordance with the Party's policy and method of work and, when faced with complaints from the well-to-do middle peasants and certain flaws in our work, they panicked, raised a hue and cry against "rash advance", and "axed" co-operatives at will as if they were malignant tumours which would be fatal unless removed at once. But this is not at all how things stand. Shortcomings there are in our work, but on the whole the movement is healthy. The masses of the poor and lower-middle peasants welcome the co-operatives. If some of the middle peasants want to wait and see, we should let them. As for the well-to-do middle peasants, we should give them even more time to wait and see, except for those willing to join. At present, the main defect in the movement is that in many places the Party leadership has failed to keep pace; the comrades in charge have not taken the leadership of the whole movement into their hands, they have no over-all plan for the province, county, district or township, but adopt a piecemeal approach, and they lack initiative, enthusiasm, warm responsiveness and drive. Thus a big problem has arisen. With the movement spreading widely at the grass roots but receiving insufficient attention from above, some troubles naturally occur. In the face of such troubles, instead of providing stronger leadership and better planning, our comrades take a negative attitude and try to check the progress of the movement or rush to "axe" a number of co-operatives. Of course this is wrong and is sure to give rise to more troubles.

We have just compiled a book, *How to Run Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives*.[1] It includes factual examples from various provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, a total of more than 120 articles. The bulk of the material covers the period January-August 1955 and the rest the second half of 1954. Most of the articles have been reprinted from the inner-Party publications of provinces, municipalities or autonomous regions, some have been taken from newspapers, others are reports of Party committees or of working personnel to Party committees at higher levels, and one is a verbatim record of a talk by the director of a co-operative who was invited to Peking. We have made only a few verbal changes in the material, keeping intact the original contents. We have written comments on some of the articles. To keep our comments separate from those of the editors of the original publications, ours carry the designation "Editor's Note". We believe that the views of the authors as expressed in the material are correct or basically correct. From this material the reader will see the scope and direction of the co-operative movement in the country and the prospects for its development. The material shows that the movement is healthy. Troubles occurred only in places where the Party committees had failed to give proper guidance. But once they caught up and gave proper guidance according to the policy of the Central Committee of our Party, the problem was solved right away. The material is very convincing; it can rouse to action those who have so far adopted a passive attitude towards the movement; it can help those who still do not know how to run a co-operative to find ways to run it; what is more, it can silence those who are fond of "axing" co-operatives at will.

It is indeed a tremendous task to carry out the socialist transformation of agriculture among several hundred million peasants. The movement has not been going on very long in the country as a whole, and the experience gained is still inadequate. In particular we have not yet conducted extensive and effective propaganda throughout the Party; as a result, many comrades have paid no heed to the subject and do not understand the principles, policies and measures for the movement, and so there is still a lack of unity of will within the Party. The Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of our Party is soon to be convened to discuss the subject and a new resolution on it will be adopted. We should start extensive and effective propaganda in accordance with the resolution so as to achieve unity of will throughout the Party. The publication of this book may be of some help to our propaganda work.

PREFACE II

December 27, 1955

This is a source book intended for people working in the countryside. A preface[2] was written for it in September. Now, three months later, that preface is already out of date, and so a new one has to be prepared.

Here is the sequence of events. The book has been compiled twice, in September and again in December. In the first compilation 121 articles were included. Most of them reflected conditions in the first half of 1955 and a few those in the second half of 1954. Sample copies were distributed for comment to responsible comrades from provincial, municipal, autonomous region and prefectural Party committees who attended the Sixth Plenary Session (Enlarged) of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, October 4-11, 1955. These comrades found the book needed to be supplemented. After the meeting most of the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions sent in additional material. Much of this reflected conditions in the second half of 1955. Thus the book had to be recompiled. From the original 121 articles we deleted 30, keeping 91, and added 85 from the new material, bringing the total to 176 articles — some 900,000 words. Hence the present collection. The comrades responsible for the editing have gone over all the material, made some verbal changes, added notes on difficult terms and prepared a subject index. Furthermore, we have added comments on some of the articles, criticizing certain erroneous ideas or making certain suggestions. To keep our comments separate from those of the editors of the original publications, ours carry the designation "Editor's Note". Since some of our comments were written in September and others in December, there is naturally some variation in tone.

However, what is involved is not just the material. The point is that the situation in China underwent a fundamental change in the second half of 1955. Of China's 110 million peasant households more than 70 million (over 60 per cent) have up to now (late December 1955) joined semi-socialist agricultural producers' co-operatives in response to the call of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. In my report of July 31, 1955 on the co-operative transformation of agriculture, I put the number of peasant households in co-operatives at 16,900,000, but in the space of a few months that number has been exceeded by well over 50 million. This is a tremendous event. This event makes it clear to us that we need only the calendar year 1956 in order basically to complete the semi-socialist co-operative transformation of agriculture. In another three or four years, that is, by 1959 or 1960, we can in the main complete the transformation of semi-socialist co-operatives into fully socialist ones. This event makes it clear to us that we must try to accomplish the socialist transformation of China's handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce ahead of schedule in order to meet the needs of an expanding agriculture. And this event makes it clear to us that in scale and tempo China's industrialization and the development of its science, culture, education, health work, etc. can no longer proceed exactly in the way previously envisaged, but must be appropriately expanded and accelerated.

Is agricultural co-operation, now proceeding at such a high tempo, going forward in a healthy way? It certainly is. The Party organizations everywhere are giving over-all leadership to the movement. The peasants are taking part in the movement whole-heartedly and in excellent order. Their enthusiasm for production is rising to unprecedented heights. For the first time the broadest masses know clearly what the future has in store for them. When three five-year plans are completed, that is, by 1967, the production of grain and many other crops will probably double or treble the highest annual output before the founding of the People's Republic. In a relatively short time, say seven or eight years, illiteracy will be wiped out. Many of the diseases most harmful to the people, such as schistosomiasis, diseases formerly considered incurable, can now be treated. In short, the masses already see a great future lying before them.

The problem facing the whole Party and people is no longer that of criticizing Right conservative ideas about the speed of the socialist transformation of agriculture. That problem has been solved. Nor is it the problem of the speed of transforming the whole of capitalist industry and commerce trade by trade into joint state-private enterprises. That problem too has been solved. The speed of the socialist transformation of handicrafts should be discussed during the first half of 1956. And that problem can also be easily solved. The problem today concerns none of these, it lies elsewhere. It lies in agricultural production; industrial production (including state, joint state-private and co-operative industries); handicraft production; the scale and speed of capital construction in industry, communications and transport; the co-ordination of commerce with other branches of the economy; the co-ordination of the work in science, culture, education and health with our various economic activities, etc. In all these fields there is an underestimation of the situation, a shortcoming which must be criticized and corrected if our work is to keep pace with the development of the situation as a whole. People must adapt their thinking to the changed conditions. Of course, no one should disregard reality and indulge in flights of fancy, or make plans of action unwarranted by the objective situation, or reach out for the impossible. However, the problem today is that Right conservative thinking is still causing trouble in many spheres and prevents our work from keeping pace with the development of the objective situation. The problem today is that what can be done by a measure of exertion is considered by many to be impossible. It is therefore entirely necessary to continue the criticism of Right conservative ideas, which do in fact exist.

This book is intended for comrades working in the countryside. Can city people read it too? They not only can but should. Here is something fresh. Just as new things are happening every day, every hour, in the building of socialism in the cities, so they are in the countryside. What are the peasants doing? What is the connection between what the peasants are doing and what the working class, the intellectuals and all patriotic personages are doing? To gain such an understanding, it will be helpful to read about the rural areas.

To make it possible for more people to understand the current situation in the countryside, we are preparing an abridged edition, containing 44 of the 176 articles, or about 270,000 words, so that those unable to read the entire collection can have some idea of this subject.

NOTES

[1] The book was renamed *Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside* when it was published.

[2] This refers to "Preface I".

EDITOR'S NOTES FROM *SOCIALIST UPSURGE IN CHINA'S COUNTRYSIDE*

September and December 1955

1

This is a very well written article which deserves to be recommended to the reader as the first piece in this book. As described at the beginning of the article, in many parts of the country there are still quite a few people who are "steering clear of the co-op" because they are ignorant about it and are afraid of being asked questions. "Resolute contraction", the wholesale dissolution of co-operatives by command, is likewise a manifestation of "steering clear of the co-op"; the only difference is that, instead of taking a passive attitude of evasion, these people take a very active attitude and "axe" (to use their own expression) a great many co-operatives with one fell blow. Axe in hand, they chop and thus avoid troublesome problems. They say that there are all sorts of difficulties in running co-operatives, and according to them the difficulties defy the imagination. However, there are countless examples throughout the country which give the lie to their arguments. One such example is the experience of Tsunhua County, Hopei Province. In 1952 no one there knew how to run a co-operative. Their solution was to learn how. Their slogan was: "The Party secretary pitches in and all Party members help run the co-ops." The result was: "from knowing nothing to knowing a lot",

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In editing *Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside*, Comrade Mao Tsetung wrote notes, of which 43 have been selected here. At the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in Chengtu in March 1958, part of the notes was reprinted. On March 19, 1958 Comrade Mao Tsetung wrote an explanation, the full text of which reads:

> These notes which appeared in the book entitled *Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside* were written in September and December 1955. To this day some have not lost their significance. There is however one statement in the notes to

"from a few knowing how to many knowing how", "from district cadres running the co-ops to the masses running them". In the three years from 1952 to 1954, the eleven townships of the Tenth District, Tsunhua County, Hopei Province, basically completed semi-socialist co-operative transformation, with 85 per cent of the 4,343 peasant households drawn into co-operatives. Compared with 1952, production in agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry in this district showed the following increases in 1954: grain 76 per cent, timber trees 56.4 per cent, fruit trees 62.87 per cent and sheep 463.1 per cent.

Now we have every reason to raise this question: if this could be done here, why can't it be done elsewhere? If you say it can't, what are your reasons? I can see only one reason — unwillingness to take the trouble, or, to put it more bluntly, Right opportunism. Hence "steering clear of the co-op", hence the Party secretary not pitching in and all Party members not helping to run the co-operatives, and hence from knowing nothing to still knowing nothing, from a few knowing how to still only a few knowing how, from district cadres running the co-operatives to still only district cadres running them. Or else, axe in hand, chopping down any troublesome co-operative in sight. If that reason prevails, then nothing can be accomplished. We have put forward such slogans as "active leadership and steady advance" and "comprehensive planning and more effective leadership", and we agree with the perfectly correct slogan raised by the comrades of Tsunhua County, "The Party secretary pitches in and all Party members help run the co-ops." Hasn't there been "active leadership and steady advance" in Tsunhua County? Hasn't there been "comprehensive planning and more effective leadership"? Of course there has. Is this dangerous? Is this "rash advance"? Such danger as exists lies in "steering clear of the co-op", and this has been overcome by the Tsunhua County comrades. The danger also lies in "axing" co-operatives wholesale on the pretext of opposing "rash advance", but this did not happen in Tsunhua County. If, as is alleged, "the development of the co-operatives has gone beyond the level of political

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the effect that 1955 was the year in which socialism won basic victory in the decisive battle with capitalism; it is not proper to put it that way. This is the way it should be put: 1955 was the year in which basic victory was won as regards the aspect of ownership in the relations of production, while in the other aspects of the relations of production as well as in some aspects of the superstructure, namely, on the ideological and political fronts, either a basic victory was not won or, if won, the victory was not complete, and further efforts were required. We did not anticipate that such a great storm would burst upon the world in 1956, nor did consciousness of the masses and the ability of the cadres to lead", how can one explain what happened in Tsunhua County? There the masses actually pressed for co-operation, there the cadres did change from knowing nothing to knowing a lot. Everybody has eyes, does anyone see any danger in Tsunhua County? In the three years in which they completed co-operative transformation step by step, grain increased by 76 per cent, timber trees by 56.4 per cent, fruit trees by 62.87 per cent and sheep by 463.1 per cent. Can this be considered any kind of danger? Can this be called "rash advance"? Can this be regarded as "having gone beyond the level of political consciousness of the masses and the ability of the cadres to lead"?

In the Tsunhua County co-operative movement there is the Wang Kuo-fan Co-operative, once known as a "paupers' co-op" because its twenty-three poor peasant households owned only "three legs" of a donkey. Relying on their own efforts, its members "made the mountains yield"[1] a substantial amount of the means of production in three years, a feat which moved not a few visitors to tears. This, in my view, is the image of our entire nation. Why can't 600 million "paupers" create a prosperous and strong socialist country in several decades by their own efforts? Society's wealth is created by workers, peasants and working intellectuals. Provided they take their destiny into their own hands, provided they have a Marxist-Leninist line and energetically tackle problems instead of evading them, they can overcome any difficulty on earth.

Finally, we wish to thank the author of this article which carries no byline. Brimming with enthusiasm and writing in a lively style, he gives a detailed description of the process of the co-operative transformation of agriculture in one district. This will be no small contribution to co-operative transformation in the whole country. We hope every province, prefecture and county can produce one or more such articles.

(Note to "The Party Secretary Pitches In and
All Party Members Help Run the Co-ops")

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we anticipate that a campaign to "oppose rash advance" would occur in the same year in our country, a campaign which dampened the enthusiasm of the masses. Both events gave a considerable stimulus to the Rightists in mounting their wild attacks. Hence a lesson can be drawn: neither socialist revolution nor socialist construction is plain sailing, and we should be prepared to cope with the many great difficulties that may crop up at home and abroad. Both internationally and domestically the general situation is favourable, we can be sure of this, but many serious difficulties are bound to occur and we must be prepared to tackle them.

2

For many people in China 1955 has been a year of shattered illusions. In the first half of the year many still clung tenaciously to their own beliefs on certain questions. But by the second half, they could no longer do so and had to believe in the new. Examples follow: They held that "co-operative transformation in three years" as demanded by the masses was only an idle dream; that co-operation could be achieved more quickly in the north but not in the south; that it was impossible to run co-operatives in backward townships, in mountain areas, in minority nationality areas, in areas populated by several nationalities or in areas stricken by natural calamities; that it was easy to set up a co-operative but hard to consolidate it; that the peasants were too poor and had no way of raising funds; that the peasants were illiterate and bookkeepers were not available; that more co-operatives meant more troubles; that the development of the co-operatives had gone beyond the level of political consciousness of the masses and the experience of the cadres; that the Party's policy of state monopoly for the purchase and marketing of grain and its policy on co-operation were dampening the peasants' enthusiasm for production; that unless the Communist Party backed down immediately on the question of co-operation, it would be running the risk of breaking up the worker-peasant alliance; that co-operative transformation would produce a vast pool of surplus labour-power for which there would be no outlet. And many more examples of the kind could be cited. In a word, these were all illusions. All of them were shattered after being criticized by the Sixth Plenary Session (Enlarged) of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 1955. A high tide of socialist transformation is sweeping through the rural areas, and the masses are jubilant. This has been a profound lesson for all Communists. The masses have such a vast reservoir of socialist enthusiasm, but why was it that many of the leading organizations could be so insensitive or only barely sensitive to this a few months ago? Why was there such a difference between what was on the minds of some leaders and what was on the minds of the masses? Taking this as a lesson, how should one handle similar cases and problems in the future? There is only one answer. Don't divorce yourselves from the masses; instead learn to discern the enthusiasm of the masses in its essence.

(Note to "A 'Backward' Village Is Not
Necessarily Backward in Every Respect")

3

All those who believe it impossible for each individual area to achieve lower-stage co-operative transformation in three years (co-operation in three years was the slogan raised by the masses but criticized by the opportunists) and all those who believe it impossible for the areas liberated later to go co-operative at the same time as those liberated earlier, please take a good look at this township in Kunshan County, Kiangsu Province! Here, co-operative transformation took not three years but two. It is not an old liberated area but a 100 per cent new liberated area. And it is running ahead of many of the old liberated areas. What can you do about it? Pull it back? Of course not. The opportunists just have to admit defeat. The masses have a vast reservoir of enthusiasm for socialism. Those who know no better than to keep to the old routine even in times of revolution are utterly incapable of seeing this enthusiasm. They are blind and all is dark ahead of them. At times they go so far as to confound right and wrong and turn things upside down. Haven't we come across enough of such people? Only knowing how to keep to the old routine, they invariably underestimate the people's enthusiasm. Let something new appear and they always disapprove and immediately oppose it. Later they admit defeat and do a little self-criticism. The next time something new appears, they again go through the same process, one attitude alternating with the other. And this is the way they will behave in regard to everything new. Such people are always passive in that at the critical moment they stand still and have to be given a hard shove in the back before they take a step forward. Just how long will it be before such people can manage to move of their own accord and walk properly? There is a cure for those who have this kind of ailment: take some time out and go among the masses, learn what they are thinking about, see what they are doing, and find out their advanced experience and spread it. This is an effective prescription for chronic Right opportunism, and those so afflicted are advised to give it a try.

(Note to "This Township Goes Co-operative in Two Years")

4

This is a good article. Reading it one can see that the Uighur peasants are very eager to take the road of co-operation. They have already trained the cadres they need for semi-socialist co-operative transformation. Some people claim that co-operation cannot succeed among the minority nationalities. This is not so. We have seen quite a few co-operatives run either separately by the Mongolian, Hui, Uighur, Miao, Chuang and other minority nationalities or jointly by people of several nationalities, and they are all very successful. This fact refutes the erroneous views of those who look down on the minority nationalities.

(Note to "Township and Village Cadres Are Capable of Giving Leadership to the Formation of Co-operatives")

5

This is an excellent article which will convince many people. The Party organization here has never wavered on the question of co-operation. It stood four-square behind the badly-off peasants in their demand for organizing a co-operative, with the result that they won out in their competition with the well-to-do middle peasants, developed a small co-operative into a big one and increased production each year, and that the whole village went co-operative in less than three years. The well-to-do middle peasants had jeered, "Imagine, those paupers think they can set up a co-op. Never heard of chicken feathers flying up to heaven." And yet the chicken feathers have done just that. This is a struggle between the two roads — socialism versus capitalism. In China, the rich peasant economy is very weak (that portion of the rich peasants' land operated in a semi-feudal way was requisitioned during agrarian reform, most of the old rich peasants no longer hire labour, and socially they are very much discredited), but the well-to-do and fairly well-to-do middle peasants who constitute 20 to 30 per cent of the rural population are quite strong. An important aspect of the struggle between the two roads in China's countryside manifests itself in the peaceful competition of the poor and lower-middle peasants with the well-to-do middle peasants. Who can increase production within two or three years, the well-to-do middle peasants working on their own, or the poor and lower-middle peasants working together in co-operatives? In the beginning, the competition was between a number of poor and lower-middle peasants organized in co-operatives and the well-to-do middle peasants working on their own, with most of the poor and lower-middle peasants looking on; it was a contest between the two sides to win over the masses. Behind the well-to-do middle peasants were landlords and rich peasants, who gave them support, sometimes openly, sometimes secretly. On the side of the co-operatives stood the Communist Party members, who should be as firm in their support for the co-operatives as were the Communists in Nantsuichuang Village, Anyang County. It's a pity that not all the rural Party branches were so firm. And where they were not, confusion arose. First of all, there was the question of public opinion on whether chicken feathers could fly up to heaven. It is of course a question of great importance. In thousands of years, who had ever seen chicken feathers flying up to heaven? That they could not seemed a truism. Many a poor or lower-middle peasant would have been confused if the Party had not refuted this truism. Secondly, as for cadres and, thirdly, as for such material resources as loans, the co-operatives would have run into great difficulties if the Party and the state had not come to their aid. The well-to-do middle peasants dared to spread such hoary truisms as "chicken feathers can't fly up to heaven" because the co-operatives had not increased their output, the poor co-operatives had not become rich ones, and the co-operatives had not grown in number from a few isolated ones to tens and hundreds of thousands. They dared to do so because the Party had not yet conducted vigorous nation-wide propaganda about the advantages of co-operation and because the Party had not yet pointed out in clear-cut terms that the hoary truism "chicken feathers can't fly up to heaven" no longer holds good in the era of socialism. The poor are turning their past upside down. The old system is dying, a new system is being born. Chicken feathers really are flying up to heaven. In the Soviet Union, this has already happened. In China, it is happening now. And it is going to happen all over the world. Many of our local Party organizations were not solely to blame for failing to give strong backing to the badly-off peasants because, higher up, opportunist ideas had not yet been dealt mortal blows, comprehensive plans had not been made to promote co-operative transformation and more effective leadership had not been given to the movement on a national scale. In 1955 we did all this and in the space of a few months the situation changed completely. Onlookers before, large numbers of people now came over in groups to the side of the co-operatives. The well-to-do middle peasants also changed their tune. Some applied to join the co-operatives and others were getting ready to do so. Even the most stubborn among them no longer dared talk about whether chicken feathers could fly up to heaven. The landlords and rich peasants were completely deflated. The fact that the People's Government punished a number of counter-revolutionaries who had disrupted public order and tried to sabotage the co-operative transformation also played a part here. In short, in the second half of 1955, a fundamental change took place in the balance of class forces in our country: socialism soared and capitalism plunged. Given another year of hard work in 1956, the foundation will have been basically laid for the socialist transformation in the transition period.

(Note to "Who Says Chicken Feathers Can't Fly Up to Heaven?")

6

The almost ubiquitous Right opportunists inside the Party who hinder the masses of poor and lower-middle peasants from taking the road of co-operation act in concert with the forces of capitalism in our society. This article gives an apt description of the situation. The author lashes out with great indignation at the opportunists and champions those peasants who are badly off. Some people are supposed to be Communists, but they show hardly any interest in the socialist tasks that have to be undertaken now. Instead of supporting the enthusiastic masses, they pour cold water on them. Nineteen fifty-five has been the decisive year for the struggle between socialism and capitalism in China. The decisive battle unfolded first of all in the three conferences called in May, July and October by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. In the first half of 1955 the atmosphere was foul and dark clouds threatened. But in the second half of the year there has been a complete change and the climate is entirely different; in response to the call of the Central Committee tens of millions of peasant households have swung into action and gone co-operative. At the time the editor is writing these lines, over sixty million peasant households have joined co-operatives all over the country. This is a raging tidal wave sweeping away all demons and monsters. People of all sorts in our society have been clearly revealed for what they are. It is the same in the Party. By the end of this year the victory of socialism will be largely assured. Of course, many more battles lie ahead and further efforts must be made to carry on the fight.

(Note to "The Ill Wind of Opportunism Is Dying, the Fair Wind of Socialism Is Rising")

7

This is an interesting article too. Opportunists trying to stem the tide are found almost everywhere, but the tide can never be stemmed, and socialism is advancing triumphantly everywhere, sweeping away all obstacles. Society progresses daily in this way and people's thinking is transformed in the process, particularly when there is an upsurge in the revolution.

(Note to "The Workers' Families Are Very Keen on the Co-operative Movement")

8

This article tells a moving story. We hope the reader will go through it carefully. Those comrades who do not believe the peasant masses are eager to take the socialist road and those comrades who are only too ready to pick up the axe to "chop" the co-operatives are particularly urged to do so. Throughout the countryside the socialist factors are growing daily and hourly, the peasant masses are pressing to form co-operatives and large numbers of intelligent, capable, fair-minded and enthusiastic leaders are emerging from among the people; this is a very heartening situation indeed. The most serious failing is that in many places the Party leaders have not bestirred themselves to keep pace. Our present task is to get the local Party committees at various levels to take the initiative on this matter in conformity with the Marxist-Leninist stand, assume full responsibility for agricultural co-operation and lead the movement forward with enthusiasm, warm responsiveness and drive. The story of Lord Yeh who professed to love dragons should not be repeated, one must not just talk about socialism for years and then suddenly turn pale when socialism comes knocking at the door.

(Note to "A Co-operative Set Up Spontaneously by
the Masses Against the Wishes of the Leadership")

9

The correct line is being followed in this township, which already has five agricultural producers' co-operatives, seven combined mutual-aid teams, three permanent mutual-aid teams and fourteen temporary mutual-aid teams. This means the total membership amounts to 98.4 per cent of the peasant households which ought to be organized. Before December 1954, this township Party branch did not lay stress on the mutual-aid and co-operative movement in exercising its leadership, and Party members were afraid of difficulties in leading the mutual-aid teams. Instead of "the Party secretary pitching in and all Party members helping run the co-ops", this Party branch leaned on the work team (apparently sent from above). In the whole country, there are quite a few rural Party branches just as weak and incompetent on the question of agricultural co-operation. Apart from these Party branches, it is quite possible that some of the higher Party committees are also in this state. There's the rub. Whether the socialist transformation of agriculture can keep pace with the industrialization of the country and whether the co-operative movement can develop in a healthy way with a minimum of shortcomings and a guaranteed increase in production depends on whether the local Party committees at various levels can quickly and correctly shift the emphasis of their leadership to agricultural co-operation. Work teams should be sent in, but it must be made clear that they are there only to help the local Party organizations, not to take their place and render them idle and completely dependent. This township in Kweichow Province achieved remarkable success in only a little over five months after the leadership changed its approach to work in December 1954. Instead of being dependent on the work team, they pitched in themselves, and Party members stopped being afraid of difficulties. A change of this sort depends first and foremost on the secretaries of the Party committees at all levels — province and autonomous region, prefecture and autonomous prefecture, county and autonomous county, and district — as well as on the Party branch secretaries; they themselves must assume full responsibility for agricultural co-operation. To be afraid of trouble and difficulties and to refuse to pitch in when confronted with this great task but instead simply to pass it on to the Party's rural work departments or to the work teams — such an attitude will not only make it impossible to accomplish the task but will also cause a great deal of trouble.

(Note to "How Chunghsin Township, Fengkang County Launched the Mutual-Aid and Co-operative Movement Under the Leadership of the Party Branch")

10

The author of this article says it was after a joint meeting of co-operative directors in the county that this co-operative developed the practice of seasonal contracts from that of occasional contracts. From this one can see that county leadership is very important. We hope that the leading body in each of China's well over two thousand counties will closely watch the development of its co-operative movement, identify the problems, work out solutions to them, call timely meetings of the directors of all its co-operatives or of selected ones, make decisions and carry them out quickly. Don't wait until problems pile up and cause a lot of trouble before you tackle them. Leaders must be in the van of the movement, not lag behind it. Within each county, it is the county Party committee that should play the main role in giving leadership.

(Note to "Contracts on a Seasonal Basis")

11

This material is very convincing. Healthy co-operative transformation in a locality depends on the Party's policies and methods of work. If our Party's policies for co-operative transformation are correct, if its method of work in mobilizing the masses to join co-operatives is not high-handed or simplistic, but one of explaining and analysing things to the masses and relying entirely on their initiative and willingness, then it should not be very difficult to achieve co-operative transformation and raise output. Tungchuankou Village, Hsingtai County, Hopei Province, lies in an old liberated area. Before 1952 the seventy households in the village had all joined mutual-aid teams and they had a strong Party branch and in Wang Chih-chi a leader who enjoyed the trust of the masses. All the conditions were ripe. So in 1952 the village organized a co-operative, accomplishing semi-socialist co-operative transformation in barely over a month. What about places where conditions are not as ripe as in this village? Then it is a question of creating the conditions and this can be done in a few months, a year, or a little longer. The required conditions can be created while the work is being carried on. To set up a few small co-operatives is to create the conditions for the co-operative transformation of the whole village, the whole township and the whole district. This material about Tungchuankou also explains at length how a Party branch should conduct propaganda and education among the masses and how it should rely on the initiative and willingness of the masses themselves to establish co-operatives. The method of "reverse propaganda"[2] used in this village is well worth paying attention to. The material describes how the co-operative traversed a zigzag course in tackling the problems of organizing and supervising labour and went on to achieve great success in increasing production from year to year. Facts have proved that this co-operative is sound. The main criterion by which every co-operative judges whether it is sound is to see whether its production is rising and by how much.

(Note to "The Whole Village Goes Co-operative in Barely over a Month")

12

This material points to the truth that any co-operative in a state of confusion can be put in order. Since co-operative members are all working peasants, whatever the differences among the various strata, they can be ironed out in the end. For a time there really was confusion in some co-operatives, solely because they got no leadership from the Party which did not explain its policies and measures to the masses. "We know it's a good thing to set up a co-op. But when we did set one up, nobody bothered about us, neither the county Party committee, nor the district Party committee, nor the local Party branch. Perhaps they didn't think much of our poor village, they couldn't eat and live well here, and so they never came our way." This, and this alone, accounts for such confusion as exists. Without leadership from the Party, confusion naturally arises. The moment leadership is given, confusion will end. This material also raises the question of whether co-operatives can be established in backward villages. The answer is "yes". The very co-operative the author describes-lies in a backward village. Something like 5 per cent of China's villages are backward; we must set up co-operatives in all these villages and in the course of this struggle wipe out their backwardness.

(Note to "A Co-operative in a State of Confusion Is Put in Order")

13

This is a common but serious problem. Party committees at every level and comrades sent to guide the work of co-operative transformation in the rural areas should give it their full attention. It is imperative to establish the dominant position of the present-day poor peasants and the new lower-middle peasants in the leading body of a co-operative, with the old lower-middle peasants and the new and old upper-middle peasants as the auxiliary force; only thus can unity between the poor and the middle peasants be attained, the co-operatives be consolidated, production be expanded and socialist transformation in the entire countryside be correctly carried out in line with the Party's policy. In the absence of this condition, it is impossible to attain unity between the middle and the poor peasants, consolidate the co-operatives, expand production and achieve socialist transformation in the entire countryside. Many comrades fail to understand this point. They maintain that in the period of agrarian reform it was necessary to establish the dominant position of the poor peasants, because the poor peasants, who then accounted for 50, or 60 to 70 per cent of the rural population, had not yet moved up to the status of middle peasants, while the middle peasants were wavering with regard to agrarian reform, and so the necessity was indeed real. They argue that we are now in the period of the socialist transformation of agriculture and most of the former poor peasants have become new middle peasants and that, moreover, the old middle peasants own plenty of the means of production and without their participation it is impossible for the co-operatives to cope with the shortage of the means of production. Therefore, these comrades maintain that we should no longer raise the slogan of relying on the poor peasants or establishing their dominant position and that this slogan is harmful to the co-operative movement. This view, we believe, is wrong. If the working class and the Communist Party are to bring about a thorough transformation of the small peasant private ownership of the means of production in the entire countryside in accordance with the socialist spirit and the socialist system, they can do so relatively smoothly only by relying on the masses of the poor peasants, the former semi-proletarians, otherwise it will be most difficult. For the rural semi-proletariat are not so stubborn in clinging to small peasant private ownership of the means of production; they are more ready to accept socialist transformation. Most of them have now become new middle peasants, but except for a section who have become well-to-do, the majority of the new middle peasants have a higher level of political consciousness than the old middle peasants, as they can easily recall their past misery. Then there are the old lower-middle peasants; in economic status and political attitude, they are more or less similar to the new lower-middle peasants but different from the new and old upper-middle peasants, *i.e.*, the well-to-do or fairly well-to-do middle peasants. Therefore, in the course of co-operative transformation we must pay attention to (1) the poor peasants, who are still in difficulty, (2) the new lower-middle peasants, and (3) the old lower-middle peasants — the three sections who are more ready to accept socialist transformation. They should be the first ones to be drawn into the co-operatives, batch by batch and stage by stage; a number of them with higher political consciousness and greater organizational ability should be selected and trained as the mainstay of the leadership of the co-operatives, and there should be special emphasis on selecting them from among the present-day poor peasants and the new lower-middle peasants. This does not mean a new determination of class status is to be made in the rural areas; it is a policy to be carefully followed in the course of co-operative transformation by the Party branches and the comrades sent to the countryside to guide the work, and this policy should be publicly explained to the peasant masses. Nor do we mean to keep the well-to-do middle peasants out of the co-operatives; what we do mean is to admit them only when they have raised their socialist consciousness and are willing to join and accept the leadership of the poor peasants (including the present-day poor peasants and all the new lower-middle peasants who were formerly poor peasants), and not to set eyes on their oxen and farm implements and force them to join when they are unwilling. Those already in co-operatives may stay on if they wish. Those who have asked to withdraw but have been persuaded to change their minds may also stay on. Co-operatives can be organized even with scanty means of production, as has been proved by the many co-operatives organized by poor and lower-middle peasants. Furthermore, we do not mean that none of the well-to-do middle peasants should be allowed to serve as co-operative cadres. A few well-to-do middle peasants, who are well thought of by the majority of co-operative members for their higher level of socialist consciousness, fair-mindedness and competence, may serve as cadres. However, it is imperative to establish the dominant position of the poor peasants in the co-operatives (to repeat, they include the present-day poor peasants and all the new lower-middle peasants who were formerly poor peasants, and together they constitute the majority, or the overwhelming majority, of the rural population). As for the composition of the leading body, the poor peasants should account for some two-thirds, while the middle peasants (including the old lower-middle peasants and the new and old upper-middle peasants) should form about one-third, but no more. As for the guiding principle, the co-operatives must pursue policies beneficial to both the poor and the middle peasants and not harmful to the interests of either. For this purpose, too, it is necessary to establish the dominant position of the poor peasants. In co-operatives where the middle peasants occupy the dominant position, the poor peasants are usually pushed aside and their interests violated. The experience of Kaoshan Township, Changsha County, Hunan Province, fully shows that it is imperative and possible to establish the dominant position of the poor peasants and thereby firmly to unite with the middle peasants, and how dangerous it can be if this is not done. The author of this article thoroughly understands the Party line. And the procedure is also a correct one, that is, first of all fulfilling the urgent task of increasing production and then establishing the dominant position of the poor peasants in the leadership. As a result, the poor peasants did themselves proud and the middle peasants were impressed too. The author also tells us something very important. Is it better to dissolve a co-operative that is in a state of confusion or give it a good shake-up and help it to get out of the confusion and on to a sound basis? Is it possible to put such a co-operative in order and consolidate it? He very convincingly tells us that instead of dissolving Class III co-operatives we should set about putting them in order. After such an effort, it is entirely possible for Class III co-operatives to become Class I co-operatives. This experience is shared by many other places in the country and is not peculiar to Kaoshan Township, Changsha County.

(Note to "How the Dominant Position Passed from the Middle Peasants to the Poor Peasants in the Wutang Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of Kaoshan Township, Changsha County")

14

The problem discussed here is of general significance. It is essential to unite with the middle peasants, and it is wrong not to do so. But who should the working class and the Communist Party rely on in the rural areas in order to unite with the middle peasants and achieve socialist transformation in the entire countryside? Surely none other than the poor peasants. That was the case in the past when the struggle was waged against the landlords to carry out agrarian reform, and that is the case today when the struggle is being waged against the rich peasants and other capitalist elements to achieve the socialist transformation of agriculture. In both these revolutionary periods the middle peasants wavered in the initial stage. Only when the middle peasants see clearly which way the wind is blowing and only when victory in the revolution is within sight will they come in on the side of the revolution. The poor peasants have to work on the middle peasants and win them over, so that the revolution will broaden from day to day until final victory is achieved. The management committees of the agricultural producers' co-operatives today, like the peasant associations in the past, must draw in the old lower-middle peasants and a number of the new and old upper-middle peasants who are representative of this stratum and have a relatively high level of political consciousness, but there should not be too many of them on the committee, one-third is about the right proportion. The other two-thirds should be poor peasants (including the present-day poor peasants and the new lower-middle peasants who were formerly poor peasants). Generally speaking, the key posts in the co-operative should be held by the poor peasants (to repeat, including the present-day poor peasants and all the new lower-middle peasants who were formerly poor peasants), but such posts may also be filled by old lower-middle peasants and some of the new and old upper-middle peasants who have a high level of political consciousness and are really fair-minded and competent. In Fuan County, Fukien Province, a co-operative led by the poor peasants and another led by the middle peasants take different attitudes towards the cause of socialism; this is true everywhere and should not be regarded as an isolated phenomenon.

(Note to "A Lesson Drawn from the Existence of a 'Middle Peasants' Co-operative' Side by Side with a 'Poor Peasants' Co-operative' in Fuan County")

15

This material is useful and worth general attention. It describes the trends among the various strata in the countryside. The poor peasants are the most enthusiastic about co-operative transformation. Many middle peasants want to "wait and see for a while" and would like to "stay outside and be free", mainly because they want to find out whether they would get a bad bargain if they invested their means of production in the co-operatives; they can swing either way. Many well-to-do middle peasants have strong feelings against co-operation; the worst among them sell off their means of production, spirit their money away, or rig up fake co-operatives, and a few even gang up with landlords and rich peasants. We hope that all the comrades engaged in rural work will carefully observe and analyse the trends among the various strata in their localities so as to adopt policies suited to the circumstances. This material mentions the mistaken tendency of paying attention to the co-operatives to the neglect of the mutual-aid teams and recommends over-all planning and all-round consideration, and this is correct. The "network of mutual aid and co-operation" is a good idea, which takes into consideration both the co-operatives and the mutual-aid teams, with the co-operatives providing real help to the mutual-aid teams and peasants working on their own in solving their current production difficulties. The poor peasants' fund must be made available to the villages at once. Those poor peasants who have not yet joined the co-operatives should be told that they can draw on this fund whenever they join.

(Note to "New Situation and New Problems")

16

The policy of this co-operative is correct. All co-operatives should do the same. In their resolutions or directives on the question of co-operative transformation, the provinces should point out that it is the responsibility of all co-operatives to help solve the difficulties of the widows, orphans and other members without a provider, who have no labour-power (it was right to admit such people), and also of those members who have labour-power but are suffering great hardship. At present there are quite a number of co-operatives in which the socialist spirit of helping needy families is lacking and from which the poor peasants are even excluded; this is utterly wrong. The government has now set up a poor peasants' fund which can help them solve the problems of oxen and farm implements but cannot as yet solve the problems of some poor peasant families short of labour-power, or solve entirely the problems of some other families short of food before the new harvest. These problems can be solved only by relying on the strength of the masses in the co-operatives.

(Note to "The Party Branch of Chingfeng Township, Hsiangtan County, Helps Badly-off Co-operative Members Tide Over Their Difficulties")

17

This is a very interesting story. Socialism, which is new, comes into being only through severe struggle against what is old. At one time, a section of society is very stubborn in following a set routine. At another, the very same people are quite capable of changing their attitude and favouring the new. In the first half of 1955 most of the well-to-do middle peasants were still opposed to co-operation, but in the second half a number of them changed their minds and expressed a desire to join the co-operatives, although some did so because they hoped to obtain the leadership of the co-operatives. Another group wavered a great deal, they said they wanted to join, but at heart they were reluctant. A third group were obdurate and still wanted to wait and see. On this matter the rural Party organizations should be patient with this stratum and give them time. In order to establish the dominant position of the poor and new lower-middle peasants in the leading bodies, it may well prove to be an advantage if some of the well-to-do middle peasants join the co-operatives a little later.

(Note to "They Firmly Choose the Road of Co-operation")

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

18

Political work is the life-blood of all economic work. This is particularly true at a time when the social and economic system is undergoing fundamental change. From the start, the agricultural co-operative movement has been a severe ideological and political struggle. No co-operative can be established without going through such a struggle. Before a new social system can be built on the site of the old, the site must be swept clean. Remnant old ideas reflecting the old system invariably persist in people's minds for a long time, and they do not easily give way. Having been established, a co-operative must go through many more struggles before it can be consolidated. Even then, it may collapse if efforts are relaxed. A case in point is the Sanlouszu Co-operative in Hsiehyu County, Shansi Province, which nearly collapsed for lack of sustained effort after it had been consolidated. Not until the Party branch of the co-operative had criticized its own errors, resumed education for socialism and against capitalism among the co-operative members and revived its political work was the crisis overcome and the co-operative able to grow again. To oppose spontaneous tendencies towards capitalism which is characterized by selfishness and to foster the socialist spirit which postulates the principle of integrating collective interest with individual interest as the criterion for judging all words and deeds — these are the ideological and political guarantees for the gradual transition from a scattered small peasant economy to a large-scale co-operative economy. This entails doing an enormous amount of hard work, not in a crude and over-simplified way, but concretely and painstakingly in the light of the peasants' own experience. It should proceed together with and not apart from economic work. We now have fairly rich experience in this kind of work on a national scale. This is shown in almost every article in this book.

(Note to "A Serious Lesson")

19

The viewpoint of this article is correct. Co-operatives must stress doing political work well. The basic requirement of political work is constantly to imbue the peasant masses with a socialist ideology and to criticize capitalist tendencies.

(Note to "Political Work in the Changkuochuang Co-operative")

20

This situation merits attention. There are serious tendencies towards capitalism among the well-to-do peasants. These tendencies will become rampant if we in the slightest way neglect political work among the peasants not only during the co-operative transformation but also for a very long period afterwards.

(Note to "Wage a Resolute Struggle Against Capitalist Tendencies")

21

This is a very good account of how to consolidate a co-operative and should be recommended. The birth of a new social system is invariably accompanied by cheering and shouting, that is to say, by propagating the superiority of the new system and criticizing the backwardness of the old. It is impossible to carry out in an atmosphere of tranquillity such an earth-shaking task as getting some 500 million Chinese peasants to undertake socialist transformation; therefore it behoves us Communists to conduct patient, lively and easily understandable propaganda and education among the peasant masses who are weighed down with the burdens of the old system. This is now being done in every part of the country and many of the comrades engaged in rural work have proved themselves good propagandists. The method described in this article, "make four comparisons and five calculations",[3] is a fine one for explaining to the peasants, in terms easy to understand, which system is good and which bad. It has great powers of persuasion. It is quite unlike the method of those comrades who are not so good at propaganda work and can produce nothing convincing but merely say, "Either you follow the road of the Communist Party, or you follow the road of Chiang Kai-shek," thus trying to subdue their audience by threatening to stick labels on them. It is a method that draws on the local peasants' own experience and provides them with a detailed analysis; hence its great powers of persuasion.

(Note to "Good Experience in Consolidating a Co-operative")

22

Sabotage of the co-operative movement by counter-revolutionaries is a common occurrence and not limited to the Fifth District of Tuyun County, Kweichow Province, but very little is written about it in similar publications in other provinces. In the course of co-operative transformation, all comrades engaged in rural work must pay full attention to the struggle against counter-revolutionary wrecking activities. As in this district in Tuyun County, security units with Party and Youth League members as the mainstay should be set up within the co-operatives. It is absolutely necessary for the district Party committee, led and supervised by the county Party committee, to study the situation, carry out propaganda and explain things to people inside and outside the Party, alert the masses to counter-revolutionary wrecking activities, and then investigate, clear out and punish the counter-revolutionaries and other bad elements who have wormed their way into the leading bodies of the co-operatives. However, those to be cleared out must be confirmed counter-revolutionaries and bad elements; good persons or persons merely with certain shortcomings must not be labelled bad elements. In particular, punishment must be appropriate and has to be approved by the county authorities.

(Note to "Wage a Resolute Struggle Against Counter-Revolutionary Sabotage")

23

In order to build a great socialist society it is most important to mobilize the masses of women to join in productive activity. In production men and women must receive equal pay for equal work. Genuine equality between the sexes can only be realized in the process of the socialist transformation of society as a whole.

(Note to "Women Are Now on the Labour Front")

24

This is an excellent article which can serve as reference material for all localities. Young people are the most active and dynamic force in society. They are the most eager to learn and the least conservative in their thinking, and this is especially true in the era of socialism. We hope that the Party organizations in all places, working in concert with the Youth League organizations, will pay particular attention to bringing the energy of our youth into full play, and not just take them for granted and ignore their characteristics. Of course, the young should learn from the older people and try as far as possible to win their agreement for doing useful things. Older people are more encumbered with conservative ideas and often restrain the progressive activities of the young; they will not be convinced until the young people make a success of something. All this is very well described in the article. Naturally, there should be no compromise with conservative ideas. Well then, let's have a try at it, and if it works, they'll agree.

(Note to "The Youth Shock Brigade of the Ninth Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Hsinping Township, Chungshan County")

25

Here is another good article which can serve as reference material for all localities. It mentions organizing the participation of middle school students and primary school graduates in the co-operative movement. This is especially noteworthy. All such educated young people who can go and work in the countryside should be glad to do so. The countryside is a big world where much can be accomplished.

(Note to "Experience in Planning Co-operative Transformation in a Township")

26

Here is another one, Chen Hsueh-meng. In China, such heroes are legion, but it is a pity that our writers do not seek them out, and as for those people who go to the countryside to guide the co-operative movement, they see a lot but write very little.

(Note to "Chen Hsueh-meng, Pace-Setter in Co-operative Transformation")

27

This very well written article deserves to be recommended to all Party and Youth League committees at the county and district levels and to all township Party and Youth League branches. All co-operatives should follow the example described. The author understands the Party line and hits the nail on the head. The language is good, the article is easy to read and does not smack of stereotyped Party writing. Here we should like to call the reader's attention to the fact that many of our comrades are addicted to stereotyped Party writing and that the articles they turn out are not lively, not vivid, and give the reader a headache. They care little for syntax or diction, and they fancy a style that is a cross between the literary and the colloquial, at times verbose and rambling, at times elliptical and archaic, as though they were out to torment the reader. Quite a number of the more than 170 articles selected for this book reeked heavily of stereotyped Party writing. Only after repeated polishing were they made fairly readable. Even so, a few remain rather obscure and hard to understand. They have been included only for their content. How much longer will it be before we read less of this stereotyped Party writing which gives us such headaches? It is up to those comrades who work as editors on our newspapers and periodicals to pay attention to this matter, ask their contributors to write coherently and vividly, and take it upon themselves to polish the manuscripts.

(Note to "Political Work in the Co-operatives")

28

The co-operative introduced here is the "paupers' co-op" led by Wang Kuo-fan. Diligence and thrift ought to be the principle for managing all our agricultural producers' co-operatives, nay, all our economic enterprises. Diligence and thrift should be practised in running factories, stores and all state-owned, co-operative and other enterprises; this principle should be observed in doing everything. It is the principle of practising economy, one of the basic principles of socialist economy. China is a big country but it is still very poor, and it will take several decades to make China prosperous. Even then the principle of diligence and thrift will still have to be observed, but it is in the coming decades, in the span of several five-year plans, that diligence and thrift must be particularly stressed and special attention paid to practising economy. At present, many co-operatives pay little attention to practising economy; this is an unhealthy tendency which should be immediately corrected. Co-operatives run with diligence and thrift can be found in every province and county, and these examples should be publicized for all to follow. Those co-operatives which are industrious and thrifty, get the highest yields and do well in all respects should be commended, whereas those which are wasteful, get very low yields and do poorly in all respects should be criticized.

(Note to "Run the Co-operative with Diligence and Thrift")

29

This is a long-range seven-year plan for a large co-operative (they call it a collective farm, that is, a co-operative) which will embrace the township's thousand or so households. The plan can serve as reference material for all localities. People will understand the need for this kind of long-term plan after they have gone over the contents here. The development of mankind goes back hundreds of thousands of years, but here in China it is only today that conditions have been secured for the planned development of our economy and culture. Given these conditions, the face of our country will change from year to year. The change in each five years will be considerable and after several five-year periods very much bigger.

(Note to "The Long-Range Plan of the Red Star Collective Farm")

30

This is a good article. Everyone ought to read it and co-operatives in all localities can consult it when they draw up their own long-term plans. As the author puts it so aptly, "The whole process of drawing up a production plan is one of struggle between advanced and conservative thinking." Conservative ideas are causing trouble almost everywhere. To overcome them and take the productive forces and production a big step forward, all localities and co-operatives should draw up their own long-range plans.

(Note to "The Three-Year Production Plan of a Co-operative")

31

This township has made a two-year plan for co-operative transformation, increased production, water conservancy, consolidation of the Party and Youth League organizations, cultural and educational work, etc., and so should every township in China. Some people say plans are hard to make, then how did this township manage it? In 1956 every county, district and township in our country should draw up a comprehensive plan, which should include more items than the above plan, items such as side-line production, trade, finance, afforestation and health work. Even if the plan is a bit crude and not quite in accord with actual conditions, it is better than none. If one or two counties, districts and townships in a province can produce fairly good plans, these can be immediately publicized and serve as models for other counties, districts and townships. Planning is said to be hard, but actually it's not so hard.

(Note to "Yitao Township's Comprehensive Plan")

32

This article is very useful and can serve as reference material for all counties. In its over-all planning every county should map out an appropriate plan for water conservancy. Water conservancy is an important measure to ensure increased agricultural production, small projects are well within the capacity of every county, district, township and co-operative, and it is therefore most necessary for plans to be drawn up and carried out in stages over a number of years to ensure irrigation in times of drought and drainage in times of water-logging, barring extraordinary and uncontrollable floods and droughts. This is certainly practicable. Organized in co-operatives, the masses have immense strength. Insoluble for thousands of years, the problems of ordinary floods and droughts can now be solved in a matter of a few years.

(Note to "Let Everyone Have One *Mou* of Irrigated Land")

33

Pig-raising is an important matter which has a direct bearing on the provision of fertilizer, meat supply and the earning of foreign exchange from exports; therefore all co-operatives should include the raising of pigs in their plans, and naturally the provinces, prefectures, counties and districts should all have their own plans. Pig-feed is readily available; some kinds of grass and tree leaves, sweet potatoes and their vines are all pig-feed, and it need not necessarily be grain, still less a lot of it. Apart from collective pig-raising by co-operatives, every peasant household should be advised to raise one or more pigs, and this goal is to be attained by stages in a few years. Of course exceptions should be made in the case of some minority nationality communities where pig-raising is taboo and of some families which object to raising pigs on religious grounds. A set of measures should be devised to reward pig-raising and the experience of the Shanghua Co-operative in Chekiang Province can serve for the reference of all localities.

(Note to "Plenty of Pigs Are Raised Here")

34

Before the co-operative transformation of agriculture, surplus labour-power was a problem in many parts of the country. Since then many co-operatives have felt the pinch of a labour shortage and the need to mobilize the masses of women, who did not work in the fields before, to take their place on the labour front. This was a major development that came as a surprise to many people. People had generally expected a surplus of labour-power in the wake of co-operation. A surplus already, and what if there should be another one? In many places co-operation in practice has dispelled such misgivings, as the problem has not been a surplus but a shortage of labour-power. Some places did find a surplus of labour-power for a while following co-operation, but that was because they had not yet extended the scale of production, initiated diverse economic undertakings or started intensive cultivation. For many places the labour shortage becomes evident as production grows in scale, the number of undertakings increases, the efforts to remake nature become more extensive and intensive and the work is done more thoroughly. This is only the beginning, and it will become more evident as the years go by. It will be the same after agriculture is mechanized. In the days to come all kinds of enterprises undreamed of before will make their appearance and agricultural output will rise several times, a dozen times, perhaps scores of times, above the present level. The expansion of industry, communications and exchange will defy the imagination of past generations. It will be the same with science, culture, education and health work. Women form a great reserve of labour-power in China. This reserve should be tapped in the struggle to build a great socialist country. The principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women must be enforced to encourage women to engage in productive activity. All co-operatives can draw upon the experience of Chienteh County in Chekiang Province.

(Note to "Labour Shortage Solved by Rallying Women to Join in Production")

35

This is also a common problem. The experience of these two co-operatives shows that under present conditions of production there is already a surplus of roughly one-third of the labour-power. What required three people in the past can be done by two after co-operative transformation, an indication of the superiority of socialism. Where can an outlet be found for this surplus labour-power of one-third or more? For the most part, still in the countryside. Socialism has not only liberated the working people and freed the means of production from the shackles of the old society but has also released the boundless resources of nature which the old society could not exploit. The masses have unlimited creative power. They can organize themselves to take on all spheres and branches of work where they can give full play to their energy, tackle production more intensively and extensively and initiate more and more undertakings for their own well-being. So far we have not touched on the mechanization of agriculture. With mechanization, much more labour-power can be saved. Will there be an outlet? Yes, there will be one, too, according to the experience of certain mechanized state farms. As the scope of production expands, the number of undertakings increases and the work is done more intensively, there is no need to worry about labour-power not being put to use.

(Note to "An Outlet Has Been Found for Surplus Labour-Power")

36

Things in this county also show us that an outlet can be found in the villages for rural surplus labour-power. As management improves and the scope of production expands, every able-bodied man and woman can put in more work-days in the year. Instead of over one hundred work-days for a man and a few score for a woman as described in this article, the former can put in well over two hundred work-days and the latter well over one hundred or more. Some co-operatives in other parts of the country have already reached that level. Side-line production must have an assured market and not develop blindly — this is correct. Taking the country as a whole, rural side-line production in a large measure caters to the countryside, but a fair part, which is likely to expand in the future, must cater to the cities and meet export requirements. The point is that the state must have a unified plan so as gradually to eliminate blind development.

(Note to "Hsiangyin County Has Found
an Outlet for Surplus Labour-Power")

37

This article is very good and what it describes should be the example for all localities. "Bookkeepers are not available" — this is one of the excuses of those who are against the rapid development of co-operation. Agricultural co-operation throughout the country calls for several million bookkeepers, and where are they to be found? As a matter of fact such manpower is available, since large numbers of primary school and junior middle school graduates can be mobilized to do the job. What is required is to train them quickly and raise their literacy level and vocational ability in the course of their work. In each district organize the bookkeepers from the producers', the supply and marketing and the credit co-operatives into a bookkeepers' mutual-aid network — this would be a good way to raise their literacy and vocational levels. Such a network in Changwu County's Third District has helped raise the bookkeepers' level in both these respects and has done a lot of economic and political work besides. Party organizations at the county and district levels must give their attention and guidance to the work discussed here.

(Note to "Experience in Organizing Bookkeepers for the Agricultural Producers', the Supply and Marketing and the Credit Co-operatives into a Bookkeepers' Mutual-Aid Network")

38

The experience discussed here should be popularized. Lenin said that "a communist society cannot be built in an illiterate country".[4] In our country today there are so many illiterates, and yet the building of socialism cannot wait until illiteracy is eliminated; thus an acute contradiction arises. In our country today, it is not only the many school-age children who have no schools to go to, but also large numbers of young people above that age, to say nothing of adults. This serious problem must be, and can only be, solved in the course of agricultural co-operation. With the formation of co-operatives, the peasants have a strong urge to learn to read and write out of economic necessity. With the formation of co-operatives, the peasants have collective strength, the situation changes completely and they can organize their own literacy classes. First, to be able to record work-points, they must learn to write the names of the persons and places in their village or township, the names of farm implements, the terms for different kinds of farm work and other indispensable words — two or three hundred in all. Next, they must acquire a bigger vocabulary. Two kinds of textbooks are thus needed. The first should be compiled with the needs of the co-operatives in a particular locality in mind by the local educated people with the help of the comrades guiding the work of co-operation. Each locality should compile a textbook of its own, and there should not be a uniform text for all. This textbook does not need approval by the higher authorities. The second textbook, also with a vocabulary of a few hundred words and to be compiled in the same manner, should be based on things and expressions pertinent to a relatively limited area (for instance, a county or prefecture), and in addition on certain things and expressions of the province (or municipality or autonomous region) and the whole country. This kind of textbook need not be uniform in all localities either, but it should be examined promptly by the educational authorities of the county, prefecture, or province (or municipality or autonomous region). After these two steps, a third should be taken; this will require the educational authorities of each province (or municipality or autonomous region) to prepare a third textbook for general use. More advanced textbooks will subsequently have to be compiled. The cultural and educational authorities at the national level should give proper guidance in this matter. The Youth League branch of Kaochialiukou Village, Chunan County, Shantung Province, has done something creative. It is most gratifying to see how things are going there. They found teachers among the graduates of their township primary school. Progress was rapid with more than a hundred young people and adults learning over two hundred words in two and a half months. They can now keep records of their own work-points and some have become work-point recorders for the co-operative. "A course for recording work-points" — that's an apt name, too. Such courses should be opened everywhere. Youth League organizations at every level should give guidance to this work and all Party and government organizations should give it their support.

(Note to "The Experience of the Youth League
Branch of Kaochialiukou Village, Chunan County,
in Starting a Course for Recording Work-Points")

39

This is about the Gold Star Agricultural, Forestry and Livestock Producers' Co-operative led by Li Shun-ta. In the three years since its formation it has grown into a large co-operative with 283 households. It is located in a barren area in the Taihang Mountains, but by sheer hard work on the part of all during these three years it has begun to take on a new look. The utilization rate of labour-power is now 110.6 per cent higher than in the days of individual farming before the anti-Japanese war and 74 per cent higher than in the period of the mutual-aid teams before the co-operative was formed. The co-operative's accumulation has increased from 120 yuan in its first year to over 11,000 yuan. In 1955 each member received an average of 884 catties of grain, which is 77 per cent more than in the days before the anti-Japanese war and

25.1 per cent more than in the mutual-aid team period. This co-operative made a five-year plan, but after three years its total output value is already 100.6 per cent of the target set by the plan. The experience of this co-operative poses the following question to us: If large increases in output can be attained in places where the natural conditions are poor, why can't places where the natural conditions are more favourable do even better?

(Note to "Run the Co-operative with Diligence and Thrift, Develop the Mountain Areas")

40

This is a well managed co-operative. One can learn a great deal from its valuable experience. Chufu County is Confucius' home town where the old man ran a school for many years and trained a good number of capable disciples, a fact that is quite well known. But he didn't care much about the economic aspects of the life of the people. When his disciple Fan Chih asked him how to do farming, he not only parried the question but abused Fan Chih behind his back as belonging to "the lower orders".[5] Now the people in his home town have set up socialist co-operatives. After three years of co-operation, the economic and cultural life of the people, who were poor and destitute for over two thousand years, has begun to change. This demonstrates that the socialism of our time has indeed no parallel in history. Socialism is infinitely superior to the Confucian "classics". I would like to suggest to those interested in visiting the Temple and Tomb of Confucius that on their way they might well go and have a look at the co-operative described here.

(Note to "An Agricultural Producers' Co-operative Increases Production by 67 Per Cent in Three Years")

41

This article is very well written and worth reading. Most of the existing semi-socialist co-operatives are small, each with only twenty or thirty households, because co-operatives of that size are easy to set up and give the cadres and members an opportunity to gain experience quickly. But with its few members, little land and scanty funds a small co-operative cannot operate on a large scale or use machinery. Co-operatives so small in size still hamper the development of the productive forces; they should not remain at this stage for long, but should gradually merge. In some places a single co-operative may embrace an entire township, in a few places several townships, but, of course, in many others one township may have several co-operatives. Big co-operatives can be formed in mountain areas as well as on the plains. The township in Anhwei Province where the Futzuling Reservoir is situated is all hills for dozens of *li* around. It is precisely here that a big co-operative has been set up which goes in for agriculture, forestry and livestock in a comprehensive way. Of course the amalgamation of co-operatives should proceed step by step with the members' consent and when suitable cadres are available.

(Note to "The Superiority of the Big Co-operative")

42

The experience of the Red Flag Co-operative on Hainan Island has again demonstrated the greater advantages of big co-operatives and co-operatives of the advanced type. Only one year after its formation, this big co-operative was ready to move on to the advanced stage. Of course, this is not to say that all co-operatives should follow suit, for they must first consider whether their conditions are ripe before deciding when to merge and move on to the advanced stage. But generally speaking, a period of three years is about right. The important thing is to set examples for the peasants. When they see that big co-operatives and co-operatives of the advanced type yield greater advantages than small and elementary ones, they will want to merge their co-operatives and move on to the advanced stage.

(Note to "The Red Flag Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in the First District of Chiungshan County Grows Strong in the Struggle Against Natural Disasters and Capitalist Ideology")

42

It is necessary to consider changing elementary co-operatives to advanced ones when their conditions are ripe, so as to further develop their productive forces and production. Since elementary co-operatives maintain a system of semi-private ownership,[6] with the passage of time this will hamper the development of the productive forces and people will begin to demand a change in the system of ownership, so that the co-operative will become a collectively managed economic unit in which the means of production are owned wholly in common. Once the productive forces are further freed, production will expand even more. Some places can make the change-over fairly quickly, others will probably have to go a bit more slowly. After functioning for about three years co-operatives of an elementary type will in the main acquire the necessary conditions. The Party organizations in every province, municipality and autonomous region should look into this matter and make preparations, and during 1956 and 1957 establish a number of experimental co-operatives of the advanced type with the consent of the masses. In general, the co-operatives today are small, and when they switch over to the advanced type, the many small co-operatives should be merged into big ones with the consent of the masses. If in 1956 and 1957 every district can get one or more such co-operatives organized and their superiority over the elementary type is made plain to the masses, this will create favourable conditions for co-operatives to merge and move on to the advanced stage in the years to follow. This work must be co-ordinated with over-all planning to expand production. When people see that big co-operatives and co-operatives of the advanced type have greater advantages than small and elementary ones, when people see that long-range planning brings a much higher level of material and cultural life in its train, they will agree to merge their co-operatives and move on to the advanced stage. The elevation to the advanced stage will proceed more quickly in the suburban areas. The experience of this co-operative in Peking can serve as reference material for other co-operatives with similar conditions.

(Note to "A Co-operative That Goes from the Elementary to the Advanced Type")

NOTES

[1] In its early days the Wang Kuo-fan Co-operative was woefully short of means of production. Instead of asking for state loans, the co-operative organized its members to go into the mountains some thirty *li* away to collect firewood which they sold to pay for means of production. So the co-operative members said that they "made the mountains yield" a substantial amount of the means of production.

[2] Here "reverse propaganda" means making clear to the masses the difficulties and adversities they may come across in forming co-operatives, in addition to publicizing the advantages and favourable conditions. This was done when the masses were fully aroused and applied in great numbers for co-operative membership, so that they could weigh the matter thoroughly and join of their own free will.

[3] The four comparisons were to compare and see which was better: (1) the co-operative, the mutual-aid team, or peasants working on their own; (2) socialism or capitalism; (3) a system with exploitation or a system without exploitation, and (4) personal enrichment or prosperity for all. The five calculations referred to the calculations of the superiority of the co-operatives with respect to (1) coping with natural disasters, (2) increasing earnings through the promotion of side-lines, (3) increasing work-points by arousing enthusiasm for labour, (4) increasing production as a result of mutually beneficial co-operation by the poor and the middle peasants, and (5) overcoming difficulties in production and in livelihood.

[4] V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues".

[5] *Confucian Analects*, Book XIII, "Tzu Lu".

[6] The elementary co-operative characterized by the pooling of land as shares and unified management was semi-socialist in nature. It maintained private ownership by the co-operative members of such means of production as land, draught animals and the larger farm implements, and the co-operative had to pay "dividends" to its members for their use. The elementary co-operative was therefore said to have retained semi-private ownership.

REQUEST FOR OPINIONS ON THE SEVENTEEN-ARTICLE DOCUMENT CONCERNING AGRICULTURE

December 21, 1955

In November this year a seventeen-article document was agreed upon after consultations held by Comrade Mao Tsetung in Hangchow and Tientsin with secretaries of the Party committees of fourteen provinces and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. The Central Committee holds that the document should be confirmed at the conference of secretaries of the provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party committees to be convened by the Central Committee on January 10 so that it can be incorporated in the 1956 plan and begin to be carried out in earnest. To this end, on receiving this message please summon the secretaries of all the prefectural Party committees and of some of the county Party committees under your jurisdiction to make a detailed study of the following questions:

(1) Whether all or only some of the articles can be carried out and whether the conditions are sufficient for carrying out each article;

(2) Whether any additions to the seventeen articles are needed (additions which are practicable can be made); and

(3) Whether you are ready to incorporate the seventeen articles in your 1956 plan and carry them out right away.

Please complete your study of these questions and have your opinions ready by January 3, 1956.

The seventeen articles are as follows:

Circular drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and sent to the Shanghai Bureau and the provincial and autonomous region Party committees.

1. Regarding the pace of the co-operative transformation of agriculture, the work of establishing co-operatives of the elementary type should in the main be accomplished by the latter half of 1956, and it is advisable for the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions (Sinkiang excepted) to set a target for co-operative membership of 75 per cent of the peasant households and let the lower levels exceed this somewhat and reach about 80 to 85 per cent.

As for co-operation of the higher stage, you should strive to accomplish it basically by 1960, or if possible a year sooner, by 1959. To this end it is necessary for the counties, and preferably the districts, to take direct charge of setting up one or more large co-operatives of the advanced type (each with over a hundred households) in every county or district in 1956 and then another batch in 1957 — these two batches should account for about 25 per cent of the peasant households and serve as models. Is this possible or not? What should be the size of a co-operative when small co-operatives merge into big ones? Several co-operatives forming one township, one co-operative forming one township, or one co-operative embracing several townships — are all three forms practicable? Which is the more suitable figure for the total number of co-operatives in the country — 300,000, 400,000, or 500,000? The figure is 100,000 in the Soviet Union; would over 300,000, or 400,000, be more suitable for us? Further, which way is better — to merge the co-operatives first and then raise them to the higher stage, or to merge and raise them at the same time, or to raise them first and then merge them? Please consider these questions as well.

2. As for the admission of landlords and rich peasants into co-operatives, perhaps during 1956 you could act upon the suggestion made by Anhwei, Shansi and Heilungkiang Provinces, that is, allowing those who behave well to join and those who behave neither well nor badly to take part in co-operative production but without co-operative membership, while compelling those who behave badly to engage in production under the co-operatives' supervision. This method can be adopted by all the old co-operatives which have strong cadres. There are many advantages to this, though there is one disadvantage, namely, those upper-middle peasants who are as yet unwilling to join the co-operatives will inevitably feel obliged to do so, and moreover they will have to be admitted before the landlords and rich peasants so as to save their face. Is this good or not? Or shall we postpone the adoption of the above method for a year, that is, until 1957? Please consider which alternative is better.

3. As for the composition of the leadership in a co-operative, two-thirds should come from among the present-day poor peasants plus all the new lower-middle peasants who were formerly poor peasants, while one-third should come from among the old lower-middle peasants and the old and new upper-middle peasants.

4. Conditions for increasing production: (a) carry out a few fundamental measures (the details still have to be discussed, and some differences may be allowed for different places); (b) spread advanced experience (materials on models are to be collected every year and published in a volume by each province).

5. In 1956 every province, prefecture, county, district and township should draw up a long-term comprehensive plan embracing all the necessary items, with stress on county and township plans. A draft should be prepared in the first half of the year and finalized in the second, subject to further revision. The plan should cover a period of at least three years, preferably seven, possibly as many as twelve. This must be done without delay. Have you made any arrangements for it? While many plans are likely to be rough-and-ready for lack of experience, you should strive to have a few counties and townships draw up more realistic plans so that they can be recommended as models.

6. Make an over-all plan for the protection and breeding of cattle, horses, mules, donkeys, pigs, sheep, chickens and ducks, and especially for the protection of young animals. The breeding plans will be discussed, so please have your opinions ready.

7. In co-ordination with the plans for river basins, there should be widespread construction of small water conservancy projects to ensure basic control over ordinary floods and droughts within seven years.

8. Within seven years, basically eliminate a dozen or so insect pests and plant diseases harmful to crops.

9. Within twelve years, make most of the waste land and barren hills productive and achieve afforestation by planting trees according to specified requirements in every possible place, that is, around every house and every village, by roadsides and watersides as well as on waste land and barren hills.

10. Within twelve years, in most regions 90 per cent, and in some regions 100 per cent, of the needed fertilizer is to be supplied by the localities and co-operatives themselves.

11. Within twelve years, the average yield of grain per *mou* should reach four hundred catties in the areas north of the Yellow River, the

Chinling Mountains, the Pailung River and the section of the Yellow River inside Chinghai Province, five hundred catties in the areas south of the Yellow River and north of the Huai River, and eight hundred catties in the areas south of the Huai River, the Chinling Mountains and the Pailung River. As for cotton, oil-bearing crops, soya beans, silk, tea, jute, sugar-cane, fruit and other items, please suggest a quota for each item for discussion.

12. Within seven years, basically eliminate a number of those diseases most harmful to human beings and livestock, such as schistosomiasis, filariasis, bubonic plague, encephalitis, cattle plague and hog cholera. Please study which of the endemic diseases in your province or region can be basically wiped out within seven years, which will take longer, and which cannot be wiped out under present conditions.

13. Get rid of the four pests, that is, within seven years basically exterminate rats (and other harmful animals), sparrows (and other birds which damage crops, but whether it is advisable to exterminate crows remains to be investigated), flies and mosquitoes.[1]

14. Within seven years, basically wipe out illiteracy, setting a literacy target of 1,500 to 2,000 characters.

15. Within seven years, build according to specified requirements the different kinds of roads (highways, roads and paths) needed in the provinces, prefectures, counties, districts and townships.

16. Within seven years, install wired broadcasting networks so that broadcasts can reach every township and every co-operative.

17. Within seven years, complete the installation of telephone networks connecting townships and large co-operatives.

Please consider the above points with other comrades concerned and complete preparations by January 3. The Central Committee may first summon the secretaries of some provincial Party committees to a meeting around January 4 to study these matters for several days and to have suggestions ready for the coming conference on January 10.

NOTES

[1] The directive on health work drafted in March 1960 by Comrade Mao Tsetung for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party says, "There is another thing. Stop killing sparrows; instead, wipe out bedbugs. The slogan should be, 'Exterminate rats, bedbugs, flies and mosquitoes.'"

SPEED UP
THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF HANDICRAFTS

March 5, 1956

1. It seems to me that the pace of the socialist transformation of independent handicrafts was a little too slow. I said so in January this year at the conference of secretaries of provincial and municipal Party committees. By the end of 1955 only two million handicraftsmen had been organized. In the first two months of this year, however, three million more have been organized, so in the main the work can be accomplished this year; that is fine. You are contemplating an average annual increase of 10.9 per cent in the total value of handicraft production over a period of three five-year plans; that seems a bit too small. We set too low a target in the First Five-Year Plan and have suffered a little in consequence; it need not be changed now, but you should use your discretion.

2. As for the size of handicraft co-operatives, generally speaking, about one hundred people per co-operative would be appropriate, although some may have several hundred and others only a few dozen.

3. It is a good idea to organize co-operatives of the blacksmiths and carpenters who make the rounds of the villages to repair farm implements and serve agricultural production; the peasants will certainly welcome this. That is what handicraftsmen in China have been doing for thousands of years. Organized in co-operatives, the craftsmen can improve their skills and serve the peasants better.

4. You have said that the masses were dissatisfied because production was centralized in the repair and service trades and too many service stations were closed during the high tide of the transformation

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Part of Comrade Mao Tsetung's instructions when the departments concerned under the State Council reported their work on handicrafts.

of handicrafts. That was too bad! What is to be done now? "The general trend under heaven is that there is bound to be unification after prolonged division and division after prolonged unification."

5. The highest labour productivity in mechanized and semi-mechanized production is over thirty times the lowest in handicraft production. The annual value of output per capita is 20,000 to 30,000 yuan in modernized state industry, 5,000 yuan in mechanized and semi-mechanized co-operatives, 2,000 yuan in big co-operatives with more than 100 handicraftsmen, 1,500 yuan in small co-operatives and 800 to 900 yuan among independent handicraftsmen. Compare the differences in labour productivity and it becomes clear that the handicrafts must develop in the direction of semi-mechanization and mechanization and that labour productivity must be raised.

6. All the handicraft trades perform useful services. They provide food, clothing and other things for daily use. They also produce arts and crafts, such as cloisonne or the glass grapes blown by "the five spinsters of the Chang family".[1] Besides, the technique of roasting Peking duck is exportable. People in some service trades make their rounds of the streets and villages, fixing all sorts of things, as in the play *Mending Jars for Aunty Wang* — these people travel around and are well-informed. The Dawn-in-the-East Market in Peking displays more than six thousand kinds of articles for sale.

Mind you, don't let our fine handicraft products be discarded. Pock-marked Wang's and Chang Hsiao-chuan's kitchen knives and scissors must not be discarded, no, not even ten thousand years from now. Anything good and characteristically Chinese that has been discarded must be restored and even improved.

7. It is a good idea to improve the quality of arts and crafts and to look after the old master craftsmen, and you should start now and speed up the work. You can set up organizations, open schools and call meetings. Yang Shih-hui, the ivory carver, is actually a very fine artist. Once he and I ate at table together, and while observing me he was able to carve my likeness. I could have observed him for several days without being able to draw a picture of him, I'm afraid.

8. The prices of equipment and materials allocated by the state to the co-operatives should be reasonably fixed and must not be set at the normal allocation prices. Co-operatives are not the same as state enterprises and there is a difference between socialist collective ownership and socialist ownership by the whole people. At the outset the economic foundations of the co-operatives are not strong enough and

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

they need state assistance. It is a good idea for the state to allocate to the co-operatives at low prices old machines which have been replaced as well as the machinery and factory buildings rendered surplus by the amalgamation of privately owned plants under joint state-private management. "Give in order to take." When the foundations of the co-operatives have become strong enough, the state will collect a larger tax from them and raise the prices of raw materials too. By that time, the co-operatives will be owned by the collective in form but in reality by the whole people.

The state should help the co-operatives to achieve semi-mechanization and mechanization, and they themselves should strive for the same goal. The greater the speed of mechanization, the shorter the life of your handicraft co-operatives. The more your "kingdom" shrinks, the better it is for our common cause. You should exert yourselves to hasten mechanization and make a greater contribution to the state.

9. Since the value of handicraft output forms a quarter of the total value of the country's industrial output, why is it that the supply of raw materials for the handicrafts as well as their production and sales have not been made part of the state plan? The handicrafts assume such large proportions that they should be included in the state plan.

10. In some places the Party committees are so occupied with other tasks that they don't put handicrafts on the agenda; this is not good. Why are some cadres rather unwilling to undertake this work? I myself would very much like to do it, as it is very important.

11. You should select outstanding examples from among the sixty-thousand-odd handicraft co-operatives and compile material on their typical experience. The examples should be chosen from every locality and every trade and should include good and bad, big and small, concentrated and scattered, as well as semi-mechanized and mechanized co-operatives. They should be published in book form like *Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside*.

NOTES

[1] This refers to the five women of Master Chang's family in Peking famous for the glass grapes they blew.

ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS

April 25, 1956

In recent months the Political Bureau of the Central Committee has heard reports on the work of thirty-four industrial, agricultural, transport, commercial, financial and other departments under the central authorities and from these reports has identified a number of problems concerning socialist construction and socialist transformation. In all, they boil down to ten problems, or ten major relationships.

It is to focus on one basic policy that these ten problems are being raised, the basic policy of mobilizing all positive factors, internal and external, to serve the cause of socialism. In the past we followed this policy of mobilizing all positive factors in order to put an end to the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism and to win victory for the people's democratic revolution. We are now following the same policy in order to carry on the socialist revolution and build a socialist country, Nevertheless, there are some problems in our work that need discussion. Particularly worthy of attention is the fact that in the Soviet Union certain defects and errors that occurred in the course of their building socialism have lately come to light. Do you want to follow the detours they have made? It was by drawing lessons from their experience that we were able to avoid certain detours in the past, and there is all the more reason for us to do so now.

What are the positive factors, internal and external? Internally, the workers and the peasants are the basic force. The middle forces are forces that can be won over. The reactionary forces are a negative factor, but even so we should do our work well and turn this negative

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Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Bearing in mind lessons drawn from the Soviet Union, Comrade Mao Tsetung summed up China's experience, dealt with ten major relationships in socialist revolution and socialist construction and set forth the ideas underlying the general line of building socialism with greater, faster, better and more economical results, a line suited to the conditions of our country.

factor as far as possible into a positive one. Internationally, all the forces that can be united with must be united, the forces that are not neutral can be neutralized through our efforts, and even the reactionary forces can be split and made use of. In short, we should mobilize all forces, whether direct or indirect, and strive to make China a powerful socialist country.

I will now discuss the ten problems.

I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEAVY INDUSTRY ON THE ONE HAND AND LIGHT INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE ON THE OTHER

The emphasis in our country's construction is on heavy industry. The production of the means of production must be given priority, that's settled. But it definitely does not follow that the production of the means of subsistence, especially grain, can be neglected. Without enough food and other daily necessities, it would be impossible to provide for the workers in the first place, and then what sense would it make to talk about developing heavy industry? Therefore, the relationship between heavy industry on the one hand and light industry and agriculture on the other must be properly handled.

In dealing with this relationship we have not made mistakes of principle. We have done better than the Soviet Union and a number of East European countries. The prolonged failure of the Soviet Union to reach the highest pre-October Revolution level in grain output, the grave problems arising from the glaring disequilibrium between the development of heavy industry and that of light industry in some East European countries — such problems do not exist in our country. Their lop-sided stress on heavy industry to the neglect of agriculture and light industry results in a shortage of goods on the market and an unstable currency. We, on the other hand, attach more importance to agriculture and light industry. We have all along attended to and developed agriculture and have to a considerable degree ensured the supply of grain and raw materials necessary for the development of industry. Our daily necessities are in fairly good supply and our prices and currency are stable.

The problem now facing us is that of continuing to adjust properly the ratio between investment in heavy industry on the one hand and in agriculture and light industry on the other in order to bring about a greater development of the latter. Does this mean that heavy industry is no longer primary? No. It still is, it still claims the emphasis in our investment. But the proportion for agriculture and light industry must be somewhat increased.

What will be the results of this increase? First, the daily needs of the people will be better satisfied, and, second, the accumulation of capital will be speeded up so that we can develop heavy industry with greater and better results. Heavy industry can also accumulate capital, but, given our present economic conditions, light industry and agriculture can accumulate more and faster.

Here the question arises: Is your desire to develop heavy industry genuine or feigned, strong or weak? If your desire is feigned or weak, then you will hit agriculture and light industry and invest less in them. If your desire is genuine or strong, then you will attach importance to agriculture and light industry so that there will be more grain and more raw materials for light industry and a greater accumulation of capital. And there will be more funds in the future to invest in heavy industry.

There are now two possible approaches to our development of heavy industry: one is to develop agriculture and light industry less, and the other is to develop them more. In the long run, the first approach will lead to a smaller and slower development of heavy industry, or at least will put it on a less solid foundation, and when the over-all account is added up a few decades hence, it will not prove to have paid. The second approach will lead to a greater and faster development of heavy industry and, since it ensures the livelihood of the people, it will lay a more solid foundation for the development of heavy industry.

II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDUSTRY IN THE COASTAL REGIONS AND INDUSTRY IN THE INTERIOR

In the past our industry was concentrated in the coastal regions. By coastal regions we mean Liaoning, Hopei, Peking, Tientsin, eastern Honan, Shantung, Anhwei, Kiangsu, Shanghai, Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi. About 70 per cent of all our industry, both light and heavy, is to be found in the coastal regions and only 30 per cent in the interior. This irrational situation is a product of history. The coastal industrial base must be put to full use, but to even out the distribution of industry as it develops we must strive to promote industry in the interior. We have not made any major mistakes on the relationship between the two. However, in recent years we have underestimated coastal industry to some extent and have not given great enough attention to its development. This must change.

Not so long ago, there was still fighting in Korea and the international situation was quite tense; this could not but affect our attitude towards coastal industry. Now, it seems unlikely that there will be a new war of aggression against China or another world war in the near future, and there will probably be a period of peace for a decade or more. It would therefore be wrong if we still fail to make full use of the plant capacity and technical forces of coastal industry. If we are to have only five years, not to say ten, we should still work hard to develop industries in the coastal regions for four years and evacuate them when war breaks out in the fifth. According to available information, in light industry the construction of a plant and its accumulation of capital generally proceed quite rapidly. After the whole plant goes into production, it can earn enough in four years to build three new factories, or two, or one or at least half of one, in addition to recouping its capital outlay. Why shouldn't we do such profitable things? The notion that the atom bomb is already overhead and about to fall on us in a matter of seconds is a calculation at variance with reality, and it would be wrong to take a negative attitude towards coastal industry on this account.

It does not follow that all new factories should be built in the coastal regions. Without doubt, the greater part of the new industry should be located in the interior so that industry may gradually become evenly distributed; moreover, this will help our preparations against war. But a number of new factories and mines, even some large ones, may also be built in the coastal regions. As for the expansion and reconstruction of the light and heavy industries already in the coastal regions, we have done a fair amount of work in the past and will do much more in the future.

Making good use of the old industries in the coastal regions and developing their capacities will put us in a stronger position to promote and support industry in the interior. To adopt a negative attitude would be to hinder the latter's speedy growth. So it is likewise a question of whether the desire to develop industry in the interior is genuine or not. If it is genuine and not feigned, we must more actively use and promote industry in the coastal regions, especially light industry.

III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION AND DEFENCE CONSTRUCTION

National defence is indispensable. Our defence capabilities have attained a certain level. As a result of the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and of several years of training and consolidation, our armed forces have grown more powerful and are now stronger than was the Soviet Red Army before the Second World War; also, there have been improvements in armaments. Our defence industry is being built up. Ever since Pan Ku separated heaven and earth, we have never been able to make planes and cars, and now we are beginning to make them.

We do not have the atom bomb yet. But neither did we have planes and artillery in the past. We defeated the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek with millet plus rifles. We are stronger than before and will be stronger still in the future. We will have not only more planes and artillery but atom bombs too. If we are not to be bullied in the present-day world, we cannot do without the bomb. Then what is to be done about it? One reliable way is to cut military and administrative expenditures down to appropriate proportions and increase expenditures on economic construction. Only with the faster growth of economic construction can there be greater progress in defence construction.

At the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of our Party in 1950, we already raised the question of streamlining the state apparatus and reducing military and administrative expenditures and considered this measure to be one of the three prerequisites for achieving a fundamental turn for the better in our financial and economic situation. In the period of the First Five-Year Plan, military and administrative expenditures accounted for 30 per cent of the total expenditures in the state budget. This proportion is much too high. In the period of the Second Five-Year Plan, we must reduce it to around 20 per cent, so that more funds can be released for building more factories and turning out more machines. After a time, we shall not only have plenty of planes and artillery but probably have our own atom bombs as well.

Here again the question arises: Is your desire for the atom bomb genuine and very keen? Or is it only lukewarm and not so very keen? If your desire is genuine and very keen, then you will reduce the proportion of military and administrative expenditures and spend more on economic construction. If your desire is not genuine or not so very keen, you will stay in the old rut. This is a matter of strategic policy, and I hope the Military Commission will discuss it.

Would it be all right to demobilize all our troops now? No, it would not. For enemies are still around, and we are being bullied and encircled by them. We must strengthen our national defence, and for that purpose we must first of all strengthen our work in economic construction.

IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE, THE UNITS OF PRODUCTION AND THE PRODUCERS

The relationship between the state on the one hand and factories and agricultural co-operatives on the other and the relationship between factories and agricultural co-operatives on the one hand and the producers on the other should both be handled well. To this end we should consider not just one side but all three, the state, the collective and the individual, or, as we used to say, "take into consideration both the army and the people" and "take into consideration both the public and the private interest". In view of the experience of the Soviet Union as well as our own, we must see to it that from now on this problem is solved much better.

Take the workers for example. As their labour productivity rises, there should be a gradual improvement in their working conditions and collective welfare. We have always advocated plain living and hard work and opposed putting personal material benefits above everything else; at the same time we have always advocated concern for the livelihood of the masses and opposed bureaucracy, which is callous to their well-being. With the growth of our economy as a whole, wages should be appropriately adjusted. We have recently decided to increase wages to some extent, mainly the wages of those at the lower levels, the wages of the workers, in order to narrow the wage gap between them and the upper levels. Generally speaking, our wages are not high, but compared with the past the life of our workers has greatly improved because, among other things, more people are employed and prices remain low and stable. Under the regime of the proletariat, our workers have unfailingly displayed high political consciousness and enthusiasm for labour. When at the end of last year the Central Committee called for a fight against Right conservatism, the masses of workers warmly responded and, what was exceptional, overfulfilled the plan for the first quarter of the year by working all out for three months. We must strive to encourage this zeal for hard work and at the same time pay still greater attention to solving the pressing problems in their work and everyday life.

Here I would like to touch on the question of the independence of the factories under unified leadership. It's not right, I'm afraid, to place everything in the hands of the central or the provincial and municipal authorities without leaving the factories any power of their own, any room for independent action, any benefits. We don't have much experience on how to share power and returns properly among the central authorities, the provincial and municipal authorities and the factories, and we should study the subject. As a matter of principle, centralization and independence form a unity of opposites, and there must be both centralization and independence. For instance, we are now having a meeting, which is centralization; after the meeting, some of us will go for a walk, some will read books, some will go to eat, which is independence. If we don't adjourn the meeting and give everyone some independence but let it go on and on, wouldn't it be the death of us all? This is true of individuals, and no less true of factories and other units of production. Every unit of production must enjoy independence as the correlative of centralization if it is to develop more vigorously.

Now about the peasants. Our relations with the peasants have always been good, but we did make a mistake on the question of grain. In 1954 floods caused a decrease in production in some parts of our country, and yet we purchased 7,000 million more catties of grain. A decrease in production and an increase in purchasing — this made grain the topic on almost everyone's lips in many places last spring, and nearly every household talked about the state monopoly for marketing grain. The peasants were disgruntled, and there were a lot of complaints both inside and outside the Party. Although quite a few people indulged in deliberate exaggeration and exploited the opportunity to attack us, it cannot be said that we had no shortcomings. Inadequate investigation and failure to size up the situation resulted in the purchase of 7,000 million catties more; that was a shortcoming. After discovering it, we purchased 7,000 million catties less in 1955 and introduced a system of fixed quotas for grain production, purchasing and marketing[1] and, what's more, there was a good harvest. With a decrease in purchasing and an increase in production, the peasants had over 20,000 million more catties of grain at their disposal. Thus even those peasants who had complaints before said, "The Communist Party is really good." This lesson the whole Party must bear in mind.

The Soviet Union has adopted measures which squeeze the peasants very hard. It takes away too much from the peasants at too low a price through its system of so-called obligatory sales[2] and other measures. This method of capital accumulation has seriously dampened the peasants' enthusiasm for production. You want the hen to lay more eggs and yet you don't feed it, you want the horse to run fast and yet you don't let it graze. What kind of logic is that!

Our policies towards the peasants differ from those of the Soviet Union and take into account the interests of both the state and the peasants. Our agricultural tax has always been relatively low. In the exchange of industrial and agricultural products we follow a policy of narrowing the price scissors, a policy of exchanging equal or roughly equal values. The state buys agricultural products at standard prices while the peasants suffer no loss, and, what is more, our purchase prices are gradually being raised. In supplying the peasants with manufactured goods we follow a policy of larger sales at a small profit and of stabilizing or appropriately reducing their prices; in supplying grain to the peasants in grain-deficient areas we generally subsidize such sales to a certain extent. Even so, mistakes of one kind or another will occur if we are not careful. In view of the grave mistakes made by the Soviet Union on this question, we must take greater care and handle the relationship between the state and the peasants well.

Similarly, the relationship between the co-operative and the peasants should be well handled. What proportion of the earnings of a co-operative should go to the state, to the co-operative and to the peasants respectively and in what form should be determined properly. The amount that goes to the co-operative is used directly to serve the peasants. Production expenses need no explanation, management expenses are also necessary, the accumulation fund is for expanded reproduction and the public welfare fund is for the peasants' well-being. However, together with the peasants, we should work out equitable ratios among these items. We must strictly economize on production and management expenses. The accumulation fund and the public welfare fund must also be kept within limits, and one shouldn't expect all good things to be done in a single year.

Except in case of extraordinary natural disasters, we must see to it that, given increased agricultural production, 90 per cent of the co-operative members get some increase in their income and the other 10 per cent break even each year, and if the latter's income should fall, ways must be found to solve the problem in good time.

In short, consideration must be given to both sides, not to just one, whether they are the state and the factory, the state and the worker, the factory and the worker, the state and the co-operative, the state and the peasant, or the co-operative and the peasant. To give consideration to only one side, whichever it may be, is harmful to socialism and to the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is a big question which concerns 600 million people, and it calls for repeated education in the whole Party and the whole nation.

V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

The relationship between the central and the local authorities constitutes another contradiction. To resolve this contradiction, our attention should now be focussed on how to enlarge the powers of the local authorities to some extent, give them greater independence and let them do more, all on the premise that the unified leadership of the central authorities is to be strengthened. This will be advantageous to our task of building a powerful socialist country. Our territory is so vast, our population is so large and the conditions are so complex that it is far better to have the initiative come from both the central and the local authorities than from one source alone. We must not follow the example of the Soviet Union in concentrating everything in the hands of the central authorities, shackling the local authorities and denying them the right to independent action.

The central authorities want to develop industry, and so do the local authorities. Even industries directly under the central authorities need assistance from the local authorities. And all the more so for agriculture and commerce. In short, if we are to promote socialist construction, we must bring the initiative of the local authorities into play. If we are to strengthen the central authorities, we must attend to the interests of the localities.

At present scores of hands are reaching out to the localities, making things difficult for them. Once a ministry is set up, it wants to have a revolution and so it issues orders. Since the ministries don't think it proper to issue orders to the Party committees and people's councils at the provincial level, they establish direct contact with the relevant departments and bureaus in the provinces and municipalities and give them orders every day. These orders are all supposed to come from the central authorities, even though neither the Central Committee of the Party nor the State Council knows anything about them, and they put a great strain on the local authorities. There is such a flood of statistical forms that they become a scourge. This state of affairs must be changed.

We should encourage the style of work in which the local authorities are consulted on the matters to be taken up. It is the practice of the Central Committee of the Party to consult the local authorities; it never hastily issues orders without prior consultation. We hope that the ministries and departments under the central authorities will pay due attention to this and will first confer with the localities on all matters concerning them and issue no order without full consultation.

The central departments fall into two categories. Those in the first category exercise leadership right down to the enterprises, but their administrative offices and enterprises in the localities are also subject to supervision by the local authorities. Those in the second have the task of laying down guiding principles and mapping out work plans, while the local authorities assume the responsibility for putting them into operation.

For a large country like ours and a big Party like ours the proper handling of the relationship between the central and local authorities is of vital importance. Some capitalist countries pay great attention to this too. Although their social system is fundamentally different from ours, the experience of their growth is nevertheless worth studying. Take our own experience; the system of the greater administrative area instituted in the early days of our People's Republic was a necessity at that time, and yet it had shortcomings which were later exploited to a certain extent by the anti-Party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih. It was subsequently decided to abolish the greater administrative areas and put the various provinces directly under the central authorities; that was a correct decision. But neither was the outcome so satisfactory when matters went to the length of depriving the localities of their necessary independence. According to our Constitution, the legislative powers are all vested in the central authorities. But, provided that the policies of the central authorities are not violated, the local authorities may work out rules, regulations and measures in the light of their specific conditions and the needs of their work, and this is in no way prohibited by the Constitution. We want both unity and particularity. To build a powerful socialist country it is imperative to have a strong and unified central leadership and unified planning and discipline throughout the country; disruption of this indispensable unity is impermissible. At the same time, it is essential to bring the initiative of the local authorities into full play and let each locality enjoy the particularity suited to its local conditions. This particularity is not the Kao Kang type of particularity but one that is necessary for the interest of the whole and for the strengthening of national unity.

There is also the relationship between different local authorities, and here I refer chiefly to the relationship between the higher and lower local authorities. Since the provinces and municipalities have their own complaints about the central departments, can it be that the prefectures, counties, districts and townships have no complaints about the provinces and municipalities? The central authorities should take care to give scope to the initiative of the provinces and municipalities, and the latter in their turn should do the same for the prefectures, counties, districts and townships; in neither case should the lower levels be put in a strait-jacket. Of course comrades at the lower levels must be informed of the matters on which centralization is necessary and they must not act as they please. In short, centralization must be enforced where it is possible and necessary, otherwise it should not be imposed at all. The provinces and municipalities, prefectures, counties, districts and townships should all enjoy their own proper independence and rights and should fight for them. To fight for such rights in the interest of the whole nation and not of the locality cannot be called localism or an undue assertion of independence.

The relationship between different provinces and municipalities is also a kind of relationship between different local authorities, and it should be properly handled too. It is our consistent principle to advocate consideration for the general interest and mutual help and accommodation.

Our experience is still insufficient and immature on the question of handling the relationship between the central and local authorities and that between different local authorities. We hope that you will consider and discuss it in earnest and sum up your experience from time to time so as to enhance achievements and overcome shortcomings.

VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HAN NATIONALITY AND THE MINORITY NATIONALITIES

Comparatively speaking, our policy on the relationship between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities is sound and has won the favour of the minority nationalities. We put the emphasis on opposing Han chauvinism. Local-nationality chauvinism must be opposed too, but generally that is not where our emphasis lies.

The population of the minority nationalities in our country is small, but the area they inhabit is large. The Han people comprise 94 per cent of the total population, an overwhelming majority. If they practised Han chauvinism and discriminated against the minority peoples, that would be very bad. And who has more land? The minority nationalities, who occupy 50 to 60 per cent of the territory. We say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large in population; as a matter of fact, it is the Han nationality whose population is large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose resources are rich, or at least in all probability their resources under the soil are rich.

The minority nationalities have all contributed to the making of China's history. The huge Han population is the result of the intermingling of many nationalities over a long time. All through the ages, the reactionary rulers, chiefly from the Han nationality, sowed feelings of estrangement among our various nationalities and bullied the minority peoples. Even among the working people it is not easy to eliminate the resultant influences in a short time. So we have to make extensive and sustained efforts to educate both the cadres and the masses in our proletarian nationality policy and make a point of frequently reviewing the relationship between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities. One such review was made two years ago and there should be another now. If the relationship is found to be abnormal, then we must deal with it in earnest and not just in words.

We need to make a thorough study of what systems of economic management and finance will suit the minority nationality areas.

We must sincerely and actively help the minority nationalities to develop their economy and culture. In the Soviet Union the relationship between the Russian nationality and the minority nationalities is very abnormal; we should draw lessons from this. The air in the atmosphere, the forests on the earth and the riches under the soil are all important factors needed for the building of socialism, but no material factor can be exploited and utilized without the human factor. We must foster good relations between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities and strengthen the unity of all the nationalities in the common endeavour to build our great socialist motherland.

VII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY AND NON-PARTY

Which is better, to have just one party or several? As we see it now, it's perhaps better to have several parties. This has been true in the past and may well be so for the future; it means long-term coexistence and mutual supervision.

In our country the various democratic parties, consisting primarily of the national bourgeoisie and its intellectuals, emerged during the resistance to Japan and the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek, and they continue to exist to this day. In this respect, China is different from the Soviet Union. We have purposely let the democratic parties remain, giving them opportunities to express their views and adopting a policy of both unity and struggle towards them. We unite with all those democratic personages who offer us well-intentioned criticisms. We should go on activating the enthusiasm of such people from the Kuomintang army and government as Wei Li-huang and Weng Wen-hao, who are patriotic. We should even provide for such abusive types as Lung Yun, Liang Shu-ming and Peng Yi-hu and allow them to rail at us, while refuting their nonsense and accepting what makes sense in their rebukes. This is better for the Party, for the people and for socialism.

Since classes and class struggle still exist in China, there is bound to be opposition in one form or another. Although all the democratic parties and democrats without party affiliation have professed their acceptance of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, many of them are actually in opposition in varying degrees. On such matters as "carrying the revolution through to the end", the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and the agrarian reform, they were against us and yet not against us. To this very day they have reservations about the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. They didn't want to have a constitution of the socialist type, for, as they said, the Common Programme was just perfect, and yet when the Draft Constitution came out, their hands all went up in favour. Things often turn into their opposites, and this is also true of the attitude of the democratic parties on many questions. They are in opposition, and yet not in opposition, often proceeding from being in opposition to not being in opposition.

The Communist Party and the democratic parties are all products of history. What emerges in history disappears in history. Therefore, the Communist Party will disappear one day, and so will the democratic parties. Is this disappearance so unpleasant? In my opinion, it will be very pleasant. I think it is just fine that one day we will be able to do away with the Communist Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Our task is to hasten their extinction. We have spoken about this point many times.

But at present we cannot do without the proletarian party and the dictatorship of the proletariat and, what is more, it is imperative that they should be made still more powerful. Otherwise, we would not be able to suppress the counter-revolutionaries, resist the imperialists and build socialism, or consolidate it when it is built. Lenin's theory on the proletarian party and the dictatorship of the proletariat is by no means "outmoded", as alleged by certain people. The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot but be highly coercive. Still, we must oppose bureaucracy and a cumbersome apparatus. I propose that the Party and government organs should be thoroughly streamlined and cut by two-thirds provided that no person dies and no work stops.

However, streamlining the Party and government organs does not mean getting rid of the democratic parties. I suggest you give attention to our united front work so as to improve our relations with them and make every possible effort to mobilize their enthusiasm for the cause of socialism.

VIII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

What kind of factor are counter-revolutionaries? They are a negative factor, a destructive factor, they are forces opposed to the positive factors. Is it possible for counter-revolutionaries to change? The die-hards will undoubtedly never change. However, given the conditions in our country, most of the counter-revolutionaries will eventually change to a greater or lesser extent. Thanks to the correct policy we adopted, many have been transformed into persons no longer opposed to the revolution, and a few have even done some good.

The following points should be affirmed:

First, it should be affirmed that the suppression of counter-revolutionaries in 1951-52 was necessary. There is a view that this campaign needn't have been launched. This is wrong.

Counter-revolutionaries may be dealt with in these ways: execution, imprisonment, supervision and leaving at large. Execution — everybody knows what that means. By imprisonment we mean putting counter-revolutionaries in jail and reforming them through labour. By supervision we mean leaving them in society to be reformed under the supervision of the masses. By leaving at large we mean that generally no arrest is made in those cases where it is marginal whether to make an arrest, or that those arrested are set free for good behaviour. It is essential that different counter-revolutionaries should be dealt with differently on the merits of each case.

Now let's take execution in particular. True, we executed a number of people during the above-mentioned campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries. But what sort of people were they? They were counter-revolutionaries who owed the masses many blood debts and were bitterly hated. In a great revolution embracing 600 million people, the masses would not have been able to rise if we had not killed off such local despots as the "Tyrant of the East" and the "Tyrant of the West". Had it not been for that campaign of suppression, the people would not have approved our present policy of leniency. Now that some people have heard that Stalin wrongly put a number of people to death, they jump to the conclusion that we too were wrong in putting those counter-revolutionaries to death. This is a wrong view. It is of immediate significance today to affirm that it was absolutely right to execute those counter-revolutionaries.

Second, it should be affirmed that counter-revolutionaries still exist, although their number has greatly diminished. After the Hu Feng case surfaced, it was necessary to ferret out the counter-revolutionaries. The effort to clear out those who remain hidden must go on. It should be affirmed that there are still a small number of counter-revolutionaries carrying out counter-revolutionary sabotage of one kind or another. For example, they kill cattle, set fire to granaries, wreck factories, steal information and put up reactionary posters. Consequently, it is wrong to say that counter-revolutionaries have been completely eliminated and that we can therefore lay our heads on our pillows and just drop off to sleep. As long as class struggle exists in China and in the world, we should never relax our vigilance. Nevertheless, it would be equally wrong to assert that there are still large numbers of counter-revolutionaries.

Third, from now on there should be fewer arrests and executions in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries in society at large. They are the mortal and immediate enemies of the people and are deeply hated by them, and therefore a small number should be executed. But most of them should be handed over to the agricultural co-operatives and made to work under supervision and be reformed through labour. All the same, we cannot announce that there will be no more executions, and we must not abolish the death penalty.

Fourth, in clearing out counter-revolutionaries in Party and government organs, schools and army units, we must adhere to the policy started in Yenan of killing none and arresting few. Confirmed counter-revolutionaries are to be screened by the organizations concerned, but they are not to be arrested by the public security bureaus, prosecuted by the procuratorial organs or tried by the law courts. Well over ninety out of every hundred of these counter-revolutionaries should be dealt with in this way. This is what we mean by arresting few. As for executions, kill none.

What kind of people are those we don’t execute? We don’t execute people like Hu Feng, Pan Han-nien, Jao Shu-shih, or even captured war criminals such as Emperor Pu Yi and Kang Tse. We don’t have them executed, not because their crimes don’t deserve capital punishment but because such executions would yield no advantage. If one such criminal is executed, a second and a third will be compared with him in their crimes, and then many heads will begin to roll. This is my first point. Second, people may be wrongly executed. Once a head is chopped off, history shows it can’t be restored, nor can it grow again as chives do, after being cut. If you cut off a head by mistake, there is no way to rectify the mistake, even if you want to. The third point is that you will have destroyed a source of evidence. You need evidence in order to suppress counter-revolutionaries. Often one counter-revolutionary serves as a living witness against another, and there will be cases where you may want to consult him. If you have got rid of him, you may not be able to get evidence any more. And this will be to the advantage of counter-revolution, not of revolution. The fourth point is that killing these counter-revolutionaries won't (1) raise production, (2) raise the country's scientific level, (3) help do away with the four pests, (4) strengthen national defence, or (5) help recover Taiwan. It will only earn you the reputation of killing captives, and killing captives has always given one a bad name. Another point is that counter-revolutionaries inside Party and government organs are different from those in society at large. The latter lord it over the masses while the former are somewhat removed from the masses, and therefore make enemies in general but seldom enemies in particular. What harm is there in killing none of them? Those who are physically fit for manual labour should be reformed through labour, and those who are not should be provided for. Counter-revolutionaries are trash, they are vermin, but once in your hands, you can make them perform some kind of service for the people.

But shall we enact a law stipulating that no counter-revolutionary in Party and government organs is to be executed? Ours is a policy for internal observance which need not be made public, and all we need do is carry it out as far as possible in practice. Supposing someone should throw a bomb into this building, killing everybody here, or half or one-third of the people present, what would you say — execute him or not execute him? Certainly he must be executed.

Adopting the policy of killing none when eliminating counter-revolutionaries from Party and government organs in no way prevents us from being strict with them. Instead, it serves as a safeguard against irretrievable mistakes, and if mistakes are made, it gives us an opportunity to correct them. In this way many people will be put at ease and distrust among comrades inside the Party avoided. If counter-revolutionaries are not executed, they have to be fed. All counter-revolutionaries should be given a chance to earn a living, so that they can start anew. This will be good for the cause of the people and be well received abroad.

The suppression of counter-revolutionaries still calls for hard work. We must not relax. In future not only must the suppression of counter-revolutionaries in society continue, but we must also uncover all the hidden counter-revolutionaries in Party and government organs, schools and army units. We must draw a clear distinction between ourselves and the enemy. If the enemy is allowed to worm his way into our ranks and even into our organs of leadership, we know only too well how serious a threat this will be to the cause of socialism and to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

IX. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG

A clear distinction must be made between right and wrong, whether inside or outside the Party. How to deal with people who have made mistakes is an important question. The correct attitude towards them should be to adopt a policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient", help them correct their mistakes and allow them to go on taking part in the revolution. In those days when the dogmatists headed by Wang Ming were in the saddle, our Party erred on this question, picking up the bad aspect of Stalin's style of work. In society the dogmatists rejected the middle forces and inside the Party they did not allow people to correct their mistakes; they barred both from the revolution.

The True Story of Ah Q is a fine story. I would recommend comrades who have read it before to reread it and those who haven't to read it carefully. In this story Lu Hsun writes mainly about a peasant who is backward and politically unawakened. He devotes a whole chapter, "Barred from the Revolution", to describing how a bogus foreign devil bars Ah Q from the revolution. Actually, all Ah Q understands by revolution is helping himself to a few things just like some others. But even this kind of revolution is denied him by the bogus foreign devil. It seems to me that in this respect some people are quite like that bogus foreign devil. They barred from the revolution those who had committed errors, drawing no distinction between the making of mistakes and counter-revolution, and went so far as to kill a number of people who were guilty only of mistakes. We must take this lesson to heart. It is bad either to bar people outside the Party from the revolution or to prohibit erring comrades inside the Party from making amends.

With regard to comrades who have erred, some people say we must observe them and see if they are going to correct their mistakes. I would say just observing them will not do, we must help them correct their mistakes. That is to say, first we must observe and second we must give help. Everybody needs help; those who have not done wrong need it and those who have need it still more. Probably no one is free from mistakes, only some make more and some less, and once they do they need help. It is passive just to observe; conditions must be created to help those who have erred to mend their ways. A clear distinction must be drawn between right and wrong, for inner-Party controversies over principle are a reflection inside the Party of the class struggle in society, and no equivocation is to be tolerated. It is normal, in accordance with the merits of the case, to mete out appropriate and well grounded criticism to comrades who have erred, and even to conduct necessary struggle against them; this is to help them correct mistakes. To deny them help and, what is worse, to gloat over their mistakes, is sectarianism.

For revolution, it is always better to have more people. Except for a few who cling to their mistakes and fail to mend their ways after repeated admonition, the majority of those who have erred can correct their mistakes. People who have had typhoid become immune to it; similarly, people who have made mistakes will make fewer ones provided they are good at drawing lessons. On the other hand, since it is easier for those who have not erred to become cocky, they are prone to make mistakes. Let us be careful, for those who fix people guilty of mistakes will more often than not end up finding themselves in a fix. Kao Kang started out to lift a rock to hurl at others only to find himself being knocked down. Treating with good will those who have erred will win general approval and unite people. A helpful attitude or a hostile attitude towards comrades who have erred — this is a criterion for judging whether one is well-intentioned or ill-intentioned.

The policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient" is a policy for uniting the whole Party. We must stick to this policy.

X. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES

We have put forward the slogan of learning from other countries. I think we have been right. At present, the leaders of some countries are chary and even afraid of advancing this slogan. It takes some courage to do so, because theatrical pretensions have to be discarded.

It must be admitted that every nation has its strong points. If not, how can it survive? How can it progress? On the other hand, every nation has its weak points. Some believe that socialism is just perfect, without a single flaw. How can that be true? It must be recognized that there are always two aspects, the strong points and the weak points. The secretaries of our Party branches, the company commanders and platoon leaders of our army have all learned to jot down both aspects in their pocket notebooks, the weak points as well as the strong ones, when summing up their experience. They all know there are two aspects to everything, why do we mention only one? There will always be two aspects, even ten thousand years from now. Each age, whether the future or the present, has its own two aspects, and each individual has his own two aspects. In short, there are two aspects, not just one. To say there is only one is to be aware of one aspect and to be ignorant of the other.

Our policy is to learn from the strong points of all nations and all countries, learn all that is genuinely good in the political, economic, scientific and technological fields and in literature and art. But we must learn with an analytical and critical eye, not blindly, and we mustn't copy everything indiscriminately and transplant mechanically. Naturally, we mustn't pick up their shortcomings and weak points.

We should adopt the same attitude in learning from the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Some of our people were not clear about this before and even picked up their weaknesses. While they were swelling with pride over what they had picked up, it was already being discarded in those countries; as a result, they had to do a somersault like the Monkey Sun Wu-kung. For instance, there were people who accused us of making a mistake of principle in setting up a Ministry of Culture and a Bureau of Cinematography rather than a Ministry of Cinematography and a Bureau of Culture, as was the case in the Soviet Union. They did not anticipate that shortly afterwards the Soviet Union would make a change and set up a Ministry of Culture as we had-done. Some people never take the trouble to analyse, they simply follow the "wind". Today, when the north wind is blowing, they join the "north wind" school; tomorrow, when there is a west wind, they switch to the "west wind" school; afterwards when the north wind blows again, they switch back to the "north wind" school. They hold no independent opinion of their own and often go from one extreme to the other.

In the Soviet Union, those who once extolled Stalin to the skies have now in one swoop consigned him to purgatory. Here in China some people are following their example. It is the opinion of the Central Committee that Stalin's mistakes amounted to only 30 per cent of the whole and his achievements to 70 per cent, and that all things considered Stalin was nonetheless a great Marxist. We wrote "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" on the basis of this evaluation. This assessment of 30 per cent for mistakes and 70 per cent for achievements is just about right. Stalin did a number of wrong things in connection with China. The "Left" adventurism pursued by Wang Ming in the latter part of the Second Revolutionary Civil War period and his Right opportunism in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan can both be traced to Stalin. At the time of the War of Liberation, Stalin first enjoined us not to press on with the revolution, maintaining that if civil war flared up, the Chinese nation would run the risk of destroying itself. Then when fighting did erupt, he took us half seriously, half sceptically. When we won the war, Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type, and in 1949 and 1950 the pressure on us was very strong indeed. Even so, we maintain the estimate of 30 per cent for his mistakes and 70 per cent for his achievements. This is only fair.

In the social sciences and in Marxism-Leninism, we must continue to study Stalin diligently wherever he is right. What we must study is all that is universally true and we must make sure that this study is linked with Chinese reality. It would lead to a mess if every single sentence, even of Marx's, were followed. Our theory is an integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. At one time some people in the Party went in for dogmatism, and this came under our criticism. Nevertheless, there is still dogmatism today. It still exists in academic circles and in economic circles too.

In the natural sciences we are rather backward, and here we should make a special effort to learn from foreign countries. And yet we must learn critically, not blindly. In technology I think first we have to follow others in most cases, and it is better for us to do so, since that is what we are lacking at present and know little about. However, in those cases where we already have clear knowledge, we must not follow others in every detail.

We must firmly reject and criticize all the decadent bourgeois systems, ideologies and ways of life of foreign countries. But this should in no way prevent us from learning the advanced sciences and technologies of capitalist countries and whatever is scientific in the management of their enterprises. In the industrially developed countries they run their enterprises with fewer people and greater efficiency and they know how to do business. All this should be learned well in accordance with our own principles in order to improve our work. Nowadays, those who make English their study no longer work hard at it, and research papers are no longer translated into English, French, German or Japanese for exchange with other countries. This too is a kind of blind prejudice. Neither the indiscriminate rejection of everything foreign, whether scientific, technological or cultural, nor the indiscriminate imitation of everything foreign as noted above, has anything in common with the Marxist attitude, and neither in any way benefits our cause.

In my opinion, China has two weaknesses, which are at the same time two strong points.

First, in the past China was a colonial and semi-colonial country, not an imperialist power, and was always bullied by others. Its industry and agriculture are not developed and its scientific and technological level is low, and except for its vast territory, rich resources, large population, long history, *The Dream of the Red Chamber* in literature, and so on, China is inferior to other countries in many respects, and so has no reason to feel conceited. However, there are people who, having been slaves too long, feel inferior in everything and don't stand up straight in the presence of foreigners. They are just like Chia Kuei[3] in the opera *The Famen Temple* who, when asked to take a seat, refuses to do so, giving the excuse that he is used to standing in attendance. Here we need to bestir ourselves, enhance our national confidence and encourage the spirit typified by "scorn U.S. imperialism", which was fostered during the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea.

Second, our revolution came late. Although the Revolution of 1911 which overthrew the Ching emperor preceded the Russian revolution, there was no Communist Party at that time and the revolution failed. Victory in the people's revolution came only in 1949, some thirty years later than the October Revolution. On this account too, we are not in a position to feel conceited. The Soviet Union differs from our country in that, firstly, tsarist Russia was an imperialist power and, secondly, it had the October Revolution. As a result, many people in the Soviet Union are conceited and very arrogant.

Our two weaknesses are also strong points. As I have said elsewhere, we are first "poor" and second "blank". By "poor" I mean we do not have much industry and our agriculture is underdeveloped. By "blank" I mean we are like a blank sheet of paper and our cultural and scientific level is not high. From the developmental point of view, this is not bad. The poor want revolution, whereas it is difficult for the rich to want revolution. Countries with a high scientific and technological level are overblown with arrogance. We are like a blank sheet of paper, which is good for writing on.

Being "poor" and "blank" is therefore all to our good. Even when one day our country becomes strong and prosperous, we must still adhere to the revolutionary stand, remain modest and prudent, learn from other countries and not allow ourselves to become swollen with conceit. We must not only learn from other countries during the period of our First Five-Year Plan, but must go on doing so after the completion of scores of five-year plans. We must be ready to learn even ten thousand years from now. Is there anything bad about that?

I have taken up ten topics altogether. These ten relationships are all contradictions. The world consists of contradictions. Without contradictions the world would cease to exist. Our task is to handle these contradictions correctly. As to whether or not they can be resolved entirely to our satisfaction in practice, we must be prepared for either possibility; furthermore, in the course of resolving these contradictions we are bound to come up against new ones, new problems. But as we have often said, while the road ahead is tortuous, the future is bright. We must do our best to mobilize all positive factors, both inside and outside the Party, both at home and abroad, both direct and indirect, and make China a powerful socialist country.

NOTES

[1] The system of fixed quotas for the production, purchase and marketing of grain was instituted in the spring of 1955. The quotas for production fixed in that year were based on the grain yield per *mou* in normal years, and increases in production were not to entail extra sales of grain to the state for three years. The fixed quota for purchase refers to the purchase by the state of a fixed proportion of surplus grain from peasant households having a surplus. The fixed quota for marketing refers to the quota for the state's supply of grain to grain-deficient households. The system was adopted in order to raise the peasants' enthusiasm for increasing production.

[2] The system of obligatory sales enforced in the Soviet Union from 1933 to 1957 was the principal measure by which the state bought agricultural products. Under it the collective farms and individual peasant households were required to sell their agricultural products annually to the state in quantities and at prices fixed by the state.

[3] In the Peking opera *The Famen Temple*, Chia Kuei is a trusted lackey of Liu Chin, a Ming Dynasty eunuch.

U.S. IMPERIALISM IS A PAPER TIGER

July 14, 1956

The United States is flaunting the anti-communist banner everywhere in order to perpetrate aggression against other countries.

The United States owes debts everywhere. It owes debts not only to the countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa, but also to the countries of Europe and Oceania. The whole world, Britain included, dislikes the United States. The masses of the people dislike it. Japan dislikes the United States because it oppresses her. None of the countries in the East is free from U.S. aggression. The United States has invaded our Taiwan Province. Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Viet Nam and Pakistan all suffer from U.S. aggression, although some of them are allies of the United States. The people are dissatisfied and in some countries so are the authorities.

All oppressed nations want independence.

Everything is subject to change. The big decadent forces will give way to the small new-born forces. The small forces will change into big forces because the majority of the people demand this change. The U.S. imperialist forces will change from big to small because the American people, too, are dissatisfied with their government.

In my own lifetime I myself have witnessed such changes. Some of us present were born in the Ching Dynasty and others after the 1911 Revolution.

The Ching Dynasty was overthrown long ago. By whom? By the party led by Sun Yat-sen, together with the people. Sun Yat-sen's forces were so small that the Ching officials didn't take him seriously. He led many uprisings which failed each time. In the end, however, it was Sun Yat-sen who brought down the Ching Dynasty. Bigness is nothing to be afraid of. The big will be overthrown by the small. The small will become big. After overthrowing the Ching Dynasty, Sun Yat-sen

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Part of a talk with two Latin-American public figures.

met with defeat. For he failed to satisfy the demands of the people, such as their demands for land and for opposition to imperialism. Nor did he understand the necessity of suppressing the counter-revolutionaries who were then moving about freely. Later, he suffered defeat at the hands of Yuan Shih-kai, the chieftain of the Northern warlords. Yuan Shih-kai's forces were larger than Sun Yat-sen's. But here again this law operated: small forces linked with the people become strong, while big forces opposed to the people become weak. Subsequently Sun Yat-sen's bourgeois-democratic revolutionaries co-operated with us Communists and together we defeated the warlord set-up left behind by Yuan Shih-kai.

Chiang Kai-shek's rule in China was recognized by the governments of all countries and lasted twenty-two years, and his forces were the biggest. Our forces were small, fifty thousand Party members at first but only a few thousand after counter-revolutionary suppressions. The enemy made trouble everywhere. Again this law operated: the big and strong end up in defeat because they are divorced from the people, whereas the small and weak emerge victorious because they are linked with the people and work in their interest. That's how things turned out in the end.

During the anti-Japanese war, Japan was very powerful, the Kuomintang troops were driven to the hinterland, and the armed forces led by the Communist Party could only conduct guerrilla warfare in the rural areas behind the enemy lines. Japan occupied large Chinese cities such as Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan and Canton. Nevertheless, like Germany's Hitler the Japanese militarists collapsed in a few years, in accordance with the same law.

We underwent innumerable difficulties and were driven from the south to the north, while our forces fell from several hundred thousand strong to a few tens of thousands. At the end of the 25,000-*li* Long March we had only 25,000 men left.

In the history of our Party many erroneous "Left" and Right lines have occurred. Gravest of all were the Right deviationist line of Chen Tu-hsiu and the "Left" deviationist line of Wang Ming. Besides, there were the Right deviationist errors committed by Chang Kuo-tao, Kao Kang and others.

There is also a good side to mistakes, for they can educate the people and the Party. We have had a good many teachers by negative example, such as Japan, the United States, Chiang Kai-shek, Chen Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san, Wang Ming, Chang Kuo-tao and Kao Kang. We paid a very high price to learn from these teachers by negative example. In the past, Britain made war on us many times. Britain, the United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, tsarist Russia and Holland were all very interested in this land of ours. They were all our teachers by negative example and we were their pupils.

During the War of Resistance, our troops grew and became 900,000 strong through fighting against Japan. Then came the War of Liberation. Our arms were inferior to those of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang troops then numbered four million, but in three years of fighting we wiped out eight million of them all told. The Kuomintang, though aided by U.S. imperialism, could not defeat us. The big and strong cannot win, it is always the small and weak who win out.

Now U.S. imperialism is quite powerful, but in reality it isn't. It is very weak politically because it is divorced from the masses of the people and is disliked by everybody and by the American people too. In appearance it is very powerful but in reality it is nothing to be afraid of, it is a paper tiger. Outwardly a tiger, it is made of paper, unable to withstand the wind and the rain. I believe the United States is nothing but a paper tiger.

History as a whole, the history of class society for thousands of years, has proved this point: the strong must give way to the weak. This holds true for the Americas as well.

Only when imperialism is eliminated can peace prevail. The day will come when the paper tigers will be wiped out. But they won't become extinct of their own accord, they need to be battered by the wind and the rain.

When we say U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger, we are speaking in terms of strategy. Regarding it as a whole, we must despise it. But regarding each part, we must take it seriously. It has claws and fangs. We have to destroy it piecemeal. For instance, if it has ten fangs, knock off one the first time, and there will be nine left; knock off another, and there will be eight left. When all the fangs are gone, it will still have claws. If we deal with it step by step and in earnest, we will certainly succeed in the end.

Strategically, we must utterly despise U.S. imperialism. Tactically, we must take it seriously. In struggling against it, we must take each battle, each encounter, seriously. At present, the United States is powerful, but when looked at in a broader perspective, as a whole and from a long-term viewpoint, it has no popular support, its policies are disliked by the people, because it oppresses and exploits them.

For this reason, the tiger is doomed. Therefore, it is nothing to be afraid of and can be despised. But today the United States still has strength, turning out more than 100 million tons of steel a year and hitting out everywhere. That is why we must continue to wage struggles against it, fight it with all our might and wrest one position after another from it. And that takes time.

It seems that the countries of the Americas, Asia and Africa will have to go on quarrelling with the United States till the very end, till the paper tiger is destroyed by the wind and the rain.

To oppose U.S. imperialism, people of European origin in the Latin-American countries should unite with the indigenous Indians. Perhaps the white immigrants from Europe can be divided into two groups, one composed of rulers and the other of ruled. This should make it easier for the group of oppressed white people to get close to the local people, for their position is the same.

Our friends in Latin America, Asia and Africa are in the same position as we and are doing the same kind of work, doing something for the people to lessen their oppression by imperialism. If we do a good job, we can root out imperialist oppression. In this we are comrades.

We are of the same nature as you in our opposition to imperialist oppression, differing only in geographical position, nationality and language. But we are different in nature from imperialism, and the very sight of it makes us sick.

What use is imperialism? The Chinese people will have none of it, nor will the people in the rest of the world. There is no reason for the existence of imperialism.

STRENGTHEN PARTY UNITY AND CARRY FORWARD PARTY TRADITIONS

August 30, 1956

Today we begin the preparatory meeting for the Eighth National Congress. The meeting will last about a fortnight and its main business is: (1) drafting documents for the congress; (2) conducting a preliminary election of the Central Committee; and (3) preparing speeches for the congress.

Now let me deal with a few points.

First, about the objectives and purposes of the congress. What problems is this congress to solve and what are its objectives? In a word, it is to sum up the experience gained since the Seventh Congress, unite the whole Party and unite with all the forces at home and abroad that can be united in the struggle to build a great socialist China.

About the summing-up of experience. Although we have a rich store of experience, we should not merely juxtapose a host of facts but should sum up by grasping the essentials, proceeding from reality and adopting a Marxist standpoint. A summing-up in this way will stimulate our whole Party and enable us to do our work better.

Our Party is a great, glorious and correct Party, a fact which is acknowledged by the whole world. In the past, some foreign comrades had doubts about what we were actually doing. Many didn't understand our policy towards the national bourgeoisie, nor were they very clear about our rectification movement. Today I would say more have come to understand them and most can be said to have such an understanding. Of course, there are still some who don't. Within the country and even inside the Party, there are some who don't understand and who maintain that the line we have followed since the Seventh Congress is not necessarily so correct. But the facts are

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Speech at the first session of the preparatory meeting for the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

there for all to see, we have carried out two revolutions — the bourgeois-democratic revolution to seize state power and the proletarian socialist revolution to carry out socialist transformation and build a socialist country. In the eleven years since the Seventh Congress we have scored great successes, and this is acknowledged by the whole nation and the whole world. Even the bourgeoisie abroad has to acknowledge it. The two revolutions prove that the line of the Central Committee since the Seventh Congress has been correct.

The October Revolution overthrew the bourgeoisie, an event without precedent in world history. In all countries the bourgeoisie was sweeping in its denunciation of this revolution and had never a good word for it. The bourgeoisie in Russia was a counter-revolutionary class, it rejected state capitalism at that time, organized slow-downs and sabotage and resorted to the gun. The Russian proletariat had no choice but to finish it off. This infuriated the bourgeoisie in other countries, and they became abusive. Here in China we have been relatively moderate with our national bourgeoisie, who feel a little more comfortable and believe there are some good points in our policy. By prohibiting American journalists from coming to China, Eisenhower and Dulles have now in fact admitted that it does have good points. If things were in an awful mess here, they would have let their journalists come, knowing that the result could only be vicious articles. What they dread most is that the articles might include not only invective but a good word here and there, and that would be awkward for them.

China used to be stigmatized as a “decrepit empire”, “the sick man of East Asia”, a country with a backward economy and a backward culture, with no hygiene, poor at ball games and swimming, where the women had bound feet, the men wore pigtails and eunuchs could still be found, and where the moon was inferior and did not shine as brightly as in foreign lands. In short, there was much that was bad in China. But after six years’ work of transformation we have changed the face of China. No one can deny our achievements.

Our Party is the core leading our revolutionary cause forward. In summing up experience the congress must first and foremost aim at achieving greater unity throughout the Party. Up to June Party membership stood at 10,730,000. A great deal of work must be done to educate, enlighten and unite these more than ten million Party members, so that they can play their role as the core among the people better. By itself the Party is not enough, it is only the core and needs a mass following. In all fields, including industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, 90 per cent of the work is done by non-Party people and not by Party members. Therefore, we must strive hard to unite with the masses, unite and work with all those that can be united. In our past efforts to achieve unity inside the Party and with people outside the Party there were many defects. During and after the congress we must conduct propaganda and carry on education so that our work in this respect will be considerably improved.

Internationally, we must unite with all the forces in the world that can be united, first of all with the Soviet Union, the fraternal Parties, the fraternal countries and their people, and also with all the peace-loving countries and people, and we must enlist the support of all useful forces. Delegates of Communist Parties from over fifty countries will attend our congress, and this is very good. In the past we had not seized state power or won victory in the two revolutions and had no success to speak of in construction. It is quite different now. We are held in fairly high esteem by our foreign comrades.

What is our objective in uniting with all the forces that can be united, inside and outside the Party and at home and abroad? It is to build a great socialist country. A country like ours may and ought to be described as "great". Our Party is a great Party, our people a great people, our revolution a great revolution, and our construction is great, too. Only one country on this globe has a population of 600 million, and that is China. In the past there were reasons for others to look down upon us. For we had little to contribute, steel output registered only several hundred thousand tons a year, and even that was in the hands of the Japanese. Under the despotic rule of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, which lasted twenty-two years, steel output was only some tens of thousands of tons a year. We still don't have much steel, but a promising start has been made. Output this year will be over four million tons, it will hit the five million mark next year, will exceed ten million tons after the Second Five-Year Plan and is likely to top twenty million after the Third. We must work hard to reach this target. There are about a hundred countries in the world, but only a few produce over twenty million tons of steel a year. Therefore, once built up, China will be a great socialist country and will radically transform the situation in which for over a century it was backward, despised and wretched. Moreover, it will be able to catch up with the most powerful capitalist country in the world, the United States. The United States has a population of only 170 million, and as we have a population several times larger, are similarly rich in resources and are favoured with more or less the same kind of climate, it is possible for us to catch up with the United States. Oughtn't we to catch up? Definitely yes. What are your 600 million people doing? Dozing? Which is right, dozing or working? If working is the answer, why can't you with your 600 million people produce 200 or 300 million tons of steel when they with their population of 170 million can produce 100 million tons? If you fail to catch up, you cannot justify yourselves and you will not be so glorious or great. The United States has a history of only one hundred and eighty years, and sixty years ago it too produced four million tons of steel, so we are sixty years behind. Given fifty or sixty years, we certainly ought to overtake the United States. This is an obligation. You have such a big population, such a vast territory and such rich resources, and what is more, you are said to be building socialism, which is supposed to be superior; if after working at it for fifty or sixty years you are still unable to overtake the United States, what a sorry figure you will cut! You should be read off the face of the earth. Therefore, to overtake the United States is not only possible, but absolutely necessary and obligatory. If we don't, we the Chinese nation will be letting the nations of the world down and we will not be making much of a contribution to mankind.

Second, about carrying forward the Party's traditions. The congress should carry forward our Party's fine traditions with respect to ideology and style of work. It should effectively combat subjectivism and sectarianism and oppose bureaucracy as well. I won't go into bureaucracy today and will deal only with subjectivism and sectarianism. After being overcome, subjectivism and sectarianism crop up again and have to be overcome again.

By making mistakes, we mean making subjectivist mistakes, following a wrong way of thinking. The many articles we've come across criticizing Stalin's mistakes say little or nothing on this score. Why did Stalin make mistakes? Because on a number of issues his subjective thinking failed to correspond with objective reality. Such cases still happen frequently in our work today. Subjectivism means proceeding not from objective reality and from what is actually possible, but from subjective wishes. What is to be set forth and dealt with in our congress documents should as far as possible conform to or approximate Chinese realities. At the same time, in the light of our experience, we should criticize views running counter to the realities, criticize and combat subjectivism. This was the task we set ourselves years ago. At present, we are combating subjectivism as found in the socialist revolution and socialist construction. In the course of the democratic revolution we were plagued by subjectivism for a long time and we paid dearly for it, losing practically all our base areas and over 90 per cent of our revolutionary forces, and it was only then that we began to come to our senses. The problem was not straightened out until the rectification movement in Yenan, which laid stress on investigation and study and a realistic approach. The universal truth of Marxism must be integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or else we will get nowhere. In other words, theory must be integrated with practice. Integration of theory with practice is one of the fundamental principles of Marxism. According to dialectical materialism, thought must reflect objective reality and must be tested and verified in objective practice before it can be taken as truth, otherwise it cannot. Though we have done well in the last few years, subjectivism is evident everywhere. There will be subjectivism in the future, just as there is today. Subjectivism will always be there, ten thousand years and even a hundred million years from now, and it will be so as long as humanity does not perish. Where there is subjectivism, there are mistakes.

Then there is another phenomenon called sectarianism. A locality has its own over-all interest, a nation has another and the earth yet another. Right now I won't go into matters outside our planet, for the travel routes beyond the earth have not yet been opened. If human beings should be discovered on Mars or Venus, we would then discuss the matter of uniting with them and forming a united front. For the time being, we will confine ourselves to the question of unity in the Party, in the country and in the world. Our principle is to unite with all those who are capable of doing some good for world peace and the cause of human progress, whether they are foreign Communists or foreign non-Party people. First of all, we should unite with the scores of Communist Parties and with the Soviet Union. As some mistakes have occurred in the Soviet Union and there is so much talk and gossip about them, it might seem that these mistakes were terrible. It is wrong to take this view. No nation can be free from mistakes, and since the Soviet Union was the first socialist country in the world and went through so much for so long, it was impossible for it not to make mistakes. Then how should we weigh the Soviet Union's mistakes, for instance those of Stalin? They are of a partial and transitory nature. Although it has come to our ears that certain things have been going on for twenty years, still they are transitory and partial and can be set right. In the Soviet Union the main trend, the principal aspect, the major part, has been correct. Russia gave birth to Leninism and through the October Revolution became the first socialist country. It built socialism, defeated fascism and became a powerful industrial country. There are a lot of things we can learn from the Soviet Union. Naturally, we should learn from its advanced and not its backward experience. The slogan we have advocated all along is to draw on the advanced Soviet experience. Who told you to pick up its backward experience? Some people are so undiscriminating that they say a Russian fart is fragrant. That too is subjectivism. The Russians themselves say it stinks. Therefore, we should be analytical. As we have indicated elsewhere, the assessment of Stalin should be 70 per cent for achievements and 30 per cent for mistakes. In the case of the Soviet Union what is good and useful makes up the essential and larger part and what is wrong only a small part. We too have things that are not good, and far from letting other countries pick them up, we should dump them. In a way, bad things are also some kind of experience and can serve a useful purpose. We have had people like Chen Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san, Wang Ming, Chang Kuo-tao, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, who have served as our teachers. In addition, we have other teachers. Within the country the best among them has been Chiang Kai-shek. Those whom we couldn't convince were convinced right away when Chiang Kai-shek came along to give them a lesson. How did Chiang Kai-shek teach his lessons? He taught with machine-guns, cannon and planes. Imperialism is another teacher that has given our 600 million people an education. For over a century we were oppressed by several imperialist powers, and this has been an education. Therefore, bad things can serve an educational purpose and open our eyes.

As for the fight against sectarianism, one thing in particular should be pointed out, that is, you should unite with those who have waged struggles against you. They came to blows with you, knocked you down, made you suffer and lose face and conferred the "official honour" of opportunist on you, although you were not that bad. If the blow was justified, then it served you right. If you were an opportunist, why shouldn't the blow have been aimed at you? What I am talking about here is the unjustified blows and struggles. Once those who dealt such blows change their attitude and admit that they did wrong in attacking you and that it was not right to proclaim you "king" of the realm of opportunism, then let the matter end there. If a few don't admit they were wrong, can't you wait? You can, I suppose. By unity we mean uniting with those who have differences with you, who look down on you or show little respect for you, who have had a bone to pick with you or waged struggles against you and at whose hands you have suffered. As for those who see eye to eye with you, you are already united with them, so the question of unity doesn't arise. The trouble here is with those who have yet to be united. We mean those who have opinions differing from yours or who have serious shortcomings. For instance, within our Party at present there are many who have joined the Party only organizationally and not ideologically. They may not have come to blows or crossed swords with you, but as they have not joined the Party ideologically, what they do is inevitably not so satisfactory or is marred by faults, and they may even do some bad things. With regard to such people, we must unite with them and educate and help them. I said before that in dealing with all those who have shortcomings or have made mistakes, we must not only observe whether they are going to mend their ways but should help them correct their mistakes. In other words, we must first observe, and second give help. Merely to observe means to stand by and see how they behave. If they do well, that's fine, and if they don't, let them suffer. This is a passive attitude, not a positive one. Marxists should adopt a positive attitude, that is, help as well as observe.

Third, about the election of the Central Committee. Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping mentioned just now that the Eighth Central Committee will have 150 to 170 members. This is slightly more than twice the size of the Seventh Central Committee with its seventy-seven members and is probably quite appropriate. It will probably be better not to expand the Central Committee further for several years, say, five years. Many capable people doing very useful work today were trained during the War of Resistance Against Japan, and they are known as cadres of the "'38 type". They are the mainstay of our work today, and we cannot do without them. But they are numerous, and if arrangements were to be made for them, the number of Central Committee members would have to rise to several hundred. So this time we will not make any such arrangements. We leave to the comrades here to consider whether the figure of 150 to 170 proposed by the Central Committee is appropriate, and if not, what size would be proper.

It should be affirmed that members of the present Central Committee have done good work and lived up to the trust placed in them by the Seventh Congress. In the past eleven years they have correctly led the Chinese democratic revolution and the socialist revolution and socialist construction without committing grave errors and have waged struggles against opportunism of all descriptions and against what is erroneous, thus overcoming all factors unfavourable to the revolution and construction. They have done well, including some of those comrades who made mistakes before. Here I am speaking of the Central Committee as a whole. As for certain comrades, this assessment does not hold true. Especially for Wang Ming. At the Seventh Congress, in order to get by, he submitted a written statement acknowledging that the line of the Central Committee was correct, accepting its political report to the Seventh Congress and indicating his willingness to abide by its decisions. But when I had a talk with him some time later, he made a right about face, forgetting what he had written. Then he thought it over and said the next day that he had written something in which he did own up to his mistakes. I told him that, even so, if he wanted to deny his mistakes now, he could withdraw that statement. But he didn't. Later at the Second Plenary Session we expressed the hope that he would speak on his mistakes, but instead he digressed, lavishing praises upon us. We told him he could cut that out and speak on the mistakes he, Wang Ming, had made, but he wouldn't hear of it. He promised to write a self-criticism after the session. But later he said that he had been taken ill and was unable to do mental work, and that as soon as he started writing his illness returned. Maybe he was cooking all this up, it's hard to say. He has been feeling unwell and will not be able to attend the congress. Shall we elect him? And Comrade Li Li-san too? More comrades are ready to forgive Li Li-san, whereas there are fewer ready to forgive Wang Ming. As Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping stated, if we elect them the significance will be similar to their election at the Seventh Congress. At that congress, many delegates were unwilling to elect them (not only Wang Ming, but quite a few other comrades as well). We said at the time that we would make a mistake if we adopted such a policy. Why would we have made a mistake if we had not elected those who had erred? Because it would have meant that we were following their example. Their procedure was to reject anyone once labelled by them as an opportunist, regardless of whether or not he had actually made mistakes. If we had followed this procedure, we would have been following their line, the Wang Ming line or the Li Li-san line. We would do nothing of the kind, under no circumstances would we follow the Wang Ming or the Li Li-san line. The inner-Party relations they cultivated were such that they rejected without exception all those who had made mistakes and those who had waged struggles against them or denounced them as opportunists. They styled themselves 100 per cent Bolsheviks, only to be shown later to be 100 per cent opportunists. On the other hand, it is those of us once labelled by them as "opportunists" who have some grasp of Marxism.

The heart of the matter here is that they are not just a few isolated individuals but represent a substantial part of the petty bourgeoisie. China is a country with a huge petty bourgeoisie. A considerable part of the petty bourgeoisie vacillates. It is plain to all that the well-to-do middle peasants, for instance, invariably vacillate and do not stand firm in any revolution, going wild when elated and burying their heads in dejection when pessimistic. Most of the time their eyes are glued on that precious bit of property they possess, which is no more than one or two draught animals, a cart and a dozen *mou* of land. Swayed by considerations of loss and gain, they are most anxious not to lose these possessions. They are different from the poor peasants. The poor peasants account for 50 per cent of the rural population in northern China and 70 per cent in the south. In terms of class composition, our Party consists chiefly of workers and poor peasants, namely, the proletariat and the semi-proletariat. The semi-proletariat is also petty bourgeois, but they are much more steadfast than the middle peasants. Our Party has also admitted a number of intellectuals into its ranks, and of our more than ten million members, intellectuals of the higher, middle and lower levels total approximately one million. It would not be proper to say that they represent imperialism or that they represent the landlord class, the bureaucrat-capitalist class or the national bourgeoisie; it would be more appropriate to classify them as petty bourgeois. Which part of the petty bourgeoisie do they chiefly represent? That part of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie with more means of production, the well-to-do middle peasants for instance. The intellectuals among our Party members "fear dragons ahead and tigers behind", they constantly waver and are afflicted with a fair amount of subjectivism and no small measure of sectarianism. What does our election of these two persons representing the Wang Ming and Li Li-san lines signify? It signifies that we treat those who have made ideological mistakes differently from those who are counter-revolutionaries and splittists (people like Chen Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-tao, Kao

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Kang and Jao Shu-shih). Wang Ming and Li Li-san went about their subjectivism and sectarianism in an open way and with a great fanfare, trying to overwhelm people with their political programmes. Wang Ming had his own political programme and so did Li Li-san. Of course, Chen Tu-hsiu had one of his own too, but he went the Trotskyite way, worked for a split and carried on activities against the Party from the outside. Chang Kuo-tao was engaged in conspiracy and splittism and eventually went over to the Kuomintang. Therefore the question of Wang Ming and Li Li-san is not just a question of two individuals, what is important here is that there are underlying social causes. One of their manifestations in our Party is that quite a number of members tend to vacillate at critical junctures. These vacillating elements are opportunistic. That is to say, such people do one thing if they can get something out of it and switch to another if that benefits them. They have no definite principles, no definite rules of conduct and no definite orientation, going this way today and that tomorrow. Wang Ming, for instance, is just like that. First he was "Left" in the extreme and later he became Right in the extreme.

At the Seventh Congress, we convinced many comrades and had Wang Ming and Li Li-san elected. In the eleven years since, have we suffered any loss in consequence? No, none at all. We did not fail in our revolution, nor was our victory delayed by a few months just because we had elected Wang Ming and Li Li-san.

Does their election mean encouragement for people who have made mistakes? "Now that people who have made mistakes are on the Central Committee, let us all make mistakes, then we too will have a chance of being elected!" Will this happen? No, it won't. Look, not one of our seventy or so Central Committee members has gone out of his way to make a few mistakes in order to get re-elected. As for those who are not Central Committee members, whether they joined the revolution before, during or after the year 1938, will they follow the example of Wang Ming and Li Li-san and come up with another two lines — to make a total of four — just to get themselves elected to the Central Committee? No, they won't, nobody will do that. On the contrary, drawing lessons from their mistakes, our comrades will become more prudent.

There is another point. In the past one heard such talk as "better join the revolution late than early, or better still, don't join the revolution at all". Now, will the election of Wang Ming and Li Li-san create the impression in the Party that it is better to be wrong than right, better to make big mistakes than small ones? If Wang Ming and Li Li-san who have made mistakes on the Party line are now to be elected to the Central Committee, comrades who have proved themselves correct or have made only small mistakes will have to yield two seats to them. Isn't this arrangement the most unfair thing in the world? Judged in that light, it is indeed unfair. You see, those who have proved themselves correct or have made only small mistakes have to make room for those who have made big ones. It is obviously unfair, there is no fairness whatsoever in it. If a comparison is made this way, it must be conceded that it is better to be wrong than right, better to make big mistakes than small ones. But judged from another angle, the case is different. Their mistakes on the Party line are known all over the country and throughout the world, and the fact that they are well known is precisely the reason for electing them. What can you do about it? They are well known, but you who have made no mistakes or have made only small ones don't have as big a reputation as theirs. In a country like ours with its very large petty bourgeoisie they are standards. If we elect them, many people will say, "The Communist Party continues to be patient with them and is willing to give up two seats to them in the hope that they will mend their ways." Whether they will or not is another matter, which is inconsequential, involving as it does only the two of them. The point is that in our society the petty bourgeoisie is vast in number, that in our Party there are many vacillating elements of petty-bourgeois origin and that among the intellectuals there are many such vacillating elements; they all want to see what will happen to these test cases. When they see these two standards still there, they will feel comfortable, they will sleep well and be pleased. If you haul down the two standards, they may panic. Therefore, it is not a question of whether Wang Ming and Li Li-san will mend their ways, that does not matter very much. What matters is that the millions of Party members of petty-bourgeois origin who are prone to vacillate, and the intellectuals in particular, are watching the kind of attitude we take towards Wang Ming and Li Li-san. This is like our treatment of the rich peasants in the agrarian reform; when we left the rich peasants untouched, the middle peasants were at ease. If we adopt the same attitude towards these two men at the Eighth Congress as we did at the Seventh, our Party will have something to gain, to derive benefit from, that is, the task of remoulding the masses of the petty bourgeoisie throughout the country will be easier. This will also have an influence in the world. Few countries, or one can say none, adopt the attitude we do towards persons who have made mistakes.

The preparatory meeting for the congress will last only about a fortnight, counting from today, but if arrangements are made properly, it is entirely possible to do a good job of the preparations. We are certain that the congress will be a success and that with their political level the delegates will assure its success. But all of us must be conscientious and do our very best.

SOME EXPERIENCES IN OUR PARTY'S HISTORY

September 25, 1956

U.S. imperialism is your adversary as well as ours and the adversary of the people of the world. It is harder for U.S. imperialism to interfere in our affairs than in yours. For one thing, the United States is far away from us. But U.S. imperialism has reached out very far, to our Taiwan, to Japan, south Korea, south Viet Nam, the Philippines, and so on. The United States has stationed its troops in Britain, France, Italy, Iceland and West Germany and has set up military bases in North Africa and in the Middle and Near East. It has reached out to every corner of the earth. It is a global imperialism. It is a teacher by negative example to the people of all countries. The people of the world should unite and help each other to chop off the tentacles of U.S. imperialism wherever they reach. Each time we chop off one of its tentacles, we will be a little more comfortable.

In the past China was also a country oppressed by imperialism and feudalism, so our conditions and yours are quite similar. A large rural population and the existence of feudal forces are liabilities for a country, but they are assets for a revolution led by the proletariat because they provide us with a broad ally in the peasants. In Russia before the October Revolution, feudalism was strong, and it was with the support of the peasant masses that the Bolshevik Party won victory in the revolution. This was even more so in China. Ours is an agricultural country, with over 500 million people living in the countryside. In the past we relied mainly on the peasants in fighting. Now also it is because the peasants are organized and agriculture has become co-operative that our urban bourgeoisie has quickly submitted to socialist transformation. Hence the vital importance of the Party's work among the peasants.

Part of a talk with representatives of some Latin-American Communist Parties.

I think that in countries where feudalism is strong the political party of the proletariat should go to the countryside and seek out the peasants. When intellectuals go to the countryside to seek out the peasants, they cannot win their trust unless they have the right attitude. City intellectuals know little about rural affairs and peasant psychology, and they never can solve the peasants' problems in quite the right way. According to our experience, it is only after a long period of time and after we have really become one with the peasants and convinced them we are fighting in their interest that we can win victory. Don't imagine that the peasants will trust us right away. Don't expect them to trust us the moment we have given them some help.

The peasants are the chief ally of the proletariat. In the beginning our Party too did not realize the importance of work among the peasants and put urban work first and rural work second. It seems to me that the Parties in some Asian countries, such as India and Indonesia, have not done so well in rural work.

At first, our Party wasn't successful in its work among the peasants. The intellectuals had a certain air about them, an intellectual air. Therefore, they were unwilling to go to the countryside, which they looked down on. The peasants, for their part, looked askance at the intellectuals. Besides, our Party had not yet found the way to understand the countryside. Later when we went there again, we found the way, analysed the various classes in the rural areas and came to understand the peasants' revolutionary demands.

During the first period, we didn't have clear ideas about the countryside. Under the Right opportunist line of Chen Tu-hsiu, the peasants, our chief ally, were abandoned. Many of our comrades looked on the countryside as a plane rather than a solid, that is to say, they did not know how to look at the countryside from the class viewpoint. It was only after they had some grasp of Marxism that they began to adopt the class viewpoint in looking at the countryside. The countryside turned out to be not a plane, but stratified into the rich, the poor and the very poor, into farm labourers, poor peasants, middle peasants, rich peasants and landlords. During this period I made a study of the countryside and opened peasant movement institutes which ran for several terms. Though I knew some Marxism, my understanding of the countryside was not deep.

During the second period, we had to thank our good teacher, Chiang Kai-shek. He drove us to the countryside. This was a long period, a period of ten years of civil war, in which we fought against him, and thus we were obliged to make a study of the countryside. In the first few years, our understanding of the countryside was still not so deep, but later it became better and deeper. During this period the three "Left" opportunist lines which were represented successively by Chu Chiu-pai, Li Li-san and Wang Ming caused great losses to our Party, and Wang Ming's "Left" opportunist line in particular brought about the collapse of most of our Party's rural base areas.

Then came the third period, the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan. When the Japanese imperialists invaded China, we stopped fighting the Kuomintang and fought Japanese imperialism instead. At that time our comrades could go openly to cities in Kuomintang areas. Wang Ming, who had previously made the mistake of pushing a "Left" opportunist line, now made the mistake of pushing a Right opportunist line. He had first carried out the ultra-Left policy of the Communist International, and this time he carried out an ultra-Right policy. He too was one of our good teachers by negative example and he educated our Party. We had another good teacher by negative example in Li Li-san. Their chief mistake at the time was dogmatism, transplanting foreign experience mechanically. Our Party liquidated their erroneous lines and really found the way to integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete conditions of China. As a result, in the fourth period when Chiang Kai-shek launched an offensive against us, it was possible for us to overthrow him and found the People's Republic of China.

The experience of the Chinese revolution, that is, building rural base areas, encircling the cities from the countryside and finally seizing the cities, may not be wholly applicable to many of your countries, though it can serve for your reference. I beg to advise you not to transplant Chinese experience mechanically. The experience of any foreign country can serve only for reference and must not be regarded as dogma. The universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the concrete conditions of your own countries — the two must be integrated.

If you are to win over the peasants and rely on them, you must conduct investigations in the rural areas. The method is to investigate one or more villages and spend a few weeks there to get a clear idea of the class forces, the economic situation, living conditions and so on, in the countryside. The principal leaders, such as the general secretary of the Party, should themselves undertake this work and get to know one or two villages; they should try to find the time, for it is well worth the effort. Though there are plenty of sparrows, it is not necessary to dissect every one of them; to dissect one or two is enough. When the general secretary of the Party has investigated one or two villages and knows what's what, he will be able to help his comrades to become acquainted with the villages and get a clear idea of the concrete conditions there. It seems to me that the general secretaries of the Parties in many countries don't attach importance to dissecting one or two "sparrows"; true, they know something about the countryside, but their knowledge doesn't go very deep, and therefore the directives they issue do not quite fit the rural conditions. Likewise, the comrades in charge of the leading bodies of the Party at the central, provincial and county levels should themselves investigate one or two villages, or dissect one or two "sparrows". This is called "anatomy".

There are two ways of making investigations, one is to look at flowers on horseback and the other is to get off your horse and look at them. If you look at flowers on horseback, you'll only get a superficial impression, as there are so many. In coming from Latin America to Asia you have been looking at flowers on horseback. There are so many flowers in your own countries that it's just not enough to give them a glance or two and then leave, and so the second way has to be adopted, that is, to get off your horse and look at the flowers, observe them closely and analyse one "flower", or dissect one "sparrow".

In countries under imperialist oppression there are two kinds of bourgeoisie — the national bourgeoisie and the comprador-bourgeoisie. Do these two kinds of bourgeoisie exist in your countries? Probably yes.

The comprador-bourgeoisie is always a running dog of imperialism and a target of the revolution. Different groups of the comprador-bourgeoisie belong to the monopoly capitalist groups of different imperialist countries such as the United States, Britain and France. In the struggle against the various comprador groups it is necessary to exploit the contradictions between imperialist countries, first coping with one of them and striking at the chief immediate enemy. For instance, in the past the Chinese comprador-bourgeoisie consisted of pro-British, pro-U.S. and pro-Japanese groups. During the War of Resistance Against Japan we exploited the contradiction between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Japan on the other, first striking down the Japanese aggressors and the comprador group depending on them. Then we turned round to deal blows at the U.S. and British aggressor forces and bring down the pro-U.S. and pro-British comprador groups. The landlord class also consists of different factions. The most reactionary landlords are few in number, and those who are patriotic and favour fighting imperialism should not be lumped together with them when we strike. Moreover, a distinction must be made between the big and small landlords. Don't strike at too many enemies at a time, strike at a few, and even with the big landlords deal your blows only at the most reactionary handful. To strike at everyone may seem very revolutionary, but actually it causes great harm.

The national bourgeoisie is an opponent of ours. There is a popular saying in China, "Opponents always meet." One experience of the Chinese revolution is that caution is needed in dealing with the national bourgeoisie. While it is opposed to the working class, it is also opposed to imperialism. In view of the fact that our main task is to fight imperialism and feudalism and that the liberation of the people would be out of the question unless these two enemies are overthrown, we must by all means win the national bourgeoisie over to the fight against imperialism. The national bourgeoisie is not interested in fighting feudalism because it has close ties with the landlord class. What is more, it oppresses and exploits the workers. We must therefore struggle against it. But in order to win it over to join us in the fight against imperialism, we must know when to stop in the struggle, that is, the struggle must be waged on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint. In other words, we must have just grounds for waging the struggle, be sure of victory, and use restraint when a proper measure of victory is gained. Hence the necessity of making investigations into the conditions of both sides, those of the workers and those of the capitalists. If we know only the workers and not the capitalists, we won't be able to hold talks with the latter. In this respect, it is also necessary to investigate typical cases, or to dissect one or two "sparrows"; both methods, looking at flowers on horseback and getting off your horse to look at them, should likewise be used.

Throughout the historical period of the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, we must win over and unite with the national bourgeoisie so that it will side with the people against imperialism. Even after the task of opposing imperialism and feudalism is in the main accomplished, we must still keep our alliance with the national bourgeoisie for a certain period. This will be advantageous in dealing with imperialist aggression, in expanding production and stabilizing the market and also in winning over and remoulding bourgeois intellectuals.

You have not yet won state power but are preparing to seize it. Towards the national bourgeoisie a policy of "both unity and struggle" should be adopted. Unite with them in the common fight against imperialism and support all their anti-imperialist words and deeds, while waging an appropriate struggle against their reactionary, anti-working class and anti-Communist words and deeds. It is wrong to be one-sided; struggle without unity is a "Left" deviationist mistake and unity without struggle is a Right deviationist mistake. Both mistakes occurred in our Party and we learned bitter lessons from them. Later, we summed up the two kinds of experience and have since adopted a policy of "both unity and struggle", that is, to struggle whenever necessary and unite whenever possible. The aim of struggle is to unite with the national bourgeoisie and win victory in the struggle against imperialism.

In countries under the oppression of imperialism and feudalism the political party of the proletariat should raise the national banner and must have a programme of national unity by which to unite with all the forces that can be united, excluding the running dogs of imperialism. Let the whole nation see how patriotic the Communist Party is, how peace-loving and how desirous of national unity. This will help isolate imperialism and its running dogs, and the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie too.

Communists should not be afraid of making mistakes. Mistakes have a dual character. On the one hand mistakes harm the Party and the people; on the other they serve as good teachers, giving both the Party and the people a good education, and this benefits the revolution. Failure is the mother of success. If there is nothing good about failure, how can it be the mother of success? When too many mistakes are made, there is bound to be a turn-about. That is Marxism. "Things turn into their opposites when they reach the extreme"; when mistakes pile up, light is not far off.

IN COMMEMORATION OF DR. SUN YAT-SEN

November 12, 1956

Let us pay tribute to our great revolutionary forerunner, Dr. Sun Yat-sen!

We pay tribute to him for the intense struggle he waged in the preparatory period of our democratic revolution against the Chinese reformists, taking the clear-cut stand of a Chinese revolutionary democrat. In this struggle he was the standard-bearer of China's revolutionary democrats.

We pay tribute to him for the signal contribution he made in the period of the Revolution of 1911 when he led the people in overthrowing the monarchy and founding the republic.

We pay tribute to him for his signal contribution in developing the new Three People's Principles from the old Three People's Principles in the first period of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

He bequeathed to us much that is useful in the sphere of political thought.

Save for a handful of reactionaries, the people of contemporary China are all successors in the revolutionary cause to which Dr. Sun Yat-sen dedicated himself.

We have completed the democratic revolution left unfinished by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and developed it into a socialist revolution. We are now in the midst of this revolution.

Things are always progressing. It is only forty-five years since the Revolution of 1911, but the face of China has entirely changed. In another forty-five years, that is, by the year 2001, at the beginning of the 21st century, China will have undergone an even greater change. It will have become a powerful industrial socialist country. And that is as it should be. China is a land with an area of 9,600,000 square

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Article in commemoration of the ninetieth birthday of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

kilometres and a population of 600 million, and it ought to make a greater contribution to humanity. But for a long time in the past its contribution was far too small. For this we are regretful.

However, we should be modest — not only now, but forty-five years hence and indeed always. In international relations, the Chinese people should rid themselves of great-nation chauvinism resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely.

Dr. Sun was a modest man. I heard him speak on many occasions and was impressed by the force of his character. From the way he applied himself to the study both of China's past and present and of foreign countries, including the Soviet Union, I knew he was a man with a receptive mind.

He worked heart and soul for the transformation of China, devoting his whole life to the cause; of him it can be justly said that he gave his best, gave his all, till his heart ceased to beat.

Like many great figures in history who stood in the forefront guiding the march of events, Dr. Sun, too, had his shortcomings. These shortcomings should be explained in the light of the historical conditions so that people can understand; we should not be too critical of our predecessors.

SPEECH AT THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

November 15, 1956

I am going to speak on four questions: the economy, the international situation, Sino-Soviet relations and the question of great and small democracy.

I

We must make a comprehensive analysis of a problem before it can be properly solved. Whether to advance or to retreat, whether to get on or get off the horse, must accord with dialectics. In this world there are always cases of getting on or off the horse, of advancing or retreating. How is it possible to ride all day without getting off? When we walk, our two feet do not move forward together, but always one after the other. When we take a step, one foot moves forward, the other stays behind, and when we take the next, the latter moves forward, leaving the former behind. We see in a movie that the figures are continually in motion on the screen, but when we look at the film-strip, we see they are all motionless in each frame. The essay "Under Heaven" in *Chuang Tzu* says, "The shadow of a flying bird is not in motion." All things are at once in motion and not in motion — such is the dialectics of our world. Pure motionlessness does not exist, neither does pure motion. Motion is absolute while rest is temporary and conditional.

Our planned economy is at once in equilibrium and in disequilibrium. Equilibrium is temporary and conditional. After equilibrium is temporarily established, changes will take place. Equilibrium in the first half of the year will become disequilibrium in the second half; equilibrium in the current year will change into disequilibrium in the next. It is impossible to have equilibrium all the time without having it upset. We Marxists hold that disequilibrium, contradiction, struggle and development are absolute, while equilibrium and rest are relative. Relative means temporary, conditional. Viewed in this light, is our economy advancing or retreating? We should tell the cadres and the masses that it is both advancing and retreating, but mainly advancing, though not in a straight line but in a wave-like manner. Although there are times when we get off the horse, as a rule we get on more often. Are our Party committees at all levels, the various central departments and the governments at all levels promoting progress or promoting retrogression? Fundamentally speaking, they are promoting progress. Society is always advancing, for to advance, to develop, is the general trend.

Is the First Five-Year Plan correct? I support the opinion that it is essentially correct, as is clearly shown by the first four years of its implementation. True, there have been mistakes, but this is hardly avoidable because we lack experience. Shall we still make mistakes in the future when we have gained experience after several five-year plans? Yes, we shall. One can never acquire enough experience. Will it be possible to make no mistakes at all in planning ten thousand years hence? Things happening ten thousand years hence will no longer be our business, but one thing is certain, mistakes will be made even then. Young people will make mistakes, but won't older people? Confucius said that at the age of seventy whatever he did was in conformity with objective law,[1] but I don't believe it, he was just bragging. Some of the construction projects above the norm in our First Five-Year Plan have been designed for us by the Soviet Union, but most of them have been of our own designing. Do you think the Chinese are incompetent? Why, we are competent too. However, it must be admitted that we are still not so competent, for we cannot as yet design some of the projects ourselves. There has been a problem in our construction in the last few years. As some comrades put it, attention has been paid only to the "bones" but very little to the "flesh". Factory buildings have been put up and machinery and other equipment installed without the municipal construction and service facilities to go with them, and this will become a big problem in the future. In my view, its effects will be felt not during the First Five-Year Plan, but during the Second, or perhaps the Third. As to whether the First Five-Year Plan is correct, we can draw a partial conclusion now and another one next year, but I think a comprehensive conclusion will have to wait till the last phase of the Second Five-Year Plan. It is impossible to avoid some degree of subjectivism in planning. To make a few mistakes is not so bad. Achievements have a dual character and so have mistakes. Achievements encourage people but at the same time are liable to turn their heads; mistakes depress people and cause anxiety, hence they are an enemy, but at the same time a good teacher. On the whole, nothing seriously or fundamentally wrong has been found in the First Five-Year Plan so far.

We must protect the enthusiasm of the cadres and the masses and not pour cold water on them. Once some people did pour cold water on the socialist transformation of agriculture, and there was then, as it were, a "committee for promoting retrogression". We pointed out later that it was not right to pour cold water, so we countered with a committee for promoting progress. According to the original plan, the socialist transformation of ownership was to be basically completed in eighteen years, but with this promotion it has been greatly speeded up. The Draft Programme for Agricultural Development stipulates that higher-stage agricultural co-operation should be completed in 1958, and now it seems that we can achieve the aim this winter or next spring. There may be quite a few flaws in the process, but this is better than that committee for promoting retrogression; the peasants are pleased and there has been an increase in agricultural production. But for this co-operative transformation, the grain output could not have increased this year by over 20,000 million catties in the face of such severe natural calamities. In the stricken areas, the existence of co-operatives also helps relief work through production. The shortcomings of the cadres and the masses as well as our own are to be criticized on the premise that their enthusiasm is protected, and in this way they will have plenty of push. When the masses want something done which is impossible for the time being, matters should be clearly explained to them, and this can certainly be done.

There should be three rounds of discussion before the annual state budget is decided. That is to say, comrades on our Central Committee and other comrades concerned should hold three meetings to discuss it and make the decision. This will enable all of us to get to understand the contents of the budget. Otherwise it will always be the comrades in charge who know them better while we on our part will just raise our hands. Yet don't we know anything about the contents? Well, I would say yes and no, we don't know very much about them. With this method of decision after three rounds of discussion, can you say you will know them very well? Not likely, and there will still be a gap between us and the comrades in charge. They are like opera singers on the stage, they know how to sing; we are like the audience, we don't know how to sing. But if we go to the opera often enough, we shall be able to tell good singers from poor ones more or less correctly. After all, it is up to the audience to pass judgment on the singer's performance. And it is with its help that the singer corrects his mistakes. This is where the audience is superior. An opera can continue to run if people like to see it over and over again. Operas which people don't like very much have to be changed. Therefore, inside our Central Committee there is the contradiction between experts and non-experts. Experts have their strong points, and so do non-experts. Non-experts can tell what is right from what is wrong.

In the report on the state budget for 1956 the expression "safely reliable" was used, and I suggest that from now on it should be changed into "fully reliable". At the meeting held last January on the question of the intellectuals, I used the expression "fully reliable". "Safe" and "reliable" are tautological. To use "safely" to modify "reliable" neither adds nor qualifies anything. A modifier both describes and qualifies. To say something is "fully reliable" is to qualify reliability as to degree, meaning that it is not just reliable in a general sense but reliable to the full. It is not easy to make things fully reliable. When the budget was adopted at the National People's Congress last June, everybody said it was reliable. Now it seems that a portion of the budget, less than 10 per cent, is unreliable, because some of the items are not given due priority and others are allocated too much money. So in the future we must pay attention to the priorities of the items in the budget. Whether the priorities are correct or not requires the experts' attention, but it also requires our attention, and particularly that of the comrades at the provincial level. Of course, everybody should give it his attention.

Both we and the secretaries of the provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party committees should attend to finance and planning. In the past some comrades failed to do so seriously. I would like to call your attention, comrades, to the questions of grain, pork, eggs, vegetables and so on, since they present quite a big problem. Beginning from last winter, efforts were concentrated on grain to the neglect of side-lines and industrial crops. This deviation has now been corrected, and efforts have been shifted to them; particularly since there are fixed price ratios between grain and twenty or thirty other items such as cotton, edible oil, pigs and tobacco, the peasants have become very much interested in side-lines and industrial crops at the expense of grain. Lop-sided stress first on grain, and then on side-lines and industrial crops. Low prices for grain hurt the peasants; now that you have set such low prices for grain, the peasants will simply stop growing it. This problem merits close attention.

We must build the country through diligence and thrift, combat extravagance and waste, and encourage hard work and plain living and sharing weal and woe with the masses. Some comrades have suggested that factory directors and heads of schools and colleges might live in sheds, and this, I think, is a good idea, especially in hard times. There were no houses whatsoever when we crossed the marshlands on the Long March, we just slept where we could, and Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh did so too when he walked for forty days across the marshlands. We all came through. Our troops had no food and ate the bark and leaves of trees. To share happiness and suffering with the people — we did this in the past, why can't we do it now? As long as we keep on doing so, we shall not alienate ourselves from the masses.

We must attend to the newspapers. Where newspapers are published, the Central Committee and the Party committees at all levels should take the running of newspapers as a matter of major importance. Since the beginning of this year there has been one-sided and unrealistic propaganda in the press for improving the people's livelihood, but very little publicity has been given to building the country through diligence and thrift, combating extravagance and waste and encouraging hard work, plain living and sharing weal and woe with the masses, which should from now on be the focus of our propaganda in the press. Probably what is broadcast by the radio stations also comes from the newspapers. Therefore it is necessary to call meetings of reporters, newspaper staffs and radio personnel to exchange views with them and inform them of the guiding principles in our propaganda.

Here I would like to touch on another question, the question of suppressing counter-revolutionaries. Should the local tyrants and evil gentry, despots and counter-revolutionaries who have committed heinous crimes be put to death? Yes, they should. Some democratic personages say it is bad to execute them and we say it is fine —

we are singing different tunes, that's all. On this theme, we can never sing in tune with the democratic personages. Those we executed were "little Chiang Kai-sheks". As for the "big Chiang Kai-sheks" such as Emperor Pu Yi, Wang Yao-wu and Tu Yu-ming, we will execute none of them. But if the "little Chiang Kai-sheks" were not done away with, there would be an "earthquake" under our feet every day, the productive forces would not be set free nor the working people liberated. The productive forces consist of two factors, labourers and tools. If we did not suppress counter-revolutionaries, the working people would be unhappy. So would the oxen and the hoes, and even the land would feel uncomfortable, all because the peasants who put the oxen and hoes and the land to use would be unhappy. Therefore, some counter-revolutionaries must be executed, others arrested and still others put under public supervision.

II

On the whole, the international situation is fine. There are a few imperialist powers, but what of it? Nothing terrifying even if there were a few dozen more.

Now troubles have occurred in two areas, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Disturbances have taken place in Poland and Hungary,[2] and Britain and France have launched an armed aggression against Egypt. I think these bad things are good things too. In the eyes of a Marxist, a bad thing has a dual character; on the one hand it is bad and on the other it is good. When people see the word "bad" before the word "thing", many think that it's nothing but bad. But we say there is another aspect to it, that is, a bad thing is at the same time a good thing, and this is what is meant by "failure is the mother of success". Every failure, every reverse, or every mistake, may lead to good results under given conditions. Since there is fire in Poland and Hungary, it will blaze up sooner or later. Which is better, to let the fire blaze, or not to let it? Fire cannot be wrapped up in paper. Now that fires have blazed up, that's just fine. In this way numerous counter-revolutionaries in Hungary have exposed themselves. The Hungarian incident has educated the Hungarian people and at the same time some comrades in the Soviet Union as well as us Chinese comrades. It was such a shock when Beria was uncovered. How could a socialist country produce a Beria? It was another big shock when Kao Kang was exposed. It is precisely through such phenomena that we learn. They are in the nature of things and will always happen.

Will there still be revolutions in the future when all the imperialists in the world are overthrown and classes eliminated? What do you say? In my view, there will still be the need for revolution. The social system will still need to be changed and the term "revolution" will still be in use. Of course, revolutions then will not be of the same nature as those in the era of class struggle. But there will still be contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces, between the superstructure and the economic base. When the relations of production become unsuitable, they will have to be overthrown. If the superstructure (ideology and public opinion included) protects the kind of relations of production the people dislike, they will transform it. The superstructure itself constitutes social relations of another kind. It rests on the economic base. By the economic base we mean the relations of production, chiefly ownership. The productive forces are the most revolutionary factor. When the productive forces have developed, there is bound to be a revolution. The productive forces consist of two factors: one is man and the other tools. Tools are made by men. When tools call for a revolution, they will speak through men, through the labourers, who will destroy the old relations of production and the old social relations. "A gentleman uses his tongue, not his fists," and the best way is to reason things out. But if reasoning goes unheeded, arms will have to speak. What if there aren't any arms? The labourers have tools in their hands and those without can use rocks, and if there aren't any rocks even, there are always one's two fists.

Our state organs are organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Take the courts for instance, their function is to deal with counter-revolutionaries, but that is not all, for they have to settle numerous disputes among the people. It looks as if courts will still be needed ten thousand years from now. For when classes are eliminated, there will still be contradictions between the advanced and the backward, there will still be struggles and scuffles among people, and there will still be all sorts of disturbances. What a mess there would be without a court! However, the struggles will then be of a different nature, different from class struggle. The court will be different in nature too. The superstructure may then still go wrong. For instance, people like us may make mistakes, lose out in struggle and be ousted from office, so that a Gomulka may come to power or a Jao Shu-shih be propped up. Would you say such things will not happen? I think they will, even a thousand or ten thousand years from now.

III

Everything in the world is a unity of opposites. By the unity of opposites we mean the unity of opposite things differing in nature. For instance, water is a combination of two elements, hydrogen and oxygen. If there were only hydrogen and no oxygen, or vice versa, water could not be formed. Over a million compounds are said to have already been named and no one knows how many have not yet been. All compounds are unities of opposites differing in nature. Likewise with things in society. The relationship between the central and the local authorities is a unity of opposites, and so is that between one department and another.

The relationship between two countries is also a unity of opposites. China and the Soviet Union are both socialist countries. Are there any differences between them? Yes, there are. The two countries are different in nationality. Thirty-nine years have gone by since the October Revolution took place, whereas it is only seven years since we won state power throughout the country. As for the things each has done, they are different in many ways. For instance, unlike theirs our agricultural collectivization has gone through several stages, our policy towards the capitalists is different from theirs, so are our market price policy and the way we handle the relationship between agriculture and light industry on the one hand and heavy industry on the other, and so are our army system and Party system. We have told them: We don't agree with some of the things you have done, nor do we approve of some of the ways you handle matters.

Some comrades simply don't pay attention to dialectics and are not analytical. They say all things Soviet are good and they transplant them mechanically. In fact, all things, whether Chinese or foreign, admit of analysis, some being good and some bad. This is true of the work in each province, there are both achievements and shortcomings. And it is also true of every one of us, for we all have not just one but two aspects, strong points and weak points. The doctrine that everything has only one aspect has existed ever since ancient times, and so has the doctrine that everything has two aspects. They are known as metaphysics and dialectics respectively. An ancient Chinese said: "The *yin* and the *yang* make up the *Tao*."[3] It is impossible to have only the *yin* without the *yang*, or vice versa. This was a doctrine in ancient times affirming two aspects. Metaphysics is a doctrine affirming only one aspect. And it still persists among a considerable number of comrades. They take a one-sided view of things and think everything Soviet is good and transplant it indiscriminately, bringing in quite a few things which should not have been transplanted. Where things are wrongly transplanted and unsuited to this land of ours, there must be changes.

Here I'll speak on the question of "having illicit relations with foreign countries". Are there such people in our country who provide foreigners with information behind the back of the Central Committee? I think there are. Kao Kang is a case in point. Many facts have proved this.

On December 24, 1953, at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to unmask Kao Kang, I declared that there were two headquarters in the city of Peking, one comprised all of us present and it stirred up an open wind and lit an open fire, whereas the other was an underground headquarters, and it also stirred up a kind of wind and lit a kind of fire, a sinister wind and a sinister fire. Lin Tai-yu, a character in a classical Chinese novel, said: "Either the east wind prevails over the west wind, or the west wind prevails over the east wind." As for the present day, either the open wind and open fire prevail over the sinister wind and sinister fire, or the sinister wind and sinister fire prevail over the open wind and open fire. The purpose of the other headquarters in stirring up the sinister wind and lighting the sinister fire was to overpower the open wind and put out the open fire, that is, to overthrow a large number of people.

Among our cadres of higher and middle rank there are a few (not many) who maintain illicit relations with foreign countries. This is not good. I hope you comrades will make it clear to everybody in the leading Party groups and Party committees of the central departments as well as in the Party committees at the provincial, municipal and autonomous region level that this kind of business must stop. We don't approve of some of the things done in the Soviet Union, and the Central Committee has already said this to the Soviet leaders several times; some questions on which we have not touched will be taken up later. If they are to be taken up, it should be done by the Central Committee. As for information, don't try to pass it on. Such information is of no use at all, it can only cause harm. It undermines the relations between the two Parties and the two countries. Moreover, those engaged in such activities put themselves in an awkward position. Since they do this behind the Party's back, they always have a guilty conscience. Those who have passed on information should make a clean breast of it and be done with it, or else there will be an investigation and they will be duly punished if found out.

I would like to say a few words about the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I think there are two "swords": one is Lenin and the other Stalin. The sword of Stalin has now been discarded by the Russians. Gomulka and some people in Hungary have picked it up to stab at the Soviet Union and oppose so-called Stalinism. The Communist Parties of many European countries are also criticizing the Soviet Union, and their leader is Togliatti. The imperialists also use this sword to slay people with. Dulles, for instance, has brandished it for some time. This sword has not been lent out, it has been thrown out. We Chinese have not thrown it away. First, we protect Stalin, and, second, we at the same time criticize his mistakes, and we have written the article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". Unlike some people who have tried to defame and destroy Stalin, we are acting in accordance with objective reality.

As for the sword of Lenin, hasn't it too been discarded to a certain extent by some Soviet leaders? In my view, it has been discarded to a considerable extent. Is the October Revolution still valid? Can it still serve as the example for all countries? Khrushchov's report at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union says it is possible to seize state power by the parliamentary road, that is to say, it is no longer necessary for all countries to learn from the October Revolution. Once this gate is opened, by and large Leninism is thrown away.

The doctrine of Leninism has developed Marxism. In what respects has it done so? First, in world outlook, that is, in materialism and dialectics; and second, in revolutionary theory and tactics, particularly on the questions of class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the political party of the proletariat. And then there are Lenin's teachings on socialist construction. Beginning from the October Revolution of 1917, construction went on in the midst of revolution, and thus Lenin had seven years of practical experience in construction, something denied to Marx. It is precisely these fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism that we have been learning.

In both our democratic revolution and our socialist revolution, we have mobilized the masses to wage class struggle in the course of which we have educated the people. It is from the October Revolution that we have learned to wage class struggle. During the October Revolution, the masses in the cities and villages were fully mobilized to wage class struggle. Those who are now sent by the Soviet Union as experts to various countries were but children or teenagers at the time of the October Revolution, and many of them have forgotten about this practice. Comrades in some countries say that China's mass line is not right, and they are only too happy to pick up the paternalistic approach. There is no stopping them if they want to do so; in any case, we adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, with non-interference in each other's internal affairs and mutual non-aggression. We have no intention of exercising leadership over any country save our own, that is, the People's Republic of China.

The fundamental problem with some East European countries is that they have not done a good job of waging class struggle and have left so many counter-revolutionaries at large; nor have they trained their proletariat in class struggle to help them learn how to draw a clear distinction between the people and the enemy, between right and wrong and between materialism and idealism. And now they have to reap what they have sown, they have brought the fire upon their own heads.

How much capital do you have? Just Lenin and Stalin. Now you have abandoned Stalin and practically all of Lenin as well, with Lenin's feet gone, or perhaps with only his head left, or with one of his hands cut off. We, on our part, stick to studying Marxism-Leninism and learning from the October Revolution. Marx has left us a great many writings, and so has Lenin. To rely on the masses, to follow the mass line — this is what we have learned from them. Not to rely on the masses in waging class struggle and not to make a clear distinction between the people and the enemy — that would be very dangerous.

IV

A few cadres with an intellectual background at the level of department or bureau head advocate great democracy, saying that small democracy is not satisfying enough. Their “great democracy” means the adoption of the bourgeois parliamentary system of the West and the imitation of such Western stuff as “parliamentary democracy”, “freedom of the press” and “freedom of speech”. Their advocacy is wrong, for they lack the Marxist viewpoint, the class viewpoint. However, the terms great democracy and small democracy are quite graphic, so we have borrowed them.

Democracy is a method, and it all depends on to whom it is applied and for what purpose. We are in favour of great democracy. And what we favour is great democracy under the leadership of the proletariat. We mobilized the masses to fight Chiang Kai-shek and licked him after a struggle lasting more than twenty years. In the agrarian reform movement, the peasant masses rose against the landlord class and got land after three years of struggle. These were instances of great democracy. The movement against the “three evils” was a struggle against those of our personnel who had been corrupted by the bourgeoisie. The movement against the “five evils” was a struggle against the bourgeoisie. In both movements relentless blows were dealt. These were all vigorous mass movements and instances of great democracy. A few days ago, masses of people held a demonstration in front of the Office of the British Chargé d’Affaires in China, and several hundred thousand people held a rally at Tien An Men Square in Peking in support of Egypt’s resistance to Anglo-French aggression. This was also an instance of great democracy, aimed at imperialism. Why shouldn’t we cherish this great democracy? We do in fact cherish it. Who is this great democracy directed against? Against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, and against capitalism. The socialist transformation of private industry and commerce was directed against capitalism. The socialist transformation of agriculture, which was designed to abolish the private ownership of small producers, was by its nature also directed against capitalism. It was by means of the mass movement that we carried out the socialist transformation of agriculture, mobilizing the peasants, principally the poor and lower-middle peasants first, to organize themselves, so that the upper-middle peasants could not but agree. As for the fact that the capitalists beat drums and struck gongs to welcome the socialist transformation, it was because they had no alternative with the advent of the socialist upsurge in the countryside and with the pressure from the masses of workers under them.

If great democracy is now to be practised again, I am for it. You are afraid of the masses taking to the streets, I am not, not even if hundreds of thousands should do so. "He who is not afraid of death by a thousand cuts dares to unhorse the emperor." This was a saying of a character in a classical Chinese novel, Wang Hsi-feng, otherwise called Sister Feng. She it was who said this. The great democracy set in motion by the proletariat is directed against class enemies. Enemies of the nation (who are none other than the imperialists and the foreign monopoly capitalists) are class enemies also. Great democracy can be directed against bureaucrats too. I just said that there would still be revolutions ten thousand years from now, so possibly great democracy will have to be practised then. If some people grow tired of life and so become bureaucratic, if, when meeting the masses, they have not a single kind word for them but only take them to task, and if they don't bother to solve any of the problems the masses may have, they are destined to be overthrown. Now this danger does exist. If you alienate yourself from the masses and fail to solve their problems, the peasants will wield their carrying-poles, the workers will demonstrate in the streets and the students will create disturbances. Whenever such things happen, they must in the first place be taken as good things, and that is how I look at the matter.

Several years ago, an airfield was to be built somewhere in Honan Province, but no proper arrangements were made beforehand for the peasants living there nor any adequate explanations offered them when they were compelled to move out. The peasants of the village affected said, even the birds will make a few squawks if you go poking with your pole at their nest in a tree and try to bring it down. Teng Hsiao-ping, you, too, have a nest, and if I destroyed it, wouldn't you make a few squawks? So the local people set up three lines of defence: the first line was composed of children, the second of women, and the third of able-bodied young men. All who went there to do the surveying were driven away and the peasants won out in the end. Later, when satisfactory explanations were given and arrangements made, they agreed to move and the airfield was built. There are quite a few similar cases. Now there are people who seem to think that, as state power has been won, they can sleep soundly without any worry and play the tyrant at will. The masses will oppose such persons, throw stones at them and strike at them with their hoes, which will, I think, serve them right and will please me immensely. Moreover, sometimes to fight is the only way to solve a problem. The Communist Party needs to learn a lesson. Whenever students and workers take to the streets, you comrades should regard it as a good thing. There were over a hundred students from Chengtu who wanted to come to Peking to present a petition, but those in one train were halted at the Kuangyuan station in Szechuan Province, while those in another train got as far as Loyang but failed to reach Peking. It is my opinion and Premier Chou's too that the students should have been allowed to come to Peking and call on the departments concerned. The workers should be allowed to go on strike and the masses to hold demonstrations. Processions and demonstrations are provided for in our Constitution. In the future when the Constitution is revised, I suggest that the freedom to strike be added, so that the workers shall be allowed to go on strike. This will help resolve the contradictions between the state and the factory director on the one hand and the masses of workers on the other. After all they are nothing but contradictions. The world is full of contradictions. The democratic revolution resolved the set of contradictions with imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. At present, when the contradictions with national capitalism and small production with respect to ownership have been basically resolved, contradictions in other respects have come to the fore, and new contradictions have arisen. There are several hundred thousand cadres at the level of the county Party committee and above who hold the destiny of the country in their hands. If they fail to do a good job, alienate themselves from the masses and do not live plainly and work hard, the workers, peasants and students will have good reason to disapprove of them. We must watch out lest we foster the bureaucratic style of work and grow into an aristocratic stratum divorced from the people. The masses will have good reason to remove from office whoever practises bureaucracy, makes no effort to solve their problems, scolds them, tyrannizes over them and never tries to make amends. I say it is fine to remove such fellows, and they ought to be removed.

Now the democratic parties and the bourgeoisie are against the great democracy of the proletariat. If we were to start a second movement against the "five evils", they would not like it. They are very much afraid that the democratic parties will be eliminated and will not enjoy long-term coexistence if great democracy is put into practice. Do professors like great democracy? It is hard to say, but I think they are on their guard, they too are afraid of proletarian great democracy. If they want to practise bourgeois great democracy, I will propose a rectification, that is, ideological remoulding. All the students will be mobilized to criticize them, and in every college a checkpoint, so to speak, will be set up which they must pass through before the whole matter can be considered closed. So professors, too, are afraid of proletarian great democracy.

Here I will take up another topic, the question of the Dalai. Buddha has been dead for 2,500 years, and now the Dalai and his followers want to go to India and pay homage to him. Shall we let him go or not? The Central Committee thinks that it is better to let him go than not. He will set out in a few days. We advised him to go by air, but he refused, preferring to travel by car via Kalimpong,[4] where there are spies from various countries as well as Kuomintang secret agents. It must be anticipated that the Dalai may not come back, that, in addition, he may abuse us every day, making allegations such as "the Communists have invaded Tibet", and that he may go so far as to declare "the independence of Tibet" in India. It must also be anticipated that he may incite the Tibetan upper-stratum reactionaries to issue a call for major disturbances in the hope of driving us out, while using his absence as an alibi to shirk responsibility. This is possible, if the worst comes to the worst. I would still be glad even if this bad situation occurred. Our Working Committee and our troops in Tibet must make preparations, build fortifications and store up plenty of food and water. All we have there is only a few soldiers; anyway, each party is free to act as he chooses. If you want to fight, we shall be on our guard; if you make an attack, we shall defend ourselves. We should never attack first but let them do so, and then we shall launch a counter-attack and crush the attackers with relentless blows. Shall I feel aggrieved at the desertion of one Dalai? Not at all, even if you throw in nine more and make it ten Dalais. It was our experience that Chang Kuo-tao's desertion did not turn out to be a bad thing. You cannot bind a man and a woman together to make them husband and wife. When someone stops caring for your place and wants to leave it, just let him go. What harm will his departure do us? None whatsoever. He can't do more than curse us. Our Communist Party has been cursed for thirty-five years. And the curses have been just such hackneyed nonsense as that the Communist Party "is extremely ferocious", "communizes property and women" and "is brutal and inhuman". What difference will it make if a Dalai or anyone else should be added to the number of abusers? If the abusing goes on for another thirty-five years, that will amount to only seventy years. I don't consider it good for a person to be afraid of being abused. Some people are worried that confidential information may be divulged. Didn't Chang Kuo-tao possess a lot of confidential information? Never heard that our affairs went amiss as a result of Chang Kuo-tao divulging confidential information.

Our Party has millions of experienced cadres. Most of them are good cadres, born and brought up on our native soil, linked to the masses and tested in the course of long struggles. We have a whole body of cadres — those who joined the revolution in the period of the founding of the Party, in the period of the Northern Expedition, during the War of the Agrarian Revolution, the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the War of Liberation and those who joined after nation-wide liberation. They are all valuable assets to our country. The situation in some East European countries is not very stable, and one major reason is that they lack such a body of experienced cadres. With such cadres as ours who have been tested in different periods of the revolution, we are able to "sit tight in the fishing boat despite the rising wind and waves". We must have this much confidence. We are not even afraid of imperialism, so why should we be afraid of great democracy? Why should we be afraid of students taking to the streets? Yet among our Party members there are some who are afraid of great democracy, and this is not good. Those bureaucrats who are afraid of great democracy must study Marxism hard and mend their ways.

We are to carry out a rectification movement next year. Three bad styles are to be rectified: (1) subjectivism, (2) sectarianism and (3) bureaucracy. After the Central Committee has made the decision, a circular will first be issued, in which different items will be listed. For instance, bureaucracy consists of several items, such as failure to make contact with cadres and the masses, failure to go down and find out about the situation below and failure to share weal and woe with the masses, plus corruption, waste and so on. If a circular is issued in the first half of the year, the rectification movement is to begin in the second, with a period of several months in between. Whoever has embezzled public money must confess and return it during that interval, or pay it back later in instalments, or if he cannot possibly manage it even in instalments, he will have to be exempted from repaying it; each of these three ways is all right. But in any case he must admit his mistake and of his own accord state the amount taken. This is to provide him, so to speak, with a staircase by which he can come down step by step. This method is also to be adopted in dealing with other mistakes. Rather than meting out "punishment without prior warning", make an announcement beforehand and then start the rectification movement at the specified time — this is a method of applying small democracy. Some say, if this method is adopted, there probably won't be much left to rectify in the second half of the year. That is precisely the end we hope to achieve. Our hope is that by the time the rectification movement formally starts, subjectivism, sectarianism and bureaucracy will have been considerably reduced. In our history the rectification movement has proved to be an effective method. From now on, all problems among the people or inside the Party are to be solved by means of rectification, by means of criticism and self-criticism, and not by force. We are in favour of the method of the "gentle breeze and mild rain", and though it is hardly avoidable that in a few cases things may get a little too rough, the over-all intention is to cure the sickness and save the patient, and truly to achieve this end instead of merely paying lip-service to it. The first principle is to protect a person, and the second one is to criticize him. First he is to be protected because he is not a counter-revolutionary. This means to start from the desire for unity and, through criticism and self-criticism, arrive at a new unity on a new basis. Within the ranks of the people, if we adopt the method of both protecting and criticizing a person who has made mistakes, we shall win people's hearts, be able to unite the entire people and bring into play all the positive factors among our 600 million people for building socialism.

I am in favour of the idea that in peace-time the wage gap between cadres in the army and those outside it should be gradually narrowed, but this does not mean absolute egalitarianism. I have always been of the opinion that the army should live plainly and work hard and be a model. At a meeting held here in 1949, one of our generals proposed that the pay in the army should be raised, and many comrades were for his proposal, but I was against it. The illustration he used was that a capitalist ate a meal of five courses whereas a PLA soldier had only salt water plus some pickled cabbage at a meal, and this, he said, wouldn't do. I said, on the contrary, this was just fine. They had five courses while we ate pickles. There was politics in these pickles, out of which models would emerge. The PLA won people's hearts precisely because of these pickles, but, of course, there were other factors too.

Now the army meals have improved and are already rather different from having only pickles to eat. But what is most essential is that we must advocate plain living and hard work, which is our intrinsic political quality. Chinchow is an apple-growing area. At the time of the Liaohsi campaign, it was autumn, and there were plenty of apples in the villagers' homes, but our fighters did not take a single apple. I was deeply moved when I read about this. Here the fighters themselves were conscious that not to eat the apples was noble, whereas to eat them would have been ignoble, for the apples belonged to the people. Our discipline rests on such consciousness. It is the result of leadership and education by our Party. Man must have some spirit, and the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat stems from this consciousness. Did anyone starve to death from not eating an apple? No, for there was millet plus pickles. In times of necessity, you comrades present here will have to live in sheds. When we crossed the marshlands, we had no sheds to sleep in and yet we managed without. Why can't we live in sheds now that we have them? The army people have been in session these few days, and they have expressed with deep feelings and enthusiasm their readiness to exercise self-denial and practise economy. Now that the army is doing this, there is all the more reason for other people to live plainly and work hard. Otherwise they would be challenged by the army people. There are both civilians and army people present here, so we'll let the army people challenge the civilians. The PLA is a good army, and I like it very much.

Political work must be strengthened. It must be greatly strengthened in every sphere, whether among civilians or army people, whether in factories, villages, shops, schools or army units, whether in Party and government organs or people's organizations, so as to raise the political level of the cadres and the masses.

NOTES

[1] This refers to a saying of Confucius, "At seventy, I can follow my heart's desire, without transgressing what is right." *Confucian Analects*, Book II, "Wei Cheng".

[2] They refer to the riot that occurred in Poznan, Poland, in June 1956 and to the counter-revolutionary rebellion that took place in Hungary in October of the same year.

[3] *The Book of Changes*, "Hsi Tzu", Part I.

[4] Kalimpong is a border town in northeastern India near Yatung in Tibet, China.

TALKS AT A CONFERENCE OF SECRETARIES OF PROVINCIAL, MUNICIPAL AND AUTONOMOUS REGION PARTY COMMITTEES

January 1957

I. THE TALK OF JANUARY 18

The present conference will chiefly discuss three questions: the question of ideological trends, the rural question and the economic question. Today I shall speak on the question of ideological trends.

We should keep tabs on ideological trends, which I am taking up here as the first question. At present, certain problems concerning them inside the Party and in society at large have cropped up and demand our close attention.

One kind of problem arises among our own ranks. For example, some cadres now scramble for fame and fortune and are interested only in personal gain. In the discussion of the grading of cadres, there were instances where a cadre would not be satisfied with a rise of one grade, even a rise of two grades still left him weeping in bed, and perhaps only a three-grade promotion could get him out of bed. The fuss they kicked up has settled the question. This business of grading cadres, have done with it! Let wages be roughly evened out, with slight differences here and there. In the old days, the government of the Northern warlords had a prime minister by the name of Tang Shao-yi. Years later he was magistrate of Chungshan County, Kwangtung Province. If a prime minister in the old society could serve as a county magistrate, why on earth can't our government ministers do likewise? In this regard, those who fuss over their rank and can be graded up but not down compare poorly, in my opinion, with this old mandarin. They vie with each other not in plain living, doing more work and having fewer comforts, but for luxuries, rank and status. At present, this kind of thinking has grown considerably in the Party, and the matter demands our attention.

Is agricultural co-operation promising, or is it unpromising? Which is better, the co-operative, or the individual economy? This question has been raised again. Last year, it did not come up in places reaping a rich harvest or in areas stricken by serious natural adversities, but only in those co-operatives which had suffered natural adversities but not of a serious kind or reaped a harvest but not a rich one. The cash value of work-points in these co-operatives turned out to be less than had been promised, and there was no increase but actually a decrease in the income of the members. This gave rise to such talk as, “Is the co-operative still good and worth preserving?” And this kind of talk has found an echo among certain Party cadres. The co-operatives, some say, are in no way superior. Some government ministers made a brief visit to the countryside, and on their return to Peking they spread alarmist views, saying that the peasants were listless and not keen on farming, as if the co-operatives were on the verge of collapse and extinction. Some co-operative directors cannot hold their heads up because they are being attacked right and left and have to endure criticisms from above and from the press. Some heads of the propaganda departments of Party committees shy away from making propaganda about the superiority of the co-operatives. Minister of Agriculture Liao Lu-yen, who is concurrently Deputy Director of the Rural Work Department of the Party Central Committee, says in effect that he himself feels discouraged and so do the responsible cadres under him, and that the co-operatives won’t work anyway and the forty-article Programme for Agricultural Development is no longer valid. What are we to do with a person who feels discouraged? That’s simple. If someone is losing courage, we just pump a little into him. The newspapers have now taken on a different tone in their propaganda, dwelling on the superiority of the co-operatives and speaking well rather than ill of them. Keep this up for several months to generate a little courage.

The year before last there was a struggle against a Right deviation, and last year a struggle against “rash advance”, which resulted in another Right deviation. By this I mean the Right deviation on the question of socialist revolution, primarily that of socialist transformation in the rural areas. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that a gust of wind with the force of a typhoon has been blowing among our cadres. A considerable number of our ministers, vice-ministers, heads of departments or bureaus as well as cadres at the provincial level are from landlord, rich peasant or well-to-do middle peasant families, and in some cases their fathers are landlords who to this day are deprived of the right to vote. When these cadres go home for a visit, they hear from their folks nothing but adverse comments such as that the co-operatives are no good and won't last. The well-to-do middle peasants are a wavering social stratum, the go-it-alone tendency among them is rising again, and some want to withdraw from the co-operatives. The wind blowing among our cadres indicates what is in the minds of these classes and strata.

Agricultural co-operation is sure to be a success, but it cannot achieve complete success in a year or two. This must be made clear to comrades in the Party, the government, the army and the people's organizations. The co-operatives have only a short history, mostly of a year or a year and a half, and are lacking in experience. People who have been working for the revolution most of their lives still make mistakes, so how can you expect those who have been at the job for only a year to a year and a half to make no mistakes at all? To say that co-operation won't work when there is a little wind and rain is itself a big mistake. In point of fact, most co-operatives are doing well or fairly well. Cite just one co-operative that is being managed successfully, and you will be able to explode all the absurd arguments against co-operation. If this co-operative can be run well, why can't others? If this co-operative displays superiority, why can't others? Publicize the experience of this co-operative wherever you go. Each province should be able to find at least one such example. Choose a co-operative with the worst conditions including an unfavourable terrain, which previously had very low yields and was very poor. Do not choose one where the conditions were good to start with. Of course, it is fine if you have scores of examples, but if you can make just one co-operative work well, that spells success.

There is also trouble in the schools and colleges, and in a number of places students have created disturbances. In Shihchiachuang jobs were temporarily not available for some students of the graduating class in a school, and they had to stay on another year. This aroused their discontent. A handful of counter-revolutionaries seized the opportunity to agitate, organize a demonstration and threaten to occupy the Shihchiachuang radio station and proclaim a "Hungary". They put up many posters, the most striking of which carried these three slogans: "Down with fascism!" "We want war, not peace!" and "Socialism is in no way superior!" According to them, the Communist Party was fascist and people like us had to be overthrown. The slogans they put up were so reactionary that they estranged the workers, peasants and people in all walks of life. In Peking a student of Tsinghua University openly declared, "The day will come when I will have thousands and tens of thousands of people shot!" With the introduction of the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend, even this "school" has come into the open. Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping went to the university and made a speech. If you want to have thousands and tens of thousands of people shot, he said, then we will have to enforce dictatorship.

According to a survey made in Peking, most college students are children of landlords, rich peasants, the bourgeoisie and well-to-do middle peasants, while students from working-class and poor and lower-middle peasant families account for less than 20 per cent. Probably this is roughly the case too in the rest of the country. This situation should change, but it will take time. Gomulka has been very popular with a number of our college students, and so have Tito and Kardelj. On the other hand, at the time of the riots in Poland and Hungary, most of the landlords and rich peasants in the countryside and the capitalists and members of the democratic parties in the cities behaved better and made no attempt to stir up trouble or come out with threats to kill thousands and tens of thousands of people. But one should be analytical about their behaviour. For they no longer have any political capital, the workers and the poor and lower-middle peasants won't listen to them, and they have no ground to stand on. Should something happen like atom bombs blowing up Peking and Shanghai, wouldn't these people change? You can't be too sure they wouldn't. In that eventuality, there would be a process of realignment of the landlords, the rich peasants, the bourgeoisie and the members of the democratic parties. They have worldly wisdom, and many of them are lying low. Their offspring — those school kids — are inexperienced, and it is they who expose such wares as "I will have thousands and tens of thousands of people shot" and "Socialism is in no way superior".

There is queer talk among some professors too, such as that the Communist Party should be done away with, the Communist Party cannot lead them, socialism is no good, and so on and so forth. Before, they kept these ideas to themselves, but since the policy of letting a hundred schools of thought contend gave them an opportunity to speak up, these remarks have come tumbling out. Have you seen the film *The*

Life of Wu Hsun? There is one shot of a writing brush, dozens of feet long, symbolizing the "men of learning". A sweep of that brush could be terrific. Now they are coming out, probably with the intention of sweeping us away. Aren't they in fact attempting a restoration?

During the past year, several storms raged on the world scene. At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union they went for Stalin in a big way. Subsequently the imperialists stirred up two storms against communism, and there were two stormy debates in the international communist movement. Amidst these storms, the impact and losses were quite big in the case of some Communist Parties in Europe and the Americas but smaller for the Communist Parties in the Orient. With the convocation of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, some people who had been most enthusiastic for Stalin became most vehement against him. In my view, these people do not adhere to Marxism-Leninism, they do not take an analytical approach to things and they lack revolutionary morality. Marxism-Leninism embraces the revolutionary morality of the proletariat. Since formerly you were all for Stalin, you should at least give some reason for making such a sharp turn. But you offer no reason at all for this sudden about-face, as if you had never in your life supported Stalin, though in fact you had fully supported him before. The question of Stalin concerns the entire international communist movement and involves the Communist Parties of all countries.

Most cadres in our Party are dissatisfied with the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and think it went too far in attacking Stalin. That is a normal feeling and a normal reaction. But a few cadres started to vacillate. Before it rains in a typhoon, ants come out of their holes, they have very sensitive "noses" and they know their meteorology. No sooner had the typhoon of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU struck than a few such ants in China came out of their holes. They are wavering elements in the Party who vacillate whenever something is astir. When they heard of the sweeping denunciation of Stalin, they felt good and swung to the other side, cheering and saying that Khrushchov was right in everything and that they themselves had been of the same opinion all along. Later when the imperialists struck a few blows and a few more came from inside the international communist movement, even Khrushchov had to change his tune somewhat, and so they swung back to this side again. In the face of an irresistible trend, they had no choice but to swing back. A tuft of grass atop the wall sways right and left in the wind. The waverers' real intention was not to swing to our side, but to the other. It's a good thing that some people inside and outside the Party sang the praises of the Polish and Hungarian incidents. They could not open their mouths without talking about Poznan and Hungary. In so doing they gave themselves away. Ants came out of their holes and turtles, tortoises and all the scum of the earth left their hiding places. They danced to Gomulka's baton. When Gomulka talked about great democracy, they echoed him. Now the situation has changed and they are keeping their mouths shut. But that's not what they really want to do. Their real desire is to speak out.

When a typhoon strikes, the wavering elements who cannot withstand it begin to vacillate. That's a law. I would like to call your attention to it. Some people, having vacillated a few times, gain experience and stop wavering. But there is a type of person who will go on wavering forever. They are like some crops, rice for example, which sway at a whiff of wind because of their slender stalks. Sorghum and maize with their stouter stalks do better. Only big trees stand upright and rock-firm. Typhoons occur every year. So do ideological and political typhoons at home and abroad. This is a natural phenomenon in society. A political party is a kind of society, a political kind of society. The primary category in political society consists of political parties and political groups. A political party is a class organization. Our Chinese Communist Party is a proletarian political party composed chiefly of people of working-class and semi-proletarian poor peasant origin. But there are also a number of Party members who hail from landlord, rich peasant and capitalist families, or have a well-to-do middle peasant or urban petty-bourgeois origin. Though more or less tempered in long years of arduous struggle, quite a number have not acquired much Marxism, and thus ideologically or mentally they are apt to sway in the wind like rice stalks.

Some Party members who have come through many tests now find it difficult to pass the test of socialism. Hsueh Hsun is a typical example. She was formerly a deputy secretary of the Hopei Provincial Party Committee and a vice-governor of the province. When did she begin to vacillate? At the time when the state monopoly of the purchase and marketing of grain was first instituted. It was an important measure for implementing socialism. But she was dead against it and opposed it at all costs. Another example is Meng Yung-chien, deputy director of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Co-operatives. In a letter of petition he, too, firmly opposed this state monopoly. When agricultural co-operation was being carried out, again some people in the Party opposed it. In short, there are high-ranking Party cadres who have vacillated and cannot pass the test of socialism. Has this state of affairs come to an end? No, it hasn't. Will these people become firm and really believe in socialism ten years from now? Well, not necessarily. Ten years from now, when something crops up, they may say again, I foresaw that long ago.

Here is some material to be distributed among the comrades present which shows the ideological trends among certain cadres in the army. Although there is something valid in their opinions, for instance, when they say the wages of some cadres are too high and the peasants don't like it, the general tenor is not quite right and the fundamental line they follow is wrong. They criticize our Party's policies as being "Left" in the countryside and Right in the cities. For all its 9,600,000 square kilometres China is made up of but two constituents, town and country. According to them, we are wrong in both.

When they say our rural policy has deviated to the "Left", they mean that the income of the peasants is meagre, less than that of the workers. Here one should make an analysis and not judge by income alone. It is true that the income of the workers is generally higher than that of the peasants, but the value they produce is bigger, and besides they have to pay more for daily necessities. The improvement of the peasants' livelihood depends mainly on their own efforts to increase production. The government is also doing much to help them, building water conservancy projects, granting them agricultural credits, and so on. Our tax on agricultural products, side-line products included, forms about 8 per cent of the total value of the peasants' output, and no tax is levied on many side-lines. The state purchases grain at standard prices. Moreover, the state gets only a very small profit from the exchange of industrial products for the peasants' agricultural products. We do not adopt the system of obligatory sales enforced in the Soviet Union. In the exchange of industrial products for agricultural products, we try to narrow the price scissors instead of widening them as in the Soviet Union. There is a world of difference between our policy and that of the Soviet Union. Therefore, our rural policy cannot be said to have deviated to the "Left".

Some of the ranking cadres in our army make complaints on behalf of the peasants because they are affected by the remarks of well-to-do middle peasants, rich peasants or landlords which they may have heard on visits to their home town or from relatives invited to stay with them. In the first half of 1955 a good many Party members made such complaints, chiming in with Liang Shu-ming and his ilk, as if only people from these two quarters spoke for the peasants and understood their sufferings. In their eyes, our Central Committee does not represent the peasants, nor do the provincial Party committees and the majority of Party members. A survey in Kiangsu Province shows that in some places 30 per cent of the cadres at the county, district and township levels made complaints on behalf of the peasants. It further reveals that most of them belong to rather well-to-do families which have surplus grain for sale. What they call "sufferings" turns out to be having surplus grain. And when they say "help the peasants" and "show concern for the peasants", they mean withholding sales of surplus grain to the state. Who on earth do these grumblers represent? Not the peasant masses, but a small number of well-to-do peasants.

As for the charge that our urban policy has deviated to the Right, this seems to be the case, as we have undertaken to provide for the capitalists and pay them a fixed rate of interest for a period of seven years.[1] What is to be done after the seven years? That is to be decided according to the circumstances prevailing then. It is better to leave the matter open, that is, to go on giving them a certain amount in fixed interest. At this small cost we are buying over this class. The Central Committee has given this policy very careful consideration. On the whole, the capitalists plus the democrats and intellectuals associated with them have a higher level of cultural and technical knowledge. By buying over this class, we have deprived them of their political capital and kept their mouths shut. The way to deprive them is to buy them over and make arrangements to give them jobs. Thus political capital will not be in their hands but in ours. We must deprive them of every bit of their political capital and continue to do so until not one jot is left to them. Therefore, neither can our urban policy be said to have deviated to the Right.

Our rural policy is correct and so is our urban policy. That is why a nation-wide disturbance such as the Hungarian incident cannot take place here. At most a small number of people may create trouble here and there and clamour for so-called great democracy. There is nothing terrifying about great democracy. On this score I do not see eye to eye with some comrades among you, who seem scared of it. In my view, should great democracy come about, first, you should not be scared of it and, second, you should make an analysis of the words and deeds of its advocates. In pushing their so-called great democracy, those bad types are bound to say or do something wrong, which will only expose and isolate them. To "have thousands and tens of thousands of people shot" — is this the way to resolve contradictions among the people? Can this win any sympathy from the majority of people? "Down with fascism" and "Socialism is in no way superior" — doesn't this flagrantly violate the Constitution? The Communist Party and the state power under its leadership are revolutionary and socialism is superior; this is all stated in the Constitution and acknowledged by the whole nation. "We want war, not peace" — well, that's fine! So you are calling for war, and yet what you can muster is only a small band, an insufficient number of men without trained officers. These kids have really gone mad! That school in Shihchiachuang had a discussion on the three slogans mentioned above and out of seventy representatives only a dozen spoke in favour, while fifty-odd said no. Then the slogans were discussed among four thousand students. Not a single one approved, so the dozen were isolated. The ultra-reactionaries who put up and stuck to these slogans were only a handful. If they had not taken up great democracy and splashed those posters everywhere, we would have been in the dark as to what they were up to. Once they pressed for great democracy, they got caught. One good thing about the Hungarian incident was that these ants in China were thus lured out of their holes.

In Hungary, great democracy toppled the Party, the government and the army once it was set in motion. This will not happen in China. If a handful of school kids can topple our Party, government and army by a show of force, we must all be fatheads. Therefore, don't be afraid of great democracy. If there is a disturbance, it will help get the festering sore cured, and that's a good thing. We were not afraid of imperialism in the past nor are we now. And we have never been afraid of Chiang Kai-shek. Are we now to be afraid of great democracy? I say we ought not to be. If anyone resorts to what he calls great democracy to oppose the socialist system and try to overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party, we shall exercise the dictatorship of the proletariat over him.

On the question of the intellectuals, there is a tendency today to stress arranging jobs for them to the neglect of remoulding them, there is too much of the former and too little of the latter. With the introduction of the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend, there has been some timidity about remoulding intellectuals. Since we have not been timid about remoulding capitalists, why should we be timid about remoulding intellectuals and democratic personages?

Let a hundred flowers blossom — I think we should go on doing that. Some comrades hold that only fragrant flowers should be allowed to blossom and that poisonous weeds should not be allowed to grow. This approach shows little understanding of the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend. In general, counter-revolutionary statements will naturally be prohibited. However, if they are made not in a counter-revolutionary-form but in a revolutionary guise, you will have to allow them. That will help us see these statements for what they are and wage struggles against them. Two kinds of plants grow in the fields, grain and weeds. Weeding must be done every year, indeed several times a year. If you say you will allow only fragrant flowers to blossom and no poisonous weeds to grow, that is tantamount to saying that you will allow only grain and not a single weed to grow in the fields. You may very well say so, but whoever has been to the fields knows that if weeding is not done there will be weeds galore. Weeds are useful in a way — when ploughed under they can be turned into manure. You say they are of no use? Well, uselessness can be turned into usefulness. The peasants must wage struggles against weeds in the fields year in year out, and so must the writers, artists, critics and professors of our Party against weeds in the ideological held. To say something is tempered means that it has been through a struggle. If weeds grow, we uproot them. This opposite in the contradiction shows itself continually. Weeds will grow even ten thousand years from now, and so we must be prepared to wage struggles for that long.

In short, we have had an eventful year in 1956. Internationally, it was a year in which Khrushchov and Gomulka stirred up storms, and internally, it was a year of very intense socialist transformation. It is still eventful now, and all kinds of ideas will go on obtruding themselves. I hope you comrades here will keep your eyes open.

II. THE TALK OF JANUARY 27

Now, let me take up a few points.

First, we must make an adequate assessment of our achievements. In our revolution and construction, the achievements are primary, though there are shortcomings and mistakes. Our achievements, however many, must not be exaggerated, but to underestimate them will lead to mistakes, perhaps even to big mistakes. This question was settled at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, but repeated references to it at the present conference show that some comrades are still unconvinced. Among the democratic personages in particular there are such remarks as, "You people always say achievements are basic. That doesn't solve any problem. Who doesn't know that achievements are basic, but what about shortcomings and mistakes?" Nonetheless, it is really achievements that are basic. If this is not affirmed, people will be disheartened. Aren't there people who have become disheartened about co-operative transformation?

Second, there must be over-all planning and all-round consideration, so that everyone is provided for. This has been our consistent policy. It was our policy in the Yenan days. In August 1944, the newspaper *Ta Kung Pao* carried an editorial saying, "Don't set up a separate kitchen." During the Chungking negotiations, I told the man in charge of *Ta Kung Pao* that I quite agreed with what he said, provided Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek took care of our meals, otherwise what else could we do but set up a separate kitchen? At that time we confronted Chiang Kai-shek with the slogan that everyone should be provided for. Now we are running the country. Our policy is still one of over-all planning and all-round consideration so that everyone is provided for. This includes providing for all the army and government personnel left behind by the Kuomintang. Even those who fled to Taiwan can come back. All counter-revolutionaries not to be put to death will undergo remoulding and be given a chance to earn a living. The democratic parties will be preserved and coexist with us for a long time and their members will be provided for. In a word, we will take care of all our country's 600 million people. For instance, through the state monopoly of the purchase and marketing of grain we look after the entire urban population and all rural grain-deficient households. Or take the urban youth for example. Arrangements must be made for them in one way or another — they can go to school or work on a farm, in a factory or in a frontier area. Relief will be extended to families where no member has a job, our principle being not to allow anybody to die of starvation. All this falls within the scope of over-all planning and all-round consideration. What kind of policy is this? It is one of mobilizing all positive forces to build socialism. It is a strategic policy. It is better to follow this policy, and there will be fewer troubles. This idea of over-all planning and all-round consideration must be made clear to all.

Comrade Ko Ching-shih said that we must explore every possible way. That's well said, for we must explore every possible way of surmounting difficulties. This slogan should be publicized. The difficulties before us are not very great and don't amount to much! Aren't things at least better now than on the Long March, when we had to scale snow-topped mountains and plod through the marshlands? After crossing the Tatu River on the Long March, the question was which way to go. There was nothing but high mountains to the north and very few inhabitants. At that time we called for surmounting the difficulties by a thousand ways and a hundred devices. What do we mean by a thousand ways and a hundred devices? A thousand ways mean 999 ways plus one, and one hundred devices mean 99 devices and another thrown in. You have so far proposed very few ways or devices. How many ways and devices has each of the provinces and the central departments got? Explore every possible way and the difficulties will be surmounted.

Third, the international situation. In the Middle East, there was that Suez Canal incident. A man called Nasser nationalized the canal, another called Eden sent in an invading army, and close on his heels came a third called Eisenhower who decided to drive the British out and have the place all to himself. The British bourgeoisie, past masters of machination and manoeuvre, are a class which knows best when to compromise. But this time they bungled and let the Middle East fall into the hands of the Americans. What a colossal mistake! Can one find many such mistakes in the history of the British bourgeoisie? How come that this time they lost their heads and made such a mistake? Because the pressure exerted by the United States was too much and they lost control of themselves in their anxiety to regain the Middle East and block the United States. Did Britain direct the spearhead chiefly at Egypt? No. Britain's moves were against the United States, much as the moves of the United States were against Britain.

From this incident we can pin-point the focus of struggle in the world today. The contradiction between the imperialist countries and the socialist countries is certainly most acute. But the imperialist countries are now contending with each other for the control of different areas in the name of opposing communism. What areas are they contending for? Areas in Asia and Africa inhabited by 1,000 million people. At present their contention converges on the Middle East, an area of great strategic significance, and particularly on Egypt's Suez Canal Zone. In the Middle East, two kinds of contradictions and three kinds of forces are in conflict. The two kinds of contradictions are: first, those between different imperialist powers, that is, between the United States and Britain and between the United States and France and, second, those between the imperialist powers and the oppressed nations. The three kinds of forces are: one, the United States, the biggest imperialist power, two, Britain and France, second-rate imperialist powers, and three, the oppressed nations. Asia and Africa are today the main areas of imperialist contention. National independence movements have emerged in these regions. The methods the United States employs are now violent, now non-violent, and this is the game it is playing in the Middle East.

Their embroilment is to our advantage. We, the socialist countries, should pursue the policy of consolidating ourselves and not yielding a single inch of our land. We will struggle against anyone who tries to make us do so. This is where we draw the line beyond which they can be left to quarrel among themselves. Then shall we speak up or not? Yes, we shall. We certainly will support the anti-imperialist struggles of the people in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries.

As for the relations between the imperialist countries and ourselves, "they are among us and we are among them". We support the people's revolution in their countries and they conduct subversive activities in ours. We have our men in their midst, that is, the Communists, the revolutionary workers, farmers and intellectuals, and the progressives in their countries. They have their men in our midst, and in China for instance they have among us many people from the bourgeoisie and the democratic parties and also the landlord class. At present, these people seem to be behaving themselves and are not causing trouble. But what will they do if an atom bomb is dropped on Peking? They won't revolt? That's highly questionable. Still more so in the case of those criminals now undergoing reform through labour, those ringleaders who created disturbances in that school in Shihchiachuang, and that college student in Peking who wanted to have thousands and tens of thousands of people shot. We must absorb them and transform the landlords and capitalists into working people. This is also a strategic policy. It takes a very long time to abolish classes.

In short, our assessment of the international situation is still that the embroilment of the imperialist countries contending for colonies is the greater contradiction. They try to cover up the contradictions between themselves by playing up their contradictions with us. We can make use of their contradictions, a lot can be done in this connection. This is a matter of importance for our external policy.

Now a few words about Sino-American relations. We have had Eisenhower's letter to Chiang Kai-shek reproduced and distributed among you. In my view, the letter is meant chiefly to pour cold water on Chiang Kai-shek and then pump a little courage into him. The letter talks about the need to keep cool and not to be impulsive, which means not resorting to war but relying on the United Nations. That's pouring cold water. For Chiang Kai-shek has really become rather impulsive. To pump courage into Chiang Kai-shek, Eisenhower says he will continue his hard-line policy towards the Communists and pins his hopes on disturbances breaking out in our midst. In Eisenhower's view, disturbances have already occurred and the Communists cannot stop them. Well, everybody has his own way of looking at things.

I still think it preferable to put off the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States for some years. This will be more to our advantage. The Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with the United States seventeen years after the October Revolution. In 1929 a world-wide economic crisis broke out which lasted through 1933. In 1933 Hitler came to power in Germany and Roosevelt in the United States. And it was only then that diplomatic relations were established between the Soviet Union and the United States. It will probably be after our Third Five-Year Plan that we will establish diplomatic relations with the United States, that is, eighteen years or even more from the day of liberation. We are in no hurry to take our seat in the United Nations, just as we are in no hurry to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. We adopt this policy to deprive the United States of as much political capital as possible and put it in the wrong and in an isolated position. You bar us from the United Nations and don't want to establish diplomatic relations with us; all right, but the longer you stall, the more you will be in debt to us. The longer you stall, the more you will be in the wrong and the more isolated you will become in your own country and before world opinion. Once I told an American in Yenan, the United States can go on withholding recognition of our government for a hundred years, but I doubt if it can withhold it in the 101st. One day the United States will have to establish diplomatic relations with us.

When the Americans come to China then and look around, they will find it too late for regrets. For this land of China will have become quite different, with its house swept clean and the "four pests" eliminated; they won't find many friends here and they can't do much even if they spread a few germs.

Since World War II, the capitalist countries have been very unstable and in deep turmoil, with anxiety widespread among their people. There is anxiety in all countries, China included. But there is less here anyway. Look into the matter and see who is actually afraid of whom — the socialist countries of the imperialist countries, principally the United States, or the other way round. I say there is fear on both sides. The question is, which side is more afraid of the other? I'm inclined to think that the imperialists are more afraid of us. There may be some danger in making such an assessment, that is, our people may all go to bed and sleep for three days on end. So we must take two possibilities into account. In addition to the favourable possibility, there is the unfavourable one, and that is the imperialists may go berserk. They harbour evil designs and are always out to make trouble. Of course, today it is not so easy for them to start another world war, for they have to think of the consequences.

Now a few words about Sino-Soviet relations. In my view, wrangling is inevitable. Let no one imagine that there is no wrangling between Communist Parties. How can there be no wrangling in this world of ours? Marxism is a wrangling *ism*, dealing as it does with contradictions and struggles. Contradictions are always present, and where there are contradictions there are struggles. Now there are some contradictions between China and the Soviet Union. The way they think, the way they do things and their traditional habits are different from ours. So we must work on them. I always say that we should work on our comrades. Some people say, since they are Communists, they should be as good as we are, so why is such work needed? To work on people means doing united front work, working on the democratic personages, but why on Communists? It is wrong to look at the matter this way. There are different opinions inside the Communist Party itself. Some people have joined the Party organizationally, but ideologically they still need to be straightened out. And even among veteran cadres there are some who do not talk the same language as we do. Therefore, it is often necessary to have heart-to-heart talks, confer individually or collectively and hold meetings more than once to help people straighten out their thinking.

In my opinion, circumstances are more powerful than individuals, even than high officials. The force of circumstances will make it impossible for those die-hard elements in the Soviet Union to get anywhere if they continue to push their great-nation chauvinism. Our present policy is still to help them by talking things over with them face to face. This time when our delegation went to the Soviet Union, we came straight to the point on a number of questions. I told Comrade Chou En-lai over the phone that these people are blinded by their material gains and the best way to deal with them is to give them a good dressing down. What are their material gains? Nothing but 50 million tons of steel, 400 million tons of coal, and 80 million tons of petroleum. Does this amount to much? Not at all. Now at the sight of this much their heads are swelled. What Communists! What Marxists! I say multiply all that tenfold, or even a hundredfold, it still doesn't amount to much. All you have done is to extract something from the earth, turn it into steel and make some cars, planes, and what not. What is so remarkable about that? And yet you make all this such a heavy burden on your backs that you even cast away revolutionary principles. Isn't this being blinded by material gains? If one attains high office, one can be blinded by material gain too. To be the first secretary is some kind of material gain, which is also liable to swell one's head. When a man's head gets too swelled, we have to give him a good bawling out one way or another. This time in Moscow, Comrade Chou En-lai did not stand on ceremony and took them on, and consequently they kicked up a row. This is good, straightening things out face to face. They tried to influence us and we tried to influence them. However, we didn't come straight to the point on every question, we didn't play all our cards but kept some up our sleeves. There will always be contradictions. As long as things are tolerable on the whole, we can seek common grounds and reserve differences, to be dealt with later. If they insist on having their own way, sooner or later we will have to bring everything into the open.

As for us, we mustn't talk big in our external propaganda. We must always be modest and prudent and must, so to speak, tuck our tail between our legs. We must continue to learn from the Soviet Union. However, we must do it selectively, learning only what is advanced and not what is backward. In regard to what is backward there is another way of learning — just don't. As for their mistakes, we can avoid repeating them if we know about them. As for those things of theirs which are useful to us, we must learn them by all means. We shall learn what is useful from every country in the world. One should go everywhere in search of knowledge. To go to one place only would be monotonous.

Fourth, let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend. This policy was advanced following the repudiation of the counter-revolutionary Hu Feng clique, and I think it remains correct because it accords with dialectics.

Concerning dialectics Lenin said, "In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This grasps the kernel of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development."[2] It is our job to explain and develop the doctrine. It needs to be explained, and so far we have done too little. And it needs to be developed; with our rich experience in revolution, we ought to develop this doctrine. Lenin also said, "The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute."[3] Proceeding from this concept, we have advanced the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend.

Truth stands in contrast to falsehood and develops in struggle with it. The beautiful stands in contrast to the ugly and develops in struggle with it. The same holds true of good and bad, that is, good deeds and good people stand in contrast to bad deeds and bad people and develop in struggle with them. In short, fragrant flowers stand in contrast to poisonous weeds and develop in struggle with them. It is a dangerous policy to prohibit people from coming into contact with the false, the ugly and the hostile, with idealism and metaphysics and with the twaddle of Confucius, Lao Tzu and Chiang Kai-shek. It will lead to mental deterioration, one-track minds, and unpreparedness to face the world and meet challenges.

In philosophy, materialism and idealism form a unity of opposites and struggle with each other. The same is true of another pair of opposites, dialectics and metaphysics. Whenever one talks about philosophy, one cannot do without these two pairs of opposites. Now in the Soviet Union they will have nothing to do with such "pairs" but are going in only for "singles", asserting that only fragrant flowers, but not poisonous weeds, grow there, and denying the existence of idealism and metaphysics in a socialist country. As a matter of fact, idealism, metaphysics and poisonous weeds are found in every country. In the Soviet Union many of the poisonous weeds appear in the

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

name of fragrant flowers, and many absurd statements bear the label of materialism or socialist realism. We openly recognize the struggle between materialism and idealism, between dialectics and metaphysics, and between fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds. This struggle will go on for ever and will move a step forward at every stage.

If you comrades here already know materialism and dialectics, I would like to advise you to supplement your knowledge by some study of their opposites, that is, idealism and metaphysics. You should read Kant and Hegel and Confucius and Chiang Kai-shek, which are all negative stuff. If you know nothing about idealism and metaphysics, if you have never waged any struggle against them, your materialism and dialectics will not be solid. The shortcoming of some of our Party's members and intellectuals is precisely that they know too little about the negative stuff. Having read a few books by Marx, they just repeat what is in them and sound rather monotonous. Their speeches and articles are not convincing. If you don't study the negative stuff, you won't be able to refute it. Neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin was like that. They made great efforts to learn and study all sorts of things, contemporary and past, and taught other people to do likewise. The three component parts of Marxism came into being in the course of their study of, as well as their struggle with, such bourgeois things as German classical philosophy, English classical political economy and French utopian socialism. In this respect Stalin was not as good. For instance, in his time, German classical idealist philosophy was described as a reaction on the part of the German aristocracy to the French revolution. This conclusion totally negates German classical idealist philosophy. Stalin negated German military science, alleging that it was no longer of any use and that books by Clausewitz[4] should no longer be read since the Germans had been defeated.

Stalin had a fair amount of metaphysics in him and he taught many people to follow metaphysics. In the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, *Short Course*, Stalin says that Marxist dialectics has four principal features. As the first feature he talks of the interconnection of things, as if all things happened to be interconnected for no reason at all. What then are the things that are interconnected? It is the two contradictory aspects of a thing that are interconnected. Everything has two contradictory aspects. As the fourth feature he talks of the internal contradiction in all things, but then he deals only with the struggle of opposites, without mentioning their unity. According to the basic law of dialectics, the unity of opposites, there is at once struggle and unity between the opposites, which are both mutually exclusive and interconnected and which under given conditions transform themselves into each other.

Stalin's viewpoint is reflected in the entry on "identity" in the *Shorter Dictionary of Philosophy*, fourth edition, compiled in the Soviet Union. It is said there: "There can be no identity between war and peace, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between life and death and other such phenomena, because they are fundamentally opposed to each other and mutually exclusive." In other words, between these fundamentally opposed phenomena there is no identity in the Marxist sense; rather, they are solely mutually exclusive, not interconnected, and incapable of transforming themselves into each other under given conditions. This interpretation is utterly wrong.

In their view, war is war and peace is peace, the two are mutually exclusive and entirely unconnected, and war cannot be transformed into peace, nor peace into war. Lenin quoted Clausewitz, "War is the continuation of politics by other means."[5] Struggle in peace-time is politics, so is war, though certain special means are used. War and peace are both mutually exclusive and interconnected and can be transformed into each other under given conditions. If war is not brewing in peace-time, how can it possibly break out all of a sudden? If peace is not brewing in wartime, how can it suddenly come about?

If life and death cannot be transformed into each other, then please tell me where living things come from. Originally there was only non-living matter on earth, and living things did not come into existence until later, when they were transformed from non-living matter, that is, dead matter. All living matter undergoes a process of metabolism: it grows, reproduces and perishes. While life is in progress, life and death are engaged in a constant struggle and are being transformed into each other all the time.

If the bourgeoisie and the proletariat cannot transform themselves into each other, how come that through revolution the proletariat becomes the ruler and the bourgeoisie the ruled? For instance, we stood in diametrical opposition to Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang. As a result of the mutual struggle and the mutual exclusion of the two opposing sides, a change took place in our status and theirs, that is, they turned from the ruler into the ruled, whereas we turned from the ruled into the ruler. Those who fled to Taiwan were only one-tenth of the Kuomintang, those remaining on the mainland accounting for nine-tenths. The latter are being remoulded by us; this is a case of the unity of opposites under new circumstances. As for the one-tenth who have gone to Taiwan, our relationship with them is still a unity of opposites, and they, too, will be transformed through struggle.

Stalin failed to see the connection between the struggle of opposites and the unity of opposites. Some people in the Soviet Union are so metaphysical and rigid in their thinking that they think a thing has to be either one or the other, refusing to recognize the unity of opposites. Hence, political mistakes are made. We adhere to the concept of the unity of opposites and adopt the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend. When fragrant flowers are blossoming, you will inevitably find poisonous weeds growing. This is nothing to be afraid of, under given conditions they can even be turned to good account.

Some phenomena are unavoidable at a given time, and after their occurrence a way will be found to cope with them. For example, in the past rigid control was exercised over the repertory of drama and this or that piece was banned. Once the ban was lifted, all sorts of plays about ghosts and monsters such as *The Story of a Haunted Black Basin* and *Retribution by the God of Thunder* appeared on the stage. What do you think of this phenomenon? I think their appearance is all to the good. Many people have never seen ghosts and monsters on the stage, and when they see these ugly images, they will realize that things are being staged which should not be staged. Then these shows will be criticized, changed or banned. Some say that a few local operas are so bad that even the local people disapprove of them. In my opinion, it is all right to stage some of them. Let practice decide whether they can survive and how large an audience they will draw, so don't be in a rush to ban them.

We have now decided to increase the circulation of *News for Reference* from 2,000 to 400,000 so that it can be read by people both inside and outside the Party. This is a case of a Communist Party publishing a newspaper for imperialism, as it even carries reactionary statements vilifying us. Why should we do this? The purpose is to put poisonous weeds and what is non-Marxist and anti-Marxist before our comrades, before the masses and the democratic personages, so that they can be tempered. Don't seal these things up, otherwise it would be dangerous. In this respect our approach is different from that of the Soviet Union. Why is vaccination necessary? A virus is artificially introduced into a man's body to wage "germ warfare" against him in order to bring about immunity. The publication of *News for Reference* and other negative teaching material is "vaccination" to increase the political immunity of the cadres and the masses.

Harmful statements should be refuted forcefully and in good time. A case in point is the article "On Unavoidability" in the *People's Daily*, which asserts that mistakes in our work are not unavoidable and that we use the word "unavoidable" as an excuse for these mistakes. This is a harmful statement. Perhaps that article should not have been published. Since it was to be published, preparations ought to have been made to meet the challenge with a timely refutation. In our revolution and construction some mistakes are unavoidable in any case, as past experience has proved. The article "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" deals precisely with a major case of unavoidability. Who among our comrades wants to make mistakes? Mistakes are not recognized until after they are made, and at first everyone considers himself a 100 per cent Marxist. Of course we should not think that since mistakes are unavoidable, it does not matter if we make some. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that it is definitely impossible not to make any mistake in our work. The point is to make fewer and smaller ones.

Bad trends in society must definitely be overcome. Whether inside the Party, among the democratic personages or among students, bad trends, that is, mistakes which are not those of a few individuals but which have developed into trends, must definitely be overcome. The way to do so is through reasoning. So long as the reasoning is convincing, it is possible to overcome bad trends. If it is not convincing and only a few words of condemnation are used, these trends will go from bad to worse. Where major issues are involved, full preparations should be made, and wholly convincing refutations should be published when success is certain. Party secretaries should personally supervise the newspapers and write articles.

Of the two opposing aspects of a unity in struggle with each other, one must be principal and the other secondary. In our state which is a dictatorship of the proletariat, poisonous weeds should of course not be allowed to spread unchecked. Whether inside the Party or in ideological or in literary and art circles, we must endeavour to make sure that fragrant flowers and Marxism occupy the chief and dominant position. Poisonous weeds and what is non-Marxist and anti-Marxist must be kept in the subordinate position. In a sense, the relationship between the two can be compared to that between the nucleus and the electrons in an atom. An atom has two parts, the nucleus and the electrons. The nucleus is very small but very heavy. The electrons are very light, in fact an electron weighs only about 1/1,800th of the lightest nucleus. The nucleus of an atom can also be split, only its binding force is stronger. The electrons are somewhat guilty of "liberalism", with some going and others coming. The relationship between the nucleus and the electrons in an atom is also a unity of opposites, one being principal and the other secondary. Seen from this viewpoint, the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend is beneficial, not harmful.

Fifth, the question of disturbances. In socialist society the creation of disturbances by small numbers of people presents a new problem which is well worth looking into.

Everything in society is a unity of opposites. Socialist society is likewise a unity of opposites; this unity of opposites exists both within the ranks of the people and between ourselves and the enemy. The basic reason why small numbers of people still create disturbances in our country is that all kinds of opposing aspects, positive and negative, still exist in society, as do opposing classes, opposing people and opposing views.

We have basically completed the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production, but the bourgeoisie are still around, and also the landlords and rich peasants, local tyrants and counter-revolutionaries. They are the expropriated classes and are being oppressed by us, they nurse hatred in their hearts and many of them will give vent to it at the first opportunity. At the time of the Hungarian incident they hoped that Hungary would be thrown into chaos and, best of all, China too. That is their class instinct.

The queer statements of some democratic personages and professors are also in opposition to our views. They preach idealism whereas we advocate materialism. They say that the Communist Party is unable to direct the sciences, that there is nothing superior about socialism and that co-operative transformation is very bad indeed, whereas we say that the Communist Party has the ability to direct the sciences, that socialism is superior and that co-operative transformation is excellent.

Among the students there are also quite a few who stand opposed to us. Since most of today's college students come from exploiting class families, no wonder some of them are opposed to us. Such persons can be found in Peking, Shihchiachuang and elsewhere.

There are certain persons in society who vilify our provincial Party committees as "mummies". Are they mummies? In my view, they are not dead at all, so how can they be mummies? These fellows vilify our provincial Party committees as "mummies", we say they are not, and the two views stand opposed to each other.

Opposing views are also found inside our Party. For instance, two opposing views, pro and con, exist about the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU finishing Stalin off with one blow. Differences of opinion constantly occur inside the Party; no sooner has unanimity been reached than new differences arise within a month or two.

With respect to the way people think, subjectivism and seeking truth from the facts are opposed to each other. I believe there will always be subjectivism. Will there be no trace of subjectivism ten thousand years from now? I don't think so.

Opposing sides exist in a factory, an agricultural co-operative, a school, an organization or a family, in short, in every place and at every time. Therefore, disturbances by small numbers of people in society will occur every year.

Then, should we be afraid of disturbances or not? We Communists have never feared imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, the landlord class or the bourgeoisie, and it would be really strange if we should now be afraid of students creating disturbances or peasants kicking up a row in a co-operative! Only Tuan Chi-jui and Chiang Kai-shek were afraid of disturbances by the masses. Some people in Hungary and in the Soviet Union are afraid as well. We should adopt an active, and not a passive, attitude towards disturbances by small numbers of people, that is to say, we should not be afraid of them but be ready for them. Being afraid is no solution. The more you are afraid, the more the ghosts will haunt you. If you are not afraid of disturbances and are mentally prepared for them, you will not be put on the defensive. I think we should be prepared for major incidents. When you are thus prepared, such incidents may not happen, but when you are not, disturbances will occur.

In the development of a thing, there are only two possibilities, either a good one or a bad one. Both should be taken into consideration in dealing with international and domestic problems. You say this will be a year of peace, well, perhaps it will be. But it would not be good to base your work on this estimate, rather you should base it on the assumption that the worst may happen. Internationally, the worst would be at most the outbreak of a world war and the dropping of atom bombs. At home, it would be at most nation-wide riots, or a "Hungarian incident", with several million people rising up against us, occupying a few hundred counties and advancing on Peking. All we would need to do then would be to go back to Yenan where we came from. We have already lived in Peking for seven years, and what if we are requested to return to Yenan in the eighth? Would we all lament our loss and cry our hearts out? Of course we don't intend to return to Yenan now, to "make a feint and turn the horse round to retreat". At the Seventh Congress, I said that we should anticipate seventeen difficulties, among them, a thousand *li* of parched land, severe natural calamities, famine and the loss of all the county towns. It was because we had taken all this into account that the initiative was always in our hands. Now that we have won state power, we should still anticipate the worst possibilities.

In some cases, disturbances by small numbers of people were due to bureaucracy and subjectivism on the part of the leadership and to mistakes in our political or economic policies. In other cases, they were due to the incorrectness not of our policies but of our method of work, which was too rigid. Another factor was the existence of counter-revolutionaries and bad elements. It is impossible completely to avoid disturbances by small numbers of people. Here is a case of unavoidability again. But as long as we do not make major mistakes in political line, big nation-wide disturbances will not occur. Even if they do occur owing to such mistakes, I think they will quickly subside and not lead to national ruin. Of course, if we fail to do our work well, it is still quite possible that history will to some extent reverse its course and move backward a little. The Revolution of 1911 did suffer reversals; after it dethroned the emperor, another emperor and then the warlords came on the scene. Problems give rise to revolution and after the revolution other problems crop up. If a big nation-wide disturbance flares up, I am sure the masses and their leaders, maybe we ourselves or maybe others, will certainly come forward to clean up the situation. Through a big disturbance of this kind, our country will emerge all the stronger after the boil has burst. Whatever happens, China will march on.

As for small numbers of people creating disturbances, in the first place, we do not encourage this, and in the second, if some people are bent on creating disturbances, then let them. Freedom of procession and demonstration is provided for in our Constitution, and although freedom to strike is not provided for, it is not prohibited either, so to go on strike does not violate the Constitution. If some people want to stage a strike or present a petition and you obstinately try to prevent them, that is not good. In my opinion, whoever wants to make trouble may do so for as long as he pleases, and if one month is not enough, he may go on for two, in short, the matter should not be wound up until he feels he has had enough. If you hastily wind it up, sooner or later he will make trouble again. Where students make trouble, don't give the school a vacation but fight the matter out as at the Battle of Chihpi in ancient times. What good will come of this? It will help to expose problems to the full and to draw a clear distinction between right and wrong, so that everyone can be tempered and those who are unreasonable, those bad types, will suffer defeat.

You should learn this art of leadership. Don't always try to keep a lid on everything. Whenever people utter queer remarks, go on strike or present a petition, you try to beat them back with one blow, always thinking that these things ought not to occur. Why is it then that these things which ought not to occur still do? This very fact proves that they ought to occur. You forbid people to strike, to petition or to make unfavourable comments, you simply resort to repression in every case, until one day you become a Rakosi. This is true both inside and outside the Party. As for queer remarks, strange happenings and contradictions, it is better to have them exposed. Contradictions must be exposed and then resolved.

Disturbances should be differentiated into several categories and handled accordingly. In one category there are the justifiable disturbances, in which case we should admit our mistakes and correct them. In another category there are the unjustifiable ones, and these we must rebut. Disturbances having good grounds ought to occur; groundless ones will get nowhere. In yet another category, the disturbances are partly justifiable and partly not, and we should accept what is justifiable and criticize what is not; here we must not give way at every step in total disregard of principle and promise to do whatever is demanded. Don't be too ready to use force or to open fire on people, except in the case of a real, large-scale counter-revolutionary rebellion which necessitates armed suppression. In the March 18th Massacre[6] which he staged, Tuan Chi-jui resorted to shooting, and he eventually brought himself down. We mustn't follow his example.

We must work well among those involved in disturbances to split them and differentiate the many from the few. Give the many proper guidance and education so that they can gradually change, and don't hurt them. I believe it is true everywhere that people at the two poles are few while those in the middle are many. Win over the middle section step by step and we will get the upper hand. We must make an analysis of riot leaders. Some of those who dare to take the lead in-rioting may become useful people through education. As for the handful of bad types, we need not arrest, jail or expel any except those guilty of the gravest offences. Let them stay on in their own unit but strip them of their political capital, isolate them and use them as teachers by negative example. When Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping went to make a speech at Tsinghua University, he asked the student who had threatened to kill thousands and tens of thousands of people to serve as a teacher. A fellow like him has no arms, not even a pistol, why should you be afraid of him? If you expel him right away, you will have a clean house but then you'll not win general approval. Expelled from your place, he'll have to find a job in some other place. Therefore, to expel people like him in haste is not a good way. Such people represent the reactionary classes, and it is not a question of just a few individuals. To deal with them too crudely is good riddance, but their function as teachers by negative example will not be fully utilized. In the Soviet Union, when college students create trouble, the practice is to expel a few ringleaders, and it is not realized that bad things can serve us as teaching material. Of course, dictatorship must be exercised over the very few who stage such counter-revolutionary rebellions as the Hungarian incident.

We should allow democratic personages to challenge us with opposing views and give them a free hand to criticize us. Otherwise we would be a little like the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang was mortally afraid of criticism and went in fear and trepidation each time the Political Council was in session. Criticisms from democratic personages can be of only two kinds, those that are wrong and those that are not. Criticisms that are not wrong can help remedy our shortcomings while wrong ones must be refuted. As for such types as Liang Shu-ming, Peng Yi-hu and Chang Nai-chi, if they want to fart, let them. That will be to our advantage, for everybody can judge whether the smell is good or foul, and through discussion the majority can be won over and these types isolated. If they want to create trouble, let them have their fill of it. He who perpetrates many injustices is doomed to self-ruin. The falser their words and the greater their mistakes, the better, and the more isolated they will become and the better they will educate the people by negative example. We must both unite with and struggle against the democratic personages and, according to the circumstances, work among them on our own initiative in some cases, while in others let them expose themselves before we take action rather than striking first.

The struggle against bourgeois ideology, against bad men and bad things, is a long-term one which will take several decades or even centuries. The working class, the other sections of the working people and the revolutionary intellectuals will gain experience and temper themselves in the course of struggle, and this is a great advantage.

A bad thing has a dual character — good as well as bad. Many comrades are still not clear on this point. A bad thing contains good factors as well. To regard bad people and bad things as solely bad is a one-sided, metaphysical approach to problems; it is not a dialectical approach or a Marxist way of looking at things. On the one hand, bad people and bad things are bad, but on the other they can play a good role. For instance, a bad fellow like Wang Ming plays a good role as a teacher by negative example. Similarly, a good thing contains bad factors as well. For instance, the tremendous victories won in the seven years since liberation, especially those won last year, have given some comrades swelled heads, made them conceited, and they are caught unawares at the sudden outbreak of disturbances by small numbers of people.

The root cause of being afraid of disturbances on the one hand and handling them crudely on the other is the refusal to recognize in one's thinking that socialist society is a unity of opposites, in which contradictions, classes and class struggle exist.

For a long time Stalin denied that contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base exist under the socialist system. Not until the year before his death when he wrote *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* did he hesitantly mention the contradiction between the relations of production and the productive forces under the socialist system and admit that incorrect policies and improper adjustments would lead to trouble. Even then he did not pose the question of the contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base under the socialist system as a question of over-all importance, nor did he realize that they are the basic contradictions which propel socialist society forward. He thought all was secure under his rule. We on our part mustn't presume that all is secure under our rule; it is secure and yet insecure.

According to dialectics, as surely as a man must die, the socialist system as a historical phenomenon will come to an end some day, to be negated by the communist system. If it is asserted that the socialist system and its relations of production and superstructure will not die out, what kind of Marxism would that be? Wouldn't it be the same as a religious creed or theology that preaches an everlasting God?

How to handle the contradictions between the people and the enemy and those among the people in socialist society is a branch of science worthy of careful study. In the conditions prevailing in our country, although the present class struggle partly consists of contradictions between the people and the enemy, it finds expression on a vast scale in contradictions among the people. The disturbances stirred up by a small number of people at the moment are a reflection of this situation. If the earth is to perish ten thousand years from now, then at least disturbances will go on occurring for these ten thousand years. However, things happening in so remote a future as ten thousand years hence won't be our business. What we are concerned with is to make serious efforts to gain experience in handling this problem within the space of several five-year plans.

Strengthen our work and overcome our mistakes and shortcomings. What kind of work should be strengthened? Political and ideological work in the spheres of industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education as well as in the army, government and Party. You are all preoccupied with your professional duties, with your day-to-day work in economic, cultural and educational, national defence and Party matters, but if you neglect political and ideological work, that will be very dangerous. Now that our Party General Secretary Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping has turned up personally at Tsinghua University and given a talk, I would like all of you to get cracking. The leading comrades of the Central Committee as well as of the provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party committees should all personally take on political and ideological work. After World War II, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and certain East European Parties no longer concerned themselves with the basic principles of Marxism. They no longer concerned themselves with class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, Party leadership, democratic centralism and the ties between the Party and the masses, and there wasn't much of a political atmosphere. The Hungarian incident was the consequence. We must adhere to the basic theory of Marxism. Every province, every municipality and autonomous region should take up theoretical work and systematically train Marxist theorists and critics.

Streamline our organizations. The state is an instrument of class struggle. A class is not to be equated with the state which is formed by a number of people (a small number) from the class in the dominant position. Office work does need some people, but the fewer the better. At present the state apparatus is bloated, with many departments and with many people sitting idle in their offices. This problem cries out for solution. First, cut the personnel; second, make appropriate arrangements and see to it that those to be discharged have a place to go to. The above applies equally to the Party, the government and the army.

Go down to the grass roots and study the problems there. I hope that the comrades on the Central Committee and the leading comrades in charge of the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions and of the central departments will all do this. I have heard that many leading comrades no longer do so, which is not good. The central organs are miserable places where you can get no knowledge at all. If you are seeking knowledge, you won't find any by staying put in your office. The factories, the co-operatives and the shops are the real sources of knowledge. If you stay in your office, you will never get a clear idea of how factories, co-operatives and shops are run. The higher the office, the less the knowledge. To tackle problems, you must go down personally or invite people to come up. If you neither go down nor invite people to come up, you won't be able to solve any problem. I suggest that the secretary of a provincial, municipal or autonomous region Party committee serve concurrently as secretary of a county Party committee or of a factory or school Party committee and that the secretary of a prefectural or a county Party committee do likewise in a subordinate unit. In this way they can gain experience for giving over-all guidance.

Keep in close touch with the masses. Alienation from the masses and bureaucracy are sure to bring punishment upon one's head. The Hungarian leaders were ignorant of the conditions among the masses for lack of investigation and study, and when large-scale disturbances broke out they did not know what had gone wrong. There have been cases of late in which the leaders of some of our central departments and provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party committees did not keep tabs on the ideological trends among the masses, were completely unaware of the disturbances and riots being brewed by some people and were consequently at a loss when something happened. We must take warning from this state of affairs. Comrades on the Central Committee and leading comrades in charge of the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions and of the central departments should take some time out each year to visit grass-roots units such as factories, agricultural co-operatives, shops and schools to make investigation and study and find out the political conditions of the masses, how many are advanced, backward or in between and how well our mass work is going, and thus get a clear picture of the situation. Rely on the working class, on the poor and lower-middle peasants and on the advanced elements, for reliance there must be. Only thus can incidents such as that in Hungary be avoided.

Sixth, the question of the legal system. I am going to make three points: the law must be observed, counter-revolutionaries must be eliminated, and our achievements in eliminating counter-revolutionaries must be affirmed.

The law must be observed and the revolutionary legal system must not be undermined. Laws form part of the superstructure. Our laws are made by the working people themselves. They are designed to maintain revolutionary order and protect the interests of the working people, the socialist economic base and the productive forces. We require everybody, and not just the democratic personages, to respect the revolutionary legal system.

Counter-revolutionaries must be eliminated. Where this task has not yet been completed according to plan, it must be completed this year, and if there are still loose ends to tie up, the work must be finished next year without fail. Some units went through the campaign to eliminate counter-revolutionaries but the work was not thorough, and it is necessary to clear them all out gradually in the course of struggle. There are not many counter-revolutionaries left, a fact that must be affirmed. Where disturbances break out, the masses will not follow the counter-revolutionaries, and those who do are few in number and do so only for a time. On the other hand, it must also be affirmed that there are still counter-revolutionaries and that the work of eliminating them is not yet finished.

Our achievements in eliminating counter-revolutionaries must be affirmed. They are great achievements. There are also mistakes, which of course should be taken seriously. We should back up the cadres doing the work of eliminating counter-revolutionaries, and there mustn't be any softening because of abuse from some democratic personages. These fellows have been at it day after day, they have nothing better to do after a good meal except abuse people; well, let them. In my opinion, the more abusive they are, the better; anyway no amount of abuse can controvert the three points I've dealt with.

No one knows how much abuse has been hurled at the Communist Party. The Kuomintang vilified us as "Communist bandits", and if people had the slightest contact with us, they were accused of "having contact with bandits". In the end it is the "bandits" who have proved to be better than the "non-bandits". From time immemorial, nothing progressive has ever been favourably received at first and everything progressive has invariably been the object of abuse. Marxism and the Communist Party have been abused from the very beginning. Even ten thousand years hence, things progressive will still be abused at the outset.

Keep up the work of eliminating counter-revolutionaries, and eliminate them wherever they are found. The legal system must be respected. Acting in accordance with the law does not mean being bound hand and foot. It is wrong to be bound hand and foot and not to eliminate counter-revolutionaries where they are found. Be sure to act in accordance with the law and with hands and feet unfettered.

Seventh, the question of agriculture. We should strive for a good harvest this year. A good harvest this year will give people a sense of security and significantly consolidate the co-operatives. In the Soviet Union and in some East European countries, agricultural collectivization invariably brought about decreases in grain production for a number of years. We have had agricultural co-operation for several years, and we went all out last year, yet, far from falling, our grain production has increased. If another good harvest is reaped this year, there will be no parallel in the history of the agricultural co-operative movement as well as in the history of the international communist movement.

The whole Party should attach great importance to agriculture. Agriculture has vital bearing on the nation's economy and the people's livelihood. Take heed, for it is very dangerous not to grasp grain production. If this is ignored, there will be widespread disorder some day.

(1) Agriculture is vital to a rural population of 500 million for the supply of grain, meat, edible oils and other agricultural products for daily use consumed at source. This portion of agricultural products consumed at source by the peasants is enormous. For instance, of the more than 360,000 million catties of grain produced last year, commodity grain, including grain delivered to the state, accounted for some 80,000 million catties, or less than a quarter of the total, while the remaining three quarters and more went to the peasants. If agriculture is in good shape and the peasants are self-supporting, then 500 million people will feel secure.

(2) Agriculture is vital for the supply of food to the population in urban, industrial and mining areas. Only when the production of agricultural products for the market is increased can the needs of the industrial population be met and industry developed. With rising agricultural production, we should gradually increase the proportion of agricultural products entering the market, and particularly commodity grain. When everybody has a regular meal, we need not worry about a handful of people stirring up trouble in schools and factories.

(3) Agriculture is the chief source of raw materials for light industry, for which the countryside provides an important market. Only when agriculture is developed can light industry get enough raw materials and find a vast market for its goods.

(4) Here again the countryside is an important market for heavy industry. For example, chemical fertilizer, farm machinery of all kinds and part of our electric power, coal and petroleum are all supplied to the rural areas, and the railways, the highways and the large water conservancy projects all serve agriculture. Now that we have built up a socialist agricultural economy, the countryside is becoming an immense market for our growing heavy and light industries.

(5) Agricultural products make up the bulk of our exports at present. They earn foreign exchange with which to import various kinds of industrial equipment.

(6) Agriculture is an important source of accumulation. When expanded, it can provide more funds for the development of industry.

Therefore we may say that in a sense agriculture is itself industry. We should persuade the industrial departments to face the countryside and support agriculture. This must be done if industrialization is to be realized.

In the earnings of the co-operatives, what should be the right proportion between the accumulation earmarked for agriculture and the accumulation taken from agriculture by the state? Please consider this matter and work out the appropriate proportion. The aim is to enable agriculture to expand reproduction, to provide a larger market for industry and to become a greater source of accumulation. First, let agriculture accumulate more for itself, for only then can it accumulate more for industry. If agriculture accumulated only for industry and very little or none for itself, that would mean "draining the pond to get all the fish" and would only harm the development of industry.

Attention should also be paid to the ratio between accumulation for the co-operative and the income of the co-operative members. In order to increase accumulation bit by bit, the co-operatives should make use of the law of value and adopt economic accounting, and they should be run with diligence and thrift. If there is a good harvest this year, their accumulation should be a little more than last year, but not too much, for it's better to let the peasants have more to eat first. Accumulate more in good years and less or none in years when the crops half fail or totally fail. In other words, accumulation proceeds in a wave-like manner or in spirals. Since everything in the world is itself a contradiction, a unity of opposites, its movement and development is wave-like. The light emitted by the sun is called light waves, the waves transmitted by radio stations are called radio waves, and sound is carried by sound waves. Water moves in water waves and heat in heat waves. In a sense, walking also proceeds in waves, the step-by-step movement constituting waves. Opera-singing also proceeds in waves, with the singer singing one line after another, never seven or eight lines all at the same time. Handwriting too is done in waves, for people write one word after another and not several hundred words with one stroke of the pen. Such is the undulatory nature of the movement of opposites in all things.

In a word, we must act in accordance with dialectics. So said Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping. In my opinion, the whole Party should study dialectics and advocate acting in accordance with dialectics. The whole Party should pay attention to ideological and theoretical work, build up contingents of Marxist theoretical workers and devote greater efforts to studying and propagating Marxist theory. The Marxist theory of the unity of opposites must be applied in examining and handling the new problems of class contradiction and class struggle in socialist society and also the new problems in the international struggle.

NOTES

[1] The payment of a fixed rate of interest was a means employed by the state in the course of socialist transformation to implement its policy of redemption with regard to the national bourgeoisie's means of production. After the conversion of capitalist industry and commerce into joint state-private enterprises by whole trades in 1956, the state paid the national bourgeoisie a fixed annual rate of interest on the money value of their assets for a given period of time. In its nature this interest was still a form of exploitation.

[2] V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*".

[3] V. I. Lenin, "On the Question of Dialectics".

[4] Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), the well-known German bourgeois military scientist. Among his chief works is *On War*. For Stalin's comment on Clausewitz see Stalin's "Letter in Reply to Comrade Razin".

[5] V. I. Lenin, "War and Revolution".

[6] In March 1926, during the war between Feng Yu-hsiang's National Army and the northeastern warlord Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese imperialists brazenly sent naval vessels to provide cover for Chang's troops who were attacking Feng's troops stationed at Taku Port. Thwarted, the Japanese aggressors, working hand in glove with seven other countries including Britain and the United States, sent the Chinese government an ultimatum, with insolent demands such as that for the dismantling of the defence works at Taku Port. On March 18, thousands of Peking workers, students and citizens held a protest rally in front of Tien An Men and started a demonstration. When the demonstrators reached the government building and demanded the rejection of the eight-power ultimatum, Tuan Chi-jui, the chief of the Northern warlord government, ordered the guards to fire and the demonstrators were slaughtered in cold blood.

ON THE CORRECT HANDLING OF CONTRADICTIONS AMONG THE PEOPLE

February 27, 1957

Our general subject is the correct handling of contradictions among the people. For convenience, let us discuss it under twelve sub-headings. Although reference will be made to contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, this discussion will centre on contradictions among the people.

I. TWO TYPES OF CONTRADICTIONS DIFFERING IN NATURE

Never before has our country been as united as it is today. The victories of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and of the socialist revolution and our achievements in socialist construction have rapidly changed the face of the old China. A still brighter future lies ahead for our motherland. The days of national disunity and chaos which the people detested are gone, never to return. Led by the working class and the Communist Party, our 600 million people, united as one, are engaged in the great task of building socialism. The unification of our country, the unity of our people and the unity of our various nationalities — these are the basic guarantees for the sure triumph of our cause. However, this does not mean that contradictions no longer exist in our society. To imagine that none exist is a naive idea which is at variance with objective reality. We are confronted with two types of social contradictions — those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people. The two are totally different in nature.

Speech at the Eleventh Session (Enlarged) of the Supreme State Conference Comrade Mao Tsetung went over the verbatim record and made certain additions before its publication in the *People's Daily* on June 19, 1957.

To understand these two different types of contradictions correctly, we must first be clear on what is meant by "the people" and what is meant by "the enemy". The concept of "the people" varies in content in different countries and in different periods of history in a given country. Take our own country for example. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, all those classes, strata and social groups opposing Japanese aggression came within the category of the people, while the Japanese imperialists, their Chinese collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements were all enemies of the people. During the War of Liberation, the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs — the bureaucrat-capitalists, the landlords and the Kuomintang reactionaries who represented these two classes — were the enemies of the people, while the other classes, strata and social groups, which opposed them, all came within the category of the people. At the present stage, the period of building socialism, the classes, strata and social groups which favour, support and work for the cause of socialist construction all come within the category of the people, while the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction are all enemies of the people.

The contradictions between ourselves and the enemy are antagonistic contradictions. Within the ranks of the people, the contradictions among the working people are non-antagonistic, while those between the exploited and the exploiting classes have a non-antagonistic as well as an antagonistic aspect. There have always been contradictions among the people, but they are different in content in each period of the revolution and in the period of building socialism. In the conditions prevailing in China today, the contradictions among the people comprise the contradictions within the working class, the contradictions within the peasantry, the contradictions within the intelligentsia, the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry, the contradictions between the workers and peasants on the one hand and the intellectuals on the other, the contradictions between the working class and other sections of the working people on the one hand and the national bourgeoisie on the other, the contradictions within the national bourgeoisie, and so on. Our People's Government is one that genuinely represents the people's interests, it is a government that serves the people. Nevertheless, there are still certain contradictions between this government and the people. These include the contradictions between the interests of the state and the interests of the collective on the one hand and the interests of the individual on the other, between democracy and centralism, between the leadership and the led, and the contradictions arising from the bureaucratic style of work of some of the state personnel in their relations with the masses. All these are also contradictions among the people. Generally speaking, the fundamental identity of the people's interests underlies the contradictions among the people.

In our country, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie comes under the category of contradictions among the people. By and large, the class struggle between the two is a class struggle within the ranks of the people, because the Chinese national bourgeoisie has a dual character. In the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, it had both a revolutionary and a conciliationist side to its character. In the period of the socialist revolution, exploitation of the working class for profit constitutes one side of the character of the national bourgeoisie, while its support of the Constitution and its willingness to accept socialist transformation constitute the other. The national bourgeoisie differs from the imperialists, the landlords and the bureaucrat-capitalists. The contradiction between the national bourgeoisie and the working class is one between exploiter and exploited, and is by nature antagonistic. But in the concrete conditions of China, this antagonistic contradiction between the two classes, if properly handled, can be transformed into a non-antagonistic one and be resolved by peaceful methods. However, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie will change into a contradiction between ourselves and the enemy if we do not handle it properly and do not follow the policy of uniting with, criticizing and educating the national bourgeoisie, or if the national bourgeoisie does not accept this policy of ours.

Since they are different in nature, the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and the contradictions among the people must be resolved by different methods. To put it briefly, the former entail drawing a clear distinction between ourselves and the enemy, and the latter entail drawing a clear distinction between right and wrong. It is of course true that the distinction between ourselves and the enemy is also one of right and wrong. For example, the question of who is in the right, we or the domestic and foreign reactionaries, the imperialists, the feudalists and bureaucrat-capitalists, is also one of right and wrong, but it is in a different category from questions of right and wrong among the people.

Our state is a people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance. What is this dictatorship for? Its first function is internal, namely, to suppress the reactionary classes and elements and those exploiters who resist the socialist revolution, to suppress those who try to wreck our socialist construction, or in other words, to resolve the contradictions between ourselves and the internal enemy. For instance, to arrest, try and sentence certain counter-revolutionaries, and to deprive landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists of their right to vote and their freedom of speech for a certain period of time — all this comes within the scope of our dictatorship. To maintain public order and safeguard the interests of the people, it is necessary to exercise dictatorship as well over thieves, swindlers, murderers, arsonists, criminal gangs and other scoundrels who seriously disrupt public order. The second function of this dictatorship is to protect our country from subversion and possible aggression by external enemies. In such contingencies, it is the task of this dictatorship to resolve the contradiction between ourselves and the external enemy. The aim of this dictatorship is to protect all our people so that they can devote themselves to peaceful labour and make China a socialist country with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science and culture. Who is to exercise this dictatorship? Naturally, the working class and the entire people under its leadership. Dictatorship does not apply within the ranks of the people. The people cannot exercise dictatorship over themselves, nor must one section of the people oppress another. Law-breakers among the people will be punished according to law, but this is different in principle from the exercise of dictatorship to suppress enemies of the people. What applies among the people is democratic centralism. Our Constitution lays it down that citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration, religious belief, and so on. Our Constitution also provides that the organs of state must practise democratic centralism, that they must rely on the masses and that their personnel must serve the people. Our socialist democracy is the broadest kind of democracy, such as is not to be found in any bourgeois state. Our dictatorship is the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance. That is to say, democracy operates within the ranks of the people, while the working class, uniting with all others enjoying civil rights, and in the first place with the peasantry, enforces dictatorship over the reactionary classes and elements and all those who resist socialist transformation and oppose socialist construction. By civil rights, we mean, politically, the rights of freedom and democracy.

But this freedom is freedom with leadership and this democracy is democracy under centralized guidance, not anarchy. Anarchy does not accord with the interests or wishes of the people.

Certain people in our country were delighted by the Hungarian incident. They hoped that something similar would happen in China, that thousands upon thousands of people would take to the streets to demonstrate against the People's Government. Their hopes ran counter to the interests of the masses and therefore could not possibly win their support. Deceived by domestic and foreign counter-revolutionaries, a section of the people in Hungary made the mistake of resorting to violence against the people's government, with the result that both the state and the people suffered. The damage done to the country's economy in a few weeks of rioting will take a long time to repair. In our country there were some others who wavered on the question of the Hungarian incident because they were ignorant of the real state of affairs in the world. They think that there is too little freedom under our people's democracy and that there is more freedom under Western parliamentary democracy. They ask for a two-party system as in the West, with one party in office and the other in opposition. But this so-called two-party system is nothing but a device for maintaining the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; it can never guarantee freedoms to the working people. As a matter of fact, freedom and democracy exist not in the abstract, but only in the concrete. In a society where class struggle exists, if there is freedom for the exploiting classes to exploit the working people, there is no freedom for the working people not to be exploited. If there is democracy for the bourgeoisie, there is no democracy for the proletariat and other working people. The legal existence of the Communist Party is tolerated in some capitalist countries, but only to the extent that it does not endanger the fundamental interests of the bourgeoisie; it is not tolerated beyond that. Those who demand freedom and democracy in the abstract regard democracy as an end and not as a means. Democracy as such sometimes seems to be an end, but it is in fact only a means. Marxism teaches us that democracy is part of the superstructure and belongs to the realm of politics. That is to say, in the last analysis, it serves the economic base. The same is true of freedom. Both democracy and freedom are relative, not absolute, and they come into being and develop in specific historical conditions. Within the ranks of the people, democracy is correlative with centralism and freedom with discipline. They are the two opposites of a single entity, contradictory as well as united, and we should not one-sidedly emphasize one to the exclusion of the other. Within the ranks of the people, we cannot do without freedom, nor can we do without discipline; we cannot do without democracy, nor can we do without centralism. This unity of democracy and centralism, of freedom and discipline, constitutes our democratic centralism. Under this system, the people enjoy broad democracy and freedom, but at the same time they have to keep within the bounds of socialist discipline. All this is well understood by the masses.

In advocating freedom with leadership and democracy under centralized guidance, we in no way mean that coercive measures should be taken to settle ideological questions or questions involving the distinction between right and wrong among the people. All attempts to use administrative orders or coercive measures to settle ideological questions or questions of right and wrong are not only ineffective but harmful. We cannot abolish religion by administrative order or force people not to believe in it. We cannot compel people to give up idealism, any more than we can force them to embrace Marxism. The only way to settle questions of an ideological nature or controversial issues among the people is by the democratic method, the method of discussion, criticism, persuasion and education, and not by the method of coercion or repression. To be able to carry on their production and studies effectively and to lead their lives in peace and order, the people want their government and those in charge of production and of cultural and educational organizations to issue appropriate administrative regulations of an obligatory nature. It is common sense that without them the maintenance of public order would be impossible. Administrative regulations and the method of persuasion and education complement each other in resolving contradictions among the people. In fact, administrative regulations for the maintenance of public order must be accompanied by persuasion and education, for in many cases regulations alone will not work.

This democratic method of resolving contradictions among the people was epitomized in 1942 in the formula “unity — criticism — unity”. To elaborate, that means starting from the desire for unity, resolving contradictions through criticism or struggle, and arriving at a new unity on a new basis. In our experience this is the correct method of resolving contradictions among the people. In 1942 we used it to resolve contradictions inside the Communist Party, namely, the contradictions between the dogmatists and the great majority of the membership, and between dogmatism and Marxism. The "Left" dogmatists had resorted to the method of "ruthless struggle and merciless blows" in inner-Party struggle. It was the wrong method. In criticizing "Left" dogmatism, we did not use this old method but adopted a new one, that is, one of starting from the desire for unity, distinguishing between right and wrong through criticism or struggle, and arriving at a new unity on a new basis. This was the method used in the rectification movement of 1942. Within a few years, by the time the Chinese Communist Party held its Seventh National Congress in 1945, unity was achieved throughout the Party as anticipated, and consequently the people's revolution triumphed. Here, the essential thing is to start from the desire for unity. For without this desire for unity, the struggle, once begun, is certain to throw things into confusion and get out of hand. Wouldn't this be the same as "ruthless struggle and merciless blows"? And what Party unity would there be left? It was precisely this experience that led us to the formula "unity — criticism — unity". Or, in other words, "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones and cure the sickness to save the patient". We extended this method beyond our Party. We applied it with great success in the anti-Japanese base areas in dealing with the relations between the leadership and the masses, between the army and the people, between officers and men, between the different units of the army, and between the different groups of cadres. The use of this method can be traced back to still earlier times in our Party's history. Ever since 1927 when we built our revolutionary armed forces and base areas in the south, this method had been used to deal with the relations between the Party and the masses, between the army and the people, between officers and men, and with other relations among the people. The only difference was that during the anti-Japanese war we employed this method much more consciously. And since the liberation of the whole country, we have employed this same method of "unity — criticism — unity" in our relations with the democratic parties and with industrial and commercial circles. Our task now is to continue to extend and make still better use of this method throughout the ranks of the people; we want all our factories, co-operatives, shops, schools, offices and people's organizations, in a word, all our 600 million people, to use it in resolving contradictions among themselves.

In ordinary circumstances, contradictions among the people are not antagonistic. But if they are not handled properly, or if we relax our vigilance and lower our guard, antagonism may arise. In a socialist country, a development of this kind is usually only a localized and temporary phenomenon. The reason is that the system of exploitation of man by man has been abolished and the interests of the people are fundamentally identical. The antagonistic actions which took place on a fairly wide scale during the Hungarian incident were the result of the operations of both domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary elements. This was a particular as well as a temporary phenomenon. It was a case of the reactionaries inside a socialist country, in league with the imperialists, attempting to achieve their conspiratorial aims by taking advantage of contradictions among the people to foment dissension and stir up disorder. The lesson of the Hungarian incident merits attention.

Many people seem to think that the use of the democratic method to resolve contradictions among the people is something new. Actually it is not. Marxists have always held that the cause of the proletariat must depend on the masses of the people and that Communists must use the democratic method of persuasion and education when working among the labouring people and must on no account resort to commandism or coercion. The Chinese Communist Party faithfully adheres to this Marxist-Leninist principle. It has been our consistent view that under the people's democratic dictatorship two different methods, one dictatorial and the other democratic, should be used to resolve the two types of contradictions which differ in nature — those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people. This idea has been explained again and again in many Party documents and in speeches by many leading comrades of our Party. In my article "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", written in 1949, I said, "The combination of these two aspects, democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries, is the people's democratic dictatorship." I also pointed out that in order to settle problems within the ranks of the people "the method we employ is democratic, the method of persuasion, not of compulsion". Again, in addressing the Second Session of the First National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference in June 1950, I said:

> The people's democratic dictatorship uses two methods. Towards the enemy, it uses the method of dictatorship, that is, for as long a period of time as is necessary it does not permit them to take part in political activity and compels them to obey the law of the People's Government, to engage in labour and, through such labour, be transformed into new men. Towards the people, on the contrary, it uses the method of democracy and not of compulsion, that is, it must necessarily let them take part in political activity and does not compel them to do this or that but uses the method of democracy to educate and persuade. Such education is self-education for the people, and its basic method is criticism and self-criticism.

Thus, on many occasions we have discussed the use of the democratic method for resolving contradictions among the people; furthermore, we have in the main applied it in our work, and many cadres and many other people are familiar with it in practice. Why then do some people now feel that it is a new issue? Because, in the past, the struggle between ourselves and the enemy, both internal and external, was most acute, and contradictions among the people therefore did not attract as much attention as they do today.

Quite a few people fail to make a clear distinction between these two different types of contradictions — those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people — and are prone to confuse the two. It must be admitted that it is sometimes quite easy to do so. We have had instances of such confusion in our work in the past. In the course of cleaning out counter-revolutionaries good people were sometimes mistaken for bad, and such things still happen today. We are able to keep mistakes within bounds because it has been our policy to draw a sharp line between ourselves and the enemy and to rectify mistakes whenever discovered.

Marxist philosophy holds that the law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law of the universe. This law operates universally, whether in the natural world, in human society, or in man's thinking. Between the opposites in a contradiction there is at once unity and struggle, and it is this that impels things to move and change. Contradictions exist everywhere, but their nature differs in accordance with the different nature of different things. In any given thing, the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and transitory, and hence relative, whereas the struggle of opposites is absolute. Lenin gave a very clear exposition of this law. It has come to be understood by a growing number of people in our country. But for many people it is one thing to accept this law and quite another to apply it in examining and dealing with problems. Many dare not openly admit that contradictions still exist among the people of our country, while it is precisely these contradictions that are pushing our society forward. Many do not admit that contradictions still exist in socialist society, with the result that they become irresolute and passive when confronted with social contradictions; they do not understand that socialist society grows more united and consolidated through the ceaseless process of correctly handling and resolving contradictions. For this reason, we need to explain things to our people, and to our cadres in the first place, in order to help them understand the contradictions in socialist society and learn to use correct methods for handling them.

Contradictions in socialist society are fundamentally different from those in the old societies, such as capitalist society. In capitalist society contradictions find expression in acute antagonisms and conflicts, in sharp class struggle; they cannot be resolved by the capitalist system itself and can only be resolved by socialist revolution. The case is quite different with contradictions in socialist society; on the contrary, they are not antagonistic and can be ceaselessly resolved by the socialist system itself.

In socialist society the basic contradictions are still those between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base. However, they are fundamentally different in character and have different features from the contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base in the old societies. The present social system of our country is far superior to that of the old days. If it were not so, the old system would not have been overthrown and the new system could not have been established. In saying that the socialist relations of production correspond better to the character of the productive forces than did the old relations of production, we mean that they allow the productive forces to develop at a speed unattainable in the old society, so that production can expand steadily and increasingly meet the constantly growing needs of the people. Under the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, the productive forces of the old China grew very slowly. For more than fifty years before liberation, China produced only a few tens of thousands of tons of steel a year, not counting the output of the northeastern provinces. If these provinces are included the peak annual steel output only amounted to a little over 900,000 tons. In 1949, the national steel output was a little over 100,000 tons. Yet now, a mere seven years after the liberation of our country, steel output already exceeds 4,000,000 tons. In the old China, there was hardly any machine-building industry, to say nothing of the automobile and aircraft industries; now we have all three. When the people overthrew the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, many were not clear as to which way China should head — towards capitalism or towards socialism. Facts have now provided the answer: Only socialism can save China. The socialist system has promoted the rapid development of the productive forces of our country, a fact even our enemies abroad have had to acknowledge.

But our socialist system has only just been set up; it is not yet fully established or fully consolidated. In joint state-private industrial and commercial enterprises, capitalists still get a fixed rate of interest on their capital, that is to say, exploitation still exists. So far as ownership is concerned, these enterprises are not yet completely socialist in nature. A number of our agricultural and handicraft producers' co-operatives are still semi-socialist, while even in the fully socialist co-operatives certain specific problems of ownership remain to be solved. Relations between production and exchange in accordance with socialist principles are being gradually established within and between all branches of our economy, and more and more appropriate forms are being sought. The problem of the proper relation of accumulation to consumption within each of the two sectors of the socialist economy — the one where the means of production are owned by the whole people and the other where the means of production are owned by the collective — and the problem of the proper relation of accumulation to consumption between the two sectors themselves are complicated problems for which it is not easy to work out a perfectly rational solution all at once. To sum up, socialist relations of production have been established and are in correspondence with the growth of the productive forces, but these relations are still far from perfect, and this imperfection stands in contradiction to the growth of the productive forces. Apart from correspondence as well as contradiction between the relations of production and the growth of the productive forces, there is correspondence as well as contradiction between the superstructure and the economic base. The superstructure, comprising the state system and laws of the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist ideology guided by Marxism-Leninism, plays a positive role in facilitating the victory of socialist transformation and the socialist way of organizing labour; it is in correspondence with the socialist economic base, that is, with socialist relations of production. But the existence of bourgeois ideology, a certain bureaucratic style of work in our state organs and defects in some of the links in our state institutions are in contradiction with the socialist economic base. We must continue to resolve all such contradictions in the light of our specific conditions. Of course, new problems will emerge as these contradictions are resolved. And further efforts will be required to resolve the new contradictions. For instance, a constant process of readjustment through state planning is needed to deal with the contradiction between production and the needs of society, which will long remain an objective reality. Every year our country draws up an economic plan in order to establish a proper ratio between accumulation and consumption and achieve an equilibrium between production and needs. Equilibrium is nothing but a temporary, relative, unity of opposites. By the end of each year, this equilibrium, taken as a whole, is upset by the struggle of opposites; the unity undergoes a change, equilibrium becomes disequilibrium, unity becomes disunity, and once again it is necessary to work out an equilibrium and unity for the next year. Herein lies the superiority of our planned economy. As a matter of fact, this equilibrium, this unity, is partially upset every month or every quarter, and partial readjustments are called for. Sometimes, contradictions arise and the equilibrium is upset because our subjective arrangements do not conform to objective reality; this is what we call making a mistake. The ceaseless emergence and ceaseless resolution of contradictions constitute the dialectical law of the development of things.

Today, matters stand as follows. The large-scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution have in the main come to an end, but class struggle is by no means entirely over. While welcoming the new system, the masses are not yet quite accustomed to it. Government personnel are not sufficiently experienced and have to undertake further study and investigation of specific policies. In other words, time is needed for our socialist system to become established and consolidated, for the masses to become accustomed to the new system, and for government personnel to learn and acquire experience. It is therefore imperative for us at this juncture to raise the question of distinguishing contradictions among the people from those between ourselves and the enemy, as well as the question of the correct handling of contradictions among the people, in order to unite the people of all nationalities in our country for the new battle, the battle against nature, develop our economy and culture, help the whole nation to traverse this period of transition relatively smoothly, consolidate our new system and build up our new state.

II. THE QUESTION OF ELIMINATING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES

The elimination of counter-revolutionaries is a struggle of opposites as between ourselves and the enemy. Among the people, there are some who see this question in a somewhat different light. Two kinds of people hold views differing from ours. Those with a Right deviation in their thinking make no distinction between ourselves and the enemy and take the enemy for our own people. They regard as friends the very persons whom the masses regard as enemies. Those with a "Left" deviation in their thinking magnify contradictions between ourselves and the enemy to such an extent that they take certain contradictions among the people for contradictions with the enemy and regard as counter-revolutionaries persons who are actually not. Both these views are wrong. Neither makes possible the correct handling of the problem of eliminating counter-revolutionaries or a correct assessment of this work.

To form a correct evaluation of our work in eliminating counter-revolutionaries, let us see what repercussions the Hungarian incident has had in China. After its occurrence there was some unrest among a section of our intellectuals, but there were no squalls. Why? One reason, it must be said, was our success in eliminating counter-revolutionaries fairly thoroughly.

Of course, the consolidation of our state is not due primarily to the elimination of counter-revolutionaries. It is due primarily to the fact that we have a Communist Party and a Liberation Army both tempered in decades of revolutionary struggle, and a working people likewise so tempered. Our Party and our armed forces are rooted in the masses, have been tempered in the flames of a protracted revolution and have the capacity to fight. Our People's Republic was not built overnight, but developed step by step out of the revolutionary base areas. A number of democratic personages have also been tempered in the struggle in varying degrees, and they have gone through troubled times together with us. Some intellectuals were tempered in the struggles against imperialism and reaction; since liberation many have gone through a process of ideological remoulding aimed at enabling them to distinguish clearly between ourselves and the enemy. In addition, the consolidation of our state is due to the fact that our economic measures are basically sound, that the people's life is secure and steadily improving, that our policies towards the national bourgeoisie and other classes are correct, and so on. Nevertheless, our success in eliminating counter-revolutionaries is undoubtedly an important reason for the consolidation of our state. For all these reasons, with few exceptions our college students are patriotic and support socialism and did not give way to unrest during the Hungarian incident, even though many of them come from families of non-working people. The same was true of the national bourgeoisie, to say nothing of the basic masses — the workers and peasants.

After liberation, we rooted out a number of counter-revolutionaries. Some were sentenced to death for major crimes. This was absolutely necessary, it was the demand of the masses, and it was done to free them from long years of oppression by the counter-revolutionaries and all kinds of local tyrants, in other words, to liberate the productive forces. If we had not done so, the masses would not have been able to lift their heads. Since 1956, however, there has been a radical change in the situation. In the country as a whole, the bulk of the counter-revolutionaries have been cleared out. Our basic task has changed from unfettering the productive forces to protecting and expanding them in the context of the new relations of production. Because of failure to understand that our present policy fits the present situation and our past policy fitted the past situation, some people want to make use of the present policy to reverse past decisions and to negate the tremendous success we achieved in eliminating counter-revolutionaries. This is completely wrong, and the masses will not permit it.

In our work of eliminating counter-revolutionaries successes were the main thing, but there were also mistakes. In some cases there were excesses and in others counter-revolutionaries slipped through our net. Our policy is: "Counter-revolutionaries must be eliminated wherever found, mistakes must be corrected whenever discovered." Our line in the work of eliminating counter-revolutionaries is the mass line. Of course, even with the mass line mistakes may still occur, but they will be fewer and easier to correct. The masses gain experience through struggle. From the things done correctly they gain the experience of how things are done correctly. From the mistakes made they gain the experience of how mistakes are made.

Wherever mistakes have been discovered in the work of eliminating counter-revolutionaries, steps have been or are being taken to correct them. Those not yet discovered will be corrected as soon as they come to light. Exoneration or rehabilitation should be made known as widely as were the original wrong decisions. I propose that a comprehensive review of the work of eliminating counter-revolutionaries be made this year or next to sum up experience, promote justice and counter unjust attacks. Nationally, this review should be in the charge of the Standing Committees of the National People's Congress and of the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference and, locally, in the charge of the people's councils and the committees of the Political Consultative Conference in the provinces and municipalities. In this review, we must help the large numbers of cadres and activists involved in the work, and not pour cold water on them. It would not be right to dampen their spirits. Nonetheless, wrongs must be righted when discovered. This must be the attitude of all the public security organs, the procurators' offices and the judicial departments, prisons and agencies charged with the reform of criminals through labour. We hope that wherever possible members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, members of the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference and people's deputies will take part in this review. This will be of help in perfecting our legal system and in dealing correctly with counter-revolutionaries and other criminals.

The present situation with regard to counter-revolutionaries can be described in these words: There still are counter-revolutionaries, but not many. In the first place, there still are counter-revolutionaries. Some people say that there aren't any more left and all is well and that we can therefore lay our heads on our pillows and just drop off to sleep. But this is not the way things are. The fact is, there still are counter-revolutionaries (of course, that is not to say you'll find them everywhere and in every organization), and we must continue to fight them. It must be understood that the hidden counter-revolutionaries still at large will not take things lying down, but will certainly seize every opportunity to make trouble. The U.S. imperialists and the Chiang

Kai-shek clique are constantly sending in secret agents to carry on disruptive activities. Even after all the existing counter-revolutionaries have been combed out, new ones are likely to emerge. If we drop our guard, we shall be badly fooled and shall suffer severely. Counter-revolutionaries must be rooted out with a firm hand wherever they are found making trouble. But, taking the country as a whole, there are certainly not many counter-revolutionaries. It would be wrong to say that there are still large numbers of counter-revolutionaries in China. Acceptance of that view would likewise result in a mess.

III. THE QUESTION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE

We have a rural population of over 500 million, so how our peasants fare has a most important bearing on the development of our economy and the consolidation of our state power. In my view, the situation is basically sound. The co-operative transformation of agriculture has been successfully accomplished, and this has resolved the great contradiction in our country between socialist industrialization and the individual peasant economy. As the co-operative transformation of agriculture was completed so rapidly, some people were worried and wondered whether something untoward might occur. There are indeed some faults, but fortunately they are not serious and on the whole the movement is healthy. The peasants are working with a will, and last year there was an increase in the country's grain output despite the worst floods, droughts and gales in years. Now there are people who are stirring up a miniature typhoon, they are saying that co-operation is no good, that there is nothing superior about it. Is co-operation superior or not? Among the documents distributed at today's meeting there is one about the Wang Kuo-fan Co-operative in Tsunhua County, Hopei Province, which I suggest you read. This co-operative is situated in a hilly region which was very poor in the past and which for a number of years depended on relief grain from the People's Government. When the co-operative was first set up in 1953, people called it the "paupers' co-op". But it has become better off year by year, and now, after four years of hard struggle, most of its households have reserves of grain. What was possible for this co-operative should also be possible for others to achieve under normal conditions in the same length of time or a little longer. Clearly there are no grounds for saying that something has gone wrong with agricultural co-operation.

It is also clear that it takes hard struggle to build co-operatives. New things always have to experience difficulties and setbacks as they grow. It is sheer fantasy to imagine that the cause of socialism is all plain sailing and easy success, with no difficulties and setbacks, or without the exertion of tremendous efforts.

Who are the active supporters of the co-operatives? The overwhelming majority of the poor and lower-middle peasants who constitute more than 70 per cent of the rural population. Most of the other peasants are also placing their hopes on the co-operatives. Only a very small minority are really dissatisfied. Quite a number of persons have failed to analyse this situation and to make an over-all examination of the achievements and shortcomings of the co-operatives and the causes of these shortcomings; instead they have taken part of the picture or one side of the matter for the whole, and consequently a miniature typhoon has been stirred up among some people, who are saying that the co-operatives are not superior.

How long will it take to consolidate the co-operatives and for this talk about their not being superior to wind up? Judging from the experience of the growth of many co-operatives, it will probably take five years or a little longer. As most of our co-operatives are only a little over a year old, it would be unreasonable to ask too much of them. In my view, we will be doing well enough if the co-operatives can be consolidated during the Second Five-Year Plan after being established in the First.

The co-operatives are now in the process of gradual consolidation. There are certain contradictions that remain to be resolved, such as those between the state and the co-operatives and those in and between the co-operatives themselves.

To resolve these contradictions we must pay constant attention to the problems of production and distribution. On the question of production, the co-operative economy must be subject to the unified economic planning of the state, while retaining a certain flexibility and independence that do not run counter to the state's unified plan or its policies, laws and regulations. At the same time, every household in a co-operative must comply with the over-all plan of the co-operative or production team to which it belongs, though it may make its own appropriate plans in regard to land allotted for personal needs and to other individually operated economic undertakings. On the question of distribution, we must take the interests of the state, the collective and the individual into account. We must properly handle the three-way relationship between the state agricultural tax, the co-operative's accumulation fund and the peasants' personal income, and take constant care to make readjustments so as to resolve contradictions between them. Accumulation is essential for both the state and the co-operative but in neither case should it be excessive. We should do everything possible to enable the peasants in normal years to raise their personal incomes annually through increased production.

Many people say that the peasants lead a hard life. Is this true? In one sense it is. That is to say, because the imperialists and their agents oppressed and exploited us for over a century, ours is an impoverished country and the standard of living not only of our peasants but of our workers and intellectuals is still low. We will need several decades of strenuous effort gradually to raise the standard of living of our people as a whole. In this context, it is right to say that the peasants lead a "hard life". But in another sense it is not true. We refer to the allegation that in the seven years since liberation it is only the life of the workers that has been improved and not that of the peasants. As a matter of fact, with very few exceptions, there has been some improvement in the life of both the peasants and the workers. Since liberation, the peasants have been free from landlord exploitation and their production has increased annually. Take grain crops. In 1949, the country's output was only something over 210,000 million catties. By 1956, it had risen to more than 360,000 million catties, an increase of nearly 150,000 million catties. The state agricultural tax is not heavy, only amounting to something over 30,000 million catties a year. State purchases of grain from the peasants at standard prices only amount to a little over 50,000 million catties a year. These two items together total over 80,000 million catties. Furthermore, more than half this grain is sold back to the villages and nearby towns. Obviously, no one can say that there has been no improvement in the life of the peasants. In order to help agriculture to develop and the co-operatives to become consolidated, we are planning to stabilize the total annual amount of the grain tax plus the grain purchased by the state at somewhat more than 80,000 million catties within a few years. In this way, the small number of grain-deficient households still found in the countryside will stop being short, all peasant households, except some raising industrial crops, will either have grain reserves or at least become self-sufficient, there will no longer be poor peasants in the countryside, and the standard of living of the entire peasantry will reach or surpass the middle peasants' level. It is not right simply to compare a peasant's average annual income with a worker's and jump to the conclusion that one is too low and the other too high. Since the labour productivity of the workers is much higher than that of the peasants and the latter's cost of living is much lower than that of workers in the cities, the workers cannot be said to have received special favours from the state. The wages of a small number of workers and some state personnel are in fact a little too high, the peasants have reason to be dissatisfied with this, and it is necessary to make certain appropriate adjustments according to specific circumstances.

IV. THE QUESTION OF THE INDUSTRIALISTS AND BUSINESSMEN

With regard to the transformation of our social system, the year 1956 saw the conversion of privately owned industrial and commercial enterprises into joint state-private enterprises as well as the co-operative transformation of agriculture and handicrafts. The speed and smoothness of this conversion were closely bound up with our treating the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie as a contradiction among the people. Has this class contradiction been completely resolved? No, not yet. That will take a considerable period of time. However, some people say the capitalists have been so remoulded that they are now not very different from the workers and that further remoulding is unnecessary. Others go so far as to say that the capitalists are even better than the workers. Still others ask, if remoulding is necessary, why isn't it necessary for the working class? Are these opinions correct? Of course not.

In the building of a socialist society, everybody needs remoulding — the exploiters and also the working people. Who says it isn't necessary for the working class? Of course, the remoulding of the exploiters is essentially different from that of the working people, and the two must not be confused. The working class remoulds the whole of society in class struggle and in the struggle against nature, and in the process it remoulds itself. It must ceaselessly learn in the course of work, gradually overcome its shortcomings and never stop doing so. Take for example those of us present here. Many of us make some progress each year, that is to say, we are remoulding ourselves each year. For myself, I used to have all sorts of non-Marxist ideas, and it was only later that I embraced Marxism. I learned a little Marxism from books and took the first steps in remoulding my ideology, but it was mainly through taking part in class struggle over the years that I came to be remoulded. And if I am to make further progress, I must continue to learn, otherwise I shall lag behind. Can the capitalists be so good that they need no more remoulding?

Some people contend that the Chinese bourgeoisie no longer has two sides to its character, but only one side. Is this true? No. While members of the bourgeoisie have become administrative personnel in joint state-private enterprises and are being transformed from exploiters into working people living by their own labour, they still get a fixed rate of interest on their capital in the joint enterprises, that is, they have not yet cut themselves loose from the roots of exploitation. Between them and the working class there is still a considerable gap in ideology, sentiments and habits of life. How can it be said that they no longer have two sides to their character? Even when they stop receiving their fixed interest payments and the "bourgeois" label is removed, they will still need ideological remoulding for quite some time. If, as is alleged, the bourgeoisie no longer has a dual character, then the capitalists will no longer have the task of studying and of remoulding themselves.

It must be said that this view does not tally either with the actual situation of our industrialists and businessmen or with what most of them want. During the past few years, most of them have been willing to study and have made marked progress. As their thorough remoulding can be achieved only in the course of work, they should engage in labour together with the staff and workers in the enterprises and regard these enterprises as the chief places in which to remould themselves. But it is also important for them to change some of their old views through study. Such study should be on a voluntary basis. When they return to the enterprises after being in study groups for some weeks, many industrialists and businessmen find that they have more of a common language with the workers and the representatives of state ownership, and so there are better possibilities for working together. They know from personal experience that it is good for them to keep on studying and remoulding themselves. The idea mentioned above that study and remoulding are not necessary reflects the views not of the majority of industrialists and businessmen but of only a small number.

V. THE QUESTION OF THE INTELLECTUALS

The contradictions within the ranks of the people in our country also find expression among the intellectuals. The several million intellectuals who worked for the old society have come to serve the new society, and the question that now arises is how they can fit in with the needs of the new society and how we can help them to do so. This, too, is a contradiction among the people.

Most of our intellectuals have made marked progress during the last seven years. They have shown they are in favour of the socialist system. Many are diligently studying Marxism, and some have become communists. The latter, though at present small in number, are steadily increasing. Of course, there are still some intellectuals who are sceptical about socialism or do not approve of it, but they are a minority.

China needs the services of as many intellectuals as possible for the colossal task of building socialism. We should trust those who are really willing to serve the cause of socialism and should radically improve our relations with them and help them solve the problems requiring solution, so that they can give full play to their talents. Many of our comrades are not good at uniting with intellectuals. They are stiff in their attitude towards them, lack respect for their work and interfere in certain scientific and cultural matters where interference is unwarranted. We must do away with all such shortcomings.

Although large numbers of intellectuals have made progress, they should not be complacent. They must continue to remould themselves, gradually shed their bourgeois world outlook and acquire the proletarian, communist world outlook so that they can fully fit in with the needs of the new society and unite with the workers and peasants. The change in world outlook is fundamental, and up to now most of our intellectuals cannot be said to have accomplished it. We hope that they will continue to make progress and that in the course of work and study they will gradually acquire the communist world outlook, grasp Marxism-Leninism and become integrated with the workers and peasants. We hope they will not stop halfway, or, what is worse, slide back, for there will be no future for them in going backwards. Since our country's social system has changed and the economic base of bourgeois ideology has in the main been destroyed, not only is it imperative for large numbers of our intellectuals to change their world outlook, but it is also possible for them to do so. But a thorough change in world outlook takes a very long time, and we should spare no pains in helping them and must not be impatient. Actually, there are bound to be some who ideologically will always be reluctant to accept Marxism-Leninism and communism. We should not be too exacting in what we demand of them; as long as they comply with the requirements laid down by the state and engage in legitimate pursuits, we should let them have opportunities for suitable work.

Among students and intellectuals there has recently been a falling off in ideological and political work, and some unhealthy tendencies have appeared. Some people seem to think that there is no longer any need to concern themselves with politics or with the future of the motherland and the ideals of mankind. It seems as if Marxism, once all the rage, is currently not so much in fashion. To counter these tendencies, we must strengthen our ideological and political work. Both students and intellectuals should study hard. In addition to the study of their specialized subjects, they must make progress ideologically and politically, which means they should study Marxism, current events and politics. Not to have a correct political orientation is like not having a soul. The ideological remoulding in the past was necessary and has yielded positive results. But it was carried on in a somewhat rough-and-ready fashion and the feelings of some people were hurt — this was not good. We must avoid such shortcomings in future. All departments and organizations should shoulder their responsibilities for ideological and political work. This applies to the Communist Party, the Youth League, government departments in charge of this work, and especially to heads of educational institutions and teachers. Our educational policy must enable everyone who receives an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and become a worker with both socialist consciousness and culture. We must spread the idea of building our country through diligence and thrift. We must help all our young people to understand that ours is still a very poor country, that we cannot change this situation radically in a short time, and that only through decades of united effort by our younger generation and all our people, working with their own hands, can China be made prosperous and strong. The establishment of our socialist system has opened the road leading to the ideal society of the future, but to translate this ideal into reality needs hard work. Some of our young people think that everything ought to be perfect once a socialist society is established and that they should be able to enjoy a happy life ready-made, without working for it. This is unrealistic.

VI. THE QUESTION OF THE MINORITY NATIONALITIES

The minority nationalities in our country number more than thirty million. Although they constitute only 6 per cent of the total population, they inhabit extensive regions which comprise 50 to 60 per cent of China's total area. It is thus imperative to foster good relations between the Han people and the minority nationalities. The key to this question lies in overcoming Han chauvinism. At the same time, efforts should also be made to overcome local-nationality chauvinism, wherever it exists among the minority nationalities. Both Han chauvinism and local-nationality chauvinism are harmful to the unity of the nationalities; they represent one kind of contradiction among the people which should be resolved. We have already done some work to this end. In most of the areas inhabited by minority nationalities, there has been considerable improvement in the relations between the nationalities, but a number of problems remain to be solved. In some areas, both Han chauvinism and local-nationality chauvinism still exist to a serious degree, and this demands full attention. As a result of the efforts of the people of all nationalities over the last few years, democratic reforms and socialist transformation have in the main been completed in most of the minority nationality areas. Democratic reforms have not yet been carried out in Tibet because conditions are not ripe. According to the seventeen-article agreement reached between the Central People's Government and the local government of Tibet, the reform of the social system must be carried out, but the timing can only be decided when the great majority of the people of Tibet and the local leading public figures consider it opportune, and one should not be impatient. It has now been decided not to proceed with democratic reforms in Tibet during the period of the Second Five-Year Plan. Whether to proceed with them in the period of the Third Five-Year Plan can only be decided in the light of the situation at the time.

VII. OVER-ALL CONSIDERATION AND PROPER ARRANGEMENT

By over-all consideration we mean consideration that embraces the 600 million people of our country. In drawing up plans, handling affairs or thinking over problems, we must proceed from the fact that China has a population of 600 million, and we must never forget this fact. Why do we make a point of this? Is it possible that there are people who are still unaware that we have a population of 600 million? Of course, everyone knows this, but when it comes to actual practice, some people forget all about it and act as though the fewer the people, the smaller the circle, the better. Those who have this "small circle" mentality abhor the idea of bringing every positive factor into play, of uniting with everyone who can be united with, and of doing everything possible to turn negative factors into positive ones so as to serve the great cause of building a socialist society. I hope these people will take a wider view and fully recognize that we have a population of 600 million, that this is an objective fact, and that it is an asset for us. Our large population is a good thing, but of course it also involves certain difficulties. Construction is going ahead vigorously on all fronts and very successfully too, but in the present transition period of tremendous social change there are still many difficult problems. Progress and at the same time difficulties — this is a contradiction. However, not only should all such contradictions be resolved, but they definitely can be. Our guiding principle is over-all consideration and proper arrangement. Whatever the problem — whether it concerns food, natural calamities, employment, education, the intellectuals, the united front of all patriotic forces, the minority nationalities, or anything else — we must always proceed from the standpoint of over-all consideration, which embraces the whole people, and must make the proper arrangement, after consultation with all the circles concerned, in the light of what is feasible at a particular time and place. On no account should we complain that there are too many people, that others are backward, that things are troublesome and hard to handle, and close the door on them. Do I mean to say that the government alone must take care of everyone and everything? Of course not. In many cases, they can be left to the direct care of the public organizations or the masses — both are quite capable of devising many good ways of handling them. This also comes within the scope of the principle of over-all consideration and proper arrangement. We should give guidance on this to the public organizations and the people everywhere.

VIII. ON "LET A HUNDRED FLOWERS BLOSSOM, LET A HUNDRED SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT CONTEND" AND "LONG-TERM COEXISTENCE AND MUTUAL SUPERVISION"

"Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" and "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" — how did these slogans come to be put forward? They were put forward in the light of China's specific conditions, in recognition of the continued existence of various kinds of contradictions in socialist society and in response to the country's urgent need to speed up its economic and cultural development. Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend is the policy for promoting progress in the arts and sciences and a flourishing socialist culture in our land. Different forms and styles in art should develop freely and different schools in science should contend freely. We think that it is harmful to the growth of art and science if administrative measures are used to impose one particular style of art or school of thought and to ban another. Questions of right and wrong in the arts and sciences should be settled through free discussion in artistic and scientific circles and through practical work in these fields. They should not be settled in an over-simple manner. A period of trial is often needed to determine whether something is right or wrong. Throughout history, at the outset new and correct things often failed to win recognition from the majority of people and had to develop by twists and turns through struggle. Often, correct and good things were first regarded not as fragrant flowers but as poisonous weeds. Copernicus' theory of the solar system and Darwin's theory of evolution were once dismissed as erroneous and had to win out over bitter opposition. Chinese history offers many similar examples. In a socialist society, the conditions for the growth of the new are radically different from and far superior to those in the old society. Nevertheless, it often happens that new, rising forces are held back and sound ideas stifled. Besides, even in the absence of their deliberate suppression, the growth of new things may be hindered simply through lack of discernment. It is therefore necessary to be careful about questions of right and wrong in the arts and sciences, to encourage free discussion and avoid hasty conclusions. We believe that such an attitude will help ensure a relatively smooth development of the arts and sciences.

Marxism, too, has developed through struggle. At the beginning, Marxism was subjected to all kinds of attack and regarded as a poisonous weed. This is still the case in many parts of the world. In the socialist countries, it enjoys a different position. But non-Marxist and, what is more, anti-Marxist ideologies exist even in these countries. In China, although socialist transformation has in the main been completed as regards the system of ownership, and although the large-scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution have in the main come to an end, there are still remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador classes, there is still a bourgeoisie, and the remoulding of the petty bourgeoisie has only just started. Class struggle is by no means over. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the various political forces, and the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the ideological field will still be protracted and tortuous and at times even very sharp. The proletariat seeks to transform the world according to its own world outlook, and so does the bourgeoisie. In this respect, the question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism, is not really settled yet. Marxists remain a minority among the entire population as well as among the intellectuals. Therefore, Marxism must continue to develop through struggle. Marxism can develop only through struggle, and this is not only true of the past and the present, it is necessarily true of the future as well. What is correct invariably develops in the course of struggle with what is wrong. The true, the good and the beautiful always exist by contrast with the false, the evil and the ugly, and grow in struggle with them. As soon as something erroneous is rejected and a particular truth accepted by mankind, new truths begin to struggle with new errors. Such struggles will never end. This is the law of development of truth and, naturally, of Marxism.

It will take a fairly long period of time to decide the issue in the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country. The reason is that the influence of the bourgeoisie and of the intellectuals who come from the old society, the very influence which constitutes their class ideology, will persist in our country for a long time. If this is not understood at all or is insufficiently understood, the gravest of mistakes will be made and the necessity of waging struggle in the ideological field will be ignored. Ideological struggle differs from other forms of struggle, since the only method used is painstaking reasoning, and not crude coercion. Today, socialism is in an advantageous position in the ideological struggle. The basic power of the state is in the hands of the working people led by the proletariat. The Communist Party is strong and its prestige high. Although there are defects and mistakes in our work, every fair-minded person can see that we are loyal to the people, that we are both determined and able to build up our motherland together with them, and that we have already achieved great successes and will achieve still greater ones. The vast majority of the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals who come from the old society are patriotic and are willing to serve their flourishing socialist motherland; they know they will have nothing to fall back on and their future cannot possibly be bright if they turn away from the socialist cause and from the working people led by the Communist Party.

People may ask, since Marxism is accepted as the guiding ideology by the majority of the people in our country, can it be criticized? Certainly it can. Marxism is scientific truth and fears no criticism. If it did, and if it could be overthrown by criticism, it would be worthless. In fact, aren't the idealists criticizing Marxism every day and in every way? And those who harbour bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas and do not wish to change — aren't they also criticizing Marxism in every way? Marxists should not be afraid of criticism from any quarter. Quite the contrary, they need to temper and develop themselves and win new positions in the teeth of criticism and in the storm and stress of struggle. Fighting against wrong ideas is like being vaccinated — a man develops greater immunity from disease as a result of vaccination. Plants raised in hothouses are unlikely to be hardy. Carrying out the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend will not weaken, but strengthen, the leading position of Marxism in the ideological field.

What should our policy be towards non-Marxist ideas? As far as unmistakable counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs of the socialist cause are concerned, the matter is easy, we simply deprive them of their freedom of speech. But incorrect ideas among the people are quite a different matter. Will it do to ban such ideas and deny them any opportunity for expression? Certainly not. It is not only futile but very harmful to use crude methods in dealing with ideological- questions among the people, with questions about man's mental world.- You may ban the expression of wrong ideas, but the ideas will still be there. On the other hand, if correct ideas are pampered in hothouses and never exposed to the elements and immunized against disease, they will not win out against erroneous ones. Therefore, it is only by employing the method of discussion, criticism and reasoning that we can really foster correct ideas and overcome wrong ones, and that we can really settle issues.

It is inevitable that the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie will give expression to their own ideologies. It is inevitable that they will stubbornly assert themselves on political and ideological questions by every possible means. You cannot expect them to do otherwise. We should not use the method of suppression and prevent them from expressing themselves, but should allow them to do so and at the same time argue with them and direct appropriate criticism at them. Undoubtedly, we must criticize wrong ideas of every description. It certainly would not be right to refrain from criticism, look on while wrong ideas spread unchecked and allow them to dominate the field. Mistakes must be criticized and poisonous weeds fought wherever they crop up. However, such criticism should not be dogmatic, and the metaphysical method should not be used, but instead the effort should be made to apply the dialectical method. What is needed is scientific analysis and convincing argument. Dogmatic criticism settles nothing. We are against poisonous weeds of whatever kind, but we must carefully distinguish between what is really a poisonous weed and what is really a fragrant flower. Together with the masses of the people, we must learn to differentiate carefully between the two and use correct methods to fight the poisonous weeds.

At the same time as we criticize dogmatism, we must direct our attention to criticizing revisionism. Revisionism, or Right opportunism, is a bourgeois trend of thought that is even more dangerous than dogmatism. The revisionists, the Right opportunists, pay lip-service to Marxism; they too attack "dogmatism". But what they are really attacking is the quintessence of Marxism. They oppose or distort materialism and dialectics, oppose or try to weaken the people's democratic dictatorship and the leading role of the Communist Party, and oppose or try to weaken socialist transformation and socialist construction. Even after the basic victory of our socialist revolution, there will still be a number of people in our society who vainly hope to restore the capitalist system and are sure to fight the working class on every front, including the ideological one. And their right-hand men in this struggle are the revisionists.

Literally the two slogans — let a hundred flowers blossom and let a hundred schools of thought contend — have no class character; the proletariat can turn them to account, and so can the bourgeoisie or others. Different classes, strata and social groups each have their own views on what are fragrant flowers and what are poisonous weeds. Then, from the point of view of the masses, what should be the criteria today for distinguishing fragrant flowers from poisonous weeds? In their political activities, how should our people judge whether a person's words and deeds are right or wrong? On the basis of the principles of our Constitution, the will of the overwhelming majority of our people and the common political positions which have been proclaimed on various occasions by our political parties, we consider that, broadly speaking, the criteria should be as follows:

(1) Words and deeds should help to unite, and not divide, the people of all our nationalities.

(2) They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction.

(3) They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, the people's democratic dictatorship.

(4) They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, democratic centralism.

(5) They should help to strengthen, and not shake off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party.

(6) They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to international socialist unity and the unity of the peace-loving people of the world.

Of these six criteria, the most important are the two about the socialist path and the leadership of the Party. These criteria are put forward not to hinder but to foster the free discussion of questions among the people. Those who disapprove these criteria can still state their own views and argue their case. However, so long as the majority of the people have clear-cut criteria to go by, criticism and self-criticism can be conducted along proper lines, and these criteria can be applied to people's words and deeds to determine whether they are right or wrong, whether they are fragrant flowers or poisonous weeds. These are political criteria. Naturally, to judge the validity of scientific theories or assess the aesthetic value of works of art, other relevant criteria are needed. But these six political criteria are applicable to all activities in the arts and sciences. In a socialist country like ours, can there possibly be any useful scientific or artistic activity which runs counter to these political criteria?

The views set out above are based on China's specific historical conditions. Conditions vary in different socialist countries and with different Communist Parties. Therefore, we do not maintain that they should or must adopt the Chinese way.

The slogan "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" is also a product of China's specific historical conditions. It was not put forward all of a sudden, but had been in the making for several years. The idea of long-term coexistence had been there for a long time. When the socialist system was in the main established last year, the slogan was formulated in explicit terms. Why should the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democratic parties be allowed to exist side by side with the party of the working class over a long period of time? Because we have no reason for not adopting the policy of long-term coexistence with all those political parties which are truly devoted to the task of uniting the people for the cause of socialism and which enjoy the trust of the people. As early as June 1950, at the Second Session of the First National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference, I put the matter in this way:

> The people and their government have no reason to reject anyone or deny him the opportunity of making a living and rendering service to the country, provided he is really willing to serve the people and provided he really helped and did a good turn when the people were faced with difficulties and keeps on doing good without giving up halfway.

What I was discussing here was the political basis for the long-term coexistence of the various parties. It is the desire as well as the policy of the Communist Party to exist side by side with the democratic parties for a long time to come. But whether the democratic parties can long remain in existence depends not merely on the desire of the Communist Party but on how well they acquit themselves and on whether they enjoy the trust of the people. Mutual supervision among the various parties is also a long-established fact, in the sense that they have long been advising and criticizing each other. Mutual supervision is obviously not a one-sided matter; it means that the

Communist Party can exercise supervision over the democratic parties, and vice versa. Why should the democratic parties be allowed to exercise supervision over the Communist Party? Because a party as much as an individual has great need to hear opinions different from its own. We all know that supervision over the Communist Party is mainly exercised by the working people and the Party membership. But it augments the benefit to us to have supervision by the democratic parties too. Of course, the advice and criticism exchanged by the Communist Party and the democratic parties will play a positive supervisory role only when they conform to the six political criteria given above. Thus, we hope that in order to fit in with the needs of the new society, all the democratic parties will pay attention to ideological remoulding and strive for long-term coexistence with the Communist Party and mutual supervision.

IX. ON THE QUESTION OF DISTURBANCES CREATED BY SMALL NUMBERS OF PEOPLE

In 1956, small numbers of workers or students in certain places went on strike. The immediate cause of these disturbances was the failure to satisfy some of their demands for material benefits, of which some should and could have been met, while others were out of place or excessive and therefore could not be met for the time being. But a more important cause was bureaucracy on the part of the leadership. In some cases, the responsibility for such bureaucratic mistakes fell on the higher authorities, and those at the lower levels were not to blame. Another cause of these disturbances was lack of ideological and political education among the workers and students. The same year, in some agricultural co-operatives there were also disturbances created by a few of their members, and here too the main causes were bureaucracy on the part of the leadership and lack of educational work among the masses.

It should be admitted that among the masses some are prone to pay attention to immediate, partial and personal interests and do not understand, or do not sufficiently understand, long-range, national and collective interests. Because of lack of political and social experience, quite a number of young people cannot readily see the contrast between the old China and the new, and it is not easy for them thoroughly to comprehend the hardships our people went through in the struggle to free themselves from the oppression of the imperialists and Kuomintang reactionaries, or the long years of hard work needed before a fine socialist society can be established. That is why we must constantly carry on lively and effective political education among the masses and should always tell them the truth about the difficulties that crop up and discuss with them how to surmount these difficulties.

We do not approve of disturbances, because contradictions among the people can be resolved through the method of "unity — criticism — unity", while disturbances are bound to cause some losses and are not conducive to the advance of socialism. We believe that the masses of the people support socialism, conscientiously observe discipline and are reasonable, and will certainly not take part in disturbances without cause. But this does not mean that the possibility of disturbances by the masses no longer exists in our country. On this question, we should pay attention to the following. (1) In order to root out the causes of disturbances, we must resolutely overcome bureaucracy, greatly improve ideological and political education, and deal with all contradictions properly. If this is done, generally speaking there will be no disturbances. (2) When disturbances do occur as a result of poor work on our part, then we should guide those involved onto the correct path, use the disturbances as a special means for improving our work and educating the cadres and the masses, and find solutions to those problems which were previously left unsolved. In handling any disturbance, we should take pains and not use over-simple methods, or hastily declare the matter closed. The ringleaders in disturbances should not be summarily expelled, except for those who have committed criminal offences or are active counter-revolutionaries and have to be punished by law. In a large country like ours, there is nothing to get alarmed about if small numbers of people create disturbances; on the contrary, such disturbances will help us get rid of bureaucracy.

There are also a small number of individuals in our society who, flouting the public interest, wilfully break the law and commit crimes. They are apt to take advantage of our policies and distort them, and deliberately put forward unreasonable demands in order to incite the masses, or deliberately spread rumours to create trouble and disrupt public order. We do not propose to let these individuals have their way. On the contrary, proper legal action must be taken against them. Punishing them is the demand of the masses, and it would run counter to the popular will if they were not punished.

X. CAN BAD THINGS BE TURNED INTO GOOD THINGS?

In our society, as I have said, disturbances by the masses are bad, and we do not approve of them. But when disturbances do occur, they enable us to learn lessons, to overcome bureaucracy and to educate the cadres and the masses. In this sense, bad things can be turned into good things. Disturbances thus have a dual character. Every disturbance can be regarded in this way.

Everybody knows that the Hungarian incident was not a good thing. But it too had a dual character. Because our Hungarian comrades took proper action in the course of the incident, what was a bad thing has eventually turned into a good one. Hungary is now more consolidated than ever, and all other countries in the socialist camp have also learned a lesson.

Similarly, the world-wide campaign against communism and the people which took place in the latter half of 1956 was of course a bad thing. But it served to educate and temper the Communist Parties and the working class in all countries, and thus it has turned into a good thing. In the storm and stress of this period, a number of people in many countries withdrew from the Communist Party. Withdrawal from the Party reduces its membership and is, of course, a bad thing. But there is a good side to it, too. Vacillating elements who are unwilling to carry on have withdrawn, and the vast majority who are staunch Party members can be the better united for struggle. Why isn't this a good thing?

To sum up, we must learn to look at problems from all sides, seeing the reverse as well as the obverse side of things. In given conditions, a bad thing can lead to good results and a good thing to bad results. More than two thousand years ago Lao Tzu said: "Good fortune lieth within bad, bad fortune lurketh within good."[1] When the Japanese shot their way into China, they called this a victory. Huge parts of China's territory were seized, and the Chinese called this a defeat. But victory was conceived in China's defeat, while defeat was conceived in Japan's victory. Hasn't history proved this true?

People all over the world are now discussing whether or not a third world war will break out. On this question, too, we must be mentally prepared and do some analysis. We stand firmly for peace and against war. But if the imperialists insist on unleashing another war, we should not be afraid of it. Our attitude on this question is the same as our attitude towards any disturbance: first, we are against it; second, we are not afraid of it. The First World War was followed by the birth of the Soviet Union with a population of 200 million. The Second World War was followed by the emergence of the socialist camp with a combined population of 900 million. If the imperialists insist on launching a third world war, it is certain that several hundred million more will turn to socialism, and then there will not be much room left on earth for the imperialists; it is also likely that the whole structure of imperialism will completely collapse.

In given conditions, each of the two opposing aspects of a contradiction invariably transforms itself into its opposite as a result of the struggle between them. Here, it is the conditions which are essential. Without the given conditions, neither of the two contradictory aspects can transform itself into its opposite. Of all the classes in the world the proletariat is the one which is most eager to change its position, and next comes the semi-proletariat, for the former possesses nothing at all while the latter is hardly any better off. The United States now controls a majority in the United Nations and dominates many parts of the world — this state of affairs is temporary and will be changed one of these days. China's position as a poor country denied its rights in international affairs will also be changed — the poor country will change into a rich one, the country denied its rights into one enjoying them — a transformation of things into their opposites. Here, the decisive conditions are the socialist system and the concerted efforts of a united people.

XI. ON PRACTISING ECONOMY

Here I wish to speak briefly on practising economy. We want to carry on large-scale construction, but our country is still very poor — herein lies a contradiction. One way of resolving it is to make a sustained effort to practise strict economy in every field.

During the movement against the "three evils" in 1952, we fought against corruption, waste and bureaucracy, with the emphasis on combating corruption. In 1955 we advocated the practice of economy with great success, our emphasis then being on combating the unduly high standards for non-productive projects in capital construction and economizing on raw materials in industrial production. But at that time economy was not yet applied in earnest as a guiding principle in all branches of the national economy, or in government offices, army units, schools and people's organizations in general. This year we are calling for economy and the elimination of waste in every sphere throughout the country. We still lack experience in the work of construction. During the last few years, great successes have been achieved, but there has also been waste. We must build up a number of large-scale modern enterprises step by step to form the mainstay of our industry, without which we shall not be able to turn China into a powerful modern industrial country within the coming decades. But the majority of our enterprises should not be built on such a scale; we should set up more small and medium enterprises and make full use of the industrial base inherited from the old society, so as to effect the greatest economy and do more with less money. Good results have begun to appear in the few months since the principle of practising strict economy and combating waste was put forward, in more emphatic terms than before, by the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in November 1956. The present campaign for economy must be conducted in a thorough and sustained way. Like the criticism of any other fault or mistake, the fight against waste may be compared to washing one's face. Don't people wash their faces every day? The Chinese Communist Party, the democratic parties, the democrats with no party affiliation, the intellectuals, industrialists and businessmen, workers, peasants and handicraftsmen — in short, all our 600 million people — must strive for increased production and economy, and against extravagance and waste. This is of prime importance not only economically, but politically as well. A dangerous tendency has shown itself of late among many of our personnel — an unwillingness to share weal and woe with the masses, a concern for personal fame and gain. This is very bad. One way of overcoming it is to streamline our organizations in the course of our campaign to increase production and practise economy, and to transfer cadres to lower levels so that a considerable number will return to productive work. We must see to it that all our cadres and all our people constantly bear in mind that ours is a large socialist country but an economically backward and poor one, and that this is a very big contradiction. To make China prosperous and strong needs several decades of hard struggle, which means, among other things, pursuing the policy of building up our country through diligence and thrift, that is, practising strict economy and fighting waste.

XII. CHINA'S PATH TO INDUSTRIALIZATION

In discussing our path to industrialization, we are here concerned principally with the relationship between the growth of heavy industry, light industry and agriculture. It must be affirmed that heavy industry is the core of China's economic construction. At the same time, full attention must be paid to the development of agriculture and light industry.

As China is a large agricultural country, with over 80 per cent of its population in the rural areas, agriculture must develop along with industry, for only thus can industry secure raw materials and a market, and only thus is it possible to accumulate more funds for building a powerful heavy industry. Everyone knows that light industry is closely tied up with agriculture. Without agriculture there can be no light industry. But it is not yet so clearly understood that agriculture provides heavy industry with an important market. This fact, however, will be more readily appreciated as gradual progress in the technical transformation and modernization of agriculture calls for more and more machinery, fertilizer, water conservancy and electric power projects and transport facilities for the farms, as well as fuel and building materials for the rural consumers. During the period of the Second and Third Five-Year Plans, the entire national economy will benefit if we can achieve an even greater growth in our agriculture and thus induce a correspondingly greater development of light industry. As agriculture and light industry develop, heavy industry, assured of its market and funds, will grow faster. Hence what may seem to be a slower pace of industrialization will actually not be so slow, and indeed may even be faster. In three five-year plans or perhaps a little longer, China's annual steel output can be raised to 20,000,000 tons or more, as compared with the peak pre-liberation output of something over

900,000 tons in 1943. This will gladden the people in both town and country.

I do not propose to dwell on economic questions today. With barely seven years of economic construction behind us, we still lack experience and need to accumulate it. Neither had we any experience in revolution when we first started, and it was only after we had taken a number of tumbles and acquired experience that we won nation-wide victory. What we must now demand of ourselves is to gain experience in economic construction in a shorter period of time than it took us to gain experience in revolution, and not to pay as high a price for it. Some price we will have to pay, but we hope it will not be as high as that paid during the period of revolution. We must realize that there is a contradiction here — the contradiction between the objective laws of economic development of a socialist society and our subjective cognition of them — which needs to be resolved in the course of practice. This contradiction also manifests itself as a contradiction between different people, that is, a contradiction between those in whom the reflection of these objective laws is relatively accurate and those in whom the reflection is relatively inaccurate; this, too, is a contradiction among the people. Every contradiction is an objective reality, and it is our task to reflect it and resolve it in as nearly correct a fashion as we can.

In order to turn China into an industrial country, we must learn conscientiously from the advanced experience of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been building socialism for forty years, and its experience is very valuable to us. Let us ask: Who designed and equipped so many important factories for us? Was it the United States? Or Britain? No, neither the one nor the other. Only the Soviet Union was willing to do so, because it is a socialist country and our ally. In addition to the Soviet Union, the fraternal countries in East Europe have also given us some assistance. It is perfectly true that we should learn from the good experience of all countries, socialist or capitalist, about this there is no argument. But the main thing is still to learn from the Soviet Union. Now there are two different attitudes towards learning from others. One is the dogmatic attitude of transplanting everything, whether or not it is suited to our conditions. This is no good. The other attitude is to use our heads and learn those things which suit our conditions, that is, to absorb whatever experience is useful to us. That is the attitude we should adopt.

To strengthen our solidarity with the Soviet Union, to strengthen our solidarity with all the socialist countries — this is our fundamental policy, this is where our basic interests lie. Then there are the Asian and African countries and all the peace-loving countries and peoples — we must strengthen and develop our solidarity with them. United with these two forces, we shall not stand alone. As for the imperialist countries, we should unite with their people and strive to coexist peacefully with those countries, do business with them and prevent a possible war, but under no circumstances should we harbour any unrealistic notions about them.

NOTES

[1] *Lao Tzu*, Chapter LVIII.

SPEECH AT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PROPAGANDA WORK

March 12, 1957

Comrades,

This conference has gone very well. Many questions have been raised during the conference and we have learned about many things. I shall now make a few remarks on questions the comrades here have been discussing.

We are living in a period of great social change. Chinese society has been in the midst of great changes for a long time. The War of Resistance Against Japan was one period of great change and the War of Liberation another. But the present changes are much more profound in character than the earlier ones. We are now building socialism. Hundreds of millions of people are taking part in the movement for socialist transformation. Class relations are changing throughout the country. The petty bourgeoisie in agriculture and handicrafts and the bourgeoisie in industry and commerce have both experienced changes. The social and economic system has been changed; individual economy has been transformed into collective economy, and capitalist private ownership is being transformed into socialist public ownership. Changes of such magnitude are of course reflected in people's minds. Man's social being determines his consciousness. These great changes in our social system are reflected differently among people of different classes, strata and social groups. The masses eagerly support them, for life itself has confirmed that socialism is the only way out for China. Overthrowing the old social system and establishing a new one, the system of socialism, means a great struggle, a great change in the social system and in men's relations with each other. It should be said that the situation is basically sound. But the new social system has only just been established and requires time for its consolidation. It must not be assumed that the new system can be completely consolidated the moment it is established; that is impossible. It has to be consolidated step by step. To achieve its ultimate consolidation, it is necessary not only to bring about the socialist industrialization of the country and persevere in the socialist revolution on the economic front, but also to carry on constant and arduous socialist revolutionary struggles and socialist education on the political and ideological fronts. Moreover, various complementary international conditions are required. In China the struggle to consolidate the socialist system, the struggle to decide whether socialism or capitalism will prevail, will take a long historical period. But we should all realize that the new system of socialism will unquestionably be consolidated. We can assuredly build a socialist state with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science and culture. This is the first point I want to make.

Second, the situation regarding the intellectuals in our country. No accurate statistics are available on the number of intellectuals in China. It is estimated that there are about five million of all types, including both higher and ordinary intellectuals. Of these five million the overwhelming majority are patriotic, love our People's Republic, and are willing to serve the people and the socialist state. A small number do not quite welcome the socialist system and are not very happy about it. They are still sceptical about socialism, but they are patriotic when it comes to facing imperialism. The number of intellectuals who are hostile to our state is very small. They do not like our state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and yearn for the old society. Whenever there is an opportunity, they will stir up trouble and attempt to overthrow the Communist Party and restore the old China. As between the proletarian and the bourgeois lines, as between the socialist and the capitalist lines, they stubbornly choose to follow the latter. In fact this line is not practicable, and therefore they are actually ready to capitulate to imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. Such persons are found in political circles and in industrial and commercial, cultural and educational, scientific and technological and religious circles, and they are extremely reactionary. They account for only 1 or 2 or 3 per cent of the five million intellectuals. The overwhelming majority, or well over 90 per cent, of the total of five million, support the socialist system in varying degrees. Many of them are not yet quite clear on how to work under socialism and on how to understand, handle and solve many of the new problems.

As far as the attitude of the five million intellectuals towards Marxism is concerned, one may say that over 10 per cent, comprising the Communists and sympathizers, are relatively familiar with Marxism and take a firm stand — the stand of the proletariat. Among the total of five million, they are a minority, but they are the nucleus and a powerful force. The majority have the desire to study Marxism and have already learned a little, but they are not yet familiar with it. Some of them still have doubts, their stand is not yet firm and they vacillate in moments of stress. This section of intellectuals, constituting the majority of the five million, is still in the middle. Those who strongly oppose Marxism, or are hostile to it, are very few in number. Some actually disagree with Marxism, although they do not openly say so. There will be people like this for a long time to come, and we should allow them to disagree. Take some of the idealists for example. They may support the socialist political and economic system but disagree with the Marxist world outlook. The same holds true for the patriotic people in religious circles. They are theists and we are atheists. We cannot force them to accept the Marxist world outlook. In short, the attitude towards Marxism of the five million intellectuals may be summed up as follows: Those who support Marxism and are relatively familiar with it are a minority, those who oppose it are also a minority, and the majority support Marxism but are not familiar with it and support it in varying degrees. Here there are three different kinds of stand — resolute, wavering and antagonistic. It should be recognized that this situation will continue for a very long time. If we fail to recognize this, we shall make too great a demand on others and at the same time set ourselves too small a task. Our comrades in propaganda work have the task of disseminating Marxism. This has to be done gradually and done well, so that people willingly accept it. We cannot force people to accept Marxism, we can only persuade them. If over a period of several five-year plans a fairly large number of our intellectuals accept Marxism and acquire a fairly good grasp of it through practice, through their work and life, through class struggle, production and scientific activity, that will be fine. And that is what we hope will happen.

Third, the question of the remoulding of the intellectuals. Ours is a culturally underdeveloped country. For a vast country like ours, five million intellectuals are too few. Without intellectuals our work cannot be done well, and we should therefore do a good job of uniting with them. Socialist society mainly comprises three sections of people, the workers, the peasants and the intellectuals. Intellectuals are mental workers. Their work is in the service of the people, that is, in the service of the workers and the peasants. As far as the majority of the intellectuals are concerned, they can serve the new China as they did the old, serve the proletariat as they did the bourgeoisie. When the intellectuals served the old China, the left wing resisted, the middle wavered, and only the right wing stood firm. Now, when it comes to serving the new society, the reverse is the case. The left wing stands firm, the middle wavers (this wavering in the new society is different from that in the old), and the right wing resists. Moreover, intellectuals are educators. Our newspapers are educating the people every day. Our writers and artists, scientists and technicians, professors and teachers are all educating students, educating the people. Being educators and teachers, they have the duty to be educated first. And all the more so in the present period of great change in the social system. They have had some Marxist education in the last few years, and some have studied very hard and made great progress. But the majority still have a long way to go before they can completely replace their bourgeois world outlook with the proletarian world outlook. Some have read a few Marxist books and think themselves quite learned, but what they have read has not sunk in, has not taken root in their minds, so that they don't know how to use it and their class feelings remain unchanged. Others are conceited; having picked up some book-phrases, they think themselves terrific and are very cocky; but whenever a storm blows up, they take a stand very different from that of the workers and the great majority of the working peasants. They waver while the latter stand firm, they equivocate while the latter are forthright. Hence it is wrong to assume that people who educate others no longer need to be educated themselves and no longer need to study, or that socialist remoulding means remoulding others — the landlords, the capitalists and the individual producers — but not the intellectuals. The intellectuals, too, need remoulding, and not only those who have not changed their basic stand; everybody should study and remould himself. I say "everybody", and that includes all of us present here. Conditions are changing all the time, and to adapt one's thinking to the new conditions, one must study. Even those who have a better grasp of Marxism and are comparatively firm in their proletarian stand have to go on studying, have to absorb what is new and study new problems. Unless they rid their minds of what is unsound, intellectuals cannot shoulder the task of educating others. Naturally, we have to learn while teaching and be pupils while serving as teachers. To be a good teacher, one must first be a good pupil. There are many things which cannot be learned from books alone; one must learn from those engaged in production, from the workers, from the peasants and, in schools, from the students, from those one teaches. In my opinion, the majority of our intellectuals are willing to learn. Given their willingness, it is our duty sincerely to help them study; we must help them in an appropriate way and must not resort to compulsion and force them to study.

Fourth, the question of the integration of the intellectuals with the masses of workers and peasants. Since they are to serve the masses of workers and peasants, intellectuals must, first and foremost, know them and be familiar with their life, work and ideas. We encourage intellectuals to go among the masses, to go to factories and villages. It is very bad if you never in all your life meet a worker or a peasant. Our state personnel, writers, artists, teachers and scientific research workers should seize every opportunity to get close to the workers and peasants. Some can go to factories or villages just to look around; this may be called "looking at the flowers on horseback" and is better than doing nothing at all. Others can stay for a few months, conducting investigations and making friends; this may be called "dismounting to look at the flowers". Still others can stay and live there for a considerable time, say, two or three years or even longer; this may be called "settling down". Some intellectuals do live among the workers and peasants, for instance, technicians in factories, technical personnel in agriculture and teachers in rural schools. They should do their work well and become one with the workers and peasants. We should make it the common practice to get close to the workers and peasants, in other words, we should have large numbers of intellectuals doing so. Not all of them of course; some are unable to go for one reason or another, but we hope that as many as possible will go. Nor can they all go at the same time; they can go in batches at different times. In the Yenan days, intellectuals were urged to make direct contact with workers and peasants. Many intellectuals in Yenan were very confused in their thinking and came forth with all sorts of queer arguments. We held a forum and advised them to go among the masses. Later on, many did, and the results were very good. Until an intellectual's book knowledge is integrated with practice, it is incomplete or indeed very incomplete. It is chiefly through reading books that intellectuals acquire the experience of our predecessors. Of course, reading books cannot be dispensed with, but by itself it does not solve problems. One must study the actual situation, study practical experience and factual material, and make friends with the workers and peasants. Making friends with the workers and peasants is no easy job. Today also there are people who go to factories or villages, and the results are good in some cases but not in others. What is involved here is the question of stand or attitude, that is, of one's world outlook. We advocate "letting a hundred schools of thought contend", and there may be many schools and trends in every branch of learning, but on the matter of world outlook, there are basically only two schools in our time, the proletarian and the bourgeois. It is one or the other, either the proletarian or the bourgeois world outlook. The communist world outlook is the world outlook of the proletariat and of no other class. Most of our present intellectuals come from the old society and from families of non-working people. Even those who come from workers' or peasants' families are still bourgeois intellectuals, because the education they received before liberation was a bourgeois education and their world outlook is fundamentally bourgeois. If the intellectuals do not discard the old and replace it by the proletarian world outlook, they will remain different from the workers and peasants in their viewpoint, stand and feelings and will be like square pegs in round holes, and the workers and peasants will not open their hearts to them. If the intellectuals integrate themselves with the workers and peasants and make friends with them, the Marxism they have learned from books can become truly their own. In order to have a real grasp of Marxism, one must learn it not only from books, but chiefly through class struggle, through practical work and close contact with the masses of workers and peasants. When in addition to studying some Marxism our intellectuals have gained some understanding of it through close contact with the masses of workers and peasants and through their own practical work, we will all be speaking the same language, not only the common language of patriotism and of the socialist system, but probably even that of the communist world outlook. If that happens, all of us will certainly work much better.

Fifth, rectification. Rectification means correcting one's way of thinking and style of work. Rectification movements were conducted within the Communist Party during the anti-Japanese war, during the War of Liberation, and in the early days after the founding of the People's Republic of China. Now the Central Committee of the Communist Party has decided on another rectification within the Party to be started this year. Non-Party people may take part or abstain as they wish. The main thing in this rectification movement is to criticize the following incorrect ways of thinking and styles of work — subjectivism, bureaucracy and sectarianism. As in the rectification movement during the anti-Japanese war, the method this time will be first to study a number of documents, and then, on the basis of such study, to examine one's own thinking and work and unfold criticism and self-criticism to expose shortcomings and mistakes and promote what is right and good. On the one hand, we must be strict and conduct criticism and self-criticism with respect to mistakes and shortcomings seriously, not perfunctorily, and correct them; on the other hand, we must use the method of the "gentle breeze and mild rain" and that of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient", and we must oppose the method of "finishing people off with a single blow".

Ours is a great Party, a glorious Party, a correct Party. This must be affirmed as a fact. But we still have shortcomings, and this, too, must be affirmed as a fact. We should not affirm everything about ourselves, but only what is correct; at the same time, we should not negate everything about ourselves, but only what is wrong. Achievements are the main thing in our work, and yet there are not a few shortcomings and mistakes. That is why we need a rectification movement. Will it undermine our Party's prestige if we criticize our own subjectivism, bureaucracy and sectarianism? I think not. On the contrary, it will serve to enhance the Party's prestige. This was borne out by the rectification movement during the anti-Japanese war. It enhanced the prestige of our Party, of our Party comrades and our veteran cadres, and it also enabled the new cadres to make great progress. Which of the two was afraid of criticism, the Communist Party or the Kuomintang? The Kuomintang. It prohibited criticism, but that did not save it from final defeat. The Communist Party does not fear criticism because we are Marxists, the truth is on our side, and the basic masses, the workers and peasants, are on our side. As we used to say, the rectification movement is "a widespread movement of Marxist education".[1] Rectification means the whole Party studying Marxism through criticism and self-criticism. We can certainly learn more Marxism in the course of the rectification movement.

The transformation and construction of China depend on us for leadership. When we have rectified our way of thinking and style of work, we shall enjoy greater initiative in our work, become more capable and do a better job. Our country has need of many people who whole-heartedly serve the masses and the cause of socialism and who are determined to bring about changes. We Communists should all be people of this kind. Formerly, in the old China, it was a crime to talk about reforms, and offenders would be beheaded or imprisoned. Nevertheless there were determined reformers who were dauntless and published books and newspapers, educated and organized the people and waged indomitable struggles under every kind of difficulty. The state, the people's democratic dictatorship, has paved the way for the rapid economic and cultural development of our country. It is only a few years since the establishment of our state, and yet people can already see the unprecedented flowering of the economy, culture, education and science. In building up the new China we Communists are likewise not daunted by any difficulties. But we cannot accomplish this all on our own. We need a good number of non-Party people with high ideals who will keep to the socialist and communist orientation and fight dauntlessly with us to transform and construct our society. It is a colossal task to ensure a better life for the several hundred million people of China and to make our economically and culturally backward country a prosperous and powerful one with a high level of culture. And it is precisely in order to be able to shoulder this task more competently and work better with all non-Party people who have high ideals and the determination to institute reforms that we must conduct rectification movements both now and in the future, and constantly rid ourselves of whatever is wrong. Thoroughgoing materialists are fearless; we hope that all our fellow fighters will courageously shoulder their responsibilities and overcome all difficulties, fearing no setbacks or gibes, nor hesitating to criticize us Communists and give us their suggestions. "He who is not afraid of death by a thousand cuts dares to unhorse the emperor" — this is the dauntless spirit needed in our struggle to build socialism and communism. On our part, we Communists should create conditions helpful to those who co-operate with us, establish good comradely relations with them in our common work and unite with them in our joint struggle.

Sixth, the question of one-sidedness. One-sidedness means thinking in terms of absolutes, that is, taking a metaphysical approach to problems. In the appraisal of our work, it is one-sided to affirm everything or to negate everything. There still are quite a few people inside the Communist Party and many outside it who do just that. To affirm everything is to see only the good and not the bad, and to welcome only praise and not criticism. To talk as though our work is good in every respect is at variance with the facts. It is not true that everything is good; there are shortcomings and mistakes. But neither is it true that everything is bad; that too is at variance with the facts. Here analysis is necessary. To negate everything is to think, without prior analysis, that nothing has been done well and that the great task of building socialism, the great struggle in which hundreds of millions of people are participating, is a complete mess with nothing commendable about it. Although there is a difference between many of those who hold such views and those who are hostile to the socialist system, these views are very mistaken and harmful and can only dishearten people. It is wrong to appraise our work either from the standpoint of affirming everything or from the standpoint of negating everything. We should criticize those people who take such a one-sided approach to problems, though of course we should do so in the spirit of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient", and we should give them help.

Some people say: Since there is to be a rectification movement and since everyone is asked to express his opinions, one-sidedness is unavoidable, and therefore it seems that in calling for the elimination of one-sidedness, you really don't want people to speak up. Is this assertion right? It is naturally difficult for everyone to be free from any trace of one-sidedness. People always examine and handle problems and express their views in the light of their own experience, and unavoidably they sometimes show a little one-sidedness. However, shouldn't we ask them gradually to overcome their one-sidedness and look at problems in a relatively all-sided way? In my opinion, we should. We would be stagnating and we would be approving one-sidedness and contradicting the whole purpose of rectification if we did not make the demand that from day to day and from year to year more and more people should view problems in a relatively all-sided way. One-sidedness violates dialectics. We want gradually to disseminate dialectics and to ask everyone gradually to learn the use of the scientific dialectical method. Some of the articles appearing today are extremely pretentious but empty, without any analysis of problems or reasoned argument, and they carry no conviction. There should be fewer and fewer articles of this kind. When writing an article, one should not be for ever thinking, "How smart I am!" but should put oneself on a completely equal footing with one's readers. You may have been in the revolution for a long time, but if you say something wrong people will refute you all the same. The more you put on airs, the less people will stand for it and the less they will care to read your articles. We should do our work honestly, take an analytical approach, write convincingly and never strike a pose to overawe people.

Some people say that while one-sidedness can be avoided in a lengthy article, it is unavoidable in a short essay. Must a short essay inevitably be one-sided? As I have just said, it is usually hard to avoid one-sidedness, and there is nothing terrible if it creeps in to a certain extent. Criticism would be hampered if everyone were required to look at problems in an absolutely all-sided way. Nevertheless, we do ask everyone to try to approach problems in a relatively all-sided way and try to avoid one-sidedness not only in long articles but also in short articles, short essays included. Some people argue, how is it possible to undertake analysis in an essay of a few hundred or one to two thousand words? I say, why not? Didn't Lu Hsun do it? The analytical method is dialectical. By analysis, we mean analysing the contradictions in things. And sound analysis is impossible without intimate knowledge of life and without real understanding of the relevant contradictions. Lu Hsun's later essays are so penetrating and powerful and yet so free from one-sidedness precisely because by then he had grasped dialectics. Some of Lenin's articles can also be called short essays; they are satirical and pungent, but without one-sidedness. Almost all of Lu Hsun's essays were directed at the enemy; some of Lenin's essays were directed at the enemy and others at comrades. Can the Lu Hsun type of essay be used against mistakes and shortcomings within the ranks of the people? I think it can. Of course, we must make a distinction between ourselves and the enemy, and we must not adopt an antagonistic stand towards comrades and treat them as we would the enemy. One must speak warmly and sincerely with a desire to protect the cause of the people and raise their political consciousness and must not indulge in ridicule or attack.

What if one dare not write? Some people say they dare not write even when they have something to say, lest they should offend people and be criticized. I think such worries can be cast aside. Ours is a people's democratic state, and it provides an environment conducive to writing in the service of the people. The policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend offers additional guarantees for the flowering of science and the arts. If what you say is right, you need not fear criticism, and through debate you can further explain your correct views. If what you say is wrong, then criticism can help you correct your mistakes, and there is nothing bad in that. In our society, militant revolutionary criticism and counter-criticism is the healthy method used to expose and resolve contradictions, develop science and the arts and ensure success in all our work.

Seventh, whether to "open wide" or to "restrict"? This is a question of policy. "Let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend" is a long-term as well as a fundamental policy; it is not just a temporary policy. In the discussion, comrades expressed disapproval of "restriction", and I think this view is the correct one. The Central Committee of the Party is of the opinion that we must "open wide", not "restrict".

Two alternative methods of leading our country, or in other words two alternative policies, can be adopted — to "open wide" or to "restrict". To "open wide" means to let all people express their opinions freely, so that they dare to speak, dare to criticize and dare to debate; it means not being afraid of wrong views or anything poisonous; it means to encourage argument and criticism among people holding different views, allowing freedom both for criticism and for counter-criticism; it means not coercing people with wrong views into submission but convincing them by reasoning. To "restrict" means to forbid people to air differing opinions and express wrong ideas, and to "finish them off with a single blow" if they do so. That is the way to aggravate rather than to resolve contradictions. To "open wide", or to "restrict"? We must choose one or the other of these two policies. We choose the former, because it is the policy which will help to consolidate our country and develop our culture.

We intend to use the policy of "opening wide" to unite with the several million intellectuals and change their present outlook. As I have said above, the overwhelming majority of the intellectuals in our country want to make progress and remould themselves, and they are quite capable of being remoulded. In this connection, the policy we adopt will play a big role. The question of the intellectuals is above all one of ideology, and it is not helpful but harmful to resort to crude and heavy-handed measures for solving ideological questions. The remoulding of the intellectuals, and especially the changing of their world outlook, is a process that requires a long period of time. Our comrades must understand that ideological remoulding involves long-term, patient and painstaking work, and they must not attempt to change people's ideology, which has been shaped over decades of life, by giving a few lectures or by holding a few meetings. Persuasion, not coercion, is the only way to convince people. Coercion will never result in convincing people. To try to make them submit by force simply won't do. This kind of method is permissible in dealing with the enemy, but absolutely impermissible in dealing with comrades or friends. What if we don't know how to convince others? Then we have to learn. We must learn to conquer erroneous ideas through debate and reasoning.

"Let a hundred flowers blossom" is the way to develop the arts, and "let a hundred schools of thought contend" the way to develop science. Not only is this a good method for developing science and the arts, but, applied more widely, it is a good method for all our work. It enables us to make fewer mistakes. There are many things we don't understand and are therefore unable to tackle, but through debate and struggle we shall come to understand them and learn how to tackle them. Truth develops through debate between different views. The same method can be adopted in dealing with whatever is poisonous and anti-Marxist, because in the struggle against it Marxism will develop. This is development through the struggle of opposites, development conforming to dialectics.

Haven't people discussed the true, the good and the beautiful all through the ages? Their opposites are the false, the evil and the ugly. The former would not exist without the latter. Truth stands in opposition to falsehood. In society as in nature, every entity invariably divides into different parts, only there are differences in content and form under different concrete conditions. There will always be wrong things and ugly phenomena. There will always be such opposites as the right and the wrong, the good and the evil, the beautiful and the ugly. The same is true of fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds. The relationship between them is one of the unity and struggle of opposites. Only by comparing can one distinguish. Only by making distinctions and waging struggle can there be development. Truth develops through its struggle against falsehood. This is how Marxism develops. Marxism develops in the struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, and it is only through struggle that it can develop.

We are for the policy of "opening wide"; so far there has been too little of it rather than too much. We must not be afraid of "opening wide", nor should we be afraid of criticism and poisonous weeds. Marxism is scientific truth; it fears no criticism and cannot be overthrown by criticism. The same holds for the Communist Party and the People's Government; they fear no criticism and cannot be toppled by it. There will always be things that are wrong, and that is nothing to be afraid of. Recently, ghosts and monsters have been presented on the stage. Some comrades have become very worried by this spectacle. In my opinion, a little of this doesn't matter much; within a few decades such ghosts and monsters will disappear from the stage altogether, and you won't be able to see them even if you want to. We must promote what is right and oppose what is wrong, but we need not be frightened if people come in contact with erroneous things. It will solve no problem simply to issue administrative orders forbidding people to have any contact with perverse and ugly phenomena and with erroneous ideas, or forbidding them to see ghosts and monsters on the stage. Of course, I am not advocating the spread of such stuff, I am only saying "a little of this doesn't matter much". It is not at all strange that erroneous things should exist, nor should this give any cause for fear; indeed it helps people learn to struggle against them better. Even great storms are not to be feared. It is amid great storms that human society progresses.

In our country bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology and anti-Marxist ideologies will persist for a long time. Basically, the socialist system has been established in our country. While we have won basic victory in transforming the ownership of the means of production, we are even farther from complete victory on the political and ideological fronts. In the ideological field, the question of who will win out, the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, has not yet been really settled. We still have to wage a protracted struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology. It is wrong not to understand this and to give up ideological struggle. All erroneous ideas, all poisonous weeds, all ghosts and monsters, must be subjected to criticism; in no circumstances should they be allowed to spread freely. However, the criticism should be fully reasoned, analytical and convincing, and neither rough and bureaucratic, nor metaphysical and dogmatic.

For a long time now people have been levelling a lot of criticism at dogmatism. That is as it should be. But they often neglect to criticize revisionism. Both dogmatism and revisionism run counter to Marxism. Marxism must necessarily advance; it must develop along with practice and cannot stand still. It would become lifeless if it were stagnant and stereotyped. However, the basic principles of Marxism must never be violated, otherwise mistakes will be made. It is dogmatism to approach Marxism from a metaphysical point of view and to regard it as something rigid. It is revisionism to negate the basic principles of Marxism and to negate its universal truth. Revisionism is one form of bourgeois ideology. The revisionists deny the differences between socialism and capitalism, between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. What they advocate is in fact not the socialist line but the capitalist line. In present circumstances, revisionism is more pernicious than dogmatism. It is an important task for us to unfold criticism of revisionism on the ideological front now.

Eighth and last, it is imperative for the Party committees of the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions to tackle the question of ideology. This is a point some of the comrades present here want me to touch upon. In many places, the Party committees have not yet tackled the question of ideology, or have done very little about it. Mainly because they are busy. But tackle it they must. By "tackling it" I mean that it must be put on the agenda and studied. In the main the large-scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution in our country have come to an end, but there is still class struggle — chiefly on the political and ideological fronts — and it is very acute too. The question of ideology has now assumed great importance. The first secretaries of the Party committees in all provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions should personally tackle this question, which can be solved correctly only when they have given it serious attention and gone into it. Meetings on propaganda work similar to our present one should be held in all these places to discuss local ideological work and all related problems. Such meetings should be attended not only by Party comrades but also by people outside the Party, and people with different opinions should be included. This will be all to the good of these meetings, and no harm can come of it, as the experience of the present conference has proved.

NOTES

[1] "On Production by the Army for Its Own Support and on the Importance of the Great Movements for Rectification and for Production", *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Vol. III.

PERSEVERE IN PLAIN LIVING AND HARD STRUGGLE, MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES WITH THE MASSES

March 1957

1

Our Party is going to unfold a rectification movement. This is a way of resolving contradictions within the Party through criticism and self-criticism and also of resolving contradictions between the Party and the people. This time the movement will be aimed at three bad styles, bureaucracy, sectarianism and subjectivism. Through rectification we must strive to carry forward our Party's tradition of plain living and hard struggle. Since our victory in the revolution, the revolutionary will of some of our comrades has been waning, their revolutionary enthusiasm has been ebbing, their spirit of whole-hearted service to the people has been flagging, and so has the death-defying spirit they displayed in the days of fighting against our enemies; at the same time, they are clamouring for position and for the limelight, becoming particular about what they eat and wear, competing for salary and scrambling for fame and gain — all these tendencies are growing. I have heard that during the grading of cadres last year, some people burst into tears and made terrible scenes. People have two eyes, haven't they? Drops of water welling up in them are called tears. When the grading doesn't meet their wishes, tears begin to stream down their cheeks. They never shed a single tear during the war against Chiang Kai-shek, the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, the agrarian reform and the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, nor have they shed a tear

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Section 1 is part of a speech at a conference of Party cadres in Tsinan on March 18, 1957, and Section 2 is part of a speech at a conference of Party cadres in Nanking on March 19 of the same year.

during the building of socialism, but as soon as their personal interests were affected, rivers of tears began to flow. I have even heard of someone refusing to eat for three days. I would say, it doesn't matter much if one doesn't eat for three days, but it would be a little dangerous if that went on for a week. In short, the tendency has emerged of contending for fame and position, of comparing salaries, food, clothing and comforts. To go on hunger strike and shed tears on account of one's personal interests may be considered a kind of contradiction among the people. There is an opera scene called *Lin Chung Flees at Night*,[1] in which one line goes, "A man does not easily shed tears until his heart is broken." Now some of our comrades are men (and probably women too) about whom it can be said that they do not easily shed tears until it comes to grading. Such behaviour must be rectified too, mustn't it? It is right not to shed tears easily, but when is one's heart broken? When the destiny of the working class and the masses of the working people is at stake. Then one may shed a few tears. Whatever rank you are given, you should take it even if you are graded incorrectly, and you should not let your tears out but keep them in. There is much that is unfair in this world, and maybe you have been improperly graded, but even so there is no reason to make a fuss about it, for it is inconsequential and you should rest content as long as you have enough to eat. After all, we are a revolutionary Party, so we make it a principle not to allow anybody to starve to death. As long as one isn't starving to death, one should do revolutionary work and exert oneself. Even ten thousand years from now people should work hard. A Communist is supposed to work hard and to serve the people with his whole heart, not with half or two-thirds. Those whose revolutionary will has been waning should have their spirits revived through rectification.

2

We should maintain the same vigour, the same revolutionary enthusiasm and the same death-defying spirit we displayed in the years of the revolutionary wars and carry our revolutionary work through to the end. What is meant by death-defying? In the novel *Water Margin* there is a character called Death-Defying Third Brother Shih Hsiu, whose spirit is exactly what we have in mind. It was with this spirit that we made revolution in the past. A man has but one life to live, and he may live to sixty, seventy, eighty or ninety, it all depends. At least you should do some work as long as you can. And you should do it with revolutionary enthusiasm and a death-defying spirit. Some comrades are lacking in this enthusiasm and spirit and have stopped making progress. This is not a wholesome phenomenon, and education should be conducted among them.

The whole Party should strengthen political and ideological work. Quite a number of comrades present at today's conference are from the army. How are things in the army? Isn't there some difference between political work in peace-time and in wartime? In wartime close ties must be forged with the masses, the officers must be integrated with the men and the army with the people. In such times the people excuse us if we have some shortcomings. Now it is peace-time, we have no battles to fight and all we have to do is to train; if we do not persist in maintaining close ties with the masses, they will naturally find it hard to excuse our shortcomings. Although the system of military ranks[2] and other systems have been instituted, those with higher rank should still be at one with their subordinates and the cadres with the soldiers, and subordinates should still be allowed to criticize their superiors and soldiers to criticize cadres. For instance, a Party conference can be convened to provide an opportunity to make criticisms. During the movement against the "three evils", Comrade Chen Yi put it aptly when he said, "It was all right for us to issue orders for so many years, wouldn't it be all right now to let our subordinates criticize us for a while, say for a week?" What he meant was that it ought to be all right. I agree with him, let our subordinates have one week to criticize us. Before the criticisms begin, make some preparations, then give some sort of report and say something about your own shortcomings, which probably won't amount to more than one, two, three, or four points. Then let the comrades speak, adding some points and making criticisms. The masses are fair-minded, they won't write off our record. Company and platoon commanders should also offer their men an opportunity to make criticisms, and it would be best to do so once a year by holding criticism meetings for several days in a row. In the past we practised democracy of this kind in the army, and with good results. Don't let the close relations between the higher and lower levels, between officers and men, between the army and the people and between the armed forces and the local authorities be impaired as a result of the adoption of the system of military ranks and other systems. It goes without saying that the higher levels should maintain close relations with the lower

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

levels and that these should be comradely. Cadres should forge close ties with soldiers and be integrated with them. The armed forces should likewise maintain close relations with the people and with the local Party and government organizations.

Our comrades should take note: Don't live on the power of your office, your high position or seniority. Speaking of seniority, we have been making revolution for many years, and while this record of ours does count, still we must not live on it. True, you are a veteran who has worked for several decades. For all that, when you do something foolish and talk nonsense, the people won't excuse you. No matter how many your good deeds in the past and no matter how high your post, if today you are not doing a good job, not solving problems correctly and thus harming the people's interests, they won't forgive you. Therefore our comrades should rely not on seniority but on being correct in solving problems. What counts here is correctness, not seniority. Since you cannot rely on your seniority, you might as well forget about it, as if you had never been an official at all, that is, you must stop putting on the airs of an overlord, of a bureaucrat, you must put aside your airs and go among the people and among your subordinates.- This is a point our cadres, and particularly our old cadres, must keep-in mind. Generally speaking, new cadres are not so burdened, are less encumbered. Old cadres should treat new cadres on an equal footing. In many ways old cadres are not as good as new cadres and should learn from them.

NOTES

[1] *Lin Chung Flees at Night* is a scene in the Kunchu opera *The Story of a Sword* composed in the Ming Dynasty. The Kunchu opera originated in Kunshan, Kiangsu.

[2] The system of military ranks was initiated in September 1955 and abolished in May 1965.

THINGS ARE BEGINNING TO CHANGE

May 15, 1957

The unity and struggle of opposites are universal phenomena in the life of society. Struggle results in the transformation of opposites into each other and in the formation of a new unity, and the life of society thus moves one step forward.

The rectification movement in the Communist Party is a struggle between two styles in a single entity. This is true of the Communist Party and also of the people as a whole.

There are different kinds of people in the Communist Party. There are Marxists, who comprise the majority. They, too, have shortcomings but not serious ones. There are a number of people whose thinking errs on the side of dogmatism. Most of them are staunch and steadfast and devoted to the Party and the country, only their approach to problems shows a "Left" one-sidedness. After overcoming this one-sidedness, they will take a big step forward. There are also a number of people whose thinking errs on the side of revisionism or Right opportunism. They pose the bigger danger because their ideas are a reflection of bourgeois ideology inside the Party, and because they yearn for bourgeois liberalism, negate everything and are tied in a hundred and one ways to bourgeois intellectuals outside the Party. Over the last few months, people have been criticizing dogmatism but have allowed revisionism to go unchallenged. Dogmatism should be criticized, or else many mistakes cannot be rectified. Now it's time to direct our attention to criticizing revisionism. When dogmatism turns into its opposite, it becomes either Marxism or revisionism. Our Party's experience shows that there have been many instances of dogmatism turning into Marxism but very few of dogmatism turning into revisionism, because the dogmatists represent a proletarian school of thought tainted with petty-bourgeois fanaticism. In some cases what

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Article written by Comrade Mao Tsetung and circulated among Party cadres.

is attacked as "dogmatism" is in fact mistakes in work. In other cases what is attacked as "dogmatism" is in fact Marxism itself, which certain people mistake for "dogmatism" and attack as such. Real dogmatists think that it is better to be on the "Left" than on the Right, and they have a reason — they want revolution. But in terms of damage to the revolutionary cause, to be on the "Left" is in no way better than to be on the Right and should therefore be resolutely corrected. Some mistakes are the result of carrying out the policies of the central authorities, and people at the lower levels should not be given an undue share of the blame. There are a great many new members in our Party (even more in the Youth League) who are intellectuals, and it is true that a number of them are rather seriously afflicted with revisionist ideas. They deny the Party spirit and class nature of the press, they confound the differences in principle between proletarian journalism and bourgeois journalism, and they confuse journalism reflecting the collective economy of socialist countries with journalism reflecting the economy of capitalist countries, which is marked by anarchy and rivalry among monopoly groups. They admire bourgeois liberalism and are against the leadership of the Party. They favour democracy and reject centralism. They are opposed to what is essential to the realization of a planned economy, that is, leadership, planning and control in the cultural and educational fields (journalism included), which are indispensable and at the same time not unduly centralized. These people and right-wing intellectuals outside the Party act in concert and form a congenial lot, hitting it off like sworn brothers. Dogmatism is being criticized by various kinds of people. By Communists, that is, Marxists. By so-called Communists, that is, Rightists in the Communist Party — revisionists. And outside the Party, by the Left, the middle and the Right. Large in number, this middle section accounts for about 70 per cent of all the intellectuals outside the Party, while the Left makes up about 20 per cent, and the Right about 1, 3, 5 or up to 10 per cent, as the case may be.

In recent days the Rightists in the democratic parties and institutions of higher education have shown themselves to be most determined and most rabid. They think the middle elements are on their side and will not follow the lead of the Communist Party, but this is actually a pipe dream. Some of the middle elements are wavering, may swing either left or right and, in the face of the current spate of wild attacks by the Rightists, may want to keep mum and wait and see. To date, the Rightists have yet to reach the climax of their attack, and they are going at it in high spirits. Rightists, both inside and outside the Party, know nothing about dialectics — things turn into their opposites when they reach the extreme. We shall let the Rightists run amuck for a time and let them reach their climax. The more they run amuck, the better for us. Some say they are afraid of being hooked like a fish, and others say they are afraid of being lured in deep, rounded up and annihilated. Now that large numbers of fish have come to the surface of themselves, there is no need to bait the hook. They are no ordinary fish, but more likely man-eating sharks with sharp teeth — it is these sharks whose fins people eat. Our struggle with the Rightists is centred on winning over the middle elements, who can be won over to our side. The Rightists' pledge of support to the people's democratic dictatorship, to the People's Government, to socialism and to the leadership of the Communist Party is all a sham, and on no account should any credence be given it. This holds true for all Rightists, whether in the democratic parties, in the fields of education, literature and art, the press, science and technology, or in industrial and commercial circles. There are two kinds of people who are most determined — the Left and the Right. Both are trying to win over the middle elements and gain the leadership over them. The Rightists are trying to seize first a part and then the whole. To begin with, they are out to gain leadership in the press, education, literature and art, and science and technology. They know that in these fields the Communists are not as strong as they are, which is actually the case. They are "national treasures", not to be rubbed the wrong way. The movement against the "three evils", the elimination of counter-revolutionaries and the ideological remoulding in past years — how outrageous and what impudence! They also know that many college students come from landlord, rich peasant or bourgeois families and believe these people will rise at their call. This likelihood exists for that section of the student body with Right deviationist ideas. But to assume it is true of most students is sheer fantasy. There are also indications that the Rightists in press circles are instigating the worker and peasant masses to oppose the government.

Some people are against the pinning of political labels, but only when it is they who are being labelled by the Communist Party. But they themselves feel free to slap labels on Communists and on the Left and middle elements in the democratic parties and in all walks of life. What a rash of labels tossed out by the Rightists has found its way into the press in the last few months! The middle elements are sincere in their opposition to labelling. All the inappropriate labels we pinned on the middle elements in the past should be removed and indiscriminate labelling should be avoided in the future. If injustices were really done to certain people, no matter who, in the movement against the "three evils", in the elimination of counter-revolutionaries and in the ideological remoulding, they should be publicly corrected. But labelling the Rightists is a different matter. Even so, the cap must fit, and only confirmed Rightists should be labelled as such. With few exceptions, the Rightists need not be publicly identified by name, but should be given some leeway so that it will be easier for them to compromise in appropriate circumstances. The number of Rightists set above at 1, 3, 5 and up to 10 per cent is only an estimate, and it may turn out to be larger or smaller. Moreover, conditions vary in different units, and it is therefore essential to have conclusive evidence, adopt an objective approach and avoid excesses, for excesses are a mistake.

The bourgeoisie and many of the intellectuals who formerly served the old society are invariably stubborn in asserting themselves, invariably yearn for that old world of theirs and invariably find themselves somewhat out of their element in the new. It will take quite a long time to remould them, and in the process crude methods should not be used. On the other hand, we must take into account the fact that, compared with the early days of liberation, most of them have made considerable progress, and their criticisms of our work are mostly correct and must be accepted. Only some of the criticisms are wrong, and in such cases matters should be clarified. It is in order for them to ask to be trusted and given authority commensurate with their positions; they must be trusted and given authority and responsibility. Some of the criticisms made even by the Rightists are correct and should not be categorically rejected. Their criticisms, wherever correct, should be accepted. The Rightists are characterized by their Rightist political attitude. The kind of co-operation they maintain with us is co-operation only in appearance and not in essence. There is co-operation on some matters, but not on others. There is co-operation in normal circumstances, but when there is an opening which can be used, as at the present juncture, they don't really want any co-operation. They go back on their pledge to accept the leadership of the Communist Party and try to shake it off. But without this leadership, it would be impossible to build socialism and our nation would be plunged into total disaster.

In China, the bourgeois elements and the intellectuals who served the old society number several million, and we need them to work for us; we must further improve our relations with them so that we can enable them to give better service to the cause of socialism and so that we can further remould them and help them gradually become part of the working class, thus transforming them into the opposite of what they are today. Most of them are sure to reach this goal. Remoulding involves both unity and struggle, with struggle as the means to achieve unity, which is the end. Struggle is mutual; now is the time that many people are waging struggle against us. The criticisms made by most people are valid or essentially so, including the sharp criticisms by Professor Fu Ying of Peking University, which have not been published in the press. They are making their criticisms in the hope of improving their relations with us, so these criticisms are well-intentioned. But the Rightists' criticisms are usually malicious, because they are antagonistic. Intentions, whether good or bad, are not a matter of guesswork, they can be perceived.

The current criticism and rectification movement has been launched by the Communist Party. As we expected and hoped, poisonous weeds have been growing side by side with fragrant flowers and ghosts and monsters appearing together with the unicorn and phoenix. Anyway, good things outnumber bad. Some say we are trying to catch big fish, and we say we are digging up poisonous weeds, which are only different ways of saying the same thing. In order to achieve their end, the Rightists, who are anti-Communist, are making a desperate attempt to stir up a typhoon above force 7 in China, strong enough to devastate crops and houses. The more outrageous their conduct, the more quickly will they show themselves up as doing the opposite of co-operating with the Communist Party and accepting its leadership, as they pretended in the past, and the people will thus recognize them as nothing but a handful of ghosts and monsters opposed to the Communist Party and the people. They will then end up by burying themselves. Is there anything bad about that?

There are two alternatives for the Rightists. One is to keep their tails tucked between their legs and mend their ways. The other is to go on making trouble and court ruin. Gentlemen Rightists, the choice is yours, the initiative (for a short time) is in your hands.

In our country, there are several criteria by which to judge whether the bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals are politically honest or dishonest, good or bad. The main thing is to see whether they really accept socialism and really accept the leadership of the Communist Party. They agreed to both long ago, but now some want to go back on their word, and this will not do. Once they back out, there is no place for them in the People's Republic of China. Your ideals are those of the Western world (also known as the free world), you might as well go there.

Why is such a torrent of reactionary, vicious statements being allowed to appear in the press? To let the people have some idea of these poisonous weeds and noxious fumes so as to have them uprooted or dispelled.

"Why didn't you say all this earlier?" Didn't we? Didn't we say long ago that all poisonous weeds must be uprooted?

"You divide people into the Left, the middle and the Right. Isn't that contrary to how things stand?" Wherever there are masses of people — everywhere except deserts — they are invariably divided into the Left, the middle and the Right, and this will be so ten thousand years hence. Is that contrary to how things stand? This division will serve as a guide for the masses to size up people and will make it easier to win over the middle elements and isolate the Rightists.

"Why not win over the Rightists?" We shall try. But it won't be possible to win them over until they feel isolated. How can they be amenable when they are riding their high horse and are so bent on destroying the Communist Party? Isolation will cause a split, and we must bring about a split among the Rightists. It has all along been our practice to divide people into the Left, the middle and the Right, or in other words, progressive, middle-of-the-road and backward; this is nothing new, only some people have a short memory.

Are you going to "fix" people with a vengeance? It depends on how the Rightist gentlemen behave themselves. Poisonous weeds are to be uprooted, and this means uprooting the ideological poisonous weeds. To "fix" people is another matter. No one will be "fixed" unless he "grossly violates the law". Then what is meant by "gross violation of the law"? It means serious damage to the interests of the state and the people as a result of the evil-doer's wilful actions despite repeated warnings. As for people who commit ordinary errors, there is all the more reason to apply the principle of curing the sickness to save the patient. This is the proper distinction to be observed both inside and outside the Party. To "fix" also means to cure the sickness to save the patient.

How long will it take the Party to accomplish the task of rectification? Events are now moving very fast and the relations between the Party and the masses will rapidly improve. Apparently, the task will take a few weeks in some places, a few months in others and about a year in still others (for instance, the rural areas). But studying Marxism and raising the ideological level will take much longer.

Our unity and struggle with the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals will go on for a long time. When the rectification movement inside the Communist Party is basically over, we shall suggest that the democratic parties and people in all walks of life carry out their own rectification, which will accelerate their progress and make it easier to isolate the handful of right-wingers. Now it is people outside the Party who are helping us in our rectification. Later on we shall help them in theirs. This help is mutual, in the course of which what is evil will be done away with, that is, turned into its opposite, into what is good. This is exactly what the people expect of us, and we ought to gratify their wishes.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IS THE CORE OF LEADERSHIP OF THE WHOLE CHINESE PEOPLE

May 25, 1957

Your congress has been very successful. I hope you will unite and serve as the core of leadership of the youth of China.

The Chinese Communist Party is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people. Without this core, the cause of socialism cannot be victorious.

Your congress is a congress of unity and will exert a tremendous influence on young people throughout China. I extend my congratulations to you.

Unite, comrades, and fight resolutely and courageously for the great cause of socialism. Any word or deed at variance with socialism is completely wrong.

Remarks by Comrade Mao Tsetung when he received the entire body of delegates to the Third National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League of China.

MUSTER OUR FORCES TO REPULSE THE RIGHTISTS' WILD ATTACKS

June 8, 1957

Fifteen days or so will be sufficient for the free airing of views in organizations at the provincial and municipal level and in colleges and universities. The reactionary elements have been unbridled in their attacks. Among Party and League members the waverers have already deserted to them or are contemplating desertion. Among the vast numbers of Party and League members the activists and middle elements are rising to give battle. Using the big-character poster as a weapon, both sides are gaining experience and being tempered in the struggle. We needn't worry, for the reactionary elements number no more than a few per cent and the most frantic only 1 per cent. Don't be scared stiff just because the sky appears overcast for the time being. The reactionary elements will go out from their own organizations or colleges to carry on their activities in factories and other colleges, and precautions should be taken to keep them out. Call meetings of the principal cadres and veteran workers in the factories and explain to them that some bad capitalists, bad intellectuals and reactionary elements in society are mounting wild attacks against the working class and the Communist Party in an attempt to overthrow the state power led by the working class, and that they should make sure not to be taken in by these persons. Stop anyone trying to incite the people. Mobilize the masses to tear down reactionary posters on street walls. Factory workers should be clear about the over-all situation and must not stir up any trouble. During this time, they should not raise such matters as welfare and wages but should concert their actions against the reactionaries.

Inner-Party directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Please watch out for the wild attacks of the reactionary elements in the democratic parties. Get each of these parties to organize forums with the Left, middle and Right elements all taking part, let both positive and negative opinions be voiced, and send reporters to cover these discussions. We should tactfully encourage the Left and middle elements to speak out at the meetings and refute the Rightists. This is very effective. The Party paper in each locality should have dozens of articles ready and publish them from day to day when the high tide of the attacks begins to ebb there. Make a point of organizing the middle and Left elements to write for the press. But before the tide is on the ebb, Party papers should restrict the number of articles expressing positive views (they can publish articles written by the middle elements). Give the masses a free hand in refuting the Rightists' big-character posters. Organize forums at colleges and universities to let professors speak their minds about the Party, and as far as possible try to get the Rightists to spew out all their venom, which will be published in the newspapers. Let the professors make speeches and let the students respond freely. Better let the reactionary professors, lecturers, assistants and students spew out their venom and speak without any inhibitions. They are the best teachers. When the opportune moment arrives, lose no time in organizing separate meetings of Party and League members to sort out the criticisms; accept those criticisms that are constructive and correct mistakes and shortcomings, but refute those criticisms that are destructive. At the same time, organize some non-Party people to make speeches and state the correct views. Then, have a responsible Party cadre who enjoys prestige make a summing-up speech that is both analytical and convincing to effect a complete change in the atmosphere. If all goes well, a month or so will see the whole process through and we can then switch to the inner-Party rectification, which will proceed like "a gentle breeze and a mild rain".

This is a great political and ideological struggle. Only by waging it can our Party keep the initiative, temper our cadres, educate the masses, isolate the reactionaries and put them on the defensive. During the past seven years, we seemed to have the initiative, but this was at best only half true. The surrender of the reactionaries was a sham, and many of the middle elements submitted unwillingly. Now the situation has begun to change. Though outwardly on the defensive, we are actually gaining the initiative. The reason is that we are carrying out the rectification in all seriousness. The reactionaries who have lost their heads and run wild only appear to have the initiative, but they have gone too far and as a result are alienating the people and finding themselves on the defensive. As the situation varies from place to place, you can be flexible in your tactics and dispositions.

In short, this is a big battle (with the battleground both inside and outside the Party). If we don't win this battle, it will be impossible to attain socialism and there may even be some danger of a "Hungarian incident". Now by launching the rectification of our own accord, we have purposely invited a possible "Hungarian incident" and broken it down into many small "Hungarian incidents" staged in various organizations and colleges and dealt with individually. Besides, the Party and government have not been thrown into disarray except for a very small section (it is just fine that this small section has gone rotten, for this means that the pus has been squeezed out). All this is very beneficial. Since there were reactionaries in our society, since the middle elements had never received the lessons they are now getting and since the Party had never undergone such tests as the present one, it was inevitable for disturbances to occur sooner or later.

Today, the situation at home is excellent, we have the workers, the peasants, the Party, the government, the army and the majority of students firmly with us. The international situation is excellent and the United States is in a difficult position.

WEN HUI PAO'S BOURGEOIS ORIENTATION SHOULD BE CRITICIZED

July 1, 1957

Since June 14, when our editorial department published "The Bourgeois Orientation of *Wen Hui Pao* over a Period of Time", both *Wen Hui Pao* and the *Kuangming Daily* have undertaken some self-criticism on this question.

The staff of the *Kuangming Daily* held several meetings and severely criticized its director, Chang Po-chun, and its editor-in-chief, Chu An-ping, for their wrong orientation. This criticism was unequivocal and there has been a basic change in stand, a change to the revolutionary socialist line from the bourgeois line of Chang Po-chun and Chu An-ping opposing the Communist Party, the people and socialism. As a result, the *Kuangming Daily* has regained the reader's confidence and reads like a socialist paper. Only the technique of its layout still leaves something to be desired. Technique in layout and political slant in layout are two different things, and as far as the *Kuangming Daily* is concerned, there is not enough of the former but quite enough of the latter. Technique is something it is entirely possible to improve. A change in the technique of layout would give the paper a new look which its readers would be glad to see. Nonetheless it is not easy; our paper has long set its mind on this, but its layout, though somewhat improved, is still not up to expectations.

Wen Hui Pao has published its self-criticism, giving the impression that a change has come about in its orientation, and it has carried many news items and articles reflecting the positive line — this of course is all to the good. Still, there is something lacking. It is just like performing on the stage, where some actors give fine portrayals as villains but never look right in their roles as heroes, they are so affected and unnatural.

Editorial written for the *People's Daily*.

It is indeed difficult for them to be otherwise. Either the East Wind prevails over the West Wind, or the West Wind prevails over the East Wind; on the question of the two lines there is no room for compromise. Many editors and reporters are used to the old and beaten tracks, and it is far from easy for them to change all at once. But change they must, however grudgingly and painfully, for this is dictated by the general trend. When people say that the change is easy and pleasant, they are saying so merely out of conventional politeness. This is only human and should be excused. As for the editorial department of *Wen Hui Peo*, the matter is serious because it was this editorial department which was in command during the period when the paper kicked up a rumpus with its bourgeois orientation, and so there is a heavy burden on its shoulders which cannot be easily thrown off. As to whether there is another commander higher up, those who make this charge say "yes", while those who speak for the defence say "no"; moreover, this commander has been identified as Lo Lung-chi of the alliance of Chang Po-chun and Lo Lung-chi. In between the two commanders, there is a third in the person of Pu Hsi-hsiu, a capable woman of action in charge of the Peking office of *Wen Hui Pao*. People say that Lo Lung-chi — Pu Hsi-hsiu — the *Wen Hui Pao* editorial department represents the chain of command of the Rightists in the Democratic League directing *Wen Hui Pao*.

The Democratic League has played a particularly vicious role in the course of the contention among the hundred schools of thought and the rectification movement. It operates in an organized way, complete with a plan, programme and line which alienate it from the people and which are directed against the Communist Party and socialism. Then there is the Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party which has played exactly the same role. These two parties have made themselves particularly conspicuous in these days of violent storm. It is the Chang-Lo alliance which has raised the storm. Other parties have played their role, and some of their members are very vicious, too. But they are smaller in number and their chain of command is not so obvious. As for the rank and file of the Democratic League and the Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, not all nor even the majority of them are involved. After all, it is only a handful of individuals, namely, the leading bourgeois Rightists, who summon the storm and churn the waves, plot in secret and incite discontent among the masses, make contacts high and low and seek responses far and near; it is only they whose estimate of the current situation is that utter confusion everywhere will lead to their take-over and whose ultimate aim is to complete their grand scheme by gradual steps. Among the members of these parties some keep their heads, many are deceived, and a small number make up the nucleus of the right wing. Few as they are, being the nucleus, they have considerable power to manipulate. All this spring, the sky over China suddenly became overcast with rolling dark clouds, and the source of the trouble can be traced to the Chang-Lo alliance.

Two meetings were called by the Journalists' Association, the first a negation and the second a negation of the negation, and the fact that this took place in a little over a month indicates the swift changes in the situation in China. The meetings were helpful. At the first meeting, "dark clouds bearing down on the city threatened to crush it", as the reactionary bourgeois line in journalism asserted itself. But at the second, begun the other day, the atmosphere has changed and, although the Rightists are still stubbornly resisting, most people can be said to have found the correct orientation.

On June 14, *Wen Hui Pao* made a self-criticism and admitted it had made some mistakes. It is all very well to make self-criticism and we welcome it. But we consider *Wen Hui Pao*'s self-criticism inadequate. And what is inadequate here is fundamental in character. That is to say, fundamentally the paper made no self-criticism. On the contrary, in the editorial of June 14 it tried to defend its mistakes. "We have one-sidedly and incorrectly interpreted the Party's policy on the free airing of views, believing that unqualified encouragement of the free airing of views would of itself help the Party in the rectification movement, and that more space given to positive views or criticisms to counter the wrong views would hinder the free airing of views." Is that so? No. During the spring *Wen Hui Pao* pursued the policy of the central authorities of the Democratic League opposing the Communist Party, the people and socialism and launched violent attacks on the proletariat, in diametrical opposition to the policy of the Communist Party. It was a policy designed to topple the Communist Party and create utter confusion everywhere to facilitate a take-over. Can this really be called "helping in the rectification movement"? No, that is a lie, a downright swindle. Was it wrong for a while to refrain from publishing any positive views or to publish only a few and to let erroneous views go unrefuted? Between May 8 and June 7, acting on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, our paper and all the other Party papers did precisely that. The purpose was to let demons and devils, ghosts and monsters "air views freely" and let poisonous weeds sprout and grow in profusion, so that the people, now shocked to find these ugly things still existing in the world, would take action to wipe them out. In other words, the Communist Party foresaw this inevitable class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals were allowed to start this war, and for a time the press refrained from publishing any positive views or published only a few and did not take any action to repulse the wild attacks of the reactionary bourgeois Rightists, nor did the Party organization in any of the departments and schools where the rectification movement was in progress. The masses could thus clearly distinguish those whose criticism was well-intentioned from those whose so-called criticism was malevolent, and thus forces could be mustered to counter-attack when the time was ripe. Some people say this was a covert scheme. We say it was an overt one. For we made it plain to the enemy beforehand: only when ghosts and monsters are allowed to come into the open can they be wiped out; only when poisonous weeds are allowed to sprout from the soil can they be uprooted. Don't the peasants weed several times a year? Besides, uprooted weeds can be used as manure. The class enemies will invariably seek opportunities to assert themselves. They will not resign themselves to losing state power and being expropriated. However much the Communist Party warns its enemies in advance and makes its basic strategy known to them, they will still launch attacks. Class struggle is an objective reality, independent of man's will. That is to say, class struggle is inevitable. It cannot be avoided even if people want to avoid it. The only thing to do is to make the best use of the situation and guide the struggle to victory. Why do the reactionary class enemies bite the hook? As reactionary social groups blinded by the lust for gain, they take the absolute superiority of the proletariat for absolute inferiority. Fanning flames everywhere would stir up workers and peasants, students' big-character posters would facilitate the taking over of schools, free airing of views would touch off an explosive situation, there would be instant chaos everywhere and the Communist Party would crack up at once — this was how Chang Po-chun sized up the situation on June 6 for six professors in Peking. Isn't this a case of being blinded by the lust for gain? "Gain" means the grabbing of power. They have quite a few papers, one of them being *Wen Hui Pao*. This paper operated in accordance with the reactionary policy mentioned above, but on June 14 it tried to deceive the people, pretending that it had acted with good intentions. The paper said, "And this incorrect understanding is due to the remnants of bourgeois ideas of journalism in our minds." No, here "remnants" should read "abundance". For several months the paper served as the mouthpiece of the reactionaries who mounted unbridled attacks against the proletariat, and it changed its orientation to one of opposing the Communist Party, the people and socialism, that is, to the bourgeois orientation — could it manage all that with just some odd remnants of bourgeois ideas? What sort of logic is this? A particular premise leads to a universal conclusion — this is *Wen Hui Pao*'s logic. To this day *Wen Hui Pao* is still not ready to criticize itself for carrying a host of reactionary reports flying in the face of the facts, for printing a spate of reactionary views and opinions, and for splashing the paper with a reactionary layout as a means for attacking the proletariat. The case is different with *Hsin Min Pao*; it has made many self-criticisms which are quite sincere. *Hsin Min Pao*'s mistakes were not as serious as *Wen Hui Pao*'s, and when it realized that it had made mistakes it started correcting them in earnest; this shows a sense of responsibility towards the people's cause on the part of those in charge of the paper and its reporters, and thus in the eyes of the reader the paper has begun to free itself from its predicament. Where on earth is *Wen Hui Pao*'s sense of responsibility? Just when will *Wen Hui Pao* begin to follow *Hsin Min Pao*'s example? Debts must be paid, and when will *Wen Hui Pao* begin to pay its debt? In making self-criticism *Hsin Min Pao* has apparently raised lots of awkward questions for *Wen Hui Pao*, and the reader would like to ask, when will *Wen Hui Pao* catch up with *Hsin Min Pao*? *Wen Hui Pao* is now in a bad fix. Before *Hsin Min Pao* made its self-criticism, it seemed that *Wen Hui Pao* might be able to muddle along for a while, but after that things have become difficult. A bad fix can be turned into a good position, and that calls for a conscientious effort to emulate *Hsin Min Pao*.

Now to return to the term "bourgeois Rightists". Bourgeois Rightists are the bourgeois reactionaries mentioned above who oppose the Communist Party, the people and socialism; this definition is scientific and true to fact. Only a handful, they are to be found in the democratic parties, among intellectuals, capitalists and students and also in the Communist Party and Youth League, and they have surfaced in the present great storm. They are very small in number, but in the democratic parties, and particularly in certain of these parties, they carry weight and should not be taken lightly. This bunch have not only expressed themselves in words but also followed up with deeds; they are guilty, and the principle of "blame not the speaker" does not apply to them. They are not only speakers but doers. Are they to be punished by law? There seems to be no need for that at present. For the people's state is very secure and, moreover, many among them are prominent figures. They can be treated leniently, without punishment. In general, it is enough to call them "Rightists", not reactionaries. The only exceptions are those who refuse to correct their mistakes after repeated warnings and continue to engage in sabotage in violation of the criminal law; these will have to be punished. Learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, cure the sickness to save the patient, transform negative factors into positive ones — these principles still apply to the Rightists. Then there are Rightists of another kind who have expressed themselves in words but have not followed up with deeds. Their views are similar to those of the Rightists mentioned above, but they have not engaged in disruptive activities. There should be a greater degree of leniency towards them. Erroneous views must be repudiated root and branch with no quarter given, but these individuals should be permitted to reserve their opinions. The various types of Rightists mentioned above are allowed their freedom of speech. For a great, secure nation, there is little harm in keeping a small number of such people around when their mistakes are known to the masses. It must be understood that Rightists are persons who teach us by negative example. In this sense, poisonous weeds can render service. They render service precisely because they are poisonous and because in the past people were harmed by the poison they spread.

The Communist Party is continuing with its rectification and the democratic parties have also begun theirs. Now that the Rightists' wild attacks have been repulsed by the people, the rectification movement can proceed smoothly.

BEAT BACK THE ATTACKS OF THE BOURGEOIS RIGHTISTS

July 9, 1957

In March I spoke here to a number of Party cadres. A hundred days have passed since then. During these hundred days a great change in the situation has occurred. We have fought a battle with the bourgeois Rightists, and the political consciousness of the people has risen, and indeed to a considerable degree. We expected this at the time. For instance, I said here that when people started criticizing, or in other words, when the fire started burning, wouldn't that cause pain? We must toughen our scalps and bear it, I added. This part of the body is called the head, and the skin on it is called the scalp. Toughening one's scalp and bearing it means, when you criticize me, I toughen my scalp and listen for a while. Afterwards, I'll analyse what you say and make a reply, accepting what is right and rebutting what is wrong.

We must believe that in China, as everywhere else in the world, the majority of the people are good. By the majority, we mean not 51 per cent but over 90 per cent. Of the 600 million people in our country, the worker and peasant masses are our mainstay. In the Communist Party, the Youth League and the democratic parties and among the students and intellectuals, the majority are invariably good people. They are kind-hearted and honest, they are not crafty and don't have ulterior motives. This should be acknowledged. It has been borne out in every political movement. Take the students in the present movement. There are more than seven thousand students at Peking University, but the Rightists account for only 1, 2 or 3 per cent. What does this 1, 2 or 3 per cent really mean? It means that the backbone die-hard elements who kick up a rumpus from time to time never exceed fifty persons or so, or less than 1 per cent. The remaining 1 or 2 per cent form their claque.

Speech at a conference of cadres in Shanghai.

It's not easy to set a fire going and draw it upon oneself. Now I hear that some comrades in this city rather regret that the fire was not fierce enough. I think the fire in Shanghai was about right, almost but not quite strong enough to be satisfying. Wouldn't you have let the fire rage if you had foreseen its miraculous effect? Let poisonous weeds sprout and ghosts and monsters appear. Why be afraid of them? I said in March you shouldn't be afraid. However, some comrades in our Party have been afraid that chaos would spread across the land. I say that, staunch and devoted to the Party and the country as these comrades are, they don't see the over-all situation, don't see that the vast majority of the people, that is, more than 90 per cent, are good. Don't be afraid of the masses, they are with us. They may rail at us but they will never strike us with their fists. The Rightists are only a handful, and at Peking University they make up only 1, 2 or 3 per cent, as I have just said. This applies to the students only. The case is different with the professors and associate professors, about 10 per cent of whom are Rightists. The Left also amounts to about 10 per cent. The two sides are matched in strength. The middle makes up approximately 80 per cent. So what is there to be afraid of? And yet some of our comrades are assailed by fears of one kind or another, afraid of houses collapsing and the sky falling. From time immemorial no one but "the man of Chi worried lest the sky fall",[1] meaning that only one man from Honan was afraid it might happen. Save for this man, no one else is known to have entertained the fear. As for houses, I am sure this one will not collapse, as it was built not long ago. How can it collapse so easily?

In short, more than 90 per cent of the people everywhere are our friends and comrades. Don't be afraid. Why be afraid of the masses? There's no reason to be. What sort of persons are leading figures? Group leaders, team leaders, Party branch secretaries, heads of schools and colleges and Party committee secretaries — they are all leading figures, Comrade Ko Ching-shih counts among them and I too. At any rate all of us have some political capital, that is, we have performed some service for the people. Now the fire is set ablaze, and more than 90 per cent of the people hope that our comrades will be tempered in the fire. Every one of our comrades has his weaknesses. Who hasn't? "Men are not saints, how can they be free from faults?" One way or another, we say or do something wrong, for instance by being bureaucratic. These things are usually done unwittingly.

It is necessary to "set a fire going" at regular intervals. How often? Once a year or once every three years, which do you prefer? I think we should do it at least twice in the space of each five-year plan, in the same way as the intercalary month in a lunar leap year turns up once in three years and twice in five. The Monkey Sun Wu-kung becomes much stronger after being tempered in the Eight-Diagram Magic Crucible of the God of Supreme Power. Isn't Sun Wu-kung a character of tremendous magical power? Even Sun, who is called "The Great Saint on a Par with the Emperor of Heaven", needs tempering in the Eight-Diagram Crucible. Don't we talk about tempering? Tempering means forging and refining. Forging is shaping by hammering and refining is smelting iron in a blast furnace or making steel in an open-hearth furnace. After steel is made, it needs forging, which nowadays is done with a pneumatic hammer. That hammering is terrific! We human beings need tempering too. Some comrades, when asked about being tempered, would appear very much in favour, saying, "Oh yes, I have shortcomings. I'm eager to get some tempering." Everybody says he wants it. To talk about it is very easy, but when it comes to the real thing, when it means being "forged" with a pneumatic hammer, he backs away, scared stiff. We have been in the midst of tempering. For a time there was gloom above and darkness below, with the rays of the sun and the moon completely shut out. Two winds were then blowing, one from the overwhelming majority, the good people, who put up big-character posters saying that the Communist Party had shortcomings and should overcome them, the other from a handful of Rightists who attacked us. These two offensives went for the same target. The offensive by the majority was justified and correct. It was a kind of tempering for us. The offensive by the Rightists was also a kind of tempering for us. For real tempering this time we have to thank the Rightists. They have given a most instructive lesson to our Party, to the masses, the working class) peasants, students and democratic parties. There are Rightists in every city and they want to topple us. We are now closing in on them.

Ours is a people's revolution, a revolution by 600 million people under the leadership of the proletariat; it is the people's cause. The democratic revolution was the people's cause, the socialist revolution is the people's cause and so is socialist construction. Then, are the socialist revolution and socialist construction good or not? Have there been achievements? Which is primary, achievements or mistakes? The Rightists negate the achievements in the people's cause. This is the first point. Second, which is the direction to take? One way leads to socialism and the other to capitalism. The Rightists want us to turn round and take the capitalist road. Third, who is to lead in building socialism? The proletariat or the bourgeoisie? The Communist Party or those bourgeois Rightists? The Rightists say they don't want leadership by the Communist Party. I think this has been a great debate with the focus on these three questions. It is good to have a debate. In the past, there wasn't any debate on these questions.

There were prolonged debates in the course of the democratic revolution. In the last years of the Ching Dynasty up to the Revolution of 1911, in the fight against Yuan Shih-kai, in the Northern Expedition and the War of Resistance Against Japan — in each of these periods there were debates. To resist or not to resist Japan? One school preached the theory that weapons decide everything. China, they said, was short of arms and so could not resist Japan. Another school said that need not cause fear, for after all people were primary, and though inferior in arms we could still put up a fight. The War of Liberation that followed was preceded by debates. The Chungking negotiations, the old Political Consultative Conference held in Chungking and the Nanking negotiations were all debates. Chiang Kai-shek turned a deaf ear to our opinions and to those of the people, what he wanted was war. The outcome of the war was that he was beaten. So there were debates, a long period of mental preparation, in the course of the democratic revolution.

The socialist revolution came swiftly. In a matter of six or seven years the socialist transformation of capitalist ownership and of individual ownership by small producers has by and large been completed. But the transformation of man still has a long way to go, though some progress has been made. Socialist transformation is a twofold task, one is to transform the system and the other to transform man. The system embraces not only ownership, it also includes the superstructure, primarily the state apparatus and ideology. For instance, the press comes within the scope of ideology. Some people say that the press has no class nature and is not an instrument of class struggle. They are mistaken. Until at least the extinction of imperialism the press and everything else in the realm of ideology will reflect class relations. School education, literature and art all fall within the scope of ideology, belong to the superstructure and have a class nature. As for the natural sciences, there are two aspects. The natural sciences as such have no class nature, but the question of who studies and makes use of them does. In the universities, the departments of Chinese for one and the departments of history for another are most seriously affected by idealism. So are the people who work on newspapers. Let no one suppose that idealism abounds only in the field of the social sciences, there is also a good deal in the field of the natural sciences. Many people who work in the natural sciences are idealists in their world outlook. When you ask them what water is composed of, they are materialists and say it is composed of two elements, which conforms with reality. When it comes to the transformation of society, they are idealists. While we say the Communist Party should be further strengthened through rectification, some of them say it should be wiped out. This is what the present movement has revealed.

When the Rightists were on the offensive, our policy was to listen and keep quiet. For several weeks we toughened our scalps, cocked our ears to listen and kept mum. Moreover, we didn't inform the Youth League and Party rank and file, nor did we inform the Party branch secretaries and Party branch committees, we just allowed a free-for-all fight where everybody was on his own. Some enemies had sneaked into the Party committees and general Party branches in the universities; for instance, they were on the Tsinghua University Party Committee. When there was a meeting, they would inform the enemy of what was going on. Such persons were dubbed "insurgents". Hadn't there been insurgent generals? Now there were "insurgent scholars". This pleased both the enemy and us. The enemy was very much pleased to see the "insurrection" of Communist Party members and the imminent "collapse" of the Communist Party. How many Party members have collapsed this time? I'm not clear about Shanghai. In Peking probably 5 per cent of the Party membership in the universities have collapsed, and the percentage is higher among the League members, perhaps 10 per cent or more. In my view, their collapse is exactly as it should be. In short, whether it was 10, 20, 30 or 40 per cent, I'm very happy that they have collapsed. Their minds are stuffed with bourgeois ideas and idealism and they have wormed their way into the Communist Party or the Youth League, they are nominally for communism, but are actually anti-Communists or waverers. So we were also pleased to see their "insurrection". When did we ever do such a thorough job of purifying the ranks of the Party and Youth League? These people scampered away of their own accord without our having to clear them out. But now the situation has changed and the tables have been turned. The "insurrection" stopped when we started closing in on the Rightists and when many who were not Rightists themselves but had connections with them came forward to expose them. The Rightists are having a very hard time and some of them have rebelled. I spoke here in March. How things have changed in a hundred days!

The current struggle against the Rightists is essentially a political one. Class struggle takes various forms. This time it is chiefly a political, not a military or an economic, struggle. Is it partly an ideological struggle? Yes, it is, but in my view the struggle is mainly political. Ideological struggle will come chiefly in the next stage and should be like a gentle breeze and a mild rain. Rectification in the Communist Party and the Youth League is an ideological struggle. We must raise our level and really learn some Marxism. We must truly help each other. As for shortcomings, are we totally free from subjectivism or bureaucracy? We must really think hard, take notes and keep at it for a few months to raise our understanding of Marxism and our political and ideological level.

The counter-attack on the Rightists may take a few more weeks, a month or so. However, it would be impossible if the press kept on publishing the Rightists' views as it is now doing and continued for the rest of the year, next year and the year after. There are just so many Rightists, the press has carried just about enough of their views, and there isn't much more to print. From now on, we shall print a little more in some form or other but none when there is nothing worth printing. In my view July is still a month for intensive counter-attack on the Rightists. The Rightists like a strong gale and a torrential downpour most and a gentle breeze and a mild rain least. We advocate a gentle breeze and a mild rain, don't we? But they say, "What? A gentle breeze and a mild rain? If it keeps drizzling for days on end, the rice seedlings will rot and there will be a famine. It's better to have a strong gale and a torrential downpour." Haven't you got someone here in Shanghai who wrote an article "A Crow Caws 'at High Noon'"? That "crow" is the man who proposed having a strong gale and a torrential downpour. They also say, "You Communists are downright unfair. When you fixed us in the past, you preferred a strong gale and a torrential downpour, and now when your turn comes, you want a gentle breeze and a mild rain." The fact is that we always called for a gentle breeze and a mild rain in our previous inner-Party directives concerning ideological remoulding, including the criticism of Hu Shih and Liang Shu-ming. Everything in the world develops in twists and turns. For instance, when you walk, you never walk in a straight line. Have you ever been to Mokan Mountain?

There are eighteen hairpin bends on the way up. Society invariably moves forward in a spiral. Now the fight to ferret out the Rightists must go on without any let-up, and we must keep up the strong gale and torrential downpour. Just because they started it all, it may look as if we are trying to get even with them. It is only now that the Rightists realize how good a gentle breeze and a mild rain is. At the sight of a reed they try to cling to it, because they are sinking fast, like a drowning man in the Whangpoo River clutching at a straw. I suppose that "crow" must now be pining for a gentle breeze and a mild rain. But now it is stormy weather. After July, there will be a gentle breeze and a mild rain in August, for there won't be much left to ferret out.

The Rightists are very good teachers by negative example. China has always had teachers by both positive and negative example. People need to be educated by negative as well as positive example. Japanese imperialism was our first top-flight teacher by negative example. Previously there were the Ching government, Yuan Shih-kai and the Northern warlords, and then there was Chiang Kai-shek. They were all fine teachers by negative example. Without them the Chinese people could never have learned their lessons. The Communist Party served as the teacher by positive example, but this alone would not have been enough. This holds good to this day. There are people who refused to listen to many of the things we said. Who are they? Many of the middle elements, and particularly the Rightists. The former took us half seriously and half sceptically. The Rightists wouldn't listen to us at all. We told them our views on quite a number of issues but they turned a deaf ear and took a different course. For instance, we advocated "unity — criticism — unity", but they wouldn't listen. We said that achievements were primary in the elimination of counter-revolutionaries, but they denied it. We said there must be democratic centralism and people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat, but they denied it. We said we must unite with the socialist countries and the peace-loving people throughout the world, but they denied that too. In short, we told them all this before, but they wouldn't listen. There was another point which they particularly wouldn't listen to, namely, that poisonous weeds must be uprooted. Let ghosts and monsters come out and make an exhibition of themselves, and afterwards the people will say these ghosts and monsters are no good and must be eliminated. Let poisonous weeds sprout, then uproot them and plough them under for manure. Didn't we say all this before? Of course we did. All the same, poisonous weeds keep sprouting. Year in year out, the peasants tell the weeds they are going to dig them up several times a year, but the weeds simply won't listen and keep growing. Even though digging will go on for ten thousand years, weeds will keep growing. They will grow even a hundred million years from now. When I talked about weeding, the Rightists were not afraid because I was only talking and weeding had not actually started. What is more, the Rightists considered that they were not poisonous weeds but fragrant flowers and that we were poisonous weeds and we, not they, should be uprooted. It just didn't occur to them that it was precisely they who should be uprooted.

A debate on the three questions referred to earlier is now in progress. The socialist revolution came so swiftly that the Party's general line for the transition period has not been fully debated either inside the Party or in society at large. This may be likened to a cow eating grass. It gulps the grass down, stores it in its stomach, then regurgitates it and slowly chews the cud. We have been making socialist revolution in the system, firstly in the ownership of the means of production and secondly in the superstructure, in the political system and the sphere of ideology, but there has never been a full debate on the question. And now we are unfolding the debate through the newspapers, forums, mass rallies and big-character posters.

The big-character poster is a fine thing and I think it will be handed down to future generations. The *Confucian Analects*, the *Five Classics*, the *Thirteen Classics* and the *Twenty-four Dynastic Histories* have all been handed down to us. Won't the big-character poster be handed down to posterity? I think it will. Will it be used in the future when rectification is unfolded, in factories for instance? I think it is a good idea to use it, the more the better. Like language, it has no class nature. Our vernacular has no class nature. We all speak in the vernacular and so does Chiang Kai-shek. We no longer speak literary Chinese exemplified by sayings like — "Great pleasure is derived from learning and constantly reviewing what has been learned" and "Welcoming friends from afar gives one great delight". The vernacular is used by the proletariat and also by the bourgeoisie. The big-character poster can be used by the bourgeoisie as well as by the proletariat. We believe that the majority of the people are on the side of the proletariat. Therefore, the big-character poster as an instrument favours the proletariat, not the bourgeoisie. For a period of time, about two or three weeks, things seemed to go in favour of the bourgeoisie, with gloom above and darkness below and the rays of the sun and the moon completely shut out. When we said we must toughen our scalps and bear it, we meant losing sleep and appetite for those two or three weeks. Didn't you say you wanted tempering? To lose sleep and appetite for a few weeks is a kind of tempering, and this doesn't mean being shoved into a blast furnace to be smelted.

Many middle elements have vacillated, and this is a good thing too. They will draw lessons from their vacillation. It is the hallmark of the middle elements, otherwise would they be known as such? The proletariat is at one end and the bourgeoisie at the other, with large numbers of middle elements in between, a case of both ends being small and the middle being large. But in the final analysis the middle elements are good people, an ally of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie too wanted to win them over as an ally, and at one time they looked like it. For these middle elements also criticized us, but their criticisms were well-intentioned. When the Rightists saw them criticizing us, they came out and made trouble. In Shanghai, you had Rightists like Wang Tsao-shih, Lu Yi, Chen Jen-ping and Peng Wen-ying and also Wu Yin making trouble. Once the Rightists went at it, the middle elements got confused. The Rightists' progenitors are Chang Po-chun, Lo Lung-chi and Chang Nai-chi, and Peking is the Rightists' place of origin. The greater the chaos in Peking, the better, and the more profound it is, the better. This has been borne out by our experience.

Just now I talked about the big-character poster. It is a question of method, a question of what method to use in fighting. The big-character poster is one of the weapons used in fighting, like small arms such as the rifle, the pistol and the machine-gun. As for planes and field guns, perhaps they are *Wen Hui Pao*, the *Kuangming Daily* and some other newspapers. For a time the Party papers also carried the Rightists' views. We issued an order to the effect that all Rightists' views must be published verbatim. Through the use of this and other methods, we helped the broad masses to get educated by both positive and negative examples. The staff on the *Kuangming Daily* and *Wen Hui Pao*, for instance, have received a profound education this time. Hitherto they were unable to tell the difference between a proletarian and a bourgeois newspaper, between a socialist and a capitalist one. For some time the Rightists in charge ran these two newspapers as bourgeois newspapers. These Rightists hated the proletariat and socialism. They guided the universities not towards the proletariat but towards the bourgeoisie.

Is remoulding necessary for the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals from the old society? They are mortally afraid of remoulding, saying that it gives rise to a particular complex called the "inferiority complex", and the more the remoulding one undergoes, the stronger this complex. This view is wrong. The correct view is that the more the remoulding, the greater one's self-respect. If anything, the result should be a sense of self-respect since one has awakened to the need for remoulding. These people with their high level of "class consciousness" think they need no remoulding themselves, on the contrary they want to remould the proletariat. They seek to transform the world in the image of the bourgeoisie whereas the proletariat seeks to transform the world in its own image. I dare say the majority, that is, over 90 per cent of these people, will eventually bring themselves around to accepting remoulding after some hesitation, reconsideration, reluctance and vacillation. The more the remoulding one undergoes, the more one feels the need for it. Even the Communist Party is undergoing remoulding. Rectification means remoulding and it will continue into the future. Do you think there will be no more rectifications after this one? Will bureaucracy vanish after the present rectification? After only two or three years, some people will forget all about it and then bureaucracy will return. That's how people are, they have a short memory. Hence the need for rectification from time to time. Since the Communist Party itself is in need of rectification, can it be that the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals from the old society need no rectification? No remoulding? Certainly, they need rectification and remoulding, only more so.

Aren't the democratic parties in the midst of a rectification movement? All society should go through a process of rectification. What's bad about that? The rectification will deal not with trivialities but with important issues, with the question of political line. At present the democratic parties are putting the stress of rectification on the question of line and on repudiating the counter-revolutionary line pursued by the bourgeois Rightists. I think they have been correct. In its own rectification the Communist Party is now stressing not the question of line but the style of work. For the democratic parties, however, style of work is secondary and the main stress should be on what line they follow. Should they follow the counter-revolutionary line of Chang Po-chun, Lo Lung-chi, Chang Nai-chi, Chen Jen-ping, Peng Wen-ying, Lu Yi and Sun Ta-yu, or should they follow another line? First and foremost, they must get a clear idea about this and about the three questions I am raising here: Are the achievements of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, the work accomplished by several hundred million people, good or not? Which road should we follow, the socialist road or the capitalist road? Which party should assume leadership in building socialism, the Chang-Lo alliance or the Communist Party? Let there be a great debate to thrash out the question of line.

There is also the question of line within the Communist Party. As far as those "insurgents", the Rightists in the Communist Party and the Youth League, are concerned, it is indeed a question of line. At present dogmatism is not the question, for it has not evolved into a line. In the history of our Party dogmatism did become a question of line on several occasions, because it developed into a system, policy and programme. Present-day dogmatism has not developed to this extent, but it does have a certain rigidity which is now being somewhat softened by hammering and forging. Aren't those in leading positions in departments and organizations, universities and factories "coming down the stairs"?[2] They are discarding the Kuomintang style of work and their uppity airs and no longer act like bureaucrats. Bureaucracy has greatly diminished now that directors of co-operatives work with the peasants in the fields and factory directors and Party committee secretaries join the workers on the shop floor. This kind of rectification will still be necessary in future. We should put up big-character posters, hold forums and deal separately with what should be set right and what should be criticized. There is another point. We should raise our level and learn some Marxism.

I believe most of our people are fine people and the Chinese nation is a fine nation. Ours is a nation which is very sensible, warm-hearted, intelligent and courageous. I hope a situation will be created in which we have both unity of will and liveliness, that is, both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom. There should be two aspects; not just one, not just discipline alone nor just centralism alone. That would muzzle people and prevent them from speaking up and criticizing what is in fact wrong. We should encourage people to speak out and there should be a lively atmosphere. Whoever criticizes us in good faith is not blameworthy. However sharp his criticism or severe his censure, he is not to be blamed or punished or given tight shoes to wear. Tight shoes are very uncomfortable. Now to whom should we give the tight shoes? The Rightists. The Rightists must be made to wear them.

We should not be afraid of the masses but should be with them. Some comrades fear the masses just as they fear water. Do you swim? I encourage swimming everywhere I go. Water is a good thing. If you put in an hour every day to learn swimming and keep it up, taking a dip today and another tomorrow, I bet you will learn how in a hundred days. First, you mustn't get a coach, second, you mustn't use a rubber tyre, as you won't learn if you use one. "But I fear for my life, I can't swim yet!" Well, you can first start in shallow water. Suppose you are to learn swimming in a hundred days, you paddle in the shallow water for thirty days and then you get the hang of it. Once you know how, it makes no difference whether you go swimming in the Yangtse River or in the Pacific Ocean, it is just water, the same thing. Some argue that you can't drown in a swimming-pool, because somebody will come to your rescue if you sink; but swimming in the Yangtse is terrifying, the current is so swift, won't you be lost for good once you go under? This is an argument some use to scare people. I say that's the way amateurs talk. None of our top-notch swimmers, none of our coaches and experts at the swimming-pools dared to go swimming in the Yangtse at first, but they do now. Don't people swim in your Whangpoo River here nowadays? The Whangpoo and the Yangtse are admission-free swimming-pools. Metaphorically speaking, the people are like water and the leaders at various levels are like swimmers who must stay in the water and swim with the current, not against it. Don't rail at the masses! In no circumstances must you do so. You mustn't rail at the worker, peasant and student masses and the majority of the members of the democratic parties and of the intellectuals. You mustn't set yourselves up against the masses, on the contrary you must always be with them. The masses may make mistakes. When they do, patiently reason things out with them, and if they refuse to listen, then wait for another chance to talk to them. But don't alienate yourselves from them, just as in swimming you don't leave the water. When Liu Pei got Chukeh Liang to help him, he said he felt "just like a fish in water". This is all true. Their fish-water relationship is not only described in fiction but recorded in history. The masses are Chukeh Liangs, the leaders are Liu Peis. One leads, the other is led.

All wisdom comes from the masses. I have always said that it is intellectuals who are most ignorant. This is the heart of the matter. Overweening intellectuals stick up their tails which are longer than that of the Monkey Sun Wu-kung. Sun Wu-kung can make seventy-two metamorphoses, and on one occasion he changes his tail into a flagstaff — that long. It's just terrific when the intellectuals stick up their tails. "If I'm not Number One Under Heaven, then I'm at least Number Two." "Who do the workers and peasants think they are? They're just blockheads! They can barely read and write." But the over-all situation is determined not by the intellectuals but ultimately by the working people, by their most advanced section, the proletariat.

Which leads which — the proletariat the bourgeoisie, or vice versa? The proletariat the intellectuals, or vice versa? The intellectuals must transform themselves into proletarian intellectuals. There is no other way out for them. "With the skin gone, to what can the hair attach itself?"[3] In the past the "hair", meaning the intellectuals, attached itself to five "skins", that is, depended on them for a living. Imperialist ownership was the first skin, feudal ownership the second and bureaucrat-capitalist ownership the third. Wasn't the purpose of the democratic revolution to topple the three big mountains of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism? National capitalist ownership was the fourth skin, and the fifth was ownership by small producers, that is, individual ownership by the peasants and handicraftsmen. In the past the intellectuals attached themselves either to the first three skins or to the latter two and depended on them for a living. Do these five skins still exist? "The skins are gone." Imperialism is gone and its property has been taken over. Feudal ownership was liquidated and the land restored to the peasants, and now there is agricultural co-operation. Bureaucrat-capitalist enterprises were nationalized. National capitalist industry and commerce have been transformed into joint state-private enterprises and have by and large become socialist enterprises, though not entirely. Individual ownership by the peasants and handicraftsmen has been changed into collective ownership, even though the latter is not yet consolidated and will take a few years to consolidate itself. These five skins are no more, but they have a lingering effect on the "hair", on the capitalists and the intellectuals. These people can't get these skins out of their systems, and even dwell on them in their dreams. Those who came over from the old society, the old orbits, are nostalgic for their old habits and ways of life. Therefore the transformation of man will take a much longer time.

At present what kind of skin do intellectuals attach themselves to? To the skin of public ownership, to the proletariat. Who provides them with a living? The workers and peasants. Intellectuals are teachers employed by the working class and the labouring people to teach their children. If they go against the wishes of their masters and insist on teaching their own set of subjects, teaching stereotyped writing, Confucian classics or capitalist rubbish, and turn out a number of counter-revolutionaries, the working class will not tolerate it and will sack them and not renew their contract for the coming year.

As I said here a hundred days ago, the intellectuals from the old society are now without a base, they have lost their former social and economic base, that is, the five skins, and they have no alternative but to attach themselves to a new one. Some intellectuals are now unsettled. Suspended as they are in mid-air, they have nothing to hang on to above and no solid ground to rest their feet on below. I say, these people may be called "gentlemen in mid-air". Flying in mid-air, they want to go back but are unable to because they find their old home, those skins, gone. Though now homeless, they are still unwilling to attach themselves to the proletariat. If they are to do so, they must make a study of proletarian ideas, have some feeling for the proletariat and make friends with workers and peasants. But no, they won't. They still hanker after what they know is gone. What we are doing now is persuading them to wake up. After this great debate, I think they will wake up somehow or other.

Those intellectuals who take a middle position should awaken and not be too cocky, because what they know is limited. I say these people are intellectuals and at the same time not intellectuals, maybe semi-intellectuals is a more appropriate term. For they have just so much knowledge, and on matters of principle they cannot open their mouths without making mistakes. Now let us leave aside the Rightist intellectuals, for they are reactionaries. The trouble with intellectuals who take a middle position is that they waver, do not have a clear orientation and sometimes even lose their bearings. If you have such great learning, how come you make mistakes? If you are so marvellous and cocksure of yourselves, how come you waver? A tuft of grass atop the wall sways right and left in the wind. It all goes to show that you don't know much. In this connection, it is the workers and the semi-proletarians among the peasants who know a lot. They can tell at a glance that Sun Ta-yu and his wares are nothing but fakes. You see who knows better? Undoubtedly it is those who can hardly read and write that know better. One must go to the proletariat when it comes to making the crucial decision concerning the over-all situation, the general direction. I'm the kind of person who consults the workers and peasants before I do anything significant or make decisions on major issues, talking over and discussing things with them and with the cadres close to them to see if my ideas are all right. This makes visits to various places necessary. Staying put in Peking could be fatal. It is a barren place where you can't get any raw material. All the raw material comes from the workers and peasants and from the localities. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party can be likened to a processing factory, which uses raw material to turn out products. The finished products must be good, or otherwise mistakes are made. Knowledge comes from the masses. What does the correct handling of contradictions among the people mean? It means seeking truth from facts and following the mass line. In the final analysis, it is the mass line that counts. We mustn't alienate ourselves from the masses, our relationship with the masses is a fish-water relationship or swimmer-water relationship.

Do we need to finish off the Rightists with one blow? Giving them a couple of hard knocks is quite necessary. If we don't, they will play possum. Don't we need to mount attacks on these types and go after them? Yes, attacks are necessary. But the aim is to force them to reverse course. We should use every means in our offensive to isolate them completely, only then can we win over some, if not all. They are intellectuals and some are big intellectuals; once won over they can be useful. Win them over and let them do some work. Besides, they have done a great service to us this time as teachers who have educated the people by negative example. We are not going to dump them into the Whangpoo River but will still take the approach of curing the sickness to save the patient. Perhaps some are not willing to come over. If men like Sun Ta-yu are obstinate and refuse to make the change, so be it. We have a lot to do now. It is simply impossible to keep on hitting out at these types day in day out for the next fifty years! There are people who refuse to correct their mistakes, they can take them into their coffins when they go to see the King of Hell. They can say to him, "I'm a defender of the five skins. I'm a man of 'integrity'. The Communists and the masses grilled me but I did not submit and I have come through all right." But they should get this into their heads. Today there is a change of hands even in Hell, with Marx, Engels and Lenin ruling there. There are two Hells today, the rulers of the Hell of the capitalist world probably remain the same, while Marx, Engels and Lenin rule the Hell of the socialist world. As I see it, even a century hence the die-hard Rightists will get their punishment.

NOTES

[1] *Lieh Tzu*, "Tien Jui".

[2] "Coming down the stairs" refers to the efforts of those leading cadres who had committed errors to make self-criticism in response to the criticisms of the masses and to win their understanding during the rectification movement.

[3] *Tso Chuan*, "The 14th Year of Marquis Hsi".

THE SITUATION IN THE SUMMER OF 1957

July 1957

During the period of socialist revolution in our country the contradiction between the people and the bourgeois Rightists, who oppose the Communist Party, the people and socialism, is one between ourselves and the enemy, that is, an antagonistic, irreconcilable, life-and-death contradiction.

The bourgeois Rightists who have launched wild attacks against the working class and the Communist Party are reactionaries or counter-revolutionaries. They are not so labelled but are instead called Rightists because, first, this will make it easier to win over the middle and, second, it will help split the Rightists and enable some of them to change and come over.

Those bourgeois Rightists who remain unchanged to the bitter end are die-hards, but they too will be given work and not deprived of their civil rights, unless they act as secret agents or carry on sabotage. This line of action is being taken because, judging from many events in the past, extreme policies produce bad results. We should take a long view, and decades from now when we look back an the present events we shall see how this treatment of the bourgeois Rightists profoundly influenced and greatly benefited the revolutionary cause of the proletariat.

Our aim is to create a political situation in which we have both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness, and thus to promote our socialist revolution and socialist construction, make it easier to overcome difficulties, build a modern industry and modern agriculture

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Article written during the conference of the secretaries of provincial and municipal Party committees held in Tsingtao in July 1957 and printed and distributed at the conference. It was circulated among the leading cadres of the Party in August of the same year.

more rapidly and make our Party and state more secure and better able to weather storm and stress. The general subject here is the correct handling of contradictions among the people and those between ourselves and the enemy. The method is to seek truth from facts and follow the mass line. The derivative methods are those of holding meetings attended by both Party and non-Party people to discuss major policies, conducting the rectification movement publicly, and criticizing many of the Party's and the government's shortcomings and mistakes in the press. The rectification and the socialist education movement should proceed by batches and stages in the democratic parties, in the various circles comprising education, the press, science and technology, literature and art, public health, industry and commerce, and among the working class, the different strata of the peasantry, handicraftsmen and other urban and rural working people. With regard to the bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals, the problem is to get them to accept socialist transformation, and the same holds for the petty bourgeoisie (including the peasants and the urban and rural self-employed working people), and especially the well-to-do middle peasants; but where the basic ranks of the working class and the Communist Party are concerned, the problem is to rectify their style of work. These are problems concerning two social categories that are different in character. This being the case, why is rectification used as a slogan for both? Because most people are receptive to this slogan. We can say to people: Since the Communist Party and the working class are undergoing rectification, do you think you can do without it? Thus the initiative will be completely in our hands. The method of rectification is to make criticism and self-criticism, present the facts and reason things out. The aim of rectification is to guide the struggle in such a way as to set right the political orientation, raise the ideological level, overcome shortcomings in work, unite with the broad masses, and isolate and split the bourgeois Rightists and all other anti-socialist elements. The bourgeois Rightists referred to here include those who have sneaked into the Party and the Youth League and whose political complexion is exactly the same as that of the Rightists outside; they have betrayed the revolutionary cause of the proletariat and launched wild attacks against the Party, and therefore must be fully exposed and expelled in order to preserve the purity of the ranks of the Party and the Youth League.

Firm faith in the majority of the masses, and first and foremost in the majority of the basic masses, the workers and peasants — this is our fundamental point of departure. Even in the case of industrialists and businessmen and intellectuals, most people, who may have been deceived for a time and wavered during the period of the Rightists' frenzied attack, regained their bearings and came over to our side a few weeks later when the counter-attack against the Rightists started. Therefore, the majority in these circles are trustworthy in the long run, they can accept socialist transformation. At one time or another, quite a few comrades made the mistake of underestimating the strength of the proletariat and overestimating that of the bourgeois Rightists. There are still many cadres in prefectures, counties, districts, townships and factories who do so, and we should patiently persuade them not to underestimate our own strength and overestimate that of the enemy. In the countryside the landlords and rich peasants are being remoulded; some are still making trouble and we must heighten our vigilance. A great number of the well-to-do middle peasants are willing to stay in the co-operatives; a small number clamour to withdraw, eager to take the capitalist road. We should deal with each case on its merits. In the countryside it is imperative to pay attention to the class line and enable the former poor peasants and farm labourers to occupy the dominant position in the leading bodies, while at the same time pains must be taken to unite with the middle peasants. I'm all for a directive to be issued at once by the Central Committee to initiate a large-scale socialist education movement among the entire rural population to criticize Right opportunist ideas within the Party, the departmentalism of certain cadres and the capitalist and individualist ideas of the well-to-do middle peasants, and to strike at the counter-revolutionary activities of landlords and rich peasants. The criticism should be directed mainly against the vacillating well-to-do middle peasants whose capitalist ideas should be struggled against by arguing things out. From now on such struggle should be resolutely carried out once a year in co-ordination with the rectification movement among the district and township cadres and with the check-up of Class III co-operatives, so that all co-operatives may gradually be consolidated. In the countryside, let the peasants too have the "free airing of views" first, that is, make criticisms and comments. Then accept what is good and criticize what is bad. All this should proceed step by step in the rural rectification movement, which is to be conducted by the local cadres with the assistance of work teams sent from above. In the rural areas as in the cities the struggle is still one between the two roads — between socialism and capitalism. Complete victory in this struggle will take a very long time. It is a task for the entire transition period. In the countryside diligence and thrift should be encouraged in running the household as well as in running the co-operative, and love of the country and the co-operative as well as love of the family. We must rely in particular on the efforts of the women's organizations to tackle the problem of running the household thriftily. Over the next few years, the annual sum of 35,000 million catties of grain in tax and of 50,000 million catties in state purchases must be obtained without fail. However, some adjustments may be made, depending on whether the harvest is good or poor. As production rises year by year and the number of grain-deficient households correspondingly falls, there should be annual reductions in rural grain sales. In cities, wherever grain sales are excessive, there should also be appropriate reductions. Only thus can the state increase its grain reserves each year and meet possible emergencies. Failure to collect these 85,000 million catties of grain will affect market prices, check the smooth fulfilment of the national economic plan as a whole and leave us helpless in the face of emergencies, and that would be very dangerous. Before the autumn harvest sets in this year, it is imperative to wage a struggle in the countryside against individualism and departmentalism, both of which ignore the interests of the state and the collective.

Counter-revolutionaries must be eliminated wherever found. Kill few, but on no account repeal the death penalty or grant any general pardon. Arrest and punish again those persons who commit fresh crimes after having served prison terms. Punish the gangsters, hooligans, thieves, murderers, rapists, embezzlers, and other felons in our society who undermine public order and grossly violate the law; also punish those whom the public identifies as bad elements. At present, certain functionaries in the judicial and public security departments are neglecting their duties and allowing persons who should be arrested and punished to remain at large; this is wrong. Just as over-punishment is wrong, so is under-punishment, and these days the danger lies in the latter. Prohibit gambling. Strictly enforce the ban on reactionary secret societies. Rightist student leaders should be thoroughly criticized; in most cases they should be kept where they are, to be reformed under supervision and to serve as "teachers". The above points hold good for the transition period, and it is the responsibility of the provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party committees to have them carried out. Subject to the policies and laws of the central authorities, local departments in charge of justice and public security and of cultural and educational affairs must act without fail under the direction of the provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party committees and people's councils.

Our general subject is the correct handling of contradictions among the people. Keep on talking about it until it becomes familiar, then what once seemed bewildering will no longer be so. Clarify in your own mind the question of contradictions among the people, openly and clearly explain it, correctly handle a number of these contradictions, and then, having achieved results and gained experience, you won't be afraid of it any more.

Let me repeat. Correctly handling the contradictions among the people means following the mass line, which is consistently stressed by our Party. Party members should be good at consulting the masses in their work and in no circumstances should they alienate themselves from the masses. The relation between the Party and the masses is like that between fish and water. Without good relations between the Party and the masses, the socialist system cannot be established or, once established, be consolidated.

The armed forces have carried out rectification on many occasions; the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention are enforced; democracy is practised in military, political and economic affairs; in times of war mutual-aid groups are organized in the squads; officers are integrated with men and the army with the people; and hitting or swearing at people is forbidden, and so is the execution of deserters. As a result, morale is high and our army is invincible. If this can be done among soldiers bearing arms, why can't democracy be practised in factories, villages, offices and schools and their problems (contradictions) solved by persuasion and not by coercion?

Why be afraid of our own people when we are not afraid of the imperialists? He is no true communist who fears the common people and believes the masses are not open to reason and must be coerced rather than convinced.

Except for renegades and persons who have grossly violated the law, we should protect all Party and Youth League members during the rectification movement, and make great and sincere efforts to help them correct their mistakes and shortcomings, improve their method of work, enhance their competence and raise their political and ideological level. A Party member must be full of vigour and strong in revolutionary will, be endowed with the drive to defy all difficulties and to persevere in overcoming them, and be determined to rid himself of individualism, departmentalism, absolute egalitarianism and liberalism;

otherwise, he is not a Party member in the real sense of the term. Those Party members who prove wanting in vigour and revolutionary will or who persist in their mistakes should be duly dealt with by the Party committee if they refuse to mend their ways after repeated warnings and, in serious cases, they should be disciplined.

Within six to twelve months the first secretaries (and the other secretaries too) of provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party committees should each make a personal study of a particular co-operative, factory, store and school to obtain some knowledge and earn the "right to speak" and so give better guidance to their work in general. The secretaries of prefectural, county and district Party committees should do likewise.

Don't underestimate the significance of our current criticism of the bourgeois Rightists. This is a great socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts. By itself, the socialist revolution of 1956 on the economic front (that is, in the ownership of the means of production) is not enough, nor is it secure. This has been borne out by the Hungarian incident. There must be a thoroughgoing socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts too. In the democratic parties and in intellectual and in industrial and commercial circles, it is of course out of the question for the Communist Party to exercise leadership over some people (the Rightists), for they are our enemies, and the Party's leadership over most people (the middle section) has not been consolidated; in certain cultural and educational units the Party's leadership has not been established at all. Firm leadership over the middle section must be established, and the sooner the better. The bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals do not gladly submit to the Communist Party, and the Rightists among them are determined to match their strength with ours. Once beaten in a trial of strength, they will realize that the game is up and their position is hopeless. Not until then will the majority (the middle section plus a number of the Rightists) begin to behave themselves, gradually abandon their bourgeois stand, come over to the side of the proletariat and make up their minds to throw in their lot with it. A small number will refuse to change to the very end; we'll just have to let them take their reactionary views with them to the grave. We must however heighten our vigilance. It must be realized that at the first opportunity they will again stir up trouble. Counting from now, this struggle will probably last ten or as many as fifteen years. The time can be shortened if things are well managed. Of course, this is not to say that class struggle will cease in ten to fifteen years. As long as imperialism and the bourgeoisie exist in this world of ours, the activities of the domestic counter-revolutionaries and bourgeois Rightists will always partake of the nature of class struggle, and, what is more, they will invariably mesh with those of the foreign reactionaries. After a necessary period of time, the form of the present struggle should change from that of a strong gale and a torrential downpour to a gentle breeze and a mild rain so that ideologically the struggle can become deeper and more thoroughgoing. We have won the first decisive battle in the last few months, mainly in the last two months. But in order to win complete victory, several more months of deep digging are needed, and we must not wind up the struggle in a hurry. Make no mistake, if this struggle is not won socialism is impossible.

This great debate among the people throughout the country has solved or is in the process of solving questions of cardinal importance, such as whether our work in the revolution and in construction is correct (that is, whether achievements in the revolution and in construction are primary), whether the socialist road should be taken, whether the leadership of the Communist Party, the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism are needed, and whether our foreign policy is correct. It is natural that such a great debate should have taken place. It took place in the Soviet Union in the twenties (the debate with Trotsky and others on whether socialism could be built in one country[1]), and it is taking place this year in our country, in the fifties. If we fail to win complete victory in the debate, it will be impossible to continue our march forward. Once we triumph in the debate, our socialist transformation and socialist construction will receive a big impetus. This debate is a great event of world significance.

We must understand that, counting from now, ten to fifteen years will be required to build a modern industrial and modern agricultural base in China. Only when the productive forces of our society have been fairly adequately developed over a period of ten to fifteen years will it be possible to regard our socialist economic and political system as having obtained a fairly adequate material base (now far from adequate), and will it be possible to regard our state (the superstructure) as fully consolidated and our socialist society as fundamentally built. It is not built yet, and ten to fifteen years more are needed. To build socialism, the working class must have its own army of technical cadres and of professors, teachers, scientists, journalists, writers, artists and Marxist theorists. It must be a vast army; a small number of people will not suffice. This is a task that should be basically accomplished in the next ten to fifteen years. The tasks after that will be to make further efforts to develop the productive forces and expand the army of working-class intellectuals, create the pre-conditions for the gradual transition from socialism to communism and get prepared to catch up with and surpass the United States economically in eight to ten five-year plans. All members of the Communist Party and the Youth League and the nation as a whole should be aware of this task, and everybody should study hard. Wherever possible they should strive to acquire technical skill and vocational knowledge and study Marxist theory, so that a new army of working-class intellectuals will be formed (including all the intellectuals from the old society who take a firm working-class stand after having been genuinely remoulded). This is a great task history sets us. The revolutionary cause of the working class will not be fully consolidated until this vast new army of working-class intellectuals comes into being.

It is a major achievement that experience has been gained at the central and the provincial and municipal levels in the three tasks of rectification, criticism of the Rightists and winning over the middle section of the masses. With this experience things will be easier. The task for the next few months is to teach those at the prefectural and the county levels how to gain this experience. Between now and the coming winter and spring, the task is gradually to teach those at the district and the township levels to do likewise. In the cities it is to teach those at the district level and in factories and mines at the basic level as well as the neighbourhood committees. As a result, many people will be enlightened, the mass line will cease to be a mere phrase to them, and it will be easier for contradictions among the people to be resolved.

The first secretaries and all the other members of provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party committees must take full command of this great struggle. They must assume full control over the work of political transformation and ideological remoulding in the democratic parties (political circles) and in the circles of education, the press (including all newspapers and periodicals), science and technology, literature and art, public health, and industry and commerce. Each province, municipality and autonomous region should have its own Marxist theorists, scientists and technical personnel, writers, artists and literary critics, and first-rate editors and reporters on its own newspapers and periodicals. The first secretaries (and the other secretaries too) should pay particular attention to newspapers and periodicals and not be lazy about it; each should read at least five papers and five periodicals for comparison, so that they can improve their own publications.

Our criticism of the Rightists has given a great shock to everybody in the democratic parties and in intellectual and in industrial and commercial circles. It should be noted that the majority of them (the middle) are inclined to accept the socialist road and the leadership of the proletariat. This inclination varies in degree with different categories of people; It should be further noted that although they now merely show an inclination towards a genuine acceptance of the fundamentals, namely, the socialist road and the leadership of the proletariat, this very inclination signifies the first step on their long journey from the stand of the bourgeoisie to that of the working class. After a year of rectification (from May this year to May next year), they will be able to take a big step forward. In the past they were mentally unprepared to take part in socialist revolution. For them this revolution happened all of a sudden. This was also the case with a number of Communist Party members. The criticism of the Rightists and the rectification movement will give these people and the broad masses a profound education in socialism.

The big-character poster can be put to use everywhere except in the salesrooms of stores, rural areas (districts and townships), primary schools, and the battalions and companies of the armed forces. In the conditions obtaining in our country, it is a form of struggle favourable to the proletariat and unfavourable to the bourgeoisie. Fear of the big-character poster is groundless. Big-character posters, forums and debates are three excellent forms for revealing and overcoming contradictions and helping people make progress in institutions of higher education, in departments and organizations at the central, the provincial and municipal, the prefectural and the county levels and in large urban enterprises.

At no time should production and other work be neglected during the rectification movement. The authorities in various places should not start rectification in all the units under them at the same time, but should stagger it and carry it out by groups.

Don't be afraid of the violent storm, toughen yourselves and bear it. In each unit, the crest of the torrent will pass in two or three weeks, and the unit can then switch to the new stage of counter-attack on the Rightists. Faced with the Rightists' wild attacks during these two or three weeks, the leading cadres of various units should toughen themselves and hear them out without rebutting, concentrate on analysing and studying the situation, muster strength for the counter-attack, and unite with the forces of the Left, win over the middle, and isolate the Rightists — all this makes an excellent set of Marxist tactics.

The stage of freely airing views (carrying out reform at the same time), the stage of counter-attack on the Rightists (carrying out reform at the same time), the stage of putting the emphasis on reform (with a further free airing of views) and the stage in which everyone studies relevant documents and makes criticism and self-criticism to raise his own political consciousness — these are the four indispensable stages of the rectification movement at the central, the provincial and municipal, the prefectural and the county levels. In addition, rectification is to be conducted at the grass roots in the cities and the countryside. After such a movement, it is certain that the whole Party and the whole people will take on a fresh complexion.

The first secretaries of the provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party committees and of the prefectural Party committees are requested to devote some time in August to studying the check-up of co-operatives, production, grain, and other questions in rural areas in preparation for the plenary session of the Central Committee to be held in September. Please study the forty articles of the Programme for Agricultural Development one by one and see whether changes are needed.

NOTES

[1] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Chapter 9, Section 5.

BE ACTIVISTS IN PROMOTING THE REVOLUTION

October 9, 1957

This conference has been a success. With the participation of comrades from the provincial and prefectural Party committees, such an enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee is in fact a conference of cadres from three levels and is good for clarifying policies, exchanging experience and achieving unity of will.

Perhaps it is necessary to convene this sort of conference once a year. For work is very complicated in a large country like ours. We did not call such a conference last year; we suffered in consequence and a Right deviation occurred. There had been a high tide the year before last, but last year saw a let-down. Of course we held the Eighth Congress last year and didn't have time. Next time such a conference is convened, a few secretaries of county Party committees and of district Party committees in some large cities may be included; for instance, it would be all right to have an additional hundred or so. I suggest every province should also convene an all-province conference of cadres from three or four levels, with some from the co-operatives, to thrash out problems. This is the first point.

Second, a few words about rectification. Be bold, thorough and resolute in letting people air their views and in making reforms. We must have this kind of resolve. Then, is it necessary to add a campaign against the Rightists, and a vigorous one at that? No, it isn't. Because the anti-Rightist campaign is on the right track and in some places has already ended. Now the stress should be on airing views and making reforms at the grass-roots levels, that is, at the three levels of county, district and township. In some departments at the central

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Speech at the Enlarged Third Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

and the provincial and municipal levels, the airing of views should continue but the emphasis should be on reform.

In the course of this year the masses have created a form of making revolution, a form of waging mass struggle, namely, speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters. Our revolution has now found a form well suited to its content. This form could not have emerged in the past. Since we were then engaged in fighting, in the five major movements[1] and the three great transformations,[2] it was impossible for this form of unhurried debate to come into being. It would have been impermissible to devote a whole year to unhurried debate, to presenting facts and reasoning things out. Now it can be done. We have found this form, a form suited to the content of the current struggle of the masses, to the content of the present class struggle and to the correct handling of contradictions among the people. Grasp this form and henceforward you will find things much easier to manage. Major and minor questions of right and wrong as well as problems in revolution and construction can be solved through airing views and holding debates, and more quickly. The Left should freely air views and hold debates not only with the middle but also openly with the Rightists and, in the villages, with the landlords and rich peasants. Not being afraid of "losing face", we have published in our newspapers such nonsense as "the Communist Party monopolizes everything", "the Communist Party should abdicate" and "get off your sedan-chair". We have just got "on" our "sedan-chair", and already the Rightists want us to get "off". Speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters are the form best suited to arousing the initiative of the masses and enhancing their sense of responsibility.

Our Party has a democratic tradition. Without this tradition it would have been impossible to accept such free airing of views, great debates and big-character posters. During the rectification movement in Yenan people took notes, made self-criticisms and helped each other, seven or eight to a group, and this lasted for several months. All those I have met are grateful for that rectification, they say it was only then that they began to shed their subjectivism. In the days of the agrarian reform, we consulted the masses whenever problems arose in order to straighten out ideas. In our army units, company commanders would personally see to it that their men were properly covered at night and would have friendly chats with them on an equal footing. Forms of democracy abounded in the rectification movement in Yenan, in the agrarian reform, in the democratic life of the army units, in the Three Check-ups and Three Improvements,[3] and later on in the struggles against the "three evils" and the "five evils", and in the ideological remoulding of intellectuals. But the free airing of views and the holding of great debates, to be followed by consultation and persuasion in the nature of "a gentle breeze and a mild rain" — it is only now that all this can come about. We have found this form which will immensely benefit our cause and make it easier for us to overcome subjectivism, bureaucracy and commandism (by commandism we mean striking or cursing people or forcing them to carry out orders) and for leading cadres to become one with the masses.

This year has seen a great development in our democratic tradition, and this form of speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters should be handed down to future generations. It brings socialist democracy into full play. Democracy of this kind is possible only in socialist countries, not in capitalist countries. On the basis of such democracy, centralism is not weakened but further strengthened, as is the dictatorship of the proletariat. For the proletariat must rely on its broad allies to exercise dictatorship, it cannot do so all by itself. The proletariat in China is small in number, some ten million only, and it must rely on the several hundred million poor and lower-middle peasants, city poor, badly-off handicraftsmen and revolutionary intellectuals in order to exercise dictatorship — otherwise it cannot. Now that we have aroused their enthusiasm, the dictatorship of the proletariat is being consolidated.

Third, agriculture. The forty-article Programme for Agricultural Development has been revised and will soon be issued. Comrades, please do a good job of organizing debates and discussions on it in the villages. I have asked some comrades whether prefectures should draw up agricultural plans. They said yes. Should districts do likewise? Again the answer was yes. What about the townships? Yet again they said yes. And the co-operatives too should draw up such plans. Then there will be six levels in all, provincial, prefectural, county, district, township and co-operative. Please take heed and lose no time in drawing up these agricultural plans. A plan and a programme are one and the same thing, and since we have been in the habit of using the word plan, let's call it that. We must persist in making comprehensive plans, giving more effective leadership, having Party secretaries pitch in and having all Party members help run the co-operatives.

Apparently not all Party members helped run the co-operatives in the second half of last year and Party secretaries rarely pitched in. This year we must persist in doing what we had done before.

When will the plans be ready? I've asked some comrades and learned that they are ready in some places and not quite in others. With stress now being laid on the three levels of province, prefecture and county, can their plans be ready this winter or next spring? If not, they must at all events be ready in the coming year, and at all six levels. For we have had several years of experience and the forty-article National Programme for Agricultural Development is almost ready. This programme and the plans at the provincial and other levels should all be discussed in the villages. But since it would be too much to discuss all seven plans at the same time, it is preferable to stagger the airing of views and debates by the masses. Here we are talking about long-term plans. What should be done if a plan turns out to be unsuitable? It will have to be revised after we've had a few more years of experience. For instance, the forty articles will need further revision in a few years. This is inevitable. I think they will probably need a minor revision every three years and a major one every five years. It is always better to have some plan than none. The programme covers a period of twelve years, and now two years have passed, leaving only ten; unless we grasp the matter firmly, there will be the danger of failing to fulfil the targets set in the forty articles for the yields of grain per *mou* for the three different regions, namely, four, five and eight hundred catties. Grasp the matter firmly and these targets can be fulfilled.

In my opinion, China must depend on intensive cultivation to feed itself. One day China will become the world's number one high-yield country. Some of our counties are already producing one thousand catties per *mou*. Will it be possible to reach two thousand catties per *mou* in half a century? In future will it be possible for the region north of the Yellow River to produce eight hundred catties per *mou*, that north of the Huai River one thousand catties and that south of it two thousand? There are still a few decades left before these targets are reached at the beginning of the 21st century, or maybe it won't take that long. We depend on intensive cultivation to feed ourselves, and even with a fairly large population we still have enough food. I think an average of three *mou* of land per person is more than enough and in future less than one *mou* will yield enough grain to feed one individual. Of course birth control will still be necessary, and I am not encouraging more births.

Please investigate how much grain the peasants actually consume. We must encourage diligence and thrift in running the household and economy in the use of grain so as to have reserves. When the state has a reserve and each co-operative and family has one too, we shall be quite well off with these three kinds of reserves. Otherwise, if all the grain is eaten up, what prosperity will there be to speak of?

This year there should be a little more accumulation wherever a good harvest has been reaped or natural disasters have not occurred. It is most necessary to make up for possible shortages with surpluses. In co-operatives in some provinces, in addition to the accumulation fund (5 per cent), the public welfare fund (5 per cent) and management expenses, production costs account for 20 per cent of the total value of output and capital construction expenditures in turn account for 20 per cent of production costs. I discussed the matter with comrades from other provinces, who said these capital construction expenditures were probably a bit too high. What I am saying today is to be taken as suggestions, which you may carry out if feasible, otherwise not. Moreover, it is not necessary for all provinces and counties to act in exactly the same way, and I leave the matter to you for consideration. The management expenses of co-operatives in some places have so far assumed too large a proportion and should therefore be reduced to 1 per cent. They consist of allowances to cadres of co-operatives plus administrative expenses. They should be cut and capital expenditures on farmlands increased.

The Chinese people should have high aspirations. We should teach everyone in the cities and villages of the country to have lofty aims and high aspirations. To indulge in eating and drinking, to eat and drink everything up, can this be considered a high aspiration? No, it can't. We should be diligent and thrifty in running our households and should make long-term plans. When people wear red or white, that is, at weddings or funerals, the practice of giving lavish feasts can well be dispensed with. We should practise economy in these matters and avoid extravagance. This is a matter of changing old customs. To this end it is necessary to argue things out through airing views in a big way, or maybe in a small way. Then there is gambling. In the past it was impossible to ban this practice, which can be changed only through the free airing of views and debate. In my opinion, changing old customs should also be included in the plans to be drawn up.

Then there is the question of eliminating the four pests and paying attention to hygiene. I'm very keen on wiping out the four pests, rats, sparrows, flies and mosquitoes. As there are only ten years left, can't we make some preparations and carry out propaganda this year and set about the work next spring? Because that is just the time when flies emerge. I still think that we should wipe out these pests and that the whole nation should pay particular attention to hygiene. This is a question of civilization, the level of which should be significantly raised. There should be an emulation drive; every possible effort must be made to wipe out these pests and everyone should pay attention to hygiene. Progress is liable to be uneven in different provinces and counties, anyway let's see who is champion. China should become a country of "four without's", without rats, without sparrows, without flies and without mosquitoes.

There should also be a ten-year programme for family planning. However, it should not be promoted in the minority nationality areas or in sparsely populated regions. Even in densely populated regions it is necessary to try it out in selected places and then spread it step by step until family planning gradually becomes universal. Family planning requires open education, which simply means airing views freely and holding great debates. As far as procreation is concerned, the human race has been in a state of total anarchy and has failed to exercise control. The complete realization of family planning in the future will be out of the question without the weight of society as a whole behind it, that is, without general consent and joint effort.

There is also the question of comprehensive planning. I've just talked about agricultural plans, but there are also plans for industry, commerce, culture and education. It is absolutely necessary to make a comprehensive plan which brings industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education together and co-ordinates them.

The cultivation of experimental plots is an experience worth spreading everywhere. The leading cadres of counties, districts, townships and co-operatives should each cultivate a small plot and experiment to see if a high yield can be reached and what methods serve that end.

We must get to know farming techniques. It is no longer possible to engage in agricultural work without acquiring these techniques. Politics and the professions form a unity of opposites, in which politics is predominant and primary, and while we must fight against the tendency to ignore politics, it won't do to confine oneself to politics and have no technical or professional knowledge. Whatever line our comrades are in, whether it is industry, agriculture, commerce, or culture and education, they should all acquire some technical and professional knowledge. I think a ten-year plan should also be made here. Our cadres in all trades and professions should strive to be proficient in technical and professional work, turn themselves into experts and become both red and expert. It is wrong to talk about becoming expert before becoming red, which is tantamount to being white before being red. For in fact those who talk thus intend to remain white to the end, and becoming red later is just empty talk. Nowadays some cadres are no longer red since they have succumbed to rich peasant thinking. Some people are white, like the Rightists in the Party who are politically white and technically inexpert. Others are grey and still others pinkish. It is the Left who are really red, blazing red, like the colour of our five-star red flag. But being red alone won't do, one should have professional and technical knowledge as well. At present many cadres are only red but not expert and lack professional or technical knowledge. The Rightists say that we don't have the ability to lead, that "laymen cannot lead experts". We rebut them by asserting that we can. When we assert we can, we mean that politically we can. As for technical knowledge, we still have a lot to learn, and we will certainly be able to learn it.

The proletariat cannot build socialism without its own vast contingent of technicians and theoretical workers. We should form a contingent of proletarian intellectuals within the next ten years (the plans for the development of science also cover twelve years, and there are still ten years left). Our Party members and non-Party activists should all strive to become proletarian intellectuals. Plans for training proletarian intellectuals should be worked out at all levels, particularly at the three levels of province, prefecture and county, or else time will have passed with no such people trained. An old Chinese saying goes, "It takes ten years to grow trees but a hundred years to rear people." Let's subtract ninety from the hundred years and rear people in ten. It's not true that it takes ten years to grow trees, since it takes twenty-five years in the south and even longer in the north. But it is quite possible to bring up people in ten years. We have had eight years and if we add ten, we will have had eighteen years; it can be expected that by then a contingent of working-class experts with

Marxist ideology will have basically been formed. After that for another ten years the task will be to enlarge this contingent and raise its level.

Talking about the relationship between agriculture and industry, we should of course concentrate on heavy industry and give priority to its development; this is a principle about which there can be no question or wavering. But with this pre-condition, we must develop industry and agriculture simultaneously and build up a modern industry and modern agriculture step by step. We often talk about making China an industrial country, which actually involves the modernization of agriculture. The stress of our propaganda should now be on agriculture. Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping has also spoken about this.

Fourth, concerning the two methods. There are at least two methods of doing things, one producing slower and poorer results and the other faster and better ones. Here both speed and quality are involved. Don't consider just one method, always consider at least two. Take railway building for example. There should be several plans, so that out of several routes one can be chosen. There can be several and at least two, methods for comparison. For instance, should views be aired in a big way or in a small way? Should there be big-character posters or not? Which of the two is better? Questions of this sort are legion, but somehow no free airing of views has been allowed. None of the authorities in the thirty-four institutions of higher education in Peking have allowed this, or allowed it readily and unhesitatingly. For them this is a matter of drawing the fire upon themselves! To make them let people air views freely calls for plenty of persuasion and, what is more, considerable pressure, that is, issuing an open call and holding many meetings, so that they find themselves checkmated and "driven to join the Liangshan Mountain rebels".[4] When we made revolution in the past, diverse opinions arose in the Party with regard to this or that method and this or that policy, but in the end as we adopted the policy best suited to the prevailing conditions, greater progress was made in the periods of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation than in the preceding periods. Likewise there can be this or that policy for construction, and here too we should adopt the policy best suited to the actual conditions.

The Soviet experience in construction is fairly complete. By complete I mean it includes the making of mistakes. No experience can be considered complete unless it includes the making of mistakes. To learn from the Soviet Union does not mean to copy everything mechanically, which is exactly what dogmatism does. It was after we had criticized dogmatism that we encouraged people to learn from the Soviet Union, and so there was no danger. Since the rectification movement in Yenan and the Seventh Congress, we have stressed learning from the Soviet Union, which has not only done us no harm but has proved beneficial. In revolution, we are experienced. In construction, we have just begun and have had only eight years of experience. In our construction the achievements are primary, but we are not free from mistakes. We shall still make mistakes in the future, but we hope fewer. Learning from the Soviet Union must include studying its mistakes. Having studied them, we need make fewer detours. Can't we avoid the Soviet Union's detours and do things faster and better? We should of course strive for this. In steel production for instance, can't we reach 20,000,000 tons in a period of three five-year plans or a bit longer? We can, if we make the effort. For this purpose we shall have to set up more small steel plants. I think we should run more steel plants that turn out 30,000 to 50,000 or 70,000 to 80,000 tons annually because they are very useful. It is also necessary to set up medium-sized plants with an annual capacity of 300,000 or 400,000 tons.

Fifth, several things were swept away last year. One was the principle of doing things with greater, faster, better and more economical results. The demand for greater and faster results was dropped, and with it the demand for better and more economical results was swept away, too. No one, I think, objects to doing things better and more economically; it is just doing things with greater and faster results that people don't like and some comrades label "rash". As a matter of fact "better" and "more economical" are meant to restrict "greater" and "faster". "Better" means better in quality, "more economical" means spending less money, "greater" means doing more things, and "faster" also means doing more things. This slogan is self-restricting, since it calls for better and more economical results, that is, for better quality and lower cost, which precludes greater and faster results that are unrealistic. I am glad that a couple of comrades have spoken on this question at the present session. Besides, I've read an article on it in the newspaper. Our demand for greater, faster, better and more economical results is realistic, in conformity with the actual conditions and not subjectivist. We must always do our utmost to achieve greater and faster results; what we oppose is only the subjectivist demand for greater and faster results. In the second half of last year, a gust of wind swept away this slogan, which I want to restore. Is this possible? Please consider the matter.

The forty-article Programme for Agricultural Development was also swept away. These forty articles went out of vogue last year but are now staging a "come-back".

Committees for promoting progress were swept away, too. I once raised this question: Are the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Party committees at all levels, the State Council and the people's councils at all levels — in short, the multitude of "committees" among which the Party committees are primary — are all these committees intrinsically for promoting progress or for promoting retrogression? They ought to be committees for promoting progress. To my mind, the Kuomintang is a committee for promoting retrogression and the Communist Party a committee for promoting progress. Can't we now restore those committees for promoting progress which were swept away by last year's gust of wind? If you all speak against their restoration and are bent on organizing committees for promoting retrogression, then, with so many of you for retrogression there is nothing I can do about it. However, judging from the present session, everyone wants to promote progress and there hasn't been a single speech in favour of retrogression. It was the Rightist Chang-Lo alliance that wanted us to go backward. In those cases where things are really moving too fast and beyond proper bounds, temporary and partial retrogression is permissible, that is to say, we have to take a step backward or slow down a step. But our general policy is always to promote progress.

Sixth, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the socialist road and the capitalist road, is undoubtedly the principal contradiction in contemporary Chinese society. Our present task is different from that in the past. Previously the principal task for the proletariat was to lead the masses in struggles against imperialism and feudalism, a task that has already been accomplished. What then is the principal contradiction now? We are now carrying on the socialist revolution, the spearhead of which is directed against the bourgeoisie, and at the same time this revolution aims at transforming the system of individual production, that is, bringing about co-operation; consequently the principal contradiction is between socialism and capitalism, between collectivism and individualism, or in a nutshell between the socialist road and the capitalist road. The resolution of the Eighth Congress makes no mention of this question. It contains a passage which speaks of the principal contradiction as being that between the advanced socialist system and the backward social productive forces. This formulation is incorrect. At the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee we stated that after nation-wide victory the principal contradiction would be, internally, that between the working class and the bourgeoisie and, externally, that between China and imperialism. Though we made no public reference to this statement after the session, we have been acting on it ever since, because our revolution has developed into the socialist revolution and that is what we have been engaged in. The three great transformations constitute a socialist revolution, a revolution mainly in the ownership of the means of production; they have been basically accomplished. They have all been sharp class struggles.

In the second half of last year there was a slackening in class struggle, a slackening that was brought about deliberately. But once we allowed it, the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intellectuals, the landlords, the rich peasants and part of the well-to do middle peasants started the attack on us. That was what happened this year. We allowed the slackening and they started the attack — that suited us fine, we gained the initiative. As an editorial in the *People's Daily* puts it, "The tree may prefer calm, but the wind will not subside."[5] They wanted to raise a gale, a typhoon of some force! Well then, we started building a "shelter belt". This was the anti-Rightist struggle, the rectification movement.

Rectification consists of two tasks: one is to fight against the Rightists, including the fight against bourgeois ideology, and the other is to carry out reforms, which also entails a struggle between the two lines. Subjectivism, bureaucracy and sectarianism are all bourgeois phenomena ~hose presence in our Party should be blamed on the bourgeoisie. Will it still be possible to blame it on the bourgeoisie a century or two hence? That would be rather difficult, I'm afraid. Will there still be bureaucracy and subjectivism then? Yes, there will but the blame will be placed on backwardness. In society there will always be the Left, the middle and the Right, and there will always be the advanced, the middling and the backward. By that time, if you are guilty of bureaucracy and subjectivism, you will be backward.

The rectification movement will go on till May 1 next year, there is that much time for it. Is there going to be a slackening again after May 1? I think yes. Can such a slackening be called a Right deviation?

I think not. Take a meeting for example. If it goes on and on, night and day for six months on end, I'm afraid many people will simply disappear. Therefore we should do our work according to circumstances, now speeding it up, now slowing it down. Last year we scored such a big victory that the capitalists beat drums and struck gongs to show their allegiance; if we hadn't allowed a slackening, we would have found it hard to justify ourselves, as there was no adequate excuse. We have said that the problem of ownership is solved basically but not completely. Class struggle has not died out. Hence slackening is not a concession in principle but is called for by the circumstances.

I think that the rectification should go on till May I next year and that it should stop in the latter half of the year. We shall see then whether there is any need for another rectification or another debate in the countryside and shall discuss the matter next year. Anyway, there must be another rectification the year after next. If we do not launch one then, or worse still, for several years, the old and new Rightists and the ones currently emerging will start wriggling again; besides, some elements to the right of centre, some middle elements and even some on the Left are liable to change. There are some queer characters in the world whose Right deviationist sentiments will surface and who will come forward with unwholesome comments and Rightist observations if you slacken for any length of time. It is also necessary to carry out constant education in our army units on the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention. If you suspend it for a few months, morale will slacken. Morale should be boosted several times a year. Education should be conducted among the new recruits. Even the ideology of veterans and senior cadres would change without rectification.

A word in passing about our differences with the Soviet Union. First of all, there is a contradiction between us and Khrushchov on the question of Stalin. He has drawn such a black picture of Stalin, and we do not agree with him. He has made Stalin so terribly ugly! This then is no longer a matter that concerns his country alone, it concerns all countries. We have put Stalin's portrait up in Tien An Men Square. This accords with the wishes of the working people the world over and indicates our fundamental differences with Khrushchov. As for Stalin himself, you should at least give him a 70-30 evaluation, 70 for his achievements and 30 for his mistakes. This may not be entirely accurate, for his mistakes may be only 20 or even 10, or perhaps somewhat more than 30. All things considered, Stalin's achievements are primary and his shortcomings and mistakes are secondary. On this point we take a view different from Khrushchov's.

Next, we also disagree with Khrushchov and his associates on the question of peaceful transition. We maintain that the proletarian party of any country should be prepared for two possibilities, one for peace and the other for war. In the first case, the Communist Party demands peaceful transition from the ruling class, following Lenin in the slogan he advanced during the period between the February and October Revolutions. Similarly we made a proposal to Chiang Kai-shek for the negotiation of peace. This is a defensive slogan against the bourgeoisie, against the enemy, showing that we want peace, not war, and it will help us win over the masses. It is a slogan that will give us the initiative, it is a tactical slogan. However, the bourgeoisie will never hand over state power of their own accord, but will resort to violence. Then there is the second possibility. If they want to fight and they fire the first shot, we cannot but fight back. To seize state power by armed force — this is a strategic slogan. If you insist on peaceful transition, there won't be any difference between you and the socialist parties. The Japanese Socialist Party is just like that, it is prepared for only one possibility, that is, it will never use violence. The same is true of all the socialist parties of the world. Generally speaking, the political parties of the proletariat had better be prepared for two possibilities: one, a gentleman uses his tongue, not his fists, but two, if a bastard uses his fists, I'll use mine. Putting the matter this way takes care of both possibilities and leaves no loophole. It won't do otherwise. Now the Communist Parties in a number of countries, the British Communist Party for example, only advance the slogan of peaceful transition. We talked this over with the leader of the British Party but couldn't get anywhere. Naturally they may well feel proud, for as their leader queried, "How can Khrushchov claim to have introduced peaceful transition? I advanced it long before he did!"

Besides, the Soviet comrades do not understand our policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend. What we want is to have a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend within the framework of socialism, within the ranks of the people and with the exclusion of counter-revolutionaries. Of course, realignment may take place among the people themselves, a section of whom may turn into our enemies. Take the Rightists for instance. In the past they were among the people, but now it seems to me that they are one-third people and two-thirds counter-revolutionary. Shall we deprive them of the right to vote? On the whole, it is preferable not to do so, except for those few who are to be punished by law or reformed through labour. Some of them may even be allowed to sit on the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference, because anyway it is all right for the committee to have about a thousand people. In appearance the Rightists are still in the ranks of the people, but in reality they are our enemies. We openly declare that they are our enemies and that the contradiction between us and them is one between the people and the enemy, because they are against socialism, against the leadership of the Communist Party and against the dictatorship of the proletariat. In short, their words and deeds do not conform to the six criteria![6] They are poisonous weeds. A few poisonous weeds will always crop up among the people, no matter when.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Lastly, we should bestir ourselves and make arduous efforts in our study. Mark these three words, "make", "arduous" and "efforts". We must bestir ourselves and make arduous efforts. Now many of our comrades do not make arduous efforts, and some comrades devote their surplus energy after work chiefly to playing cards and mahjong and to dancing, and this I think is bad. We should devote our surplus energy after work chiefly to study and should make study a habit. What then should we study? For one thing, we should study Marxism-Leninism, for another, technology and for a third, natural science. Besides, there is literature, and especially the theories of literature, which leading cadres must know something about. They should also have some knowledge of journalism and education. In short, there is a very wide range of knowledge, of which we should get some general understanding. For we are supposed to exercise leadership over these matters! What kind of specialists can people like us be called? We can be called political specialists. How can we carry on without knowing about these matters and exercising leadership over them? All provinces have their own newspapers, which were neglected in the past, and their own literary and art journals and organizations, which were also neglected, as were the united front and the democratic parties, and as was education. All these things were neglected, and so it was precisely in these fields that rebellion erupted. But once these things were attended to, the whole situation changed within a few months. Lo Lung-chi asked, how could little proletarian intellectuals lead big petty-bourgeois intellectuals? He was wrong there. He says he is petty bourgeois but actually he is bourgeois. The "little intellectuals" of the proletariat will do precisely that — exercise leadership over the big bourgeois intellectuals. The proletariat has had a group of intellectuals in its service, the first of whom was Marx, then there were Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and now there are people like us and many others. The proletariat is the most advanced class, it will lead the revolution all over the world.

NOTES

[1] The five major movements were the agrarian reform, the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, the elimination of counter-revolutionaries, the movement against the "three evils" and the "five evils", and the ideological remoulding.

[2] This refers to the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce.

[3] "The Democratic Movement in the Army", Note 1, *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Vol. IV.

[4] Liangshan Mountain in Shantung Province was a rebel peasant base in the Sung Dynasty. Most of the rebel leaders in the classical novel *Water Margin* were forced to take refuge on Liangshan Mountain as a result of oppression by the authorities or despotic landlords. The expression "driven to join the Liangshan Mountain rebels" has since come to mean that one is forced to do something under pressure.

[5] Han Ying (Western Han Dynasty), *Commentary on the Book of Songs*, Chapter 9.

[6] See page 412 above.

HAVE FIRM FAITH IN THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE

October 13, 1957

A form has now been found for the rectification movement, namely, speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters. It is a new form created by the masses which is different from other forms employed by our Party in the past. True, there were a few big-character posters during the rectification in Yenan, but we didn't encourage them. Nor was this form subsequently used in the Three Check-ups and Three Improvements. In the period of the revolutionary wars we received no pay and had no ordnance factories, what our Party and army relied on were the soldiers and the people in different localities, the masses. And so a democratic style of work has evolved over the years. But in those days there was no such form as speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters such as there is now. Why? Because we were then in the heat of war and the class struggle was very acute, and if we had allowed a free-for-all within our own ranks, that would have been bad. Things are different now. The war is over and the whole country except Taiwan Province is liberated. Hence this new form. New revolutionary content must find a new form of expression. Our revolution today is a socialist revolution, its aim is to build a socialist country and it has found this new form. This form can be speedily popularized, it can be readily picked up in a few months.

There are chiefly two fears when it comes to speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters. One is fear of disorder. Are you afraid of disorder? I think many are. The other is fear of not being able to get out of one's predicament. Those who serve as factory or co-operative directors, college heads or Party committee secretaries are all afraid that they won't

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Speech at the Thirteenth Session of the Supreme State Conference.

be able to extricate themselves once views are aired or fires lit. It is easy now to convince people not to be afraid, but it was rather difficult in May. In Peking's thirty-four institutions of higher education the free airing of views was not allowed until after many meetings had been held. Why is there no need for fear? Why is the airing of views to our advantage? Which is to our advantage — airing views in a big way, or in a small way, or not at all? No airing of views is not to our advantage and airing views in a small way can solve no problems, therefore views must be aired in a big way. First, this will not bring on disorder and, second, it will not make extricating oneself impossible. Of course, the case is different with certain individuals, for example, Ting Ling cannot extricate herself, nor can Feng Hsueh-feng, who has lit a fire to burn up the Communist Party. They are only a handful and are Rightists. Other people need not worry, they should be able to extricate themselves. At most they have such faults as bureaucracy, sectarianism or subjectivism, and if they do, they need only correct them, so there is no ground for fear. The basic thing is to have faith in the majority of the people, in the fact that the majority are good. The majority of the workers are good, and so are the majority of the peasants. And so are most members of the Communist Party and the Youth League. None of them want to throw our country into disorder. Most of the bourgeois intellectuals, the capitalists and the members of the democratic parties can be remoulded. Therefore we need not be afraid, for there won't and can't be disorder. We must have faith in the majority, and by that do we mean 51 per cent? No, we do not, we mean go to 98 per cent.

The socialist revolution is new to us all. The revolution we carried out in the past was only a democratic revolution, which was bourgeois in nature. It only destroyed imperialist, feudal and bureaucrat-capitalist ownership, but not individual ownership or national capitalist ownership. Thus many people could pass the test of the democratic revolution. While some were not really keen on a thoroughgoing democratic revolution and barely managed to come through, others were willing to work hard for it and passed the test all right. The test now is socialism, and it is hard for some people. Take for example that Party member in Hupeh Province who was originally a farm labourer. For three generations his family had to go begging. Liberation brought him a new life, he grew well off and became a cadre at the district level. However, he complained bitterly about socialism and strongly disapproved of agricultural co-operation; he demanded "freedom" and opposed the state monopoly of the purchase and marketing of grain. An exhibition about the life of this man has now been organized to serve as class education. He wept bitter tears of remorse, saying he would mend his ways. Why is the test of socialism hard to pass? Because socialism means destroying capitalist ownership and transforming it into socialist ownership by the whole people, destroying individual ownership and transforming it into socialist collective ownership. Of course, this struggle will go on for many years, and it is hard to say for sure right now just how long the transition period will be. The struggle this year is like a crest in the waves. Will there be such a crest every year like those in the Yellow River? I am afraid not. Nonetheless there will be some in the years ahead.

How many people are there today in the whole country who do not approve of socialism? Together with many comrades in the localities, I have made an estimate. It shows that about 10 per cent of our total population disapprove of or oppose socialism. The figure comprises the landlord class, the rich peasants, part of the well-to-do middle peasants, part of the national bourgeoisie, part of the bourgeois intellectuals, part of the upper stratum of the urban petty bourgeoisie and even a few workers and poor and lower-middle peasants. What is 10 per cent of a population of 600 million? Sixty million. That's no small number and should not be underrated.

There are two underlying reasons for saying that we must have firm faith in the majority of the people. First, 90 per cent of our people are in favour of socialism. This comprises the proletariat, the poor peasants who are the semi-proletariat of the rural areas, the lower-middle peasants and the majority of the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, the majority of the bourgeois intellectuals and part of the national bourgeoisie. Second, among those who disapprove of or oppose socialism, how many are the worst die-hards, namely, ultra-Rightists, counter-revolutionaries, saboteurs, and those who, while not engaging in sabotage, are most obstinate and are likely to carry their ossified heads to their graves? Probably only 2 per cent. What is 2 per cent of the total population? Twelve million. Banded together and equipped with guns, these twelve million would make a sizable army. But why won't there be any great disorder in the country? Because they are scattered in different co-operatives, villages, factories, schools and branches of the Communist Party, the Youth League and the democratic parties. Since they are scattered all over the place and cannot band together, there won't be any great disorder.

What is the scope of the socialist revolution, what classes are involved in this struggle? The socialist revolution is a struggle waged by the proletariat at the head of the working people against the bourgeoisie. Though relatively small in number, China's proletariat has allies in vast numbers, the most important of whom are the poor and lower-middle peasants who form 70 per cent or a little more of the rural population. The well-to-do middle peasants make up about another 20 per cent. The present-day well-to-do middle peasants may be roughly divided into three categories: those who are for co-operation, 40 per cent; those who are of two minds, 40 per cent; and those who are against, 20 per cent. Education and remoulding in recent years has brought about a split among the landlords and the rich peasants, some of whom are no longer entirely opposed to socialism. We should also take an analytical approach towards the bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals and not regard them all as being opposed to socialism, because that is not the case. Ninety per cent of our entire population are for socialism. We must have faith in this majority. Through our efforts and great debates we may win over an additional 8 per cent, which will bring the total to 98 per cent. The die-hards bitterly opposed to socialism are only 2 per cent. Of course we must be on the alert, because they are still a considerable force, as Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping put it just now.

The rich peasants are the bourgeoisie in the countryside where very few people listen to them. The landlords are still more discredited. The comprador-bourgeoisie has long been discredited. As for the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals, the upper stratum of the rural petty bourgeoisie (the well-to-do middle peasants), the upper stratum of the urban petty bourgeoisie (the relatively well-to-do small proprietors) and the intellectuals from these strata, they do have a certain influence. The intellectuals in particular are much sought after, they are needed in every sphere. Universities need professors, primary and middle schools need teachers, newspapers need journalists, theatres actors and actresses, and construction projects scientists, engineers and technicians. At present there are five million intellectuals and seven hundred thousand capitalists, or together almost six million. If each has a family of five, five times six million are thirty million. Comparatively speaking, the bourgeoisie and its intellectuals have a high level of education and technical know-how. That's why the Rightists are so cocky. Didn't Lo Lung-chi say that the little proletarian intellectuals are incapable of leading a big petty-bourgeois intellectual like him? He insisted on saying that he is not bourgeois but petty bourgeois, a big petty-bourgeois intellectual. In my opinion, not only the little proletarian intellectuals but the workers and peasants who may know hardly any characters at all are a great deal wiser than Lo Lung-chi.

The Rightists and the middle elements among the bourgeoisie and its intellectuals and among the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie and its intellectuals are not reconciled to the leadership of the Communist Party and the proletariat. They say they support the Communist Party and the Constitution, in a way they mean it and their hands are raised in favour, but at heart they are not really reconciled. Here a distinction must be made between the Rightists who are hostile and the middle elements who are half inclined to be reconciled and half not. Aren't there persons who say the Communist Party is incapable of leading this or leading that? This view is not confined to the Rightists but is shared by some of the middle elements. In short, according to their argument, our days are numbered, the Communist Party has no choice but to move to another country and the proletariat to another planet. Because you are no good at anything! The Rightists say, you are not fit for any trade whatsoever. The main purpose of the current debate is to win over the half-hearted middle elements so that they will understand what the law of social development is all about and realize they'd better listen to the proletariat which does not have a high level of education and to the poor and lower-middle peasants in the countryside. Speaking of educational level, the proletariat and the poor and lower-middle peasants are not as good, but when it comes to making revolution, it is they who are really good at it. Can this convince the majority of the people? Yes, it can. It can convince the majority of the bourgeoisie, of the bourgeois intellectuals and of the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. And also most of the university professors, primary and middle school teachers, artists, writers, scientists and engineers. Those who are not quite reconciled will gradually become reconciled, after some years.

With the majority of the people supporting socialism, the current appearance of the new form — speaking out, airing views and holding debates in a big way and writing big-character posters — is advantageous. This form has no class character. The Rightists too can use it. We are indebted to the Rightists for inventing the expression "in a big way". In my talk of February 27 this year I didn't use this expression, I said nothing about speaking out, airing views and holding debates in a big way. At a meeting here in May last year, when we talked about letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend, we were referring to "airing views" and "speaking out", and in neither case was the expression "in a big way" used. What is more, letting a hundred flowers blossom was meant to apply only to the sphere of literature and art and letting a hundred schools of thought contend only to academic matters. Later on the Rightists called for extending the application to political matters, in other words, they called for the airing of views on all matters, for a "period of airing views", and, what is more, they wanted them aired in a big way. It is evident that this slogan can be used by the bourgeoisie as well as by the proletariat; it can be used by the Left, the middle and the Right alike. Which class really benefits from this slogan of speaking out, airing views and holding debates in a big way and writing big-character posters? In the final analysis, the proletariat, not the bourgeois Rightists. The reason is that 90 per cent of the population don't want disorder in the country, they want to build socialism. Of the remaining 10 per cent who disapprove of socialism or are opposed to it, many are of two minds, and only 2 per cent are dyed-in-the-wool anti-socialist elements. How can they possibly plunge the country into disorder? Therefore, in the final analysis, the slogan of speaking out and airing views in a big way, the form or method of speaking out, airing views and holding debates in a big way and writing big-character posters, benefits the majority of the people and helps them remould themselves. There are two roads — the road of socialism and the road of capitalism, and it is socialism that this slogan benefits.

We should not be afraid of disorder or of being unable to extricate ourselves. On the other hand, the Rightists will find it difficult to extricate themselves, although it will still be possible for them to do so. In accordance with dialectics, the Rightists will, I think, split into two sections. Probably quite a few of them, pushed by the general trend of events, will clarify their thinking, change their stand, behave themselves and not be so stubborn. When that happens, their Rightist label will be removed, they will no longer be called "Rightists" and besides will be given jobs. A handful of the worst die-hards may remain unrepentant to the end and carry the Rightist label to their graves. It doesn't matter much, there will always be such individuals.

Since the Rightists stirred up trouble, we have been able to do some stock-taking: on the one hand, 90 per cent of the population are in favour of socialism, and with some effort we can make it 98 per cent; on the other hand, 10 per cent disapprove of socialism or are opposed to it, among whom the worst die-hards dead set against socialism account for only 2 per cent. With this stock-taking we know where we are. Under the leadership of the political party of the proletariat and with the majority of the people supporting socialism, we can use the method of speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters to avoid such incidents as the one in Hungary and what is happening in Poland now. There is no need for us to ban a journal as was done in Poland,[1] all we have to do is to publish a couple of editorials in the Party newspaper. We wrote two editorials criticizing *Wen Hui Pao*. The first one was not thorough and did not hit the nail on the head, but after the second *Wen Hui Pao* set about correcting its mistakes. So did *Hsin Min Pao*. This could not happen in Poland, for they have not solved the problems of counter-revolutionaries and Rightists and of which road to take, nor have they put emphasis on the struggle against bourgeois ideas. Consequently, banning a journal touched off an incident. I think things are easier to manage in China and I have never been pessimistic. Didn't I say there wouldn't be disorder and we shouldn't be afraid? Disorder can be turned to good account. Wherever views are aired to the full, with the worst types howling and growling and great disorder following in their wake, things will be much easier to manage.

Before liberation China had only four million industrial workers and now there are twelve million. Though small in number, the working class, and the working class alone, has great promise. The other classes are all classes in transition, they all have to make the transition towards the working class. In the first step of this transition, the peasants become collective peasants and in the second step workers on state farms. The bourgeoisie will be eliminated, but not physically; the bourgeoisie will be eliminated as a class but remoulded as individuals. The bourgeois intellectuals need remoulding, and so do the petty-bourgeois intellectuals. They can be gradually remoulded and eventually transformed into proletarian intellectuals. Once I quoted the saying, "With the skin gone, to what can the hair attach itself?" If the intellectuals do not attach themselves to the proletariat, they will be in danger of "dangling in mid-air". Many people have now joined the trade unions, and some ask, "Aren't we members of the working class now that we are in trade unions?" No. Some have joined the Communist Party and yet they are anti-Communist. Aren't Ting Ling and Feng Hsueh-feng Communists who are anti-Communist? Joining a trade union does not automatically make a person a member of the working class, for he has to undergo a process of remoulding. Members of the democratic parties, university professors, men of letters and writers have no friends among the workers and peasants. That is a serious drawback. Fei Hsiao-tung, for one, has over two hundred friends among the higher intellectuals in places like Peking, Shanghai, Chengtu, Wuhan and Wusih. He simply cannot break away from the group and, what is more, he has made a conscious effort to organize these people and has aired views on their behalf. That's the source of his trouble. I would ask, can't you change a little? Chuck your group of two hundred and seek another two hundred among workers and peasants. In my opinion, all intellectuals should make friends among the worker and peasant masses, where they can find true friends. Make friends with old workers. Among the peasants don't too readily make friends with the well-to-do middle peasants but seek your friends among the poor and lower-middle peasants. For the old workers have a keen sense of orientation and so do the poor and lower-middle peasants.

The rectification movement comprises four stages — airing of views, counter-attack, reform and study. This means the stage of free airing of views, that of counter-attack on the Rightists, that of check-up and reform and lastly that of studying some Marxism-Leninism and making criticism and self-criticism in the manner of "a gentle breeze and a mild rain" in group meetings. When "a gentle breeze and a mild rain" was first proposed in a document on rectification issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on May I this year, quite a few people, mainly Rightists, took exception to the idea and wanted "a strong gale and a torrential downpour", which has turned out to be advantageous to us. This is what we had expected. For the same thing happened in the rectification movement in Yenan; instead of the gentle breeze we had proposed, a strong gale arose, but in the end it was the gentle breeze that prevailed. When big-character posters appeared in their thousands in factories, people in positions of leadership had a tough time. For ten days or so, some wanted to quit or resign, saying they couldn't take it any more, couldn't eat or sleep. That was the case with the secretaries of university Party committees in Peking, they lost their appetites and couldn't go to sleep. The Rightists said they must have an unrestricted airing of views and no rejoinders. We too said we would let them shoot their mouths off and not answer. So in May we left them alone and did not come out with any refutation until June 8, and thus all views were freely aired.

Roughly speaking, more than go per cent of the views aired were valid and the Rightist ones were a tiny fraction. We just had to stick it out and hear them through before hitting back. Each organization has to go through this stage. The rectification has to be conducted in every factory and agricultural co-operative. It is now being carried out in the army. This is most necessary. If you skip it, the "free market" will expand. It is a strange world, for if rectification is allowed to lapse for three years, many queer arguments will crop up and bourgeois ideas will re-emerge in the Communist Party, the Youth League and the democratic parties, and among university professors, primary and middle school teachers, journalists, engineers and scientists. Just as one's house must be tidied up and one's face washed every day, I think rectification should, in general, be conducted once a year and last a month or so. Perhaps there will be crests again. We are not responsible for the current one, the Rightists are. Didn't we say that even in the Communist Party we had Kao Kang? Could it be that there wasn't a single Kao Kang in the democratic parties? I just don't believe that. Again, such types as Ting Ling, Feng Hsueh-feng and Chiang Feng have been found in the Communist Party, aren't their likes already found in the democratic parties too?

The bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals ought to recognize the necessity of remoulding themselves. The Rightists refuse to do so, and because of their influence some others are also reluctant to accept remoulding, claiming they have already been remoulded. Chang Nai-chi says remoulding is horrible, as bad as having one's tendons pulled out and one's skin torn off. We say one should cast off one's old self and he says that means having your tendons pulled out and your skin torn off. Now, who is going to pull out that gentleman's tendons and tear off his skin? Many have forgotten what our aim is, why we want to do all this and what is good about socialism. Why is ideological remoulding necessary? Because we want the bourgeois intellectuals to acquire the proletarian world outlook and transform themselves into proletarian intellectuals. The old intellectuals will be obliged to make the change because new intellectuals are coming on the scene. In terms of knowledge you can say that the new intellectuals haven't made the grade yet, but eventually they will. The emergence of these new forces will pose a challenge to the old scientists, engineers, professors and teachers and spur them on. We reckon that most can make progress and some can remould themselves into proletarian intellectuals.

The proletariat must build up its own army of intellectuals, just as the bourgeoisie does. The regime of a given class cannot do without its own intellectuals. How could bourgeois dictatorship be possible in the United States without its intellectuals? Ours is a dictatorship of the proletariat, and the proletariat must build its own army of intellectuals, including all those intellectuals from the old society who truly take a firm working-class stand after being remoulded. Probably Chang Nai-chi can be counted among those Rightists who refuse to change. When urged to make the change into a proletarian intellectual, he refuses, saying he made the change long ago and is now a "red bourgeois". Well, let's follow the method of self-assessment and public discussion; you can make the assessment yourself, but it has to be put to the public for discussion. We say you are not up to the mark, Chang Nai-chi, you are a white bourgeois. Some people argue for becoming expert first and red later. To be expert first and red later means to be white first and red later. Not red now but red in the future — if they are not red now, then what is their present colour? White of course. Intellectuals should be at once red and expert. To be red, they must make up their minds thoroughly to transform their bourgeois world outlook. They don't have to read a lot of books, what they must do is to get a true understanding of the following questions. What is the proletariat? What is the dictatorship of the proletariat? Why is it that the proletariat alone has great promise while the other classes are all classes in transition? Why must our country take the socialist road and not the capitalist road? Why is the leadership of the Communist Party indispensable?

Many people take exception to what I said on April 30.[2] "With the skin gone, to what can the hair attach itself?" I said there used to be five skins in China. Three of them were old ones, namely, imperialist ownership, feudal ownership and bureaucrat-capitalist ownership. In the past the intellectuals depended on these skins for a living. They also depended on national capitalist ownership and on ownership by small producers, that is, petty-bourgeois ownership. Our democratic revolution was aimed at removing the first three skins and, counting from the time of Lin Tse-hsu,[3] it went on for more than a century. The last two skins, namely, national capitalist and small producer ownership, were targets of the socialist revolution. All these five skins are now things of the past. The three older skins disappeared long ago and now the other two are gone. What skin is there now? The skin of socialist public ownership. Of course, this is divided into two parts, ownership by the whole people and ownership by the collective. On whom do they depend for a living? Whether members of the democratic parties, professors, scientists or journalists, they all depend on the working class, on the collective peasants, on ownership by the whole people and on ownership by the collective, in a word, they live off socialist public ownership. With those five skins gone, the hair is flying in mid-air and it won't stay put when it comes down. The intellectuals still look with disdain on this new skin, they have a very low opinion of the proletariat and the poor and lower-middle peasants, who, they say, are as ignorant of astronomy as of geography, and they think that people of all "three religions and nine schools of thought"[4] are not fit to hold a candle to them. The intellectuals are reluctant to accept Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism was opposed by many people in the past. The imperialists opposed it. Chiang Kai-shek opposed it, day in day out, saying "Communism is not suited to China's conditions" and making people afraid of it. It requires time as well as a socialist ideological revolutionary movement for intellectuals to embrace Marxism-Leninism and transform their bourgeois world outlook into the proletarian world outlook. The movement this year is meant to pave the way.

After the counter-attack on the Rightists, all is calm now in some departments, organizations and colleges; those in leading positions are having an easy time and are unwilling to carry out the reforms called for by the many correct criticisms put forward. Such is the case with some departments, organizations and colleges in Peking. In my opinion, there should be another high tide of airing views at the present stage of reform. Put up big-character posters and ask, "Why don't you carry out reforms?" Challenge them! This challenge can be very useful. The stage of reform should be allowed a little time, say, a couple of months. It is to be followed by a period of study, to study some Marxism-Leninism and to make criticism and self-criticism in the manner of "a gentle breeze and a mild rain". That will be the fourth stage. Such study of course is not simply a matter for a couple of months, what I mean is that people's interest in study should be aroused as the movement draws to a close.

The counter-attack on the Rightists will have to draw to a close. Some Rightists have anticipated this. The storm will be over sooner or later, they said. That's quite true. You can't attack the Rightists all the time, day after day and year after year. For instance, in Peking the air is not as thick with the dust of the battle against the Rightists as before, because the counter-attack is nearly over. However, it is not quite over and we must not relax our efforts. To this day, some Rightists obstinately refuse to surrender, for instance Lo Lung-chi and Chang Nai-chi. I think we should try reasoning things out with them a few more times, and if they still refuse to be convinced, what can we do — call them to meetings every day? A number of die-hards will never mend their ways, and we will just have to give them up. They are only a handful, we'll leave them to their own devices and shelve them for several decades. Anyway, the majority will press ahead.

Are we going to throw the Rightists into the sea? No, not a single one. The Rightists are a hostile force because they oppose the Communist Party, the people and socialism. But now we don't treat them in the way we treat the landlords and counter-revolutionaries, and the basic indicator of the difference is that they are not deprived of their right to vote. Perhaps a few will have to be denied this right and made to reform through labour. Our practice is not to make arrests and not to deprive them of their right to vote but instead to give them some leeway, and this will help to split them. Didn't I say a while ago that the Rightists are of two types? Type one are those who, having mended their ways, will have the Rightist label removed and who may return to the ranks of the people. Type two are those who will remain incorrigible to the day they report to the King of Hell. They will say, "We are not the surrendering type, Your Majesty. See what 'integrity' we have!" They are the loyal servants of the bourgeoisie. The Rightists maintain ties and identify with the feudal remnants and counter-revolutionaries and act in concert with them. The landlords jumped with joy at that paper *Wen Hui Pao* and bought copies to read to the peasants and intimidate them. "Look here," they would say, "all this is printed in the newspaper!" They wanted to retaliate. Then there are the imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek who also identify with the Rightists. For instance, the reactionaries in Taiwan and Hongkong stand four-square behind Chu An-ping's allegation of the "monopoly of everything by the Communist Party", Chang Po-chun's demand for a "political planning chamber" and Lo Lung-chi's call for a "political rehabilitation committee". U.S. imperialism, too, is very sympathetic to the Rightists. I once put it to you, "If the Americans invade Peking, what will you do? What attitude will you adopt? What action will you take? Will you join the United States in setting up a puppet regime, or will you come along with us to the mountains?" I said then that my intention was to take to the mountains, first going to Changchiakou and then to Yenan. I was talking in extreme terms and considering the worst possibility — we are not afraid of disorder. Even if the United States should occupy half of China, it wouldn't frighten us. Didn't Japan have the greater part of China under its occupation? And didn't we fight back and create a new China? In conversations with some Japanese I said that we should thank Japanese imperialism for its aggression because it did us a lot of good by arousing the opposition of our whole nation and promoting the awakening of our people.

The Rightists are liars, they are dishonest and do bad things behind our backs. Who would have thought Chang Po-chun would do so many bad things? I think the higher the office these types hold, the greater their treachery. The Chang-Lo alliance was delighted with the two slogans, long-term coexistence and mutual supervision, and letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend. They used these two slogans to oppose us. We said we favoured long-term coexistence but they tried to turn it into a short-term one for us. We said we favoured mutual supervision and they rejected any supervision. For a time they ran amuck and in the end they got the opposite of what they wanted, turning long-term coexistence into a short-term one for themselves. What about Chang Po-chun's ministerial post? I'm afraid he can no longer keep it. Surely the people will not agree to a Rightist heading a ministry! Then there are some well-known Rightists who are deputies to the National People's Congress. What is to be done about them? I'm afraid it is difficult to keep them in these posts. For instance, Ting Ling can no longer be a deputy. In some cases, it may not be good if no posts or no jobs are given them. For instance, Chien Wei-chang can perhaps still keep his post as professor but not the vice-chancellorship. As for some other professors, perhaps they should not continue in that capacity for the time being because the students won't go to their lectures. Then what work can they do? We can assign them some other-jobs on the campus, let them reform themselves in the meantime and take up teaching again after a few years. All these questions need considering, it is a complicated business. Revolution itself is a complicated business. So I would like you to discuss the question of how the Rightists are to be dealt with and what arrangements are to be made for them.

How do things stand with the various democratic parties and at the grass roots? I'm afraid you who are in responsible positions haven't a very clear idea. For a time die-hard Rightists may have muddied the waters in some organizations so that we could not see to the bottom.

Investigation reveals that they actually account for only 1 or 2 per cent. Drop a little alum into the water and you can see to the bottom. The current rectification is like a dose of alum. After views are aired and debates held in a big way, we can see through to the bottom. We have been able to see through to the bottom of things in factories, villages and colleges, and get to the bottom of things in the Communist Party, the Youth League and the democratic parties.

Now a few words about the forty-article Programme for Agricultural Development. After two years of experience, the basic targets are still kept at four, five and eight, that is, an annual yield of four hundred catties of grain per *mou* north of the Yellow River, five hundred catties north of the Huai River and eight hundred catties south of the Huai River. This goal should be attained in twelve years, that's the essential point. Basically no change has been made in the programme as a whole with the exception of a few articles. Some questions have been solved, for instance, the question of co-operative transformation has been settled in the main, and the relevant articles have been revised accordingly. Previously some points were not emphasized, such as farm machinery and chemical fertilizer, and since big efforts are going to be made in these spheres, these points have now been stressed in the relevant articles. Some readjustment has been made in the sequence of articles. After due deliberation at the joint meeting of the Standing Committees of the National People's Congress and of the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference, this revised Draft Programme for Agricultural Development will be promulgated for discussion throughout the countryside, as was its previous version. It may also be discussed in factories, various circles and the democratic parties. This draft programme put forward by the Chinese Communist Party was drawn up by our political planning chamber, that is, by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and not by the "political planning chamber" envisaged by Chang Po-chun.

It is essential to get the entire peasantry to discuss this programme. We must enhance the vigour and enthusiasm of the people. Enthusiasm flagged in the second half of last year and the first half of this and then dropped further because of the trouble created by the Rightists in town and country. The rectification and the anti-Rightist movement have given this enthusiasm a big push. In my opinion the forty-article Programme for Agricultural Development is well suited to China's conditions and is not the product of subjectivism. There was some subjectivism in the programme, but we have eliminated it. Taken all in all, there is great hope for this programme. China can be changed, ignorance can be changed into knowledge and lethargy into vitality.

There is an article in the programme about doing away with the four pests, that is, wiping out rats, sparrows, flies and mosquitoes. I'm very interested in this matter, I don't know how you feel about it. But I assume you are interested too. Doing away with the four pests is a big public health campaign and a campaign to destroy superstition. Eliminating them is not easy. To exterminate the four pests also calls for the free airing of views, great debate and big-character posters. If the entire nation is mobilized to do this and achieves some success, I believe there will be a change in the mentality of the people and the morale of the Chinese nation will be given a big boost. We must invigorate this nation of ours.

The prospects for the success of family planning are good. There should be a great debate on this matter too, and there should be periods of trial, expansion and popularization, each lasting several years.

There is much for us to do. Many things stipulated in the forty-article Programme for Agricultural Development need to be done. That's only a plan for agriculture; there are also plans for industry and for cultural and educational work. The look of our country will change when the first three five-year plans are fulfilled.

We estimate that the annual output of steel may reach 20,000,000 tons at the end of the Third Five-Year Plan. With output this year at 5,200,000 tons, the goal will probably be attained in ten years. India produced 1,600,000 tons of steel in 1952 and its current output is a little over 1,700,000 tons, an increase of only 100,000 tons or so in five years. What about us? Our output in 1949 was only 190,000 tons, it registered over 1,000,000 tons at the end of the three-year rehabilitation period, and now five years later it has reached 5,200,000 tons, an increase of more than 3,000,000 tons in five years. Five more years and our output may top the 10,000,000 mark or a bit more to reach 11,500,000 tons. Then, with the fulfilment of the Third Five-Year Plan, can we make it 20,000,000 tons? Yes, we can.

I say this country of ours is full of hope. The Rightists say it is hopeless, they are utterly wrong. They lack confidence; since they oppose socialism, naturally they have no confidence. We adhere to socialism and we are brimming over with confidence.

NOTES

[1] In October 1957 the Polish Government banned the weekly *Po Prostu*, which led to student riots.

[2] This refers to the address by Comrade Mao Tsetung on April 30, 1957 at a meeting of leading members of the democratic parties and democrats without party affiliation on the rectification movement and the ideological remoulding of intellectuals.

[3] Lin Tse-hsu (1785-1850), Ching Dynasty viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces during the First Opium War, stood for resolute resistance to British aggression.

[4] In ancient China, the three religions were Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, and the nine schools of thought were the Confucians, the Taoists, the *Yin-Yang*, the Legalists, the Logicians, the Mohists, the Political Strategists, the Eclectics and the Agriculturists. Later the "three religions and nine schools of thought" took on a broader meaning to indicate the different religious sects and academic schools. In the old society the phrase was also used to mean people in dubious trades.

A DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO INNER-PARTY UNITY

November 18, 1957

With regard to the question of unity I'd like to say something about the approach. I think our attitude should be one of unity towards every comrade, no matter who, provided he is not a hostile element or a saboteur. We should adopt a dialectical, not a metaphysical, approach towards him. What is meant by a dialectical approach? It means being analytical about everything, acknowledging that human beings all make mistakes and not negating a person completely just because he has made mistakes. Lenin once said that there is not a single person in the world who does not make mistakes. Everyone needs support. An able fellow needs the help of three other people, a fence needs the support of three stakes. With all its beauty the lotus needs the green of its leaves to set it off. These are Chinese proverbs. Still another Chinese proverb says three cobblers with their wits combined equal Chukeh Liang the master mind. Chukeh Liang by himself can never be perfect, he has his limitations. Look at this declaration of our twelve countries We have gone through a first, second, third and fourth draft and have not yet finished polishing it. I think it would be presumptuous for anyone to claim God-like omniscience and omnipotence. So what attitude should we adopt towards a comrade who has made mistakes? We should be analytical and adopt a dialectical, rather than a metaphysical, approach. Our Party once got bogged down in metaphysics, in dogmatism, which totally destroyed anyone not to its liking. Later, we repudiated dogmatism and came to learn a little more dialectics. The unity of opposites is the fundamental concept of dialectics. In accordance with this concept, what should we do with a comrade who has made mistakes? We should first wage a struggle to

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Excerpts from a speech at the Moscow Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties.

rid him of his wrong ideas. Second, we should also help him. Point one, struggle, and point two, help. We should proceed from good intentions to help him correct his mistakes so that he will have a way out.

However, dealing with persons of another type is different. Towards persons like Trotsky and like Chen Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-tao and Kao Kang in China, it was impossible to adopt a helpful attitude, for they were incorrigible. And there were individuals like Hitler, Chiang Kai-shek and the tsar, who were likewise incorrigible and had to be overthrown because we and they were absolutely exclusive of each other. In this sense, there is only one aspect to their nature, not two. In the final analysis, this is also true of the imperialist and capitalist systems, which are bound to be replaced in the end by the socialist system. The same applies to ideology, idealism will be replaced by materialism and theism by atheism. Here we are speaking of the strategic objective. But the case is different with tactical stages, where compromises may be made. Didn't we compromise with the Americans on the 38th Parallel in Korea? Wasn't there a compromise with the French in Viet Nam?

At each tactical stage, it is necessary to be good at making compromises as well as at waging struggles. Now let us return to the relations between comrades. I would suggest that talks be held by comrades where there has been some misunderstanding between them. Some seem to think that, once in the Communist Party, people all become saints with no differences or misunderstandings, and that the Party is not subject to analysis, that is to say, it is monolithic and uniform, hence there is no need for talks. It seems as if people have to be 100 per cent Marxists once they are in the Party. Actually there are Marxists of all degrees, those who are 100 per cent, 90, 80, 70, 60 or 50 per cent Marxist, and some who are only 10 or 20 per cent Marxist. Can't two or more of us have talks together in a small room? Can't we proceed from the desire for unity and hold talks in the spirit of helping each other? Of course I'm referring to talks within the Communist ranks, and not to talks with the imperialists (though we do hold talks with them as well). Let me give an example. Aren't our twelve countries holding talks on the present occasion? Aren't the more than sixty Parties holding talks too? As a matter of fact they are. In other words, provided that no damage is done to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, we accept from others certain views that are acceptable and give up certain of our own views that can be given up. Thus we have two hands to deal with a comrade who has made mistakes, one hand to struggle with him and the other to unite with him. The aim of struggle is to uphold the principles of Marxism, which means being principled; that is one hand. The other hand is to unite with him. The aim of unity is to provide him with a way out, to compromise with him, which means being flexible. The integration of principle with flexibility is a Marxist-Leninist principle, and it is a unity of opposites.

Any kind of world, and of course class society in particular, teems with contradictions. Some say that there are contradictions to be "found" in socialist society, but I think this is a wrong way of putting it. The point is not that there are contradictions to be found, but that it teems with contradictions. There is no place where contradictions do not exist, nor is there any person who cannot be analysed. To think that he cannot is being metaphysical. You see, an atom is a complex of unities of opposites. There is a unity of the two opposites, the nucleus and the electrons. In a nucleus there is again a unity of opposites, the protons and the neutrons. Speaking of the proton, there are protons and antiprotons, and as for the neutron, there are neutrons and antineutrons. In short, the unity of opposites is present everywhere. The concept of the unity of opposites, dialectics, must be widely propagated. I say dialectics should move from the small circle of philosophers to the broad masses of the people. I suggest that this question be discussed at meetings of the political bureaus and at the plenary sessions of the central committees of the various Parties and also at meetings of their Party committees at all levels. As a matter of fact, the secretaries of our Party branches understand dialectics, for when they prepare reports to branch meetings, they usually write down two items in their notebooks, first, the achievements and, second, the shortcomings. One divides into two — this is a universal phenomenon, and this is dialectics.

ALL REACTIONARIES ARE PAPER TIGERS

November 18, 1957

When Chiang Kai-shek started his offensive against us in 1946, many of our comrades and the people of the country were much concerned about whether we could win the war. I myself was concerned. But we were confident of one thing. At that time an American correspondent, Anna Louise Strong, came to Yenan. In an interview, I discussed many questions with her, including Chiang Kai-shek, Hitler, Japan, the United States and the atom bomb. I said all allegedly powerful reactionaries are merely paper tigers. The reason is that they are divorced from the people. Look! Wasn't Hitler a paper tiger? Wasn't he overthrown? I also said that the tsar of Russia was a paper tiger, as were the emperor of China and Japanese imperialism, and see, they were all overthrown. U.S. imperialism has not yet been overthrown and it has the atom bomb, but I believe it too is a paper tiger and will be overthrown. Chiang Kai-shek was very powerful, for he had a regular army of more than four million. We were then in Yenan. What was the population of Yenan? Seven thousand. How many troops did we have? We had 900,000 guerrillas, all isolated by Chiang Kai-shek in scores of base areas. But we said that Chiang Kai-shek was only a paper tiger and that we could certainly defeat him. We have developed a concept over a long period for the struggle against the enemy, namely, strategically we should despise all our enemies, but tactically we should take them all seriously. In other words, with regard to the whole we must despise the enemy, but with regard to each specific problem we must take him seriously. If we do not despise him with regard to the whole, we shall commit opportunist errors. Marx and Engels were but two individuals, and yet in those early days they already declared that capitalism would be overthrown throughout the world. But with regard

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Excerpts from a speech at the Moscow Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties.

to specific problems and specific enemies, if we do not take them seriously, we shall commit adventurist errors. In war, battles can only be fought one by one and the enemy forces can only be destroyed one part at a time. Factories can only be built one by one. Peasants can only plough the land plot by plot. The same is even true of eating a meal. Strategically, we take the eating of a meal lightly, we are sure we can manage it. But when it comes to the actual eating, it must be done mouthful by mouthful, you cannot swallow an entire banquet at one gulp. This is called the piecemeal solution and is known in military writings as destroying the enemy forces one by one.

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WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

毛澤东

SELECTED WORKS
OF
MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume VI

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE (First Edition)

An authentic compilation of Mao's Collected works is long overdue. Especially now, its need is all the more great and urgent. But there is very little hope of such a publication being brought out officially by the CPC. However, several writings of Mao, not covered by the CPC's official publication i.e., *Selected works of Mao Tse-Tung Volumes 1 to 5*—are available elsewhere. All these lie scattered in a number of English editions by western scholars and in some remote research journals etc. We do realize that even if all these are put together it will not be the collected—works nor will even be a good substitute. Yet we hope their presentation at one place, chronologically arranged, will certainly facilitate easy and ready reference, further stimulating the study of Mao's works. Hence this venture.

Many more works might have certainly remained in Chinese and even some available in English may have remained out of our reach. To come to the works included in this volume, we have neither the means nor the competence to vouch safe about their authenticity and completeness. We appeal to the readers to bear these inevitable limitations in mind while using this book. Due to these and other reasons if any errors crept into this publication, we earnestly hope to rectify them in future editions. We fondly hope that much more additional material could come to light enabling us to substantially improve on this.

As far as possible all these writings strictly chronologically. Except indicating the primary source quoted in the originals, no attempt is made to annotate or edit the texts in any respect or in and manner.

We mention our sincere thanks and acknowledgements to all the pioneers who translated, edited and published these works in different forms earlier. We whole heartedly extend our thanks to all these comrades—the respected scholars and loving friends—whose unstinted cooperation and painstaking efforts contributed in a big way to the success of this venture.

We feel very happy that this volume could be brought out despite many odds. We hope to bring out the other volumes also soon. We fondly hope our effort will be well rewarded by the warm and enthusiastic response of our esteemed readers.

Kranti Publications

Contents

A Study of Physical Education (April 1917) 1

- An Explanation of Physical Education 1
- The Place of Physical Education in our Life 2
- Previous Abuses of Physical Education and My Method for Remedying them 3
- The Utility of Physical Education 3
- The Reasons for Disliking Exercise 6
- The Methods of Exercise Should be Few 6
- The Points to Which We Must Pay Attention When We Exercise 7

To Hakuro Toten (Miyazaki Toten) (Apri1 1917) 9

To the Glory of the Hans (July & August 1919) 10

The Great Union of the Popular Masses 12

Miss Chao's Suicide (November 16, 1919) 14

Communism and Dictatorship (November 1920, January 1921) 17

The Role of the Merchants in the National Revolution (July 11, 1923) 20

The Chinese Government and the Foreigners (August 29, 1923) 23

The Bitter Sufferings of the Peasants in Kiangsu and Chekiang, and Their Movements of Resistance (November 25, 1926) 25

The Second Anniversary of An Wu-ching's Martyrdom (1929) 27

Oppose Book Worship (May 1930) 28

- I. No Investigation No Right to Speak 28
- II. To Investigate A Problem is to Solve It 28
- III. Oppose Book Worship 29
- IV. Without Investigating the Actual Situation, There is Bound to be an Idealist Appraisal of Class Forces and an Idealist Guidance in Work, Resulting Either in Opportunism or in Putschism 30
- V. The Aim of Social and Economic Investigation is to Arrive at a Correct Appraisal of Class Forces and Then to Formulate Correct Tactics for The Struggle 31
- VI. Victory in China's Revolutionary Struggle Will Depend on the Chinese Comrades Understanding of Chinese Conditions 32
- VII. The Technique of Investigation 34

Decree Regarding Marriage (January 28, 1931) 37

A Letter from the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to Our Brothers the Soldiers of the White Army on the Subject of the Forced Occupation of Manchuria by Japanese Imperialism (September 25, 1931) 38

The League of Nations is a League of Robbers! (October 6, 1932) 41

Preliminary Conclusions of the Land Investigation Campaign (August 29, 1933) 43

- The Great Victory 43
- Some Places Have Given up the Leadership of the Land Investigation Campaign 48
- In Certain Place the Party has Surrendered to the Landlords and Rich Peasants 49
- The Tendency to Encroach Upon the Middle Peasants is the Most Serious Danger 49
- Closed Door-ism of the Poor Peasant Corps and its Negligence of the Leadership Role of the Hired Hands are 51

Wrong.
The Incorrect Idea About the Question of Rich Peasants 52
The Department of the Worker's and Peasant's Inspection has not Assumed its Own Responsibility and Committed some Mistakes 54
On the Art of Leadership in the Land Investigation Struggle 55
Develop A Two-Front Struggle to Overcome the Mistakes and Win a Thorough Victory in the Land Investigation Campaign 58

The Land Investigation Campaign is the Central Important Task in the Vast (Soviet) Areas (August 31, 1933) 59

Report to the 2nd National Congress of Workers and Peasants Representatives (January 23, 1934) 63

The Present Situation and Development of Soviet Movement 63
The Anti-Imperialist Movement 65
The Imperialist-Kuomintang Offensive Repulsed 66
Fundamental Policies of the Soviet 69

Proclamation on the Northward March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to Fight Japan (July, 15 1934) 98

To Lin Piao (1936) 100

We Are Not Going to Turn the Country Over to Moscow! (July 23, 1936) 101

To Hsu T'eh-li (February 1937) 103

Letter to the Spanish People (May 15, 1937) 104

Letter to Comrade Browder (July 24, 1937) 106

Inscription for the Founding of the North Shensi Public School (1937) 107

Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the Completion of the Building of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (1937) 108

On Lu Hsun (1937) 109

Basic Tactics (1937) 112

Chapter I Introductory Remarks 112
Chapter II Tactics 114
Chapter III The Aim of The War 120
Chapter IV Organization 121
Chapter V Tasks 128
Chapter VI Operations 129
Chapter VII Surprise Attacks 133
Chapter VIII Espionage 138
Chapter IX Ambushes 140
Chapter X Surprise Attacks on The Enemy's Foraging Units 142
Chapter XI Surprise Attacks on the Enemy's Transport Units 143
Chapter XII The Correspondence Network of a Guerrilla Unit and the Destruction of Communications Facilities in the Rear 145
Chapter XIII Regular Hiding Places and Precautions to be Taken When We Halt 147
Chapter XIV Training 151
Chapter XV Political Work 156

On Guerilla Warfare (1937) 168

What is Guerrilla Warfare? 168
The Relation of Guerrilla Hostilities to Regular Operations 174
Guerrilla Warfare in History 178
Can Victory be Attained by Guerrilla Operations 182
Organization for Guerrilla Warfare 185
The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare 196
The Strategy of Guerrilla Resistance Against Japan 199

Dialectical Materialism (April-June, 1938) 220

Chapter I Idealism and Materialism 220
Chapter II Dialectical Materialism 224

We Are for Roosevelt and Against Chamberlain (January 20, 1939) 230

To be Attacked by the Enemy is Not a Bad Thing but a Good Thing (May 26, 1939) 231

The Second Imperialist War (September 14, 1939) 234

Youth Needs Experience (October 5, 1939) 240

Economic and Financial Problems in the Anti-Japanese War (December 1942) 241

A Basic Summary of our Past Work 241
On the Development of Agriculture 246
On the Development of Animal Husbandry 279
On the Development of Handicrafts 282
On the Development of Cooperatives 287
On the Development of the Salt Industry 308
On the Development of Self-Supporting Industry 317
On the Development of the Productive Under-Takings of the Troops 333
On the Development of the Productive Under-Takings of Official Organizations and Schools 369
On Grain Work 389

The Comintern has Long Ceased to Meddle in Our Internal Affairs (May 26, 1943) 411

Letter to the Yenan Peking Opera Theatre After Seeing "Driven to Join the Lianshan Mountain Rebels" (January 9, 1944) 413

Mao's Interview with an American Journalist, Gunther Stien (1944) 414

Salute the April 8th Martyrs (1946) 424

A STUDY OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION[1]

April 1917

Our nation is wanting in strength. The military spirit has not been encouraged. The physical condition of the population deteriorates daily. This is an extremely disturbing phenomenon. The promoters of physical education have not grasped the essence of the problem, and therefore, their efforts, though prolonged, have not been effective. If this state continues, our weakness will increase further. To attain our goals and to make our influence felt are external matters, results. The development of our physical strength is an internal matter, a cause. If our bodies are not strong we will be afraid as soon as we see enemy soldiers, and then how can we attain our goals and make ourselves respected? Strength depends on drill, and drill depends on self-awareness. The advocates of physical education have not failed to devise various methods. If their efforts have nevertheless remained fruitless, it is because external forces are insufficient to move the heart...

If we wish to make physical education effective, we must influence people's subjective attitudes and stimulate them to become conscious of physical education. If one becomes conscious of the problem, a program for physical education will come easily, and we will attain our goals and make our influence felt as a matter of course...

1. An Explanation of Physical Education…

Physical education helps to maintain life. East and West differ in their interpretations of it. Chuang Tzu followed the example of the cook, Confucius drew on the lesson of the archer and the charioteer. In Germany, physical education has gained the greatest popularity. Fencing has spread all over the country. Japan has *bushido.* Moreover, recently, following the traditions of our country, judo has developed there to an admirable degree, When we examine these examples, we see that they all begin with the study of physiology…

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[1] *Extracted from an essay published in April 1917 (in Hsin ching-nein)*

2. The Place of Physical Education in our Life

Physical education complements education in virtue and knowledge. Moreover, both virtue and knowledge reside in the body. Without the body there would be neither virtue nor knowledge. Those who understand this are rare. People stress either knowledge or morality. Knowledge is certainly valuable, for it distinguishes man from animals. But wherein is knowledge contained? Morality, too, is valuable; it is the basis of the social order and of equality between ourselves and others. But where does virtue reside? It is the body that contains knowledge and houses virtue, it contains knowledge like a chariot and houses morality like a chamber. The body is the chariot that contains knowledge, the chamber that houses virtue. Children enter primary school when they reach the proper age. In primary school, particular attention should be paid to the development of the body; progress in knowledge and moral training are of secondary importance. Nourishment and care should be primary, teaching and discipline complementary. At present, most people do not know this, and the result is that children become ill, or even die young, because of studying. In middle and higher schools, stress should be placed equally on all three aspects of education. At present, most people overemphasize knowledge. During the years of middle school, the development of the body is not yet completed. Since today the factors favouring physical development are few, and those deterring it numerous, won't physical development tend to cease? In the educational system of our country, required courses are as thick as the hairs on a cow. Even an adult with a tough, strong body could not stand it let alone those who have not reached adulthood, or those who are weak. Speculating on the intentions of the educators, one is led to wonder whether they did not design such an unwieldy curriculum in order to exhaust the students, to trample on their bodies and ruin their lives.... How stupid! The only calamity that can befall a man is not to have a body. What else is there to worry about? If one seeks to improve one's body other things will follow automatically. For the improvement of the body, nothing is more effective than physical education. *Physical education really occupies the first place in our lives. When the body is strong, then one can advance speedily in knowledge and morality, and reap far-reaching advantages.* It should be regarded as an important part of our study. Learning has its essential and its accessory parts, and affairs have their end and their beginning. To know what is first and what is last will bring one closer to the proper way. [From *The Great Learning*, one of the four Confucian classics]. This is exactly what I intend to say.

3. Previous Abuses of Physical Education and my Method for Remedying Them

The three forms of education are equally important: students hitherto have paid much attention to moral and intellectual education but have neglected physical education. The unfortunate consequence has been that they bend their backs and bow their heads; they have ‘white and slender hands’ [from *Nineteen Old Poems,* a famous collection of poems of the Han dynasty]; when they climb a hill they are short of breath, and when they walk in water they get cramps in their feet. That is why Yen Tzu had a short life, and Chia I died young. As for Wang Po and Lu Chao-lin, the one died young, and the other became a paralytic. All these were men of high attainments in morality and knowledge. But there comes a day when the body cannot be preserved, and then morality and wisdom are destroyed along with it. Only the men of the North are able ‘to lie under arms and meet death without regret’. [From *The Doctrine of the Mean*, one of the Confucian classics]. In the regions of Yen and Chao there were many heroes, and martyrs and warriors often came from Liangchow. At the beginning of the Ch’ing dynasty, Yen Hsi-chai and Li Kang-chu practiced both the literary and military arts. Yen Hsi-chai traveled over a thousand *li* (about 0.5 K.M.) to the north of the Great Wall to learn the art of fencing. He contended with brave soldiers and won. Hence he said: ‘If one lacks either the literary or the military arts, is this the true way?’… As far as we students are concerned, *the installation of a school and the instruction given by its teachers are only the external and objective aspect. We also have the internal, the subjective aspect.* When one’s decision is made in his heart, then all parts of the body obey its orders. Fortune and misfortune are of our own seeking. ‘I wish to be virtuous, and lo, virtue is at hand.’ [From the Confucian *Analects*.] How much more this is true of physical education! If we do not have the will to act, then even though the exterior and the objective are perfect, they still cannot benefit us. *Hence, when we speak of physical education, we should begin with individual initiative.*

4. The Utility of Physical Education

Because man is an animal, movement is most important for him. And because he is a rational animal, his movements must have a reason. But why is movement deserving of esteem? Why is rational movement deserving of esteem? To say that movement helps in earning a living is trivial. To say that movement protects the nation is lofty. Yet neither is the basic reason. The object of movement is simply to preserve our life and gladden our hearts. Chu Hsi stresses respect, and Lu Chiu-yüan stresses tranquility. Tranquility is tranquil, and respect is not action; it is merely tranquil. Lao Tzu said that immobility was the ultimate goal; the Buddha sought quiet and methods of contemplation. The art of contemplation is esteemed by the disciples of Chu and Lu. Recently there have been those who, following these masters, have spoken of methods of contemplation, boasted about the effectiveness of their methods, and expressed contempt for those who exercise, thereby ruining their own bodies. This is perhaps one way, but I would not venture to imitate it. In my humble opinion, *there is only movement in heaven and on earth.*

One often hears it said that the mind and the body cannot both be perfect at the same time, that those who use their minds are deficient in physical health and those with a robust body are generally deficient in mental capacities. This kind of talk is also absurd and applies only to those who are weak in will and feeble in action, which is generally not the case of superior men. Confucius died at the age of seventy-two, and I have not heard that his body was not healthy. The Buddha traveled continually, preaching his doctrine, and he died at an old age. Jesus had the misfortune to die unjustly. As for Mohammed, he subjugated the world holding the Koran in his left hand and a sword in his right. All these men were called sages and are among the greatest thinkers...

Physical education not only strengthens the body but also enhances our knowledge. There is a saying: Civilize the mind and make savage the body. This is an apt saying. In order to civilize the mind one must first make savage the body. If the body is made savage, then the civilized mind will follow. *Knowledge consists in knowing the things in the world, and in discerning their laws. In this matter we must rely on our body, because direct observation depends on the ears and eyes, and reflection depends on the brain. The ears and eyes, as well as the brain, may be considered parts of the body. When the body is perfect, then knowledge is also perfect.* Hence one can say that knowledge is acquired indirectly through physical education. Physical strength is required to undertake the study of the numerous modern sciences, whether in school or through independent study. He who is equal to this is the man with a strong body; he who is not equal to it is the man with a weak body. The division between the strong and the weak determines the area of responsibilities each can assume.

Physical education not only enhances knowledge, it also harmonizes the sentiments. The power of the sentiments is extremely great. The ancients endeavoured to discipline them with reason. Hence they asked, ‘Is the master [i.e., reason] always alert?’ They also said: ‘One should discipline the heart with reason.’ But reason proceeds from the heart, and the heart resides in the body. We often observe that the weak are enslaved by their sentiments and are incapable of mastering them. Those whose senses are imperfect or whose limbs are defective are often enslaved by excessive passion, and reason is incapable of saving them. Hence it may be called an invariable law that when the body is perfect and healthy, the sentiments are also correct…

Physical education not only harmonizes the emotions, it also strengthens the will. The great utility of physical education lies precisely in this. The principle aim of physical education is military heroism. Such objects of military heroism as courage, dauntlessness, audacity, and perseverance are all matters of will. Let me explain this with and example. To wash our feet in ice water makes us acquire courage and dauntlessness, as well as audacity. In general, any form of exercise, if pursued continuously will help to train us in perseverance. Long-distance running is particularly good training in perseverance. ‘My strength uprooted mountains, my energy dominate the world’ [from a poem attributed to Hsiang Yü]—this is courage. ‘If I don’t behead Lou Lan, I swear I will not return’—this is dauntlessness. To replace the family with the nation—this is audacity. ‘[Yü] was away from his home for eight years, and though he thrice passed the door of it, he did not enter’ [reference to Mencius]—this is perseverance. All these can be accomplished merely on the basis of daily physical education. *The will is the antecedent of a man’s career.*

Those whose bodies are small and frail are flippant in their behaviour. Those whose skin is flabby are soft and dull in will. Thus does the body influence the mind. The purpose of physical education is to strengthen the muscles and the bones; as a result, knowledge is enhanced, the sentiments are harmonized, and the will is strengthened. The muscles and the bones belong to our body; knowledge, sentiments, and will belong to our heart. When both the body and the heart are at ease, one may speak of perfect harmony. Hence, physical education is nothing else but the nourishing of our lives and the gladdening of our hearts.

5. The Reasons for Disliking Exercise

Exercise is the most important part of physical education. Nowadays students generally dislike exercise. There are four reasons for this: (1) They do not have self-awareness. If a thing is to be put into practice, one must first take pleasure in it. One must understand in detail the whys and the wherefores. To know in detail the whys and the wherefores is self-awareness. People generally do not know the interrelation between exercise and themselves—or they may know it in general terms but not intimately... (2) They cannot change their long-established habits. Our country has always stressed literary accomplishment. People blush to wear short clothes. [The mode of dress of the swordsmen of King Wen of Chao, according to a chapter of the Taoist classic *Chuang Tzu.*] Hence there is the common saying, 'A good man does not become a soldier'… (3) Exercise has not been propagated forcefully... (4) Students feel that exercise is shameful. According to my humble observation, this is really their major reason for disliking exercise. Flowing garments, a slow gait, a grave, calm gaze—these constitute a fine deportment, respected by society. Why should one suddenly extend an arm or expose a leg, stretch and bend down? Is this not strange? Hence there are those who know well that their body needs exercise and, moreover, wish very much to do so, but they cannot. There are those who can exercise only with a group, not by themselves, and those who can exercise in privacy but not in public. In short, all this is due to feelings of shame. All four of these are reasons for disliking exercise. The first and the fourth are subjective, and changing them depends on ourselves: the second and third are objective, and changing them depends on others: 'What the superior man seeks is in himself' [*Analects*], that which depends on others is of lesser importance.

6. The Methods of Exercise Should be Few

Tseng Wen-cheng washed his feet before going to bed and walked a thousand steps after meals, benefiting greatly from this method. There was an eighty-year-old man who was still healthy. On being asked how he maintained his health, he replied, 'I don't eat hearty meals, that's all.' Nowadays the methods of exercise are very diverse, more than I can count. But although there may be several score or even several hundred, 'A branch in the forest is sufficient for the bird to lodge in, and if it drinks at the river it does not drink more than what its stomach can hold.' [From *Chuang Tzu*] We have only this body and only these senses, bones, viscera, and veins. Even though there are several hundred methods of exercise, all of them are *aimed at improving the circulation of* *the blood.* If one method can accomplish this, the result of a hundred methods is the same as that of one. Therefore the other ninety-nine methods can be dispensed with. 'Our eyes can see only one thing at a time; our ears can hear only one sound at a time.' [From Hsun Tzu, a Confucian 'realist']. To employ a hundred different methods to train the muscles and the bones only disturbs them...

7. The Points to Which We Must Pay Attention When We Exercise

We should have perseverance in all things. Exercise is no exception. Suppose there are two men who exercise. One practices and then stops, the other is unremitting in his practice. There will certainly be a difference in the results. First of all, perseverance in exercise creates interest. In general, that which is at rest cannot set itself in motion; there must be something to move it. And this something can only be interest…

Interest arises from unremitting daily exercise. The best way is to exercise twice a day—on getting up and before going to bed—in the nude; the next best way is to wear light clothes. Too much clothing impedes movement. If one does this daily, the idea of exercise is continually present and never interrupted. Today's exercise is a continuation of yesterday's exercise and thus leads to tomorrow's exercise. The individual exercise periods need not be long; thirty minutes are sufficient. In this way, a certain interest will naturally arise. *Secondly, perseverance in exercise can create pleasure. Exercise over a long time can produce great results and give rise to a feeling of personal value. As a result, we will be able to study with joy, and every day will see some progress in our virtue. Our heart is filled with boundless joy because we have persevered and obtained a result.* Pleasure and interest are distinct. Interest is the origin of exercise and pleasure its consequence. Interest arises from the action, and pleasure from the result. The two are naturally different.

Perseverance without concentration of mind can hardly produce results. If we look at flowers from a galloping horse, even though we may look daily, it is like not having seen them at all. If one person's heart follows a swan in the sky, he cannot compete with the person who has meanwhile been studying carefully. Hence one should concentrate all one's effort on exercise. During exercise, the mind should be on the exercise. Idle and confused thoughts should all be put aside...

The superior man's deportment is cultivated and agreeable, but one cannot say this about exercise. Exercise should be savage and rude. To be able to leap on horseback and to shoot at the same time; to go from battle to battle; to shake the mountains by one's cries, and the colours of the sky by one's roars of anger; to have the strength to uproot mountains like Hsiang Yü and the audacity to pierce the mark like Yu Çhi—all this is savage and rude and has nothing to do with delicacy. In order to progress in exercise, one must be savage. If one is savage, one will have great vigour and strong muscles and bones. The method of exercise should be rude; then one can apply oneself seriously and it will be easy to exercise. These two things are especially important for beginners.

There are three things to which we must pay attention in exercise: (1) perseverance, (2) concentration of all our strength, and (3) that it be savage and rude. There are many other things that require attention. Here I have merely indicated the most important ones…

TO HAKURO TOTEN (Miyazaki Toten)[2]

April 1917

Dear Mr. Hakuro Toten,

We have long admired your integrity but regret not having had the privilege of your acquaintance. Even at this great distance your reputation is enough to inspire us.

Sir, you gave moral support to Huang[3] [when he was alive] and now mourn him with your tears. He is to be buried, and you have come across a myriad leagues of waves to bid him farewell at his grave. Your lofty friendship reaches as high as the sun and moon; your sincerity moves gods and spirits. Both are rare in this world, in the past as well today.

Chih-fan and Tse-tung are schoolboys in Hunan who have acquired some knowledge of the classics and have disciplined their aspirations. We long to have an opportunity to meet you, to learn deportment and receive instructions from you. We shall feet extremely honoured if our request is granted.

Students at the First Teachers' Training College, Hunan

signed
Hsiao Chin-fan
Mao Tse-Tung

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2. (1870-1922) a Meiji shishi (extremist patriot) and supporter of the revolutionary activities of Sun Yat-sen and his comrades.

3. Huang Hsing (1874-1916), a revolutionary leader and supporter of Sun Yat-sen, who was buried on 15 April 1917

TO THE GLORY OF THE HANS[4]

July & August 1919

Toward a New Golden Age

...What is the greatest question in the world? The greatest question is that of getting food to eat. What is the greatest force? The greatest force is that of the union of the popular masses. What should we not fear? We should not fear heaven. We should not fear ghosts. We should not fear the dead, we should not fear the bureaucrats. We should not fear the militarists. We should not fear the capitalists...

The time has come! The great tide in the world is rolling ever more impetuously!...He who conforms to it shall survive, he who resists it shall perish...

As a result of the world war and the bitterness of their lives, the popular masses in many countries have suddenly undertaken all sorts of action. In Russia, they have overthrown the aristocrats and driven out the rich... The army of the red flag swarms over the East and the West, sweeping away numerous enemies... The whole world has been shaken by it... Within the area enclosed by the Great Wall and the China Sea, the May 4th Movement has arisen. Its banner has advanced southward, across the Yellow River to the Yangtze. From Canton to Hankow, many real-life dramas have been performed; from Lake Tungt'ing to the Min River the tide is rising. Heaven and earth are aroused, the traitors and the wicked are put to flight. Ha! We know it! We are awakened! The world is ours, the nation is ours, society is ours. If we do not speak, who will speak? If we do not act, who will act? If we do not rise up and fight, who will rise up and fight...

It is not that basically we have no strength; the source of our impotence lies in our lack of practice. For thousands of years the Chinese people of several hundred millions have all led a life of slaves. Only one person—the 'emperor'—was not a slave, or rather one could say that even he was the slave of

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[4] *This article and the following one were extracted from the manifesto written by comrade Hao for the first issue of his magazine, 'Hsiang-chiang p'ing-lun, in July 1919, and from his article "The great union of the popular masses', published in nos. 2-4 of. the same periodical, July and August 1919.*

"heaven". When the emperor was in control of everything, we were given no opportunity for practice...

We must act energetically to carry out the great union of the popular masses, which will not brook a moment's delay... our Chinese people possess great intrinsic energy. The more profound the oppression, the greater its resistance; that which has accumulated for a long time will surely burst forth quickly. The great union of the Chinese people must be achieved Gentlemen! We must all exert ourselves, we must all advance with the utmost strength. Our golden age, our age of brightness and splendour lies ahead!

THE GREAT UNION OF THE POPULAR MASSES

The decadence of the state, the sufferings of humanity, and the darkness of society have all reached an extreme. To be sure, among the methods of improvement and reform, education, industrialization, strenuous efforts, creation, destruction (of that which is bad and outmoded), and construction are all right, but there is a method more fundamental than these, which is that of the great union of the popular masses.

If we study history, we find that all the movements that have occurred in the course of history, of whatever type may be, have all without exception resulted from the union of a certain number of people. A greater movement naturally requires a greater union, and the greatest movement requires the greatest union. All such unions are more likely to appear in a time of reform and resistance...

That which decides between victory and defeat is the solidity or weakness of the union and whether the ideology that serves as its basis is new or old, true or false...

[The aristocrats and capitalists and other powerful people in society have carried their oppression to an extreme]... and consequently the decadence of the state, the sufferings of humanity, and the darkness of society have also reached an extreme. It is then that reform and resistance arise, and that the great union of the popular masses is achieved.

When the great union of the popular masses of France opposed the great union of the adherents of the monarchy and the victory of political reform had been attained, many countries followed the French example and undertook all sorts of 'political reforms'. After last year's struggle in Russia, which pitted the great union of the popular masses against the great union of the aristocracy and the great union of the capitalists and led to the victory of 'social reform', many countries—Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany—have followed Russia's example and have undertaken all sorts of social reforms. Although this victory is not complete... it may certainly become so, and one can also imagine that it will spread throughout the whole world.

Why is the great union of the popular masses so terribly effective? Because the popular masses in any country are much more numerous than the aristocracy, the capitalists, and the other holders of power in society...

We should know that our brothers of other lands have often employed this method in pursuing their interests. We must arise and imitate them, we must carry out our great union... As soon as we arise and let out a shout, the traitors will get up and tremble and flee for their lives.

If we wish to achieve a great union, in order to resist the powerful people whom we face, who harm their fellow men, and in order to pursue our own interests, we must necessarily have many small unions to serve as its foundation... Because our circumstances and professions are different, there are also certain differences, large or small, in the sphere of our common interests... Hence, the method (union) for seeking our common interests also displays certain differences, large or small...

We are peasants, and so we want to unite with others who cultivate the land like we do, in order to pursue our various interests. The interests of us who cultivate the land can only be protected by ourselves!... How do the landlords treat us? Are the rents and taxes heavy or light? Are our houses satisfactory or not? Are our bellies full or not? Is there enough land? Are there those in the village who have no land to cultivate? We must constantly seek answers to all these questions... We are workers, we wish to unite with others who work like ourselves in order to pursue the various interests of us workers... We cannot fail to seek a solution to such questions concerning us workers as the level of our wages, the length of the working day, and the equal or unequal sharing of dividends...

We are students, we are already living in the twentieth century and yet they still compel us to observe the old ceremonies and the old methods. The country is about to perish, and yet they still paste up posters forbidding us to love our country,... We want our own union... We are women, we are sunk even deeper in a sea of bitterness, we want to carry out our union...

MISS CHAO'S SUICIDE[5]

November 16, 1919

A person's suicide is entirely determined by circumstances. Was Miss Chao's original idea to seek death? On the contrary, it was to seek life. If Miss Chao ended up by seeking death instead, it is because circumstances drove her to this. The circumstances in which Miss Chao found herself were the following: (1) Chinese society; (2) the Chao family of Nanyang Street in Changsha; (3) the Wu family of Kantzuyuan Street in Changsha, the family of the husband she did not want. These three factors constituted three iron nets, composing a kind of triangular cage. Once caught in these three nets, it was in vain that she sought life in every way possible. There was no way for her to go on living; the contrary of life is death, and Miss Chao thus felt compelled to die... If, among these three factors, there had been one that was not an iron net, or if one of these nets had opened, Miss Chao would certainly not have died. (1) If Miss Chao's parents had not had recourse to compulsion but had yielded before Miss Chao's free will, Miss Chao would certainly not have died; (2) if Miss Chao's parents had not resorted to compulsion but had permitted Miss Chao to explain her point of view to the family of her future husband, and to explain the reasons for her refusal, and if in the end the family of her future husband had accepted her point of view and respected her individual freedom, Miss Chao would certainly not have died; (3) even if her parents and the family of her future husband had refused to accept her free will, if in society there had been a powerful group of public opinion to support her, if there were an entirely new world where the fact of running away from one's parents' home and finding refuge elsewhere were considered honourable and not dishonourable, in this case, too, Miss Chao would certainly not have died. If Miss Chao is dead today, it is because she was solidly enclosed by the three iron nets (society, her own family, the family of her future husband); she sought life in vain and finally was led to seek death...

Yesterday's incident was important. It happened because of the shameful system of arranged marriages, because of the darkness of the social system, the negation of the individual will, and the absence of the freedom to choose one's own mate. It is to be hoped that interested persons will comment on all aspects of this affair, and that they will defend the honour of a girl who died a martyr's death for the cause of the freedom to choose her own love...

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[5] *Extracted from several articles published in the 'Changsha Ta-kung-pa', beginning on 16 November 1919*

The family of the parents and the family of the future husband are both bound up with society; they are both parts of society. We must understand that the family of the parents and the family of the future husband have committed a crime, but the source of this crime lies in society. It is true that the two families themselves carried out this crime; but a great part of the culpability was transmitted to them by society. Moreover, if society were good, even if the families had wanted to carry out this crime, they would not have had the opportunity to do so...

Since there are factors in our society that have brought about the death of Miss Chao, this society is an extremely dangerous thing. It was capable of causing the death of Miss Chao; it could also cause the death of Miss Ch'ieh, Miss Sun, or Miss Li. It is capable of killing men as well as women. All of us, the potential victims, must be on our guard before this dangerous thing that could inflict a fatal, blow on us. We should protest loudly, warn the other human beings who are not yet dead, and condemn the countless evils of our society...

If we conduct a campaign in favour of marriage reform, it is first of all the superstitions about marriage that must be demolished, above all the belief that marriages are predestined by fate. Once these beliefs are demolished, the pretext behind which this arrangement of marriages by parents hides itself will disappear at the same time, and then the concept of incompatibility of husband and wife will immediately appear in society. And with the appearance of the concept of incompatibility of husband and wife, the army of the family revolution will arise in countless numbers, and the great wave of the freedom of marriage and of the freedom to love will sweep over China...

My attitude toward suicide is to reject it... First of all, man's goal is to seek life, and he should not go against the grain of his natural tendency and seek death... Secondly, although suicide results from the fact that society deprives people of all hope... we should struggle against society in order to regain the hope that we have lost... We should die fighting... Thirdly, if people show respect for those who have courageously put an end to their own lives, that does not at all mean that they respect suicide as such, but rather that they respect the courageous spirit of resistance to brute force, which inspires the person who commits suicide...

It is so much better to be killed in fighting than to take one's own life! The goal of struggle is not 'to be killed by others' but 'to aspire toward the emergence of a true personality.' If a person does not attain this despite all his efforts, if he fights to the death and sacrifices himself, then he will be the most courageous of all on earth, and his tragedy will make a great impression on men's minds!...

COMMUNISM AND DICTATORSHIP[6]

November 1920, January 1921

In his lecture at Changsha, Russell... took a position in favour of communism but against the dictatorship of the workers and peasants. He said that one should employ the method of education to change the consciousness of the propertied classes, and that in this way it would not be necessary to limit freedom or to have recourse to war and bloody revolution... My objections to Russell's view point can be stated in a few words: 'This is all very well as a theory, but it is unfeasible in practice'.... Education requires money, people and instruments. In today's world money is entirely in the hands of the capitalists. Those who have charge of education are all either capitalists or wives of capitalists. In today's world the schools and the press, the two most important instruments of education are entirely under capitalist control. In short, education in today's world is capitalist education. If we teach capitalism to children, these children, when they grow up will in turn teach capitalism to a second generation of children. Education thus remains in the hands of the capitalists. Then the capitalists have 'parliaments' to pass laws protecting the capitalists and handicapping the proletariat; they have 'governments' to apply these laws and to enforce the advantages and the prohibitions that they contain; they have 'armies' and 'police' to defend the well-being of the capitalists and to repress the demands of the proletariat; they have 'banks' to serve as repositories in the circulation of their wealth; they have 'factories', which are the instruments by which they monopolize the production of goods. Thus, if the communists do not seize political power, they will not be able to find any refuge in this world; how; under such circumstances, could they take charge of education? Thus, the capitalists will continue to control education and to praise their capitalism to the skies, so that the number of converts to the proletariat's communist propaganda will diminish from day to day. Consequently, I believe that the method of education is unfeasible... What I have just said constitutes the first argument. The second argument is that, based on the principle of mental habits and on my observation of human history, I am of the opinion that one absolutely cannot expect the capitalists to become converted to communism...

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[6] *Extracted from two letters to Ts'ai Ho-sen, in November 1920 and January 1921.*

If one wishes to use the power of education to transform them, then since one cannot obtain control of the whole or even an important part of the two instruments of education—schools and the press—even if one has a mouth and a tongue and one or two schools and newspapers as a means of propaganda, this is really not enough to change the mentality of the adherents of capitalism even slightly; how then can one hope that the latter will repent and turn toward the good? So much from a psychological standpoint. From a historical standpoint... one observes that no despot imperialist and militarist throughout history has ever been known to leave the stage of history of his own free will without being overthrown by the people. Napoleon I proclaimed himself emperor and failed; then there was Napoleon, III. Yuan Shih-K'ai failed; then, also there was Tuan Ch'i-Jui... From what I have just said based on both a psychological and a historical standpoint, it can be seen that capitalism cannot be overthrown by the force of a few feeble efforts in the domain of education. This is the second argument. There is yet a third argument, most assuredly a very important argument, even more important in reality. If we use peaceful means to attain the goal of communism, when will we finally achieve it? Let us assume that a century will be required, a century marked by the unceasing groans of the proletariat. What position shall we adopt in the face of this situation? The proletariat is many times more numerous than the bourgeoisie; if we assume that the proletariat constitutes two-thirds of humanity, then one billion of the earth's one billion five hundred million inhabitants are proletarians (I fear that the figure is even higher), who during this century will be cruelly exploited by the remaining third of capitalists. How can we bear this? Furthermore, since the proletariat has already become conscious of the fact that it, too should possess wealth, and of the fact that its sufferings are unnecessary, the proletarians are discontented, and a demand for communism has arisen and has already become a fact. This fact confronts us, we cannot make it disappear; when we become conscious of it—we wish to act. This is why, in my opinion, the Russian revolution, as well as the radical communists in every country, will daily grow more powerful and numerous and more tightly organized. This is the natural result. This is the third argument…

There is a further point pertaining to my doubts about anarchism. My argument pertains not merely to the impossibility of a society without power or organization. I should like to mention only the difficulties in the way of the establishment of such form of society and of its final attainment... For all the reasons just stated, my present viewpoint on absolute liberalism, anarchism, and even democracy is that those things are fine in theory, but not feasible in practice...

THE ROLE OF THE MERCHANTS IN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION[7]

July 11, 1923

The present coup d'état has roused the merchants, who have persistently ignored politics, and has led them suddenly to look up and pay attention to politics. This is most welcome news!... The Shanghai Chamber of Commerce... has published a declaration to the whole nation. The declaration says: 'We venture to proclaim with sincerity to the Chinese and the foreigners that from the fourteenth day of this month our people do not recognize any action of Ts'ao K'un and Kao Ling-wei, following their usurpation of political power... as qualified to represent the country...'

At the same time the Chamber of Commerce resolved not to recognize the national assembly, which 'cannot represent the people's will', and resolved, moreover, to organize a democratic committee as the organ for dealing positively with the affairs of the nation. This action... may be regarded as the first gesture of the merchants to intervene in politics and as a manifestation of the fact that the merchants, who remained silent for three years, now speak in awesome tones.

The present political problem in China is none other than the problem, of the national revolution *[kuomin ko-ming].* To use the strength of the people to overthrow the militarists and foreign imperialism, with which the former are in collusion to accomplish their treasonable acts, is the historic mission of the Chinese people. This revolution is the task of the people as a whole. The merchants, workers, peasants, students, and teachers should all come forward to take on the responsibility for a portion of the revolutionary work; but because of historical necessity and current tendencies, the work for which the merchants should be responsible in the national revolution is both more urgent and more important than the work that the rest of the people should take upon themselves. We know that the politics of semi-colonial China is characterized by the fact that the militarists and the foreign powers have banded together to impose a twofold oppression on the people of the whole country. The people of the whole country naturally suffer profoundly under this kind of twofold oppression. Nevertheless, the merchants are the ones who feel these sufferings most acutely and most urgently. Everybody knows that the *likin* and customs duties are matters of life and death for the merchants. The pressing demands for the merchants to 'abolish the *likin* and raise the tariffs' are the expression of their most immediate interest. But abolishing the *likin* and raising the tariffs is not something that can be easily done, because abolishing the *likin* hurts the interests of the militarists and raising the tariffs hurts the interest of foreign imperialism. If the *likin* were abolished completely the militarists would grow thinner day by day, and the merchants fatter. In that case, the merchants would need only to shout in order to overthrow the militarists. But the clever militarists definitely will not do such a foolish thing as to lift a stone in this way and crush their own feet. And if one were to increase considerably the tariffs on foreign goods or even go so far as to abolish the tariffs fixed by the treaties and replace them by protective tariffs freely set by the Chinese themselves, thus removing the fetters encumbering the Chinese merchants, the industry and commerce of the country would develop rapidly and foreign goods would no longer be able to gain a foothold in China. The cunning foreign imperialists are even less likely to do such a foolish thing... The positions of the foreign powers and the militarists on the one hand and the merchants on the other are truly incompatible...

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[7] *Extracted front the article 'The Peking coup d'etat and the merchants', published in Hsiang-tao, nos. 31-32 (11 July 1923).*

The merchants have hitherto 'loved peace' and have never imagined the political transformation necessitated a revolution which could not be accomplished by *a* few telegrams in favour of 'the reduction of the number of soldiers, the application of the constitution, and financial reforms'. Still less did they imagine that revolution necessitated their personal participation, and that only by calling for the organization of all the people and creating a mass movement could a revolutionary force be brought into existence. They even went so far as to think that political reform did not require a political party and to call the revolutionary efforts of the Kuomintang superfluous. It is impossible to compare these juvenile and timid attitudes with the present situation without being convulsed with laughter... Judging from the actions of the Shanghai merchants in response to the *coup d'état,* we know that they have already changed their attitudes, cast away their pacifism, adopted revolutionary methods, drummed up the courage to shoulder responsibility for the affairs of the nation, and progressed rapidly.

The Shanghai merchants have arisen and begun to act. We hope that the merchants outside of Shanghai will all rise up and act together. The present situation is extremely pressing, as though the fire were already singeing our eyebrows, and does not permit us to fall idly asleep once more. At present, we must unite the whole nation in order to carry out the revolution. Factionalism among the merchants cannot be tolerated. They must know that foreign powers and the militarists are the common enemies of all the merchants, as well as of the whole nation. Moreover, the advantages obtained after a successful revolution will be common advantages. It is essential to unite and struggle so as to overthrow the common enemy and assure the common interest... The broader the organization of merchants, the greater will be their influence, the greater will be their ability to lead the people of the whole country, and the more rapid the success of the revolution!

In conclusion, we have the following warnings for the merchants of the whole country: (1) The great cause of revolution is no easy matter, even less so in China, a country under the two-fold pressure of the foreign powers and the militarists. The only solution is to call upon the merchants, the workers, the peasants, the students, and the teachers of the whole country, as well as all the others who constitute our nation and who suffer under a common oppression, and to establish a closely knit united front. It is only then that this revolution will succeed... We must no longer neglect the lesson to be learned from previous experience, when the Association of Merchants and Teachers refused participation of the workers. (2) Now that the merchants have already courageously taken the first step in the revolution, they must take the second step... endeavour to move forward, and never stop until they have attained their goal. Above all, they must never stop on meeting a slight obstruction, or set out on the false path of making an agreement with the foreign powers and the militarists. Everyone must believe that the only way to save both himself and the nation is through the national revolution. Many revolutionary causes throughout history may serve as our reference and our guide. Circumstances call upon us to perform a historic task. We can no longer be negligent! To open a new era through revolutionary methods, and to build a new nation—such is the historic mission of the Chinese people. We must never forget it!

THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND THE FOREIGNERS[8]

August 29, 1923

We often say: 'The Chinese Government is the counting-house of our foreign masters'. Perhaps there are some who don't believe this. We also say: 'The false show of friendship by foreigners (especially Englishmen and Americans) is merely a pretense of "amity" in order that they may squeeze out more of the fat and blood of the Chinese people'. Perhaps there are some who don't believe this either. Ever since the prohibition against the export of cotton was repealed owing to the opposition of the foreigners, it has been impossible not to believe what we have just said to some extent. Now that the foreigners have put pressure on the government to abolish the cigarette tax in Checkiang and other provinces, it is impossible not to believe it a little more…

Of the cigarettes produced by English and American companies, a small portion is imported from England, America, and Japan, and a large portion is manufactured by English and American merchants using Chinese tobacco and Chinese labour in factories set up in Shanghai, Hankow, and elsewhere in China. When the manufactured cigarettes leave the factory, small tax is paid, in accordance with 'treaties'. They are then transported in bulk to the various provinces, and China is not allowed again to tax them 'freely'. In Chekiang Province alone, the sale of cigarettes amounts to 'over ten million *yuan* a year'. There is no accurate total figure for the annual sale of cigarettes in the whole nation; estimating on the basis of sales in Chekiang alone, it must be above 200 million *yuan*. This is really 'frightening to hear'! I ask my 400 million brethren to ponder awhile: What does the 'amity' of the foreigners really mean?

The 'Council of Ministers' of the Chinese Government is really both accommodating and agreeable. If one of our foreign masters farts, it is a lovely perfume. If our foreign masters want to export cotton, the Council of Ministers thereupon abolishes the prohibition of the export of cotton; if our foreign masters want to bring in cigarettes, the Council of Ministers thereupon 'instructs the several provinces by telegram to stop levying taxes on cigarettes'. Again, I ask my 400 million brethren to ponder a little. Isn't it true that the

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[8] *Extracted from the article 'The Cigarette tax', published in Hsiang-tao, no. 38, 29 August 1923*

Chinese Government is the counting-house of our foreign masters?

THE BITTER SUFFERINGS OF THE PEASANTS IN KIANGSU AND CHEKIANG, AND THEIR MOVEMENTS OF RESISTANCE[9]

November 25, 1926

If one takes the boat from Wuhsi, the first place at which one arrives is the market town of Kushan. It is situated between the three *hsien* of Chiangyin, Shangshu, and Wuhsi. In these three *hsien* there are many big land-lords who oppress the farmers very severely. Last autumn, a certain Kushan student who had studied in Japan, by the name of Chou Shui-p'ing, returned to this village. (Chou had first graduated from Wuhsi Provincial Teachers' College). He could not bear the sight (of such oppression), and encouraged the tenant farmers to organize into a body called the 'Tenant Farmers' Cooperative Self-help Society'. Chou moved from village to village speaking with tears in his eyes of the sufferings of the peasants, A large number of Kushan peasants followed him, and those in the neighbouring areas of Chiangyin, Shangshu, and Wuhsi *hsien* were all inflamed. They rose like clouds and opposed the rich but heartless big landlords, and with one voice demanded the reduction of rent. But before the peasants had completely united themselves, the bad landlords had already united themselves and the gentry and landlords of the three *hsien* Chiangyin, Shangshu, and Wuhsi acted simultaneously. Letters and telegrams fell like snowflakes on Sun Ch'uan-fang; Sun Ch'uan-fang of course obeyed the order of the landlords. Last November, he dissolved the 'Tenant Farmers' Cooperative Self-help Society' and arrested Chou Shui-p'ing, who was executed in January of this year. It seemed that the movement for rent reduction had been suppressed for a time. But when Chou Shui-p'ing's coffin was returned to Kushan to be exhibited in his house, the farmers went up to the coffin daily in crowds and kowtowed before it, saying, 'Mr. Chou died for us, we will avenge his death.' This year there was a big drought, and the harvest was poor; the farmers again thought of rising up to demand rent reduction. This shows that they are not in the least afraid to die. They know that a united struggle to reduce the exploitation of the avaricious and cruel landlords is their only way out.

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[9] *Extracted from an article of the same title published in Hsiang-tao, no. 179, 25 November 1926*

Tz'u Hsi is located in Chekiang, east of Ningpo. In recent months there occurred a great insurrection in the Shanpei area of this *hsien.* The peasants of this Shanpei area are violent by nature, and frequently indulge in armed combat. On top of this, in recent years the officials and police have been unreasonably oppressive and the bad landlords have stepped up their exploitation. So the accumulated exasperation of the peasants was already deep. By chance the climate this year was unstable, and as a result the rice and cotton crops failed, but the landlords refused to make any reduction whatever in their harsh rents. The peasants' insurrection against famine thereupon exploded. Once the farmers' insurrection broke out, all the *elements déclassé* joined them very courageously. In the morning of 13 September, there assembled more than 2,000 people who went to the police station to report the famine, and clashed with the police. They burned down the police station, and distributed the arms of the police among themselves. Then they turned to go to the houses of the village gentry landlords to 'eat up powerful families'. After eating them up, and out of anger at the evils of the village gentry landlords, they destroyed the landlords' screens, paintings, and sculptured ancient doors and windows. They did this every day; they did not listen much to others' exhortation but let off their steam in this manner. The day after (each such outburst), the landlord in question ran to the city to report, and soldiers and police came down to the village and turned everything upside down, but the leaders of the peasants had already mostly escaped. There was widespread propaganda about 'Violation of the Law' and 'Crimes', the farmers became fearful, and thus the movement was suppressed. The reason for the failure of this movement is that the masses did not fully organize themselves, and did not have leadership, so that the movement barely got started and then failed.

THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF AN WU-CHING'S MARTYRDOM

1929

Young communists and non-communists who have brought new blood and new spirit to the revolutionary ranks are precious people. Without them the ranks can never be expanded and the revolution can never be won. However, their weakness lies in a lack of experience, and experience comes only from personal participation in revolutionary struggles. The inexperienced can become experienced if they begin from the lowest level and work steadily without a grain of dishonesty for several years.

OPPOSE BOOK WORSHIP

May 1930

I. No Investigation, No Right To Speak

Unless you have investigated a problem, you will be deprived of the right to speak on it. Isn't that too harsh? Not in the least. When you have not probed into a problem, into the present facts and its past history, and know nothing of its essentials, whatever you say about it will undoubtedly be nonsense. Talking nonsense solves no problems, as everyone knows, so why is it unjust to deprive you of the right to speak? Quite a few comrades always keep their eyes shut and talk nonsense, and for a Communist that is disgraceful. How can a Communist keep his eyes shut and talk nonsense?

It won't do!
It won't do!
You must investigate!
You must not talk nonsense!

II. To Investigate a Problem is to Solve It

You can't solve a problem? Well, get down and investigate the present facts and its past history! When you have investigated the problem thoroughly, you will know how to solve it. Conclusions invariably come after investigation, and not before. Only a blockhead cudgels his brains on his own, or together with a group, to "find a solution" or "evolve an idea" without making any investigation. It must be stressed that this cannot possibly lead to any effective solution or any good idea. In other words, he is bound to arrive at a wrong solution and a wrong idea.

There are not a few comrades doing inspection work, as well as guerilla leaders and cadres newly in office, who like to make political pronouncements the moment they arrive at a place and who strut about, criticizing this and condemning that when they have only seen the surface of things or minor details. Such purely subjective nonsensical talk is indeed detestable. These people are bound to make a mess of things, lose the confidence of the masses and prove incapable of solving any problem at all.

When they come across difficult problems, quite a number of people in leading positions simply heave a sigh without being able to solve them. They lose patience and ask to be transferred on the grounds that they "have not the ability and cannot do the job". These are cowards' words.

Just get moving on your two legs, go the rounds of every sector placed under your charge and "inquire into everything"[10] as Confucius did, and then you will be able to solve the problems, however little your ability; for although your head may be empty before you go out of doors, it will be empty no longer when you return but will contain all sorts of material necessary for the solution of the problems, and that is how problems are solved. Must you go out of doors? Not necessarily. You can call a fact-finding meeting of people familiar with the situation in order to get at the source of what you call a difficult problem and come to know how it stands now, and then it will be easy to solve your difficult problem.

Investigation may be likened to the long months of pregnancy, and solving a problem to the day of birth. To investigate a problem is, indeed, to solve it.

III. Oppose Book Worship

Whatever is written in a book is right—such is still the mentality of culturally backward Chinese peasants. Strangely enough, within the Communist Party there are also people who always say in a discussion, "Show me where it's written in the book." When we say that a directive of a higher organ of leadership is correct, that is not just because it comes from "a higher organ of leadership" but because its contents conform with both the objective and subjective circumstances of the struggle and meet its requirements. It is quite wrong to take a formalistic attitude and blindly carry out directives without discussing and examining them in the light of actual conditions simply because they come from a higher organ. It is the mischief done by this formalism which explains why the line and tactics of the Party do not take deeper root among the masses. To carry out a directive of a higher organ blindly, and seemingly without any disagreement, is not really to carry it out but is the most artful way of opposing or sabotaging it.

The method of studying the social sciences exclusively from the book is likewise extremely dangerous and may even lead one onto the road of counter-revolution. Clear proof of this is provided by the fact that whole batches of

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[10] *See Confucian Analects, Book III, "Pa Yi": "When Confucius entered the Ancestral Temple he inquired into everything."*

Chinese Communists who confined themselves to books in their study of the social sciences have turned into counter-revolutionaries. When we say Marxism is correct, it is certainly not because Marx was a "prophet" but because his theory has been proved correct in our practice and in our struggle. We need Marxism in our struggle. In our acceptance of his theory no such formalisation of mystical notion as that of "prophecy" ever enters our minds. Many who have read Marxist books have become renegades from the revolution, whereas illiterate workers often grasp Marxism very well. Of course we should study Marxist books, but this study must be integrated with our country's actual conditions. We need, books, but we must overcome book worship, which is divorced from the actual situation.

How can we overcome book worship? The only way is to investigate the actual situation.

IV. Without Investigating the Actual Situation, There is Bound to be an Idealist Appraisal of Class Forges and an Idealist Guidance in Work, Resulting Either in Opportunism or in Putschism

Do you doubt this conclusion? Facts will force you to accept it. Just try and appraise the political situation or guide the struggle without making any investigation, and you will see whether or not such appraisal or guidance is groundless and idealist and whether or not it will lead to opportunist or putschist errors. Certainly it will. This is not because of failure to make careful plans before taking action but because of failure to study the specific social situation carefully before making the plans, as often happens in our Red Army guerrilla units. Officers of the Li Kuei[11] type do not discriminate when they punish the men for offences. As a result, the offenders feel they have been unfairly treated, many disputes ensue, and the leaders lose all prestige. Does this not happen frequently in the Red Army?

We must wipe out idealism and guard against all opportunist and putschist errors before we can succeed in winning over the masses and defeating the enemy. The only way to wipe out idealism is to make the effort and investigate the actual situation.

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[11] *Li Kuei was a hero in the well-known Chinese novel 'Shui Hu Chuan' (Heroes of the Marshes) which describes the peasant war that occurred towards the end of the Northern Sung Dynasty (960-1127). He was simple, outspoken and very loyal to the revolutionary cause of the peasants, but crude and tactless.*

V. The Aim of Social and Economic Investigation is to Arrive at a Correct Appraisal of Class Forces and Then to Formulate Correct Tactics for the Struggle

This is our answer to the question: Why do we have to investigate social and economic conditions? Accordingly, the object of our investigation is all the social classes and not fragmentary social phenomena. Of late, the comrades in the Fourth Army of the Red Army have generally given attention to the work of investigation[12], but the method many of them employ is wrong. The results of their investigation are therefore as trivial as a grocer's accounts, or resemble the many strange tales a country bumpkin hears when he comes to town, or are like a distant view of a populous city from a mountain top. This kind of investigation is of little use and cannot achieve our main purpose. Our main purpose is to learn the political and economic situation of the various social classes. The outcome of our investigation should be a picture of the present situation of each class and the ups and downs of its development. For example, when we investigate the composition of the peasantry, not only must we know the number of owner-peasants, semi-owner peasants, and tenant-peasants, who are differentiated according to tenancy relationships, but more especially we must know the number of rich peasants, middle peasants and poor peasants, who are differentiated according to class or stratum. When we investigate the composition of the merchants, not only must we know the number in each trade, such as grain, clothing, medicinal herbs, etc., but more especially we must know the number of small merchants, middle merchants, and big merchants. We should investigate not only the state of each trade, but more especially the class relations within it. We should investigate the relationships not only between the different trades but more especially between the different classes. Our chief method of investigation must be to dissect the different social classes, the ultimate purpose being to understand their interrelations, to arrive at a correct appraisal of class forces, and then to formulate the correct tactics for the struggle, defining which classes constitute the main force in the

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[12] Comrade Mao Tse-tung has always laid great stress on investigation, regarding social investigation as the most important task and the basis for defining policy in the work of leadership. The work of investigation was gradually developed in the Fourth Army of the Red Army on Comrade Mao Tse-tung's initiative. He stipulated that social investigation should be a regular part of the work, and the Political Department of the Red Army prepared detailed forms covering such items as the state of the mass struggle, the condition of the reactionaries, the economic life of the people and the amount of land owned by each class in the rural areas. Wherever the Red Army went, if first made itself familiar with the class situation in the locality and then formulated slogans suited to the needs of the masses.

revolutionary struggle, which classes are to be won over as allies and which classes are to be overthrown. This is our sole purpose.

What are the social classes requiring investigation?

They are:

The industrial proletariat
The handicraft workers
The farm labourers
The poor peasants
The urban poor
The *lumpen*-proletariat
The master handicraftsmen
The small merchants
The middle peasants
The rich peasants
The landlords
The commercial bourgeoisie
The industrial bourgeoisie

In our investigation we should give attention to the state of all these classes or strata. Only the industrial proletariat and industrial bourgeoisie are absent in the areas where we are now working, and we constantly come across all the others. Our tactics of struggle are tactics in relation to all these classes and strata.

Another serious shortcoming in our past investigations has been the undue stress on the countryside to the neglect of the towns, so that many comrades have always been vague about our tactics towards the urban poor and the commercial bourgeoisie. The development of the struggle has enabled us to leave the mountains for the plains,[13] We have descended physically, but we are still up in the mountains mentally. We must understand the towns as well as the countryside, or we shall be unable to meet the needs of the revolutionary struggle.

VI. Victory in China's Revolutionary Struggle Will Depend on the Chinese Comrades' Understanding of Chinese Conditions

The aim of our struggle is to attain socialism via the stage of democracy. In

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13. Here "the mountains" are the Chingkang mountain area along the borders of Kiangsi and Hunan Provinces; the "plains" are those in southern Kiangsi and western Fukien. In January 1929, Comrade Mao Tse-tung led the main force of the Fourth Army of the Red Army down from the Chingkang Mountains to southern Kiangsi and western Fukien in order to set up two large revolutionary base areas.

this task, the first step is to complete the democratic revolution by winning the majority of the working class and arousing the peasant masses and the urban poor for the overthrow of the landlord class, imperialism and the Kuomintang regime. The next step is to carry out the socialist revolution, which will follow on the development of this struggle. The fulfilment of this great revolutionary task is no simple or easy job and will depend entirely on correct and firm tactics on the part of the proletarian party. If its tactics of struggle are wrong, or irresolute and wavering, the revolution will certainly suffer temporary defeat. It must be borne in mind that the bourgeois parties, too, constantly discuss their tactics of struggle. They are considering how to spread reformist influences among the working class so as to mislead it and turn it away from Communist Party leadership, how to get the rich peasants to put down the uprisings of the poor peasants and how to organize gangsters to suppress the revolutionary struggles. In a situation when the class struggle grows increasingly acute and is waged at close quarters, the proletariat has to depend for its victory entirely on the correct and firm tactics of struggle of its own party, the Communist Party. A communist party's correct and unswerving tactics of struggle can in no circumstance be created by a few people sitting in an office; they emerge in the course of mass struggle, that is, through actual experience. Therefore, we must at all times study social conditions and make practical investigations. Those comrades who are inflexible, conservative, formalistic, and groundlessly optimistic think that the present tactics of struggle are perfect, that the "book of documents"[14] of the Party's Sixth National Congress guarantees lasting victory, and that one can always be victorious merely by adhering to the established methods. These ideas are absolutely wrong and have nothing in common with the idea that Communists should create favourable new situations through struggle; they represent a purely conservative line. Unless it is completely discarded, this line will cause great losses to the revolution and do harm to these comrades themselves. There are obviously some comrades in our Red Army who are content to leave things as they are, who do not seek to understand anything thoroughly and are groundlessly optimistic, and they spread the fallacy that "this is proletarian". They eat their fill and sit dozing in their offices all day long without ever moving a step and going out among the masses to investigate. Whenever they open their mouths, their platitudes make people sick. To awaken these comrades we must raise our voices and cry out to them:

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[14] *The "book of documents" consisted of the resolutions adopted at the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1928, including the political resolution and the resolutions on the peasant question, the land question, the organization of political power, etc. Early in 1929 the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army published these resolutions in book form for distribution to the Party organizations in the Red Army and to the local Party organizations.*

Change your conservative ideas without delay!
Replace them by progressive and militant Communist ideas!
Get into the struggle!
Go among the masses and investigate the facts!

VII. The Technique of Investigation

1. Hold fact-finding meetings and undertake investigation through discussions.

This is the only way to get near the truth, the only way to draw conclusions. It is easy to commit mistakes if you do not hold fact-finding meetings for investigation through discussions but simply rely on one individual relating his own experience. You cannot possibly draw more or less correct conclusions at such meetings if you put questions casually instead of raising key questions for discussion.

2. What kind of people should attend the fact-finding meetings?

They should be people well acquainted with social and economic conditions. As far as age is concerned, older people are best, because they are rich in experience and not only know what is going on but understand the causes and effects. Young people with experience of struggle should also be included, because they have progressive ideas and sharp eyes. As far as occupation is concerned, there should be workers, peasants, merchants, intellectuals, and occasionally soldiers, and sometimes even vagrants. Naturally, when a particular subject is being looked into, those who have nothing to do with it need not be present. For example, workers, peasants, and students need not attend when commerce is the subject of investigation.

3. Which is better, a large fact-finding meeting or a small one?

That depends on the investigator's ability to conduct a meeting. If he is good at it, a meeting of as many as a dozen or even twenty or more people can be called. A large meeting has its advantages; from the answers you get fairly accurate statistics (e.g., in finding out the percentage of poor peasants in the total peasant population) and fairly correct conclusions (e.g. in finding out whether equal or differentiated land redistribution is better). Of course, it has its disadvantages too; unless you are skillful in conducting meetings, you will find it difficult to keep order. So the number of people attending a meeting depends on the competence of the investigator. However, the minimum is three, or otherwise the information obtained will be too limited to correspond to the real situation.

4. Prepare a detailed outline for the investigation.

A detailed outline should be prepared beforehand, and the investigator should ask questions according to the outline, with those present at the meeting giving their answers. Any points which are unclear or doubtful should be put up for discussion. The detailed outline should include main subjects and sub-headings and also detailed items. For instance, taking commerce as a main subject, it can have such sub-headings as cloth, grain, other necessities, and medicinal herbs; again, under cloth, there can be such detailed items as calico, homespun and silk, and satin.

5. Personal participation.

Everyone with responsibility for giving leadership—from the chairman of the township government to the chairman of the central government, from the detachment leader to the commander-in-chief, from the secretary of a Party branch to the general secretary—must personally undertake investigation into the specific social and economic conditions and not merely rely on reading reports. For investigation and reading reports are two entirely different things.

6. Probe deeply.

Anyone new to investigation work should make one or two thorough investigations in order to gain full knowledge of a particular place (say, a village or a town) of a particular problem (say, the problem of grain or currency). Deep probing into a particular place or problem will make future investigation of other places or problems easier.

7. Make your own notes.

The investigator should not only preside at fact-finding meetings and give proper guidance to those present but should also make his own notes and record the results himself. To have others do it for him is no good.

DEGREE REGARDING MARRIAGE[15]

January 28, 1931

Under feudal domination, marriage is a barbaric and inhuman Institution. The Oppression and suffering borne by women is far greater than that of man. Only the victory of the workers' and peasants' revolution, followed by the first step toward the economic emancipation of men and women, brings with it a change in the marriage relationship and makes it free. In the Soviet districts, marriages now are contracted on a free basis. Free choice must be the basic principle of every marriage. The whole feudal system of marriage, including the power of parents to arrange marriage for their children, to exercise compulsion, and all purchase and sale in marriage contracts shall henceforth be abolished.

Although women have obtained freedom from the feudal yoke, they are still labouring under tremendous physical handicaps (for example the binding of the feet) and have not obtained complete economic independence. Therefore on questions concerning divorce, it becomes necessary to protect the interests of women and place the greater part of the obligations and responsibilities entailed by divorce upon men.

Children are the masters of the new society. Under the old system little attention was paid to children. Consequently special regulations have been established concerning the protection of children.

These present regulations are hereby made public and shall enter into force as of 1 December 1931.

MAO TSE-TUNG, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee
HSIANG YING
CHANG KUO-TA'O, Vice-Chairmen,
28 January 1931

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[15] *This is the full text of a decree of the First Session of the Central executive committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, entitled 'Provisional Marriage Regulations'.*

A LETTER FROM THE CHINESE WORKER'S AND PEASANT'S RED ARMY TO OUR BROTHERS THE SOLDIERS OF THE WHITE ARMY ON THE SUBJECT OF THE FORCED OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA BY JAPANESE IMPERIALISM[16]

September 25, 1931

Soldiers, Our Brothers!

Do not the Kuomintang militarists frequently tell you that it is your responsibility to 'defend the country and protect the people'? But look, at present Japanese imperialist troops have already occupied all the most important cities of Manchuria: They have massacred the toiling masses of workers and peasants in Manchuria and our soldiers with guns, cannons, and bombs, and already regard Manchuria as their colony. May I ask: How are the Kuomintang militarists carrying out their responsibility to defend the country and protect the people[1]? What do they tell you now?

Confronted by such violent behaviour on the part of Japanese imperialism, the Kuomintang militarists tell you 'we must not resist', they tell you 'reasonable people should submit to violence'; they ask you to stretch out your neck and let the Japanese imperialist robbers butcher you; they ask you to submit peacefully and to become 'men without a country', slaves of Japanese imperialism. From this you can see that the Kuomintang militarists can only toady and capitulate to imperialism, can only act as the running dogs of imperialism. They cannot 'defend the country' nor can they 'protect the people'.

And yet, for the sake of enlarging their own spheres of influence, and of exploiting and butchering the Chinese people on a still larger scale, the Kuomintang militarists have, year after year, carried on a confused military struggle among themselves. And in the name of these wars among militarists, they bravely urge you to go to the battlefield to kill your own brothers, to destroy the lives and property of the people; they levy vexing and irregular taxes, impress men into coolie service and requisition horses: they suck the last drop of blood of the toiling masses; they butcher the revolutionary workers and peasants; they force people to grow opium to poison the masses; they have created calamities (floods, drought, and famine) without precedent throughout China; in exploiting and butchering the masses they have shown great resolution and courage!

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[16] *This is the full text of a proclamation disseminated in 1931.*

Especially when the masses of workers and peasants of our soviet area arose on their own initiative and drove out all the imperialists, overthrew the rule of the Kuomintang, confiscated all the land of the landlord class, enforced the eight-hour day, created the Workers and Peasants' Red Army and established the Soviet Government of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, all the militarists of the Kuomintang were mortally offended and manifested their resolution and courage. Once, twice, three times, they attacked us with the aid of the imperialists; they used airplanes, bombs, poison gas, cannons, and machine guns to butcher the people of the soviet area. If we do not destroy them root and branch, they will definitely not leave us alone, although their attacks have all been defeated through strenuous effort by us and by the masses. They are also extraordinarily brave in attacking the people's soviet political power and the people's Red Army!

Soldiers, our brothers! You have had enough of the deception and oppression of such militarists. Think for a moment. Why do you risk your lives on behalf of these militarists? Can you say you do so in order to live and feed your families? In reality you yourselves often do not receive a copper of pay. You yourselves have neither enough to eat nor warm clothing. How can you feed a family? Your superior officers treat you like cattle, like cannon fodder; they want you to risk your lives to massacre your own worker and peasant brothers so that they can rise in rank and enrich themselves.

Soldiers, our brothers! You must think of another way out. There is a way out for you—revolution! You now have guns and cannons in your hands. First kill your reactionary superior officers; then unite with the workers, peasants, and all the tolling masses of your area to overthrow the fucking Kuomintang Government [*Kuomintang ti tiao cheng-fu];* confiscate the land of the landlord class and distribute it among the poor peasants; confiscate the food and the houses of the wealthy and distribute them among the poor; let the workers do only eight hours of work a day; then, organize yourselves to run your own affairs. In this way, you will have created a government of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, that is, a Soviet Government. You will have become the armed force of the workers and peasants—the workers' and peasants' Red Army. If there is a Soviet Government and a Red Army near your garrison area, then when you have either taken as prisoners or killed your reactionary superior officers, present yourself there to join the Red Army. Only the Soviet Government and only the Red Army can protect the interests of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, overthrow the Kuomintang, overthrow imperialism, and really defend the people.

Soldiers, our brothers! Turn your guns in the opposite direction and fight to overthrow imperialism and the Kuomintang, which exploit, oppress, and butcher the Chinese labouring masses; fight to establish the Soviet Government and the Red Army of the workers, peasants, and soldiers! We your brothers, the hundreds of thousands of soldiers of the Red Army, truly welcome you to our ranks.

Down with imperialism and the Kuomintang!
Establish the Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviet Government!
Long live the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army!
Long live the victory of the Chinese Soviet Revolution!

Commander-in-chief of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants'
Red Army and Commander of the First Army.
CHU TE
Chief of the Central Political Department of the Chinese
Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.
MAO TSE-TUNG
Commander of the Second Army of the Chinese Workers'
and Peasants' Red Army.
HO LUNG
Commander of the Third Army of the Chinese Workers'
and Peasants' Red Army.
P'ENG TE-HUAI
General of the Third Army of the Chinese Workers' and
Peasants' Red Army.
HUANG KUNG-LUEH

25 September 1931

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS A LEAGUE OF ROBBERS![17]

October 6, 1932

Workers, peasants, and soldiers of all China! Exploited masses of the whole country!

The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic long ago told the popular masses of the whole country that the League of Nations is a League of Robbers by which the various imperialisms are dismembering China. The principal task of the Lytton Commission of Enquiry sent to China by the League was to prepare the dismemberment of China and the repression of all the revolutionary movements that have raised the flag of the Chinese Soviets.

Now the Commission of Enquiry of the league of imperialist robbers—the Lytton Commission—has already published its report regarding the dismemberment of China. This report is an admirable document shown to the Chinese popular masses by the imperialists regarding the dismemberment they propose to inflict on China; and yet the Kuomintang, which is selling out and dishonouring the country, as well as the government which is the emanation of the Kuomintang, have accepted it completely!...

The Lytton Report is the bill of sale by which imperialism reduced the Chinese people to slavery! The Soviet Government calls on the popular masses of the whole country to participate in an armed uprising under the direction of the Soviet Government, to wage a national revolutionary war in order to tear to shreds the Lytton Report, and to oppose all the new projects of the imperialists for dismembering China, repressing the Chinese revolution, and attacking the Soviet regions and the Soviet union. Let us hurl out of China, Japanese imperialism and all other imperialisms in order to obtain the complete liberation and independence of the Chinese people! Let us defend the Soviet Union with arms in our hands, let us establish a close alliance between the toiling masses of China and of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government proclaims to the workers, peasants, and soldiers of the whole country, and to all the exploited popular masses, that if we really want to wage national revolutionary war and oppose the dismemberment of

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[17] *Extracted from a telegram of the Chinese Soviet Government, dated 6 October 1932.*

China by the imperialists, we must first overthrow the reactionary domination of the Kuomintang, these scavengers who pick up the scraps of the imperialist dismemberment of China, and who are repressing the national war!...

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE LAND INVESTIGATION CAMPAIGN[18]

August 29, 1933

1. The Great Victory

Under the call of the party and the Central [Soviet] Government the land investigation campaign has been unleashed widely. If we assume that the land investigation campaign in the past was merely in the initial stage, then the land investigation of eight counties during June has achieved more than what has been accomplished over the half year since last winter. Generally speaking, in the eight counties that have held meetings, the land investigation campaign has advanced to a new phase having become a broad mass movement. Achievement in two counties, Juichin and Posheng are the greatest, and they have searched out two thousand and several hundred households of landlords and rich peasants, while the counties, Shengli, Yutu, Huich'ang, Tingtung, Ch'angting, Shihch'eng and Nighua, all have achieved initial results. In all the districts and *hsiang* that have achieved results in the land investigation a broad mass struggle has been unleashed. Many stalemate situations which prevailed in the past in the soviet work and in the party work have now become active. Many undesirable elements in the soviets have been washed out, and the counter-revolutionary elements who were hidden in the countryside have been dealt with severe punishments. In a word, the feudal remnant forces have suffered disastrous defeat before the bread masses. On this basis various activities are ever more unfolded. In the regions where some results were achieved in the land investigation, the expansion of the Red Army and local armed forces, the promotion of economic construction bonds, and the growth of cooperatives, as well as the programs of culture building like clubs, evening classes, and primary schools, all have gained extremely great achievements and all the work is being carried through ever more smoothly. Based on the activeness of the masses, large numbers of activists have joined the party on their own, and are drawn into the soviet's work. The best example is Jent'ien District of Juichin. With the assistance of the Central Government Work Corps the land investigation campaign in Jent'ien has spurred the masses of the entire district who have in fifty-five days, thoroughly stamped out the feudal remnants, searched out some three hundred landlord and rich peasant families, brought before a firing squad the so-called "big tigers", twelve counter-revolutionaries, for execution and suppressed counter-revolutionary activities; they have arrested among the soviet work personnel, the class heretics who have sneaked into the [district] soviet. The entire district has searched out a land of 22,000 *mu (mu - 0.0614 ha)* and some 20,000 toiling masses in the district have each acquired in average an additional land of one *mu* and two *mu* and were distributed countless belongings of the *haoshen* and landlords. Relying on the unprecedented height of mass activism, they have expanded the Red Army [detachments] in fifty-five days by some 700 people, who have joined the Juichin Model Division, without a single person deserting. They have saved grains, to sell to the Red Army, which amounted to some 1,900 *tan.* No other district of the whole county can match it. At the instance of various *hsiang,* the entire district assumed the promotional sale of economic construction bonds worth 40,000 *yuan.* Landlord fines and rich peasant taxes which were collected totaled 7,500 *yuan* and those that can be continually raised will be 10,000 *yuan.* Cooperatives have grown rapidly and the institutions of culture and education such as clubs, study classes, evening classes also have increased. The number of party members has expanded and the leadership of the party has been strengthened. The labour union work, too, has moved forward. The entire district has transformed, to breath a fresh spirit. From one of the backward districts of Juichin, it has altered its status in fifty-five days and became a first rate district comparable to Wuyang. We now want to ask: Why has Jentien District achieved such a great result? That we should point out: because of their understanding of the import of the task of land investigation and because of their formula of mobilization, their class line and their mass work, which have been resolutely carried out according to the correct directives of the Central Bureau [of the Soviet Areas] and the Central Government, they have performed a genuine Bolshevik work. In the way of appreciating the task, they were aware that the land investigation campaign and the revolutionary war are closely linked together. Hence, they have carried through this task in earnest, firmly grasped the leadership of the land investigation campaign, and developed the local work systematically. In the way of the mobilization formula, they firmly grasped the work of the most and relatively backward seven *hsiang* among the eleven *hsiang* of the entire district. In these seven hsiang soviets they mobilized the labour unions, poor peasant corps and other mass organizations through which they went out to mobilize the broad masses. In the way of the class line they resolutely executed the tactic of relying on the hired hands and poor peasants in alliance with the middle peasants, thus broadly developing the poor peasant corps. They explained that land investigation is not land distribution and that class examination is not to examine the class of the middle and poor peasants and hired hands. The work of "class talk" has been done very sufficiently. When the landlords and rich peasants of Wofeng *hsiang* intimidated the middle peasants and drove a section of them into panic, our comrades paid a visit to several middle peasants and talked to them individually. After they had relayed [the talk] to other middle peasants, the middle peasants of Wofeng *hsiang* began to quiet down immediately. Actively supported by the land investigation policy of the *[hsiang]* Soviet they [the middle peasants] have moved into a joint attack on the landlords and rich peasants, from whom they have endured extortions previously, along with the poor peasants and hired hands. Comrades in Jent'ien District have once incorrectly classified the status of several peasant families but they have promptly corrected the mistake. As for directing the mass work, they first of all conducted widespread propaganda. What they held was not a district-wide or *hsiang*-wide meeting but a village or residence meeting. Thus they, got access to the broader masses for whom they have repeatedly conducted propaganda and agitation. Therefore, the masses of the entire district have come to understand clearly that the land investigation and class examination are their own responsibility and that they are for their own interests. They then went on to investigate class status; they spurred many people to go out to investigate, gathering data in detail on each status to be proven to the masses. Thus, no incident of mass discontent took place. And then the approval of class status was decided first through the analysis of the land investigation committee, which was then referred to the poor peasant corps for discussion and confirmation. It was further sent to the District Soviet for approval. Again, it was sent back to the concerned village to hold a meeting for further explanation and approval by a show of hands, and then the confiscation was executed. In distributing the property as well as the land, all the working personnel understood that they ought to be exemplary, not to take things but to distribute them entirely among the masses, allocating more to the village directly involved in the confiscation, and less to other villages. Thus they obtained complete satisfaction from the masses. The land was also promptly distributed. While the land elsewhere was distributed only after a prolonged delay, there was no such a phenomenon in Jent'ien District. Hence, it promptly spurred the masses. Their method of first breaking into large and backward villages was also correct. They had no fear of these large villages, nor did they employ barbarous methods to deal with them. What they did with regard to the large villages was to concentrate fire power on them, making more and more propaganda beginning with local activists, to unite and educate them, and through them they reached out to other masses. With great patience they went on to carry through the village, the work of this nature. In appearance it looked tedious but in practice it was fast. In a period of fifty-five days they have spurred without exception all the large backward villages of Jent'ien District and in a very short time stamped out backwardness of these villages. They could not break into a village of Pok'ang *hsiang.* There were previously two "big tigers" who were restive all the time. They took a different method. First they captured these two rascals and convicted them in circuit court held in the locality. With the masses' enthusiastic support they were executed by a firing squad. Thereupon the mass struggle became intensive like a violent fire. They held ten mass tribunals and three circuit courts. All these followed the extremely broad mass line with many residents of the *hsiang* attending and other *hsiang* sending representatives from each village—a small *hsiang* sending a score of people or so, a large *hsiang* forty to fifty people. Therefore, every public trial and the result of a tribunal was all at once relayed to the *hsiang* and all villages of the entire district. It enabled them not only to punish or execute individuals who deserved it, but also to think immediately that the same dealing will have to be accorded to similar evildoers in their own locality. The land investigation campaign in Jent'ien District can truly be regarded as a model for all the Soviet Areas! The work in Chiupao District of Juichin has achieved an extremely great result. They first firmly grasped three *hsiang* to work on. They called members of the land investigation committee of each *hsiang* to attend a three-day training session in the District Soviet where the mobilization formula, the class line, and the method of winning the masses were clearly discussed. They initiated a measure for the problem of confiscation and distribution. Their measure has been that, in confiscating a landlord household, they called upon the masses of the village and the household to go together to a mass meeting where a confiscation and distribution committee was selected. Under the surveillance of the masses they proceeded to the confiscation, piling up the confiscated items on the terrace. Again with the masses' consent, they immediately distributed them to the masses who deserved. Edible items also called for disposal, that is, letting the people have a hearty eating together, slaughtering hogs, and cooking rice. This measure in Chiupao District has scored the maximum effectiveness. Since their confiscation and distribution committee was not a standing organization but a provisional one, it has greatly enhanced intimate relations with the masses (with regard to the confiscation and distribution of land, it was still assumed by the regular land committee). It did not require all the items to be carried to the *hsiang* soviet nor did it have to concentrate on a certain number of households only before taking up the distribution in others. It has thus avoided the shortcoming of being procrastinated and things being stolen away in the meanwhile. Like the class line and the work method in Chiupao District they were also generally correct. Therefore, they could spur the broad masses to commence the class examination on their own. They have carried it through in such a way that not a single landlord or rich peasant came to the *hsiang* Soviet or District Soviet to dispute his status; it was completely different from the land investigation of the past. In the past there were after all many landlords and rich peasants who had been classified, came to the soviet for nuisance, arguing that they had been incorrectly classified. Not only the persons themselves but also even a *hsiang* representative and the man in charge of the poor peasant corps came on their behalf to testify. This time, naturally, not only did they make no nuisance, but they could not do so even if they wanted to. Not a single person of the clans and relatives came to their assistance. There was no possibility for them to make fuss as their power was shorn off. This even proves that Chiupao District has been extremely thorough in spurring the masses. Otherwise, it was impossible to carry it through to this extent.

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[18] *This is a translation from the document in Tou-cheng (Struggle), No.24, August 29, 1933.*

All these glorious exemplary instances (the instances of this type are still many elsewhere) have given a Bolshevik reply to the call of the party and the Central Government and have proven the absolute correctness of the directives of the Central Bureau and the Central Government. Whenever these directives were completely carried through, great victory was at once won. Whoever betrayed or ignored these directives, however, he committed mistakes in his work, achieved little or no result. Let me prove it again with facts.

2. Some Places Have Given Up the Leadership of the Land Investigation Campaign

In the combat task of the land investigation campaign, after the Central Bureau issued the resolution on the land investigation, after the Central Government decreed the land investigation, and after the Eight-County Conference on Land Investigation was convened, the land investigation campaign in various counties has not spread to all the places. For instance, the result of the land investigation in the entire province of Fukien was comparable only to that of one county alone, i.e. Posheng. The result even in each of the counties Shengli, Yutu, Huich'ang, and Shihch'eng was comparable only to that of one or two best districts of Juichin [County]. Many land investigation committees in various districts, as well as a few counties, have not firmly grasped the work of a [district-wide or] county-wide land investigation (Huich'ang, Yutu, Shihch'eng, and Ninghua). In many districts and *hsiang* land investigation committees, district and *hsiang* [soviet] chairmen did not assume leadership on the plea of being preoccupied elsewhere and left the land investigation unattended. As for the Party's leadership in the land investigation, in places where achievements were made in land investigation it has been clearly demonstrated that the party's leadership role has been resolute. The majority of the rank and file of the party has engaged in numerous combat programs with Bolshevik bravery under the leadership of the branch and district committees. In places where little or no achievement was made, however, it has been demonstrated that the party organs have ignored the land investigation campaign. For instance, after the Central Bureau's resolution on the land investigation was issued, the Huich'ang County Committee has not even once discussed the land investigation work for nearly two months. Not until the end of July did it hold a meeting to discuss the land investigation. The Hsiahsiao District Committee of Juichin [County] has entirely left the land investigation campaign unattended over a period of time. Ward committees of Jui'chin City, though held a meeting once, did not push forward the suburban branches to head the leadership of land investigation, while each branch did not hold any meeting on the land investigation campaign. At other places like Yutu, Shengli, Shihch'eng, and Ninghua, the county committees and many district committees have not likewise exerted great efforts at paying attention to the land investigation work. The party and the Central Government stated that: "The land investigation campaign has become a struggle to spur the masses and deeply penetrate the rural classes and a powerful method to thoroughly resolve the land question and purge the feudal and semi-feudal [forces]" (the Central Bureau's Resolution); that "the land investigation campaign is the task, which the soviets in various places cannot allow to relax for a moment" (the Central Government's Decree); and that "the land investigation campaign is a most Principal link' of the present work" (Conclusion of the Eight-County Conference). Nevertheless many of our comrades stated that they... "were very busy and have no time to attend to the land investigation campaign." The Party Resolution stated: "To handle the land investigation campaign with a perfunctory attitude of bureaucratism and formalism is most harmful." Notwithstanding; these comrades handled the land investigation campaign with the style of bureaucratism.

3. In Certain Place the Party has Surrendered to the Landlords and Rich Peasants

In places where the land investigation campaign has been unleashed, there are yet many individual but serious mistakes. That is to say, in these local party organs and soviets there appeared frequently some individual comrades who have manifested their opportunistic vacillations in the land investigation campaign which is a violent class struggle. Mainly, when the land investigation campaign was undergoing violent development they could not forsake clannish and parochial relations and covered up the landlords and rich peasants of the same clan and the same village, or they made an incorrect analysis of class status by classifying a landlord as a rich peasant and a rich peasant, a middle peasant. Some comrades working in the tribunal department have accepted, out of their extreme inadvertence, slanderous charges against those who were active in the land investigation, made by the landlords and rich peasants in the false name of the masses. On the other hand, we had some comrades in the security bureau as well as the tribunal department who could not keep up with the masses in pushing forward the struggle for class examination and in suppressing the counterrevolutionaries vigorously. Even when the masses made a request for arrest and execution by a firing squad of the landlords and rich peasants who had resisted the land investigation, some of them did not honor their request. For instance, the tribunal department of Juichin made many mistakes like this.

4. The Tendency to Encroach Upon the Middle Peasants is the Most Serious Danger

The tendency of "left" opportunism occurred again in very many places during the land investigation of July. What should be pointed out emphatically here is the tendency to encroach upon the middle peasants, though it was clearly stated in the Central Bureau's Resolution that: "Special attention must be focused on the alliance with the middle peasants who will be the broadest basic masses in rural soviets after the revolution. All our treatments and policies must win their approval and support. Every decision of the poor peasant corps and the soviet must have the support of the middle peasantry, secured through a village or residence meeting. All the voices of the middle peasant masses must be heard with care, and any attempt to encroach upon the interests of the middle peasantry must be severely dealt with". In the summary of the Eight-County Conference it was pointed out that: "The aim of the land investigation is to examine classes and not to redistribute the land", "alliance with the middle peasantry should start with non-encroachment of the interests of the middle peasants", "in the beginning of the land investigation we should make widespread propaganda to the effect that the soviet policy is to ally with the middle peasantry, not to encroach upon them. In the process of land investigation we should carefully determine the uncertain elements between the middle peasants and the rich peasants as not to misplace them." But these directives were not heeded by comrades in many places. The land investigation in the confines of Juichin, once under way, has proceeded to examine the middle peasants, house by house and *mu* by *mu* so much so that it drove them to panic. In the end they rushed to the soviet to ask for reclassification of their status into poor peasants. They argued that: "To be a middle peasant is very dangerous, for one would become a rich peasant if stretched. Change to a poor peasant, for it is a bit far away from becoming a rich peasant." Does not such a despairing voice merit our attention? Comrades in Yangku *hsiang* of Huangpo District have told the masses: "Class examination is not for examining others, but only to examine the middle and rich peasant and landlord classes". Comrades in T'aching District have investigated so exhaustively by putting up markings, that it has caused the same panic among the middle peasants. In the Conclusion of the Eight-County Conference it was already stated that "such an idea as to assume that the land investigation is one of putting up markings is not correct." However, these comrades did not pay heed to it at all. This method of such an exhaustive investigation by markings has appeared in every county. This is an extraordinarily serious situation. They have mixed up the land investigation for the land distribution. But if this method is to be employed in the land investigations campaign it would confound the objective of the struggle in the villages. In the past we pointed out that: "Land investigation and land distribution must be strictly distinguished. Such a distinction is to be made not only for consolidating the land ownership of peasants so as not to cause panic out of the ill-defined land distribution, but also for victory in the struggle for class Examination. We must concentrate all our energy, particularly in alliance with the middle peasants, to cope with the resistance of the landlords and rich peasants. In such an event we should not allow any dispute to take place within the ranks of peasants themselves" (Conclusion of the Eight-County Conference). Such a tactic is a most important part of the whole strategy in our leadership of the struggle of land investigation. Nevertheless it was what many comrades had still neglected. Such a negligence cannot be tolerated again, even for a moment. Those who have been admonished but still deliberately continue these mistakes, must be meted out with severe punishments by the higher soviet of the locality. We need to wage thorough struggle within the party and youth league against the idea and action of any party or youth league members who encroach upon the interests of the middle peasants and violate the strategy of alliance with the middle peasants. In places where mistakes are already committed by confiscating, for example, the property and land of the middle peasant, the soviet personnel should publicly admit their mistakes to the middle peasants in the locality and should redeem them forthwith. That Hsiangkuo County reinstituted many lands of the middle peasants last year, thus to win their satisfaction, is a very valuable lesson.

5. Closed Door-ism of the Poor Peasant Corps and its Negligence of the Leadership Role of the Hired Hands are Wrong

"Poor peasant masses are the pillars of the party and the proletariat in the countryside and are the resolute supporters of a thoroughgoing execution of the land revolution". "To rely on the poor peasants" is one of our important policies in the land investigation and in all the struggles for land, the poor peasant corps is the organization that plays an extremely important role [here]. The Eight-County Poor Peasant Corps Representatives' Conference has already pointed out that the past tendency of closed door-ism of the poor peasant corps was wrong, and that the system of introduction should be discarded, and that the door should be kept wide-open to the poor peasants and workers so that they, male and female, old and young, can all apply and join. In many places, however, the old method is still being followed and remains unchanged; without introduction one still cannot join the poor peasant corps. Worse still, when non-member poor peasant masses' in T'aching District of Juichin had rushed to attend a poor peasant corps meeting, the man in charge of the corps simply refused to admit them. In Chuchajen District of Posheng, the poor peasant corps did not admit even a single person during the month of July. In all the districts and *hsiang* where the land investigation has gained results, the poor peasant corps has developed broadly, and in places where the land investigation has gained no or little result, the phenomenon there is that the poor peasant corps is in the state of closed door-ism. Likewise, the great leadership role of the hired hands in the land investigation campaign was not appreciated by many comrades. The Party Resolution stated: "The masses of the hired hands, who are brothers of the urban proletariat in the countryside, are the vanguard of the land revolution. Hence, the working personnel in the soviets must maintain close contact with the [rural] labour unions through which activism of the masses of the [rural] workers can be developed and organized in order to make them the vanguard of the land investigation campaign." Our comrades who have carried work according to this directive are still few in number. The principal method here is to have the rural workers join up the poor peasant corps and set up within it individual small groups of workers. Through these workers' small groups [*hsio-tsu*] we should go out to unite poor peasant activists, develop the poor peasant corps, and promote advancement of the land investigation campaign. The experience in Shanho hsiang of Huangpo District is valuable. When our comrades there twice failed to convene a poor peasant corps meeting, they held a joint meeting of the rank-and-file members of the agricultural labour union and the handicraft labour union and spurred a few dozen workers to arise actively so that they each bring a poor peasant to join the poor peasant corps. On the following day the poor peasant corps again convened a meeting to which all attended as anticipated, and thus unleashed the land investigation campaign. This experience in Shanho *hsiang* should be employed in all the villages. The high-level leadership organs of the labour unions here should provide the low-level labour unions with positive leadership so as to regard the task of land investigation as one of the important tasks of the unions.

6. The Incorrect Idea About the Question of Rich Peasants

Our entire strategy in the agrarian struggle is to depend on the poor peasants, to resolutely ally with the middle peasants, to enable the poor peasants to play the vanguard role, and to unite all the revolutionary forces in order to eliminate the landlord class and combat the rich peasants. Concerning the question of rich peasants the party has already correctly stated: "We must clearly distinguish the landlord from the rich peasant. In the unrelenting struggle to eliminate the landlord remnants we must under no circumstances allow any attempt to eliminate the rich peasantry." During the land investigation of July, we have not yet found a theory openly advocating the elimination of the rich peasants but we found the phenomenon in many places in which a rich peasant element was treated as a landlord thereby confiscating all his family property. The origin of this mistake is due to the elimination of labour power of the rich peasant. When we stated that "those who possess no labour power or only incidental labour power and exploit rent for land are landlords," in some places those who employed a considerable number of labouring elements in production, which was [thus] considered a kind of "incidental labour power," were construed as landlords. In some places the rich peasants who concurrently practiced usurious exploitation were regarded as "usurers," such rich peasants were treated in accordance with the measures of "eliminating usurers." In some places, old accounts were settled by going back to some years prior to the [1925-27] Revolution; someone who had employed regular farmhands five to six years or even a dozen years or so before the Revolution were also regarded as rich peasants; or well-to-do middle peasants who had employed regular farmhands merely for one or two years and have since never done so were also thrown into the rich peasant category. Even more serious was the case in the past in a certain place of Hsiangkuo County. The method there differentiated the landlords from the rich peasants by the type and extent of exploitation. Those who practiced three kinds of exploitation were called landlords, two kinds rich peasants. For instance, if one has hired regular farmhands, collected rent, and also extended loans, he was in-short classified as a landlord regardless of how many people there were [then] in that family who could work. There was also the question of "reactionary rich peasants" which turned out to be considerable absurdity in many places. In Wuyang District there was a rich peasant family who was also a merchant having seven people to feed. In the past a member of the family who had joined the A-B Corps was killed two years ago. Because of this, comrades there, two years later, insisted that they must confiscate the entire [family] property. In many other places many a similar incident took place. Many of the masses demanded punitive measures against those rich peasants who, prior to the Uprising, had taken part in, not very serious, counter-revolutionary activity, like participating in the type of "collecting thirty percent rent in grain" (as in Juichin), and have not since taken part in any counter-revolutionary activity over the post-Uprising years; and some of our comrades wanted, of necessity, to confiscate their property. Correctly speaking, our measure of dealing with the [rich peasant] elements of this type should be different in tactics in the consolidated region and in the non-consolidated region and in the non-consolidated border region. In the border region, unquestionably we employ a strict method of suppressing all the counter-revolutionary elements including the rich peasants; in the Central Area it should be determined according to situations. Those who have committed a serious counter-revolutionary action prior to the Uprising or those who are still engaged in counter-revolutionary activity should of course be subjected to resolute confiscation. Others should not be subjected to confiscation. Except the person in a certain family and the elements who are directly involved with him in counter-revolutionary activity, other people should not be subjected to confiscation. Such will be the correct treatment.

7. The Department of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection has not Assumed its Own Responsibility and Committed Some Mistakes

Many of our comrades in the department of the workers' and peasants' inspection do not understand that the duration of the land investigation campaign is the best opportunity to commence a thorough struggle, to combat bureaucratism, corruption, and passive sabotage, and to drive class heretics out of the soviet [organs]. Our work on these elements has been extraordinarily inadequate. Many of our comrades in the department of the workers' and peasants" inspection have demonstrated, in the face of this violent class struggle, their passivism and vacillations, and their bureaucratism and formalism. In some extreme cases, for instance, the chief of the section of the workers' and peasants' inspection of the Municipal Soviet of Juichin and the chief of the tribunal section of the Municipal Soviet of Paopi committed an exceedingly serious crime of corruption (embezzlement of some 1,000 *yuan* of public funds). The chief of the section of the workers' and peasants' inspection of Tut'ou District neither criticized nor arrested the chairman of the District Soviet who has abandoned and neglected the land investigation campaign. In some places the prosecution drive of the department of workers' and peasants' inspection has again gone into another wrong direction by treating the question of love as decadent and the taking of things of landlords as corrupt. They proceeded to prosecute these elements even on public trial. In some places they dismissed those who committed trivial mistakes in their duties, and they did not initiate self-criticism systematically to commence a thorough struggle. They spared themselves with this arduous work and substituted a simplified punitivism for it. Needless to say, those among the working personnel of the soviets who committed chronic and serious mistakes should be washed out resolutely but to dismiss from duties those whose mistakes did not reach this extent is an excess.

As to the question of class heretics, it generally concerns only one's class origin, not one's work; only if one's background happens to be bad is he called a class heretic, and is dismissed regardless of how long a history of struggle he has behind him, regardless of how correctly he has carried on the policy of the party and soviet in the past and at present. True, we should resolutely wash out those class heretics and should without question wash out those whose class origin is bad and whose work is also bad (including the landlords, rich peasants, passive saboteurs, and corrupt and decadent elements). But if those who are not in this category are to be purged, it is an excess.

8. On the Art of Leadership in the Land Investigation Struggle

If we understand the task and policy and yet if we do not possess the Bolshevik art of leading the mass struggle we still cannot commence the land investigation campaign. In the opening of this essay, mention has been made of very many good examples of leading the struggle in the places. Like Jent'ien District and others but in many others places many mistakes were committed over this question. In some places we did not know how to use various methods to spur the struggle in the large backward villages where the landlords and rich peasants were concentrated. That is to say, if such a large village existed, we should first of all capture the most notoriously bad *haoshen* and landlords whom the masses called "big tigers." Only this way can we initiate the struggle in the locality. Nevertheless our comrades did not do this way. As regards the best method to spur the mass struggle through the utilization of the distribution of the confiscated items, they did not know how to use it in many places. In Watzu *hsiang* of T'aching District of Juichin they distributed things, worst of all, only to land investigation cadres and poor peasants corps members while issuing none to others. The reason was that if one was not active he does not deserve it. In some places the distribution of confiscated things was very slow. In some extreme cases even when a month or so had passed after confiscation, distribution to the masses was not done. The distribution of the confiscated land was even more slow. Comrades in quite a few places did not know how to mobilize various departments of the soviets and mass organizations; nor did they know how to mobilize the available party and youth league members to play the nucleus leadership role in the mass organizations, villages' and residences. Unable to push forward the work they said there had been no way out here at the outset. In some places with the mass struggle for class examination already in full swing, many people came to report on the landlords and rich peasants and asked for examination and confiscation. At the time comrades could not immediately seize on the popular enthusiasm to lead the masses to further the struggle so as to carry the work of class examination into the villages. In some places, when the popular zeal in struggle, after a round of investigation, could not continue to surge upward and reached the state of stalemate, our comrades were unable to use various methods to invigorate the masses, to make the struggle continually surge upward leading right up to the stage of eliminating all the feudal remnants. In many places, when the mass zeal in struggle, after going through the land investigation campaign, had erupted, they did not know how to organize the zeal of this sort into other fronts. For instance, when the masses did secure things and land, they did not then at the mass meeting or at all other propitious opportunities incite the masses to enlist in the Red Army, purchase public bonds, to join cooperatives, to accelerate the harvest work and autumn cultivation, to set up clubs and study groups, and to develop evening and primary schools. They missed such a best opportunity, and only until the high-level [organ] pressed for these did they start all over again to wage propaganda and agitation. Such a leadership of tailism, following behind the popular enthusiasm in struggle is the most harmful one to the revolutionary work.

In many other places, on the other hand, there occurred again the evil phenomenon of savagery by a few people. We have emphasized that, in combatting the apathy in winning a great majority of the masses and the work style of commandism, we only need to be persevering and enduring with the work of spurring and winning the masses. Only then can we gain the support of the great majority of the masses and reach the goal of eliminating the feudal remnants. Such a mass work is the only guarantee for executing the class line. The land investigation campaign should commence a broad propaganda in all the villages and residences, to expound to the masses the need of the land investigation campaign, explaining that the land investigation is not a land distribution, and that the class examination is not to examine the classes of middle and poor peasant and farmhands. Particularly important is to give a clear analysis as to what constitutes landlords, rich, and middle peasants. Village and residence meetings should not be held only once. Especially, backward villages and residences should hold more than one meeting and should not let a single person of the revolutionary masses get away from listening to our propaganda. To reach this goal we should first explain clearly to all the active elements in the representative council of the *hsiang* soviet, labour unions, poor peasant corps, women workers' and peasants' associations, as well as other mass organizations, through whom we should wage propaganda to the broad masses. Class examination should be carried out not by a few people but by spurring many people. Passage of class status should be made not merely by the poor peasant corps, the *hsiang* soviet, and the district soviet, but by a mass meeting held in the village or residence of the confiscates to secure popular approval; only then can confiscation be carried out. In distributing assets, we should issue them to the people of the village or residence involved to win popular satisfaction. All this is to win a great majority of the masses. The working personnel of the party and soviet should not lose sight of the great majority of the masses on every occasion and in every work. The masses we should face up to is the great majority of the masses; the deepening-of our work among the masses is to penetrate the masses in all the villages, large or small, and in all the cities and towns, large or small. We should strictly combat the mistaken method of closed door-ism and commandism followed by a minority. Our comrades in many places, however, have never done [their work] this way. In Juichin [County], there are very many districts and *hsiang* where not one class discussion has been held with the masses (no analysis has been made as to what constitutes landlords, rich and middle peasants). In many places of Juichin and other counties it was discovered that they just set out to investigate [classes] in every instance without going through propaganda so as to drive the landlords and rich peasants to fabricate rumors and cheat the middle peasants or say that there were very many landlords and rich peasants in the *hsiang* or state that there were a few hundred landlord families who were going to be investigated (Juichin). Furthermore, our comrades did not know clearly the method of conducting "class talks" to break up this kind of rumor. Landlords in Kuangch'ang said: "The land investigation is what the Central Government is going to make those who did not pay debt in the past, pay their debt to the Central Government'. Yet our comrades did not go out immediately to break and expose such a devilish talk. In Several *hsiang* of T'aching District they not only did not wage any propaganda, but the class examination was undertaken merely by a few people of the land investigation committee. Passage of class [status] did neither go through the mass meeting nor through the poor peasant corps. They said: "The masses are unreliable and do not know how to analyze classes. To bring up class status at the mass meeting for passage is to cause dispute. It is all the more reliable to have it passed by the land investigation committee alone." This theory of the comrades in T'aching District can truly be a fantastic story in the whole world! In goodly many places landlords and their properties were confiscated not in the daytime but in the evening. The only reason was that they were afraid that the landlords would run way. In one place a mass meeting was held using the technique of holding an "all-district meeting" but no more than a couple of hundred of people attended. Three people took turns to speak from the morning to the afternoon not letting the masses take intermissions, nor letting them drink water or eat. They said that they were afraid that the masses would run away. Such a barbarous method can also be a fantastical one of its kind.

9. Develop a Two-Front Struggle to Overcome the Mistakes and Win a Thorough Victory in The Land Investigation Campaign

Undoubtedly the land investigation campaign has been unleashed over vast areas. However, when this campaign is in progress, when we correctly estimate the achievement already gained and consolidate the foundation of growth of the campaign, we should yet realize with vigilance, obstacles to be encountered in the course of the campaign. Only through the unleashing of the fire power of the two-front struggle to clear away these obstacles, can we advance the land investigation campaign even more rapidly. To start the fight against the Rightist thought, to combat the underestimation of the grave significance of the land investigation campaign, to combat the compromise and the surrender to the landlords and rich peasants, and to combat the tailism in leadership of the mass struggle, are the responsibility of every Communist Party member. At the same time, attention of all the party members should be focused on the danger of encroaching on the middle peasants and a "severe blow should be dealt to any attempt to violate the interests of the middle peasants," for this is the sufficiently serious danger which has been manifested in the present work of land investigation. Incorrect ideas about the rich peasants, too, will undoubtedly affect the middle peasants. All barbarous acts of commandism are of the greatest harm to the alliance with the middle peasants. Only upon elimination of all obstacles in the course of the land investigation campaign by the fire power of the two-front struggle, the campaign will make great strides forward, and its thorough victory will be sufficiently assured.

THE LAND INVESTIGATION CAMPAIGN IS THE CENTRAL IMPORTANT TASK IN THE VAST (SOVIET) AREAS[19]

August 31, 1933

All the past experiences prove that only through the correct solution of the land question, only through the resolute class slogan under which the flame of class struggle in the countryside is whipped up to the highest degree, can we spur the broad peasant masses to participate under the leadership of the proletariat in the revolutionary war, in the construction of the Soviet Areas in the various spheres, and in the building of a firm revolutionary base to further strengthen the soviet movement and score greater progress and victory.

According to the experience in developing the land revolution, the growth of class struggle in the countryside calls for three general stages to follow, namely, 1) the stage of land confiscation and distribution, 2) the stage of land investigation, 3) the stage of land construction. Based on the three stages of development in the land struggle, there exist generally three types of regions regardless of any soviet area, namely, 1) the region where the struggle has deepened, 2) the region where the struggle has relatively fallen behind, 3) the region where the struggle is newly developing.

In the newly developing region, the development of land struggle is still at the stage of land confiscation and distribution. The central question at this stage is to overturn by armed power the political power of the landlord class, to establish a revolutionary provisional political power (the Revolutionary Committee), to build a local armed force of the workers and peasants as well as revolutionary mass organizations, to confiscate the land and property belonging to the landlord class plus the land of rich peasants to be divided among the hired hands, poor peasants, middle peasants, to give the rich peasants the poor land, to nullify debts and to burn land titles and IOUs. Involved in the struggle at this stage is the whole range of struggle in which the revolution commences battle with the counter-revolution leading to the defeat of the counter-revolution by the revolution and implementing the disposition of their land and property.

In the region where the struggle has deepened, a firm soviet political power has been established and the local armed forces and revolutionary mass organizations have developed extensively; the feudal forces of landlords and rich peasants have been completely defeated and the land has been thoroughly distributed. The struggle of the peasant masses over the land question has advanced to the stage of improving the soil and developing soil productivity. Therefore, the central question here is one of land construction.

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[19] *Taken from Hung-ch'i Chou-pao (Red Flag Weekly), no. 59, August 31, 1933.*

In the region where the struggle has fallen behind, its stage of development is between the two stages mentioned above. It has moved into the period of a formal political power from that of a provisional political power but it has not yet reached the period of completely consolidating the political power. Here the open counter-revolutionary struggle of the landlords and rich peasants have been defeated by the revolutionary masses in the first period. From that time on, many of these elements would turn about, take off their counter-revolutionary mask and put on the revolutionary mask. They too approve the revolution and the land redistribution as well, and call themselves poor peasants and demand that the land be distributed to them accordingly. They act actively by virtue of their historical advantage in that "come to think of talking; they can talk, come to think of writing, they can write." Therefore, during the first period they have taken advantage of the opportunity to snatch away the fruit of land revolution. Facts in many places proved that they are dominating the provisional political power by sneaking into the local armed forces and manipulating the revolutionary organizations to get more and better land than what the poor peasants have obtained. Having moved into the second, some of those sham revolutionary elements have been washed out because of the pressure of the upper-level government as well as the advancement of mass struggle, and because the Revolutionary Committee has been reconstructed into the soviet, and the mass organizations and local armed forces have undergone the preliminary reform and further growth. In many places the land has been divided twice, even three or four times, and the land stolen by the landlords and rich peasants has been in part liquidated. However, there are still many class heretics hidden among the soviet mass organizations and local armed forces. There they "carry Red ribbons to be called comrades", there they fabricate rumors and hold secret meetings, there they accuse the masses of "left opportunism," of "random beating of local bullies," and of "public revenge for private animosity." Or they "speak articulately at a meeting but carry out none after the meeting." When the struggle becomes violent, they organize secret counter-revolutionary organizations like the KMT, the Social Democratic Party, the A-B Corps, and a New Communist Party, as well as all kinds of things, to subvert the revolution and try to murder revolutionary activities. In short, the landlord and rich peasant classes suppress the mass struggle through various methods and attempt to preserve their rights to political power, land and property and perpetuate their remaining feudal forces. In these regions serious struggles are being waged between the revolutionary masses and the landlords and rich peasants. The struggle here, however, is not like the open struggle between the Red banner and the White banner during the first period but a struggle between the revolutionary peasant masses and the masked landlords and rich peasants elements. The struggle of this kind has its special difficulty, that is, the peasant masses cannot as nearly clearly recognize at a first glance the hidden counter-revolutionary as the open counter-revolutionary. In addition, in view of the various deep-rooted feudal relations like the clannish ones it is not an easy matter for the peasants to attain the degree of class consciousness, so that they can generally recognize that the feudal remnants should be stamped out eventually. This means that the Communist Party and the soviet government must certainly be patient in explaining to the peasants, that they must engage in many trying tasks, and that they must have the correct class line and the [correct] method of the mass work. The central question here is the question of land investigation and class investigation. Unless this question is solved, revolutionary activeness of the peasant masses cannot be developed to the fullest, the feudal remnant forces cannot be completely smashed; nor the soviet can [carry on] the important tasks as to attain the maximum degree of consolidation and expansion of the Red Army, to expand the local armed forces and implement land construction as well as economic construction, and to develop culture and education. [Otherwise], in no way can all this gain its maximum success. Therefore, the land investigation campaign is the most central and most important task in these regions.

Speaking of the Central Soviet Area [i.e. Kiangsi Soviet], most part of the Area constitute the regions where the struggle of this kind has relatively fallen behind, such as the thirteen whole counties, Huich'ang, Hsianwu, Anyuan, Hsianfeng, Loan, Yuhuang, Kwangch'ang, Shihch'eng, Chienning, Lich'uan, Ninghua, Ch'angting, and Wup'ing, most of the counties like Juichin, Yutu, Posheng, Shengli, and Yungfeng, portions of the counties like Kunglueh, Want'ai, Kanhsien, Shanghang, Yungting, and Hsinch'uan, and even the county Hsiangkuo, too, has two districts Chunch'un and Huangt'ang.

All these represent the regions where the land question has not yet been thoroughly resolved.

The peasant masses of these regions have not yet been spurred broadly; the feudal forces have not yet been beaten decisively, and in the soviets, in the mass organizations, and in the local armed forces, there are still numerous class heretics who are surreptitiously active; there are still numerous counter-revolutionary secret organizations which are secretly engaging in the subversion of the revolution. For this reason, war mobilization and economic and cultural construction all have fallen far behind the advanced areas (nearly the entire county of Hsiangkuo, sections of the counties Shengli, Kanhsien, Wangt'ai, Kunglueh, Yungfeng, and Shanghang, Huangp'o District of Posheng, Wuyang District of Juichin, Hsianp'o District of Yutu, Hsinan District of Yungting, and etc.). These regions occupy nearly eighty percent of the Central [Soviet] Area in acreage and contain more than two million people. In this vast area to carry out an all-round, deepening land investigation campaign, to kindle to the maximum degree the flame of class struggle among the masses of two million people and more, to wage a final war against the feudal forces to destroy them once and for all, are the tasks that the Communist Party and the Soviet Government cannot afford to relax for a moment.

REPORT TO THE 2nd NATIONAL CONGRESS OF WORKER'S AND PEASANT'S REPRESENTATIVES[20]

January 23, 1934

1. The Present Situation and Development of Soviet Movement

Two years have elapsed since the 1st National Soviet Congress convened. Facts and events of the past two years tell us that the imperialist Kuomintang rule has further declined in the process of its debacle while the Soviet movement proceeded and developed vigorously towards its victory!

Now we have arrived at the era when the Chinese Revolution has become further acute and the whole world is passing its transitory period leading to a new turn of war and revolution. The opposition of the socialist world to the capitalist world has become much sharper. On the one hand, the socialist construction in the Soviet Union and the peace policy of the Soviet Government have achieved sweeping success, all conducive to the consolidation of the position of the Soviet Union, in sharp contradiction to the capitalist world where the ever-sharpening of the economic crisis has led the imperialist powers to seek a workable solution in the attack on the Soviet Union and China. Preparations for the intervention against the Soviet Union have never ceased for a single minute while the imperialist division of China and the intervention against the Chinese revolution are in full swing.

But the world proletariat revolution and the revolution of the oppressed nations are extending in every direction precisely under the influence of the successful socialist construction in the Soviet Union and in face of the menace of the imperialist crisis and war. A part of the world revolution, the Chinese revolution is growing out of the sharpening of the national crisis, the collapse of national economy, the success of the Soviet movement at an accelerated pace, resulting in pushing the Chinese revolution to the foreground in the world revolution.

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[20] *This is a report presented by comrade Mao before the Second National Congress of worker's and peasant's deputies, held in Juichin in Kiangsi, on January 23, 1934. Extracted from 'Chinese worker's correspondence' Shanghai, Volume 4, No.11, March 31, 1934. (Please also see Mao's article 'Our economic work', S.W., Volume I, p. 141).*

The dominating factors of the present Chinese situation are: Wide civil war; death-and-life struggle between revolution and counter-revolution; sharp contrast between the worker-peasant Soviet power and the Kuomintang power of landlords and bourgeoisie. On the one hand, the Soviet power is summoning, organizing, and leading the country-wide masses to fight in national revolutionary war to overthrow the rule of landlords and bourgeoisie throughout the country; to oust imperialism from China; to liberate the millions of the masses from oppression and exploitation by imperialists and Kuomintang; to save the country from colonization and to build up Soviet China of complete freedom, independence and territorial integrity.

The growing acute contrast between the two powers cannot but promote the death-and-life struggle between them to assume more and more violent proportions. It had now come to the decisive historical stage of the struggle. The Kuomintang is launching its 5th offensive against us. The historical task of the soviet power is: to summon, to organize and to lead all revolutionary masses both in the Soviet Districts and in other parts of the country to fight in this decisive war; to mobilize broad worker-peasant masses to join the Red Army; to improve the political, cultural, and technical levels of the Red Army; to enlarge the local armed forces and partisans; to agitate for broad partisan wars; to strengthen the concentrated and unified leadership of the Soviet over all Soviet districts and Red Armies; to strengthen the working speed and quality of the Soviet work in every field; to strengthen the financial and economical work of the Soviet so as to guarantee the material demands of the revolutionary war; to develop the class struggle of the working masses; to organize the revolutionary initiative of the working masses into the struggle of smashing the 5th offensive of the enemy; to develop the agrarian revolution of the peasants; to mobilize the broad masses to fight for the acquisition and protection of land; to call all working and peasant masses of the Soviet Districts and throughout China to fight with all efforts and at all cost in the revolutionary war. This is the way to smash the 5th offensive of imperialists and the Kuomintang, to save China from being colonized and to attain the Soviet victory in one or several provinces and in the whole territory of China!

2. The Anti-Imperialist Movement

The greatest events in the past two years in China since the inauguration of the Provisional Soviet Central Government were imperialist attacks and the 4th and 5th offensives waged upon revolution by counter-revolution. The occupation of Manchuria, Mongolia, and North China by Japanese robbers and the intensified control of Tibet, Sikong, Yunnan, the Yangtze Valley by British, French, and American imperialists, are all directed by the Imperialists to wreck the Chinese Soviet power and to completely enslave the Chinese nation as a preliminary step toward the war against the USSR. The Kuomintang of landlords and bourgeoisie still sticks to its long followed policy of capitulation while, on the contrary, the anti-imperialist movement of the country-wide revolutionary masses, with the unprecedented national crisis before them, has developed with extreme violence.

At the present movement two powers of opposite directions are laid before the country-wide revolutionary masses: the Kuomintang which surrenders completely to imperialism and with all means suppresses the anti-imperialistic masses; the Soviet which is determinately anti-imperialistic and does its best to support and lead the anti-imperialist movement.

In the past two years the Provisional Soviet Central Government has repeatedly circulated statements denouncing the predatory wars waged by the Japanese imperialists and the traitorous capitulation of Kuomintang. On April 14, 1932, the Provisional Central Government formally declared war on Japan and issued mobilization orders for war against her. The Provisional Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Council have more than once announced their readiness to conclude agreement with any armed unit of the Kuomintang for joint anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist military movement under the following conditions: (1) Immediate stop of offensive against the Soviet districts; (2) Guarantee of Civil rights for the masses; (3) Arming of the masses, and creation of anti-Japanese volunteers. The Tankoo Agreement concluded between the Kuomintang and Japan on May 30, 1933, and the Sino-Japanese direct negotiations since then are policies and actions against the national interests but repeatedly repudiated by the Provisional Central Government in its statements made public of late. The Soviet has supported the anti-Japanese struggle in any and every part of the country. To speak alone of the anti-Japanese strike of the textile workers in West Shanghai, 1932, the Soviet aided them with $16,000.

In the Soviet territories, imperialist privileges have been abolished and imperialist influence wiped out. Imperialist pastors and fathers were ousted by the masses; estates of the people seized by imperialist missionaries were returned; missionary schools were turned into Soviet schools. In short, the Soviet districts in China alone are liberated from the imperialist yoke.

These facts point to one thing; the Soviet is the sole anti-imperialist government. The Soviet Government wants to make known to the country-wide masses: the greatest responsibility of the Soviet and the whole masses is to win victory over imperialists by means of direct war. The fulfillment of this work depends upon the development of the mass anti-imperialist struggle. First of all, the lackey of Imperialism, the Kuomintang, should be smashed because it is the greatest obstacle on the way before the anti-imperialist Soviet and masses.

3. The Imperialist-Kuomintang Offensive Repulsed

Because the Chinese Soviet districts are the revolutionary base for the Chinese anti-imperialist movement, because the Chinese Red Army is the main pillar of the Chinese anti-imperialist forces, and because the Soviet movement and the revolutionary war are proceeding violently, the Kuomintang with the direct help of the imperialists and with all force at its disposal, waged four offensives and is now waging the 5th one against the Soviet and Red Armies in an attempt to put down the Chinese revolution and to fulfill its task of cleaning the ground for imperialism. But every offensive of imperialism and the Kuomintang ended in glaring failure. The victories of the Soviet and Red Armies have further confirmed the belief of the country-wide masses that the Soviet and Red Armies alone are fighting for the national independence and freedom, and that they are the sole forces for the salvation of China.

The 4th offensive of the enemy began right after the Kuomintang had surrendered Manchuria to the Japanese and concluded the Shanghai Truce Agreement of May 5th, 1932. The traitorous Kuomintang did not mobilize a single soldier to fight the Japanese aggression. On the contrary, despite the fact that the Soviet and Red Armies have more than once proposed to conclude an anti-Japanese military agreement with any anti-Japanese troops, the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, chief of all traitors, concentrated hundreds of thousands of troops to attack the Hupeh-Honan-Anhui and Hunan-Hupeh West Soviet districts and forced the Red Armies to withdraw from the cordon they formed around the district of Wu-Han. On our side, because of some tactical mistakes, coupled with our reluctance to have a direct clash with a force of the enemy which was overwhelmingly stronger than ours, the 4th Red Army Corps was obliged to withdraw from the Hupeh-Honan-Anhui Soviet district and began the famous expedition to Szechuen where a new and big Soviet base embracing Tungkiang, Bachun, Nankiang, Hsunhan and Suiting has been created. During the expedition, the 4th Red Army corps had widely disseminated seeds of the Soviet in the comparatively revolutionary backward zones of the Northwest where broad revolutionary struggle of the masses have been brought up to develop. In not more than one year, the 4th Red Army Corps has sovietized more than ten *hsien* and called forth leaning of the Szechuen toiling masses and soldiers of the White troops toward the Soviet revolution. Meantime the 2nd Red Army Corps which evacuated from the Hung Lake Zone not only has suffered no serious loss but also gained new success in the Szechuen-Hupeh-Hunan frontier regions in its operation in coordination with the 4th Red Army Corps, Even in the Hung Lake zone, Red partisans are still active. In the Hupeh-Honan-Anhui Soviet district, we did not lose much of our base. On the contrary, we are now very successful there in the strife to consolidate our position and to develop partisan wars in the surrounding neighborhood.

As to the Central Soviet District (Kiangsi), it is the location of the Central Soviet Government headquarters of the country-wide Soviet movement and the chief target of the offensive of the enemy. Around this district and its neighboring Soviet zones the enemy has concentrated most of its forces—the so-called "Central Government" troops, the units under the command of militarists Chiang Kwang-lai, Tsai Ting-kai, together with those under the command of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Hunan warlords. Through one year's hard struggles, we have gained unprecedented success. The biggest victory was that we gained in the spring of 1933 when the Red Armies of the Central Soviet district alone destroyed 23 regiments, 6 battalions and 2 companies of the enemy and smashed 3 divisions, 12 regiments, 3 battalions and 2 companies and captured twenty thousand rifles and one thousand machine guns and auto-rifles. Particularly in the battles of Tungpi and Hangpi, we annihilated a complete column of the crack troops of the enemy. These battles ended the 4th offensive of Nanking with a complete failure to the enemy.

The failure of the 4th offensive of the enemy had brought along qualitative and quantitative growth of the Red Army. The commanders and fighters of the Red Army have become more determined politically and more skillful in military techniques, showing long strides of progress as compared with the time before the 4th offensive. Moreover, the Soviet territory has been enlarged. Besides the new Soviet district in Szechuen, we have now Fukien-Kiangsi province, another new Soviet district in the east part of Kiangsi, which increased the population of Soviet China by almost one million. Our old Soviet districts are further consolidated. This has been shown by the improvement of the Soviet work, by the rise of the militancy of the worker-peasant masses by the development of class struggle both in cities and villages, and by the suppression of the remnants of counter-revolution in the Soviet districts. This sum-total of the success of the Soviets revolution has also its influence in the Kuomintang-ruled districts where the struggling spirit of the oppressed worker-peasant masses has been further promoted, the soldiers and commanders of the White troops have shown their further wavering, and Chiang Kai-shek himself was even obliged to proclaim his desperate order of "Death punishment to all who do not fight the 'bandits' but demand to fight the Japanese."

Since the failure of the 4th offensive, the only manifestation of the Kuomintang has been to further shamelessly surrender to imperialism. From the imperialists the Kuomintang has received new loans and consignments of military supplies. Directly led by the imperialists and with foreign advisers helping it reorganize its forces (training of new recruits, air forces, and the Blue Jacket officials), the Kuomintang has been enabled once more to proceed with its 5th offensive against the Soviet and Red Army. The struggle of the C.E.C. of the Party, namely, "to make it impossible for imperialist crisis to seek its way out, or in other words, to struggle for the independence and freedom of Soviet China." Indeed, the struggle against the 5th offensive is to determine whether China goes down to complete independence, freedom, and territorial integrity.

We have acquired all fundamental conditions to win our struggle against our enemy since our victory over the 4th offensive. We have to point out that enemy has far more difficulties than we: the wavering of the soldiery of the white troops; the hatred against the rulers of the workers-peasant masses together with the broad petty bourgeoisie in the enemy-ruled districts; the disintegration of the militarists; the clashes and conflicts among the imperialists who are supporters of the Kuomintang; the financial and economical bankruptcy of the Kuomintang. These are all objective conditions that show the possibility of victory for the revolution.

4. Fundamental Policies of the Soviet

We get to know its environment, now and past, together with the tasks the environment calls forth, before we explain the fundamental policies of the Soviet. The Soviet has grown up from partisan wars and from many isolated and small districts beyond the boundaries of which is the world of the enemy. The enemy has been quite busy with the destruction and oppression of the Soviet. Yet the Soviet has been victorious. It is able to defeat the enemy and has grown up through its repeated victories over the enemy. This is the environment of the Soviet. In many respects, the environment of the Soviet at present is different from that of the past. It has a wider territory, broader masses, and stronger Red Army. It has concentrated many of its scattered forces (although the work has not been complete). It has been organized into a state, the Soviet Republic of China which has now its central and local organization. The central organ, the Provisional Central Government, is the nucleus of concentrated power depending upon the broad masses and their armed force—the Red Army. This Government is the power of workers and peasants themselves. It is the revolutionary worker peasant democratic dictatorship which is ever enlarging its influence throughout the country by virtue of the growing confidence of the broad masses in it. Evidently, the Soviet now no longer has the same environment confronting it as in the partisan war stage. Yet it still has to face constant warfare which is becoming wider and more violent. The reason is that the opposition between it and the landlord-bourgeois Kuomintang is growing daily acute and the time has come when the two contending parties have to fight a decisive battle. In short, before it there is at present a big scale offensive of Imperialists and the Kuomintang and that is its environment nowadays.

This very environment determines the tasks of the Soviets. It must do its best to mobilize, organize and arm the masses, concentrate all of its strength for the development of the revolutionary war and fight out the other dictatorship together with the imperialist rule that has acted as the supporter and director of that other dictatorship. The aim of knocking down imperialism and the Kuomintang is to unify China, to bring the bourgeois democratic revolution to realization and to make it possible to turn the said revolution later to a higher stage of socialist revolution. This is the task of the Soviet.

From this we may understand what the various Soviet policies and tasks are. They are: to consolidate the victoriously established worker-peasant dictatorship; to develop this dictatorship to the whole country; to mobilize; organize and arm the Soviet and country-wide masses to fight in the determined revolutionary war to overthrow the imperialist Kuomintang rule and to consolidate and develop the worker-peasant dictatorship; to prepare the present bourgeois democratic revolution for its turn toward the socialist proletarian dictatorship in the future. All these form the starting point of the Soviet policies.

a. The Armed Masses and the Red Army.

Let us first speak of the armed masses and Red Army of the Soviet. To fight against the offensive of the enemy and to wage the revolutionary war, the first task of the Soviet is to arm the masses and to organize a strong and iron Red Army, local forces and partisans, and provisions, supplies, and transportations for the war. The Soviet has been successful in its work along this line during the past two years, particularly during the 4th offensive and the present determined struggle against the fifth one.

The formation of the Central Revolutionary Military Council has unified the leadership over the national Red troops and made the Red forces in every Soviet district and on any front to be able to fight and to operate in good coordination under the unified tactics. This is an important turn to convert the scattered activities of partisan troops into activities of regular and big scale Red Armies. The Revolutionary Military Council in the past two years has victoriously led the country-wide Red armies, particularly those of the Central Soviet district, in the smashing of the 4th offensive and in the initial successes of the struggle against the 5th offensive. The Red army is now several times bigger than it was two years ago. This work owes its success to the militancy of the broad worker peasant masses to join the Red army, to the improvement of the mobilization methods, and to the determined execution of the special treatment for the red fighters by the Soviet. During May 1933, in the Central Soviet district alone, the Red army was increased by twenty thousand new fighters from the various *hsien*. This smashed the various opportunistic points of view that the masses are not willing to join the Red army or that enlargement of the Red army cannot be achieved in new Soviet districts. There are many models of the work to enlarge the Red army. For instance, in Chankanhsian, Kiangsi, 80 percent of the men between 16 and 45 and in Shangwanshihsian, Fukien, 88 percent of them are now serving in the Red army. In these villages with the overwhelming majority of the adults going to bravely fight in the revolutionary war, the daily affairs of farming production are not only not affected, but also improved and enlarged! Why is that so? The village labour power has been readjusted and reorganized better, and the difficult problems confronting the families of the Red fighters have been solved through the efforts exerted by the

Labour Cooperative and Farming Volunteers.

The strengthening of the Red army, has proceeded along with its enlargement. Now the Red army is proceeding to assume the form of ironsides as regular revolutionary armed forces. The causes are: (1) Growth of the percentage of worker-peasant toiling masses in it; (2) More worker cadres and universal practice of political commissioner system; (3) The progress of political training strengthened the determination of the Red fighters to fight for the final victory of the Soviet, raised the class-conscious discipline and increased the relation between the Red army and the masses; (4) General rise of military technics; (5) Better organization increased the organized strength. These have promoted the fighting strength of the Red army and made it the formidable force of the Soviet.

Red Defense and Young Vanguards are ready-made reservists for the Red army on the fighting front, forces of defense for the Soviet districts and the bridge that is leading the present voluntary military system to the conscription system of tomorrow.

Partisan units are creators of new Soviet districts and inseparable detachments of the main force—the Red army. In the past two years more of them are developed in the various Soviet districts with their political and military training considerably improved. They have in the past offensives of the enemy showed marvelous success in their work for the defense of the Soviet districts, and in their operation to take the troops of the enemy by surprise and to disturb their rear. Many of their performances were even thought by the enemy as miracles. Their activities have offered the greatest difficulties to the enemy in attempting to invade the Soviet districts. This has been particularly shown in the Central and Kiangsi-Checkiang Soviet districts.

To satisfy the Red army with supplies and provisions, to organize the military transportation between the front and the rear and to organize sanitary organs and hospitals for the Red fighters are all tasks of decisive importance to the revolutionary war. Since we have not yet captured many central cities and since the economic blockade of the enemy against us is very strict, there are numerous difficulties confronting us in our work along this lines. However, in the past two years the militancy of the broad masses in the Soviet district has guaranteed continued supplies, provisions and transportation for the Red army. This is also one of our big successes.

The fundamental task of the Soviet is revolutionary war and to mobilize all mass strength to fight in the war. Around this fundamental task the Soviet has many urgent tasks. It has to practice wide democracy: to determinately suppress the counter-revolution under its jurisdiction; to promote class-struggle of the workers; to promote agrarian revolution of the peasants; to promote the militancy of the worker-peasant masses under the principle of workers leading the worker-peasant alliance; to administer the correct financial and economic policies so as to guarantee the material needs of the revolutionary war; to wage the cultural revolution so as to arm the heads of the worker-peasant masses. All these, together with other policies, are but directed to one goal: to overthrow the imperialist-Kuomintang rule through revolutionary war, to consolidate and develop the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship and to be prepared to proceed to the stage of proletarian dictatorship.

b. Soviet Democracy.

The Soviet of the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship is the government of the masses themselves, directly depending upon them, maintaining the closest relation with them and, therefore, able to operate its maximum strength. It has already been the organizer and leader of the revolutionary war and the mass life. Its enormous strength is incomparable to any form of state in the history. It needs a strong power to cope with its class enemy. But to the worker-peasant masses it exercises no strong power but wide democracy. The wide democracy of the Soviet is, first of all, manifested in its election. The Soviet gives the right to vote to all oppressed and exploited masses regardless of sex. This right to the worker-peasant masses is unprecedented in human history. The experience of the past two years tells us that the Soviet has been very successful in its election. The particulars of the Soviet elections are as follows: (1) The names of the electors are written on a big red paper and an election meeting with no exploiters participating in it takes the place of the general mass meeting of the past. (2) The proportions of social composition are as follows: one from every fifteen workers and their family members; one from fifty peasants and poor people; all the city and village Soviet councils are formed this way. The method guarantees the leading position of the workers in the worker-peasant alliance. (3) According to the Election Act proclaimed by the Central Soviet Executive committee in September 1933, the election units for the peasants are villages, while workers have another rule. This makes the election universal among the peasants, while the workers can also elect their best representatives to work in the Soviet Council. (4) During the two elections in 1932 and the election in the autumn of 1933, in many places more than 80 percent of the electorate joined it. In some places, the sick people and those on defense duty did not join. (5) In the autumn of 1932, the nominee system was introduced in the election. The electorate could consider beforehand who would be their best representatives. (6) In many city or village Soviet councils women form a percentage of above 25 percent. In the Soviets of Shang-tsaishihhsian and Shi-atsaishihhsian, of Shanhan, in Fukien, the percentages of women are 60 and 66 percent respectively. Broad woman masses are now participating in the affairs of state administration. (7) Before the election takes place the electors have the chance to hear reports about the past work of the City or Village Soviet in a preparatory meeting. They are led to give criticisms of the past work. This was more universally practiced during the fall election of last year. All these have helped the masses in getting familiar with the Soviet election, primary step of state administration, and have guaranteed the consolidation of the Soviet power.

Next, the Soviet democracy is also manifested in the City and *hsiang* councils which form the foundation of the organization of the Soviet. Two years progress gives us now better organization of the councils. The characteristics are as follows: (1) The delegates are scattered evenly to live among the people so that they will have the closest relation with them (usually one delegate leads and lives with 30 to 70 people). This makes the council not separated from its masses. (2) The delegates are grouped in from 3 to 7 with their fellow-members in the neighborhood having a head who serves as the immediate connector between them and the presidium of the council. The group has the regular task of summoning meetings of the people under them by order of the presidium to solve problems of minor importance. All groups in one village have a general head who is responsible for the whole village. This makes the connection between the presidium and the delegates very close and guarantees strong leadership over the work of each village. (3) There are various permanent or temporary committees under the City or *hsiang* Councils such as Cultural, Irrigation, Sanitary, Food, Red Army Families, Defense, etc., which absorb the active elements among the masses to work. In this way, the Soviet work is made into the form of a net and the broad masses can directly participate in it. (4) Election of City or *hsiang* Soviet takes place once in six months and that of province or *hsien* Soviets once in a year. This makes it easy for the opinions of the masses to reach the Soviet. (5) Any delegate who commits serious errors may lose his seat through the suggestion of ten or more electors, seconded by more than one-half of the whole electorate or through the resolution of the council meeting.

The City and *hsiang* Soviets are the foundation for the government organs of the Soviets above them; they are all formed by the Soviet congresses and their executives. Government workers are also appointed by election. If anyone is found to be incompetent, he may be recalled by public opinion. The solution of all problems is based on public opinion. So the Soviet is really the government of broad masses.

The Soviet democracy is also shown by the fact that all revolutionary masses are given the right of free speech, free association, free assembly, free publication, and free strike. The Soviet gives them all facilities such as meeting places, paper, printing shop, and other material needs. Moreover, to consolidate the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship, the Soviet always welcomes the supervision and criticism of the broad masses. Every revolutionary citizen has the right to disclose the error or shortcoming of any Soviet functionary in his work. Finally, the Soviet democracy is also found in the division or administrative districts. All the administrative districts from province down to *hsiang* are now smaller than before. This makes the Soviets of various grades to know exhaustively the demands of the masses and makes the opinions of the masses to be quickly reflected in the Soviets.

c. Soviet Attitude Toward Landlord-Bourgeois.

The Soviet is not democratic to the exploiters—landlord and bourgeoisie who have been knocked down by the revolutionary masses. The Soviet maintains a different attitude toward them. Although overthrown, they still have a deep foundation and their remnants have not yet been wiped out. They have a superior knowledge and techniques. They are always thinking of the restoration of their power. Particularly in the course of the civil war, they are always seeking to support the attacking enemies through counter-revolutionary activities. Hence, the Soviet has to curb and oppress them from all sides.

First of all, the Soviet rules the exploiting elements out of the political power. In the Soviet Constitution, they are all deprived of the rights of election and military service. The Soviet has been ceaselessly engaged in bitter struggles against the alien elements in the Soviet organs. The past experience tells us that this task has been very important work of the Soviet. Secondly, all landlords, and bourgeoisie are deprived of the freedom of speech, publication, assembly and association.

Thirdly, counter-revolutionary activities are under the suppression of the revolutionary forces and revolutionary courts. The Soviet courts directly depend upon the mass armed forces, the activities of the State Political Defense

Bureau, and the class-struggle of the broad masses. All these have offered strict suppression to the country-revolutionary activities in the Soviet districts. The well-known cases were the suppression by the Soviet courts of the activities of A-B Corps in the Central and Hunan-Kiangsi Soviets, of the Social-Democrats in Fukien, of the Re-organizationists in Hupeh-Hunan west, Hupeh-Honan-Anhui, Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi, and Fukien-Kiangsi Soviet districts and of the Trotskyist-Chen Groupings in Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Soviet district. Through these suppressions, the State Political Defense Bureaus and the Soviet courts have acquired abundant experience and corrected many errors in the past that were committed through the diversion from the correct class line. The mass character of the Soviet Court, namely, the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities by the Soviet courts in coordination with the mass struggle against counter-revolutionary intrigues, has been making long strides of progress. The practice of the Traveling Court is a proof of this.

The Soviet has formally proclaimed prohibition of corporal punishment. In the Soviet prisons, except for those prisoners who are sentenced to death punishment, all other prisoners are put under reformatory education; that is to say, the Soviet policy for prisoners is to train them in the communistic spirit and with labour discipline. In sharp contradiction to this situation is the practice in full bloom of medieval tortures in the Kuomintang courts and prisons. To put down counter-revolutionary intrigues, to keep the Soviet territory in revolutionary order and to abolish all feudalistic and barbarous remnants in the field of jurisdiction constitute the aim of the Soviet court. The improvement of the Soviet in this direction is of historical significance.

In summary, the Soviet has by far the widest revolutionary democracy for the broad masses and out of it rises its enormous power—a power which is built upon the determined faith and self-conscious needs of the millions of the worker-peasant masses. Having this power in operation, the Soviet shapes itself into a dictatorship and organizes the revolutionary war and the revolutionary court which wage violent attacks upon the class enemy from all directions. This brings about the enormous function of the Soviet court in the Soviet territory.

d. The Soviet Labour Policy.

The Soviet, based on the class character of its political power and on its enormous task of arming the toiling masses to fight out imperialists and the Kuomintang through a revolutionary war, must initiate class struggles of workers, defend their everyday interests, develop their revolutionary initiative, organize this initiative in the enormous revolutionary war and turn the workers into active leaders for the revolutionary war and pillars for the consolidation and development of Soviet power.

Interests of the workers are completely protected under the Soviet labour policy. The labour situation under it as compared with that in the past while under the Kuomintang rule, or with that of the districts now still ruled by the Kuomintang, forms a sharp contrast which is comparable only to the difference between heaven and hell. Before the Soviet districts came to exist, that is to say, when the Kuomintang were the rulers, the workers were slaves of employers. The long working hours, the meagre wages, the brutal treatment, and the absence of any legal means whatsoever for protecting the interests of workers are what will remain permanently in the memory of every worker. All these disadvantages for the workers still exist in the Kuomintang-ruled districts and are aggravated. Lately, the real wages of workers in the white districts have been cut by more than fifty percent. Cut of production, mass-dismissal, and lock-out, have been the common methods of capitalists to launch attacks upon their employees. It logically follows that broad unemployment has been formed. To speak of industrial workers alone the unemployed now exceeds 60 percent. In the Kuomintang-ruled districts, strike is a criminal act in the eyes of the rulers. In March 1933, the Kuomintang authorities at Hankow even proclaimed death punishment for strikers. Whenever there is a conflict between labour and capital, the Kuomintang never fails to stand on the side of the capitalist to suppress the workers.

In the Soviet districts these things have been completely wiped out. Under Soviet power, workers are masters themselves and are leading the broad peasantry in the enormous task of consolidating and developing the Soviet. Hence the basic principle of the Soviet labour policy is to protect the interests of the workers and to consolidate and develop the Soviet power. The Labour Act proclaimed in December 1931, was based on this principle. It was revised and re-proclaimed in March 1933, better applicable to towns, villages, big enterprises and small ones.

The eight-hour system is now universally observed in the Soviet districts.

There is also a wide practice of labour agreement and collective agreement. In many urban and rural districts, there are Labour-Inspection offices which send our inspectors to examine whether the Soviet Labour Act is violated by employers or not. There is the Labour Court for cases in which the employer is accused of violating the Soviet Laws. To guard against control of labour by employers and to work for the interests of the unemployed, the Soviet has the absolute control of employment. All employers must go to the Soviet for hiring workers. Unemployment relief measures are in broader practice. Generally speaking, unemployed workers can now get concrete relief. Village workers have their own farming land. The social insurance system is administered by a Social Insurance bureau established in the Soviet towns. These are what the workers cannot get at all in the Kuomintang-ruled districts, but what the Soviet considers as its big responsibility to fulfill.

Because of the determined execution by the Soviet of its labour policy, the living conditions of the workers in the Soviet districts are greatly improved. First of all is the wages. The real wages of the workers of the Soviet districts has been generally increased as compared with the pre-revolutionary period. The following table is a comparison of wages of the workers in Tingchow before and after the revolution which may be taken as an example:

	Maximum			*Minimum*				*Aver.*
	P-r		*A-r*	*d.*	*P-r*	*A-r*	*d.*	
Fruit workers	*$10*	*monthly*	*$32*	*$22*	*$2*	*$22*	*$20*	*$30*
Paper workers	*10*	*monthly*	*35*	*25*	*3*	*31*	*28*	*33*
Oil Workers	*6*	*monthly*	*18*	*12*	*3*	*12*	*9*	*15*
Medicine workers	*6*	*monthly*	*18*	*12*	*2*	*26*	*24*	*28*
Tobacco workers	*7*	*monthly*	*36*	*29*	*3.5*	*30*	*26.5*	*28*
Printers	*15*	*monthly*	*36*	*11*	*5*	*28*	*23*	*34*

	Maximum			Minimum				Aver.
	P-r		A-r	d.	P-r	A-r	d.	
Metal workers	$6	monthly	$18	$12	$14			$16
Dyeing workers	5.5	monthly	20	14.5	2	18	16	19
Oil-paper Workers	5	monthly	21	16	2	17	15	19
Wine workers	6	monthly	20	14	3	18	15	
Weaving workers	10	monthly	35	25	2	31	29	32
Carpenters	0.6	daily	0.8	0.2				
Boatmen	14 each travel from Tinchow to Shanghan							
						$46	$32	

(P-r means pre-revolutionary period; A-r means after the revolution; d. means difference.)

From this table we can easily see the great difference in the wages of the workers in Tingchow before and after the revolution. The smallest increase is 32 percent (carpenters) and the biggest is 1450 percent (weaving workers). What a contrast it is as compared with the decreasing wages in the Kuomintang era! In other districts where the employers supply meals to the workers, the wage level is slightly lower. The wages of a carpenter and mason of Jukin is now 45 cents a day as compared with 25 cents a day in the pre-revolutionary period. The increase is 80 percent.

Wages in the village are also increased. The following table is the comparison of daily wage scales in cents which prevailed in different periods in Tienchen district of Kanhsien:

Maximum	Handicrafts-men	Paper Workers	Farming Hands	Coolies
Pre-rev.	30	40	28	45
Before May 1, 1931	30	40	30	67.5
Now	35	45	32	96
Difference	5	5	4	51
Average				
Pre-rev.	22	22	10	26
Before May 1, 1931	25	24	15	39

Now	*30*	*30*	*20*	*50*
Difference	*8*	*8*	*10*	*24*
Minimum				
Pre-rev.	*10*	*14*	*3*	*10*
Before May 1, 1931	*15*	*21*	*6*	*..*
Now	*20*	*25*	*10*	*20*
Difference	*10*	*11*	*7*	*10*

This the story of only one village. A similar situation is found in other villages. As to the wage scale prevalent in the state enterprises, there has been a general increase from 20 percent to 40 percent in the past two years.

Generally speaking, the wages of the workers are paid on time. Because of the superintendence of the Soviet, very few employers delay their wage payments to workers. Some stubborn capitalists did try to do so, but were brought under control by the Labour Court.

Concerning the legal working hour, the 8 hour system has been introduced to all Soviet cities and towns in the past two years and in the villages there are but rare cases in which employees work more than eight hours a day. Employees between the age of 16 and 18 have shorter hours than do adults.

Protection for Women and Infants

Equal work, equal pay, rest before and after confinement, prohibition of infant workers below fourteen years of age, and so on, are in general practice.

As to apprentices, the apprenticeship period is shortened, treatment improved, and feudalistic oppression abolished. The living conditions of apprentices have been considerably made better. The wages of apprentices are increased. For instance, in Kiangsi apprentices receive allowance to the amount of from fifteen to thirty-six dollars annually.

Sanitary conditions and food supplies for the workers in general and for the employees of the state enterprises in particular have been greatly improved. In the cities, the workers' food is rated at least six dollars a month. In the villages, the farming employees eat the same food as served to their employers.

The Soviet workers are organized in their strong class trade union which is the pillar of the Soviet power, burg for the workers themselves and school in which the broad working masses learn communism. With its interests protected by the Soviets, the membership of the trade union is ever on the increase. According to the statistics of the All China Trade Union Federation, the trade union membership in the Central Soviet District, together with its neighbouring Soviet zones, amount to 229,000. The distribution is as follows: Central Soviet District 110,000 persons; Hsiang-Kan (Hunan-Kiangsi) 23,000; Hsiang-O-Kan (Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi) 40,000; Min-Che-Kan (Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi) 25,000; Min-Kan (Fukien-Kiangsi) 6,000; North Fukien, 5,000. According to statistics compiled by the Central Soviet District there are 3,676 non-trade union workers in the said district which means not more than five percent of the whole working body.

In other words, 95 percent of the workers in the Central Soviet District are members in the Trade Unions. In the district of Hsinkuo this percentage reaches as high as 98 percent. Can this be dreamed of in the Kuomintang-ruled districts? Except for U.S.S.R., can this be dreamed of in any of the imperialist countries?

In short, in the course of only two years, the Soviet Labour Act has been generally observed in all towns and all villages. In the two years, the capitalists and the kulaks attempted to resist the Act. But the active struggles of the working masses, together with the close superintendence of the Soviet, have frustrated them. In dealing with independent producers and middle peasants who would have violated the Labour Act in their relation with farming hands or other employees, the method of convincing them with frank explanations has been used. All these account for the general improvement of the living conditions of workers, the development of their militancy in the revolution and their vital task in the revolutionary war and the Soviet reconstruction.

According to reports from Kun-lu Wantai, Lun-kan, Hsin-kuo, Shien-li, Sikiang, Yu-tu, Chinwu, Shanghan, Nin-hua, Changting, and Hsinchien, out of the 70,580 trade union members in these twelve *hsiens*, 19,960 are now serving either in the Red troops or in the local partisan units forming 28 percent of the whole membership, and also 6,752 in various Soviet organs forming 10 percent. The two make a total of 38 percent. The remainder amounts to 43,860 persons. It was they who cancelled the 2nd Government Bonds to the amount of $43,855 and bought recently the Government Reconstruction Bonds to the amount of $197,803. This means that every trade union member bought the bonds to the amount of $4.50 on the average. Among them, 12,435 are members of the Communist Party or the young Communist League, the percentage being 28 percent.

From these statistics, one learns how ardently the working masses are joining the Red army, support the revolutionary war and favor the Communist

Party. But these are nothing but the outcome of the work of the Soviet for their interests and to promote their militancy. Someone said that workers gained nothing since the revolution, neither has their militancy been promoted. This is completely a vile slander!

The Agrarian Revolution

The Chinese Soviet and Red army have grown up from the development of agrarian revolution, which liberates the broad peasantry from the brutal oppression and exploitation by landlords and the Kuomintang militarists. The principle of the land policy of the Soviet is to completely wipe out the feudalistic and semi-feudalistic oppression and exploitation. In any village of the Kuomintang district, past or now, there are horrible land rents (60 percent to 80 percent], horrible usury (30 percent to 100 percent), and horrible, onerous taxes (there are above 1,700 different kinds of taxes throughout the country). Consequently, the land is concentrated in the hands of landlords and kulaks. The overwhelming majority of the peasantry lost their land and are obliged to live in extreme misery. The relentless exploitation has exhausted them of their means to combat catastrophe. The whole country is, therefore, exposed to constant inundation or drought. The catastrophe stricken area in 1931 amounted to 809 *hsiens* covering a population of 44,000,000. The exploitation has also exhausted the peasantry of their production power. Much land has been turned infertile or left uncultivated. Yet with their meager products, they have to face the dumping of the imperialist agricultural productions. All these lead the Chinese rural economy to the state of complete bankruptcy from which outbreaks the violent agrarian revolution.

The power of the agrarian revolution in the Soviet districts has wiped out all feudalistic remnants. The millions of the peasantry awakening from their long dark age confiscated land from all the landlords and fertile land from the Kulaks, abolished usury and onerous taxation, knocked down all that are against the revolution and built up their own government. For the first time, the Chinese peasant masses break their way out of the hell and make masters themselves. This is the fundamental situation that differs the rural district under the Soviet from those under the Kuomintang.

The First National Soviet Congress proclaimed the Land Act which has since served as the correct guidance for the proper solution of the land problems in this country. There have been numerous arguments over the analysis of classes in the villages owing to the acute class struggle. Based on the experience of the agrarian revolution, the People's Council has passed a resolution on the various problems of the struggle for land. Undoubtedly, this will promote the further development of the village struggle. As to the methods of partition in connection with the distance, fertility, infertility, forests, waters, etc., it is now of urgent need to work out a definite resolution out of the experience of all places so as to make it the guidance for the partition of land in the new Soviet districts.

The inspection movement mobilized by the Central Government is directed to thoroughly wipe out the feudalistic remnants and to make sure that the real benefits resulting from the agrarian revolution have gone to the farming employees and poor and middle peasants. According to the statistics of July, August, and September,1933, through this movement in the Central Soviet District that further called forth the revolutionary militancy of the peasant masses, landlords to the number of 6,988 families and the Kulaks to the number of 6,638 families were disclosed with land to the size of 17,539 *mu* revoked and money forfeits from the landlords and fines from the Kulaks, to the sum of $606,916 seized. The Farming Employee Trade Union and the Poor Peasant Corps have now formed the pillars of the Soviet in the villages! This is only the result of three months' work which tells that the Soviet has to pay yet closer attention to the class struggle in the villages. The result also shows that the land inspection movement is an effective means to further develop the village struggle and to annihilate the feudalistic remnants in the rural districts. The class line of the agrarian revolution is to depend upon the farming employees and poor peasants, to ally the middle peasants, to exploit the Kulaks and to annihilate the landlords. The correct practice of this line is the key to the success of the agrarian revolution and foundation for all other policies of the Soviet in the villages. Hence the Soviet should deal seriously with those erroneous tendencies that attempt to infringe upon the middle peasants or to annihilate the Kulaks. At the same time, it should also not let go any error of making compromise with the landlords and Kulaks. That is the way to lead the agrarian revolution in the correct direction. In the past two years we have gained much experience in our mass work in the agrarian revolution. The summarized particulars are as follows:

(1) Full mobilization of agricultural workers, poor, and middle peasants for struggle against landlords and Kulaks is necessary in the partition and inspection movements. The partition and inspection works should be done with the concurrence of the masses. The determination of class should be passed by mass meeting. To conduct these works solely through the activities of a few

Soviet functionaries is liable to cause danger of lowering the struggling spirit of the masses.

(2) When belongings other than land of the landlords and surplus drag animals and farming implements of the Kulaks are confiscated, the greater part of them must be shared by the poor masses. It is bad to have them only shared by a few for it will lower the struggling spirit of the masses on the one hand and favor the opposition of the exploiters on the other.

(3) The partition of the land should be completed in the shortest possible period. Unless it is demanded by a considerable mass of the peasants, re-partition is not a good policy, for otherwise the militancy of the peasant masses to promote agricultural production may be destroyed and the exploiters may take advantage of it to hinder the development of the struggle.

(4) The aim of the inspection movement is to disclose the exploiters, but not to disturb the exploited. So the inspection should not be made from house to house and from one piece of land to another. It should be done through the mobilization of broad masses.

(5) Those counter-revolutionary elements who work to hinder the partition and inspection movements should be seriously dealt with. They should be severely punished by mass judgment or through mass concurrence to serve imprisonment or even to face death penalty. This is necessary for otherwise the agrarian revolution will be handicapped.

(6) Class struggle should be promoted while clashes between families and localities should be avoided. The landlords and Kulaks are always thinking of displacing class struggle with family or local struggle.

(7) The development of the agrarian revolution depends upon the class-consciousness and organizational strength of the basic masses in the villages. The Soviet functionaries must have, therefore, broad and deep propaganda in the villages and work to strengthen the organizations of farming employees and poor peasants.

The aim of the agrarian revolution is not only to solve the land problem of the peasants but also to promote them to increase the productivity of their land. Because of the adequate leadership of the Soviet, and the initiative of the peasant masses themselves, the agricultural production has been restored in most places and in some places it is even increased.

On this foundation, the living conditions of the peasantry have been much improved.

It the past, the peasants lived on tree bark or grain husks for months in a year. This situation no longer prevails and there is no more starvation in the Soviet districts. The life of the peasantry is better and better year by year. They are no longer in rags. They eat meat more constantly, which was a luxury to them in former times.

Which kind of government and which kind of life is liked by the peasants? We have this question for the peasants in the Kuomintang-ruled districts to answer.

Financial Policy of the Soviets

The financial policy of the Soviets assured ample supplies demanded by the revolutionary war as well as all the money needed by revolutionary work. With a comparatively small territory characterized by economic backwardness and pursuing a policy of taxation beneficial to the masses, the Soviets have got along fairly well in sharp contrast to the KMT who, controlling a vast territory and increasing its exploitation from day to day, is now facing financial bankruptcy. In accordance with the principle of class and revolution the Soviets raise its revenue from the following sources: (1) confiscation or requisition from all feudal exploiters, (2) taxation, (3) development of national economy.

Under the 1st heading, landlords and kulaks both in the KMT and Soviet districts are required to raise funds for the Soviets, which, as shown by the past experience, form the largest item in the revenue of the Soviet government. This is in direct contradiction to the KMT, who always places the financial burdens on the shoulders of the toiling masses. The Soviet progressive taxation consists of two categories, namely, the commercial and agricultural taxes, both imposed on the exploiters. The commercial tax is again divided into two classes viz., the customs duty and business tax. The former is designed to control importation with a tariff ranging from entire exemption to a 100 percent duty, free from any intervention from any foreign power. It means that only the Soviets can realize customs autonomy in China. After payment of the customs duty all goods can flow freely within the Soviet territory without having to pay any more taxes, in contrast to the goods passing through the KMT territory which are still subject to various taxes, similar to *likin*.

The business tax is again progressive. It takes more from the larger enterprises with higher profit but less from the smaller enterprises with lower profit. Undertakings with less than $100 capital, cooperatives, farmers selling their own surpluses, are all exempted.

The agricultural tax is likewise progressive. It is heavier for the larger families who have obtained more land but lighter for those who have got less land.

The poor peasants and middle peasants pay less but the kulaks pay more. Farm hands and families of the red armies are all exempted. This tax may be reduced or exempted in case of a disaster.

On the other hand, the KMT lays the principal burden on the peasantry and the small proprietors. It collects the surtax on the regular ones at a much heavier rate. According to the *Ta Kung Pao*, of Tientsin, March 21, 1933, the KMT collects as many as 1,756 taxes, and the Szechwan militarists have collected the land tax up to 1987. In Shensi the KMT has increased the tax by 25 times.

The development of national economy as a source of the Soviet finances forms an important part of the financial policy of the Soviets. It has begun to make progress in Mien-che-kang and Kiangsi. The financial and economical organs ought to do more in this direction. Here it may be pointed out that the state banks must issue notes to meet the needs for the development of national economy, considering financial needs as only secondary.

The use of money shall be governed by the principle of economy. Corruption and waste are the greatest crimes. Great achievements have been registered in the struggle against these crimes. "Save every penny for the revolutionary war" is the guiding principle of the Soviet accounting system.

With the expansion of the red army, with the development of the revolutionary war, the Soviets are of course facing financial difficulties which will, however, create conditions for their own solution. The Soviet finances will improve when conquering more territory from the KMT, developing national economy on a larger scale, etc., with the financial burdens placed on the exploiters.

Economic Policy of the Soviets

Confronted with an impoverished people, the KMT, however, spread lies against the Soviets, saying that the Soviet government is bankrupt. The KMT is bent on the destruction of the Soviets not only by guns and cannon but by economic measures, the most ruthless of which is "blockade." With the broad masses and the red army behind it, the Soviets have been able to smash the KMT drives one after another. And it has, too, succeeded to a certain extent in economic reconstruction within its territory, a step which has been taken to break the blockade of the enemy.

Engaged in a battle against imperialism and KMT, at the same time located in a region economically backward encircled by the economic blockade of the enemy, the Soviets must proceed, whenever possible, with the economic reconstruction, concentrate its forces on war supplies, improve the life of the masses, consolidate the alliance between the workers and peasants in the economic field, assure the leadership of the proletariat over the peasantry, create the premises for the development of socialist construction in the future.

The central tasks involved in economic reconstruction of the Soviets are the development of agricultural production, of industrial production, of foreign trade, of cooperatives.

Agriculture in Soviet districts is apparently forging ahead at a big pace. Agricultural products in 1933 have increased 15 percent on the average as against 1932. The rise in Mien-che-kang is 20 percent. In the couple of years following the Soviet revolution agricultural production showed a downward trend, but thanks to the certainty in the division of land, the promotion of the Soviets and the growth of enthusiasm among the masses, production has been moving upwards steadily. In some cases production has been restored to its original level, but in others it has exceeded the original level. Fallow land has been cultivated again while new land reclaimed. Wide masses of women have joined the shock work in agricultural production. These are the facts never witnessed under the KMT's rule. Satisfied with the land obtained, encouraged by the Soviets, the peasants have shown a great enthusiasm in working up the land allotted to them. Under present conditions, agricultural production shall be the first task in the economic reconstruction of the Soviets. It shall solve the food problem as well as secure raw materials for articles of every-day use. It shall emphasize afforestation and increase in livestock. Taking the small farm economy as a basis, plans must be worked out for certain branches of agriculture as, for example, cotton whose production shall be fixed for each province.

The Soviets must lead the peasants to solve such vital problems as labour, oxen, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation, etc. Here the organized mobilization of the labour force and the participation of women in production are of vital importance. The Soviets must lead the peasantry in launching the Spring and Summer ploughing campaigns. About 25 percent of the peasantry is in need of oxen, hence the necessity of organizing the oxen cooperatives. The Soviets must direct the greatest attention to irrigation. At present we are not in need of Soviet farms and collective farms, but for agricultural improvement an experimental station shall be set up in each district. In addition, agricultural research institutes shall be established, agricultural products show rooms arranged.

As a result of the blockade of the enemy, difficulties have arisen in our exportation, and many handicraft industries in the Soviet districts have declined.

Tobacco and paper have suffered most. But these difficulties are by no means invincible. Owing to the large consumption of the people, the Soviet goods can find a big market within the Soviet territory. In the first half of 1933 the efforts of the Soviets and the development of the cooperatives resulted in the revival of many industries as, e.g., tobacco, paper, tungsten, camphor, fertilizers, agricultural instruments, etc. Attention shall be directed to cloth, drugs, sugar industries. New industries have sprung up in Mien-che-kang province (paper, cloth, etc.). To relieve the shortage in salt, nitrate-salt has been manufactured. It is hard to map out a plan for the scattered handicraft industries but it is possible to elaborate a plan for the leading industries, above all, for the undertakings operated by the state and cooperatives. The Soviet and cooperative-controlled enterprises shall make an appraisal of the production of materials (raw) as well as market both in the white and red districts.

The Soviet shall organize foreign trade and directly control the flow of such goods as the importation of salt and clothes, the exportation of food and tungsten. It shall see to it that food be equally distributed within the Soviet districts. This work began in Mien-che-kang at an early date, followed by Kiangsi in the spring of 1933. The inauguration of the foreign trade bureau produced the initial success in this direction.

In the Soviet territory national economy is composed of three parts, namely state, cooperative and private enterprises. The state undertakings are at present very much limited in scope but have a bright prospect in the future. Within the pale of law, private economy is, far from being restricted, rather encouraged, owing to the Soviets need for private economy. Not only at the present time, but for a long time to come, private economy is predominant. Now it assumes the form of small capital in the Soviet districts.

The cooperative enterprises are making a rapid advance. According to the statistics of September 1933, there are 1,423 cooperatives with a capital of $305,531 in 17 *hsiens*. In certain *hsiens* like Suikin and Sinkuo the number of cooperatives has doubled owing to the encouragement of the economic conference. At present the consumption and food cooperatives are of major importance. They overshadow the production cooperatives. As to the credit cooperatives, they are just in the initial stage. No doubt the development of the cooperatives constitutes an important lever of Soviet economy. Combined with state enterprises, it will become a mighty force in the economic field, assert its supremacy over private economy in a protracted struggle, create conditions for transition of Soviet economy to socialist economy. State enterprises shall be pushed together with the big-scale development of the cooperatives, at the same time, private economy will be encouraged.

As an aid to the development of the state enterprises and the cooperatives, $3,000,000 economic reconstruction bonds have been issued thus enlisting the support of the masses to the Soviet economic construction. In the face of millions of starving people and with an impoverished country, the Soviets alone boldly embark on economic reconstruction in a planned way which will carry out the task of saving millions now in distress from final collapse.

Soviet Culture

For making sure the victory of the revolution, for consolidating the Soviets, for drawing the gigantic forces of the masses in the revolutionary class struggle, for creating a new revolutionary generation the Soviets must proceed with far-reaching cultural reforms designed to shake off the spiritual yoke of the reactionary ruling class as well as to create a new Soviet culture for the workers and peasants.

As is known to all, cultural institutions of the KMT are without exception in the hands of the landlord and bourgeoisie, employed to spread demagogical propaganda to check the revolutionary thought of the oppressed classes. In support of illiteracy they exclude the workers and peasants from education. Educational appropriations have been used for the attack on the revolution. Legions of colleges and universities have closed down, throwing out thousands of students. Over 80 percent of the population under the KMT is still illiterate. Left wing thought has been ruthlessly suppressed by the white terror. Left writers have been arrested by the Fascist thugs. Educational institutions have become a hell for the masses, a fact that characterizes the educational policy of the KMT.

But in the Soviet territory all cultural and educational institutions are under the direct control of the workers and peasants, giving their children a preferred right to enjoy education. The Soviets have done their best in raising the cultural level of the masses. In spite of the Soviets being located in a backward region and threatened by war from all sides, cultural reconstruction has been going on at an accelerated pace.

For the 2,931 villages in Kiangsi, Fukien and Yeh-kang provinces there are 3,052 Leninist primary schools with 89,710 pupils; 64,612 evening schools with an attendance of 94,517; 32,388 reading groups with a membership of 155,371; 1,656 clubs with 49,668 workers. These are only the statistics compiled from the data in the central Soviet districts.

A majority of the school children have attended the Leninist primaries. For instance, out of the 20,969 school children in Sinkuo, 12,860 have attended the Leninist primaries. The school children spend most of the time in reading and reserve only a small fraction of the time for family work. They also join the red boy scouts and learn practical communism therein.

Women are very enthusiastic for education, too. In Sinkuo there are 15,740 pupils for the evening schools, out of which 4,988 are men or 31 percent, and 10,752 are women or 69 percent. Among the reading groups of Sinkuo we find that 40 percent of the membership is men, while the female members amount to as high as 60 percent. Not only eager for education, some of the women have occupied high positions in the cultural institutions. They serve as heads of the primaries or evening schools, or as directors of the reading groups. The delegate council of woman workers and peasants is almost universal in the Soviets, directing close attention to the interests of the toiling women, including education.

A vigorous campaign against illiteracy is in full swing. Evening schools for reading have been established (in Sinkuo the number of people who joined the reading groups scattered all over the *hsien*—3,387—]. To help reading, signboards inscribed with characters have been set up close to the highways.

The cultural advance of the Soviets may be illustrated by the increase in the circulation of the papers. In the Central Soviet district we have some 34 papers big and small. *The Red China*, organ of the Soviet government, has increased its circulation from 3,000 to 40,000; the *True Word of the Youth* up to 28,000; the *Struggle*, (organ of the Central Communist Party), 27,000; the *Red Star*, (organ of the red army), 17,300, an increase that testifies to the rapid advance of the masses in the cultural field.

The revolutionary arts of the Soviets have already made a good start with the formation of the worker and peasant dramatics club and the commencement of the blue-shirt movement extending in all directions in the villages. Red sports have been gaining ground everywhere. Gymnasium fields may be seen here and there.

Now the Soviets, though having not much to show in the construction of technical education, have nevertheless succeeded in establishing the Red Army University. The Soviet University, the Communist University and many higher schools under the direct control of the Ministry of Education, all calculated to train leaders for the revolutionary leadership. Colleges and high schools must follow closely on the heels of the development of the ordinary schools as is scheduled in the educational plan.

For training the revolutionary intelligentsia, for the development of education and culture the Soviets have utilized the services of the landlord-bourgeoisie intelligentsia—a point that cannot be overlooked in the cultural policy of the Soviets.

The general line of the cultural policy of the Soviets is to educate the broad masses in the spirit of communism, to subordinate education to the revolutionary war and the class struggle, to link labour with education. In the educational field the central tasks confronting the Soviets are the enforcement of compulsory education throughout the whole land. The development of social education on a wide scale, the rapid liquidation of illiteracy, the training of large numbers of cadres for revolution. All these tasks can be performed only under the Soviets because they signalize the sharpened class struggle and an unprecedented victory for spiritual emancipation.

Marriage Under the Soviet

To free women from the most barbarous marriage system handed down through thousands of years, the Soviets as early as November 1931, proclaimed the equality of men and women in marriages by a new set of regulations which declared complete liberty of marriage and divorce, abolish the sale of women as wives, interdict child marriage, provisions that have been enforced throughout the Soviet territory. As a rule, a man of twenty may marry a girl of 18 by simple registration with the Soviets provided he is free from dangerous disease. Lineal descendants from the same grandfather, however, cannot marry each other within five generations. Divorce may be granted by the Soviets if one of the parties to the marriage insists on it.

This liberation of women from the feudal marriage fetters is made possible only under the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants subsequent to the overthrow of the landlord-bourgeoisie and the accomplishment of the land revolution. Men and women, particularly the latter, must have first of all political liberty and also some measure of economic liberty as a guarantee for free marriage. More oppressed by the feudal marriage system than men, women have been given more protection in the matter of marriage, and the burden arising from divorce is imposed for the most part on the shoulders of men.

Of vital importance to the revolution are children who we may say are new revolutionists, to whom protection must be afforded. The Soviets recognize the illegal children and give them protection. The protection of children has been laid down in the Soviet Law.

Nationality Policy of Soviets

The point of departure for the Soviet nationality policy is the capture of all the oppressed minorities around the Soviets as a means to increase the strength of the revolution against imperialism and KMT. The oppressed minorities such as the Mongols, Tibetans, Koreans, Annamites, Miaos, etc., are all oppressed by Chinese monarchs, militarists, etc. General Geng Yu-hsiang massacred the Mohammedans in Kansu while General Pei Tsung-shi butchered the Miaos in Kwangsi to mention but two recent examples of the Kuomintang in maltreating the minorities. On the other hand, the ruling classes of the minorities such as princes, living Buddhas, Lamas, etc., have allied with the KMT in oppressing and exploiting the mass of people, especially the toilers. In the case of Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia the ruling classes have directly surrendered to imperialism and accelerated the colonization of their country.

The Soviets, on the other hand, are decisively against the exploitation of the minorities by imperialism and KMT. The Constitution of the Soviets as passed by the 1st Soviet Congress in November 1931, is quite clear on this point (Article 14):

"Soviet China recognizes the complete self-determination of the minorities who may go so far as to secede and form independent free states. Soviet China shall see to it that the minorities be freed from the misrule of imperialism and the KMT and secure complete emancipation from the misrule of their own princes and Lamas. In this regard the Soviets will gladly aid the minorities in carrying out this task. The Soviets will permit the development of national culture and languages among these minorities."

Article 15 of the same constitution provides that "Soviet China will give the right of asylum to the revolutionaries either from the nationalities in China or from other countries who should have been persecuted by the reactionary rule; it will help them in securing complete victory for-the revolutionary movement sponsored by them."

The fact that many Korean, Annam and Taiwan comrades attended the 1st Soviet Congress and 2nd Soviet Congress is a concrete proof that the Soviets mean what it says. The common revolutionary interests will unite the toilers of China with those of the oppressed minorities in a firm alliance. The free union of nationalities will replace national oppression, an event that is possible only under the Soviets. To achieve complete emancipation the minority nationality shall, on its part, assist the Soviet-revolution in securing a victory on a national scale.

Concrete Tasks Confronting the Soviets in Shattering the Fifth Campaign of Imperialism and KMT

In the past two years the Soviets have scored successive victories over the KMT, as a result of which the relation of power between the Soviets and KMT has apparently changed in favour of the former, but at the expense of the latter. The Soviets have consolidated but the KMT has been steadily on the decline. The masses in KMT territory have put up the revolutionary flag. But owing to the fact that the Soviets are situated in a region economically backward with only a comparatively small area, we must extend our territory and fight for the realization of the task of capturing one or more provinces. We must shatter the illusions of those who are satisfied with the present limited area of the Soviets. The revolutionary masses under the Soviets are called on to fight for the carrying out of the following urgent tasks:

Reconstruction of Red Army

First of all the central revolutionary military committee shall be strengthened in its leadership of the whole red army so as to make it possible for the red armies to act more efficiently under a unified, strengthened command. In the second place, the expansion of the red army to 1,000,000 as a slogan must be popularized among the toiling masses, enabling them to understand that a 1,000,000 red army is a decisive factor in the struggle against imperialism and KMT. Recruiting shall be made through political agitation instead of compulsion. At the same time, a sharp class struggle together with the Soviet laws shall be directed against the alien elements who blocked the expansion of the red army by desertions. The families of the red armists shall be treated in a better way. Land shall be cultivated and ploughed for them, articles of every-day use supplied to them, in order to comfort them spiritually. The Soviets shall see to it that all those who sabotage the work in this respect shall be punished by law.

To consolidate the red army a political education is of special importance. It will enable the red armists to fight consciously for the victory of the Soviets, to value conscious discipline as a guarantee for the victory of the revolution. The system of the political commissioners shall be observed in all the units of the red army, more workers drawn in to act as military or political directors, more cadres turned out from the red army schools, decisive blows directed against the landlord-bourgeois elements who try to steal into the red army, technique of the red army improved.

The red guards and youth vanguards shall be universally formed in all the

Soviet districts, all the grown boys and girls armed as a reserve in defense of the rear. Every youth vanguardist shall be made to understand that conscription plays a big role in the future big-scale civil wars against imperialism and the KMT. Conscription in general shall be popularized among the masses, model youth vanguards be incorporated into formal red armies, more red partisans organized in the bordering districts who may penetrate far into the white regions. A closer relation shall be maintained between the red armies and the toiling masses.

The supplies and transport for the red armies shall be assured and taken care of by the financial and economic organs of the Soviets as well as by the transport and sanitary organs of the red army.

Soviet Economic Reconstruction

To crush the economic blockade of the enemy, to counteract the manipulation of the wicked merchants, to assure the revolutionary needs, to improve the lot of the workers and peasants, the Soviets must proceed at once with economic reconstruction in various fields.

In the first place, agricultural production shall be raised, enthusiasm of the masses for such production aroused, propaganda campaigns in ploughing and harvest time launched, all peasantry drawn into the production campaign (including peasant women). Labour mutual assistance and ploughing corps shall be widely organized, the oxen and seed problems solved with the aid of the Soviets. Our fighting slogans are “Liquidate all fallow land.” “Increase the crops by 20 percent.” The food bureau of the Soviets shall maintain a more close relation with the food cooperatives to assure ample food for the red army and the masses. The commissar of national economy shall map out a plan for the more important branches of agriculture, such as food and cotton.

The tasks of the Soviet economic reconstruction rest on the need for the revival of the handicraft industry and the needs of the war. In elaborating the plans for economic reconstruction, consideration must be taken of the needs of the revolutionary war, the needs of the masses and the possibility of exports to the white regions. Maximum energy shall be devoted to the leading industries as tungsten, coal, iron, lime, agricultural instruments, tobacco, paper, cloth, sugar, drugs, nitrate-salt, lumber, camphor, etc. Production cooperatives shall be organized for these industries, drawing in the unemployed, independent workers and peasants. Private investment being permitted, the Soviets shall not monopolize all the productive enterprises but concentrate on those beneficial to the state. The vital means to raise production are more incentive to labour, competition in production, reward to those who have made achievements on the production front.

The exchange of Soviet surpluses (such as food, tungsten, lumber, tobacco, paper) with salt, cloth, oils, etc., from the white regions as may be made possible through the development of foreign trade serves as an important lever in breaking through the blockade of the enemy and in promoting the development of our national economy. The commercial institutions of the Soviets shall be consolidated while private merchants be encouraged for exportation and importation of necessaries. Wide masses of the workers and peasants shall be organized in consumption cooperatives to be set up everywhere, and thus enabled to buy cheap but sell at higher prices their products to the white regions, a possibility that plays a vital role in the economic reconstruction of the Soviets. The Soviets must strengthen their leadership of the central consumption cooperatives, and see to it that such centers be established where they do not yet exist.

The solution of the capital problem as involved in economic reconstruction is found in the absorption of capital from the masses through the development credit cooperatives which will smash usury to pieces. The money of the masses will flow into the state enterprises through such channels as economic bonds, subscriptions, to the stock of the state bank, etc. Capital in the Soviet districts will be made mobile through the encouragement of the private capital. The note issue of the Soviet banks shall correspond to the needs of the market and absorb the deposits from the masses, to lend the money so gathered to production enterprises. The Soviet banks shall provide financial relief within the Soviet territory and lead the struggle of the cooperatives against the speculative merchants.

Reconstruction Of Soviets

The Central Soviet Government inaugurated as the supreme leader of the Soviet movement in China has a vital significance, and has in the past two years scored glorious success in the fight against imperialism and KMT, but many weaknesses are found in the organization and work of the central government. The organization and work of the presidium of the central executive committee shall be improved and strengthened, the commissariats shall have a sufficient working staff, more commissariats created, if necessary, so that the central government can fulfill its role as the supreme leader of the revolution.

As an important link with the central government as well as with local Soviets, the provincial Soviet government has been lax in its work in certain respects, a defect which shall be overcome hereafter.

The village and town Soviets constitute the basis of the Soviet system and for this simple reason merit the utmost attention. Congresses shall be established in places where they do not yet exist, and their work strengthened. Presidia shall be set up, committees moved into the villages, militant workers and peasants drawn into the Soviets, relations between a delegate and a number of inhabitants established, each village shall have a general delegate, permitting him to call a conference of the delegates and inhabitants to discuss the work to be done. The village and town Soviets are the direct organs for the mobilization of the masses and do practical work in the village and street. The latter may compete with each other in order to raise the efficiency of their work. As regards the work done by local Soviets, the system of inspection shall rigorously be enforced. The district Soviets shall give an efficient leadership in regard to the lower Soviets.

The provincial Soviets shall direct maximum attention to the work in new Soviet territory where a revolutionary committee exists in place of the Soviets. In regards to organization and work, the revolutionary committee differs radically from the Soviets and its work (such as arming the inhabitants, waging the mass struggle, clearing the counter-revolutionaries, etc.) shall be strengthened.

Soviet democracy has progressed far but not enough. A struggle shall be waged against bureaucratism and dictation still remaining among the Soviet functionaries. Persuasion shall replace dictation vis-à-vis the masses. The worker and peasant inspection commissariat shall draw in large masses for the critical examination of the work of the Soviet functionaries and lead the struggle in criticizing the evil functionaries, even punish them in accordance with Soviet laws, thus maintaining the good relations between the Soviets and the masses. In the Soviet elections more electors shall be drawn in and alien elements, bureaucrats, etc., barred. More workers shall be attracted into the Soviets in order to strengthen the workers' hegemony in the government. In order to get close to the masses the Soviets must establish an intimate connection with the labour unions, the poor peasant unions, cooperatives, etc.

All the work of the Soviets shall be adapted to the needs of the revolutionary war, any relaxation among the Soviet functionaries be stamped out, the functionaries aroused to enthusiasm and consciousness that they work for the worker and peasant democratic dictatorship. Slogans shall be put forward "Subordinate all work to the revolutionary war," "For the greater speed and better quality of the work," all to be brought before the functionaries of the Soviets. In this respect the responsible leaders of the Soviets, especially the worker and peasant inspection commissariat, must win over the Soviet functionaries by persistent persuasion and education.

The Soviets shall enforce the following laws: labour (eight-hours, minimum wages, etc.,), land revolution (confiscation of land of the landlord, land inspection, etc.), culture and education, and, finally, all the laws and orders against the counter-revolutionaries (GPU and Soviet courts drawing in large masses in the struggle against the reactionaries).

Anti-Imperialist Work

The Soviets must strengthen its leadership of the anti-imperialist struggle throughout the whole country as well as of the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants against the KMT in the white territory. Passivity on the part of the Soviets in this direction means connivance at the aggression of imperialism, prolongation of the KMT misrule, and limitation on the development of the Soviets in the territorial aspect. The Soviets must look forward to the vast area of the KMT and lead the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie there in the struggle against imperialism and KMT. By utilizing the concrete facts of the KMT's surrender to imperialism the Soviets may arouse the masses in the white regions to a sharp struggle against imperialism and its lackey, the Kuomintang. The Soviets shall call on the masses to organize and arm themselves, to fight for the independence of China, to drive imperialism out of China; in Manchuria and Jehol where Japanese imperialism still marches on with bayonets, the people, revolutionary army and volunteers shall be organized, the existing volunteers be alienated from the influence of the KMT in a determined fight against Japanese imperialism. The Soviets must give aid to every anti-imperialist struggle of the workers, peasants and petty-bourgeoisie.

The Soviets shall aid in every way possible the revolutionary struggle of the workers against capital and of the peasants against the landlord, and lead it to victory. The functionaries of the Soviets must understand that expansion of the Soviet territory and success of the revolution on a national scale depends much on the work of the Soviets in the KMT area, that they have to devote the greatest attention to the white regions where the masses are subject to the military slavery and other exactions and are most apt to accept our influence, the more so in the districts bordering on the Soviets.

By making use of every opportunity the Soviets in the borderland shall establish regular contact with the masses, organize their everyday struggle, organize their revolt, develop partisan fighting, bring the new districts under the control of the Soviets. The work in the borderland is of special importance. The partisans must observe the fundamental policy of the Soviets and refrain from making indiscriminate attacks on the *Tuhao* without any regard to class distinctions. In addition, the opposition of the reds to the whites, the flight of the masses, the salt question, the refugee problem, etc., shall be solved on the class principle and in accordance with the principle of mass work. The causes of the opposition of the reds to the whites and the flight of the masses have to be removed, and in the work in the borderland to be improved, factors that can play a decisive role in changing the white into red districts.

(Thunderous and prolonged applause.)

PROCLAMATION ON THE NORTHWARD MARCH OF THE CHINESE WORKER'S AND PEASANT'S RED ARMY TO FIGHT JAPAN[21]

July 15, 1934

The hateful Japanese imperialism… intends to transform China into its colony and turn the people of all China into slaves without a country doomed to suffer eternally the massacre, rape, exploitation, and trampling of the Japanese bandits.

If their reaction toward the invasion of Japanese imperialism the Kuomintang militarists—Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsueh-liang and all the others—have all capitulated and sold out... Under the slogan 'No strength to fight Japan' they have instituted ceaseless 'campaigns of encirclement' of the Soviet Government, which is the only anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist government in all China, and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. All this proves that the Kuomintang is the most faithful running dog of Japanese imperialism and that the Kuomintang militarists are the greatest traitors in all Chinese history. In the face of the ceaseless aggressions of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese Soviet Government has repeatedly called upon the Chinese masses to arm themselves for a national revolutionary war... and it is preparing for a direct combat with Japanese imperialism. Under... three conditions, the Soviet Government is willing to conclude an agreement regarding military operations with any armed force anywhere in China... The Kuomintang attacks make it impossible for our Soviet Government to unite directly with the masses of all China and to wage a revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism together with the anti-Japanese volunteers in the North-east, in order to drive the Japanese imperialist bandits out of China...

Therefore, if the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is to mobilize all its forces to fight Japanese imperialism, it can do nothing else but fight a bloody war with the millions of Kuomintang bandit troops that are attacking us. Only thus can it protect and maintain the free Soviet area that has already been saved from imperialist bondage, so that it will not again be trodden underfoot and sold out by the imperialist running dogs, the Kuomintang bandits. We will definitely not abandon the revolutionary anti-imperialist bases that have been created as a result of countless bloody fights with Kuomintang bandit troops. But the Soviet Government definitely cannot sit by and watch the ruin of the Chinese people at the hand of the Japanese imperialism. The Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, fearing no difficulties and with the greatest resolution, are sending an advance guard detachment northward to fight the Japanese. If this detachment should encounter any armed force that will accept the three conditions we have put forth, the main units of our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will follow the advance guard to unite with all armed forces in China for a common struggle against Japan... More concretely, the Soviet Government proposes:

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[21] *Extracted from a proclamation published in 1934. (Min-tsu chan-hsien hsun-pao, no. 2, 10 August 1935).*

1. To oppose resolutely the selling out... of the whole of China by the Kuomintang Government...
2. To proclaim the immediate breaking off of diplomatic relations with Japan...
3. To call upon the masses of all China to arm themselves with the weapons that can be found in the Kuomintang arsenals and factories as well as with all the imported weapons and to organize popular anti-Japanese volunteer units and guerrillas...
4. To confiscate all the enterprises and property of the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese traitors...
5. To organize everywhere anti-Japanese groups of the masses. Let the running dogs of imperialism, the Kuomintang, let the Kuomintang traitors who are selling out their country, shout 'no strength to fight Japan'. By mobilizing the masses of all China against Japan, by arming the masses of all China against Japan, we shall gain the strength to overthrow Japanese imperialism and the band of traitors of Kuomintang.

Chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviets:
MAO TSE-TUNG
Chairman of the military committee of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army

TO LIN PIAO

1936

Comrade Lin Piao,

I entirely agree with your letter. One further point—of the three courses, ‘cultural’ education (cultivating the ability to read, reading books and newspapers, and writing) is the most important, the basic component. According to what you and your colleagues say, equal emphasis will be given to theory and practice, and ‘cultural’ tools are a part of the ‘practice’ which links up theory with practice. ‘Cultural’ tools can and should be used to link up the two. If the student, having learnt other things, can neither read books nor write, his future development after leaving the school will be limited. If you agree with me, then I think in the next four months there should be more ‘culture’ classes (reading, writing, and composition) in the second and third courses. My view is that these classes should be increased to a quarter or even one third of the total study hours (including homework) of a student. Please give your consideration to this problem. When the time comes for the periodic test, ‘culture’ will be an important criterion of judgement.

Salute!

WE ARE NOT GOING TO TURN THE COUNTRY OVER TO MOSCOW![22]

July 23, 1936

Question: In actual practice, if the Chinese revolution were victorious would the economic and political relationship between Soviet China and Soviet Russia be maintained within the Third International or a similar organization, or would there probably be some kind of actual merger of governments? Would the Chinese Soviet Government be comparable in its relation to Moscow to the present government of Outer Mongolia?

Answer: I assume this is a purely hypothetical question. As I have told you, the Red Army is not now seeking the hegemony of power but a united China against Japanese imperialism.

The Third International is an organization in which the vanguard of the world proletariat brings together its collective experience for the benefit of all revolutionary peoples throughout the world. It is not an administrative organization nor has it any political power beyond that of an advisory capacity. Structurally it is not very different from the Second International, though in content it is vastly different. But just as no one would say that in a country where the Cabinet is organized by the social-democrats, the Second International is dictator, so it is ridiculous to say that the Third International is dictator in countries where there are communist parties.

In the U.S.S.R., the Communist Party is in power, yet even there the Third International does not rule nor does it have any direct political power over the people at all. Similarly, it can be said that although the Communist Party of China is a member of the Comintern, still this in no sense means that Soviet China is ruled by Moscow or by the Comintern. We are certainly not fighting for an emancipated China in order to turn the country over to Moscow!

The Chinese Communist Party is only one party in China, and in its victory it will have to speak for the whole nation.

It cannot speak for the Russian people or rule for the Third International but only in the interest of the Chinese masses. Only where the interests of the

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[22] *An extract from Edgar Snow's interview with comrade Mao Tse-tung, 23 July 1936.*

Chinese masses coincide with the interests of the Russian masses can it be said to be obeying the will of Moscow. But of course this basis of common benefit will be tremendously broadened, once the masses of China are in democratic power and socially and economically emancipated like their brothers in Russia.

When Soviet governments have been established in many countries, the problem of an international union of soviets may arise, and it will be interesting to see how it will be solved. But today I cannot suggest the formula, it is a problem which has not been and cannot be solved in advance. In the world of today with increasingly close economic and cultural intimacies between different states and peoples, such union would seem to be highly desirable, if achieved on a voluntary basis.

Clearly, however, the last point is of utmost importance; such a world union could be successful only if every nation had the right to enter or leave the union according to the will of its people, and with its sovereignty intact, and certainly never at the 'command' of Moscow. No communist ever thought otherwise, and the myth of 'world domination from Moscow' is an invention of the fascists and counter-revolutionaries.

The relationship between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, now and in the past, has always been based on the principle of complete equality. When the people's revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at its own will. The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples, likewise, will form autonomous republics attached to the China federation.

Question: With the achievement of victory of a Red movement in China, do you think that revolution would occur quickly in other Asiatic colonial or semi-colonial countries such as Korea, Indochina, the Philippines, and India? Is China at present the 'key' to the world revolution?

Answer: The Chinese revolution is a key factor in the world situation and its victory is heartily anticipated by the people of every country, especially by the toiling masses of the colonial countries. When the Chinese revolution comes into full power, the masses of many colonial countries will follow the example of China and win a similar victory of their own...

TO HSÜ T'EH-LI

February 1937

Old Comrade Hsu[23],

You were my teacher twenty years ago; you are still my teacher; you will continue to be my teacher in the future. When the revolution failed and many members left the party, even defecting to the enemy, you joined [the party] in the autumn of 1927 and adopted an extremely active attitude. From then until now you have shown through a long period of bitter struggle greater positiveness, less fear of difficulty, and more humility in learning new things than many younger members of the party. 'Age', 'declining physical and mental abilities', and 'hardships and obstacles' have all surrendered to you, in spite of the fact that they have served as excuses for the timidity of many people. You know a great deal but always feel a deficiency in your knowledge, whereas many 'half-buckets of water' [people of superficial knowledge] make a lot of noise. What you think is what you say or what you do, whereas other people hide filthy things in a comer of their minds. You enjoy being with the masses all the time, whereas some others enjoy being without the masses. You are always a model of obedience to the party and its revolutionary discipline, whereas some others regard the discipline as a restraint for others but not for themselves. For you, it is 'revolution first', 'work first', and 'other people first', whereas for some others it is 'limelight first', 'rest first', and 'oneself first'. You always pick the most difficult things to do, never avoiding your responsibilities, whereas some others choose easy work to do, always shunning responsibilities. In all these respects, I admire you and am willing to continue to learn from you. also hope that other members of the party will learn from you. I write this congratulatory letter to you on your sixtieth birthday with my wishes that you will enjoy good health and a long life and continue to be a model for all the members of our revolutionary party and all the people.

Revolutionary Salute!

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23. (1877-1968) Went to Japan and joined Sun Yat-sen's Alliance Society (T'ung Meng Hui) in 1912. Hsu visited France, Germany, and Belgium in 1920-1923 as a student and a worker and also Russia to study at the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1928-1930. At the age of 57 he joined the Long March.

LETTER TO THE SPANISH PEOPLE[24]

May 15, 1937

People of Spain, Comrades in arms:

We, the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Red Army, and the Chinese Soviets, regard the war fought by the Spanish Republican Government as the most sacred war in the world. This war is being waged not only for the life of the Spanish people, but also for the oppressed peoples of the world, because the Spanish Government is resisting German and Italian fascism, which, with their Spanish accomplices, are destroying the culture, civilization, and justice of the world. The Spanish Government and the Spanish people are fighting the German and Italian fascists, who are in league with and giving support to the Japanese fascist invaders of China in the Far East... Were it not for the support received from German and Italian fascism, Japanese fascism could not, as it is now doing attack us like a mad dog...

We do not believe that the struggle of the Chinese people can be separated from your struggle in Spain. The Communist Party of China is supporting and encouraging you, the Spanish people, by struggling against Japanese fascism. The Communist Party of China, the Chinese Soviets, the Chinese Red Army, and the Chinese people are greatly moved by your defense of Madrid and by your victories on the northern and southern fronts. Each day our press here in the Soviet regions publishes reports and articles about your heroic struggle... We firmly believe that the unity of your various parties in the People's Front is the basis for your final victory...

We know that your victory will directly aid us in our fight against Japanese fascism. Your cause is our cause. We read with emotion of the International Volunteers organized by people from every land, and we are glad that there are Chinese and Japanese in their ranks. Many comrades of the Chinese Red Army also wish to go to Spain to join you...Were it not that we are face to face with the Japanese enemy, we would join you and take our place in your front ranks.

As many of you know, the Chinese Red Army has carried on a ceaseless and hard struggle for ten years. We fought without resources, through hunger and cold, with insufficient arms, ammunition, and medical supplies, until at last we won our victories. We know that you and your army are also passing through great hardships such as we also have passed through, and we are certain that you will be victorious. Our ten years' struggle has proved that if a revolutionary people and their revolutionary army are not afraid of suffering, but continue to fight heroically and unyieldingly against the enemy, they will be victorious...

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[24] *Extracted from a letter dated 15 May 1937, published in Chieh-fang, no. 4, June 1937*

LETTER TO COMRADE BROWDER[25]

July 24, 1937

Dear Comrade Browder:

Taking advantage of the visit of a comrade, I am sending this letter to you, honoured Comrade Browder, the good friend of the Chinese people and the leader of the American people.

We have heard from several American comrades and from other quarters that the American Communist Party and the great mass of the American people are profoundly concerned about China's anti-Japanese struggle, and they have already aided us in several ways. This gives us the feeling that our struggle is not an isolated one, that we are receiving heroic assistance from abroad; at the same time, we have the feeling that, when we obtain victory, this victory will be of great assistance to the struggle of the American people for liberation.

Today's world is on the eve of a great explosion, and the working class of the whole world, as well as all the peoples seeking liberation, must certainly unite and carry on a common struggle.

Revolutionary greetings!

Mao Tse-tung
24 June 1937

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[25] *Extracted from Mao Tse-tung lun-wen-chi.*

INSCRIPTION FOR THE FOUNDING OF THE NORTH SHENSI PUBLIC SCHOOL

1937

We must educate a lot of people—the sort of people who are the vanguard of revolution, who have political farsightedness, who are prepared for battle and sacrifice, who are frank, loyal, positive, and upright; the sort of people who seek no self-interest, only national and social emancipation, who show, instead of fear, determination and forwardness in the face of hardships; the sort of people who are neither undisciplined nor fond of limelight, but practical, with their feet firmly on the ground. If China possesses many such men, the tasks of the Chinese revolution can easily be fulfilled.

SPEECH AT THE MEETING CELEBRATING THE COMPLETION OF THE BUILDING OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE MILITARY AND POLITICAL UNIVERSITY

1937

What I want to say to you, Comrades, is that, in short, the success of this great enterprise is due to [our] overcoming difficulties and uniting with the masses. The experience of the struggle in the past ten years, the cave [buildings] you have dug, and the future course of the Resistance War have proved or will prove that if we continue to overcome difficulties and unite with the masses we shall be ever victorious!

To overcome natural difficulties by defeating the loess and to overcome military difficulties by defeating the Japanese bandits have something in common but quite a lot of differences. The latter is harder and more arduous. Therefore in addition to orienting oneself towards overcoming difficulties and uniting with the masses, the Resistance War requires skills in strategy and tactics, in mobilizing, organizing, and leading the masses, and in winning allies.

You have now the spirit to overcome difficulties and unite with the masses. If you can use your talents to develop from this basis, it is entirely possible to defeat Japan and drive the Japanese out of China.

ON LU HSUN[26]

1937

Comrades,

Our main tasks at the present moment are those of the vanguard. At a time when the great national Resistance War is making rapid progress, we need a large number of activists to play the leading role [in it] and a large number of vanguards to find the path. Vanguards must be frank, positive, and upright people. They seek no self-interest, only national and social emancipation. They fear no hardships; instead, in the face of hardship they are determined and forever moving forward. Neither undisciplined nor fond of limelight, they have their feet firmly on the ground and are realistic. They are the guides on the road of revolution. In the light of the present state of the war, if the Resistance is the concern only of the government and armed forces, without the participation of the broad masses, we cannot be certain that we shall win the final victory. We must now train a large number of vanguards who will fight for our national liberation and can be relied upon to lead and organize the masses for the fulfilment of this historic mission. First of all, the numerous vanguards of the whole country must urgently organize themselves. Our communist party is the vanguard of national liberation. We must fight to the bitter end in order to accomplish our tasks.

Today we commemorate [the death] of Lu Hsün. We must first of all understand him and his place in the history of our revolution. We commemorate him not only because he was a distinguished writer but also because he, at the forefront of national emancipation, dedicated all his strength to the revolutionary struggle. (We commemorate him not only because he wrote well, becoming a great literary figure, but also because he was a vanguard for national liberation and gave tremendous help to the revolution.) Although he did not belong to the communist party organization, his thinking, action, and writing were all Marxianized. He showed more and more youthful energy as his life drew to its end. He fought consistently and incessantly against feudal forces

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[26] Speech at the Meeting Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Death of Lu Hsün held in the north Shensi Public School on 19.10.1939. Reproduced from the fortnightly. July (Chi-yueh), March 1938.

and imperialism. Under despicable circumstances of enemy pressure and persecution, he struggled (suffered) and protested. In a similar way, Comrades, you can also study revolutionary theories diligently while [living] under such adverse material conditions [because] you are full of militant spirit. The material arrangement of this school is poor, but here we have truth, freedom, and a place to train revolutionary vanguards.

Lu Hsün emerged from the decaying feudal society. But he knew how to fight back against the rotten society and the evil imperialist forces of which he had had so much experience. He used his sardonic, humorous, and sharp (powerful) pen to depict the force(s) of the dark society (and of the ferocious imperialists). He was really an accomplished 'painter'. In his last years he fought for truth and freedom from the standpoint of the proletariat and national liberation.

Lu Hsün's first characteristic was his political vision. He examined society with both a microscope and a telescope, hence with precision and farsightedness. As early as 1936 he pointed out the dangerous tendencies of the criminal Trotskyites. Now the clarity and correctness of his judgement have been proved beyond doubt by the facts—the obvious fact that the Trotskyite faction has turned into a traitorous organization subsidized by Japanese special agents.

In my view, Lu Hsün is a great Chinese saint—the saint of modern China, just as Confucius was the saint of old China. For his immortal memory, we have established the Lu Hsün Library and the Lu Hsün Teachers' Training School in Yan'an so that future generations may have a glimpse of his greatness.

His second characteristic was his militancy, which we mentioned a moment ago. He was a great steadfast tree, not a blade of wavering grass, against the onslaught of dark and violent forces. Once he saw a political destination clearly he strove to reach it, never surrendering or compromising halfway. There have been half-hearted revolutionaries who fought at first but then deserted the battlefield. Kautsky and Plekhanov of foreign countries (Russia) were good examples [of this]. Such people are not infrequently found in China. If I remember correctly, Lu Hsün once said that at first all [of them] were 'left' and revolutionary, but as soon as pressure came, [they] changed and presented their comrades [to the enemy] as a gift. Lu Hsün bitterly hated these sort of people. While fighting against them, he educated and disciplined the young writers who followed him. He taught them to fight resolutely, to be vanguards, and to find their own way.

His third characteristic was his readiness to sacrifice himself, completely fearless of enemy intimidation and persecution and utterly unmoved by enemy enticement. With merciless pungency his sword-like pen cut all those he despised. Among the bloodstains of revolutionary fighters he showed his tenacious defiance and marched ahead while calling [the others to follow him]. Lu Hsün was an absolute realist, always uncompromising, always determined. In one of his essays he maintained that one should [continue to] beat a dog after it had fallen in water. If you did not, the dog would jump up either to bite you or at least to shake a lot of dirty water over you. Therefore the beating had to be thorough. Lu Hsün did not entertain a speck of sentimentalism or hypocrisy.

Now the mad dog, Japanese imperialism, has not been beaten in water yet. We must learn this Lu Hsün spirit and apply it to the whole country.

These characteristics are the components of the great 'Lu Hsun spirit'. Throughout his life Lu Hsün never deviated from this spirit and that is why he was an outstanding writer in the world of letters and a tough, excellent vanguard in the revolutionary ranks. As we commemorate him, we must learn his spirit. [We] must take it to all the units engaged in the Resistance War and use it in the struggle for our national liberation.

BASIC TACTICS

1937

CHAPTER I

Introductory Remarks

1. How the Popular Masses Carry Out Military Action.

How is it that the bare-handed masses, banded together in ill-armed military units without guns or bullets, are able to charge the enemy, kill the enemy, and resolutely carry out effective action in the war? This is a very widespread and very reasonable query. But if we know the function of the weapons used by an army and the aim of an army's action, we can then understand how our popular masses, although bare-handed, still have weapons and can engage in action to subdue the enemy.

The principal function of an army's weapons is simply to kill the enemy, and an army's final aim is simply to reduce or destroy the enemy's fighting strength. Well, in our daily life, is there any object that cannot be used to kill the enemy or any type of action that cannot reduce or destroy his fighting strength? For example, a kitchen knife, a wooden cudgel, an axe, a hoe, a wooden stool, or a stone can all be used to kill people. Such actions as cutting electric lines, destroying bridges, starting rumors, spreading poison, or cutting off supplies can everywhere inconvenience the enemy or reduce his fighting strength. All these are methods we may be unwilling to utilize or unable to employ. If we really want to kill and exterminate the enemy, there are weapons for us everywhere and work for us to be doing at all times, in order to ensure effective united action by the army and the people.

2. Points of Special Attention.

After from this, we must pay special attention to the present war on the national level, which has become cruel beyond our imagination and has also lasted a long time. We must not, because we are undergoing the suffering of a war more cruel than any seen in the past, immediately capitulate; nor must we, under the influence of a long war, suddenly lose our endurance and give way to lassitude. We must inspire ourselves with the most resolute spirit of unyielding struggle, with the most burning patriotic sentiments, and with the will to endurance, and carry out a protracted struggle against the enemy. We must know that, although the circumstances and the duration of the war are cruel and protracted, this is nothing compared to what would happen if the war were lost; if our country were destroyed and the whole of our people reduced to a position of irretrievable ruin, the suffering would be even more cruel and would never come to an end. Therefore, however cruel the war may be, we must absolutely and firmly endure until the last five minutes of struggle. This is especially the case with our present enemy, who finds his advantage in a rapid decision in the war, whereas our advantage is to be found in the strategy of a protracted war.

3. We Must Not Fear the Enemy.

When we see the enemy, simply because he has a weapon in his hands, we must not be frightened to death like a rat who sees a cat. We must not be afraid of approaching him or infiltrating into his midst in order to carry out sabotage. We are men; our enemies are also men; we are all men, so what should we fear? The fact that he has weapons? We can find a way to seize his weapons. All we are afraid of is getting killed by the enemy. But when we undergo the oppression of the enemy to such a point as this, how can anyone still fear death? And if we do not fear death, then what is there to fear about the enemy? So when we see the enemy, whether he is many or few, we must act as though he is bread that can satisfy our hunger, and immediately swallow him.

4. Definition of Guerrilla Warfare.

When it is not advantageous for our main land army to meet the enemy in large-scale engagements and we, therefore, send out commando units or guerrilla units, which employ the tactics of avoiding strength and striking at weakness, of flitting about and having no fixed position, and of subduing the enemy according to circumstances, and when we do not oppose the enemy according to the ordinary rules of tactics, this is called employing guerrilla tactics.

CHAPTER II

Tactics

At a time when our country's national defense preparations are not completed, and when our weapons are inferior to the excellent equipment with which the enemy has provided himself, we must observe the following principles whenever we wish to wage a battle with the enemy:

1. Precautions When On The March.

When we are on the march, we must send plainclothes units armed with pistols ahead of our vanguard, behind our rear guard, and to the side of our lateral defenses in order to spy out the situation and to forestall unexpected attacks by the enemy, or superfluous clashes.

2. Precautions During Halts.

When we encamp, if there is a presumption that the enemy may be near, we should send every day a guerrilla company—or at least a platoon—toward the enemy's defenses to carry out reconnaissance at a distance (from 20 to 30 *li*) or to join up with the local forces and carry out propaganda among the masses, in order to inspire them to resist the enemy. If this unit discovers the enemy, it should, on the one hand, resist him, and, on the other hand. report to us so that we can prepare to meet the foe or to retreat without being drawn into an unnecessary battle.

3. We Must Not Attack Strong Positions.

If the enemy guards his position firmly or defends a strong strategic point then, unless we have special guarantees of success, we must not attack him. If we attack him, we will waste considerable time, and our losses in killed and wounded will certainly be many times those of the enemy. Moreover, in guerrilla warfare, our artillery is not strong: if we recklessly attack a strong position; it will be very difficult to take it rapidly at one stroke, and, meanwhile, it will be easy for the enemy to gather his forces from all sides and surround us. On this point, the army and the people must be absolutely firm of purpose and cannot act recklessly in a disorderly fashion because of a moment's anger.

4. Do Not Fight Hard Battles.

If we do not have a 100 percent guarantee of victory, we should not fight a battle, for it is not worthwhile to kill 1,000 of the enemy and lose 800 killed among ourselves. Especially in guerrilla warfare such as we are waging, it is difficult to replace men, horses, and ammunition; if we fight a battle and lose many men, and horses, and much ammunition, this must be considered a defeat for us.

5. We Must Not Fight if the Situation of the Enemy is not Clear.

When we are encamped in a certain place and suddenly discover the enemy but are not informed regarding his numbers or where he is coming from, we must absolutely not fight, but must resolutely retreat several tens of *li*. It is only if we are right up against the enemy that we should send covering units, for, if the enemy comes to attack us, it is certainly because his forces are superior or he has a plan, and we must under no circumstances fall into his trap. If the enemy is in force, it is obviously advantageous to retreat. If his numbers are small and we retreat, nothing more than a little extra fatigue is involved, and there will always be time to return and attack him again later.

6. We Must Organize the Masses and Unite with Them.

Modern warfare is not a matter in which armies alone can determine victory or defeat. Especially in guerrilla combat, we must rely on the force of the popular masses, for it is only thus that we can have a guarantee of success. The support of the masses offers us great advantages as regards transport, assistance to wounded, intelligence, disruption of the enemy's position, etc. At the same time, the enemy can be put into an isolated position, thus further increasing our advantages. If, by misfortune, we are defeated, it will also be possible to escape or to find concealment. Consequently, we must not lightly give battle in places where the masses are not organized and linked to us.

7. Using the Masses to Make a Surprise Attack and Break a Blockade.

When the enemy surrounds us and blockades us, we should rouse the popular masses and cut the enemy's communications in all directions, so that he does not know that our army is already near him. Then we should take advantage of a dark night or of the light of dawn to attack and disperse him.

8. Surprise Attacks on Isolated Units.

When we have reconnoitered the enemy's position and have kept our men at a distance of several *li* and when he has unquestionably relaxed his precautions, then we advance rapidly with light equipment, before dawn when the enemy does not expect us, and exterminate him.

9. Using the Popular Masses to Harry the Enemy.

On the basis of a decision by the main force of the army, in time of battle, we send out part of our forces, divided into several units—the smallest element being a platoon—to lead the local militia, police, volunteer army, or other popular masses of the peasantry and the workers. These groups use a great variety of flags, occupy mountaintops or villages and market towns, use brass gongs, spears, rudimentary cannon, swords and spikes, trumpets, etc. They scatter all over the landscape and yell, thus distracting the enemy's eyes and ears. Or, both night and day, on all sides, they shoot off isolated shots to cause panic among the enemy soldiers and fatigue their spirit. Then, afterward, our army appears in full strength when the enemy does not expect it and disperses him by a flank attack.

10. Circling Around to Get Away From the Enemy.

When we are faced with a large enemy force and do not have sufficient strength to meet its attack, we use the method of circling around. We hasten to a place where there are no enemy troops, and we use mountain trails so that the enemy cannot catch up with us. At the same time, along the way, we utilize the popular masses, getting them to carry on reconnaissance work in the front and the rear, so that we are not attacked by the enemy from either direction.

11. Getting Out of Difficult Situations.

Presume that in the rear there is a pursuing army and in the front an obstacle, or that the pursuing army is too strong for us. As a plan to get out of such a difficult situation, we can send a part of our forces 4 or 5 *li* off, to lure the enemy up a big road, while our main force follows a side road and escapes the enemy. Or we can make a detour around to the enemy's rear and attack him them by surprise. Or we can use the local militia and the police to go along another route, leaving some objects, making footprints in the road, sticking up notices, etc., so as to induce the enemy to follow them. Then, our main force suddenly rushes out from a side road, striking at the enemy from the front and the rear, encircles him on all sides, and annihilates him.

12. "Cause an Uproar in the East, Strike in the West."

When the army wants to attack a certain place, it does not advance there directly but makes a detour by some other place and then changes its course in the midst of its march, in order to attack and disperse the enemy. "The thunderclap leaves no time to cover one's ears."

13. Concealed Attacks From Ambush.

When the enemy is pursuing us in great haste, we select a spot for an ambush and wait until he arrives. Thus, we can capture the enemy all at one stroke.

14. Ambushing the Enemy in the Course of His March.

When we learn from reconnaissance that the enemy plans to advance from a certain point, we choose a spot where his path is narrow and passes through confusing mountainous terrain and send a part of our troops—or a group of sharpshooters—to lie hidden on the mountains bordering his path, or in the forest, to wait until his main force is passing through. Then we throw rocks down on his men from the mountains and rake them with bullets, or shoot from ambush at their commanding officers mounted on horseback.

15. Making a Strong Defense by Emptying the Countryside.

When our spies have informed us that the enemy is about to arrive, and if our force is not sufficient to give battle, we should then carry out the stratagem of "making a strong defense by emptying the countryside." We hide the food, stores, fuel, grain, pots and other utensils, etc., in order to cut off the enemy's food supply. Moreover, as regards the popular masses of the area in question, with the exception of old men, women, and children, who are left behind to provide reconnaissance information, we lead all able-bodied men to hiding places. Thus, the enemy has no one to serve as porters, guides, and scouts. At the same time, we send a few men to the enemy's rear communication lines to cut off his supplies, capture his couriers, and cut or sabotage his communications facilities.

16. Meeting a superior enemy.

(1) When the enemy advances, we retreat. If the enemy were forces were weaker than ours, he would not dare advance and attack us. So, when he advances toward us, we can conclude that the enemy is certainly coming with a superior force and is acting according to plan and with preparation. It is, therefore, appropriate for us to evade his vanguard, by withdrawing beforehand. If we meet with the enemy in the course of our march and either do not have clear information regarding him, or know that his army is stronger than ours, we should, without the slightest hesitation, carry out a precautionary withdrawal.

As to the place to which we should withdraw, it is not appropriate to go long distances on the main roads, so that the enemy follows us to the end. We should move about sinuously in the nearby area, winding around in circles. If the enemy appears ahead of us, we should circle around to his rear; if the enemy is on the mountains, we should descend into the valleys; if the enemy is in the middle, we should retreat on the two sides; if the enemy in on the left bank of the river, we should retreat on the right bank; if the enemy is on the right bank, we should retreat on the left bank.

Moreover, in withdrawing, when we come to a crossroads, we can deliberately leave some objects in the branch of the road we do not take or send a small fraction of our men and horses that way, in order to leave some tracks or write some notices or symbols. Or, we can write some distinguishing marks on the road we do take to indicate that it is closed. Thus, we induce the enemy to direct his pursuit and attack in the wrong direction.

At such times, it is best to evacuate the popular masses and such armed forces as the militia, police, volunteer army, etc., by various routes in all directions, in order to confuse the enemy's eyes and ears. We can leave behind part of our men, who bury their uniforms and weapons and disguise themselves as merchants, street vendors, etc. They spread rumors or pretend to be obliging in order to spy out information regarding the enemy's numbers, his plans, the location and routine of his camps, and the precautions he is taking. If the enemy questions them about the direction in which we have withdrawn and the strength of our force, they should talk incoherently, pointing to the east and saying the west, pointing to the south and saying the north, replacing big by small and small by big, talking at random and creating rumors. They wait until our army is about to attack, and then they dig up their uniforms and put them on, take out their weapons, and attack the enemy from his midst, thus completely routing him and leaving him with nowhere to turn.

(2) When the enemy retreats, we pursue. When the enemy army retreats, it is appropriate to take advantage of the situation to advance. On such an occasion, the enemy's military situation must have undergone a change, otherwise he would not have retreated, and he is certainly not prepared to join battle against us with any resolution. If we take advantage of the situation and make a covering attack on his rear, the enemy's covering units will certainly not be resolved to fight, and in the context of the enemy's over-all plan it will be difficult for his forward units to return and join in the fray. In rough mountainous terrain, where the paths are narrow and rivers and streams intertwined so that there are many bridges, even if the enemy's forward force were to turn back,

this move would require much time. So, by the time he turns back, his rear will already have been annihilated and he will already have been disarmed.

At this time, the organizations of the popular masses should devise methods for destroying the bridges on the route over which the enemy is retreating, or cutting the wires of his communications system. Or, best of all, they should wait until the bulk of the enemy's army have retreated and, taking advantage of the protection afforded by our guards and army, block the enemy's path of retreat, so that, although his forces may want to turn back, they cannot do it, and, although they yearn for help, they cannot obtain it.

But, at such a time, the most important task of the popular masses is to spy out the direction in whih the enemy is withdrawing, in order to ascertain whether or not there may be an ambush or a feigned retreat intended to encircle us from two sides, and report to us immediately, so that our army can pluck up courage and pursue the enemy or devise methods of evading him.

(3) When the enemy halts, we harm him. When the enemy is newly arrived in our territory, is not familiar will the terrain, does not understand the local dialect, and is unable to gain any information from the scouts he sends out, it is as though he had entered a distant and inaccessible land. At such a time. we should increase our harassment, shooting off guns everywhere, to make him ill at ease day and night, so exercising a great influence on both his mind and body. Under such circumstances, I fear that any army, however overbearing, will begin to waver and will become weary. We need only await the time when his spirits are wavering and his body weary, and then, if our armies rush in all together, we can certainly exterminate him completely.

17. Dealing with a Weak Enemy.

Fighting as we are for the existence of our nation and the achievement of the aims of guerrilla warfare—which are to destroy the enemy and to stir up the courage of the popular masses—when we are faced with a weak enemy, naturally we should unite with the popular masses of the place in question to surround him and exterminate him at one stroke.

18. Arousing the Masses.

There are always a good many among the popular masses who forget the great cause for the sake of petty advantage. Frequently having received great favors from the enemy, they act contrary to conscience and aid the forces of evil. For this reason, before the arrival of the enemy in a given place, we must do our utmost to whip up the spirits of the popular masses, to rouse their will to resist, and to endow them with an unshakable resolve to fight to the end, without seeking advantage, without compromise or surrender. We must induce them to follow our orders sincerely and to cooperate with our army to resist the enemy. At the same time, we should also organize "resist-the-enemy associations," "associations for national salvation," and other types of professional bodies to facilitate the transmission of orders and the evacuation of villages in time of necessity and to clean out traitors and prevent their utilization by the enemy.

CHAPTER III

The Aim of the War

The ultimate aim of guerrilla warfare is certainly to disarm the enemy, to destroy his fighting strength, to get back the territories he has occupied and to save our brethren whom he is trampling under foot! But when, because of objective circumstances and other factors of various kinds, it is impossible to attain this goal, it sometimes happens that the areas unaffected by the fighting are controlled by the enemy in all tranquility. This should not be. Because of this possibility, we must think up methods for inflicting economic and political damage in these areas and destroying communication facilities, so that, although the enemy has occupied our territory, it is of no use to him and he decides to withdraw on his own initiative.

In guerilla warfare, we must observe the principle "To gain territory is no cause for joy, and to lose territory is no cause for sorrow." To lose territory or cities is of no importance. The important thing is to think up methods for destroying the enemy. If the enemy's effective strength is undiminished, even if we take cities, we will be unable to hold them. Conversely, when our own forces are insufficient, if we give up the cities, we still have hope of regaining them. It is altogether improper to defend cities to the utmost, for this merely leads to sacrificing our own effective strength.

CHAPTER IV

Organization

1. Opportunities for Organization.

(1) When we are devoting ourselves to warfare in an open region, it is the sparsely populated areas, with a low cultural level, where communications are difficult and facilities for transmitting correspondence are inadequate, that are advantageous'.

(2) Narrow mountainous regions, rising and falling terrain, or areas in the vicinity of narrow roads—all of which are inconvenient for the movement of large bodies of troops—are also advantageous.

Opportunities also exist:

(3) When the people in the enemy's rear are in sympathy with our army.

(4) When the enemy is well-armed, and his troops numerous and courageous, so that we have to evade direct clashes.

(5) When the enemy has penetrated deeply into our territory and we are preparing everywhere to carry out measures of harassment and obstruction against him.

(6) Dense forests or reedy marshes, in the depths of which we can disappear, are most advantageous for this purpose, especially in the late summer and autumn, when we find ourselves behind a curtain of green.

2. Forms of Organization.

The action of a guerrilla unit takes one of the following forms:

(1) We send out a large cavalry unit from our main force, together with mounted artillery, or cavalry accompanied by a platoon or more armed with light automatic weapons. They penetrate as rapidly as possible into the enemy's rear destroy there all his communications links, and carry out the thorough and complete destruction of all his storehouses of food, grain for his horses, and ammunition. Moreover, they send out a small group of their forces to destroy all places of military significance in the enemy's rear. Once these forays have been carried out, the group fights its way out in another direction and rejoins the main force.

(2) We send out cavalry or a special task group of infantry. Their strength should be from a platoon to a few companies. They should penetrate as deeply as possible into the enemy's rear and, moving rapidly and unpredictably,

should carry the battle from one place to another. When there is no alternative, or when the enemy is not expected to arrive before a certain time, they can also dwell temporarily in secret where they are. As required by the exigencies of the situation, they can employ either all or a part of their forces. They return when the time comes that they can no longer stay in the enemy's rear, or when the task entrusted to them is completed, or because the enemy has already discovered our traces and our intentions, and has taken effective measures of defense.

(3) In the enemy's rear, we choose some young, strong, and courageous elements among the local population and organize some small groups who will accept the leadership of the experienced and trained persons we send out or of experienced persons whom we had trained previously in the place in question. The secret activity of these small groups involves moving from their own area to another one, changing their uniforms, unit numbers, and external appearance, and using every method, so as to cover their tracks to the utmost.

(4) Or we seek volunteers from our army and provide them with high-quality light weapons, in order to form them into special guerrilla units under the leadership of such officers as have benefited from experience and study.

(5) Guerrilla units can be classified according to their nature. Those formed of selected volunteers are called special guerrilla units. Those organized generally from a part of our army are called basic guerrilla units. Those organized from the local population are called local guerrilla units. When basic and local guerrilla units engage in combined actions, they are subject to the unified command of the commander of the basic unit.

(6) As for the choice of the members of a guerrilla unit, the members of a basic guerrilla unit should be taken from among those soldiers who are healthy, firm of purpose, patient, courageous, and quick-witted. Moreover, the soldiers themselves be willing to join the group in question. In the case of the independent actions carried out by these men in the course of guerrilla operations, there is generally no way to verify whether or not their tasks are executed in accordance with orders, and frequently they act beyond the knowledge of the responsible commander. For this reason, the choice and training of members of guerrilla units should have as its central theme "faithfully carrying out one's task."

(7) The choice and the nomination of the commander of a guerrilla task group or small group requires even greater forethought and reflection. The capacity of the commanders for faithful and courageous action, their military knowledge—especially their knowledge of guerrilla tactics—their possession

of a lively intelligence and the ability to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances, their loyalty, and their daring are indispensable conditions for carrying out plans and completing our tasks.

3. Number of Troops.

The number of men belonging to a guerrilla unit is determined by the tasks, but it commonly ranges from five or ten men to something over a thousand. However, the maximum strength of such a unit may not exceed one regiment. If the number of soldiers is too large, the movements of our forces will be encumbered, there will be greater difficulties regarding food supply, and it will be difficult to conceal the troops by the use of false uniforms. Because of these problems, our plans may be discovered or revealed before they have been carried out. Moreover, replenishing our supplies of ammunition will be a problem. Furthermore, we will often have difficulties because of poor roads, with the result that not only will all our plans prove merely illusory, but also we will often fall into difficulties to no good purpose in going and returning.

The great superiority of a small guerrilla unit lies in its remarkable mobility. With very little expenditure of time and effort, one can get food, and it is also easy to find a place to rest, for one does not need much in the way of rations or a place of shelter to camp. Still less is one held up by bad roads, and supplies of ammunition and medicine are also easy to replenish. If we do not succeed in our operation, we can retreat in good order.

4. Types of Soldiers.

As for the type of soldiers employed in guerrilla units, cavalry, engineers, and highly mobile infantry troops are excellent. Cavalry is entrusted with the task of creating disorder on the enemy's flanks, and also, when we are pursuing the enemy, with that of maintaining pressure on his rear guard and creating confusion on his flanks and in his rear. Moreover, at all times, cavalry is the guerilla unit's only instrument for transmitting correspondence and for reconnoitering. Hence, the cavalry is indispensable to any guerrilla unit. Engineers are used for destroying communications in the enemy's rear (such as railroads, telephone and telegraph lines, bridges, etc.) As for the highly mobile infantry units, they are useful to startle the enemy and produce in him a feeling of insecurity night and day.

5. Weapons.

Apart from the rifles of the infantry and the cavalry, light machine guns, hand grenades, etc., guerrilla units should also be supplied with pistols and submachine guns.

To the extent that the terrain permits it, one can also add heavy machine guns, mortars, and small cannons.

6. Men and Baggage.

Convenience of movement and agility being the characteristics of a guerrilla unit, the baggage train, cases of equipment, and ammunition, etc., should all be kept as simple as possible for the sake of convenience. The combatant and noncombatant members of the unit should all be organized as most appropriate for guerrilla warfare, and all other persons who are not indispensably should be kept to the strict minimum.

(1) The officers and men in each guerrilla squad should not exceed 8; each platoon should not exceed 26; and each company should not exceed 100.

(2) When automatic weapons are somewhat more numerous, the number of men can be still further reduced, and guerrilla units composed of 5 or 6 men can be sent out repeatedly, in order to achieve the greatest results in terms of harassing the enemy or securing intelligence.

(3) Each commanding officer of a unit should have only one orderly at most. Apart from this according to the complexity of the tasks, two or three officers should share the services of one orderly. Even more attention should be accorded to not abusing this rule by unnecessarily increasing the number of couriers as a substitute for orderlies and to seeing that an unnecessarily large number of men are not sent to carry out a given task, thereby reducing the fighting strength of one's own unit. Hence, when one sends out couriers, one must reflect carefully on whether they can accomplish their task or not.

(4) It is preferable that each mass unit should not carry bundles of food. When the dry rations carried separately by each soldier are exhausted, one should take advantage of opportunities to borrow the pots and pans of the population so as to prepare supplementary rations. If it is necessary to carry bundles, each unit should not carry more than two.

(5) Bundles of writing materials should not be carried in excess of needs. Normally, two bundles per regiment, one per battalion, and one per company are permissible. The weight of each bundle should not exceed 40 kilograms.

(6) Each officer and soldier should carry his own bedding, knapsack, etc. Bearers should not be engaged to transport these items. This rule should be firmly established in advance.

7. Objects to be Carried.

A guerrilla unit preferably should have the following things:

(1) Equipment and explosives for destroying railroads, telephone and telegraph lines, arsenals, etc.

(2) Medicines. Those needed in case of emergencies should be carried according to the season, but dressings, etc., should be provided on a permanent basis.

(3) A compass and maps of the area in which the guerrilla unit operates.

(4) Light radio equipment, which is especially important in order to be able to report at all times on the situation of the enemy and to listen in on the enemy's reports.

(5) A certain quantity of gold coins, to provide for unexpected needs and for buying food.

8. Discipline.

Whether or not the military discipline of a guerrilla unit is good influences the reputation of our whole army and its ability to secure the sympathy and support of the popular masses. Only strict discipline can assure the complete victory of all our independent actions. Consequently, our attitude toward those persons who violate military discipline, harm the people's interest, and do not resolutely execute the orders of their superiors, should consist in punishing them severely without the slightest regard for politeness. The application of military discipline in a partisan unit does not aim exclusively at punishment. Rather, it aims at strengthening the political instruction of the officers and men and raising their level of political consciousness, thereby indirectly eliminating a large number of actions contrary to military discipline and causing the officers and soldiers to understand, the psychology of the masses, so that at appropriate times they can unite effectively with the common people.

9. Political Organization.

(1) Each guerrilla task group and small group should have a political director, and in the headquarters of the guerrilla unit there should be a political training department, for directing the political work of officers and soldiers and dealing with the human problems of all the political instructors.

(2) Each mess unit of a guerrilla unit should establish a special commissioner in order to guard against the infiltration and activity of reactionary elements and to encourage those soldiers without clear ideological consciousness who

are wavering in their purposes.

(3) In order to prevent desertion by the soldiers, a committee against desertion, as well as "groups of ten," should be organized in each guerrilla unit. The groups of ten and the committee against desertion are negative methods for preventing desertion. Their organization and work should be carried out roughly as follows:

a. In order to prevent desertion, every guerrilla unit should establish a desertion committee and every mess unit should organize a group of ten.

b. The committee against desertion should be composed of from seven to nine people, one of them being the chairman and the other members. It should be composed of lower-level cadres who can endure difficulties and whose thinking is firm, as well as heads of the groups of ten. The groups of ten are composed of ten men in all, one of them being the head and the other members. They are made up of faithful and reliable soldiers.

c. The over-all activity of the groups of ten is subordinated to the committee against desertion. As regards military matters, it is subordinated to the commander of the unit and to the committee against desertion. In other work, it is subordinated to the political training department. Both groups of ten and committees against desertion must accept the guidance of their commanding officer.

d. The work of the group of ten should take account of all the actions and talk of the officers and soldiers, especially of "camp idlers" and such. Unstable elements should be secretly watched, even if they are members of the group of ten or their friends.

Meetings should be held once a week to review the work and to report to the commanding officer and the committee against desertion regarding the situation in general at all times. After each extreme difficulty or when our army has suffered a slight defeat and is staying in its base camp, special attention should be paid to unfavourable attitudes that may develop among the soldiers and to conversations that may endanger the morale of the soldiers.

e. The work of the committee against desertion consists above all in reviewing the work of the groups of ten and in admonishing and guiding them at the appropriate times. The committee may also call conferences of the heads of all the groups of ten, or plenary conferences of all the members of the groups, to discuss the progress of the work as a whole.

The soldiers' life is rather like living in the desert, and every day the men undergo the fatigue of political study and training in the art of combat. This may easily engender feelings of disgust and opposition. In order to provide entertainment for the army and to compensate for a dull life, one should establish in a guerrilla unit clubs or amusement rooms. (For details of the organization and activities of such clubs, see the account in Chap. XV. 10.)

10. Special Forms of Military Organization.

(1) In order to make up for insufficient supplies of ammunition and poor marksmanship, every company should have from three to nine sharpshooters, to be employed exclusively for shooting from ambush at long distances or for shooting at special targets (enemy officers, machine-gunners or artillerymen, couriers, etc.).

(2) The commander of each task group and small group should choose particularly sharp-eyed couriers to serve as observers. Normally, a task group commander should have two of these, and a small group commander one. These men serve exclusively to remedy the insufficiency of battlefield observation.

(3) Each task group and small group of a guerrilla unit should have two nurses, who devote themselves exclusively to emergency care of sick officers and soldiers and to give instruction in hygiene.

(4) In order to obtain reliable information regarding the enemy's disposition, so as to be able to oppose him without losing any opportunities, all guerrilla units should establish groups of scouts. Normally, it will be sufficient if each unit has one platoon, each task group has one squad, and each small group a smaller element. A network of local scouts should also be established by the group of scouts wherever they go, or by scouts concealed in advance.

CHAPTER V

Tasks

The principal object of the action of a guerrilla unit lies in dealing the enemy the strongest possible blows to his morale, and in creating disorder and agitation in his rear, in drawing off his principal force to the flanks or to the rear, in stopping or slowing down his operations, and ultimately in dissipating his fighting strength so that the enemy's units are crushed one by one and he is precipitated into a situation where, even by rapid and deceptive actions, he can neither advance nor retreat.

(1) Destroy railroads and highways within the area of action, as well as important structures along the roads. Telephone lines and telegraph systems are especially important.

(2) Destroy the enemy's principal or secondary supply depots.

(3) Destroy the enemy's storehouses of food and military equipment.

(4) Strike in the enemy's rear, at his baggage train, or at his mounted and unmounted couriers, as well as at his mounted scouts, etc. Also seize the provisions and ammunition that the enemy is bringing up from the rear to the front.

(5) Strike at the enemy's independent task groups and at the inhabited areas that he has not yet solidly occupied.

(6) Mobilize and organize the popular masses everywhere and aid them in their own self-defense.

(7) Destroy airfields and military depots of the air force in the enemy's rear.

CHAPTER VI

Operations

1. Action.

(1) The first principle lies in careful and secret preparation, and in rapid and sudden attack. Fierce wind and heavy rain offer a favorable occasion for a guerrilla attack, as do thick fog, the darkness of night, or circumstances in which it is possible to strike at an exhausted enemy.

(2) The operations of a guerilla unit should consist of offensive warfare. Whether its numbers be great or small, such a unit can nonetheless appear where it is not expected and, in its attacks, take advantage of the enemy's lack of preparation. But when there are indications that the situation is unfavourable, or when there is no certainty of victory, it is appropriate to withdraw rapidly, so as not to suffer damaging losses. If the attack originally planned by the guerrilla unit fails to give an advantageous result, and the enemy goes over to the offensive, a guerrilla unit should withdraw quickly. Only when the enemy pursues us, and it is impossible to evade his attacks, can we fight a defensive action and then gradually withdraw.

2. The Use Of Tactics.

(1) The redoubtable force of a guerrilla unit definitely does not depend exclusively on its own numerical strength, but on its use of sudden attacks and ambushes, so as to "cause an uproar in the east and strike in the west," appearing now here and now there, using false banners and making empty demonstrations, propagating rumors about one's own strength, etc., in order to shatter the enemy's morale and create in him a boundless terror. In addition, we must pay attention to such principles as: "The enemy advances, we retreat, the enemy retreats, we advance, the enemy halts, we harass him," camouflaged attacks, etc.

(2) A really excellent stratagem for bringing the enemy to his destruction lies in mobilizing the popular masses, in making a strong defense by emptying the countryside, in luring the enemy to penetrate our lines deeply, in cutting his communications, in placing him in a position where he has difficulties with his food supply, where his men are weary and the terrain is unfavorable—and then launching an attack.

(3) By such tactics as sudden attacks, ambushes, making a strong defense by emptying the countryside, etc., a guerrilla unit should make every effort to

avoid positional warfare, and all frontal engagements. Before the local guerrilla units have received regular military training, they should not be launched against the enemy in a regular and prolonged battle. For this reason, when local guerrilla units are first formed, they should be used only in conjunction with actions by basic or special guerrilla units. It is only after a certain period that they can act independently.

(4) If we strike at the point where the enemy feels the greatest difficulties, in order to draw his main force to come to the relief of the position, then, afterwards, we send our main force somewhere else, either to attack other isolated and weak forces of the enemy or to attack his reinforcements on the march.

3. Advantageous and Disadvantageous Terrain.

(1) Because open terrain affords very little good cover, it is slightly disadvantageous for us when guerrilla units operate there. Covered, mountainous, or broken terrain are advantageous for us.

(2) A guerrilla unit should be thoroughly familiar with the terrain in its region of action and should think frequently about the ways in which it can appear from a place where the enemy army does not expect it, following secret and hidden routes such as valleys, forests, or narrow winding paths, so as to approach close to the enemy army and take advantage of a situation in which the enemy, persuaded he is quite secure, has taken no measure of defense whatsoever. Then, following the principle that the “thunderclap leaves no time to cover one’s ears,” the unit can strike sudden blows and then vanish into hiding without a trace, thus reducing the enemy to a level where he does not feel secure whether he is withdrawing or advancing, attacking or defending, moving or remaining still, sitting or lying down.

(3) Relatively large villages, market towns, and places where there is a reasonably large amount of grain and other moveable property are frequently the objects of enemy attack and harassment. A guerrilla unit should regularly spy out the enemy’s traces, and prepare an ambush so as to attack him when he is in the midst of his march.

(4) A guerrilla unit should use every method, within its area of action, to prevent the enemy’s small units from entering, and his main force from concealing itself there. In case of necessity, a guerrilla unit should also strive to unmask the military strength, disposition, and plans of the enemy operating outside its area of action.

4. Seasons.

A guerrilla unit must consider the seasons (winter, summer, or autumn are suitable for operations), with reference to the strength of our forces and those of the enemy, and especially with reference to the weapons of war; it must also be thoroughly familiar with the organization of the enemy's rear. Whether or not each season is favourable to us is also determined with reference to the terrain.

5. Secret Action.

The peculiar quality of the operations of a guerrilla unit lies entirely in taking the enemy by surprise. Consequently, we must take every possible measure to preserve military secrecy, as described in detail below:

(1) The commander of the unit should explain to his subordinates their tasks and the plan for the operation only just before the action begins, or while they are advancing. In case of necessity, he should explain the whole plan only by stages, so that others learn about each stage only when required.

(2) The best method for the transmission of orders in a guerrilla unit is by oral explanations from the commander to his subordinates. It is necessary to limit written orders insofar as possible, in order to avoid leakage of military secrets.

(3) One should not discuss the whole of one's actions and plans with guides or the local population. This is the case even with regard to local populations favourable to us; it is even more necessary to forbid such talk when we are about to attack a certain place.

(4) We should send out faithful and reliable scouts in advance to observe the point where we are going to camp or to lie in ambush along important roads in the enemy's rear, in order to cut off his information.

(5) When we advance, our rear guard should take full responsibility for obliterating and removing all secret signals and road signs. We should also advance by circuitous route, so that the enemy does not know the direction of our advance.

(6) Fixed code names should be used in place of all unit designations, and the use of the real names of units should be strictly prohibited.

(7) Except in case of necessity, all documents should be burned immediately after they have been read.

(8) Apart from the methods already enumerated, the true plans of a guerrilla unit can also be obscured in certain cases by using the local population

for the deliberate propagation of false information about the operations of the guerrilla unit, in order to deceive the enemy.

6. Arrangements and Preparations for Movement.

In order that our movements may be rapid, apart from doing our utmost to simplify all our organization, we should at all times maintain excellent preparations for action (investigation and intelligence regarding the front, care of sick soldiers, preparation for guides, preferably employing local peasants whose sympathies lie with the guerrillas, or other reliable persons), and we should also preferably carry three days' dry rations. If this is done, then when we want to move, we move, and when we want to stop, we stop, and there is no need for special arrangements.

7. The Conditions for Victory.

(1) A condition for the victory of a guerrilla unit is that the officers and soldiers have an absolutely courageous and resolute spirit. They must also be filled with a spirit of action in common, and be thoroughly alert and resolved to carry out their own tasks. Apart from this, they must have healthy bodies and be able to endure boundless hardships, be good at the use of their weapons, etc.

(2) A guerrilla unit should not lose heart in difficult times, nor should it cease its activity if it encounters difficult circumstances. As regards their confidence in ultimate victory, their confidence in the success of their cause, and especially their hatred of our national enemy, such circumstances should only strengthen their purpose to advance courageously in spite of all obstacles.

8. United Actions.

If a small guerrilla unit, because its number are insufficient cannot carry out a task assigned to it, it can unite temporarily with a few other guerilla units to fulfill its task.

Guerrilla operations are best carried out under the cover of night.

CHAPTER VII

Surprise Attacks

1. Points that Should be Carefully Considered Regarding Our Tasks Before a Surprise Attack.

When a guerrilla unit has finished concentrating for an attack, and when plans for scouts, courier service etc., have all been satisfactorily completed, and one is preparing a surprise attack on a certain inhabited place, the commander of the guerrilla unit must first form a clear idea about each of the following points.

(1) What is the strength of the military forces defending the given inhabited place? How are they deployed? How are they armed? What is their fighting capacity? How many scouts to sound a warning have they sent out?

(2) Is there any other enemy nearby? If there is, how far away is he? Can he quickly come to the aid of the defending forces? Can we imagine how he would come to aid them? From what direction would he come?

(3) What sort of roads are there that could be followed by the guerrillas and by the enemy? What hidden roads are there in the vicinity of the place we intend to attack by surprise? What route will we take to get to the place we are attacking? The preceding three points are not only things we should know in view of carrying out a surprise attack; we must also not fail to consider them with reference to our withdrawal after the attack.

(4) As for fixing the time of a surprise attack, it is best to carry it out at night, for, under the cover of darkness, even if the attack should fail, it can still inspire panic in the enemy. But we can attack at night only if we are thoroughly familiar with the terrain, and have clearly understood the enemy's dispositions or have extremely good guides. Otherwise, we should choose instead to carry out such surprise attacks at daybreak. If a surprise attack is to be directed against a supply depot, it should be carried out in the dead of night, for the men, horses, and military equipment in such a depot will be on the move again very early, at daybreak.

(5) Can the population of the given inhabited place aid the enemy or not? How can we prevent the population from bringing trouble on itself in this way?

While we should think through our plans at length, we should avoid overly subtle plans.

2. Points for Attention Before Setting Out.

(1) Before setting out, a guerrilla unit should complete all its preparations for the march (see below). Moreover, it should consider taking stretchers for transporting wounded soldiers.

(2) The method for a surprise attack on the enemy should be thoroughly understood beforehand not only by the commander of the unit and the commanders of each task group, but also by all the members of each independent task group. The best mode of transmitting this information is through oral explanations by the commander and his staff. Written orders of all kinds should be held to a minimum, in order to avoid having their contents divulged by loss or mistake.

(3) Prior to setting out, all officers at every level should appoint a replacement, in order, on the one hand to express their resolution to sacrifice themselves and, on the other hand, to avoid the risk that, if they are wounded or killed, the action of the guerrilla unit may fail to attain its objective because of them, thus influencing the whole situation.

3. Points for Attention While on the Move.

(1) We must make the greatest efforts to conceal the movements of a guerrilla unit and to prevent discovery by the enemy. Consequently, while advancing, we must leave the highroads and avoid large villages, and choose out-of-the-way places or even places where there are no roads at all, advancing along narrow winding trails. But we should keep away from miry roads, so as to avoid excessive fatigue.

(2) When advancing, we should not proceed for a long time off the same road, for this makes it easy for the enemy to discover our tracks. From the standpoint of keeping our movements secret, it is also generally appropriate to move by night, even when we are advancing a long distance.

(3) When we are advancing, for the sake of concealing ourselves, we should hold the number of people we send out for reconnaissance to the very lowest level. In general, it will be sufficient to send just a few scouts along the road, but we must have very good guides.

(4) If we are not absolutely certain that there are no enemy spies coming to observe us, it is best to divide our forces into small groups, which advance separately in different directions and then concentrate at a point which has been secretly designated.

(5) When a guerrilla unit is on the move, it should be constantly prepared

for a meeting with the enemy. For this reason, the commanding officer of a guerrilla unit generally advances, accompanied by his staff, just behind the scouts, behind the elite soldiers, or ahead of the staff of the unit (the staff is entrusted to the leadership of the second in command). Thus, it is easy to obtain a clear picture of the situation, and decisions can be taken very rapidly. If the commander sees that it is possible to advance, he advances; if he becomes aware of difficulties, he withdraws. All that is required is for two or three officers to hold a discussion, and then the decision can be made. Thus, we avoid sending orders back and forth with the consequent wasting of opportunities, and we diminish command from the rear, and its attendant evil of taking action not in keeping with the circumstances.

(6) Apart from the scouts sent out along the read, the soldiers of the guerrilla unit should not load their rifles, so as to avoid accidental discharges during the march and discovery by the enemy.

4. Measures to be Taken if the Enemy is Encountered While on the March.

(1) Under no circumstances should a guerrilla unit provoke a pointless battle before it has reached its objective. Even though a guerrilla unit may encounter the enemy in the course of its march, it should devise a way for getting around him—if necessary, departing from the original plan. If there is no way of avoiding battle, we should emerge from ambush, after rapid preparations, so as to appear where the enemy does not expect us and annihilate him by a surprise attack. At the same time, when we are carrying out such a maneuver, we should pay attention to whether the enemy halts or advances, and send out scouts to reconnoiter from all directions. If the enemy army is not prepared for battle or if, although he is in some strength, he is not on the alert, we should charge him immediately. Otherwise, we should remain in hiding and quietly await an opportunity.

(2) When, in the course of our march, we encounter enemy outposts or scouts, we should avoid being seen by them and circle past them in strict silence. But it we encounter a situation in which we judge there is an opportunity to be grasped, we should act rapidly and capture them without firing a shot.

5. Disposition of Troops During a Surprise Attack.

When a guerrilla unit carries out a surprise attack, the disposition of its troops should be more or less as follows:

(1) We should launch a fierce attack by our main force on the point in the enemy's disposition where it hurts the most—a really swift and resolute sudden

blow. We should also send another force around to carry out energetic action on the enemy's flanks and in his rear, in order to confuse his judgement, and prevent him from fathoming where our main force is located.

(2) We should attack one point in the enemy's disposition with all our might, but we should also carry out feigned deployments in other places and make an empty demonstration with a few scattered soldiers, so as to confuse the enemy's eyes and ears, and disperse his forces.

(3) If we can determine beforehand the enemy's line of retreat, then we should, within the limits of what is possible, send a part of our forces to intercept him. If the enemy has his heavy artillery and logistic supply installed outside the village, then we should designate a special small group to seize them.

(4) If the guerrilla unit is numerically strong, it should be divided into several columns and should carry out the attack from two, three, or several directions, attempting to cut off the enemy's retreat, But we should consider the matter thoroughly, so as to avoid causing confusion in our own ranks, which might result in erroneously taking our own troops for those of the enemy. Because of this possibility, it is necessary, in advance of the action, to agree on signals.

(5) In the case of a surprise attack on the enemy, if there is reason to fear that enemy reinforcements may arrive from a certain direction, we should send a small body of troops in advance of the action to the route where the reinforcements may arrive, so as to obstruct their advance, or report this peril to the main force.

(6) At the time of a surprise attack, the choice of the point on which the brunt of the attack will fall, and the geographical distribution of our forces (in general, two-thirds of our men are used for the principal direction of attack, and only one-third for the auxiliary directions of attack) must absolutely be such as to prevent the enemy forces from spreading out or receiving reinforcements and to make it possible for us to smash them one by one.

(7) The various task groups making up a guerrilla unit should divide their forces within a very short distance of the point where the attack is to be made, and from there make a separate but coordinated advance. The best place for this is the point from which the charge will be made. In this way, we can avoid such misfortunes as losing our way, or the premature division of our forces, and we can also guard against the danger of surprise attacks by the enemy. For the farther apart are the various independent columns or groups, the more likely they are to be separated by the terrain, and the more difficult it will be to ex-

pect them all to strike at the same moment.

6. The Success of a Surprise Attack.

In general, we charge the enemy when he is not prepared, in circumstances where he is frightened and flustered. If we really want to strike when the enemy is not expecting us and attain success, the following points should be attended to:

(1) We must act rapidly and secretly and not allow our pains to be revealed prematurely.

(2) We must strike at a time when the enemy's warning system is not very alert.

(3) We must make an empty display, and attack in several places at once, so that the enemy's reaction is confused, his forces are frightened and hamper one another, and he cannot use all his strength to resist us stubbornly.

(4) In carrying out the surprise attack, we must attack at the appointed hours; there must be no noise; no shots must be fired; there must be no battle cries. We must make every soldier understand the use of the arms employed in a surprise attack, which are the bayonet and the hand grenade. We must not return fire simply because we hear the gunfire of the enemy. It is only when we have an opportunity to take advantage of the situation to attack the enemy that we should launch our attack, with our vanguard well supported by our rear guard, choosing frontal, flanking, or direct blows.

7. Dispositions Following the Success of a Surprise Attack.

(1) As soon as the tasks of a surprise attack have been carried out, a guerrilla unit should rapidly withdraw. Before withdrawing, it is best to go a few *li*, in a false direction, and then afterward turn and go in our true direction, so that the enemy will be unable to discover our tracks, and will not be able to follow us.

(2) It is not appropriate for a guerrilla unit to take along prisoners, or to acquire large amounts of booty, which hinder our movement. It is best to require the prisoners first to hand over their weapons, and then to disperse them or to execute them. As for booty, it should be dispatched by the local government, or by the population.

(3) During the battle, three officers and men out of every company should be given the exclusive task of picking up and gathering together abandoned rifles and ammunition. After a victorious battle, we should devote all our efforts to collecting everything on the battlefield, and we can also call upon the pop-

ulation of nearby areas to gather such things together, so that not the smallest trifle is left behind.

8. Dispositions Following the Defeat of a Surprise Attack.

If a surprise attack is defeated, we should rapidly withdraw to the place of assembly designated in advance. The usual assembly point is in the place where we encamped the previous night. If our forces are sufficient, we can leave a reserve unit along the designated withdrawal route to look out for prisoners and wounded men.

CHAPTER VIII

Espionage

1. Points for Attention When Carrying Out Espionage.

(1) All reports on the situation should be transmitted without loss of time to one's superiors or to friendly armies.

(2) The reports which we collect absolutely must be in full detail. All sloppy and negligent reporting must be severely prohibited.

(3) The scope of espionage is not limited merely to the situation of the enemy; spies should also pay attention to the terrain. We should be informed of all aspects of the terrain that are disadvantageous to us, especially those aspects favourable to the enemy, such as narrow roads, river crossings, circuitous routes for avoiding these river crossings and narrow roads, etc.

(4) We should bend every effort to obtain complete and detailed information regarding all matters having any relation to our guerrilla unit; our efforts should never cease until we understand the situation thoroughly.

(5) We should pay attention to the sentiments of the people toward ourselves and the enemy. Are the people actively aiding us? How is their positive attitude manifested?

2. Methods of Espionage.

Apart from sending out courageous and intelligent individuals (i.e. spies) to carry out espionage on every hand, a guerrilla unit must unite closely with the popular masses of the place in question. Moreover, in strategically important places, we use reliable local inhabitants or those among the people who sympathize with the guerrilla unit (for example, we can make use of feudal relationships and find a relative, or someone belonging to the family of a person who has been executed by the enemy; we can also employ those among the people who hate the enemy, etc.). We give these people a relatively good salary, establish a secret espionage network, as well as a system of sentries, so that we can transmit information with facility.

3. Espionage Regarding the Number of the Enemy's Troops, his Tactical Skill, and his Armament.

(1) Where are so and so many enemy infantrymen, cavalrymen, artillerymen, and other units to be found? How many armored cars and trains, tanks, and airplanes does the enemy have? And where are they?
(2) What kind of defensive works does the enemy have in his front, in his rear, and around his cities and other places? What kind of forces are defending?
(3) Where are the enemy's encampments and arsenals?
(4) What about the enemy's reserves and flanking troops? Where are they?
(5) How is the morale of the enemy soldiers? Are they prepared to fight or not? What are their relations with the people and with their own officers?
(6) What about the enemy army's supplies of military equipment, bedding and clothes, food, and other items?

4. Espionage Regarding the Terrain.

(1) First of all, we must pay attention to the important roads within this area, as well as their direction, their width, their type of surface, whether or not they are muddy, etc., and whether or not they are suitable for use by all types of forces.
(2) Are there any forest or not? If there are, we must pay attention to the kinds of trees and to their area.
(3) We must consider rivers, their width and depth, their rate of flow, the slope and type of soil of the banks. Are there bridges, ferries, or other means for crossing the river? If there are bridges, will they bear up under artillery, the baggage train, and other types of unit?
(4) Are there any marshes? Where? What is their area? Can they be crossed or not? If so, we must note what kinds of troops can get through them.

CHAPTER IX

Ambushes

1. Types of Ambush.

When we emerge suddenly from hiding, and strike a sudden blow at the enemy who is just passing by, this is called an ambush. The sole habitual tactic of a guerrilla unit is the ambush. By means of an ambush it is extremely easy to obtain a good result, and as a general rule they are always advantageous. Such action is divided into the following types:

(1) Ambush by luring the enemy. This occurs when our troops, so to speak, prostrate themselves and hold out both arms, enticing the enemy to penetrate deeply. It is carried out by first placing our main force in ambush along the two sides of the road, or in a hiding place on one side, and then attacking the enemy with a small force. This force then feigns defeat and withdraws, luring the enemy deep into our lines, after which the main force rushes out from one side or both sides and carries out a surprise attack.

(2) Waiting ambushes. These are very similar to ambushes by luring the enemy, but it is not necessary for a part of our forces to feign defeat. Instead, we establish an observation post on some height, to observe the movements, of the enemy army, and when his main force has reached the appropriate point, we rush out and attack him by surprise.

2. Spots for Carrying Out Ambushes, and Objectives to be Attacked.

Ambushes can be carried out against a variety of objectives such as isolated enemy soldiers, couriers, whole mobile units, logistic convoys, transport columns, trains, etc. Further details are given below.

(1) When ambushing the enemy's cavalry or infantry, we should choose a spot where they cannot use their weapons and where it is not easy for them to manifest their full strength.

(2) Ambushes against logistic convoys or transport columns should be carried out in the midst of a forest or in the countryside.

(3) Ambushes of small enemy units, or whole mobile units or motorized transport columns are most valuable. But we must first understand their plans, the direction in which they are advancing, and the time it will take them to pass. We must also reflect in detail on the location for the ambush and carefully seek out a place likely to contribute to a favourable result. At the same time, we must carefully select in advance the route for our own withdrawal.

(4) When a guerrilla unit carries out an ambush against a railroad train, our forces can be split into three parts. The first part should take up battle positions near the railroad, to guard against resistance from the train. The second part should take up a position on the two sides of the train, and shoot into the carriage. The third part has the task of charging and boarding the train to make a search, unloading the cargo, taking charge of the weapons, etc.

3. The Terrain in Ambushes

The point at which an ambush is carried out must have the following features:

(1) It must have good cover, in order to prevent being observed by the enemy and, at the same time, permit us to observe the enemy.

(2) It must permit us to employ our maximum fire power.

(3) It must allow us to leap out rapidly at one bound from ambush and come to grips with the enemy. Hence, between the point where we lie in ambush and the enemy, there should be a dense forest, a damp depression, a narrow road, or some other intervening ground.

4. The Distance from Which an Ambush Should be Carried Out.

If the guerrilla unit which carries out a surprise attack is in sufficient strength so that it wants to come to grips with the enemy at one bound, then it should stage its ambush near the side of the road. If, on the other hand, the enemy is in considerable strength, and our plan is merely to harass him and cause confusion, then we should remain in a place some distance from the road.

5. Important Tricks for an Ambush.

(1) An ambush can most advantageously be carried out in silence. Whether by day or night, loud talking should be absolutely forbidden, as should patrolling along the front.

(2) Remaining a long time in ambush can easily lead to discovery of our plans and an increase in the danger. Because of remaining too long in ambush, the state of tension of our men is gradually weakened, and they can no longer maintain their vigilance. Hence, one can easily be discovered by the enemy. A point that especially merits attention is that, if we have already been discovered by the enemy, we should immediately either launch our attack or withdraw.

CHAPTER X

Surprise Attacks on the Enemy's Foraging Units

1. Occasions for Surprise Attacks.

A charge against the enemy's foraging units should be carried out under the following circumstances:

(1) It can be executed when the enemy unit is nearing a village.

(2) We can wait until the enemy enters a village and has scattered in all directions to forage from door to door, and then carry it out.

(3) We can wait until the enemy has finished foraging and is returning loaded with booty, and then attack by surprise from ambush.

(4) Which of the above types of attack is most appropriate should be determined with reference to the circumstances, by the persons who are responsible for the guerrilla unit. They should carefully evaluate all the factors and make arrangements adapted to circumstances.

2. Surprise Attacks in a Village.

It is most advantageous to attack the enemy's foraging units in a village. At such a time the greater part of the enemy's foraging unit is scattered all over the place, and it is not easy for them to gather together quickly. But, in carrying out this type of surprise attack we must steal by the enemy's warning outposts or capture his sentinels without the slightest sound; only then can we make our attack.

3. Surprise Attacks Outside a Village.

If the force carrying out a surprise attack is especially weak, it must wait until the foraging is completed and until the foraging column has reached a place favourable to a surprise attack—such as when it is passing through a forest, across a bridge, or along a narrow road—before attacking.

4. The Objectives of the Surprise Attack.

When a guerrilla unit has attacked and dispersed the enemy unit covering a foraging operation, it can reckon only that it has completed part of its attack. It must also destroy or capture all of their wagons. Consequently, the guerrilla unit should first engage the enemy covering unit in combat and then attack the logistic convoy with its main force and capture it.

5. Points to Which the Guerrilla Unit Should Pay Attention.

It is easy to obtain the assistance of the local population when attacking one of the enemy's foraging units. Hence, within the limits of what is possible, part of the property seized should be given to the popular masses, to heighten their courage.

CHAPTER XI

Surprise Attacks on the Enemy's Transport Units

An attack on a transport column is one of the most advantageous forms of action for a guerrilla unit, since we can obtain in this manner the weapons, food, and supplies we need.

1. Sudden Surprise Attacks.

With such attacks, we can frighten the enemy out of his wits, and precipitate him into a state of complete confusion.

The coolies of the transport units are, in large part, timid peasants forcibly impressed. Moreover, the size of the covering force is limited, and it is generally spread out over a very long distance. If we overturn one of the wagons, we can make all the wagons behind it stop too.

2. Methods of Attack.

(1) The guerrilla unit must not forget that its task is not to defeat the enemy, but to capture the enemy's wagons. Consequently, we should detail only a part of our forces to do battle with the enemy's covering unit. The rest of our men should be ordered to plunder, pursue, and demolish the materials he is transporting. Hence, whenever we carry out such a surprise attack, we should do our best to contrive matters so as to open fire rapidly against the transport unit and cause them to stop, in order to increase their confusion and fear.

(2) In order to stop the whole transport column, it is only necessary to shoot at the front part of it, because, under conditions of mass anxiety and bewilderment, when the wagons in front stop, they will interfere with one another, fall over on the side of the road, and bring about a situation of extreme confusion. If there are a large number of transport wagons, and if, because the front of the column is under fire, the wagons at the rear endeavor to turn around and escape, the guerrilla unit should send out a small number of riflemen to shoot furiously from cover at the tail end of the column, so that it does not dare turn around.

(3) If the unit carrying out the surprise attack is in an inferior position, and the covering unit is taking active precautionary measures, the guerrilla unit should exhaust the enemy by incessant false alarms, and then when the transport column is passing through a forest or valley or along a narrow road in some other type of terrain, where the enemy's logistic convoy cannot easily turn around, the attack should be swiftly carried out.

It is not often advantageous to carry out a surprise attack on a baggage train in a village, for the covering unit and the logistic convoy can easily make use of the houses and other cover, and offer strong resistance.

(4) If the covering unit has already been dispersed by our attack, the resistance of the transport unit has also been overcome, and enemy reinforcements cannot arrive in time, the guerrilla unit can then destroy the wagons and the goods they are carrying or destroy completely whatever the guerrillas cannot carry away or have no use for.

CHAPTER XII

The Correspondence Network of a Guerrilla Unit and the Destruction of Communications Facilities in the Rear

1. The Object of the Network.

So that they may be able to call upon one another for aid and receive information at all times regarding the situation of the enemy, guerrilla units should do their utmost to maintain the closest and most solid relations with the local population for the exchange of correspondence.

2. Means for Maintaining Relations.

In order to set up such a correspondence network, we should, in addition to utilizing the telephone in the greatest possible measure, employ all means at hand. These include runners, messengers on horseback, messengers on bicycles, secret couriers posted in advance for transmitting information, as well as transmittal by sentries, and even signals and pre-established signs, etc.

3. Methods for Transmitting Reports.

(1) A network for important correspondence should be set up. Reports of an urgent character can best be transmitted by messengers on horseback. When this is impossible, we should send out reliable individuals particularly good at going on foot. It is also possible to arrange in advance for the transmittal of secret letters. There are times, too, when we must send out several men, each of them taking a different route, to make certain that the report in question will reach its destination. (This method should be limited to the most important reports.)

(2) As for ordinary reports that are not particularly important, they are commonly transmitted by runners or messengers on bicycles. There are times when one can also use faithful individuals from among the local population who are thoroughly familiar with the routes to carry such reports.

4. Signals for Communications.

For the sake of convenience in guiding each guerrilla group or unit by day or by night, in its actions in mountainous terrain or in forests, the commander of a guerrilla unit should establish in advance a certain number of basic signals and signs (such as signals fires at night, smoke signals by day, coloured pennants, flags, semaphore signaling by flags, paper signals, whistles, bugle calls, etc.).

5. Dispositions Regarding Routes of Communication in the Rear.

Should we or should we not destroy the routes of communication in the enemy's rear? We must reflect in detail about this problem. If we conclude that, in the future, our own army will not need to utilize these roads, or will not be able to utilize them, then we can destroy them.

6. Points for Attention in Destroying Routes of Communication.

If we want to destroy routes of communication, we must be thoroughly familiar with the terrain. It is only then that, moving rapidly and elusively, we appear suddenly and quickly withdraw. In eliminating the enemy's sentries, we must not fire a shot, in order not to alert them and give them a chance to flee.

7. Precautions When Beginning the Destruction of Routes of Communication.

When we begin the destruction of routes of communication, we must first send out a detachment to the place where the presence of the enemy has been reported, in order to keep an eye on the enemy's patrols and his small detachments, so that they cannot quickly and secretly get close to the point where our own unit is at work. If, while beginning work, we are discovered by the enemy, we should shoot at him to keep him from coming nearer.

8. Methods of Destroying Works on the Ground.

(1) Railroads should be destroyed at the points where they are most difficult to repair, such as at curves, at points where the railway is hidden from view, where the enemy's precautions are lax, where we can work under cover, or where we can destroy a large length of track. When destroying the rails, we should bend them, or hollow out the ground beneath them. In low-laying places we should dig ditches. As for tunnels, we should obstruct them.

(2) Railroad ties, wooden bridges, telegraph and telephone poles, etc., should be burned up. Wires should be carried away or dropped into the water.

(3) Signals switches, semaphores, railroad carriages, etc., located in the stations should be destroyed, preferably by blowing them up with explosives.

(4) In destroying cobblestone roads, highways, bridges, and other constructions, we must in all cases choose a method of destruction appropriate to the nature of the construction.

CHAPTER XIII

Regular Hiding Places and Precautions to be Taken When We Halt

1. Marshaling Our Troops.

The problem is not merely one of resting and marshaling out troops. We require a place that can also be used for conserving ammunition and food and for receiving and looking after wounded and sick soldiers. Hence, the place in question commonly serves also as a supporting point in time of battle. As soon as we are the objects of the enemy's pursuit and attack, we withdraw there, and secretly hide, so as to await an opportunity to act or to begin resisting the enemy again.

2. The Choice of a Spot.

(1) A hiding place where we can rest for a long time may conveniently be found deep in the forest, in a thatched hut near a marsh, in a cave under the ground or in a mountainside, on a lonely farm, or in a small and secluded hamlet. Because of the sympathy it enjoys a small guerrilla unit normally has no difficulty at all in finding a regular hiding place.

(2) A guerrilla unit must absolutely maintain the strictest secrecy regarding the hiding places it has selected. Even one's closest friends and relatives must not be informed if they have no connection with the guerrilla unit in question.

If our original hiding place has been discovered by the enemy, then, in general, we should not wait for the enemy to come and attack us but must quickly remove elsewhere.

(3) Sometimes such hiding places also serve as storehouses for military equipment, powder, and provisions, and also for receiving wounded and sick soldiers. More often, a separate secret location in the vicinity of the hiding place is selected for each type of storehouse because there are people continually going in and out of a hiding place and it can very easily be discovered by the enemy.

(4) The more individuals there are among the people who support the guerrillas, so that the guerrilla unit can also maintain a communications network among the people, the easier it is for the guerrilla unit to find a hiding place. There are times when, in order to evade the enemy's pursuit and attack, and find a good place to hide, a given guerrilla unit must be split up, each of its members being obliged to find a way to hide himself in one of the houses of the local population. In such circumstances, the local population is the only hope

of salvation of the members of the guerrilla unit.

3. The Question of Provisions.

In places where the local population is hostile to the guerrillas, there is no alternative to foraging backed by force, but one should send reliable people from among the detachment, in order to guard against pillaging.

When the guerrilla unit does not fear discovery, it can send out a special small unit to forage for food, to collect contributions of food, or to demand food supplies from the local authorities.

4. Changing One's Halting Place.

The best method by which a guerrilla unit can maintain its own security is through the agility of its action. In case of necessity, the unit can make a habit of changing its halting place every night (if, during the day, it has been in village A, at twilight it moves to village B).

5. Occupying a Halting Place.

When a guerrilla unit encamps, the arrangement of its forces should be determined entirely by the nature of its action, but it should not occupy a large village that its own forces are insufficient to hold. If a guerrilla unit cannot do otherwise, and finds itself in such a place, it should occupy only a few collective dwellings situated apart and convenient for defense. The best thing is to be located in a village where one can keep a lookout in all directions, especially on the road along which the enemy might come. We must absolutely not disperse the members of the unit to stay in different houses, acting, for the sake of individual convenience, in a way of which the enemy could take advantage. In order to keep the enemy from knowing where we are staying, the best method is to enter the village only late at night. Moreover, we should look about carefully on all sides of the village and not allow anyone at all to come out.

6. The Degree of Precautions.

In order to avoid excessive fatigue to the members of a guerrilla unit, and to assure them of a real rest, it is not necessary to send out large numbers of scouts to sound a warning. It suffices to arrange for military outposts and concealed scouts in all adjoining places and along all roads (those which the enemy must take, or those related to us). We should also send out spies to places from 2 to 4 *li* away. This distance will be sufficient.

Whether or not the enemy attacks us, we must always fix an assembly point at a distance of from 10 to 16 *li*, for use in case of withdrawal. Moreover, the roads leading to the assembly point should be designated and marked in advance (but there must be at least two roads giving access to such a place).

7. Preparations.

When a guerrilla unit is staying in a place, all its members, whether they be officers or soldiers, must at all times take measures to prepare for battle. Especially after twilight, every officer and soldier must gather together the arms and other equipment he carries with him, and arrange them in proper order, so that it will be convenient, in case there is an alarm in the dark, for him to go out quickly and meet the attack.

8. When There is Anxiety About a Surprise Attack by the Enemy.

(1) If the guerrilla unit itself is especially alert, if its intelligence network is organized with exceptional discretion, and if the people of the area are in sympathy with us, so that they regularly report all movements to us, then it is extremely difficult for the enemy to mount sudden surprise attacks. But whatever the circumstances may be, we must always exercise due caution.

(2) In order to prevent the enemy relying on a hostile population from coming and making a surprise attack on us, we must take special precautionary measures. Thus by methods of intimidation we warn the local population, we arrest and detain people. But at the same time, the unit must exercise caution and be prepared.

(3) If there is an alarm, we should assemble the whole unit in a building that has been prepared for defense. We should dispatch to this building advance sentries and observers as required. The entrance to the building should be closed by movable obstacles, and we should establish in advance signals for the defense. Weapons and other equipment should be properly prepared and placed within reach of each man.

(4) When circumstances are extremely critical, part of a friendly unit should take over responsibility for the security of our position and the place in which our army is staying, as well as for sending out spies far and wide to add to the warning system. They report constantly to the guerrilla task group on the situation of nearby enemy forces.

(5) When we use artificial obstacles to block the roads, we must make provision for communication with our first line and reserves, as well as with the local population and our correspondence network.

(6) In case of necessity, the roads within villages can be completely blocked

off, or we can leave a way through. Whenever possible, each guerrilla task group should have a prepared position.

9. Dispositions in Case of an Enemy Surprise Attack.

(1) When we discover that the enemy is moving toward us, if we find out from reconnaissance that he is not in strength, we should annihilate him with one sudden blow. If the enemy forces are several times more numerous than ours, we should rapidly withdraw. But while we are withdrawing we should give the enemy a false impression of the direction in which we are moving, so as to conceal our actual route of withdrawal.

(2) If the enemy attacks us by surprise and we do not succeed in evading him, we should exploit in full measure the advantages of a village for defensive action, resist him firmly, and then later take advantage of an opportunity to withdraw.

(3) If we have already lost a village, we should reply by a counterattack or counterblows in order to take it back quickly and save our captured comrades, or those comrades who are clinging to a position and defending it stubbornly to the death. If our action is rapid, we can always attain such objectives, because after a victory the enemy is often in great confusion and lax in his precautions.

(4) The best occasion for carrying out such counterblows, or such a counteroffensive, is just after the victory of the enemy's surprise attack. The sacrifices of a charge under such circumstances are less than those from running away, or from stopping and giving battle in unfavourable terrain following the enemy's attack.

CHAPTER XIV

Training

1. The Scope of Training.

Training is not limited to the military arts; we must also pay attention to political training, to the literacy movement, to training in hygiene, etc. Consequently, when a guerrilla unit is engaged in drills, literacy training should represent an appropriate part of the whole, and can be given in all places and at all times.

For the purpose of achieving a full and satisfactory result from all the kinds of training carried out in a guerrilla unit, we must increase the will to study on their own initiative among the officers and soldiers. Apart from the political aspect, and in addition to increasing political consciousness, we must also promote amusements for the army, mitigate a painful and tedious existence, assist the people in their own self-defense, and cause the armed force of the popular masses to unite closely with us.

2. Training in all Subjects.

The consequence of training in all subjects, though it is difficult to reduce it to uniformity, is, as regards methods in general, to proceed from the superficial to the profound, first the broad and then the rigorous, from the simple and easy to the complex and difficult, first the partial and then the universal. In all fields, one must demonstrate one's theories by concrete experience, so as to strengthen the students' confidence.

3. Cultivating the People's Capacity for Self-Defense.

The most pressing and most important task of a guerilla unit is to carry out guerrilla attacks without ceasing in the places occupied by the enemy, to seize and kill all traitors and reactionaries, and to protect the popular masses. At the same time, a guerrilla unit must investigate the concrete offenses of the enemy and use every possible method to discover and smash his tricks and plots. Therefore:

(1) It is advantageous to make known our good government, to make great efforts to unite with the popular masses, and to support the forces of the popular masses. Such actions can also be carried out on the territory of the enemy. We should also use every possible method and devote all our strength to encourage the people to imitate our own actions, stimulate them to fight the

enemy actively, and guide their combat.

(2) Our action in supporting the people's capacity for self-defense should be of long duration, and not ephemeral. We must do the best we can to let people know that, at all times, a guerrilla unit struggles and sacrifices itself for the popular masses and, even in the case of the most dangerous crisis, will absolutely not harm the popular masses. If the local population meets with a defeat in its first military action, after we have drawn it into the war, its spirit of struggle will necessarily be dissipated to some extent. When the masses falter in this way, we must devise a way to rouse their enthusiasm and to bring their spirit of struggle to a high level once more.

(3) A guerrilla unit constitutes the most conscious and advanced segment of the people. Hence, they should first unite those among the popular masses who are dissatisfied with the enemy and who accept the leadership of those we send among them. We must also aid the people to establish plans, to get arms, and to establish liaison and mutual assistance with mass organizations in neighboring villages and even in other cities that are victims of the enemy's oppression. But, in carrying out all such work, we must maintain the strictest secrecy.

4. Training in Hygiene.

(1) In order to strengthen its own fighting capacity, every mess unit should designate one or two soldiers as nurses, to treat the ailments of the officers and soldiers when they arise and, also, to explain the rudiments of hygiene, as well as to assist, direct, supervise, and encourage all matters of hygiene in the unit.

(2) Replenishing stocks of medicines is an extremely difficult matter in a guerrilla unit. Hence we should, in accordance with the seasons, etc., prepare certain medicines especially for emergency care, and other normally indispensable medicines. As regards wounded and seriously ill members of the unit, when there is no alternative, they are entrusted to fellow soldiers with some slight medical knowledge or to local inhabitants sympathetic to us.

5. Military Training.

Military training all relates to the enemy army. Its purpose is to create greater skill than that of the enemy in each specialized art.

(1) Subjects. The items requiring particular attention are dispersing, assembling, marksmanship, maneuvering an army, mountain climbing, construction of military works, night fighting, mountain fighting, fighting on narrow roads, espionage and security measures, searches, liaison, and other such actions.

(2) Methods. In carrying out military instruction, particular attention should be paid to all methods of teaching and explanation, which should be more or less as described below:

a. For theoretical instruction one can employ the method of giving suggestions and the method of questions and answers. All methods of teaching that adopt the style of speechmaking and injecting [ideas into the students' heads] should be eliminated in so far as possible.

b. When explaining actions, we should pay attention to linking our talks with the living reality, so that it will be easy for the soldiers to understand us.

c. We should devote more time to concrete demonstrations of actions and less time to talking about empty theories. Consequently, the greatest effort should be made to diminish the duration and number of classroom sessions and the number of practical exercises should be increased.

d. All explanations in the classroom should in so far as possible correspond to the exercises outside.

e. All demonstrations of actions should be carefully prepared in advance before they are executed. All negligent and perfunctory behaviour—doing things any old way—must absolutely be eliminated.

f. With respect to all activities, we should devise a way to incite the officers and soldiers to carry out a competition, in order to increase the spirit of initiative and the positive attitude they manifest in their work, and to speed up the work.

g. Increase applied training, diminish training according to a fixed pattern, and correct the erroneous idea that training according to a fixed pattern is useful in maintaining military discipline.

h. The plan of training should be suited to the circumstances, time, and place in which it is to be carried out. The training plan must absolutely not be rigid; we must seize every occasion and strive to give training adapted to the circumstances. This is done more or less as indicated below:

(i) We utilize the time when the army is on the march to carry on direction finding, recognizing differences in terrain, estimating distances, reconnaissance action, and designating objectives and the utilization of terrain.

(ii) When we are in camp, we utilize preparations for security measures in order to carry out exercises in all kinds of observation and precautions, beginning with the role of advanced sentries. We also provide training in construction of military works.

(iii) We utilize the opportunity provided by a battle, and before setting out or before the fighting begins, we explain, on the basis of the tasks we have been ordered to perform, such forms of action as ambushes, surprise attacks, main attacks, and supporting attacks, etc.

(iv) We utilize the opportunity, when we are awaiting the moment for action, to explain in practical terms how we resist the charges of the enemy, as well as shooting and other such military actions.

(v) We utilize post-battle exposition and criticism (such exposition and criticism should be based on a minute investigation of the facts, carried out beforehand) to point out the strength and weaknesses in our actions during the battle and what was appropriate and inappropriate in the individual commands, thus giving a concrete lesson to all officers and men.

(vi) We utilize the time offered by morning and evening roll calls to give various kinds of talks.

(vii) We utilize the occasion offered by the recreation period to put on games, dances, and modern style plays, having military significance, thus imperceptibly increasing the officers' and soldiers' desire to correct themselves, and increasing their willingness to follow good examples.

(viii) We utilize each occasion of reward and punishment to carry out thorough propaganda among the officers and soldiers, in order to increase the soldiers' sense of achievement and their shame in doing evil, and thus, little by little, fostering a good military discipline.

6. Political Training.

In order to assure that all the independent actions of a guerrilla unit attain complete victory, apart from reinforcing military training, the most important thing is that we must make certain that the officers and soldiers have a high level of "political consciousness" and of "devotion" to their own cause. Political training is the only method by which this objective can be attained. Its content is described in detail later on.

7. The Literacy Movement.

In order to increase the cultural level of the officers and soldiers, so that they may more easily absorb all kinds of training, each mess unit must carry out literacy training. The methods are as follows:

(1) The "A" class includes all those who know about fifty characters.
(2) The "B" class includes those who know above twenty characters.
(3) The "C" class includes those who know no characters at all.
(4) The teachers of the various classes consist of those in the unit with a

relatively high cultural level.

(5) When we halt, there should be an hour each day devoted to the study of characters. When we are on the march, we can carry out instruction either while moving or during rest periods. In such training, the important thing is regularity rather than speed. In general, if the soldiers learn two words a day, it is excellent.

CHAPTER XV

Political Work

1. The Aim of the Political Work of a Guerrilla Unit.

This aim lies in strengthening and raising to a higher level the fighting capacity of each member of the unit. The fighting capacity of a guerrilla unit is not determined exclusively by military arts, but depends above all on political consciousness, political influence, setting in motion the broad popular masses, disintegrating the enemy army, and inducing the broad popular masses to accept our leadership. All the plans of a guerrilla unit, whether they be political, military, or of any other nature, are all directed toward this single end.

2. The Main Content of Political Work.

We must carry out political instruction directed toward the resurrection of our people (stimulate the soldiers' national consciousness, their patriotism, and their love for the people and for the masses) and see to it that every officer and soldier in a guerrilla unit understands not only the national tasks for which he is responsible but also the necessity of fighting in defense of our state.

We must also pay attention to supporting the leaders, to maintaining the solidarity of the unit with real sincerity, to carrying out to the end the orders of one's superiors, and to maintaining an iron military discipline. We must see to it that the multitude of the soldiers are of a single mind and endowed with the resolve and the will to save our country together.

Apart from strengthening its own fighting capacity, a guerrilla unit must also carry out propaganda among the masses regarding the plots of the invaders and of the enemy.

3. Discussions in Small Groups.

These are excellent activities to unite our walls, to strengthen confidence, and to proclaim our doctrine.

(1) We collect the view of all the comrades, in order to avoid feelings of alienation and to achieve the effect of gathering together ideas and obtaining greater advantage.

(2) By training the cadres, we increase their capacity for work and give them more practice in techniques for holding meetings and in methods of speaking. We will also be able to solve problems more quickly, investigate the past, and transform the future.

(3) We can thus verify the fellowship existing among the members of the unit, and draw new comrades into the party.

(4) This method is convenient for training, and makes it possible to understand completely each comrade's circumstances, capacity, and knowledge.

(5) According to their character, these activities can be divided into discussion meetings, review meetings, and criticism meetings.

4. Methods

Before the meeting we must prepare for it. These preparations consist in informing the members of the group, establishing the essential subject matter of the discussion, and, at the same time, reporting to the next higher echelon.

(1) As regards the number of participants, from three to five represents the optimum.

(2) One should not be bound by any rigid pattern. Discussion meetings can be held at all times and in all places.

(3) As for the time limit, it is not desirable that the meetings should last too long. One hour is the maximum permissible.

(4) It is appropriate to hold one meeting a week. The order of procedure consists in a report by the chairman, discussion of the report by the participants, and a conclusion entrusted to the leader of the group. The record of the meeting should indicate in detail the name of' the chairman, the subjects of discussion, the number of those present and absent, and the place where the meeting was held.

(5) Not more than two problems at most should be discussed. The discussions should have as its starting point the individual problems of the participants.

(6) As for the manner of speaking, it is appropriate that the remarks of the participants should deal with essentials and be simple and clear. They should be systematic and not repetitive. They should be persuasive in content and presented in a friendly and agreeable manner. In answering questions, one should avoid any hint of mockery and pay attention to what the others say. At the same time, one should arrive at a decision concerning the topic discussed.

(7) As regards the leader of the group, his report should be simple. He should not give a long and repetitive presentation but seize the occasion to induce the participants to speak.

(8) The conclusion should follow the inductive method. It should include a criticism of the whole of the discussions. If there are dissident conclusions, they may also be expressed.

5. Carrying out Political Work.

One should not merely rely on a few political workers. The best thing is to be able to attract and train conscious elements, or interested officers and soldiers, to participate in the work and to train the whole personnel of the unit so that they can all carry on effective political work.

6. Types of Political Work.

In broad terms, political work can be divided into three categories according to whether it is carried out in ordinary times, during battle, or after a battle. As for propaganda destined to encourage the troops, the various aspects are as indicate below:

(1) Political work in ordinary times. We intensify political training in order to raise the level of political consciousness, create unity in thought, word, and deed, maintain an iron military discipline, and unite closely with the popular masses. The methods are roughly as follows:

a. We must really put into practice the principles of not disturbing or harming the people (such as "Pay fairly for what you buy," "Speak politely," "Return everything you borrow", and "Pay for anything you damage").

b. At all times and in all places, aid the popular masses and help them to solve their difficulties (for example, help the popular masses to gather the harvest or to cultivate their land and send our army doctors to prevent epidemics or treat the people's ailments, or to enquire after people who have suffered difficulties and devise methods to aid them), maintain the unity of the army and the people, and encourage the spirit of sharing both good fortune and adversity together.

c. Chat frequently with the popular masses and let them know about our military discipline and our affection for them, and also learn in detail about the hunger and suffering among the people.

d. Frequently hold joint entertainment sessions for the soldiers and the people, so as to smooth over any feelings of alienation between the army and the people and increase the affection of the army and the people for one another.

(2) Resolving any feelings of alienation between the lower and higher ranks of officers and soldiers. The methods employed are roughly as follows:

a. Persons engaged in political training, apart from sharing the good fortune and adversity of the soldiers, should also frequently chat with the soldiers, carefully investigate all their deep griefs and report their problems at all times to their superior officers, and devise methods for improving the situation.

b. As regards all the opinions of higher and lower ranks, we should take our stand on a position of pure rational knowledge, convince them by an attitude of sincere entreaty, and explain things to them. We must make absolutely certain that higher and lower ranks unite solidly as one man, and we must strengthen their capacity to unite.

c. With respect to soldiers who violate discipline, we should use educational methods to persuade them. All corporal punishment and insults must absolutely be reduced.

d. We should frequently hold meetings at which officers and soldiers can enjoy themselves together, in order to heighten the affection between officers and soldiers.

(3) Augmenting the officers' and soldiers' hatred of the enemy, and increasing their resolve to fight to the death to kill the enemy. Increasing the common hatred of the enemy is an important factor in strengthening the soldiers' morale. Consequently, a guerrilla unit should pay particular attention to all the atrocities of the enemy, and to all the instances in which he massacres our army or our people, and carry out propaganda generally among the army regarding these atrocities, so as to heighten the courage of the officers and soldiers to fight to the death and harden their resolve to fight the enemy to the death, since either we or they must perish.

(4) Strengthening confidence in the inevitable victory of our war against the enemy. The methods are more or less as follows:

a. We must frequently avail ourselves of the tales of the glorious feats of arms in our past, in order to carry out propaganda among our officers and soldiers and inspire them.

b. We put forward examples of the enemy's defects (such as difficulties, collapses, and other problems that he has recently encountered), in order to demonstrate that in the end the enemy must be defeated.

c. We must put forward examples of our own strong points (such as the support of the popular masses, transmission of information, familiarity with the terrain) and the present victorious circumstances, in order to demonstrate that we must ultimately triumph.

d. By exposing the clever tricks habitually used by the enemy, we make known the points to which our army should pay particular attention, in order to prevent the emergence of a mentality of fearing or underestimating the enemy.

After we have suffered an attack, we sink for a time into a situation characterized by difficulties and painful effort, and as a consequence we underestimate ourselves, exaggerate the enemy's strength, and lose our confidence in victory.

7. Political Work in Time of Battle.

Political work before we set out is carried on as described below.

(1) The commander-in-chief of the unit first calls a meeting of the cadres. He explains in what respects the existing political situation is favourable to us, as well as the conditions of victory and the significance of the battle. He also explains the methods and points for attention in attaining our goal, but without infringing military secrecy.

(2) On the basis of the meeting of the cadres, the political training section immediately calls meetings of political workers at all levels, at which the essential points and the methods of propaganda are explained and concrete tasks are assigned.

(3) The various groups immediately call meetings of all the officers and soldiers, at which, in addition to reporting on the current political situation and the guarantees of our victory, conditions for competition are also put forward. ("He who is lightly wounded should not leave the firing line, he who is seriously wounded should not cry out in pain"; "Let us see who can hand in the most weapons"; or Let us see who can take the most prisoners.") At the same time, tasks are distributed to all political workers and activists (supervision, leadership, or propaganda).

(4) Political workers should be sent to the local population to gather them together, call meetings, and give talks, inspiring them to participate in the battle or to join the ranks of the porters or the transport units. As regards the organizations of the popular masses, we should guide them in methods of calling meetings, of fighting, and of preparing mobilization.

(5) After the battle has begun, the most important political training workers should be sent to inspire the units responsible for the main attack or for particularly important actions. The less important political training workers should be sent to inspire the less important fighting units.

(6) Propaganda units and groups of singers and dancers (all composed of lively and lovable boys in uniform and attractive clothing) should be sent in advance to positions along the side of the roads where the army will advance, to give short talks, sing, dance, or shout slogans, so as to inspire the maximum of courage in the officers and soldiers.

8. Political Work After the Battle has Begun.

(1) After the battle has begun, we should pay attention to calling out slogans to the soldiers of the other side, so as to dissipate their morale. This is one of the forms taken by our work of sabotage.

(2) When the situation on the battlefield enters the stage of an encounter at close range or from positions arrayed opposite one another, we devise a method for holding a joint meeting with the soldiers of the opposite side and take advantage of this opportunity to give them food, in order to gladden their hearts. After this, we carry on more propaganda work, which must be prepared in advance.

(3) After the battle has begun, we must assuredly carry out propaganda directed toward those outside our army. It is even more important to inspire those within our army. The methods for this work are diverse and are determined primarily by what is adapted to the circumstances. For example:

a. On the attack:

(1) When we suffer a surprise attack by the enemy while advancing tp. attack, we should give an explanation such as the following "Comrades! Airplanes cannot decide a battle. We must seize this opportunity, advance rapidly, and quickly come to grips with the enemy on the ground. Charge the enemy with your bayonets!"

(ii) When firing begins, we should encourage the soldiers in the following terms: "Comrades! Don't shoot at random, shoot only when you have taken careful aim. We must try to kill an enemy with every bullet."

(iii) When we are near the enemy and are about to charge, the method for inspiring the soldiers is as follows: "Comrades! The time to dispose of the enemy has come. We shall pay no attention to sacrifice, we shall summon up our courage, defeat the enemy and annihilate him. Let our victory inspire the whole army! Forward quickly! Charge!"

(iv) When the first charge is repelled and we charge a second time, we should encourage the soldiers as follows: "Comrades! We are an invincible iron army, we are a mighty unit victorious in every battle, we are absolutely resolved to destroy this enemy and preserve our glorious reputation."

(v) When officers are wounded or killed in battle, we should exhort the troops as follows: "Comrades! Our officers (So-and-so) and (So-and-so) have already sacrificed themselves gloriously. Let us tread in their bloody footsteps, complete their task, and annihilate the enemy before us. Let us go and avenge them!"

(vi) If the enemy shows signs of wavering, we should exhort the soldiers as follows: "Comrades! The enemy is wavering. Charge quickly and capture his commander-in-chief alive!"

(vii) When we pursue the enemy, we should exhort the soldiers as follows: "Comrades! The enemy has retreated. Pursue him quickly! Charge and smash the enemy's holding units, finish off his main force, annihilate his whole force. Let us see who can hand in the most arms, and who can take the most prisoners. To win a battle and not to pursue the enemy is a great pity."

b. On the defense:

(i) When the order has been received, we should carry out propaganda as follows: "Comrades! The enemy has arrived. This is the best opportunity to annihilate the enemy. Make skillful use of natural obstacles, and shoot with *sang-froid*. The more of the enemy we kill and wound, the easier it will be for our main attack to progress and obtain results."

(ii) When the enemy charges, we should exhort the troops as follows: "Comrades! The enemy is about to charge. Fix your bayonets, and prepare your hand grenades. Let us summon up our awe-inspiring reputation, preserve the glory we have already won, and annihilate the enemy in front of our position."

(iii) When we are surrounded by the enemy, we should exhort the soldiers as follows: "Comrades! We are an ever-victorious unit. We are a courageous and invincible iron army. We will wage a bloody battle to the end for our people and our country, shed our last drop of blood, hold onto our rifles to the death, and die rather than surrender. To hand over one's rifle is suicide, to surrender is the supreme shame. Let us smash their lines at one point and break through."

(iv) At the time of the counterattack or when the order to go over to the offensive is received: "Comrades! We are counterattacking. Let us take away the enemy's rifles, let us capture the enemy officers, let us see who is most courageous!"

(v) Propaganda when we retreat: "Comrades! Let us keep our movements secret and baffle the enemy in his calculations. Let us open wide our arms and lure the enemy to penetrate deep. Do not break ranks, do not fall behind, do not waver, do not succumb to panic, do not fear sacrifice, execute resolutely to the end the orders of your superiors. Final victory will be ours!"

(vi) When we cover the withdrawal of our forces, the methods for exhorting them are similar to those indicated above.

9. Political Work Following a Battle.

After the battle has been concluded, political work continues.

(1) In order to avoid the appearance of attitudes of slighting the enemy or fearing the enemy, we should pay attention to the following points:

a. We should correctly point out the causes of victory and defeat. We must not become puffed up because of a small victory; still less can we lose our confidence in victory because of a small setback.

b. We must establish the attitude that should be adopted henceforth, or the points requiring attention.

(2) We should collect materials and anecdotes concerning our victory, as well as the names of units, individual officers, and soldiers who have fought courageously. We should then use these materials to compose propaganda outlines, songs, dances, old-and new-style plays, etc.

(3) We should print large numbers of victory announcements and slogans and stick them up everywhere. At the same time, we should organize a roving propaganda unit, which spreads out toward areas established in advance, to carry out propaganda and to call the popular masses together and hold meetings to celebrate the victory.

(4) When meetings are held to celebrate the victory, one should pay attention to the following points:

a. Report on the significance of the victory, and the tasks now before us, as well as the concrete methods to be employed to carry out these tasks.

b. Report on units that have fought courageously, as well as individual officers and soldiers. As for officers and soldiers wounded or killed, one can select the most valuable among them and report about them.

c. Put on new versions of classic plays, as well as songs and dances.

While the reports indicated under a and b above are being delivered, or the play is being put on, the units participating in such a meeting should shout out slogans in accompaniment. We should also bring up the methods for providing pensions to the members of the families of the soldiers killed in battle.

Moreover, we should bring together the prisoners and booty in the sight of the masses, thus further increasing the courage and the spirit of struggle of our soldiers and of the people.

(5) At meetings to celebrate the victory, all organizations should also launch a consolation movement. The main points for attention in this respect are:

a. As regards material consolation, the important thing is not the quantity, but the significance; it is not the elegance and refinement of the items given, but their utility. Such things as straw sandals, face towels, pigs, sheep, chickens, and ducks are all suitable for this purpose.

b. In case there is a lack of goods for material consolation, consolation in the form of honors should be used. For example, one can make flags for presentation, or compose songs in memory of the fallen, or issue an order of the day in their praise.

c. Following a small victory, there should be no large-scale consolation, Consolation should be carried out only if we can devise means for doing it in a place near the battlefield.

(6) We should praise examples of combined operations, autonomous actions, and the resolute application of orders. Thus:

a. When there are those who, in the course of a fierce battle, have achieved victory by combined operations, autonomous action, and the resolute execution of orders, the maximum effort should be made to publicize the fact and to praise them. Those who have the misfortune to be defeated in similar circumstances should also be praised.

b. When there is punishment for those who, in order to preserve their own forces, fail to advance, or fail to carry out their tasks energetically, thus bringing about the defeat of another unit of our army, the case should also be the object of large-scale propaganda within the unit. In this way we give a lesson to the officers and soldiers of the whole unit, or of other units, and make them afraid to commit similar offenses.

10. Work Pertaining to Clubs and Amusement Rooms.

By virtue of the fact that it compensates for a painful and tedious existence in the army, this is also a way of preventing desertion. The essentials regarding the organization and work of clubs are dealt with below.

(1) Rules regarding organization.

a. In order to promote entertainment in the army, compensate for a tedious existence, increase interest in our work, and inspire a taste for study, each mess unit within a guerrilla unit should organize an amusement room. This should be divided into a military section, a guerrilla section, and a physical culture section. Each officer and soldier in the mess unit should choose one of these sections, in accordance with his own nature; he can, if he wishes, participate in two or three of the sections.

b. One person from among the company commanders or the particularly energetic and capable platoon commanders should be chosen to be responsible for the amusement room. Each of the three sections should have a section head, chosen at a meeting of the members of the section, for a period of six months with the possibility of being chosen to succeed himself.

c. Each week there should be one meeting of the section heads and one meeting of the members of each section. A meeting of the leaders should be held once a month. It is called separately by the chairman of the section heads.

d. In its work, the amusement room should follow the guidance of the club of the next higher echelon. It is also subject to the supervision and guidance of the commanding officer of the unit. In military affairs, it is absolutely subordinate to the commanding officer of the unit.

e. In order to guide and unify the work of the various amusement rooms, a guerrilla battalion should establish a club. This club should have a chairman and a secretary who are responsible for all its activities.

f. The club should be attached to the political training section, because the work of the amusement rooms constitutes a kind of political training. If there is no political training section, the club is directly subordinated to the commanding officer.

g. The work of the club consists in guiding and promoting the work of the various amusement rooms. Consequently, each week there should be a meeting of the responsible heads of the various amusement rooms, and each month we should call a meeting of all the officers and soldiers or a meeting of the army and the people together.

All the work of both the clubs and amusement rooms should have as its principle not to interfere with military administration, military training, or military action.

(2) The essentials of the work of clubs and amusement rooms.

a. The work of the military section consists in furthering a spirit of independent study among the officers and soldiers, in discussion of military questions, or in the mutual rectification of the actions of the members in order to remedy the lacks and insufficiencies of military training. Its content is as indicated below.

(i) Bayonet section (practice, taking a hypothetical enemy dummy as the object).

(ii) Grenade section (throwing a wooden hand grenade at a target).

b. Guerrilla section.

(i) Taking aim from a fixed support.

(ii) Checking one's aim.

(iii) Carriage while shooting.

(iv) Investigations when setting out.

(v) Utilization of obstacles.

(vi) Shooting at various types of objectives in the field.

(3) Physical culture section. The work of this section lies in strengthening the bodies of the officers and soldiers. It can also remedy insufficiencies in military training. Its contents is as follows:

a. Ball playing (basketball, football, volleyball, tennis, baseball, etc.).

b. Track and field sports (high jump, broad jump, races, obstacle course).

c. Boxing and swordplay.

(4) Entertainment section. The work of this section consists in providing amusement for the members of the army, in compensating for a tedious existence, and in increasing the soldiers' interest in their work and their taste for study.

a. Joke section. This section can carry on its activities at any time at all, but attention should be paid to the following points:

(i) When jokes are told, we must make them easy to understand. We can take materials from joke books and such, but they should not be too obscene.

(ii) When telling stories, we should devote much time to stories about the abundant exploits and great enterprises of the ancients, and to their excellent words and admirable conduct, in order to achieve an inspirational effect.

(iii) When reporting on the news, we should devote attention to our own victories and to the atrocities of the enemy.

b. Theatrical section. This section utilizes rest periods, both in the evenings and during the day, to put on all sorts of new-style plays, traditional operas, comedy teams, storytellers with drums, etc.—performances that have political content and are at the same time amusing, in order to improve morale.

c. Song and dance section. In accordance with the circumstances in which the unit finds itself and the nature of its tasks, this section composes all sorts of songs in order to stimulate the interest of the officers and soldiers in singing songs, or it puts on dances in costume, assuming various comical attitudes, in order to make the onlookers laugh until they hold their sides.

d. Music section. This is divided into violin, harmonica, guitar and other groups, which can accompany the plays and dances.

e. The methods of work of all sections should be adapted to the time and circumstances. They should be employed in a lively manner, and on no account in a wooden fashion.

f. The work of all sections should be subject to strict control and supervision. We should also use methods of competition to induce all the officers and soldiers to make spontaneous efforts.

g. All kinds of songs and old and new plays, etc.

h. For the benefit of the work, all groups and sections should have specialized talents.

i. The officers and soldiers who participate in these performances should be excused from their other duties.

ON GUERRILLA WARFARE

1. What is Guerrilla Warfare?

In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary part. This is particularly true in war waged for the emancipation of a people who inhabit a vast nation. China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose communications are poor. She finds herself confronted with a strong and victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these circumstances, the development of the type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality of mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be developed to an unprecedented degree and it must coordinate with the operations of our regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat the enemy.

These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance. In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the people were unable to endure any more from the Japanese imperialists. Lenin, in *People and Revolution*, said: 'A people's insurrection and a people's revolution are not only natural but inevitable.' We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a solution to the struggle.

Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare we turn these advantages to the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.

During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.

Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare has certain distinctive characteristics. We first discuss the relationship of guerrilla warfare to national policy. Because ours is the resistance of a semi-colonial country against an imperialism, our hostilities must have a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political responsibilities. Our basic policy is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front. This policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit:

1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.

There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and conducted in complete accord with national anti-Japanese policy. It is only those who misinterpret guerrilla action who say, as does Jen Ch'i Shan, "The question of guerrilla hostilities is purely a military matter and not a political one." Those who maintain this simple point of view have lost sight of the political goal and the political effects of guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people to lose confidence and will result in our defeat.

What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must, if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of counter-revolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation. There are those who do not comprehend guerrilla action, and who therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities of a people's guerrilla war, who say: 'Only regular troops can carry on guerrilla operations.' There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate success of guerilla action, mistakenly say:

'Guerrilla warfare is an insignificant and highly specialized type of operation in which there is no place for the masses of the people' (Jen Ch'i Shan). Then there are those who ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no understanding of the war of resistance (Yeh Ch'ing, for one). The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.

What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all guerrilla bands that spring from the masses of the people suffer from lack of organization at the time of their formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units. Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; they may be formed from an admixture of regular troops with groups of the people, or they may consist of regular army units intact. And mere quantity does not affect this matter. Such units may consist of a squad of a few men, a battalion of several hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand men.

All these must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies—resolute, loyal, sincere, and robust. These men must be well-educated in revolutionary technique, self-confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counter-propaganda. In short, these leaders must be models for the people. As the war progresses, such leaders will gradually overcome the lack of discipline which at first prevails; they will establish discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing their combat efficiency. Thus eventual victory will be attained.

Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who attack the movement as a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. They say: 'This movement is a haven for disappointed militarists, vagabonds, and bandits' (Jen Ch'i Shan), hoping thus to bring the movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are corrupt guerrillas, nor that there are people who under the guise of guerrillas indulge in unlawful activities. Neither do we deny that the movement has at the present time symptoms of a lack of organization, symptoms that might indeed be serious were we to judge guerrilla warfare solely by the corrupt and temporary phenomena we have mentioned. We should study the corrupt, phenomena and attempt to eradicate them in order to encourage guerrilla warfare, and to increase its military efficiency. 'This is hard work, there is no help for it, and the problem cannot be solved immediately. The whole people must try to reform themselves during the course of the war. We must educate them and reform them in light of past experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that are anarchism,' said Lenin, in *On Guerilla Warfare*.

What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather, and the situation of the people.

In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he steps; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and coordination with the effort of the regular armies. But, in spite of the most complete preparation, there can be no victory if mistakes are made in the matter of command. Guerrilla warfare based on the principles we five mentioned and carried out over a vast extent of territory in which communications are inconvenient will contribute tremendously towards ultimate defeat of the Japanese and consequent emancipation of the Chinese people.

A careful distinction must be made between two types of guerrilla warfare. The fact that revolutionary guerrilla warfare is based on the masses of the people does not in itself mean that the organization of guerrilla units is impossible in a war of counter-revolutionary character. As examples of the former type we may cite Red guerrilla hostilities during the Russian Revolution; those of the Reds in China; of the Abyssinians against the Italians for the past three years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria, and the vast anti-Japanese guerrilla war that is carried on in China today. All these struggles have been carried on in the interest of the whole people or the greater part of them; all had a broad basis in the national manpower, and all have been in accord with the laws of historical development. They have existed and will continue to exist, flourish, and develop as long as they are not contrary to national policy.

The second type of guerrilla warfare directly contradicts the law of historical development. Of this type, we may cite the examples furnished by the White

Russian guerrilla units organized by Denikin and Kolchak; those organized by the Japanese; those organized by the Italians in Abyssinia; those supported by the puppet governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, and those that will be organized here by Chinese traitors. All such have oppressed the masses and have been contrary to the true interests of the people. They must be firmly opposed. They are easy to destroy because they lack a broad foundation in the people.

If we fail to differentiate between the two types of guerrilla hostilities mentioned, it is likely that we will exaggerate their effect when applied by an invader. We might arrive at the conclusion that the invader can organize guerrilla units from among the people. Such a conclusion might well diminish our confidence in guerrilla warfare. As far as this matter is concerned, we have but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles.

Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely 'class' type. In the former case, the whole people of a nation, without regard to class or party, carry on a guerrilla struggle that is an instrument of the national policy. Its basis is, therefore, much broader than is the basis of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been said: 'When a nation is invaded, the people become sympathetic to one another and all aid in organizing guerrilla units. In civil war, no matter to what extent guerrillas are developed, they do not produce the same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners' (*Civil War in Russia*). The one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle is its quality of internal purity. One class may be easily united and perhaps fight with great effect, whereas in a national revolutionary war, guerrilla units are faced with the problem of internal unification of different class groups. This necessitates the use of propaganda. Both types of guerrilla war are, however, similar in that they both employ the same military methods.

National guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency, has employed varying implements as times, peoples, and conditions differ. The guerrilla aspects of the Opium War, those of the fighting in Manchuria since the Mukden incident, and those employed in China today are all slightly different. The guerrilla warfare conducted by the Moroccans against the French and the Spanish was not exactly similar to that which we conduct today in China. These differences express the characteristics of different peoples in different periods. Although there is a general similarity in the quality of all these struggles, there are dissimilarities in form. This fact we must recognize. Clausewitz wrote, in *On War*: 'Wars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every period must have its independent theory of war.' Lenin, in *On Guerrilla Warfare*, said: 'As regards the form of fighting, it is unconditionally requisite that history be investigated in order to discover the conditions of environment, the state of economic progress, and the political ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs, and degree of civilization.' Again: 'It is necessary to be completely unsympathetic to abstract formulas and rules and to study with sympathy the conditions of the actual fighting, for these will change in accordance with the political and economic situations and the realization of the people's aspirations. These progressive changes in conditions create new methods.

If, in today's struggle, we fall to apply the historical truths of revolutionary guerrilla war, we will fall into the error of believing with T'ou Hsi Sheng that under the impact of Japan's mechanized army, 'the guerrilla unit has lost its historical function'. Jen Ch'i Shan writes: 'In olden days, guerrilla warfare was part of regular strategy but there is almost no chance that it can be applied today.' These opinions are harmful. If we do not make an estimate of the characteristics peculiar to our anti-Japanese guerrilla war, but insist on applying to it mechanical formulas derived from past history, we are making the mistake of placing our hostilities in the same category as all other national guerrilla struggles. If we hold this view, we will simply be beating our heads against a stone wall and we will be unable to profit from guerrilla hostilities.

To summarize: What is the guerrilla war of resistance against Japan? It is one aspect of the entire war, which, although alone incapable of producing the decision, attacks the enemy in every quarter, diminishes the extent of area under his control, increases our national strength, and assists our regular armies. It is one of the strategic instruments used to inflict defeat on our enemy. It is the one pure expression of anti-Japanese policy, that is to say, it is military strength organized by the active people and inseparable from them. It is a powerful special weapon with which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them.

2. The Relation of Guerrilla Hostilities to Regular Operations

The general features of orthodox hostilities, that is, the war of position and the war of movement, differ fundamentally from guerrilla warfare. There are other readily apparent differences such as those in organization, armament, equipment, supply, tactics, command; in conception of the terms ‘front’ and ‘rear’; in the matter of military responsibilities.

When considered from the point of view of total numbers, guerrilla units are many; as individual combat units, they may vary in size from the smallest, of several score of several hundred men, to the battalion or the regiment, of several thousand. This is not the case in regularly organized units. A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and other units. As a result of this, organization depends largely upon local circumstances. In the case of guerrilla groups, the standard of equipment is of a low order and they must depend for their sustenance primarily upon what the locality affords.

The strategy of guerrilla warfare is manifestly unlike that employed in orthodox operations, as the basic tactic of the former is constant activity and movement. There is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defense that characterizes orthodox war. In guerrilla warfare, the transformation of a moving situation into a positional defensive situation never arises. The general features of reconnaissance, partial deployment, general deployment, and development of the attack that are usual in mobile warfare are not common in guerrilla war.

There are differences also in the matter of leadership and command. In guerrilla warfare, small units acting independently play the principal role and there must be no excessive interference with their activities. In orthodox warfare, particularly in a moving situation, a certain degree of initiative is accorded subordinates, but in principle, command is centralized. This is done because all units and all supporting arms in all districts must coordinate to the highest degree. In the case of guerrilla warfare, this is not only undesirable but impossible. Only adjacent guerrilla units can coordinate their activities to any degree. Strategically, their activities can be roughly correlated with those of the regular forces, and tactically, they must cooperate with adjacent units of the regular army. But there are no strictures on the extent of guerrilla activity nor is it primarily characterized by the quality of cooperation of many units.

When we discuss the terms ‘front’ and ‘rear’ it must be remembered, that while guerrillas do have bases, their primary field of activity is in the enemy's rear areas. They themselves have no rear. Because an orthodox army has rear installations (except in some special cases as during the 10,000-mile Long March of the Red Army or as in the case of certain units operating in-Shansi Province), it cannot operate as guerrillas can.

As to the matter of military responsibilities, those of the guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communications; to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear: to force the enemy to disperse his strength; and to coordinate all these activities with those of the regular armies on distant battle fronts.

From the foregoing summary of differences that exist between guerrilla warfare and orthodox warfare, it can be seen that it is improper to compare the two. Further distinction must be made in order to clarify this matter. While the Eighth Route Army is a regular army, its North China campaign is essentially guerrilla in nature, for it operates in the enemy's rear. On occasion, however, Eighth Route Army commanders have concentrated powerful forces to strike an enemy in motion, and the characteristics of orthodox mobile warfare were evident in the battle at P'ing Hsing Kuan and in other engagements.

On the other hand, after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, the operations of Central Shansi and Suiyuan, troops were more guerrilla than orthodox in nature. In this connection the precise character of Generalissimo Chiang's instructions to the effect that independent brigades would carry out guerrilla operations should be recalled. In spite of such temporary activities, these orthodox units retained their identity and after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, they not only were able to fight along orthodox lines but often found it necessary to do so. This is an example of the fact that orthodox armies may, due to changes in the situation, temporarily function as guerrillas.

Likewise, guerrilla units formed from the people may gradually develop into regular units and, when operating as such, employ the tactics of orthodox mobile war. While these units function as guerrillas, they may be compared to innumerable gnats, which, by biting a giant both in front and in rear, ultimately exhaust him. They make themselves as unendurable as a group of cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions, they will find that their victim is not only exhausted but practically perishing. It is for this very reason that our guerrilla activities are a source of constant mental worry to Imperial Japan.

While it is improper to confuse orthodox with guerrilla operations, it is equally improper to consider that there is a chasm between the two. While differences do exist, similarities appear under certain conditions and this fact must be appreciated if we wish to establish clearly the relationship between the two. If we consider both types of warfare as a single subject, or if we confuse guerrilla warfare with the mobile operations of orthodox war, we fall into this error: We exaggerate the function of guerrillas and minimize that of the regular armies. If we agree with Chang Tso Hua, who says, 'Guerrilla warfare is the primary war strategy of a people seeking to emancipate itself,' or with Kao Kang, who believes that 'Guerrilla strategy is the only strategy possible for an oppressed people,' we are exaggerating the importance of guerrilla hostilities. What these zealous friends I have just quoted do not realize is this: If we do not fit guerrilla operations into their proper niche, we cannot promote them realistically. Then, not only would those who oppose us take advantage of our varying opinions to turn them to their own uses to undermine us, but guerrillas would be led to assume responsibilities they could not successfully discharge and that should properly be carried out by orthodox forces. In the meantime, the important guerrilla function of coordinating activities with the regular forces would be neglected.

Furthermore, if the theory that guerrilla warfare as our only strategy were actually applied, the regular forces would be weakened, we would be divided in purpose, and guerrilla hostilities would decline. If we say, 'Let us transform the regular forces into guerrillas', and do not place our first reliance on a victory to be gained by the regular armies over the enemy, we may certainly expect to see as a result the failure of the anti-Japanese war of resistance. The concept that guerrilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla activities can be divorced from those of the regular forces is incorrect. If we assume that guerrilla warfare does not progress from beginning to end beyond its elementary forms, we have failed to recognize the fact that guerrilla hostilities can, under specific conditions, develop and assume orthodox characteristics. An opinion that admits the existence of guerrilla war, but isolates it, is one that does not properly estimate the potentialities of such war.

Equally dangerous is the concept that condemns guerrilla war on the ground that war has no other aspects than, the purely orthodox. This opinion is often expressed by those who have seen the corrupt phenomena of some guerrilla regimes, observed their lack of discipline, and have seen them used as a screen behind which certain persons have indulged in bribery and other corrupt practices. These people will not admit the fundamental necessity for guerrilla bands that spring from the armed people. They say, ‘Only the regular forces are capable of conducting guerrilla operations.’ This theory is a mistaken one and would lead to the abolition of the people’s guerrilla war.

A proper conception of the relationship that exists between guerrilla effort and that of the regular forces is essential. We believe it can be stated this way: ‘Guerrilla operations during the anti-Japanese war may for a certain time and temporarily become its paramount feature, particularly insofar as the enemy’s rear is concerned. However, if we view the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision. Guerrilla warfare assists them in producing this favourable decision. Orthodox forces may under certain conditions operate as guerrillas, and the latter may, under certain conditions, develop to the status of the former. However, both guerrilla forces and regular forces have their own respective development and their proper combinations.’

To clarify the relationship between the mobile aspect of orthodox war and guerrilla war, we may say that general agreement exists that the principal element of our strategy must be mobility. With the war of movement, we may at times combine the war of position. Both of these are assisted by general guerrilla hostilities. It is true that on the battlefield mobile war often becomes positional; it is true that this situation may be reversed; it is equally true that each form may combine with the other. The possibility of such combination will become more evident after the prevailing standards of equipment have been raised. For example, in a general strategical counter-attack to recapture key cities and lines of communication, it would be normal to use both mobile and positional methods. However, the point must again be made that our fundamental strategical form must be the war of movement, if we deny this, we cannot arrive at the victorious solution of the war. In sum, while we must promote guerrilla warfare as a necessary strategical auxiliary to orthodox operations, we must neither assign it the primary position in our war strategy nor substitute it for mobile and positional warfare as conducted by orthodox forces.

3. Guerrilla Warfare in History

Guerrilla warfare is neither a product of China nor peculiar to the present day. From the earliest historical days, it has been a feature of wars fought by every class of men against invaders and oppressors. Under suitable conditions, it has great possibilities. The many guerrilla wars in history have their points of difference, their peculiar characteristics, their varying processes and conclusions, and we must respect and profit by the experience of those whose blood was shed in them. What a pity it is that the priceless experience gained during the several hundred wars waged by the peasants of China cannot be marshalled today to guide us. Our only experience in guerrilla hostilities has been that gained from the several conflicts that have been carried on against us by foreign imperialists. But that experience should help the fighting Chinese recognize the necessity for guerrilla warfare and should confirm them in confidence of ultimate victory.

In September 1812, Napoleon, in the course of swallowing all of Europe, invaded Russia at the head of a great army totaling several hundred thousand infantry, cavalry, and artillery. At that time, Russia was weak and her ill-prepared army was not concentrated. The most important phase of her strategy was the use made of Cossack cavalry and detachments of peasants to carry on guerrilla operations. After giving up Moscow, the Russians formed nine guerrilla divisions of about five hundred men each. These, and vast groups of organized peasants, carried on partisan warfare and continually harassed the French Army. When the French Army was withdrawing, cold and starving, Russian guerrillas blocked the way and, in combination with regular troops, carried out counter-attacks on the French rear, pursuing and defeating them. The army of the heroic Napoleon was almost entirely annihilated, and the guerrillas captured many officers, men, cannon, and rifles. Though the victory was the result of various factors, and depended largely on the activities of the regular army, the function of the partisan groups was extremely important. The corrupt and poorly organized country that was Russia defeated and destroyed an army led by the most famous soldier of Europe and won the war in spite of the fact that her ability to organize guerrilla regimes was not fully developed. At times, guerrilla groups were hindered in their operations and the supply of equipment and arms was insufficient. If we use the Russian saying, it was a case of a battle between “the fist and the axe” (Ivanov].

From 1918 to 1920, the Russian Soviets, because of the opposition and intervention of foreign imperialists and the internal disturbances of White

Russian groups, were forced to organize themselves in occupied territories and fight a real war. In Siberia and Alashan, in the rear of the army of the traitor Denikin and in the rear of the Poles, there were many Red Russian guerrillas. These not only disrupted and destroyed the communications in the enemy's rear but also frequently prevented his advance. On one occasion, the guerrillas completely destroyed a retreating White Army that had previously been defeated by regular Red forces. Kolchak, Denikin, the Japanese, and the Poles, owing to the necessity of staving off the attacks of guerrillas, were forced to withdraw regular troops from the front. 'Thus not only was the enemy's manpower impoverished but he found himself unable to cope with the ever-moving guerrilla' (*The Nature of Guerrilla Action).*

The development of guerrillas at that time had only reached the stage where there were detached groups of several thousands in strength, old, middle-aged, and young. The old men organized themselves into propaganda groups known as 'silver-haired units'; there was a suitable guerrilla activity for the middle-aged; the young men formed combat units, and there were even groups for the children. Among the leaders were determined Communists who carried on general political work among the people. These, although they opposed the doctrine of extreme guerrilla warfare, were quick to oppose those who condemned it. Experience tells us that 'Orthodox armies are the fundamental and principal power; guerrilla units are secondary to them and assist in the accomplishment of the mission assigned the regular forces' (Gusev, *Lessons of Civil War*). Many of the guerrilla regimes in Russia gradually developed until in battle they were able to discharge functions of organized regulars. The army of the famous General Galen was entirely derived from guerrillas.

During seven months in 1935 and 1936, the Abyssinians lost their war against Italy. The cause of defeat—aside from the most important political reasons that there were dissentient political groups, no strong government party, and unstable policy—was the failure to adopt a positive policy of mobile warfare. There was never a combination of the war of movement with large-scale guerrilla operations. Ultimately, the Abyssinians adopted a purely passive defense, with the result that they were unable to defeat the Italians. In addition to this, the fact that Abyssinia is a relatively small and sparsely populated country was contributory. Even in spite of the fact that the Abyssinian Army and its equipment were not modern, she was able to withstand a mechanized Italian force of 400,000 for seven months. During that period, there were several occasions when a war of movement was combined with large-scale guerrilla operations to strike the Italians heavy blows. Moreover, several cities were retaken and casualties totaling 140,000 were inflicted. Had this policy been steadfastly continued, it would have been difficult to have named the ultimate winner. At the present time, guerrilla activities continue in Abyssinia, and if the internal political questions can be solved, an extension of such activities is probable.

In 1841 and 1842, when brave people from San Yuan Li fought the English; again from 1850 to 1864, during the Taiping War, and for a third time in 1899 in the Boxer Uprising, guerrilla tactics were employed to a remarkable degree. Particularly was this so during the Taiping War, when guerrilla operations were most extensive and the Ch'ing troops were often completely exhausted and forced to flee for their lives.

In these wars, there were no guiding principles of guerrilla action. Perhaps these guerrilla hostilities were not carried out in conjunction with regular operations, or perhaps there was a lack of coordination. But the fact that victory was not gained was not because of any lack in guerrilla activity but rather because of the interference of politics in military affairs. Experience shows that if precedence is not given to the question of conquering the enemy in both political and military affairs, and if regular hostilities are not conducted with tenacity, guerrilla operations alone cannot produce final victory.

From 1927 to 1936, the Chinese Red Army fought almost continually and employed guerrilla tactics constantly. At the very beginning, a positive policy was adopted. Many bases were established, and from guerrilla bands, the Reds were able to develop into regular armies. As these armies fought, new guerrilla regimes were developed over a wide area. These regimes coordinated their efforts with those of the regular forces. This policy accounted for the many victories gained by guerrilla troops relatively few in number, who were armed with weapons inferior to those of their opponents. The leaders of that period properly combined guerrilla operations with a war of movement both strategically and tactically. They depended primarily upon alertness. They stressed the correct basis for both political affairs and military operations. They developed their guerrilla bands into trained units. They then determined upon a ten-year period of resistance during which time they overcame innumerable difficulties and have only lately reached their goal of direct participation in the anti-Japanese war. There is no doubt that the internal unification of China is now a permanent and definite fact and that the experience gained during our internal struggles has proved to be both necessary and advantageous to us in the struggle against Japanese imperialism. There are many valuable lessons we can learn from the experience of those years. Principle among them is the fact that guerrilla success largely depends upon powerful political leaders who work unceasingly to bring about internal unification. Such leaders must work with the people; they must have a correct conception of the policy to be adopted as regards both the people and the enemy.

After 18 September 1931, strong anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns were opened in each of the three north-east provinces. Guerrilla activity persists there in spite of the cruelties and deceits practiced by the Japanese at the expense of the people, and in spite of the fact that her armies have occupied the land and oppressed the people for the last seven years. The struggle can be divided into two periods. During the first, which extended from 18 September 1931 to January 1933, anti-Japanese guerrilla activity exploded constantly in all three provinces. Ma Chan Shan and Ssu Ping Wei established an anti-Japanese regime in Heilungkiang. In Chi Lin, the National Salvation Army and the Self-Defense Army were led by Wang Te Lin and Li Tu respectively. In Feng T'ien, Chu Lu and others commanded guerrilla units. The influence of these forces was great. They harassed the Japanese unceasingly, but because there was an indefinite political goal, improper leadership, failure to coordinate military command and operations and to work with the people, and, finally, failure to delegate proper political functions to the army, the whole organization was feeble, and its strength was not unified. As a direct result of these conditions, the campaigns failed and the troops were finally defeated by our enemy.

During the second period, which has extended from January 1933 to the present time, the situation has greatly improved. This has come about because great numbers of people who have been oppressed by the enemy have decided to resist him, because of the participation of the Chinese Communists in the anti-Japanese war, and because of the fine work of the volunteer units. The guerrillas have finally educated the people to the meaning of guerrilla warfare, and in the north-east, it has again become an important and powerful influence, already seven or eight guerrilla regiments and a number of independent platoons have been formed, and their activities make it necessary for the Japanese to send troops after them month after month. These units hamper the Japanese and undermine their control in the north-east, while, at the same time, they inspire a Nationalist revolution in Korea. Such activities are not merely of transient and local importance but directly contribute to our ultimate victory.

However, there are still some weak points. For instance: National defense policy has not been sufficiently developed; participation of the people is not general; internal political organization is still in its primary stages, and the force used to attack the Japanese and the puppet governments is not yet sufficient. But if present policy is continued tenaciously, all these weaknesses will be overcome. Experience proves that guerrilla war will develop to even greater proportions and that, in spite of the cruelty of the Japanese and the many methods they have devised to cheat the people, they cannot extinguish guerrilla activities in the three north-eastern provinces.

The guerrilla experiences of China and of other countries that have been outlined prove that in a war of revolutionary nature such hostilities are possible, natural, and necessary. They prove that if the present anti-Japanese war for the emancipation of the masses of the Chinese people is to gain ultimate victory, such hostilities must expand tremendously.

Historical experience is written in iron and blood. We must point out that the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will not be confined solely to China in her present anti-Japanese war but will be worldwide.

4. Can Victory be Attained by Guerrilla Operations?

Guerrilla hostilities are but one phase of the war of resistance against Japan and the answer to the question of whether or not they can produce ultimate victory can be given only after investigation and comparison of all elements of our own strength with those of the enemy. The particulars of such a comparison are several. First, the strong Japanese bandit nation is an absolute monarchy. During the course of her invasion of China, she had made comparative progress in the techniques of industrial production and in the development of excellence and skill in her army, navy, and air force. But in spite of this industrial progress, she remains an absolute monarchy of inferior physical endowments. Her manpower, her raw materials, and her financial resources are all inadequate and insufficient to maintain her in protracted warfare or to meet the situation presented by a war prosecuted over a vast area. Added to this is the anti-war feeling now manifested by the Japanese people, a feeling that is shared by the junior officers and, more extensively, by the soldiers of the invading army. Furthermore, China is not Japan's only enemy. Japan is unable to employ her entire strength in the attack on China; she cannot, at most, spare more than a million men for this purpose, as she must hold any in excess of that number for use against other possible opponents. Because of these important primary considerations, the invading Japanese bandits can hope neither to be victorious in a protracted struggle nor to conquer a vast area. Their strategy must be one of lightning war and speedy decision. If we can hold out for three or more years; it will be most difficult for Japan to bear up under the strain.

In the war, the Japanese brigands must depend upon lines of communication linking the principal cities as routes for the transport of war materials. The most important considerations for her are that her rear be stable and peaceful and that her lines of communication be intact. It is not to her advantage to wage war over a vast area with disrupted lines of communication. She cannot disperse her strength and fight in a number of places, and her greatest fears are thus eruptions in her rear and disruption of her lines of communication. If she can maintain communications, she will be able at will to concentrate powerful forces speedily at strategic points to engage our organized units in decisive battle. Another important Japanese objective is to profit from the industries, finances, and manpower in captured areas and with them to augment her own insufficient strength. Certainly, it is not to her advantage to forgo these benefits, nor to be forced to dissipate her energies in a type of warfare in which the gains will not compensate for the losses. It is for these reasons that guerrilla warfare conducted in each bit of conquered territory over a wide area will be a heavy blow struck at the Japanese bandits. Experience in the five northern provinces as well as in Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Anhwei has absolutely established the truth of this assertion.

China is a country half colonial and half feudal; it is a country that is politically, militarily, and economically backward. This is an inescapable conclusion. It is a vast country with great resources and tremendous population, a country in which the terrain is complicated and the facilities for communication are poor. All these factors favour a protracted war; they all favour the application of mobile warfare and guerrilla operations. The establishment of innumerable anti-Japanese bases behind the enemy's lines will force him to fight unceasingly in many places at once, both to his front and his rear. He thus endlessly expends his resources.

We must unite the strength of the army with that of the people; we must strike the weak spots in the enemy's flanks, in his front, in his rear. We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal of his forces and dissipation of his strength. Thus the time will come when a gradual change will become evident in the relative position of ourselves and our enemy, and when that day comes, it will be the beginning of our ultimate victory over the Japanese.

Although China's population is great, it is unorganized. This is a weakness which must be taken into account.

The Japanese bandits have invaded our country not merely to conquer territory but to carry out the violent, rapacious, and murderous policy of their government, which is the extinction of the Chinese race. For this compelling reason, we must unite the nation without regard to parties or classes and follow our policy of resistance to the end. China today is not the China of old. It is not like Abyssinia. China today is at the point of her greatest historical progress. The standards of literacy among the masses have been raised; the rapprochement of Communists and Nationalists has laid the foundation for an anti-Japanese war front that is constantly being strengthened and expanded; government, army, and people are all working with great energy; the raw material resources and the economic strength of the nation are waiting to be used; the unorganized people are becoming an organized nation.

These energies must be directed toward the goal of protracted war so that should the Japanese occupy much of our territory or even most of it, we shall still gain final victory. Not only must those behind our lines organize for resistance but also those who live in Japanese-occupied territory in every part of the country. The traitors who accept the Japanese as fathers are few in number, and those who have taken an oath that they would prefer death to abject slavery are many. If we resist with this spirit, what enemy can we not conquer and who can say that ultimate victory will not be ours?

The Japanese are waging a barbaric war along uncivilized lines. For that reason, Japanese of all classes oppose the policies of their government, as do vast international groups. On the other hand, because China's cause is righteous, our countrymen of all classes and parties are united to oppose the invader; we have sympathy in many foreign countries including even Japan itself. This is perhaps the most important reason why Japan will lose and China will win.

The progress of the war for the emancipation of the Chinese people will be in accord with these facts. The guerrilla war of resistance will be in accord with these facts, and that guerrilla operations correlated with those of our regular forces will produce victory is the conviction of the many patriots who devote their entire strength to guerrilla hostilities.

5. Organization for Guerilla Warfare

Four points must be considered under this subject. These are:

1. How are guerrilla bands formed?
2. How are guerrilla bands organized?
3. What are the methods of arming guerrilla bands?
4. What elements constitute a guerrilla band?

These are all questions pertaining to the organization of armed guerrilla units; they are questions which those who have had no experience in guerilla hostilities do not understand and on which they can arrive at no sound decisions; indeed, they would not know in what manner to begin.

How Guerrilla Units are Originally Formed

The unit may originate in any one of the following ways:

a) From the masses of the people.
b) From regular army units temporarily detailed for the purpose.
c) From regular army units permanently detailed.
d) From the combination of a regular army unit and a unit recruited from the people.
e) From the local militia.
f) From deserters from the ranks of the enemy.
g) From former bandits and bandit groups.

In the present hostilities, no doubt, all these sources will be employed.

In the first case above, the guerrilla unit is formed from the people. This is the fundamental type. Upon the arrival of the enemy army to oppress and slaughter the people, their leaders call upon them to resist. They assemble the most valorous elements, arm them with old rifles or whatever firearms they can, and thus a guerrilla unit begins. Orders have already been issued throughout the nation that call upon the people to form guerrilla units both for local defense and for other combat. If the local governments approve and aid such movements, they cannot fail to prosper. In some places, where the local government is not determined or where its officers have all fled, the leaders among the masses (relying on the sympathy of the people and their sincere desire to resist Japan and secure the country) call upon the people to resist, and they respond. Thus, many guerrilla units are organized. In circumstances of this kind, the duties of leadership usually fall upon the shoulders of young students, teachers, professors, other educators, local soldiery, professional men, artisans, and those without a fixed profession, who are willing to exert themselves to the last drop of their blood. Recently, in Shansi, Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shantung, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and other provinces, extensive guerrilla hostilities have broken out. All these are organized and led by patriots. The amount of such activity is the best proof of the foregoing statement. The more such bands there are, the better will the situation be. Each district, each county, should be able to organize a great number of guerrilla squads, which, when assembled, form a guerrilla company.

There are those who say: 'I am a farmer', or, I am a student'; 'I can discuss literature but not military arts.' This is incorrect. There is no profound difference between the farmer and the soldier. You must have courage. You simply leave your farms and become soldiers. That you are farmers is of no difference, and if you have education, that is so much the better. When you take your arms in hand, you become soldiers; when you are organized, you become military units.

Guerrilla hostilities are the university of war, and after you have fought several times valiantly and aggressively, you may become a leader of troops and there will be many well-known regular soldiers who will not be your peers. Without question, the fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people, who organize guerrilla units directly from themselves.

The second type of guerrilla unit is that which is organized from small units of the regular forces temporarily detached for the purpose. For example, since hostilities commenced, many groups have been temporarily detached from armies, divisions, and brigades and have been assigned guerrilla duties. A regiment of the regular army may, if circumstances warrant, be dispersed into groups for the purpose of carrying on guerrilla operations. As an example of this, there is the Eighth Route Army, in North China. Excluding the periods when it carries on mobile operations as an army, it is divided into its elements and these carry on guerrilla hostilities. This type of guerrilla unit is essential for two reasons. First, in mobile-warfare situations, the coordination of guerrilla activities with regular operations is necessary. Second, until guerrilla hostilities can be developed on a grand scale, there is no one to carry out guerrilla missions but regulars. Historical experience shows us that regular army units are not able to undergo the hardships of guerrilla campaigning over long periods. The leaders of regular units engaged in guerrilla operations must be extremely adaptable. They must study the methods of guerrilla war. They must understand that initiative, discipline, and the employment of stratagems are all of the utmost importance. As the guerrilla status of regular units is but temporary, their leaders must lend all possible support to the organization of guerrilla units from among the people. These units must be so disciplined that they hold together after the departure of the regulars.

The third type of unit consists of a detachment of regulars who are permanently assigned guerrilla duties. This type of small detachment does not have to be prepared to rejoin the regular forces. Its post is somewhere in the rear of the enemy, and there it becomes the backbone of guerrilla organization. As an example of this type of organization we may take the Wu Tai Shan district in the heart of the Hopeh-Chahar-Shansi area. Along the borders of these provinces, units from the Eighth Route Army have established a framework for guerrilla operations. Around these small cores, many detachments have been organized and the area of guerrilla activity greatly expanded. In areas in which there is a possibility of cutting the enemy's lines of supply, this system should be used. Severing enemy supply routes destroys his lifeline; this is one feature that cannot be neglected. If, at the time the regular forces withdraw from a certain area, some units are left behind, these should conduct guerrilla operations in the enemy's rear. As an example of this, we have the guerrilla bands now continuing their independent operations in the Shanghai-Woosung area in spite of the withdrawal of regular forces.

The fourth type of organization is the result of a merger between small regular detachments and local guerrilla units. The regular forces may dispatch a squad, a platoon, or a company, which is placed at the disposal of the local guerrilla commander. If a small group experienced in military and political affairs is sent, it becomes the core of the local guerrilla unit. These several methods are all excellent, and if properly applied, the intensity of guerrilla warfare can be extended. In the Wu Tai Shan area, each of these methods has been used.

The fifth type mentioned above is from the local militia, from police and home guards. In every North China province, there are now many of these groups, and they should be formed in every locality. The government has issued a mandate to the effect that the people are not to depart from war areas. The officer in command of the county, the commander of the peace-preservation unit, the chief of police are all required to obey this mandate. They cannot retreat with their forces but must remain at their stations and resist.

The sixth type of unit is that organized from troops that come over from the enemy—the Chinese 'traitor troops' employed by the Japanese. It is always possible to produce disaffection in their ranks, and we must increase our propaganda efforts and foment mutinies among such troops. Immediately after mutinying, they must be received into our ranks and organized. The concord of the leaders and the assent of the men must be gained, and the units rebuilt politically and reorganized militarily. Once this has been accomplished, they become successful guerrilla units. In regard to this type of unit, it may be said that political work among them is of the utmost importance.

The seventh type of guerrilla organization is that formed from bands of bandits and brigands. This, although difficult, must be carried out with utmost vigour lest the enemy use such bands to his own advantages. Many bandit groups pose as anti-Japanese guerrillas, and it is only necessary to correct their political beliefs to convert them.

In spite of inescapable differences in the fundamental types of guerrilla bands, it is possible to unite them to form a vast sea of guerrillas. The ancients said, ‘Tai Shan is a great mountain because it does not scorn the merest handful of dirt; the rivers and seas are deep because they absorb the waters of small streams.’ Attention paid to the enlistment and organization of guerrillas of every type and from every source will increase the potentialities of guerrilla action in the anti-Japanese war. This is something that patriots will not neglect.

The Method of Organizing Guerrilla Regimes

Many of those who decide to participate in guerrilla activities do not know the methods of organization. For such people, as well as for students who have no knowledge of military affairs, the matter of organization is a problem that requires solution. Even among those who have military knowledge, there are some who know nothing of guerrilla regimes because they are lacking in that particular type of experience. The subject of the organization of such regimes is not confined to the organization of specific units but includes all guerrilla activities within the area where the regime functions.

As an example of such organization, we may take a geographical area in the enemy’s rear. This area may comprise many counties. It must be sub-divided and individual companies or battalions formed to accord with the sub-divisions. To this ‘military area’, a military commander and political commissioners are appointed. Under these, the necessary officers, both military and political, are appointed. In the military headquarters, there will be the staff, the aides, the supply officers, and the medical personnel. These are controlled by the chief of staff, who acts in accordance with orders from the commander. In the political headquarters, there are bureaus of propaganda organization, people’s mass movements, and miscellaneous affairs. Control of these is vested in the political chairmen.

The military areas are sub-divided into smaller districts in accordance with local geography, the enemy situation locally, and the state of guerrilla development. Each of these smaller divisions within the area is a district, each of which may consist of from two to six counties. To each district, a military commander and several political commissioners are appointed. Under their direction, military and political headquarters are organized. Tasks are assigned in accordance with the number of guerrilla troops available. Although the names of the officers in the 'district' correspond to those in the larger 'area', the number of functionaries assigned in the former case should be reduced to the least possible, in order to unify control, to handle guerrilla troops that come from different sources, and to harmonize military operations and local political affairs, a committee of from seven to nine members should be organized in each area and district. This committee, the members of which are selected by the troops and the local political officers, should function as a forum for the discussion of both military and political matters.

All the people in an area should arm themselves and be organized into two groups. One of these groups is a combat group, the other a self-defense unit with but limited military quality. Regular combatant guerrillas are organized into one of three general types of unit. The first of these is the small unit, the platoon or company. In each county, three to six units may be organized. The second type is the battalion of from two to four companies. One such unit should be organized in each county. While the unit fundamentally belongs to the county in which it was organized, it may operate in other counties. While in areas other than its own, it must operate in conjunction with local units in order to take advantage of their manpower, their knowledge of local terrain and local customs, and their information of the enemy.

The third type is the guerrilla regiment, which consists of from two to four of the above-mentioned battalion units. If sufficient manpower is available, a guerrilla brigade of from two to four regiments may be formed.

Each of the units has its own peculiarities of organization. A squad, the smallest unit, has a strength of from nine to eleven men, including the leader and the assistant leader. Its arms may be from two to five Western-style rifles, with the remaining men armed with rifles of local manufacture, fowling-pieces, etc., spears, or big swords. Two to four such squads form a platoon. This too has a leader and an assistant leader, and when acting independently, it is assigned a political officer to carry on political propaganda work. The platoon may have about ten rifles, with the remainder of its weapons being fowling-pieces, lances, and big swords. Two to four of such units form a company, which, like the platoon, has a leader, an assistant leader, and a political officer. All these units are under the direct supervision of the military commanders of the areas in which they operate.

The battalion unit must be more thoroughly organized and better equipped than the smaller units. Its discipline and its personnel should be superior. If a battalion is formed from company units, it should not deprive subordinate units entirely of their manpower and their arms. If in a small area, there is a peace-preservation corps, a branch of the militia, or police, regular guerrilla units should not be dispersed over it.

The guerrilla unit next in size to the battalion is the regiment. This must be under more severe discipline than the battalion. In an independent guerrilla regiment, there may be ten men per squad, three squads per platoon, three platoons per company, three companies per battalion, and three battalions to the regiment. Two of such regiments form a brigade. Each of these units has a commander, a vice-commander, and a political officer.

In North China, guerrilla cavalry units should be established. These may be regiments of from two to four companies, or battalions.

All these units from the lowest to the highest are combatant guerrilla units and receive their supplies from the central government. Details of their organization are shown in the tables (pages 213 to 219).

All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to forty-five must be organized into anti-Japanese self-defense units, the basis of which is voluntary service. As a first step, they must procure arms, then they must be given both military and political training. Their responsibilities are: local sentry duties, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda. When the enemy launches a guerrilla-suppression drive, these units, armed with what weapons there are, are assigned to certain areas to deceive, hinder, and harass him. Thus, the defense units assist the combatant guerrillas. They have other functions. They furnish stretcher-bearers to transport the wounded, carriers to take food to the troops, and comfort missions to provide the troops with tea and rice. If a locality can organize such a self-defense unit as we have described, the traitors cannot hide nor can bandits and robbers disturb the peace of the people. Thus the people will continue to assist the guerrilla and supply manpower to our regular armies. 'The organization of self-defense units is a transitional step in the development of universal conscription. Such units are reservoirs of manpower for the orthodox forces.

There have been such organizations for some time in Shansi, Shensi, Honan, and Suiyuan. The youth organizations in different provinces were formed for the purpose of educating the young. They have been of some help. However, they were not voluntary, and the confidence of the people was thus not gained. These organizations were not widespread, and their effect was almost negligible. This system was, therefore supplanted by the new-type organizations, which are organized on the principles of voluntary cooperation and non-separation of the members from their native localities. When the members of these organizations are in their native towns, they support themselves. Only in case of military necessity are they ordered to remote places, and when this is done, the government must support them. Each member of these groups must have a weapon even if the weapon is only a knife, a pistol, a lance, or a spear.

In all places where the enemy operates, these self-defense units should organize within themselves a small guerrilla group of perhaps from three to ten men armed with pistols or revolvers. This group is not required to leave its native locality.

The organization of these self-defense units is mentioned in this book because such units are useful for the purposes of inculcating the people with military and political knowledge, keeping order in the rear, and replenishing the ranks of the regulars. These groups should be organized not only in the active war zones but in every province in China. 'The people must be inspired to cooperate voluntarily. We must not force them, for if we do, it will be ineffectual.' This is extremely important.

In order to control anti-Japanese military organization as a whole, it is necessary to establish a system of military areas and districts along the lines we have indicated.

Equipment of Guerrillas

In regard to the problem of guerrilla equipment, it must be understood that guerrillas are lightly armed attack groups, which require simple equipment. The standard of equipment is based upon the nature of duties assigned; the equipment of low-class guerrilla units is not as good as that of higher-class units. For example, those who are assigned the task of destroying rail communications are better equipped than those who do not have that task. The equipment of guerrillas cannot be based on what the guerrillas want, or even what they need, but must be based on what is available for their use. Equipment cannot be furnished immediately but must be acquired gradually. These are points to be kept in mind.

The question of equipment includes the collection, supply, distribution, and replacement of weapons, ammunition, blankets, communication materials, transport, and facilities for propaganda work. The supply of weapons and ammunition is most difficult, particularly at the time the unit is established, but this problem can always be solved eventually. Guerrilla bands that originate in the people are furnished with revolvers, pistols, rifles, spears, big swords, and land mines and mortars of local manufacture. Other elementary weapons are added and as many new-type rifles as are available are distributed. After a period of resistance, it is possible to increase the supply of equipment by capturing it from the enemy. In this respect, the transport companies are the easiest to equip, for in any successful attack, we will capture the enemy's transport.

An armoury should be established in each guerrilla district for the manufacture and repair of rifles and for the production of cartridges, hand grenades, and bayonets. Guerrillas must not depend too much on an armoury. The enemy is the principal source of their supply.

For destruction of railway tracks, bridges, and stations in enemy-controlled territory, it is necessary to gather together demolition materials. Troops must be trained in the preparation and use of demolitions, and a demolition unit must be organized in each regiment.

As for minimum clothing requirements, these are that each man shall have at least two summer-weight uniforms, one suit of winter clothing, two hats, a pair of wrap puttees, and a blanket. Each man must have a pack or a bag for food. In the north, each man must have an overcoat. In acquiring this clothing, we cannot depend on captures made from the enemy, for it is forbidden for captors to take clothing from their prisoners. In order to maintain high morale in guerrilla forces, all the clothing and equipment mentioned should be furnished by the representatives of the government stationed in each guerrilla district. These men may confiscate clothing from traitors or ask contributions from those best able to afford them. In subordinate groups, uniforms are unnecessary.

Telephone and radio equipment is not necessary in lower groups, but all units from regiment up are equipped with both. This material can be obtained by contributions from the regular forces and by capture from the enemy.

In the guerrilla army in general, and at bases in particular, there must be a high standard of medical equipment. Besides the services of the doctors, medicines must be procured. Although guerrillas can depend on the enemy for some portion of their medical supplies, they must, in general, depend upon contributions. If Western medicines are not available, local medicines must be made to suffice.

The problem of transport is more vital in North China than in the south, for in the south all that are necessary are mules and horses. Small guerrilla units need no animals, but regiments and brigades will find them necessary. Commanders and staffs of units from companies up should be furnished a riding animal each. At times, two officers will have to share a horse. Officers whose duties are of minor nature do not have to be mounted.

Propaganda materials are very important. Every large guerrilla unit should have a printing press and a mimeograph stone. They must also have paper on which to print propaganda leaflets and notices. They must be supplied with chalk and large brushes. In guerrilla areas, there should be a printing press or a lead-type press.

For the purpose of printing training instructions, this material is of the greatest importance.

In addition to the equipment listed above, it is necessary to have field-glasses, compasses, and military maps. An accomplished guerrilla group will acquire these things.

Because of the proved importance of guerrilla hostilities in the anti-Japanese war, the headquarters of the Nationalist Government and the commanding officers of the various war zones should do their best to supply the guerrillas with what they actually need and are unable to get for themselves. However, it must be repeated that guerrilla equipment will in the main depend on the efforts of the guerrillas themselves. If they depend on higher officers too much, the psychological effect will be to weaken the guerrilla spirit of resistance.

Elements of the Guerrilla Army

The term 'element' as used in the title to this section refers to the personnel, both officers and men, of the guerrilla army. Since each guerrilla group fights in a protracted war, its officers must be brave and positive men whose entire loyalty is dedicated to the cause of emancipation of the people. An officer should have the following qualities: great powers of endurance so that in spite of any hardship he sets an example to his men and is a model for them; he must be able to mix easily with the people; his spirit and that of the men must be one in strengthening the policy of resistance to the Japanese. If he wishes to gain victories, he must study tactics. A guerrilla group with officers of this caliber would be unbeatable. I do not mean that every guerrilla group can have, at its inception, officers of such qualities. The officers must be men naturally endowed with good qualities which can be developed during the course of campaigning. The most important natural quality is that of complete loyalty to the idea of people's emancipation. If this is present, the others will develop; if it is not present, nothing can be done. When officers are first selected from a group, it is this quality that should receive particular attention. The officers in a group should be inhabitants of the locality in which the group is organized, as this will facilitate relations between them and the local civilians. In addition, officers so chosen would be familiar with conditions. If in any locality there are not enough men of sufficiently high qualifications to become officers, an effort must be made to train and educate the people so these qualities may be developed and the potential officer material increased. There can be no disagreements between officers native to one place and those from other localities.

A guerrilla group ought to operate on the principle that only volunteers are acceptable for service. It is a mistake to impress people into service. As long as a person is willing to fight, his social condition or position is no consideration, but only men who are courageous and determined can bear the hardships of guerrilla campaigning in a protracted war.

A soldier who habitually breaks regulations must be dismissed from the army. Vagabonds and vicious people must not be accepted for service. The opium habit must be forbidden, and a soldier who cannot break himself of the habit should be dismissed. Victory in guerrilla war is conditioned upon keeping the membership pure and clean.

It is a fact that during the war the enemy may take advantage of certain people who are lacking in conscience and patriotism and induce them to join the guerrillas for the purpose of betraying them. Officers must, therefore, continually educate the soldiers and inculcate patriotism in them. This will prevent the success of traitors. The traitors who are in the ranks must be discovered and expelled, and punishment and expulsion meted out to those who have been influenced by them. In all such cases, the officers should summon the soldiers and relate the facts to them, thus arousing their hatred and detestation for traitors. This procedure will serve as well as a warning to the other soldiers. If an officer is discovered to be a traitor, some prudence must be used in the punishment adjudged. However, the work of eliminating traitors in the army begins with their elimination from among the people.

Chinese soldiers who have served under puppet governments and bandits who have been converted should be welcomed as individuals or as groups. They should be well-treated and repatriated. But care should be used during their reorientation to distinguish those whose idea is to fight the Japanese from those who may be present for other reasons.

6. The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare

In Chapter 1, I mentioned the fact that guerrilla troops should have a precise conception of the political goal of the struggle and the political organization to be used in attaining that goal. This means that both organization and discipline of guerrilla troops must be at a high level so that they can carry out the political activities that are the life of both the guerilla armies and of revolutionary warfare.

First of all, political activities depend upon the indoctrination of both military and political leaders with the idea of anti-Japanism. Through them, the idea is transmitted to the troops. One must not feel that he is anti-Japanese merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction, and if it is forgotten, we may succumb to the temptations of the enemy or be overcome with discouragements. In a war of long duration, those whose conviction that the people must be emancipated is not deep-rooted are likely to become shaken in their faith or actually revolt. Without the general education that enables everyone to understand our goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing a free and happy China, the soldiers fight without conviction and lose their determination.

The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national consciousness awakened. Hence, a concrete explanation of the political systems used is important not only to guerrilla troops but to all those who are concerned with the realization of our political goal. The Kuomintang has issued a pamphlet entitled *System of National Organization for War*, which should be widely distributed throughout guerrilla zones. If we lack national organization, we will lack the essential unity that should exist between the soldiers and the people.

A study and comprehension of the political objectives of this war and of the anti-Japanese front is particularly important for officers of guerrilla troops. There are some militarists who say: ‘We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.’ It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical.it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

It is to be hoped that the world is in the last era of strife. The vast majority of human beings have already prepared or are preparing to fight a war that will bring justice to the oppressed peoples of the world. No matter how long this war may last, there is no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented epoch of peace. The war that we are fighting today for the freedom of all human beings, and the independent, happy, and liberal China that we are fighting to establish will be a part of that new world order. A conception like this is difficult for the simple-minded militarist to grasp and it must therefore be carefully explained to him.

There are three additional matters that must be considered under the broad question of political activities. These are political activities, first, as applied to the troops; second, as applied to the people; and, third, as applied to the enemy. The fundamental problems are: first, spiritual unification of officers and men within the army; second, spiritual unification of the army and the people; and, last, destruction of the unity of the enemy. The concrete methods for achieving these unities are discussed in detail in pamphlet Number 4 of this series, entitled *Political Activities in Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare*.

A revolutionary army must have discipline that is established on a limited democratic basis. In all armies, obedience of the subordinates, to their superiors must be exacted. This is true in the case of guerrilla discipline, but the basis for guerrilla discipline must be the individual conscience. With guerrillas, a discipline of compulsion is ineffective. In any revolutionary army, there is unity of purpose as far as both officers and men are concerned, and, therefore, within such an army, discipline is self-imposed. Although discipline in guerrilla ranks is not as severe as in the ranks of orthodox forces, the necessity for discipline exists. This must be self-imposed, because only when it is, is the soldier able to understand completely why he fights and why he must obey. This type of discipline becomes a tower of strength within the army, and it is the only type that can truly harmonize the relationship that exists between officers and soldiers.

In any system where discipline is externally imposed, the relationship that exists between officer and man is characterized by indifference of the one to the other. The idea that officers can physically beat or severely tongue-lash their men is a feudal one and is not in accord with the conception of a self-imposed discipline. Discipline of the feudal type will destroy internal unity and fighting strength. A discipline self-imposed is the primary characteristic of a democratic system in the army.

A secondary characteristic is found in the degree of liberties accorded officers and soldiers. In a revolutionary army, all individuals enjoy political liberty and the question, for example, of the emancipation of the people must not only be tolerated but discussed, and propaganda must be encouraged. Further, in such an army, the mode of living of the officers and the soldiers must not differ too much, and this is particularly true in the case of guerrilla troops. Officers should live under the same conditions as their men, for that is the only way in which they can gain from their men the admiration and confidence so vital in war. It is incorrect to hold to a theory of equality in all things, but there must be equality of existence in accepting the hardships and dangers of war. Thus we may attain to the unification of the officer and soldier groups, a unity both horizontal within the group itself, and vertical that is, from lower to higher echelons. It is only when such unity is present that units can be said to be powerful combat factors.

There is also a unity of spirit that should exist between troops and local inhabitants. The Eighth Route Army put into practice a code known as 'Three Rules and the Eight Remarks', which we list here:

Rules:
1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks:
1. Replace the door when you leave the house.
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow.
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search those you arrest.

The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the Eighth Route Army and other units have since adopted it.

Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.

We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy.

7. The Strategy of Guerrilla Resistance Against Japan

It has been definitely decided that in the strategy of our war against Japan, guerrilla strategy must be auxiliary to fundamental orthodox methods. If this were a small country, guerrilla activities could be carried out close to the scene of operations of the regular army and directly complementary to them. In such a case, there would be no question guerrilla strategy as such. Nor would the question arise if our country were as strong as Russia, for example, and able speedily to eject an invader. The question exists because China, a weak country of vast size, has today progressed to the point where it has become possible to adopt the policy of a protracted war characterized by guerrilla operations. Although these may at first glance seem to be abnormal or heterodox, such is not actually the case.

Because Japanese military power is inadequate, much of the territory her armies have overrun is without sufficient garrison troops. Under such circumstances the primary functions of guerrillas are three: first, to conduct a war on exterior lines, that is, in the rear of the enemy; second, to establish bases; and, last, to extend the war areas. Thus, guerrilla participation in the war is not merely a matter of purely local guerrilla tactics but involves strategist considerations.

Such war, with its vast time and space factors, establishes a new military process, the focal point of which China today. The Japanese are apparently attempting recall a past that saw the Yüan extinguish the Sung and the Ch'ing conquer the Ming; that witnessed the extension of the British Empire to North America and India; that saw the Latins overrun Central and South America. As far as China today is concerned, such dreams of conquest are fantastic and without reality. Today's China is better equipped than was the China of yesterday, and a new type of guerrilla hostilities is a part of that equipment. If our enemy fails to take these facts into consideration and makes too optimistic an estimate of the situation, he courts disaster.

Though the strategy of guerrillas is inseparable from war strategy as a whole, the actual conduct of these hostilities differs front the conduct of orthodox operations. Each type of warfare has methods peculiar to itself, and methods suitable to regular warfare cannot be applied with success to the special situations that confront guerrillas.

Before we treat the practical aspects of guerrilla war, it might be well to recall the fundamental axiom of combat on which all military action is based. This can be stated: 'Conservation of one's own strength; destruction of enemy strength.' A military policy based on this axiom is consonant with a national policy directed towards the building of a free and prosperous Chinese state and the destruction of Japanese imperialism. It is in furtherance of this policy that government applies its military strength. Is the sacrifice demanded by war in conflict with the idea of self-preservation? No at all. The sacrifices demanded are necessary both to destroy the enemy and to preserve ourselves; the sacrifice of a part of the people is necessary to preserve the whole. All the considerations of military action are derived from this axiom. Its application is as apparent in all tactical and strategical conceptions as it is in the simple case of the soldier who shoots at his enemy from a covered position.

All guerrilla units start from nothing and grow. What methods should we select to ensure the conservation and development of our own strength and the destruction of that of the enemy? The essential requirements are the six listed below:

1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategical defense; tactical speed in a war strategically protracted; tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducted strategically on interior lines.
2. Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.
3. The establishment of bases.
4. A clear understanding of the relationship that exists between the attack and the defense.
5. The development of mobile operations.
6. Correct command.

The enemy, though numerically weak, is strong-in the quality of his troops and their equipment; we, on the other hand, are strong numerically but weak as to quality. These considerations have been taken into account in the development of the policy of tactical offence, tactical speed, and tactical operations on exterior lines in a war that, strategically speaking, is defensive in character, protracted in nature, and conducted along interior lines. Our strategy is based on these conceptions. They must be kept in mind in the conduct of all operations.

Although the element of surprise is not absent in orthodox warfare, there are fewer opportunities to apply it than there are during guerrilla hostilities. In the latter, speed is essential. The movements of guerrilla troops must be secret and of supernatural rapidity; the enemy must be taken unaware, and the action entered speedily. There can be no procrastination in the execution of plans; no assumption of a negative or passive defense; no great dispersion of forces in many local engagements. The basic method is the attack in a violent and deceptive form.

While there may be cases where the attack will extend over a period of several days (if that length of time is necessary to annihilate an enemy group), it is more profitable to launch and push an attack with maximum speed. The tactics of defense have no place in the realm of guerrilla warfare. If a delaying action is necessary, such places as defiles, river crossings, and villages offer the most suitable conditions, for it is in such places that the enemy's arrangements may be disrupted and he may be annihilated.

The enemy is much stronger than we are, and it is true that we can hinder, distract, disperse, and destroy him only if we disperse our own forces. Although guerrilla warfare is the warfare of such dispersed units, it is sometimes desirable to concentrate in order to destroy an enemy. Thus, the principle of concentration of force against a relatively weaker enemy is applicable to guerrilla warfare.

We can prolong this struggle and make of it a protracted war only by gaining positive and lightning-like tactical decisions; by employing our manpower in proper concentrations and dispersions; and by operation on exterior lines in order to surround and destroy our enemy. If we cannot surround whole armies, we can at least partially destroy them; if we cannot kill the Japanese, we can capture them. The total effect of many local successes will be to change the relative strengths of the opposing forces. The destruction of Japan's military power, combined with the international sympathy for China's cause and the revolutionary tendencies evident in Japan, will be sufficient to destroy Japanese imperialism.

We will next discuss initiative, alertness, and the matter of careful planning. What is meant by initiative in warfare? In all battles and wars, a struggle to gain and retain the initiative goes on between the opposing sides, for it is the side that holds the initiative that has liberty of action. When an army loses the initiative, it loses its liberty; its role becomes passive; it faces the danger of defeat and destruction.

It is more difficult to obtain the initiative when defending on interior lines than it is while attacking on exterior lines. This is what Japan is doing. There are, however, several weak points as far as Japan is concerned. One of these is lack of sufficient manpower for the task; another is her cruelty to the inhabitants of conquered areas; a third is the underestimation of Chinese strength, which has resulted in the differences between military cliques, which, in turn, have been productive of many mistakes in the direction of her military forces. For instance, she has been gradually compelled to increase her manpower in China while, at the same time, the many arguments over plans of operations and disposition of troops have resulted in the loss of good opportunities for improvement of her strategical position. This explains the fact that although the Japanese are frequently able to surround large bodies of Chinese troops, they have never yet been able to capture more than a few. The Japanese military machine is thus being weakened by insufficiency of manpower, inadequacy of resources, the barbarism of her troops, and the general stupidity that has characterized the conduct of operations. Her offensive continues unabated, but because of the weaknesses pointed out, her attack must be limited in extent. She can never conquer China. The day will come—indeed, already has in some areas—when she will be forced into a passive role. When hostilities commenced, China was passive, but as we enter the second phase of the war we find ourselves pursuing a strategy of mobile warfare, with both guerrillas and regulars operating on exterior lines. Thus, with each passing day, we seize some degree of initiative from the Japanese.

The matter of initiative is especially serious for guerrilla forces, who must face critical situations unknown to regular troops. The superiority of the enemy and the lack of unity and experience within our own ranks may be cited. Guerrillas can, however, gain the initiative if they keep in mind the weak points of the enemy. Because of the enemy's insufficient manpower, guerrillas can operate over vast territories; because he is a foreigner and a barbarian, guerrillas can gain the confidence of millions of their countrymen; because of the stupidity of enemy commanders, guerrillas can make full use of their own cleverness. Both guerrillas and regulars must exploit these enemy weaknesses while, at the same time, our own are remedied. Some of our weaknesses are apparent only and are, in actuality, sources of strength. For example, the very fact that most guerrilla groups are small makes it desirable and advantageous for them to appear and disappear in the enemy's rear. With such activities, the enemy is simply unable to cope. A similar liberty of action can rarely be obtained by regular forces.

When the enemy attacks the guerrillas with more than one column, it is difficult for the latter to retain the initiative. Any error, no matter how slight, in the estimation of the situation is likely to result in forcing the guerrillas into a passive role. They will then find themselves unable to beat off the attacks of the enemy.

It is apparent that we can gain and retain the initiative only by a correct estimation of the situation and a proper arrangement of all military and political factors. A too pessimistic estimate will operate to force us into a passive position, with consequent loss of initiative; an overly optimistic estimate, with its rash ordering of factors, will produce the same result.

No military leader is endowed by heaven with an ability to seize the initiative. It is the intelligent leader who does so after a careful study and estimate of the situation and arrangement of the military and political factors involved. When a guerrilla unit, through either a poor estimate on the part of its leader or pressure from the enemy, is forced into a passive position, its first duty is to extricate itself. No method can be prescribed for this, as the method to be employed will, in every case, depend on the situation. One can, if necessary, run away. But there are times when the situation seems hopeless and, in reality, is not so at all. It is at such times that the good leader recognizes and seizes the moment when he can regain the lost initiative.

Let us revert to alertness. To conduct one's troops with alertness is an essential of guerrilla command. Leaders must realize, that to operate alertly is the most important factor in gaining the initiative and vital in its effect of the relative situation that exists between our forces and those of the enemy. Guerrilla commanders adjust their operations to the enemy situation, to the terrain, and to prevailing local conditions. Leaders must be alert to sense changes in these factors and make necessary modifications in troop dispositions to accord with them. The leader must be like the fisherman, who, with his nets, is able both to cast them and to pull them out in awareness of the depth of the water, the strength of the current or the presence of any obstructions that may foul them. As the fisherman controls his nets through the lead ropes, so the guerrilla leader maintains contact with control over his units. As the fisherman must change his position, so must the guerrilla commander. Dispersion, concentration, constant change of position—-it is in these ways that guerrillas employ their strength.

In general, guerrilla units disperse to operate:

1. When the enemy is in over-extended defense, and sufficient force cannot

be concentrated against him, guerrillas must disperse, harass him, and demoralize him.

2. When encircled by the enemy, guerrillas disperse to withdraw.

3. When the nature of the ground limits action, guerrillas disperse.

4. When the availability of supplies limits action, they disperse.

5. Guerrillas disperse in order to promote mass movements over a wide area.

Regardless of the circumstances that prevail at the time of dispersal, caution must be exercised in certain matters:

1. A relatively large group should be retained as a central force. The remainder of the troops should not be divided into groups of absolutely equal size. In this way, the leader is in a position to deal with any circumstances that may arise.

2. Each dispersed unit should have clear and definite responsibilities. Orders should specify a place to which to proceed, the time of proceeding, and the place, time, and method of assembly.

Guerrillas concentrate when the enemy is advancing upon them, and there is opportunity to fall upon him and destroy him. Concentration may be desirable when the enemy is on the defensive and guerrillas wish to destroy isolated detachments in particular localities. By the term ‘concentrate’, we do not mean the assembly of all manpower but rather of only that necessary for the task. The remaining guerrillas are assigned missions of hindering and delaying the enemy, of destroying isolated groups, or of conducting mass propaganda.

In addition to the dispersion and concentration of forces, the leader must understand what is termed ‘alert shifting’. When the enemy feels the danger of guerrillas, he will generally send troops out to attack them. The guerrillas must consider the situation and decide at what time and at what place they wish to fight. If they find that they cannot fight, they must immediately shift. Then the enemy may be destroyed piecemeal. For example, after a guerrilla group has destroyed an enemy detachment at one place, it may be shifted to another area to attack and destroy a second detachment. Sometimes, it will not be profitable for a unit to become engaged in a certain area, and in that case, it must move immediately.

When the situation is serious, the guerrilla must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind. Their tactics must deceive, tempt, and confuse the enemy. They must lead the enemy to believe that they will attack him from the east and north, and they must then strike him from the west and the south. They must strike, then rapidly disperse. They must move at night.

Guerrilla initiative is expressed in dispersion, concentration, and the alert shifting of forces. If guerrillas are stupid and obstinate, they will be led to passive positions and severely damaged. Skill in conducting guerrilla operations, however, lies not in merely understanding the things we have discussed but rather in their actual application on the field of battle. The quick intelligence that constantly watches the ever-changing situation and is able to seize on the right moment for decisive action is found only in keen and thoughtful observers.

Careful planning is necessary if victory is to be won in guerrilla war, and those who fight without method do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. A plan is necessary regardless of the size of the unit involved; a prudent plan is as necessary in the case of the squad as in the case of the regiment. The situation must be carefully studied, then an assignment of duties made. Plans must include both political and military instruction; the matter of supply and equipment, and the matter of cooperation with local civilians. Without study of these factors, it is impossible either to seize the initiative or to operate alertly. It is true that guerrillas can make only limited plans, but even so, the factors we have mentioned must be considered.

The initiative can be secured and retained only following a positive victory that results from attack. The attack must be made on guerrilla initiative; that is, guerrillas must not permit themselves to be maneuvered into a position where they are robbed of initiative and where the decision to attack is forced upon them. Any victory will result from careful planning and alert control. Even in defense, all our efforts must be directed toward a resumption of the attack, for it is only by attack that we can extinguish our enemies and preserve ourselves. A defense or a withdrawal is entirely useless as far as extinguishing our enemies is concerned and of only temporary value as far as the conservation of our forces is concerned. This principle is valid both for guerrillas and regular troops. The differences are of degree only; that is to say, in the manner of execution.

The relationship that exists between guerrilla and the orthodox forces is important and must be appreciated. Generally speaking, there are types of cooperation between guerrillas and orthodox groups. These are:

1. Strategical cooperation.
2. Tactical cooperation.
3. Battle cooperation.

Guerrillas who harass the enemy's rear installations and hinder his transport are weakening him and encouraging the national spirit of resistance. They are cooperating strategically. For example, the guerrillas in Manchuria had no functions of strategical cooperation with orthodox forces until the war in China started. Since that time, their function of strategical cooperation is evident, for if they can kill one enemy, make the enemy expend one round of ammunition, or hinder one enemy group in its advance southward, our powers of resistance here are proportionately increased. Such guerrilla action has a positive action on the enemy nation and on its troops, while, at the same time, it encourages our own countrymen. Another example of strategical cooperation is furnished by the guerrillas who operate along the P'ing-Sui, P'ing-Han, Chin-P'u, T'ung-Pu, and Cheng-T'ai railways. This cooperation began when the invader attacked, continued during the period when he held garrisoned cities in the areas, and was intensified when our regular forces counter-attacked, in an effort to restore the lost territories.

As an example of tactical cooperation, we may cite the operations at Hsing-K'ou, when guerrillas both north and south of Yeh Men destroyed the T'ung-P'u railway and the motor roads near P'ing Hsing Pass and Yang Fang K'ou. A number of small operating bases were established, and organized guerrilla action in Shansi complemented the activities of the regular forces both there and in the defense of Honan. Similarly, during the south Shantung campaign, guerrillas in the five northern provinces cooperated with the army's operation on the Hsuchow front.

Guerrilla commanders in rear areas and those in command of regiments assigned to operate with orthodox units must cooperate in accordance with the situation. It is their function to determine weak points in the enemy dispositions, to harass them, to disrupt their transport, and to undermine their morale. If guerrilla action were independent, the results to be obtained from tactical cooperation would be lost and those that result from strategical cooperation greatly diminished. In order to accomplish their mission and improve the degree of cooperation, guerrilla units must be equipped with some means of rapid communication. For this purpose, two way radio sets are recommended.

Guerrilla forces in the immediate battle area are responsible for close cooperation with regular forces. Their principal functions are to hinder enemy transport, to gather information, and to act as outposts and sentinels. Even without precise instructions from the commander of the regular forces, these missions, as well as any others that contribute to the general success, should be assumed.

The problem of establishment of bases is of particular importance. This is so because this war is a cruel and protracted struggle. The lost territories can be restored only by a strategical counter-attack and this we cannot carry out until the enemy is well into China. Consequently, some part of our country—or, indeed, most of it—may be captured by the enemy and become his rear area. It is our task to develop intensive guerrilla warfare over this vast area and convert the enemy's rear into an additional front. Thus the enemy will never be able to stop fighting. In order to subdue the occupied territory, the enemy will have to become increasingly severe and oppressive.

A guerrilla base may be defined as an area, strategically located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation and development. Ability to fight a war without a rear area is a fundamental characteristics of guerrilla action, but this does not mean that guerrillas can exist and function over a long period of time without the development of base areas. History shows us many examples of peasant revolts that were unsuccessful, and it is fanciful to believe that such movements, characterized by banditry and brigandage, could succeed in this era of improved communications and military equipment. Some guerrilla leaders seem to think that those qualities are present in today's movement, and before such leaders can comprehend the importance of base areas in the long-term war, their minds must be disabused of this idea.

The subject of bases may be better understood if we consider:

1. The various categories of bases.
2. Guerrilla areas and base areas.
3. The establishment of bases.
4. The development of bases.

Guerrilla bases may be classified according to their location as: first, mountain bases; second, plains bases; and, last, river, lake, and bay bases. The advantages of bases in mountainous areas are evident. Those which are now established are at Ch'ang P'o Chan, Wu Tai Shan, Taiheng Shan, Tai Shan, Yen Shan, and Mao Shan. These bases are strongly protected. Similar bases should be established in all enemy rear areas.

Plains country is generally not satisfactory for guerrilla operating bases, but this does not mean that guerrilla warfare cannot flourish in such country or that bases cannot be established there. The extent of guerrilla development in Hopeh and west Shantung proves the opposite to be the case. Whether we can count on the use of these bases over long periods of time is questionable. We can, however, establish small bases of a seasonal or temporary nature. This we can do because our barbaric enemy simply does not have the manpower to occupy all the areas he has overrun and because the population of China is so numerous that a base can be established anywhere. Seasonal bases in plains country may be established in the winter when the rivers are frozen over, and in the summer when the crops are growing. Temporary bases may be established when the enemy is otherwise occupied. When the enemy advances, the guerrillas who have established bases in the plains area are the first to engage him. Upon their withdrawal into mountainous country, they should leave behind their guerrilla groups dispersed over the entire area. Guerrillas shift from base to base on the theory that they must be in one place one day and another place the next.

There are many historical examples of the establishment of bases in river, bay, and lake country, and this is one aspect of our activity that has so far received little attention. Red guerrillas held out for many years in the Hungtze Lake region. We should establish bases in the Hungtze and Tai areas and along rivers and watercourses in territory controlled by the enemy so as to deny him access, to, and free use of, the water routes.

There is a difference between the terms base area and guerrilla area. An area completely surrounded by territory occupied by the enemy is a 'base area.' Wu Tai Shan, Tai Shan, and Taiheng Shan are examples of base areas. On the other hand, the area east and north of Wu Tai Shan (the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar border zone) is a guerrilla area. Such areas can be controlled by guerrillas only while they actually physically occupy them. Upon their departure, control reverts to a puppet pro-Japanese government. East Hopeh, for example, was at first a guerrilla area rather than a base area. A puppet government functioned there. Eventually, the people, organized and inspired by guerrillas from the Wu Tai mountains, assisted in the transformation of this guerrilla area into a real base area. Such a task is extremely difficult, for it is largely dependent upon the degree to which the people can be inspired. In certain garrisoned areas, such as the cities and zones contiguous to the railroads, the guerrillas are unable to drive the Japanese and puppets out. These areas remain guerrilla areas. At other times, base areas might become guerrilla areas due either to our own mistakes or to the activities of the enemy.

Obviously, in any given area in the war zone, any one of three situations may develop: The area may remain in Chinese hands; it may be lost to the Japanese and puppets; or it may be divided between the combatants. Guerrilla leaders should endeavor to see that either the first or the last of these situations is assured.

Another point essential in the establishment of bases is the cooperation that must exist between the armed guerrilla bands and the people. All our strength must be used to spread the doctrine of armed resistance to Japan, to arm the people, to organize self-defense units, and to train guerrilla bands. This doctrine must be spread among the people, who must be organized into anti-Japanese groups. Their political instincts must be sharpened and their martial ardour increased. If the workers, the farmers, the lovers of liberty, the young men, the women, and the children are yet organized, they will never realize their own anti-Japanese power. Only the united strength of the people can eliminate traitors, recover the measure of political power that has been lost, and conserve and improve what we still retain.

We have already touched on geographic factors in our discussion of bases, and we must also mention the economic aspects of the problem. What economic policy should be adopted? Any such policy must offer reasonable protection to commerce and business. We interpret 'reasonable protection' to mean the people must contribute money in proportion to the money they have. Farmers will be required to furnish a certain share of their crops to guerrilla troops. Confiscation, except in the case of businesses run by traitors, is prohibited.

Our activities must be extended over the entire periphery of the base area if we wish to attack the enemy's bases and thus strengthen and develop our own. This will afford us opportunity to organize, equip, and train the people, thus furthering guerrilla policy as well as the national policy of protracted war. At times, we must emphasize the development and extension of base areas; at other times, the organization, training, or equipment of the people.

Each guerrilla base will have its own peculiar problems of attack and defense. In general, the enemy, in an endeavour to consolidate his gains, will attempt to extinguish guerrilla bases by dispatching numerous bodies of troops over a number of different routes. This must be anticipated and the encirclement broken by counter-attack. As such enemy columns are without reserves, we should plan on using our main forces to attack one of them by surprise and devote our secondary effort to continual hindrance and harassment. At the same time, other forces should isolate enemy garrison troops and operate on their lines of supply and communication. When one column has been disposed of, we may turn our attention to one of the others. In a base area as large as Wu Tai Shan, for example, there are four or five military sub-divisions.

Guerrillas in these sub-divisions must cooperate to form a primary force to counterattack the enemy, or the area from which he came, while a secondary force harasses and hinders him.

After defeating the enemy in any area, we must take advantage of the period he requires for reorganization to press home our attacks. We must not attack an objective we are not certain of winning. We must confine our operations to relatively small areas and destroy the enemy and traitors in those places.

When the inhabitants have been inspired, new volunteers accepted, trained, equipped, and organized, our operations may be extended to include cities and lines of communication not strongly held. We may hold these at least for temporary (if not for permanent) periods. All these are our duties in offensive strategy. Their object is to lengthen the period that the enemy must remain on the defensive. Then our military activities and our organization work among the masses of the people must be zealously expanded: and with equal zeal, the strength of the enemy attacked and diminished. It is of great importance that guerrilla units be rested and instructed. During such times as the enemy is on the defensive, the troops may get some rest and instruction may be carried out.

The development of mobile warfare is not only possible but essential. This is the case because our current war is a desperate and protracted struggle. If China were able to conquer the Japanese bandits speedily and to recover her lost territories, there would be no question of long-term war on a national scale. Hence, there would be no question of the relation of guerrilla warfare and the war of movement. Exactly the opposite is actually the case. In order to ensure the development of guerrilla hostilities into mobile warfare of an orthodox nature, both the quantity and quality of guerrilla troops must be improved. Primarily, more men must join the armies; then the quality of equipment and standards of training must be improved. Political training must be emphasized and our organization, the technique of handling our weapons, our tactics—all must he improved. Our internal discipline must be strengthened. The soldiers must be educated politically. There must be a gradual change from guerrilla formations to orthodox regimental organization. The necessary bureau and staffs, both political and military, must be provided. At the same time, attention must be paid to the creation of suitable supply, medical, and hygiene units. The standards of equipment must be raised and types of weapons increased. Communication equipment must not be forgotten. Orthodox standards of discipline must be established.

Because guerrilla formations act independently and because most elementary of armed formations, command highly centralized. If it were, guerrilla action would be too limited in scope. At the same time, guerrilla activities, be most effective, must be coordinated , not only in so far as they themselves are concerned, but additionally with regular troops operating in the same areas. This coordination is a function of the war zone commander and his staff.

In guerrilla base areas, the command must be centralized for strategical purposes and decentralized for tactical purposes. Centralized strategical command takes care of the general management of all guerrilla units, their coordination within war zones, and the general policy regarding guerrilla base areas. Beyond this, centralization of command will result in interference with subordinate units, as, naturally, the tactics to apply to concrete situations can be determined only as these various situations arise. This is true in orthodox warfare when communications between lower and higher echelons break down. In a word, proper guerrilla policy will provide for unified strategy and independent activity.

Each guerrilla area is divided into districts and these in turn are divided into sub-districts. Each sub-division has its appointed commander, and while general plans are made by higher commanders, the nature of actions is determined by inferior commanders. The former may suggest the nature of the action to be taken but cannot define it. Thus inferior groups have more or less complete local control.

Appendix

Notes

1. Each squad consists of from 9 to 11 man. In case men or arms are not sufficient, the third platoon may be dispensed with or one squad organized as company headquarters.

2. The mobile propaganda unit consists of members of the company who are not relieved of primary duties except to carry out propaganda when they are not fighting.

3. If there is insufficient personnel, the medical section is not separately organized. If there are only two or three medical personnel, they may be attached to the administrative section.

4. If there is no barber, it is unimportant. If there is an insufficient number of cooks, any member of the company may be designated to prepare food.

5. Each combatant soldier should be armed with the rifle. If there are not enough rifles, each squad should have two or three. Shotguns, lances, and big swords can also be furnished. The distribution of rifles does not have to be equalized in platoons. As different missions are assigned to platoons, it may be necessary to give one platoon more rifles than the others.

6. The strength of a company should at the most be 180, divided into 12 squads of 11 men each. The minimum strength of a company should be 82 men, divided into 6 squads of 9 men each.

Table 1 - Organization of an independent Guerrilla Company


Company Commander
Political Officer
Mobile Propaganda Unit
Executive Officer
Company Headquarters
Message Section
Administrative Section
First-Aid and Hospital Section
Intelligence Section
First Platoon
Second Platoon
Third Platoon
Squad
Squad
Squad

Table of Organizations, Guerrilla Company

RANK	PERSONNEL	ARM
Company Leader	1	Pistol
Political Leader	1	Pistol
Executive Officer	1	Pistol
Company Headquarters		
Message Section Chief	1	
Signal	1	
Administrative Section Chief	1	Rifle
Public Relations	3	Rifle
Duty Personnel	2	
Barber	1	
Cooks	10	
Medical Section Chief	1	
Assistant	1	
First Aid and Nursing	4	
Intelligence Section Chief	1	Rifle
Intelligence	9	Rifle
Platoon Leaders	3	Rifle
Squad Leaders	9	Rifle
Nine Squads (8 each)	72	Rifle
TOTAL	122	3 Pistols, 98 Rifles

Table 2 - Organization of an independent Guerrilla Battalion


Battalion Commander
Political Officer
Executive Officer
Battalion Headquarters and Three Companies
Intelligence Section
Signal Section
Machine-Gun Section
Medical Section
Administrative Section
First Company
Second Company
Third Company
Fourth Company

Notes

1. Total headquarters of an independent guerrilla battalion may vary from a minimum of 46 to a maximum of 110.

2. When there are 4 companies to a battalion, regimental organization should be used.

3. Machine-gun squads may be heavy or light. A light machine-gun squad has from 5 to 7 men. A heavy machine-gun squad has from 7 to 9 men.

4. The intelligence section is organized in from 2 to 4 squads, at least one of which is made up of plain-clothes men. If horses are available, one squad should be mounted.

5. If no men are available for stretcher-bearers, omit them and use the cooks or ask aid from the people.

6. Each company must have at least 25 rifles. The remaining; weapons may be fowling-pieces, etc., big swords, or locally made shotguns,

Table of Organization, Guerilla Battalion (Independent)

RANK	PERSONNEL	ARM
Battalion Commander	1	Pistol
Political Officer	1	Pistol
Executive Officer	1	Pistol
Battalion Headquarters		
Signal Section	2	
Administrative Section		
Section Chief	1	Rifle
Runner	1	Rifle
Public Relations	10	Rifle
Duty Personnel	2	
Barbers	3	
Supply	1	
Cooks	10	
Medical Section		
Medical Officer	1	
Stretcher-Bearers	6	
Nursing	4	
Intelligence Section		
Section Chief	1	Pistol
Intelligence	30	Pistol
Machine-Gun Section	As Available	As Available
TOTAL, Headquarters	75	34 Pistols 12 Rifles
Three Companies (122 each)	366	9 Pistols 294 Rifles
TOTAL	441	43 Pistols 306 Rifles

Table 3 - Organization of an Independant Guerrilla Regiment


Regimental Commander
Political Officer
Chief of Staff
Regimental Headquarters and Three Battalions
First Section
Operations and Training
Second Section
Intelligence
Third Section
Public Relations
Fourth Section
Administration
Medical Section
Transport Section
First Batallion
Second Batallion
Third Batallion

1. See Tables 1 and 2 for company and battalion organization.
2. Battalions and companies have no transport sections.
3. The hand weapon may be either revolver or pistol. Of these, each regiment should have more than 100.

Table of Organization, Guerilla Regiment

RANK	PERSONNEL	ARM
Regimental Commander	1	Pistol
Political Officer	1	Pistol
Chief of Staff	1	Pistol
Operations Section		
Operations Officer	1	
Clerks	15	
Intelligence Section		Rifle
Intelligence Officer	1	Rifle
Personnel	36	Rifle
Public-Relations Section		
Public-Relations Officer	1	
Personnel	36	
Administrative Section		
Administrative Officer	1	
Clerks	15	
Runner	1	
Transport Section		
Chief of Section	1	
Finance	1	
Traffic Manager	1	
Supply	1	
Drivers	5	
Medical Section		
Chief of Section	1	
Doctors	2	
Nurses	15	
TOTAL, Regimental Headquarters	137	60 Pistols 36 Rifles
Three Battalions (441 Each)	1323	129 Pistols 918 Rifles
TOTAL	1460	189 Pistols 954 Rifles

Table 4 - Organization of Independent Guerilla Brigade (or Division)


Brigade Commander
Political Officer
Headquarters
Medical
Supply and Finance
Staff
Transport
Supply
Accounting
Disbursing
Operations and Training
Intelligence
Public Relations
Administration
Personnel
First Regiment
Second Regiment
Third Regiment
Fourth Regiment
Engineers
First Battalion
Second Battalion
Third Battalion
First Company
Second Company
Third Company

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM[27]

April-June 1938

Chapter I

Idealism and Materialism

1. The Struggle Between Two Armies in Philosophy.

The whole history of philosophy is the history of the struggle and the development of two mutually opposed schools of philosophy, idealism, and materialism. All philosophical currents and schools are manifestations of these two fundamental schools.

All philosophical theories have been created by men belonging to a definite social class. The ideas of these men have moreover been historically determined by a definite social existence. All philosophical doctrines express the needs of a definite social class and reflect the level of development of the productive forces of society and the historical stage in men's comprehension of nature...

The social origins of idealism and materialism lie in a social structure marked by class contradictions. The earliest appearance of idealism was the product of the ignorance and superstition of savage and primitive man. Then, with the development of the productive forces, and the ensuing development of scientific knowledge, it stands to reason that idealism should decline and be replaced by materialism. And yet, from ancient times to the present, idealism not only has not declined, but, on the contrary has developed and carried on a struggle for supremacy with materialism from which neither has emerged the victor. The reason lies in the division of society into classes. On the one hand, in its own interest, the oppressing class must develop and reinforce its idealist doctrines. On the other-hand, the oppressed classes, likewise in their own interest, must develop and reinforce their materialist doctrines. Both idealism and materialism are weapons in the class struggle, and the struggle between idealism and materialism cannot disappear so long as classes continue to exist.

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[27] This text includes about two thirds of the first chapter, and about one fifth of the first six sections of the second chapter of Mao's 'Pien-Cheng-fa wei-wu-lun (chiang-shou t'i-kang)' ('Dialectical materialism-notes of lectures'), as published in K'ang-chan ta-hsueh, nos. 6 to 8 April to June 1938.

Idealism, in the process of its historical development, represents the Ideology of the exploiting classes and serves reactionary purposes. Materialism, on the other hand, is the worldview of the revolutionary class; in a class society, it grows and develops in the midst of an incessant struggle against the reactionary philosophy of idealism. Consequently, the history of the struggle between idealism and materialism in philosophy reflects the struggle of interests between the reactionary class and the revolutionary class... A given philosophical tendency is in the last analysis a manifestation in a particular guise of the policy of the social class to which the philosophers belong.

The distinguishing characteristic of Marxist philosophy—i.e., dialectical materialism—is its effort to explain clearly the class nature of all social consciousness (including philosophy). It publicly declares a resolute struggle between its own proletarian nature and the idealist philosophy of the propertied class. Moreover, it subordinates its own special and independent tasks to such general tasks as overthrowing capitalism, organizing and building a proletarian dictatorship, and edifying a socialist society.

2. The Difference Between Idealism and Materialism.

Wherein lies the basic difference between idealism and materialism? It lies in the opposite answers given by the two to the fundamental question in philosophy, that of the relation- ship between spirit and matter (that of the relationship between consciousness and existence). Idealism considers spirit (consciousness, concepts, the subject) as the source of all that exists on earth, and matter (nature and society, the object) as secondary and subordinate. Materialism recognizes the independent existence of matter as detached from spirit and considers spirit as secondary and subordinate.

3. The Source of the Growth and the Development of Idealism.

Idealism sees matter as the product of the spirit. This is turning the real world upside down. Where is the source of the growth and the development of such a philosophy?

As mentioned above, the earliest manifestation of idealism was brought about by the superstition and ignorance of primitive, savage man. But with the development of production, the separation between manual labour and intellectual labour was responsible for ranking idealism first among currents of philosophical thought. With the development of the productive forces of society, the division of labour made its appearance; the further development of the division of labour saw the emergence of persons devoting themselves entirely and exclusively to intellectual labour. But when the productive forces are still weak, the division between the two does not reach the stage of complete separation. Only after classes and private property appear and exploitation becomes the foundation of the existence of the ruling class do great changes occur. Intellectual labour then becomes the exclusive privilege of the ruling class, while manual labour becomes the fate of the oppressed classes. The ruling class begins to examine the relationship between themselves and the oppressed classes in an upside-down fashion: It is not the labourers who furnish them with means for existence, but rather they who supply the labourers with these means. Hence, they despise manual labour and develop idealist conceptions. To eliminate the distinction between manual labour and intellectual labour is one of the preconditions for eliminating idealist philosophy.

The social root that makes possible the development of idealist philosophy lies principally in the fact that this kind of philosophical consciousness is the manifestation of the interests of the exploiting class... The final decline of idealism will come with the elimination of classes, after the establishment of a communist society.

The source that enables idealism to develop and deepen and gives it the strength to struggle with materialism must be sought in the process of human knowing. When men think, they must use concepts. This can easily cause our knowledge to be split into two aspects: reality, which is of an individual and particular character; and concepts, which are of a general character... In the nature of things, the particular and the general are inseparably linked; once separated, they depart from objective truth... To separate the general from the particular, and to view the general as objective reality and the particular merely as the form in which the general exists—this is the method adopted by all idealists. All idealists put consciousness, spirit, or concepts in place of objective reality existing independently from human consciousness… They cannot point out the materialist truth according to which consciousness is limited by matter, but believe that only consciousness is active, whereas matter is only an inert composite entity. Urged on moreover by their own class nature, the idealists then use every method to exaggerate the activity of consciousness, developing this aspect unilaterally... Idealism in economics exaggerates beyond measure a nonessential aspect of exchange, raising the law of supply and demand to the status of the fundamental law of capitalism... Idealist historians regard heroes as the makers of history. Idealist politicians regard politics as omnipotent. Idealist military leaders practice the methods of desperate combat [*p'ing-ming-*

chu-i-ti tso-chan]. Idealist revolutionaries advocate Blanquism. The diehards say that the only way to revive our nation is to restore the old morality. All this results from exaggerating subjective factors beyond measure...

Pre-Marxist materialism (mechanistic materialism) did not stress the thought process in the development of knowledge, but regarded thought merely as the object of action, as the mirror that reflects nature... Only dialectical materialism correctly shows the active role of thought, and at the same time points out the limitation imposed upon thought by matter. It points out that thought arises from social practice and at the same time actively shapes practice. Only this kind of dialectical theory of the unity of knowledge and action can thoroughly vanquish idealism.

4. The Origin of the Inception and the Development of Materialism.

The recognition that matter exists independently and apart from consciousness in the external world is the foundation of materialism. Man created this foundation through practice...

Obliged to submit to natural forces, and capable of using only simple tools, primitive man could not explain the surrounding phenomena and hence sought help from spirits. This is the origin of religion and idealism.

But in the long-range process of production, man came into contact with surrounding nature, acted upon nature, changed nature, and created things to eat, to live in, and to use, and adapted nature to the interests of man and caused man to believe that matter has an objective existence.

In the social existence of humanity, reciprocal relationships and influences arise between individuals. In a class society there is moreover a class struggle. The oppressed class considers the circumstances and estimates its strength, and then makes its plans. When they succeed in the struggle, the members of this class are convinced that their views are not the product of fantasy, but the reflection of the objectively existing material world. Because the oppressed class fails when it adopts the wrong plans and succeeds by correcting its plans it learns to understand that it can achieve its purpose only when its subjective plans rest upon the accurate understanding of the material nature of the objective world and the fact that the objective world is governed by laws.

The history of science furnishes man with proof of the material nature of the world and of the fact that it is governed by laws and helps man to see the futility of the illusions of religion and idealism and to arrive at materialist conclusions.

In sum, the history of man's practice comprises the history of his struggle with nature, the history of the class struggle, the history of science. Owing to the necessity to live and struggle, men have thought about the reality of matter and its laws, have proved the correctness of materialism, and have found the necessary intellectual tool for their struggle—materialist philosophy. The higher the level to which social production develops, the greater the development of the class struggle, and the more scientific knowledge reveals the 'secrets' of nature, the greater the development and consolidation of materialist philosophy. Thus man can be delivered gradually from the dual and crushing oppression of nature and society...

CHAPTER II

Dialectical Materialism

1. Dialectical Materialism is the Revolutionary Arm of the Proletariat

The Chinese proletariat, having assumed at the present time the historical task of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, must make use of dialectical materialism as its mental arm... The study of dialectical materialism is even more indispensable for the cadres who lead the revolutionary movement, because the two erroneous theories and methods of work of subjectivism and mechanism frequently subsist among the cadres, and as a result frequently cause the cadres to go against Marxism, and lead the revolutionary movement on to the wrong path. If we wish to avoid or correct such deficiencies, the only solution lies in conscious study and understanding of dialectical materialism, in order to arm one's brain anew.

2. The Relations Between the Old Philosophical Heritage and Dialectical Materialism

After the May 4th Movement of 1919, as a consequence of the conscious appearance of the Chinese proletariat on the political stage, and the rise in the scientific level of the country, Marxist philosophical movement arose and developed in China. In its first period, however, the level of understanding of materialist dialectics within the materialist current of thought was rather weak, and mechanistic materialism influenced by the bourgeoisie, as well as the subjectivism of Deborin, were its principal components. Following the defeat of the revolution in 1927 the level of understanding of Marxism and Leninism progressed, and the thinking of materialist dialectics gradually developed. Just recently, because of the severity of the national and social crisis, and also because of the influence of the movement for liquidating deviations in Soviet philosophy, a broad movement of materialist dialectics has developed in China's intellectual circles.

Because of the backwardness of China's social development the dialectical materialist philosophical currents developing in China today do not result from taking over and reforming our own philosophical heritage, but from the study of Marxism-Leninism. However, if we wish to ensure that dialectical materialist thought shall penetrate profoundly in China and continue to develop, and shall moreover give firm direction to the Chinese revolution and lead it to final victory in the future, then we must struggle with all the old and rotten philosophical theories existing in China on the ideological front throughout the whole country, raise the flag of criticism and in this way liquidate the philosophical heritage of ancient China. Only thus we can attain our goal.

3. The Unity of Worldview and Methodology in Dialectical Materialism

Dialectical materialism is the worldview of the proletariat. At the same time it is the method of the proletariat for taking cognizance of the surrounding world, and the method of revolutionary action of the proletariat. It is the unity of worldview and methodology...

4. The Question of the Object of Materialist Dialectics—What Do Materialist Dialectics Serve to Study?

Marx, Engels, and Lenin all explained materialist dialectics as the theory of development...

Under the heading of the object of philosophy we must still solve another problem, namely the problem of the unity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology...

Materialist dialectics is the only scientific epistemology, and it is also the only scientific logic. Materialist dialectics studies the origin and development of our knowledge of the outside world. It studies the transition from not knowing to knowing, and from incomplete knowledge to more complete knowledge; it studies how the laws of the development of nature and society are daily reflected more profoundly and more extensively in the mind of humanity. This is precisely the unity of materialist dialectics with epistemology...

The essence of the concept of development consists in regarding laws as the reflection in and transplanting to our minds (moreover further elaborated in our minds) of the manifestations of the movement of matter...

Only by using materialism to arrive at a solution of the problem of the relations between existence and thought, only by taking one's stand on the theory of the reflection, can one arrive at a thorough solution to the problems of dialectics, logic, and epistemology...

5. On Matter

The very first condition for belonging to the materialist camp consists in recognizing the independent existence of the material world, separate from human consciousness—the fact that it existed before the appearance of humanity, and continues to exist since the appearance of humanity, independently and outside of human consciousness. To recognize this point is a fundamental premise of all scientific research.

How shall we demonstrate this? The proofs are extremely numerous. Humanity is constantly in contact with the external world and must, moreover, struggle fiercely against the pressure and resistance of the outside world (nature and society). Moreover, we not only must, but can overcome this pressure and resistance. All of these real circumstances of the social practice of humanity, as manifested in the historical development of human society, are the best proof [of the existence of the material world]. China does not doubt the objective existence of Japanese imperialism which has invaded our country, nor of the Chinese people themselves. The students of the Anti-Japanese Military-Political University also do not doubt the objective existence of this university and of the students themselves…

If we consider this thing known as consciousness in the light of thoroughgoing materialism (that is to say in the light of materialist dialectics), then what we call consciousness is nothing else but a form of the movement of matter, a particular characteristic of the material brain of humanity; it is that particular characteristic of the material brain which causes the material processes outside consciousness to be reflected in consciousness. From this we see that when we distinguish matter from consciousness and when, moreover, we oppose them one to another, this is only conditional; that is to say, it has meaning only from the standpoint of epistemology...

In a word, matter is everything in the universe. 'All power belongs to Ssu-Ma I.' 'We say, All power belongs to matter.' This is the source of the unity of the world...

6. On Movement (On Development)

The first fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its view of matter... This principle of the unity of the world has already been explained above in discussing matter.

The second fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its theory of movement (or theory of development). This means the recognition that movement is the form of the existence of matter, an inherent attribute of matter, a manifestation of the multiplicity of matter. This is the principle of the development of the world. The combination of the principle of the development of the world with the principle of the unity of the world, set forth above, constitutes the whole of the worldview of dialectical materialism. The world is nothing else but the material world in a process of unlimited development...

Dialectical materialism's theory of movement is in opposition first of all with philosophical idealism and with the theological concepts of religion. The fundamental nature of all philosophical idealism and religious theology derives from their denial of the unity and material nature of the world, and in imagining that the movement and development of the world takes place apart from matter, or took place at least in the beginning apart from matter, and is the result of the action of spirit, God, or divine forces. The German idealist philosopher; Hegel, held that the present world results from the development of the so-called 'world idea'. In China the philosophy of the *Book of Changes*, and the metaphysics of the Sung and Ming, all put forward idealist views of the development of the universe. Christianity says that God created the world. Buddhism and all of China's various fetishist religions attribute the movement and development of all the myriad phenomena (*wan wu*) of the universe to spiritual forces. All of these doctrines which think about movement apart from matter are fundamentally incompatible with dialectical materialism...

Dialectical materialism considers that rest or equilibrium are merely one element of movement, that they are merely one particular circumstance of movement… A sentence popular with the metaphysical thinkers of ancient China, 'Heaven does not change and the Way also does not change,' corresponds to... a theory of the immobility of the universe... In their view, the basic nature of the universe and of society was eternally unchanging. The reason why they adopted this attitude is to be found primarily in their class limitations. If the feudal landlord class had recognized that the basic nature of the universe and of society is subject to movement and development, then most certainly they would have been pronouncing in theory a death sentence on their own class. The philosophies of all reactionary forces are theories of immobilism. Revolutionary classes and the popular masses have all perceived the principle of the development of the world, and consequently advocate transforming society and the world; their philosophy is dialectical materialism...

The causes of the transformation of matter is to be found not without, but within. It is not because of the impulsion of external mechanical forces, but because of the existence within the matter in question of two components different in their nature and mutually contradictory which struggle with one another, thus giving an impetus to the movement and development of the matter. As a result of the discovery of the laws of such movement and transformation, dialectical materialism is capable of enlarging the principle of the material unity of the world, extending it to the history of nature and society. Thus, not only it is possible to investigate the world considered as matter in perpetual movement, but the world can also be investigated as matter endlessly in movement from a lower form to a higher form. That is to say, it is possible to investigate the world as development and process.

Dialectical materialism investigates the development of the world as a progressive movement from the inorganic to the organic, and from thence to the highest form of the movement of matter (society).

What we have just discussed is the theory of the movement of the world, or the principle of the development of the world in accordance with dialectical materialism. This doctrine is the essence of Marxist philosophy. It is the worldview and methodology of the proletariat. If the proletariat and all revolutionaries take up this consistently scientific arm, they will then be able to understand this world, and transform the world.

WE ARE FOR ROOSVELT AND AGAINST CHAMBERLAIN[28]

January 20, 1939

… The great war of resistance now being waged by China is not merely the affair of China—it is also the affair of the world. In the democratic countries such as England, America, and France, there are broad popular masses including all the progressive people from the various social strata who sympathize with China's war of resistance and oppose the invasion of China of Japanese imperialism. It is only a reactionary faction that opposes China's war of resistance... In this great war of resistance we rely first of all on China's own strength to vanquish the enemy... But at the same time, we need outside aid. Our enemy is a world-wide enemy, and the war of resistance waged by China is a war of resistance of a world-wide character. History has already shown that a viewpoint attempting to isolate this war is erroneous. In all the democratic countries, such as England and America, there still exists an isolationist viewpoint whose adherents do not understand that if China is defeated, England, America, and the other countries will not be able to go on enjoying their own tranquility. This erroneous viewpoint is not attuned to the needs of the times. For the others, to aid China is to aid themselves—this is the only concrete verity at the present time... China is pursuing her war amidst many difficulties, but the flames of a war among the great powers of the world are coming closer every day and no country can remain aloof. We are in agreement with President Roosevelt's proclamation regarding the defense of democracy. We are, on the other hand, resolutely opposed to the policy of concessions to the fascist states in the West, practiced by Chamberlain. Up to this day, Chamberlain has also displayed a cowardly attitude towards Japan. I hope that the popular masses of England and America will arise and act positively to admonish their governments and make them adopt a new policy of resistance to wars of aggression—for the good of China and also for the good of England and America themselves.

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[28] *Extracted front Mao's Preface to the English edition of 'On Protracted War', dated 20 January 1939.*

TO BE ATTACKED BY THE ENEMY IS NOT A BAD THING BUT A GOOD THING

On the Third Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College

May 26, 1939

Why is it that the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College has become famous all over the country and even enjoys some reputation abroad? Because, of all the anti-Japanese military institutes, it is the most revolutionary, the most progressive, and the best fighter for national liberation and social emancipation. This, I think, is also the reason why visitors to Yan'an are so keen on seeing it.

The college is revolutionary and progressive because both its staff members and teachers and its courses are revolutionary and progressive. Without this revolutionary and progressive character, it could never have won the praise of revolutionary people at home and abroad.

Some people attack the college; they are the country's capitulationists and die-hards. This only goes to show that the college is a most revolutionary and progressive one, or otherwise they would not attack it. The vigorous attacks by the capitulationists and die-hards testify to its revolutionary and progressive nature and add to its luster. It is a glorious military-institute not only because the majority of the people support and praise it, but also because the capitulationists and die-hards strenuously attack and slander it.

I hold that it is bad as far as we are concerned if a person, a political party, an army or a school is not attacked by the enemy, for in that case it would definitely mean that we have sunk to the level of the enemy. It is good if we are attacked by the enemy, since it proves that we have drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves. It is still better if the enemy attacks us wildly and paints us as utterly black and without a single virtue; it demonstrates that we have not only drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves but achieved a great deal in our work.

In the past three years, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College has made a great contribution to the country, to the nation and to society by training tens of thousands of promising, progressive, and revolutionary young students. It will certainly go on making its contribution to the country, the nation, and society, because it will continue to train such young students in large numbers. In speaking of the college, people often compare it to the Whampoa Military Academy[29] before the Northern Expedition. In fact, there are points of both similarity and difference between the two institutes. The similarity is the presence of Communists among the teachers and students in both. The difference is that, while the chief leaders and the majority of the students at the Whampoa Military Academy were members of the Kuomintang, the entire leadership of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College is in the hands of the Communist Party and the vast majority of the students are communist or communist-inclined. For this reason, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College of today cannot but be more revolutionary and more progressive than was the Whampoa Military Academy of the past, and it will certainly make a greater contribution to national liberation and social emancipation.

The educational policy of the college is to cultivate a firm and correct political orientation, an industrious and simple style of work, and flexible strategy and tactics. These are the three essentials in the making of an anti-Japanese revolutionary soldier. It is in accordance with these essentials that the staff teach and the students study.

The progress and development of the college over the past few years have been accompanied by certain shortcomings. It has grown, but difficulties have arisen too. The main difficulty is the shortage of funds, teachers and teaching materials. But led by the Communist Party, the college does not fear any difficulties and will certainly overcome them. There are no such things as difficulties for Communists, for they can surmount them.

It is my hope and the hope of the people of the whole country that the college will eliminate its shortcomings and become still more progressive after its third anniversary.

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[29] *The Whampoa Military Academy, located at Whampoa near Canton, was established by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 with the help of the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. At the time, it was run jointly by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. At one time or another Chou En-lai, Yun Tai-ying, Hsiao Chu-nu, Hsiung Hsiung and other comrades did political and other work in the academy. They trained large numbers of cadres in a revolutionary spirit for the revolutionary armed forces; these cadres included many members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League. However, the head of the academy was Chiang Kai-shek. Using his position, he pushed aside the Communists, built up his own following and finally, after the counter-revolutionary coup d'état of April 12, 1927, turned the academy into a counter-revolutionary organization.*

Teachers, staff members and students of the college, let us redouble our efforts!

THE SECOND IMPERIALIST WAR[30]

September 14, 1939

…The new world economic crisis, which began in 1937, has in recent years penetrated into so-called 'peaceful' states such as England, France, and America; it is also developing in Germany, Japan, and Italy. This economic crisis has also brought a grave political crisis in its wake. The people are discontented with capitalism and with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Whether it be in the states that became fascist a long time ago, or in the states where they are taking advantage of the war to carry out fascization, this political crisis, this popular discontent, are daily becoming more acute. On the other hand, the socialist Soviet Union has been strengthened to the point where it can no longer be invaded. Under these conditions, the bourgeoisie of each of the imperialist states realizes that without a vast war, without transforming the limited war into a total war, without demolishing its imperialist friends, it cannot escape either the economic crisis or the political crisis, nor can it escape its own death.

These are the calculations of the bourgeoisie of all the countries of the world on the eve of its death. The authors of these calculations have no idea that in this way—by making use of a war to divide up the world anew in order to escape from the economic and political crisis and to avoid their own death—they cannot fail to create an even greater economic and political crisis and to hasten the day of their death. They are like a mad dog, they are already mad, the capitalist system has made them altogether mad, they cannot do otherwise than hurl themselves pell-mell against their enemies and against the walls of the world. Such is the reality of life today in all the capitalist countries of the world. A fight between mad dogs—such is the present imperialist war.

1. The Aims of the War

'War is the continuation of politics'. The nature of imperialism is predatory, and even in periods of 'peace' there is no instance when the policy of the imperialist states is not predatory. But when the predatory policy of certain imperialist states encounters the obstacle of certain other imperialist states and cannot break through this obstacle by peaceful means, then these states use warlike means to break through this obstacle so that they may pursue their predatory policies. The aim of the Second Imperialist War is similar to that of the First Imperialist War. It consists in dividing up the world anew, that is to say, in dividing up anew the colonies, semi-colonies, and spheres of influence, in pillaging the peoples of the world, and in establishing their domination over the peoples of the world... Apart from aims of this kind, are there any other aims? Are there any good aims? There are none whatever. Whether it be Germany, Italy, or Japan, whether it be England, America, or France, all the imperialist states participating directly or indirectly in the war have only a counter-revolutionary, an imperialist goal—pillaging the people. The 'lasting peace' of Japanese imperialism, the 'self-determination of peoples' of Hitler, the 'opposition to National Socialism' of Chamberlain, the 'aid to Poland' of Daladier—all this comes down to a single word: pillage. Merely because it sounds good and to fool the people, they order their secretaries to invent a few synonyms, that is all.

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[30] *Extracted from a lecture to the Party Cadres in Yan'an, 14 September 1939, reported in Chieh-fang, No.85, 30 September 1939.*

2. The Nature of the War

The nature of the war is basically determined by the political aims of the war. All wars are divided into two categories. As Comrade Stalin has said, they are divided into (1) Just wars, the aim of which is not pillage but liberation, and (2) Unjust wars of pillage. By its nature, the Second Imperialist War like the First Imperialist War, belongs to the second category. The two sides in the present war, in order to fool the people and mobilize public opinion, both proclaim with utter shamelessness that they themselves are just and those on the other side unjust. In reality, all of this is nothing but a farce and sham. Only wars of national liberation and wars of popular liberation, as well as wars undertaken by socialist countries to support these two kinds of liberation movements, are just wars. Many people are confused about the present war. According to them Germany is certainly unjust, whereas England and France are democratic and anti-fascist states, and Poland, for her part, is waging a national war of self-defense. They therefore believe that on the whole, the Anglo-Franco-Polish side has after all a slightly progressive character. This is altogether muddled conception, arising from the fact that people have not clearly understood either the aims of the war or the peculiarities that characterize the first and the second stages of the war.

3. The Peculiarities of the First Stage of the War

A portion of the imperialist states, the fascist states of Germany, Italy, and Japan, were waging wars of aggression like mad dogs, violating the interests of all small and weak peoples, violating the interests of all democratic countries, and unleashing a fascist menace within each democratic country. At this time the people of the whole world demanded that aggression be resisted and that democracy be defended; they demanded that another part of the imperialist states, the so-called democratic states of England, America, and France, intervene against these wars of aggression and that they allow the people to retain a small residue of democracy. The Soviet Union made known many times that she was ready to establish a joint front against aggression with all these so-called democratic states. If these so-called democratic states had intervened at the time against the aggressors, if a war had broken out to prevent aggression, if for example it had been possible—together with the Soviet Union to aid the armies of the Spanish Government in their effort to stop the German and Italian aggressors, and to aid China in her effort to stop the Japanese aggressors, then such an action, such a war, would have been just, would have had a progressive character. But these so-called democratic states did not intervene; they adopted a policy of 'non-intervention'. Their aim was to bring about a situation in which the two sides—the side of the aggressors and the side of the victims of aggression—would be ravaged by war, after which they would intervene to fish in troubled waters... Nevertheless, at this time, apart from the circumstances that German, Italian, and Japanese imperialism were waging unjust wars of pillage, and that the so-called democratic states were allowing them to continue, there was another circumstance, there were also wars of national liberation.

4. Our Revolutionary Policy During the First Stage of the War

There is not the slightest doubt that the revolutionary policy of this stage has as its goal the organization of a united front against aggression of the people of the country that is the victim of aggression... At the same time, this policy does not ignore the organization by the Soviet Union and the governments of all the democratic countries of the struggle to prevent new aggression... Even after Munich, because of the anger aroused among the broad masses of the English and French people and even among the left wing of the bourgeoisie by the defeat of Spain and the disappearance of Czechoslovakia, there was a possibility of compelling the Chamberlain and Daladier governments to abandon their policy of non-intervention and to organize, with the Soviet Union, a common front against aggression…

5. The Rupture of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Negotiations and the Beginning of the Second Stage of the War.

The bourgeoises of the so-called democratic states fear on the one hand that the fascist states may violate their interests; but they fear the development of the revolutionary forces even more. They fear the Soviet Union, they fear the liberation movements of the peoples of their own countries, they fear the liberation movements in the colonies and semi-colonies. Consequently, they rejected a genuine united front against aggression and a genuine war against aggression involving the participation of the Soviet Union, and they organized by themselves a united counter-revolutionary front, they undertook by themselves a robbers' war of pillage.

The Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations lasted from 15 April to 23 August... but from beginning to end, England and France refused to recognize the principle of equality and reciprocity. They wanted the Soviet Union to guarantee their security, but they were absolutely unwilling to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union or of the small countries of the Baltic... In addition, they would not allow the Soviet Army to cross Poland to fight the aggressor. Naturally, the Soviet Union was not willing to conclude a treaty like that proposed by England and France, which would not have been adapted to revolutionary aims but only to counter-revolutionary aims... This is the basic reason for the rupture of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. At this point, Germany abandoned her anti-Soviet position and in fact was ready to abandon the so-called "anti-Comintern Pact' as she recognized the inviolability of the Soviet frontier, and so the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty was concluded. The absolute lack of sincerity of England and France in their negotiations with the Soviet Union, their absolute refusal genuinely to oppose aggression, the way in which they decided to break off the Three Power Negotiations, proves nothing less than that Chamberlain had already decided on war. Consequently, if the great war broke out, it was not only Hitler but Chamberlain who wanted to fight, for if he had really wanted to avoid the war, he could have done so only with Soviet participation...

6. The Peculiarities of the Second Stage of the War

At the present time, now that war has broken out, the situation has undergone a fundamental change. The distinction that existed in the past between the fascist states and the democratic states has lost all meaning. At the present time, if one wishes to distinguish between things of different natures, there are only the following two categories: (1) all the countries that are waging an imperialist war of pillage as well as all the countries that are in reality supporting this war; and (2) those who are waging not wars of pillage but just wars of national liberation and popular liberation, as well as the countries that support these war... Today England has become the most reactionary country in the world, and the Number One anti-Soviet, anti-communist, anti-democratic, and anti-popular leader, the enemy of all small peoples, is none other than Chamberlain...

7. Our Revolutionary Policy During the Second Stage of the War.

In conformity with the peculiarities of the second stage of the war, what should the revolutionary policy of the proletariat be, and especially of the Communist Party?

In my opinion, it should be the following:

1. In all the imperialist countries participating in the war, we must call on the people to oppose the imperialist war, make clear the imperialist nature of both warring camps, treat them all as the same kind of robbers. In particular, we must oppose English imperialism, this robber chief, incite the people not to allow themselves to be deceived by the imperialist robbers, carry out propaganda among the people, in order that they may transform the imperialist war into a revolutionary civil war, establish a united popular front against the imperialist war...

2. In all the neutral countries, such as America, the members of the Communist Party should reveal to the people the imperialist policy of the bourgeois government, with calls itself neutral but in reality aids the war and seeks to enrich itself in the war...

3. In all the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the policy to follow is that of the national united front, either to resist the invader (as in China), or to oppose the mother country (as in the case of India), in order to attain national independence... In all the colonies of countries participating in the war we must oppose the actions of the traitors to the nation who support the war waged by the mother country, oppose the mobilization of the people of the colony to participate in the war on the front of the other country, remind the people of the colony of the misery they suffered during the First Imperialist War. In the colonial and semi-colonial countries, if we do not oppose the traitors to the nation there is no hope for the movement of national liberation.

8. The Perspectives of the War

Wars between imperialisms and mutual weakening of imperialisms, constitute a favourable condition for movements of popular liberation in all countries, for movements of national liberation in all countries, for China's war of resistance, for the building of communism in the Soviet Union. From this standpoint, the darkness that reigns in the world is only provisional and the future of the world is bright. Imperialism will surely perish, and the liberation of the oppressed people and of the oppressed nations will surely be achieved.

YOUTH NEEDS EXPERIENCE[31]

October 5, 1939

The young people—whether or not they be members of the Communist Party—who join the ranks of the revolutionary movement, bringing new blood and enthusiasm, are all very precious. Without them, the ranks of the revolution could not develop and the revolution could not triumph. But lack of experience is the natural failing of our young comrades. Now revolutionary experience comes from personal participation in revolutionary struggle. If one begins working at the grass roots, if, for several years, one does work that is genuine, not false, then experience will come to those who do not have it.

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[31] This is the complete text of a message dated 5 October 1939, published as an unnumbered page at the beginning of Chung-kuo ch'ling-vin wel-hsuan, Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien She, 1940.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR[32]

December 1942

1. A Basic Summary of our Past Work

The general policy guiding our economic and financial work is to develop the economy and ensure supplies. But many of our comrades place one-sided stress on public finance and do not understand the importance of the economy as a whole; engrossed in matters of revenue and expenditure as such, they cannot find solutions to any problem hard as they try. The reason is that an outmoded and conservative notion is doing mischief in their minds. They do not know that while a good or a bad financial policy affects the economy, it is the economy that determines finance. Without a well-based economy it is impossible to solve financial difficulties, and without a growing economy it is impossible to attain financial sufficiency. The financial problem in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region is that of supplying funds for the living and operating expenses of tens of thousands of troops and civilian personnel, in

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32. This is a report delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a conference of senior cadres of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. The years 1941 and 1942 were the hardest for the Liberated Areas in the War of Resistance Against Japan. The savage attacks by the Japanese invaders and the encirclement and blockade by the Kuomintang created enormous financial difficulties for the Liberated Areas. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that in order to overcome these difficulties it was necessary for the Party to exert itself in leading the people in developing agriculture and other branches of production, and he called upon the government and other organizations, schools and the army in the Liberated Areas to produce as much as possible for their own support. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's "Economic and Financial Problems" and his articles "Spread the Campaigns to Reduce Rent, Increase Production and 'Support the Government and Cherish the people' in the Base Areas" and "Get Organized!" formed the Party's basic program for leading the production campaign in the Liberated Areas. Comrade Mao Tse-tung here severely criticizes the mistaken notion of concentrating on public revenue and expenditure to the neglect of economic development, and the wrong working style of making demands on the people without mobilizing and helping them to develop production and surmount difficulties, and he set forth the Party's correct policy of "developing the economy and ensuring supplies". With this policy great successes were achieved in the production campaign which was unfolded in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and in the Liberated Areas behind the enemy lines. It not only enabled the armed forces and the people of the Liberated Areas successfully to tide over the most difficult period of the war, but also provided the Party with a rich store of experience for guiding economic construction in later years. The first Chapter of this report was published in the 'Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung' Volume 3, p. 111-116.

other words, the problem of supplying funds for waging the war. These funds come partly from taxes paid by the people and partly from production carried on by the tens of thousands of troops and civilian personnel themselves. We shall simply be resigning ourselves to extinction unless we develop both the private and the public sectors of the economy. Financial difficulties can be overcome only by down-to-earth and effective economic development. To neglect economic development and the opening up of sources of finance, and instead to hope for the solution of financial difficulties by curtailing indispensable expenditures, is a conservative notion which cannot solve any problem.

In the last five years we have passed through several stages. Our worst difficulties occurred in 1940 and 1941, when, the Kuomintang created friction by its two anti-Communist drives. For a time we had a very acute scarcity of clothing, cooking oil, paper and vegetables, of footwear for our soldiers and of winter bedding for our civilian personnel. The Kuomintang tried to strangle us by cutting off the funds due to us and imposing an economic blockade; we were indeed in dire straits. But we pulled through. Not only did the people of the Border Region provide us with grain but, in particular, we resolutely built up the public sector of our economy with our own hands. The government established many industries to meet the needs of the Border Region, the troops engaged in an extensive production campaign and expanded agriculture, industry and commerce to supply their own needs, and the tens of thousands of people in the various organizations and schools also developed similar economic activities for their own support. This self-supporting economy, which has been developed by the troops and the various organizations and schools, is a special product of the special conditions of today. It would be unreasonable and incomprehensible in other historical conditions, but it is perfectly reasonable and necessary at present. It is by such means that we have been overcoming our difficulties. Do not these indisputable historical facts prove the truth that supplies can be ensured only through economic development? While we still face many difficulties, the foundation of the public sector of our economy has already been laid. In another year, by the end of 1943, this foundation will be even firmer.

Developing the economy is the correct line, but development does not mean reckless or ill-founded expansion. Some comrades who disregard the specific conditions here and now are setting up an empty clamour for development; for example, they are demanding the establishment of heavy industry and putting forward plans for huge salt and armament industries, all of which are unrealistic and unacceptable. The Party's line is the correct line for development; it opposes outmoded and conservative notions on the one hand and grandiose, empty and unrealistic plans on the other. This is the Party's struggle on two fronts in financial and economic work.

While we must develop the public sector of our economy, we should not forget the importance of help from the people. They have given us grain, 90,000 *tan* in 1940, 200,000 in 1941 and 160,000 in 1942[33], thus ensuring food for our troops and civilian personnel. Up to the end of 1941, the grain output of the public sector of our agriculture was meagre and we relied on the people for grain. We must urge the army to produce more grain, but for a time we shall still have to rely mainly on the people. Although the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region is in the rear and has not suffered direct war damage, it has only 1,500,000 inhabitants, a small population for so large an area, and the provision of such large quantities of grain is not easy. Besides, the people transport salt for us or pay a salt transport levy, and in 1941 they purchased five million *yuan* worth of government bonds; all of which represents no small burden. To meet the needs of the War of Resistance and national reconstruction, the people must shoulder such burdens, the necessity of which they very well realize. When the government is in very great difficulties, it is necessary to ask the people to bear a heavier burden, and they understand that too. But while taking from the people we must at the same time help them to replenish and expand their economy. That is to say, appropriate steps and methods must be adopted to help the people develop their agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, salt industry and commerce, so that they gain at the same time as they give and, moreover, gain more than they give; only thus can we sustain a long war against Japan.

Disregarding the needs of the war, some comrades insist that the government should adopt a policy of "benevolence". This is a mistake. For unless we win the war against Japan, such "benevolence" will mean nothing to the people and will benefit only the Japanese imperialists. Conversely, although the people have to carry rather heavy burdens for the time being, things will get better for them as the difficulties confronting the government and the troops are overcome, the War of Resistance is sustained and the enemy is defeated; and this is where the true benevolence of the revolutionary government lies.

Another mistake is "draining the pond to catch the fish", that is, making

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[33] These figures are the totals paid in agricultural tax (public grain) by the peasants of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region from 1940 to 1942.

endless demands on the people, disregarding their hardships and considering only the needs of the government and the army. That is a Kuomintang mode of thinking which we must never adopt. Although we have temporarily added to the people's burden, we have immediately set to work building the public sector of our economy. In the years 1941 and 1942 the army, the government and other organizations and the schools met most of their needs by their own efforts. This is a wonderful achievement without precedent in Chinese history, and it contributes to the material basis of our invincibility. The greater our self-supporting economic activities, the more we shall be able to lighten the people's tax burdens. In the first stage, from 1937 to 1939, we took very little from them; during this stage they were able to build up considerable strength. In the second stage, from 1940 to 1942, the burden on the people was increased. The third stage will begin in 1943. In the next two years, 1943 and 1944, if the public sector of our economy continues to grow and if all or most of our troops in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region are in a position to engage in farming, then by the end of J.944 the people's burden will again be lightened, and they will again be able to build up strength. This is a possibility which we should prepare to turn into actuality.

We must refute all one-sided views and advance the correct slogan of our Party, "Develop the economy and ensure supplies". With regard to the relation between public and private interests, our slogans are "Give consideration to both public and private interests" and "Give consideration to both troops and civilians". We consider only such slogans to be correct. We can guarantee our financial needs only by expanding both the public and the private sectors of our economy in a realistic and practical way. Even in difficult times we must take care to set a limit to taxation so that the burdens, though heavy, will not hurt the people. And as soon as we can, we should lighten the burdens so that the people can build up strength.

The Kuomintang die-hards regard construction in the Border Region as a hopeless undertaking and the difficulties here as insurmountable they are expecting the Border Region to collapse any day. It is not worth arguing with such people; they will never see the day of our "collapse" and shall unquestionably grow more and more prosperous. They do not understand that under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Border Region revolutionary government the masses always give their support to the Party and government. And the Party and the government will always find ways to get over economic and financial difficulties, however serious. In fact we have already pulled through some of our recent difficulties and will soon overcome others. We encountered difficulties many times greater in the past and surmounted them all. With intense fighting going on every day, our base areas in northern and central China are now facing much greater difficulties than the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, but we have already held out for five and a half years in these areas and can certainly continue to do so till victory. For us, there is no ground for pessimism; we can conquer any difficulty.

After the present conference of senior cadres of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region we shall put into effect the policy of "better troops and simpler administration".[34] It must be carried out strictly, thoroughly and universally, and not perfunctorily, superficially or partially. In carrying it out, we must attain the five objectives of simplification, unification, efficiency, economy and opposition to bureaucracy. These five objectives have a very important bearing on our economic and financial work. Simplification will reduce nonproductive expenditures and increase our income from production; it will not only have a direct and healthy effect on our finances, but will lighten the people's burdens and benefit them economically. In our economic and financial set-up, we must overcome such evils as disunity, assertion of independence and lack of coordination, and must establish a working system which is unified and responsive to direction and which permits the full application of our policies and regulations. With the establishment of such a unified system working efficiency will rise. All our organizations, and particularly those engaged in economic and financial work, must pay attention to thrift. By practising thrift we can cut out a great deal of unnecessary and wasteful expenditure, which amounts possibly to tens of millions of *yuan*. Finally, people engaged in economic and financial work must overcome surviving bureaucratic practices, some of which, such as corruption and graft, over-elaborate organization, meaningless "standardization" and red tape, are very serious. If we fully attain these five objectives in the Party, the government and the army, our policy of "better troops and simpler administration" will achieve its purpose, our difficulties will surely be overcome, and we shall silence the gibes about our approaching "collapse".

Below, we shall discuss separately various objectives of financial and economic work, concretely summarize experience in past work, and put forward the general policies for work that should be carried out in 1943.

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[34] *For 'better troops and simpler administration' see 'A most Important Policy'. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Volume 3 p. 99-102.*

2. On the Development of Agriculture

The general strategy for economic and financial work in the Border Region is to develop the economy and ensure supplies. This being the case, the first and most important questions are ‘How has our economic work been done in the past?’, ‘What are the successes?’, ‘What are the shortcomings?’, and ‘What should be our strategy henceforth?’.

The economy of the Border Region is divided into the two large sectors, the public and the private. The private sector of our economy consists of all agriculture, industry, and commerce undertaken by private individuals. The public sector of our economy consists of the agriculture, industry, and commerce, undertaken by the government, troops, official organizations and schools. The functions and relationship of these two sectors are such that the private sector provides the livelihood of the 1,400,000 people of the Border Region. At the same time through taxation, it assists the government and troops, and supports the sacred cause of the War of Resistance and the reconstruction of the country. The public sector provides the bulk of the living and operating expenses of several tens of thousands of Party members, government workers and soldiers, thus reducing the amount taken from the people and building up their resources so that these can be obtained in future urgent need. The principles used here are ‘Give, consideration to both public and private interests’ and ‘Give consideration to both troops and civilians’.

If our Party and government do not pay attention to mobilizing the people and helping them to develop agriculture, industry, and commerce, their life cannot be improved, and the needs of the War of Resistance cannot be met. As a result there will be trouble between the troops and the people. And if we cannot settle the minds of the troops and the people, it is pointless to consider anything else. Therefore the most important task is for the Party and the government to concentrate great efforts on building up the people’s economy.

However, relaying on the taxer, handed over by the people alone cannot meet the needs of the War of Resistance and the reconstruction of the country. This is particularly true of the Border Region where the area is large and the population sparse, and where there has long been a large contradiction between the taxes paid by the people and the expenditure of the government. Therefore, we must also concentrate great efforts on managing the public sector of the economy. This is an extremely great responsibility borne by our government, troops, official organizations and schools. In the past few years we have had great successes in this work. In 1943 we must achieve even greater successes so as directly to meet the needs of the War of Resistance and the reconstruction of the country. The more the public sector of the economy grows, the more the burden carried by the people can be reduced. This is another way of building up the resources of the people. And the instrument which unites and reconciles the private and public sectors is the currency.

The Private sector comprises agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, co-operative undertakings, the salt industry, and commerce. Here I shall first deal with agriculture.

The agriculture of the Border Region was depressed during the period of the land revolution. At that time there was much uncultivated land in Yan'an, Ansai, Bao'an, Ganquan, Huachi and the three eastern counties, etc. On the border between Huachi and Bao'an, there was an area called Erjiachuan which was more than 200 *li* long yet only twenty or thirty households lived there. As early as the Tongzhi period (1862-74) there was no one living in Wuyasi and Zhangjiacha in Bao'an county. Fucunchuan in Ganquan county, and Jinpenwan and Machichuan in Yan'an county had for the most part ceased to be cultivated. Cotton-planting had ceased throughout the Border Region. The decline in animal husbandry was very great. Only 400,000-500,000 head of sheep remained and 100,000 oxen and donkeys. Textiles, the transport of salt, and other subsidiary undertakings had all been disrupted in the same way. In particular the textile industry had almost completely disappeared. By 1938, only 70,000 packs of eating salt were exported. All this shows how depressed the agriculture of the Border Region was at that time. Agriculture was only speedily restored and developed after the Central Red Army came to the Border Region and civil war ceased, after the local bandits were cleaned up and the peasants were given security, after the 'left' economic policy was corrected and a mild taxation policy was adopted, and after the Party and government's call for the development of agriculture had greatly raised the enthusiasm of the peasant for production.

Table 1.1 gives the statistics for livestock, cotton-planting, and opening up of uncultivated lands in the past four years.

Table 1.1 Agricultural activity 1939-42

Year	Area of new land opened (mu)	Area of cotton planted (mu)	Livestock		
			Oxen	Donkeys	Sheep
1939	1,002,774	3,767	150,892	124,935	1,171,366
1940	698,989	15,177	193,238	135,004	1,723,037
1941	390,087	39,087	202,914	137,001	1,724,203
1942	281,413	94,405	-	-	-
Total	2,373,263	-	-	-	-

Explanation:

(1) The statistics for the livestock of Jiaxian and Mizhi counties have not been included: the 1939 figures for livestock include the 1940 total for seven of the counties.

(2) The figure for the area of new land cultivated is for the amount of new land opened each year. The figures for cotton planted and for livestock are the annual totals for the whole of the Border Region.

These statistics show that year by year the cultivated land of the Border Region has expanded, the acreage of cotton planted has grown, and the amount of livestock has increased. Moreover, the real totals are more than those shown in the statistical table. As a result much of the formerly uncultivated land has become productive. For example, there are now more than a hundred households in Erjiachuan and all the land of the area has been cultivated. Wuyasi and Zhangjiacha are now both fully inhabited. In the past, all eleven districts in Yan'an county had unused land. At present only Jinpen and Liulin districts, half the Central district and one township in Yaodian district have uncultivated land. In 1939, there were only about 300,000 *mu* of ploughed land in Yan'an. In 1942, there were 699,538 *mu*. There used to be a lot of uncultivated land in the counties of Ansai, Anding, Yanchuan, and Yanchang. Now there is very little. Before 1940 the Border Region bought grain from Luochuan county and east of the yellow River. Now, not only, is it unnecessary to buy grain from outside, there is even some surplus grain which is exported to the region of Yulin. Some people have moved here from other areas, livestock has increased, but we do not feel a shortage of grain. In light of all these facts there is no longer any doubt that the Border Region can be self-supporting in grain.

Cotton-growing has not only again reached its prerevolutionary peak, but has also developed. For example, the districts of Yongping, Yongsheng and Yuju in Yanchuan county did not previously grow cotton. Now they have all started growing it. The same is true of Yan'an. The profit from cotton is greater than the profit from grain. The return from 1 *mu* of cotton is on average 700 *yuan* or more, whereas if grain were planted the return would only be 200 *yuan*. The ratio is thus 3:1. In 1939, the area planted to cotton was only just over 3,700 *mu*. In 1942 it was more than 94,000 *mu*, and the quantity produced reached 1,400,000 *jin*. This was a great achievement. However, the amount needed by the Border Region is 3 million *jin*. This is our future task.

The increase in livestock has also been very rapid. For example, in 1937 there were only about 8,000 sheep in Yan'an. Now there are more than 60,000. In 1937 there were only 70,000 sheep in Huachi, now there are more than 120,000. Before the land revolution, there were only five flocks of sheep in Zhangjiahe of Third township, Dongyang district, Yanchuan county. (There was no grazing land and there could only be thirty to fifty head in each flock.) Now there are thirteen flocks. Oxen and donkeys have increased by almost two-thirds since the time of the civil war. As a result in 1940 and 1941 we were able to export 500,000 packs of salt. If it were not for the increase in oxen and donkeys, this salt would have been very difficult to move out.

However, the development of agriculture has not been even. Those areas with relatively all-round development and rather more successes include the counties under direct administration and the Longdong sub-region, in particular Yan'an, Ansai. Ganquan, Huachi, Quzi and the three eastern counties. This is because they have a lot of land, few people, and the climate is quite good. These counties also have the biggest share in the subsidiary work of salt transport and at the same time, the largest amount of public expenditure. The area that has not developed is the special military area [*jingbeiqu*], because it has a large population and the land is limited. There is no possibility of enlarging the ploughed area. They have had some success there in the gradual restoration of household spinning and weaving work. Moreover, there has been some emigration to the Yan'an area, which has eased the distribution of population and land.

The speed of development has also varied. Development was faster before 1940, particularly in the years 1939 and 1940. In these two years 1,700,000 *mu* of new land were opened up. In 1940, the number of sheep increased by nearly 600,000, and oxen and donkeys by over 50,000. But in 1941 and 1942 only about 500,000 mi of land were opened up, This is only one-third of the previous two years. There were fewer sheep in 1941 over 1940, and the number of oxen and donkeys only increased by 10,000 (in reality there was a reduction). However, in these two years cotton-growing and textiles both developed.

The above outlines the development of agriculture in the Border Region. Now I want to say a few words about how this development took place.

Before the civil war ended, agriculture was in decline. Afterwards it developed. How did this development come about? Apart from the arrival of the Central Red Army, the cleaning up of the local bandits, and the realization of peace so that the peasants could live and work securely, there were the following six reasons.

(1) The 'left' mistakes in economic policy were corrected and the policies to build up the resources of the people were implemented. Although the peasants had obtained a share of land, they were afraid to develop production because of the 'left' economic policy. In addition, because agriculture was disrupted both before and after the revolution, the base was very weak and hindered growth. The Central Committee corrected the 'left' policy and thus put an end to the peasants' tendency to fear developing production. The peasants were then willing to buy more implements, and the rich peasants dared to take on tenants [an huozi] and long-term labourers [*gu changgong*]. The milder policies restored confidence and helped the extension of production. At the same time the high price for grain and the great profit in subsidiary undertakings stimulated the peasants' zeal to produce, and made agriculture develop rapidly. This laid the basis for the levy of 200,000 *tan* of grain tax and 26 million *jin* of hay tax in 1941.

(2) Calls were made for the development of production. The Production Mobilization Conference for cadres held by the Central Committee (1939), the Second Party Congress of the Border Region (1939), the first meeting of the Border Region Council (1941), and the first agricultural exhibition, all called for the development of production. These calls played a major role in promoting growth. They first aroused the cadres, and then through them penetrated deeply to the masses, mobilizing men, women, old, young, and even loafers [*er liuzi*] to take part in production. They increased the labour force, and finally destroyed the peasants' fear of developing production. Thus the amount of new land opened up in 1939 was more than 1 million *mu*, and real imports of livestock were also greatest in that year.

(3) The immigration policy. A major reason for the enlargement of cultivated land by 2,350,000 *mu* in the past four years has been that those regions with large amounts of land have absorbed large numbers of immigrants, and increased their population. For example, in 1937 Yan'an (including Yan'an city) only had a population of 34,000. Now its population is roughly 70,000. Because of this, cultivated land in this county has increased from around 300,000 *mu* to roughly 700,000 *mu*. In 1936 Ansai only had a population of about 20,000. Now it has a population of more than 40,000. Ganquan originally had about 8,000 people. Now it has more than 14,000. In 1939 Yanchang only had a population of 25,000. New it has more than 32,000. Yanchuan had the least amount of uncultivated land, but between 1938 and the present its population has increased by over 10,000. Huachi only had a population of 35,000 in 1938. Now it has a population of more than 40,000, Other places such as Bao'an, Anding, Jingbian, and the counties of the Longdong and Guanzhong sub-regions have also increased their population. These immigrants came mostly from Hengshan, Yulin, Shenmu, and Fugu, and secondly from the special military area. They all came voluntarily and were not organized by the government. They were willing to come because there was land and they were treated well. The various counties organized the existing householders to give help with grain, tools, and cave houses, etc. At the same time the rich peasants took on tenants, which also helped the immigrants. The increase in immigrants not only enlarged the area cultivated, but also increased livestock, and stimulated commerce. Therefore the immigrants were one of the factors in the development of agriculture.

(4) The policy of incentives. Immigrants do not pay grain tax for three years, and their other obligations are reduced. If some of the peasants planting cotton do not make as much profit as those planting grain, the government pays compensation. If livestock is purchased from outside the Border Region, there is a reduction in grain tax by a fixed amount in the first year. In addition, there were the rewards to labour heroes given at the two agricultural exhibitions, which also brought about great results. For example, Wu Manyou and Mao Kehu of Yan'an and Due Fafu of Ganquan were rewarded at the first agricultural exhibition. Now they have become very good, rich peasants. They all pay more than 5 *tan* of grain tax (in the Border Region 1 *tan* is 300 *jin*). Moreover, they have encouraged other peasant householders in the villages to develop production. All these things have promoted the development of agriculture, in particular of grain and cotton.

(5) The reduction in the wastage of labour power, and the better adjustment in the use of labour power. Because we were busy fighting during the civil-war period, we did not pay attention to production and the land was neglected. After peace was established, there were frequent exercises and guard duties by the self-defense army [*ziweijun*] and many kinds of meetings. Therefore, each month each able-bodied man missed at least three working-days, Later this kind of wastage was reduced. Furthermore, before 1941 not much grain tax was collected, there was little tax grain transport duty, and the amount of work missed was comparatively limited. In recent years in rural areas, contract-labour teams [*zhagong*] and exchange-labour teams [*biangong*] have developed and made better adjustment in the use of labour power. We have mobilized loafers to take part in production. The number of women joining in production has also increased. All these things have helped the development of Border Region agriculture.

(6) The policy of agricultural credit. Formerly there was no agricultural credit but this was offset by the mild taxation policy. Now that grain tax has increased and particularly as BO percent of peasant households must pay it, those households (roughly one-third) lacking oxen, agricultural, tools, and food grain must be helped with credit. Moreover, a supply of credit is very necessary for certain kinds of agriculture that must be developed (like cotton-planting), for agricultural subsidiaries (like spinning and weaving), and for certain regions which need more development. Although only 4 million *yuan* credit was given in 1942, of which merely 1,500,000 *yuan* was for oxen, over 2,600 oxen and nearly 5,000 agriculture implements were bought and cotton-planting also expanded. It cannot be denied that this was a great help. But because finances are limited and we can only lend according to the government's financial strength, we still cannot provide enough credit to match the needs of the peasant households. However, a little is always better than nothing, and it does give some help.

The above are several of the major factors in the development of agriculture; below I shall discuss several major lessons to be drawn from our work.

(1) Act according to the conditions of the area and the season. Agricultural regions and seasons are different and methods of development are also different. For example, there is no uncultivated land in the special military area (apart from a small amount in Qingjian). The cultivated land area cannot be enlarged. Sheep-herding is limited by the pasture lands available. There

is also a lack of pack-animals for the transport of salt. The policy of rent reduction has not yet been thoroughly implemented. Because of these things, grain production has not increased in those areas, and with the exception of spinning and weaving, subsidiary undertakings have not developed. Although improved techniques such as more frequent hoeing of weeds, greater use of manure, and more deep ploughing were introduced there long ago, we should still carry out more investigation of the situation, and at the right time do our utmost to increase production. However, if we were to employ these improved techniques in areas where land is plentiful and population sparse, and working methods primitive, they would not be very effective because they all need an increase in labour power. From the point of view of the peasants of the latter kind of area, deep ploughing is not as good as planting more land. Applying more manure is not as good as opening up more uncultivated land. Planting more land is especially good in areas with low rainfall. Therefore, in these areas the call to improve agricultural methods is in general ineffective at the present time. To really increase production in these regions the most important thing for the moment is to rely on opening up unused land. If in the six years from 1937 to 1942 the increase in ploughed land was roughly 3 million *mu* then the amount harvested in 1942 was at least 500,000 *tan* more than in 1936, which is equivalent to 250,000 *tan* of hulled grain (each *tan* is 300 *jin*). If we estimate the grain production of the Border Region in 1942 to be 1,500,000 *tan* of hulled grain, then over six years, the increase in grain production through the increase of ploughed land is approximately one-sixth of the total. Some of this increase in cultivated land is new land opened up by immigrants, and some is expansion of land farmed by the original households. All this shows us that in directing agriculture, we must adopt different methods in different regions. In one region we should make deep ploughing the key, and in another enlarging the area ploughed. We must also make distinctions with respect to timing. At a time when there is unused land that can be cultivated, we should mainly encourage the opening up of new land. When uncultivated land has been exhausted, then we must turn to encouraging deep ploughing. We must not only make these distinctions between large regions, we must also make them within a county, a district and sometimes even within a township. For example, if certain villages in a township have rather a lot of unused land, we should encourage the opening up of unused land there. If in other villages there is little or no unused land, we should encourage deep ploughing. While there is still uncultivated land in a township, we should encourage the opening up of land.

When all the lands have been opened up, we should encourage deep ploughing. Although we have had some successes in the past few years in our work, much has been too empty and generalized. Many of our comrades still do not know how to investigate objective circumstances minutely, nor do they know how to put forward concrete proposals to provide the conditions for increasing production in different regions and at different times. Slogans put forward in the past for deep ploughing, opening new lands, water conservancy, and increasing production by 400,000 *tan* or 200,000 *tan*, in reality contained much subjectivism. Many peasants were not interested or influenced by them. From this we may conclude that in future we must carry out deep, factual investigation, and solve problems in terms of concrete times, places, and conditions.

(2) As yet the peasants in a large number of areas still pay heavy rents and heavy interest rates, and the policy of reducing these has not been thoroughly implemented. On the one hand peasants must bear the burden of paying rent and interest to the landlords, and on the other they must pay grain tax and money tax to the government. They get too little for themselves, which dampens their enthusiasm to produce. Thus there is no possibility of increasing production. From this we may conclude that we must conscientiously implement the decrees to reduce rent and interest rates.

(3) As a result of the increase in grain tax, and the newly levied hay tax, sheep tax, and salt-transport requirement, the peasants' enthusiasm for production has diminished. In the two years 1941 and 1942 the peasants paid a large amount of grain tax, hay tax and salt tax, and during these years they expanded the area of ploughed land by only 600,000 *mu*, merely 60 percent of the increase in 1939. Livestock did not increase in 1941, and sheep even declined (of course epidemics had some effect). Immigration also dropped. In 1942 only 4,843, households came. Moreover, 3,527 old households moved out, the reason mainly being that they feared further burdens. Another reason was that the amount of grain tax collected increased progressively according to the amount harvested and not according to the area of land worked. This method, although rational in terms of sharing the burden equally, hindered the growth of investment in agriculture. It lowered the peasants' enthusiasm to invest in the land because for the same land a good harvest meant paying out a lot and a poor harvest meant paying out little or even nothing. If taxation was based on the area of land worked, this point could be corrected. The enthusiasm of the middle and rich peasants could be raised, and there would be no detriment to the poor peasants. From this we may conclude that there must be

limits to the grain tax and hay tax, and at the same time we must improve the methods of taxation so as to promote agricultural production.

(4) Policies should be thoroughly implemented. For example, we stipulated that for three years we would not take grain tax from new immigrants or from those planting cotton, but in fact we have 'welcomed' grain tax from immigrants, and we have levied one-half of the grain tax for land planted to cotton. We originally stipulated that when livestock was bought from areas outside the Border Region we would reduce grain tax by a definite amount for the first year, but this has also not yet been implemented. In addition regulations for giving rewards for increased production have not been fully carried out. All these things not only affect the authority of the government but also diminish the enthusiasm of the peasants. From this we may conclude that henceforward everything pertaining to the decrees announced by the government must be resolutely implemented.

(5) More equitable adjustment in the use of labour power and other methods helpful to peasants, such as exchange-labour teams, contract-labour teams and so forth, have a strong influence on agricultural growth. However, with the exception of some counties like Yan'an, we have still not done enough to organize and promote them. There are certainly many comrades among the county cadres who are actively striving to put ideas to the people, and who have originated many good methods for mobilizing the masses to develop production. They have created many model examples. However, many other comrades are not like this. They lack the spirit of factual investigation and enthusiastic effort. They lack creativity. They feel that there is no work that they can do for agriculture, or they do not know how to set-to. Therefore they only raise empty slogans like 'spring ploughing' or 'autumn harvest'. They remain passive, and let the peasants do things as they like. The government simply keeps a record of what is done. But in fact there are many things to be done. Many good methods can be thought up. For example, during spring ploughing in 1942 some of the peasants in Yan'an felt very discouraged. Instances of moving out, splitting up the family, and selling livestock in preparation for reducing production occurred. From the point of view o the comrades who lack enthusiasm and creativity, these phenomena would be insoluble and it would be best to accept fate and let such bad things happen. But the comrades from Yan'an were not like this. They were neither passive nor bureaucratic. They were able to grasp the key to the problem and adopt active methods. They overcame the difficulties. At that time, the Party and government did much propaganda work, and

gave help with grain, cave houses, and agricultural tools. Afterwards, not only did production not decline, but cultivated land increased by 80,000 *mu*. This example proved that there is much work in agriculture that can and should be done by the local Party committees and the local government. Moreover, so long as they grasp the key points and find a method, then when they are they can be effective. From this we may conclude that cadre must be active to overcome difficulties, they must unite with the masses, and according to the needs of the masses create vigorous methods to solve their problems. They definitely cannot be passive and bureaucratic.

In order to give our comrades a clear-cut standpoint on this extremely important question of uniting closely with the masses and conscientiously solving their difficulties, I here specially reproduce for reference the reports of the comrades of Yan'an county on how they handled the problem of opening up unused land, how they handled the problem of refugees, and how they handled the problem of loafers.

What follows is the original report.

HOW WAS YAN'AN COUNTY'S PLAN TO OPEN UP 80,000 *MU* OF UNUSED LAND IN 1942 COMPLETED?

(1) We relied on the labour power of immigrant refugees to open up uncultivated land.

There were 25,428 refugees in the period 1940 to 1942. On the basis of five of them equalling one labour power, there were 5,086 labour powers. Each labour power can open up 10 of new land in one year, giving a total of 50,860 *mu*. (Ten *mu* is the average figure for the land opened up by refugees in the past three years. In 1942 the land opened up by each labour power was more than this.)

(2) We relied on the labour power of original households and animals to open up unused land, totalling 29,399 *mu*.

The original households had 10,616 labour powers. The work could be done with each labour power opening up less than 3 *mu*.

(3) However, the organization of labour power is a major task. This year we adopted methods of collective labour, such as contract-labour teams and exchange-labour teams. We also organized women and loafers to take part in production.

Altogether we organized 487 contract-labour teams. We also drew 4,939 good labour powers into collective labour (exchange-labour teams). This was almost one-third of the total number of labour powers (according to statistics for this spring, there were 15,702 labour powers in the whole county), which meant that out of every three people one took part in collective labour. The method of contract labour was to form a group of eight to ten good workers from a village and establish a foreman [*gongtou*]. Then they opened up new land and hoed weeds either for themselves or for others. Sometimes the foreman took part in physical labour, in which case he received pay valued at two labour days per day worked. If he did not take part, he only received pay valued at one labour day per day. Those forming contract-labour teams were either entirely from the local village, or came from outside, or were organized with people from outside the village together with peasants from the village.

The peasants were very pleased that we organized loafers to take part in production. It increased their enthusiasm for work.

More and more women joined in production each year. In particular refugee women took part in opening up uncultivated land, and even more of them in hoeing. There were thirty-nine in Liulin district this year. The refugee women of Third township in Chuankou district did not have any hoes. They went to the mountains and waited until others were tired and resting, then they took up the hoes and began opening-up land. When the others had finished their rest they handed back the hoes and waited again.

(4) We relied on production plans for each peasant household. In 1942, this county laid emphasis on determining production plans for each peasant household based on discussions with that household and with its agreement. The government printed a standard form to record plans including such things as opening up new lands, hoeing weeds, and so forth. When a plan was determined, it was posted up in the home of each family so that afterwards the government could examine the production plan of each household according to the form. When determining peasant household plans we had to pay attention to the following points:

i) The production circumstances of the previous year.

ii) The conditions for the increase of production in the current year.

iii) The amount of labour power (human and animal).

iv) Obtaining the agreement of the man concerned.

v) The need for constant examination and supervision of work.

(5) The effect of agricultural credit was important, in particular the 100,000 *yuan* credit given to refugees for agricultural tools. When the refugees arrived they did not have a thing. To open up unused land, first a mattock was needed

to clear away the scrub and then a hoe to break the land. After agricultural credit was issued and the problem of tools was solved, the refugees' desire to open up new land was very strong. In six days they were able to open up 3 *mu*. In 1942 agricultural credit was given rather late. The earlier credit is given the sooner more land can be opened up. (Note: do not violate the agricultural season.)

(6) During spring ploughing, mobilization work had to be reduced as much as possible. The peasants were allowed the time lo open up new land and to take part in production.

(7) The government had a tight grasp on the work of opening-up unused land. Only three months were available for this. With a hundred-day plan, each day opening up 800 *mu* it was necessary to have a labour force of 1,600. This was one-tenth of the labour force of the whole county. By 19 April we had only opened up 15,000 *mu*. This was still far short of completing the task, and already two-thirds of the time had gone. Therefore beginning on 20 April, after a rainfall, there was a twenty-day assault, in the twenty days more than 50 percent of the whole task was completed. Between 10 March and 19 April, 15,000 *mu* of land was opened up. This was 18,7 percent of the work. In the twenty day assault, 46,442 *mu* of land was opened up, which was 58 percent of the work.

In the assault the best districts were the following:

Luilin district: the ratio of new land opened up during the period of assault to that opened up before was 1,294.4:100.

Yaodian district: the ratio was 1,184.4:100.

Chuankou district: the ratio was 432.1:100.

Altogether the county government held two meetings of district heads to inspect the work, and issued three directives. The cadres of the county government went down to the districts and townships more than three times.

The districts checked up on the work of the townships up to seven or eight times in some cases, and three times at the very least. The townships also checked up many times on the work of the villages.

The tight grasp of the leadership and the strict check-ups played a decisive role in the completion of the task.

HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF REFUGES TAKING PART IN PRODUCTION

(1) [Table 1.2 refers to] statistics on the flow of refugees into Yan'an county in recent years.

Putting it simply, the number of households more than doubled, and the number of people just about doubled.

The refugees who came settled mainly in Chuankou, Liulin, Jinpen, and Yaodian districts, in these districts there was a lot of unused land.

Table 1.2 The flow of refugees into Yan'an county (Yan'an City excluded), 1938-42

Year	Households	Number of people
1938	249	1,200
1939	533	1,976
1940	1,137	6,090
1941	5,040	14,207
1942	1,050	6,231
Total	8,009	29,704

Comparison with 1937

	Households	Number of people
1937	7,703	32,705
Increase during 5 years	8,009	29,704
Percentage increase	103.09%	90.8%

(2) Statistics on how the government helped the refugees solve problems in production after they had come (Table 1.3).

(3) the methods for solving refugees' difficulties in production were:

(i) There was a lot of land. We proposed that the ownership of publicly-owned uncultivated land should go to those who opened it up. If the owner of privately-owned unused land did not open it up, we let refugees do so. The three-year exemption from tax was an incentive.

Table 1.3 Allocation of State aid to refugees, 1940-42

	1940	1941	1942	Total
Allocation of land (in *mu*)	10,220	3,451	6,335	20,006
Grain (in *tan*)	669.9	495	458.48	1,623.38
Seeds (in *tan*)	40.18	8.2	47.34	95.75
Agricultural tools (items)	424	2,133	427	2,984
Oxen	979	82	212	1,273

Notes:

(a) In 1942, 13,555 *jin* of sweet potatoes [*yangyu*] were given to the refugees in addition, and on 273 occasions they were helped with oxen.

(b) Agricultural tools were ploughshares, rakes and hoes.

(ii) The problem of a place to live. In the beginning they lived in old cave houses or broken-down cave houses. Many of the others who came afterwards were joining friends, relatives, or people of other social relationships. They lived in the cave houses of those friends or relatives. Having settled down, they dug out their own cave house. In other cases one person came in the first year and dug out the cave house. In second year the family came and moved into the house.

(iii) We made arrangements among the peasants for grain to eat. We proposed that if 1 *tou* of grain was borrowed before spring, after autumn 1 *tou* and 3 *sheng* should be repaid. This was a profit of 30 percent. It encouraged the original households to lend grain and the government guaranteed repayment. Another method was to urge the original households to hire help [*diao fenzi*], to take on share-cropping tenants [*an zhuangjia*] and to contract short-term labour [*lan gong*] from among the refugees. Conditions were decided voluntarily by both sides. Allowing the original households to exploit a little was not a problem because when the refugees first came they did not have a thing. Although they were exploited, we could not let them starve.

Statistics for this year (1942) [are shown in Table 1.4].

Table 1.4 Households reliant upon employers for food grain in 1942

Hired help [*diao fenzi*]	359 households
Share-cropping tenants [*an zhuangjia*]	466 households
Short-term contract labour [*lan gong*]	184 households
Total	1,009 households

These households relied on their employers for food grain. However, the hired helpers [*diao fenzi*] could only get supplies for themselves. Hired farmhands and short-term contract labourers were able to get food grain for their family members as well. There were 650 households of the latter kind. At a rate of three people per household, this was altogether 1,950 persons. If we add on the 359 hired helpers, the full total was 2,309 people relaying on their employers for grain. If they had asked for aid from the government, at a rate of 5 *tou* per man per year the amount of grain needed would have been 1,154.5 *tou*. What a large amount this would have been! Therefore on the basis of mutual agreement between employer and employee, the hiring of farmhands, helpers, and short-term contract labourers solved many great problems. It not only solved the problem of food grains. It also enlarged production and increased the supply of grain. Taking each household as one labour power, there were 1,009 labour powers altogether. One labour power could produce 2 *tan* of grain, so in total they could increase grain production by 2,018 *tan*. After consumption this still left a surplus of 863.5 *tan*. By the following year these people were in a position to carry out production by themselves.

(iv) The peasants were urged to help the refugees with seed and land to work. Seed was repaid after autumn, and a rent paid for land with the government as guarantor.

(v) The institution of credit for agricultural implements for refugees was very effective in solving the problem of supplying tools to open up new lands. If arrangements for any problem (food grain, supply of agricultural implements, etc.) were not good, the opening up of unused lands could have been impeded. Therefore it was necessary to solve each problem rapidly and at the correct time. A delay of one day reduces the amount of land opened up.

(vi) As for the problem of burdens on the refugees, we resolutely carried out the decisions of the government of the Border Region on treating them well. For three years we made no demands on them, and instead the government helped them solve all kinds of difficulties. This year the government cadres of the county, districts, and townships saved 10 *tan* of grain for issue to the refugees. While solving the problem of grain for refugees to eat. Third township in Central district made great efforts to reduce their burdens.

(4) Why did the refugees want to come to Yan'an?

(i) We have really solved the difficulties of refugees. The solution of the refugee food-grain problem in 1340 had a particularly wide influence. In Chuankou district alone 300 *tan* of grain was supplied. Therefore many more refugees came in the year 1941.

(ii) Although government calls had a great impact, the effect of the refugees themselves telling their own friends, relations and other social acquaintances of the good treatment they received was even greater. We found that very few refugees who came to us had refugee certificates issued by Suide sub-region. This was because they feared that after having accepted settling-in funds or registration cards from there, they would not be free or they would become public property. They preferred to get money through their own personal relationships.

(5) Opinions concerning future immigrant refugees.

(i) Get more to come by encouraging refugees to use their social connections.

(ii) The government at county and district levels should conscientiously solve problems for them.

(iii) The government of the Border Region should issue some grain and funds to help them, with repayment after autumn.

(iv) Persist in carrying out the decisions to treat refugees favourably.

HOW TO MOBILIZE LOAFERS TO TAKE PART IN PRODUCTION

(1) Statistical summary [given in Table 1.5].

Explanation:

(i) In Panlong district, a certain spirit medium beat his 'three mountains' knife[35] into a hoe. He told the masses he would not swindle people again and would work hard in the future.

(ii) At Lijiaqu in Third township of Chuankou district, Hui San and Gao Wu were each given the task of opening up 6 *mu* of uncultivated land this spring. They completed this and even exceeded it by 2 *mu*. At Tianujiagelao in Fourth township, Yang Yingcheng was given the job of opening up 5 *mu*. He

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[35] The 'Three mountains' refer to three mythical islands where magic spirits are presumed to live.

opened up 9 *mu*.

Table 1.5 Mobilization of loaferism 1937-42

Year	Original number of loafers	Number joining in production	Number not yet taking part in production
1937	1,629	299	1,330
1938	1,246	578	668
1939	543	120	423
1940	359	175	184
1941	184	126	58
1942	145	40	105

Note:

The chief reason for the increase in loafers in 1942 was that in 1941 Jinpenwan was taken from Gulin county and placed under the administration of this county. According to statistics, that district had forty-three idlers.

(iii) In Liulin district this year, seven men were reformed and joined in production. In Wuyang district twelve men were investigated. After a struggle, nine of them took part in production. In Fengfu district there were eight men. At Ganguyi in Yaodian district eight men were organized in two groups to go to Zhangjiakou to open up new land.

(iv) At Nanyigou of Third township in Fengfu district, Bai Fenyu was a shaman before 1936. By 1941 he had an ox and hired a man. He had 200 sheep and had become the village head. He paid 10.2 *tan* grain tax, 200 *jin* salt tax, and 500 *jin* hay tax. This year he has got another ox and hired a helper. He has expanded production and his prospects are very good.

(v) Because the government mobilized them to take part in production, the loafers of Panlong district said: ‘If things go wrong this year government men will be even more strict with us’. For example, Li Dejin from Lijiabian in Fourth township used to smoke opium. This year he has opened up 6 *mu* of new land and also stopped smoking. In the whole district there were twenty-seven loafers. They have written guarantees that they will do well in production, and as a result twenty of them are very good.

(vi) At Liujiaping in Mudan district there is. a man (name unknown) with extremely bright prospects now that the government has mobilized him to join-in production. Later he sought out one of the government personnel and treated him very well saying; "The government was right to get us to take part in production". Gao Yucheng from the same district used to be a loafer. He did not farm and he did not cut firewood. Winter and summer, wearing a ragged old cotton-padded jacket he would curl up on the cold kang. Each day he would smoke one-fifth of ounce [*er qian*] of opium. His wife and children cried from cold and hunger. After the revolution and educated by the government, he has become the production director of Fourth township. Everybody praises his method of work. He is a labour hero Moreover he keeps a close watch on loafers. He forces them to make production plans. Every five days he goes up into the hills to supervise them. Under his direction Liu Guai and Yan Fenghe have each planted 24 *mu* of land this year.

(2) Our methods of mobilization are:

(i) Doing propaganda, educational, and persuasive work to get them to take part in production. Having got some grain their prospects improve.

(ii) The government gives them definite production tasks, such as opening up uncultivated land (see examples above). They are inspected at regular intervals. Moreover special people in the villages are designated to supervise their production.

(iii) Urging the masses to struggle against them, and to force them to join production. This year in the two villages, Jinpenhe and Yunshansi in Third township, Panlong district, production competitions were organized. In this situation, Chang Degong, a loafer in Jinpenhe, was forced by the villagers to go up into the hills to open up new land. He has opened up 3 *mu*. At the moment he is preparing to plant 15 *mu*.

(iv) Organizing the loafers in collective labour. The loafers are concentrated in the district town and organized into teams to open up new land. After they get rid of the opium-smoking habit, they can go home. The land opened up and farmed is given to whoever does the work.

(v) The government solved some of the loafers' production difficulties.

(3) Results.

The masses were very pleased that the government made the loafers take part in production. The masses opposed them very much because they did no work at all, paid no grain tax, and caused trouble every time there was mobilization work. As for the loafers themselves, after they obtained some real results from production, they realized that the government was acting for their betterment. The above examples clarify this point. As for those who were extremely stubborn and refused to change, some even running away when the government tried to mobilize them, on their return they joined in a little light productive labour, in this county no loafers have become bandits.

We have not referred to this report of the leading comrades of the Party and government of Yan'an county without purpose. The spirit of the comrades of Yan'an county is entirely the spirit of Bolsheviks. Their attitude is enthusiastic, and there is not the slightest passivity in their thoughts and in their actions. They are not at all afraid of difficulties, and are able vigorously and firmly to overcome them all. Look how responsible they are towards their work: 'In 1942 agricultural credit was given rather late. The earlier credit is given the sooner more land can be opened up!' 'It was a necessary to solve each problem rapidly and at the correct time.' 'A delay of one day reduces the amount of land opened up!' 'Determine the production plans of each peasant household.' 'The tight grasp of the leadership and the strict check-ups played a decisive role in the completion of the task.' How vastly different and how much better is this spirit than that of those timid people who draw back, full of sighs when they meet difficulties, and of those who are not conscientious in their work and try to get by and neglect things! Imbued with such spirit, there is not one thing that the comrades of Yan'an did not handle realistically and practically. They have a full understanding of the feelings, needs, and concrete circumstances of all the people of Yan'an county. They are completely united with the masses. They carry out extremely good investigation and research, and thus they have learned the Marxist art of leading the masses. They are entirely without subjectivism, sectarianism, and the Party 'eight-legged essay'. How does this compare with those subjectivists who do not solve problems according to the demands of the masses but according to their own subjective imagination? And with those bureaucrats who do no investigation and research work at all and, though they work for many years, have no idea of what is going on beneath them? Is there not a world of difference between them? We hope all the comrades of the Border Region will have this spirit of the comrades of Yan'an, this attitude towards their work, this one-ness with the masses, this willingness to carry out investigation work, and thus also learn the Marxist art of leading the masses to overcome difficulties so as to make our work successful whatever is undertaken. Quite a few of the comrades of the various counties of the Border Region are like or more or less like the comrades of Yan'an. We hope that the model experience of these comrades can quickly spread to all counties, districts, and townships.

The above is a summary of agricultural work in the Border Region in the past. What follows are the tasks for the year 1943.

The major demand on agriculture is to increase the production of grain and cotton (subsidiary undertakings will be discussed elsewhere). In the light of the present need for grain and cotton, and also in order to strive for some grain and cotton for export, it is still necessary for us to mobilize the peasant masses to increase the production of hulled grain by 200,000 *tan* and to increase the production of cotton by 1,600,000 *jin*. Is there any hope that this can be achieved? In the six years between 1937 and 1942, it is estimated that roughly 3 million *mu* of uncultivated land was opened up and the production of grain increased by 500,000 *tan*. Well then, is it possible in the next few years once again on the basis of opening up new land and other methods to increase the production of grain by 400,000 *tan* equivalent to 200,000 *tan* of hulled grain? In the years between 1939 and 1942 the land planted to cotton exceeded 90,000 *mu* and the raw cotton produced reached 1,100,000 *jin*. Well then in the next few years is it possible to increase the land planted to cotton by more than 100,000 *mu*, and the cotton produced by more than 1,600,000 *jin*?

We consider that all this is entirely possible.

If the peasants are able to increase the production of hulled grain by 20,000 *tan* then even if they hand over 200,000 *tan* of grain tax as in 1941, they will still only have to give the government the amount of increase. They themselves will be able to keep an amount equal to the entire previous harvest. As for cotton, even if in future we levy some in tax, the peasants will still be able to keep the largest part of the harvest, and the problem of cotton cloth supply for the Border Region can be solved.

What are the policies which will effectively attain the above targets and not remain just empty words? According to our past experience the following eight policies must be implemented: (1) the reduction of rent and the reduction of interest rates; (2) an increase in the opening up of uncultivated land; (3) an increase in the planting of cotton; (4) not violating the agricultural seasons; (5) better adjustment in the use of labour power; (6) an increase in agricultural credit; (7) improvement in technical skill; (8) implementing progressive taxation. In what follows I shall deal with each of these eight points separately.

Our first agricultural policy is the reduction of rent and the reduction of interest rates. Approximately one-half of the 1,400,000 people of the Border Region have received a share of land. The remainder have not yet done so, such as those in the Suide-Mizhi special military area, Longdong sub-region, Fuxian county and many places in Sanbian sub-region and so forth. In these regions we should carry out the reduction of rent and interest rates in accordance with government decrees. This is an extremely important policy for increasing the peasants' enthusiasm for production. After rent and interest rates have been reduced, the peasants' burdens from the landlords are less and the amount they can keep themselves is increased. Thus their enthusiasm for production is greatly raised and they can produce more. The Northwest Bureau [*Xibei Ju*] has already made concrete arrangements with the Border Region Government over this policy and I will not speak more of it here.

Our second agricultural policy is to increase the amount of uncultivated land opened up. Peasants in areas where there is a lot of uncultivated land consider that deep ploughing is not as good as opening up new land. We should therefore organize the peasants in the counties, districts, and townships where such land exists to develop it as a means of increasing the production of grain. Besides land freshly cultivated by the original households, we must mainly rely on encouraging immigrants to come and develop unused land. At present the conditions are right for getting immigrants. The various counties should do a large amount of organizational work. According to circumstances they should determine specific tasks for the new and old households separately. Like Yan'an county they should make specific sowing and planting plans for each household. Such plans should include both the opening up of new land and the planting of cultivated land. For 1943 the planned increase in production of grain for the entire Border Region has been fixed as 80,000 *tan* of hulled grain. This should be achieved through the people and the troops opening new lands and improving agricultural methods.

Our third agricultural policy is to increase the planting of cotton. The entire Border Region needs 3 million *jin* of cotton. If on average each *mu* of land can yield a net total of 20 *jin* of raw cotton, we only need 150,000 *mu* of land for cotton. If each *mu* can only yield a net total of 15 *jin* or even less, we shall need 200,000 *mu*. We should prepare our cotton land according to the latter estimates. But because households planting cotton for the first time lack experience and faith, even if we expand the area planted to cotton, the harvest will not live up to expectations.

Therefore it is not possible to attain the full target for cotton production in a single year and we should increase cotton land by 56,000 *mu* in 1943. Together with the previous 94,000 *mu*, the total will be 150,000 *mu* making it possible to increase production to 2,250,000 *jin*. There is no problem over land and seed for planting this area of cotton, but there is a great shortage of cotton-ginning equipment. If each ginning machine can gin 60 *jin* of cotton per day on average, we need 300 machines in order to be able to gin 3 million *jin* of cotton in half a year. In 1943 there will be 2,250,000 *jin* of cotton to be ginned. For this we need more than 200 machines. However, at present there are only a hundred or so broken and old machines of which only fifty can be used every day. If we attempt to gin 2 million *jin* of cotton on fifty machines we will need two whole years. Therefore solving the problem of ginning the cotton is a vitally necessary part of the policy of expanding the planting of cotton. A further point is that up to the present the peasants of the Border Region have still not learned to press cotton-seed oil. With 2 million *jin* cotton we will also get 4 million of cotton seed. Each 100 *jin* can produce 12 *jin* of cotton-seed oil. If we can solve the problem of pressing the oil, then the returns to the peasants growing cotton will increase. Their enthusiasm for growing cotton will also rise. In relation to the above needs, in 1943 the government should do the following work to expand the planting of cotton. (1) Allocate the planting of cotton to peasant households with suitable land so as to make a total of 150.000 *mu*. Help the households planting cotton with seed, manure and techniques. Those who have difficulties with draught animals and implements should be given credit. (2) Construct cotton-ginning machines and spare parts, and supply them to the peasants planting cotton. Help them to repair old machines. At the same time organize them to buy cot ton-ginning machines from outside areas, helping with credit. In these ways solve the problem of ginning the cotton. (3) Do research into methods of pressing cotton-seed oil so that the peasants planting cotton will be able to extract 480,000 *jin* of oil from the 4 million *jin* of seed (each *jin* is worth 15 *yuan*, a total value of 7,200,000 *yuan*). (4) Organize joint public and private cotton cooperatives to undertake work such as cot ton-ginning, making up into bundles, selling, pressing oil and so forth. (5) Give rewards to peasants good at growing cotton and introduce good methods of planting cotton and ginning so as to increase the enthusiasm of the peasants growing cotton and to raise the amount and quality of the cotton.

Our fourth agricultural policy is not to violate the agricultural seasons. That is, in busy agricultural seasons we should allow the peasants to cease all meetings and mobilization work which is not related to agriculture. Under the present circumstances in the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region, in busy agricultural seasons we should stop all meetings and mobilization of the peasant masses outside of their agricultural work, so as to economize on labour and animal power, and let it all be used for agricultural production. Essential meetings and mobilization should be carried out during gaps in the work. The previous mistake of holding too many meetings and too much mobilization must be corrected.

Our fifth agricultural policy is better adjustment in the use of labour power. To this end there are the following methods: incentives to immigrants, mutual-aid labour, mobilization of women, mobilization of loafers, emphasizing support for families with kin serving as soldiers in the War of Resistance, granting leave of absence to take part in the War of Resistance, granting leave of absence to take part in production, obtaining help from the troops, and so forth. All of these assist in adjusting the use of labour power.

As regards incentives to immigrants, we must rely on cooperation between the government and the people. The methods to be employed are as follows. (1) the Party and government of the Suide-Mizhi special military area should be responsible for organizing immigrants with a total of 5,000 labour powers to go to the directly administered counties to open up unused land. However, the basic principle must be voluntary participation, and all kinds of propaganda and organizational work should be done. (2) The government should set aside some grain for lending to immigrants who need help. It should also provide credit for agricultural implements and fully carry out preferential treatment by waiving grain tax for three years. (3) The old households should be encouraged to help the new households by lending grain, giving up some cultivated land, lending out cave houses, and so forth. In these loans the peasant doing the lending should be permitted to charge some interest, with the rate freely decided by the two parties. (4) Peasant households with a good basis should be organized to take on the poorest immigrants as tenants [*huozhong*]. The amount of rent should not be excessively low, so that the old households will be happy to take them on. (5) Immigrants from outside should be encouraged to come by old households who have contact with outside areas. Each county in the frontier areas should have a special person responsible for their reception. He should tell them about regions where there is land to be opened up so that they can go there and settle down. For example recently 600 refugees from Henan came to Longdong sub-region; they should be welcomed in this way.

Mutual-aid labour means that within one village or among several villages the peasant households not only plough and plant their land independently but in busy seasons also carry out mutual aid. For example, on a voluntary basis five, six, seven or eight households can become one group. Those that have labour power can supply labour power. Those that have animal power can supply animal power. Those that have a lot can supply a lot, those that have little can supply a little. In rotation and collectively they can plough hoe, and harvest for each household in the group, and they can settle accounts in autumn. Work can be repaid by equal amounts of work. Those who supply more can receive supplementary wages from those who supply less, according to the wage rate of the village. This method is called mutual-aid labour. The mutual-aid cooperatives and ploughing teams previously set up throughout the Kiangsi Soviet were all organized according to this method. In villages with a large population, several small teams can join together into a mutual-aid cooperative. The teams have a team head and a deputy head. Cooperatives have a cooperative head and a deputy cooperative head. Adjustment in the use of labour can also take place between cooperatives. These, then are the labour cooperatives of the peasant masses. They are extremely effective. Not only do they mean that peasant households which lack labour power can plant, hoe and harvest at the correct time, but also those households which do not lack labour power can through collective labour, get even more profit from their planting, hoeing and harvesting. This method is entirely beneficial and has no drawbacks. We should promote it widely. The system of exchange-labour teams which some areas in the Border Region have already implemented is the same method. Each county should strive to organize mutual-aid cooperatives and greatly expand collective labour by the peasants. Apart from this, there are contract-labour teams. These are also welcomed by the peasants of the Border Region. The method is not one of mutual aid but a kind of hired-labour organization for the busy agricultural seasons. Several people or even more form a group and collectively work for the people who hire them. When they have finished working for one household they go to another. It is another method of adjusting the use of labour power. All areas should help those who come from outside to do contract labour by helping them to find work to do and so forth.

As for mobilizing women to take part in production, although many of the women of the Border Region have bound feet, they are still a large labour force second only to the men. They can take part in various kinds of supplementary agricultural work such as planting vegetables, sowing seeds, hoeing weeds, feeding livestock, taking food to the fields, drawing water, and gathering the harvest, etc. There are also some who can take part in basic labour. They have generally done these things in the past. In the future we should spread propaganda and encouragement widely, stimulating their enthusiasm for labour so as to raise agricultural production. Comrades in the leading organs of Party and mass organizations for women have as yet not found the orientation for their work. They feel there is nothing that they can do. In fact their first task should be that of looking into and helping the women of the Border Region to play a wider role in productive labour, so that all those women who can take part in labour go to the production front and together with the men solve the great problem of how to increase production. There are still a large number of women in the Border Region who have not untied their bound feet. This is a great hindrance to labour and production. We should use the two methods propaganda and compulsion so that within a few years we make them untie their bound feet. Henceforth no one is permitted to bind the feet of young girls, no matter who they are.

As for mobilizing loafers to take part in productive labour, we have already had some remarkable successes over the past few years. After the various counties did this work, the number of loafers greatly decreased. However, in those regions where they still exist we should use both persuasion and compulsion to mobilize all of them to go to the production front during 1943. The experience of Yan'an county in this work is good, Bolshevik experience. Mobilizing loafers to take part in production not only increases the labour force but also reduces the number of bad people doing bad things. It is supported by the people and strengthens social peace.

When emphasizing support for families with members working in the War of Resistance, we have in the past put support for families with civilian personnel in first place and support for families with kin serving as soldiers in the War of Resistance second. This is entirely wrong. Now we should reverse this and put support for families with kin serving as soldiers in the War of Resistance first. The system of substitute cultivation [*daigeng-zhi*] should first be applied conscientiously for those family dependents of soldiers in the army resisting Japan who lack labour power (making no distinction between our own army and friendly armies). Secondly it should be applied to those dependents of workers in the Party and government who truly lack labour power. In those areas where labour cooperatives [exchange-labour teams] have been successfully organized, the solution of this problem can be entrusted to the cooperative.

Granting leave of absence to take part in production means that in the busy agricultural seasons Party and government officials in the Border Region whose families have difficulties are each year permitted to return home on two occasions, each time for several days, so that they can take part in family-based agricultural production. The primary and secondary schools of the Border Region should also stop classes in the busy agricultural seasons, letting the students and local teachers return home to help production. This is another method of adjusting the use of labour.

The armed forces assisting in production means that each busy agricultural season the troops of the Border Region spend several days helping the peasants in the areas around where they are stationed with the ploughing, hoeing and harvesting. Moreover they do not receive any payment (they eat their own food). On the one hand this can help adjust the use of labour power, and on the other hand it can strengthen the relationship between the army and the people. The political work departments of the army should plan this work.

If all the above seven ways of adjusting the use of labour power are well implemented, they will be of great help to agricultural production in the Border Region. Among them the most important is the mutual-aid cooperative, which should be realized generally throughout the whole Border Region.

Our sixth agricultural policy is to increase agricultural credit. In 1942 the government issued credit for draught animals, cotton-planting, water conservancy work and so forth. This was greatly appreciated by the peasants, and helped some of them to overcome their difficulties. One-third of the peasants of the Border Region lack draught animals and agricultural implements. This is an extremely important problem. If we want agriculture to develop, helping this huge number of peasant masses to solve their difficulties is a very important policy. One way of doing this is to increase agricultural credit. In 1942 under the sponsorship of the Border Region Bank, 1,580,000 *yuan* of credit for draught animals and agricultural implements was issued to 8,025 peasant households in the seven counties, Yan'an, Ganquan, Fuxian, Ansai, Zichang, Gulin and Zhidan. Together with capital of more than 1,030,000 *yuan* amassed by the peasants themselves, this bought 2,672 draught animals, and 4,980 pieces of agricultural equipment. Over 100,000 *mu* of new land was opened up and grain production increased by an estimated 26,000-odd *tan*. In addition, the three counties Yanchang, Yanchuan and Gulin issued 1,530 *yuan* of credit for planting cotton and for cotton-seedlings. The area planted to cotton grew by over 51,000 *mu* and could produce an estimated increase of 870,000 *jin* of cotton. In view of the achievements through agricultural credit in 1942, a further 17 million *yuan yuan* should be lent in 1943 in addition to re-lending the 3,110,000 *yuan*. Of this, 14 million *yuan* should be credit for agricultural implements and draught animals, and 3 million *yuan* should be for planting cotton. Based on the experience in issuing credit in 1942, methods for credit in 1943 should pay attention to the following points.

(1) Credit should be given in those regions which have a lot of unused land to new and old immigrants and old households of poor peasants who have labour power but lack implements, draught animals and grain, and to peasant households which have planted a lot of land but have no money with which to hire labour for hoeing.

(2) After trials by the Commodities Bureau [*Wuzi Ju*], we should introduce loans in kind, buying draught animals and suitable implements from outside or assisting peasant households themselves to purchase them. Only in this way can we truly increase the draught animals and agricultural implements in the Border Region. Otherwise the peasants can only buy implements and animals from the rich peasants and landlords of the Border Region with their Border Region currency. This merely has the function of adjusting the ownership of animals and tools within the Border Region and does not increase the total stock of animals and implements.

(3) Agricultural credit for next year has already been increased. We should also alter the policy used this year of concentrating issue of credit in the counties around Yan'an. We should issue a suitable amount to the Sui-Mi, Longdong, Sanbian, and Guan-zhong sub-regions. But this should not be done on an egalitarian basis. Instead it should be issued in a planned way to those counties, districts and peasant households where there is a lot of unused land, where the need for funds is greatest, and where there can be profitable production.

(4) The organization for issuing credit must be improved. That is to say, credit must be issued through district and township governments, and cooperatives which have the trust of the masses. Therefore the cadres of the districts and townships must be made to recognize the great significance of agricultural credit in the development of agriculture. They must not look upon it as a disaster-relief system. They may not adopt a policy of egalitarian distribution nor an irresponsible attitude.

(5) The formalities for issuing credit must be simple. Use the local methods for giving credit with which the peasants are already familiar. There is no need for formalities such as the letter of request for credit, etc.

(6) Of the total agricultural credit of 20,110,000 *yuan* set aside 8 million *yuan* specially as credit for cotton and wheat seedlings. The households which borrow this can repay in kind after the cotton and wheat harvest. Although

these funds are specified as funds for cotton and wheat seedlings, the peasants should be able to use them freely. Such credit is of mutual benefit to public and private interests. The government gets repayment in kind and the peasants can reduce exploitation through paying high interest rates on loans.

(7) The issue of credit should not violate the agricultural seasons. The Finance Department [*Caiting*] and the Border Region Bank should make repid plans so as to issue half of the entire total of credit before the end of the lunar year this year, that is about 10 million *yuan.*

Our seventh agricultural policy is to improve agricultural techniques. Improving techniques means carrying out research into things that are feasible, starting from the existing agricultural techniques and the peasants' production skills in the Border Region. The aim is to help the peasants improve the major processes in the production of grain and cotton and to increase production. Some improvements are very possible. We have already had quite a lot of experience. It is wrong to lack faith and enthusiasm on this point. However, there is no basis for boasting of the possibility of great improvement, or for considering that we can realize modernized, large-scale agricultural techniques in the Border Region.

How should we implement this policy? We consider that the following things should be done.

(1) We should build effective water conservancy projects. Jingbian provides an example. In Yangquiaopan, Changcheng district. Jingbian county there are 25,000 *mu* of land that can be irrigated. They have already irrigated 5,000 *mu*. In 1943 they want to carry out further construction. According to the Jingbian comrades, 1 *mu* of dry land only yields 1 *tou* of hulled grain. However, 1 *mu* of irrigated land can be planted three times per year. The first planting is spring wheat which yields 8 *tou*, equal to 4 *tou* of hulled grain. The second planting is black beans, yielding 4 *tou* equal to 2 *tou* of hulled grain. The final planting is turnips, yielding 2,000 *jin*. Each is worth 0.3 *yuan* and the total value is 600 *yuan.* On the basis of each *tou* of hulled grain being worthy 150 *yuan*, this is the equivalent of 4 *tou* of hulled grain. These three things give a total equivalent of 1 *tan* of hulled grain. This is ten times the yield of dry land. Therefore the peasants of Jingbian often proudly say. 'Plant wheat first and then black beans. The black bean forest contains turnips too'. The major problems in constructing irrigated land are those of the distribution of land rights, of mobilizing manpower, of organizational leadership, and of building ditches and dykes. If one of these four is not right then nothing can be achieved. In 1942

the comrades of Jingbian led the peasants to construct six dykes in Tuwan and Yangqiaopan, etc. After the dykes they built ditches, channeling in the water to irrigate the land. First of all they solved the question of land rights by dividing the new irrigated land between landlords and peasants at ratios of 70 percent to 30 percent, 60 percent to 40 percent, or half and half. This aroused the enthusiasm of the peasant masses. According to the comrades from Jingbian: 'So long as the problem of land rights is solved, it is easy to call on the peasants. For example, we constructed ten irrigated areas. Over a hundred new households came in addition to the existing 200 peasant households and of these mere than thirty came from other districts.' They also say:

'Government funds are very important in the construction of irrigated land. However we must mainly rely on the organization of manpower and on unutilized capital. In Jingbian we built 5,000 *mu* of irrigated land in 1942. Altogether we used 28,560 labour days, which is an average of 5.7 per *mu*. The total funds were 858,000 *yuan*, of this 210,000 *yuan* came from public funds and 648,000 *yuan* from unutilized capital absorbed. Of course a large proportion of these resources was made up by the ordinary folk giving their labour instead of cash.'

As regards organization and leadership, the Jingbian comrades say:

'We adopted the following two methods of leadership when building irrigated land. First we organized water conservancy committees of three to five men from good peasants in the locality. These were responsible for balancing equitably the use of labour, tools, and so forth. However, it was often difficult for them to solve problems of property rights and water-use rights, hindering the implementation of water-conservation work. Therefore it was necessary to have a second method whereby the government delegated cadres to assist in leadership and to solve difficult disputes among the masses. Cadres from the Water Conservancy Bureau [*Shuili Ju*] and a further three delegated by the county government took partial control of construction at the ten sites.'

The comrades of Jingbian have also decided that in 1943 they will continue by constructing 4,000 *mu* of irrigated land in Yangqiaopan. However since there were originally only sixty households there and in 1942 only about forty new households came in, the total of a hundred or so households still leaves a problem of labour power. They have therefore decided to appeal for a hundred households to come in 1943. At present they have already begun to dig out cave houses and to prepare dwellings. 'Settling a hundred immigrant households is a heavy task. Since most of them came from Hengshan and many will be refugees, they will need a lot of credit if we are to succeed. If the immigrants arrive, together with the labour power already in the area there will be no difficulty in constructing, 4,000 *mu* in 1943.' As well as this the comrades of Jingbian have also built a kind of 'water-logged land' [*Shuimandi*]. Water-logged lands are 'large pieces of flat land surrounded on three sides by nigh mountains and on the fourth side by a deep gully [*tian gou*]. Some are 2,000 to 3,000 *mu* and some are 200 to 300 *mu*. The soil of such land is very good but on top of it is piled sand and gravel which obstructs the seedlings and spoils the quality of the soil'. The method of constructing water-logged land is 'to build a solid dyke along the side of the gully on top of which sand willows [*shaliu*] and pea-trees [*ningtiaozi*] (in winter this supplies food for the sheep) are planted. This dyke prevents the water that runs off the mountains during the course of the year from flowing away through the gully. It all lies on the land. The mud is very thick. It is extremely fertile and has a high water-content. It is very good for planting crops. Furthermore, each year the area expands and the mountain gullies become flat land. Thus the productive area is increased'; The yield of this water-logged land is more than double that of dry land. 'Five *mu* of dry land yields 1 *tan* of grain but 5 *mu* of water-logged land can yield 2 or 3 *tan*. The comrades of Jingbian only discovered how to build this water-logged land during the mobilization for the spring ploughing in 1942. Therefore it has as yet only been tried out in two places totaling 1,000 *mu*. They are preparing to construct such lands in a good many places in 1943 and the total area will be over 13,000 *mu*. They say 'In the entire county from 50,000 to 60,000 *mu* of waterlogged land can be built'. I have given the example of Jingbian in detail to prove that the case for building water conservancy works is far from hopeless. Conditions for doing so exist in several places. In particular the conscientious and practical spirit of the comrades of Jingbian provides an effective model for the various counties. Although the water-conservancy conditions in other counties cannot be the same as those in Jingbian, by relying on the leadership of the Party and government and the efforts of the people some water conservancy can be started in those places where conditions are really right. In 1943 the government should set aside 2 million *yuan* as funds for carrying out water conservancy works in the Yangqiaopan area of Jingbian, the Huluhe area of Fuxian and so forth.

(2) We should popularize the use of superior-quality seeds. If we have good seeds we can get a bigger harvest even without increasing labour and manure. For example the Guanghua agricultural station has already successfully tried

out the ‘Wolf’s tail’ seed. It has a high yield, is resistant to insects and birds, and can be planted anywhere. Their sweet-potato yield is also higher than average. We should encourage the peasants to plant them. First each county should select one or two districts and order some peasants to carry out tests. If they find the soil and climate suitable, then such seeds can be popularized so as to increase production.

(3) We should encourage the opening up of new land and the turning over of the earth during autumn, as this can reduce insect pests and promote the aeration of the soil. It can also conserve the water content and increase the harvest of the following year.

(4) After popularizing the organization of mutual-aid cooperatives, we should encourage the peasants to increase the number of times they hoe weeds. The purpose of hoeing weeds is not only to get rid of weeds and to help the seedling, but also to conserve water and resist drought. If we increase the number of times we undertake hoeing, we can increase the amount of harvest even if we do not use much manure.

(5) In the summer and winter of 1943 the five sub-regions should separately hold exhibitions organized by the Reconstruction Department [*Jianting*] and five special offices [*zhuanshu*]. In the light of the experience of the two previous agricultural exhibitions in the Border Region, we should improve the layout, introduce and promote the achievements of model-peasants, and popularize an agricultural production movement in the labour style and skills of Wu Manyou. In 1943 the agricultural exhibitions of the sub-regions should include the achievements of the troops, the official organizations and schools in agricultural production. This will encourage their agricultural production and will also promote unity between the troops and the people.

(6) In 1943 the *Liberation Daily* and *Border Region Masses Daily* should widely promote the Wu Manyou production movement so that many more Wu Manyous will be created within the five sub-regions.

(7) The primary and secondary schools of the Border Region should run general agricultural knowledge classes and edit textbooks for winter study containing practical information on Border Region agriculture with the aim of improving agriculture and increasing production.

(8) the Reconstruction Department should call a meeting of experts to get down to research on the ‘willow-root’ water which flows from the hilltops, so as to deal with it in a scientific manner and to prevent people from contracting ‘limping sickness’ after drinking it. If this problem can be solved then much

fertile land in the neighborhood of the hills can be put under the plough and become good arable land.

Our eighth agricultural policy is to implement progressive agricultural taxation. In the past agricultural taxation was in the form of national salvation grain tax. Although it was levied on progressive principles, the amount levied each year was not standard. The amount levied per family varied from year to year. In 1941 there were cases of taxes being approtioned out [*tanpai*]. Although an assessment method [*pingyizhi*] was instituted in 1942 as being more equitable, there were still inequalities. The most important failing was that the amount of tax was not fixed. This dampened the enthusiasm of the peasants for production. We propose that in 1943 the government should examine and register the land held by the people, and thereby construct a simple progressive agricultural tax. The amount of tax should be decided according to the amount of land, its quality, and so forth. In this way the peasant will be able to calculate the amount of tax themselves according to the amount and quality of the land they farm. Once the peasants can do this, they can work out the ratio between income and expenditure for the family for the entire year. They can then set-to and produce with greater enthusiasm for production. This will guarantee an increase in the production of grain. Moreover, inequalities will not arise when the government levies the tax. After carrying out the preparatory work in 1943, we can implement progressive taxation in 1944. Counties where preparation is completed early, can carry it out on a trial basis in 1943.

Reduction of rent and of interest rates, an increase in opening up new lands, popularizing the planting of cotton, not violating agricultural seasons, better adjustment in the use of labour power, an increase in agricultural credit, improvements of agricultural techniques, and preparation for implementing a progressive tax—these eight items are the effective agricultural policies which we can and must carry out in 1943. With the exception of the progressive tax for which we can make preparations and which can be tried out in a few counties, the other seven items should be implemented immediately. Many of them should commence during the winter of 1942. Otherwise the time will be lost and they will become empty words.

The above is a summary of our work as regards agriculture in the private sector and our strategy for 1943. What follows is a discussion of closely related agricultural subsidiary undertakings such as animal husbandry and handicrafts.

3. On the Development of Animal Husbandry

The three major subsidiary undertakings of the peasants of the Border Region are animal husbandry, salt transport, and textiles. It is well known that the breeding of cows and donkeys plays a decisive role in agriculture and salt transport. The breeding of sheep is closely related to the supply of bedding and clothing. Last year the peasants of the Border Region harvested more than 1 million *jin* of wool. Including sheep exported the estimated value was more than 20 million *yuan* which is proof of the importance of sheep. The greatest enemies of livestock are the many diseases and the lack of fodder. If we do not solve these two problems, there can be no development. In the first place the destructive power of disease is very great. For example in the spring of 1941, more than 20,000 sheep died in an epidemic in Jingbian. In 1942 more than 16,000 died of the same cause in Dingbian. In the summer of 1941, more than 500 cows died of cattle plague in Yan'an. In the summer and autumn of 1942, 574 cows died in Zhidan. This shows how disease is the great enemy of the livestock of the Border Region. Secondly, the lack of fodder also greatly hinders the raising of livestock. In the spring of 1941 when 20,000 sheep died in Jingbian, most of the 30,000 lambs also died. Besides the epidemic, an important, factor was the lack of fodder. At the same time over 2,000 cows and horses died of hunger there. Another keenly-felt difficulty in recent years is the lack of fodder supplies on salt-transport routes, which greatly hinders the transport of salt.

Our task is to protect livestock and increase breeding, in order to attain these goals we should implement the following policies.

Prevention of disease. The important thing here is for the county and district governments to call meetings of local veterinarians and old experienced peasants to do research into simple methods of preventing and curing animal diseases, and to encourage the use of these methods among peasant families with livestock. This is a very simple thing to effect. Secondly, the Reconstruction Department should order its agricultural station to increase veterinary equipment, to do research into animal diseases in the Border Region, to produce large amounts of serum and vaccine, and to propagate and implement effective methods of prevention and cure.

Popularize the planting of grass for animal pasture. Most of the animals of the Border Region are put out to pasture. Where the pasture is not good, disease easily arises. Therefore we should widely promote the planting of alfalfa [*musu*], particularly on and near the salt-transport routes. This will benefit both the transport of salt and the development of animal husbandry. In 1942 the government originally planned to plant 30,000 *mu* of alfalfa, but ultimately only 23,000 *mu* were planted because there were not enough seeds. In 1943 the county governments should transport more seeds from Guanzhong and issue them to the peasants in areas where planting is planned. They should also encourage the peasants to buy some themselves. In addition they should mobilize the peasants to cut large quantities of grass in the autumn and to store it up for winter use. This will not only avoid illness induced by animals eating cold grass but also step the peasants from selling animals because of lack of winter fodder. We should look to the experience of Jingbian in this respect. Warned by the great loss of livestock in the spring of 1941, the comrades in Jingbian have done much work in the past two years. They have appealed to the peasants to plant alfalfa, create fields for pasture, cut autumn grass, plant willow trees, and dig up grass roots as means of providing fodder. First of all they called upon the peasants to plant over 2,000 *mu* of alfalfa in 1942. Most of the seed was issued by the government, and the peasants were very enthusiastic. They are once again preparing to issue some credit for seeds to the peasants in 1943, and they are specially calling upon the peasants themselves to prepare seeds. As a way of encouraging them to plant large amounts of alfalfa, they are giving rewards to those who do very well. Secondly, they prepared more than 4,000 *mu* of pasture fields in 1942. The grass on this pasture land is mainly reed grass [*luwei*]. This flourishes in the ponds and large marshes in the desert land bordering on Mongolia. Each *mu* yields more than 500 *jin*. The pasture fields that existed before the revolution were later destroyed, and the cows and sheep wandered around at will. Now they are mobilizing the masses to restore them, it does not take a lot of labour, and cutting the grasses after autumn prepares for winter use. Thirdly, in the mountainous areas of Jingbian there is a lot of reed grass, white grass [*baicao*], bing grass [*bingcao*], desert rushes, and so forth. These are of great help for the livestock, if they are harvested in autumn. In 1941 the masses were organized to gather 5 million *jin*. In 1942 they again mobilized each man to cut 100 *jin*. As yet they have not worked out the latter total. Fourthly, they encouraged the masses to plant willow-trees, sand-willows, and pea-trees. The leaves and twigs can be fed to camels and sheep, which is another way of providing fodder. At the same time this supplies fuel which pleases the masses. The duty of the government is to supply seeds and encourage planting. Fifthly, in Jingbian the animals eat both the leaves and the roots of the white grass and bing grass. During spring ploughing the strongest men in Jingbian plough the land in the morning, dig-up roots in the afternoon, and feed the livestock in the evening. The women and children spend the whole day digging-up roots. Each person can dig-up more than 100 *jin*, and this plays an important part in the supply of fodder. However, the government must make good arrangements since, as there are many people digging, there are arguments over land rights. The landless-refugees make it even more difficult. According to the Jingbian comrades:

'With these methods we solved many problems for the people. Of course the grass grew well in 1942 because there was a good rainfall. However, animal husbandry also developed because of the above five methods for providing fodder. In 1942 over 60,000 lambs survived throughout the county and there were very few deaths. With the exception of a few areas, there was a great reduction in the loss through disease of fully-grown sheep, and cows, donkeys, horses and so forth. Excluding sheep, the livestock of Jingbian requires 30 million *jin* of fodder per year. We can get at least 10 million *jin* with the above five methods'.

Fodder is a life-and-death question for livestock. We hope that the comrades in the various counties will make a plan for fodder in 1943.

Ban the slaughter and export of female animals. The slaughter of all cattle is forbidden and old cattle can only be killed after inspection.

Improve animal breeds. We should investigate experience in cross-breeding, select good breeds of donkeys and sheep, and popularize them among the people. This should be done first of all in Ganquan and Yan'an and then spread to other counties. Besides this the government should purchase *tanyang* sheep from Yanchi. These should be issued for breeding to peasant families with many sheep. Each *tanyang* ram can be mated with twenty ewes. The wool of this sheep is extremely fine and soft, and each sheep yields 2 *jin* per year.

If we can conscientiously implement the above methods, there can be even greater expansion of livestock in the Border Region. I hope the Reconstruction Department and the comrades in the various counties will pay attention to this.

4. On the Development of Handicrafts

Handicrafts in the Border Region exist in two forms. The majority are subsidiary family undertakings and a proportion are independent handicrafts. The largest is the spinning and weaving undertaken by women. However, for many years past a large proportion of local yarn and local cloth has been displaced by foreign yarn and foreign cloth. Only recently, because of our encouragement, has there been some resurgence. Even-so the peasants of the Border Region still want to take their surplus products, skins, and salt-transport trade to outside regions in exchange for large amounts of foreign yam and foreign cloth. Their own spinning and weaving industry is still far from sufficient to supply their own needs. I shall therefore take textiles as the key popular handicraft for discussion here. In addition I shall deal with silk and oil-pressing, ignoring others for the moment.

Spinning and weaving

The people, the troops, and official personnel need 250,000 bolts of coarse cloth per year (each bolt is 2 feet 4 inches wide and 100 feet long [Chinese measurement]). Of this, the amount required by the troops and official personnel is roughly 50,000 bolts, and that by the people 200,000 bolts. What is the present supply? The seven publicly-run textile mills produce approximately 11,000 bolts per year. The seven large and small textile cooperatives run by the people produce roughly 18,000 bolts per year. There are no statistics for the amount of local cloth produced by the women at home, but it is estimated to be around 30,000 bolts per year. Public and private annual production totals 100,000 bolts, 150,000 bolts less than the amount needed. That is easy to say, we can already supply 40 percent of our needs, which is a great achievement. But we are still 60 percent short, and meeting this is our future task. This task is very great, and we shall need several years to complete it. But it can be done if we rely on, improve and expand the existing textile enterprises run by the government and by the people. If we have the raw cotton, we can in a planned way encourage the women to spin yarn and to weave cloth made half of local yarn and half of foreign yarn. Gradually we can reduce the import of foreign yarn, until eventually we reach the position where we use only our own yam to weave cloth. In this way we can solve the problem.

As regards weaving, the responsibility rests first with the publicly-run mills. In 1942 publicly-run textile mills were capable of producing 11,000 bolts of cloth. This could supply almost half of the needs of the troops and official personnel. In a few more years we can be completely self-sufficient. Second, we must encourage women to weave cloth as a popular industry. In the Suide sub-region the women can already produce more than 30,000 bolts per year. However, the widths and lengths are not uniform. The people do not like to buy it. They still prefer imported cloth. If improvements can be made, there are good prospects for increasing the production of cloth. Third, the people's cooperatives can already produce 18,000 bolts per year. This can be further developed. We must rely on the combination of these three forms to provide the cloth required by the Border Region. However in the first place the greatest problem is the supply of yarn. At 12 *jin* of yarn per bolt, we need 3 million *jin* to weave 250,000 bolts of coarse cloth entirely from local yarn. If we use a mixture of half local yarn and half foreign yarn, we will need 1,500,000 *jin* of local yarn and 150,000 bundles of foreign yarn. At present the cloth woven by publicly-run mills and the people's cooperatives is made from this mixture of half local and half foreign yarn. However, there is still not enough local yarn. We must greatly expand the amount of spinning done by the people, and improve the quality of the yarn. Therefore it is extremely important for the Border Region to gradually expand handicraft spinning and weaving among the people, to increase the quantity, and too improve the quality.

How should we gradually solve these problems? In the light of past experience, we propose the following methods.

(1) First we should reorganize and expand spinning and weaving among the people in the counties of the Suide special military area. The way to do this is, under the direction of the special office of the military area, to unite the efforts of the Commodities Bureau and the Daguang Yarn Factory of 359 Brigade, issuing raw cotton to women and ordering them to produce more local yam to supply the yarn needs of the publicly-run cloth factories. This method was effectively implemented in 1942. It should be continued and expanded in 1943. Apart from supplying yarn to the publicly-run cloth factories, the people of the special military area may weave cloth themselves. The Commodities Bureau can determine measurements and quality, and guarantee a market. That is, the cloth can be purchased by the Commodities Bureau either for its own use or for selling among the people. Next, the government should invest 1 million *yuan* in order to increase the quantity of local yarn. Based on the experience of the Southern District Cooperative of Yan'an county which organized spinning by women in 800 households, lending funds to 3,000 households in Yan'an and Ansai will increase the number of spinning-machines in the two counties by 3,000 in 1943. Organizing spinning by women in 1,000 households in Qingyang and Quzi counties will increase the number of spinning-machines by 1,000. These credit funds can be handled by the Commodities Bureau, which can issue raw cotton and spinning-machines. It can purchase the local yarn produced to supply the needs of the publicly-run factories. Next, in order to increase cloth production the government should invest a further 1 million *yuan* either as loans or as share capital in the existing cloth-weaving cooperatives run by the people as a means of expanding their undertakings.

Here we should consider the plan for Yan'an county. In their *Plan for Production and Construction* in 1943, the comrades in Yan'an say:

In 1943 we shall increase the number of women able to spin and weave by 40,000. Estimating that they will be able to spin 18 *jin* of yarn each in a year (1½ *jin* per month), this gives a total of 72,000 *jin*. In addition, there were already 1,000 women able to spin in 1942. Each year one of these can spin 20 *jin*, giving a total of 20,000 *jin*. The two groups can together spin 92,000 *jin*, which can be woven into 8,363.6 bolts of cloth. However, this is still 4,886.4 bolts short of our needs. We plan to solve this problem within two or three years, and to achieve complete self-sufficiency. The population of this county is 64,000 (excluding the city of Yan'an). Of these, 42,000 are adults. Each adult needs one-quarter of a bolt of coarse cloth per year (a suit of plain clothes requires 11 feet of cloth and half a suit of padded clothes requires 14 feet of cloth, a total of 25 feet: each bolt of coarse cloth is 100 feet long). Their total requirement is therefore 10,500 bolts. The 22,000 young people each need half the quantity of cloth required by an adult. A bolt of cloth is enough for eight and their total requirement is 2,750 bolts. The annual requirement for the whole county is thus 13,250 bolts.

The 92,000 *jin* of yarn spun in 1943 will be woven into 8,366.6 bolts of coarse cloth. This requires 56 looms (each loom can weave 150 bolts of coarse cloth per year). In 1942 there were twelve looms in the villages and factories of this county. Thus we must expand the number in the village by forty-four during 1943 using the cooperative structure. There are three methods for doing this. The first is investment (i) in incentive awards to encourage women to spin, 50,000 *yuan* (ii) in producing 5,000 *jin* of raw cotton at 100 *yuan* per *jin* 500,000 *yuan* and (iii) in expenses for spinning and weaving-equipment, 1,000 spinning-wheels at 100 *yuan* each, 100,000 *yuan*, and 44 looms at 1,000 *yuan* each, 44,000 *yuan.* The total required for the above items is 694,000 *yuan*, second, looms in the villages should be set up by the peasants organizing themselves into partnerships. The government can help them overcome their difficulties by training skilled workers, or by investing capital for looms and so forth. Third, for every 2 of raw cotton issued, 1 *jin* of yarn should be collected. The cotton cloth woven in the villages may be used by the peasants themselves. The Gaodan Yarn Spinning Factory should play the leading role in encouraging women to spin, and in training workers.

This plan by the comrades in Yan'an is really worth looking at. If the people of Yan'an, who lack experience of spinning and weaving, are able with the encouragement of the Party and government to become fully self-sufficient in yarn and cloth within two or three years, other counties without experience should also be able to solve the problem within a similar or slightly longer period. We hope that the comrades in the various counties will all make such a plan. As for the various counties where the peasants have experience, such as the special military area, the problem should be solved even more easily. According to the calculations of the comrades in Yan'an, adults make up two-thirds of the population and children one-third. One bolt of cloth is enough for four adults or eight children. Therefore, the yearly cloth requirement for the 1,400,000 population of the Border Region is not 200,000 bolts but 337,500. According to the opinions of the comrades in Yan'an a large quantity like this can be provided within two or three years. In sum, by relying on the masses setting-to and on the leadership of the Party and the government any difficulty can be overcome.

(2) The Reconstruction Department should do research into the people's experiences in spinning in order to improve the quality of local yarn so as to prepare to produce Border Region cloth entirely from local yarn, gradually reducing and ultimately stopping the import of foreign yarn. If the quality of yam cannot be improved then we cannot suspend dealings in foreign yarn.

(3) Improve the woolen goods made by the publicly-run factories. Using woolen goods in place of some of the cotton clothing and bedding used by the army is a way of reducing the consumption of cotton cloth.

(4) In 1943 official personnel should set a personal example and wear local cloth without exception. At the same time they should encourage the people to use more local cloth and less foreign cloth. According to the situation in the development of local cloth, the Commodities Bureau can gradually limit the import of foreign cloth.

The above methods will help us gradually to solve the great problem of self-sufficiency in cotton cloth. Although it can only be done gradually, it is nevertheless entirely possible. We must resolutely implement all methods for doing so.

Cotton-seed oil

In 1942 the peasants of the counties planting cotton harvested around 3 million *jin* of cotton seeds capable of giving 360,000 *jin* of oil, and, with the expansion in cotton-planting, from 5 to 6 million *jin* of seed can be obtained next year which can further increase the quantity of oil. We should prevent all this being wasted. Cotton-seed oil is edible but the peasants of the Border Region are still not accustomed to it. If the government does not promote it, they will not extract the oil. Therefore the government of the Border Region should invest-300,000 *yuan* and, through the governments of the counties where cotton is planted, encourage the peasants to experiment with pressing cotton-seed oil. After the experiments succeed, it can be widely promoted. The oil can be bought by the government. This will not only provide edible oil but also at present oil prices of 30 *yuan* per *jin* give the peasants an income of 10,800,000 *yuan* from 360,000 *jin* of oil.

Silk

In the counties of Suide, Qingjian, Anding, Yanchuan, Gulin and so forth many peasants rear silkworms. It is a relatively large subsidiary undertaking. For example, in Anding alone there were 3,585 peasant households rearing silkworms during 1942. They harvested 23.662 *jin* of silkworm cocoons, at a value of 600,000 *yuan.*

Our sewing and repair industry needs silk thread and our woollen-blanket industry needs silk edging. We can also use silk thread for the woof when weaving cotton cloth as a means of reducing the import of foreign yarn. Therefore, we should develop the silk production of the Border Region. The way to do this is for the government to issue 300,000 *yuan* in credit to the peasant families to expand the rearing of silkworms. Credit should be given especially to those peasant households which have a good record in rearing silkworms. Moreover, the commodities Bureau should buy the peasants' silk through the local cooperatives and order woven silk articles from the peasants in order to promote the expansion of the silk industry.

The total investment in the above three undertakings, spinning and weaving, oil-pressing, and silk, is 2,600,000 *yuan* (yarn spinning 1 million, cloth-weaving 1 million, oil-pressing 300,000 and silk 300,000). Although these funds are not great, they can stimulate the people to progress a little in solving the urgent needs of the moment. In 1943 when we have even more experience, we should consider increasing the amount of capital. Spinning and weaving are particularly important. Unless the people set-to and the public sector helps, the problem cannot be solved as a whole.

Here I have only taken up spinning and weaving, oil-pressing, and silk. Other items have not been mentioned. The counties can according to actual circumstances, do research into handicrafts which are related to the people's economy and which need stimulus from the Party and the government, and they can make their own plans.

5. On the Development of Cooperatives

There were already cooperatives in the Border Region during the civil-war period. Since the War of Resistance began, the Border Region government has continued to promote them, and after five-and-a-half years of hard effort they have gradually expanded.

In the four years from 1937 to 1941 the number of consumer cooperatives increased from 130 to 155 and the number of cooperative members from 57,847 to 140, 218. The share capital grew from 55,525 *yuan* to 693,071 *yuan.* The value of sales increased from 261,189 *yuan* to more than 6,008,000 *yuan.* Profits rose from 4,800 *yuan* to over 1,020,000 *yuan* and the public accumulation fund [*gongjijin*] increased from 3,500 *yuan* to over 173,000 *yuan.*

If we compare the October 1942 Statistics for the nineteen county capitals with those of 1941, the number of cooperative members has increased from 97,297 to 115,899. The share capital has risen abruptly from over 712,900 *yuan* to more than 6 million *yuan* and the profit has also grown from 858,000 *yuan* to more than 3,398,000 *yuan.*

The largest amount of share capital owned by Individual members of consumer cooperatives is around 10,000 *yuan* and the lowest is around 4 or 5 *yuan.*

The distribution of consumer cooperatives at the end of 1941 was as follows: Yan'an, twenty-eight; Ansai, twelve; Yanchang, eight; Gulin, eight; Dingbian, eight; Qingyang, Huachi, Quzi and Yanchuan, seven each; Anding, Fuxian and Wuqi, six each; Ganquan, Jingbian and Heshui, five each; Yan'an city and Mizhi, four each; and Suide, two. There are still no statistics for the other counties.

Turning to producer cooperatives, ten were established in 1939 with the support of the government and the assistance of the northwest office of the Chinese Industrial cooperative [*Gonghe*]. Thereafter some consumer cooperatives with large amounts of capital also ran producer cooperatives. By October 1942 the number of producer cooperatives had increased from ten to fifty. The number of employees engaged in production had increased from 199 to 563. Share capital had grown from 11,130 *yuan* to 2,491,600 *yuan* and the total value of monthly production from 60 *yuan* to over 2,300,000 *yuan.*

According to this years' statistics the distribution of producer cooperatives is as follows: Suide, sixteen; Yan'an, seven; Gulin, five; Yanchang, five; Yanchuan, five; Ganquan, three; Ansai, three; Jingbian, two; Qingyang, one; Jiaxian, one; Mizhi, one; Anding, one.

Among the fifty producer cooperatives there are twenty-seven large and small textile cooperatives, thirteen in Suide, four in Yan'an, two in Gulin, and one each in Ganquan, Fuxian, Yanchang, Yanchuan, Ansai, Anding, Jiaxian and Mizhi. Altogether they employ 497 people and their share capital is 1,700,000 *yuan.* Six have twenty-five or more employees, the rest ranging from three to over ten. If these twenty-seven cooperatives were working at full capacity, they could produce 30,000 bolts of cloth annually. At the moment they are only producing around 22,000 bolts, 6,000 woven blankets, 4,152 dozen woolen towels, and 8,400 dozen pairs of woven socks.

There are five dyeing cooperatives, two in Yanchuan, two in Suide, and one in Yanchang. They employ a total of thirteen people, their share capital is 128,000 *yuan* and each year they can dye over 7,000 bolts of cloth. There are five producer cooperatives pressing cottonseed oil. Of these, two are in Gulin, two in Jingbian, and one in Yanchang. They employ a total of nineteen people, their share capital 245,000 *yuan*, and each year they can press 10,000 *jin*. of cottonseed oil.

There are nine flour mills, two each in Ansai, Ganquan, Yanchang, Yanchuan and one in Gulin. They employ a total of twenty-four people and their share capital is 262,000 *yuan.* There are four blanket-making cooperatives, two in Yan'an, one in Qingyang, and one in Suide. They employ a total of forty-two people and their share capital is 152,000 *yuan.* Each year they can produce 7,600 blankets. There is one pottery cooperative in Yan'an county. It employs seven men, its share capital is 3,000 *yuan* and each year it produces six kiln-loads of pottery.

The above statistics show us that both consumer and producer cooperatives have expanded greatly in terms of membership, share capital, profit and undertakings. However this development has been uneven. In the past five years it has gone through three stages. Moreover, qualitative development only began to advance rapidly during 1942. Before 1939, cooperatives everywhere were based upon share capital from the government with the addition of some share capital assessed from the masses. At this time their nature was basically that of publicly-run enterprises and for the most part they became shops publicly-run by the county and district governments. Cooperative enterprise was not facing the masses, but was chiefly-facing the government. It was providing funds for the government and all decisions were taken by the government. This was the first stage. After 1939, the slogan 'Popularize the Cooperatives' was put forward. However, most places still used the old method of assessing share capital from the masses to carry out this so-called ‘popularization’. Thus the masses still regarded the cooperatives as a burden, assessed upon them and not as something of their own. Cooperative personnel were still the same official personnel. They ordered the masses to do substitute farm work on their land on their behalf. The masses could not see the great benefits to the cooperatives for themselves and, on the contrary, considered that the cooperatives increased the labour burden they had to bear. After 1940, the duty of all the local governments to achieve self-sufficiency in production was increased. Thereafter the large shareholders in many cooperatives were not the people but government organs. It was thus even more difficult for the cooperatives to give due consideration to the interests of the masses. This was the second stage. It was only in January 1942 that the Reconstruction Department put forward the strategy of ‘overcome the desire to monopolize everything, implement the policy of the people in control and officials as helpers’, based on the experience of the Southern District Cooperative of Yan’an county. It was only by implementing this strategy that cooperatives everywhere did away with the method of levying shares by assessment, and gradually built up close relations with the masses and experience in being concerned for the interested of the masses. Thus, in merely ten months the share capital has risen sharply by more than 5 million *yuan* and undertakings have also expanded. This has played a great role in organizing the economic strength of the people, reducing middleman exploitation, and developing the people’s economy. This is the third stage. It is only in this stage that the cooperatives of the Border Region have in general begun to follow the right path.

The above outlines the path of development of most cooperatives. However, there have been exceptions. For example the Southern District Cooperative of Yan’an county got on to the right path somewhat earlier. Through several years of hard experience, this cooperative has become a model cooperative truly supported by the people. During 1942, cooperatives from the counties of Suide, Anding, Ansai, Ganquan, Yanchang, Wuqi, etc. have advanced by studying this model cooperative.

What, then, are the special features of the Southern District Cooperative? It has the following good points.

(1) It has smashed dogmatism and formalism in cooperatives, and it does not cling to old ways and regulations. The Southern District Cooperative began as a consumer cooperative. However, its undertakings have extended into every aspect of the economic life of all the people of Southern district. It does

not just manage consumer undertakings but handles supply and distribution, transport, production and credit. It has organized six producer-cooperatives for textiles, oil-pressing, blanket manufacture and so forth, and one transport team with more than a hundred animals. It has become a comprehensive co-operative. It does not concentrate on the percentage of income that should be devoted to the cooperative's own public accumulation fund and public welfare fund [*gonguijin*], but strives to share out its profits to the members. It does not place a limit on the share dividend and each member receives a return on his shares regardless of the number held. It does not limit the right of members to dispose of their shares, and each member has the freedom to withdraw his shareholding at any time. Nor does it limit the nature of the membership. People from all social strata can join. (Since Yan'an is an area that has gone through land revolution, allowing people from all classes to join is no hindrance to the leadership of the cooperative by the Communist Party.) They can also belong to the organs of the cooperative. Moreover, it is not necessary to have ready cash to become a shareholder. Before the cooperative won complete confidence among the masses, it permitted them to become shareholders using government bonds [*gongzhaiquan*] and saving bonds [*chuxupiao*]. In this way the share capital was increased. When the cooperative came to have the confidence of the masses and the masses wanted to take out shares but had no money, it allowed them to use any articles of value such as grain, livestock, eggs and firewood to buy shares. Therefore, all the people praise it.

(2) It has smashed formalism in cooperatives, and conscientiously carried out the policy of facing the masses and working for the benefit of the people. It has therefore gradually come to be loved and respected by the masses. For example, every year during spring ploughing, it makes early arrangements to transport shovels from Hancheng and other places, selling them to the peasants at a price lower than the market price. It organizes various productive enterprises, which not only absorb unemployed workers, take on apprentices, and employ the family dependents of working personnel, but also expand profits, guarantee the supply of daily necessities to the people of the area, and increase the income of the people. The Southern District Cooperative has organized more than 800 women to spin yarn. Each month they can spin 1,400 *jin*. This has increased the monthly income by 70,000 *yuan*. The managerial policy of the consumer cooperative is to fully ensure the supply of necessary commodities for the people, not only letting them make fewer trips for their purchases but also charging prices cheaper than those found in shops of large towns.

(3) It uses the policy of benefiting both the public and the private sectors as the bridge between the economic activity of the government and the economic activity of the people. On the one hand it carries out the financial and economic policies of the government and on the other it adjusts the burdens of the people so as to make those burdens more acceptable, raises their income, and increases their enthusiasm. For example, in 1941 when the government was mobilizing for the salt-transport levy, the Southern District Cooperative got the people of the district to hand over a money substitute, and its transport team transported the salt for the government on behalf of the people. Before the government collects the tax grain, the cooperative mobilizes the people to pay it to the cooperative itself in accordance with the amount of tax collected in the previous year. The cooperative guarantees to pay the tax grain for the current year on behalf of the cooperative members and also accepts the tax grain handed over as share capital paid in by people to join the cooperative. Thus on the one hand the cooperative acts on behalf of the government, ensuring the payment of tax grain but using it to make a profit before it is finally paid over. On the other hand the people not only pay their tax grain but also get some share capital. As a result some households with surplus grain have even wished to pay two years' worth of tax grain to the cooperative. No matter what the increase in tax grain the following year, the cooperative undertakes to pay the difference. More than forty households in the district have done this. In this way the burdens of the peasants have been fixed, their income has increased, and their enthusiasm for production has also been raised. Another example was when the government of the county and district wanted the people to pay educational expenses and expenses for the guard posts of the self-defense army. The cooperative again paid these for the people from its profits. In this way the government was saved the trouble of collecting the expenses and the people were not burdened with the payment. The government policies of encouraging immigration and assisting refugees can also be carried out by the cooperative (it can give credit to the refugees and immigrants and so forth). In these ways the interests of the individual and the collective and closely united.

(4) It changes the organizational structure of the cooperative according to the wishes of the people. It does not hold congresses of all the cooperative members, but allows the members to elect delegated from each village. It does not use the method of assessment for raising share capital, but rallies groups of activist cooperative members to go and encourage the people to take out shares. It does not limit the share capital of the cooperative members, and it di-

vides the profit according to shares held. However, in solving the cooperative's problems it does not consider the number of shares owned. Each shareholder has equal rights.

The above are the features of the Southern District Cooperative. As a consumer cooperative, its characteristics conform to the basic spirit of consumer cooperatives and grow from the life, culture, economy, and politics of the people of the Border Region. As a producer cooperative, while not a cooperative of the producers themselves but an enterprise where shareholders hire labour, its present structure is a means of absorbing unused rural capital to develop handicrafts and corresponds to existing conditions in the Border Region where handicrafts are not developed and handicraft workers are few.

Since 1936 the Southern District Cooperative has gone through six to seven years of trial and hard struggle. Now it has grown from 160 members to include more than 90 percent of the households of the Southern district. The number of voluntary members is 1,112. The amount of share capital has risen from 159 *yuan* to 2 million *yuan.* It has grown from one cooperative to sixteen cooperatives. The net profit has risen from several tens of *yuan* to 1,620,000 *yuan* for the first ten months of 1942. It has developed the agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprises of the people of the district and looked after their economic welfare, becoming the economic heart of the people of Southern district.

In the large but underpopulated Border Region where the economy is almost entirely a small-scale peasant economy, it is necessary to rely upon truly popularized cooperatives to play a pivotal role in implementing the economic policies of the government and in organizing and encouraging the people to develop the economy. Thus the road of the Southern District Cooperative is the road for all the cooperatives of the Border Region. A movement to develop cooperatives in the style of the Southern District Cooperative is a major item of work for expanding the economy of the people of the Border Region.

For this reason, the Party and government should carry out the following work in cooperatives throughout the Border Region in 1943.

(1) The Reconstruction Department should be responsible for studying the experience of the Southern District Cooperative and for compiling a small handbook as educational material for the fourth section [*ke*] of all county governments and for the personnel of all cooperatives. Furthermore, we should use the opportunity presented by holding meetings in Yan'an to take working cadres from all parts of the Border Region on a tour of the Southern District

Cooperative.

(2) All the enterprises run by the Commodities Bureau should help successful consumer and producer cooperatives with supplies and distribution. They should sell commodities to the consumer cooperatives, and supply raw material to, and guarantee the purchase of products from, the producer cooperatives. The government should issue 3 million *yuan* to the Commodities Bureau in 1943 to help in adjusting the cooperatives' supplies and distribution.

(3) In order to stimulate cooperatives, the government must clearly stipulate and conscientiously carry out a reduction in the cooperatives' tax burden.

(4) The Border Region Government and the governments of all the counties should seek out students educated to the upper primary school or higher level for training as accountants or managers so as to ease the difficulties of all cooperatives over these.

(5) The personnel of the cooperatives must implement the policy of 'popularization' and adopt the wages system, doing away with the system of substitute cultivation for cooperative personnel. They must improve cooperative organization and simplify administration. They must make them into proper enterprises and not official organs. They must reduce the working personnel and reduce expenditure.

In order to ensure that everyone fully understands the history of the development of the Southern District Cooperative, we have specially invited its director, Comrades Liu Jianzhang, to write a report which now follows.

THE HISTORY OF THE YAN'AN SOUTHERN DISTRICT COOPERATIVE

First Period

On 2 December 1936, we began to propagandize the people to buy shares. At that time each share was worth 0.30 *yuan* in soviet currency. After twenty days there were 160 members with 533 shares giving a total value of 159.90 *yuan.*

Wang Tianjin was elected director, Liu Jianzhang accountant, and Li Shengzhang buyer.

Dividends were paid quarterly and the gross profit for the first quarter was 199.44 *yuan.*

Expenditures were made up of payments to the three personnel 9 *yuan*, food 45 yuan, stationery 3.50 *yuan*, woolen socks and gloves to support the front 13 *yuan*, help for the dependents of troops of the War of Resistance 15 *yuan*, support for the small school B *yuan* and public welfare fund 10 *yuan*. After expenses, the dividend per share was 0.18 *yuan*, and the total dividend 95.94 *yuan*.

On the occasion of this dividend, we held a cooperative members' congress attended by all. At this meeting we reported on the work done by the cooperative' shared out the dividend, and gave the members dinner. The meeting produced great results. The members themselves proposed that since the cooperative was helping the dependents of soldiers in the War of Resistance, assisting the small school, and supporting the front with woolen socks and gloves and so forth on their' behalf, everyone should buy more shares. This was the first period.

Second Period

Wang Shengming became treasurer. I planned a large increase in the share capital. Director Wang was not satisfied. He argued that an increase in share capital should be carried out when the situation demanded it. I wanted to take the matter to the county government for discussion and later we went to see Liu Shichang, head of the national economy department [*guomin jingjibu*] of the county government. Department head Liu permitted an increase in share capital. Since Wang Tianjin disagreed with everyone, the county government moved him to another post.

In March 1937, Liu Jianzhang was elected director, Wang Shengming accountant, and Li Shengzhang remained as buyer. Once again there were three people. On one hand we managed the business and on the other we increased the share capital. The date for the second payment of dividend was 2, June 1937. The total of new shares issued was 2,697, which together with the previous issue made a total of 3,230 with a value of 969 *yuan* at the maintained rate of 0.30 *yuan* per share. The sum of 3,657 *yuan* was handled in turnover [*guoliushui*] during the three months and the gross profit was 276 *yuan*. Expenditures included support for the small school 6 *yuan*, support for the dependents of soldiers in the War of Resistance 12 *yuan*, donation to the appeal for support for the front 20 *yuan*, public welfare fund 10 *yuan*, three months 'food 53 *yuan*, staff payments 13.50 *yuan*, and office expenses 3.50 *yuan*. After expenses the dividend per share was 0.05 *yuan*, a combined total of 161.50 *yuan*. As before, a congress of cooperative members was held when the dividend was paid. Two-thirds of the members attended. We reported on the activities of the cooperative. At that time we had bought 3 *tan* of grain on behalf of the troops and had also acted as an agent in the purchase of all the charcoal and firewood used by the reception center of the Northwest Military Committee [*Xibei Junwei*]. All income from this business was in soviet notes, but the ordinary people did not agree. They asked the cooperative to request goods as a pledge when acting as a purchasing agent. On the one hand they should give some goods and on the other we could accept some soviet notes. At this time the cadres of the cooperative worked hard and patiently to bring about agreement between the people and the troops. After this we built up relations between the army and the people. If the soviet notes held by the people could not be used to buy things in other places, the cooperative could buy them. When this was announced, the members gained a greater understanding of the cooperative and stated that 'the cooperative was able to act on their behalf.'

Third Period

Beginning in June 1937 we again planned to increase the number of cadres. Sun Shenghua was promoted to be a buyer. He worked for one month, every day acting as buying agent for the troops which he found very troublesome. He said he wanted to stop working. Despite repeated attempts at persuasion and education, he was determined not to work for the cooperative and so he left. Li Shengcai became buyer. We planned to open a firewood shop at Goumenshang. The cooperative put up 200 *yuan* capital and it became an independent unit. Li Shengzhang was director of the shop with his wife as cook and Li Shengcai as assistant. In three months the gross profit was 400 *yuan.*

The current account for the running of the cooperative and the shop was 7,175.60 *yuan* and the gross profit 538.70 *yuan.* Three *yuan* in soviet currency was equivalent to one *yuan* in national currency [*baipiao*], giving a converted value of 175 *yuan* [*yang guan*]. When cooperative members took out shares, 1 *yuan* in Soviet currency was taken. as equivalent to 1 *yuan* in national currency. We donated 25 *yuan* for the front and 10 *yuan* to help, the small school. The director for women's affairs of the district was robbed by local bandits and new bedding for her cost 4.50 *yuan.* The public welfare fund was 12 *yuan.* Losses on forged notes came to 8.50 *yuan*, payments to staff 45 *yuan*, food 90 *yuan*, and office expenses 7.50 *yuan.* New shares issued numbered 2,130, making a total of 5,360 with value of 1,596 *yuan.* Dividend per share was 0.02 *yuan.*

During this period, the porters in Ansai county, Bao'an county, and our own district organized a salt-transport cooperative. They pooled their capital and formed a partnership setting up a salt-transport team with a total of twelve donkeys, horses and mules. Together with more than one hundred privately-owned animals, they regularly went to Yanchi to transport salt which was sold through the cooperative. This also encouraged porters from other counties to invest 320 *yuan* in the shop. During this period the soviet currency used to buy shares was converted entirely into national currency.

We reported to the September cooperative members' meeting. Everyone expressed the opinion that making the soviet notes worth 1 *yuan* in national currency instead of 0.30 *yuan* had increased the trust of the members. We proposed an increase in the share capital, made a census of the population and surveyed the conditions of the people's economy. The three townships of the district had 432 households with a population of 1,733. There were 222 ox-drawn implements and 323 oxen, 125 donkeys and 270 sheep. The total value of the people's economy for the whole district was 220,000 *yuan*, including livestock, land, houses and all assets. Excluding grains, the average annual expenditure per head on clothing, agricultural implements, salt, matches, etc. was 40 *yuan*, making a total of 69,320 *yuan*, we proposed to the meeting that each person should increase his share capital to 20 *yuan* so that we could provide daily necessities for the people. The members agreed to increase the share capital and to lengthen the accounting periods from quarterly to half-yearly.

Fourth Period

The fourth period ran from September 1937 to February 1938. The original value of 0.30 *yuan* per share was raised to 0.50 *yuan.* The total number of shares was 5,360 valued at 2,680 *yuan.* The current account was 22,875 *yuan* and the gross profit 1,732.30 *yuan.* Outgoings were the public accumulation fund 110 *yuan*, the public welfare fund 68 *yuan*, woolen socks and gloves to support the front 245 *yuan*, support for the dependents of troops in the War of Resistance 18 *yuan*, support for the small school 12 *yuan*, payments to cooperative personnel and hired labour 310.50 *yuan*, food 90 *yuan*, entertainment expenses 38.50 *yuan*, office expenses 61.50 *yuan*, incentives for personnel 50 *yuan* and repairs 285 *yuan.* After expenses the dividend per share was 0.08 *yuan* and the total dividend was 428.80 *yuan.* Although the cooperative members' meeting for the previous period had proposed raising the share capital per person to 20 *yuan*, this had only been partly realized because of difficulties in the people's economy. This time the meeting planned to establish a credit cooperative with share capital of 1,000 *yuan.* People could come to this cooperative for short-term loans for marriages and funerals without paying interest. As soon as this slogan was put forward, the members said they would guarantee the raising of all share capital. The aim was to provide assistance. We also planned to open a restaurant in Liulin.

Fifth Period

This ran from March to August 1938. First of all we increased the number of cadres, recruiting Wang Yaoming, Mao Keye, Li Shenghai, Huang Baozhong, etc. Within three months we raised 1,060 *yuan* share capital for the credit cooperative and in addition increased other share capital by 110 *yuan*, including previous share capital the total was 3,890 *yuan.* The current account for the six months was 42,500 *yuan* and the gross profit was 3,633 *yuan.* Expenses were woolen socks for troops at the front 185 *yuan*, relief appeal donations 22 *yuan*, incentives 80 *yuan*, repairs 230 *yuan*, meetings and entertainment 85.60 *yuan*, office expenses 169 *yuan*, payments and salaries (twenty-four people) 864 *yuan*, and food 900 *yuan.* After expenses the dividend per share was 0.10 *yuan* and the total dividend 778 *yuan.* When the dividend was distributed we held a meeting of cooperative members' group leaders. We planned to accumulate 500 *yuan* to buy ploughshares. Each ploughshare cost 0.25 *yuan* so we could buy 2,000. We also planned to expand with an oil-pressing shop [*youfang*], a flour-mill [*fenfang*], and a public welfare center [*gongyixin*] so as to establish commercial relations in Yan'an city. On this occasion none of the group leaders disagreed.

Sixth Period

This ran from September 1938 to February 1939. We changed the share value from 0.50 *yuan* to 1 yuan, and we increased share capital by 4,510 *yuan* making a new total of 8,200 *yuan.* The current account for the six months was 49,860 *yuan* and the gross profit 4,118 *yuan.* Expenses included support for dependents of troops in the War of Resistance 34 yuan, the public accumulation fund 654 yuan, the public welfare fund 100 yuan, incentives 131 yuan, entertainment 180 yuan, miscellaneous expenses 116 yuan, salaries and payments to personnel (thirty people) 867 *yuan* and food 1,116 *yuan.* During this period all plans were realized. We bought 2,000 shovels in Hancheng. Each shovel was worth 0.50 *yuan* and the market-price was 0.90 *yuan.* We sold them to cooperative members at 0.60 *yuan* each, a saving of 0.30 *yuan* and a total saving of 600 *yuan.* The oil-pressing shop and flour-mill were established. In this period we still paid a dividend on a half-yearly basis. There was a total of 850 cooperative members.

Seventh Period

This ran from March to August 1939. We started planning to do business in partnership with private individuals. In the area there were some people who wanted to go into business but feared that the government would increase taxation on them. So they invested their money together with the cooperative as individual shareholders in a joint venture. First we set up a business in partnership with private individuals in Sanshilipu including a noodle shop and a restaurant. The cooperative put up 200 *yuan* and the individuals 800 *yuan.* Through this partnership business we solved many problems for the people. We made a rule allowing the freedom to invest or withdraw share capital from the cooperative. This lasted until the end of the year when the government, reaffirming the principles of cooperatives, pointed out that the cooperative had developed the private economy and this was not allowed. So this business was broken off.

In the same year we expanded share capital by 860 yuan, making a new total of 9,016 *yuan.* Cooperative members numbered 960.

The current account was 57,600 *yuan* and the gross profit was 4,778.60 *yuan.*

After deducting the public accumulation fund, welfare fund, and other expenses, the net dividend was 0.10 *yuan* per share and the total dividend 901.60 *yuan.*

In the course of paying out this dividend, many difficulties arose. On one hand the expansion of share capital was slow and the rise in commodity prices high, making it difficult for the cooperative to operate. On the other hand, the people reckoned there was no increased profit for the individual, and were unwilling to invest in more shares. We tried again and again to propagandize and persuade them but they remained unwilling to invest more. I myself reckoned that unless we formed partnerships with private individuals, the cooperative could not develop, and that we should do business in such partnerships without government approval, I put this forward for discussion at a management meeting and it was agreed that it should be done.

Eighth Period

In September 1939 we again went into partnership with individuals to set up the Xinghua Branch Cooperative at Sanshilipu, the Limin Cooperative at Goumenshang, the Minsheng Herbalist at Liulin, and the Lihe Cooperative at Nanzhuanghe. Using the cover of being joint public and private ventures, they attracted over 100,000 *yuan* of capital from private investors. The people working in the branches got personal shares. We drew up contracts. There was still complete freedom in making investments and withdrawals and the cooperative did not lay down any restrictions. Subsequently when the county government learned about this, it wanted to see the contracts. After seeing them, it approved the formation of partnerships. The original cooperative was changed into the head cooperative of the district, and the various townships set up branch cooperatives. Excluding the branch cooperatives, the head cooperative again increased share capital by 2,629 yuan, making a new total of 11,645 *yuan.* The current account for the head and branch cooperatives together was 158,350 *yuan* and the gross profit 18,250 *yuan.* Expenses were 8,895.13 *yuan* and the net profit was 9,354.07 *yuan.* The dividend per share was 0.10 yuan, including the branch cooperatives. Having set up branch cooperatives, the head cooperative was strong enough to establish productive undertakings. In 1940 in partnership with the Guanghua Store, we bought mules and set up a transport team, benefiting from cooperation with private individuals. The original capital of the transport team was 5,000 *yuan.* By the end of the year, it had expanded to have 160 mules and was regularly transporting salt goods. We also set up a textile mill and a leather-workshop. The West District Cooperative and the Xinmin Cooperative at Dufuchuan collectively set up a trans-shipment warehouse and two felt-workshops at Qilipu. At first shares were taken out on an individual basis so that there could be several cooperative members within one family. Later this became troublesome, so they were combined, taking the household as the unit. Each family became one cooperative member, and there was a total of 853 members.

After the membership had been combined in this way households had 300-500 *yuan* to 1000 *yuan* invested. At the same time, small merchants and porters from other counties had also joined the branch cooperatives with share capital of 10,000 *yuan.* In particular the porters who came frequently from the counties of Luochuan, Fuxian, Ansai, Bao'an and Sanbian invested in the co-operative. When the dividend was paid in the ninth month we held a meeting of members' representatives and reported on the reasons for the expansion of the cooperative. After examination we put forward the general aims for future work. First we wanted to increase shares by 30,000 *yuan* and we asked the representatives to guarantee that this would be done. Secondly, we planned to accept local products and to sell them on behalf of the people, to supply the people with all daily necessities, and to take responsibility for buying goods from other areas. Thirdly, the salt, matches, and ploughshares needed by the people of the district would not be bought from outside but would be supplied by the cooperative. We reckoned that the 7,135 people of the district consumed 2 qian of a salt per head per day and 4.5 *jin* per head per year, making an annual total of 32,107.5 *jin*. At a price per *jin* 1 *yuan* below the market-price, we could save over 32,100 *yuan.* Each family used five packs of matches per year, a total of 8,675 packs for the whole district. At a price per pack 5 *yuan* below the market-price, we could save 43,375 *yuan.* The district used 1,500 ploughshares per year. At 15 *yuan* below the market price we could save 22,500 *yuan.* The total savings for these three items could be 98,050 *yuan.* The district population's annual consumption of cotton cloth for making clothes was 7,000 bolts. Each bolt required 2½ *jin* of raw cotton, a total requirement of 17,515 *jin*. The total value was 3,500,000 *yuan.* If the yarn was spun by the people, they could earn half of it, that is, 1,750,000 *yuan.* We reported on our plans to the members at this meeting. After approval by the members, we increased the number of machines for spinning and weaving by peasant women.

Ninth Period

In August 1941 we increased share capital in the form of shares taken out as government bends for national salvation [*jiuguo gongzhai*]. The government mobilized the people to buy government bonds for national salvation. The amount of bonds to be taken out by the people was added on to their share capital. The dividend on this share capital was paid towards the government bonds of 33,000 *yuan.* in this difficult situation for the people, we helped them ease their burdens and raised their faith in our ability to do so.

The new share capital was 33,070 *yuan*, combined with the old, this gave a total of 44,715 *yuan* for the head cooperative. The share capital for the various branch cooperatives was 120,000 yuan, and for the transport team it was 80,000 *yuan.* The combined total was thus 244.715 *yuan* and the membership was 1,018. The current account for the head and branch cooperatives together was 1,161,840.70 *yuan* and the gross profit was 284,317.40 *yuan.* Expenses were 138,349.30 *yuan* and the net profit was 145,469 *yuan.* The dividend per share of 1 *yuan* was 0.7 *yuan.* When issuing the dividend we proposed that each dividend of 0.70 *yuan* could be valued at 1 *yuan* if invested as share capital. This increased members' trust and a lot of the dividend was added on to the share capital. People taking out additional share could use local products, firewood and grain as money, calculating the value higher than market price. For example, each *jin* of grass was valued 0.20 *yuan* higher than the market price.

This was true of all investment in kind and it also increased the people's trust.

Tenth Period

In 1942 we set up a sock-weaving factory. When we began propagandizing for share capital, we made each share worth 20 *yuan* and presented the members with a pair of socks. Afterwards, with the increase in the cost of raw cotton, we raised the value of each share to 40 *yuan.* The total share capital was 30,000 *yuan.* We set up the sock-weaving factory and it now has six machines. In Yan'an city we set up the Yunhe trans-shipment warehouse with 420,000 *yuan* share capital. At Songshulin we set up a branch cooperative with share capital of 340,000 *yuan.* The surplus accumulated by the transport team increased its capital to 750,000 *yuan.* The head and branch cooperatives expanded their share capital by 1,232,000 yuan, making a new total 2,520,000 *yuan.* The membership was 1,112 (each member represented one household). The largest investor had shares to the value of 5,000 *yuan.* There were nineteen units of the cooperative within the boundaries of the district (including production, transport, and consumption). Apart from the cooperatives, there was no other private commerce, southern district is 60 *li* long and 40 *li* broad. It has 1,544 households with 7,128 people. Altogether there are 1,469 oxen, 635 donkeys, 60 horses, 22 mules, and 4,445 sheep. Arable land covers 54,408 *mu*. The wheat harvest was 872.5 *tan*. The harvest of coarse grains was 9,084.16 equivalent to 5,662.43 *tan* of hulled grain. The output from subsidiary undertakings was equivalent to 334.25 of hulled grain. The full total was 6,869.18 *tan*. In 1942 we paid 2,480 *tan* of grain, tax leaving 4,389.18 *tan*. The average amount of grain per head was 0.6 *tan*. Animal fodder totaled 1,500 *tan*.

This spring the government mobilized to get 34,000 *yuan* for educational expenses and for sentry fees for the self-defense army, 8,000 *yuan* for share capital for production at Gaomaowan, and 20,000 *yuan* for bank savings bonds. The total was 62,000 *yuan* to be raised in three parts. Each time each household would have to attend a meeting for collection and loose the work of one of its members. This would happen three times and each time the work of 1,500 would be lost. The work of each person was valued at 30 *yuan* so the total loss of earnings would be 135,000 *yuan.* Added to the 62,000 *yuan* the full burden on the people would have been 197,000 *yuan.* Therefore the cooperative paid the 62,000 *yuan.* On behalf of the people, saving the 135,000 *yuan* which would have been lost. We helped the people's production at a particularly busy agricultural time. We also handed over 1,050 packs of salt each worth 240 *yuan* as salt tax on behalf of the people. The total value of this was 252,000 *yuan.*

Reducing the amount of work time lost by the people influenced their attitude towards the cooperative, and we increased share capital by 420,000 yuan, we plan to pay next year's salt tax on their behalf.

We organized 600 peasant women to do spinning. Each day each person spun 2 liang of yarn. The total of raw cotton spun each day was 75 *jin* and the people should get half of it. Each *jin* of yarn was reckoned as worth 150 *yuan*. The profit per day was 5,250 *yuan* and the profit for the year was 1,890,000 *yuan*. This year they spun 5,000 *jin* of raw cotton. In the first half of the year cotton was low-priced. Combining both halves each *jin* cost 70 *yuan*. The people earned 2,500 *jin* of raw cotton, equal to 175,000 *yuan*. The cooperative arranged advances, of 20,000 *yuan* for spinning-wheels. After deducting this 20,000 yuan, the people earned 155,000 *yuan*, now we are expanding the amount of spinning done by women. In the past there was no spinning done in Southern district. Now large numbers of women are taking part, but there are problems of raw materials. Finally, this year we sold 20,000 *jin* of charcoal for the people at 2 *yuan* per *jin*. The people got 400,000 *yuan*.

The above facts relate what the cooperative has done. We have not divided out the dividend so far this year on account of the floods. The cooperative has lost 58 buildings with a value of 400,000 *yuan*, equipment worth 300,000 yuan, goods worth 400,000 yuan, and the Fuchang Storehouse at a value of 200,000 *yuan*. Total losses were 1,300,000 *yuan*. The Government later helped us borrow 500,000 *yuan* and we went to Dingbian county three times to sell goods making a gross profit of 300,000 *yuan*. At present we again have repair expenses of 240,000 *yuan* and we are expanding share capital.

As regards the organization of the cooperative, each village elects one or two representatives. Cooperative affairs are handled by the twelve man management committee held on the sixth day of each month. All questions concerning management and cadres are determined at the management committee meetings.

Supplementary notes:

(1) At present the cooperative has 135 buildings and fifty-five stone-built cave houses worth 2,890,000 *yuan* at current values, liquid capital of 1,500,000 *yuan*, and equipment and livestock worth 1,020,000 *yuan*.

(2) The experience and lessons of the cooperative are explained in the page on the southern District Cooperative in the volume *Materials on Yan'an's Economic Construction.*

13 December 1942

The above document leaves a gap of two years between the eighth and ninth periods, and there seem to be some omissions. Inquiries were made and the following report came back:

CONCERNING THE PROBLEM OF PERIODIZATION OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT COOPERATIVE

Operations began in December 1936 and the first meeting of all cooperative members was held after three months. Altogether three such meetings were held at three-monthly intervals. Then they were changed to once every six months and a further three meetings were held. After the sixth meeting, there was a gap of eight months and then the first meeting of representatives was held (at the end of 1939). Afterwards the second meeting of representatives was held in July 1940, and the third in August 1941. We planned to hold the fourth meeting in July this year but because of floods it was difficult to draw up the accounts so we extended the period. Before 1939 the period between meetings was short and all the members attended. This was because our scope and membership were both small. Later, meetings of representatives were held once a year because our membership was too large, our undertakings had expanded and drawing up accounts was not easy.

In our previous report we omitted to refer to the second representative meeting of July 1940 and so the eighth period was lengthened into two years.

The previous report was made without proper drafting. If there are still questions on this material please instruct for further reports.

Wang Pi'ntan'
Liu Jianzhang
15 December

Below is the report of the comrades of the Yan'an county Party Committee on the Southern District Cooperative, it is reproduced here for study.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LIULIN DISTRICT (I.E. YAN'AN SOUTHERN DISTRICT) COOPERATIVE

Looking at the process of development of the Liulin District Cooperative we can see:

(1) Cooperative operations are not limited to consumption but are also related to production, credit and transport, making them a coherent whole. The

head cooperative and its branches make a total of sixteen.

On the production side there is the textile-mill, the leather-workshop, the felt-workshop, the oil-pressing shop, and the flour-mill.

On the transport side there is the transport team with over a hundred animals. The cooperative's capital investment is 500,000 *yuan.*

Because the Liulin District Cooperative operates by uniting several economic functions together, its scope is wide, its capital is large, its activities are big, its development is fast, and it has solved many problems in the supply of daily commodities for the people. Other cooperatives in this county are limited to consumption. Compared to a cooperative which also carries out production and transport, their capital and scope are small and their development retarded.

(2) The policy for management of cooperatives by the people was put forward by adopting the experience of Liulin. This cooperative's share capital expanded, absorbed the capital of small merchants and drew them in to take part in the work. All the work of the cooperative was discussed and decided by the cooperative members. The people were deeply involved with the cooperative. They did not consider it to be run by officials but by themselves.

(3) The cooperative solves problems in the supply of daily necessities for the masses, such as bolts of cloth, salt, matches, ploughshares, etc., at lower than market price. Taking matches and salt alone, the annual savings for the people more than 80,000 *yuan.* Naturally the people wish to buy things at the cooperative. The cooperative can supply the entire needs of the people of Liulin district in these four daily necessities.

(4) The cooperative helps the masses out of urgent difficulties such as those created by marriages or funerals by allowing them to borrow funds temporarily, either giving credit against bolts of cloth or taking something as a pledge. It sets a time limit for repayment. This fills the role of a credit cooperative, solving major difficulties for the people. Because the cooperative does this at a time of urgent need when no help can be found elsewhere, it creates trust among the people, who consider the cooperative really helps them.

(5) The cooperative has a variety of ways of expanding share capital:

(i) Buying shares with ready cash.

(ii) Taking out shares in return for goods: a chicken, a pair of shoes, some sheepskins, some hemp ropes can all be exchanged for shares at equivalent value.

(iii) Absorbing the capital of small merchants.

(iv) Helping the masses pay burdens from the government and making this a way of taking out shares. After the government issues its demand, the cooperative turns them into a call for buying shares (to the same amount) and itself pays the taxes. For example, in 1942 the people of the district had to pay 250,000 *yuan* to the government as a cash substitute for tax salt. This was treated as share capital and paid to the cooperative. The cooperative paid the salt tax to the government, making a profit from the handling of the cash. The people also got a dividend. Government bonds, education costs, sentry costs, and so forth were collected in this way and paid by the cooperative. The government was paid, the cooperative's share capital increased and its operations expanded. The people profited and they had less troubles. They also received dividends as shareholders.

(v) Increasing share capital through making timely responses to the needs of the moment of the people. For example, when they wanted to expand spinning and weaving, they put forward the slogan of raising share capital to do so. In 1941 the cooperative experimented with paying tax grain for the people. For each *tan* of the previous year's grain tax the people bought shares for cash. The cooperative used the cash to expand its operations. In the following year when the grain tax was allocated among the people, it was paid by the cooperative from the profits it had obtained. This was done for forty or so households, for whom paying grain tax was almost like not paying. They became share holders in the cooperative, able to get a dividend every year. They were very happy, their enthusiasm for production increased and they got even more grain.

(vi) Paying a dividend on taking out shares. People taking out shares for 40 *yuan* were issued a pair of socks valued at 20 *yuan*. In this way the people were encouraged to buy shares.

(6) The cooperative is in a very good geographical position since it is in Liulin district which is close to the large commercial market in Yan'an, Liulin has much forest land. Many people sell timber and charcoal, which raises their income and thus there is a lot of liquid capital in the villages which can be absorbed in the purchase of shares. At the same time, being near a market, the turnover of capital is very quick. These are objective factors.

(7) The scope of the cooperative's activities is very wide. It has established relations with the Border Region Bank, the Guanghua Store and the various official organizations in Yan'an. Sometimes it can borrow capital or do a lot of work for the official organizations and the cooperative has been able to develop through this mutual help,

(8) The cadres have not been transferred much and they pay attention to investigation and research. Director Liu has not been transferred to other work since he was appointed. He has been able to concentrate exclusively on his work, on research and on thinking of ways of doing things. At the same time, he also pays great attention to investigating objective conditions. For example, he often investigated such things as the annual consumption per individual of bolts of cotton, salt, matches and so forth so as to solve the people's problems.

Here is an example to show the relationship between the cooperative and the people. In 1941 the peasant Bai Da of Lufengpo in Liulin district had to hand over 60 *yuan* for national salvation grain tax. Beforehand he paid it to the cooperative as share capital. At the appointed time the cooperative paid the government on his behalf. Later the dividend was added to the original capital of 60 *yuan* bringing it up to 200 *yuan.* He bought four ploughshares from the cooperative and saved 15 *yuan* on each (that is, they were sold at 15 *yuan* less than the market price), making a total saving of 60 *yuan.* He bought five packs of matches saving 5 *yuan* on each, a total of 25 *yuan.* At the end of the twelfth lunar month in 1941, he bought goods worth 1000 *yuan* at the cooperative but only paid 500 *yuan* saving 500 *yuan.*

Subsequently, the market prices of these goods rose by 550 *yuan.* Including the previous purchases of ploughshares and matches he saved a total of 635 *yuan.* Originally he had to pay 60 *yuan* in grain tax, now it has become share capital of 200 *yuan* and he saved 635 *yuan* on the purchase of goods. This has really made the cooperative belong to the people, facilitating their dealings and looking after their interests. There are many examples like this.

The Cooperative Situation throughout the County

Table 5.1 Number of cooperatives in Yan'an county, 1941 and July 1942

	1941	1942
Branch cooperatives	18	30
District cooperatives	8	8
Total	26	38

Within six months capital increased by 833,167.14 *yuan.* The fastest increase in capital was in the branch cooperatives, which are directly organized by the people with the support of the district cooperatives. Therefore the people are very enthusiastic about taking shares.

Table 5.2 Capital (in *yuan*) invested in cooperatives in Yan'an county, 1941 and 1942 (half year)

	1941	1942 (for half year)
District cooperatives	264,207.56	312,207.56
Branch cooperatives	193,340.00	978,507.14
Total	457,547.56	1,290,714.70

The average taken from 1,290,000 *yuan* works out 20 *yuan* per head of the population of the county. This is not much, so the role of the cooperatives in the entire county is still a minor one.

Important experience

(1) Persist in the policy of management by the people and non-interference by the government. We inspected the cooperatives in July this year and called for an increase in share capital. Substantial capital should be held by the cooperatives,

(2) Cooperative cadres should not be lightly transferred to other posts. Let them be settled in their posts, concentrating on their work. Guarantee their livelihood. Cooperatives should adopt the method of assigning personal shares [*da shenfen*]. That is, each member of the cooperative's personnel should be equivalent to a number of shares depending on his ability and work. For example, if someone is made equivalent to shares of 5,000 *yuan*, he is paid the interest due on shares of 5,000 *yuan* at the time of setting accounts. This becomes his salary and he does not receive any other income.

(3) Enlarging the scope of cooperative undertakings should not be limited to consumption alone but should include production, transport, credit and so forth. This is an inevitable trend in cooperative development henceforth. That is to say, we must run comprehensive cooperatives.

(4) Concentrate on making a good job of one or two cooperatives and gaining experience. Gradually expand to other areas. For example, we are preparing to turn the Songshulin Cooperative of Jinpen district into a second Liulin Cooperative.

These are opinions on our future work.

6. On the Development of the Salt Industry

Salt is the great resource of the Border Region. It is the mainstay which balances imports and exports, stabilizes the currency, and regulates commodity prices. A large proportion of the people rely on salt [as a form of] exchange for goods from outside. A relatively large proportion of the troops and working personnel rely on salt for their livelihood or to supplement their livelihood. Salt is also a major source of government financial revenue. Therefore salt plays an extremely important role in the Border Region. Since the War of Resistance began, the supply of salt from the sea has been cut off and the supply from the Huai area and from Shanxi has been reduced. The southwest relies on salt from Sichuan and the northwest and the eastern areas on salt from Ningsia and Qinghai. Salt from our Border Region has thus come to occupy an important position and the transport and sale of salt increases annually. In 1938 our salt exports were only 70,000 packs (each pack is 150 *jin* and each *jin* is 24 liang). In 1939 there was a sudden increase to 190,000 packs. In 1940, the figure was 230,000 packs and in 1941 there was another abrupt increase to 299.068 packs. By September 1942 the total was 155,790 packs and it is estimated that another 70,000-80,000 packs can be sold in the last three months making a total of 230,000-240,000 packs. These statistics reflect two important facts: the first is the external demand, and the second is our hard work. Some comrades cannot see that external demand is determined by the War of Resistance and that within certain limits salt can be sold. Therefore they propose that things should follow their own course and that there is no need for the Party and government to interfere. Other comrades merely ascribe the yearly increase in the sale of salt to external demand and do not recognize that the leadership of the Party and government is a great factor in that increase. We began to pay attention to the salt industry in autumn 1940. As well as the objective factor of the external salt famine and depletion of salt stocks which made 1941 salt sales particularly good, the abrupt increase from 230,000 packs in 1940 to 299,000 packs in 1941 was also due to the subjective factor that we implemented the policy of supervising transport in that year. Apart from the fact that external demand was not as urgent as in 1941, the sudden drop to 230,000-240,000 packs in 1942 from the previous year's 299,000 was due to our abandonment of the policy of supervising transport (putting an end to the many plans made by the people for transporting salt). If we do not learn a lesson from this, we shall repeat past mistakes in future work. Certainly there were defects in the salt-industry work for 1941. The original plan to transport 600,000 packs was too big. The Border Region still does not have such a great transport capacity. The achievement in producing 700,000 packs of salt was good, but the quality [of the salt] was too poor. Supervision of transport was correct but it was unnecessary to mobilize everyone everywhere. There were also many abuses in the organization and method of mobilization which did not accord with the actual situation. All these things were shortcomings and mistakes in our work in 1941. Nevertheless, adopting a policy of active development of the salt industry was entirely correct. Belittling, misunderstanding and even opposing this policy is entirely wrong.

What should be done in 1943? First we must determine a policy for active development. In the current situation in the Border Region, we certainly cannot adopt a negative approach towards salt which is a major factor in solving financial problems (the publicly-run salt industry and the salt tax), in balancing imports and exports, and in stabilizing the currency and commodity prices. Therefore we must enlarge the already established Salt Company into the main force for allying public and private salt industry and for expanding public and private production, transport and sales. And we must improve the quality of salt produced so as to promote sales. We must restore transport supervision and organize all possible transport capacity among the people to expand salt transport. We must draw importers from outside areas to transport and sell more. We must build roads, and arrange for inns, warehouses and fodder to help transport. The Salt Company should gradually gain control of outside sales in order to avoid the anarchic situation produced by lack of public and private coordination. These are our general policies for the active development of the salt industry in 1943. Concrete arrangements should be as follows:

(1) Expand the Salt Company and increase its capital. Under the direction of the Commodities Bureau raise share capital from the various official organizations, the troops and private individuals.. Develop salt transport, expand salt sales. Regulate salt prices. Guarantee that the company transports 40,000 packs in 1943, and with this salt as a basis buy as much salt from the people as possible to carry out partial unification of salt sales to outside areas. Afterwards, depending on the situation, gradually achieve complete unification so as to prevent outside manipulation and guarantee the interests of the government and the people.

(2) In 1943, plan to produce 400,000 packs of salt and to transport 300,000-360,000 packs. Moreover strive to exceed this. As regards production, continue the policy of supervision by officials and production by the people. Ensure that the salt is mostly or entirely top-quality and do not allow inferior quality to be produced again. As regards transport, plan for the Salt Company system to transport, 400,000 packs, draw in porters from outside to move 50,000

packs, and organize the manpower and animal power of the Border Region to move 210,000-260,000 packs, making a total of 300,000-360,000 packs.

(3) The organization of the manpower and animal power of the Border Region to transport 210,000-260,000 packs is an immense, arduous and meticulous piece of organizational and mass work. It should be directed by the Reconstruction Department and supervised by the government at various levels, the Party committees at each level having the responsibility for checking up and helping. Mobilization to transport salt must have a degree of coercion but it certainly must avoid commandism which causes damage. We must chiefly adopt the policy of using propaganda and persuasion. The organization to transport salt must take the forms of transport cooperatives and transport teams. Propagandize the masses to buy shares voluntarily. Some can provide manpower and some can provide draught animals. Some can provide both. Some can provide running costs and some, in special circumstances, can be exempted from providing anything. We can organize transport teams among people who have rich experience in portering, together with the necessary animals. The Party and government at county, district and township level should actively direct the rational, fair and healthy organization of these transport teams. They should set off smoothly, do the necessary work along the way and ensure the safety of the personnel and animals. On return pay attention to the distribution of the cooperative's profits and guarantee the interests of the people involved and of all the cooperative members. Salt transport must not violate the agricultural season. We must strengthen the organization of labour mutual-aid cooperatives (exchange labour) so that after the transport team has set off, the cooperative members do not lose agricultural production through lack of manpower and animal power. As regards the salt-transport organizations (cooperatives and teams) of the Sui-Mi special military area and the three eastern counties, we should allow the masses greater freedom and reduce coercion. The transport cooperatives and teams of all places must be built up on a basis of benefiting the cooperative members. The duties of the Party and government lie in making these benefits increase daily, otherwise we will certainly be defeated. The Reconstruction Department, the sub-regions and counties should teach the people through the most successful examples of salt transport by the masses. They should propagandize them widely for imitation so as to be certain that the plan for salt-transport in 1943 will be completed and will also bring large direct benefits for the people.

(4) The enterprises of the Commodities Bureau and the people's coopera-

tives in all places must closely coordinate with the people's transport cooperatives and teams, and strive to ensure that the animals used by the people to transport salt are able to transport other goods on their return journey. Only then can the people's salt-transport undertaking expand and the whole of salt transport develop, and only then will the whole salt-transport plan be completed.

(5) The key sector in developing the salt industry is transport, and the major condition for transport is communications. In 1943 the government should allocate 2 million *yuan* under the direction of the Reconstruction Department for the building of two cart-roads between Yan'an and Dingbian, and Dingbian and Qingyang, and for repairing the road from Yan'an to Fuxian. Furthermore the Commodities Bureau should set up inns with stables and trans-shipment warehouses along the main salt transport routes, and dig water-storage holes in places lacking water. The Reconstruction Department and Commodities Bureau together should plant alfalfa widely along the routes and also provide fodder in other ways. So long as there are roads, inns, grass and water, transport costs can be greatly cut, the volume of transport can be greatly increased, and the three forms of transport - porters from outside, people from the area and the Salt Company - can all develop. Plans to improve the means of transport should also be directed by the Reconstruction Department. Carts and handcarts should be built according to road conditions in order to increase salt transport. Provided the roads are well built, it is much better for the government to use more carts and the people to use more handcarts than to use pack-animals.

(6) In 1943 the salt tax is fixed as 100,000 packs. Those who live near will provide transport, those who live far away will provide a substitute, and some will provide a mixture of both. However, the salt tax and the development of the salt industry are two different matters. So long as we can definitely, export 300,000-360,000 packs, it does not matter whether we accept actual salt or substitute payments for salt tax.

If we can complete our plans for planting cotton and spinning and weaving in 1943, we can reduce our imports of raw cotton, cotton yarn and cotton cloth. If we can export 300,000- 360,000 packs of salt in 1943 at an average value of 10 *yuan* Border Region currency per *jin* (each donkey pack is 150 *jin* our income will be between 450 million *yuan* and 540 million *yuan.* Thus by reducing one and increasing the other, the Border Region's problem of balancing imports and exports will be entirely solved. The following material reflects the people's experience in the transport of salt during 1941.

A RECORD OF LU ZHONGCAI'S LONG MARCH

Report on the first experiences in salt transport of Chengguan district, Fuxian county, as told by the deputy leader of Chengguan district, Lu Zhongcai. Supplemented by Wang Yuxian and Kong Zhaoqing. Recorded by Gao Kelin, 13 August 1941.

(1) For the first salt transport, Chengguan district should have provided fifty pack animals. In fact it provided twenty-eight. The reason the plan was not fulfilled was the lack of animals (at the very most we could mobilize forty). Some animals were hidden away and not kept at home. The district government did not handle things firmly as it was busy with grain loans and government bonds.

(2) We set off on 18 July and returned home on 11 August, a total of twenty-five days, it took twelve days to get from Fuxian to Dingbian, one day to get to Yanchi and load up, and twelve days to return. The longest stage was 90 *li*. The route, stage names and conditions during each stage was as follows:

(i) From Fuxian to Zhangcunyi, 50 *li*. Five gullies and the road was difficult. Good water and grass.

(ii) Zhangcunyi to Lannipo, altogether five stages, each 70 *li*. Road good. Cut grass to feed the animals.

(iii) Lannipo to Lijiabian. 20 *li* of mountains and 40 *li* of gullies. Road difficult. Fodder no good.

(iv) Lijiabian to Lujiajiao. 30 *li* of gullies and 5 *li* of mountains. Most difficult to travel. Fodder no good.

(v) Lujiajiao to Luanshitouchuan. Traveling in gullies. There were military stations. Fodder was sold (each 100 *jin* of mountain grass 30 *yuan* of valley grass 50 yuan, and wheat hay 40 *yuan*.)

(vi) Luanshitouchuan to Sanlimiao, 80 *li*. There were military stations. Dry grass cost 50 *yuan* for 100 *jin*. Forty *li* of mountains, very precipitous. Difficult to travel. Water difficult (Salt water not drinkable). Saw a salt-porter whose donkey fallen to its death.

(vii) Sanlimiao to Liangzhuang, 80 *li*.

(viii) Liangzhuang to Dingbian, 90 *li*. There were military stations. Fodder 50 to 100 *yuan* per 100 *jin*. No water.

(ix) Dingbian to Yanchi, 40 *li*. One day there and back. Sandy road difficult to travel.

(3) Difficulties along the route were:

(i) During three of the five stages from Zhangcunyi to Lannipo, locusts [*zhameng*] were biting. It was best for men and animals to travel in the evening.

(ii) During the two stages from Sanlimiao to Liangzhuang and thence to Dingbian there was no water. Men and animals were thirsty.

(iii) There were a lot of thieves at Dingbian. Animals, money, clothing and tools often taken.

(iv) Beyond Luanshitouchuan since salt-transport animals from various counties converge there are often several thousands or hundreds of animals traveling together. Thus there are problems of inn space, fodder, water, and especially of room to rest animals. Things can easily go wrong and cause trouble.

(4) Life on the road:

Chengguan district sent twenty-eight animals and fourteen men. Along the way we cooked for ourselves. Each meal required 7 *sheng* of millet, roughly 25 *jin*. Everyone felt that 'We eat more when we have set out'. Inn charges ranged from 3 *yuan* at the lowest to 8 *yuan* at the most. It depended entirely on whether you had a good or bad relationship with the manager of the inn. When traveling we sang and told stories, many of them about Duke Xiang seeking a wife. Everyone was very happy and no one felt burdened. Animal fodder was cut in rotation. It was plentiful and could not all be eaten up. The masses along the route were very good, and there was no problem in getting grain and fodder—though we chiefly relied on ourselves. Sometimes there were quarrels, mainly because the animals had eaten someone's crops. Only in one place did the manager of an inn give us bad grain.

(5) Points that arose during the journey:

Good:

(i) None of the animals had any illness. Those from the first and Third townships were thin when we set off but returned fat. This was because of the care of the porters, and careful feeding.

(ii) None of the porters had any illness. Everyone was very fit and in good spirits. No one grew thinner. They just got a little sunburned.

(iii) Nothing was left behind along the way and the animals did not eat people's crops. This was mainly because deputy district head Lu Zhongcai was an old porter. He was experienced, responsible, and meticulous. Everyone else was very active and thus we were successful.

Bad:

(i) Du Hai, head of the village council of the First administrative village of the Third township, sold a good donkey and bought a bad one to go. As a result the donkey was exhausted, did not carry packs, and we wasted 165 *yuan* in travel expenses. Third township also sent another bad animal (it had bad loins) and Jianjuntaicun of Fourth township sent a donkey with a bad leg. Neither carried salt and each wasted 165 *yuan* in travel expenses. Furthermore, the same village sent a donkey with a rotten saddle with the result that its back was hurt through the pressure of its load. The head of Second township had two donkeys. He sent a bad one with a poor saddle and frame. This caused a lot of bother along the way. The district-level government did not make a careful inspection of these matters before we set out. Some were known about but not corrected. As a result only twenty-five of the twenty-eight donkeys carried salt. The other three traveled without loads, not contributing one bit to the value of salt carried and wasting from 500 to 600 *yuan* in travel costs. All in, the total loss was over 1,500 *yuan.* This is a valuable warning for district and township cadres.

(ii) The head of the village council of Jianjuntaicun in Fourth township did not obey deputy district head Lu Zhongcai's instructions. He did not bring good fodder for the animals (oats [*yumai*] and broad beans [*candou*]) and instead used kaoliang and other poor substitutes. As a result the animals from that township sometimes lay down when traveling because of their poor fodder. We are preparing to struggle against that village head and punish him.

(iii) The porter Yang Wanbao from Fourth township was a real troublemaker on the way. He pretended to be ill and skulked off home. He created wild rumours, 'two people had died, deputy district head Lu and a man called Wang... There was nothing to eat along the way... The donkeys' backs had all been ruined under their loads... The inns could not sell grain…' so that many people back in the town felt unhappy. The district head did not pay sufficient attention to this. In future he should be alert.

(iv) Some families sent bad donkeys which carried less, only about 110 *jin*. One family from Jianjuntaicun in Fourth district changed their donkey's halter for a bad one when they sent it off. They anticipated the donkey would die and had made up their minds to write everything off. The donkey from the head of Second township was only 10 *li* from home on the way back when it lay down. He was unwilling to send a good donkey to take over. He defaulted on his responsibility as he thought the donkey would surely die and could not return. So he did not come and take over.

(v) Twelve donkeys carried too much and 40 to 50 *jin* were given to a donkey without a load. When we got to the tax inspection office at Sunkeyaoxian they confiscated 50 *jin* of salt and one sack (value 20 *yuan*) because we had no certificate.

(6) Costs, losses and gains:

(i) Average expenses per donkey were: 2 *tou* of beans value 60 *yuan*; each man had 1.5 *tou* of grain and as each man looked after two donkeys this equaled 0.75 *tou* per donkey with a value of 35 *yuan*; traveling costs were 70 *yuan.* The total was 155 *yuan.* In addition there was salt capital [*yanben*] of 20 *yuan.* The average cost per donkey was thus 135 *yuan.*

(ii) On average each donkey from First township carried 130 and from Second, Third and Fourth townships 110 *jin*. At present market prices of 200 *yuan* per 100 *jin* salt, each load was worth from 220 to 260 *yuan.*

(iii) At current prices, after expenses are deducted, earnings per donkey load ranged from 35 to 75 *yuan.* Notes: (a) If each donkey were able to carry 150 *jin*, the guaranteed income per donkey at current prices would be above 100 *yuan.* (b) Reports on amounts carried were given by the porters who were certainly holding something in reserve—most donkeys here can carry 150 *jin*. (c) At the same time the principle is clear that so long as you have good donkeys you can earn more. The worse the donkeys the less you earn, and you can even make a loss.

(7) Experience and lessons:

(i) The victorious return of this salt-transport team from Chengguan district, Fuxian, proves that the Party and government's plans, estimates and methods for salt transport ate entirely correct. The doubts, lack of trust and considerations that it would be a burden by various comrades are all erroneous and shallow outlooks.

(ii) We smashed the fears of some cadres and masses about going to Sanbian for salt ('men and animals will die... they will go and not return'). On the contrary, the animals carrying salt returned fatter, and the men were healthier and merely a little sunburned.

(iii) We proved that salt transport can earn money, and smashed the inaccurate reckless talk that we 'certainly would lose capital', 'each donkey would lose 100 *yuan*', and 'it is the greatest burden ever imposed in the Border Region'.

(iv) We showed that certain cadres at district and township level, particularly at township level, did not do their work responsibly (they did not inspect carefully), were prepared to cover-up things that were wrong (village and township heads could send poor animals and were not investigated), were corrupt (used poor kaoliang instead of beans), and had become tails following behind the masses.

(v) The cadres played a decisive role. Deputy district head Lu Zhongcai was experienced, lively and responsible. Each time we reached a place or something happened, he held a discussion meeting of the porters—he even discussed how much salt each donkey should carry. As a result neither men nor animals came to any harm and on the contrary ended up stronger and in better spirits than when they set out.

Lessons:

(i) The district and township cadres did not pay attention to and investigate at the right time the troublemaker from Fourth township, Yang Wanbao who skulked off home and created rumors. They did not talk to him and did not report to higher levels. As a result a rumor spread among the people of the district that two people had died—deputy district head Lu and somebody Wang—and that three donkeys had died. This made people very uneasy.

(ii) There were problems along the way (some stages were hard going, one or two had many locusts, and two had little water) but they could be overcome. On bad roads we had to be more careful. Where there were locusts we traveled in the evening. Where there was little water we drank more on getting up in the morning and carried water with us. With patience all difficulties could be overcome.

(iii) The better the donkeys, the more we can earn. If we could earn 75 *yuan* for each donkey that carried 130 *jin* this time, we can earn 115 *yuan* for donkeys carrying 150 *jin*. The worse the donkeys the less we can earn, and we can even make a loss. For example, Chengguan district sent three poor donkeys (one with bad loins, one with bad legs, and one was exhausted). As a result they did not carry salt. Each donkey wasted 165 *yuan* in traveling expenses and the total loss including porters was over 1,000 *yuan*. At the same time this showed that work must be done carefully and you cannot muddle through. If the district and township had carefully inspected the donkeys sent this time, worked conscientiously, and not given any favours, we would not have made these losses since everyone would have known about the poor donkeys.

(iv) If we had not stayed at inns along the way and let the animals out to pasture not buying hay, we could have saved over 50 *yuan* per donkey. What we save becomes earnings.

(v) We must pay more attention to the national laws. Because we were not careful we had 50 *jin* of saltand one sack confiscated. This was an unnecessary loss.

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7. On the Development of Self-Supporting Industry

The agriculture, animal husbandry, handicraft industry, cooperatives and salt industry discussed above are all economic undertakings by the people. The Party and government give guidance and help within the bounds of possibility and need so that these things can develop and the requirements of the people can be met. At the same time, the portion handed over to the government by the people in the form of taxes ensures a part of the government's needs (for example, grain tax, salt tax and other taxes) and the portion handed over in the form of trade ensures another part of the government's needs (for example, raw cotton, cotton yarn, cotton cloth, wool, etc,). Their basic nature is that of undertakings run by the people. Only in the case of the salt industry, where 40,000 packs of salt are transported and sold under the control of the government's Salt Company and the 5,000 or so packs are consumed directly by government personnel, does a part (about one-seventh of the whole) belong to the public sector of the economy.

As a whole the undertakings of the public sector of the economy consist of the following three kinds: (1) the salt industry, industry and commerce run by the government; (2) the agriculture, industry and commerce run by the army; and (3) the agriculture, industry and commerce of the official organizations of the Party and government. These all directly ensure the supply of the living and other expenses of the Party, government and army personnel. According to accounts for 1942 and the budget for 1943, the amount supplied in this way exceeds the amount handed over by the people in the form of taxes (including the grain tax). Therefore publicly-run economic undertakings have become the greater of the two large sources ensuring financial supplies. Their importance cannot be overstated.

The reasons we pay attention to publicly-run economic construction are both historical and contemporary. During the civil war, the Party Central established some publicly-run industry and commerce in the Jiangxi Soviet in order to meet the needs of the war. At that time, we initiated the growing of vegetables and raising of pigs by the various official organizations and schools so as to make up for the lack of provisions. Only the army did not have experience in production. Also, since the peasants of Jiangxi were comparatively rich and numerous, it was not yet necessary for us ourselves to set-to to provide grain. These are historical reasons. Since the War of Resistance began, we have found ourselves in a very special situation. At first the Kuomintang provided a very small amount of rations for our army. Subsequently it cut them off entirely. The Border Region was blockaded, leaving us no alternative but to become self-supporting in supplying the needs of the War of Resistance. These are contemporary reasons.

After the War of Resistance began, attention was turned to publicly-run economic construction in 1938. Since we could not cover the costs of our army we began a production movement. However, at that time we only ordered some of the troops to take part in production, growing vegetables, raising pigs, cutting wood, making shoes and so forth on a trial basis. The aim was simply to rely on this as a way of improving the livelihood of the soldiers. We still did not plan to rely on it as a way of providing general finance and supplies. Later we saw bow successful the soldiers were in this experiment. They could do a lot of productive work during their rests from training, and their living standards really improved. After this happened there was a reduction in the instances of desertion. On seeing this success, we applied the experience widely among the troops garrisoned in the Border Region. An order was issued from the Garrison Office [*liushouchu*] calling on the troops to learn from this example. But we still aimed at improving livelihood and not at meeting general needs. At that time, the government started to pay attention to setting up several small factories, but the official organizations and schools were not even called on to grow vegetables and raise pigs. In 1939, the Kuomintang issued the *Methods to Restrict the Activities at Alien Parties* and relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party worsened. The number of official organizations and schools in the Border Region also increased. Although there was a small amount of subsidy for expenses from outside, it was already far from sufficient. We were facing a serious situation in finance and supplies. For these reasons we were forced to devise a movement for all-round mobilization to become economically self-supporting. We then raised the following questions at the congress for cadre mobilization. Do you want to starve to death? Shall we disband? Or shall we set-to ourselves? No one approved of starving to death, and no one approved of disbanding. Let us set-to ourselves—this was our answer. We pointed out this simple principle: in the final analysis, how did ancient man survive if not by getting down to it himself? Why is it that we, the sons and grandsons of these ancient men, do not even have this spark of intelligence? We also pointed out: it is very common for an exploited peasant household in a feudal society with three or four or even seven or eight mouths to feed to rely on the production of only one labour power. Such a family must not only support itself but must also pay 50 to 80 percent of its income in rent and taxes to others. Why are we not as good as such a family? Our army is made up entirely of labour power, there are no women, no old and young. Nor is there the burden of rent and taxes. How could hunger arise? We have these powerful organs of government. Why cannot they provide their own clothing, food, housing, and equipment? We reflected for a while on the reasons why ancient man and today's poor peasant were able to survive and moreover to live better than wild animals. Without doubt it was because each had a pair of hands and extended their hands using tools. We again considered ourselves. In fact each of us has a pair of hands, and we can extend them with tools. This period of reflection was very important. Thereafter our problems were immediately solved. In sum we affirmed that we were able to overcome economic difficulties. Our response to all problems in this respect were the three words 'set-to ourselves'. This time the tasks we set were no longer the same as those of 1938. We no longer wanted merely to improve our livelihood, but also wanted to meet some of our general needs. The scope of mobilization was not limited to the army and we called on all forces, official organizations and schools to carry out production. We implemented a call for a large-scale production movement. *The Song of Opening up New Land* was a new song from that period, and so was *The Production Chorus*. This call not only mobilized the several tens of thousands of personnel in the Party, government, army and schools, but also mobilized the common folk of the Border Region. In that year the common folk opened up over 1 million *mu* of new land. This call also reached all over north China. Many units of the Eighth Route Army at the battlefront also carried out production during breaks in the fighting. This was the first stage of our movement for production self-sufficiency. This stage included the three whole years of 1938, 1939 and 1940. During this stage the government's industrial construction advanced and the army, official organizations and schools developed agricultural production.

From 1941 until this Senior Cadres' Conference (December 1942) has been the second stage. The foundation for self-supporting production had already been firmly laid. During these two years personnel increased and many people unable to find enough to eat outside came to the Border Region seeking food. The 359 Brigade also came to strengthen defenses along the Yellow River. The troops have grown in number and support from outside has completely ceased. There are only two sources for the government's living and operating expenses, the people and the government itself. As a result of two years hard work the proportion of the total amount coming from the government itself is greater than that coming from the people. Experience during this stage makes us feel grateful to those people who blockaded us. For the blockade as well as having its negative drawbacks also brought about a positive side, which was to encourage us to be determined to set-to ourselves. As a result we achieved our goal of overcoming difficulties and gained experience in running economic enterprises. The old saying 'Hardship and distress help you to success' is something we have come to understand entirely and consciously.

During the first of the two stages we have gone through, the troops, official organizations and schools placed emphasis on agriculture and the government developed industry. During the second stage we stressed commerce in order to provide for the critical needs of the moment. With the exception of these troops, official organizations and schools which persisted in the policy of putting agriculture in a prime position, the rest developed business skills and did not place such heavy emphasis on agriculture as in the first stage. However, the government, troops, official organizations and schools all developed industry and handicrafts. After this Senior Cadres' Conference we will enter a new stage of development. In the new stage our economic base will already be rather firm and our experience fairly wide. We should put agriculture in first place, industry, handicrafts, transport and animal husbandry in second place, and commerce in third place. Since commerce can only help in an emergency, we cannot and should not attempt to lay a long-lasting foundation upon it.

Distinctions between the government, the army, and the official organizations and schools in the public sector of the economy can only be made in terms of management and not in terms of an economic nature. Therefore in the following discussion on self-supporting industry we shall treat the industry run by all three as a whole, and when discussing the self-supporting economy of the army and the official organizations and schools, we shall again look at their industrial production separately. However, since industry run by the government is the largest part of all publicly-run industry (government textile mills produce 56 percent of the 22,000 bolts of cloth produced annually by all publicly-run textile mills; the output of government paper factories is 70 percent of all publicly-run paper production; the output of government soap factories is 70 percent of all Border Region soap production), it is rational to deal with all self-supporting industry alongside that run by the government.

Why should unified, self-supporting industry be run in such a dispersed way? The main reason is that the labour force is divided among the various branches of the Party, government and army. If it were centralized, we would destroy their activism. For example, we encouraged 359 Brigade to set up the Daguang Textile Mill and did not order it to combine with a government mill because most of the several hundred employees at the mill were selected from the officers and men of 359 Brigade. They work to produce the bedding and clothing requirements of the Brigade and their enthusiasm is high. If we centralized, we would destroy this enthusiasm. Another important reason for dispersed operation is that raw materials are in many different locations and this causes transport problems. For example, in order to meet the needs of the Party, government, and army personnel of Guanzhong, Longdong, Sanbian, and Suide the bedding and clothing industry finds it best to produce cloth (or buy it) on the spot, and to make it up on the spot. It certainly should not concentrate its making up in Yan'an alone. Thus we use the activism of the various branches to undertake production to meet their own needs. Adopting the policy of 'dispersed operation' is correct and ideas aimed at centralizing everything are wrong. However, enterprises of the same kind carried out within the same area should be centralized as much as possible. Unlimited dispersal is not profitable. At present we are already carrying out or about to carry out centralization of this kind. One example is the handing over to government control of the Tuanjie Textile Mill of the Central Committee's Central Administration Bureau [*Zhongyang Guanliju*] and the Jiaotong Textile Mill of the Rear Services Department [*houquinbu*]. Perhaps this process of dispersal at first and centralization later cannot be avoided. Dispersal makes it possible to use the activism of various branches when setting something up, and centralization enables the various branches to get better supplies. But it is very important that dispersed management does not lead to forgetting centralized leadership. This facilitates unified planning, balanced supplies, and essential arrangements in rational management and distribution. Up to now we have had great shortcomings in this respect and they must be corrected in future. To sum up, our policy is 'centralized leadership and dispersed operation'. Not only is industry like this, agriculture and commerce are too.

At this point we must distinguish between two forms of publicly-run agriculture, industry and commerce, the large and the small. Large should be centralized and small should be dispersed. Examples of things for which we should encourage dispersed operation include agricultural work such as growing vegetables, raising pigs, cutting wood and making charcoal, and handicrafts such as shoe-making, knitting, or small mills when both are run by one or more provision units [*huoshi danwei*] to provide for their own daily food, bedding and clothing needs and to make up deficiencies in running expenses; or cooperatives and small-scale commerce operated to provide from consumption costs or to earn a small profit to cover office expenses. These things must be dispersed, being carried out and developed everywhere. They cannot be centralized and should not be. This is one kind. However, there is another kind. Examples of this are such things as large agricultural plans to provide a definite amount of grain for a whole brigade or regiment of troops—that is the military farming [*tun tian*] plan; large agricultural stations run to meet the grain and vegetable requirements of many official organizations: large workshops and factories run to provide for the bedding, clothing and daily requirements of a whole brigade, a regiment, or a large number of official organizations; and large-scale commerce run to meet the operating costs of such large units. All these things must have a unified plan, centralized control, and strict regulation of expenditure. We cannot allow them to lack coordination and operate without restraint. However, agriculture, industry and commerce which should be under centralized leadership must not be put entirely in the hands of one single official organization for the whole Border Region. instead the unified plan drawn up by such an official organization (at present the Border Region Finance and Economy Committee and its office) according to the needs of the whole and the parts and the possibilities for operation, is handed over to the Party, government and army systems for separate implementation. Within the Party, government and army systems, there is also a unified plan with division in operation. These are the features of the policy of 'centralized leadership and dispersed operation' in the publicly-run sector of the economy of the Border Region.

In the five years since 1938, the public sector of the economy has made some very great achievements. These achievements are worth treasuring for ourselves and for our nation. That is, we have established a new model for the national economy. The reason that this is a new model is that it is neither the old Bismarkian model of the national economy nor the new Soviet model of the national economy but it is the national economy of the New Democracy or the Three People's Principles.

Our publicly-run, self-supporting industry has not yet reached the stage of supplying fully all our needs. We still cannot talk of using surplus capacity to meet the needs of the people. As yet those needs can only be met by the Party and government providing organizational stimulus and the people setting-to themselves. At present all our efforts are aimed at meeting the needs of self-sufficiency within two or three years, particularly the need for cotton cloth. We must not indulge in the fantasy that in present circumstances we can have tremendous development. That will only do harm.

Below I shall discuss our publicly-run economic undertakings over the past five years item-by-item beginning with self-supporting industry.

We first began to pay attention to the construction of publicly-run industry in 1938. In that year the Border Region successively established the Refugee Textile Mills, the paper factory, the bedding and clothing factory, the agricultural implements factory, and the Eighth Route Army medicine factory. Later on most of these factories each provided an important stimulus. At the time the industrialist Mr. Shen Hong voluntarily moved his ten privately-owned machines to the Border Region to serve the Eighth Route Army, and Mr. Shen himself came to the Border Region to work. Thereafter many scientific and technical personnel also came to the Border Region to work, enabling the Border Region to gather a pool of scientific and technical talent as the guiding force in the establishment of industry.

In 1939 the blockade of the Border Region economy began. Imports of industrial products were limited. The Party Central issued the calls to 'set-to ourselves' and to be 'self-reliant'. After the Border Region Government held the agricultural exhibition in January, it held an industrial exhibition on Labour Day, which stimulated enthusiasm to develop industry. The government and the Rear Services Department sent people to Si'an to select and buy machines and materials. They also organized spinning and weaving cooperatives and oil-pressing and tile-making producer cooperatives in Yan'an and Ansai. Although the machines and materials bought from Si'an were insufficient, they became one of the major material strengths in the development of Border Region industry over the past few years. In that year we also set up the Xinhua Chemical Factory and the Guanghua Medicine Factory, and began to explore the thick coal-seams at Shilipu in Yan'an county.

The development of industry in 1940 was carried out under the policy of becoming 'semi-self-sufficient' in production. It was decided to make the development of light industry the key feature. In January we held the second industrial exhibition and reviewed the strength of our factories. The Border Region Bank lent 1 million *yuan* to expand factory capital, to set up proper factory sites and to continue buying materials. In February the Central Committee put forward the policy of 'centralized leadership and dispersed operation'. In September Commander Zhu promoted the wool-spinning movement and developed some wool-spinning and weaving undertakings. Very many large official organizations and schools and troop units planned actively to set up factories. They sent people to existing factories to study techniques. They studied methods of control and fixed plans for the rapid development of industry in 1941.

In 1941 the Central Committee put forward the policy of 'moving from semi-self-sufficiency to complete self-sufficiency'. Under this policy the Bank increased its loan by 3 million *yuan* and the government also invested506,000 *yuan* in the publicly-run factories. Many official organizations and troop units also set aside funds to establish factories. On the Eight of March Festival (International Women's Day) we held a production exhibition. In December the large Bank building was completed and we held another industrial exhibition presided over by the Bank. The following list gives the factories set up by the official organizations and schools directly under the Central Committee in 1942 so as to show the efforts made by the various units to develop industry at this time. These industries are all handicraft factories, none large and some very small,

(1) The Xin Zhongguo Textile Mill, the Shiyan Factory, the wooden implements factory, the carpentry factory, the first and second charcoal factories, the tile factory, and the bedding and clothing factory run by the Finance and Economy Office directly under the Central Committee. Total capital over 200,000 *yuan.* More than 220 employees.

(2) The Shengli Wool Factory and Shengli Carpentry Factory set up by the Central Organization Department [*Zhongyang Zuzhibu*].

(3) The Qiyi Mill set up by the Central Propaganda Department [*Zhongyang Zuzhibu*]

(4) The Tuanjie Textile Mill set up by the Marxism-Leninism Institute.

(5) The Sun Yat-sen Textile Mill set up by the Central Party School.

(6) The blanket factory, mill, alcohol factory, glass factory and machine factory set up by the National Sciences Institute.

(7) The factories run by the Lu Hsun Academy, the North Shaanxi Public

School [*Shaangong*], the Youth League cadres and the Women's University.

(8) The Xinhua Carpentry Factory and the bedding and clothing factory run by the Central Printing and Publishing Department.

(9) The Yanyuan Paper Factory run by the instruction brigade [*jiaodao dadui*].

The above lists twenty-seven factories run by the systems directly controlled by the Central Committee with a total of 447 employees and more than 400,000 *yuan* capital. Most were set up with the aim of achieving economic self-sufficiency.

These apart, there are several small factories run by the Economic Construction Department [*Jingjianb*u], the Garrison Office, the Public Security headquarters, the Border Region Finance and Economy Office, 359 Brigade and various special offices. The Daguang Textile Mill of 359 Brigade has a fairly large output. The various regiments of 359 Brigade also have their own small-scale cotton or wool-spinning and weaving workshops.

The industry constructed from 1938 to 1941 is now expanding. Development during 1941 was particularly vigorous and provided a foundation for the work of 1942. However throughout the period construction was carried out rather blindly. Many personnel lacked conscious awareness. They only thought of the present and not of the future. They only thought of dispersed operation and not of unified leadership. They had an entirely anarchic outlook. As a result some factories closed down as soon as they were built, some announced they were closing down after a short period of operation and some merged with other factories. Only a portion of them have continued to exist. To take textile enterprises near Yan'an, by 1942 only three large factories, the Refugee, the Jiaotong and the Tuanjie and two small factories, the Xinghua and the Gongyi remained. This winding path could not be avoided at the time, since one can only gain experience from paths that one has already travelled. But having gained experience from this stage, it would be better to avoid following similar winding path in new industrial construction.

In 1942 the Reconstruction Department laid down the policy of 'consolidating existing publicly-run factories and developing rural handicrafts'. Government investment in industry was 1,700,000 yuan. Rural handicrafts run by the people had already greatly expanded before this year. In Suide, for example, there were 600-700 cotton cloth hand-looms. Blanket-making, leather-tanning and ironwork had also developed in other places. The public and private textile industry has developed particularly quickly and it has a lot of problems.

In order to ensure the development of the textile industry, we have reduced the import tax on raw cotton and foreign yarn to 1 per cent and increased the import tax on bolts of cloth to 15 percent. In Suide the bank organized the 'Yongchang Native Cloth Producing and Selling Company' with capital of 2 million yuan. It issues raw cotton and collects yarn and cloth, encouraging the peasant women to spin yarn and weave cloth. Since cloth-weaving by peasant households has expanded, much of the cloth produced by privately-run, small-scale, capitalist textile production cooperatives can no longer be sold. They also have difficulties with the supply of native yarn. They have no choice but to reduce their scope of operation, or to become fragmented, distributing their equipment among the people and transforming themselves into family subsidiaries. Since publicly-run textile mills chiefly supply for public use, they can maintain themselves. But they also have problems with the supply of raw cotton and yarn. This year the Zhenhua main factory and branch factory of the publicly-run paper industry completed the task of supplying the Publications Office with 3,000 rolls of paper made from malan grass. The Lihua first and second factories originally planned to produce 2,500 rolls but did not succeed. This year's output will not exceed 500 rolls. Other publicly-run paper factories experience great difficulty since there is no market for their paper. The products of the publicly-run woollen industry such as blankets are aimed at solving problems of finance. The government does not use them itself. Some are exported and others are sold to the troops. The fine-spun woollen thread produced is particularly well received and brings a good profit. Beginning in September, the Jiaotong, Xinghua and Tuanjie textile mills, and the first and second Lihua paper factories were all handed over to the control of the Border Region Government from the Central Committee and the Rear Services Department systems. In order to ensure raw materials for spinning and weaving in 1943, we have begun to buy cotton from the three eastern counties this year. We plan to buy 750,000 jin. To ensure the supply of raw materials for paper manufacture, we have raised a levy of 730,000 jin of malan grass from the counties of Ganquan, Yan'an, Ansai, Anding, and so forth. The factories should wait until they have carried out the policy of better workers and simpler administration before dealing with the recruitment of personnel.

The year 1942, and particularly this Senior Cadres' Conference, is an important landmark in beginning to get rid of blindness and anarchy, and for introducing consciousness and unified and planned operation into the whole of the public sector of the Border Region economy, and especially into publicly-run industry. Although the Central Committee put forward the principle of 'centralized leadership and dispersed operation' long ago in February 1940, only in 1942 has it attracted comrades' attention. It has only obtained unanimous acceptance at this Senior Cadres' Conference. Five years of practical experience has made us progress a lot. After this conference, the whole public sector, industry included, must be reorganized so that it develops healthily.

Above I have given a simple outline of the history of industry in the Border Region over the past five years. By December 1942 we have seven kinds of industry: textiles, bedding and clothing, paper, printing, chemical, tools and coal and charcoal. There are seven textile mills with 26,900,000 yuan capital and 1,427 employees; eight bedding, clothing and shoe factories with l,001,100 yuan capital and 405 employees; twelve paper factories with 4,100,000 yuan capital and 437 employees; three printing factories with 5,200,000 yuan capital and 379 employees; twelve chemical factories (medicine, soap, leather, pottery, petrol, etc.) with 17,030,000 yuan capital and 674 employees; nine tool factories with 3,662,792 yuan capital and 237 employees: and twelve coal and charcoal factories with 1,777,070 yuan capital and 432 employees. The total figures are sixty-two factories with 59,670,962 yuan capital and 3,991 employees. Although our industry is still very small and mainly takes the form of handicrafts with not much machine industry, nevertheless it has taken five years of effort, laid down an initial foundation and played a part in ensuring supplies and regulating commodity prices. Developing from this foundation, it can certainly plan an even greater role.

Our most important self-supporting industries are the textile industry and the bedding and clothing industry. These are what the several tens of thousands of troops and personnel in the official organizations and schools rely upon each year for their cloth, bedding and clothing. Without them we would be frozen. In 1942 our textile industry was already capable of producing over 22,000 bolts of cloth. However we needed 40,000-50,000 bolts and we can only reach our goal of self-sufficiency through great efforts. If we want to develop textiles, we must carry out the following policies.

(1) We must raise cotton-cloth import duty and protect native cloth. At the same time, the troops and official organizations and schools must use only native cloth produced in the Border Region.

(2) We must generally encourage peasant women to spin cotton yarn and woolen thread to guarantee supplies of yarn and thread to the factories. At the same time, we can raise the income of the masses.

(3) We must solve problems of supply and distribution. No matter whether publicly-run, privately-run or family subsidiary, the ability to develop is chiefly related to whether problems of supply and distribution can be solved. As regards raw materials, we are still not self-sufficient in raw cotton and cotton yarn, and the sources are not dependable. Since communications are not very good either, there are problems in distribution. We must arrange things so that yarn-spinners can buy raw cotton whenever they want it, and cloth-wavers can buy yarn whenever they want it. As regards finished products, the markets for cotton cloth and woolen products are not stable. We must arrange things so that producers can sell their products at any time of suitable market-prices. These problems must be solved by the combined strength of the financial organs, commercial organs and the people's cooperatives.

(4) As for problems in the supply of clothing and bedding, we must act according to the methods implemented by the Finance Department in 1942 so as to economize on costs and get clothing at the right time.

Our papermaking industry can already produce over 5,000 rolls of *malan* paper per year. In 1943 we can increase this to 7,000 rolls, which is entirely sufficient for our printing needs. However, we must (i) unify the production and supply of paper. *Malan* paper is not suitable for general use apart from printing. It cannot be sold if the printing departments do not want it. At present we have the following situation: if the printing factories do not use enough, the paper factories cannot sell and have to stockpile, capital turnover is sluggish and this influences production. In order to solve this contradiction between supply and demand in 1943, we should unify purchase and supply, and make precise economic relationships between particular official organizations and paper factories. (2) We must improve the quality of the paper. With existing equipment and technical conditions the quality of the paper can be improved at a greater cost in work and raw materials. From the point of view of function and significance, a slightly greater cost is worth-while. On the other hand we must study improvements in papermaking implements so as to raise production efficiency.

Our printing industry is a modernized cultural tool, and a large quantity of books and papers depend on it. In 1942 printing shops of the Central Committee, Eighth Route Army and Northwest Bureau printed 51,600,000 characters. In 1943 this can be increased to 53,600,000. However, we must increase equipment and ensure the supply of paper.

Our chemical industry includes medicine, snap, leather, pottery, glass, alcohol, matches, petrol and so forth. The Eighth Route Army and Guanghua medicine factories can produce some of the Western and Chinese medicines needed for military and public use, but we are still not entirely self-sufficient. In 1943 we should study the medicinal materials produced in the Border Region, and set up the means for buying raw materials so as to increase the production of necessary medicines. The Xinhua and Daguang factories make soap. Their production increases daily and their quality is good. As well as meeting our own needs, they can sell outside. In 1943 the Xinhua factory can produce 420,000 pieces of soap valued at 7 million. And it has prospects of development. The scale of leather-tanning is small and the cost of materials high. It cannot develop much. If we could use plant materials produced in the Border Region to manufacture leather for military use then there would be some prospect of development. There are three small pottery kilns making pottery for daily and industrial uses. Glass has already been successfully trial-produced and we have decided to set up a factory. We can also make our own alcohol for industrial and medical use. We have still not been able to solve the problem of supply of phosphorous for making matches. We are now investigating the possibility of getting it from animal bones. Apart from these, there is petrol from Yanchang which supplies a little each year for military use. The white wax it contains can he supplied for daily use. In sum, the chemical industry must choose to expand and introduce the supply of things which are urgently needed or are profitable and possible. It should not bother with the rest.

Our tool-manufacturing industry supplies spinning machine, weaving-machinery, cotton-bowing and crushing machinery, paper-making equipment, horse-carts, carpenters' tools, agricultural implements and so forth. They are mainly handicraft tools but are extremely important. We must do research into improvements.

Our coal industry is concentrated in Yan'an and Guanzhong.

Its output is chiefly for daily use. Although it is small-scale, it is very important.

The Border Region lacks iron, which impedes the manufacture and improvement of industrial and agricultural tools. At present we are holding trials in Guanzhong and there are hopes of success. If we can make iron, we can solve a major problem of the Border Region.

The above discussion has roughly covered the whole of publicly-run. self-sufficient industry. Textiles, papermaking, bedding and clothing, printing, chemical, toolmaking and coal, all have reasonable prospects for development.

Their first target is to meet the needs of the army and government, and their second is to supply some of the people's needs. We should make the following improvements in 1943 in order to meet these targets.

(1) Increase capital (the amount to be decided). Each official organization concerned should draw up concrete plans for consideration by the Finance and Economy Office [of the Border Region Government—*Caijing Banshichu*] with the aim of investing in each, of the various industries and in certain investigation and research undertakings, in order to promote the development of self-sufficient industry in a planned way.

(2) Establish a unified leadership for the whole of self-supporting industry, overcome the serious anarchy which exists now. The principle of 'centralized leadership and dispersed operation' put forward earlier is correct but it has not been thoroughly implemented. As a result, there is lack of planning, excessive dispersal in production, lack of work inspection and waste of manpower and materials among the industries run by the Reconstruction Department, the Finance Department, the troops and the official organizations. In 1943 we should set up unified leadership under the Finance and Economy Office and first make all self-supporting industry have a unified plan, no matter which branch it controls. In the unified plan we should calculate as a whole the supplies of raw materials, grain and straw, the totals for production and the coordination of sales. In supplying raw materials we must deal with the problem of many factories facing regular raw-material crises because the region is spread out and these materials are not concentrated, or because supply comes from outside. In supplying grain and hay, we should provide the factories with the grain and hay they need as calculated by the Finance Department so as to save distracting the responsible people at each factory from their concentration on looking after production. In respect of the problems of production and sales, the Finance Department and the official organization concerned should, under the unified plan of the Finance and Economy Office, give each factory responsibility to produce a definite amount so that whatever is needed is produced in the quantity required and the finished products are accepted by a definite organ at the right time solving the contradiction between production and supply. In the unified plan we must realize mutual aid between enterprises and get rid of departmentalism, which gives rise to independence from each other or even hinderance of each other. We must also realize unified inspection, giving encouragement and criticism so that the poor catch up with the good. In sum, the problem of unified leadership is the central problem in advancing self-sup-

porting industry during 1943. We must make thorough efforts to solve it.

(3) Establish the system of economic accounting [*jingji hesuanzhi*], overcome the muddled situation within the enterprises. To achieve this we must do the following. First, each factory unit should have independent capital (liquid and fixed) so that it can handle the capital itself and its production is not frequently hindered through capital problems. Second, income and expenditure in each factory unit should be handled according to fixed regulations and procedures, putting an end to the confused situation where income and expenditure are not clear and procedures are not settled. Third, according to the actual situation in the factories, some should adopt the cost-accounting system [*chengben kuaijizhi*] and some need not the time being. However, all factories must calculate costs. Fourth, each factory should have regulations for inspecting the rate of progress in completing the annual and monthly plans. They should not let things slide by doing without inspections for long periods. Fifth, each factory should have regulations for economizing on raw materials and looking after tools, and for fostering the practice of doing these things. All these points are the chief elements of the system of economic accounting. Once we have a strict accounting system, we examine fully whether an enterprise is profitably operated or not.

(4) Improve factory organization and administration, overcome the tendency to build organizations like those of government organs [*jiguanhua*] and relaxation of discipline. The first thing we must reform is the irrational phenomenon of excessive staffing in factories. At present many of our factories are extremely irrationally organized. There are too many personnel, the organization is too large, the ratio between administrative personnel and those directly involved in production is not right, and systems for administering large factories are being used in our small factories. These phenomena must be quickly corrected so that all factories carry out ‘enterprization’ [*qiyehua*]. All factories should shrink or grow according to their economic prosperity. All salaries should be paid from the factories’ own profit and not from tax grain, government clothing and government grants. Second, we should implement the ten-hour work system and the progressive piecework wages system [*jijian leijin gongzizhi*] so as to raise work enthusiasm and increase production. The eight-hour system is something to be implemented in future with the development of large-scale industry. At present we should universally implement the ten-hour system and make employees understand that this is a requirement of the War of Resistance. An egalitarian system of wages destroys the distinction

between skilled labour and unskilled labour and the distinction between industriousness and laziness, thus lowering work enthusiasm. We can only stimulate labour enthusiasm and increase the quantity and quality of production by replacing it with a progressive piecework wages system. For the moment industrial production in the army cannot adopt the piecework wages system and should have the piecework incentive system [*jijian jiangli zhidu*]. Next, we should improve the work of the workers' congress [*zhigonghui*] and launch a Zhao Zhankui (A model worker) movement in every factory. Work done by the workers' congresses which is not suitable for raising labour discipline and activism must be changed. Within a factory, the work of the administration, Party branch and workers' congress must be united towards common ends. These common ends are to save as much as possible on costs (raw materials, tools and other expenses), to make as many and as good products as possible and to sell them as quickly and as profitably as possible. These tasks of lower costs, better products and faster sales are the tasks shared by the administration, Party branch and workers' congress, all three of which should unite as one. Working methods which divide their work into three separate areas are entirely wrong. The three sides must organize a unified committee, in the first place to put administrative personnel, administrative work, and production plans on the right track. The task of the Party and the workers' congress is to ensure completion of the production plans. Finally the factory should reward the workers and employees with the greatest achievements, and criticize or punish workers and employees who commit errors. Without a suitable system of reward and punishments, we cannot ensure the improvement of labour discipline and labour enthusiasm.

(5) Strengthen and enlarge textile mills, increase output of bolts of cotton cloth, struggle to achieve complete self-sufficiency in cotton cloth used by the government in 1944. Improve woolen goods and, after supplying the army's needs, increase the amount exported. In the bedding and clothing industry fix standards for the cotton cloth used and the methods of making up. Ensure that cotton garments and bedding can be used for two years.

(6) Put papermaking factories in order, improve the quality of paper. Ensure it is fully satisfactory for printing and office use. Make us entirely self-sufficient in paper for printing and office use in 1944.

(7) Increase production of coal and oil, ensure self-sufficiency and also some exports. Set up ways of making or buying phosphorous so that match-factories can be established. As for other industries, continue with or enlarge those

which are urgently needed or profitable. All those which do not match the principle of ensuring supplies or are unprofitable should be merged or closed down.

8. On the Development of the Productive Undertaking of the Troops

Which of the three branches of the public sector of our economy—the government, the army and the official organizations—is ultimately the most important in terms of directly meeting requirements most quickly and in greatest quantity? Our experience of the past few years shows that it is the army. The army's productive undertakings have become the most important part of the public sector of our economy because the army is the body which is relatively most organized and has most labour power. So long as it has no direct fighting duties, it can use all its time outside training doing work. And under our present backward technical conditions, labour is the decisive factor in economic undertakings.

The production movement in the garrison forces of the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region began in 1933, and one year before that in the official organizations and schools. A joint production movement of the army and the official organizations and schools together began in 1939. In 1940, 359 Brigade took on the duty of defense on the Yellow River and joined in the production movement. In 1941 and 1942, the army increased its responsibility for self-supporting production just like the official organizations and schools. However, the tasks taken on by the army were greater and occupied the most important position in the total volume of self-supporting production. It would have been impossible, if during these years the army had not for the most part provided its own means of livelihood and running costs and instead had relied on the government. Responding to the Party Central and Northwest Bureau's call for 'production self-sufficiency', the army has fulfilled its production tasks in the midst of the urgent work of fighting, guarding and training. The objective circumstances of some troop units are better than those of others; some have more duties than others, some have worked harder than others, and some have employed better methods of production than others. As a result their respective level of achievement has varied. Nevertheless, in general they have all fulfilled their tasks. With very little capital and backward techniques, they have all developed agriculture, handicrafts, transport and commerce. Some have even set up relatively large-scale textile and papermaking factories. During these two years, the capital invested by the government in the army's productive undertakings has not exceeded 6-7 million *yuan* in total. However, in that time they have both ensured supplies worth over 300 million *yuan* and they have accumulated roughly 80 million *yuan* capital from their agriculture, industry and commerce. They have opened up several tens of thousands of *mu* of land, and supplied rich experience for the whole of production construction. They have not only played a political and military role in the protection of the Border Region but have also played a role in directly providing a large amount of financial supplies and in helping to develop the Border Region economy.

Let us take a look at the self-supporting production of a certain company in a certain regiment. The income and expenditure of this company during 1941 are shown in Table 8.1.

With the exception of 750 *yuan* production capital from upper levels, miscellaneous payments of 360 *yuan* from the office, supplementary production payments of 2,855 *yuan* and supplementary provisions payments of 3,771 *yuan* given by the regimental supplies office, a total of 7,736 yuan, the expenditure of 52,530 *yuan* shown [Table 8.1] was met by the company's own production of 44,794 *yuan.* This excludes the capital accumulated for use in production the following year.

According to these figures, each regiment of ten companies can be self-supporting up to 440,440 *yuan.*

Furthermore, there is still the self-supporting production run by the regimental headquarters [shown in Table 8.2]. The total value of production of the companies, battalions and regiments is 703,828 *yuan.* The regiment's total annual expenditure (including grain and a proportion of clothing and bedding) is 896,638 *yuan*, which leaves a shortfall of 185,510 *yuan* to be supplemented from upper levels. As a result the regiment's own self-supporting production accounts for 79 percent of consumption and supplements from above account for 21 percent. If we add the large amount of self-supporting production carried out by the brigade headquarters, the proportion for the whole brigade far exceeds 80 percent.

The following material is a summary by the Garrison Office of five years' production by the garrison army. We can see the general situation in self-supporting production by the army.

A SUMMARY OF FIVE YEARS PRODUCTION BY THE GARRISON ARMY

(a) Outline

In the new and difficult environment since the War of Resistance and following chairman Mao's call for production, the garrison army began the production movement in the autumn of 1938. At the time, was not yet aimed at self-sufficiency and was merely making up for deficiencies in the necessities of life. We could only give each member of the force 0.05 *yuan* for vegetables and 1.5 *jin* of grain per day. At the market-prices of the time each *yuan* could buy 30-40 *jin* of vegetables, 2 *jin* of edible oil, or 100 *jin* of fire wood. With a hundred men in a company, each day they had 5 *yuan* for vegetables. If they bought vegetables, they could not buy oil, salt, and firewood. If they bought oil, salt and firewood, they could not buy vegetables. Pork was even further beyond their reach. As for their clothing and bedding, you could rarely see a soldier whose clothing was not darned and patched. Bullet bags were so tattered they could no longer carry bullets, which had to be put in pouches. Some wore padded clothes in summer and some wore shorts in winter. Some went on parade barefoot in the snow and some could not even find a broken old leather bag for leg wrappings. These were the material conditions of the troops then.

The methods used in the production movement at that time were: (i) to set up cooperatives; (ii) to plant lots of vegetables; (iii) to set up grinding-mills, to raise pigs and sheep, to make bean curd and to grow bean sprouts; (iv) to mobilize every soldier to learn to make shoes; (v) to knit woolen clothes, socks, shoes and gloves; (vi) to promote economy and prevent waste. The result of half a year's production in 1938 exceeded the plan, and the soldiers' life was greatly improved. For example, they ensured self-sufficiency in vegetables, each week they had two pork meals, they partly met requirements for woolen clothes, socks, gloves and shoes, and they supplemented the supply of bullet bags, pouches, leather bags and leg wrappings.

The significant achievements in production of the latter half of 1938 raised the troops' enthusiasm for, and burst in, production. So in 1939 even greater tasks for self-supporting production could be put forward, reducing the burden on the people of the Border Region. In 1939 it was stipulated that the troops in their agricultural work should plant grain as well as vegetables so as to fulfill the task of producing 4,700 *tan* of grain. Most production in 1939 was agricultural and 25,136 *mu* of new land was opened up over the whole

Table 8.1 Income and expenditure of a regimental company in 1941

1941 Income (*yuan*)		1941 Expenditure (*yuan*)	
Transport of coal and charcoal (shitan)	698.20	Miscellaneous Expenses	1,312.00
Transport of salt	772.45	2 mules	2,850.00
Sawn planks	3,256.40	1 donkey	574.00
Wooden beams	630.00	600 sweat shirts	600.00
Pig sales	738.02	Shoes (2 pairs per man)	405.50
Stables	2,256.00	87 towels	128.00
Corn sales	998.20	Tobacco	179.00
Export business	935.60	Basins	90.00
Miscellaneous business	481.25	Production tools	181.00
Oil (840 *jin*)	16,800.00	Oil	16,880.00
Meat (1,610 *jin*)	16,100.00	Meat	16,100.00
Vegetables (4,690 *jin*)	4,690.00	Vegetables	4,690.00
Charcoal (5,000 *jin*)	500.00	Charcoal	500.00
Firewood (2,555 *jin*)	2,555.00	Firewood	2,555.00
Received Production capital	750.00	Supplementary provisions	3,771.00
Miscellaneous office payments	360.00	5 months' pay	567.50
Supplementary production payments	3,885.00	Rifle-cleaning	22.00
Supplementary Provisions payments	3,771.00	Summer clothing	100.00
		New Year costs	146.00
		Office	339.00
		Horse feed [*magan*]	620.00
Total	59,147.12	Total	52,530.00

Net income 6,537.12 *yuan*

Table 8.2 The values (in *yuan*) of self-supporting production by regimental headquarters

Regimental headquarters	197,426
Directly controlled forces	27,149
1st Battalion headquarters	18,629
2nd Battalion headquarters	12,777
3rd Battalion headquarters	7,408
Total	263,389

year. At first it was estimated that 2 *tou* of hulled grain could be harvested per giving a total of 4,986 *tan*. But because the new land was just being broken in, there were not enough agricultural tools, leadership experience was not even and some of the land suffered natural disasters, only 2,590 *tan* of hulled grain was harvested. At this time the troops still had little capital and commerce had not yet developed.

In 1940 the production tasks for the troops stipulated that each section should provide grain for one-and-a-half months, a total of 3,400 *tan* in that year the troops opened up 20,679.7 *mu* of land which should have given 4,136 *tan* of hulled grain. Because the harvest was poor, they only got 2,400 *tan*. In order to fulfill its duties, each section also took on salt transport, digging liquorice root and felling trees (in Guanzhong they also did some commercial work). The garrison army earned a local profit of 2,236,516.16 *yuan* from this supplementary production. This, together with the agricultural harvest, provided grain for one-and-a-half months and also met part of the supplements for equipment.

In 1941 the operating budget for all troops was 4,479,536.40 *yuan* and the task for production was to provide 400,000 *yuan.* However, the result was entirely diffident. The requirement for operating expenses was much greater and the task for self-supporting production was much greater than originally estimated. Chiefly as a result of the call by Commander Zhu to select six battalions to get salt, we got a total of 56,966 packs of salt valued at 236,408.90 *yuan.* In agriculture 14,794.6 *mu* were opened up and 1,170 *tan* of miscellaneous grains harvested. In commerce the total profit was 12,019,592.72 *yuan.* Because of price inflation, the value of paper money fell. Regular expenses and clothing and bedding expenses for the whole year were 7,881,757.17 *yuan.* (All this excludes the income and expenditure of one regiment and the forces in Guanzhong.) The average daily expenses for provisions per man over the whole year was 0.50 *yuan.* Apart from the 0.10 *yuan* issued by the State, we provided 0.40 *yuan* ourselves, a total of 2,592,000 *yuan.* The total for the above regular expenses, bedding and clothing expenses and provisions expenses was 10,473,757.17 yuan, 5,673,804.53 *yuan* above the original budget. There was still a surplus after payments were made from production income.

In 1942 the budget for expenses (excluding grain, clothing and bedding) was 5,833,636 *yuan* and we took on the task of helping central expenses with 2,500,000 *yuan.* The year's production plan was for 12,400,000 *yuan.* By August (statistics for the later period not yet available), commerce had earned a profit of 38,969,230.20 *yuan* and industry had a profit of 431,773.40 yuan, giving a total of 39,401,004.60 *yuan.*

By June we had received 1,440,053.60 *yuan* running expenses, and supplementary expenses for the first issue of summer clothing of 206,825 *yuan.* Actual expenditure was running expenses 7,750,598.85 *yuan* supplements for bedding and clothing 3,067,730.60 *yuan*, and supplements for provisions (the State issued 0.70 *yuan* per man per day and the actual cost was 3.00 *yuan*) over the half-year, 9,180,000 *yuan.* Most of the winter clothing and bedding for the latter half of the year was provided by the brigades and regiments themselves. The second issue of summer clothing, half of the padded cloth, 40 percent of the bedding, and bindings, bullet bags, grenade pouches, padded cotton shoes, and light shoes, these eight items had a total value of 12,641,200 *yuan.* Other things like charcoal for heating in winter were provided by each unit itself. As for animal fodder, in 1941 we provided two months horse-feed ourselves. In 1942 the Finance Department issued eight months hay for horses, leaving two months' unaccounted for. In general we cut two months' supply of grass ourselves, saving roughly 1,200,000 *yuan.* Furthermore, in 1942 the budget for horse fodder was 11,000 *tan*. According to the regulations of the Finance Department 1 ton of hulled grain is equivalent to 2 *tou* of horse fodder. But this is insufficient and it is necessary to increase the annual amount by 2,750 *tan* which comes to 1,375,000 *yuan* at 500 *yuan* per *tan*.

The outcome of five years' production has been that, besides meeting annual running expenses, clothing and bedding expenses and provisions expenses, current financial assets include 24 million *yuan* commercial capital 556 transport animals (excluding plough oxen, and excluding the First and Fifth regiments) with a value of 11,232,000 yuan, and factory capital of 712,000 *yuan.* The combined total is 35,944,00 *yuan.*

(Note: The above summary does not include 359 Brigade and the peace preservation corps, [*bao'an budui*].)

(b) Lessons

(1) The reason why the forces of the Border Region have been able to carry out self-supporting production and solve great problems over the past few years is their immense labour power and better organizational strength, and the fact that the Border Region also has rich resources to develop. This experience proves that the troops can be entirely self-sufficient. Because the troops have solved the problem of self-sufficiency over the past few years and increased their faith in production, they have realized that self-sufficiency is one of the

major tasks in building-up the army, and is one of the best methods overcoming hardships and coming through a difficult period.

(2) The production construction of the troops is part of the economic construction of the whole Border Region. Although in the past the troops did well in working hard to fulfill production tasks, ideologically they did not emphasize the relationship with the construction of the Border Region. Therefore they still had a shallow understanding of the development of the agricultural and industrial base. They were not good enough at working hard to establish a secure foundation. Their thinking on unified construction was also muddled. There was even a lack of coordination between units and incidences of serious breaches of command discipline. These shortcomings must be resolutely and ruthlessly corrected.

(3) Under conditions of backward production methods, the production base must chiefly be built up depending on the labour power and economic base of each unit. Therefore the government's financial and economic policy should look after the productive undertakings of these units. Within the confines of the government's unified policy, they should be allowed full development and profitability. Only this way can the development of productive undertakings have greater organization, greater strength, greater unity, greater rationality, and greater ability to fight the blockade in a unified way. The greatest shortcoming of the troops in production is to pay most attention to commerce and to neglect agriculture in the future they must improve and encourage agricultural production.

(4) In their productive work, the troops should grasp ideological leadership tightly and set up and strengthen the regulations and leadership organs in production. They should correct and guard against cadres doing things without coordination, becoming decadent, eating and living well, spending recklessly, not economizing, not stressing effective results, and adopting other corrupt practices.

The above sums up our opinions.

The self-supporting production of 359 Brigade is the best among the various units in the garrison traces. In the first place the leading comrades of 359 Brigade have grasped the strategy of agriculture first, industry and transport second, and commerce third. They have taken advantage of their lack of active duties, the suitable environment of Nanniwan for agriculture and of the Suide special military area for light industry. They have mobilized the large amount of labour power and within three years have completed large assignments for economic self-sufficiency. In particular they have grasped the policy of taking agriculture as the care so that the economic base rests on a secure foundation. Second, the troops of 359 Brigade have carried out the following concrete economic construction: (i) Their grain production in 1940 was a failure, but they were not disheartened. They persevered in 1941 and got tremendous results. In 1942 they strengthened this foundation. They opened up 25,000 *mu* of land and planted grain, vegetables, hemp and tobacco, meeting the troops' requirements of vegetables, lamp-oil, hemp for shoes and tobacco, and supplementing supplies of grain, vegetable oil, horse beans and fodder. Thus after only two years' work they laid the foundation of the agricultural economy of all the companies in the brigade. Furthermore, the period of labour for all the officers and men was no more than two months per year. Ten months were left for troop exercises, and training was not impeded. According to the new method thought out by the brigade, each company sets up a specialist agricultural labour group of six or seven men and the masses of soldiers only provide extensive assistance during the busy agricultural seasons. In this way training time is even greater. (ii) The have used the farms to develop animal husbandry. In 1942 the whole brigade maintained 2,000 pigs which met the troops' requirements for meat and oil. Since the troops ate more meat, they saved grain. In addition they organized groups of men to gather firewood, make charcoal and saw planks, which not only provided for their own fuel and building needs but also provided a surplus for sale. (iii) They also built up industry and handicrafts. In 1941 they assigned some soldiers and rear-service personnel to establish the Daguang Textile Mill and Daguang Soap Factory. Now there are 'Daguang' products on the market in addition to those they consume themselves. They set up ten salt-wells in Suide and Nanniwan, one charcoal-pit, two carpentry factories, three iron-factories, six mills, eight flour-mills and one oil-press. They also mobilized the soldier during their spare time after training to spin woolen thread, to make various kinds of utensils from willow and elm wands, to make writing-boards from birch bark, to make vegetable-boxes and to make lamplighters. This work done by the soldiers not only benefited the whole but also profited the individuals. The brigade stipulated that four-fifths of all the products of handicraft labour done using publicly-owned tools should come under public ownership and one-fifth should belong to the private individual, and the two-thirds of that produced not using publicly-owned tools should come under public ownership and one-third should belong to the private individuals. This method provided commodities for public use and was also equivalent to raising the soldiers' pay. (iv) They established a strong transport undertaking. Now they have a transport team which owns 600 pack-mules and is fully engaged in the transport of salt and goods. Along the road between Suide, Sanbian and Yan'an they have set up ten stables and settled a group of older and weaker personnel. (v) Their commercial organ is the Daguang Store, which has ten branches besides the main shop. The profit in the first nine months of 1942 was over 6 million *yuan.* However, this commerce only makes up 10 percent of the brigade's total production of 60 million *yuan* (at Yan'an market-prices). (vi) The brigade has implemented a unified production plan, and regulations for production and supply. The production plan for the whole brigade is fixed by the brigade headquarters. Some undertakings are directly run by the brigade headquarters such as large-scale industry, transport and commerce. Others are run by the regiments and companies such as agriculture, animal husbandry, small industry and commerce. Inspections are carried out at each level from brigade down to individual companies. The regulations for production are also fixed by the brigade headquarters, The arrangements for soldiers spinning woolen thread described above is an example of this. The regulations for supply also preserve unity. Although the agricultural, industrial transport and commercial undertakings are each run separately, all expenditure above a certain level must be approved from above. Lower levels cannot spend freely. This prevents instances where free spending of the fruits of production brings unequal blessings or waste. It ensures the unity of the whole brigade. (vii) They have not only developed large amounts of production, but have also carried out the policy of strict economy rigorously. For example, they laid down that they would issue three suits of summer clothing every two years and two suits of padded clothing every three years, and that new bedding and clothing would only be issued in exchange for old. They also issued needles and thread to the soldiers so that they could repair clothes themselves. Thereafter bedding and clothing lasted longer, and the soldiers took greater care of them, greatly reducing these expenses. As mentioned above, they ordered the soldiers to make writing-boards from birch bark, vegetable-boxes and lamplighters, and issued wool to the soldiers to knit socks, gloves and so forth. This not only increased the supply of daily necessities but also economized on purchases of these things. All building construction and tool repairs for the whole brigade is done by the troops and none is contracted out. All these things have not only economized on expenditure but have also developed care for public property among the officers and men, attention to results, opposition to waste and a simple style of work that rejects ostentation.

The following material is a summary of three years' production by 359 Brigade drawn up by its leading comrades. It shows us the actual situation in the brigade's agriculture, industry and commerce.

A SUMMARY OF PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION IN 359 BRIGADE OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS

In the three years since this brigade has returned to take up the defense of the Border Region, the implementation of the economic policy of self-reliance and self-sufficiency has been a new creation in building up the army. With the exception of grain received from the government, we have achieved 82 percent self-sufficiency in all other expenses through carrying out this policy. In this way we overcame difficulties with material, resources, improved our troops' provisions, consolidated our forces, promoted the physical strength of the soldiers, consolidated army discipline and strengthened the ties between the army and the people. The following outlines our experience over the past three years in agricultural, industrial and commercial operations.

(A) Agriculture

In response to the call for a production movement, we began agricultural production in 1940. We planned to plough and plant enough land to be self-sufficient for two months' grain, to be entirely self-sufficient in vegetables from the summer onward, and to raise enough pigs to cover our meat requirement for the New Year festivities. However, since the areas where we were stationed in Suide, Mizhi and Wuqi counties were heavily populated with little spare land, we had to travel to places over 100 *li* away (Jiulishan and Qingjian) to open up new land and wasted a lot of time in travel. Although enthusiastic and taking trouble, we did not investigate carefully nor plan suitably. As a result the harvest did not match the capital spent on tools and seeds. However, the vegetables planted near where we were stationed enabled us to be self-sufficient for these after the summer. Each provisions unit was issued 0.10 *yuan* provisions expenses per man per day, barely enough to buy oil and salt. The troops had to go up to 100 *li* away carrying charcoal for sale. They earned enough to make more charcoal and a surplus to buy pigs for raising. These productive activities laid the foundations for the companies to improve provisions. Apart from opening up all the public unused land (public cemeteries, the neighborhood of temples, odd pieces of land near cities, stretches of old unused road, old military defense works, etc.) around the towns of Suide, Mizhi, Jiaxian, Wu'qi and Qingjian where we were stationed and along the river defenses, we also rented land from the local inhabitants to plant vegetables. The spirit of bitter struggle and hard work of the commanders and troops gained great sympathy and understanding from people of all walks of life. Some of the landlords from whom we rented land (like the landlords and rich peasants of Yihezhen) would not accept our rent payments. Other poor peasants voluntarily granted temporary tenant rights. This came from the deep sympathy and concern of the people for the army. For those stationed in poor agricultural regions, particularly those where the climate only suited summer and autumn crops, agricultural production was not only necessary to solve difficulties in running expenses, but was also essential to maintain the correct relationship with the people. From the end of 1939 to the spring of 1940, the troops did not have enough expenses for provisions and were short of vegetables. Personnel sent out to buy sometimes resorted to the serious actions of forced purchase or purchase at unfair prices. In carrying out agricultural production, we ensured a good political influence among the people with the exception of the small number of people in the county towns who relied on market gardening for their livelihood and spoke angrily of the poor defense forces who offered no profit.

We solved the following problems with our production in 1940. (i) We became self-sufficient in vegetables after May. (ii) We added pig raising to self-sufficiency in vegetables and improved provisions in the latter half of the year so that each man could eat 1 *jin* of meat per month, (iii) Each provisions unit made their own agricultural implements and raised over ten pigs, (iv) We proved the old saying: 'If you have vegetables you have half a year's grain, if you have no vegetables you have half a year's famine'. The troops' grain was sufficient. (v) Planting grain meant opening up new land. In the first year we got no profit from grain since it was too far from the places we were stationed. We could not weed at the right time and we wasted too much effort in travel. For these reasons, the planned grain harvest was not realized.

In 1941 the troops found land they could farm and implemented the policy of farming which the commander-in-chief himself ordered. Each man on average farmed 6 of land. Each *mu* needed seven days' work including opening up, planting seed, weeding and harvesting. Six *mu* required forty-two days from which was obtained roughly 3 *tou* (lower-middle harvest) of hulled millet, and hay, also worth 3 *tou* hulled grain. The grain and hay together could be exchanged for one suit of padded clothing. If an upper-middle harvest could be obtained, the return would increase by one-quarter. Various secondary crops such as corn, hemp and sesame also gave a harvest the same as that of millet. Around the edges of the 6 *mu* we could plant many subsidiary crops such as castor, pumpkins, beans and so forth giving good harvest, in addition, each man planted half a *mu* to provide vegetables for a whole year. Also among the products were hot peppers, garlic, onions, lamp-oil, tobacco, grass rope for sandals, and so forth. Since we had field crops, it was easy to raise domestic animals such as pigs, cows, sheep, chickens, ducks, rabbits, etc. As pig-raising was most profitable, it was the major subsidiary. Reckoning at one pig for every five men, a hundred men could raise twenty pigs, as well as this they could raise three sows. Every year each sow can have two litters of at the very least four piglets. With no swine fever and no untoward events, they could produce twenty-four pigs per year. Killing pigs at a rate of two a month, we would have to kill twenty-four a year. The pig-breeding rate would counterbalance the slaughter rate and there would still be surplus piglets. From birth to slaughter, piglets can grow 5 liang per day on average. In actual practice the annual average was indeed one pig per five men.

As a result of agricultural production, there was a lot of vegetable refuse. Since we were grinding flour, we got the chaff remains from the husking, and since we were making bean curd, we got the bean residues, etc. We could raise the pigs using waste and gain great benefits. Now the entire brigade has achieved all of the above. The wealth obtained from agriculture and animal husbandry by each provisions unit is increasing. All this wealth is controlled by the party branch, supervised by all the soldiers and used rationally according to the regulations laid down at high levels. As yet there is no summary for 1942, but harvests will definitely be no less than last year.

Reviewing the agricultural production movement, we can make the following summary of its merits and shortcomings.

Merits

(1) The troops carried out political mobilization concerning the performance of the tasks so that all personnel realized that the slogan of self-sufficiency in production put forward by Chairman Mao was of great significance in maintaining unity in the War of Resistance and in passing through an economic crisis. The commander-in-chief himself led the way after his return to the Border Region and strengthened the soldiers' enthusiasm and endurance.

(2) Improvements in real livelihood made us feel the advantages of the pro-

duction movement.

(3) The brigade and regiments fixed the whole of the annual production plan, stipulated the production tasks for the companies, and conscientiously supervised the regiments' guidance and supervision of the companies' production.

(4) The companies organized production committees to discuss and arrange the implementation of production tasks, to inspect and examine the economy (the companies' economies are entirely public) and to ensure the implementation of the supply regulations.

(5) How every company is enjoying a self-sufficient, rich peasant family standard of living because of its agricultural production.

Shortcomings

(1) We have not paid full attention to production tools, we have not organized and employed plough oxen and we have not selected some soldiers (from among the cooks) to specialize in farming throughout the year. We have generally adopted the method of all-round mobilization, wasting time and impeding troop-training.

(2) Some cadres have taken a negative attitude towards farming and do not strive to get a larger harvest by extending the land farmed.

(3) We have not been conscientious in gathering manure.

(4) We have no cadres specially directing production.

According to experience, we must use oxen for ploughing, carting manure and harvesting (using ox-carts), prepare sufficient tools, assign cadres with special responsibility for directing production (a deputy battalion leader for production and company leaders with special duties), assign soldiers (from among the cooks) to carry out agricultural production throughout the year, mobilize all the officers and men to take part at planting, weeding and harvesting times, and stipulate the number of workdays so as to use a fixed amount of time. In this way the total work per man to farm 6 *mu* and cut a year's firewood will not exceed two months, and we shall not only get grain but will also become entirely self-sufficient for all daily vegetables, meat, straw shoes, firewood, shoes and socks. The last few items alone make up one-third of all running expenses so they cannot be considered a small problem. The grain harvest can sustain 2,000 men.

The above is a brief summary of the brigade's agricultural production.

The following list shows how much work and time it would cost a provisions unit for a hundred men to travel over 60 *li* to make the purchases if it did not plant vegetables itself.

Monthly vegetable consumption (1 *jin* per man per day)	3,000 *jin*
Number of purchases (each time buying 100 *jin*)	30 times
Labour days per purchase (each time using 2 men)	4 days
Actual days per purchase (there and back 2 days)	2 days
Labour days per month	120 days
Actual days per month	60 days
Labour days per year	1,440 days
Actual days per year	720 days

Using this table alone we can explode the lie that 'agricultural production is profitless and hinders training'.

(B) Industry

There follows a summary of our experience in establishing and developing the Daguang Textile Mill and of other handicrafts.

(1) Motivation and intention. The troops need clothing and bedding every year. The raw materials for bedding and clothing are the chief problems in supply work, in the winter of 1939 after the troops returned to the defense of the Border Region, we had difficulties in buying these raw materials and also had no money. In response to the call by Chairman Mao for self-reliance, self-sufficiency and overcoming difficulties to build up the Border Region, we made a long-term plan to run a textile mill.

(2) Trial beginnings. We began to think of running a textile mill in September 1940. At the time there was a man from Hebei in the short-term training class set up by the supply department who could weave cloth. We set up a small wooden loom, bought some foreign yarn and tried it out. Within ten days all the yarn was woven and the cloth was quite good. We could weave 100 feet per day [Chinese measurement] and costs worked out one-third cheaper than buying cloth.

Since there were weavers among the troops we decided to set up a factory and undertook the following: (i) we bought wood and built nineteen small looms in our own machine-repair shop, and we bought four metal looms from Shanxi; (ii) we bought yarn from local merchants on credit; (iii) we selected twenty skilled men from places like Gaoyang in Hebei who were among the troops.

In this way the factory got going. It was not only profitable and convenient, but also solved problems in buying cloth.

In December 1940 we decided to enlarge' the factory in order to achieve self-sufficiency in cloth for the whole brigade.

Early in 1941 we abolished service personnel at all levels throughout the brigade, and collected together over a hundred youths as apprentices to study weaving.

We again bought two iron looms from the northwest of Shanxi and made a further eleven large wooden ones ourselves. In February and March we made another sixteen large wooden looms, and fourteen more towards the end of March. We thus had sixty-six looms of all kinds. At the same time we made spinning-wheels and other essential small implements.

As regards raw materials, in 1941 the government issued the brigade with 400,000 *yuan* capital for production. Of this, 250,000 *yuan* was divided among the regiments. Of the remaining 150,000 *yuan*, 100,000 was spent buying 300 bales of yarn (each bale was 7 *jin* 14 liang and cost 280-90 *yuan*) and some things that had to be bought (such as the wire for the looms which we could not make ourselves and had to purchase outside).

Administered by the supply department accountants, the workers divided into yarn-starchers, weavers, thread-joiners [*luoxian*], and threaders [*daxian*]. Each group had twenty to thirty men. About ten skilled men became master workmen and took charge of the technical work in starching and reeling the yam. Intelligent youths studied weaving, and the less bright and the younger did threading and thread-coining.

As soon as the looms started working, we became aware of a need for more labour power. So taking the name, the Daguange Textile Mills, we employed fifty young boys and girls from the Suide areas as apprentices. We also took captured bandits and people who had committed mistakes from the military courts. In this way we assembled our labour force. There were then over 200 workers administered by the military training unit and the supply department. They were divided into four platoons and twelve squads (including one women's platoon; each platoon had three squads of ten or more people).

The factory was roughly taking shape. But there were still two difficult problems to be solved, first the supply of capital and raw materials, and second the control, education and training of the workers.

(a) The problem of the supply of capital and raw materials. In May 1941 we borrowed 200,000 *yuan* from the Border Region Bank but it still did not provide support for long. After that we had to make friends, built up relationships, liaise with rich merchants and buy raw materials on credit, making repayments at fixed periods.

Before May 1941 most foreign yarn was bought from Shanxi. Afterwards, because supplies were cut off, we could only buy from Sian and Yan'an (Shenxin and Guanghe brands). We also bought raw cotton from Sian and Yan'an.

The supply of local yarn came as a result of the government's encouragement of local women to spin. At first the wage for spinning 1 *jin* of yarn was from 3 to 7 *yuan* (raw cotton cost 4 *yuan* per *jin*), and it was divided into three grades. In July and August this was changed to issuing 1½ *jin* of prepared cotton in return for 1 *jin* of yarn. In February and March of 1942 this was again changed into 2 *jin* or 2 *jin* 2 liang for 1 *jin* of yarn.

Because the supply of yarn from the people was insufficient and of poor quality, we set up our own yarn-spinning factory with four cotton-bowing machines and forty spinning machines in October 1941. By July 1942 we still lacked skilled workers and the cotton bowed by the machines could not all be used on the machines (the raw cotton was poor). Now only the four bowing machines are still going and spinning has stopped.

(b) The problem of controlling, educating and training the workers. The number of workers has increased but there are many different elements and they are not easy to control. They young service personnel in particular were used to a free life and had not taken part in labour before they left home. At first they would fight, curse and carry-on every day. They would say 'We've seen all the officers, big and small' and would not accept any controls.

Most of the women from the villages had come because of marriage problems. They had been sent to the factory by the women's aid committee or the government. Whenever they talked of marriage, some cried and some laughed. They often asked for help in solving their marriage problems.

Persuading captured bandits to work was difficult.

Many of the people being punished for mistakes were company and platoon cadres who maintained their old character, were unwilling to work and were troublemakers.

From January to March 1941, the head of the supply department tried hard to correct them and achieved some success.

During this time, approximately twenty skilled workers acted as master-workers and taught the youths in the weaving group. First they used the small looms (needed little strength and easy to manage). The master-worker did all the preliminaries and told them how to start the loom, how to connect broken threads, how to handle the shuttle, and how to coordinate hand and foot. At the beginning they only wove for two or three hours a day. After one or two months, this group had mastered these looms and moved onto the large wooden ones, and another group came to learn. Thus group-by-group teaching went on until March 1941.

The work of joining the threads and threading was easy to learn and only needed patience. Once you had learned to join the threads properly, you were all right. But it needed practice. When unpracticed, the results were not good enough for weaving.

When the work began and the young apprentices sat at the looms or did their joining and threading, their backsides ached after a short time, yarn easily broke, tempers rose, there was little patience and they wasted a lot of thread and some looms. So before March 1941, products were no good.

Apart from strengthening technical training and raising technical skills, the chief way of dealing with this was political encouragement and education in revolutionary labour discipline. This made the workers consciously realize the important significance of production, made them patient in their work and improved their enthusiasm for production and their labour discipline.

Various methods of education were used to implement military discipline. The head of the supply department, He Weizhong, the head of the military training unit and the branch Party secretary personally came to give guidance every day, explaining that production at the rear was equal to fighting at the front, that they should accept organization, that work was glorious and that they were the working class. We proposed a competition with emulation between apprentices and emulation between male and female workers. We implemented a system of rewards and punishments and a system for getting time off. At the same time each person was given some writing materials every month, and we bought some entertainment equipment.

Thereafter the workers felt that to work was glorious. After work they wanted to study culture and politics and to live a military life. As a result life became organized on military lines. In this way we gradually set up the soldier-worker system, and the factory got going in the right way. Before breakfast there were early-morning exercises and running. After breakfast they went to work. In winter and spring there was a ten-hour day.

We then encountered new difficulties.

The factory site was a hired house. As it was not convenient for work, we built ten or so cave houses ourselves for the workers to live in. Unexpectedly the cave houses were moist and damp, the workers developed sores and many of them could not work. So we changed the new caves into storerooms and the workers moved into the hired house. In June we began to build five stone cave houses for the looms and these were not completed until October. During this period there was nowhere to put the looms. The only thing we could do was to put them in the courtyards and work under tents. In May and June there was early morning dew and it rained often. Wet thread is no good for weaving. In July the weather was hot and the sun strong. The threads became very dry which was also not good for weaving. The only thing we could do then was cover the looms in wet army blankets and pour water on the ground. But this only worked for two or three hours and, as can be imagined, gave a lot of trouble.

The months from June to September passed in this way. The new caves were completed in October and we also built one-story houses with a total of twenty-seven rooms for the workers to live in. Only then were all these problems overcome.

As for raising the workers' technical level, after June the youths gradually became skilled, and some even exceeded the master-workers.

In the first week when they were apprentices they generally only worked for two or three hours a day and made four or five feet of cloth. After two or three weeks they worked for seven or eight hours a day and could weave 10 to 40 feet. After April they could do 40 to 50 feet, and by May, 60 to 70. After June, they had all become skilled workers and the best could weave 120 to 130 feet a day. During this time the quality of cloth continuously improved.

We can say that after June 1941 the factory was consolidated and began to develop, having overcome all kinds of difficulties.

(3) Establishing the soldier-worker system

The factory expanded and needed to be regularized. It was very inconvenient for the administrators from the military training unit. And so under the supply department we set up a factory head and a commissar to provide leadership, and drew up a draft outline for the administration of the factory.

Under the leadership of the head and commissar, the administration was divided into four sections, labour, operations, accounts and general work. These sections divided the tasks and worked together, each with its own responsibility. We stipulated a variety of regulations for meetings, minutes, reports, inspection, livelihood, pay (according to technical skill with the top rate of 10 *yuan*) and for rewards and punishment. We settled the times for work, study, rest and relaxation. We fixed the scope for democratic life and all kinds of principles for the workshops, dormitories, canteen, days off, leaving the premises and so forth.

By October 1941, everything was properly set up.

After October we felt that the wooden looms were not as good as the iron ones. The cloth the latter produced was of good quality and needed less work. We planned gradually to replace the wooden looms with iron ones. Between January and October 1942 we built iron looms ourselves. However, as one had to be strong and skillful to weave with these looms and there were not enough workers like that, we could not convert entirely to iron looms and we did not build any more. The total was forty-five iron looms and sixty-two wooden looms. Apart from this, we bought thirteen wooden looms for weaving woolen blankets and woolen goods from the Longwan Factory (in spring 1942) and built thirteen wooden looms ourselves. This gave a total of 133 looms. On average we produced about 1,000 bolts of wide cloth, 500 woolen towels and 100 blankets per month.

After May 1942 the pay system was changed into a piecework system giving 70-80 *yuan* per month at the most (roughly one-tenth of wages in a privately-run factory), and 20-30 *yuan* at the least. This increased the workers' enthusiasm to produce. Some workers did not take their noon rest and did not stop work at the end of the working day but kept on working. After some persuasion and education, we overcame this excessive enthusiasm.

We persisted in the soldier-worker system. The factory workers also grew vegetables and raised pigs for their food.

In the winter of 1942 we stopped work for one month to make padded clothing.

In 1941 after all expenses, the factory made a profit of 3,900,000 *yuan.* In the first ten months of 1942, the profit was 8 million *yuan.* The value of the factory site, looms, yarn and raw cotton is 5 million *yuan* (yarn and cotton 1 million *yuan*). We intend to invest several million more to maintain reproduction.

In sum the lessons of experience in running industry are as follows:

(i) The profit earned by the soldier-workers working in textiles, that is the Daguang Mill led by the brigade supply department, is the largest of all the profits earned by the various industrial enterprises. In 1941 the total number of employees was 250 and in 1942 it was 225. After all expenses, its profit in

1941 was 3,900,000 *yuan* equivalent to the price of 4,000 *tan* of millet at year-end price (300 *jin* per *tan*). Profit by October 1942 was 8 million *yuan*, again equivalent to 4,000 *tan* of millet at current prices in Suide. The average net profit per worker was roughly 18 *tan*.

In the light of two years' experience and the present circumstances, we shall invest 25,000 *yuan* per head for the 225 employees of the factory during 1943, not counting buildings and tools, making a total of 5,625,000 *yuan*. The cloth required for uniforms will be bought from the factory. In this way production for 1943 will earn a net profit per man of 20 *tan* of millet (because of inflation, it is best to take millet as the standard).

Each regiment has a cloth-weaving factory which can produce enough cloth for a hundred men.

In addition, apart from undertakings purely for producing equipment and clothing for the troops such as shoe-making, cloths-making and leather-tanning, the brigade also has roughly 200 blacksmiths and carpenters. In the light of the past two to three years' experience and the prospects for the continued development of the Border Region economy, these craftsmen could make an annual profit roughly equivalent to 6 *tan* of millet in return for an investment of 1,000 *yuan* per man.

There is also a papermaking factory and an oil-pressing shop which use as raw materials the sesame seeds and straw coming from the troops' agriculture and *malan* grass cut by the soldier-workers, for which the factories pay a cheap price. These enterprises employ sixty people with an average net profit per head of 6 *tan* of millet.

(ii) Besides agriculture, effective operation of the system of soldier-workers is a way of realizing self-sufficiency and solves both commodity and financial problems. Commerce is definitely not as reliable as agriculture and industry. Commerce relies on others, not on oneself, so it is not suitable to do too much of it.

(iii) Shortcomings are: in running a large factory there is a lot of expenses and waste, and there is no fixed amount of capital. This influences reproduction. Therefore in future we must strive to set up a fixed amount of capital.

(iv) In the past we did not take the whole Border Region economy into consideration. Nor did we make a unified plan for the troops' agricultural and industrial production. We could not interlock agriculture, industry, transport, and commerce. This was a great failing. Henceforth, we should have unified plans and interrelated management.

The above is a summary of our opinions.

(C) Commerce

Our commerce began with a cooperative and it took six years to develop into large-scale commerce.

In 1937, the brigade was sent across the Yellow River to the area around Guoxian to fight the enemy. After the loss of Taiyuan, commerce was disrupted and city goods could not be moved into the countryside. The common folk did not dare to travel to buy goods. As a result there were great shortages in daily necessities. Oil and salt were out of supply for a while. Both the army and the people had to eat plain food. In these circumstances we set up a cooperative at the request of the people. We allocated animals to go to Ningwu and elsewhere for salt. The supply department put up 300 *yuan* to buy goods belonging to merchants which were stored in the countryside. We contracted the merchant, Li Maolin, from Yangwu as manager and set up business at Yangwu. It was called '359 Brigade Army-People Cooperative'. The aim was simply to solve difficulties in the supply of salt, oil and so forth, and to handle other necessary goods. At the time the currency had not yet lost value, so, although the capital was small, business was successful. In the short period of six months from October 1937 to April 1938 when the troops moved east, we gained great sympathy among the people of the county. Thousands of people praised us saying that if it were not for the cooperative, they would have died without being killed by the enemy. Making a profit was not the aim at the time, so although business was good we did not earn any money. At the end in April, the capital and profit of 490 *yuan* was handed over to the troops and used.

In May 1938, the cooperative personnel went to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region with the troops. When they got to Lingqiu there was another shortage of daily necessities. Both the people and the army suffered. They wanted to continue with the cooperative but had no capital and could think of no way. In August, the cooperative personnel went to the county town of Laiyu county to build up relations with merchants. Through friendly connections they bought goods worth 3,042 *yuan* on credit. Most of it consisted of bolts of cloth, writing-materials, paper, soap and so forth totaling eleven packs. They returned to Donghenanzhen east of Lingqiu and set up a shop. The suppliers of the goods also came along. Within five days the goods were entirely sold and they got a net profit of 800 *yuan.* They paid the suppliers 2,042 *yuan* and presented 1,000 *yuan* to the frontline troops for buying provisions. With the 800 *yuan* left over, they returned with the suppliers to Laiyuan to get more goods. This process was repeated several times up until December when the bill for goods was fully repaid. From August to December the operations of the cooperative provided supplies of oil, salt and cloth needed by the people of the Lingqiu region and earned 2,800 *yuan* to supplement the troops' expenses. In addition there remained goods worth 1,500 *yuan.*

In January 1939 we moved the 1,500 *yuan* worth of goods to Xiaguanzhen. We mainly dealt in oil and salt, on the one hand supplying the troops and on the other helping the ordinary folk. Since the troops were continuously engaging the enemy at this time, we had over 1,000 wounded. It was not easy to get Western medicines and nutritious foods so the cooperative set up good relations with various merchants and through them got Western medicine, milk, arrowroot and so forth from Tianjin, Beijing, Baoding and other places. This ensured the supply of necessities for the wounded. In September 1939 the brigade received the order to take on the defense of the Yellow River between Shanxi and Shaanxi. The cooperative was closed down. The nine months' business brought in 9,400 *yuan.* When the troops set off they had no money so 5,400 *yuan* was paid out in expenses. The remaining goods worth 4,000 *yuan* were brought west with the troops in five donkey packs. In October we got to Wuliwan in Suide in the Border Region, we sold them for 20,000 *yuan* and we sent people to Loufan, Wenshui and Jiaocheng to buy writing materials and cloth. By the end of the year we had 31,000 *yuan* in goods and cash.

In January 1940 the cooperative moved to Nanguan in Suide. At that time the troops' economy was in great difficulties. We could only rely on the earnings of the cooperative to help pay expenses, so we felt the name 'Army-People Cooperative' was not suitable and changed it into the 'Daguang Store' showing that its goal had changed into making a profit. During that year we built up friendships with some merchants and bought goods either for cash or on credit. We bought writing-materials, cloth, paper, shoes, socks, towels and so forth, and made a profit in the market. We worked hard and by the year-end earned 191,700 *yuan.* We apportioned 101,700 *yuan* to the troops to help with the expenses, and kept 90,000 *yuan* as capital for 1941.

In 1941 the brigade decided to expand its commercial activities as a supplement to the major undertakings in agriculture, industry and transport in order to meet the urgent requirements of the troops. Besides the existing 90,000 *yuan* capital, a further 250,000 *yuan* was given from the 400,000 *yuan* issued to the brigade by the Finance Department for production capital. In addition all the small shops run by the regiments were closed, and their capital of

60,000 *yuan* collected together. The total capital was 400,000 *yuan*. Beginning in January 1941 we set up ten branch shops. After a year's operation we got a profit of 2,982,377 *yuan* of which 982,377 *yuan* was used to supplement the troops' expenses and 2 million was kept as the store's capital.

In 1942, the store and ten branch shops got a profit of 6,720,080 *yuan* from operations during spring, summer, and autumn. Two million *yuan* were used to supplement expenditure for the troops and the remaining sum of 4,720,080 *yuan* continues in use.

The lessons of experience are:

(i) We helped the ordinary folk to buy cloth, paper, oil, salt and other necessities, and we strengthened relations between the army and the people.

(ii) We helped the troops to buy daily necessities by making it possible for the soldiers' income of 1 *yuan* to purchase soap, towels, toothbrushes, toothpaste etc., at a time when the Eighth Route Army was in difficult economic circumstances. On the other hand, the troops rightfully bought daily necessities with their money which reduced improper and wasteful behaviour among the troops.

(iii) Building friendships is very important. If we had not had good relations with the merchants of Laiyuan, we could not have bought goods.

(iv) Surplus income supplemented expenditure for our forces.

(v) We sold local products and put limits on goods from outside. However, since we did not inspect strictly and provide firm leadership, some shops could not carry out this work in a pleasant and integrated manner. They only looked after narrow departmental interests and neglected all-round economic construction.

(vi) Before 1940 we did not know much about setting up a Commercial information network, and only knew how to work hard. As a result we suffered quite a few losses from rises and falls in prices. In 1941 we set up such a network to report on the situation in various places and built up liaison with some big merchants. We learned of rises and falls in prices at the right time. Therefore we did not make losses of this kind in 1941 and 1942.

(vii) We liaised and worked together with local experienced merchants able to operate outside the Border' Region. When we encountered difficulties in the supply of raw materials for spinning and weaving, we obtained great help. However, we also encountered some rogue merchants who used us to carry out their own business, damaging our operations.

(viii) There were too many people working in the store not earning their keep and adding to expenses.

(ix) Frequent contact with merchants from outside enabled us to understand each other's policies and attitudes, reducing misunderstandings and building friendships.

(x) We tested the cadres' Party spirit, thought, and ability.

(xi) Only with strict administration and a complete system of regulations could the store reduce waste.

(xii) To help stabilize the currency, in 1940 the store changed Guanghua banknotes.

(xiii) Comprehensive preparations, correct and lively application of trading policies, staying within the scope of non-prohibited goods, selling local products and selling necessities solved difficulties in the supply of goods for the army and provided a profit.

(xiv) With the aim of earning money, after January 1941 all the brigade and regimental cooperatives became part of the Daguange Store. The organization took Suide as its center and set up branches in Suide, Mizhi, Jiaxian, Wuqi, Anding, Yanchuan and Yanchang. The brigade had the Daguange Store, and the regiments had the branches.

(xv) Most personnel in the shops were soldiers given payments according to their jobs. Employees were paid a wage according to their ability, strengths, and weaknesses.

(xvi) Most of the goods were bought from northwestern Shanxi during 1941. Afterwards because of the enemy's mopping-up campaigns and the economic blockade (the decline of the nationalist currency and the use of the puppet currency), commodity prices rose. In addition because of our problems with capital, we could not get much money to buy goods. Therefore using the slogan 'resist the enemy's goods and sell local products', we sold the cloth we wove ourselves, and the leather shoes, woollen towels and cloth shoes we produced ourselves. We also sold Daguange soap in even greater quantities. To prevent unprincipled merchants from raising market-prices and to promote the Border Region currency, we changed Guanghua banknotes, and lowered the rising market-prices. For example, the salt we extracted ourselves we sold at 2 *jin* 4 liang per *yuan* compared to the market-price of 1 *jin* 4 liang per *yuan.* Thus we enabled the ordinary folk to buy at cheaper prices. So we can say that in a certain period our aim was not to earn money but to stabilize prices and secure the people's livelihood

(xvii) 'If you knew what would happen in three days' time, you would be rich for thousands of years.' It seems as if trading is a question of finding the right way by accident. If you find a good opportunity, then you can earn money. In fact it is not so. Trading relies entirely on correct estimation, understanding of the situation locally and elsewhere, and understanding the difference between imports and exports. Then you can forecast the rises and falls in commodity prices, and fix the policies for attention in a certain period.

(xviii) A stable currency and secured finances are the primary conditions for developing business. During the past three years the sudden rise and fall in the value of the Border Region currency and the disruption of finances has influenced trading in commodities and made everything difficult. Another aspect is that this situation has enabled speculative merchants to deal in currency notes. They have earned a lot of money and influenced the economy of the Border Region.

(xix) The various regimental shops have in practice not thoroughly implemented centralized leadership and have competed with each other. They have lacked coordination which is an unhealthy tendency.

(xx) The various regiments have set up an accounting system run by specialists who keep the accounts. However since too many of them were merchants in the past, they did not use new methods of recording and still used the old.

A concrete plan for agricultural production in 1943 has been prepared by 359 Brigade. It is really clear and definite and may be supplied to all units for consideration. The text follows.

359 BRIGADE'S 1943 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PLAN

The military farming system of the troops stationed in the Border Region is one of the basic duties of our army in carrying out the policy of the anti-Japanese national united front and in establishing new democratic politics. Persisting in carrying out this duty enables us to lighten the people's burden, improve the quality of the army and achieve close unity with the people from a position of self-reliance and self-sufficiency. Therefore, in the light of the experience and achievements in carrying out the call from upper levels for production during the past three years, the brigade has drawn up the following plan to strengthen the implementation of this call and to increase the quantity of production in 1943.

(A) How should we organize the troops' agricultural production?

(1) All the defense areas where the regiments and troops are stationed have arable land, so we stipulate that each provisions unit should carry out agricul-

tural production according to its manpower and the land situation.

(2) In circumstances where the army is stationed in one place, each provisions unit only needs three cooks for every hundred men. Therefore each provisions unit can select six or seven strong comrades with agricultural experience from among the cooks to specialize in farming.

(3) The deputy battalion head with responsibility for production in each battalion, the head of the special duties in each company, and the deputy officers with responsibility for production in the brigade and regiments have the task of planning and inspection. During spring ploughing, summer weeding and autumn harvesting, they should organize and lead all personnel to take part.

(4) We stipulate that the provisions unit of each combat company, apart from supplying all their own vegetables, should plant 600 *mu* of grain. Table 8.3 lays down the tasks each unit can shoulder.

(B) The year's plan relies on the spring. This winter we must prepare for the work of the coming spring.

(1) Each provisions unit must make a clear register of the land to be planted, how much mountain land, how much river land, how much land that has been farmed, and how much uncultivated land. It must also work out what is going to be planted and how much work, seed and so forth will be required for planting, hoeing and harvesting.

(2) Farming requires oxen, ploughs, and other agricultural tools such as hoes, rakes, baskets and sickles. These should be fully prepared in winter. Actual requirements per provisions unit are three plough oxen, three ploughs and sixty other implements.

(3) If you do not use manure, the crops do not grow well. Every unit must collect manure. All night soil, animal manure, and wood and straw ashes must be gathered. Pay attention to control of lavatories, pig-sties, sheep-pens, and oxen and horse-stables. We must put at least 4 *tan* of manure on each *mu* of land. In many places there are grass roots from flooded land and tree leaves. These can be moved to the farmed land for burning.

Table 8.4 lists the amount of preparatory work to be undertaken by all units and by the brigade as a whole.

(C) How much money is needed and how many workdays?

(1) Oxen, ploughs and other implements all cost money to buy or make. This is capital. In addition there is manure and seeds which come to at least

Table 8.3 Agricultural tasks assigned to units

Troop units	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	Total
Number of production units	5	2	1	17	16	13	6	5	65
Area to be planted (*mu*)	3,000	1,200	600	10,200	9,600	7,800	3,600	3,000	39,000
Number of men to be selected from among the cooks	30	12	6	102	96	78	36	30	390

Table 8.4 Preparatory work necessary by spring 1944

Units	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	Total
Number of production units	5	2	1	17	16	13	6	5	65
Number of plough oxen	15	6	3	51	48	39	18	15	195
Number of plough	15	6	3	51	48	39	18	15	195
Number of other implements	300	120	60	10,20	960	780	360	300	3,900
Amount of manure in ‘*tan*’	12,000	4,800	2,400	40,800	38,400	31,200	14,400	12,000	156,000

800 *yuan* for 600 *mu*. Total capital for 600 *mu*, and for the land formed by the units and for the brigade as a whole, is shown [in Tables 8.5 and 8.6].

Table 8.5 Capital needed to farm 600 mu

Item	Cost (*yuan*)
Oxen	12,000
Ploughs	600
Other implements	6,000
Manure & seed	800
Ox fodder	2,700
Total	22,100

NB (i) Each ox is reckoned at 4,000 *yuan.*
(ii) Each plough at 200 *yuan.*
(iii) Each implement at 100 *yuan.*
(iv) Ox fodder at 900 *yuan* per animal.

(2) How many workdays are required on 600 *mu*, from opening up the land and sowing seed to harvesting? It is estimated that opening land and sowing seed requires 500 days; preparation and spreading of manure, 800 days; three weedings, 1,800 days; and harvesting, 450 days. This makes 3,550 days in all.

Note: six cooks farming 600 *mu* throughout the year can do at least 1,000 workdays; 3,550 work days minus 1,000 leaves 2,550. Each provisions unit has a hundred men so each man has to do twenty-five days' agricultural labour during the year.

(D) The type of crops and the harvest

(1) Find out what is the most suitable grain to be planted according to the land. In general, plant spiked millet [*gu (zi)*], millet [*su*], *gaoliang*, maize [*baogu*], beans, rice and so forth. In addition, also consider the needs of the troops and plant hemp for sandals, lamp-oil and cooking-oil Some units can plant cotton.

The seventh regiment can plant 200 *mu* of cotton. Estimating a harvest of 30 *jin* of cotton per *mu*, the total will be 6,000 *jin*. At a value of 50 *yuan* per *jin* this will be equal to 300,000 *yuan.*

Each company in the special duties battalion [*tewuying*] should plant 80 *mu* of cotton in addition to its 600 *mu* of grain. This can give an estimated harvest

Table 8.6 Capital needed for the land farmed by the units and by the brigade as a whole (yuan)

Unit	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	Total
Oxen	60,000	24,000	12,000	204,000	192,000	156,000	72,000	60,000	780,000
Ploughs	3,000	1,200	600	10,200	9,600	7,800	3,600	3,000	39,000
Other implements	30,000	1,000	6,000	102,000	96,000	78,000	36,000	30,000	379,000
Seed, manure	4,000	1,600	800	13,600	12,800	10,400	4,800	4,000	52,000
Ox fodder	13,500	5,400	2,700	45,900	43,200	35,100	16,200	13,500	175,500
Total	110,500	33,200	22,100	375,700	353,600	287,300	132,600	110,500	1,425,500

of 2,400 *jin* worth 120,000 *yuan*. The battalion headquarters can plant 20 *mu* giving 600 *jin* worth 30,000 *yuan*.

(2) Reckoning at 4 *tou* of hulled grain for every 3 *mu*, 600 *mu* can produce 80 *tan* of hulled grain, and the 39,000 *mu* of the whole brigade can produce 5,200 *tan*. At a value of 1,250 *yuan* per *tan*, the crop from 600 *mu* will be worth 100,000 yuan, and that of the brigade's 39,000 *mu*, 6.5 million *yuan*.

(3) In each 600 *mu*, it is estimated that 300 will be planted to spiked millet. Each *mu* will produce 300 *jin* of hay giving a total of 90,000 *jin*. At a value of 1 *yuan* per *jin*, 600 *mu* will produce hay worth 90,000 *yuan*, and the whole brigade will produce hay worth 5,850,000 *yuan*.

The harvest totals are given [in Tables 8.7 and 8.8].

Table 8.7 Harvest total on 600 *mu*

Hulled grain	80	*tan*
Value of grain per *tan*	1,250	*yuan*
Total grain value	100,000	*yuan*
Hay	90,000	*jin*
Value of hay per 100 *jin*	100	*yuan*
Total value of hay	90,000	*yuan*
Total value grain & hay	190,000	*yuan*

After each regiment and unit has received this plan, it should at once call a meeting of production cadres to discuss implementation. The general plan for the regiment or unit and the plan for each provisions unit (including their own plans for vegetables, edible oil, lamp-oil, hemp for making sandals and so forth for which they have been self-sufficient for three years) should be reported upwards by the end of November. It is important that this should be obeyed.

The above materials show us that the army's self-supporting production has undoubtedly achieved a great deal. What have these achievements depended on? They have depended on the active leadership of the cadres and the labour enthusiasm of the troops. The cadres have given active leadership to the production movement consciously in order to overcome difficulties in the course of the revolution. The troops have taken part in productive labour consciously in order to overcome difficulties in the course of the revolution. If these two groups had not had this conscious awareness, if they had not felt that their work was not for others but for themselves, not for some worthless cause but

Table 8.8 Harvest for 359 Brigade

Unit	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	Total
Area planted in *mu*	3,000	1,200	600	10,200	9,600	7,800	3,600	3,000	39,000
Grain which could be harvested in *tan*	400	160	80	1,360	1,280	1,040	480	400	5,200
Hay (10,000) *jin*	45	18	9	153	144	117	54	45	585
Value of hay crops (10,000 *yuan*)	50	20	10	170	160	130	60	50	650
Total value of crops (10,000 *yuan*)	95	38	19	323	304	247	114	95	1,235

for the sacred cause of the revolution, there would have been no ways for them to fulfill these difficult production tasks. If they had felt they were hired labourers, if they had felt that the production they carried out had no relationship to their own interests and no relationship to the common revolutionary cause, there would have been no way to fulfill these production tasks.

Above we have discussed the fine experience and great achievements of our army in self-supporting production. Below we shall again discuss the shortcomings in our work.

Our work has shortcomings, and these shortcomings are not only found in the army but also in the official organizations and schools. Some of these shortcomings were unavoidable in the past. However, after five years' experience we should be able to correct them. Some have already become serious abuses. If we do not correct them, they will hinder the interests of the Party and the revolution.

What are these shortcomings?

First, in order to solve urgent problems of self-sufficiency quickly some army units and some official organizations and schools have relatively or specially stressed commerce and neglected agriculture and industry. They do not realize that only agriculture and industry produce value. Commerce is merely a medium of circulation. It cannot produce any value itself. Warned by experience, the production task for all forces and official organizations and schools in 1943 is gradually to transfer the main emphasis to agriculture, industry and transport. In our present circumstances, agriculture is particularly important since the majority of the things we need are agriculture products (staple grain, miscellaneous grain, vegetables, hemp, meat, vegetable-oil, animal-oil, cotton, horse-fodder, timber, firewood, etc.). Agricultural products can also be exported in exchange for industrial products. If we also undertake some possible and necessary handicrafts (spinning yarn, spinning wool, making shoes, weaving woollen thread and garments, digging coal, sawing wood, pressing oil, etc.), and large light industry (textiles, papermaking), we can meet the majority of our daily requirements and produce enough for trading.

The second shortcoming is that we lack unified planning and unified inspection. Lower levels act without coordination and upper levels either do not have or lack sufficient unified direction, planning and inspection of policy principles and work content. As a result the various branches do not know what they should not do, or do know but still do it. Thus instances of lack of coordination or struggling for independence often occur. Incidents have arisen where policy principles and government orders have been broken, where the people's interests have been damaged, where various economic units have not only not cooperated but have competed and hindered each other, where the upper levels have been deceived and not the lower levels, or where both have been deceived, where things have been kept back or where lies have been told. There has been great waste, reckless spending, concentration on show and not on results. Particularly serious are cases of the evils of bribery and corruption among cadres. Some cadres have been enticed by material things and are not loyal to the sacred cause of communism, having become completely corrupt. Other cadres, have been poisoned, and can only get back to health by drying out in the sun. All these bad things and all this corruption have occurred to a lesser or greater extent among some parts of the army and in some official organizations and schools. Henceforth, all upper-level leadership organs in the army and the official organizations and schools must place emphasis on looking after the whole situation and on grasping policy. They must provide unified planning and inspection for the productive activities of all subordinate units. They certainly must not permit the abuses described above to occur again. If they do occur again, they must be strictly disciplined. Less important cases should be criticized and serious ones punished. We certainly cannot condone them or, to use a flattering term, 'have a liberal policy'. These are the three work styles for rectification in economic work. We must carry them out without the slightest delay.

The third shortcoming is that in the production activities of many army units, official organizations and schools, the cadres responsible for administration and control do not take many pains. A minority even pay no attention at all and merely entrust everything to the supply organ or to the general office. This is because they still do not understand the importance of economic work. And the reason they still do not understand it is because they have been poisoned by the deceitful corrupting words of metaphysicists like Dong Zhongshu, 'Conform to the requirements and do not seek gain, be concerned with the way and do not plan for merit', and have not yet cast them fully aside. It is also because they consider politics, Party and army affairs come first and are most important, while economic work, although also important, is not important to the same degree. They feel that they themselves do not have to divide their attention or to give much attention by being concerned. However, these attitudes are entirely wrong. In the present situation in the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region, the great majority of people have work to do. If you talk of revolution, then in the final analysis apart from economic work and educational work (including theoretical education, political education, military education, cultural education, technical education, professional education and national education) what other work is worthy of the names central or primary work? Is there any other work that is more revolutionary? True, there is other work and a lot of it, but the central or primary work for the majority of comrades in the present situation in the Border Region is certainly economic work and educational work. All other work is only significant in the context of these two. If we conscientiously carry out these two items of work, we can consider that we have done well in supporting the war at the front and in helping the people of the great rear areas. Of the two, education (or study) cannot be carried out alone. We are not in a time when 'official rank lies in study'. We cannot go and 'conform to the requirements and illuminate the way' with hungry stomachs. We must get food to eat. We must pay attention to economic work. Talking of education or study separately from economic work is merely using superfluous and empty words. Talking of 'revolution' separately from economic work is like making revolution against the Finance Department and against yourselves. The enemy will not be in the least hurt by you. Because we have many comrades with leadership responsibilities who still take the attitude of neglecting or not paying much attention to economic work, many other comrades copy them, being willing to do Party; government, army and educational work, or to work in literature and art but unwilling to do economic work. Some female comrades are unwilling to marry economic workers, implying that they consider them dishonorable. They consider that marrying the head of a mule-and-horse-team would be an insult and they would rather marry a political-worker. In fact all these view-points are very wrong and do not match the situation in this time and place. We must make a new division of labour. We need some revolutionary specialists who are separate from production affairs. We also require some doctors, literature and art workers, and so forth. But we do not want many people like this. If there are too many then danger arises. If those who eat are many and those who produce are few, if those who are employed suffer and those who benefit are comfortable, we shall collapse. Therefore many cadres must be transferred from their present work or study to economic posts. Chief responsible cadres at all levels in the Party, government and army must at the same time pay full attention to leading economic work. They must investigate and study the content of economic work, be responsible for making plans for economic work, allocate cadres for economic work, inspect the results of economic work, and never again entrust this extremely important work to the supply departments or general offices alone and wash their hands of it.

The fourth shortcoming is that in the past some army units and official organizations have not had a division of labour between levels when allocating production tasks. All levels from brigade to company and from upper level to lower level have been permitted to run commerce without any limits. Thus many defects have arisen. Henceforth most commerce, industry and transport should be concentrated in brigades, in regiments working in independent areas and in upper-level organs. Furthermore these must work according to correct principles. Trade with the outside must be united under the direction of the Commodities Bureau. Units under regiments working in an independent area, units at battalion level or below, and most lower-level organs should be instructed to carry out agriculture, handicrafts that can be done by troops or miscellaneous personnel and business or trading of the consumer cooperative type. They are not allowed to do other work.

In light of achievements and shortcomings over the past five years, the concrete tasks for the various units of the army in 1943 are as follows:

(1) With the exception of most of the grain and some of the bedding and clothing which are supplied by the government, the great majority of army units should provide 80 percent of their own supplies. Some units (such as 359 Brigade) should provide 100 percent. Only those in special circumstances (such as the cavalry) can be allowed to bear a lighter production burden, and they too should think of ways to provide more in 1944. All forces should prepare to increase self-sufficiency in grain and clothing and bedding in 1944 so as to reduce the burden on the people and to let them build up their strength.

(2) With the exception of 359 Brigade, which is already fully carrying out the military farming system, or the cavalry, which would find it difficult because of special circumstances to implement that system at once, and of those with garrison duties, all other forces should carry out the policy of military farming in individual units or several units together so as to increase agricultural production.

(3) All units from top to bottom should carry out production in an organized, led and planned way. Set up production committees at all levels from brigade to company, and carry out collective planning and inspection at each level. Study improvements in production techniques so as to increase production and improve supplies. Correct all irregular phenomena.

(4) Select cadres strong in politics and ability to administer production and supply work in each department. Existing economic cadres should be examined. Incompetents and those who have committed corrupt and decadent errors must be transferred. Particularly serious cases must be punished. Every unit must set up a deputy battalion head with responsibility for production and personnel to administer production in companies. These people should specially control production and the distribution of tasks for whole battalions and whole companies. Brigade units and regimental units should establish deputy officers with responsibility for production to administer the production work of the units themselves. The commanding officer of each level must personally plan and inspect economic work.

(5) All economic and financial work of the Party, government and army in each sub-region should carry out coordinated cost-accounting under the leadership of the finance sub-committee of the sub-region. In order to stimulate the activism of the production and working personnel of all units, it should permit them to spend a suitable amount of the results of their production on improving their livelihood. Everything apart from this should be distributed in a coordinated way so as to avoid the problem of unequal benefits. Some coordinated distribution should be applied throughout the Border Region as a whole, some within the sub-regions, some within the various systems, and some within units. It can be decided according to the nature of production and the economic situation.

(6) Implement the policy of 'giving consideration to both the army and the people'. The economic activities of the army, Party and government should harmonize with the economic activities of the people. Anything that damages the people's interests or causes them dissatisfaction is not allowed.

(7) Production and education cannot be out of balance. All units must carefully plan both kinds of work and their mutual relationships. Correctly share out the time for each so that production and education in 1943 can be greater and better than in 1942. We have had five years' experience and it is entirely possible to achieve this aim.

(8) The core of the army's political work is to ensure the fulfillment of its production and education plans, to ensure that while it is carrying out these plans there are correct relationships with the Party, government, and people, to ensure the correct relationship between upper and lower levels within the army itself, and to ensure the purity of economic cadres. If political work does not fulfil its own task in these areas then it will be defeated.

9. On the Development of the Productive Undertakings of Official Organizations and Schools

Within the three branches of the public sector of the economy, production by the troops and by the official organizations and schools is directly intended to meet their own living and running-costs. Production by government organs is also included in this. For example, the personnel working in the various departments and offices of the Border Region government run agricultural, handicraft, and commercial undertakings. These directly supplement deficiencies in the running-expenses of the organs and in clothing, bedding and food for the personnel. By contrast the salt industry, industry and agriculture established as government enterprises are not intended to provide running-expenses but to meet the needs of the whole Party, government and army.

In Yan'an and the Border Region, the official organizations of the Party and government, leading organs of the mass organizations and many schools have pursued agriculture, industry and commerce under the slogans 'set-to ourselves' and self-reliance'. This is a broad mass-movement, and it has solved many big problems of finance and supply. It is only just second to the army's production and it is worth our while to sum up its experience carefully, to point out its achievements and shortcomings and to determine the work-plan for 1943.

The army's production movement began in 1938 and gained some experience. In 1939 we spread this experience into all official organizations and schools. In February 1939 we held a Production Mobilization Conference. We organized production committees to be leading organs for the production movement and we stipulated different production tasks according to the different circumstances of the work and study of each official organization and school and the strength of their labour force. For example, we laid down that working personnel in districts and townships should be fully self-sufficient in grain and other organizations from the center down to the county should be either one-half or one-third self-sufficient according to the strength and size of their labour force. In total we asked them to open up 100,200 *mu* of land and to harvest 13,000 *tan* of hulled grain. Besides this we decided that all official organizations and schools should be entirely self-sufficient in vegetables, should raise pigs for meat and should use the straw from their grain crops to provide part of the fodder for horses. At the time there were roughly 200,000 people in the official organizations and schools of the whole Border Region. We issued average production expenses of 2.60 *yuan* per head, a total of over

49,000 *yuan.* This provided capital to buy plough-oxen and agricultural tools. After they had found land and bought oxen and tools everyone was mobilized for the spring ploughing. Most of these people were intellectuals and youths who had never previously taken part in production. Together with cadres from worker and peasant backgrounds and service personnel, cooks and grooms, they were organized into production groups to open up the land. All hilltops near Yan'an with unused land became covered with men and women opening them up. They automatically showed labour discipline and declared competitions in clearing land. The strong took up hoes and the weak grew vegetables and raised pigs, or took food and water to the workers.

The gains from this production movement were: (i) the official organizations and schools of the whole Border Region opened up 113,414 *mu* of land, harvested 11,325.63 *tan* of grain (equivalent to 5,830.17 *tan* of hulled grain) and harvested roughly 1,200,000 *jin* of vegetables. At prevailing market-prices the two harvests were worth over 368,000 *yuan* (over 10,179,000 *yuan* at 1942 prices). This provided one-quarter of the grain requirements of 20,000 people, one-half of the horse fodder and some of the vegetables and meat. (ii) It enabled over 10,000 intellectuals and young people to understand from their own experience what physical labour is. This tempered them. (iii) When the common folk of the Border Region saw or heard that all working personnel and young students in all the Party and government official organizations—from Party Central Committee members to young service personnel—were all going up into the mountains to farm, they were moved. Everyone was keen to open up land and it became an exceptional year for doing so.

On the other hand, the stipulated task for grain productions was not fulfilled in this year because of lack of labour experience and because the application of manure, seed planting and weeding was not done at the right time. Also, in some areas there was drought and so forth. As a result, although a lot of land was opened up, the harvest was not large and only 45 percent of the original grain target of 13,000 *tan* of hulled grain was achieved. Secondly the error of egalitarianism was committed in leadership and organization. The different nature of each organization and school was not considered. Some were given tasks that were too great such as the call for district and township cadres to be self-sufficient in grain. In fact they only achieved one-quarter. Some put off and spoilt their work or study in order to carry out production with the result that it was uneconomic. In some cases male and female comrades too physically weak to do hard work, were forced to labour and their health suffered. Some units could in fact have undertaken industry and commerce but this was not pointed out at the time, and they purely and simply concentrated on agriculture.

In 1940 we corrected these shortcomings. First we reduced the agricultural production tasks. Apart from self-sufficiency in vegetables and meat, we stipulated that the official organizations and schools should be only from one-seventh to one-sixth or one-quarter self-sufficient in grain according to their different circumstances. We did not ask weak males nor any females to do physical labour. No person over fifty or under fifteen took part in production. We permitted the hiring of experienced peasants to join-in or to direct production. In addition the Finance Department issued 50,000 *yuan* to the official organizations and schools as capital to allow them to undertake industry and commerce and to develop animal husbandry, raising pigs and sheep. Therefore in agricultural production during 1940 we did not increase cultivated land beyond the existing amount. Some units lacked labour power and adopted the method of taking ordinary folk on as tenants. Some gave part of their grain-producing land to others and concentrated on planting vegetables and raising pigs. In addition some schools moved to other places in north China. Therefore the 1940 harvest only amounted to 3,000 *tan* of hulled grain and 900,000 *jin* of vegetables, worth 3 million *yuan* at the market-prices of the time.

The commerce we ran began with cooperatives. In 1939 each official organization and school had a consumers' cooperative and some had opened restaurants. By the first half of 1940 there were thirty cooperatives and restaurants with more than 60,000 *yuan* capital. The largest had 10,000 *yuan* and the smallest not more than a few hundred *yuan.* Their aim was to supply daily necessities for the organization or school itself. At the same time they sold to outsiders for a slight profit as a means of improving their livelihood. They had still not become commercial undertakings to meet general needs. However, they gave initial tempering to cadres running commerce, and accumulated some commercial experience and a small amount of capital.

In the two years of 1939 and 1940, the organizations and schools generally did not undertake industry. They only set up some flour mills for their own needs and the rear services. Jiaotong Store set up a smithy for horseshoes. These can be considered the beginnings of their handicraft production.

The above was the first period in self-sufficient production for the organizations and schools. Below we turn to the second period.

In the winter of 1940 the production tasks of the organizations and schools rapidly changed as a result of the economic blockade of the Border Region, the cutting-off of outside aid, the extreme financial difficulties, and the unavoidable need to move quickly from semi-self-sufficiency to full self-sufficiency in finance and supplies.

At the time (with the exception of the troops) the various organs of the Party, government, army and mass organizations and the personnel of the schools could not all take up agriculture and the task of achieving self-sufficiency was extremely difficult. On the one hand we wanted to rely on developing production to ensure daily and monthly supplies. At the same time we wanted to accumulate capital to establish a foundation for future self-sufficiency.

In order to get through this difficult situation, the Party and government adopted necessary steps. First we improved the organizations for leading production. In succession we established the Finance and Economy Office directly under the Central Committee, the Rear Services Economic Construction Office, the Finance and Economy Office at top level in the Border Region Government, and ordered each sub-region and county to set up production committees. Second, between the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 the government paid out 700,000 *yuan* and the Border Region Bank lent 3 million *yuan* to increase the production capital of the various branches. This was handed to the various bodies leading self-sufficient production for issuing downwards, to be added to the capital accumulated by the organizations themselves in the first period. Thereupon everyone made new arrangements, selected personnel, chose undertakings put industry and commerce to the fore.

Agriculture was then placed in a subordinate position.

Below we shall discuss the experience of the various organizations and schools in industry, commerce and agriculture during this period.

The starting point for the industry of the organizations and schools was textiles. Since the Border Region had wool, the personnel of the organizations and schools spun wool by hand after work and study during the winter of 1940. For a while it became a movement and everybody began to spin. But since there was not enough raw material and spinning skills were poor, the woolen threads were uneven, and too much labour was wasted. After March 1941 this was gradually stopped and we applied ourselves to setting up handicraft textile mills. In the first half of 1941 each large organization and school selected service personnel and messengers to go to the Refugee Textile Mill run by the government to study spinning and weaving. Like bamboo shoots after spring rain, more than ten textile mills grew up within a short time. The shortcoming was that there was no planning. By the latter half of the year because they had no ensured supply of raw materials or market for yarn, or because they lacked sufficient liquid capital or were poorly administered, some had closed, some had merged and some had temporarily closed. For example, the Xin Zhongguo Textile Mill of the Finance and Economy Office directly under the Central Committee first merged with the Shengli Mill of the Central Organization Department and then merged with the Tuanjie Mill run by the Marxism-Leninism Institute. Then using the name of Tuanjie Textile Mill, it was run in a centralized way and got more profit. The wool-spinning factory run by the Lu Xun Academy and the Women's University was closed down and its capital used elsewhere. The Tuanjie Textile Mill of the Financial and Economy Office under the Central Committee and the Jiaotong Mill run by the Rear Services could not fully employ their production capacity because of all kinds of difficulties. They alternately worked and closed down for a while until they eventually got on the right track. Thus the process of moving from a hand-spinning movement of several thousands of people to the setting up of handicraft factories, from the setting up of over ten small textile mills and wool-spinning factories to the final merger into two factories, the Jiaotong and the Tuanjie, was a process of moving from blindness to consciousness in which there was continuous groping forward through research, improvement in techniques and improvement in administration. This process on the one hand illustrated the hard-working spirit of the various organizations and schools and on the other illustrated our complete lack of experience in running industry at that time. By 1942 the Jiaotong produced 3,336 bolts of cloth and the Tuanjie produced 2,736, becoming major factories in the Border Region. They are the valuable creation of the process of hard work and groping the way forward.

Besides textile mills, the organizations and schools directly under the Central Committee have successively set up many handicraft factories for such things as bedding and clothing, shoes, coal and charcoal, carpentry, paper-making, pottery, flour-milling and oil-pressing, silk weaving and making iron implements. Their aim has been self-sufficiency. The capital for these factories came either from commercial capital, or from bank loans, or from the closure of the wool-spinning factories. Warned by the experience with textiles, these factories were not run in such an entirely disorganized way. They were rather more orderly with several organizations and schools cooperating, or with cooperation with the common folk or with the Bank. But it was not all plain sailing.

Most only laid a firm foundation after following a winding path from initial loss of capital through continued support to final profit.

In the years 1941 and 1942, the system under the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office [*Zhong-cai xitong*] set up a total of twenty-seven large and small handicraft factories with total capital of over 400,000 *yuan* and with 477 employees. Among them there were eight textile mills with 217,000 *yuan* capital and 161 employees, three coal and charcoal factories with 70,000 *yuan* capital and sixty-eight employees, three mills with 15,000 *yuan* capital and twenty-one employees, two bedding and clothing factories with forty-eight employees (capital details not available), three carpentry factories with 35,000 *yuan* capital and seven employees, one shoe factory with 10,000 *yuan* capital and thirty-eight employees, and one papermaking workshop with 20,000 *yuan* capital and twenty-nine employees. In addition there were six small factories individually producing machinery, glass, alcohol, pottery, oil-lamps and blankets. (There are no statistics on capital and employees for these factories. The first three were experimental undertakings by the Natural Sciences Institute.) All the above factories were reorganized in September 1941 when the official organizations and schools directly under the Central Committee carried out their first drive for better troops and simpler administration. They were transferred to the direct control of Central Administration Bureau (the Finance and Economy Office directly under the Central Committee was dissolved and we set up the Central Administration Bureau attached to the Central Work Department [*Zhongyang Bangongting*]). Their number was reduced from twenty-seven by closure or merger to nineteen. In particular the merging of the eight textile mills into two, the Tuanjie and the Shiyan, enabled concentration of management and improvement in operation. Thus we were able to move from a situation where eight mills either lost capital or just maintained themselves to one of a profit of 1,600,0000 *yuan* in October 1942.

Self-sufficient industry run by the Rear Services system was started in the winter of 1940 just like that run by the central financial system. After two years' operation, 1941 and 1942, there was one textile mill, two papermaking factories, three charcoal factories, two carpentry factories, two silk-weaving factories, and one factory each for coal [*shitan*], refined salt, pottery, bedding and clothing, writing-brushes, ironwork, flour-milling, shoes and hemp-weaving, a total of nineteen altogether. There are no statistics yet for the amount of capital, number of employees, and amount of production of these factories. Although the profit earned by these undertakings is not great (in the first ten months of 1942 it was 200,000 *yuan*), their great merits are: (I) they are run in a centralized way by the Rear Services and are not run freely in a dispersed way as by the various official organizations and schools. Thus leadership and inspection are thorough, and mistakes are quickly corrected. (ii) They constitute a wide range of operation. Unlike the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office system's initial concentration on textiles through the establishment of eight factories, the Rear Services has at all times only run one factory, the Jiaotong Textile Mill, and thus had spare capacity to do other things. (iii) They are entirely aimed at ensuring supplies. Although they do not earn money, they have provided a supply of many necessary goods.

In October 1942 we carried out a thorough drive for better troops and simpler administration. The Central Administration Bureau and Rear Services systems were combined, and their industries administered in a unified way. We also carried out further reorganization. The Tuanjie and Jiaotong textile mills and the bedding and clothing factories were transferred to the Finance Department. The medicine, alcohol, iron, and glassmaking factories were transferred to the Garrison Office. The Natural Sciences Institute and all the things that went with it were handed over to the government. All remaining factories were closed or merged and handed over to the control of the Central Administration Bureau. By December 1942 there were three carpentry factories, two papermaking factories, five charcoal-factories, one shoe-factory, one oil-pressing factory, one flour-mill, three grinding-mills, one cart-factory, one wine-factory and three blanket-workshops, a total of twenty-one large and small handicraft factories and workshops. These can ensure all supplies of coal, shoes and flour, the manufacture and repair of all wooden and galvanized-iron implements, and some of the paper and edible-oil requirements for the whole of the Central Administration Bureau system. Bedding and clothing are supplied by the government. This is the outcome of the activism in industrial production over the past two years of the Central Administration Bureau (prior to September 1941 the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office) and the Rear Services.

The above experience shows that under present circumstances it is essential for the official organizations and schools to run handicrafts. The aim is not to earn money but to ensure supplies of necessities. However, organizations and schools cannot set up any kind of factory they want to. They should choose in a planned way which ones to run, according to the nature of the industry and the situation in the official organization or school. They should reduce the number of errors created by blindly groping around. Existing factories should be organized into systems according to area and official organization. Cutbacks, mergers, and transfers can reduce waste and enable them to play an even greater role in providing supplies.

As mentioned above, our comrades lacked experience of running commerce in the same way as they did of running industry. They had previously only managed a few cooperatives. We wished to turn to relying on a profit from commerce in order to provide a large proportion of supplies. What had to be done? Once again it was a process of moving from blindness to consciousness in order to find an answer to this question.

During 1941 and 1942 commerce started off with the aim of rapidly overcoming difficulties. Therefore we had no choice but to use the bulk of the capital of each official organization and school to trade for a quick profit.

In the year from autumn 1940 to autumn 1941 we mainly operated large stores. Some official organizations and schools enlarged their existing low-capital, small-profit cooperatives, small shops and stalls, increasing capital and staff, joining chambers of commerce and running proper commercial undertakings. For example, the Jiaotong Store of the military base was at first a small cigarette-shop set up at the entrance to the base at Qilipu in Yan'an. In August 1939 it moved to the new market in Yan'an and as well as selling general goods set up a Chinese Medicine shop and a horseshoe-shop. Its capital increased from a few hundred *yuan* to 20,000 *yuan.* Another example is the Hezuo Store which grew from the cooperative of the Anti-Japanese University. In June 1940 it moved to the new market and set up branch stores at the three branch schools of the Anti-Japanese University. Its capital increased from 80 *yuan* to 19,000 *yuan.* The Rear Services Store was at first a small stall with 30 *yuan* capital. By September 1940 it had expanded and its capital had grown to 20,000 *yuan.* As well as selling goods it also set up a dyeing shop. Originally many official organizations and schools did not have shops. Around this time they too collected capital and people together and set up business either independently or in partnerships. At the time the business done by all the publicly-run stores depended on trading goods mainly from Suide, Dingbian and Fuxian counties, in particular the cloth, paper, writing-materials required by the official organizations, schools and troops themselves, and the matches, raw cotton and so forth required by the common folk. During this period the official organizations and schools set up over sixty large and small stores in Yan'an, Suide and Dingbian, not including those run by the army. In addition, there were many that did not set up premises but depended on one or two people and a few animals to trade goods along the roads, calling it ‘floating trade’. According to statistics for October 1941 the stores under the control of the Rear Services’ committee for store administration were the Xibei Store, the Xibei Vegetable Cooperative, and fourteen large and small stores including the Xinghua, the Hezuo, the Jiaotong, the Xinxin, the Xingmin, the Minxing, the Biahuo, the Junmin, and so forth. The Central Administration Bureau had twenty stores.

We really relied on commerce to pass through a serious crisis during that year. It solved great problems of supply. For example, during the first half of 1941 the Central Committee’s Finance and Economy Office and the official organizations and schools relied on the twenty large and small stores run by 113 staff with 296,800 *yuan* capital to earn a profit of 256,000 *yuan* which supplied 48 percent of their daily running-expenses. The Rear Services system with capital of 706,000 *yuan* made 810,000 *yuan* profit in the same period which supplied 45 percent of their daily running-costs.

However commerce during this period had one great fault which was excessive dispersal and no centralized leadership. Furthermore, almost all of it was trade in general goods. These faults came from the urgent need to solve difficulties in running-costs for each official organization and school. Each acted without coordination, competed with others and even disobeyed Party policy, influencing prices and currency. Simultaneously. there was price inflation, the Border Region banknotes lost value and the external blockade intensified. Suddenly dealing in export and import of general goods had a gloomy future and the various official organizations and schools which relied on this for their running-expenses also found themselves with problems. In this situation, it was urgently necessary to transform the commerce run by the official organizations and schools and by the army. This transformation began in the latter half of 1941. In the spring of 1942 the Border Region carried out an initial drive for better troops and simpler administration. It was then decided to organize all commerce into proper enterprises [*qiyehua*]. On the one hand each system put its existing stores in order, organized a joint committee for publicly-run commerce, unified the leadership of publicly-run stores, and strictly carried out laws, commands and policies. On the other hand they expanded the scope of commercial activity, carrying out many kinds of business such as salt-shops, mule and horse supplies, transshipment agencies, merchant warehousing, slaughtering and so forth. The method of operation also changed. In some cases stores were merged, in others capital was invested in private stores or in cooperatives and the official organization or school did not run its own trade. In other cases capital was invested in the government's Salt Company or in the Guanghua Store. Thereafter the fault of having too many shops competing with each other was avoided, and the function of providing the running-costs of the official organizations and schools could be restored. For example, as a result of reorganization according to this policy the Central Administration Bureau and Rear Services systems reduced the number of their shops from thirty-eight with 196 staff to twenty-five with 105 staff by October 1942. In the first ten months of 1942 the two systems earned a profit of 16,440,000 *yuan* with capital of 8 million *yuan*. This accounted for 68 percent of all production income. Also during 1942 the production committees of the various departments and offices of the Border Region Government earned 600,000 *yuan* from agriculture and commerce, of this commerce accounted for 350,000 *yuan* or 58 percent. Official organizations at sub-region and county level originally put agriculture first but by 1942 commerce was the most important.

In 1943 financial and economic leadership will be united [*yiyuanhua*]. External trade will be unified under the Commodities Bureau. Every official organization and school must carry out a thorough drive for better troops and simplified administration. As a result the commerce run by the official organizations and schools must be regulated by the Commodities Bureau, must share in running transport for local products and salt, and must allocate some capital for cooperation with the Commodities Bureau. In this way publicly-run commerce will be more rational.

The agricultural production of the official organizations and schools also made progress in 1941 and 1942. In these two years there were great achievements in the areas of grain, vegetables, charcoal and labour after work.

Some official organizations and schools were still growing grain entirely independently in 1941, some had already changed to forming partnerships with the common folk, and some ran agricultural stations (including both independent operation and partnerships). Independent operation had changed somewhat. The entire personnel no longer went up the mountains to farm. Instead, those who went were chiefly those doing miscellaneous duties organized into production teams accompanied by some of the physically stronger personnel. For example, the production teams of the various official organizations in the Rear Services system planted 5,200 *mu* of grain in 1941, and the Central Party School planted 800 *mu*. Those in partnership with the common folk included the Central organization Department which planted 840 *mu* and divided the grain at a ratio of 2:8, 2 to the government and 8 to the private individuals, and the hay at a ratio of 7:3, 7 to the government and 3 to the individuals. The agricultural stations included the two stations run by the Secretariat of the Border Region Government on a partnership basis. There were also the independent stations run at Nanniwan by teams selected from the miscellaneous duties personnel of the official organizations and schools equipped with oxen and tools. These included two from the Rear Services and one each from the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office, the Central Organization Department and the Youth League cadres. Official organizations of the sub-regions and counties also adopted both independent operation and partnerships.

In 1942 the drive for better troops and simpler administration was carried out. Many official organizations and schools in Yan'an were merged. As a result, self-supporting vegetable production continued but all grain production was only carried out either at agricultural stations or in partnerships.

Although partnerships have some of the character of exploitation, the common folk, in particular the immigrants and refugees, appreciate it very much since the government supplies seed, plough oxen and agricultural implements, and the taxes are not high. This method has a role to play in encouraging immigration and in adjusting the use of labour power. The Party School provides an example:

The general office of the Party School planted 300 *mu* in partnership with four immigrants. These four were all very strong. The Party School sent one man responsible for leadership and inspection. The arrangements were for the Party School to supply the agricultural tools, a hoe, a pick and a sickle per man, to lend two oxen and to give the seed. They also lent grain at rate of 4 *sheng* of hulled grain per 3 *mu* making 4 *tan* for 300 *mu*. It was agreed to repay in the autumn of the following year. The division of the grain and hay harvest was laid down as 20 percent of the spiked millet [*gu (zi)*] for the government and 80 percent for the private individuals, 30 percent of coarse millet [*meizi*] for the government and 70 percent for the private individuals, and 40 percent of the miscellaneous grains for the government and 60 percent for the private individuals. All the hay went to the Party School. This year the Party School received 10,500 *jin* of hay, 8.37 *tan* of spiked millet, 10.17 *tan* of coarse millet, 6.9 *tou* of black beans [*heidou*] 4.2 *tou* of hemp-seed [*xiao mazi*], l *tou* of sesame [*lao mazi*] and 2 *tou* of adzuki beans [*xiaodou*], valued at a total of 31,925 *yuan* in Border Region money. The four partners received 33.48 *tan* of spiked millet, 22.4 *tan* of coarse millet, 7.5 *tou* of black beans, 6.3 *tou* of hemp-seed, 1.5 *tou* of sesame, and 3 *tou* of adzuki beans, valued at a total of 46,805 *yuan* This is a good example of giving consideration to both public and private interests.

There is also new experience in building up agriculture stations. Since the personnel selected from the official organizations and schools are not strong labour powers, have limits on their working-time and are not skilled in agricultural techniques, they will waste their capital if they only concentrate on farming. In 1942 we adopted the following two methods. One was independent operation which includes subsidiary undertakings such as animal husbandry, wood-plank sawing and so forth as well as planting grain. This was like the method adopted by 359 Brigade. The other was to form partnerships and involved going into partnership with the common folk on stations that already had some foundation, and setting up another new station oneself. In the first year the new station brings no profit but in the second year it has some foundation and can also be changed into a partnership. The Secretariat of the Border Region Government provides an example. According to the comrades there:

We have two stations, one to the east, the other to the south. Their size, method of operation and harvest are much the same. In 1942 the southern station planted 288 *mu* of river land, 324 *mu* of previously farmed hill land and 408 *mu* of newly opened land. Altogether the harvest was 244 *tan* of grain. Since beans and corn formed the bulk, this was equivalent to 146.6 *tan* of hulled grain. Taking each *tan* at 1,300 *yuan* this was worth 190,230 *yuan.* We also harvested 14,000 *jin* of hay worth 14,000 *yuan* and 20,000 *jin* of vegetables worth 20,000 *yuan.* The total value for these three items was 224,320 *yuan.* Originally we had 128 sheep. In 1942, eighty-one lambs were raised, worth 10,000 *yuan.* We bought pigs for 3,482 yuan, and we also had thirteen worth 400 *yuan* each. The total of all the above items is 243,002 *yuan.*

As we have adopted the method of partnership operation all our expenditures were taken from the amount harvested including all expenses for the five men we assigned. We went into partnership with twelve households, totaling forty-five people. They had nineteen whole-labour powers, thirteen half-labour powers and thirteen children not able to work. Altogether their share was 68 *tan* of grain equivalent 40.8 *tan* of hulled grain with a total value of 53,040 *yuan* at 1,300 *yuan* per *tan*. They also received 7,000 *jin* of hay worth 7,000 *yuan.* The two items came to 60,040 *yuan.* Our own five men (one was crippled and looked after general running, two cooked, planted vegetables and crops, and two looked after sheep and did general work) four oxen, one mule and five dogs received 30 *tan* of grain for eating equivalent to 18 *tan* of hulled grain worth 23,400 *yuan* and 50 *jin* of edible oil worth 1,300 *yuan* at 26 *yuan* per *jin*. In addition, repairs to implements, ploughs, clothing and supplementary payments came to 20,000 *yuan.* The total of all the above expenditure was 104,740 *yuan* giving a surplus of 138,262 *yuan.* Adding on the roughly 110,000 *yuan* from the eastern station, the return on the two stations was roughly 250,000 *yuan.*

The two stations are nominally run by the Secretariat and the Civil Affairs, Finance, Education and Reconstruction Departments. In practice, they only send out ten people of whom two are hired labourers, one is a cripple and seven are surplus personnel. The government has a production committee to control the two stations. In practice usually only one person runs things. This year thanks to floods and strong winds we were 150 *tan* short on our harvest, worth 117,000 *yuan.* We were also swindled on the seeds we bought for turnips and cabbage which were the wrong kind. This lost 30,000 *yuan.* These two items came to 147,000 *yuan* and total losses for the two stations were roughly 200,000 *yuan.* This means that without natural disasters and the wrong seeds we could get 200,000 *yuan* more. The working personnel in the Civil Affairs, Finance, Education, Reconstruction Departments and the Secretariat number around 400. The income of 250,000 *yuan* is thus an average of 625 *yuan* per head. Although the harvest this year is below norm, they have laid the foundations for next year and provided a livelihood for twelve immigrant households. Furthermore, relying on this foundation, next year we are preparing to expand the ploughed land at the southern station by 900 *mu* so as to settle down surplus personnel. The two original stations will still be run as partnerships.

The method adopted by the county-level official organizations also include both individual operation and partnerships. For example, the top-rank official organizations in Yan'an county have planted a total of 630 *mu*. Of these over 270 *mu* are farmed in partnership with two households. These have five labour powers and the county committee has only assigned two people to work on the station. The remaining 360 *mu* are farmed by criminals. In 1942, excluding the amount distributed to the partners, they received a total of 75 *tan* of grain, equivalent to 45 *tan* of hulled grain with a value of 58,500 *yuan.* With the addition of hay worth 3,000 yuan, the total was 61,500 *yuan.*

As the above examples show, independent operation, partnerships and a combination of both are correct. We should pay attention to this experience when determining the grain production tasks for 1943.

A very great task in agricultural work is the growing of vegetables, since grain is also provided by the grain tax. If vegetables are not grown then over 20,000 people will be semi-starved. The saying 'no vegetables is like half a year's famine' is completely true.

The method for producing vegetables in the past two years has been to assign personnel specially for growing them and to assign some supplementary labour from the official organizations and schools. Each year we have on average been self-sufficient for three to six months. According to the Rear Services statistics, in 1941 their various official organizations and schools planted 1,801 *mu* of vegetables consisting of 1,030 *mu* of potatoes and 771 *mu* of cabbage, beans, turnips and miscellaneous vegetables.

In autumn, autumn cabbage and autumn turnips were planted on the 771 *mu*. Over the year 879,000 *jin* of vegetables were harvested equal to one-third of annual consumption on average. According to the Central Administration Bureau statistics, in 1942 the various official organizations and schools directly under central control assigned forty personnel for growing vegetables and planted 388 *mu* of river land and 1,941 *mu* of hill land. They harvested 745,000 *jin* of vegetables, being self-sufficient for five months on average. The Central Administration Bureau itself supplied nine months of its needs. Yan'an University and the Natural Sciences Institute both supplied eight months of their needs, and the Central Research Institute and the Chinese Writers Anti-Aggression Association [*Wen-kang*] both supplied seven months of their needs. The circumstances for vegetable production by the personnel in the various official organizations are very varied. For example, in Guanzhong sub-region they can only plant a little on account of the climate, and can only achieve three months' self-sufficiency on average. In the special military area they can only reach two or three months' self-sufficiency because of the scarcity of land. In some areas such as Huachi, Mudan and other counties they can achieve six months' or more because they have land and can farm in partnerships. Production of vegetables for their own use by official organizations and schools throughout the Border Region is estimated to be worth around 6 million *yuan.*

The problem here is to discern whether the method whereby the official organizations and schools assign production personnel to grow vegetables outside their permanent organizational structure is ultimately worthwhile or not. The experience of the various offices under central control shows that it is. The best land for growing vegetables is river land, where all kinds of green vegetables can be grown. On hilly land only potatoes and beans can be grown. One *mu* of river land growing vegetables can supply five people for a whole year, that is 0.2 *mu* per person. However, 1.5 *mu* of hill land is required to supply one person for one year. Furthermore, so long as a man specializing in growing vegetables has additional help when spreading manure, he can farm 6 *mu* of river land. This means that one man specializing in growing vegetables together with some supplementary labour can supply a year's vegetables for thirty people. The daily vegetable requirement per head is 12 liang and the annual requirement is 300 *jin*. For thirty people the annual requirement is 9,000 *jin*. At December 1942 Yan'an market prices of 3 *yuan* per *jin*, the total value of this is 27,000 *yuan.* Allowing 6,000 *yuan* for the man specializing in growing vegetables there is a surplus of 21,000 *yuan.* Taking the necessary incentive payments into account, the least return is 20,000 *yuan.* Therefore in future after each official organization and school has carried out a thorough drive for better troops and simpler administration, it should pay attention to arranging river land for growing vegetables, to assigning personnel for the work, to providing supplementary labour and to ensuring self-sufficiency in vegetables for more than half a year and even for a whole year.

Apart from grain and vegetables, raising pigs and sheep for meat is also an important part of agriculture.

Some people consider that raising pigs wastes grain. However, our experience proves that raising pigs does not waste grain and, instead, not raising them does. First of all, without pigs, left-overs have to be thrown away, and there are quite a lot of left-overs in large official organizations and companies. Secondly, if little meat is eaten then greater quantities of other food is consumed, and if a lot of meat is eaten then less other food is consumed. Thus, raising pigs to increase meat supplies is not only necessary to maintain health but is also economically rational. The various official organizations and schools have developed many ways of raising pigs. For example, the Central Party School directed the pig slaughterhouse to send someone to the kitchen daily to collect the water in which the grain was washed and the vegetable waste to feed the pigs. The Central General Affairs Section [*Zhongyang Zongwuchu*] directed someone to collect as pig-food the waste left after husking the grain and also the leaves and roots left over in the vegetable plots when the vegetables were harvested. According to the Rear Services Department statistics, in the first half of 1941 its various official organizations got 56,814 *jin* of pork worth 170,440 *yuan* at the market-prices of that time. This was enough for each person to have 1 *jin* of pork a month. If we add the following six months, the value for the whole year was roughly 350,000 *yuan.* According to the statistics of the Central Administration Bureau, the various official organizations and schools directly under central control raised an average of 265 pigs a month up to October 1942. Over the ten months this gave an estimated 23,330 *jin* of pork worth 700,000 *yuan* in Border Region currency. Another example is the top-level official organizations in Yan'an county, which in the first ten months of 1942 earned 10,000 *yuan* from pig-raising. According to these figures the total value of animal husbandry by the official organizations and schools of the whole Border Region is more than 4 million *yuan.*

As well as raising pigs, raising sheep is also profitable where there is pasture.

After a thorough drive for better troops and simpler administration in 1943, we can adopt the method used by 359 Brigade whereby they assign one cook for every forty people and reduce the service personnel. The remaining cooks and service personnel are sent to work on the production front where they can do many things such as growing grain and vegetables, and raising pigs and sheep. Running large-scale animal husbandry on large livestock farms should be given greater prominence in 1943.

Apart from the grain, vegetables and animals, there is also charcoal-burning and labour done outside working hours, both of which have provided examples worth looking at. All the charcoal used in the winter of 1942 by the various official organizations and schools in Yan'an was provided by teams of people from those institutions sent up into the hills. If it had been bought, a substantial sum of money would have been involved. In September the Central General Affairs Section organized a charcoal-burning team of forty-two people made up of service personnel, cooks and grooms to spend three months up in the hills making charcoal. Altogether they prepared 145 pits of charcoal completing their task of making 140,000 *jin*. At 1.20 *yuan* a *jin* this was worth 168,000 *yuan.* If during the four winter months the 30,000 people in the official organizations and schools of the Border Region on average made 1 *jin* of charcoal per head per day, this would provide 3,600,000 *jin* of charcoal worth 3,600,000 *yuan.* If we do not make the charcoal ourselves, where shall we find such a large amount of money?

There is also the labour done outside working-hours by the miscellaneous duties personnel of the official organizations and offices of the Border Region. For example, the Central General Affairs Section this year mobilized them to repair buildings, to build surrounding walls, to make bridges, to build roads and to cut horse-fodder. This saved the government over 110,000 *yuan.* Similar labour done by miscellaneous personnel of the Central Party School saved the government over 139,000 yuan; and 359 Brigade did not employ outside workers for any of its repairs or new construction. All official organizations and schools should strive to do the same. Mobilize all the people in an official organization or school to do all the work they can do. If we only consider the labour done after working hours by miscellaneous duties personnel, the amount from all the official organizations and schools of the Border Region could be surprising. We should give rewards to all people who make achievements in production, and this should also apply to labour outside working-hours.

The above is a summary of the experience of the various official organizations and schools of the Border Region in self-sufficient production during the period 1939-42.

According to the comrades doing economic work, in the two years 1941 and 1942 the agricultural, industrial and commercial capital of the Central Administration Bureau and the Rear Services Department rose from 1,281,917 *yuan* to 11,690,000 *yuan* (much of this increase was due to the fall in the value of the currency and it was not all due to increased production). The production surplus of the year 1942 was 23,810,000 *yuan.* Except for the 2,330,000 *yuan* retained to increase production capital in 1943, the remaining 21,480,000 *yuan* was all used to supplement food, clothing, bedding and office expenses for the various official organizations and schools. In terms of the type of enterprise, agriculture accounted for 17 percent, industry 8 percent, salt 7 percent and commerce 68 percent. In terms of the official organizations, the enterprises directly under the control of the Rear Services Department got 8,400,000 yuan, those directly under the Central Administration Bureau 3,500,000 yuan, those jointly run by the above two 800,000 yuan, and those run by the various official organizations and schools individually 11,100,000 *yuan.* If we compare the amount of self-supporting production and the amount supplied by the people, the former is 57.5 percent and the latter 42.5 percent. The comrades at county level estimate that the monthly running-expenses for Party and government at county level is roughly 10,000 *yuan.* Their own production is around 9,000 *yuan* and the upper levels only issue around 1,000 *yuan.* The proportion is thus 90 percent to 10 percent and is an even greater achievement.

In sum, the self-supporting production work of the official organizations and schools of Yan'an and of the whole Border Region has had some success. It has not only supplied the greater part of daily running-expenses and solved urgent financial problems but has also laid a secure foundation for the public sector of the economy. Relying on this base, we can continue to develop production and solve future problems.

What is particularly important and worth raising is that we have gained experience in running economic enterprises. This is a priceless treasure that cannot be reckoned in figures. We should not only be able to manage political, military, Party and cultural affairs, but should also be able to manage economic affairs. If we could do all the others but not economic work, we would be a useless bunch of people. We would be overthrown by our enemies and decline until we collapsed.

In the light of our experience of the past five years and particularly the past two, production by official organizations and schools must henceforth improve, expanding its achievements, overcoming its weak points, developing towards greater consolidation and completing even greater production tasks. In 1943 we should adopt the following policies.

(1) Implement the policy of taking agriculture as the chief sector.

(A) According to the actual circumstances in the official organizations and schools, in each system adopt the following methods of running agriculture: (i) Those with no foundations in agricultural stations should at once set-to to prepare ploughs and tools, and separately or in partnership with the people grow grain and vegetables. (ii) Those with agricultural stations, as well as continuing production, should expand the scope of operations and arrange for surplus personnel to do more subsidiary work such as raising pigs, sheep, chickens and ducks, sawing planks and so forth. They should also form partnerships with the ordinary people and open new farms. With these methods grain production in 1943 will be greater and better than in 1942. Agriculture must not be considered backward and must not be neglected.

(B) All official organizations and schools, large and small, must allocate the necessary personnel to specialize in growing vegetables supplemented by light work done by working personnel and students. According to the area and climate become self-sufficient in vegetables for six or more months of the year, and strive to become entirely self-sufficient. This is one of the most important steps in improving livelihood.

(2) Coordinate and develop the various kinds of handicrafts. According to the area, system and the principle of better troops and simpler administration, join the existing handicrafts of a similar nature run by each section into partnerships. At the same time, according to the needs of each area and each system, set up new handicraft workshops, such as oil-pressing workshops, places

to make soya sauce and condiments, charcoal pits and so forth. The principles for running these handicrafts should be first that the workshop itself must be self-supporting, and second that it can make a profit.

(3) Develop animal husbandry. All official organizations and schools both large and small should raise pigs and strive to equal 359 Brigade's rate of one pig for every five people, so as to increase the supply of meat. Treat increasing the supply of meat, improving living-standards and raising health-standards as extremely important matters. In addition, each large official organization and school, and particularly the army, should set aside capital and without harming the interests of the people select areas in Sanbian, Longdong, Jinpenwan and so forth to run livestock farms. They should raise large numbers of cows, sheep, donkeys and horses, preparing for the time after victory in the War of Resistance when the Border Region's salt trade declines and it has to be replaced by animal exports.

(4) Develop transport undertakings. After a thorough drive for better troops and simpler administration, keep only a small number of animals to ensure the transport of grain and straw needed by each official organization and school itself. All surplus animals together with animals specially purchased should be organized into transport teams to transport salt or goods. These transport undertakings can be run by area and system as the best way of reducing costs.

(5) Regulate commerce. Following the policy of commerce playing a supplementary role and the principles of not going against trading policies nor doing speculative business, run shops in partnerships or individually according to the circumstances in the various systems and units after the drive for better troops and simpler administration. Eradicate commerce which goes against policy and close unprofitable shops. The various systems should transfer the proportion needed from commercial capital to agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, and transport. Do not hesitate to lay secure foundations in the work of becoming self-supporting through agriculture, industry, animal husbandry, and transport.

(6) Treat improving the livelihood of the working personnel, miscellaneous duties personnel and students in the official organizations and schools as an important matter. Responsible people in these institutions should think of all kinds of ways of doing so. Under the principle of voluntary participation, they should encourage and direct miscellaneous duties personnel, working personnel and mothers with children to carry out some handicraft or agricultural production in ways which do not hinder their work, study or health. However,

they should not run commerce. This work can be carried out in large production cooperatives, in small production groups or individually as the people involved wish. The government should provide loans for capital and the earnings should belong to the people who take part in the labour. All responsible people who run this very well and have the best successes should get rewards. All those who are not good at running their official organizations and schools hence make the life of the working personnel, miscellaneous duties personnel, students, mothers, children, the sick and the convalescent too harsh, or those who improve livelihood through ways which are wrong, hinder work and study, or sabotage policies and orders should be criticized and taken to task.

(7) Implement unified leadership. Firmly carry out the principle of unified leadership and dispersed operation. The top-levels of the central Committee, the Border Region, the special regions [*zhuangqu*] and the counties should all set up strong leadership organizations concerned with unifying all production undertakings. According to the system and level, unify the policies for running enterprises, unify the coordination between the enterprises, and unify the ways of inspecting the running of each enterprise. Furthermore, under the condition of permitting each production unit to retain a suitable profit for itself, within a suitable area and according to the nature of production and operation, unify the distribution of the profits from production. This is necessary to avoid the great evils of lack of coordination, of inequalities in profits and losses, and of disparities in hardship and comforts.

(8) All agriculture, industry, animal husbandry, transport and commerce must be run as proper enterprises [*qiyehua*], using the system of economic accounting. The food, bedding, clothing and payments for the working personnel and employees in each enterprise should be supplied by the enterprise itself. They must not be provided at public expense.

(9) All production organs (factories, shops, etc.) should be ‘popularized’ no matter whether they belong to the government, the troops or the official organizations and schools. With the exception of the allocation of production tasks, the administration and supervision of production and the disposal of the results of production, everything else is under the leadership of the local Party and government, even including branch life. All personnel in production organizations must carry out policies, be law-abiding and pay taxes, take off their uniforms and put on ordinary clothing, join in the activities of the local masses and be model citizens of the Border Region.

(10) In accordance with the concrete circumstances, the Finance and Econ-

omy Office and the financial and economic committees of the sub-regions should issue specific production tasks for 1943 to the official organizations and schools in each county system. They should investigate and examine the production plans, and enter all the results of production completed within the plan by these production units into the financial accounts. Surplus production beyond the plan should be retained by the production unit for itself as a means of improving livelihood. Upper levels should issue supplements to units whose production is not enough Those that made a loss in 1942 should be quickly examined to find ways of making up the deficiency.

(11) The four shortcomings pointed out in Chapter 8, 'On the Development of the Productive Undertakings of the Troops', also apply to the official organizations and schools. All official organizations and schools committing similar abuses should pay attention to correcting them.

(12) It must be clearly explained to all personnel engaged in agriculture, industry, animal husbandry, transport, commerce and labour outside working-hours (including the ordinary people working as hired labour or in partnerships) that their work is for the revolution and they are part of a very glorious cause. Setting aside a portion of the income from their labour to hand over to the government all helps our own, glorious and sacred revolutionary cause. It does not increase the assets of any individual. If publicly employed personnel working in the public sector of the economy plot to make special profits for themselves, they are guilty of immoral conduct within our ranks and crimes of corruption before the law. Those who are entirely free of corruption and waste, and work loyally for the Party and the country, are considered noble and moral, and should receive praise and rewards from the Party and the government. This point should be explained to the troops.

(13) All people doing economic, financial, supply and general service work, so long as they are not corrupt, do not waste, are loyal and work for the Party and the country, should be honoured. All people who treat their work lightly or with disdain should be criticized and rebuked.

10. On Grain Work

We have now completed our discussion of economic work. Our economy is divided into the two large private and public sectors. The private sector of the economy includes agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, cooperatives and salt undertakings. The public sector consists of the undertakings run by the government, the army, and the official organizations and schools. We have looked at all these things. We have not discussed commerce in the private sector since we still lack the necessary information. For the moment we have to ignore it. Now we must discuss the problems of finance. However, we shall not look at all of its aspects but just look at three questions: (i) the question of grain, (ii) the question of taxation, and (iii) the question of economizing.

Our finances depend on two sources, the people and ourselves. Financial work for the portion supplied by ourselves is basically distribution and supply work when the process of production by the three elements of the public sector of the economy is completed and becomes a process of distribution. The public sector of the economy is the primary foundation for our finances and supplies. It provided three-fifths of all finances and supplies during 1942. Thus our primary financial work consists of properly carrying out the distribution of the fruits of production in the public sector. We have already discussed this question at length as a supplementary factor when dealing with the public sector of the economy and there is no space to say more about the details here. It can wait for further studies later. Now we must discuss the second foundation for our finances and supplies—the portion obtained from the people, namely grain and tax. There is also the question of economizing. This is related to what we get from the people and what we supply ourselves. It is a question related to the whole of the resources we already possess and to the correct distribution and use of the funds for running our undertakings. Therefore it is an important financial problem. The grain question referred to here is the grain tax alone and not all grain problems. This is part of the tax system. However, since it is related to all the needs of the army and government, and to the relationship of 80 to 90 percent of the people of the Border Region with the Party, the Eighth Route Army and the government, it is worth specially setting it aside from the general question of taxation and dealing with it first.

More than 90 percent of the 1,400,000 people in the Border Region are peasants. Landlords and merchants make up less than 10 percent. Over half of these peasants have obtained a share of land and the other half have not yet done so. Why are we striving to the utmost to enable the peasants to develop agriculture? In the first place our aim is to enable the peasants to grow richer and improve their life. Secondly, we want the peasants to be capable of paying grain tax to help meet the needs of the War of Resistance. There is also a third reason which is that we want the peasants, after obtaining a reduction in rent and in interest rates, to develop agricultural production in order to be able to pay part as land rent to the landlords, and thus to unite the landlords with ourselves in the War of Resistance. We must only do one thing to achieve these three aims and that is strive to the utmost to enable the peasants to develop agriculture. The more agricultural production develops and the greater the amount of agricultural and subsidiary products tile peasants harvest each year, then the less the amount of grain tax paid to the government becomes as a proportion of their total harvest. We propose to levy an annual grain tax of 180,000 *tan* beginning in 1943. We intend to keep this amount as fixed in the following few years even if as a result of agricultural development the total amount of grain produced in the Border Region increases from its present level of around 1,500,000 *tan*. (Many comrades estimate that with better use of existing labour power, we can raise the total production of the Border Region to 2 million *tan*.) All increases will thus accrue to the peasants, making them keen to work hard to develop their own production, and enabling them to improve their own livelihood and to dress and eat well.

All comrades throughout the Border Region must learn from the way the comrades of Yan'an county strive to work in the interests of the peasants, so that the peasants rapidly get richer. The richer the peasants become, the less they take exception to handing over a fixed amount of grain tax and the more they feel close to and inseparable from the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the Border Region Government. The peasant Wu Manyou of Yan'an county is clear proof of this. On 30 April 1942, the Liberation Daily carried the following report on him.

THE MODEL RURAL LABOUR HERO, WU MANYOU EXCELS IN OPENING NEW LAND AND HARVESTING GRAIN FOR SEVERAL YEARS RUNNING, AND INFLUENCES THE MASSES TO TAKE PART ACTIVELY IN SPRING PLOUGHING

(Our special report.) Rural labour heroes appear one after another in the spring ploughing movement. In order to express their deep devotion to the Border Region, to consolidate the Region and to improve their own life, they display the spirit of labour to a high degree. Among them, Wu Manyou from Luilin district in Yan'an county is especially respected by most peasants. Every year his harvest of grain exceeds that of others by one-sixth. The two labour powers in his family farm over 120 *mu* of land. This year they opened up 35 *mu* of uncultivated land. He is already publicly recognized as a model labour hero by the peasants of the township. According to late news last night, the Reconstruction Department of the Border Region Government has decided to give him a special award.

(Our report from Yan'an.) For successive years the peasant Wu Manyou of Wujiacaoyuan in Second township, Liulin district, Yan'an county has been active in spring ploughing and grown good crops. Usually people get an average of 5 *tou* from every 3 *mu*; he gets 6 *tou*. Thus when the government issued the call for great efforts in spring ploughing he said; 'I have benefited from the revolution and I can never forget it. I truly love the Border Region and at the same time I work to improve my own life'. He redoubled his efforts at opening up new land and influenced the masses. He created an enthusiastic spring ploughing movement in his own village. All the peasants in Yan'an county know that Wu Manyou's township did the best farming this year. Wu Manyou originally planned to open up 35 *mu*. He had already opened up 15 *mu* before it rained, and he was even more active afterwards. He said: 'I can finish clearing the new land in ten days, and if there is time I'll exceed the plan'. As for his other l00-odd *mu* of cultivated land, some parts have already been seeded and some parts have already been turned over. All the inhabitants of Wujiacaoyuan, the village head, the head of the township, and the head of the district unanimously praise him as 'a model hero in spring ploughing'. Now the district government has applied to higher levels to reward him. On hearing this the Border Region Government also decided after practical investigation to give him a suitable reward as an incentive.

(Our report from Yan'an county.) During the spring ploughing movement, many labour heroes have appeared, but in the final analysis who is best at growing crops? To clear up this question our reporters spent a month visiting various villages. Now they have found the model labour hero generally recognized by the masses. This model hero's name is Wu Manyou. This year he is forty-nine. He is well built and strong. Before the land revolution he was a tenant farmer. At that time he had to eat leaves and husks. He 'suffered hardship' [worked for others] by cutting firewood. The money he earned he had to pay as taxes to the local bad officials and rich gentry, and he himself usually went hungry. After the Land revolution, he joined the revolution. He was given a share of land on the hills, roughly 40 *shang* equal to 120-odd *mu*. Apart from this private land, he has actively opened up and sown uncultivated land in successive years, and he raises cows and sheep. Now all the hill land is cultivated and he has two bullocks, three cows and more than a hundred sheep. His prospects grow brighter and brighter. He has got married, and eats and dresses well. Last year after government examination his family status was raised from poor peasant to middle peasant. He often says: 'When I think of the past and then of the present, how can I forget the benefits, of the revolution and of the Border Region?'

(Our report from Yan'an county). Model labour hero, Wu Manyou, plants crops like any other peasant. Why does he reap more grain than others? According to the peasants in his village there are several reasons. First, he gets up earlier than anyone else and goes to bed later. Before the sky grows light he has fed his cows and gone up the hill. He only comes back from his land when the sky is dark. He can really endure hard work. Second, in winter when there is no work to do, he diligently collects manure. As he also can raise sheep and cows, he has more manure than others. On average he applies seven pack loads of manure to every 3 *mu*. Third, when the crops begin to shoot, some peasants are afraid to go up into the hills. They do not hoe the weeds or only hoe once at the most. He hoes twice at least, so his millet naturally grows well. Fourth, he plough deeply. Other households plough down 5 inches he ploughs down 7 inches at least. Fifth, when breaking up the earth, he breaks it finely and is not careless. Sixth, he always ploughs and sows at the correct time, neither early nor late. Because of these fine qualities, he harvests a top yield per 3 *mu* of 12 *tou* on the old scale (18 *tou* on the market scale) and a lowest of 4 *tou* (6 market *tou*). The average is 6 *tou* (9 market *tou*). The average for other peasants is 5 *tou* (7 market *tou*). In terms of averages, he is one-sixth better than others.

(Our report from Yan'an county.) Model labour hero, Wu Manyou, is not only a model at growing crops but is also a model citizen. Last year he harvested 18 market *tan* of wheat [*xiaomai*] and 27 market *tan* of grains (equivalent to 16 *tan* 2 *tou* of hulled grains). He paid 14 *tan* 3 *tou* in grain tax, 1,000 *jin* of hay tax, contributed two lots of 150 *yuan* to government bonds, and paid 665 *yuan* cash substitute for the salt tax. The villagers said to him: 'Old Wu, you pay out too much, cut down a bit! He said 'During the revolution, the Eighth Route Army protects our Border Region. People at the front lose blood. All we have to do is sweat a little more. How can you say "Too much"?' Afterwards everyone respected his opinion and enthusiastically gave grain to the State. This year the upper levels moved some refugees to live in the village. He lent grain and hoes to them and helped them find uncultivated land. He also often encouraged them materially and in spirit to open up and plant land. Usually he is also the most fair person in the village. His prestige among the ordinary people is very high and everyone trusts him. In May last year he was elected a member of the township council and director of the township's work in supporting families with dependents fighting in the War of Resistance. He has a younger brother who is a soldier with the Eighth Route Army, so he himself belongs to such a family but he declined public support. He said: ‘Fighting is the duty of the Chinese people, there is nothing strange about it. I’ve enough to eat, what other support do I need?’ However, he is extremely correct towards other families in the township with dependents at the front. At the same time he is very fair in his distribution of labour duties. There are twelve families in the township with dependents fighting in the war. This year he arranged substitute farming for 220 *mu* and all the families were grateful to him. No one in township says he is not good.

(Our report from Yan’an county.) There are fourteen peasant households in Wujiacaoyuan with fourteen heads of family. When you raise the question of whether Wu Manyou is worthy of being called a model labour hero, everyone raises his thumb and says ‘What else can be said about old Wu. He is the best at enduring hardship. If he isn’t a hero who is fit to be?

On 2 June there was another report in the Liberation Daily.

Because of the influence of the labour hero, Wu Manyou, Wujiacaoyuan which originally planned to open up 147 *mu* of uncultivated land, had already opened up 225 *mu*. Wu Manyou himself opened up 15 *mu*. After Wu Manyou was rewarded the whole township (Second township, Luilin district) opened up 540 *mu*.

On 29 October, the Liberation Daily carried a further report.

This year the harvest of coarse millet is very good.

In Wu Manyou’s village the yield per 3 *mu* is in general 5 to 6 *tou* but he has got 8 *tou* (each *tou* is the large kind equivalent to 45 *jin*). Most peasants get 3 or 4 *tou* of hulled grain from husking 1 *tan* of coarse grains. He always maintains the official standard for the equivalent amount of hulled grain. Wu Manyou often puts on a propagandistic air and says to others: ‘If you want to get your crops as good as mine, learn from me! I have no secret, I am simply willing to labour’.

Wu Manyou is already a rich peasant. Because he got benefits from the soviet government in the past and the Border Region Government now, he has united his destiny with that of the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the Border Region Government. All empty words are useless, we must give the people visible material wealth. The minds of many of our comrades have still not fully turned into the minds of communists. They only know how to do one kind of work, asking the people for this and that, for grain, for hay, for taxes and for mobilization for various kinds of work. They do not know how to do the other kind of work, striving to the utmost to help the people develop production and to improve their cultural level. It is entirely rational for us to ask things of the people for the sake of the revolution and the War of Resistance. It is good that our comrades consider that in doing this work they are doing the work they should do for the revolution. But it is only doing one aspect of work and it is not the primary aspect. The primary aspect of our work is not to ask things of the people but to give things to the people. What can we give the people? Under present conditions in the Shaan-Kan-Ning Border Region, we can organize, lead and help the people to develop production and increase their material wealth. And on this basis we can step-by-step raise their political awareness and cultural level. To these ends we must endure all discomforts and night and day, diligently and thoroughly look into the people's problems in their livelihood and production, including such important matters as plough-oxen, agricultural implements, seeds, manure, water conservancy, animal fodder, agricultural credit, immigration, opening up new land, improving agricultural methods, female labour, labour by loafers, plans for setting up households, cooperatives, exchange-labour teams, transport teams, textiles, animal husbandry, salt industry and so forth. Moreover, we must concretely help the people to solve these problems and not use empty words. This work is the primary work for all Communist Party members working in the countryside. Only after we have done this aspect of work and achieved real results can we get the people's support when we do the second aspect of our work which is to ask them for things. Only then will they say that our requests are necessary and correct. Only then will they understand that if they do not give grain, hay and other things to the government, their life cannot be good and cannot get better. Only in this way will our work not be done through coercion. Only in this way will things run smoothly, and only in this way will we be truly united with the people. This is the basic line and policy of our party. Every comrade (including those in the army) should study this thoroughly. Only when our comrades understand and carry out the complementary nature of these two aspects of work, can we call ourselves all-round, communist revolutionaries. Otherwise, although we do revolutionary work and although we are revolutionaries, we shall still not be all-round revolutionaries. Furthermore, some comrades are still bureaucrats remote from the masses. Because they only know how to ask the masses for things and do not know how to or are unwilling to give things to the masses, the masses detest them. This question is extremely important. I hope everyone will pay great attention to it and propagandize the principle throughout the whole Party.

In what follows we shall sum up our past experience in grain work and point out the policy for 1943.

From 1937 to 1939, the grain tax levied in the Border Region covered only a part of supplies. The deficiency each year was made up by purchase using funds issued by the government. With the exception of particular areas and periods when there were grain difficulties, there were no insurmountable problems in the whole of grain supply for the four years. During that time we actually enabled the people to build up their resources. The burdens of grain tax were heavy on the rich peasants and landlords, very light on the middle peasants and most poor peasants had none at all. In 1940 outside aid was cut off and the government had no resources to buy grain. We had to turn to raising all of it in tax. However, the principle of 'calculating tax on the basis of income' had not yet changed. Also the grain tax for 1940 was raised to only 90,000 *tan* and the policies for collection were not altered. For supplies in the following year (1941) we put forward the policy of 'strengthening grain administration and ensuring grain sufficiency'. However, we could not provide all supplies since we had not levied much grain in 1940. There was also the related matter of achieving self-sufficiency in running costs in 1941, in connection with which the various army units and official organizations paid careful attention to grain in order to solve problems in livelihood. Another factor was that since the organizational structure of the departments doing grain work was not yet strong and the quality of the cadres was not good enough, the various regulations were not well established and we could not fully control grain income and expenditure in all places. At the time the problems of making excessive returns and rash leadership were very serious, personnel was constantly changing, increasing and decreasing, and there was too much occasional expenditure outside the set amount. The grain tax levied in 1940 provided supplies until March 1941, when some places already had nothing to eat. Before long there was a panic over grain everywhere. It was only by successively buying grain once and borrowing twice that we lasted until November. In order to guarantee supplies for 1942 and to repay loans taken in 1941, it was estimated that a levy of 200,000 *tan* was essential. At this time the problem of grain had already become the most serious financial problem. After repeated study by the Party and government and under the new principle for collection of 'calculating tax first on the basis of our expenditure and second on the basis of income', it was decided to levy 20,000 *tan* of grain and 26 million *jin* of hay. To ensure collection of this amount of grain and taking the interests of all social strata into account, the base for collection was expanded. The burden on the middle peasants was increased and the poor peasants began to bear some of it. We corrected the earlier phenomenon of bias towards the minority of wealthy.

The grain accounts at the various county granaries were not clearly kept in the past, and the great muddle in the formalities for buying and borrowing grain during 1941 had increased the difficulties of sorting them out. The Grain Office was deeply afraid that the lack of clarity over the old grain would influence the new. Therefore 'grasp the new grain, ensure supplies' was made the strategy for work in 1942. Events during the year showed that although there were deficiencies in implementation, the policy itself was entirely correct. Grain tax for 1942 was reduced to 160,000 *tan* and hay tax to 16 million *jin*. The policy for collection also reduced the burden on the poor peasants slightly. Furthermore, we are preparing to implement a unified progressive agricultural tax in 1943 in place of the grain-tax method. In order to raise the peasants' enthusiasm for production, we lent them some of the grain and hay during 1942 to help them solve problems during spring ploughing. In supply work the main thing is to concentrate on grain and hay.

As regards the work of collection, we only levied 10,000 *tan* in 1937 and 1938. The burden on the masses was very light and everyone was willing to pay. In 1939 the amount was raised to 50,000 *tan*. The government proclaimed new regulations for collecting the grain. Work groups were sent down to the countryside to make surveys and to collect tax according to the regulations. However, in reality, 50,000 *tan* was still a very slight amount of grain tax for the masses to bear. The cadres were used to the method of democratic apportionment of taxes and the survey work was very perfunctory. The so-called collection according to regulations remained a theory. In 1940 it was just the same. Only in 1941 when the grain-tax burden suddenly increased to 200,00 *tan* did the government again seriously revise the regulations. The Finance Department sent large numbers of work groups to the counties to work with the county and district governments in carrying out fairly thorough-going surveys so that the masses' burdens were made rational. This grain collection emphasized 'thorough-going surveys' and 'carrying out the regulations'. Summing up collection in 1941, there is clear proof that if good survey work is done, it is easy to carry out the regulations. For example, Ganquan county was very conscientious in making surveys and then implemented the regulations and the rates for collection. Quzi county carried out three surveys and was able to ensure a fair and rational distribution of the burden. In Baima district of Huachi county the requirement was not filled after two allocations. Eventually the head of the grain collection work group, Comrade Wang, himself surveyed one township to get experience. As a result the whole district over-fulfilled its quota by several tens of *tan*. In places where survey work was poorly done, such as in the special military area, the regulations could not be carried out. In general county cadres still treated survey work too lightly. Only a minority of them carried out thorough-going surveys for grain collection in 1941. The majority still used the old method of democratic apportionment of taxes. In 1942 the grain collection gained from the experience of the previous year. The regulations were revised again to bring them more in line with reality. More thorough surveys were undertaken on the basis of the surveys carried out in 1941. The Finance Department issued instructions that the cadres collecting the grain had to follow the regulations. In cases where carrying out the regulations meant that the task could not be completed, they could also use the method of democratic apportionment of taxes. At the same time, during this collection the cadres were given ideological education which overcame their previously crude work-style and backward conduct such as following personal preferences and holding things back. According to recent reports from Longdong there is once again proof of the importance of thorough-going surveys for the implementation of regulations. One district in Qingyang county carried out a thorough survey, and because much new land was cultivated during the year and production increased, it was able to exceed the original collection target by several hundred *tan* in line with the regulations.

A further point to consider is that for several years the figures set for the grain collection have been achieved and exceeded, but the work of putting the grain into the granaries has been too muddled. Many cadres involved in grain collection think that they only have to meet the target. They do not consider quality or investigate delayed payments. As a result on one hand the quality is not good enough with 15 to 20 percent consisting of husks in some cases, and on the other there are instances where the masses delay in paying their grain. There is a difference between the amount collected and the amount put into the granaries. In the 1941 collection, although the quality was a bit better, there were still a lot of husks mixed with the grain. The slogan ‘Grain to the Granary and Hay to the Cellar’ was put forward to overcome the problem of late payment but there was still too much of it. In addition, because the 1941 collection was much bigger than any previous year, the difficulties of getting it into the granaries were much greater. As a result over 3,900 *tan* of the grain collected did not go into the granaries. This was nearly 2 percent of the total. During the 1942 collection the problem of getting the grain into the granaries was specially emphasized. According to the latest examination this work has been done a little better this year. However, the question of whether the full total had been put in the granaries or not awaits a final summary before it can be answered.

Another point is that for several years the Finance Department has assigned work groups to help the county and district governments in the grain-levy work. Where county and district cadres are too weak, this method is of great help. Its shortcoming is that it easily creates dependency in the lower-levels of government, and every time there is a mobilization, the upper levels have to send people. The cadres have to go back and forth, spending much time on the road, which leads to waste of manpower and of time. Since collection in 1942 had the good foundation of work done in 1941, the Finance Department adopted the principle of 'fewer and better' in its assignment of work teams. It sent fewer cadres to each county and increased the responsibility of the county and district government. In 1941, 150 people were sent down. On this basis they are preparing to move towards not sending down anyone at all, handing all the grain collection work over to the county and district governments.

As regards supply work, because general income and expenditure was not firmly controlled in 1941 so that grain had to be bought once and borrowed twice, and because mobilization was hurried and almost cruel, the masses were not satisfied. This was a great shortcoming. In 1942 we were able to control income and expenditure. We also had the 200,000 *tan* of grain levied in 1941 as a guarantee to ensure supplies until December. However, since the drive for better troops and simpler administration was not thorough, the budget could not be strictly implemented. Occasional expenditures combined with unpaid grain tax came to over 18,000 *tan*. In addition, troop movements influenced the relationship between supply and demand in various places, and grain balances in the first half of 1942 could not be maintained as allocated. Therefore, after July places like Yan'an, Nanniwan and Linzhen one after another became short of grain. Afterwards, the Finance Department issued supplementary funds of 2 million *yuan* to buy grain and a summer collection was made. Only in this way was a grain panic avoided during 1942, and there was no bad effect on the masses. Next, for the grain in 1941 we adopted the method of 'allocation as a whole and divided administration'. Although this saved the bother and waste of transport to and from, it brought about cases of uncontrolled selling of grain, which also entailed a lot of waste. There was still a gap between the amount collected and the amount needed for supplies, which also led to many shortcomings. For example the grain and hay allocated to the various counties in 1941 was biased towards the harvest situation and neglected the supply and demand situation. The grain requirement in Sanbian for the year was over 10,000 *tan* but only 1,600 *tan* was collected. A supplement of 9,000 *tan* had to be transported from Longdong, Ansai, Zichang, Zhidan and so forth. Not only was the year's grain transport work excessive for the masses of these counties, but the masses in Sanbian were also very busy handling transshipment. They called out that 'this way is not as good as collecting more from us'. It is now estimated that just the 4,000 *tan* of grain moved to Sanbian from Longdong cost 7 million *yuan* to transport, which is more than the cost of buying grain in Sanbian. Another example was the grain collected in Yanchuan. Originally it should have supplied Yan'an. However in 1941 grain from Dongyang district was collected at the Majiapan granary which is on the opposite side of the county near the Yellow River. As a result it took an extra three days to transport the grain to Yan'an. Quite a few similar situations arose in other counties. Again, the plan for the 1941 hay collection was not thoroughly researched. It was decided everywhere to collect the hay after the grain and no attention was paid to supply and demand. As a result some places kept hay for which there was no use and it was allowed to go rotten which dissatisfied the masses. In other places which needed a lot of hay there was an exceptional shortage and supplies were only enough for eight months. Another example was the 1941 grain collection in Guanzhong. Millet was made the unit instead of wheat. The peasants had to go out of the Border Region to sell wheat and buy millet in order to pay the tax. As a result too much millet was collected, the troops were not used to eating it and there were many disputes. After summer begins millet rots easily which added to the troubles. Again in 1941 the relative proportion between regular and miscellaneous grains was generalized, and not reckoned according to the grain production circumstances or the relationship between supply and demand in each place. As a result some places (such as the special military area) collected a lot of miscellaneous grain which could not be issued. Some places (such as Yan'an) needed horse fodder but could not get miscellaneous grains. The official organizations had to lower the relative proportions and exchange hulled grain for miscellaneous grain which in turn led to waste of grain. The above shortcomings illustrate that grain work is very concrete and meticulous, practical work. If it is done crudely and in a way divorced from reality then the results will disturb the people and disrupt the government. In 1942 after the grain collection work was handed over to the Grain Office, the management of grain collection and supplying was united. At the same time as a means of balancing resources, it was decided to accept a money substitute for the hay tax according to the different supply-and-demand situation in each place. As for the relative proportions of grains, the earlier way of generalized application was changed into a system of deciding according to the concrete situation in each place, thus overcoming the previous shortcoming.

Next, from the winter of 1941 up to the present quite large successes have been achieved in setting up and consolidating systems for grain supply. As regards the budget system, for example, in 1942 most official organizations were able to draw up their budgets at the correct time. They have got rid of the bad practices of claiming excess grain and eating double rations, and corrected the situation where counties approved budgets haphazardly and spent grain without control. In particular they have grasped the policy of 'the final account must not exceed the budget'. During 1942 they have conscientiously cut down on all irrational expenditure, economizing on over 19,000 *tan* of grain. As regards the system for paying out grain, most army units and official organizations have honoured the regulations that grain cannot be paid out without a grain payment document. The responsible comrades in the counties have also paid attention to this regulation. They have not indiscriminately permitted loans from tax grain. At the same time during 1942 all the counties have used the official *tou* measure which considerably reduced the number of disputes. As for the granary regulations, because of the cadres' limitations, these could only be strengthened first in the central granaries and then gradually generalized to all granaries. For keeping accounts, the Finance Department drew up two standard account-books (one new-style and detailed, the other very simple) which were adopted by the cadres according to their ability. In 1942 most granaries, good and bad, had account-books. Gradually we can reach the goal of being able to obtain at any time statistics for grain income, expenditure and the amounts and kinds of grain in store. As for the grain coupon regulations, there was much corruption in 1941 because we issued large numbers of coupons. In 1942 we abandoned the old grain coupons and issued three kinds of meal-ticket which were only supplied for circulation among personnel in the official organizations to cover meals. This was a step forward.

However, there were still many defects in the grain-supply work. For example, a minority of large units still could not draw up their budget at the stipulated time. A comparison of the actual personnel totals and the budgets of various large units showed that there was still quite a proportion of figures without foundation. Some instances of taking double rations still occurred. The ratio of livestock was not clearly laid down, which in some cases led to quite a lot of waste. Instances of individual troop units insisting on grain loans from granaries because they had wasted grain and overspent could still not completely be avoided. As for the storage system, most granaries still only managed to do the work of receiving and paying out grain and of administration. They were not good enough at supervising collection, safe-keeping, submitting accounts and other duties. The meal-tickets could not be circulated among the people, which caused problems for personnel sent to do outside tasks. This too was a shortcoming. Finally, there was a great defect in building up and consolidating all regulations which was that the Grain Office only emphasized its own regulations and difficulties. It could not comprehensively and concretely concern itself with solutions to the problems and difficulties facing each official organizations.

In 1942 the official organizations in charge of grain were very successful in the work of clearing up the granaries' old grain accounts. For several years the county grain accounts had not been examined and reckoned up, so that the Grain Office's accounts were no longer any use. For example, according to the Office's accounts, in the winter of 1941, Ansai should have had over 2,900 *tan* in store. In fact it had less than 100 *tan*. Again the account for the grain taken from the granary by the sanitarium had not been worked out for five years. It was discovered in 1942 that it had collected over 100 *tan* too much. There were many cases like these. Compounded by the muddle over purchases and loans in 1941, many counties had no accounts to be examined. As a result the Grain Office sent cadres down to each place to work out the accounts and adopted all kinds of accounting methods. The old granary accounts were only cleared up after six months' hard work. Now the Grain Office is able to work out how much grain is actually held by the granaries and can keep a hold on grain income and expenditure. The counties' administration of grain was also previously very poor with losses due to a combination of rats, insects, rotting and so forth. In addition there was serious corruption among the cadres. During grain collection in 1941, there were more than ten cases. It had even gone so far that individual special agents had infiltrated granary work. For example, Zhang Bingquan, the director of the granary of Taile district in Fuxian, was a special agent. In February 1942 he embezzled over 10 *tan* of public grain and fled from the Border Region. This shows that previously the Grain Office's supervision of granary cadres was too lax and its inspection work too infrequent. Since the granary accounts were cleared up in 1942 and the leadership of the granaries by the five sections of government at county level was strengthened, corruption and waste have been reduced and many active and hardworking cadres have been discovered.

In carrying out collection policy in the two years 1939 and 1940, the regulations were fixed so that the tax threshold began at 1.2 *tan* (that is, peasant families whose harvest per person was less than 1.2 *tan* were not taxed). Tax was progressively applied to a top level of 36 percent (that is, the tax rate increased until it leveled 36 percent of the harvest and thereafter the percentage did not increase). The failing here was that the tax burden was biased towards the minority of the well-off. At the same time the method of collection was that of democratic apportionment of taxes and not that laid down by the regulations. As a result, there were cases of 'going for big households' and 'ignoring everything but the target'. Also the collection policy was influenced by excessive 'leftism'. In 1941 the regulations were revised. The tax threshold was fixed at 0.5 *tan* (for example, a family of five whose annual harvest of regular grain was less than 2.5 *tan* was not taxed). Taxation was progressively applied up to 30 percent. The implementation of these regulations resulted in a broadening of the base for collection. Apart from Huanxian which suffered natural disasters, the tax burden in all other counties was carried by over 80 percent of the people and in Yan'an county it reached 95 percent. In terms of carrying for the interests of all classes and strata, with the exception of Yan'an, Yanchang and Ansai, the burden in other counties did not exceed 30 percent of the harvest. However, there were still shortcomings. For example, the counties were not entirely rational in their allocations to meet the total collection. The special military area lowered the tax threshold to 0.3 *tan* and reduced the number of steps in the tax progression. As a result the poor and middle peasants suffered and the richer middle peasants and above were let off too lightly Also, during grain collection in 1941 we only paid attention to collecting grain and not to reducing rents and interest rates at the same time. Some new immigrants who should not have paid tax had to do so. Family dependents of troops in the War of Resistance should have received special assistance but this was stopped in some cases. Some cotton-growers should not have been taxed for grain but were. All these things contravened the government's policies. Other policies such as caring for the interests of all strata, raising the enthusiasm for production of the peasants and so forth merely remained general slogans. Actual implementation was very deficient. With the experience of 1941, the grain collection in 1942 made some advances. However, we still did not pay enough attention to the cotton-growing policy. For example, the allocation of a quota for grain tax to the cotton-growing areas in the three eastern counties was the same as that allocated to other counties. When it came to collection, problems arose. If grain tax was not collected on the cotton fields the requirement could not be fulfilled. Yet if it was collected, it would conflict with government orders. Ultimately they had to make accommodations and reduce the collection by half. This still damaged the authority of the government.

In any work, going beyond policies depends on whether the cadres are good or bad. Grain work is no exception. The most hardworking people doing grain work are the granary cadres. The easiest corrupted are also the granary cadres. Therefore we shall here specially quote examples of typically good and typically bad granary cadres, so that everyone can learn from the good and be warned by the bad.

Good Examples

(A) Comrade He Chunago, director of Panlong granary is an old fellow of fifty-two. He does not say much but is very careful and thoughtful, enthusiastic, and hardworking. In 1939 he was assigned to work in the Zhenwudong granary of the Grain Office. In 1940 he was transferred to be director of the Panlong granary, concurrently responsible for the grain-market balancing station [*diaojizhan*] and the transport station. He is responsible for the work of three men. In the past he has been secretary of a district Party committee and has been trained at the Border Region Party School. Initially he was one of seven people including Jia Zhicai and Ren Shengbiao who were assigned from the Border Region Party School to do grain work but of these he alone remains at his post today. His cultural level is not among the lowest of the granary directors. He can write simple letters and keep clear accounts. He is very conscientious in studying the newly adopted account books and learns quickly. In 1941 when the 'monthly report tables' were issued to the granaries some directors could not understand after three days of explanation. After hearing once he was able to raise questions and opinions. After a few questions like 'What should be filled in on this section?, Would it be all right to fill in that section like this?', he could complete and send in his 'monthly report tables' on time. Many fine qualities are expressed in his work. The first is meticulous attention to detail. When receiving grain he writes a receipt for the amount and makes up his accounts every evening. When paying out he double-checks on the abacus. The second is a deep sense of responsibility. He takes great care of the granary. One storage bin was a little damp and he paid special attention. He often had the grain spread out to dry in the sun, and when paying-out grain he always paid from this bin first. Eventually he dug a ditch behind the bin and dug the surface of the earth around the bin lower than the bin, making it a little drier. When the granary needs minor repairs he does not hire workers but sets-to himself to carry bricks and plaster (under his influence the personnel in charge of moving the grain also work hard and help). As administrator of the transport depot, every time a transport team arrives he helps to cut grass, draw water and prepare food. His third quality is his friendly attitude to others. Some of the personnel in leading official organizations get in a bad temper when the grain is paid-out, but he patiently finishes the job and does not get into arguments. Sometimes some of the masses send bad grain when paying-in. He just encourages them to take it back. When buying grain to balance the market, he can discuss things and get close to the masses. But he also has his own opinions. Once when it was raining and the grain in the market could not be sold, he took the opportunity to purchase it. The price was fairly low and the masses were still pleased. For these reasons he enjoys some prestige among the masses of Panlong. When receiving tax grain in 1941 a peasant from Yongping district county offered him bribes. He got angry and sent the man and the goods to the district government. His fourth quality is a plain and simple way of life. He raises very few questions about his own life and he expresses concern about receiving welfare expenses. In 1942 he was responsible for collecting 4,000 *tan* of tax grain and everyone was concerned that he might not manage since he is old and has few helpers. But every time he wrote a letter to the Grain Office, he said that he could manage.

(B) Comrade Bai Heming is director of the Tianzhuang granary in Suide. He is a graduate of upper primary school. He had worked in the old baojia office. His qualities include first a deep sense of responsibility. When receiving grain he compares receipts and invoices every evening to make sure that there has been no mistake. He also makes out clear accounts for households owing grain, and supervises the districts and townships, encouraging them to send in their grain. Before receiving grain, he himself lays stones and boards in the storage bins, spreads dry straw and puts straw mats over the straw so as to guard against dampness. After the grain is in store, he himself seals up the bins which will not be opened soon, using bricks and plaster and covering-up holes which let in the wind, with broken mats. Secondly, he is friendly towards others. When receiving grain he inspects conscientiously. However, to those who send in bad grain he simply says: 'Look everybody, can you feel easy about sending grain like this for the troops?' He has never raised his voice in abuse. If someone from the army came to collect grain not in accordance with official procedures, he always courteously and patiently explained things. On the one hand he would lend some grain to prevent shortage, and on the other asked them to make good the procedures. Before long if anyone from the troops stationed in Suide went to collect grain from old Bai's granary, they always went through the procedures to avoid difficulties for old Bai and embarrassment for themselves. Thirdly, he is very hardworking. He gathers firewood and draws water himself. He is careful over operating and food costs. He reports excess expenditure to the fifth government section at county level. He does not indiscriminately take grain and sell it for the cash to make up deficiencies. Now Comrade Bai Heming has been promoted to be head of the fifth section of Suide county government.

Bad Examples

(A) Hy Dianchang was director of the granary of Fourth district Xinning. When receiving grain in the winter of 1941, he sold 3 *tan* privately, took 1.3 *tan* home, and lent 3.92 *tan* to his relatives and friends. He himself and his relatives and friends, Hy Diangong, Hu Qingrong, and Liu Zixiao should have paid 7 *tan* of grain tax. They did not hand over a single grain but he still issued tax-grain receipts. When receiving grain he did not allow the masses to sweep up the grain on the floor, but swept it up himself and shared it with the personnel helping him to receive the grain. After he had finished issuing tax-grain for deposit in citizens' homes, he was 0.2 *tan* short but he falsely reported 1 *tan* to the fifth section of the county government. After the fifth section found him out, he was sent to court, sentenced to prison and ordered to return the embezzled grain.

(B) In September 1939 after grain was sold from the Shuifan district granary in the Huachi county, 14.7 *tan* of tax grain was missing. The granary director, Wang Wenbin reported to the upper levels that rats had eaten 12.7 *tan* and another 2 *tan* had been contaminated. In 1941 when the grain collection work group went to investigate, they discovered that Wang Wenbin had gone to the county town for a meeting during the time when the grain was sold. His place had been taken by the district secretary Mao Yupeng. During the grain sales Mao Yupeng had lived exceptionally richly. He had bought a flock of sheep and two skin coats. He had also bought cloth. There was suspicion of embezzlement. However, at the time the county government did not investigate. Afterwards Mao Yupeng was transferred to work elsewhere. This affair is still ongoing.

Above we have summed up our experience in grain work during the past five years. Below are the policies for work in 1943.

(1) Implement the unified progressive agricultural tax. In the past we have used the method of levying national salvation grain tax. It is not an entirely satisfactory method of taxation. If it is well done it can only achieve the aim of being fair and rational in its burden on the people. It cannot give any effective encouragement to the peasants' feelings towards production. Therefore we must actively prepare to implement the unified progressive agricultural tax. How should our preparatory work be done? (i) Under the leadership of the Finance Department set up a specialist research team consisting of five to seven cadres selected for their experience in political work and their good understanding of land and financial problems. This team should gather, study and arrange materials concerning progressive taxation, and plan the work for introducing it. In addition, directed by the Border Region Government, responsible comrades from the relevant official organizations led by the head of the Finance Department should organize a planning committee to take charge of policy, to solve problems and to regularly lead the work of the research team. (ii) Carry out survey work. A detailed summary of grain collection work in 1942 should be supplied to the progressive taxation research team as concrete source material. The research team should first study some counties with different situations, whose collection in 1941 and 1942 was comparatively good. They should draw up an initial survey plan, and first carry out trial surveys. Afterwards they should revise the plan, draw up a format and carry out a general survey. In the light of the materials from the survey they should determine the regulations and methods. Counties with good successes who complete the work early can carry out a trial run during 1943. (iii) Carry out land registration at the same time as the surveys. (iv) Strengthen the government organization at township level, build up sound clerical records and survey thoroughly.

(2) Grasp grain and hay, ensure supplies. Supplying grain and hay is complex and detailed work. Grain and hay resources are widespread and not easily grasped. If we are unable to pay full attention at all times and cannot suitably adjust the relationship between supply and demand, it will be hard to make

a good job of it. If we want to be able to grasp grain and hay and ensure supplies, we must do the following. (i) We must first ensure that all the 160,000 *tan* enters the granaries, and improve the quality so that 100 percent is grain. Do not allow adulteration with husks. At the same time, call on all counties to eliminate evasion of payment. We must build up thorough regulations for the administration of grain and hay. Pay attention to the running and inspection of granaries. Set up central granaries. Gradually improve equipment. Prevent damage through contamination and rotting, and corruption and theft. Strictly carry out the budget system. Completely eradicate excessive claims and taking double rations. Set up grain accounts in accordance with the cultural level of the cadres in each place. Do not be too elaborate but require that receipts, issues and stocks of grain are clearly recorded. Next, the regulations for paying out grain are even more important and must be carried out. The reason for building up regulations soundly is to ensure supplies and to prevent corruption and waste. All instances of not adhering to discipline must be strictly corrected. However, a mechanical viewpoint which one-sidedly emphasizes regulations without concern for the concrete facts must also be guarded against. (ii) To ensure supplies, we must first handle the relationship between supply and demand of grain and hay. Prepare supplements for areas deficient in grain through transport, adjustment of distribution and so forth. In 1943 we should organize any unused animals owned by the official organizations to transport grain and hay, improve the work efficiency of every transport team (on average our animals each carry 1 *tou* less than those of the common folk and we need three days to go as far as they do in two) and lay down precise transport tasks so as to economize on manpower and animal power which can then be used for production. We must depend on the grain transported by the people, making plans early and using the slack agricultural periods and unused porters and animals. Except in special circumstances, mobilizing transport in the busy agricultural seasons is not allowed. Long distance transport must also be avoided as much as possible. In areas where the distribution of grain can be adjusted, coordinated plans should be made by the Grain Office. Grain should be sold or bought at the right times so as to supplement supplies, save on transport and avoid waste. In areas where official organizations and schools are excessively concentrated such as Yan'an, we should consider the situation, and disperse men and horses to ease the distribution of grain and straw.

(3) Carry out the drive for better troops and simpler administration, store grain to prepare for famine. For successive years the Border Region has over-

drawn its tax grain and has not got the slightest reserve. If natural disaster occurred, grain supplies for the army and people would become an extremely serious problem. Everyone should be warned by this to take the following steps. (i) Resolutely carry out the new reorganization plan of the Party and government and the drive for better troops and simpler administration. Through simplification and strict economy ensure a balance between grain income and income and expenditure in 1943. (ii) Collect 180,000 *tan* of' tax grain in 1943 so that we have a chance to retain some as reserve against need. (iii) During 1943 the troops, official organizations and schools should put developing agriculture in first place. Growing grain should form a considerable proportion of farming work so that there will be an even greater surplus in 1944 and we will be prepared against disaster. The troops, official organizations and schools certainly may not relax their own grain production because we are preparing to levy 180,000 *tan* during 1943.

(4) Strive to economize, strictly prevent waste of grain. There is a serious waste of grain among the official organizations and troops. Thus, mounting a campaign to economize should be one of our central tasks for 1943. Recently in Yan'an some official organizations and schools have inspected the amount of waste and carried out economy campaigns with great success. For example, the administrators of a training squad in the supply department of the garrison forces were diligent and responsible. When issuing grain and flour, they did the weighing themselves. Thus their food supply was just right and they were often able to eat buns and noodles. The Central Party School has large kitchens. Recently administration of food has been strict. Grain-cooking has been supervised. Leftover grain has been kept and eaten as the following meal. After this was done, only 1 *jin* of millet was consumed per head per day. Before a month was up more than 5 *tan* of millet was saved. Another example was the collective meals at the nursery. In the past when the people there took meals in separate groups, the nursery consumed 150 *jin* of flour a meal. After collective meals were introduced, they only consumed 100 *jin* saving one-third. You see, comrades, what a surprising amount this is. Similarly the central departments and committees have implemented collective mess-halls and have also got good results. The Central Party School planned in the first half of the year to raise 2,000 chickens which required 300 bowls of millet a day. The waste was quite large. Afterwards they killed most of the chickens and only sixty were left. This saved quite a lot of grain. In addition, it is necessary to foster the habit of using meal-tickets. It can reduce the issue of large amounts of grain. In sum, in order

to ensure that there are absolutely no shortages of grain, on the one hand we must levy and produce it and on the other we must seek to economize. This is the work for leading comrades and it is a mass-movement. Everyone must pay attention and complete the task given by the Party.

(Two chapters on taxation and economizing originally planned for this book could not be written in time because the Senior Cadres' Conference closed. They had to be left out.)

the Author

THE COMINTERN HAS LONG CEASED TO MEDDLE IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS[36]

May 26, 1943

...Comrade Mao Tse-tung first pointed out that the dissolution of the Communist International was, exactly as an American press agency had reported, 'a great event marking the dividing line between two epochs'...

Comrade Mao Tse-tung asked: 'Why should the Communist International be disbanded? Did it not devote all its efforts to the emancipation of the working class of the whole world and to the war against fascism?'

Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: 'It is true that the Communist International was created by Lenin himself. During its entire existence it has rendered the greatest services in helping each country to organize a truly revolutionary workers' party, and it has also contributed enormously to the great cause of organizing the anti-fascist war.' Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed particularly to the great services of the Communist International in aiding the cause of the Chinese revolution...

Comrade Mao Tse-tung further pointed out: 'Revolutionary movements can be neither exported nor imported. Despite the fact that aid was accorded by the Communist International, the birth and development of the Chinese Communist Party resulted from the fact that China herself had a conscious working class. The Chinese working class created its own party—the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party, although it has a history of only twenty-two years, has already undertaken three great revolutionary movements'...

Since the Communist International has rendered such great services to China and to various other countries, why should it be necessary to proclaim its dissolution? To this question Comrade Mao Tse-tung replied: 'It is a principle of Marxism-Leninism that the forms of revolutionary organizations must be adapted to the necessities of the revolutionary struggle. If a form of organization is no longer adapted to the necessities of the struggle, then this form of organization must be abolished.' Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that

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36. Extracted from a speech explaining the dissolution of the Communist International, delivered on 26 May 1943, to the cadres of the Chinese Communist Party, 'Chieh-fang jih-pao', 28 May 1943 at present the form of revolutionary organization known as the Communist International is no longer adapted to the necessities of the struggle. To continue this organizational form would, on the contrary, hinder the development of the revolutionary struggle in each country. What is needed now is the strengthening of the national Communist Party *[min-tsu kung-chan tang]* of each country, and we no longer need this international leading center. There are three main reasons for this: (1) The internal situation in each country and the relations between the different countries are more complicated than they have been in the past and are changing more rapidly. It is no longer possible for a unified international organization to adapt itself to these extremely complicated and rapidly changing circumstances. Correct leadership must grow out of a detailed analysis of these conditions, and this makes it even more necessary for the Communist Party of each country to undertake this itself. The Communist International, which is far removed from the concrete struggle in each country, was adapted to the relatively simple condition of the past, when changes took place rather slowly, but now is no longer a suitable instrument. (2)... The anti-fascist states are of all kinds: socialist, capitalist, colonial, semi colonial. Among the fascist states and their vassals there are also great differences; in addition, there are also the neutral countries, which find themselves in varying circumstances. For some time it has been felt that a centralized organization of an international character was not very appropriate for organizing rapidly and efficiently the anti-fascists of all these states, and this has become particularly obvious recently. (3) The leading cadres of the Communist Parties of the various countries have already grown up and attained political maturity. Comrade Mao Tse-tung explained this point by using the example of the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party has been through three revolutionary movements. These revolutionary movements have been continuous and uninterrupted and extraordinarily complex, even more complex than the Russian Revolution. In the course of these revolutionary movements, the Chinese Communist Party has already acquired its own excellent cadres endowed with rich personal experience. Since the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935 the Communist International has not intervened in the internal affairs of the Chinese Communist Party. And yet, the Chinese Communist Party has done its work very well, throughout the whole Anti-Japanese War of National Liberation…

LETTER TO THE YAN'AN PEKING OPERA THEATRE AFTER SEEING 'DRIVEN TO JOIN THE LIANG SHANMOUNTAIN REBELS'[37]

January 9, 1944

Having seen your performance, I wish to express my thanks to you for the excellent work you have done. Please convey my thanks to the comrades of the cast! History is made by the people, yet the old opera (and all the old literature and art, which are divorced from the people) presents the people as though they were dirt, and the stage is dominated by lords and ladies and their pampered sons and daughters. Now you have reversed this reversal of history and restored historical truth, and thus a new life is opening up for the old opera. That is why this merits congratulations. The initiative you have taken marks an epoch-making beginning in the revolutionization of the old opera. I am very happy at the thought of this. 1 hope you will write more plays and give more performances, and so help make this practice a common one which will prevail throughout the country.

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37. The Peking opera 'Driven to Join the Liangshan Mountain Rebels' is an episode from Shui Hu Chuan (Heroes of the Marshes', 'Water Margin', or 'All Men Are Brothers'), the fourteenth-century classical novel. It tells how Lin Ch'ung, spurred on by the strength shown by the people, resolved to join their rebellion against the reactionary rulers.

MAO'S INTERVIEW WITH AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST, GUNTHER STIEN

1944

"Communists in all countries have only one thing in common", Mao Tse-tung said in reply to my question whether there was really no possibility of a change of "that awful word Communist" in the name of the party. "What they have in common is their method of political thinking along the lines of Marxism.

"Communists everywhere have to distinguish between this system of thought and an entirely different matter: the Communist system of social organization which is the final political aim of their system of thought.

"Especially we in China must strictly distinguish between the Communist method of observing, studying, and solving social problems on the one hand, and the practical policies of our New Democracy on the other, which during the present stage of China's social development must constitute our immediate aim. Without the Communist method of thinking we would be unable to direct the present, democratic stage of our social revolution. And without the political system of the New Democracy we would not apply our Communist philosophy correctly to the realities of China.

"Our present New Democracy will have to be continued under any conditions and for a long period to come. For the concrete conditions existing in China dictate to us the continuation of that policy.

"What China needs now is democracy and not socialism. To be more precise. China's needs at present are three: (1) to drive the Japanese out; (2) to realize democracy on a nationwide scale by giving the people all the forms of modem liberty and a system of national and local governments elected by them in genuinely free general elections, which we have already done in the areas under our control; and (3) to solve the agrarian question, so that capitalism of a progressive character can develop in China and improve the standard of living of the people through the introduction of modem methods of production.

"These, for the present, are the tasks of the Chinese revolution. To speak of the realization of socialism before these tasks are accomplished would merely be empty talk. This is what I told our party members In 1940 in my book *The*

New Democracy. I said already then that this first democratic phase of our revolution would by no means be short. We are not Utopians and we cannot isolate ourselves from the actual conditions right before our eyes."

He added with a smile, "It is quite possible that China may reach the stages of socialism and communism considerably later than your countries in the West which are so much more highly developed economically."

Mao Tse-tung gave me his views on the question of the future Communist attitude toward the landlords when I asked him what he considered the principal economic and social contents of the New Democracy.

"The central economic feature of the New Democracy", he said, "is the agrarian revolution. This holds good even during the present period when the fight against Japan is our main task. For our peasantry is the chief object of exploitation—not only of Chinese reactionaries but also of the Japanese imperialists in the occupied territories. Only the introduction of the New Democracy in our war regions has enabled us from the beginning to resist the Japanese as successfully as we do, because of its reforms in the interest of the peasant masses who constitute the very basis of our war effort.

"The present unreformed agrarian system in the rest of China, with its scattered, individual peasant economy—in which the farmers are not free but bound to the land, in which they have little contact even with one another and live a stagnant cultural life—has been the foundation of our ancient feudalism and despotism. The New Democracy of the future cannot rest on such a foundation. For the progress of Chinese society will mainly depend upon the development of industry.

"Industry must therefore be the main economic foundation of the New Democracy. Only an industrial society can be a fully democratic society. But to develop industry, the land problem must first be solved. Without a revolution against the feudal landlord system it is impossible to develop capitalism, as the course of events in Western countries many years ago that shown quite clearly.

"Our agrarian revolution until 1937, during the period of the Civil War, was fundamentally of the same social character as the great agrarian revolutions which took place in the past in all progressive countries of the West and cleared away the feudal obstacles to the growth of the capitalistic system."

I asked whether the radical Civil War policy of confiscating land from the landlords and distributing it to the peasants would not be resumed after the present war with Japan, since Mao Tse-tung had still emphasized the need for a continued agrarian revolution.

He explained, “During the Civil War period we had no reason to prevent the farmers from confiscating land, because the landlord class not only suppressed them but actually led the fight against them. Our party only followed the opinion of the farmers on the subject, formulated their demands into slogans, and then put them into practice as policy. Land confiscation as such was not a bad policy under Chinese conditions. The basic demand of the rural masses has always been concentrated on their desire for land ownership. Dr.Sun Yat-sen, the late leader of the Kuomintang, recognized it and advocated the ownership of the land by the tillers. This was one of the main points in his program for the improvement of the livelihood of the people.

“During a period of national war against a foreign aggressor things are of course different. A national war makes it possible to persuade the masses not to confiscate the land of the landlords, because the masses realize that while the landlords are also willing to resist the enemy, a policy of land confiscation might drive them into the Japanese-held cities and make them return to their villages together with Japanese troops in order to recover their land.

“In this way, the peasants understood soon after the beginning of the war with Japan that our new policy of reducing land rents instead of continuing confiscation of land had the twofold advantage of improving the peasants’ livelihood and of inducing the landlords to stay on in the villages and join in the fight against Japan. The general reduction of land rents in favor of the tenants and the guarantee we gave the landlords for the actual payment of the reduced rents resulted in improved relations between tenants and landlords so that the Japanese found practically nobody to cooperate with in our areas.”

I wanted to know how this change in the land policy of the Communist party had been decided at the time.

“This is a characteristic example of the democratic ways in which our party devises policies,” Mao Tse-tung said. “This fundamental change from land confiscation to a general reduction of land rents and the guarantee for their payment to the landlords was first suggested by comrades in lower party organizations. Our Central Committee took up their suggestion, which was clearly based on the wishes of the masses. We studied and formulated these demands and put them into effect as general policy.

“If the whole of China becomes a genuine democracy on the basis of co-operation between all political parties, it will be possible to practice our rent reduction policy on a nationwide scale. This would be a great reform indeed, although it would still be inferior to Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s idea of ownership of the land by those who till it, which will have to be the final solution of the land problem. But it is conceivable that even the gradual transfer to the tillers of all the land now under feudal exploitation may be brought about peacefully all over China if a genuinely democratic system of government is introduced everywhere.

"The way of bringing about such a gradual transfer of all land to the tillers would be to encourage the investment of the landlords' capital in industrial enterprises and to devise other measures of economic and fiscal policy that would be beneficial to the landlords, the tenants, and the development of Chinese economy as a whole.

"But such a solution depends upon genuine internal peace and genuine democracy in China. The possible need in the future for outright confiscation and distribution of land to the tenants can therefore not be ruled out entirely. For in the postwar period there may again be civil war if the Kuomintang insists on attacking us.

"Yet", Mao Tse-tung said with emphasis, "no matter whether we shall have internal peace or civil war, we prefer not to resume land confiscation but to continue our present policy of reduction of rents and guarantee of rent payment to the landlords; because that would reduce the obstacles to progress and reform in general.

"I want to remind you," Mao Tse-tung said "that in 1930 the Kuomintang government in Nanking issued an agrarian law restricting land rents to 37.5 percent of the tenant's main crops while no rent was to be paid from secondary crops. But the Kuomintang has proved unable and unwilling to carry it out in practice. The law was never enforced. Therefore only the Communist party has proved really able to realize agrarian reform, even in the shape of a mere reduction of rents."

I asked about the postwar attitude the Communist party intended to take toward commercial and industrial capital in China.

"We are firmly convinced that private capital, Chinese as well as foreign, must be given liberal opportunities for broad development in postwar China; for China needs industrial growth," Mao Tse-tung replied.

"In China's postwar commercial relations with the outside world we want to replace Japan's principle of colonizing China by the principle of free and equal trade with all nations. In the internal sphere we want to replace the policies of the Kuomintang government, which depress the living standards of the people and thereby restrict industrial development in the country by the policies we are already practicing in Liberated China, that is, of fostering the productive forces of the people, raising their purchasing power, and thus achieving the main prerequisites for the most rapid and most solid growth of modem industries.

"There will have to be three forms of industrialization, according to the ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which we consider justified by the conditions prevailing in China. Key industries in a position to control national economy, like railroads and mines, can best be developed and run by the state. Other industries will have to be developed by private capital. And for the exploitation of our great potentialities in handicraft and rural small-scale manufacture we shall have to depend upon strong, democratically run cooperatives."

What political role did the Communist party plan to play in postwar China, I asked.

"The membership of our party is necessarily a small portion of the Chinese people," he said. "Only if that small portion reflects the opinions of the majority of the people, and only if it works for their interests can the relationship between the people and the party be healthy.

"Today the Communist party reflects the opinions not only of the peasants and workers but also of many anti-Japanese landlords, merchants, intellectuals, etc., that is of all anti-Japanese people in our regions. The Communist party is willing and will always be ready to cooperate closely with all people in China who are prepared to cooperate with it.

"This willingness is expressed in our 'Three-thirds' system of democratic representation which restricts the seats of Communist party members in all elected bodies to a maximum of one-third of the whole and gives two-thirds of the seats to members of other parties and non-party elements."

"Yes," Mao Tse-tung replied to my question about relations with the Kuomintang, "we are also willing to cooperate with the Kuomintang: not only while the war lasts but afterward. That is to say, if the Kuomintang lets us do so.

"And we are willing to practice in the future, as we do today, the four promises we made to the Kuomintang in 1937."

I asked him about the contents of those promises to which I had often heard vague reference in Chungking, and about the conditions that had been attached to them.

"We promised (1) not to continue the kind of agrarian revolution we had practiced in the past; (2) not to overthrow the Kuomintang government by force; (3) to reorganize our Soviet government in the Border Region as a democratic, local government; and (4) to reorganize our Red Army as part of a National Revolutionary Army.

"These promises, we stated at that time, we would carry out if the Kuomintang on its part (1) stopped Civil War; (2) fought against Japan; (3) adopted a system of democratic government, and granted the people freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association; and (4) took measures to improve the livelihood of the people."

"Is there any opposition within the Communist party to your present policies?" I went on, "or to your interpretation of the long-term requirements of China?" I was referring to the frequent rumors in Chungking about dissension within the Communist ranks.

"No," he said, "there is no opposition in our party now. In earlier periods there were two deviations. One was of a Trotskyite nature, identified with Chen Tu-hsiu, who died in 1942, years after his opposition had ceased to have any influence. The other was that of Chang Kuo-tao, who had for some time set himself against our party's correct policy and left it, practically alone. He is now working in the Special Service of the Kuomintang. Both deviations never influenced the solidarity of our party and have left no trace."

I interrupted, "Do you mean to say that none of your policies are ever questioned or opposed?"

"Naturally, from time to time there may be certain differences of opinion within our ranks. But they are always solved in democratic way, by discussion and analysis of the problems in question. If a minority is still not convinced of the correctness of a majority decision, it submits to it after thorough debates in party meetings. The decisive factor in our work is that we always find out which of our policies the masses of the people accept and which they criticize or reject. Only policies which prove popular with the masses become and remain the policies of our party.

"At the time of the introduction of a new measure there may be people inside and outside the party who do not quite understand it. But in the course of the execution of any measure a united opinion of an over-whelming majority inside and outside the party is invariably formed, because our party organizations are all the time watching out for popular reaction, and because we modify our measures continuously according to the actual needs and opinions of the people. All party organizations from the top to down are held to observe our vital principle of not separating ourselves from the masses of the people but of being in closest harmony with their needs and wishes.

"The correctness of any of our policies has always to be tested and is always being tested by the masses themselves. We ourselves constantly examine our own decisions and policies. We correct our mistakes whenever we find them. We draw conclusions from all positive and negative experiences and apply those conclusions as widely as possible. In these ways relations between the Communist party and the masses of the people are constantly being improved."

Mao Tse-tung had arrived at his favorite topic, his constant demand on all party members to observe what he calls the "mass viewpoint" in all their decisions and actions. He spoke with enthusiasm.

"This is the most fundamental point. If the leading elements of a political party are really working for the interests of the broad masses of the people, and if they are sincere in this endeavor, they have unlimited opportunities of listening to the opinions of the people.

"We listen to the people. Through the media of popular meetings in villages, towns, districts, regions, and everywhere in our territories; through individual conversations between party members and men and women of all strata of the population; through special conferences, newspapers, and the telegrams and letters we receive from the people—through all this we can, and do, always find out the real, undisguised opinion of the masses.

"Apart from that, our method is to find typical samples both of satisfactory and unsatisfactory work in every field of activity. We study those samples thoroughly, learn from them, and sum up our experiences on the subject in order to draw concrete conclusions for the necessary improvements. The period of such observation of reality and of studying samples of good and bad work may in one case be a few weeks, in another several months, and sometimes even a few years. But in this way we always keep in close touch with actual developments, discover what the people want and need, and learn from those among the people inside and outside the party who do the best work.

"Some of our cadres may sometimes fail to understand our policies thoroughly and make mistakes in their execution, so that such comrades have to be criticized and taught. For this purpose, too, the thorough study and analysis of a specimen of good work is of great importance."

Mao Tse-tung showed me a copy of the *Liberation Daily,* "Take the example in tonight's newspaper. Here is a long article covering a whole page which describes in detail the ways in which one of the companies of the Eighth Route

Army got rid of its shortcomings and became one of the best units. The cadres and fighters of every company in our armies will read and study and discuss this article. This is the simple way in which the positive experiences of one company will be taught as policy to five thousand companies. On other days you may find similar articles about a cooperative, a school, a hospital, or a local administrative unit.

"To come back to the vital matter of close understanding and cooperation between party comrades and non-party people. There has been a very great and steady improvement; but mistakes are still being made by some of our comrades.

"Some incidents and misunderstandings still occur. Here and there we still have some Communists who tend to monopolize affairs.

"We are therefore all the time calling everybody's attention to the importance of giving non-party people actual power under our democratic 'Three-thirds' system. In the course of the practical execution of our policies we show all our comrades concretely how genuine cooperation between us and non-party people helps not only the masses but ourselves. In consequence, mutual trust between party and non-party people is growing in the process of all the practical work they have to do together."

I asked Mao Tse-tung whether he considered that the Communist party had made any major mistakes in its policies.

"On all basic points our policies have proved correct from the very beginning. This is true first of all of our fundamental policies under the New Democracy—of letting the masses of the people organize themselves for a revolution aiming at national independence, democracy, and the improvement of the people's livelihood on the basis of private property.

"It is only with regard to the application of these basic policies to concrete conditions that certain deviations are liable to appear from time to time, deviations partly to the left and partly to the right. They are, however, not deviations of the party as a whole or of groups in the party, but of certain people in our ranks. From all those mistakes the party as a whole has learned.

"Yes, in certain periods there have been a few individuals in our party who believed that Communism is feasible in China at this time. But the party as such has never held that view. Even the existence within our party of a group advocating the immediate practice of a Communist social system is impossible on account of the concrete conditions in China which make Communism unfeasible for a very long time to come.

"The Kuomintang allegation that there are groups with diverging views within our party is completely unfounded. The Kuomintang, which is itself so badly split by cliques, cannot conceive of a really united political party, and that is probably why such rumors are believed by some in Chungking."

"Did you ever find yourself in a minority so that your own ideas on a subject were not carried out"?

"Yes. I have been in the minority myself. The only thing for me to do at such times was to wait. But there have been very few examples of that in recent years."

I had been asked by Chinese friends in Chungking to find out whether the Communists were "Chinese first" or "Communist first" and put the question to Mao Tse-tung.

He smiled. "Without a Chinese nation there could be no Chinese Communist party. You might just as well ask, what is first, children or parents? This is not a question of theory but of practice, like the other question people put to you in the Kuomintang regions, whether we are working for our party or for the people. Go and ask our people, anywhere you want. They know well enough that the Chinese Communist party serves them. They have had their experience with us during the most difficult times.

"As to our method of thinking, I told you already that we, like Communists in any other country, are convinced of the correctness of Marxism. This is probably what people refer to when they ask whether we are 'Communist first' or 'Chinese first'. But our belief in Marxism as a correct method of thinking does not mean that we negate the Chinese cultural heritage or the value of non-Marxist foreign thought.

"It is certainly true that much is good in what Chinese history has handed down to us. And this heritage we must make our own. There are, however, certain people in China who worship the obsolete ideas of ancient times which are not suitable for our nation today but on the contrary harmful. Those things must be discarded.

"In foreign cultures, too, there is much that is good and progressive which we must accept; and, on the other hand, much that is rotten, like Fascism, which must be destroyed.

"To accept ideas from the Chinese past or from abroad does not mean to take them over unconditionally. They must be coordinated with actual conditions in China and practiced in accordance with them. Our attitude is that of critical acceptance of our own historical heritage and of foreign thought. We are against blind acceptance as well as blind rejection of any ideas. We Chinese must think with our own brains and must decide for ourselves what can grow on our own soil."

"I want to summarize what China needs today," Mao Tse-tung took the initiative. "China needs internal peace and democracy. Without internal peace China will not be able to win the war against Japan or win the peace. Our failure to achieve internal peace after the war with Japan might actually disturb peaceful international relations. For if there were to be another civil war in China, it would last for a long period and would influence foreign countries as well.

"Among people abroad there are still many who have not fully understood that during the last twenty-three years of China's political development the key problem has always been the relationship between the Kuomintang and Communist parties. And the same will be true in the future.

"In the first stage of that important twenty-three-year period of our history, from 1924 to 1927, there would have been no national revolution in China without cooperation between the Kuomintang and Communist parties.

"In the latter part of the second stage, from 1931 to 1936, China's inability to resist Japan resulted from the fact that the National Government of the Kuomintang used all its strength, the proceeds of its foreign loans, the services of its foreign military advisers, and other foreign assistance for the campaigns it waged against the Chinese Communists.

"In the third stage, from 1937 to the present, our war against Japan might not have been possible, or at least China would not have been able to hold out as long as she did if it had not been for what Kuomintang-Communist cooperation there was.

"Conversely, China's war effort against Japan today would be infinitely stronger than it is if the Kuomintang had continued to cooperate with the Communist party at least to the extent that characterized the first short phase of the war."

SALUTE THE APRIL 8th MARTYRS[38]

1946

Dear Comrades-in-Arms and Immortal Heroes,

In the last few decades you rendered your glorious service to the people. Now in dying for them your deaths are also glorious.

Your deaths are a clarion call to deepen the Chinese people's understanding of the CCP and to strengthen their determination to defend peace, democracy, and unity.

Your deaths are a clarion call to the whole party and the whole nation to unite in the struggle for a peaceful, democratic, and united China.

The whole party and the whole nation will carry on your unfinished tasks and continue to struggle until victory is won. They will never relax or shrink back from their effort.

---

[38] On 8 April 1946 the communist leaders Ch in Pang-hsien (Po-ku], Teng Fa, Wang Jo-fei, and Yeh Ting were killed in an airplane crash and subsequently there was a commemorative meeting held in Yan'an.

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毛澤东

SELECTED WORKS
OF
MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume VII

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Note from Foreign Languages Press

It's with great joy that we release this new printing of Volume VII of the "Unofficial" *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. This volume was initially released by our Indian comrades from Kranti Publications in 1991, but was out of stock by the end of the 90s and has since been unavailable in hard copy or online.

This volume covers the period from the founding of the People's Republic (October 1949) until the Great Leap Forward (1958) and contains 478 documents that are not included in the "Official" Volume V of the *Selected Works* that covered this period.

While the "Official" Volume V gave us access to documents reflecting Chairman Mao's philosophy, as well as his ideas regarding the development of the economy, this volume is mainly composed of his letters and telegrams showing all the difficulties that the chairman of the newly founded People's Republic of China had to face, including the danger of imperialist aggressions as seen during the Korean War (1950-1953), the delicate situation of national minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet and the complexity of diplomacy. These correspondences also show the challenge of how to treat all Mao's former neighbors, childhood friends and cousins and their requests for his attention, positions and recognition.

Unlike Volume VI for which we played mostly the role of "re-printer," this volume is a new edition, with over a thousand typos corrected and names and words changed from the Wade-Giles to the *pinyin* spelling. This was done both for practicality and readability, but also to uphold the *Directive on Language Reform* that Chairman Mao promulgated in 1951 (p. 148), which was the starting point of work on the simplification of Chinese characters (adopted in 1952) and the *pinyin* system (adopted in 1958).

This edition also contains new indexes of Chinese names and places, as well as non-Chinese names, which will allow the reader to navigate the 478 documents with greater ease.

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Contents

1949

September 23 Speech at Banquet Celebrating Insurrection of KMT Troops 3
September 28 Telegram to Xinjiang Political and Military Authorities 3
October 1 Proclamation of the Central People's Government of the PRC 4
October 6 Telegram to the Communist Party of the United States 6
October 9 Letter to Wang Shoudao 7
October 9 Letter to Yang Kaizhi 8
October 9 Telegram to the French Transportation Labor Union 8
October 10 Telegram to General Zhao Xiguang 9
October 10 Telegram to Insurrectionists on the "Changzhi" 9
October 12 Telegram to the United States Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy 10
October 12 Telegram to Five-man Independent Group of the British Labor Party in the House of Commons 10
October 13 Letter to Feng Youlan 10
October 15 Letter to Zhou Shizhao 11
October 16 Reply to Ambassador of the Soviet Union 12
October 16 Telegram to the German Democratic Republic 13
October 21 Reply to the Hui People of Xinjiang 14
October 21 Reply to the Provisional People's Government of Xinjiang 14
October 21 Reply to the Xinjiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy and to People of the Tacheng-Ili-Ashan Regions 15
October 24 Preface to the Victory of New Democracy in China 15
October 24 Telegram to the Insurrectionists on the "Hailiao" 16
October 25 Inscription for the Inaugural Issue of Renmin Wenxue (People's Literature) 17
October 26 Telegram to Secretary of the World Federation of Trade Unions 17
October 26 Telegram to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Algeria 17
October 26 Telegram to the Provisional Government of Greece 18
October 26 Telegram to the Albanian Council of Ministers 18
October 29 Letter to Bo Yibo 19
October 29 Telegram to the Republic of Czechoslovakia 20
November 5 Telegram to the USSR 20
November 12 Telegram to the Work Committee of the CP of Thailand 21

November 12	Telegram to Managers and Staff of Two Aviation Corporations	21
November 14	Letter to Peng Dehuai and the Northwest Bureau	22
November 15	Inscription on Public Morals	23
November 15	Letter to Mao Xusheng	24
November 17	Letter to Li Jiehou of Shaoshan, Hunan	24
November 19	Telegram to the Former KMT Government Resources Committee	25
November 19	Telegram to the Communist Party of India	25
November 19	Telegram to the Socialist Republican Party of India	26
November 19	Telegram to the Central Committee of the Iranian Workers' Party	26
November 20	Inscription for the Third Anniversary of Nanqiao Ribao	27
November 22	Telegram of Condolence on the Death of Xinjiang Delegates to the CPPCC	27
November 23	Telegram to Panchen Gnoertehni	28
November 24	Telegram to the Banka Federation of Labour Unions of Indonesia	28
November 25	Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	29
November 29	Letter to Xu Beihong	29
November 30	Telegram to the Britain-China Conference in London	30
December 1	Letter to the People of Lüshun-Dalian	30
December 2	Letter to Liu Yazi	31
December 2	Directive Issued at the Fourth Meeting of the CPGC (Excerpts)	32
December 5	Instruction on the Army's Participation in Production and Construction Work in 1950	33
December 16	Speech on Arrival at Moscow Train Station	37
December 19	Telegram to Stalin	38
December 21	Address at Birthday Celebration Meeting Held for Stalin	38
Winter	Comment on Democratic Personages	39
1949	Conversation with a Painter from the Soviet Union (Excerpts)	40

1950

January 1	Inscription for First Issue of Renmin Haijun	45
January 2	Interview Given to TASS Correspondent in Moscow	45
January 11	Inscription for Lenin's Mausoleum	46
January 24	Telegram to Bulgaria on the Death of Vasil Kolarov	46
January 28	Telegram to President Prasad of the Republic of India	47
February 17	Speech on Departure from Moscow	47

February 21	Telegram to President of the Vietnam-China Friendship Association	48
February 23	Telegram to the USSR	49
February 26	Telegram to Stalin upon Leaving the USSR	49
February 27	Conversations During Inspection of Heilongjiang Province (Excerpts)	50
February 27	Inscriptions Written in Harbin	50
March 10	Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Romania	51
March 14	Letter to Long Bojian	52
March 14	Letter to Liu Kuiyi	52
March 31	Telegram to the Communist Party of France	53
March	Directive on the film Qing Gong Mishi	54
April 1	Telegram to the People's Republic of Hungary	54
April 11	Speech at the Sixth Session of the CPGC	54
April 13	Letter to Yang Kaizhi and Li Congde	55
April 14	Comment on Chen Yun's Report	56
April 18	Letter to Mao Shenpin	57
April 18	Letter to Li Shuyi	58
April 19	Letter to Xiang Mingqing	58
April 20	Telegram to W. H. Andrews	59
April 28	Telegram to Maurice Thorez	59
May 1	Inscription Concerning the People's Education	60
May 3	Telegram to the Republic of Czechoslovakia	60
May 4	Inscription Commemorating the May Fourth Movement	60
May 7	Letter to Wen Jianquan	61
May 7	Letter to Zhang Ding	61
May 7	Letter to Zhao Puzhu	62
May 8	Letter to Mao Yimin	63
May 12	Letter to Wen Nansong	64
May 12	Letter to Ye Jiannong	64
May 12	Letter to Zhou Wennan	65
May 12	Telegram to Ho Chi Minh	66
May 15	Letter to Mao Yuju	66
May 15	Letter to Zou Puxun	67
May 16	Letter to Zhou Rong	67
May 20	Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of India	68
May 22	Letter to Li Jinxi	69
May 26	Telegram of Condolence to Yan Huiqing's Family	69

May 27	Letter to Liu Yanan	70
June 4	Letter to Liu Shaoqi	70
June 12	Letter to Chen Mingshu	72
June 12	Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of Poland	73
June 12	Reply to Ambassador of the Kingdom of Sweden	74
June 14	Opening Speech at the Second Meeting of the National Committee of the CPPCC	74
June 19	Letter to Ma Xulun	75
June 24	Reply to Minister of the Kingdom of Denmark	76
June 24	Reply to Head of Diplomatic Mission of the German Democratic Republic	77
June 28	Speech at Eighth Session of the CPGC	78
July 3	Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Mongolia	79
July 7	Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia	80
July 18	Telegram to the Socialist Unity Party of Germany	80
July 19	Letter to Wu Qirui	81
July 21	Telegram to the Republic of Poland	82
July 26	Telegram to the Transvaal Indian Congress	82
August 7	Reply to Ambassador of the Union of Burma	83
August 8	Letter to Su Yu	83
August 11	Telegram to the People's Government of Qinghai on the Death of Vice-Chairman Ma Po	84
August 14	Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	84
August 16	Telegram to the Republic of Indonesia	85
August 20	Letter to Xu Haidong	85
August 21	Telegram to the People's Republic of Romania	86
August 23	Speech at Banquet Commemorating the Liberation of Romania (Excerpt)	86
August 26	Letter to Xu Beihong	87
August 29	Letter to Chen Jisheng	87
August 29	Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	88
August	Inscription for the First National Conference on Health Care	88
September 6	Telegram to the People's Republic of Bulgaria	88
September 11	Letter to Chen Yu	89
September 13	Telegram to the South African Indian Congress	90
September 19	Letter to Zhang Wei	90
September 24	Telegram to the Communist Party of Great Britain	91
September 25	Inscription for the National Conference of Representatives of Combat Heroes	91

September 27 Comments on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries 92
September 30 Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Bulgaria 92
October 4 Telegram to the German Democratic Republic 93
October 5 Inscription on the Unity of the Chinese and Soviet Peoples 94
October 8 Inscription for Display of the PLA 94
October 11 Letter to Wang Shoudao 94
October 26 Telegram to the Republic of Czechoslovakia 95
October 31 Telegram to Prince Gustaf Adolf of Sweden on the Death of King Gustaf V 96
November 5 Telegram to the USSR 96
November 20 Telegram to Harry Pollitt 97
November 22 Letter to Hu Qiaomu 97
November 26 Telegram to the People's Republic of Albania 99
November Comment on Hearing of Mao Anying's Death 100
December 2 Letter to Huang Niantian 100
December 2 Telegram to Participants of Demonstration in Tianjin 101
December 15 Inscription for the Air Force 102
December 18 Letter to Chen Shutong 102
December 23 Telegram to the Communist Party of France 103
December 29 Inscription for the First Normal School of Hunan 104
December 29 Letter to Zhou Shizhao 104
December 29 Telegram to the People's Republic of Romania 105

1951

January 1 Comment on "A Summary of the Relationship Between the Various Departments of the Military and the Soviet Advisors" 109
January 2 Telegram to the Union of Burma 109
January 2 Telegram to Wilhelm Pieck 110
January 10 Letter to Rao Shushi and Chen Pixian 110
January 14 Letter to Xu Beihong 111
January 14 Letter to Li Sian 111
January 15 Letter to Ma Xulun 112
January 22 Letter to Zhang Lan 112
January 22 Telegram to the Communist Party of Italy 113
January 24 Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries 114
January 24 Telegram to the Republic of India 114

January 26	Toast at a Reception Given by Ambassador of India	115
February 12	Telegram to the USSR	115
February 17	Letter to Huang Yanpei	116
February 21	Telegram to the USSR	117
February 28	Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries	117
March 8	Inscription for Woman's Day	118
March 9	Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries	118
March 18	Letter to Rao Shushi and Others	118
March 24	Comments on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries	119
March 27	Letter to Li Da	120
March 30	Comments on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries	121
March 31	Letter to Peng Yousheng	121
March	Directive on the Problem of Cultivating Cadres	122
April 2	Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries	123
April 9	Letter to Li Weihan	123
April 27	Letter to Situ Meitang	124
April 29	Letter to Zhen Wenxin	125
May 5	Letter to Zhang Zhizhong	126
May 29	Directive on the Huai River	126
May 16	Comment on the "Report of the Secretary's Office on the Handling of Letters from the Masses"	127
May 24	Speech on the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet	127
June 23	Letter to Li Zhuchen	128
June 29	Inscription on the Unity of Nationalities	129
July 15	Letter to Huang Yanpei	129
July 30	Letter to Zhang Yuanji	130
August 5	Inscription for the People of the Old Revolutionary Bases	130
August 14	Telegram to the Dominion of Pakistan	131
August 14	Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	131
August 14	Telegram to the Republic of Indonesia	132
September 1	Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	132
September 2	Telegram to the USSR	133
September 7	Telegram to the People's Republic of Bulgaria	133

September 12	Letter to Party Committee of Shijingshan Iron and Steel Works	134
September 18	Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries	134
September 25	Letter to Deng Zihui	135
September 27	Reply to Ambassador of the Union of Burma	135
October 1	Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries	136
October 6	Telegram to the German Democratic Republic	136
October 14	Letter to Chen Shutong	137
October 15	Telegram to the USSR	138
October 26	Telegram to the Dalai Lama	138
October	Inscription for the Cultural Work Team of the Special District Party Committee of Chu *xian*	138
November 1	Closing Speech of the Third Meeting of the First National Committee of the CPPCC	139
November 5	Telegram to the USSR	139
November 7	Telegram to Gheorghiu-Dej	140
November 12	Reply to Ambassador of Pakistan	141
December 3	Letter to Zheng Zhenduo	141
December 4	Letter to Dong Biwu	142
December 11	Letter to Mao Zelian and Mao Yuanti	143
December 12	Telegram to the Northwest Nationalities' Peoples' Representatives' Conference for Resisting US Aggression and Aiding Korea	143
December 13	Telegram to Panchen Gnoertehni	144
December 15	Letter to Liu Shaoqi	145
December 23	Letter to Chen Yuying	146
December 24	Telegram to William Gallacher	147
December	Conversation with Zhou Shizhao	147
1951	Comment Written on a Letter from Students of Chinese People's University	148
1951	Directive on Language Reform	148

1952

January 2	Telegram to the Union of Burma	151
January 24	Telegram to the Republic of India	151
January 27	Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia	152
February 4	Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	152

February 11 Telegram to the USSR 153
February 14 Imperialism's Plan for Aggression is Bound to be Smashed 154
February 21 Telegram to the USSR 154
February Decree to a Division of the Xinjiang Construction Battalion 155
March 7 Telegram to Matyas Rakosi 155
March 11 Letter to Cheng Qian 156
March 15 Instruction to Huang Yanpei 157
March 18 Reply to Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 157
March 18 Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of Czechoslovakia 158
Spring Conversation with Zhai Zuojun (Excerpt) 159
April 12 Telegram to Sa Zhenbing's Family 159
April 16 Telegram to Boleslaw Bierut 160
May 11 Telegram to Rajendra Prasad 160
May 16 Letter to Tan Kah-Kee 161
May 19 Inscription for Workers on Jing River Flood Control Project 162
May 23 Telegram to the Dalai Lama and Panchen Gnoertehni 162
May 25 Letter to Ye Gongzuo 162
June 9 Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of Poland 163
June 9 Reply to Minister of the Republic of Finland 164
June 10 Inscription on Physical Culture and Sports 165
June 10 Letter to Huang Yanpei 165
June 14 Letter to Zhou Enlai 166
July 1 Inscription on Inauguration of the Chengdu-Chongqing Railway 167
July 7 Letter to Zhang Youcheng 167
July 8 Telegram to the German Socialist Unity Party 168
July 10 Address to the First Graduating Class of the Military Academy 168
August 3 Inscription on the Monument to the People's Heroes 170
August 13 Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 171
August 15 Letter to Chen Yi 172
August 23 Letter to Li Shuqing 172
August 30 Letter to Uyghur Peasants of Xinjiang 173
September 2 Telegram to the USSR 173
September 5 Letter to Huang Yanpei 174
September 17 Letter to Comrade Li Da 176
September 26 Inscription on the Arts 177
September 26 Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of India 177

September 28 Inscription for Inauguration of the Tianshui-Lanzhou Railway 178
September 30 Toast on Third Anniversary of Founding of the PRC 178
October 2 Letter to Mao Yuju 179
October 2 Telegram to the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Region 180
October 5 Letter to Qi Baishi 181
October 5 Telegram to the German Democratic Republic 181
October 8 Talk With Tibetan Delegates (Excerpts) 182
October 10 Letter to Song Qingling 183
October 15 Letter to Tan Zhenlin 184
October 16 Letter to Li Shuqing 185
October 22 Letter to Luo Yuankun 186
October 28 Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 187
October 29-31 Conversation During an Inspection Tour of the Flood Prevention Works on the Yellow River (Excerpts) 187
November 3 Telegram to the USSR 190
November 19 Inscription on Inauguration of the Kangding-Changdu Section of the Xikang-Tibet Highway 191
December 3 Reply to Ambassador of the Kingdom of Sweden 191
December 8 Inscription Concerning Public Health Work 192
December 14 Letter to the Anshan Iron and Steel Works 192
December 15 Reply to Ambassador of the Soviet Union 193
December 21 Letter to Yi Nanping 193
December 29 Reply to the Ambassador of the People's Republic of Romania 194
December 31 Telegram to the USSR on the Transfer of the Chinese Changehun Railway 195
December Instruction on the Arts 195
1952 Directive on Education 196
1952 Comment on a Report of the National Labor Insurance Conference 196

1953

January 2 Telegram to the Union of Burma 199
January 13 Speech to the Central People's Government Council 199
February 7 Closing Speech at the Fourth Session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC (Excerpts) 200
February 10 Telegram to the USSR 201
February 19 Instruction on the Daye Steel Plant 202

February 19-24	Conversations with Naval Personnel on the Yangtze River (Excerpts)	202
February 21	Inscription Written for the Navy	206
February 21	Telegram to the USSR	206
February 22	Inscription Awarded to Soviet Troops in Lüshun	207
March 4	Telegram to Inquire after Stalin's Illness	207
March 6	Telegram to the USSR on Stalin's Death	208
March 6	Central People's Government's Decree on Stalin's Death	209
March 8	Letter to Huang Yanpei and Chen Shutong	209
March 9	The Greatest Friendship	210
March 15	Telegram to Czechoslovakia on Gottwald's Death	214
March 25	Telegram to Palmiro Togliatti	214
April 3	Instruction on Leadership Work of Health Departments of Military Commissions	215
April 3	Reply to Ambassador of The Soviet Union	216
April 21	Letter to Li Zhuchen	216
April 26	Letter to Li Zhuchen	217
May 15	Letter to Huang Yanpei and Chen Shutong	217
May 17	Instructions on Education	218
May 27	Letter to Wang Jiaxiang	218
July 2	Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Mongolia	219
July 7	Letter to Fu Dingyi	220
July 30	Letter to Huang Yanpei	221
July 31	Telegram to the USSR	221
August 12	Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	222
August 16	Letter to Ye Gongzuo	222
August 20	Telegram to the People's Republic of Albania	233
August 25	Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	233
August 26	Address at the Establishment of the Institute of Military Engineering and the Inauguration of its First Term	224
August 27	Letter to Li Shuqing	225
August 30	Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	225
September 2	Telegram to the USSR	226
September 12	Telegram to the Chinese People's Volunteers	227
September 15	Telegram to the USSR	229
September 24	Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia on the Death of Bumatsende	231
September 27	Letter to Shen Junru	231
October 4	Letter to Mao Yueqiu	232

October 5	Letter to Ma Xulun	233
October 5	Telegram to the German Democratic Republic	233
October 16	Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	234
October 18	Speech at Reception for Tibetan Delegation	235
October 22	Letter to Yang Shangkun	237
October 22	Telegram to the People's Republic of Albania	237
October 25	Letter to Wen Jiuming	238
October 28	Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia	239
October	Criticism of the Ministry of Public Health	240
November 5	Telegram to the USSR	240
November 12	Reply to Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic	241
December 2	Reply to Minister of the Republic of Finland	242
December 9	Letter to Dai Yuben	243
December 12	Reply to Minister of the Kingdom of Denmark	244
December 12	Reply to Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	244
December 13	Letter to Liao Jingwen	245
December 15	Reply to Ambassador of the Soviet Union	246
December 25	Telegram to Anshan Workers and Staff	247
December 26	Remark to Ke Qingshi	247
Winter	Inscription in Guest Book of the Moganshan Clinic	248
1953	Comment on the Department of Health Care	248
1953	Directive on Physical Culture	248
1953	Inscription for No. 1 Automobile Manufacturing Plant of Changchun	249
1953	Directive on the Work of the Ministry of Geology	249

1954

January 4	Telegram to the USSR	253
January 29	Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	253
February 11	Telegram to the USSR	253
February 21	Telegram to the USSR	254
March 2	Letter to Tian Jiaying	255
March 12	Letter to Huang Yanpei	256
March 14	Telegram to Kim Du Bong	256
March 31	Letter to Peng Shilin	257
April 29	Letter to Party Branch and *xiang* Government of Shicheng *xiang*	258

May 13	Inscription on the Completion of Guanting Reservoir	259
May 28	Telegram to the South African Indian Congress	259
July 20	Telegram to the People's Republic of Poland	260
July 23	Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	260
July 30	Directive on Work in Traditional Chinese Medicine	261
August 1	Letter to the Staff of the No. 320 Factory	264
August 12	Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	264
August 21	Telegram to the People's Republic of Romania	265
August 31	Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	266
September 2	Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Bulgaria	266
September 2	Telegram to the USSR	267
September 7	Telegram to the People's Republic of Bulgaria	268
September 13	Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Albania	269
September 13	Reply to Minister of the Confederation of Switzerland	270
September 22	Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Hungary	271
September 29	Toast at China's National Day Celebrations	271
October 5	Telegram to the German Democratic Republic	272
October 12	Letter to the Delegation of the USSR	273
October 12	Letter to the USSR	274
October 16	Telegram to the USSR	275
October 20	Implement the Correct Policy in Dealing with Doctors of Traditional Chinese Medicine	275
October 21	Toast at Reception for Prime Minister Nehru	281
October 22	Telegram to the People's Republic of Hungary	282
October 25	Inscription Expressing Gratitude to the Soviet Union	282
October 25	Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	283
October	On Criticizing Hongloumeng Yanjiu	284
October	Directive on the Film Qing Gong Mishi	284
November 6	Telegram to the USSR	285
November 18	Letter to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, et al.	286
November 22	Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	287
November 23	Letter to Huang Yanpei	288
November 25	Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia	289
November 28	Telegram to the People's Republic of Albania	290
December 1	Telegram to Petru Groza	290
December 1	Telegram to Rajendra Prasad	291
December 4	Toast at Dinner for Prime Minister U Nu	291
December 5	Telegram to the Republic of Finland	292

December 16 Telegram to Antonin Zapotocky 292
December 25 Inscription for Workers on the Kangding-Tibet and Qinghai-Tibet Highways 293
December 28 Letter to Li Da 293
December 31 Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 294
December On Writing Essays to Criticize Hu Shi 295
Winter Speech at a Standing Committee Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC (Excerpts) 295
1954 Comment on the National Budget 296
1954 Instructions on the Work of Doctors of Traditional Chinese Medicine 296
1954 Inscription on the Triumph of the People of Wuhan over the Flood 297
1954 Inscription for Historical Pavilion in Caixi *xiang*, Fujian Province 297

1955

January 2 Telegram to the Union of Burma 301
January 24 Telegram to the Republic of India 301
January 28 Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of Finland 302
January Criticism of Hu Feng 303
February 12 Telegram to the USSR 303
February 14 Speech at Banquet Celebrating Fifth Anniversary of Sino-Soviet Treaty 306
February 21 Telegram to the USSR 306
February 24 Toast at Banquet Celebrating Tibetan New Year 307
March 5 Letter to Lin Tie 308
March 6 Letter to Zhou Dungu 308
March 17 Letter To Wei Lihuang 309
March 21 Inscription for the First Congress of Heroes and Model Soldiers of the Air Force 310
Spring Speech at Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC 310
April 2 Telegram to the People's Republic of Hungary 311
April 7 Order to Terminate State of War between the PRC and Germany 312
April 27 Reply to Ambassador of Pakistan 313
April 28 Inscription for Czechoslovakian Exhibition 314
May 1 Letter to Jiang Zhuru 315

May 6 Telegram to the German Democratic Republic 315
May 7 Telegram to the Republic of Czechoslovakia 317
May 17 Letter to the Party Committee of Xiangxiang *xian* 318
May 19 Telegram to Ho Chi Minh 319
May 26 Letter to Huang Yanpei 319
May 26 Telegram to Afghanistan 320
May 29 Toast at Banquet for Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo 321
May Conversation with Security Guards on Taking Literacy Courses 321
June 8 Letter to Tan Shiying 321
June 17 Conversation with Soldiers (Excerpt) 322
June 20 On Swimming (Excerpts) 323
June 27 Telegram to Jamsarangiyn Sambuu 323
June 28 Toast to Ho Chi Minh 324
June 30 Reply to Ambassador of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 324
July 9 Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia 325
July 19 Telegram to the People's Republic of Poland 326
Mid-July Conversation with Security Guards 327
August 12 Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 327
August 15 Telegram to the Republic of Indonesia 329
August 21 Telegram to the People's Republic of Romania 329
September 1 Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 330
September 1 Telegram to Antonin Zapotocky 331
September 7 Telegram to the People's Republic of Bulgaria 332
September 12 Inscription for Tokuda Kyuichi 333
September 27 Letter to Tian Jiaying 333
October 4 Letter to Zhou Shizhao 334
October 6 Telegram to the German Democratic Republic 335
October 15 Conversation with Members of the Japanese Diet 336
October 24 Telegram to the USSR 337
November 1 Letter to Zhang Naiqi 338
November 6 Telegram to the USSR 338
November 17 Letter to Huang Yanpei 339
November 20 Remarks Made to Li Kaiwen 340
November 24 Letter to Panchen Gnoertehni 340
November 24 Letter to Zhou Shizhao 341
November 26 Telegram to the People's Republic of Albania 341

November 26 Telegram to the People's Republic of Yugoslavia 342
December 3 Reply to Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Germany 343
December 5 Telegram to the Republic of Finland 344
December 6 Talk on Opposing Right-Deviation and Conservatism 344
December 12 Letter to Zhai Zuojun 348

1956

January 20 Talk at the Conference on Intellectuals Called by the Centre (Excerpt) 351
April 5 Contradictions Under Socialism 351
April 5 Stalin's Place in History 352
April 25 Speech at Expanded Meeting of CPC Political Bureau 355
August 24 Chairman Mao's Talk to Music Workers 363
December 8 Instructions at a Discussion Meeting Attended by some of the Delegates to the Second Session of the First Committee of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce 368

1957

January Interjections at Conference of Provincial and Municipal Committee Secretaries (Collected) 383
April Talk at the Hangzhou Conference of the Shanghai Bureau 391
June 14 The Bourgeois Orientation of the Wen-Hui Bao for a Period of Time 401
July 7 Letter to Zhou Enlai 402
July Comment on Class Education with Leaders from Shanghai Motor Power Institute 403
October 7 Talk at the Enlarged Third Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CCP 403
November 2 No Power on Earth Can Separate Us 408
November 6 Speech at Moscow Celebration Meeting 409
November 17 The East Wind Prevails Over the West Wind 416

1949

Speech at Banquet Celebrating Insurrection of KMT Troops

September 23, 1949

Owing to the insurrection of some patriotic troops among the Kuomintang armed forces, not only has the disintegration of the remnants of the Kuomintang's military forces been accelerated; moreover, it has enabled us to acquire a speedily strengthening air force and navy.

Source: *People's Daily,* September 24, 1949.

Telegram to Xinjiang Political and Military Authorities

September 28, 1949

General Tao Zhiyue[1] and the officers and soldiers under his command, Chairman Burhan[2] and the government workers under him:

Your telegrams of September 25 and 26 have been received. We believe that your standpoint is a correct one. You have declared your severance from the remnants of the reactionary government in Guangzhou[3] and your new orientation towards the camp of People's Democracy; you have accepted the leadership of the People's Political Consultative Conference[4] and await and abide by the orders and disposition of the Central People's Government and the People's Revolutionary Military Council. This attitude conforms to the wishes of the people of the entire nation. We are most happy. We hope that you will unite all military and civilian governmental personnel in maintaining the unity of the nationalities and local order and cooperate with the People's Liberation Army, which is preparing at this moment to move northward, to abolish the old system and implement the new one, so as to strive for the establishment of a new Xinjiang.

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[1] Tao Zhiyue (1892-1988), a Hunanese military officer who graduated from the Baoding Military Academy in 1916 and served in various officer positions in the Hunan Army before participating in the KMT army in the Northern Expedition period. At the beginning of the War of Resistance against Japan, he was commander of the 36th Army, and later the commander of the First Army and deputy commander. At the end of the war of Resistance he became the deputy commander of the KMT's 8th Battle Zone, and in 1946, assumed command of the KMT's Xinjiang Garrison. In 1948, the Hexi district garrison was added to his command, and he also became deputy director of the Northwest Communist-Suppression Bureau of the KMT. His defection and surrender to the Communist forces at this time (Sept. 1949) was a severe blow to the KMT forces. In 1949-1950, the PRC commissioned him as commander of the 22nd Army Group and deputy commander of the Xinjiang Military District under Peng Dehuai. In 1950 he also became a member of the Provisional People's Government of Xinjiang and a member of the Northwest Military and Government Council.

[2] Burhan Shahidi (1896), also known by the sinicized version of his name, Bao Erhan, was made governor of Xinjiang Province by the KMT government in 1948. On the eve of the Communist victory. Burhan joined the Communist side and assumed the positions of chairman of the Provisional People's Government of Xinjiang and president of the Xinjiang People's Court. In 1950, he became a member of the Northwest Military and Government Council, and since then he has been a prominent representative of the people of Xinjiang in various national organizations in the PRC, such as the National Committee of the CPPCC.

(Co-signed with Zhu De and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, September 29, 1949.*

Proclamation of the Central People's Government of the PRC

October 1, 1949

The people throughout China have been plunged into bitter suffering and tribulations since the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang reactionary government betrayed the fatherland, colluded with imperialists, and launched the counter-revolutionary war. Fortunately, our People's Liberation Army, backed by the whole nation, has been fighting heroically and selflessly to defend the territorial sovereignty of our homeland, to protect the people's lives and property, to relieve the people of their sufferings, and to struggle for their rights, and it eventually wiped out the reactionary troops and overthrew the reactionary rule of the Nationalist government. Now, the People's War of Liberation has been basically won, and the majority of the people in the country have been liberated. On this foundation, the first session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, composed of delegates of all the democratic parties and people's organizations of China, the People's Liberation Army, the various regions and nationalities of the country, and the overseas Chinese and other patriotic elements, has been convened. Representing the will of the whole nation, [this session of the conference] has enacted the organic law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, elected Mao Zedong as chairman of the Central People's Government; and Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Song Qingling, Li Jishen, Zhang Lan, and Gao Gang as vice chairman [of the Central People's Government]; and Chen Yi, He Long, Li Lisan, Lin Boqu, Ye Jianying, He Xiangning, Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai, Liu Bocheng, Wu Yuzhang, Xu Xiangqian, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, Nie Rongzhen, Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, Seypidin, Rao Shushi, Chen Jiageng, Luo Ronghuan, Deng Zihui, Ulanhu, Xu Deli, Cai Chang, Liu Geping, Ma Yinchu, Chen Yun, Kang Sheng, Lin Feng, Ma Xulun, Guo Moruo, Zhang Yunyi, Deng Xiaoping, Gao Chongmin, Shen Junru, Shen Yanbing, Chen Shutong, Situ Meitang, Li Xijiu, Huang Yanpei, Cai Tingkai, Xi Zhongxun, Peng Zemin, Zhang Zhizhong, Fu Zuoyi, Li Zhuchen, Li Zhangda, Zhang Nanxian, Liu Yazi, Zhang Dongsun, and Long Yun as council members to form the Central People's Government Council, proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China and decided on Beijing as the capital of the People's Republic of China. The Central People's Government Council of the People's Republic of China took office today in the capital and unanimously made the following decisions: to proclaim the establishment of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China; to adopt the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference as the policy of the government; to elect Lin Boqu from among the council members as secretary general of the Central People's Government Council; to appoint Zhou Enlai as premier of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government and concurrently minster of Foreign Affairs, Mao Zedong as chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People's Government. Zhu De as commander-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army, Shen Junru as president of the Supreme People's Court of the Central People's Government, and Luo Ronghuan as procurator general of the Supreme People's Procuratorate of the Central People's Government, and to charge them with the task of the speedy formation of the various organs of the government to carry out the work of the government. At the same lime, the Central People's Government Council decided to declare to the governments of all other countries that this government is the sole legal government representing all the people of the People's Republic of China. This government is willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government that is willing to observe the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty.

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[3] A reference to the KMT Government which had its headquarters in Guangzhou and which was nominally headed by Li Zongren since the "retirement" of Chiang Kai-shek in January 1949.

[4] The First plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was held on September 21-30, 1949 in Beijing.

(SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT AND THE PRC)

Source: *People's Daily, October 2, 1949.*

Telegram to the Communist Party of the United States

October 6, 1949

Dear Comrade Foster and Comrade Dennis, and all comrades of the National Committee of the Communist Party of the United States of America:

We are extremely grateful for your enthusiastic congratulations on the founding of the People's Republic of China. Please convey our gratitude to all members of the Communist Party of the United States of America, and to all the people who love peace and justice and bear goodwill toward the Chinese people in the United States.

Indeed, as you yourselves said, the triumph of the Chinese people is a triumph over imperialism, first and foremost over United States imperialism. This victory is a part of the results of the general struggle which the working-class and progressive people in the whole world are waging against the world camp of imperialism. In this struggle the Communists of the United States and all sincere advocates of democracy are fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Chinese people.

In the assistance given to the Chinese people in their cause of justice and in the heroic struggle to resist the reactionary policy of opposing China on the part of the US imperialists, the Communists of the United States of America hold a place of exceptional honor. In spite of the fact that the reactionary government of the United States is savagely persecuting the Communist Party of the United States and progressive forces in the United States, and is illegally interrogating eleven leaders of the Communist Party of the United States, namely, Comrade Dennis, Comrade Williamson, Comrade Winston, Comrade Stachel, Comrade Davis, Comrade Winter, Comrade Thompson, Comrade

Gates, Comrade Potash, Comrade Green and Comrade Hall,[5] it has ultimately been demonstrated nonetheless that the Communist Party of the United States and the forces of progress in the United States of America are correct, and it is their Chinese friends who have triumphed, whereas the current imperialist government of the United States, which violates the principles of justice, has consequently gone down in shameful defeat. This fact cannot but give courage to all the forces of democracy in the world who are but temporarily in a position of being oppressed; it cannot but educate all people who are momentarily under the rule and deceptive sway of the reactionaries.

Long live the friendship of the people of China and the United States of America!

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *People's Daily, October 8, 1949.*

Letter to Wang Shoudao

October 9, 1949

Comrade Shoudao:[6]

Yang Kaizhi[7] and company should not come to the capital. They should be given appropriate jobs in accordance with their abilities in Hunan. No unreasonable request should be approved. If his old mother is in difficulty, certain assistance can be given to her. I am sending out a separate telegram; please send someone to relay it.

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[5] In October 1949, Eugene Dennis, John Williamson, Henry Winston (Organization Secretary), Jack Stachel, Benjamin Davis, Carl Winter, Robert Thompson, John Gates, Irving Potash, Gilbert Green and Gus Hall (National Secretary), all members of the National Committee of the CPUSA were convicted for violation of the Smith Act which was passed in June 1940 and which made a crime of "teaching and advocating the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence." Convictions of other lesser communist leaders in the United States followed.

[6] Wang Shoudao (1906-1996), was at this time a member of the Hunan Military and Administration Committee and deputy director of the Changsha Military Control Committee. He joined the Communist Youth League in 1923 and the CPC in 1925. In 1927 he was a leader of a series of peasant uprisings in northeastern Hunan. In 1928 he took part in the forming of the southern Hunan Soviet.

[7] Yang is the brother of Yang Kaihui, Mao's former wife who died in the "Great Revolution" period.

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters (Mao Zedong Shuxin Xuan-ji, Beijing Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), p. 342.*

Letter to Yang Kaizhi

October 9, 1949

Mr. Yang Kaizhi:[8]

I hope that you will stay in Hunan and await the Hunan Provincial Committee of the CPC to assign you to a job that is appropriate for your abilities. Do not harbor any unrealistic hopes and do not come to the capital. Whatever job the Hunan Provincial Committee assigns you, do it. Everything should be done in accordance with normal rules. Please don't put the government on the spot.

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p.343.*

Telegram to the French Transportation Labor Union

October 9, 1949

Comrades of the French Transportation Labor Union:

We express our deepest thanks for your telegram congratulating us on the birth of the People's Republic of China.

(SIGNED AND DATED IN BEIJING)

Source: *People's Daily, October 11,1949.*

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[8] For Yang Kaizhi, see the notes of the preceding text.

Telegram to General Zhao Xiguang

October 10, 1949

Dear General Zhao Xiguang[9]:

Your telegram of the first instant has been received. The whole country is rejoicing at the peaceful liberation of Xinjiang. We hope that all the officers and soldiers of the troops now stationed in southern Xinjiang will unite as one and strive to transform themselves so as to become a people's army.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 12, 1949.*

Telegram to Insurrectionists on the "Changzhi"

October 10, 1949

To all the comrades who took part in the insurrection on the "Changzhi"[10]:

Congratulations on your heroic insurrection. Owing to the continuing insurrections of the patriotic officers and soldiers within the navy, the People's Navy is already expanding rapidly. We hope that you will be industrious in learning and active in taking part in the construction of the Chinese People's Navy and in accomplishing the great task of liberating the whole of China.

(Co-signed with Zhu De and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 12, 1949.*

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[9] General Zhao was former deputy commander of the Xinjiang Garrison and a Commander of the Southern Xinjiang Garrison under the KMT.

[10] The "Changzhi" was the flagship of the First Naval Defense Fleet of the KMT.

Telegram to the United States Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy

October 12, 1949

We are deeply grateful for your congratulations on the establishment of the People's Republic of China, and for your efforts in promoting the friendship between the Chinese and American peoples.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 13, 1949.*

Telegram to Five-man Independent Group of the British Labor Party in the House of Commons

October 12, 1949

Pritt, Hutchinson, Solley, Mills and Zilliacus, Esq.:

On behalf of the Chinese people and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, I express thanks for your message of congratulations. May the worthy efforts on your part and on the part of the broad masses of the people of Britain to further the friendship between the Chinese and English peoples be successful.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 13, 1949.*

Letter to Feng Youlan

October 13, 1949

Mr. Youlan[11]

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[11] Feng Youlan is one of the modern and contemporary China's noted philosophers.

I have received your letter of October 5. We welcome people's making progress. It is very good for someone like yourself, who has committed errors in the past, to be prepared to correct them now, if this can indeed be carried out in practice. You do not need to be overly anxious about seeing results in haste; you can come around gradually. In any case, it is appropriate to adopt an attitude of honesty.

This, in reply, and with respectful regards and best wishes for your work in teaching.

(Signed and Dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 344.*

Letter to Zhou Shizhao

October 15, 1949

My dear senior Classmate Dunyuan[12]

I have received your several telegrams as well as your long letter of September 28. Your sincere and diligent words made it possible for me to believe I was actually seeing you in person. When I was in Yanan I received a letter from you. The letter you sent to Chongqing, however, I did not receive. Although you did not join the revolutionary struggle of the past, my friend, teaching is itself an occupation that is beneficial to the people. The telegram from the various friends of the Chengnan Xueshe [South City Study Society] has also been received. Please convey this information to them and thank them for their good wishes. I deeply applaud the fact that you are now the principal of First Normal; you are best for the job. I can also see that there is yet much life in those bones[13]! If it is possible, I would like you to copy and send me some of your works and your old poems. The more the better.

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[12] Zhou Shizhao was school mate of comrade Mao in the late 1910s when they studied together at the First Normal School of Hunan Province. Dunyuan is one of Zhou's many *zi* (honorific name).
It is customary to address one's friends by this honorific as a sign of intimacy. Comrade Mao also used the term *xuezhang xiong* in which *xuezhang* means "elder in learning" and used customarily in addressing one's class mates or schoolmates, and *xiong* means "brother".
At the time of this letter Zhou is the Principal of the above school. He was also a member of the *Xinmin Xuehui* (New People's Study Society) which was formed by comrade Mao and his friends during the May Fourth movement period.

[13] Mao used here the sentences: "*jun gu wei diao, shang you sheng qi*", which translates

With the exception of Taiwan and Tibet, in approximately a few more months we shall be able to complete the military occupation of the country as a whole. Even then, with the great calamity just over and the people's lives drained and exhausted, it will take several years' time before the people's economy can be restored to health. The tasks of completing the reforming of the land[-ownership] system and raising the level of the people's political consciousness need the cooperation of the cultural and educational work [circles].

I have received and read Mr. Chen Zetong's[14] letter of opinion, and I will forward it to the industrial [work] organs here for studying. Please convey thanks to him on my behalf. As for the question of his work, please ask him to go directly to the authorities in Hunan and ask for a solution, and do not await my reply.

Sincerely in reply, and respectfully sending my best wishes for your work in teaching,

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp.345-346.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Soviet Union

October 16, 1949

Mr. Ambassador [N. V.] Roshchin:

It is with great pleasure that I accept the letter of credence from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presented by Your Excellency, and I am sincerely grateful for Your Excellency's congratulations.

Since the very beginning of its establishment, the People's Republic of China has been honored by having the government of the Soviet Union take the lead in expressing its willingness to establish diplomatic relations with our country. We are confident that as a result of this decision on the part of your

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literally as "the stallions bones have not yet withered and there is yet the spirit of life"

[14] This refers to the plan that Chen, an engineer in Changsha. Hunan submitted, to Mao in 1949, in which he proposed that a region of some forty li along the eastern banks of the Xiangjing River in Hunan should be transformed into a model "Xiangtan Industrial Zone" This region lies under the jurisdiction of Xiangtan *xian*, Mao's native district.

government the friendship between China and the Soviet Union will grow and become more consolidated with each passing day. I warmly welcome Your Excellency's appointment as the first ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China. We believe that through Your Excellency's efforts, the cooperation between your country and ours will grow ever closer and will also be beneficial to our common quest for a lasting peace in the world.

We herewith sincerely wish for the prosperity of your country and the prospering of your people, and wish for the excellent health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, October 12, 1949,*

Telegram to the German Democratic Republic

October 16, 1949

President Wilhelm Pieck and Premier Otto Grotewohl of the German Democratic Republic:

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the entire Chinese people, I extend my warmest congratulations on the founding of the German Democratic Republic and warmly congratulate Herr Wilhelm Pieck and Herr Otto Grotewohl on your respective elections to the offices of president and premier of the German Democratic Republic.

The founding of the German Democratic Republic signifies a fundamental change in the history of Germany. The masses of the people have replaced the monopoly capitalists and the big landowners as the masters of Germany. Owing to the founding of the German Democratic Republic, Germany which was the spawning ground of two world wars and the focus of militarism and fascism, has now joined the ranks of the People's Democracies in the world. This is a decisive defeat for the criminal policy of the imperialist front led by the reactionary government of the United States of America of splitting Germany in the period after the Second World War and of reviving Germany as a reactionary state and a base for war. This is a great victory for the camp for world peace and democracy led by the Soviet Union.

People's Germany and People's China are both standing in the front lines of the great struggle against imperialism. We are particularly glad on this occasion of the proclamation of the founding of Democratic Germany. We extend our best wishes that under the leadership of the people's democratic forces the unification of Germany will be restored and Germany will grow in strength with each passing day. May the friendship between the Chinese and German peoples grow with each passing day.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, October 17, 1949.*

Reply to the Hui People of Xinjiang

October 21, 1949

To Mr. Ma Liangjun[15] and, through him, to all our Hui compatriots in Xinjiang:

Thank you for your message of congratulations. We hope that you will aid the People's Liberation Army and the People's Government in uniting the people of all nationalities, carry out a true people's democracy in accordance with the Common Program[16], and strive for the building of a new Xinjiang.

(Co-signed with Zhu De and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 23, 1949.*

Reply to the Provisional People's Government of Xinjiang

October 21, 1949

To Chairman Burhan and through him to all committee members of the Provisional People's Government of Xinjiang Province:

Thank you for your message of congratulations. We hope that you will unite as one with the People's Liberation Army and the people of all nationalities of Xinjiang in carrying out the Common Program and in striving for the building of a new Xinjiang.

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[15] Ma Liangjun is the chief religious leader (*zongjiao zhang*) of the Hui (Muslim) people of Xinjiang.

[16] The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was adopted at the First Plenary Session of CPPCC held in Beijing during September 1949.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 21, 1949.*

Reply to the Xinjiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy and to People of the Tacheng-Ili-Ashan Regions

October 21, 1949

To Mr. Aisihaiti Itzhakov and, through him, to all comrades of the Xinjiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy, and to all our compatriots of the Tacheng, Ili and Ashan Regions:

Thank you for your congratulations and good wishes. The heroic struggle of the people of the Tacheng-Ili-Ashan regions has been a major contribution to the liberation of the whole of Xinjiang and all of China. It is my sincere wish that the people of the three regions and the people of the whole of Xinjiang will unite as one and aid the People's Liberation Army in struggling for the common cause of building a people's democratic new Xinjiang.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 22, 1949.*

Preface to the *Victory of New Democracy in China*[17]

October 24, 1949

The comrades of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia have published in the Czech language the documents of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and my own essay concerning the people's democratic dictatorship of China. This is a great honor for the Communist Party of China. The struggles of the people of China and the peoples of Europe are two inseparable and mutually reinforcing parts of a common cause, despite the fact that owing to the differences in the levels of social development the stages of the development of their revolutions are different. All the readers of Europe who are concerned about the destiny of Asia will gain a basic knowledge of New China from reading these short documents and particularly from reading the Sixty Article Common Program passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. I believe that the effort which our comrades in Czechoslovakia have exerted in helping European readers to understand New China is a contribution to the international revolutionary movement for which we must be grateful.

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[17] The book *Vitezstvi Nove Demokraicie v Cine* (The victory of New Democracy in China) was compiled by the editorial board of the Czechoslovakian monthly *Mezinarodni politika* (International Politics) and published in the Prague on October 25, 1949. The book was edited and published under the direction of the Central Secretariat of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Source: *People's Daily, October 24, 1949.*

Telegram to the Insurrectionists on the "Hailiao"[18]

October 24, 1949

Captain Fang Linliu and all comrades onboard the ship "Hailiao":

Congratulations on your insurrection on the seas and on your success in bringing the "Hailiao" to our port in the Northeast. For the sake of the people's state you have united together, overcome difficulties, and left the side of the reactionaries to stand on the side of the people. This action is applauded by the people of the entire country and should be emulated by all captains and crews who are still under the control of the Kuomintang reactionaries and bureaucratic capitalism.

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *People's Daily, October 25, 1949.*

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[18] Telegram congratulating the Insurrectionists on the 3,000-ton merchant steamer "Hailiao" that has sailed from Hong Kong.

Inscription for the Inaugural Issue of *Renmin Wenxue* (People's Literature)

October 25, 1949

I hope that more good pieces of writing will be born of this.

(Signed)

Source: *Renmin Wenxue (People's Literature) Monthly, Beijing, October 25, 1949.*

Telegram to Secretary of the World Federation of Trade Unions

October 26, 1949

Paris,
M. [Louis André] Saillant, secretary of the World Federation of Trade Unions:

We are deeply grateful for your message of congratulations to the People's Republic of China. The people of China are deeply aware that their own triumph depends on the assistance given it by the international workers' movement and will strive to consolidate their mutual concern and immortal friendship with the laboring peoples of all countries of the world.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, October 26, 1949.*

Telegram to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Algeria

October 26, 1949

Comrade Larbi Bouhali and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Algeria:

Allow me to express my deepest gratitude for Comrade Larbi Bouhali's message of congratulations of October 9.

The Chinese people have attained their liberation after a long period of imperialist aggression and oppression. We therefore have warm sympathy for and resolute faith in the struggle for liberation of all oppressed peoples. I believe that the Algerian people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Algeria and with the aid of the international camp for peace and democracy, will eventually succeed in overthrowing the rule of imperialism.

Long live the victory of the Algerian People's struggle for liberation!

(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 27, 1949.*

Telegram to the Provisional Government of Greece

October 26, 1949

The Provisional Government of Greece,
Chairman Mitsos:

We are deeply grateful for your message of congratulations. The Chinese people express their warmest sympathy and highest respects to the people of Greece for their unyielding struggle for liberty, independence, justice and peace under difficult conditions. May we express our best wishes for the firm maintenance of unity between the provisional government of Greece and the patriotic people of Greece to triumph over temporary difficulties and to strive for final victory.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 27, 1949.*

Telegram to the Albanian Council of Ministers

October 26, 1949

Chairman Enver Hoxha,
The Albanian Council of Ministers:

We are deeply grateful for your message of congratulations to the People's Republic of China. I hereby express my sincere wish that the friendship between the Chinese and Albanian peoples will grow closer with each passing day. I believe that the courageous Albanian people, who are advancing in the correct direction under your leadership, are bound to be able to stand shoulder to shoulder with the people of the entire world and smash the menace of imperialism and Tito's counterrevolutionary clique, and to achieve their own goals.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 27, 1949.*

Letter to Bo Yibo

October 29, 1949

Comrade Yibo:[19]

I have received your letter of October 28. The two armies and the cavalry division of Suiyuan can be organized into the combat order of the People's Liberation Army and awarded registration unit numbers. The [commissioning of the] military command personnel for the two armies and the cavalry division may be approved as listed. However, they must be commissioned at the same time that the political commissars and the heads of the political departments [in those units] are; only in this way can the confidence and prestige of political work be established in the military. On this issue, please consult with Fu Yisheng.[20] If he thinks that it is somewhat inconvenient to publish [the names of] the political commissars and the heads of the political departments at this point, the military personnel can be first appointed to the job *de facto* with their formal commissioning taking place [a bit later] when it can be done at the same time [as the commissioning of the political personnel] when the decision on the latter has been made. It is a great and arduous task to carry out the political work system earnestly in the Suiyuan armed forces. We must have beforehand full mental preparation and it must be personally led by Fu Yisheng before it can work. Otherwise chaos and troubles will be unavoidable.

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[19] Bo Yibo was at the time of this letter first secretary of the North China Bureau of the CC of the CPC and political Commissar of the North China Military Region of the PLA.

[20] Fu Yisheng is the honorific name of Fu Zuoyi. He was the chief KMT military commander in North China from 1947 to 1949. In early 1949, when forces of the PLA surrounded the city of Beijing, Fu as commander negotiated and surrendered to the PLA. He was the governor of Suiyuan from 1931 to 1947.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 34.*

Telegram to the Republic of Czechoslovakia

October 29, 1949

President Gottwald,
The Republic of Czechoslovakia
Your Excellency:

On the happy occasion of the thirty-first anniversary of the independence of your country, I sincerely express my warmest congratulations and my best wishes that the diplomatic relations between China and Czechoslovakia will become closer with each passing day.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG or PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 30, 1949.*

Telegram to the USSR

November 5, 1949

Generalissimo Stalin:

On this occasion of the thirty-second anniversary of the great socialist October Revolution, I respectfully express to Your excellency my warmest congratulations. May the socialist construction of the Soviet Union make progress with every passing day, may the might of the camp for world peace and democracy led by the Soviet Union know no parallel, and may there always be friendship and cooperation between the two peoples of China and the Soviet Union.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, November 6, 1949.*

Telegram to the Work Committee of the Communist Party of Thailand

November 12, 1949

Dear Comrades of the Work Committee of the Communist Party of Thailand:

I sincerely express my deep gratitude for your congratulatory message of September 26.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, November 13, 1949.*

Telegram to Managers and Staff of Two Aviation Corporations[21]

November 12, 1949

General Manager Liu Jingyi,
China National Aviation Corporation,
General Manager Chen Zhuolin, Central Air Transport Corporation, and all comrades of the staff and workers of the two companies:

It is an act of greatly significant patriotism that the entire staff and workers of the China National Aviation Corporation and Central Air Transport Corporation, under the leadership of the general managers of these two companies, have resolutely separated themselves from the remnants of the Kuomintang reactionaries and have thrown themselves into the arms of the people's homeland. On this occasion I extend especially to you my congratulations, our welcome, and our regards. I hope that you will unite as one and strive for the building of the people's aviation enterprises and for the protection of the homelands properties that remain in Hong Kong.

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[21] On November 9, 1949 the general managers of the China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) and Central Air Transport Corporation (CATC) declared the separation of the two companies from the control of KMT and "insurrected" and came over to the side of the People's Government. This telegram was issued welcoming their act. It was published in People's Daily of November 13, 1949.

(Signed and dated)

Letter to Peng Dehuai and the Northwest Bureau

November 14, 1949

Comrade Dehuai[22] and the Northwest Bureau:

According to the information submitted repeatedly by the Qinghai Provincial [Party] Committee, the remnants of [the forces of] Bandit Ma[23] have been fanning up fires among the masses in many places and organizing a resistance. At the imminent Lanzhou conference, please pay serious attention to this.[24] In having the various provincial, [special] district and *xian* [Party] committees focusing on the arduous job [of uniting and organizing] the masses and in all such work upholding [the principle of] equality among the nationalities, the government organs at all levels should, in accordance with the size and ratio of [minority] nationality populations, allocate quotas and absorb in large numbers those members of the Hui nationality and other minority nationalities who are capable of cooperating with us into taking part in government work. In the present period they should organize across the board coalition governments, i.e., united front governments. Within [the framework of] such a cooperation, minority nationality cadres will be nurtured in large numbers. Furthermore, the provincial [Party] committees of Qinghai, Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningxia and Shaanxi and the [special] district [Party] committees of all places where there are minority nationalities ought to form training classes for minority nationality cadres, or cadre training schools. Please give this a good deal of attention. It is impossible to thoroughly resolve the problem of the minority nationalities and to totally isolate the nationalistic reactionaries without a large number of Communist cadres who are from minority nationality backgrounds.

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[22] Peng Dehui was at this time, deputy commander-in-chief of the PLA and first secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CC of the CPC.

[23] Bandit Ma refers to Ma Bufang who was governor of Qinghai province under KMT Government in 1938-49. In 1949 he became the head of China's northwest headquarters. However in late July of that year he fled to Hong Kong. In spite of his physical absence (at the time of this letter) Ma continued to have influence over some forces in Qinghai province, mostly military leaders, who were previously associated with the KMT.

[24] This refers to the enlarged meeting of the Northwest Bureau of the CC of the CPC, held in Lanzhou, in November 1949.

Have all the comrades of the Northwest Bureau arrived in Lanzhou? On what day will your conference commence? The agenda for this conference is very full and I am afraid that the meeting must be held for a week or so. You also need to make a decision as to where the political center of the Northwest should be located from now on — should it be in Xian? or Lanzhou? Please inform me of the major items on your agenda.

Please ask General Wang Zhen[25] to report to us.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters pp. 349-350.*

Inscription on Public Morals

November 15, 1949

Love the homeland; love the people; love labor; love and protect public property; these are the civic morals for all our citizens.

(Signed)

Source: *Xinhua Yuebao (New China Monthly) Beijing, November 15, 1949.*

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25. Wang Zhen (a.k.a. Wang Zhenlin, Wang Zhenting, b. 1909) was at this time the commander and political commissar of the First Army Group of the First Field Army of the PLA. Having joined the Communist Youth League in 1927, Wang rose through the CPC ranks as a labor trainer and organizer. In the early 1930s, having armed, organized labor groups in the Hunan area (groups which were later absorbed into the regular armed forces of the Communist Red Army), Wang began his career as a brilliant political officer of the Communist military units. During the Long March, he reached northern Shaanxi as political commissar of the Sixth Army Corps under Xiao Ke. In the late 1930s he led his troops in productive labor in the Yanan area, and he was considered a model officer whose soldiers were equally adept at productive work as at combat duties. At the time of this letter the First Army Group under his command was pushing into Xinjiang.

Letter to Mao Xusheng

November 15, 1949

Mr. Xusheng:[26]

I have received your three letters and apologize for being so tardy in responding. It is more appropriate for you, sir, to stay and work in the village; please do not come to the capital. [As you say,] the times are difficult for maintaining a living for the family, but this may be resolved in the process of the reforming of the landownership system in the future. I can't remember accurately what position you held in the transportation division then; I would appreciate if you would let me know at your convenience. Is Mao Ziqi[27] still alive?

Respectfully I bid you good wishes and good health!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 351.*

Letter to Li Jiehou of Shaoshan, Hunan[28]

November 17, 1949

Dear Mr. Jiehou:

I have respectfully read your letter and feel deeply grateful for the profound concern that you have expressed. I met my dear friend Genghou[29] once in 1928 at Ninggang *xian* on the Hunan-Jiangxi border. He then led his troops back to south Hunan, and we never met again. I've heard that he gave his life for the cause; this seems plausible, but there has been no way by which I could ascertain the date or place [of his martyrdom]. I hear that your father is well; this is something for me to be happy about, and I pray that you will convey my regards to him.

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[26] Mao Xusheng was a native of Pingjiang, Hunan and had been a clerk in the transportation division of the New Hunanese Army after the 1911 revolution. Comrade Mao himself served in that army for a very short time.

[27] Mao Ziqi was also a native of Pingjiang, Hunan. He was the commander of the division in which Mao Xusheng served.

[28] Shaoshan village, Xiangtan *xian*, Hunan is comrade Mao's native village.

[29] The brother of the recipient of this letter. The father mentioned in this letter was Li Shuqing, whose two sons, Genghou and Gonghou and grandson Deshen all died in the War of Liberation as Red Army fighters. He was a schoolteacher and in his youth comrade Mao often turned to him for advice. This family is also from Shaoshan. Li Shuqing died in 1957.

I am writing this letter in haste, but let me wish you:

Good health and progress.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Luxingjia (Traveler), Monthly, Beijing, February 22, 1958.*

Telegram to the Former KMT Government Resources Committee

November 19, 1949

Staff members of the office of International Commerce of the Hong Kong Trade Office of the Former Resources Committee

Comrades:

Your telegram of the fourteenth instant has been received. I am very glad and much comforted by it. I hope that you will unite as one, uphold a patriotic position, and protect the property of the homeland in anticipation of its being received by the Central People's Government.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, November 20, 1949.*

Telegram to the Communist Party of India

November 19, 1949

Dear Comrade Ranadive:

Your congratulatory telegram of October 12 has been received. We are very grateful for your warm congratulations to the People's Republic of China and the Communist Party of China. The entire Chinese people will feel great joy and pride when they read the expressions of brotherly friendship and love of the revolutionary people of India in your telegram. The Indian people are one of the greatest peoples in Asia, with a long history and a large population. There are many similarities between its past fate and future path and those of China. I am deeply convinced that by relying on the unity and heroic struggle of the courageous Communist Party of India and all Indian Patriots, India will not remain long under the yoke of the imperialists and their collaborators. One day a free India will appear in the world as a member of the great family of socialism and Peoples' Democracies, just as free China has. That day shall end the epoch of imperialism and reaction in the history of humanity. Best wishes for the triumph of the united and heroic struggle of the patriotic people of India! Long live the brotherly unity between the Indian people and the Chinese people!

(Signed as Chairman of CPC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, November 20, 1949.*

Telegram to the Socialist Republican Party of India

November 19, 1949

Mr. [Sarat Chandra] Bose:

Thank you for your congratulations to the People's Republic of China. The Chinese people welcome the establishment of extensive friendship with the people of India and with all oppressed peoples in order to oppose imperialist aggression together.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, November 20, 1949.*

Telegram to the Central Committee of the Iranian Workers' Party

November 19, 1949

Dear comrades of the Central Committee of the Iranian Workers' Party:

I express my deep and sincere gratitude for your congratulations.

The Chinese people are watching with respect the heroic struggle of the Iranian Workers' Party and the people of Iran against imperialism and against the reactionaries in their own country. We also firmly believe that this heroic struggle will result in their victory.

(SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF CPC)

Source: *People's Daily, November 20, 1949.*

Inscription for the Third Anniversary of *Nanqiao Ribao*[30]

November 20, 1949

Serve the interests of the overseas Chinese.

Source: *Peoples' Daily, January 9, 1950.*

Telegram of Condolence on the Death of Xinjiang Delegates to the CPPCC

November 22, 1949

Dear comrades of the Central Committee of the Xinjiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy:

The first group of delegates representing the people of Xinjiang in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference—comrade Ahamaitikiang, vice-chairman of the Provincial Government of Xinjiang, Comrade Izhakbek, commander-in-chief of the National Army of the Tacheng-Ili-Ashan regions, Comrade Abduklimu, member of the Central Committee of the Xinjiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy, Comrade Dalerhan, deputy commander-in-chief of the National Army [of the Tacheng-Ili-Ashan region] and Comrade Luo Zhi of the Xinjiang Sino-Soviet Cultural Association—have unfortunately met with disaster in an airplane accident on their way to Beijing in September 1949. This is a great loss to the people of Xinjiang and to the Chinese people. For this I express my profound grief. While they lived, comrade Ahamaitikiang and the other four comrades fought heroically for the cause of the liberation of the people of Xinjiang. In the end they gave their lives for the cause of establishing the People's Republic of China. They are worthy of the memory of the whole Chinese people forever. Eternal glory to Comrades Ahamaitikiang, Izhakbek, Abduklimu, Dalerhan and Luo Zhi!

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[30] Nanqiao Ribao (Southern Overseas Chinese Daily) is a Chinese language newspaper published in Singapore. It was founded by Tan Kah-kee, a leader of "Overseas Chinese" in Singapore. See *Letter to Tan Kah-kee*, p. 161 of this volume.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, November 25, 1949.*

Telegram to Panchen Gnoertehni

November 23, 1949

Panchen Gnoertehni: (Panchen Lama)

We are extremely happy to receive and read your telegram of October 1. The Tibetan people love the homeland and are opposed to foreign aggression. They are dissatisfied with the policies of the reactionary government of the Kuomintang and wish to be a part of the great family of New China which is united and strong and in which all the nationalities cooperate as equals with one another. The Central people's Government and the Chinese People's Liberation Army will surely fulfill this wish of the Tibetan people. We hope that you, sir, and all the patriotic people of Tibet will strive together to fight for the liberation of Tibet and the unity of the Han and Tibetan peoples.

(Co-signed with Zhu De and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, November 24, 1949.*

Telegram to the Banka Federation of Labour Unions of Indonesia

November 24, 1949

The Banka Federation of Labour Unions of Indonesia:

I warmly thank you for your message of congratulations. I hope that the Indonesian people will, after their long and heroic struggle, similarly achieve the independence and freedom of their homeland.

Source: *People's Daily, November 26, 1949.*

Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

November 25, 1949

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh:

We are deeply grateful for your congratulatory telegram on the founding of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. Both China and Vietnam are standing on the front line of the struggle against imperialism. With the victorious development of the struggles for liberation of the peoples of both countries, the friendship between the two peoples is bound to become closer with each passing day. Best wishes for the consolidation of the unity between the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples, and may the Democratic Republic of Vietnam achieve complete success in its cause of independence and democracy.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, November 26, 1949.*

Letter to Xu Beihong

November 29, 1949

Mr. Beihong[31]

Your letter has been received. I have written one [inscription for the art institute] and wonder if it could be of use.[32] My best wishes to you in your teaching!

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[31] Beihong (1895-1953) was a noted painter who, from 1946 until his death in September 1953, was the director of the Academy of Fine Arts in Beijing.

[32] Comrade Mao's words here were *yi zhang* which refers to a sheet of paper on which

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Meishu Fenglei (Wind and Thunder in Fine Arts), August 3, 1967, Red Guard Publication.*

Telegram to the Britain-China Conference in London[33]

November 30, 1949

To the gentlemen sponsoring the Britain-China Conference and to all the honorable delegates through the courtesy of Mr. Jack [Deliben]:

My warm and sincere congratulations on the convening of the Britain-China Conference. The Chinese people welcome all efforts to strengthen the friendship between the people of China and Britain and hope that these efforts will be successful.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, December 6, 1949.*

Letter to the People of Lüshun-Dalian

December 1, 1949

To Comrades of the Party committees of the Lüshun-Dalian region and through them, to the people of the Lüshun-Dalian region:

The letter with your signatures[34] and your gifts, brought here by Comrade Kang Minzhuang, have both been received. We thank all of you as well as the people of Lüshun-Dalian! We hope that you will make even greater efforts in

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he wrote the inscription for the art institute. The inscription reads *Guoli Meishu Xueyuan* (National Academy of Fine Arts). It was reproduced in its original calligraphic form in the above book.

[33] Message sent on the occasion of the Britain-China Conference, that was held in London during December 3-4, 1949.

[34] A letter of support for the new government on which more than 51,000 signatures appeared.

production and construction so as to create even greater achievements!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, December 26, 1949.*

Letter to Liu Yazi

December 2, 1949

Dear Venerable Mr. Liu:[35]

Your letter of November 4 has long been received. I apologize for the fact that, owing to my hectic schedule, I have been so tardy in responding. I have not seen the letter written in the train, but I thank you deeply for your warm and kind thoughts. At a moment of convenience I will make an inquiry on your behalf on the matter of the book for inscription.[36] Mr. Zhou[37] indeed has a very busy schedule of receiving visitors and official business, and perhaps he has forgotten it. As for the [delay in the] matter of the literary and historical organization,[38] it could perhaps be a result of the same problem. Again, at my convenience I shall ask about it.

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[35] Liu Yazi was an outstanding poet of the old school. He was a scholar-revolutionary in the late Qing period and joined such associations as the *Zhongguo jiaoyu hui* (China Education Society) headed by Zhang Binglin and Wu Zhihui, and the *Aiguo xueshe* (Patriotic Study Association) headed by Cai Yuanpei, as well as Sun Yat-sen's Tong meng hui. During the May Fourth period Liu became a proponent of the new-style, vernacular (baihua) literature and founded the *Xin nan she* (New Southern Society). In the mid-1920s Liu became an active and moderately influential member of the KMT, but he opposed the rightward drift of the Party after Sun Yat-sen's death. Later Liu would avoid serving in the various KMT governments—both Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing government and later Wang Jingwei's Wuhan government. Rather he dedicated himself to historical and literary pursuits and led a secluded life in Shanghai (briefly) and Hong Kong. In 1941, as a result of his reaction to the New Fourth Army Incident, Liu was expelled from the KMT. In the late-1940s Liu joined the Democratic League and formed the San min zhuyi tongzhi lianhe hui (Association of the Comrades of the Three People's Principle) and, in 1948, the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. He returned to Beijing in 1949 and was a member of the Government Administration Council of the new PRC government and of the standing committee of the National People's Congress until his death of pneumonia in 1958. Liu was one of the group of "democratic personages". Here Mao used the salutation lao to refer to Liu's venerated status

[36] According to the source, this refers to a book *Commemorative Volume I on the Yi Pavilion* which Liu sent to Mao for inscription in 1949.

[37] This refers to Zhou Enlai. Mao is employing a double-entendre here. The saying he used, *tu o zhi lao*, is a derivation of the aphorism *tu pu o fa*, from the *Lu Shijia* (Chronicle of the House of Lu), *Shi Ji* (Historical Records), which describes the diligence of the historical figure Zhou Gong (Duke of Zhou) in ancient days, saying that he stopped in the middle of eating and had to hold his hair which had been disassembled in the middle of a bath in order to receive visitors and do business. Mao apparently placed significance in the coincidence of the "name" Zhou here. The Duke of Zhou was the chief minister of the founder of the great Zhou dynasty of ancient days, and Zhou Enlai, to whom Mao was in

In response and with my regards,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 352.*

Directive Issued at the Fourth Meeting of the CPGC (Excerpts)

December 2, 1949

[The national budget is a very important issue. The policy of the entire nation is reflected in it because it delineates the scope and orientation of the government's activities. Take, for example, the problem of providing support for all the former troops and former government and educational personnel which was raised in the draft of the rough estimate.][39] This is precisely a problem of policy. The People's Government ought to adopt a responsible attitude toward this problem. Only in this way can it be beneficial to the people. [Our situation can be summarized as follows:] There are difficulties, but there are also measures that can be taken, and there is hope. There are difficulties in our fiscal situation. We must explain to the people where our difficulties lie; we must not hide these difficulties. At the same time, however, we must also explain to the people that we do indeed have the means to overcome the difficulties. Since we have the means to overcome the difficulties, our cause is a hopeful one and our prospects are bright. Our situation will improve year by year, and we project that next year will be better than this year. Within a three-to-five-year period, our economy can be completely rehabilitated, and within eight to ten years our economy will be able to achieve a great development... It is of

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fact referring, was the Premier of the People's Republic of China.

[38] According to the source, this refers to a proposal that Liu made on the preparations for establishing a historical archive and museum under the Central Committee of the CPC.

[39] This section in brackets is a synopsis of what Comrade Mao said at the beginning of his speech. The same applies to other bracketed parts in this essay.

great importance that these organizational regulations be promulgated[40]. These organizational regulations are precisely the general laws appropriate to the current period. The various local people's governments, although they may add [to these regulations] in accordance with concrete conditions [in their various localities], must implement them without exception... China is a big country, only if we establish powerful local organs at such a level can things be done well. What ought to be united, must be united; and there should by no means be any separate governance, each doing what he thinks is best. However, there must be integration between [the notion of] unification and [the notion of] discretionary arrangements according to local conditions. Under the regime of the people, the historical conditions of the past, in which regional occupation by the feudalist forces has been generated, have been eliminated. The division of labor between the Center and the localities will be to our advantage and will in no way harm us.[41]

Source: *People's Daily, December* 4, *1949.*

Instruction on the Army's Participation in Production and Construction Work in 1950[42]

December 5, 1949

The People's War of Liberation has basically won a nationwide victory. With the exception of [units] on a few fronts which have to devote themselves to pursuing and annihilating the remnant enemy forces so as to achieve a complete triumph, a large number of the troops of the People's Liberation Army have already engaged in or are soon to begin to engage in, training and consolidation. The Common Program of the People's Political Consultative Conference provides that the armed forces of the People's Republic of China shall, during peacetime, systematically take part in agricultural and industrial production in order to assist in the work of national construction, provided such work docs not interfere with their military duties. Here, a glorious and formidable task is given to our people's armed forces in addition to the great tasks of securing our national defense, reinforcing public order, and strengthening [their own] training and consolidation. Therefore, the People's Revolutionary Military Council is calling on the entire army, with the exception of those [units] which are still engaged in fighting and logistics service, to shoulder part of the task of production so that our People's Liberation Army will not only be an army for national defense but also an army of production, in order to cooperate with all the people in the country in overcoming the difficulties left behind by long years of war and in accelerating the economic construction of [our] New Democracy.

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[40] These refer the regulations governing the organization of people's representative councils for every municipality, *xian* and province.

[41] The last paragraph is in response to the suggestion of establishing military administrative councils in the various greater administrative regions.

[42] A document released in the name of People's Revolutionary Council.

This production task must and can be realized.

The reason that this production task must be realized is that the long war launched against the Chinese people by reactionaries both inside and outside of our country has caused the people serious hardships and has severely damaged the economy. Today, we want to carry the revolutionary war through to the end and heal the wounds left by the long periods of war; we must undertake the work of construction in all areas of [our] economy, our culture, and [our] national defense. The state's revenue is inadequate, but its expenditure is huge. This is the one major difficulty we are facing today. The way to overcome this kind of difficulty is first to have the entire people, under the leadership of the Central People's Government, restore and develop production step by step; and as for the People's Liberation Army, it must assume the responsibility for a set [share] of the task of production. Only by doing this can it join the people of the entire country in overcoming this difficulty.

The reason that this production task can be realized is that the overwhelming majority of [the personnel in] the People's Liberation Army come from among the laboring people. They have a high degree of political consciousness and all kinds of production skills. Furthermore, during the most difficult years and months of the War of Resistance against Japan, they shouldered the tasks of production and a tradition of labor. The vast numbers of cadres and veteran fighters of the People's Liberation Army all understand that after the troops have participated in production, not only will difficulties be overcome, government expenditures decreased, and army life improved, but also, the political quality of the army will be raised through the tempering of labor, and the relations between officers and soldiers and between the army and the people will be improved. [Another] reason that this production task can be realized is that in areas where fighting has ended, in addition to assuming such tasks as securing national defense, cleaning out bandits, consolidating public order, and strengthening training, the People's Liberation Army now has spare time to take part in production and construction work. All these things are the factors which make it possible for the People's Liberation Army to carry out the task of production.

The participation of the People's Liberation Army in production is not a temporary measure; it should proceed from the perspective of long-range construction. The emphasis is on increasing the nation's wealth through labor. Beginning in the spring of 1950, the heads of all military regions must therefore direct their subordinates to put into effect [a program of] participating in production and construction work in order to improve their own livelihood and to save a portion of the state's expenditure. This production and construction work ought to become a kind of movement in order to facilitate its wider adoption. A relatively long-term plan and concrete measures [for implementation] should be formulated for this type of production work. With the approval of the people's government, the categories of [such] production should stay within the confines of agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery, water conservation projects, handicraft industries, and transportation projects which [the army] is capable of undertaking. Commercial undertakings are forbidden. The leading organs of the army [unit] should carry out investigations and studies [for production] based on the conditions of the places where they are stationed and complete the preparation this winter.

Based on experience, the army's production movement must strictly prohibit the opening up of shops and engaging in commercial activities. If among the cadres there should be ideas of seeking quick profits by attempting to smuggle, hoard, and speculate, or if such activities are discovered, they must be corrected and stopped quickly, for they not only violate the correct production guidelines and disrupt economic order, but will invariably [cause] graft and corruption to occur and will destroy our own comrades. These activities are not tolerated by law. Moreover, in undertaking agricultural production, we must be careful not to cause floods as a result of reclaiming wasteland or incur the people's dissatisfaction by competing for land.

So that the army may carry out its production tasks correctly and develop its production movement, it is hereby stipulated that:

1) At levels above division, army, and military sub-region, representative committees should be formed of representatives from the general headquarters, political departments, and logistic service departments. Their tasks are to take charge of the direction of production, to examine and approve production

plans, to supervise the implementation of production plans, and to investigate illegal activities.

2) Producers' cooperatives are to be established in the army. Organs of leadership for these cooperatives should also be established at every level which, under the supervision and guidance of the army production committees, will control the disposition of all production funds, production activities, and fruits of production. The system of the cooperatives and the army's command system are to be parallel. They will maintain close relations with each other, but they are not to be confused with each other.

3) Implement [the principle of] taking both public and private interests] into consideration and distributing on a fair and reasonable basis] the net income from production. Forty percent should go to the individual producers; the rest should go to the production units and the stale in order to establish the revolutionary way of running the affairs of one's own household as well as those of the public. On the one hand, this will make the army partially self-sufficient, while on the other, it will allow the individual producer to have some income. This individual income may be kept by the individual for private use, or be sent home to the family for its use, or be deposited in the cooperative in reserve [for future use]; [the choice should be] at the discretion of the individual.

In areas where there is a shortage of land, in addition to participating, whenever possible, in all kinds of handicraft industries, water conservation, transportation, and construction projects, heads of army units may talk things over with the local people's governments and, on the condition that the peasants' own willingness is not violated, contribute the army's labor funds, fertilizer, and farm tools to cultivating the land jointly with the peasants in order to increase production and share the fruits equitably. However, it is necessary to make sure that this is not carried out through coercion, and that [the army] docs not compete with the people for benefits.

The production plans of the units in all military regions must be integrated with the production plans of the people's governments of all the provinces and of all the greater administrative areas. [There should be] coordination in the use of production funds. All the production funds of the army units should be treated as investment, so interest must be computed and dates set for repayment. All the army's production enterprises should pay taxes according to the rules and observe all laws and regulations of the people's governments, and no violations will be permitted.

It is hoped that all heads of military regions will pay strict attention to the above items. They must make sure that our People's Liberation Army's production and construction work in 1950 attains remarkable results. They must, moreover, conduct check-ups all the time and rectify errors and deficiencies that may arise. On their part, the people's governments in all areas have the responsibility of providing guidance and assistance in the production work of the army units in their areas.

Source: *People's Daily, December 6, 1949.*

Speech on Arrival at Moscow Train Station

December 16, 1949

Dear Comrades and Friends:

For me to have the opportunity at this time to visit the capital of the Soviet Union, the first great socialist country in the world, is a very happy event in my life. A deep friendship exists between the peoples of [our] two great countries, China and the Soviet Union. After the October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet government, following the policies of Lenin and Stalin, took the lead in abrogating the unequal treaties [concluded] with China under Imperial Russia. Over a period of almost thirty years, the Soviet people and the Soviet government have, on several occasions, assisted the Chinese people in their cause of liberation. The Chinese people will never forget that in the midst of their ordeals they received such fraternal friendship of the Soviet people and the Soviet government.

The important tasks for the present are consolidating the world peace front headed by the Soviet Union and opposing those who stir up war as well as consolidating relations between our two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, and developing the friendship of the Chinese and Soviet peoples. I am confident that with the victory of the Chinese People's Revolution and the founding of the Chinese People's Republic, with the joint efforts of the New Democracies and the peace-loving peoples of the world, with the common aspirations and close cooperation of [our] two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, and especially with the correct international policies of Generalissimo Stalin, these tasks will certainly be fully carried out and excellent results will be attained.

Long live the friendship and cooperation of China and the Soviet Union!

Source: *People's Daily, December 18, 1949.*

Telegram to Stalin

December 19, 1949

Chairman Stalin,
The Council of Ministers,
The Government of the Soviet Union
Your Excellency:

On this happy occasion of Your Excellency's seventieth birthday, I sincerely extend to you my respect and my best wishes for the daily strengthening of the fortress for world peace and democracy under Your Excellency's leadership.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, December 21, 1949.*

Address at Birthday Celebration Meeting Held for Stalin

December 21, 1949

Dear comrades and friends:

I am genuinely pleased to have the chance to join this distinguished gathering in celebration of the seventieth birthday of Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin is a teacher and friend of the people of the world as well as a teacher and friend of the Chinese people. He has further developed the revolutionary theory of Marxism-Leninism and has made extremely outstanding and extensive contributions to the cause of world Communist movement. In the arduous struggle to resist their oppressors the Chinese people have become deeply appreciative of the importance of Comrade Stalin's friendship.

At this distinguished gathering, on behalf of the Chinese people and the Communist Party of China, I congratulate Comrade Stalin on his seventieth birthday and wish him health and longevity. We wish well-being, strength, and prosperity to our great friend, the Soviet Union under the leadership of Comrade Stalin. We hail the great unprecedented solidarity of the working class in the world under the leadership of Comrade Stalin.

Long live the great Stalin, leader of the world's working class and of the international Communist movement!

Long live the Soviet Union, the stronghold of world peace and democracy!

Source: *People's Daily, December 23, 1949.*

Comment on Democratic Personages[43]

Winter 1949

Let me add two more phrases for you, namely: "Better to be a counter-revolutionary than to merely keep out of the revolution." ...Don't think you deserve preferential treatment because of your achievements in war. You must know that one democratic personage is possibly worth an army. By winning one Li Jishen[44] over to our side, we probably saved the lives of twenty or thirty thousand comrades and won the military victory one or two years ahead of time... Now we will simply do it this way; this is also the only way we can do it, whether you approve of it or not.

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[43] The Shengping Ziliao introduced this comment with the following: "In the Winter [of 1949] certain middle-echelon cadres in Beijing felt greatly resentful at the high wages and benefits given to democratic personages in contrast to what they themselves earned. Playing on the theme that Li Jishen [a former KMT general] was paid an amount equaling 5,000 catties of millet a month they chanted the slogan: "Better to join revolution late than to have joined it early, better still, not to have joined it at all". Mao's comment here is ostensibly his response to the situation.

[44] Li Jishen (1886-1959) was commander of the Fourth Army of the Nationalist forces in 1925-26. Although he often held high posts in the KMT military command, his relations with the Chiang Kai-shek dominated wing of the KMT had been strained and unstable since the Northern Expedition period. In 1929, when he attempted to mediate the dispute between Chiang and the Guangxi clique (Li Zongren, Bai Congxi), he was expelled from the KMT. After the Japanese attacked Changchun (Mukden) in 1931, and Chiang was forced from office, the Guangxi faction was restored and Li with them. Later, when Chiang returned to power in the KMT, Li was relegated to ex-officio duties in Guangzhou. In late 1933 he became chairman of the People's Revolutionary Government in Fuzhou which actively opposed the authority of the Nanjing KMT (Chiang) government. When that opposition was suppressed and the Fuzhou government dissolved, Li fled to Hong Kong, with a KMT arrest warrant out for him. In 1935 he and others founded the Chinese People's Revolutionary League, seeking to unite the various political factions against Japan, but also in opposition to Nanjing. This was dissolved in 1937. In 1938 he was restored to membership in the KMT and continued to hold high military advisory positions. However, he largely operated on a local level in Guangxi in organizing military opposition to the Japanese rather than assuming his official positions in the Chongqing government. In 1947 he went to Hong Kong and on March 8 of that year issued a statement urging the KMT and the Communists to settle their differences and end the civil war. On August 6 he was

Source: *An excerpt, reproduced from Mao Zedong Shengping Ziliao Jianbian (A Brief Compilation of Materials on the Life of Mao Zedong) pp. 288-289. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1970.*

Conversation with a Painter from the Soviet Union (Excerpts)

1949

[The Soviet painter inquires of Mao whether or not it would be too exhausting if they worked, i.e., if Mao posed for the portrait, from nine to eleven pm each day]

I usually work in the nighttime as well. This is a habit cultivated through many years of working underground. Let me now accompany you for breakfast, and then we shall start.

We need a portfolio of this type of drawings about People's China, or a series of paintings…

That is correct. In terms of their nature, the Chinese people are diligent, hardworking, and persevering However, in addition [to the fact that it is in their nature] this diligence and perseverance is also linked to the most cruel exploitation and extreme deprivation of rights suffered by the Chinese people for so many centuries. The hard life itself has forced them to pay the price, in every kind of work, of giving it their greatest labor, just so that they can feed themselves and continue to live. As for culture, we the Chinese people consider ourselves to be the most backward. Our culture is in this state because in the past there has not been in China an organized force or thought which has been able to unite the whole people and to direct their energy toward the correct path [of development]. Today, the Chinese Communist Party has taken this

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expelled from the KMT for the last time, and in January 1948 he became the chairman of the newly constituted Revolutionary Committee of the KMT. He went to Beijing in early 1949 and was appointed to the Preparatory Committee for the CPPCC. In September 1949 he became a vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC and in October on the founding of the PRC, he became one of six vice-chairmen of the Central People's Government and vice-president of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

responsibility upon its shoulders. The Chinese people, under its leadership, and learning from the people of the Soviet Union, have finally discovered a correct path for themselves.

Source: *Dagong Daily, Shanghai, May 10, 1950.*

1950

Inscription for First Issue of *Renmin Haijun*[45]

January 1, 1950

We must build a navy. This navy must be able to secure our coastal defense and effectively protect us against possible aggression by the imperialists.

Source: *People's Daily, January 4, 1950.*

Interview Given to TASS Correspondent in Moscow[46]

January 2, 1950

(Q refers to the TASS correspondent, and "A" refers to Mao)

Q: What is the current situation like in China?

A: Military matters in China are going smoothly. At present, the Communist Party of China and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China are switching to peaceful economic construction.

Q: How long will you be staying in the Soviet Union, Mr. Mao?

A: I plan to stay for a few weeks. The length of my stay in the Soviet Union will be partly determined by the time it will take to resolve the various problems related to the interests of the People's Republic of China.

Q: Would it be possible to learn what problems you have in mind?

A: Foremost among these are the matters of the current Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Soviet Union,[47] and of the Soviet Union's

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[45] *Renmin Haijun* (People's Navy) was a journal published by the political department of the East China Region headquarters of the People's Navy. Its inaugural issue was published on New Year's Day, 1950.

[46] Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS).

[47] The "current" Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Soviet Union to which Mao refers here is the treaty signed on August 14, 1945, between the Nationalist government and the Soviet Union. This treaty was abrogated on February 14, 1950, when a new treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed by the two countries and ratified and put into effect in April of the same year.

Aside from agreements on postal and telecommunication services, six agreements were reached during Mao's visit to the Soviet Union. The agreements signed on February 14, 1950 were:

1) The treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual assistance.
2) The agreement of Joint administration of the China-Changchun Railway and of

loan to the People's Republic of China and the matter of trade and of a trade agreement between our two countries. There are also other questions.

Furthermore, I also plan to visit various localities and cities in the Soviet Union in order to gain a better understanding of economic and cultural construction in the Soviet state.

Source: *People's Daily, January 3, 1950.*

Inscription for Lenin's Mausoleum[48]

January 11, 1950

To Lenin—Great teacher of the revolution.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Guangming Daily, Beijing, January 13, 1950.*

Telegram to Bulgaria on the Death of Vasil Kolarov

January 24, 1950

Vice-Chairman Chervenkov,
The Council of Ministers of Bulgaria
Your Excellency:

Dalian.
3) The abrogation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and of the agreements on the Chinese Changchun railway, Dalian and Lüshun signed August 15, 1945, and the recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic.
4) The Soviet grant of credit to the People's Republic of China over a five-year period.
5) The gratuitous transfer by the Soviet Union to China of property acquired by Soviet organizations from Japanese owners in Manchuria in 1945.
6) The gratuitous transfer by the Soviet Union of all buildings of the Soviet military compound in Beijing.

[48] This inscription was written on a wreath placed by Mao personally on Lenin's Tomb in Moscow on January 11, 1950. In Mao's company were Wang Jiaxiang, the Chinese ambassador to the USSR, and Chen Boda. The inscription was in both Chinese and Russian.

I was stunned to receive the news that Chairman Kolarov[49] of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria passed away. Please allow me to respectfully express my deepest and sincerest grief to the government and people of your country.

(SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF CPG OF PRC AND DATED)

Source: *People's Daily, January 25, 1950.*

Telegram to President Prasad of the Republic of India

January 28, 1950

President Rajendra Prasad,
The Republic of India
Your Excellency:

At this time, on Your Excellency's election as the first president of India, I express on behalf of the Central People's Government and the people of the People's Republic of China, our sincere congratulations.

(SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF CPG OF PRC AND DATED)

Source: *People's Daily, January 29, 1950.*

Speech on Departure from Moscow

February 17, 1950

Dear Comrades and friends:

This time in Moscow, Comrade Zhou Enlai, the members of the Chinese delegation, and I met with Generalissimo Stalin and other comrades in responsible positions in the Soviet government. It is difficult for me to express in words the complete understanding and deep friendship that was established between us on the basis of the fundamental interests of the people of our two great nations. It is plain to see that the unity of the people of the two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, solidified by treaty, will be permanent and inviolable, and one which cannot be put asunder by anyone. Moreover, this unity will not only influence the prosperity of these two great countries, China and the Soviet Union but will surely also affect the future of humanity and the triumph of peace and justice all over the world.

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[49] Vasil Kolarov, one of the founders of the Communist party of Bulgaria and a leading official in the Communist International, was at the time of his death chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria.

During our sojourn in the Soviet Union we have visited many factories and farms. We have seen the great achievements of the workers, peasants and intellectuals of the Soviet Union in their undertaking of socialist construction; we have observed the work-style of combining a spirit of revolution with a spirit of realism and practicality which has been nurtured among the people of the Soviet Union through the teaching of Comrade Stalin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union[50]. This has confirmed the conviction which the Chinese Communists have always held: that the experience of the Soviet Union in economic and cultural construction and its experience in construction in other major areas will serve as an example for the construction of New China.

We have received warm and enthusiastic hospitality in Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union, and in Leningrad, birthplace of the October Revolution. As we leave this great capital of socialism, we wish particularly to express our sincerest gratitude to Generalissimo Stalin and to the government and people of the Soviet Union.

Long live the eternal friendship and the eternal cooperation between China and the Soviet Union

Long live the people of the Soviet Union!

Long live the teacher of the world revolution and the true friend of the Chinese people—Comrade Stalin!

Source: *People's Daily, February 20, 1950.*

Telegram to President of the Vietnam-China Friendship Association

February 21, 1950

Mr. Ho Tung Mau:

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[50] Here Mao used the Chinese term *liangongdang* which is commonly used to refer to Bolshevik party.

On receiving the joyous tidings of the establishment of the Vietnam-China Friendship Association, I sincerely extend my congratulations and best wishes for the progress of friendly relations between the two nations of China and Vietnam

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, February 23, 1950.*

Telegram to the USSR[51]

February 23, 1950

Generalissimo Stalin
Your Excellency:

On the occasion of this grand festival of the great defender of world peace, the Soviet Union's Armed forces, we happily and sincerely express our warmest felicitations

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, February 26, 1950.*

Telegram to Stalin upon Leaving the USSR

February 26, 1950

Comrade Stalin:

Our group is now approaching the border between the Soviet Union and China. Upon leaving this great country, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I would like to express to you and to all the comrades in responsible positions in the government of the Soviet Union my deep gratitude for your hospitality and my best wishes for the continuous strengthening and prospering of the Soviet Union under your leadership.

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[51] A telegram sent on the thirty-second anniversary of the establishment of armed forces of the Soviet Union.

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *People's Daily, March 5, 1950.*

Conversations During Inspection of Heilongjiang Province (Excerpts)

February 27, 1950

It is good to have many older workers [in the factory]; when we do not know [how to run a factory] we must rely on the older workers to manage the factories...

It is also very important to cultivate new workers!

If you do not know [how to manage a factory] you must learn. We are all ignorant [in some ways] and we all have to learn.

We must transform Harbin[52], now a city of consumers, into a production-oriented city.

After Hu Zongnan attacked Yanan I together with comrades Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi, directed the nationwide War of Liberation from two caves in Northern Shaanxi.

Source: *These excerpts are culled from an article titled Weida Da Jiaohui (A Great Lesson) written by a reporter for Heilongjiang Ribao (Heilongjiang Daily) and which originally appeared in Heilongjiang Ribao (Feb. 27, 1977).*

Inscriptions Written in Harbin[53]

February 27, 1950

Do not pick up a bureaucratic work-style.

Study.

Struggle.

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[52] Mao visited Harbin, the capital city of Heilongjiang Province, for two days, February 27-28, 1950. These are the more important things he said in conversations during that time.

[53] See previous footnote. The first three inscriptions here were written for the provincial Party Committee, the fourth for the municipal party committee of Harbin and the fifth for the Second Congress of the New Democratic Youth League then being held in Harbin.

Promote production.
Study Marxism-Leninism.

Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Romania

March 10, 1950

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very glad to accept the letter of credence from the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the People's Republic of Romania presented by Your Excellency and I am grateful to Your Excellency for your congratulations and good wishes.

The resolute struggle against domestic and foreign reactionaries undertaken by the Romanian people since the world war against fascism and their current industrious efforts in the work of economic construction in which glorious achievements have already been reaped have always been regarded with deep and sincere concern and admiration by the Chinese people.

Today, the governments and peoples of the two nations of China and Romania are fighting arduously and heroically for their common goal of world peace. We believe that the increasingly close cooperation of the two countries, China and Romania, in the political, economic, and cultural spheres will surely benefit the people of the two countries and will further consolidate and reinforce the strength of the camp for the world democracy and peace.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the first ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of Romania to the People's Republic of China, and pledge to Your Excellency all my assistance in your work of consolidating the friendship between the two nations.

Best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prosperity of your people and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, March 11, 1950.*

Letter to Long Bojian

March 14, 1950

Mr. Bojian:[54]

Your letter of November 11 last year has been received and read. I am extremely gratified that you, my friend,[55] are taking part in the revolution and are undertaking work in the area of public health. The name of the *Xin Hunan Bao* (New Hunan Daily)[56] is coined by the comrades of Hunan. I feel just as honored, as you are elated, by the coincidence between this and the name of [our] old paper. My old poetry[57] is not particularly good: there really is no need for me to write them out again. I hope that you will apply yourself to your tasks diligently and work for the interests of the people.

With my regards,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 353.*

Letter to Liu Kuiyi

March 14, 1950

Honorable Mr. Linsheng:[58]

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[54] Long Bojian (1899-1983) (a.k.a. Long Yuying) was an old acquaintance of Mao's. He was a founder of the periodical *Xin Hunan* (New Hunan) and was its editor until the position was taken over by Mao himself in 1919. This student weekly, like the more famous *xiangjiung Pinglun* (*xiang* River Review) which was also based in Changsha, was abruptly closed down by the Hunan warlord Zhang Jingyao shortly after Mao took over the editorship. In August 1949, shortly after the liberation of Hunan, Long was the chief of the bureau of public health of the provisional Hunan provincial government.

[55] Here Mao used the word *xiong* (elder brother) which is a common way of addressing one's friends.

[56] This refers to a daily founded by the Hunan Provincial (Party) Committee of the CPC in January 1950.

[57] Here Mao used the term ci which refers to a particular genre of poetic writing.

[58] Linsheng is Liu Kuiyi's *zi* (honorific name). He was an early revolutionary and a founder of the *Huaxing Hui* (China Arisen Society) and at this time was an advisor to the People's Military and Administrative Committee of Hunan province.

Your letter of December 27 last year has been received. I am greatly gratified. Please permit me to apologize for being tardy in responding. With regard to the bad things that have come into practice in the requisition of grain, the government has already issued several decrees for the purpose of correcting them; I wonder if the situation has become somewhat more relaxed lately? The trouble of the bandits must be quelled and the chief villains must be dealt with; this is a fixed principle. Nonetheless in carrying out the quelling and the dealing with [the chief villains] we must have a strategy and specific steps and measures, so that [the problem] may be resolved speedily and the situation throughout the country may be secured and stabilized. I hear that the trouble caused by the bandits has been on the whole resolved as far as Hunan is concerned. Is this true? I would be very grateful if, at your convenience, you, sir, would tell me what you know about the matter.

With best and respectful regards for your good health, and apologies for the incompleteness of this message,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p.354.*

Telegram to the Communist Party of France

March 31, 1950

The Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of France, in care of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of France:

We warmly congratulate you on the success of the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of France and hope that the Communist Party of France, in the process of leading the French people in carrying forward the revolutionary struggle, will grow daily in strength.

(Signed as Chairman of CPC)

Source: *Wenyi Hong Qi (Red Flag in Literature and Art) May 30, 1967, a Red Guard Publication.*

Directive on the Film *Qing Gong Mishi*

March 1950

The film *Qing Gong Mishi*[59] is a treasonous movie and we should criticize it...

Some say that it is patriotic: I think it is treasonous, thoroughly treasonous.

Source: *Wenyi Hongqi (Red Flag in Literature and Art) May 30, 1967, Red Guard Publication.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Hungary

April 1, 1950

Chairman [Arpad] Szakasits
Your excellency:

On this occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary, on behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I extend my sincerest congratulations to your excellency and our best wishes for the happiness and progress of the people of Hungary.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, April 4, 1950.*

Speech at the Sixth Session of the CPGC

April 11, 1950

We have pointed out that implementing the people's democratic dictatorship and uniting with our international friends are two fundamental conditions for the consolidation of the victory of the revolution. The Sino-Soviet Treaty and agreements that we signed this time are to affirm the friendship between the two great countries of China and the Soviet Union in a legal fashion. By gaining for us a reliable ally, they will benefit us by giving us a free hand to undertake the work of domestic construction and to deal with the possible invasion by imperialists and to strive for world peace together.[60]

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[59] The film *Qing Gong Mishi* (Inside Story of the Ching Court) was a reactionary film which vilified the patriotic Yihetuan movement of 1900 and preached capitulation to imperialism. This film of national betrayal was extolled by Liu Shaoqi as one of "patriotism".

Source: *People's Daily, April 13, 1950.*

Letter to Yang Kaizhi and Li Congde

April 13, 1950

Comrades Zizhen and Congde:[61]

I have received your letter. I am very happy that you are now working in the provincial government. I hope that you will be positive and diligent and will have much to show by way of achievements. My son Anying is returning to Hunan to celebrate the old lady's birthday[62] and visit his mother's grave. At the same time he will come and see you. Please give him the benefit of your wisdom and teach him.

With most sincere regards for your recent well-being.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 355.*

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[60] Comrade Mao made this short address before the Sixth Session of the Central People's Government Council voted on, and ratified the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship Mutual Assistance which was signed on February 14, 1950.

[61] For Yang Kaizhi, see *Letter to Wong Shoudao* (Oct 9, 1949), p. 7 of this volume. Zizhen is Yang Kaizhi's honorific name. Li Congde is Yang's wife.

[62] Mao was referring to Yang's mother, who was Mao's mother-in-law. Comrade Mao here used the term *Lao tai tai* which is a respectful way of saying "Old lady".

Comment on Chen Yun's Report[63]

April 14, 1950

The Financial and Economic Affairs Commission of the Government Administrative Council has achieved very significant results in the past six months in the work of adjusting the budget and stabilizing the prices of goods. The policies of the Financial and Economic affairs Commission are correct [even though] there are still some shortcomings in its work, and attention should be paid to correcting these.

The financial situation of our country has begun to change for the better. This is a very good phenomenon. However, for the financial and economic situation as a whole to take a fundamental change for the better three conditions must be met. These are: the completion of land reform, the reasonable adjustment of existing industries and commercial concerns, and major reductions in the military and governmental expenditures of the state. We should strive to realize these step by step, and they can indeed be completely realized. Then fundamental changes for the better can take place. Within the next few months, the emphasis in the work of the organs of the government that are in charge of finance and the economy should be on the adjustment of the interrelationship between public and private enterprises and between the various departments within each public or private enterprise and on exerting as much effort as possible to overcome the state of anarchy. The stipulation in the Common Program [which states]:

> The state shall coordinate and regulate the state-owned, co-operative, individual peasant and handicraft, private capitalist, and state capitalist [sectors of the economy] in their spheres of operations, supply of raw materials, marketing, labor conditions, technical equipment, policies of public and general finance, etc. In this way all sector of the social economy can, under the leadership of the state-owned economy, carry out division and co-ordination of labor and play their proper parts [in pro-

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[63] These comments were made at the Seventh Meeting of the Central People's Government Council, which was held on April 13, 1950. It followed the report made by Chen Yun, who was vice-premier of the GAC of the Central People's Government and chairman of the Financial and Economic Affairs Commission. Chen's report is known by the title "Report on the Financial Condition of the Nation."

moting the development of the social economy as a whole][64]

must be fully implemented. Only then can it serve the interests of the rehabilitation and development of the entire people's economy. Certain confused ideas that have already arisen in this area must be straightened out.

Source: *New China News Agency, Daily Bulletin: 13, April 21, 1950.*

Letter to Mao Shenpin

April 18, 1950

My dear friend Shenpin:[65]

I have received your two letters and am very gratified. I apologize for the fact that, owing to other business, I have been late in responding. I am very much saddened to be reminded of the sacrifice that my good friend Qinming made for the revolution;[66] and yet it is also an honorable and glorious thing. [In your letters you] described some shortcomings in the cadres' work; indeed there are many such cases all over, and we are redoubling our efforts to reform and rectify them, and hope that things will be improved. I greatly approve the idea of having you come out and take up some responsibility [in government work]. The most appropriate procedure seems to be for you to demonstrate support for the interests of the masses, and when you have gained the respect of the people, you will very naturally join the government. It would not be appropriate for me to make a recommendation; that could affect your reputation adversely. Don't you think so? At your convenience, I shall be grateful to learn more of what you are doing.

Best wishes for your health and progress.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 356.*

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[64] Parts that have not been cited by comrade Mao here, are in brackets to provide contextual meaning.

[65] Shenpin was a classmate of Mao Zedong

[66] This refers to Mao Shenpin's elder brother Mao Qinming, who was also at one time Mao Zedong's classmate and who died in 1928 as a martyr of the revolution.

Letter to Li Shuyi

April 18, 1950

Comrade Shuyi:[67]

I have received your letter. Since the sacrifice of Zhixun, you have brought up his children through a great deal of hardship. You have my greatest respect for this accomplishment. For you to learn Marxism-Leninism, you can do it in your spare time from work; there is no need to come all the way to the capital to achieve this goal. Please convey my deepest regards to the two old gentleman Mr. Xiaodan and Mr. Wuting.[68]

Best regards for your good health.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 357.*

Letter to Xiang Mingqing

April 19, 1950

Mr. Mingqing:[69]

I have long since received your letter of October 12 last year. Permit me to apologize for the fact that, owing to [preoccupation with] other business, I have been late in responding. Your nephew Comrade Xiang Jun was a member of the Communist Party. In 1927 he was the secretary of the Hengshan *xian* [Party] Committee and was an honest and capable comrade. When the KMT betrayed us in 1927, he was arrested and gloriously gave his life for the cause. You may report all this information to the Hunan Provincial [Party] Committee. However, as for the matter of [disbursing funds for] the comforting of the bereaved, it has to be done uniformly and must not take only a few [special cases] into consideration. If the provincial committee is not yet able to handle the matter, you must understand the situation.

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[67] Li Shuyi [b. 1901] is a native of Changsha, Hunan, and the wife of Liu Zhixun, who was a good friend of Mao's and a revolutionary martyr.

[68] This refers to Li's father Li Xiaodan [1888-1953] and Liu's father Liu Wuting [1877-1957]

[69] Xiang Mingqing was a native of Pingjiang and Yang Kaihui's (Mao's former Wife) uncle.

In reply and with respectful regards for your health.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 359.*

Telegram to W. H. Andrews

April 20, 1950

Comrade W. H. Andrews:[70]

My sincerest congratulations on your eightieth birthday, and best wishes for your good health.

(Signed as Chairman of CPC)

Source: *Guangming Daily, May 23, 1950.*

Telegram to Maurice Thorez

April 28, 1950

Dear Comrade Thorez:[71]

On this occasion of your fiftieth birthday, I wish you health and longevity and pay my respects to you and to the Communist Party of France.

(Signed as Chairman of CPC)

Source: *People's Daily, April 28, 1950.*

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[70] W. H. Andrews was a former Chairman of the Communist Party of South Africa, and at the time of this telegram, its CC member.

[71] Maurice Thorez (1900-1964) was secretary general of the Communist Party of France (1936-1964).

Inscription Concerning the People's Education[72]

May 1, 1950

To rehabilitate and develop the people's education is one of the most important tasks at the present time.

Source: *"Mao Zhuxi Lun Jiaoyu Geming" [Chairman Mao on the Revolution in Education] 4, Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1967.*

Telegram to the Republic of Czechoslovakia

May 3, 1950

President Gottwald
Your Excellency:

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I extend to Your Excellency and the Czechoslovakian people our warmest congratulations on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia and express our hope that the Republic of Czechoslovakia, under Your Excellency's leadership, will grow daily in prosperity and strength.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, May 9, 1950.*

Inscription Commemorating the May Fourth Movement[73]

May 4, 1950

Congratulations on the thirty first anniversary of "May Fourth"[74]. Unite together to strive to build a New China.

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[72] This inscription was written for the inaugural issue of *Renmin Jiaoyu* (People's Education), May 1, 1950.

[73] This inscription was written for the exhibition room commemorating Li Dazhao, an early Chinese Communist and leader in the May Fourth Movement at Beijing University. It was published by the *Beida Zhoukan* (Weekly Bulletin of Beijing University).

[74] On May 4, 1919, students in Beijing demonstrated against the handing over to Japan of

Source: *Guongming Daily, May 4, 1950.*

Letter to Wen Jianquan

May 7, 1950

Dear Cousin Jianquan:[75]

I have received your letter of January 16, and am much gratified. How many people are still in Tangjiaduo? Can they be adequately fed? Are Tenth Cousin and Seventeenth Cousin still alive? Please let me know at your convenience. It would be best for Mr. Wen Kai[76] to find a solution to his employment problem in the vicinity of Hunan; it would not do him any good to travel afar, and it is not convenient for me to recommend him either. Please understand and forgive me. Cousin Yunchang wrote me several letters in succession. I wrote a reply which was sent to Baipangkou. I wonder if he has received it? I also have received Cousin Nansong's second letter and am grateful for his kind thoughts.

In reply, and with best wishes for your health!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 360.*

Letter to Zhang Ding

May 7, 1950

Mr. Zhang Ding:[77]

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many of China's sovereign rights in Shantung by Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Italy and other imperialist countries then in conference in Paris. This student movement evoked an immediate response throughout the country. After June 3, it developed into a country-wide anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary movement embracing large numbers of the proletariat, the urban petty bourgeoisie and even the national bourgeoisie. Also see *Orientation of Youth Movement, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume II.

[75] Wen Jianquan and most of the people mentioned in this letter were or are comrade Mao's cousins on his mother's side of the family.

[76] Wen Kai was a relative and a close associate of Wen Jianquan.

[77] Zhang is a native of Changsha, Hunan and had studied in a tutorial school affiliated with the "Self-Teaching University" founded in Changsha by comrade Mao and others in

I have received your letter of October 25 last year and with it the photographs of Mao Zetan[78] and company. Thank you so much for your kind thoughts. To join the Party you must do it at the local level and in accordance with the set regulations.

In reply and with best wishes for your health and good fortune,

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 362.*

Letter to Zhao Puzhu

May 7, 1950

Mr. Puzhu:[79]

I have received and studied your letter and your writing and am very grateful. As for the problems such as that of the rent reduction and land reform in our native village, it is not convenient for me to intervene directly since I really do not know enough about the specific conditions. Please contact the comrades in the people's government in the various localities themselves and settle the problems with them with a view to a fair solution. I would also appreciate if, at your convenience, you let me know more of what you are doing. Please convey my regards to all our relatives and friends at Tangjiatuo.

In reply and with regards for your health and good fortune,

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 363.*

August 1921.

[78] Mao Zetan was Mao Zedong's younger brother. He became a martyr for the cause of the revolution in Hunan in 1935.

[79] Zhao Puzhu was a native of Xiangxiang. Hunan and had been a colleague of Mao's during Comrade Mao's brief sojourn in the New Hunan Army from late 1911 to spring 1912. He is a distant relative of Mao.

Letter to Mao Yimin

May 8, 1950

Comrade Yimin:[80]

Your letter of January 3 has been received. Thank you for your good wishes and for giving me so many details about the conditions in our native village.

The poor people in our home village lead a very hard life, and life is even harder for the families of [revolutionary] martyrs. For the time being, all they can do is be a bit patient, and things could become somewhat better after the land reform. By then the People's Government may also give some assistance to the people such as loans, and the people will be able to gradually make improvements in their lives.

Taking care of the families of martyrs is a national issue. There are several million households of martyrs' families throughout the country, and they all have to be taken care of. It would not be wise for us to give special and individual attention to a few places. Nonetheless, with regard to the people in the greatest difficulties, the local people's government should, during the time of rent reduction and land reform, or in the in-between-season months,[81] give them as much attention and care as possible.

It is very good that you are working in our home village. You can write to me often and tell me what is going on in the village.

Please give my regards to the comrades in the village. I sincerely hope that everyone will work, hard and make progress.

In reply, and with best wishes for your good health,

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Hongqi (Red Flag), Beijing, August 16, 1982.*

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[80] Mao Yimin was a native of Mao's own home village, Shaoshan of Xiangtan *xian*, Hunan Province. He joined the CPC in 1938 and, prior to Liberation, worked in the Shaoshan district committee of the CPC. Shortly after Liberation (i.e., about the time of this letter,) he worked in the Huanglong district committee of the Xiangtan *xian* committee of the CPC.

[81] The Chinese term here is *qing huang gujie* (hiatus between green and yellow) which refers to the gap in the agricultural season between the time when the crop is still in its seedling stage (green) and the time of ripening and harvesting (yellow). It is often taken to mean a time of shortage of means of consumption.

Letter to Wen Nansong

May 12, 1950

Cousin Nansong:[82]

Your letter of January has been received. Thank you for your good wishes. Cousin Yunchang[83] has written me many times and I have responded with one letter which was addressed to Baipangkou, Nan *xian*. Do you know if he has received it? Regarding the appointment for Cousin Yunchang, it would not be appropriate for me to make a recommendation; rather, it would be more appropriate for him to impress others with his performance among the people, and when he has gained people's confidence he will be given the opportunity to take part in the work. Are Tenth Cousin and Seventeenth Cousin still alive? I am very gratified to know that Eleventh Cousin is still alive and well.[84] He wrote a letter to me and I have sent one back to him. I wonder if he has received it? You said that there was a shortage of grain in our home village and the government was not distributing any. How are things now? Is there still a grain shortage? Has the government come up with nothing at all? When you write again, please tell me in detail.

In reply, and with concern for your recent well-being,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 366-367.*

Letter to Ye Jiannong

May 12, 1950

Dear Jianlong:[85]

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[82] Wen Nansong is comrade Mao's Cousin on his mother's side of the family.

[83] Wen Yuanchang was an elder cousin of Mao. He died in 1961.

[84] Tenth Cousin (*Shige*) refers to Wen Banxiang who died in 1949. Seventeenth cousin (*Shiquiqe*) is Wen Meiquing, who is a peasant. Eleventh cousin is Wen Jianquan.

[85] Jianlong is Ye Jiannong's original name. He was a native of Pingjiang. Hunan and was a classmate of Mao's when he studied at the first Normal School of Hunan Province Mao here also used the salutation *xuexiong*, (elder brother).

I have received your various letters and telegrams. It is very good that you have such enthusiasm for the investigation of new knowledge. As for the matter of your employment, it would be best for you to be in Chongqing if it can be resolved there. If you have to come to the capital, please correspond directly with Director Shen Junru of the People's Supreme Court, and ask him if there is any position that you can fill. Otherwise, you can also enter a short-term studying institution to learn more before you take part in actual work.

In reply and with best regards for your well-being,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 368.*

Letter to Zhou Wennan

May 12, 1950

Comrade Wennan:[86]

I have received your letter and am greatly gratified. As for taking your mother to the Northeast to live with you, I think it is a good thing. I can write to the authorities in Hunan to have them issue you some travel funds. Nonetheless, your mother is of an advanced age, and whether or not she will be safe along the journey if no one is there to take care of her is a question. Would you be needed to personally go to bring her with you to the Northeast? Would that not be better? Please give it some thought and let me know. If you are going [to Hunan] yourself to fetch her, then my letter to Hunan can be carried by you. The enclosed document is returned to you.[87] Jiang Qing[88] and others are all doing well.

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[86] Zhou Wennan [a.k.a. Zhou Renfang] was the wife of Mao's brother Zetan, who died in the fighting against KMT troops in Southern Fujian in late 1935. Zhou herself had stayed in Hunan to do revolutionary work. In mid-1930, when the Red army forces attacked Changsha, several Mao family members remaining in the region were arrested by the KMT, including Mao's first wife Yang Kaihui and his younger sister, together with Zhou. While Yang and Mao's sister were executed, Zhou was spared and subsequently released. At the time of this letter, Zhou was the chief executive officer of the criminal court of the People's Court of Shenyang Municipality.

[87] This refers to the letter that Zhou's mother, Zhou Qian, nee Chen, wrote to Zhou in which she described her lonely conditions in Shaoshan *xian*, Hunan.

[88] Jiang Qing (Chiang Ching), Mao's wife.

My best wishes for your health,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 369.*

Telegram to Ho Chi Minh

May 12, 1950

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
President Ho Chi Minh
Your Excellency:

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and myself, I extend to you our warmest congratulations on this, Your Excellency's sixtieth birthday. We congratulate the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which, under your leadership and with the support of the patriotic people of all Vietnam, has triumphed over the foreign invaders and their running dogs, and we celebrate the eternal unity of the peoples of the two countries, China and Vietnam, and their common effort in the cause of peace in Asia.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, May 12, 1950.*

Letter to Mao Yuju

May 15, 1950

Dear Yuju: *(Yuju xiong)*[89]

I have received your several letters in rapid succession. Thank you very much. Please let me know at your convenience more things about how conditions are in our native village. If Zou Puxun (Heng Er)[90] is in dire straits and seriously ill, and if you have some extra cash on hand, please help him out a bit and let me pay you back later. Please also give the enclosed message to Zou Puxun.

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[89] Mao Yuju was Mao Zedong's older cousin and his tutor in an old-style village school when Mao was a child.

My best regards for your health.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 370.*

Letter to Zou Puxun

May 15, 1950

Dear Puxun:[91]

I have received your letter of May 7. Thank you for your kind thoughts. I am gratified to learn that your health is improving, and I hope that you will continue, nonetheless, to pay good attention to maintaining your health. I would like to know, at your convenience, how many people there are in your family, how difficult life is for you, and whether or not you are still capable of working.

My best wishes for your health.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 371.*

Letter to Zhou Rong

May 16, 1950

Mr. Zanxiang:[92]

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[90] "Heng Er" which Mao put in parenthesis in the original is a childhood nickname of Zou's. Zou was Mao's neighbor and schoolmate in the village school.

[91] See previous note.

[92] Zhou Rong (Zhou Zanxiang) is a native of Yueyang. Hunan, and made Mao's acquaintance in the First Normal School of Hunan in 1929. The matter referred to here in Mao's response is Zhou's request that Mao recommend him for membership in the CPC.

I have received your letter of August last year. I am grateful indeed for your kind thoughts. Let me apologize for being so tardy in responding. As for the matter with the organization, it is not convenient for me to recommend you in such haste. What should be done is for you to perform in the locality and make your request then to the local organization and await its resolution.

In response, and with best wishes for your progress,

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 372.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of India

May 20, 1950

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence which has been conferred upon you by the President of the Republic of India and which Your Excellency has presented, and I am grateful for Your Excellency's congratulations and good wishes.

The two countries, China and India, share a common boundary and have had between them a long-lasting and intimate relationship historically and culturally. In the last few centuries, they both have undertaken long and heroic struggles to be liberated from the adverse destiny of their peoples. The understanding, sympathy, and concern that exist between the peoples of our two countries is profound and sincere. The establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China and India now will not only cause the friendship that already exists between the people of these two countries to grow and be consolidated with the passing of each day, but moreover, the sincere cooperation between the people of these two great Asian countries produced by this friendship will surely contribute greatly to lasting peace in Asia and the world.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the first ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of India to the People's Republic of China, and pledge my assistance to your excellency in your work of strengthening the cooperation between the two nations

Best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *New China News Agency, Daily Bulletin, 34, May 22, 1950.*

Letter to Li Jinxi

May 22, 1950

Mr. Shao Xi:[93]

Your letter of May 17 has been received. I can agree with all the opinions you have expressed concerning the Dictionary Bureau,[94] and I have discussed these with Comrade Hu Qiaomu.[95] He is also in agreement with us. Please contact Comrade Hu on the telephone and discuss the matter with him.

I send best regards for your health.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p.373.*

Telegram of Condolence to Yan Huiqing's Family

May 26, 1950

Respectfully to the family of Vice-chairman Yan Huiqing:[96]

I am stunned to receive the news of the passing away of Mr. Yan Huiqing owing to illness. I feel extremely grieved and send this telegram expressly to extend my condolences.

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[93] Li Jinxi (Shao Xi) (1890-1978) was a native of Xiangtan, Hunan—comrade Mao's native village. Li was a linguist and philologist, and at the time of this letter, was director of the Editorial Bureau for the Compilation of the *Zhongguo Da Cidian* (A General Chinese Dictionary) and professor and Chairman of the Department of Chinese Language at Beijing Normal University.

[94] This refers to the opinions, expressed by Li in a letter to comrade Mao, on the planning of a rational course of action and development in organizing the personnel at the Bureau for the Compilation of the *Zhongguo Da Cidan* and on the question of under which department or branch of the government the bureau should be placed.

[95] Hu Qiaomu was at the time of this letter comrade Mao's secretary and director of the Press Administration of the Government Administrative Council.

[96] Yan was vice-chairman of the East China Military and Administrative Commission.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *New China News Agency, Daily Bulletin, 39 (May 20, 1953).*

Letter to Liu Yanan

May 27, 1950

Comrade Yanan:[97]

I have received the enclosed letters from four brothers of the family of Wen[98] from Dapingyao, Fengyin *xiang* of Sidu, Xiangxiang *[xian]* and these are herewith forwarded for your perusal. They have said things that express discontent with the work of the local district and *xiang* government. I wonder what the real situation is? If it is possible, please send a comrade down to investigate a bit and let me know the results. The Wen brothers are all poor peasants, but in their letters they speak in favor of the landlords and the rich peasants. Why is this so? Please also investigate this and let me know. As far as the question of the difficulties that the Wen family (my uncle's family) has encountered and their appeal for aid and relief, you can help them relieve their problem only insofar as the normal pattern of rent reduction and land reform, which is common to all peasants, will allow. You cannot give them special attention and aid, or else the people in general will be unhappy about it.

My best wishes for your health.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p.375*

Letter to Liu Shaoqi

June 4, 1950

Comrade Shaoqi:

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[97] Liu Yanan was at the time of this letter head of Xiangxiang *xian*, Hunan Province.

[98] See *Letter to Wen Nansong*, p. 64 of this volume.

I have read [the enclosed] document.[99] I find it very well written and very useful. I am suggesting some revisions for your consideration. The part on the rich peasants is too long, so much so that it is turning out to be unclear instead. In some places [this section] is not very appropriate; therefore I would, and have, deleted a major portion of it. I have added [a description of] the experience of the period from 1946 on in order to rectify a certain misunderstanding that some cadres already [appear to] have[100]—[i.e., a misunderstanding] that the "Left" deviationist errors of the past have been the result of the stipulation in the Land Reform Law Outline Program promulgated on October 10, 1947[101], that the surplus land and property of the rich peasants is to be confiscated. Without such an explanation [as I have included] it would not be possible to correct this misunderstanding.

By the forces of production we are referring to two things—the laborers and to the material of production (also known as the means of production).[102] By the material of production, in the countryside, the first thing we mean is land, second the farming implements, draft animals, houses, and so on.[103] Grain is what the peasants produce as a means of living by utilizing the material of production. It is reasonable for us to put the grain confiscated from the landlords and other confiscated things together and put them under the category of the material of production, because this type of grain contains the character of capital funds. By the relations of production, we mean the relationships of ownership which people have [with each other] with regard to the material of production, or in other words, the relations of the ownership of property.

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[99] This refers to the draft of the report which Liu eventually made to the Second Session of the First National Conference of the CPPCC on the question of land reform.

[100] Mao added a very long paragraph to Liu's draft here.

[101] See *Present Situation and Our Tasks, Selected Works* of Mao Tse-tung, Volume IV.

[102] Here Mao used the terms *shengchan ziliao* and *shengchan shouduan*; the former is translated in this document as "material of production" and the latter as "means of production" in order to preserve Mao's distinction here. It is an exception rather than the rule, since it is a general practice to render *shengchan ziliao* as "means of production," and elsewhere in this collection we, as a rule, followed this custom.

[103] Here the term "houses" refers to buildings that are used as means of production, while residential buildings were considered by Mao to be part of the means of living (shenghua ziliao). In the first chapter of the *Stipulations of the Central Committee of the CPC on the Distinction of Social Classes in the Land Reform and on Their Various Treatments* Mao had pointed out: "In order to live people must produce the means of living, such as grain, clothing, houses, fuel and implements. In order to produce the means of living, people must have the means of production, such as land, raw material, draft animals, implements and a workplace."

The utilization of the material of production—e.g. the utilization (renting) of the land of the landlords by the peasants—is nothing but the result of the relationship of ownership that the landlords have with regard to the land. This type of ownership relationship is expressed as the relationship of subjugation that the tenant peasant has with regard to the landlord (i.e., an interhuman relationship), and this is [what we mean by] the relations of production. In the past many comrades have committed errors on this matter of casting their thinking in a dualistic, or even a pluralistic, mode and considering the relations of production in parallel with the relations of utilization and at the same time considering the material [or means] of production in parallel with the means of living. In using this [frame of mind] as the standard for drawing class distinctions they have made the question very confusing and made mistakes in classifying the class backgrounds of many people. In the winter of 1947 I asked Qiaomu to write an article entitled "Stipulations on the Various Social Classes and Their Treatment in China."[104] The first two chapters of that article were written by me, and it clarified this problem. You may consult it.

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp.376-378.*

Letter to Chen Mingshu

June 12, 1950

Mr. Zhenru:[105]

I have availed myself of the opportunity to briefly read your great work,[106] but since I have not studied it in great detail, I would not dare to propose any opinions of my own. I only think that certain viewpoints therein can and need to be further thought out and discussed. When I have time I shall take up the discussion with you. I have held it for some time and apologize for being too tardy in responding.

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[104] This document's full titles is *Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Tudi Gaige Zhong Ge Shehui Jieji de Huafen Ji Qi Daiyu de Guiding* (Stipulations of the Central Committee of the CPC on the Distinction of Social Classes in the Land Reform and on Their Various Treatments).

[105] Zhenru is the honorific name of Chen Mingshu [1889-1965]. At the time of this letter he was a member of the Central People's Governing Council and a member of the Standing Committee of the CC of the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT.

[106] This refers to a book that Chen wrote on the teachings of Buddha.

I respectfully convey my regards and best wishes for your health and well-being.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 380.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of Poland

June 12, 1950

Mr. Ambassador:

It is with great pleasure that I accept the letter of credence which has been conferred on you by the President of the Republic of Poland and which has been presented to me by Your Excellency, and I am grateful for Your Excellency's warm congratulations and good wishes.

A profound friendship has existed between the peoples of China and Poland for a long time. In the great world war against Fascism, we watched with unbounded sympathy and concern the resolute and heroic struggle of the Polish people. We furthermore bear the greatest admiration for the Polish people for their brilliant successes in the rebuilding of their homeland today.

At present, the government and people of both countries, China and Poland, are all continuing their efforts and struggles toward their common goal of attaining world peace. I am convinced that the increasingly close cooperation between China and Poland in the political, economic, and cultural areas will not only be beneficial to the peoples of the two countries, but furthermore will strengthen and consolidate the camp for world democracy and peace.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the first ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Poland to the People's Republic of China and pledge my assistance to Your Excellency in your work of consolidating the friendship between our two countries.

Best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, June 13, 1950.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Kingdom of Sweden

June 12, 1950

Mr. Ambassador:

It gives me great pleasure to accept from Your Excellency the letter of credence conferred on Your Excellency by the King of Sweden, and I am grateful for Your Excellency's congratulations and good wishes.

A long friendship has existed between the peoples of China and Sweden. In their efforts in defense of world peace, the peoples of our two countries have a common wish. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Sweden now will not only cause the friendship that already exists between our two peoples to become more consolidated with each passing day, but will also facilitate [the growth of] a lasting peace throughout the world.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the first ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Sweden to the People's Republic of China and pledge my assistance to Your Excellency in your work of strengthening the cooperation between our two countries.

My sincere best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prosperity of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, June 13, 1950.*

Opening Speech at the Second Meeting of the National Committee of the CPPCC

June 14, 1950

Fellow committee members, comrades, and friends:

The Second Meeting of the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference is now in session. At this meeting there will be reports on the work of the National Committee, on land reform work, on economic and fiscal work, on taxation work, on diplomatic and United Front work, on cultural and educational work, on military work, and on the work of the courts. We hope that these matters will be discussed. Of these [various issues], the central issue for this meeting is the problem of land reform. We hope that a land reform bill will be adopted at this meeting and that it might be implemented after being ratified by the Central People's Government. The first thing this would do would be to enable the more than 100,000 cadres who are in the midst of preparing to carry out land reform to get an early start in studying this bill, so that after this autumn the work of reforming the land [tenure] system may be carried out smoothly throughout an area with an agricultural population of about 100 million. Naturally, all the other reports are also important. Any opinions that one may have may be voiced, and any proposal may be submitted for examination and discussion. So long as they are practicable, they ought to be adopted. We have the great and correct Common Program as our standard for reviewing our work and discussing problems. The Common Program must be fully implemented, as it is presently the organic law of our country. I am convinced that through the efforts of all our comrades our meeting will be able to accomplish its tasks smoothly. At the present moment, under the leadership of the Central People's Government, the people of the entire country are in the midst of undertaking immense tasks, struggling to overcome difficulties and to strive for a turn for the better in the economic situation. All of the people's enterprises in our country are now developing in a forward direction along new paths, and with each new day we can see progress and success. No difficulty of any sort can hinder the advance of the people's cause. The People's Political Consultative Conference and the National Committee it has elected are great political organizations of the United Front that unite all nationalities, all democratic classes, *all* democratic parties, all people's organizations, and democratic personages from all walks of life throughout the country. They enjoy very high prestige among the people of the country. We must consolidate this type of unity, consolidate our United Front, and lead the people of the entire country in steadily attaining their own goals.

Source: *People's Daily, June 15, 1950.*

Letter to Ma Xulun

June 19, 1950

Minister Ma:[107]

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[107] Ma Xulun [1884-1970] was minister of education from October 1949 to November

Your other item of correspondence is returned. This matter should be resolved as quickly as possible. Ask all schools to pay attention to health first and studies second. Where nutrition is not sufficient, operational funds should be increased. The amount of time for studying and holding meetings should be greatly reduced. People who are ill should be given special treatment. Schools throughout the country ought to be like this across the board. The conference on higher education has already been held; it would be appropriate to hold a conference each on the two [other levels:] secondary [education] and primary [education]. Please give consideration to the above and take action accordingly.

In salute,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p.381.*

Reply to Minister of the Kingdom of Denmark

June 24, 1950

Mr. Minister:

It gives me great pleasure to accept the letter of credence from His Majesty the King of Denmark presented by Your Excellency, and I am grateful for Your Excellency's congratulations and good wishes.

Friendship exists between the peoples of our two countries, China and Denmark. Moreover, in our efforts in the development of an economic relationship and in the defense of world peace, I believe that the peoples of our two countries also share common wishes. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Denmark today will undoubtedly further consolidate the

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1952. He was a philologist and a prolific scholar. Before 1911, he was an editor and publisher of many significant journals and taught at various middle and post-secondary schools. In the early years of the Republic of China he was head of the Ministry of Education and later chancellor of Beijing University. During the 1930s he held positions in the Zhejiang provincial government and taught at Beijing University. In the early 1940s he together with Xu Guangping, Wang Juechen, et al., formed the Zhongguo Minzhu Cujin Hui (Association for the Promotion of Democracy). In 1948 he accepted the CPC's invitation to take part in the preparations for the formation of the new CPPCC. From 1949 on, he was active in the CPPCC and in the work of uniting the 'democratic parties' with the CPC. He held positions in the Association for the Promotion of Democracy (of which he became chairman in March 1953) and in the *Zhongguo Minzhu Tongmeng* (Democratic League).

friendship which already exists between the peoples of the two countries. I further hope that it will facilitate [the growth of] a lasting peace in the world.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency in your appointment as the first minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Denmark to the People's Republic of China and pledge my assistance to Your Excellency in your work of strengthening the friendly relations between our two countries.

Best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and best wishes for the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, June 25, 1950.*

Reply to Head of Diplomatic Mission of the German Democratic Republic

June 24, 1950

Your Excellency:

I accept with great pleasure the letter of credence from the President of the Democratic Republic of Germany which Your Excellency has presented and am grateful to Your Excellency for your warm congratulations and good wishes.

Ever since the great Soviet army crushed Hitler's reactionary state organization, the Chinese people have watched with happiness the development of the democratic movement of the German people. Since the establishment of the New Germany—the Democratic Republic of Germany—under the leadership of the president of your country, Mr. Wilhelm Pieck, which has become the turning point of the history of Germany and of Europe, the Chinese people's happiness has multiplied. We feel that we have gained a very good and strong friend. It was at just this point that the People's Republic of China was founded and the Chinese People's Revolution won its victory throughout the entire country. Diplomatic relations were then rapidly established between our country and yours. There is no doubt that the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries will not only cause the friendship between our two peoples to develop and become more consolidated with each passing day, but it will also provide a strong guarantee for a lasting peace in the world.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the head of the diplomatic mission, with the rank of ambassador, of the Democratic Republic of Germany to the People's Republic of China, and pledge my assistance to Your Excellency in your work of strengthening the cooperation between our two nations.

Best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, June 25, 1950.*

Speech at Eighth Session of the CPGC

June 28, 1950

The Chinese people declared long ago that the affairs of all countries in the world should be managed by these countries themselves, and that the affairs of Asia should be managed by the peoples of Asia themselves, not by the United States of America. American aggression against Asia can only arouse widespread and resolute resistance by the peoples of Asia. It was only on January 5 of this year that Truman announced that the United States would not intervene in Taiwan. Now he himself has proved that [statement] to be a [pack of lies], and moreover, he has torn to shreds all international agreements regarding the nonintervention of the United States in the internal affairs of China. This exposure by the United States of its own imperialist face is advantageous to the people of China and the peoples of Asia. There is absolutely no grounds for the United States' intervention in the internal affairs of countries such as Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The sympathy of the entire Chinese people and of the broad masses of the people throughout the world will be on the side of the victims of aggression and certainly not on the side of American imperialism. They will neither be enticed by the imperialists' bribes nor cowed by their threats. Imperialism is outwardly strong but inwardly feeble because it does not have the support of the people. Our people, and people all over the world, unite and be fully prepared to crush any provocation by the American imperialists!

Source *People's Daily, June 29, 1950.*

Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Mongolia

July 3, 1950

Mr. Ambassador:

I accept with great pleasure the letter of credence from the Presidium of the Lesser Hural of the People's Republic of Mongolia which Your Excellency has presented and am grateful to Your Excellency for your warm congratulations and good wishes.

An intimate relationship had originally existed between the peoples of China and Mongolia. [However,] in the last few decades, owing to the seeds of discord sown among us by the imperialists and the reactionary government in China, communications between us were severed. The Mongolian people, under the influence of the October Revolution, not only had already freed themselves early of the reactionary government of China and established a true People's Democracy, but also are advancing along the road of development in economic and cultural construction. The Chinese people wholeheartedly celebrate and salute this success on the part of the Mongolian people. Now, the Chinese people's revolution has achieved a fundamental victory, and diplomatic relations between China and Mongolia have been established. I am convinced that this will not only bring about the further development and consolidation of the friendship between the peoples of our two countries, but will also facilitate [the growth of] a lasting peace in Asia and the world.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the first Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of Mongolia to the People's Republic of China and pledge to Your Excellency my assistance in your work of strengthening the cooperation between our two nations.

Best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *Guangming Daily, July 4, 1950.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia

July 7, 1950

Chairman Bumatsende,
Your Excellency:

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I sincerely express our sentiments of congratulations and good wishes to Your Excellency and to the Mongolian people on this happy occasion of the commemoration and celebration of the twenty-ninth anniversary of the founding of your country.[108] We are deeply convinced that the Mongolian people will achieve even greater success in the areas of economic and cultural construction.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, July 11, 1950.*

Telegram to the Socialist Unity Party of Germany

July 18, 1950

Comrade [Wilhelm] Pieck and all comrades of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany:

We are extremely honored to receive your invitation to send delegates from our Party to attend the national congress of your Party to be held from July 20 to July 23. We have now appointed Comrade Wang Jiaxiang, member of the Central Committee of our Party, to go to Berlin to attend your congress as the representative of the Communist Party of China and to convey our congratulations and good wishes.

We hereby send from afar our best wishes for the successful convening of the national congress of the Socialist Unity Party of the great German Democratic Republic, for an early end to the phenomenon of the forced division of the whole of Germany by the imperialists, for the early establishment of an integrated, unified, and democratic Germany, and for an early liberation of the entire German nation under the correct leadership of the Socialist Unity Party and the Communist Party of Germany.

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[108] In their struggle for liberation in 1921-24, the Mongolian people, under the leadership of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, drove out the Russian White guard bandit troops and the armed forces of the Northern warlords of China, both of which were backed by Japanese imperialism, overthrew Mongolian feudal rule and founded the Mongolian People's Republic.

Long live the great Socialist Unity Party and the Communist Party of Germany!

(Signed as Chairman of CPC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, July 19, 1950.*

Letter to Wu Qirui

July 19, 1950

Madam Qirui:[109]

I have received your letter of May. I am very concerned about your difficulties. With regard to your request that your three children be allowed to enter the school for cadres' children of southern Jiangsu in order that your difficulties may be somewhat alleviated, please bring this letter with you and discuss the matter with comrades in positions of responsibility in the appropriate local organs, and see if it can be done. It is up to you to decide which person to approach for this discussion. If necessary, you can look up Comrade Chen Pixian, secretary of the Sunan (south Jiangsu) District Party Committee. I completely approve of this being done; it is just that I do not know if it would be possible for that school for cadres' children to accept more children. You are a mother of eight children, so I hope that you will take very good care of yourself. Please also convey my best regards to your children.

In response, and with my best regards for your work in teaching.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 382.*

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109. Wu Qirui is a native of Wuxi, Jiangsu Province. She is the daughter-in-law of Wang Lian, Mao's mathematics teacher at the First Normal School of Hunan. Wu was teaching at the primary school affiliated with the Normal School of Wuxi.

Telegram to the Republic of Poland

July 21, 1950

President [Boleslaw] Bierut
Your Excellency:

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I sincerely extend to you and the people of Poland our congratulations and good wishes on this happy occasion of the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the founding of your country. Our best wishes for the daily growth of the Republic of Poland in prosperity and strength under Your Excellency's leadership.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, July 22, 1950.*

Telegram to the Transvaal Indian Congress

July 26, 1950

Chairman,
The Transvaal Indian Congress,
The Union of South Africa
Dr. Yusuf Dadoo:

Your telegram of June 18 has been received.

On behalf of the people of China, I support you completely in your just protest against the so-called "Group Areas Bill" of the government of the Union of South Africa, which discriminates against the Chinese, against the Indians, and against other Asian peoples.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, July 17, 1950.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Union of Burma

August 7, 1950

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very pleased to accept the letter of credence from the President of the Union of Burma presented by Your Excellency and am grateful to Your Excellency for your felicitations and good wishes.

The two countries, China and Burma, share a common boundary, and not only is there a close relationship between them historically and culturally, but there is also a deep fraternal friendship between the peoples of the two countries. In recent centuries, the people of both China and Burma have undertaken protracted and courageous struggles for the independence and liberty of their respective nations. Therefore, the sympathy and [mutual] understanding that exist between our peoples are also very profound. The newly established diplomatic relations between China and Burma will now undoubtedly further enhance the friendship that already exists between the peoples of the two countries. I also believe that it will facilitate the growth of a lasting peace in Asia and in the world.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the first Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary from the Union of Burma to the People's Republic of China and pledge my assistance to Your Excellency in your work of strengthening the cooperation between the two countries.

We sincerely hope for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, August 8, 1950.*

Letter to Su Yu

August 8, 1950

Comrade Su Yu:[110]

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[110] Su Yu was at the time of this letter Vice-Chairman of the East China Military Region and Mayor of Nanjing Municipality.

Your letter brought to me by Comrade Luo Ruiqing[111] has been received. I am very much concerned about the fact that your illness is still grave. Your new post is not a very urgent one; you may devote yourself, without worrying about it, to convalescing until your health is completely restored. As for the place for resting and convalescence, if Qingdao appears to be appropriate you should stay in Qingdao; if not, then come to Beijing. Please see which you like better.

My best regards,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 384.*

Telegram to the People's Government of Qinghai on the Death of Vice-Chairman Ma Po

August 11, 1950

The People's Government of Qinghai Province and, through it, the family of the late Vice-Chairman Ma Po:

I am deeply grieved at the passing away of Vice-Chairman Ma Po and send this telegram expressly to convey my condolences.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, August 13, 1950.*

Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

August 14, 1950

Chairman Kim Du Bong, The Standing Committee, The Supreme People's Assembly, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea Your Excellency:

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the

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[111] Luo (1906-1978) was at the time of this letter, Minister of Public Security of the Central People's Government.

Korean people our felicitations on this happy occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea. The Chinese people warmly support the Korean people's just war against United States imperialist aggression and for the independence of their nation and the unity of their country. I am deeply convinced that the Korean people will certainly triumph in the end.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 15, 1950.*

Telegram to the Republic of Indonesia

August 16, 1950

President Achmed Sukarno,
The Republic of the United States of Indonesia,
Your Excellency:

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I sincerely extend our felicitations to Your Excellency and the people of Indonesia on this happy occasion of the anniversary of the founding of your country. We hope that the friendship between the peoples of Indonesia and China will grow with each passing day.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 17, 1950.*

Letter to Xu Haidong

August 20, 1950

Comrade Haidong:[112]

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[112] Xu Haidong (1900-1979) was the commander of the Twenty-fifth Army, and Fifteenth Army Group of the Red Army and commander of the Fourth Branch Regiment of the New Fourth Army and a Deputy commander in the Jiangbei (North of the Yangtze) Command of that Army. He was suffering from a chronic illness and was at the time of this letter convalescing in Dalian.

I have received your letter of July 17. I am greatly comforted to understand that your health is mending. We are all very much concerned about you and hope that you will cast away all worries to devote yourself in quietude to your convalescence and recovery, so that your health may be totally restored.

In response, and my best wishes for your happiness!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 385.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Romania

August 21, 1950

President Constantin Parhon,
The Presidium of the Grand National Assembly,
The People's Republic of Romania Your Excellency:

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the Romanian people our felicitations and best wishes on this occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Romania. I deeply believe that the Romanian people will achieve even greater success in their economic and cultural construction.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated, in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 23, 1950.*

Speech at Banquet Commemorating the Liberation of Romania (Excerpt)[113]

August 23, 1950

Six years ago, we too were under the oppression of Fascist bandits. Now, facts have proven that the force of the people is irresistible.

Source: *People's Daily, January 17, 1951.*

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[113] This is an excerpt of a speech that Mao made at a banquet celebrating the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Romania which was held by the Romanian Embassy in Beijing on August 23, 1950.

Letter to Xu Beihong

August 26, 1950

Mr. Beihong:[114]

Mr. XXX wrote me a letter claiming that he is a professor at the Art Institute and that life is very difficult for him. It seems he wishes me to help him. Please give the matter some thought and inform me as to what this person's condition is and how his situation should be handled. I also send you my best wishes for your work in teaching!

Enclosed is the letter from XXX.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Meishu Fenglei (Wind and Thunder in Fine Arts), August 1967, Red Guard Publication.*

Letter to Chen Jisheng

August 29, 1950

Mr. Jisheng:[115]

I have received and read your book and am greatly satisfied. The scholarship which you have undertaken is on a subject that I myself have not studied, so I cannot make any comments. The only thing is that I feel that unless one studies [history, in this case] Chinese history, with the methods of Marxism, one would be wasting one's energy in vain and will not achieve good results.

This is something I hope you will attend to.

In response, and with my respects,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 366.*

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[114] Also see *Letter to Xu Beihong*, p. 29 of this volume.

[115] Chen Jisheng was a middle school teacher who had been studying the history of minority nationalities in China.

Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

August 29, 1950

President Ho Chi Minh,
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Your Excellency:

On this happy occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Independence of Vietnam, on behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and to the people of Vietnam our warmest congratulations. May the Vietnamese people win complete victory in their struggle for national liberation against imperialism and may they secure even greater successes in their cause of building an independent and democratic Vietnam.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated, in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, September 9, 1950.*

Inscription for the First National Conference on Health Care

August 1950

Unite the personnel in all areas of the work of medical and health care—with new medicine, traditional medicine, Chinese medicine, Western medicine—to forge a consolidated united front and strive to launch the great [campaign for the] work of the health care of the people!

Source: *Guangming Daily, February 12, 1961.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Bulgaria

September 6, 1950

President Georgi Damyanov,
The Presidium of the National Assembly,

The People's Republic of Bulgaria
Your Excellency:

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the Bulgarian people our warmest felicitations on this happy occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Bulgaria, and our wishes that the Bulgarian people will secure even greater successes in their great cause of building their homeland.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, September 9, 1950.*

Letter to Chen Yu

September 11, 1950

Comrade Chen Yu:[116]

I have received the letter sent to me by the entire staff and workers of the Shijiazhuang[117] Bureau of Electric Works and the letter of signatures sent to me from the entire staff and workers of the Third Generator Plant of the Tianjin Bureau of Electric Works—both of which were transmitted [to me through you]. Please convey to the staff and workers of both electric works my gratitude for their good wishes. I hope that they will unite as one and work industriously in order to strive to accomplish the tasks assigned them by the state and to better their own livelihoods.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 387.*

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[116] 116. Chen Yu (1909-1974) was Minister of Fuels Industry of the Central People's Government at the time.

[117] 117. Shijiazhuang is the capital city of Hebei Province.

Telegram to the South African Indian Congress[118]

September 13, 1950

Durban,
The Union of South Africa,
Joint Secretaries of the Conference of the South African Indian Congress
Messrs. A. I. Meer and J. N. Singh:

On behalf of the Chinese people, I completely support your stand on opposing the discrimination against and oppression of the nonwhite population (including Indians and other Asian nationalities) in South Africa by the government of the Union of South Africa. Best wishes for the success of your conference.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, September 15, 1950.*

Letter to Zhang Wei

September 19, 1950

Dear Zhang Wei:[119]

I have received and read your letter and I am greatly comforted. I am sorry not to have anything by way of a gift for your mother's eightieth birthday: I have only written a few words to express my felicitations.[120]

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[118] The South African Indian Congress held a special conference on September 15-17, 1950, in Johannesburg to discuss the intensified discriminatory attacks on non-white populations in the Union of South Africa. The joint secretaries of the congress sent a letter to comrade Mao on August 17, appealing for moral support from the People's Republic of China.

[119] Zhang (1898-1975) was a native of Liuyang, Hunan, who had a fairly close friendship with Mao in the early years. From September 1949 on, Zhang taught at the Second Army Surgeons' University in Shanghai. Mao used here, the salutation *xiong* (elder brother).

[120] Mao wrote an eight-character inscription, *Ru ri zhi sheng, ru yue zhi heng* (Rising with the Splendor of the Sun, Constant as the Glory of the Moon) for Zhang's mother's

Best wishes for your health!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p.388.*

Telegram to the Communist Party of Great Britain

September 24, 1950

Dear Comrade Pollitt and all comrades of the Communist Party of Great Britain:

The Communist Party of China warmly congratulates the Communist Party of Britain on the thirtieth anniversary of its founding. The staunch and unflagging struggle of the Communist Party of Britain against capitalism and imperialism for the past thirty years has demonstrated that the Communist Party of Britain is the only hope of the British working class for attaining freedom and peace. To the members of the Communist Party of Britain and to all who are fighting for social justice and international peace in Britain, our best wishes for attaining final victory.

(Signed as Chairman of CPC)

Source: *People's Daily, September 24, 1950.*

Inscription for the National Conference of Representatives of Combat Heroes

September 25, 1950

Combat Heroes:

You are the models of the People's Liberation Army. We hope that you will continue to exert effort to advance even further and strive for the building of a strong national defense force.

(Signed)

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birthday.

Source: *People's Daily, September 27, 1950.*

Comments on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries

September 27, 1950

[The policy of] not executing a single [secret agent] and not arresting the majority of them is a policy to which we must adhere in the current struggle against secret agents. If not a single secret agent is to be executed, they will dare to make a clean breast of things; by not arresting the majority among them, only a small number [of cases] will have to be handled by the security organs, while the majority can be handled by the various [government offices] and schools themselves. We must make the Party committees in all the localities adhere to this policy.

Party leadership should be particularly stressed in security work, which in practice should be put under the direct leadership of the Party committee; otherwise there would be danger.

Source: *Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

September 30, 1950

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very pleased to accept the letter of credence from the Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria presented by Your Excellency, and I am grateful to Your Excellency for your warm felicitations and good wishes.

There exists a profound friendship between the people of the two countries, China and Bulgaria. The deeds of the Bulgarian people, under the leadership of their great leader, Dimitrov, in their heroic struggle against domestic and foreign reactionaries, and their current achievements in economic and cultural construction, have always been regarded with deep concern and admiration by the Chinese people. Now, the Chinese people's revolution has been basically won, and diplomatic relations between China and Bulgaria have been established. I believe that this will not only further promote and consolidate the friendship between the peoples of our two countries, but will also strengthen the might of the camp for world peace and democracy.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the first ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the People's Republic of China and pledge to assist Your Excellency to the best of my ability in your work.

Sincere wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, October 2, 1950.*

Telegram to the German Democratic Republic

October 4, 1950

President Wilhelm Pieck,
The German Democratic Republic
Your Excellency:

On this happy occasion of the first anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic, on behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the people of Germany our felicitations and our best wishes to the German people for new successes in their struggle to build a united, democratic, and peace-loving Germany.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, October 17, 1950.*

Inscription on the Unity of the Chinese and Soviet Peoples[121]

October 5, 1950

The Unity of the Chinese and Soviet peoples is of the greatest significance. When these two people are united as one, it will not be difficult for the peoples of the world to be united.

Source: *People's Daily, October 5, 1950.*

Inscription for Display of the PLA

October 8, 1950

Victory belongs to the People!

Source: *Dagong Bao (Shanghai) October 10, 1950.*

Letter to Wang Shoudao[122]

October 11, 1950

Comrade Shoudao:

The two old gentlemen, Mr. Zhang Cilun and Mr. Luo Yuankun, veteran members of the educational circle of Hunan, are both now in their seventies. They have been teachers their entire lives and have done nothing bad. When I studied at the First Normal [School] of Hunan, Zhang was the principal and Luo the history teacher. Now I hear that these two gentlemen have very large families to feed and are in dire straits. I hope to propose that the provincial government of Hunan consider giving each of them, each month, a certain amount of grain subsidy in order to help them out, in their old age. Also, according to the letter Mr. Luo Yuankun has sent me, Mr. Yuan Zhongqian, my former teacher in Chinese language, has died and his wife, seventy years old, is starving. I hope that the provincial authorities will also consider giving her some appropriate relief. On this matter concerning these three people, Zhang, Luo and Dai, please let me know after you have decided how things should be handled, and please send someone to convey our regards to Mr. Zhang and Mr. Luo. Their address is Miaogaofeng Middle School. Dai, on the other hand, lives in Xinhua; [as for the exact address] you may ask Mr. Luo.

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[121] This inscription was released on October 5, 1950 as a part of a message from the Chinese leadership, to the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, congratulating it on the first anniversary of its founding.

[122] See *Letter to Wang Shoudao* (October 9, 1949) p. 7 of this volume. See also *Letter to Luo Yuankan* (October 22, 1952) p. 186 of this volume for an explanation of people and events mentioned by comrade Mao here

With my respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 389.*

Telegram to the Republic of Czechoslovakia

October 26, 1950

President Klement Gottwald,
The Republic of Czechoslovakia
Your Excellency:

On this happy occasion of the thirty-second anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, on behalf of the Government and people of the People's Republic of China, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the people of Czechoslovakia our felicitations and our best wishes to the Czechoslovakian people that in the great cause of building their homeland and advancing toward socialism, they will achieve greater successes with each passing day.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, October 28, 1950.*

Telegram to Prince Gustaf Adolf of Sweden on the Death of King Gustaf V

October 31, 1950

Prince Gustaf Adolf,
Kingdom of Sweden
Your Highness:

I am informed of the untimely passing away of His Majesty King Gustaf V of the Kingdom of Sweden. I hereby extend to you my deep condolences.

(Signed as Chairman of the CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, November 2, 1950.*

Telegram to the USSR

November 5, 1950

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Generalissimo Stalin:

On this happy occasion of the thirty-third anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China, I extend to Your Excellency and the great people of the Soviet Union our warmest congratulations. We wish the Soviet Union daily progress in its cause of socialist construction. May there be close and intimate unity between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union in their struggle to defend lasting peace in the world.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, November 7, 1950.*

Telegram to Harry Pollitt

November 20, 1950

Comrade Pollitt and comrades of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain:

Please accept our warm felicitations on the sixtieth birthday of Comrade Pollitt, the long-tested leader of the British revolutionary workers' movement. We wish comrade Pollitt good health.

(Signed as Chairman of CPC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, November 25, 1950.*

Letter to Hu Qiaomu

November 22, 1950

Comrade Qiaomu:

Please draft a directive in the name of the Central Committee to amend our shortcomings in the practice of sending telegram messages. For example: we should no longer use such words as zi, *chou, ren, mou, dong, dong, jiang, ji, etc.,* in lieu of the month and date. Instead, we should write down the complete month and date[123] [of the telegram], as, for instance, November 22. In general, for the signature we should use our full names, and not write the last [family] name and not the first [personal] name. In only those cases where the receiver of the message is entirely aware of the person [who sent the message] would it be permissible to use the last name without the first, such as "Liu-Deng," "Chen-Rao," etc.[124] For locales and the titles of the offices or organs [from which the telegrams are sent], they should in general be written out completely, and only in extremely rare cases would it be permissible to use such [traditional] provincial designations as *Jing, Jin, Hu, Han*.[125] Also, in terms of syntax we must learn to be grammatical and must ban the practice of omitting the subject, or the predicate, or other indispensable nouns, and where we use adjectives and adverbs we should be able to distinguish between their usage and character. Please take the lead in this matter and write up a preliminary draft and then invite Yang Shangkun, Li Dao, Qi Yanming, Xue Muqiao,[126] and other comrades whom you believe to be necessary to be invited [to join in this endeavor], hold one or two meetings with them and revise [the draft] and give it more substance, then send it to me for my perusal.

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[123] *Zi, chou, ren* and *mou* are the first 4 of the 12 *di ji* (or earth branches) in the duodecimal cycle. This cycle is combined in permutation with the decimal cycle known as the *tiangan* (Heavenly Cardinals) cycle to make up the sexagenary cycle which is used in traditional China to designate the years and other elements of time. This sexagenary cycle is also known as the *jiazi* system (taking the first of each cycle) and the *ganji* system. The decimal system is also used for designating common serial things such as grades, while the duodecimal cycle is commonly used to designate hour periods in the day. *Dong, dong, jiang, ji* are the first four of the rhyme keys (*yun mu*) in the ping segment of the conventional rhyming patterns for Chinese traditional poetry. In the past, when the Chinese sent telegrams, they would conventionally use the duodecimal cycle's items in sequence to indicate the twelve months, and the rhyme keys to represent the dates within each month.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 390-391.*

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[124] According to the source, Liu-Deng stands for Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, and Chen-Rao for Chen Yi and Rao Shushi.

[125] Jing stands for Beijing, Jin for Tianjin; Hu is the common name for Shanghai, and Han refers to Hankou.

[126] Yang Shangkun was at this time the director of the General office of the Central Committee of the CPC.
Li Dao (1905-1970) was, according to the source, a deputy director of the Combat Operations Department of the Military Council at the time of the writing of this letter. Li was a veteran of the Red Army since the late 1920s and served as a political officer in Peng Dehuai's Third Army Corps and then the First Front Army under Peng and Zhu De. During the War of Resistance, Li was in Yanan and worked in the Third Office of the Central Intelligence Department, then as Chief of the Second Bureau of the Army General Staff. Later he directed the Operations Department of the Army. Shortly after the war, Li joined Lin Biao's staff in the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. In the period after Liberation he was a spokesperson for the PLA headquarters and served in various positions on the People's Revolutionary Military Council.
According to the source, Qi Yanming (1907-1978) was at the time of this letter the director of the Staff office of the CPGC. A teacher by vocation, Qi joined the CPC sometime in the early 1930s and was active in the student movement. During the time of the War of Resistance he was in Yanan, still in the capacity of a teacher.

Telegram to the People's Republic of Albania

November 26, 1950

Chairman,
The Presidium,
The People's Assembly,
The People's Republic of Albania,
Mr. Omer Nishani:

On this happy occasion of the sixth anniversary of Albania, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China. I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the Albanian people our felicitations and our wishes that the people of Albania will achieve ever greater successes in their economic and cultural construction with each passing day.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, November 29, 1950.*

In 1949 he participated actively in the preparation of the establishment of the new government and worked with many organizations and conferences of people in the cultural, scientific, and educational circles. He became a member of the preparatory committee of the CPPCC and served later as one of the deputy secretaries-general of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of that body. At the same time that he was head of the Staff Office of the CPGC, he also served as a deputy secretary-general of the Government Administration Council, which was a cabinet-like organization under the CPGC serving as the day-to-day administrative organ for state affairs (and which was later replaced by the State Council). Qi was also a top-ranking leader in the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the CPC under Li Weihan. Xue Muqiao (b. 1904) was an economist for the CPC in the early years of the PRC. Xue began his career in the mid-1930s lecturing on the economic problems of China's revolutionary transformation at Kangda in Yanan. Soon after the War of Liberation he took up a position of great responsibility in organizing the circles of economists and financial planners to prepare for setting up fiscal planning and economic policy organs of the new government. At the time of the writing of this letter, Xue was secretary-general of the Finance and Economics Committee under the Government Administration Council (with Chen Yun as the chairman of the committee). Xue held this post from October 1949 to August 1952. During the 1950s, Xue's great contribution was to plan and promote the establishment of a vast network for the gathering, reporting, and studying of economic and demographic statistics throughout China. Xue is also a very productive writer of textbooks on China's new economics and the chief CPC Party spokesperson for its economic policies.

Comment on Hearing of Mao Anying's Death[127]

November 1950

"In war there must be sacrifice. Without sacrifices there will be no victory. To sacrifice my son or other people's sons are just the same. There are no parents in the world who do not treasure their children. But please do not feel sad on my behalf, because this is something entirely unpredictable."[128]

We understand the hows and whys of these things. There are so many common folk whose children have shed their blood and were sacrificed for the sake of the revolution. They are in need of consolation, and we ought to pay more attention to showing them greater concern.[129]

Letter to Huang Niantian

December 2, 1950

Mr. Niantian:[130]

Your gracious letter and the poetry of Mr. Huang Jiang[131] as well as your own writings have been received, and I am very grateful to you. I am very gratified by the fact that you have devoted yourself to scholarly improvement and to serving the people in the cause of education. You have my great veneration for that. I hope that you will continue to apply yourself to the task and that with each day's passing improvements will come and results will be achieved. That, indeed, is our fervent hope.

In reply and with my respects,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 392.*

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[127] Mao Anying was Mao's son. He laid down his life in the Korean War.

[128] Excerpt from *Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Family*, a Red Guard Publication.

[129] Excerpt from *Venerable Old Mr. Xu Talks About a Few Things About Chairman Mao* published in *China's Worker* (Semi-monthly; Beijing) 8; April 27, 1959.

[130] Huang Niantian was at the time of this letter an assistant professor of the Chinese language at Sichuan University.

[131] Huang Jiang was Huang Niantian's father.

Telegram to Participants of Demonstration in Tianjin

December 2, 1950

To Messrs. Li Zhuchen, Bi Mingqi, and Zhu Jisheng, chairman and deputy chairmen of the Tianjin Municipal Federation of Industry and Commerce, and to our 42,989 patriotic countrymen who took part in the great demonstration, parade, and rally to Resist United States [Aggression] and Aid Korea, Protect the Home and Defend the Homeland, undertaken by the industrial and commercial circles in the municipality of Tianjin:

I have read the telegram that you sent me on November 30. You have clearly recognized the reactionary nature of the aggression that the United States' imperialists have launched against China and Korea. You have not been duped by them; nor have you been cowed by their threats; instead you have taken a determined stand on the patriotic premise of resisting United States [aggression], aiding Korea, protecting your homes, and defending the homeland and have held a righteous demonstration and parade on November 30. This is worthy of our acclaim. The American imperialists have carried out a lot of deceptive propaganda among the Chinese people, and no patriot should believe in these false arguments. The American imperialists have invaded Korea, invaded China's [province] Taiwan, bombarded the north-eastern part of China, and moreover have employed all sorts of hooligan tactics to threaten the Chinese people. All patriots should be resolute in their resistance to the aggression of the American imperialists and should not succumb to their threats. The heroic deeds of the Chinese People's Volunteers to resist United States [Aggression], Aid Korea, Protect the Home, and Defend the Homeland, are worthy of out praise and admiration. It is absolutely correct for all patriotic people among the workers, peasants, intellectuals, industrialists, and business people throughout the nation to unite together and resist the aggression of American imperialism. I hope that all patriotic industrialists and business people in the whole of China will join with broad masses of the people and knit themselves into a united front against imperialist aggression that is even more consolidated than before. This will signify that the Chinese people are bound to achieve final victory in the sacred struggle against imperialist aggression.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, December 3, 1950.*

Inscription for the Air Force

December 15, 1950

Create a strong and powerful People's Air Force to wipe out the remnants of the enemy's forces and to consolidate our national defense.

(Signed)

Source: *Jinbu Ribao (Progress Daily) Tianjin, December 15, 1950.*

Letter to Chen Shutong

December 18, 1950

Dear Venerated Mr. Shu[tong]:[132]

I have received and read your letter, and have spoken with Comrades Chen Yun and Bo Yibo[133] about the matter, asking them to think about how it can be handled. There are some five million industrial and commercial units in the country, of which approximately three million are in the commercial area. At a time when the economic enterprise (of the nation) as a whole is to be switched from the old tracks to the new track of New Democracy, it is inevitable that large numbers of commercial firms and handicraft industrial units will need to be reorganized or re-channeled into other trades. The government should give good guidance in this matter.

Allow me to pay me respects and wish you good health.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 393.*

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[132] Chen Shutong (1876-1966) was a venerated "democratic personage". He was at this time a Vice-Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and the head of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. Comrade Mao here used the term shu lao which the term *lao* (old) refers to Chen's venerated status.

[133] Chen Yuan was at this time a Vice-Premier of the Government Administrative Council and the director of the Finance and Economics Committee. Bo Yibo was a deputy-director of that committee and Minister of Finance of the People's Republic of China.

Telegram to the Communist Party of France

December 23, 1950

Dear Comrade Duclos and all comrades of the Communist Party of France:

It is with great elation that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China celebrates the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of France.

In its thirty years of hard struggle, the Communist Party of France has proved that it is the most faithful defender of the interests of the working class of France and the entire French people.

The Communist Party of France and the working class of France are at present uniting with the entire French people to oppose resolutely the war plans of the government of the United States of America. This plan is aimed at turning the French people into slaves and sacrificial victims for the monopoly capitalists of the United States.

The Communist Party of China is resolute in its conviction that the struggle of the Communist Party of France is just and that it is bound to be victorious in the end.

Long live the unity of the Chinese and French peoples in their common struggle against the aggression of American imperialism.

Long live the Communist Party of France, which is faithful to the interests of the working class of France and of the international working class, and long live its leader, Comrade Maurice Thorez.

Long live Comrade Stalin, leader of the working class and progressive humanity throughout the world!

(Signed as Chairman of CPC)

Source: *People's Daily, December 27, 1950.*

Inscription for the First Normal School of Hunan

December 29, 1950

To be a teacher of the people, one must first be a student of the people.

Source: *People's Daily, July 15, 1967.*

Letter to Zhou Shizhao

December 29, 1950

My Dear Dunyuan:[134]

I have written the words that you have told me to write; I wonder if they are usable?[135]

I have received both the letter you wrote on your departure and the one from Changsha. Thank you very much. I agree with everything you said. These are things that can be done (some of them must be done gradually). [As far as convening] a conference of [people in] normal education, let me speak about it first with Mr. Ma[136], but I believe that in general it is possible.

I am now in the midst of correcting my fault of sleeping late. I did it for about half a month—working according to the sun's schedule and not that of the moon. Lately, however, I have reverted back to the old way. After the new year I shall try to change it around again. I am also paying more attention to getting some more rest and eating correctly. In any case, as you said, if we take these things to be big things and serious things, and not as small and insignificant things, we stand a chance of correcting them.

I wish you and your colleagues smooth success in your work and happiness for the new year.

(Signed and dated)

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[134] See *Letter to Zhou Shizhao* (October 15, 1949), p. 10 of this volume.

[135] This refers to the words *Di Yi Shifan* (First Normal School) which Zhou asked Mao to inscribe as a billboard for the First Normal School of Hunan of which Zhou was the principal, and the inscription *Yao zuo renmin de xiansheng xian zuo renmin de xuesheng* (To be a teacher of the people one must first be a student of the people). See preceding document in this collection.

[136] This refers to Ma Xulan. See *Letter to Ma Xulan* p. 75 of this volume.

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 395-396.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Romania

December 29, 1950

The President,
The presidium,
The Grand National Assembly,
The People's Republic of Romania
Mr. Constantin Parhon:

On this happy occasion of the third anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of Romania, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China. I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the Romanian people our felicitations and our best wishes that the prosperity of the People's Republic of Romania will increase with the passing of each day.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, January 30, 1950.*

1951

Comment on "A Summary of the Relationship Between the Various Departments of the Military and the Soviet Advisors"

January 1, 1951

We must never be arrogant or complacent. We must learn every bit of the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union in order to change our armed forces from their condition of backwardness and construct our armed forces into a most superior modernized military force [in the world], so as to be able to assure ourselves of the ability to defeat, in the future, the invasion of the imperialists' armies.

Source: *Ziliao Xuanbian (Selected Compilation of Materials), Red Guard Publication; January 1967.*

Telegram to the Union of Burma

January 2, 1951

Mr. Sao Shwe Thaik,
President,
Union of Burma:

On this happy occasion of the first anniversary of the founding of your republic, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the people of Burma our felicitations and our best wishes that the friendship between the Chinese and Burmese peoples will increase with the passing of each day.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, January 4, 1951.*

Telegram to Wilhelm Pieck

January 2, 1951

Dear President Wilhelm Pieck:

On this occasion of your seventy-fifth birthday, I extend to you on my own behalf and on the behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China our highest esteem and warmest felicitations.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC)

Source: *People's Daily, January 3, 1951.*

Letter to Rao Shushi and Chen Pixian

January 10, 1951

Comrades Shushi and Pixian:[137]

Mr. Huang Yanpei[138] has received many letters from landlords in which they have filed complaints with him. I have sent to him copies of the two directives of the East China Bureau, one issued in December of last year on rectifying the shortcomings in the work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries and the other issued on January 4 on rectifying shortcomings in the work of land reform, and he has gained a better understanding of the situation. Mr. Huang is prepared to go to southern Jiangsu this month to do some inspection and investigation in the various localities. I have bidden him to contact you, and I hope that at the time you will discuss in detail the general overall situation with him.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selection from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 397-398.*

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[137] Rao Shushi (1903-1975) was at the time of this letter, first secretary of the East China Bureau of the CPC. Chen Pixian was at this time secretary of the Southern Jiangsu district committee of the CPC, political commissar of the southern Jiangsu Military Region and member of the East China Military and Administrative Committee.

[138] For Huang Yanpei, see *Letter to Huang Yanpei (February 17, 1951)*, p. 116 of this volume.

Letter to Xu Beihong

January 14, 1951

Mr. Beihong:[139]

I have received your letter of January 13 and also the two copies of the book by Mr. Shi Yongmou[140] that you enclosed with the letter. I agree with your idea that we should take care of Mr. Shi. The best thing would be to provide a position for him in the school that you are running. If this is not possible, please bring this letter to the Cultural Commission of the Party Central Committee and work out a solution with them.

In reply to your letter, and with my deep respects.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p.399.*

Letter to Li Sian

January 14, 1951

Mr. Sian:[141]

I have received your two letters and am very gratified and elated to hear from you. I agree that you should come to Beijing. If you wish to enter, with our classmates Jiang Zhuru[142] and others, the University of the Revolution to study for a period, you may enroll there. Otherwise some other plans for your work will be made. When you come you should bring this letter with you to contact Director Li Weihan of the United Front Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and discuss with him the problem of your enrollment or employment.

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[139] For more on Xu Beihong, see *Letter to Xu Beihong (November 29, 1949)*, p. 29 of this volume.

[140] Shi Yongmou was a secondary school teacher in Tianjin. The book referred to here is the book *Lun Yu Zheng* (Rectifying the Book of the Analects of Confucius) written by Shi.

[141] Li Sian was an old acquaintance of comrade Mao's and a member of the *Xinmin Xuehui* (New Peoples' Study Society) that Mao and others formed in the early 1910s. He was a member of the staff at the Hunan Province Historical and Cultural Studies Institute.

[142] Jiang was a classmate of comrade Mao, when he studied at the First Normal School of Hunan.

In reply and with my respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections front Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 400.*

Letter to Ma Xulun

January 15, 1951

Mr. Yichu:[143]

The question of student health, which I discussed with you earlier, is profoundly deserving of our attention. I suggest using administrative measures to resolve this problem concretely. I have enclosed herewith a telegram issued by the East China Bureau of the CPC; please read it. The third point deals precisely with this problem; it proposes the policy of putting health first and study second, and I believe that it is correct. Please discuss this with the comrades, the various deputy ministers [of education], and see how it can be carried out.

In salute,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 401.*

Letter to Zhang Lan

January 22, 1951

Mr. Biaofang:[144]

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[143] 143. See *Letter to Ma Xulun*, p. 75 of this volume. Yichu is Ma Xulun's honorific name.

[144] 144. Biaofang is the honorific name of Zhang Lan (1872-1955). At the time of this letter he was the chairman of the China Democratic League in whose establishment in 1941 he took part (in 1941 the League of Chinese Democratic Parties and Organizations was formed and

I am sending you a copy of a report submitted to me by Comrade Deng Xiaoping, secretary of the Southwest Bureau [of the Central Committee of the CPC]. Please read it (you may have your secretary read it to you), and you may see from it the general situation with the work in the Southwest. Please return it to me when you are done. How are you? I am very concerned about your health.

With my respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 402.*

Telegram to the Communist Party of Italy

January 22, 1951

Comrade Longo and all comrades on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy:

On this occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Italy, I sincerely extend to you our warmest congratulations. The Communist Party of Italy has made great achievements in the past struggle against Fascism, in its present struggle against the United States aggression and war plans, and in the struggle for a People's Democratic Italy, and has thereby made itself the nucleus of the Italian working class and of all patriotic people in Italy. We firmly believe that under the correct leadership of Comrade Togliatti and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy you are sure to win the final victory in you just cause.

(Signed as Chairman of CPC)

Source: *People's Daily, January 23, 1951.*

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in 1944 this was reorganized as the China Democratic League). He was also vice-chairman of the CPGC and a deputy-chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC.

Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries

January 24, 1951

With regard to secret agents and leaders of secret organizations and sects against whom we have not gathered evidence, in order to avoid making a mistake and thus trapping ourselves in a passive position, we should carry out investigations in order to obtain conclusive evidence, and not arrest people or execute people arbitrarily.

Source: *Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

Telegram to the Republic of India

January 24, 1951

Mr. Rajendra Prasad,
President,
The Republic of India:

On behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the government and people of India our felicitations on this happy occasion of the anniversary of the founding of your republic, and our best wishes that the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples will grow with the passing of each day.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, January, 26, 1951.*

Toast at a Reception Given by Ambassador of India[145]

January 26, 1951

The Indian nation is a great nation. The people of India are a very good people. For many thousands of years, the friendship between the two nations of China and India and between the peoples of the two countries has been very good. Today, in celebrating the anniversary of the founding of the Republic of India, we hope that the Chinese and Indian nations will continue to be united and to strive for peace. People all over the world need peace. There is only a very small minority who want war. Let India, China, the Soviet Union, and all other peace-loving countries and peoples unite and strive for peace in the Far East and in the entire world. We salute and celebrate the founding of the Republic of India and congratulate the Indian people and your president.

Source: *People's Daily, January 27, 1951.*

Telegram to the USSR

February 12, 1951

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Generalissimo Stalin:

On this occasion of the anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, please accept our sincere gratitude and felicitations to Your Excellency and the government and people of the Soviet Union. The signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance has not only been of great benefit to the construction of New China, but has also provided a strong guarantee for resisting aggression and defending the peace and security of the Far East and the entire world. We hereby send our sincere wish for the further advancement and consolidation of the friendship and cooperation between China and the Soviet Union.

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[145] The reception was held in celebration of the first anniversary of the founding of the Republic of India.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, February 14, 1951.*

Letter to Huang Yanpei

February 17, 1951

Dear Venerable Old Mr. Huang Ren: [Huang Ren Lao]:[146]

I have just sent to you a piece of intelligence on correcting [the policy] of unlimited leniency in Guangdong. Now [with this letter] I forward another set [of similar intelligence] on Guangxi. Please read and consult them. These two places are the most typical examples. Other areas are not as extreme as they arc, but in general they are not too far off; there has been a very common phenomenon of causing the dissatisfaction of the masses. If the bandit leaders and the repeat offenders are not executed, the bandits cannot be cleanly eliminated, and instead, there will be more and more bandits for us to eliminate. If we do not execute the [local] tyrants, the peasant associations cannot be formed and the peasants will not dare to divide up the land. If we do not execute the *chief* secret agents, then we will see more and more cases of sabotage and murder. In any case, with regard to the bandit leaders, [local tyrants] and (the chief) secret agents, we have to adopt a resolute policy of suppression, and only then can the peasants turn around[147] and the people's political power be consolidated. Naturally, with regard to those people who may be executed but do not have to be executed, we should sentence them to terms of imprisonment or turn them over to the masses to be held in probationary supervision and reform them through labor and not execute them. Just as there should be a limit to leniency, there should also be a limit to suppression; it would be wrong to not set a limit of things. In those regions where the problem has already been resolved and the masses are already satisfied, we should no longer execute anyone.

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[146] Huang Yanpei (1878-1965) was the chairman of the Democratic National Construction Association in 1945. A prominent educator and spokesman for vocational education, he was also a founding member of the China Democratic League. From 1949 to 1954 he was minister of Light Industry for the PRC government. The address comrade Mao used was Huang Ren Lao in which *lao* (old) is a term of respect paid to elder people, the word Ren is a reference to Huang's *zi* (honorific name) "Renzhi".

[147] The term here is *fanshen*, which literally means to turn one's body over or right-side-up. It has come to connote the liberation of previously oppressed people, particularly the poor peasants. The description is a graphic one, alluding to the notion that for centuries the peasants has stooped and bent their backs so that the rulers and landlords could ride on their backs and whip them into submission.

Allow me to express my regards and high respect for you.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 403.*

Telegram to the USSR

February 21, 1951

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Generalissimo Stalin:

On this occasion of the thirty-third anniversary of the founding of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, please accept my sincere felicitations.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, February 23, 1951.*

Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries

February 28, 1951

In saying "unwilling followers will not be prosecuted" we refer to those who were coerced [into participating in wrongdoing] but [who themselves] did not commit any wrongdoing or did not commit any serious wrong doing. As for those against whom there is evidence of their abetting a crime, they are accomplices and should be sentenced. If the principal, culprit is given capital punishment, the accomplices should at least be given prison sentences, and some accomplices who committed serious crimes should be sentenced to death; they are not included in the category of "unwilling followers who will not be prosecuted."

Source: *Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

Inscription for Woman's Day

March 8, 1951

Unite! Participate in production and political activities and improve women's economic and political status.

(Signed)

Source: *Changjiang Ribao (Yangtze River Daily) Hankow.*

Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries

March 9, 1951

Where the general policy of thorough suppression has already been carried out, [the work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries] must be suspended for a while, and no more [counterrevolutionaries] should be arrested or executed. No matter where the place is, we must have planning, pay attention to strategy, do propaganda, and not execute anyone by mistake. All this is simply a matter of course.

Source: *Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

Letter to Rao Shushi and Others

March 18, 1951

Comrades Shushi, Zihui, Xiaoping, and Zhongxun:[148]

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[148] The recipients of this letter were Rao Shushi, Deng Zihui, Deng Xiaoping and Xi Zhongxun. For Rao Shushi, see *Letter to Rao Shushi and Chen Pixian*, p. 110 of this volume.

Deng Zihui (1896-1972) was at the time of this letter second secretary of the Central South

If there are democratic personages and university professors who wish to go and see land reform [in action], we should let them go and see for themselves; we must not make any preparations beforehand. Let them go and see as they wish; don't just let them see the good parts, but let them also see some of the bad things. We can educate them in this way. Wu Jingchao and Zhu Guangqian[149] and others went to the vicinity of Xian to watch the land reform; this has had a very good effect. We must use such examples to educate our cadres and dispel the ideas of closed-door-ism.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 405-406.*

Comments on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries

March 24, 1951

The suppression of counterrevolutionaries is a great struggle. Only after this is accomplished can political power be consolidated.

The suppression of counterrevolutionaries consists of [the suppression of] (1) counterrevolutionaries in society; (2) counterrevolutionaries concealed among the old personnel and new intellectuals in the military and government systems; and (3) counterrevolutionaries concealed within the Party. In order to suppress the counterrevolutionaries in these three areas, we must, of course, proceed a step at a time, and we cannot do it simultaneously. However, with regard to certain crucial departments in the Party, in the government, and in the military, and in particular, with regard to the public security department, it is necessary to clean out [counterrevolutionaries] promptly, it is absolutely essential that suspicious elements be dealt with so that these organs may be placed in the hands of reliable personnel.

Source: *Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

Bureau of the CC of CPC. Xi Zhongxun was at the time of this letter, director of the Land Reform Committee of the North-West Military and Administrative Committee.

[149] Wu Jingchao (1901-1968) was at the time of this letter Professor of Sociology at Qinghua University. Zhu Guangqian was at the time of this letter Chairman of the Foreign Languages Department of Beijing University.

Letter to Li Da

March 27, 1951

Dear Haoming:[150]

Your two letters and the attached "Explanation of 'On Practice', Part 2" have all been received. Thank you. I have also seen Part 1 of "Explanation" in the journal.[151] This explanation is excellent and will play a great role in disseminating materialism via popular language. When you finish writing Part 3 and have published it, you should put them into a single pamphlet so that it can be widely circulated. There are some [suggestions for] minor revisions on the two pages dealing with imperialism and dogmatic empiricism in Part 2,[152] please give them some consideration. If Part 2 has already been published, then revisions can be made when the pamphlet version is printed.

In the past, little has been done in disseminating dialectical materialism in popular language, and this is what the broad masses of working cadres and young students urgently need. I hope you will write more articles. My regards.

(Signed and dated)

P.S. In "On Practice", the Taiping Tianguo[153] was listed under the category of anti-foreign [struggles]. This is inappropriate. I plan to revise it when *Selected Works* is published. Here I keep it as it was for the time being.[154]

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[150] Li Da (Haoming is his scholarly honorific name), a founding member of the CPC, was in 1951, chairperson of China Philosophical Society and President of Hunan University.

[151] This refers to *Xin Jianshe* (New Construction), Vol. 3, no. 6, 1951.

[152] Mao made the following three revisions/additions to Li Da's *Explanation*:
1) Mao added a paragraph of some five lines length to the part where Li Da described the Chinese people's spontaneous anti-foreign struggles;
2) Mao added a comment to the part where Li Da discussed the absence of anti-imperialism in the 1911 Revolutionary Movement and in the proposals of Sun Yat-sen, its leader. Mao's comment was to the effect that although the 1911 Revolution carried within itself the effect of opposing the imperialists—in that it overthrew "the imperialists' running dogs,"—the revolutionaries of the time did not consciously recognize it as a principle of anti-imperialism;
3) Mao amended a sentence that described the substance and significance of rationalism and empiricism within materialism;

[153] The Taiping Revolution, or the Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, was the mid-19th century revolutionary peasant movement against the feudal rule and national oppression of the Ching Dynasty. In January 1851, Hong Xiuquan, Yang Xiuqing and other leaders launched an uprising in Qingtian Village in Guiping County, Guangxi Prov-

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 407-408.*

Comments on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries

March 30, 1951

At all times, the suppression of counterrevolutionaries ought to be accurate, meticulous, well-planned, and methodical. Furthermore, it ought to be controlled from above.

Whether work has been done well or poorly ought always to be determined by the masses' reaction to it.

Source: *Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

Letter to Peng Yousheng

March 31, 1951

Mr. Yousheng:[155]

I am very happy to receive your letter of March 14. You are too modest in your letter; please do not be so modest. If it is by the agreement of the masses

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ince, and proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Proceeding northward from Guangxi, their peasant army attacked and occupied Hunan and Hubei in 1852. In 1853 it marched through Jiangxi and Anhui and captured Nanjing. A section of the forces then continued the drive north and pushed on to the vicinity of Tianjin. However, the Taiping army failed to build stable base areas in the places it occupied; moreover, after establishing its capital in Nanjing, its leading group committed many political and military errors. Therefore it was unable to withstand the combined onslaughts of the counterrevolutionary forces of the Ching government and the British, US and French aggressors, and was finally defeated in 1864.

[154] The intended revisions were not made when Volume I of Mao Zedong *Xuanji* (Selected Works of Mao Zedong) was published.

[155] Peng Yousheng was a one-time colleague of Mao's in the New Hunan Revolutionary Army.

that you have been classified as a poor peasant, that is very good. As for work and employment, if you can manage in the countryside, it would be better if you stayed there or at least stayed in the countryside for a time, because I am afraid that if you ventured out it may be difficult for you to find a suitable position. If things indeed are very very difficult, you may bring this letter to Changsha and look up Mr. Cheng Xingling, Vice-chairman of the Hunan Provincial People's Government, and ask his direction and advice as to whether or not there are ways in which he may help you. I cannot guarantee that there will be results, since Mr. Cheng and the other comrades do not know you well and know nothing of your past or your recent circumstances. Even I myself am in that situation, so it would not be proper for me to suggest any concrete opinion to them. If you are willing to take the trip, you may want to give it a try. When you go, you can report to him about the fact that you had once worked in the Hunan army during the period of the *Xinhai* (1911) Revolution and that you were my colleague (you were the squadron second-in-command and I was a private), and give him a clear rendition of your past.

In reply and with my respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 409-410.*

Directive on the Problem of Cultivating Cadres

March 1951

The older technical personnel are the legacy of the Kuomintang; they are very highly skilled, but they are, as yet, [politically] unreliable; we should strive to unite them [to our side].

The majority of the university and middle school students throughout the country are children of the landlords and of the bourgeoisie; they too, are the legacy of the Kuomintang. However, we must cultivate them and transform them. One section of them is reliable, but there is another section that is unreliable.

The most important task for us all the present moment is to cultivate the backbone of the technical cadre. The most important thing is to cultivate the intellectuals who have been in our party, and our armed forces for over a decade. Another sector consists of the intellectuals who are participating in [the work of] land reform; we can transfer some of them to undergo training.

Another part [of our technical cadre] can be cultivated from among [people who are at the] accelerated middle schools for industrial workers and peasants and from among the children of workers and peasants. In other words, we would like to get some people from the ranks of these two latter categories and cultivate them, after which they will be used to unite with the two other categories of people mentioned earlier.

Source: *Kexue Geming (Revolution in the Sciences), Red Guard Publication, 1967.*

Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries

April 2, 1951

The suppression of counterrevolutionaries must be strictly confined to such categories as bandit chiefs, incorrigible criminals, ruffians and petty tyrants, secret agents, and chiefs of reactionary secret organizations and sects. We cannot include petty thieves, drug addicts, common landlords, ordinary Kuomintang members and members of the [*Sanmin Zhuyi* Youth] League, and common officers in the Kuomintang army. Death sentences must be for those who have committed serious crimes only. It is a mistake for a light sentence to be given out for a serious crime; it is equally a mistake for a heavy sentence to be given out for a small crime.

Source: *Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

Letter to Li Weihan

April 9, 1951

Comrade Luo Mai:[156]

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[156] Luo Mai is Li Weihan's pseudonym and a name under which he wrote many articles since the 1920's. He was one of the earliest members of the CPC. He was a schoolmate of Mao's at the First Normal School of Hunan together with others such as Cai Hesen and He Shuheng. He became a member of the *Xinmin Xuehui* (New People Study Society), which

This man was a member of the national assembly during the time of the Beiyang government. It appears that during the period of [his association with] the KMT he didn't do any bad things. He has many children working in the People's Government. He is himself now sixty-nine years old and came to the capital, staying at the Xiangtan Guest House. He is having [financial] difficulties and has asked me to take care of him. Please send someone to speak with him and to give him some assistance.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 411.*

Letter to Situ Meitang

April 27, 1951

Mr. Meitang:[157]

Cai and he organized and of which Mao also became a prominent member. In 1919 Li went to France as a participant of the *Qingong Jianxue* (Diligent Work and Frugal Study) movement. While in Europe, Li became a very active member of the socialist groups, which included such people as Cai Hesen, Zhou Enlai, Li Lisan, Xu Deli, Chen Yi, and Zhao Shiyan. Out of these organizations the Chinese Communist Youth League was formed. In early 1922, Li returned to China and began work with Mao Zedong in Hunan. In 1927, at the Fifth CPC Congress, Li became a member of the Political Bureau. He continued to work in Hunan and was active in planning the Nanchang Uprising of August 1927. He came under criticism by the CPC Congress in 1928, which was held in Moscow, but he held his position in the Party. From 1928 to 1931, he worked in the communist underground in Shanghai. In 1931, however, he was criticized and removed from the Central Committee for supporting Li Lisan. Wanted by the KMT police, he escaped to southern Jiangxi and joined Mao Zedong and Zhu De at Ruijin. Later he went on the Long March to northern Shaanxi. For the next decade at Yanan he was active primarily in Party organization work, and as far as is known, was not involved in military command or action. He took on the task of organizing and managing the Party's United Front Department in 1944 and remained at the head of that department for the next two decades. He was, together with Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, and Ye Jianying, one of the chief CPC negotiators with the KMT in the uncertain years of 1946-1949. After 1949, he became a chief officer of the new government, serving as secretary general of the government Administration Council until 1953, on the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the Council, as well as heading the United Front Department. In this last position, Li was the chief CPC spokesman to the minority nationalities and to the people's organizations, especially the industrial and commercial circles. Luo Zhengei, was an acquaintance of Comrade Mao, when he was a student at the Higher Middle School of Hunan.

[157] Situ Meitang (1868-1955) spent much of his life representing China's interests in the US In 1882, as a ship's boy, Situ arrived in the United States. Several years later, he joined the Zhigongtang (The Association for Justice and Righteousness) in Boston, and

I have received your letter of April 14, and am greatly gratified. I also received the gift of the peasant comrades of Haoshan.[158] Please convey my gratitude to them. It is good for you to stay for a short period in the South, but I hope that you will return to the capital in the early part of June so that I can see you and learn from you in person.

My respectful wishes for your health.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 412.*

Letter to Zhen Wenxin

April 29, 1951

Comrade Wenxin:[159]

I am very happy to have received your letter and your mother's letter. I hope that you and your sister will be diligent in your study or work, and, in the spirit of your departed father, serve the people's state in its reconstruction.

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began a career of opposing the Qing government of China. In 1904 he was recruited by Sun Yat-sen to work for the Chinese revolutionary movement and in 1905 he formed the On-Leong Association (Chinese Benevolent Association), a service society set up to assist Chinese-Americans in gaining a settled life and a certain measure of citizen's rights in the United States. In 1937 he organized the campaign among Chinese-Americans to raise funds to support China's struggle against Japan. In 1941, he returned to China. En route, he was captured by the Japanese in Hong Kong. Refusing to collaborate, he disguised himself and escaped to eastern Guangdong. In the summer of 1942, he went to Chongqing and returned to the United States in 1943. In 1945 he reorganized the Zhigongtang into the Hongmen Zhigongdang, a Chinese political party, and became its chairman. In 1946 he again returned to China, seeking to assist in the establishment of a new democracy. When this failed in 1948, he left China again, via Hong Kong, and, back in the United States, proclaimed his support for the Communists in China. In September 1949 he returned, for the last time, to China, and took up the leadership of the Zhigongdang as one of the democratic parties in the new republic. He became a vice-chairman of the CPPCC and a member of the Central People's Government.

[158] This is in Guangdong Province, where it is known in the local dialect as *Hok Shan*, and is now known as *Gaohao xian*. Situ Meitang was then visiting this area and inspecting the work of land reform in the region.

[159] Zhen Wenxin was, at the time of this letter, a student at the Agronomic School of Wuhan University. She is the daughter of Zhen Chang, who was a member of the *Xinmin Xuehui* (New People's Study Society) of which Mao was a prominent member. Zhen Chang, also an early member of the CPC, died in 1930.

Please give my best regards to your mother.

I wish you progress.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 413.*

Letter to Zhang Zhizhong

May 5, 1951

Mr. Wenbai:[160]

I have received and read your letter. I am most concerned to hear of your illness. Since the inspection group has Mr. Shao[161] to lead it, it should be all right and you may put away your worries and devote yourself to convalescence and your recovery so that you may be soon restored to health.

My best wishes on your recovery!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 414.*

Directive on the Huai River[162]

May 29, 1951

The Huai River Must be Harnessed

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[160] Wenbai is the honorific name of Zhang Zhizhong (1890-1969). He had a long and illustrious career as a military commander in the KMT armies. In 1946 he became the head of the KMT's Northwest Government Headquarters and the chairman of the provincial government of Xinjiang. In 1949 he headed the KMT delegation to negotiate with the CPC in Beijing and was detained when the negotiations fell through. He then went over towards the Communists, and when the new regime was established he became a vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, a member of the Central People's Government Council, and vice-chairman of the Northwest military and Administrative Committee.

[161] This refers to the group delegated by the Central Committee of the CPC to inspect the flood-control work on the Huai River. Zhang was appointed its leader. Shao refers to Shao Lizi (1882-1967) an erstwhile top ranking KMT member. He was at the time of this letter a member of the Central People's Government Council.

[162] This is an inscription comrade Mao wrote on a banner for the Huai River Control Project. It was first made public at a banner awarding ceremony held in Henan on May 9. 1951.

Source: *People's Daily, May 15, 1951.*

Comment on the "Report of the Secretary's Office on the Handling of Letters from the Masses"[163]

May 16, 1951

Attention must be paid to correspondence from the people. We must handle letters from the people properly and meet the legitimate demands of the masses. We must regard this matter as a method by which the Communist Party and the People's Government can strengthen their ties with the people. We must not adopt a bureaucratic attitude of callousness and neglect. If there are a great many letters from the people, and it is difficult for [the cadre in charge] to handle [all of] them personally, a special organ made up of an appropriate number of people should be set up or special persons assigned to deal with these letters. If there aren't too many letters, and either [the cadre in charge] or the secretary is able to handle them personally, then there won't be any need to bring in additional special personnel.

Source: *People's Daily, December 28, 1983.*

Speech on the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet[164, 165]

May 24, 1951

For hundreds of years there was no unity among the various nationalities of China. In particular there was no unity between the Han people and the

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[163] This was Mao's comment on the *Report to Chairman Mao on the Work of Handling Letters from the Masses in the Last Three Months* of the work office of the Central Committee of the CPC. This is a part of a document of the Work Office of the Central Committee of the CPC issued on June 6, 1967.

[164] Before giving this speech at a banquet celebrating the event, Mao toasted the signing of the Agreement on the Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet by the Central People's Government and the Tibetan Regional Government, the great unity of the nationalities of China, and the internal unity of the people of Tibet.

Tibetan people. Internally as well, the Tibetan nationality was not united. This was the result of the reactionary rule by the Manchu government and the Chiang Kai-shek government, and also the result of the discord sown among us by the imperialists. Now, unity has been achieved among the forces led by the Dalai Lama, those led by Panchen Gnoertehni, and the Central People's Government; this was accomplished only after the Chinese people had overthrown imperialism and the domestic reactionary government. This unity is a fraternal unity and is not based on the oppression of one side by the other. This type of unity is the product of concentrated efforts on all sides. From now on, on the basis of this unity, there will be development and progress among our various nationalities in all spheres, including such spheres as politics, economics and culture.

Source: *People's Daily, May 28, 1951.*

Letter to Li Zhuchen

June 23, 1951

Mr. Zhuchen:[166]

I have received the letter you sent me on June 13. Your suggestion is a very good one. However, the timing needs to be further considered. It seems that it would be best to wait a short period before we carry it out.[167]

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[165] In May 1951 an Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet was signed between the Central People's Government and the local government of Tibet. The agreement stipulated that the Tibetan local government should resolutely rid itself of imperialist influences and actively help the People's Liberation Army enter Tibet; that all external affairs in Tibet should be handled by the Central People's Government—in other words, the Tibetan local government must cut its ties with the imperialists and once more join the big family of the people's Republic of China. As to Tibet's internal affairs, the agreement stipulated that its existing political system and the position and authority of the Dalai Lama would remain unchanged, and the Tibetan people's religious beliefs would be fully safeguarded. A positive attitude was adopted towards social reforms in Tibet, but there was to be no compulsion. Rather, the local government of Tibet was expected to carry out the reforms of its own accord. In case the people demanded reforms, the matter should be settled by consultation.

[166] Li Zhuchen (1881-1968) was an industrialist with enterprises in Tianjin. In 1945 he joined the *Zhongguo Minzhu Jianguo hui* (Chinese Democratic Association for National Construction) and became a member of its standing committee. Later, as a member of this organization, he became a member of the National Committee of the CPPCC.

[167] This refers to Li's suggestion that the propaganda campaign vis-à-vis Taiwan be

In reply, and with my respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 415.*

Inscription on the Unity of Nationalities

June 29, 1951

All nationalities of the People's Republic of China, Unite!

(Signed)

Source: *Changjiang Ribao (Yangtze River Daily), Hankow, June 29, 1951.*

Letter to Huang Yanpei

July 15, 1951

Mr. Renzhi:[168]

Your letter of July 14 has been received and read. I am very concerned about your illness. I fully agree that you must rest for a month to recover. If necessary, it would be proper to extend that for another month so that the restoration of your health may be complete. The times are indeed as you describe. The ancients said: "It is only when one can fight that one can make peace." That is the situation with us. We took a measure yesterday that will be helpful in stripping our enemies of their excuse and facilitate the continuation of the [peace] meetings.[169]

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launched with the participation of the various democratic parties and the people's organizations and the personages who had previously had connections with the KMT government.

[168] For Huang Yanpei (Renzhi) see *Letter to Huang Yanpei (February 17, 1951),* p. 116 of this volume.

[169] This refers to the communique issued jointly by Kim Il Sung, the supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, and Peng Dehuai, commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers in the Korean conflict to the command of the United States and United Nations forces in which they agreed on the neutralization and demilitarization of the Kaesong area during the period when the peace negotiations of the two sides were being held in that city and on the recognition of the US press corps of twenty people as part of the working staff of the US side (and therefore to be awarded diplomatic status and access to the negotiations).

I respectfully wish your recovery and safety.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 416.*

Letter to Zhang Yuanji

July 30, 1951

Mr. Jusheng:[170]

Your letters of December 30 last year and April 15 and May 21 [of this year] and your enclosed masterpiece and your book have all been received. Thank you for your kind thoughts. The poem *Jixue Xichui* (Snow Drifts on the Western Frontier) is extremely well written. As a result of the signing of the agreements[171], our troops will be in Lhasa soon. I am greatly gratified to know that you are recovering from your illness.

In reply, and with respectful wishes for your health and well-being,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 418.*

Inscription for the People of the Old Revolutionary Bases

August 5, 1951

Promote the revolutionary tradition.
Strive for even greater glory.

Source: *People's Daily, August 11, 1951.*

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[170] Jusheng is the honorific name of Zhang Yuanji. At the time of his letter, Zhang was a member of the East China Military and Administrative Committee, the director of the Literature and Historical Studies Bureau of Shanghai Municipality, and a member of the National Committee of the CPPCC.

[171] This refers to the *Agreements on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet*.

Telegram to the Dominion of Pakistan

August 14, 1951

The Governor General,
The Dominion of Pakistan
Mr. [A. K.] Nazimuddin:

On this occasion of the national day of your country, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China I extend to Your Excellency and the people of Pakistan our felicitations and our best wishes that the friendship between the peoples of China and Pakistan will grow with each passing day.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 14, 1951.*

Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

August 14, 1951

Chairman Kim Du Bong,
The Standing Committee,
The Supreme People's Assembly,
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Your Excellency:

On this happy occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Korea, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the Korean people our heartfelt felicitations and our best wishes that in our common struggle to defend the lasting peace in Asia and in the world, the fraternal friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples will be further consolidated.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 15, 1951.*

Telegram to the Republic of Indonesia

August 14, 1951

Mr. Sukarno,
President,
The Republic of Indonesia:

On this happy occasion of the anniversary of the founding of your country, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the people of Indonesia our felicitations and our best wishes for the further consolidation and development of the friendship between our two peoples with the passing of each day.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated, in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 17, 1951.*

Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

September 1, 1951

Chairman Ho Chi Minh,
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
Your Excellency:

On this happy occasion of the sixth anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the Vietnamese people our heartfelt felicitations and our best wishes that the struggle against imperialism by the Vietnamese people under Your Excellency's leadership for the liberation of the whole of Vietnam will achieve new victories.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, September 2, 1951.*

Telegram to the USSR

September 2, 1951

Generalissimo Stalin:

On this occasion of the sixth anniversary of the victory in the war of Resistance Against Japan, on behalf of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the people of all China, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency, to the armed forces of the Soviet Union, and to the Soviet people our warmest felicitations and our deepest gratitude. The enormous assistance that the Soviet Union gave to the Chinese people in their War of Resistance Against Japan and the consolidated alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China for the concerted prevention of the resurgence of Japan's aggressive forces have given the Chinese people boundless encouragement in their struggle against aggressive forces in the Far East. Long live the great friendship of China and the Soviet Union in their just cause of resisting Japanese imperialism and defending peace in the Far East.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, September 3, 1951.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Bulgaria

September 7, 1951

Chairman Georgi Damyanov,
Presidium of the National Assembly, The People's Republic of Bulgaria,
Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the national day of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China, I extend my heartfelt congratulations to Your Excellency and to the Bulgarian people and wish the People's Republic of Bulgaria ever greater successes with each passing day in its cause of construction toward socialism.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, September 9, 1951.*

Letter to Party Committee of Shijingshan Iron and Steel Works[172]

September 12, 1951

Comrades of the CPC Party Committee of the Shijingshan Iron and Steel Works:

I have read your letter of August 31. Thank you for letting me know about the situation and problems in your factory. I think that your proposals[173] are reasonable, and I have already ordered the concerned organs to resolve these problems speedily and reasonably.

In reply, and with my best wishes on your continued hard work!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 419*

Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries

September 18, 1951

[Your] view is correct; let them [i.e., the counterrevolutionaries] move, and [we will] watch carefully; then there is much to gain. They are in the palm of Tathagatha[174] and are unable to jump off it. You should treat this as a major task and actively and artistically carry out observation and investigative work on it.

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[172] Shijingshan is in Hebei Province, within the municipality of Beijing.

[173] This refers to proposals made by this Party committee on adjusting certain unreasonable features of the wage system at the factory.

[174] Tathagatha is the title for Sakyamuni (Buddha). Sun Wukong is a monkey king in the Chinese novel *Hsi Yu Chi* (Journey to the West), written in the 16th century. He could cover 108,000 *li* by turning a somersault. Yet once in the palm of the Buddha, he could not escape from it, however many somersaults he turned. With a flick of his palm Buddha transformed his fingers into the five-peak Mountain of Five Elements and buried Sun Wukong.

Source: *Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

Letter to Deng Zihui

September 25, 1951

Comrade Zihui:[175]

I have received your telegram of September 25.

1. I would like to express my condolences on the passing away of your mother.

2. I agree with your plan on coming to the capital after the National Day celebration. It would be very good if you can arrive at the capital on October 3.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 420.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Union of Burma

September 27, 1951

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very pleased to accept the letter of credence from the President of the Union of Burma, presented by Your Excellency, and I am grateful to Your Excellency for your felicitations.

Historically and culturally, China and Burma have had a long-lasting and intimate relationship. Moreover, the people of the two countries, in their protracted struggles for national independence and liberty, have gained deep sympathy for, and understanding of each other. I am convinced that the development of diplomatic relations between our two countries will not only cause the friendship which already exists between the peoples of the two countries to be promoted and consolidated with the passing of each day, but will also facilitate [the growth of] peace and security in Asia.

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[175] Deng Zihui was at the time of the letter second secretary of the Central-South Bureau of the CC of the CPC.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Union of Burma to the People's Republic of China and pledge to Your Excellency my assistance in your work of strengthening the friendly cooperation between our two countries.

Our sincere wishes for the prosperity of your nation and of your people and for the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, September 28, 1951.*

Comment on Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries

October 1, 1951

Unless we take steps to wipe out the activities of the counterrevolutionaries, the people's state will be in jeopardy.

Source: *Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

Telegram to the German Democratic Republic

October 6, 1951

President Wilhelm Pieck,
The German Democratic Republic
Your Excellency:

On this happy occasion of the second anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China, I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and the German people our heartfelt felicitations and our best wishes that the German people will win still greater successes in their cause of striving for the unification, democracy, and independence of Germany and defending peace in Europe and the world.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC)

Source: *People's Daily, October 8, 1951.*

Letter to Chen Shutong

October 14, 1951

Dear Venerated Mr. Shu[tong]:[176]

I have received your gracious letter of October 9. Thank you. On the subject of [going to] inspect land reform, I agree with you[177]. However, on whether or not the wintry weather would be suitable for your physical [well being to do this], please give it some further consideration. It seems to me that it would be better [if you did it] in the spring. There will still be land reform [in progress] at that time. Furthermore, at your venerable age, it is proper for you to go and inspect the land reform, but not for you to engage in land reform [work yourself]. Besides, in inspecting it, you can go to many places, but if you were to engage in the work itself, you would be limited to a district or a *xiang*. Another thing: it is not merely the land reform by itself, but if your energies would allow, such other work as [in the area of] resisting the US, of suppressing counterrevolutionaries, of production, of education, and of the United Front should all be within the scope of your inspection.

I have here a report on the work among the minority nationalities of the Northwest. You may read it and afterward return it to me.

In salute,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 421.*

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[176] See *Letter to Chen Shutong*, p. 102 of this volume.

[177] See *Letter to Rao Shushi and Others*, p. 118 of this volume.

Telegram to the USSR

October 15, 1951

On behalf of the government of the Chinese People's Republic and Chinese people I express to you sincere thanks for your friendly greetings and cordial wishes on the second anniversary of the proclamation of Chinese People's Republic.

Source: *Current Digest of Soviet Press, Bi-weekly; New York, III:42 December 1, 1951.*

Telegram to the Dalai Lama

October 26, 1951

The Dalai Lama
Dear Sir:

Your telegram of October 24, 1951, has been received. I am grateful for your efforts in implementing the Agreement on the Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet and hereby send you my sincere congratulations.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 27, 1951.*

Inscription for the Cultural Work Team of the Special District Party Committee of Chu *xian*[178]

October 1951

Turn your faces toward the countryside.

Source: *People's Daily, January 18, 1977.*

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178. The special district of Chu *xian* is located in the northeastern part of Anhui Province.

Closing Speech of the Third Meeting of the First National Committee of the CPPCC

November 1, 1951

Comrades:

Our meeting is drawing to a triumphant close. Let me express my congratulations on the success of this meeting. Just as we have been united in the various great struggles both internationally and domestically, so have we been united in this meeting of ours. Furthermore, our unity improves; it draws us closer to each other and grows more vigorous year after year. This is quite understandable, since the People's Democratic United Front of our country was forged, step by step, in the great revolutionary struggle. It is a united front that includes all the nationalities, all the democratic classes, all the democratic parties, all the people's organizations, and all the patriotic and democratic personages in the country—a united front of several hundred million people. It is founded on the workers and peasants; it is under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, and it adopts the method of self-criticism. Therefore, it can solidly bind [us] together as one, and it can become more and more vigorous, mightier and mightier. It is invincible. Comrades, we have already summed up the experience of the past year and have laid down guidelines for future work. We have also had a make-up election for eighteen additional committee members. Let us lead the people of the entire nation in continuing to march forward and in striving to win new and greater triumphs!

Source: *People's Daily, November 2, 1951.*

Telegram to the USSR

November 5, 1951

The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Socialist Republics
Comrade Stalin:

On this occasion of the thirty-fourth anniversary of the great October

Revolution, on behalf of the Chinese people, the government of the People's Republic of China, and on my own behalf, I extend to the people and government of the Soviet Union and to Your Excellency our sincerest congratulations.

Please allow me to congratulate the Soviet Union on its tremendous achievements in socialist construction and in the communist construction that has just began. These achievements have instilled boundless courage in the laboring people of the whole world in their struggle for a bright future.

Please allow me to congratulate the Soviet Union on the great victory of its policy of peace. This victory has thwarted the disgraceful schemes of those who instigate war and has united the peace-loving peoples throughout the world and given them faith that peace will triumph over war.

Please allow me to express my congratulations on the great unshakable friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China which grows closer with each day. This friendship, which embraces one-third of the population of the entire world, is the most reliable guarantee of the certain victory of the cause of peace and progress in the world.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, November 7, 1951.*

Telegram to Gheorghiu-Dej

November 7, 1951

Dear Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej:[179]

On this occasion of your fiftieth birthday, I extend to you my warmest congratulations on behalf of the Communist Party of China and myself and wish you good health.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG and PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, November 7, 1951.*

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[179] Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was secretary general of the Romanian Workers' Party.

Reply to Ambassador of Pakistan

November 12, 1951

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very pleased to accept the letter of credence from His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Ireland, and the Overseas Dominions presented by Your Excellency, and I am grateful to Your Excellency for your congratulations.

A long friendship has existed between the Chinese and Pakistani peoples, who share the common wish of promoting the development of economic and cultural relations between the two countries and of striving for a lasting peace in Asia and the world. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan will not only enable the friendship between our two peoples to steadily grow and be consolidated, but will certainly help maintain peace and security in Asia and in the world.

We warmly welcome Your Excellency as the first ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary from Pakistan to the People's Republic of China and pledge to Your Excellency our assistance in your work of strengthening the friendly cooperation between our two countries.

Our best wishes for the prosperity of your state, the prospering of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, November 13, 1951.*

Letter to Zheng Zhenduo

December 3, 1951

Mr. Zhenduo,[180]

Mr. Yao Yuqin[181], via Mr. Chen Shutong[182], has presented me with a gift of an original handwritten copy of a Wang Chuanshan writing.[183] I hear that such handwritten originals are extremely rare. I am sending this to your department; please preserve it for us.

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[180] At that time of this letter. Zheng was a vice-minister of the Cultural Ministry of the Central People's Government and the head of its Documents and Artifacts Bureau.

[181] Yao Yuqin was a painter.

[182] See *Letter to Chen Shoutong*, p. 102 of this volume.

With best wishes for your health and wellbeing.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 422.*

Letter to Dong Biwu

December 4, 1951

Comrade Biwu:[184]

I think that the contents of your letter to Comrade Rao Shushi are correct.[185] It can be copied and the copies may be sent to the comrades in positions of responsibility in all bureaus under the Central Committee other than the East China Bureau so that they may read it. I propose this so that they may be encouraged to pay attention to this matter.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 423. (A plate original of this letter is preserved at the Documentary office of the CC of the CPC.)*

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[183] Wang Chuanshan (Wang Fuzhi) (1619-1692) was a major thinker of the late-Ming, early Qing period. The document in question was a hand written original (i.e., in Wang's own hand) of his *Shuang Haoruiwu Fu* (Poetic Essay on the Auspicious Dance of the Brace of Cranes).

[184] Dong Biwu (1886-1975) was one of the founding members of the CPC. At the time of this letter he was a vice-premier of the Government Administration Council of the PRC and the head of the Political and Legal Committee.

[185] This refers to a letter that Dong sent to Rae on the subject of establishing government organs at the *xian* and *xiang* levels. In this letter Dong made several points synopsized as follows: (1) While the work of establishing government organs at the lower levels should be directed by the Party, it would not be appropriate for the Party to be directly involved in day-to-day governmental matters. Instead, the Party should guide the establishment of such organs through the leadership of government organs at a higher level, and the leadership of the Party Committee at all levels of government organs should be realized through the presence of Party members in these organs. For example, where there are more than three Party members, a Party group should be organized within that organ, so as to ensure the Party's leadership. (2) The establishment of government organs at the *xian* and *xiang* level is the key. (3) There must be full organizational and ideological preparation for the endeavor.

Letter to Mao Zelian and Mao Yuanti

December 11, 1951

Zelian, Yuanti:[186]

I have received your letter.

Sixth Aunt Huishen[187] and Zelian should not come to the capital and should not say too long in Changsha either. After your illness[188] has been diagnosed and treated you should return to Shaoshan.[189] The People's Government is now resolved to practice streamlining and thrift and emphasizes opposition to waste and extravagance. Therefore you should not come to the capital or stay too long in Changsha.

As for difficulties that Zelian's family is having, I will try to give some measure of assistance and support at a later date; for the time being you should not expect or rely [on me] for support.

Yuanti can do some studying when he has any spare time from his work at the printing shop.

Please give my regards to Sixth Aunt.

I wish you all well!

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 429.*

Telegram to the Northwest Nationalities' Peoples' Representatives' Conference for Resisting US Aggression and Aiding Korea[190]

December 12, 1951

To all comrade delegates to the Northwest Nationalities' Peoples' Representatives' Conference for Resisting United States [Aggression] and Aiding Korea:

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[186] Mao Zelian is Mao Zedong's cousin, and Mao Yuanti is Mao Zedong's nephew.

[187] This refers to Mao Zelian's mother.

[188] The illness here refers to the aunt's illness and not to Mao Zelian's or Mao Yuanti's.

[189] Shaoshan of Xiangtan *xian*, Hunan, is Mao's native village.

[190] This conference was held at Xian, December 12-15, 1951.

Thank you all for your telegram. During the past year or more, the people of the different nationalities in northwest China have contributed a tremendous effort to the patriotic struggle of resisting United States [aggression] and aiding Korea and have secured great results. At this conference, you have resolved to further unite the people of the various nationalities, to increase production, to practice strict economy, and to conduct patriotic propaganda and education in order to support the Chinese People's Volunteers. This is very good. One of the reasons that imperialists dared to bully China in the past was that China's various nationalities were not united. However, that period in history is gone forever. From the day of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the various nationalities of China have begun to unite as one big friendly and co-operative family that has sufficient strength to defeat any imperialist aggression and to build our homeland into a prosperous and mighty nation. Best wishes for the success of your conference!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, December 12, 1951.*

Telegram to Panchen Gnoertehni

December 13, 1951

Panchen Gnoertehni[191], through the People's Government of Qinghai Province,

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your telegram. I fully agree with your wish to unite closely with the Dalai Lama under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the Central People's Government in order to struggle for the thorough implementation of the Agreement on the Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, expelling the influence of imperialism in Tibet, consolidating national defense, and building a New Tibet. I wish you a pleasant journey to your destination.

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[191] Panchen Gnoertehni, the Panchen Lama of the time, who had been living in exile in Qinghai Province for over twenty years, began his return to Tibet on December 19, 1951. Before he left Qinghai, the Panchen Lama sent a telegram to Mao.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, December 15, 1951.*

Letter to Liu Shaoqi

December 15, 1951

Comrade Shaoqi:

How is your tour? I imagine that you should have arrived at Hangzhou by now.

According to the reports of Comrades An Ziwen and Hu Qiaomu[192], there are still many people who, like the letter written by Yin Yigang of the Hebei Party School, are in disagreement with the idea that the semi-proletariat should also be considered a part of the leading class [in our society].[193] In the process of Party rectification in many localities, this problem has been proposed, and such a suggestion is reasonable. Now we are obliged to make some revisions on the proposal in the draft plan for Party rectification. On this matter we have already been pushed a bit to the passive side, and only by making these revisions can we capture the initiative. I am now sending for your perusal and assessment a copy of the telegram,[194] of An Ziwen's report[195] and of the letter sent to us by Yin Yigang of the Hebei Party School and asking for your opinion on the subject. Please send somebody back with your response.

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[192] An Ziwen was at the time of this letter deputy director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC.

[193] According to the source, while the issue of designating the working class as the leading class in society during the period of the New Democratic Revolution and the period of socialist transition is clearly defined, the issue of whether the semi-proletariat should be included in this designation is a subject discussed only in several documents immediately prior to and after the founding of the People's Republic. (Note that in this letter Mao used the term *ban gongren jieji,* i.e., semi-working class. The term, however, is unclear in its meaning, and because Mao had, in similar contexts, used the term *ban wuchan jieji*—i.e., semi-proletariat—we have translated the term in this way.) In February 1948, in revising the article "Stipulations of the Central Committee of the CPC on the Distinction of Social Classes in the Land reform and on Their Various Treatments", Mao wrote: "The proletariat and the semi-proletariat (the poor peasants) are the leading class in the people's democratic revolution and the political regime of the new democratic state, with the proletariat being the primary leading class." In March-April 1951, at the National Conference on Organizational work, the Central Committee stated in its Resolution on Rectifying and Reorganizing the Basic-Level Organizations of the Party (based on a report by Liu Shaoqi) that "in the past the Chinese revolution was led by the urban working class and the rural semi-working class (*ban gongren jieji*); from now on it stands in need of greater leadership by the working class." Then, in July of the same year, in a statement of Explanation of the Central Committee of the CPC on the Question of the leadership Role of the Working Class and the Semi-working class, this sentence was changed to read "In the past the Chinese revolution was led by the working class and the semi-working class in the cities and in the countryside." Later, some people, such as Yin Yigang of the Hebei Party School run by the Hebei provincial committee of the CPC, wrote letters of opinion objecting to the idea of considering the semi-working class (or semi-proletariat) as part of the leading class. Mao then sent these letters to An Ziwen for comment and suggestion on how they can be handled. An's suggestion was that the proposal that the semi-working class should be considered as part of the leading class should be amended. The implication of this letter

Everything here is going well. Do not be concerned.

I wish you all well.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 427.*

Letter to Chen Yuying

December 23, 1951

Comrade Chen Yuying:[196]

I am very happy to receive your letter to me of December 18. Somebody has already told me that in the past you were very resolute in the face of [the interrogation by] counterrevolutionaries and did not surrender [to their intimidations]. This is very good. For the sake of thrift you should not come to the capital. It is very good for you to work in Changsha. If you have any difficulty, you may let me know and I'll do my best to find you some assistance.

I wish you good health!

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here is that Mao agreed with An, and sent this letter to Liu Shaoqi for his opinion, Liu responded quickly with his assent, and in December 1951 the Central Committee issued an *Amended Directive on the Question of the Leading Classes in the Chinese Revolution*, in which it pointed out that "on the question of who leads the Chinese revolution, no matter whether with regard to the past or to the future, we should only say that it is led by the working class (through its vanguard, the Communist Party of China) and should no longer include therein the semi-working class."

[194] This refers, according to the source, to the "amended directive" mentioned as the last item in the previous note and which at the time was soon to be published.

[195] According to the source, this refers to An Ziwen's report to Mao on the question discussed here. An's report was made in November 1951.

[196] Chen Yuying was a nursemaid in Mao and Yang Kaihui's (his wife at the time) household from the winter of 1926 to the spring of 1931.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 430.*

Telegram to William Gallacher

December 24, 1951

Dear Comrade William Gallacher:[197]

On this happy occasion of your seventieth birthday, I extend to you my sincere congratulations on behalf of the Communist Party of China and myself and wish you excellent health.

(Signed as Chairman CPC)

Source: *People's Daily, December 25, 1951.*

Conversation with Zhou Shizhao[198]

December 1951

(Zhou says the weather is cold in the Northeast.)

Mao (laughing): Afraid of the cold? You two are only fifty-nine years old. Those in their fifties are still young fellows.

(Zhou asks whether the Chairman still takes cold water baths.)

Mao: I am getting older, I can no longer do it now. However, I bathe in a different way from others. Other people bathe in a bathtub and hot water. I splash a bit of somewhat colder water on my body and then take a shower.

Mao adds: I get two results from taking a bath; one is cleansing and the other is tempering.

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[197] Gallacher was chairman of the Communist Party of Great Britain.

[198] The article from which this conversation was excerpted is the author's interview with Zhou Shizhao, Principal of First Normal School, Changsha, Hunan. Zhou was Comrade Mao's former classmate and had paid a visit to the Chairman toward the end of 1951 on his way to the Northeast.

Source: *Excerpt from Zhang Zizhi's article "A Few Things about Physical Exercise in Chairman Mao's Life" in Tiyu Bao (Sports), Triweekly, Beijing (August 1, 1958).*

Comment Written on a Letter from Students of Chinese People's University

1951

You must shorten your time for studying and protect your health.

Source: *People's Daily, September 8, 1977.*

Directive on Language Reform

1951

The written language must be reformed and oriented toward [the use of] a phonetic system as is common with the world's [other] written languages. [The reformed script] must have a national form, [its] letters and methods [of alphabetization] being formulated on the basis of Chinese characters in current use.[199]

The language must under certain specific conditions, be reformed. Our language must be one that draws [us] closer to the masses.[200]

Source: *Excerpts from Chinese Language (Monthly) Beijing, July 1952.*

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[199] An excerpt from a lengthier and more general directive. This was cited in a speech by Ma Xulun at the inaugural session of the Committee for Studying the Reform of the Chinese Language, February 5, 1952.

[200] An excerpt from an article by Wei Yi, in which this quotation was cited.

1952

Telegram to the Union of Burma

January 2, 1952

President Sao Shwe Thaik,
The Union of Burma
Your Excellency:

On this happy occasion of your country's National Day, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and to the government and people of your country our warmest congratulations. May the friendship between the Chinese and Burmese peoples grow and increase with each passing day.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, January 4, 1952.*

Telegram to the Republic of India

January 24, 1952

President,
The Republic of India
Mr. [Rajendra] Prasad:

On this occasion of your country's National Day, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China I sincerely extend to Your Excellency and to the government and people of your country our warmest congratulations and our best wishes for the ever- growing prosperity and wellbeing of the Indian people.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, January 26, 1952.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia

January 27, 1952

Chairman,
The President of the Greater Hural, The People's Republic of Mongolia
Comrade Bumatsende:

We are stunned to receive news of the passing away of Marshal Choibalsan, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Mongolia.[201] On behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China, I extend to you and to the government and people of the People's Republic of Mongolia our deep condolences. Marshal Choibalsan was a great leader of the Mongolian people and an outstanding leader and organizer of the Mongolian People's Revolution. His death is not only a tremendous loss to the Mongolian people but also a loss to the camp for world peace and democracy. The assistance that Marshal Choibalsan rendered the Chinese people in the war of Resistance against Japanese imperialism will live forever in the hearts of the Chinese people.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, January 29, 1952.*

Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

February 4, 1952

Chairman,
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Comrade Ho Chi Minh:

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201. Marshal Khorloogiin Choibalsan (alternately spelled Choibalsang) was the leader of the Mongolian People's Revolution and one of the co-founders of the People's Republic of Mongolia. He died in Moscow on January 26, 1952.

We are grateful for your friendly message of congratulations on the second anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. I firmly believe that the Vietnamese people, in their resolute, unyielding, and protracted struggle against imperialism and for the independence and liberty of their homeland will, under your leadership and with the sympathy of the peace-loving peoples throughout Asia and the world, eventually secure final victory.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, February 5, 1952.*

Telegram to the USSR

February 11, 1952

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Comrade Stalin:

On behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China I extend to the great people and the government of the Soviet Union and to you, our deep gratitude and warm congratulations on this occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.

We are grateful for the enthusiastic and generous assistance, which in the last two years, the government and the people of the Soviet Union have given to the Chinese government and people in the spirit of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and its collateral agreements. This assistance has been of very great help to New China in the rehabilitation and development of its economy and in the consolidation of the state.

May the great friendship between the Chinese and Soviet people grow ever more intimate. The mighty alliance between China and the Soviet Union is an invincible force, a powerful guarantee against imperialist aggression and for the defense of peace and security in the Far East, and also a guarantee for the victory of the great cause of world peace.

Long live the unbreakable friendship and unity between the people of China and Soviet Union!

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, February 14, 1951,*

Imperialism's Plan for Aggression is Bound to be Smashed[202]

February 14, 1952

I believe that given the cooperation between the two great countries of China and the Soviet Union, imperialism's plans for aggression are bound to be smashed.

It is evident to all of us that given the great cooperation between our [two countries], China and the Soviet Union, all of imperialism's plans of aggression cannot but be smashed. They are bound to be thoroughly shattered. As soon as the imperialists start a war of aggression, we and the people throughout the world will certainly wipe them from the face of the earth!

Telegram to the USSR

February 21, 1952

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Comrade Stalin:

On this glorious day commemorating the thirty-fourth anniversary of the founding of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, please accept my heartfelt congratulations and best wishes.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

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[202] These comments were made by Mao at a banquet given by the Soviet Ambassador to China to celebrate the second anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Quoted from *Mao Zhuxi Lun Diguo Zhuyi He Yiqie Fandongpai Dou Shi Zhi Laohu* (Chairman Mao Discusses How the Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers), in *Shijie Zhishi* (World Knowledge), 20 (1958), Semi-monthly, Beijing.

Source: *People's Daily, March 3, 1951.*

Decree to a Division of the Xinjiang Construction Battalion

February 1952

You are now given the glorious task of the economic construction of the homeland. In the past you have been a long-tested, highly organized and well-disciplined combat unit. We trust that, on the production and construction front, you will become a highly skilled commando troop in construction as well. You will act as heroic models, striving on a new front for the happiness of the revolutionary lives of the future, on behalf of all the people of the country, including yourselves.

You may now put your weapons of combat in reserve and take up the weapons of production and construction. If and when the homeland should have the need to call upon you, I shall once again order you to take up the weapons of combat once more to defend the homeland.

Source: *Excerpt from Selected Compilation of Materials, 1967, Red Guard Publication. This decree was displayed in the Exhibition Hall of the First Agricultural Division of the Xinjiang Construction Battalion.*

Telegram to Matyas Rakosi

March 7, 1952

The Central Committee,
The Hungarian Worker's Party
Dear Comrade Matyas Rakosi:[203]

On the occasion of your sixtieth birthday, on behalf of the Communist Party of China and on my own behalf, I extend to you—loyal son of the Hungarian people and outstanding fighter for the international worker's movement—

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[203] Mátyás Rákosi (1892-1971) was general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Hungary (Kommunistak Magyarorszagi Partja, KMP) from 1945 to 1948, and general secretary of the Hungarian Working People's Party (Magyar Dolgozok Partja, MDP) formed in 1948 by the merging of the KMP with the Hungarian Social Democratic Party (Magyar Szocial Demokrata Part).

our fraternal congratulations.

Respectfully, I wish you good health and further success in your cause of leading the Hungarian people on the path to socialism and of defending world peace.

(Signed as Chairman of CPC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, March 9, 1952.*

Letter to Cheng Qian

March 11, 1952

Mr. Songyun:[204]

I have received your gracious letter of March 6. Your speech at the joint meeting[205] has permitted me to understand clearly the strengths and problems with [our country's] rivers and lakes and has been of great benefit to me.

In response, and with my respect.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 431.*

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[204] Songyun is the honorific name of Cheng Qian (1881-1968) a veteran KMT general, occupying a number of significant military and political posts in that party and in Sun Yat-sen's government from the late 1910s through the 1940s, and by the late 1940s was one of the most powerful members of the KMT. (In the 1948, he was a nearly successful candidate for the vice-presidency of the KMT national government). He was also in that year, governor of Hunan his native province and in whose political affairs he had been active ail his life. In August 1949 he surrendered to the Communists, who were rapidly advancing on Guangzhou, the seat of the KMT government, then nominally under the presidency of Li Zongren. His "defection" hastened the collapse of the defense of the KMT forces. After 1949, Cheng held several important political positions in the PRC. At the time of this letter he was, among other things, a deputy chairman of the standing committee of the NPC, and, more pertinently here, a vice-chairman of the Central-South Military and Government Administration Committee.

[205] This refers to a joint meeting attended by the persons in charge of the departments of water conservation, of forestry' and agriculture and of transportation in the governments of the provinces of Hunan and Hubei and in the Central-South China Military and Government Administration Committee. This meeting, convened by the last organ mentioned above in March 1952, was held for the purpose of discussing the plans for the Jing River flood prevention project.

Instruction to Huang Yanpei[206]

March 15, 1952

Private capital is of value in New China's construction; it is just that we must not allow it to develop in the wrong direction.

The capitalists should not be allowed to seek their private interests only; they should also take the interests of the state and the workers into account.

Unite well with them, teach them, reform them; they should first study and carry out the Common Program.

Reply to Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

March 18, 1952

Mr. Ambassador:

I am extraordinarily pleased to accept the letter of credence from the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, presented by Your Excellency and am grateful for the good wishes that Your Excellency has expressed to the Chinese people on behalf of the Korean people.

In their great patriotic war of resistance against United States imperialist aggression, the heroic people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have displayed a noble spirit of sacrifice with which they have overcome all difficulties and have secured evident victories.

The peoples of China and Korea are engaged in a common struggle for the sake of resisting our common enemy, United States imperialist aggression, and protecting the security of our two countries and peace in the Far East. Indeed, as Your Excellency has pointed out, the long-standing friendly relations of mutual assistance between the Chinese and Korean peoples have been sealed by the noble blood of our common struggle. This struggle has already turned the consolidated unity between our peoples into an immense force for the cause of defending peace. As long as the Chinese and Korean peoples always continue to unite as one and struggle together, we will surely be able to smash the United States imperialists' plans for aggression against our two countries and to make extremely significant contributions to the defense of peace in the Far East and throughout the world.

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[206] This is an indirect quotation of comrade Mao's instructions transmitted by Huang Yanpei at the fourth general meeting of the Beijing Chapter of the China Democratic National Construction Association, of which he was chairman. This was reported in the People's Daily of September 14, 1952.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the People's Republic of China and pledge to Your Excellency my utmost assistance in your work of consolidating and promoting the fraternal friendship between our two peoples'.

My best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, March 19, 1952.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of Czechoslovakia

March 18, 1952

Mr. Ambassador:

I am extraordinarily pleased to accept the letter of credence from the President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia presented by Your Excellency and am grateful to Your Excellency for your warm congratulations.

For more than two years, the friendly relations between our two countries have achieved further development in the areas of politics, the economy and culture. The Chinese people have paid constant attention to the brilliant achievements of the Czechoslovakian people in their work of socialist construction following liberation and are sincerely delighted with these achievements. I deeply believe that the friendly cooperation between our two countries will not only facilitate the economic prosperity of our countries and the strengthening of our friendship, but will also contribute to the consolidation of the camp for world peace and democracy led by the great Soviet Union.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary from the Republic of Czechoslovakia to the People's Republic of China and pledge to Your Excellency my utmost assistance in your work of consolidating and promoting the fraternal friendship between our peoples.

Best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, March 19, 1952.*

Conversation with Zhai Zuojun[207] (Excerpt)

Spring 1952

How is the campaign going in your area[208]?... (Zhai tells the Chairman that the campaign is going very well, very enthusiastically, and that workers, shop clerks, and the masses have all risen one after another to carry out struggles by reasoning with the capitalists)... That's good then. Without repelling the attack of the bourgeoisie, our revolutionary cause cannot develop.

Source: *Excerpt from Zhai Zuojun's, article 'Zai Mao Zhuxi Shenbian' (Being Next to Chairman Mao) in Xin guancha (New Observation), Semi-monthly, Beijing, May 16, 1951.*

Telegram to Sa Zhenbing's Family

April 12, 1952

The family of Mr. Sa Zhenbing:

Upon the death of Mr. Sa Zhenbing[209] owing to illness, I feel deep sorrow and send this telegram expressly to extend my condolences. Respectfully,

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[207] Zhai Zuojun was a security guard for Mao in 1931. In 1952 he was working in the PLA Air Force and had been dispatched to Tianjin to gather materials on the "Three Evils" and "Five Evils" campaign. On his return to Beijing he was invited to see Mao. The subject of the excerpt from the conversation was the campaign.

[208] The campaign refers to the movements against "Three Evils" and "Five Evils". The movement against the "Three Evils" was the struggle against corruption, waste and bureaucracy launched at the end of 1951 among the personnel of government departments and state enterprises. The movement against the "Five Evil's" was the struggle against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing of economic information, started at the beginning of 1952 among owners of private industrial and commercial enterprises.

[209] At the time of his death, Sa Zhenbing was a member of the National Committee of

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, April 12, 1952.*

Telegram to Boleslaw Bierut

April 16, 1952

President,
The Republic of Poland
Comrade Bierut:

On this occasion of your sixtieth birthday, please accept the warm congratulations of the Chinese people, the government of the People's Republic of China, and myself. Under your leadership, the people of Poland have built, out of the ruins that remained after the pillage by the Nazi bandits, a country of increasing prosperity, freedom, and happiness. By their achievements in building a socialist society, the Polish people have provided powerful evidence of the shameful defeat of aggressors and have displayed the invincible, immense strength of the camp for peace and democracy.

Our best wishes to you in securing still greater achievements in your cause of socialist construction and in your struggle for world peace. We wish you good health and a long life.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, April 16, 1952.*

Telegram to Rajendra Prasad

May 11, 1952

President Rajendra Prasad,
The Republic of India

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the CPPCC, a member of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission, a member of the Administrative Council of the Fujian Provincial People's Government, and a senior leader in the Chinese navy.

Your Excellency:

We are happy to learn that Your Excellency has been elected President of the Republic of India. On behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China I sincerely extend to you our congratulations.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, May 13, 1952.*

Letter to Tan Kah-Kee

May 16, 1952

Commissioner Tan:[210]

Your gracious letter has long been received. I apologize for being so tardy in responding. In accordance with your bidding I have written the seven characters for the Jimei Liberation Memorial.[211] I wonder if they are usable? How is your health of late? I am always concerned.

With my respect.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p.* 432.

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[210] Tan Kah-Kee (alt. Chen Jiageng) (1874-1961) is an "Overseas Chinese" of note. He went to Singapore in 1890 to help his father, Tan Ki Pei, who had left his family in China in the 1880s to seek his fortune. Tan became a very successful entrepreneur in rubber and, from the mid-1910s on, in shipping. He turned much of his patriotism for China into an effort to establish a university in Xiamen. Fujian Province, which he single-handedly supported for fifteen years. He took frequent trips to and from China. In 1938, following the outbreak of the war between China and Japan the previous year. Tan organized the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Relief Association, which continued to be the main pillar of support for China in Southeast Asia throughout the war years. From the mid-1940s on, he became outspoken in his criticism of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government and turned to the CPC. In September 1946 Tan wrote to President Truman to appeal for an end to US aid to the KMT, which he believed to be one of the causes for the prolongation of the civil war in China. In October 1949 Tan became a member of the Central People's Government Council of the PRC. He also became member of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee.

[211] Jimei village, Gongan *xian*, Fujian Province, is Tan Kah-Kee's birthplace. In 1913 Tan sponsored the building of the first of the modern primary schools in the South Fujian area here, this also marked the beginning of Tan's lifelong devotion to the enterprise of public education. Tan retired to live in Jimei in 1951.

Inscription for Workers on Jing River Flood Control Project

May 19, 1952

For the benefit of the broad masses of the people, let us strive for victory in the Jing River flood control project![212]

(Signed)

Source: *People's Daily, May 29, 1952.*

Telegram to the Dalai Lama and Panchen Gnoertehni

May 23, 1952

The Dalai Lama and Panchen Gnoertehni
Sirs:

Thank you for your telegrams of May 23. On this occasion of the anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet, I am extremely happy that you sent telegrams to express your willingness to exert effort for the gradual and thorough implementation of the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. I celebrate [this act and wish that] you and all the Tibetan people will unite ever more closely together and unite with all fraternal nationalities and peoples across the country in a concerted effort to build our great homeland and build a prosperous and happy new Tibet. Furthermore I wish you success and good health.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, May 4, 1952.*

Letter to Ye Gongzuo

May 25, 1952

Mr. Yuhu: [Ye Gongzuo][213]

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[212] This project is located on the border between Hunan and Hubei provinces.

[213] Ye Gongzuo (1881-1968) was a scholar and school teacher. Before Liberation he

I have received and read your gracious letter of several months ago, and the poem written by Mr. Sa Zhenbing which was enclosed. Soon thereafter I received and read two more poems by yourself. For all this I am very grateful. Now Mr. Sa has passed away to join the ancients, and his poem is now a part of memorabilia. I am returning it for your safekeeping. Most recently I received the letter from the four gentlemen of which you, sir, are one,[214] in which you have described the matter related to the ancestral shrine of the late-Ming patriotic leader Mr. Yuan Conghuan. I have already talked with Mayor Peng Zhen and, if there are no major objection, I believe it ought to be preserved. Please contact Mayor Peng and discuss this matter with him.

With my respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 433.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of Poland

June 9, 1952

Mr. Ambassador:

I am extremely glad to accept the letter of credence from the President of the Republic of Poland presented by Your Excellency and am grateful for Your Excellency's warm congratulations and good wishes.

For two years, the friendly relations between China and Poland in the political, economic and cultural areas have made noteworthy progress. The Chinese people have a great admiration for the inspiring cause that the Polish people have undertaken, under the leadership of President Bierut, to rebuild their homeland and march forward toward socialism, and wholeheartedly take delight in your superb achievements. I firmly believe that further close cooperation between our two peoples will not only facilitate the strengthening of the

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made many contributions towards Chinese railroad building. He was also known as the founder of Jiatong University, which came to be a leading center of engineering sciences in China.

[214] This refers to Ye, Liu Yazi, Li Jishen and Zhang Shichao. In the letter they requested the preservation and repairs of the ancestral shrine and tomb of the Ming dynasty general and patriot Yuan Chonghuan, which are in the city of Beijing.

friendship between our two countries, but will also contribute to the cause of world peace for which we are in common striving.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Poland to the People's Republic of China and pledge to Your Excellency my utmost assistance in your work of consolidating and promoting the friendship between our two peoples.

Best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, June 10, 1952.*

Reply to Minister of the Republic of Finland

June 9, 1952

Mr. Minister:

I am very glad to accept the letter of credence from the President of the Republic of Finland which Your Excellency has presented and am grateful for your president's sentiments of congratulations and wishes for the prosperity and happiness of the Chinese people which Your Excellency has conveyed to us.

The strengthening of the friendship between the peoples of China and Finland and the further development of economic and cultural relations between the two countries will contribute to the cause of world peace for which we hold a common hope.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Finland to the People's Republic of China and pledge to Your Excellency my assistance in your work of strengthening the friendly cooperation between our two countries.

Best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, June 10, 1952.*

Inscription on Physical Culture and Sports

June 10, 1952

Promote Physical Culture and Sports: Strengthen the People's Physique.[215]

(Signed)

Source: *People's Daily, June 22, 1952.*

Letter to Huang Yanpei

June 10, 1952

Mr. Renzhi:[216]

Your gracious letter of June 8 has been received. The year 1840 refers to the year in which Lin Zexu led the people's masses of Guangzhou in resistance against the attack of the British, that is, the year of the so-called Opium War.[217] It does not refer to Chen Sheng and Wu Guang.[218] I'm afraid your memory has failed you. China's modern revolutionary struggle has for its goal, first and foremost, the opposition against the invasion of imperialism. Therefore it is possible to trace its roots to the Opium War and Lin Zexu and the Guangzhou "Quell the British Corps"[219] of its day. But it would be far too remote to trace it to over two thousand years ago to commemorate Chen Sheng and Wu Guang. That was a peasant uprising of olden times, and not a modern revolution.

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[215] Comrade Mao's inscription was for the occasion of the establishment of the All China Federation of Physical Culture. Its inaugural Ceremonies were held in Beijing on June 20. 1952. The same inscription was also written for the PLA Sports Convention in Commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the "August 1" Army Day (i.e., the day of the founding of the Red Army).

[216] See *Letter to Huang Yanpei*, p. 116 of this Volume.

[217] Faced with the opposition of the Chinese people to her traffic in opium, Britain sent forces in 1840-42 to invade Guangdong and other coastal regions of China, under the pretext of protecting trade. Led by Lin Zexu the troops in Guangdong fought a war of resistance. A "Quell the British Corps" which was spontaneously organized by the people of Guangzhou also dealt the British aggressors severe blows.

[218] Chen Sheng and Wu Guang were the leaders of a rebellion at the end of the Qin dynasty circa 209 BC They were both among laborers being transported to Yuyang (in today's Hebei, near Beijing). *En route*, at Dazexian (in today's Anhui Province), they were delayed by torrential rains. Fearing that according to the severe Qin laws they would be executed. Chen and Wu led an uprising that started out with some nine hundred people in the transport and ended up involving several tens of thousands of troops, over a thousand cavalry, and several hundred chariots (a fairly large-scale uprising equivalent to the size and strength of a medium-sized state of pre-Qin days). Chen was crowned by the insurrectionary troops and made his "capital" at Chen *xian* (today's Huaiyang *xian*, Henan). They were eventually defeated by the Qin general Zhang Han. Chen and Wu's uprising is known as the first peasant rebellion in China's history.

In response, and with my respect,

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 435.*

Letter to Zhou Enlai

June 14, 1952

Premier Zhou:

1) If it is possible we should take over the administration of all private middle and primary schools entirely: 2) as for schools for cadres' children, the first step is to give them uniform treatment [with the others], and there should no longer be any graded differences, and the second step is to abolish such aristocratic schools so that they [the cadres' children] can be integrated with the people's children. Please think this over and see how it can be carried out.

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 437.*

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[219] This refers to the popular name given to the Guangdong militia that grew out of the Sanyuanli Incident of late May 1841. This incident, occurring in the second year of the "Opium War", was the culmination of severe rising tension between the Cantonese populace and the British troops stationed in and off-harbor in Guangzhou. On May 29, 1841, a British patrol violated the household of Zhang Zhaoguang in the village of Tonghua, near Sanyuanli. The local villagers armed themselves and gathered on a hill fronting the British camp. For the next two days there was prolonged fighting, and on June 1, the British troops were forced to reembark off Guangzhou harbor.

Inscription on Inauguration of the Chengdu-Chongqing Railway

July 1, 1952

Congratulations on the opening of the Chengdu-Chongqing Railway to traffic. Continue to work hard for the construction of the Tianshui-Chengdu line.[220]

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, July 2, 1952.*

Letter to Zhang Youcheng

July 7, 1952

My dear Youcheng:[221]

Your letters have been received. Thank you. Your letter to me of the first of the fifth month according to the lunar calendar is very good and has made it possible: to learn much about the conditions in our native village. [You told me that] there is a shortage of grain and the hogs are not worth much money. Have things improved somewhat in recent months? I have also received all the letters sent to me by members of the Wen family.[222] At your convenience please tell them [that I have received their letters] and convey my regards to them. It is because of the shortage of grain that there has been a prohibition on [the consumption and manufacturing of] liquor in the villages. After the autumn [harvest] the ban may be lifted, and you will be able to drink a little.

In response, and with my wishes for your health and safety!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 438.*

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[220] This inscription was given as a banner to the staff of the Railroad Engineering Office of the Southwest Bureau.

[221] Zhang Youcheng was a friend of comrade Mao, in his youth.

[222] Wen family, relatives of comrade Mao, from his mother's side.

Telegram to the German Socialist Unity Party

July 8, 1952

The Central Committee,
The Socialist Unity Party of Germany,
Dear Comrade W. Pieck, and comrade delegates to the Second Conference of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany:

On behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese people and on my own behalf I extend to the Second Conference of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany our warmest congratulations. We respectfully wish the Conference success and wish the German people new triumphs in their cause of striving for unification and democracy in Germany and of defending peace in the world.

(Signed as Chairman of CPC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, July 11, 1952.*

Address to the First Graduating Class of the Military Academy

July 10, 1952

President Liu, commanders, members of the Political Work Staff, members of the Rear Services Work Staff, instructors and the graduates of the First Term of the High-Level Accelerated Program Department of the Military Academy, Comrades:

The first term of the high-level accelerated program department and the senior level accelerated program department of the Military Academy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which itself stands for a great transition in the history of the construction of the armed forces of the Chinese people, has now come to a fruitful conclusion, and we are now holding commencement exercises. I hereby extend to you my most enthusiastic congratulations.

The establishment of the Military Academy and the educational work that it has undertaken to provide in the last year or so have contributed greatly to the construction of the regularized and modernized national defense troops [of our country]. This is the result of the combined and unified efforts of President Liu, of all our comrade advisors from the Soviet Union, of all the commanders, the members of the Political Work Staff, the members of the Rear Services Work Staff, the instructors, and the students. I wish now to extend to you my gratitude and appreciation.

The Chinese people in its history of building its armed forces, has traveled through a long trek of twenty-five years. It is, in international circles, with the exception of the Soviet Union, unparalleled in its richness of revolutionary experience. Nevertheless, prior to the nationwide victory of the Chinese people, its military construction, owing to the limitations of objective material conditions, was in a relatively low' stage of development. By this I mean that we were in a situation in which [our armed forces] had simple and low-quality equipment, in which there was an absence of regular organization and systematization, in which they lacked strict military discipline, and in which combat leadership was decentralized and non-unified, and often carried within it guerrilla characteristics, and so on. These were natural and inevitable conditions in the past, and were therefore correct [for the past]. Nevertheless, since, the Chinese people attained nationwide victory, the objective conditions have undergone a fundamental transformation. We have now entered the higher stage in which we must be in control of modern technology. This possibility is now fully inherent in the existing objective conditions; as long as we add to it our indefatigable subjective efforts, it is bound to be realized. In step with the modernization of [our armed forces] equipment, there is a demand that the establishment of the troops become regularized: this means the implementation of a unified command, a unified system, organization, discipline and training [for all the troops], that is, the materialization of closely-knit coordinated actions on the part of all the various arms of the services. For this purpose, the decentralization, lack of unity and phenomena of lassitude and simplicity in discipline, as well as the guerrilla mentality and practices, which might have been appropriate and correct in the past but are no longer appropriate and correct today, must be overcome, and, in their place, we must strengthen the sense of organization, of planning, of precision and discipline which is to be cultivated in the full range of our work and command, and particularly first of all in terms of education and training. This is an indispensable condition in the establishment of regularized and modernized national defense troops [for our country].

At the same time, in order that we may organize [and prepare for] such complex, highly mechanized and modern battle or combat, we cannot do without a sound commanding organ that can act as the brains and is rich in scientific organization and division of labor. The type of commanding organs of the past that were unsound, low in efficiency or even far from being equal to their task must, from now on, be improved and strengthened by much effort. The kind of situation that in the past placed emphasis exclusively on political work and neglected staff work must be resolutely changed around (it is correct to emphasize political work, and there should still continue to be this emphasis from now on). In the past some weaker people, people who lacked organizational ability, or even people who had committed some mistakes and did not have a high level of activism, were chosen to work in the commanding organs, and this has caused some commanding officers to be reluctant to serve as staff officers or chiefs of staff. This situation must be radically turned around. From now on we must select quality commanders who are rich in organizational and commanding abilities to serve in the commanding organs at all levels, and thus create a new work-style and a new atmosphere in the commanding organs. This, too, is an indispensable condition in the establishment of regularized and modernized national defense troops [for our country].

Commanders, members of the Political Work Staff and the Rear Services Work Staff, instructors, graduates of the first term of the Military Academy, and students still in pursuit of their studies, comrades: The Military Commission hopes that you will continue to exert your efforts in the glorious cause of the building of regularized and modernized national defense troops, and also that, through your efforts, the spirit of building regularized and modernized national defense troops will be infused into all the units.

Source: *When Sailing on the High Seas, One Needs to Rely on the Helmsman, Red Guard Publication, pp. 77-78.*

Inscription on the Monument to the People's Heroes

August 3, 1952

Immortal Glory to the People's Heroes.[223]

Source: *People's Daily, August 3, 1952.*

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[223] Inscription for a monument to the People's Heroes, the construction of which commenced on the day of the Twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the PLA (i.e., August 1).

Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

August 13, 1952

The Chairman,
The Standing Committee,
The Supreme People's Assembly,
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Comrade Kim Du Bong:

On this occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Korea, on behalf of the Chinese people, the government of the People's Republic of China, and on my own behalf, I extend to you, to our brothers the Korean people, and to the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea our sincerest congratulations.

The heroic struggles undertaken by the Korean people in striving for the independence and liberation of their homeland and in resisting the United States imperialist aggressors has made a tremendous contribution to the cause of saving peace in the world.

For the sake of thwarting our common enemy and for the sake of Korea's peace and China's security, the Chinese people will forever stand firmly by the Korean people and battle for a thorough victory over the United States imperialist aggressors.

May the friendship between China and Korea, which has grown unceasingly through the struggle and is impregnable, be forever consolidated. May the Korean people secure further and greater victories in their war of liberation.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 15, 1952.*

Work on the monument ended in late 1955. It stands in the Southern section of Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

Letter to Chen Yi

August 15, 1952

Comrade Chen Yi:[224]

I have received your letter. It is of the utmost necessity for you to rest for two months in order to recover your health. After you participate in another meeting of the Central Committee you may find a suitable spot to convalesce. Wait until your health is restored before you return to East China to work. For the time being it is suitable for your post to remain in East China because your role can be greater if you stay in East China.[1] There is much need for your contribution in that area.

In response, and with regards for your daily well-being.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 439.*

Letter to Li Shuqing

August 23, 1952

Mr Shuqing:[225]

Your gracious letter has been received. I am very much in sympathy [with your situation]. I have already forwarded your letter to the people's government of Xiangtan *xian* [for its reference] so that it can handle the matter after deliberation.

In reply, and with my great respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Traveler (Monthly) 2, 1958, Beijing.*

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[224] Chen was second secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC at the time of this letter.

[225] See *Letter to Li Jiehou of Shaoshan, Hunan*, p. 24 of this volume.

Letter to Uyghur Peasants of Xinjiang

August 30, 1952

To the Peasant Comrades of Paihataikeli *xiang*, Suofu *xian*, Kexi Region Comrades:

Thank you for the letter that you wrote to me in March this year, at the time when you celebrated the victory of land reform. You have achieved liberation from the bondage of the feudal landownership of the landlord class. I hope that you will, with the motto "Patriotism and High Yields" [as your watchwords], become even more solidly unified, strive hard for production, and make improvements in your own material [standards of] living, and, furthermore, on this basis, raise step by step, the level of your culture [and education] [*wenhua shuiping*].

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 440.*

Telegram to the USSR

September 2, 1952

Generalissimo Stalin:

On this seventh anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, please accept the warm congratulations and sincere gratitude that I, together with the Chinese People's Liberation Army and all the Chinese people, extend to you, to the armed forces of the Soviet Union, and to the Soviet people.

During the War of Resistance against Japan, the Soviet Union rendered the Chinese people immense assistance. The armies of the Soviet Union annihilated the Guangdong Army, which was the main force of the Japanese troops. This helped the Chinese people to claim the final victory in the War of Resistance against Japan. The fraternal assistance that the Soviet Union has provided for the Chinese people while China has been undergoing the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction has also enabled the Chinese people to consolidate and increase their strength rapidly.

At this moment, when Japanese militarism is reviving and when the aggressive forces of Japan rear their heads once again, the impregnable friendship and alliance between China and the Soviet Union is a powerful guarantee that renewed aggression by Japan or by any other country that is in collusion with Japan in terms of aggressive behavior will be thwarted through our concerted effort, and that peace in the eastern hemisphere and throughout the world will be defended.

Long live the great impregnable friendship between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics!

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, September 3, 1952.*

Letter to Huang Yanpei

September 5, 1952

Mr. Renzhi:[226]

Your letter from Beidaihe,[227] your letter of September 4, and the draft of your speech[228] have all been received. Thank you so much.

The intention of the draft of your speech is very good, but I feel that it is a bit too radical, and I am afraid that the majority of the bourgeoisie may not be able to stand it. Therefore, as according to your bidding, I have suggested certain amendments.[229] I wonder if they are suitable: please consider them and make your own decision.

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[226] For reference on the subject discussed in this letter see *Instructions to Huang Yanpei*, p. 157 of this volume. Also see *Letter to Huang Yanpei*, p. 116 of this volume.

[227] Beidaihe, on the eastern coastal tip of Hebei Province, is a popular resort. For its coastal climate it is often recommended by Mao to others as a suitable place for convalescence from illnesses or for relaxation and recuperation.

[228] This refers to the draft of the speech that Huang was to make in September 1952 at the general meeting of the Beijing chapter of the China Democratic National Construction Association. Its title was *How Should we Promote, on the Conclusion of the Three Evils and Five Evils Movements, the Spirit of Chairman Mao's Directive on the Policies of Democratic National Construction?*

[229] Mao made the following amendments to Huang's draft: (1) Where Huang originally had: "The capitalists ought to fully accept working class ideology," Mao changed it to: "The capitalists ought to fully accept the leadership of the working class and the state-run economy." (2) Mao changed the passage reading: "working class ideology to educate and reform

To ask the bourgeoisie to accept the fundamental ideas of the working class—e.g., the elimination of exploitation, the abolition of classes, the elimination of individualism—to accept the Marxist world view, or, as you say: "Without labor there is no living: one must not seek [means of] living outside of labor or the exertion of one's own energies," is to demand of the bourgeoisie that it must accept socialism. This is possible with a small number of progressive elements. However, it is not appropriate to demand this of them as a class as a whole; at least within the period of the First Five-Year Plan it would not be appropriate to engage in such propaganda.

In the present stage [of the development of socialism], we should only exhort them, as a class, to accept the leadership of the working class; i.e., to accept the Common Program. It is not appropriate for us to exceed this boundary.

In the present stage we allow for the existence of the bourgeoisie, but they must be engaged in enterprises that are beneficial to the state and the people, and must not be involved with the "Five Evils".[230] This is the *leadership* of the working class on the bourgeoisie and is stipulated by the Common Program.

It is not possible, or proper, for us to step out of this line and demand that the bourgeoisie accept the working class ideology or, so to speak [for us] to disallow such things as the bourgeoisie's making money by exploitative means and to allow them to only think, as the workers do, that "without labor there is no living"—[to allow them] to only think [in terms of] socialism and not

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capitalists" to "use patriotic ideas and the ideas of the Common Program to educate and reform capitalists" and the passage reading: "help the capitalists to reform their thought" to "help the capitalists to reform those bad ideas, those ideas that do not conform to the ideas of patriotism and the Common Program, i.e., the 'Five Poisons' [evils] ideas" (3)To the sentence in the draft that read: "Some members of the bourgeoisie are bad, some are good" Mao added: "For the majority of the bourgeoisie, within the ideology of any individual among them, there are bad aspects, and there are good aspects, we should help them to discard the bad parts and promote the good ones." (4) At the end of the draft. Mao added the following; "This is what we demand and expect of the majority of the bourgeoisie at the present stage. However, under the current conditions in China, a minority of the bourgeoisie, consisting of people who are farsighted, may in fact exceed these expectations and come to accept the basic ideology of the working class, i.e. the ideology of socialism. They may, on the one hand, continue to run and open up factories, without seeking to be immediately reclassified [as workers] or to alter the appearance of their enterprises and, on the other hand, [however], perceive the great contribution that the socialist enterprise is making to humanity, and [thus] hope to become, in the future, socialist. It is possible that such people exist, and we ought to express to them our welcome."

230. The "Five evils" were—bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing of economic information. Also see *Struggle against 'Three Evils and Five Evils', Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* Volume V.

capitalism.

In the earlier half of this year, some comrades writing articles in *Xuexi* [Study] magazine in Beijing have expressed precisely these opinions; we have already instructed them to make certain revisions and corrections.

With regard to a minority among the bourgeoisie—those people with vision and foresight—I agree with your viewpoint; we can indeed propagandize socialism among them to make them interested in the socialist cause—I think this can be done and is beneficial. Under China's [present] conditions, such people may emerge, and, particularly in a few years' time, when the socialist economic sector grows stronger and larger and has further demonstrated its great contribution to the state and the people, the number of such people may grow gradually.

Of late, your ideas have made much speedy progress. For example, where you spoke in your letter from Beidaihe on the subject of the state's sovereignty and this time on the subject of socialism, this is demonstrated. Nonetheless, what you say is, at the present time, a bit premature. It is possible for a few people to think such things, but it is not possible for them to be put into action. I am expressing my humble opinions above because you seem to place great trust in me. Whether or not they are proper, I would be very happy if you would examine them and teach me your thoughts.

In the near future, when I have the time, I would like very much to have a talk with you.

With my respect,

(Signed and dated)

Sources: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 441-444.*

Letter to Comrade Li Da

September 17, 1952

Dear Haoming:[231]

I have received your letter of September 11 and also the several previous letters. The three characters "Ai Wan Ting" have been written on the separate

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[231] See *Letter to Li Da*, p. 123 of this volume.

[enclosed] sheet.[232]

The third line in paragraph 10, chapter 4, of "On Contradiction" reads: "In any contradiction, and also at any time, the development of the contradictory aspects is uneven." Here the eight characters [for] „and also at any time" should be deleted. They have already been deleted in the second printing of Volume I of *Xuanji* [Selected Works].[233] Please pay attention to this when you write the explanations.

Wishing you well in your teaching.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 445.*

Inscription on the Arts

September 26, 1952

Let a hundred flowers bloom; displace the old and worn, and let new things emerge![234]

Source: *Tianjin Daily, September 26, 1952.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of India

September 26, 1952

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very glad to accept the letter of credence from the President of the Republic of India that Your Excellency has presented and am grateful for Your Excellency's congratulations.

For more than two years, the friendly relations between China and India in the areas of economy and culture have further developed. I believe that the friendly cooperation between our two peoples will be further enhanced and consolidated in our common cause of pursuing peace in Asia and throughout the world.

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[232] Ai Wan Ting is a scenic spot on Mount Yuelu, Changsha, Hunan Province, and it was completely renovated in 1952. Li Da was then president of Hunan University. At the request of Li Da, Mao inscribed in his own hand the three characters Ai Wan Ting.

[233] See *Selected Works*, Volume I.

[234] This is an inscription written for the First National Operatic Exchange and Performance Festival convened by the Ministry of Culture in Beijing from October 6 to November 1, 1952.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the ambassador plenipotentiary and extraordinary of the Republic of India to the People's Republic of China and pledge to Your Excellency assistance in your work of strengthening the friendly cooperation between our two countries.

Best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and the good health of your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, September 27, 1952.*

Inscription for Inauguration of the Tianshui-Lanzhou Railway

September 28, 1952

Congratulations on the opening of the Tianshui-Lanzhou Railway[235] to traffic. Continue to work hard for the construction of the Lanzhou-Xinjiang line.

Source: *People's Daily, September 28, 1952.*

Toast on Third Anniversary of Founding of the PRC

September 30, 1952

Dear Friends:

The third anniversary of the founding of the great People's Republic of China has arrived!

In the past year, we have done much work for the happiness of the people and for international peace; I hope that in the coming year we will be able to accomplish even more.

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[235] The Tianshui-Lanzhou railway was opened to traffic on August 23, 1952. Tianshui and Lanzhou are both in Gansu Province.

Long live the People's Republic of China!

Long live the great unity among the people of China's various nationalities and the overseas Chinese!

Long live the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers![236]

Long live the friendship and unity between China and the Soviet Union!

Long live the friendship and unity between China and Mongolia!

Long live the friendship and unity between China all the various New Democracies!

Long live the friendship and unity among the peoples of all the countries of Asia!

May the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Region be successful.[237]

Long live the friendship and unity of the people of the world!

To everyone's health, bottoms up!

Source: *People's Daily, October 1, 1952.*

Letter to Mao Yuju

October 2, 1952

My dear Yuju:[238]

Messrs. Li and Zou[239] have come to the capital. I have [therefore] received the letter you sent [through them], and I thank you for your kind gift.

Mao Zelian[240] has written a letter to me expressing his grievances. His mother is not yet buried, and the illness in his foot has not yet healed. I am hereby sending three million *RMB*,[241] one million is for Sixth Aunt's funeral costs and two million for the treatment of Zelian's illness. Please tell him not to come to the capital. He can go the Xiangya Hospital in Changsha for treatment. If they cannot cure the problem at Xiangya, nothing better can be done in Beijing.

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[236] Chinese Peoples' Volunteers were sent to Korea in support of the Korean People's war of liberation and to resist the US imperialist aggression.

[237] The Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Region was convened in Beijing, October 2-12, 1952. Thirty-seven countries were represented by 367 delegates and 37 observers. The conference condemned the United States for halting the Korean truce talks and called for the repatriation of prisoners of war in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention.

[238] See *Letter to Mao Yuju*, p. 66 of this volume.

[239] This refers to Li Shuqing and Zou Puxun. See *Letter to Li Jiehou of Shaoshan, Hunan*, p. 24 of this volume and also *Letter to Mao Yuju*, p. 66 of this volume.

[240] See *Letter to Mao Zelian and Mao Yuanti*, p. 143 of this volume.

I am also remitting another two million *RMB* for Zerong (Sunwu)[242] to help him out with household expenses. He sent me a letter to which I have not yet had the chance to respond. Please tell him on my behalf that I will not be writing a separate letter.

I thank you for spending your energy in handling the above-mentioned matters and conveying my sentiments. I wish you health and wellbeing.

(SIGNED AND DATED)

P.S. This money is entirely from payments for my own writings: please tell them to use it sparingly.

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 446-447.*

Telegram to the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Region

October 2, 1952

The Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Region:[243]

The convening of the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Region will be a tremendous contribution to the great common cause of the people of Asia, of the Pacific region, and of the entire world in safeguarding peace.

My sincere wishes for the success of this conference.

(SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPPCC AND DATED)

Source: *People's Daily, October 3, 1952.*

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[241] This figure here is for the old *renminbi* (people's currency), which was in use in the "liberated areas" prior to 1949 and throughout the country from 1950 to March 1955. The new *renminbi* (RMB) was issued by the People's Bank of China on March 1, 1955 with a conversion rate of 10.000 old RMB *yuan* (or dollars) equivalent to one new RMB *yuan*.

[242] Mao Zerong is one of comrade Mao's first cousins. Sunwu (meaning "the diminutive no. 5") is a family nickname for Mao Zerong.

[243] See *Toast on Third Anniversary of Founding of the PRC,* p. 178 of this volume.

Letter to Qi Baishi

October 5, 1952

Mr. Baishi:[244]

I thank you heartily for the gift of your scroll painting *Pu Tian Tong Qing* (Joyous Celebration for All in Heaven), which I have received. I would like to express my gratitude to all your co-creators [of the masterpiece]: Messrs. Xu Shixue, Yu Feian, Wang Shensheng, Hu Peiheng, Pu Yizai, Pu Xuezai and Guan Songfang.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 448.*

Telegram to the German Democratic Republic

October 5, 1952

The President,
The German Democratic Republic
Comrade Pieck:

On behalf of the Chinese people, the government of the People's Republic of China, and on my own behalf, I sincerely extend to you and to the people and government of the German Democratic Republic our heartfelt congratulations on this occasion of the third anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic.

In their struggles to secure a peace treaty and to restore the unity of Germany, to develop the economy and culture, and to consolidate state power, the victories scored by the German people have had a tremendous effect on the prosperity and happiness of the German people and the cause of peace throughout the world. Our best wishes to the German people for securing even greater successes in the struggle they have undertaken to build a unified, peaceful, democratic, and socialist Germany.

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[244] Qi Baishi (1864-1957) was perhaps modern China's most renowned and respected artist. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he was an Honorary director of the Chinese Academy of Fine Arts in Beijing and a chairman of the Association of Chinese Painters. On his death he willed to the Central People's Government all of his works in his possession.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, date in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, October 2, 1952.*

Talk With Tibetan Delegates (Excerpts)[245]

October 8, 1952

The Communist Party has adopted a policy of protecting religions. Believers and nonbelievers, believers of one religion or another, are all similarly protected, and their faiths are respected. Today, we have adopted this policy of protecting religions, and in future we will still maintain this policy of protection.

The problem of land redistribution is different from that of religion. In the regions inhabited by the Han people land has already been redistributed, and in these areas religions are still protected. Whether or not land should be redistributed in regions inhabited by minority nationalities will be decided by the minority nationalities themselves. At the moment, land redistribution is out of the question in Tibet. Whether or not there should be redistribution in the future will be decided by you yourselves; moreover, you yourselves should carry out the redistribution. We will not redistribute the land for you.

The setting up of a military and administrative committee and the reorganization of the Tibetan army were stipulated by the Agreement.[246] [However,] because you were afraid, I have informed the comrades working in Tibet to postpone the implementation [of this]. The Agreement must be implemented, but since you are afraid, implementation will simply have to be postponed. If you are afraid this year, we will wait until next year to implement it. If you are still afraid next year, the [we] will wait for the year after next before implementing it.

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[245] This speech was made at a reception that Mao held for the delegation of the people of the Changdu (Chamdo) region of Tibet taking part in the celebration of the anniversary of the founding of the PRC in Beijing.

[246] This refers to the Agreement between the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, May 23, 1951.

Tibet is a large area with a small population. Its population must be increased from the current figure of two or three million to five or six million. Later it would be good to increase it again to more than ten million. The economy and culture also need to be developed. Culture includes such things as schools, newspapers, cinema, etc. Religion is also included. The reactionary rulers of the past, [whether] the emperors of the Qing Dynasty or Chiang Kai-shek, all oppressed and exploited you, and so did the imperialists. They kept your population down, weakened your economy, and obstructed the development of your culture. The Communist Party puts into practice [the principle of] the equality of nationalities: it does not wish to oppress or exploit you, but rather to assist you—to assist you in developing your population, economy, and culture. When the People's Liberation Army entered Tibet, it was precisely for the purpose of carrying out the policy of helping you. In the early period of its presence there, it may not be of much help, and it may not be of great help even for the next three or four years. Later, however, it will be able to help you, that is certain. If the Communist Party could not help you develop your population, economy, and culture, the Communist Party would be of no use at all... [I] am happy that you have come. During the next few days you can go to Nanjing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong, and the Northeast for a visit. From now on, if more people, both ecclesiastical and lay, and from all different circles of Tibet can come out to visit the various places in the interior, it will help to strengthen the relations of unity and amity among the nationalities in China.

Source: *People's Daily, November 22, 1952.*

Letter to Song Qingling

October 10, 1952

Vice-chairman Song:[247]

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[247] Song Qingling (b. 1892) was one of the most prominent women in China's modern and recent history Born into a family that acquired very considerable wealth and influence, she married Sun Yat-sen in 1914. For the next ten years she was also Sun's confidant in political matters, collaborating with him as a private secretary as well as wife and assistant. After Sun's death, Song Qingling's parting of ways with the rest of her own family came in 1927 when her youngest sister, Meiling, married Chiang Kai-shek. Earlier in that year, she had parted ways with the mainstream of the KMT, which Sun had founded—i.e., with both the Nanjing government and the Wuhan government—for its anti-Communist policies and purges. In 1948 she became honorary chairman of an anti-Chiang KMT splinter group, the KMT Revolutionary Committee. This organization remained active in the PRC

I am extremely elated by your gift of your masterpiece *Wei Xin Zhongguo Fendou* (Struggle for New China), and would like hereby to express my deep gratitude. Your other gifts have also been received and I thank you equally for them.

I wish you health and well-being.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 449.*

Letter to Tan Zhenlin

October 15, 1952

Comrade Zhenlin:[248]

The [information that] Comrade Chen Yun[249] has acquired on conditions in Xiaozheng *xiang,* Qingpu *xian,*[250] is quite worthy of attention. I enclose it here for your perusal; please make a copy of it and send to the Party committee of the South Jiangsu district.

According to Comrade Bo Yibo,[251] when he was in Shanghai, he already knew that last year's grain requisition in the Zhejiang and South Jiangsu districts has been too heavy and that the East China Bureau has resolved to return part [of that] to the peasants. I wonder what the results have been in this matter? How much, in total, has been returned [to the peasants] in the two districts? How many people's problems have been resolved [by the action]? What is this year's harvest like? Has the quantity of the [state] grain requisition been greatly reduced?

In order to resolve this problem, I suggest that you convene at the East Chi-

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after 1949 as one of the "democratic parties".

[248] Tan, was at the time of this letter, third secretary of the East China Bureau of the CC of the CPC.

[249] Chen was at this time a vice-premier of the Government Administration Council and director of the Financial and Economic Commission of the Central People's Government.

[250] This locality is within the municipality of Shanghai.

[251] Bo was at this time deputy director of the Financial and Economic Commission and deputy minister of finance.

na Bureau a special conference of the people responsible for the two districts and the secretaries of the *xian* [Party] committees of some characteristic *xian* in the two districts. Before the meeting is held, you can dispatch two investigation teams, one to go to Zhejiang and the other to South Jiangsu; let them go directly to the villages in several *xian* and investigate [the conditions] in a dozen or so *xiang,* focusing especially on investigating the real situations with regard to the peasants' [contributions to] public grain and other burdens—this then can be the basis for discussion at the meeting.

In short, we must earnestly and solidly resolve the problem of giving relief to those peasants who in the past have had little to live on because the [public] burdens have been too heavy. The grain requisition this year must not exceed the rate stipulated by the Center.[252] [We must] greatly reduce the burden of the people.

I hope that you will notify me your opinions.

In comrade's salute!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 450-451.*

Letter to Li Shuqing

October 16, 1952

Mr. Shuqing:[253]

Your gracious letter has been received. I am very grateful for your conveying to me news of our home village. As for matters related to the localities, I wish only to collect material and information for reference purposes; I do not want to, and should not, directly handle local problems in general [because this would] make it difficult for the local Party and government [organs] to handle their affairs. Please understand my situation and forgive me.

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[252] In February 1950, when the Government Administration Council drew up regulations for the requisition of public grain in the "new liberated areas," it stipulated that such requisition "should not exceed seventeen percent of the gross agricultural income, and the added public grain requisition done by the local people's government must not exceed fifteen per cent of the official grain requisition." In its *Directive on the Work of Agricultural Taxation and Requisition* in 1952 the GAC stipulated: "In those parts of the late liberated areas where land reform has been completed, a unified system of accumulative progressive tax on the basis of a total combined rate will be followed in 1952. The accumulative progressive tax rate will start at seven per cent and end at thirty per cent. As a rule no additional surtax will be allowed." In this way the burden of the peasants was somewhat alleviated.

[253] Li Shuqing, see *Letter to Li Jiehou of Shaoshan, Hunan*, p. 24 of this volume.

With great respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 468.*

Letter to Luo Yuankun

October 22, 1952

Mr. Hanming:[254]

Your letter of October 19 has been received. The two items sent by courtesy of Mr. Li[255] have been read, and I am extremely grateful. The autobiography is written with great spirit and is extraordinarily stimulating: the criticisms and comments [therein] are penetrating and should serve well as a model for the young people. The "characteristics" and other points described in the other item [however,] are for the most part not particularly accurate, being the products of hearsay: please do not have these published. I now send back to you these two items. I have followed your command and have completed the inscription for Mr. Yuan's grave.[256] Please be so kind as to transmit it [to the proper people]. It is very improper for the old monasteries of Xinhua to be destroyed or damaged. Such things have occurred in many places, and [the problem is being handled by] the Government Administration Council through its centralized comprehensive measures of protecting [such historical relics]. For this reason I will not write separately [on these incidents specifically]: I hope you will forgive and understand. It is a very fair suggestion for the older people among the nuns and monks to [be permitted to] remain in the monasteries as caretakers, and the younger ones to take part in labor. I have already transmitted [this suggestion] to the government organs concerned for their consideration and handling.

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[254] Hanming is Luo's honorific name. See *Letter to Wang Shoudao*, p. 94 of this volume.

[255] This refers to the drafts of two articles written by Luo and which he had asked Li Shuqing to carry to Beijing to comrade Mao. One was an autobiographical essay and the other was titled Chairman Mao in the Days of the First Normal School.

[256] See *Letter to Wang Shoudao*, p. 94 of this volume.

In response, and with respectful wishes for your health and safety in the countryside.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 452.*

Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

October 28, 1952

I humbly express my sincere thanks to the Korean people, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and you for your greetings on the occasion of the second anniversary of the entry into the war of the Chinese People's Volunteers to resist America and aid Korea.

I am convinced, too, that our joint righteous struggle to destroy American imperialist aggressors, with the close solidarity of the Korean and Chinese people and the war support of the great Soviet Union and all the peace-loving peoples of the world, will inevitably win ultimate victory.

Source: *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington D.C., Daily Report, November 10, 1952.*

Conversation During an Inspection Tour of the Flood Prevention Works on the Yellow River (Excerpts)[257]

October 29-31, 1952

The people of the old base areas contributed a great deal to the revolutionary cause; we should pay attention to helping them...[258]

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[257] This article was originally published in various newspapers, including *Heanan Ribao* (March 28, 1957) and *Jiefang Ribao* (April 6, 1957). It was also quoted in part in *Hong Qi, Mao Zhuxi de Gongzuo, Xuexi He Shenghuo Diandi* (Bits and Pieces About Chairman Mao's Work, Study and Life) in *Gongren Ribao* (January 15, 1950). Another reprint of the article is in Mao Qunzhong, pp. 1-8.

When this enormous dam[259] is built, the flood hazards of the Yellow River, which have existed for several thousands of years, will be resolved. Moreover, we will be able to irrigate several tens of millions of *mu* in the plains and generate a million kilowatts of electricity. It can also make the river navigable for steamships. All this can be studied...

(At Dongbatou)

Mao: What is this place?

Wang (Huayun): Here is where the Yellow River broke through the dikes in the fifth year of the reign of the Xianfeng Emperor of the Qing dynasty[260] and changed its course. It is called Tongwaxiang.

Mao: How many main embankments and stone dikes of this kind have been built?

Wang: Along the entire river, we have built 1,800 kilometers of embankment and close to 5,000 dikes. In the past, during the rule of the Kuomintang reactionaries, the overwhelming majority of these embankments were built of hay stalks and were far from being solid. Today, they have all been rebuilt with stone.

Mao: For six years the Yellow River has not overflowed its banks and flooded. If from now on we continue to build up embankments and dikes, do you think the Yellow River could still break through?

Wang: This is not the way to bring about a fundamental solution to the

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The author of this article, Wang Huayun, was a worker on the flood Prevention Works on the Yellow River at Lanfeng, Henan. He accompanied Mao on the trip, made in late October 1952, described in the article. The points on the Yellow River that Mao visited on this tour—Lanfeng, Dongbatou, Tongwaxiang—are all points on the southern bank of the Yellow River in northern Henan Province, approximately an area 25-50 km east of the city of Kaifeng. The above represent the more significant exchanges in Mao's conversation with cadres during this tour. All statements, except indicated otherwise are Mao's.

258. This comment was made in response to Chen Zaidao, who was at the time a member of the People's Government of Henan Province. Mao had inquired of Chen how his native village was and Chen explained that although he had not been back to his native village for some twenty-five years, he understood that things were improving since Liberation and since the land reform, even though devastation had been severe during the pre-Liberation period of KMT control. Chen, born in 1908, was a native of Macheng, Hubei. He had been the commander of the Fourth Front Army of the PLA in 1932 and fled to Yanan in 1936, after the defeat at Lushan. He continued to be a military commander of PLA (first in the Eighth Route Army and later in the Second Field Army) from 1937 to 1949.

259. Mao is referring to the Sanmen Gorge Dam.

260. This refers to 1855 AD.

problem. If there should be an extraordinarily heavy deluge, the danger would still be quite great.

Mao: And what if the Yellow River overflows to the skies?

Wang: If we do not build huge reservoirs, we will not be able to stop [the floodwater] just by these embankments and dikes...

There is a lot of water in the South and little in the North. If it were possible, it would be nice to borrow some from the south...

(At Liuyuankou)

Mao: What is this grass?

A comrade: This is called geba grass. The masses plant this type of grass specially on the dikes in order to protect them. The masses say that it creates an advantage, that "with geba grass planted on the dikes, we fear neither rain nor waves,"

Mao: It is also good stuff to feed the livestock.

Mao: What is this place? Is this water level of the river here higher than [the ground] level in the city of Kaifeng?[261]

Wu Zhipu:[262] This is called Liuyuankou. Diagonally across the river is Chenqiao—the location of the Chenqiao military coup, in which Zhao Kuangyun was draped with the yellow' gown.[263] This place is now a ferry crossing.

Wang: The water level is three or four meters higher than the ground level in the city of Kaifeng, and during floods it is even higher.

Mao: Then this is an elevated river...

Mao: Where does this soil come from?

Wang: It is all washed down by the current from the loess plateau in the north-west.[264]

Mao: How much [is carried down]?

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[261] Capital city of Henan Province.

[262] Wu (b. 1906) was then chairman of the People's Government of Henan Province and director of the Head Office of the Yellow River Flood Prevention Committee.

[263] Zhao Kuangyun (928-976) was originally a military commander of troops for the emperor of the late Zhou Dynasty (951-959). In 960 AD, at Chenqiao, as troops under his command marched against the Khitan forces, Zhao's lieutenants staged a coup and had the troops proclaim him emperor. He then accepted the throne from the abdicating Zhou emperor and became, as Emperor Taizu, the first emperor of the Song dynasty. The draping of the yellow gown symbolizes the conferring of royal status, yellow being a royal color in China.

[264] The Chinese term for loess is *huangtu*, or "yellow earth". The loess plateau encompasses parts of Inner Mongolia, the Ningxia Hui Nationality Autonomous Region (NHNAR), and Gansu, Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces.

Wang: According to inspections made by the hydrographic station at Shen *xian*, an average of 1,280 million metric tons is brought past that point each year. (The revised figure is now 1,360 million metric tons.) The sedimentation of such a huge amount of silt accounts for the Yellow River's flooding and changing course.

Mao: Do the work on the Yellow River well.

Source: *Excerpts from Wang Huayun, "Mao Zhuxi shicha Huang he" (Chairman Mao Inspects the Yellow River), in "Chairman Mao is Concerned about Us" (Shanghai: Wenhua, 1958).*

Telegram to the USSR

November 3, 1952

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Comrade Stalin:

On this occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the great socialist October Revolution, on behalf of the Chinese people, the government of the People's Republic of China, and on my own behalf, I sincerely extend to the Soviet people, to the government of the Soviet Union, and to you our sincere congratulations.

With greatest joy, the Chinese people congratulate the great Soviet people on the brilliant, unparalleled successes that they have achieved in the cause of building Communism. These successes are a powerful new inspiration to the Chinese people, who are about to begin economic construction on a large scale, as well as to the laboring people throughout the world.

We congratulate the Soviet people on their tremendous achievements in their unflagging struggle to safeguard and consolidate international peace. These successes have brough defeat after defeat to the plots of the instigators of war and have immeasurably strengthened the confidence of peace-loving people throughout the world in defending peace and preventing war.

May the cause of defending peace in the Far East and the world triumph, and may the great, impregnable friendship between China and the Soviet

Union be ever more consolidated and developed.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, November 7, 1952.*

Inscription on Inauguration of the Kangding-Changdu Section of the Xikang-Tibet Highway

November 19, 1952

In order to help our brothers, the minority nationalities, let us brave any difficulty and energetically build this highway![265]

Source: *People's Daily, November 27, 1952.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Kingdom of Sweden

December 3, 1952

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very pleased to accept the letter of credence from the King of Sweden that Your Excellency has presented and am grateful for your congratulations.

I welcome Your Excellency's appointment as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Sweden to the People's Republic of China.

I am also very happy to accept Your Excellency's assurance that you will strive to strengthen the friendly relations between China and Sweden. I firmly believe that your wishes and efforts in this regard will be met by the support of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I Sincerely wish the King of Sweden good health, the country of Sweden prosperity, and its people, well-being and happiness.

Source: *Guangming Daily, December 4, 1952.*

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[265] The opening of this section of the Xikang-Tibet (Kang-Zhang) Highway was held on Nov. 20, 1952. Kangding is in Sichuan Province. Changdu (Chamdo) is in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

Inscription Concerning Public Health Work[266]

December 8, 1952

Mobilize,
Pay attention to hygiene,
Put down on disease,
Raise the standard of health,
Smash the enemy's germ warfare.[267]

(Signed)

Source: *People's Daily, January 4, 1952.*

Letter to the Anshan Iron and Steel Works

December 14, 1952

The staff and workers of the Smelting Plant at Anshan Iron and Steel Works,
Comrades:

I am very pleased to read your letter of December 2. Congratulations on your newest success in production in open-hearth furnace smelting. With a high degree of enthusiasm in labor and in a creative spirit, aided by the Soviet specialists, you have set a new record, surpassing the level of the capitalist countries in terms of the period for turning out each heat and in terms of the coefficient of utilization of area space at the hearth bottom. This is not only an honor for you, but also a great event for our country along its path to industrialization. I hope you will continue your efforts and strive to accomplish the new task of smelting high quality steel in 1953.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, December 17, 1952.*

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[266] This inscription was written by Mao for the Second National Health Conference.

[267] In February and March 1952, the American forces in the Korean War waged germ warfare by dropping bombs containing viral infected bugs and other insects and bombs containing viral and bacterial culture, first on territories in Korea and then, from late February onward, also on Qingdao and other parts of northeastern China.

Reply to Ambassador of the Soviet Union

December 15, 1952

Comrade Ambassador:

I am very pleased to accept the letter of credence from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which you have presented, and I sincerely thank you for your congratulations.

For the past three years, the friendly and cooperative relations between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have been greatly consolidated and developed. As a result of unceasing efforts by the Chinese people and with the fraternal assistance of the great people and government of the Soviet Union, New China has achieved successes in every area and will soon enter into large-scale economic construction.

I firmly believe that the further development of the great friendship between our two great countries will not only be beneficial to the prosperity of China and the Soviet Union, but will also play an inestimably great role in the cause of ensuring peace in the Far East and in the world.

Comrade Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the People's Republic of China. In your work of consolidating the friendship and cooperation between China and the Soviet Union you will receive my full support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I sincerely wish you complete success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, December 16, 1952.*

Letter to Yi Nanping

December 21, 1952

My dear Nanping:[268]

I have received the book and the two hand-copies which you so graciously sent to me on December 6, 1952. Thank you very much! If you are weak and suffering from many illnesses, it would not be appropriate for you to leave your home, least of all to come to the capital. I am remitting [with this letter] three million *RMB* to help out with [your] medical expenses.[269] I would be grateful if from time to time you would instruct me on the situation in our home village.

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[268] Yi Nanping was a schoolmate of Mao's, when he studied at the Higher middle school of Hunan province. Here Mao used the salutation *xiong* (elder brother).

In response, and with my best wishes for your health and well-being.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 454.*

Reply to the Ambassador of the People's Republic of Romania

December 29, 1952

Comrade Ambassador:

I am very glad to accept the letter of credence from the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the People's Republic of Romania presented by you, and I am sincerely grateful for your congratulations.

In the past three years, the relationship of friendship and cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Romania, in all areas of politics, economy, and culture, has attained a very great development. Such a relationship of friendship and cooperation enhances the prosperity of China and Romania and the friendship of the peoples of the two countries. Moreover it strengthens the force of the camp for world peace and democracy headed by the great Soviet Union.

Under the leadership of Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej[270] the Romanian people are in the midst of victoriously carrying on their socialist construction and have continuously attained brilliant achievements. These achievements have always won the deep regards and praise of the Chinese people.

Comrade Ambassador, I Warmly welcome you as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of Romania to the People's Republic of China. In your work of consolidating the friendship and cooperation between the two countries of China and Romania you will receive my wholehearted support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

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[269] See *Letter to Mao Yuju*, p. 179 of this volume.

[270] Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was Secretary General of the Romanian Workers' Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Român) from 1945 to his death in 1965.

I wish you complete success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, December 30, 1952.*

Telegram to the USSR on the Transfer of the Chinese Changehun Railway

December 31, 1952

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Comrade Stalin:

In the period of joint Sino-Soviet administration of the Chinese Changehun Railway, the Soviet side has made great contributions to the Chinese people's undertaking in railway construction. The Chinese people will forever remember this fraternal, friendly assistance. On this occasion when the Soviet government, in accordance with the 1950 Agreement and the 1952 Communique, is transferring, gratis, to the government of the People's Republic of China all rights to the Joint administration appertaining to the Chinese Changchun Railway and all the property of the railway, I on behalf of the Chinese people and government, extend to the great Soviet people, the government of the Soviet Union, and to you our heartfelt gratitude. May the great friendship between the Soviet Union and China grow and become more consolidated with each passing day.

Source: *People's Daily, December 31, 1952.*

Instruction on the Arts

December 1952

If the proletariat does not take-hold of the arts such as music, chess, calligraphy, and painting, the bourgeoisie certainly will.

Source: *Wind and Thunder in Fine Arts, (August 1967), Red Guard Publication.*

Directive on Education

1952

Don't run schools specially for children of cadres. They should become one with the masses.

Source: *Chairman Mao on the Revolution in Education, Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1967.*

Comment on a Report of the National Labor Insurance Conference

1952

While taking practical steps to increase production and to practice economy, we must pay attention to the workers safety and health and to indispensable welfare undertakings.[271]

Source: *Quanwudi (Invincible) 2, August 8, 1967, Red Guard Publication.*

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[271] The comment was made on a report submitted to the Central Committee of the CPC by the National Labor Insurance Conference which was convened by the Department of Labor on December 23-31, 1952. The labor insurance system was a compulsory insurance system to guarantee the provision of suitable and healthy working conditions and to guarantee compensation for accidental injuries and other disabilities such as maternity. It was inaugurated by the Labor Insurance Code adopted by the seventy-third meeting of the Government Administration Council on Feb. 23, 1951.

1953

Telegram to the Union of Burma

January 2, 1953

On this remarkable Independence Day of the Union of Burma, I, representing the Chinese People's Republic Government and the people of China, Pray for Your Excellency, the Union government, and the people of the Union of Burma.

Source: *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington D.C., Daily Report, January 19, 1953.*

Speech to the Central People's Government Council

January 13, 1953

Throughout the country, military activities on the mainland have already ended, land reform has already been basically accomplished, and people from all walks of life have become organized. Therefore, the conditions are now ripe for convening, according to the stipulation of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the National People's Congress and people's congresses at each local level. This is a great victory achieved by the Chinese people only after decades of struggling for democracy with bloodshed and sacrifice. The convening of the [National] People's Congress will further give full play to the people's democracy and strengthen national construction and the struggle to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. The government based on a system of people's congresses will remain a government based on the united front of all nationalities, all democratic classes, all democratic parties, and all people's organizations throughout the country. It will serve the interest of the entire people of the country.

Source: *People's Daily, January 15, 1953.*

Closing Speech at the Fourth Session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC (Excerpts)[272]

February 7, 1953

First, we must intensify the struggle to resist US aggression and aid Korea. Because US imperialism persists in holding Chinese and Korean prisoners-of-war and undermining the cease-fire negotiations and moreover, is vainly attempting to expand its war of aggression against Korea, the struggle to resist US [aggression] and aid Korea must continue to be intensified. We desire peace, but as long as US imperialism does not discard its barbaric and unreasonable demands and its plots to expand its aggression, the resolution of the Chinese people can only be to continue to fight together with the Korean people to the end. This is not because we like war: we would like to stop the war immediately and wait to resolve the remaining problems in the future, but US imperialism doesn't want to do things this way. If that's the case, that's all right; we'll continue to fight. No matter how many years US imperialism is willing to fight, we are prepared to fight with them for as many years, right up to the time when US imperialism is willing to stop, until the time when the Chinese and Korean peoples are completely victorious.

Second, we should learn from the Soviet Union. We must carry out the great task of construction in our country. The work facing us is difficult and our experience is insufficient; therefore we must earnestly study the advanced experience of the Soviet Union. Regardless of whether they are in the Communist Party or outside the Communist Party, old cadres or new cadres, technical personnel, intellectuals, or the masses of the workers and the masses of the peasants, [our people] all must wholeheartedly learn from the Soviet Union. We should not only learn from the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but must also learn from the Soviet Union's advanced science and technology. We must whip up a high tide of learning from the Soviet Union throughout the whole country [in order] to build our country.

Third, [we] must combat bureaucratism in our leadership organs at all levels and among our leading cadres. At present among a good number of the basic-level organizations and basic-level cadres, serious commandism and breaches of law and discipline are occurring. The occurrence and breeding of such phenomena cannot be separated from the bureaucratism in our leadership organs and among our leading cadres. Take, for instance, the organs at the level of the Center; a good number of leading cadres in a good number of ministries and departments are still satisfied with merely sitting in the government offices writing decisions and issuing directives, paying attention only to arranging and assigning work but not paying attention to going down to the lower levels to get an understanding of conditions and to inspect the work. They have often let their leadership become isolated from the masses and separated from reality and have caused many serious problems to come up in their work. If we want to carry out large-scale national construction we must overcome bureaucratism and link ourselves closely to the masses of the people. Leading cadres at the Center and at all the local levels must all frequently go deep down to the lower levels to inspect the work. Once the leadership organs and leading cadres have overcome bureaucratism, the bad phenomena of commandism and breaches of law and discipline at the lower levels will definitely be overcome. Once these defects have been eliminated, our planned national construction will definitely be successful, the system of the people's democracy will definitely develop, the imperialist plots will definitely be defeated, and we will definitely be able to win total victory.

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[272] This three-point directive was given at the Fourth Session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC, held Feb. 4-7, 1953, in Beijing.

Source: *People's Daily, February 8, 1953.*

Telegram to the USSR

February 10, 1953

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Comrade Stalin:

On behalf of the Chinese people, the government of the People's Republic of China, and on my own behalf, I express sincere gratitude and warm congratulations to the great Soviet people, the government of the Soviet Union, and to you on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.

In the past three years, the relations of close friendship and cooperation between the two great allies, China and the Soviet Union, have attained great consolidation and development. The truly selfless assistance that the government and people of the Soviet Union have given New China has not only accelerated China's economic recovery and development but also will have great significance for the realization of the First Five-Year Plan in China's large-scale national construction.

May the great indestructible friendship between the Soviet Union and China in opposing new aggressive plots of the imperialists and in the task of safeguarding peace in the Far East and the world become more consolidated and developed with each passing day.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, February 14, 1953.*

Instruction on the Daye Steel Plant

February 19, 1953

Strive to expand the capacity of the plant and do a good job of running it.[273]

Conversations with Naval Personnel on the Yangtze River (Excerpts)[274]

February 19-24, 1953

I hear that some of you do not want to serve in the navy. Why? Do you feel that there is too much hardship in serving in the navy?...

You all lead a very hard life!...

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[273] The Chinese version of this inscription, written after an inspection that Mao made of the Daye Steel Plant in southeastern Hubei, about 40 km, southeast of the industrial city of Wuhan, is merely a representation of the four-character slogan (or policy directive) *Ban Da Ban Hao*. It represents a policy of maintaining the quality level of industrial management while at the same time expanding the scope of the enterprises in order to meet the increasing demands of socialist construction. The slogan has been popular since 1952. Quoted in *Wu Shangyin, Mao Zhuxi Er Ci Shicha Daye Gangchang* (Chairman Mao Again Inspects the Daye Steel Plant), in Chairman Mao in Hubei Province, Wuhan, Hubei, Renmin Chubanshe, 1958, p. 267.

If they [the sailors] are obedient, then things will go well. In that case you [first mates] must pay attention to being good teachers to your students!... (Source A, p. 56)

You should settle down, put your worries aside, and be happy about serving in the navy. In the past, when the imperialists invaded our country, in most cases they came from the sea. Even now, the Pacific Ocean is not at all pacific. We ought to have a strong navy... (Source C, p. 77)

We ought to be very closely united with one another. Henceforth, it will be even better. When the worker and peasant elements become intellectuals and the intellectuals become workers and peasants, the distinction between intellectuals and workers and peasants will gradually disappear...

In the past, we were on land, and we loved the mountains and the soil. Now we are in the navy and we ought to love the ship, love the islands, and love the oceans. (Source C, p. 82; Source B and Source D, pp. 581-582)

We must take good care of old machines. We must cherish them and use them well. At the moment we have old machines: later on we will have new ones... You must nurture your children well, and when they grow up, let them have an education so as to lay a firm foundation for the revolution, and so that they may become successors to the revolution. (Source D, pp. 576-577)

More than twenty years ago I was fighting as a guerrilla in these areas. At that time I wore a straw hat and straw sandals. The reactionaries then surrounded us and attacked us on all sides; and yet today, some twenty years later, here I am cruising along on our own naval vessel together with you. (Source A, p. 58)

Thirty years ago I passed through at this spot. At the time the islands were over there; now they have moved over here. In the past the waterway was very narrow; now it has become much wider... The waterway has changed; so has the world! (Source D, p. 582; Source C, p. 83)

The imperialists take advantage of us. We must stand up for ourselves. Our country has such a long coastline, we must absolutely have a strong navy to protect our coastline. At the moment, our navy is still not sufficiently strong; we have yet to develop it in a big way... In the past we only had infantry and artillery soldiers, now we have an air force as well as a navy. Our national de-

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274. On February 19-21, 1953, Mao made a voyage down the Yangtze River onboard several naval vessels, which he also inspected, as a means to gauge the development of China's naval forces. While most of the trip of four days and three nights was spent aboard the "Changjiang," and the "Luoyang," he also inspected the "Nanchang." the "Guangzhou," and the "Huanghe" as well as two torpedo boats, "53-101" and "53-104."

fense forces are growing in strength every day, and only now can our country proceed with its national construction in peace. As long as we work together and apply our efforts, we have a very bright and pleasant future ahead of us. (Source A, p. 59; slightly different versions in Source D p. 579 and Source C pp. 78-79.)

The First Five-Year Plan in our country has begun; do you all know about it?... You are all very young. (Let's see now...) the First Five-Year Plan, the Second Five-Year Plan, the Third Five-Year Plan... you will be only thirty-some years old when we arrive at a socialist society... and you will still be young when we achieve a communist society. (Source A, p. 59; slightly different version in Source D, p. 579)

We must first of all pay attention to political education and enhance the political enthusiasm of the comrades. This book is very good in its contents.[275] The language, too, is simple and very appropriate for the soldiers to read. (Source C, pp. 80-81; slightly different version in Source D pp. 589-581)

We have been fighting for several decades. Our country is still very poor now, but after several five-year plans it will grow powerful.

At this moment, the Pacific Ocean is not pacific. When we have a powerful navy the imperialists will not dare to bully us. We must build the coastline which is over ten thousand kilometers long, into a Great Wall on the sea. (Source D, p. 580)

Furthermore, there's also imperialism (to be opposed)!... Our country is poor and blank, we have very few factories and very little iron and steel. Our line of coastal defense is very long. The imperialists bully us precisely because we have no navy... (Now we have a navy, a navy of our own, a navy of the people.)... You must do a good job and strive to build a powerful navy with combat capacity; then the imperialists will not dare to bully us anymore... You are the navy now. If you are in the navy you mustn't be afraid of storms and waves. You simply must go out on the sea to train yourselves... It does not matter if one's level of education is low. Even the most illiterate person can master technology. You have a high level of class consciousness and abundant combat experience. You are the backbone cadres [of the navy.] In the past we scaled the snow-capped mountains and crossed the marshlands,[276] what difficulty can we not overcome now?...

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[275] Mao is referring to a book given to him by the deputy political commissar of the cruiser Luoyang as an example of books read by the crew members. The book in question apparently dealt with the heroic deeds of a commander of torpedo boat No. 414 during the War of Liberation period.

[276] A reference to the "Long March". In October 1934 the First, Third and Fifth Army

(A comrade reports: Some people say that we have no experience in building a navy [and so] we must learn from other countries in a wholesale and undeviating way. They also say that fighting on the sea is different from fighting on land, and the principles employed in fighting on land are not applicable on the sea.)

We must [of course] learn from the advanced experience of other countries. However, don't think that everything is beater if it is foreign. Our own things must not be discarded. The navy has its own special characteristics, and yet we cannot emphasize the peculiarity of the navy. We must retain the good traditions of our military forces... We can make our own [naval equipment]. In the past, in the period of the War of Resistance against Japan and the War of Liberation, we were able to manufacture our own [equipment]: now we should have an even greater capacity to do so. It won't do for us to rely on others exclusively...

(In a report Mao was told that the emphasis was on the technological sophistication and mobility of the navy, and that the point was made that in a sea battle the role of the people's masses was minimal.)

The navy too must rely on the people's masses and on the fishing people. It cannot become divorced from the masses. It must go among the fishing people to sink its roots. Once we have a base among the masses everything is easier to accomplish. For instance, in the past, when we fought a battle, we knew a lot about the enemy's situation, but the enemy was unable to fathom our troops' maneuvers. This is the effect of the [favorable] conditions provided [us] by the masses [in our struggle]. The army must rely on the masses in fighting a battle, so must you when you fight a battle on the sea. No matter where you go you must rely on the masses. (Largely based on Source D pp. 586-587; partly on Source C pp. 86-87)

Source A: *Members of the crew. Cruiser XX, Nan Wangde Hangxing (An Unforgettable Voyage), in Mao Guanhuai, pp. 51-65.*

Groups of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (that is, the First Front Army of the Red Army, also known as the Central Red Army) set out from Changting and Ninghua in western Fujian and from Ruijin, Yunu and other places in southern Jiangxi and started a major strategic movement. In traversing the eleven provinces of Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan, Xikang, Gansu and Shaanxi, crossing perpetually snow-capped mountains and trackless grasslands, sustaining untold hardships and frustrating the enemy's repeated encirclement, pursuits, obstructions and interceptions, the Red Army covered 25,000 li [12,500 kilometers] on this march and finally arrived triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern Shaanxi in October 1935.

Source B: *Zhao Laijing, Mao Zhuxi He Shuibing Tanhua (Chairman Mao Converses with Sailors), in Zhongguo Qingnian Bao [Mar 26, 1954], 1.*

Source C: *Correspondent for Xinhua News Agency et al., Weida Ee Hangcheng (A Great Voyage), reprinted in Mao Gushi, vol. 2 pp. 76-78.*

Source D: *Wei Xinwen, Mao Zhuxi Yongyuan Huozai Shuibing Xinzhong originally in Jiefangjin Wenyi, II (1975), and reprinted in Huiyi Mao Zhuxi, pp. 573-588.*[277]

Inscription Written for the Navy

February 21, 1953

In order to oppose the invasion of imperialists, we absolutely must build a strong and powerful navy.

(SIGNED)

Source: *Beijing Review, Weekly, Beijing, January 3, 1968.*

Telegram to the USSR

February 21, 1953

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Comrade Stalin:

On this occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrade Chairman, please accept my sincere congratulations. May the powerful armed forces of the Soviet Union attain further successes in their cause of defending world peace and security.

(SIGNED AND DATED IN BEIJING)

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[277] There are four records of the conversations that Mao had with naval personnel on this trip. There is a great deal of overlapping in these four versions. Those excerpts comes from the relatively significant pieces of conversation.

Source: *People's Daily, February 23, 1953.*

Inscription Awarded to Soviet Troops in Lüshun

February 22, 1953

The intimate unity between the two great peoples—the Soviet People and the Chinese People—and between their armed forces is a reliable safeguard for peace in the Far East and in the world.[278]

Source: *People's Daily, February 23, 1953.*

Telegram to Inquire after Stalin's Illness

March 4, 1953

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Dear Comrade J. V. Stalin:

On learning the unfortunate news that you have come down with a severe illness, the Chinese people, the Chinese government, and myself, bearing feelings of deepest concern, extend to you our sincere sympathy and wish with all our hearts that your condition will take a turn for the better, that you will be restored to health, and that the prayers of the peace-loving people of China and of the whole world may be answered.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, March 5, 1953.*

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[278] On February 22, 1953, a delegation of the PRC government headed by Premier Zhou Enlai, visited the Soviet Union's troops stationed in the Lushan region pursuant to the Sino-Soviet agreement on the joint administration of the region which was a corollary agreement of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance signed on February 14, 1950. The delegation celebrated the thirty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union's armed forces with the Soviet troops in Lüshun-Dalian. Mao's inscription was embroidered on a banner which was awarded by the delegation to the Soviet troops.

Telegram to the USSR on Stalin's Death

March 6, 1953

Chairman,
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Comrade Shvernik:

It was with boundless grief that the Chinese people, the Chinese government, and I myself learned the news of the passing away of the Chinese people's closest friend and great teacher, Comrade Stalin. This is an inestimable loss, not only for the people of the Soviet Union, but for the Chinese people, for the entire camp of peace and democracy, and for peace-loving people throughout the world. On behalf of the Chinese people, the Chinese government, and on my own behalf, I extend to you and to the people and government of the Soviet Union our deepest condolences.

The victory of the Chinese people's revolution is absolutely inseparable from Comrade Stalin's unceasing care, leadership, and support of over thirty years. Since the victory of the Chinese people's revolution, Comrade Stalin and the people and government of the Soviet Union, under his leadership have rendered generous and selfless assistance to the Chinese people's cause of construction. Such a great and profound friendship as that which Comrade Stalin had for the Chinese people will be forever remembered with gratitude by the Chinese people. The immortal beacon of Comrade Stalin will forever illuminate the path on which the Chinese people march forward.

Comrade Chairman, the glorious party of Lenin and Stalin and the great people and government of the Soviet Union will certainly have the brotherly confidence and support of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese people, and the Chinese government. With the greatest resolve, the Chinese people definitely will always and closely unite as one with the great Soviet people to consolidate and strengthen the world camp for peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union, heighten their vigilance, redouble their efforts, strike at the provocateurs of war, and strive to the end for the lasting interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples and of world peace and security. I believe that the laboring people and all progressive peace-loving people of the world will take the same path as we do, following the direction pointed out by Comrade Stalin, and take up the sacred cause of protecting world peace.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, March 7, 1953.*

Central People's Government's Decree on Stalin's Death

March 6, 1953

Generalissimo Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of our great ally, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, unfortunately passed away at 9:50 pm (Moscow time), March 5, 1953. In order to express the Chinese people's immensely profound mourning at the demise of our great Comrade Stalin, the great leader of the world's laboring people and the most respected and beloved friend and mentor of the Chinese people, and in order to express the Chinese people's reverence for the leader of our great ally, it is hereby decreed that:

From March 7 to March 9, 1953, flags shall fly at half-mast throughout our country as a symbol of mourning:

In this period of mourning, all factories, mines, enterprises, units of the armed forces, government organs, schools, and people's organizations shall suspend all banquets and other forms of entertainment.

(Signed as Chairman and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, March 7, 1953.*

Letter to Huang Yanpei and Chen Shutong

March 8, 1953

Dear Venerable Mr. Huang Ren and Venerable Mr. Chen Shu:[279]

Please read the enclosed article and afterward, return it to me. If you have opinions [on it], please let me know.

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[279] See *Letter to Huang Yanpei*, p. 116 of this volume, also see *Letter to Chen Shutong*, p. 102 of this volume.

Venerable Mr. Ren[zhi], in your letter you said that you would like to transmit what I said in our previous conversation to the industrial and commercial circles. I think that you can tell a few people those things that I said that were related to principles, such [as the words to the effect that] things should be [handled through] discussion and negotiation, that things should be fair, that people should do just as much business as they have capital for, and that they should be taxed in proportion to the amount of profit they make. As for the other [things I said], there is no need for them to be transmitted. [Also], even in the case of the words of principle, you should only talk about them in an informal way, and do not need to transmit them in any formal manner. This is because these words are indeed too common; they belong to the realm of common knowledge. It is only because there is a severe problem of bureaucratism in our government work and because many things are not done well that these words appear to be somewhat novel. As for the concrete methods of resolving [these] problems, they must be seriously and separately studied by the ministries of finance, the taxation offices and other offices before [the problems] can be appropriately and adequately resolved.

In salute,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 455.*

The Greatest Friendship

March 9, 1953

Comrade Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, the greatest genius of the present age, the great teacher of the world Communist movement, and the comrade-in-arms of the immortal Lenin, has departed from the world.

Comrade Stalin's contribution to our era through his theoretical activities and practice is incalculable. Comrade Stalin represented our entire new age. His activities have led the Soviet people and the working people of all countries to turn around the whole world situation. That is to say, the cause of justice and of People's Democracy and socialism has achieved victory in an immense region of the world, a region embracing more than 800 million people—one third of the earth's population. Moreover, the influence of this victory is daily spreading to every corner of the world.

The death of Comrade Stalin has caused the laboring people of the whole world to feel unparalleled and profound grief; it has stirred the hearts of just people throughout the world. This demonstrates that Comrade Stalin's cause and his thought have gripped the broad masses of the people throughout the world and have already become an invincible force, a force that will guide those people who have already achieved victory in achieving still more fresh victories, one after another, and, at the same time, will guide all those people who are still groaning under the oppression of the evil old world of capitalism so that they can strike courageously at the enemies of the people.

After the death of Lenin, Comrade Stalin led the Soviet people in building into a magnificent socialist society the first socialist state in the world, which he, together with the great Lenin, created at the time of the October Revolution. The victory of socialist construction in the Soviet Union was not only a victory for the people of the Soviet Union, but also a common victory for the people of the whole world. First, this victory proved in the most real—life terms the infinite correctness of Marxism-Leninism and concretely educated working people throughout the world on how they should advance toward a good life. Second, this victory ensured that during the Second World War humanity would have the strength to defeat the Fascist beast. The achievement of victory in the anti-Fascist war, and the glory for these victories, should be attributed to our great Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin developed Marxist-Leninist theory in a comprehensive and epoch-making way and propelled the development of Marxism to a new stage. Comrade Stalin creatively developed Lenin's theory concerning the law of the uneven development of capitalism and the theory that it is possible for socialism to first achieve victory in one country; Comrade Stalin creatively contributed the theory of the general crisis of the capitalist system; he contributed the theory concerning the building of communism in the Soviet Union; he contributed the theory of the fundamental economic laws of present-day capitalism and of socialism; he contributed the theory of revolution in colonies and semi-colonies. Comrade Stalin also creatively developed Lenin's theory of party-building. All these creative theories of Comrade Stalin's further united the workers throughout the world, further united the oppressed classes and oppressed people throughout the world, thereby enabling the struggle of the world's working class and all oppressed people for liberation and well-being and the victories in this struggle to reach unprecedented proportions.

All of Comrade Stalin's writing are immortal documents of Marxism. His works, *The Foundations of Leninism, The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Bolshevik],* and his last great work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,* constitute an encyclopedia of Marxism-Leninism, a synthesis of the experience of the world Communist movement of the past hundred years. His speech at the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a precious last testament bequeathed to the Communists of all the countries of the world. We Chinese Communists, like the Communists of all countries, search for our own road to victory in the great works of Comrade Stalin.

Since the death of Lenin, Comrade Stalin has always been the central figure in the world Communist movement. We rallied around him, constantly asked his advice, and constantly drew ideological strength from his works. Comrade Stalin was full of warmth for the oppressed peoples of the East. "Do not forget the East" — this was Comrade Stalin's great call after the October Revolution. Everyone knows that Comrade Stalin warmly loved the Chinese people and regarded the might of the Chinese revolution as incalculable. On the question of the Chinese revolution, he contributed his exalted wisdom. It was by following the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, along with having the support of the great Soviet state and all the revolutionary forces of other countries, that the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people achieved their historic victory a few years ago.

Now we have lost our great teacher and most sincere friend—Comrade Stalin. What a misfortune this is! The sorrow that this misfortune has brought us cannot be described in words.

Our task is to transform sorrow into strength. In memory of our great teacher Stalin, the great friendship between the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people [on the one hand] and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people [on the other] formed in the name of Stalin will never cease to be strengthened. The Chinese Communists and the Chinese people will further intensify the study of Stalin's teachings and the study of Soviet science and technology in order to build our country.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a party nurtured personally by Lenin and Stalin; it is the most advanced, the most experienced, and the most theoretically cultivated party in the world. This party has been our model in the past, is our model at present, and will still be our model in the future. We fully believe that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union and the government of the Soviet Union headed by Comrade Malenkov will definitely be able to carry on Comrade Stalin's unfinished work and push the great cause of Communism forward and carry it to greater and more glorious development.

There is not the slightest doubt that the camp of world peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the Soviet Union will become even more united and even more powerful.

In the past thirty years, Comrade Stalin's teachings and the model of the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union have facilitated a major step forward for the world. Now that the Soviet Union has become so powerful, the Chinese people's revolution has achieved such great victories, construction in the various people's democracies has achieved such great success, the movement of the peoples of various countries throughout the world against oppression and aggression has risen to such heights, and our front of friendship and solidarity is so consolidated, we can say with complete certainty that we are not afraid of any imperialist aggression. Any imperialist aggression will be smashed by us, and all their despicable provocations will be to no avail.

The reason that the great friendship between the peoples of the two countries, China and the Soviet Union, is unbreakable is that our friendship has been built on the great principles of the internationalism of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. The friendship between the peoples of the two countries, China and the Soviet Union, and the peoples of the various people's democracies, as well as with all the people who love peace, democracy, and justice in all the countries of the world is also built upon these great principles of internationalism and consequently is also unbreakable.

Clearly, the strength created by this kind of friendship of ours is inexhaustible and truly invincible.

Let all imperialist aggressors and warmongers tremble before our great friendship!

Long live the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin!

Immortal glory to the heroic name of the great Stalin!

Source: *People's Daily, March 9, 1953.*

Telegram to Czechoslovakia on Gottwald's Death

March 15, 1953

The Presidium of the Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia:

It was with the most profound grief that I learned the news of the passing away of Comrade Gottwald. Comrade Gottwald was not only a great leader of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, but also an outstanding fighter in the cause of world peace and democracy. His death is an irreparable loss to the Czechoslovakian people and to the entire camp for world peace and democracy. On behalf of the Chinese people, the Chinese government, and on my own behalf, I sincerely express to you and through you, to the Czechoslovakian people our deepest sorrow.

I am confident that Comrade Gottwald's brilliant contributions will forever inspire the Chinese and Czechoslovakian peoples to march forward heroically and triumphantly in the cause of further consolidating and developing the intimate unity and friendly cooperation between the Chinese and Czechoslovakian peoples and further strengthening the camp for world peace and democracy headed by our common ally, the great Soviet Union.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, March 15, 1953.*

Telegram to Palmiro Togliatti

March 25, 1953

Secretary General,
The Central Committee,
The Communist Party of Italy.
Dear Comrade Togliatti:

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and I convey our warmest congratulations to you and to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy on the occasion of your sixtieth birthday.

Since your youth, you have devoted your life entirely to the cause of the liberation of the Italian laboring people. Relying on your heroic struggle and outstanding leadership, the Communist Party of Italy has already become a glorious banner of the Italian working class, a powerful political force in Italy, and one of the world's great bulwarks of Marxism-Leninism. Your brilliant contributions to Italy's revolutionary cause, to the international workers' movement, and to the movement for world peace have won you the respect and love, not only of the Italian people, but also of the people of China and of all countries of the world.

For victory in the cause of Italy's liberation from oppression by United States imperialism and its running dogs and victory in the cause of world peace and progress headed by the Soviet Union, I wish you good health and long life!

(Signed as Chairman of CPC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, March 26, 1953.*

Instruction on Leadership Work of Health Departments of Military Commissions

April 3, 1953

The disclosure by Comrade Pai XXX made me think of whether there is any major difference between the leadership work of the government health departments and that of the army's health departments. I suspect that the leadership work of the government health departments is in the same mess as that of the army's health departments. We can see neither the political leadership nor any serious professional or technical leadership. But because of the fact that there is no one else but Pai XXX who makes such a well-grounded disclosure, we still do not know much about this...

Then the fact exists that there is no leadership, no politics, and no serious administration of the business departments. The people who run these departments are bureaucrats who just eat without working. Such a condition exists not only in the health departments of military committees but also in other departments. I ask you, in the present struggle against bureaucratism, to unmask these people and set up new organs which really do the work to replace the old ones.

Source: *Selections from China Mainland Magazine; Weekly, Hong Kong (Supplement) 22, April 8, 1968.*

Reply to Ambassador of The Soviet Union

April 3, 1953

Comrade Ambassador:

I am very happy to receive the letter of credence presented by you from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and am sincerely grateful for your congratulations.

Through their close mutual assistance and cooperation, the people of China and the great people of the Soviet Union have established an unbreakable friendship. All the successes attained by New China in the areas of economy and culture and the implementation of its large-scale national construction plan, which is beginning just now, are inseparable from the sincere and fraternal assistance of the people and government of the Soviet Union.

I deeply believe that with the concerted efforts of the peoples of the two countries, the great friendship and unity between the Chinese and Soviet peoples is bound to continue to develop and be consolidated ceaselessly. The boundless strength generated by our friendship will definitely play an incomparably great role in the cause of peace and security throughout the Far East and in the whole world.

Comrade Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the People's Republic of China. In your work of consolidating the friendship and cooperation between China and the Soviet Union, you will receive my complete support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I sincerely wish you total success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, April 4, 1953.*

Letter to Li Zhuchen

April 21, 1953.

Mr. Zhuchen:[280]

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[280] 280. See *Letter to Li Zhuchen*, p. 128 of this volume.

I have received and read your letters of April 19 and April 20. Thank you very much. You have done a lot of investigative work. Your proposals[281] will help to resolve the current problems. I have already transmitted your letter to many comrades concerned [with these problems] for their reading.

In response and with my respect.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 457.*

Letter to Li Zhuchen

April 26, 1953

Mr. Zhuchen:

I have received your letter of April 21.

Although one may have to do many things, one can make an [orderly] arrangement so that during any particular period one needs to be dealing with only one major problem. In that way one may not feel too busy.

In response and with my respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 458.*

Letter to Huang Yanpei and Chen Shutong

May 15, 1953

Messrs. Renzhi and Shutong:[282]

These two articles contain some material worth reading. Please send them back [when you are done]. The crux of the matter with the problem of privately run [enterprises], like that of [the problem of] publicly run [enterprises], lies with democratic reform and production increase and thrift. When this problem is resolved other problems, such as the problem of the relationship between labour and capital, will be easy to handle.

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[281] Li went to do investigative studies at certain factories and, afterwards made a number of proposals to Mao concerning the resolution of problems in the relationship between public and private sectors, between labor and capital, and in the area of tax burden, funding, etc., in industry and commerce.

[282] See *Letter to Huang Yanpei*, p. 116 of this volume. Also see *Letter to Chen Shutong*, p. 102 of this volume.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 459.*

Instructions on Education[283]

May 17, 1953

In order to run the schools well, we must first of all resolve the problem of the backbone of the leadership in the schools...

Once you have a strong principal, good teachers will be produced...

By pedagogical reform we mean the reform in the contents of education and in teaching methods. Therefore we ought to revise the teaching materials and compile [manuals on] pedagogical methodology...

In primary school education, labor education ought to be emphasized...

The document concerning the system of five-year primary school [curriculum] is not bad...

We must develop the schools with all sorts of diverse methods: we must not insist on uniformity...

Primary schools that are run by the people [themselves] ought to be allowed.

Source: *Chairman Mao on the Revolution in Education*, Beijing, *Renmin Chubanshe*, 1967.

Letter to Wang Jiaxiang

May 27, 1953

Comrade Wang Jiaxiang:[284]

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[283] These instructions were issued at a Political Bureau Meeting.

[284] Wang Jiaxiang was head of the Foreign Liaison Department of the CC of the CPC at

In the "Manual for Advisors" given to comrades working in Vietnam,[285] in the first article, there should be, to follow the sentence: "Cherish the people of Vietnam and each blade of grass, each tree [in their country]," the addition: "Honor Vietnam's national independence and respect the customs of the people of Vietnam; support the Vietnam Workers' Party and Comrade Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Party and the people of Vietnam.

If that document has not yet been issued, I hope that we are in time to make the above-mentioned additions to the text.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 460.*

Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Mongolia

July 2, 1953

Comrade Ambassador:

I am very happy to receive the letter of credence from the Presidium of the Greater Khural of the People's Republic of Mongolia which you have presented, and I am sincerely grateful for your congratulations.

In the past three years or more, the relationship of friendship and cooperation between the People's Republic of Mongolia and the People's Republic of China has achieved extremely great development and consolidation. The agreement on economic and cultural cooperation signed last year by the governments of China and Mongolia not only further strengthens this relationship of friendship and cooperation between our two countries, but also greatly promotes the friendship between and well-being of our two peoples.[286]

The Mongolian people have already obtained great successes in their work of construction. These successes have always won the deep concern and the

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the time of this letter.

[285] This set of regulations, rendered as guwen shouze in the Chinese, refers to a set of rules and work instructions formulated by the Foreign Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CPC in May 1953 for the PRC's delegation of advisors working in Vietnam (The Democratic Republic of Vietnam).

[286] An agreement on economic and cultural cooperation in the period 1952-1962 was signed by the PRC and the People's Republic of Mongolia on October 4, 1952.

praise of the Chinese people. I deeply believe that the unity, which grows ever more intimate between the peoples of China and Mongolia, is bound to enhance our strength for the defense of peace in the Far East and in the world and will further consolidate the world camp for peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the great Soviet Union.

Comrade Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from the People's Republic of Mongolia to the People's Republic of China. In your work of consolidating the friendship and cooperation between China and Mongolia you will receive my total support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I wish you complete success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, July 3, 1953.*

Letter to Fu Dingyi

July 7, 1953

Mr. Yucheng:[287]

I have received your gracious letter today in which you asked me to write an inscription for the new printing of your work, *Lianmian Zidian* (Dictionary of Interlocking Phrases). Since I have not had the opportunity to study your masterpiece I cannot give you my opinion. As for mentioning "The great deeds and achievements of the Emperor of Qin and the [Emperor] Wudi of the Han"[288], perhaps you, sir, have made a mistake in what you heard. You are a writer and an analogy [between your achievements] and those of the feudal emperors and kings of ancient times would appear rather improper. I beg your forgiveness for where I cannot comply with your request, and hope that you will understand.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selection from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 461.*

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[287] Yucheng is the honorific name of Fu Dingyi. Fu was the director of the historical archives and museum of the CC of the CPC at the time of this letter.

[288] Qin Shi Huang (First Emperor) of the Qin dynasty ruled China from 221 to 207 BC. Emperor Wudi of the Han dynasty ruled from 140 to 87 BC.

Letter to Huang Yanpei

July 30, 1953

Mr. Renzhi:[289]

I have received and read both of your letters—the one you wrote on leaving [Beijing] and the even more recent one. The improvement in the general circumstances [in the country] is a product of the combined effort of people in all areas. I congratulate you, sir, on the insights you have reaped from reading Marx's works. The weather is hot, and it is advisable for you to spend a bit more time on the coast.

With my respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 462.*

Telegram to the USSR

July 31, 1953

Comrade G. M. Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Comrade V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union:

Our sincere thanks to the various peoples of the Soviet Union and to you for the congratulations you have expressed on the occasion of the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

The realization of the Korean armistice is a great victory for the camp for world peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union. The persistent efforts that the government and people of the Soviet Union have contributed toward peacefully resolving the Korean question have played a great role in terminating the Korean war.

The Chinese people will forever unite with the great Soviet people, the heroic Korean people, and all the peace-loving people of the world and will continue to strive for the cause of strengthening and defending peace in the Far East and throughout the world.

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[289] See *Letter to Huang Yanpei*, p. 116 of this volume.

(Co-signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC with Zhou Enlai as Premier of GAC and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 1, 1953.*

Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

August 12, 1953

The Chairman,
The Standing Committee,
The Supreme People's Assembly,
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Comrade Kim Du Bong:

On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the liberation of Korea, please accept my sincere congratulations to all the Korean people and to yourself.

May the heroic Korean people who have defeated the United States imperialist aggressors achieve great success in their cause of striving to halt a resurgence of aggressive war and to establish a peaceful, unified, and independent new Korea.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 15, 1953.*

Letter to Ye Gongzuo

August 16, 1953

Mr. Yuhu:[290]

I have received your gracious gift of the volume of portraits of Qing dynasty scholars. Thank you very much indeed! I wonder if you have access to the first volume? If you do, would it be possible for me to borrow it for a look?

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[290] See *Letter to Ye Gongzuo*, p. 171 of this volume.

With my respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 463.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Albania

August 20, 1953

My sincere thanks to the Albanian people, to the People's Government of Albania, and to you personally for your greetings on the occasion of the signing of the Korean armistice. The Chinese people will continue their relations with all the people of the world, led by the Soviet people, for a lasting peace in the Far East and in the world.

Source: *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington D.C., Daily Report, August 21, 1953.*

Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

August 25, 1953

Comrade Kim Il Sung, Premier of the Cabinet of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:

I hereby wish to express my heartfelt thanks for the congratulations extended to me on the occasion of the twenty-sixth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's liberation Army by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the entire Korean people and you. The Chinese people will... (intently) goodwill and solidarity with the brotherly Korean people, and will jointly fight to the last for the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue and for lasting peace in the Far East and of the world.

Source: *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington D.C., Daily Report, August 26, 1953.*

Address at the Establishment of the Institute of Military Engineering and the Inauguration of its First Term

August 26, 1953

President Chen, professors, teaching assistants, students and staff of the Institute of Military Engineering, Comrades:

At this moment of the beginning of a new term for you, I extend to you my warmest and most enthusiastic congratulations.

I take this opportunity also to express our heartfelt thanks to the government of the Soviet Union and the Soviet experts who have so enthusiastically aided us in planning and creating this institute.

The establishment of the Institute of Military Engineering of the Chinese People's Liberation Army has an extremely great significance for our country's national defense enterprise; in order to build a modernized national defense [system], our army, air force, and navy must all possess fully mechanized equipment and armaments, and none of this can be achieved without complex specialized technology. What we direly need today is a large number of people who are capable of managing and steering the direction of technological [advancement] and to see to it that our technology may improve and make progress uninterruptedly. The purpose for the creation of the Institute of Military Engineering is precisely to resolve this urgent and yet glorious task.

Learning from the Soviet Union's experts has been a fine tradition that we have followed throughout the history of the construction of our armed forces. No matter at what time or in whichever department of our work, we should [continue to] do so. This is something that has all the greater significance for this Institute of yours. You must learn from the Soviet Union's advanced scientific and technological knowledge, learn from the Soviet Union's rich experience in the construction of military science, and emulate the learning mentality and working attitude of our comrades, the Soviet Union's experts, and their highly developed spirit of patriotism and internationalism. In learning one must be modest and earnest; one must not become self-satisfied and arrogant as soon as one has learned a little bit.

There is something that you in this Institute, and everybody in the armed forces, must fully understand and never, not even for a single moment, forget, and that is: Maintain and develop the glorious tradition of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and particularly the heroic spirit of dedicating oneself wholeheartedly to serve the people and of self-sacrifice!

I hope that you will unite, and be of one mind, building and running this Institute well, respecting the experts, dedicating yourselves to diligent study, and strive for the accomplishment of the glorious task that the People's Military Commission has placed on your shoulders.

Source: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, Red Guard Publication, p. 253.*

Letter to Li Shuqing

August 27, 1953

Mr. Shuqing:[291]

I have received the letter that you wrote me after we parted. Thank you very much. I hope that you will, at your convenience, tell me a few things about what's happening in our home village. Please take good care of yourself.

Allow me also to express to you my regards,

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Zhou Libo's article A Journal of Five Days in Shaoshan in the Traveler (Monthly) 2, February 22, 1958, Beijing.*

Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

August 30, 1953

On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, I sincerely extend my greetings to the Vietnam people, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and you, Comrade.

I wish that the Vietnam people may score many new victories in their struggle against aggression and for the independence and liberation of their Fatherland, and wish that the fraternal friendship between the peoples of Vietnam and China may consolidate day after day.

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[291] See *Letter to Li Jiehou of Shaoshan, Hunan*, p. 24 of this volume.

Source: *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington D.C., Daily Report, September 2, 1953.*

Telegram to the USSR

September 2, 1953

Comrade G. M. Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union,
Comrade V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union:

On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, on behalf of the Chinese people and the Chinese People's Liberation Army, I extend our warm congratulations to the people and the armed forces of the Soviet Union.

From beginning to end, in the protracted and difficult war to resist Japanese imperialist aggression and in the fighting that finally crushed Japanese imperialism, the Chinese people received the support and assistance of the Soviet people. This was especially true in 1945, when, owing to the fact that the Soviet armed forces joined the war and fought alongside the Chinese people, we defeated Japanese imperialism and achieved the final victory.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, with the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, the unbreakable friendship between China and the Soviet Union has already been and is still being consolidated and developed with each passing day. This great friendship has now become a strong guarantee of peace in the Far East and throughout the world.

On top of this we also should point out here that the fraternal assistance that the Soviet Union has given the Chinese people is an important factor in the rapid restoration of China's economy and in its stepping onto the path to planned construction.

The recent signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement is clearly a great, new achievement in the efforts of the entire camp for peace and democracy to win peace and to prevent new war. This important new achievement has contributed to the beginning of the easing of tension in the world as a whole.

At the same time, it will also contribute to the efforts of the Japanese people in obtaining normalized relations with the various countries of the Far East so as to prevent the revival of Japanese imperialist aggression.

Long live the eternal cooperation between China and the Soviet Union in the just cause of defending peace in the Far East and throughout the world!

(Co-signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC with Zhou Enlai as Premier of GAC and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, September 3, 1953.*

Telegram to the Chinese People's Volunteers[292]

September 12, 1953

The Twenty-fourth session of the Central People's Government Council heard the report made by XXX, XXX, on the work of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Resisting the US and Aiding Korea. It expresses its complete satisfaction at the glorious achievements that the Chinese People's Volunteers have attained in coordinating with the Korean People's Army in resisting aggression and defending the peace, and at the fact that they have, on this basis, persisted in their striving for negotiations for an armistice for the peaceful resolution of the Korean problem, and its glorious victory in having attained the truce in Korea.[293] The Central People's Government thanks you for your nonpareil contribution in this war for justice and expresses to you its warm and enthusiastic felicitations and greetings.

On October 25, 1950, just when the US aggressive forces invaded the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in full force, and threatened our own northeastern frontiers at the Yalu and Tumen rivers, severely menacing our country's security, the Chinese People's Volunteers heroically moved toward Korea to back up the Korean People's Army in resisting the encroachment of the US imperialists. In the ensuing two years and nine months, the Chinese People's Volunteers, acting in accordance with the will of the people of their homeland, stood shoulder to shoulder with the Korean People's Army and, with the full support of the Chinese and Korean peoples and the enthusiastic sympathy and support of the various countries in the democratic camp headed by the great Soviet Union and that of all peace-loving people around the world, fought unyieldingly, persisted in the efforts to attain negotiations, and finally repelled the enemy's frenetic aggression, exposing his true brutal and warlike face, inflicting on the enemy severe defeats on the military, political and moral fronts, thus forcing it to accept an armistice. The achievements of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army in standing and fighting together stand as shining examples of the internationalism and patriotism of the Chinese and Korean peoples, and demonstrate the firm solidarity and invincible strength of our camp for peace and democracy. They have won the respect and praises of all the progressive people of the world.

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[292] Text of a telegram drafted by Mao on behalf of the Central People's Government Council. Extracted from *Selected Compilation of Materials*, January 1967, Red Guard Publication, pp. 154- 155.

[293] Also see *Our Great Victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and Our Future Tasks*, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V.

The victory represented by the Korean Armistice has totally shattered the maniacal plans of US imperialism for swallowing all of Korea and invading our country's northeastern region, and protects the peace and security of China, Korea, and the Far East [as a whole]. It has put down and defeated the invader's fierce flames [of aggression] and has greatly fanned the spirit of courage and faith among the peace-loving people of the world to strive for lasting peace and against aggressive war. The Chinese people, together with the heroic Korean people and their army, have, with the example of their victory, shown the people of the world a truth: that the aggressive war conspiracy of the imperialist must and can be defeated, and as long as all peace-loving people unite as one to oppose the intervention [of their own countries] in the domestic affairs of other countries, to oppose wars of aggression, and to insist on resolving matters of international dispute by means of peaceful negotiations, peace is guaranteed.

The victory of the Korean Armistice is a triumph for the movement among the peoples of the world for the peaceful resolution of all international disputes. However, the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement is but the first step toward the peaceful resolution of the Korean problem. The peaceful resolution of this problem with the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and under the spirit of having the Korean people handle their own affairs is something that is left to the discussions and settlement of a higher-level political assemblage [in the future.] The Chinese people have always advocated resolving international disputes by means of peaceful discussion, and they are willing to stand firm as a powerful back-up force for the peaceful resolution of international issues.

In view of the fact that the bellicose elements in the United States and the

Syngman Rhee faction in Southern Korea are still in the midst of carrying out all sorts of plots and conspiracies to forestall or sabotage [the convening of] a political assembly and further undermine the armistice, all our comrades [in] the Chinese People's Volunteers must double their vigilance and continue to strive to raise their military and political standards. They must reinforce their own combat strength, further strengthen and develop the friendship between the Chinese people and the Korean people, and hold even more fast to their battle positions together with the Korean People's Army so as to prevent any acts of aggression or provocation by the enemy.

The Chinese people themselves shall carry out economic construction with all their might, strengthen their national defense forces, and continue to develop in a more in-depth manner the movement to *Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea*, so as to back up the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army. The government and people of the People's Republic of China will do all they can to help the heroic Korean people heal the wounds of war and restore a life of peace.

We are convinced that with the encouragement and support of all the people of the homeland, all our comrades in the Chinese People's Volunteers will live up to the hopes and expectations of the people of the homeland and continue to strive to ensure the thorough implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement, for the peaceful resolution of the Korean people, and for the defense of peace in the Far East and throughout the world!

Long live the memory of the martyrs who gave their lives in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea!

Long live the impregnable and eternal friendship between the people of China and Korea!

Telegram to the USSR

September 15, 1953

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Comrade Malenkov:

At a session on September 15, 1953, the Central People's Government

Council of the People's Republic of China heard with satisfaction the report made by Comrade Li Fuchun, representative of the Delegation of the Government of the People's Republic of China, regarding its negotiations with the government of the Soviet Union over the issue of the Soviet government's aid to China's economic construction. The Central People's Government Council unanimously feels that since the great Soviet government has agreed to systematically lend economic and technical aid to China in the construction and renovation of its ninety-one new enterprises and in the fifty enterprises now under construction and renovation, the Chinese people will, with their efforts to learn from the advanced experience and latest technical achievements of the Soviet Union, be able to gradually build up their own powerful heavy industry. This plays an extremely significant role in China's industrialization in its gradual transition to socialism, and in the strengthening of the camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union.

In a single negotiation session, the two countries reached a solution on the issue of the construction of ninety-one enterprises and solved the problem of long-term aid. This is an unprecedented event in history, fully manifesting the truth of the statement made by the great Stalin: "The experience of this cooperation shows that not a single capitalist country could have rendered such genuine and technically refined and advanced assistance to the People's Democracies as the Soviet Union is rendering them. The point is not only that this assistance is [rendered at] the cheapest rate possible but is technically first rate. What is of primary importance is that at the base of this cooperation there lies a sincere desire to help one another and to seek common economic progress."

In the course of negotiations, the Soviet government, based on the more than thirty years of rich experience in its great socialist construction, has offered to us various proposals, either in principle or in concrete terms, with regard to the tasks set out in China's five-year plan. These proposals will help us avoid as many mistakes and detours as possible in the course of China's economic construction.

On behalf of the Chinese government and the Chinese people, I extend my heartfelt gratitude to the government and people of the Soviet Union for this great, comprehensive, long-term, and unselfish aid. The Chinese government and people are willing to devote their unflagging efforts to strengthening the economic cooperation and friendly alliance between the Soviet Union and China so as to facilitate our common struggle for the cause of world peace.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, September 16, 1953.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia on the Death of Bumatsende

September 24, 1953

I am deeply grieved to learn of the death of Comrade Gonchigiyn Bumatsende.[294] Comrade Gonchigiyn Bumatsende was on outstanding fighter in the revolutionary movement of the Mongolian people and a close comrade-in-arms of Marshal Choibalsan.[295] He devoted his whole life to the Mongolian people's revolutionary cause.

The passing away of Comrade Gonchigiyn Bumatsende is a great loss to the Mongolian people. On behalf of the Chinese people, the Chinese government, and on my own behalf, I express our deepest sorrow to you, and, through you, to the Mongolian people.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, September 25, 1953.*

Letter to Shen Junru

September 27, 1953

Director Shen:[296]

I have received and read your letter to me of September 16 and the enclosed documents. The damage of schistosomiasis is very severe, and we must, absolutely, pay the greatest attention to its prevention and cure. I have sent your letter and the documents over to Comrade Xi Zhongxun[297] and put him in charge of handling the matter.

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[294] Bumatsende (alternatively spelled Bumtsend) was elected by the Eight Greater Khural of the People's Republic of Mongolia in 1940 as the head of the National Lesser Khural, and held this position until 1953.

[295] See *Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia*, p. 152 of this volume.

[296] At this time of the letter Shen was the director of the People's Supreme Court.

In reply, and with my respect.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 464.*

Letter to Mao Yueqiu

October 4, 1953

Comrade Yueqiu:[298]

I have received the letter which you sent to me.

For the purpose of understanding what is going on in our home village (not, and I must make this perfectly clear, so that you can come to celebrate my birthday—for purposes of cutting down expenses, we must not, at any time for any year, have birthday celebrations) I consent to your coming for a trip to the capital. There is also Mao Xishen (I don't know his address) and Wen Dongxian[299] (of Tangjiaduo)—these two comrades have in the past written letters to me expressing their wish to come to see me. If you and other comrades in the village agree, you may arrange things with the two of them and come to the capital together. Only you three should come; all other comrades who have not made these prior arrangements must not come; no exceptions. After coming and staying for a brief spell in the capital, you will go back to the village.

When you come, first *bring this letter* to the United Front Department of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee in Changsha and ask the comrades there for assistance. They will issue the three of you money for transportation to the capital. Ask them also to send one person to escort you to the capital.

Furthermore, please *bring this letter* to the *xiang* government authorities of Shaoshan and Shicheng, to the comrades in charge of the local district governments and Party organs of these two places, and discuss things with them. If they agree, ask them to prepare a written report of the conditions in those two *xiang* and districts, and the problems and difficulties which need urgently to be resolved, and you may bring this to me for reference purposes (not that we can directly and immediately resolve these problems in the *xiang*). When you come, be sure that you *do not* bring any presents.

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[297] Xi Zhongxun was director of the Land Reform Committee of the North-west Military and Administrative Committee.

[298] Mao Yueqiu was a receptionist at Mao Zedong's old home (which had become a sort of museum of the Communist revolution for tourists) at Shaoshan *xiang*, Xiangtan *xian*, Hunan, of which he was also a native. He had been a secretary of the CPC Party branch at Ciyue, Shaoshan, in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

[299] This refers to a cousin of Mao Zedong's.

The time for you to come to the capital is the sooner the better; I hope you would not come any later than October 20-25.

My respects,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 465-469.*

Letter to Ma Xulun

October 5, 1953

Mr. Yichu:[300]

I hear that you are ailing, and I am very very concerned. I urge you to devote yourself entirely to the restoration of your health and to resting, and pay attention to nothing else. Take whatever time as needed—don't put a limit on your period of rest—and return to work only after your health is fully restored. If you have any needs at all, please let me know at any time.

Respectfully I wish you a rapid recovery of your health!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 467.*

Telegram to the German Democratic Republic

October 5, 1953

President Wilhelm Pieck,
The German Democratic Republic

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[300] See *Letter to Ma Xulun*, p. 75 of this volume.

Dear Comrade President:

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic, on behalf of the Chinese people, the government of the People's Republic of China, and on my own behalf, I extend my most sincere congratulations to the peace-loving people of all Germany and to you personally.

The Chinese people have followed with great gladness the achievements attained by the German Democratic Republic in the past four years in all areas of politics, economy, and culture. The victories which, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, the German people have attained in the struggle against provocation by international reactionary forces, and the great results obtained in the negotiations between the government of the Soviet Union and the delegation of the government of the German Democratic Republic in Moscow, have made a tremendous contribution to the cause of consolidating peace in Europe and throughout the world.

May the German people attain even greater victories in their glorious cause of striving to establish a unified, independent, democratic, and peace-loving Germany. In this cause, the German people will always have the deep sympathy and complete support of the Chinese people and government.

(Signed as Chairman of CPG of PRC, dated in Beijing.)

Source: *People's Daily, October 7, 1953.*

Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

October 16, 1953

Respectfully to Comrade Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

(On behalf of the Government) and people of China, I sincerely thank the people and Government (of the Vietnam for having sent their greetings on the occasion of the anniversary of the) establishment of the People's Republic of China. I also wish that the Vietnam people may score many more victories in their glorious work to achieve national independence and freedom.

Source: *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington D.C., Daily Report,* *October 26, 1953.*

Speech at Reception for Tibetan Delegation[301]

October 18, 1953

We must unite with all the various nationalities; no matter whether it is a large or small nationality, we must be united with it. For example, the Olunchun people may be no more than four thousand people, but we must be united with them just as well[302]. As long as they are Chinese people, regardless of national distinction, we must be united with all those who are opposed to imperialism and who stand for patriotism and advocate unity. We should be united [first], and [then] carry out our work [in separate ways] in accordance with the varying conditions in the various nationalities' areas. In some places [work] can be done a bit more quickly, in other places somewhat more slowly. In either case, things should be discussed first before they are carried out Without discussion, [they] should not be forcibly carried out. When they have been discussed and approved by the majority, then they can be carried out with deliberation. Even good things must be discussed first before they can be implemented. Doing things after discussion is what distinguishes the Communist Party from the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang oppresses people whenever they hold the upper hand. Not only do they oppress the minority nationalities; they even oppress the majority of the Han people as well. The Kuomintang does bad things. We shouldn't do bad things; those among our cadres who have committed mistakes ought to be criticized. Please speak up concerning the shortcomings and mistakes in our work in Tibet; you may speak your mind with regard to anything with which you disagree and which you believe to be detrimental to the interests of the people, so as to help us correct [these mistakes]. [When we] have committed a mistake, we [seek to] correct it immediately; this is where we differ from the Kuomintang.

China as a whole is still very backward at the moment, and is in need of being developed. This is because of the oppression by imperialism and the Kuomintang in the past. They have now been driven away by us, and, in the last four years, we have made great improvements. After the [period of] national economic recovery, we have inaugurated, this year, the First Five-Year Plan for National Construction. We estimate that after three five-year plans, our major industries will have been established. The Soviet Union chased away imperialism and the bad people at home thirty-six years ago, and it took them thirty-six years of construction to achieve what they have now achieved. We are going to be a bit faster in our construction because we will have the Soviet Union's assistance. The population in China is very large; we have over five hundred million people and are the most populous country in the world. We also have a very vast territory. Given three five-year plans we shall be able to do quite well in our construction, and then we shall be able to give greater assistance to Tibet.

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[301] The Tibetan delegation was in Beijing for the National Day celebration of the PRC.

[302] The Olunchun people are a tribal people residing in Inner Mongolia. By the mid 1960s they actually reached a population of only 2,400-2,500.

If there is anything that the central [government] can do to assist you, it is bound to do so. It is in the interests of the entire country for us to aid the various minority nationalities, thus enabling them to develop and improve. The development and improvement of the various minority nationalities is a hopeful matter.

The political, economic, cultural and religious development of Tibet must be carried out primarily on the shoulders of the leaders and people of Tibet themselves and through the discussions [among themselves]; the Center can only give assistance. This is an item written into the *Agreement on the Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet*. However, it will be some time before [these things] can be carried out, and, moreover, [they] must be carried out on the basis of your volition and gradually. Whatever can be done will be done; if something cannot be done [as yet], we will wait a bit. If there is something that can be done, and on which the majority has agreed, it would not be good not to get it done. [However] it can be done somewhat slow; so that everyone will be happy about it, and, in that way, in reality it may actually be done more quickly. In any case, our policy is one of being united in our progress and further development.

Source: *Selected Compilation of Materials—January 67, Red Guard Publication, pp. 8-9.*

Letter to Yang Shangkun

October 22, 1953

Comrade Shangkun:[303]

Please take the six points in the conclusion of [the book] *Liangong Dang Shi* (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Bolshevik]) and print them as a single leaflet to be sent tonight or tomorrow to the various comrades attending the organizational meeting.[304] Please ask them to make use of the two or three days recess in the meeting to read, study, and where possible, even discuss [these points], so that when Comrade Liu Shaoqi and others reach this issue in their speeches in the conference, they [the attending comrades] may already have some understanding of this matter. When the leading group meets this afternoon, please notify Comrades Liu, Rao, and Hu Qiaomu[305] of this matter (i.e., the matter of printing and distributing the concluding points [of the book]). While you are it, you may print some extra copies (you may print one or two thousand copies) and distribute [the surplus] to cadres in Beijing, and charge the General Party Committee[306] with notifying the various departments and Party groups, urging them to read and discuss [the subject].

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 469.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Albania

October 22, 1953

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[303] See *Letter to Hu Qiaomu,* p. 97 of this volume.

[304] This refers to the Second National Organizational Work Conference convened by the Central Committee of the CPC from September to October 1953 in Beijing.

[305] This refers to Liu Shaoqi and Rao Shushi, in addition to Hu Qiaomu.

[306] This refers to the general Party (CPC) committee of the various organs directly subordinate to or affiliated with the Central Committee of the CPC at the time. It was the general Party leadership organ for the organs directly under the Central Committee, the Central People's Government, and the Military Commission as well as the people's organizations at the central level.

Comrade Enver Hoxha, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania, Tirana:

I extend to you on behalf of the Chinese people and their Government sincere thanks for the congratulations that the Albanian people, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, and you personally extended to us on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China.

Source: *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Washington D.C., Daily Report, October 23, 1953.*

Letter to Wen Jiuming

October 25, 1953

Comrade Jiuming:[307]

I have received your letter of October 2. You appear to have some opinions about the conditions in our home village to tell me; you may come to the capital for a trip [to do this]. You must furnish your own fare for the journey, and I will reimburse you for it later. Mao Zerong, whose nickname is Songwu,[308] is my brother. He lives outside the *xian* gate [of Shaoshan *xiang*]. He has written me many times indicating a desire to come to the capital. Please look him up and come with him. He has never left home, so please give him whatever assistance you can. He, too, should furnish his own fare, and I will also reimburse him later. When you come, don't ask the United Front Department of the Provincial Party Committee for assistance if you can manage without them, but if you cannot raise the funds for the trip, then you may bring this letter to the comrades in the United Front Department and ask them to give you some help. It will be cold on the trip, so each of you should bring a thin cotton quilt blanket.

Don't bring any presents; this is most important. Other people must not come with you.

(Signed and dated)

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[307] Wen Jiuming was Mao's nephew.

[308] See *Letter to Mao Yuju*, p. 179 of this volume.

P.S. It would be best if you can arrive at the capital by the early part of November.

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 471.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia

October 28, 1953

Honorable Ambassador, Your Excellency:

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence from the President of the Republic of Indonesia presented by Your Excellency, and express my deep gratitude for the congratulations conveyed by Your Excellency from the President, government, and people of the Republic of Indonesia.

The friendship that has existed for a long time between the two peoples of China and Indonesia has been further developed over the past three years as a result of the establishment of new diplomatic relations between our two countries. I believe that from now on, with the efforts of Your Excellency, the economic and cultural relations of friendship and cooperation between China and Indonesia will grow daily ever closer, and the promotion of such friendly relations will contribute to the Asian and world peace that the people of all countries are striving to attain.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Indonesia to the People's Republic of China. In your work of strengthening the friendship and cooperation between the two countries, you will receive my assistance and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I wish Your Excellency success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, October 29, 1953.*

Criticism of the Ministry of Public Health[309]

October 1953

The Ministry of Public Health has been beset with many very serious shortcomings during the past few years. The most serious one is that [the Ministry] is short on politics, short on political work. There is too little Marxism-Leninism and socialism there. The Party must exercise overall leadership; it must lead health work... He Zheng's[310] thinking, namely, that health work is a specialized technical type of work... [and that] since the Center knows nothing about technology it is uncertain whether or not the Center could solve [any problem] even if it were reported to the Center... is completely erroneous. The Ministry of Public Health must exert the greatest effort to solve this problem.

Source: *Invincible (Red Guard Publication) 17, June 25, 1967.*

Telegram to the USSR

November 5, 1953

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Comrade Malenkov:

On the occasion of the thirty-sixth anniversary of the great October Revolution, on behalf of the Chinese people, the Chinese government, and on my own behalf, I extend to you warm and sincere congratulations.

Since the victory of the October Revolution, the Soviet state has, like a beacon, illuminated the path of forward progress for the exploited peoples and oppressed nations throughout the world. The increasingly glorious achievements of the Soviet people and the strength that they recently acquired in their cause of building communism have inspired all progressive humanity to be filled with confidence and to strive for a good future.

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[309] This criticism of the Ministry of Public Health was made at a meeting of the Political bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC in October 1953.

[310] He Zheng was the secretary of the first Party Group of the department of Health Care.

The stand taken by the Soviet Union to peacefully resolve all international disputes and its efforts in opposing the imperialists' policy of aggression prove that the interests of the Soviet Union and those of peace and freedom—loving people throughout the entire world are totally in line with each other. Good and honest people of all countries are recognizing more and more clearly that the Soviet Union is a strong bulwark for defending world peace and human justice, and moreover, the anti-Soviet slander of the imperialists is only one part of their despicable scheme to enslave humanity.

Through the rich historical experiences of the past thirty-six years, the two peoples of China and the Soviet Union have knit together an unbreakable brotherly friendship. At present, as the People's Republic of China, with the generous assistance of the Soviet Union, is progressing along the glorious path of socialist industrialization and the socialist reform of its national economy—a path already traveled victoriously by the Soviet Union — people of our country sense more than ever the priceless treasure of the close ties between the Chinese and Soviet peoples and the friendship between the two countries.

In the interests of our two people's common development and in the interests of world peace and the progress of humanity, may the great friendship between China and the Soviet Union remain forever consolidated and be continuously developed!

(SIGNED AND DATED IN BEIJING)

Source: *People's Daily, November, November 7, 1953.*

Reply to Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic[311]

November 12, 1953

Comrade Ambassador:

I am very happy to receive the letter of credence from the President of the German Democratic Republic which you have presented, and I am sincerely grateful for your congratulations.

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[311] This speech was made on the occasion of the elevation of the diplomatic relations between the GDR and the PRC to ambassadorial level.

In the past four years, the relations of friendship and cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic have made tremendous progress. The transformation of the diplomatic missions between the two countries into embassies will not only further strengthen the close cooperation between the two countries in all areas of politics, economy, and culture, but will also have great significance for the consolidation of the camp for peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the great Soviet Union.

The great successes of the German people in their work of national construction and in their struggle to attain peace have already made the German Democratic Republic a strong bulwark of the forces of peace and democracy in the whole of Germany and a principal factor in the defense of peace in Europe and the world. I believe that, with the assistance of the great Soviet Union and with the sympathy and support of all the people's democracies and peace-loving people of the world, the German people are bound to attain even greater victories in their just struggle for a unified, independent, democratic, and peace-loving Germany. The German people will forever have the full support of the Chinese people in this struggle.

Comrade Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Democratic Republic to the People's Republic of China. In your work of consolidating the friendly and cooperative relations between Germany and China, you will receive my full support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I sincerely wish you complete success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, November 13, 1953.*

Reply to Minister of the Republic of Finland

December 2, 1953

Mr. Minister:

I am very happy to receive the letter of credence from the President of the Republic of Finland presented by Your Excellency and am grateful for the congratulations to the government and people of the People's Republic of China and myself expressed by the President of the Republic of Finland through Your Excellency.

In the last three years or so, the relations of friendship and cooperation between China and Finland in terms of economy and culture have attained a remarkable development. I believe that from now on, with Your Excellency's efforts, the friendly relations between our two countries will, on the present foundation, grow closer with each passing day. The enhancement of these friendly relations will not only further consolidate the friendship between the peoples of our two countries, but will contribute to world peace which all people in the world are striving to attain.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Finland to the People's Republic of China. In your work of strengthening the friendship and cooperation between China and Finland, you will have my assistance and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I wish Your Excellency success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, December 3, 1953.*

Letter to Dai Yuben

December 9, 1953

Comrade Yuben[312]:

I have received your letter of September. I apologize for being so tardy in responding. It is very good that you are working at the Workers' Hospital, and I hope that you can persevere in your work there. When you go to a new place, it is very likely that you will encounter some difficulties [at first]; what you should do is persevere and thereby gradually overcome the difficulties there, and after a while, things could become smoother. In this way, both yourself and the country will benefit.

In reply and with my best wishes for your continued efforts.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 472.*

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[312] Dai was a native of Hunan, who studied at the Self-Teaching University founded by Mao, and who, at the time of this letter, was working at the Workers' Hospital of Tangshan.

Reply to Minister of the Kingdom of Denmark

December 12, 1953

Mr. Minister:

I am happy to accept the letter of credence from His Majesty, the King of Denmark, presented by Your Excellency, and am grateful for your congratulations.

The Chinese people attach great importance to the development of commercial and cultural relations between the peoples of China and Denmark, and believe that the development of these relations will be of assistance in promoting friendship between the two countries and defending world peace.

I welcome Your Excellency as the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Denmark to the People's Republic of China, and pledge to your Excellency my assistance in your work aimed at strengthening the friendly relations between our two countries.

Best wishes for the prosperity of your country, the prospering of your people, and the good health of His Majesty, your King.

Source: *People's Daily, December 12, 1953.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

December 12, 1953

Comrade Ambassador:

I am very pleased to accept this letter of credence from the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which you have presented, and I sincerely thank you for your congratulations.

For over three years, the Chinese and Korean peoples have knit together a most profound friendship in the struggle to resist the United States aggressor. The recent signing of the Economic and Cultural Cooperation Agreement between our countries further consolidated and developed the already longstanding and unbreakable relations of friendship and mutual assistance between our two countries.[313] Our increasingly strong unity undoubtedly will continue to contribute to the cause of safeguarding peace in the Far East and in the world.

I firmly believe that with the brotherly aid of countries in the camp for peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union and with the sympathy and support of the peace-loving peoples of the world, the heroic and industrious Korean people are bound to be able to attain new and glorious successes in the cause of recovering and developing their national economy and in striving for the peace and unification of their homeland.

I warmly welcome you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the People's Republic of China. In your work of strengthening and developing the brotherly friendship, mutual assistance, and cooperation between China and Korea, you will receive my full support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I sincerely wish you complete success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, December 13, 1953.*

Letter to Liao Jingwen

December 13, 1953

Comrade Jingwen[314]:

I have received your October letter and Mr. Xu's painting of galloping horses, and I deeply cherish the memory of him. I am now sending Comrade Tian Jiaying[315] to find out how things are with you. If you have any difficulties please feel free to inform me.

With my regards,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 473.*

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[313] A ten-year agreement on economic and cultural cooperation to take effect from December 1953 was signed between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Nov. 23, 1953, in Beijing.

[314] Liao Jingwen is the widow of the famous artist Xu Beihong, who died in September 1953. See also *Letter to Xu Beihong*, p. 29 of this volume.

[315] Tian was Mao's private secretary at the time of this letter.

Reply to Ambassador of the Soviet Union

December 15, 1953

Comrade Ambassador:

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which you have presented, and I sincerely thank you for your congratulations.

The brotherly friendship between the People's Republic of China and the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has achieved tremendous progress in the past four years and is consolidated with each passing day. The Chinese people have always esteemed the friendship of the Soviet Union. Today, in undertaking the cause of large-scale national economic construction, they recognize even more deeply the invaluable treasure of the Soviet Union's great friendship. The Chinese people will certainly, with unwavering effort, always continue to strengthen the intimate friendship, alliance, and overall cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. I am equally convinced that the unbreakable alliance and cooperation between our two great countries not only completely corresponds to the interests of our peoples, but moreover plays a great, incomparable role in the cause of consolidating the camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union and of safeguarding peace and security in the Far East and the world.

Comrade Ambassador, I welcome you with extreme warmth as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the People's Republic of China. In your work of consolidating the friendship, mutual assistance, and cooperation between the two countries of China and the Soviet Union, you will receive my full support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I wish you complete success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, December 16, 1953.*

Telegram to Anshan Workers and Staff

December 25, 1953

All workers and staff of Anshan Iron and Steel Company Comrades:

I received your letter of December 21, 1953.

The construction projects of the Anshan Seamless Tubing Mill, the Anshan Heavy Rolling Mill, and the Anshan No.7 Blast Furnace have been completed ahead of schedule, and they have begun production. All of these are great events in our country's development of heavy industry in 1953. I convey warm congratulations and deep gratitude to all the workers and staff who were engaged in these three construction projects, all the workers and staff of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company, and all the comrades of the Soviet Union who assisted in Anshan's construction. The people of our country are now united as one in a struggle to realize the socialist industrialization of our country. Your heroic labor is a major contribution to this goal. I hope you will continue your endeavor, learn from the advanced experience of the Soviet Union, make full use of your wisdom and strength, and strive for even greater achievements.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, December 26, 1953.*

Remark to Ke Qingshi[316]

December 26, 1953

Some people want me to go and take a rest. There are two types of resting: one is to sleep in bed; the other is to sleep in a drum.[317]

Source: *Combat Bulletin for the Criticism of Tan Zhenlin, Red Guard Publication, 7:484, August 5, 1967.*

Inscription in Guest Book of the Moganshan Clinic

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[316] The above comment was made in response to a letter written to Mao by Zhenlin and Chen Pixian, to which Ke Qingshi attached his signature also.

[317] Mao is here making a slight deviation from the aphorism *meng zhai gu li* (to be sealed in a drum), which translates as "being kept in the dark about things."

Winter 1953

It takes patience to recuperate from an illness, and furthermore, it requires the spirit to struggle. After striving day after day [I hope that] health will be restored to my body.

Source: *A Brief Compilation of Materials on the Life of Mao Zedong, Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1970, p. 308.*

Comment on the Department of Health Care

1953

It's a total mess. There is no visible political leadership; nor can there be seen any earnest professional or technical leadership...

[It] is a department without leadership, without political [awareness], department that does not even manage its professional [duties] in earnest...

[It] is a bureaucratic office where people specialize in eating and in acting as an officer and a lord and master... This is utterly intolerable…

[In] the current struggle against bureaucratism, [we must] tear away [their] masks, completely overthrow these [organs], change their appearance, and establish in their place organs that are truly capable of achieving some work.

Source: *This is an excerpt from the Red Guard Publication "Invincible", June 26, 1967, p. 17. This criticism was made in Mao's comments on a report submitted by the department of Health Care. He Zheng was the secretary of the First Party Group of that department.*

Directive on Physical Culture

1953

Physical culture is of major importance, concerning as it does the health of our six hundred million people.

Source: *Beijing Review, 17:36, September 6, 1974.*

Inscription for No. 1 Automobile Manufacturing Plant of Changchun

1953

In Memory of the Foundation laying of No. 1 Automobile Manufacturing Plant.

Source: *People's Daily, September 22, 1976.*

Directive on the Work of the Ministry of Geology[318]

1953

The Ministry of Geology is a department of investigative and research work. It should [pay attention to] key issues, and [yet] also be comprehensive…

At the moment you are engaged in a battle, in tactics. In the Past you have done the work of [laying out] strategies; this must be strengthened step by step.

Reconnaissance is the battle; prospecting is the tactic; the strategy is to conduct geological investigations on a region-by-region basis.

Source: *Revolution in Science and Technology, July 28, 1967, Red Guard Publication.*

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[318] This is an excerpt from *Dazibao Xuanbian* (Selections from Big-Character Posters) of the Battalion of the Revolutionary Rebels of the Offices of the Ministry of Geology., no. 14

1954

Telegram to the USSR[319]

January 4, 1954

Dear Comrades!

I thank you profoundly for your congratulations on the occasion of my birthday.

Permit me to wish that the Soviet people, under the direction of the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union, will achieve new successes in the great cause of construction of communism.

Source: *Pravda, Izvestia, Jan 9. 1954.*

Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

January 29, 1954

I hereby sincerely thank you, comrade, the Government, and people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for your New Year Greetings and I hereby wish you, comrade, good health. I believe that in the new year the Vietnam people, under your leadership, will win greater victories in the righteous struggle against imperialism.

Source: *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington D.C., Daily Report, February 1, 1954.*

Telegram to the USSR

February 11, 1954

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Comrade Malenkov:

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[319] The telegram was addressed to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, Comrade Chairman, please accept my sincere gratitude and warm congratulations.

The events that we have experienced in the past four years have clearly borne out that the great alliance between China and the Soviet Union is a dependable foundation for safeguarding peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world. The sincere and unselfish assistance given to China by the government and people of the Soviet Union has had vital significance in quickening China's socialist industrialization, ensuring China's steady transition to socialism, and expanding the strength of the camp for peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union.

May the friendship and unity of the two peoples of China and the Soviet Union always develop and be consolidated forever.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, February 14, 1954.*

Telegram to the USSR

February 21, 1954

Chairman,
The Council of Ministers,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Comrade Malenkov:

On the occasion of the thirty-sixth anniversary of the founding of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, I express to you, comrade chairman, our sincere congratulations. May the glorious Soviet armed forces gain daily in strength in its cause of consolidating and defending world peace.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *New China News Agency, Daily Bulletin, February 23, 1954.*

Letter to Tian Jiaying

March 2, 1954

Comrade Jiaying:[320]

Please make a copy of the letter from Yang Xiusheng[321] and forward it to Mr. Yang Kaizhi in Changsha.[322] Inquire of him whether or not the things described in that letter are true. I have absolutely no recollection of these things.

For this current year [our commitment] is to send, as a subsidy, 12 million yuan (*RMB*)[323] to the Yang family. The six million for the first half of the year should be sent out immediately. Please handle this matter.

Madam Li Shuyi is the widow of Comrade Liu Zhixun of Changsha (a martyr).[324] Her vocation is teaching, but she is advanced in years and the teaching is becoming too much of a burden for her, and it would be difficult for her to go on much further. Someone has asked me to recommend her to a position at the Beijing Literature and History Museum. The requirements of the Literature and History Museum [in terms of the qualifications of its staff members], however, are rather high. I have indeed recommended several people, but they have not been accepted and it does not seem appropriate for me to make any more recommendations. I intend, rather, to aid her with some of the fees I receive for my writing, and thus to resolve this problem. What I do not know is whether or not she herself, on her part, would accept this type of assistance. She is a very close friend of Yang Kaihui's, so there is nothing wrong with my assisting her in some way. Please write a letter to Mr. Yang Kaizhi, asking him to relay the question to Madam Li Shuyi, and ask her to express her feelings [on this].

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 475.*

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[320] Tian Jiaying [a.k.a. Chen Yeping] was Mao's private secretary at the time of this letter.

[321] Yang Xiusheng is a cousin of Yang Kaihui, Mao's late wife.

[322] See *Letter to Wang Shoudao*, p. 7 of this volume.

[323] See *Letter to Mao Yuju*, p. 179 of this volume.

[324] See *Letter to Li Shuyi*, p. 58 of this volume.

Letter to Huang Yanpei

March 12, 1954

Vice-premier Huang:[325]

I have received and read your letter of March 8, I have also forwarded the appended article to Premier Zhou and Minister Li Weihan[326] for discussion and their information. [The term] "people" refers to the bourgeoisie and the democratic parties, and does not include the landlord class or the bureaucratic capitalist class; in other words, it does not "include everyone." The phrase "painless labor"[327] is best left out in the publication, because, in fact, those people who do not have much [class and political] awareness would feel some pain. If we write too many checks[328] we may cause [people to have] dreams and fantasies, and if we do not then double [our efforts] in educating [them] and studying, if we do not raise their levels of political consciousness, those people who do feel pain would resent us. I pray that you would give some consideration to this.

My respectful regards for your health,

(Signed and dated from Hangzhou)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 477-478.*

Telegram to Kim Du Bong[329]

March 14, 1954

On the occasion of your sixty-fifth birthday, I express warm greetings to you. May you have good health and attain more and greater achievements in your work of promoting the recovery of the national economy of your country and striving for the peaceful unification of Korea.

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[325] See *Letter to Huang Yanpei*, p. 116 of this volume.

[326] See *Letter to Li Weihan*, p. 123 of this volume.

[327] This refers to a draft of Huang's speech to Shanghai industrial and commercial circles on March 1, 1954. In this draft, Huang had planned to use the metaphor of "painless labor" to describe the transition of industrial and commercial enterprises to the socialist stage. On Mao's suggestion Huang eventually revised the draft and eliminated the metaphor.

[328] This is a common Chinese saying meaning "making promises".

[329] Kim Du Bong was the chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. His birthday was on March 17.

Source: *People's Daily, March 17, 1954.*

Letter to Peng Shilin

March 31, 1954

Mr. Shilin:[330]

I have read with respect your letter of March 9, 1954. Since you have entrusted your matter to my friend Mao Yizhu,[331] my intervention should no longer be needed. In general I am a bit reluctant to express my thoughts and feelings on behalf of the friends of my native village and my relatives in recommendation letters; occasionally I do it, but that is extremely rare. When Mr. Li Shuqing and my friend Wen Yunchang[332] asked me [for recommendations], I had to turn them down. They resolved their problem by finding someone else to entrust the matters with. I know that you are encountering some financial difficulties, and you can tell me about them. It would not be difficult for me to give you some further assistance in the area of [living] expenses. I hope you will, however, forgive me for my unsatisfying response.

My regards,

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 479-480.*

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[330] Peng is a native of Xiangtan *xian*, Hunan Province (Mao's native *xian*). During the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War, Peng was principal of the Women's Vocational School of Qingxi *xiang*, Xiangtan *xian*, and gave Mao assistance when Mao was engaging in revolutionary activities in this area.

[331] This is another name for Mao Yuju. See *Letter to Mao Yuju*, p. 66 of this volume.

[332] See *Letter to Li Jiehou of Shaoshan, Hunan*, p. 24 of this volume, also see *Letter to Wen Nansong*, p. 64 of this volume.

Letter to Party Branch and *Xiang* Government of Shicheng *Xiang*

April 29, 1954

Comrades of the Shicheng *xiang* Branch [of the CPC] and of the *xiang* Government of Shicheng *xiang:*

Mao Yueqiu[333] came to Beijing with your report. I am very grateful.

Some of my relatives of the Wen family of Tangjiaduo have come to Beijing to see me in the past several years.[334] Some of them, on returning home, have become arrogant and would not accept the supervision of the government; this is wrong of them. The people of the Wen family, no matter who, ought to be like everyone else in the village; they should obey the leadership of the Party and the government, work diligently in their farming, and observe the law; there should be nothing special about them. I ask you not to feel that because those of the Wen family are my relatives, therefore it may not be easy to control them as you wish. My attitude [toward this matter] is: First, since they are [members of] the laboring people, and are my relatives, I care about them; second, because I care about them, I hope that they will make progress, that they will work diligently in their farming and observe the law, that they will take part in the mutual aid and cooperative organizations. In all this they ought to be exactly like everyone else and may not behave at all specially. If they behave in any backward manner, they ought to be criticized. They should not be spared the criticism of their failings and errors simply because they are my relatives.

Here I have a letter from Comrade Wen Bingzhang,[335] which I enclose for your perusal. I am in agreement with Comrade Wen Bingzhang's opinion; please handle it. Please also show this letter of mine and that of Wen Bingzhang to the people of Tangjiaduo so as to help them correct their failings and mistakes. I believe that as long as both you and I take the correct attitude and as long as they are not stubborn in their opinion, their shortcomings and mistakes can be rectified and they can make progress.

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[333] See *Letter to Mao Yueqiu*, p. 232 of this volume.

[334] See *Letter to Wen Nansong*, p. 64 of this volume. Also see *Letter to Wen Jianquan*, p. 61 of this volume and *Letter to Wen Jiuming*, p. 238 of this volume.

[335] Wen Bingzhang is Mao's nephew.

In comradely salute,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 481-482.*

Inscription on the Completion of Guanting Reservoir

May 13, 1954

In celebration of the triumphant completion of the Guanting Reservoir.[336]

(Signed)

Source: *Guangming Daily, May 16, 1954.*

Telegram to the South African Indian Congress[337]

May 28, 1954

Joint Honorary Secretaries of the South African Indian Congress Messrs. Cachalia and Mistry:

On behalf of the Chinese people, I totally support the just stand of the nonwhite people of South Africa (including Indians, and other Asian and African people) in struggling for democratic rights and opposing racial discrimination and oppression. May this Congress achieve success in the cause of uniting Indians and all peoples in South Africa—white and nonwhite—in striving for peace, freedom, democracy, and progress.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, May 29, 1954.*

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[336] Guanting Reservoir is located west of Beijing Municipality, in Hebei Province, at the confluence of the Yongding, Yang, and Shuanggan rivers. This inscription was written for the meeting of the reservoir's builder and administrative staff celebrating the completion of the project.

[337] The Congress was held on May 28-31, 1954. The secretaries, Yusuf Cachalia and D. Fu Mistry, had sent a letter to Mao on April 24 soliciting support for the Congress in its struggle against racial and social discrimination in South Africa.

Telegram to the People's Republic of Poland

July 20, 1954

Chairman,
The Council of State,
The People's Republic of Poland
Comrade Aleksander Zawadzki:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of Poland, I extend, on behalf of the Chinese people, of the government of the People's Republic of China, and on my own behalf, sincere congratulations to the Polish people, the Government of the People's Republic of Poland, and yourself.

Over the past ten years, the Polish people, led by the Polish United Workers' Party, have achieved brilliant successes in both the consolidation of the people's democratic system and the socialist industrialization of the country. People's Poland has already become an important force in the camp for world peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the Soviet Union.

The Chinese people sincerely wish the Polish people even greater successes in continuing their efforts toward socialist construction and in the struggle of safeguarding world peace.

(Signed and dated in Beijing.)

Source: *People's Daily, July 22, 1954.*

Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

July 23, 1954

President,
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Comrade Ho Chi Minh:

On the occasion of the reaching of an agreement on the armistice question and on the question of the political situation in Indochina, on behalf of the

Chinese people and the government of the People's Republic of China, I extend the most heartfelt and warmest congratulations to our brothers, the Vietnamese people, to the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and to you.

At the Geneva Conference[338] the delegation from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam represented the hopes for peace of the Vietnamese people who had struggled heroically for national independence and freedom and had already attained glorious victories, and worked hard for the restoration of the peace of Indochina, and finally achieved an agreement. This is yet another great victory for the Vietnamese people. This victory is helpful in promoting collective peace and security in Asia and is beneficial to furthering the relaxation of the tension in the international situation.

All the people of China will strive together with the people of Vietnam to assure and attain the thorough implementation of the Agreement and to preserve and consolidate the peace and security of Asia and the world.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, July 24, 1954.*

Directive on Work in Traditional Chinese Medicine

July 30, 1954

[Traditional] Chinese medicine has made a great contribution to the people of our country. With a population of six hundred million, China is the most populous country in the world. Of course, there are many factors contributing to the ability of our country's people to multiply and prosper day by day, but of these, the part played by health care must be one of the [most] important. In this respect, we must give credit first to [traditional] Chinese medicine.

If we compare Chinese and Western medicine, [traditional] Chinese medicine has a history of several thousand years, whereas Western medicine was introduced into China only a few decades ago. To this day, there are still more than 500 million people in the entire country who rely on [traditional] Chinese medicine for the diagnosis and treatment of their illnesses, while those who depend on Western medicine number only several tens of millions (and most are in big cities). Therefore, if we speak of China's health care since the beginning of history, the contributions and accomplishments of [traditional] Chinese medicine are very great.

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[338] The Geneva Conference was convened from April 26 to July 21, 1954, to settle the issues of the national independence and the peace settlement of Korea and Indochina. On July 21, agreements regarding the independence of the three countries, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were reached.

For a number of years, not only has our homeland's medical heritage not been developed, but on the contrary, it has been slighted and repudiated. (For instance, examinations given to practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine cover the subjects of physiology and pathology. Those who fail these subjects are not given certificates. In addition, there are regulations such as those prohibiting practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine from joining hospital staffs). The Central Committee's directive on uniting doctors of the traditional Chinese school with doctors of the Western school has not been fully carried out, and a true unity between the two sides remains unresolved. This is a mistake. This problem must be resolved; this mistake must be corrected. It requires first of all that the health care administration departments at all levels should change their way of thinking.

Henceforth, the most important thing is to first ask practitioners of Western medicine to study [traditional] Chinese medicine and not for practitioners of [traditional] Chinese medicine to study western medicine. First, we must transfer a hundred to two hundred graduates of medical institutes or colleges, handing them over to some well-known doctors of [traditional] medicine so that they can study their clinical experience. Furthermore, they should assume an attitude of great modesty in their studies. It is a glorious [endeavor] for practitioners of Western medicine to study [traditional] Chinese medicine because after studying and promoting if they will be able to remove the boundary between [traditional] Chinese medicine and Western medicine and from a unified Chinese medical science as a contribution to the World. Second, all hospitals must systematically invite doctors of [traditional] Chinese medicine to come to the hospitals to give medical treatments to patients and hold consultations, and permit hospitalized patients to take [traditional] Chinese medicines. Furthermore, all sorts of regulations should be laid down to ensure systematically that respect be shown to doctors of traditional Chinese medicine so that they may not encounter difficulties or have a feeling of apprehension when they do their work of treatment in the hospitals. Third, Chinese medicine [itself] should be well-protected and developed. Our country's Chinese medicine has a history of several thousand years, and it is an extremely precious asset of our homeland. If we simply let it decline, it would be a crime on our part.

Therefore, we should investigate and protect the growing of medicinal herbs in the various provinces, encourage their production, facilitate their shipment, and improve their marketing. For instance, some medicinal herbs, because of their relatively long growth period, require from planting and cultivating to harvesting, a period of more than two or three years. For instance the white peony *[Peionia albiflora]* is a plant that matures in four years, and the *huanglian [Coptis japonica]* is one that matures in six years. Individual peasants often do not have the resources to plant them. Furthermore, in some herb-producing areas such as Gansu and Qinghai, the herbs produced cannot be shipped out in time because of the inconvenience in transportation and the peasants often use them as fuel. In the past, there was a great wastage of some Chinese herbs because the processing and preserving techniques were deficient. Packaging and storage methods were not good and losses from mildew and spoilage were severe. [The situation] should be improved. Institutions in charge of such work should hence forth adopt a joint state-private form of management. Personnel who process medicinal herbs should be classified according to their technical levels and be considered technical cadres. As for research in Chinese [herbal] medicine, it is not sufficient merely to conduct chemical analysis. We should go one step further and carry out pharmacological and clinical experiments. In particular we should pay special attention to the compound effects of the Chinese [herb] medicines. Fourth, we should begin to sort things out and pull together writings on [traditional] Chinese medicine. In the past nobody pulled together [such texts] because they were difficult to comprehend and were not valued. Medicinal books on [traditional] Chinese medicine will soon cease to exist if we do not collect them together. We should organize learned physicians of traditional Chinese medicine to, first of all, systematically but also selectively translate those useful [texts on traditional Chinese medicine] from ancient Chinese into modern Chinese. When the time is right we should further organize [these physicians] to summarize their own experiences and compile a set of systematic texts on [traditional] Chinese medicine.

To realize the various tasks mentioned above, we must first rectify bourgeois, individualistic and sectarian ideology. Only when there is a change in ideology can the tasks mentioned above be carried out thoroughly.

From now on, [personnel] at any level of administrative departments in public health will be dismissed if they do not do well in carrying out these tasks.

Source: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought; Red Guard Publication, pp. 10-12.*

Letter to the Staff of the No. 320 Factory[339]

August 1, 1954

The workers and staff of No. 320 National factory,
Comrades:

I have read your report of July 26.[340] I congratulate you on your triumphant success in the trial production of the first Yake 18 airplane. This is an excellent beginning for the founding of our nation's airplane building industry and for the strengthening of our national defense forces. I hope you will continue to apply your efforts and under the guidance and instruction of the Soviet experts, further grasp [the fine points] of the technology and improve the quality [of your product] and ensure the completion of the task of the actual production.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 483.*

Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

August 12, 1954

Chairman
The Standing Committee,
The Supreme People's Assembly,
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Comrade Kim Du Bong:

On the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the liberation of Korea, on behalf of the government and people of China and on my own behalf I express sincere congratulations to the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to the Korean people, and to yourself.

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[339] The above letter was reprinted from an original preserved by the Ministry of Aeronautical Industry.

[340] July 26, 1954 was the day on which the trial flight ceremonies of the first batch of airplanes manufactured by the People's Republic of China was held.

May the heroic Korean people attain even greater successes in their struggle to restore and develop their national economy, to consolidate peace in Korea, and to prevent the resurgence of a new war of aggression.

May the unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples be further consolidated and developed. This friendship is a powerful guarantee for maintaining peace in the Far East and throughout the world.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 15, 1954.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Romania

August 21, 1954

Chairman
The presidium,
The Grand National Assembly,
The People's Republic of Romania
Comrade [Petru] Groza:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Romania, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China and on my own behalf, I convey sincere congratulations to the Romanian people and to yourself.

Over the last ten years, the Romanian people, led by the Romanian Workers' Party have attained brilliant success in the area of consolidating the people's democratic political power as well as in building socialism. These successes have enabled the Romanian people to gain a life of increasing prosperity and happiness and have strengthened the forces for world peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union.

The Chinese people wish the Romanian people even greater successes in the cause of building socialism and defending world peace.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 23, 1954.*

Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

August 31, 1954

President,
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Comrade Ho Chi Minh:

As peace is beginning to be restored in Indochina, it is with great joy that I represent the government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people in sending warm congratulations to the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and to the Vietnamese people on this occasion of the ninth anniversary of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The heroic struggle for national independence and freedom in which the Vietnamese people have been engaged for many years has already scored great achievements. I deeply believe that the Vietnamese people will win even greater victories in the cause of consolidating peace and achieving unification, independence and democracy. In this the Vietnamese people will have the deep concern and active support of the Chinese government and all the Chinese people.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, September 2, 1954.*

Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

September 2, 1954

Comrade Ambassador:

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence from the Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria which you have presented and I sincerely thank you for your congratulations.

The brotherly friendship between the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Bulgaria and their close cooperation in the areas of politics, the economy, and culture have already developed greatly. This has not only promoted the prosperity and happiness of the two peoples, but has also strengthened the forces of world peace and democracy headed by the great Soviet Union.

The brilliant successes which the Bulgarian people, under the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party, have achieved in the cause of socialist construction in the ten years since liberation have stirred up the enthusiasm for labor of the Chinese people who are moving ahead with socialist construction and socialist transformation.

Comrade Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary from the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the People's Republic of China. In your work of consolidating and strengthening the friendship and cooperation between the two countries of China and Bulgaria you will receive my full support and that of the government of the people's Republic of China.

I wish you complete success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, September 3, 1954.*

Telegram to the USSR

September 2, 1954

Comrade Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Comrade Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

On the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the victory over Japanese militarism, we express warm congratulations and deep gratitude to the Soviet government, the Soviet armed forces, and the great Soviet people.

The agreement reached at the recent Geneva Conference on restoring peace in Indochina has further eased international tension. This is an important victory for the forces of peace and a serious defeat for the forces of war. However, the United States' aggressive clique refuses to take their defeat lying down and are in the midst of actively reviving Japanese militarism, engineering the organization of war blocs in the Western Pacific and Asia, and intensifying the instigation and abetting of Chiang Kai-shek's traitorous clique in continuing its war of harassment and sabotage against the Chinese mainland and offshore islands so as to extend the threat of war throughout the Far East and the world.

The Chinese people are firmly opposed to this war policy of the United States' aggressive clique and will definitely liberate Taiwan in order to safeguard China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity and to defend the peace and security of the Far East and the World.

Restoring normal relations between the various countries of the Far East and Japan and preventing the revival of Japanese militarism have become the urgent task of all the peace-loving countries and peoples in Asia. The Chinese people are prepared to strive for the fulfillment of this task.

The friendly alliance between China and the Soviet Union is a strong guarantee for the consolidation of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world.

Long live the great, unbreakable and ever-growing friendship between China and the Soviet Union!

(CO-SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF CPG OF PRC WITH ZHOU ENLAI AS PREMIER OF GAC AND FOREIGN MINISTER, DATED IN BEIJING)

Source: *People's Daily, September 3, 1954.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Bulgaria

September 7, 1954

Chairman,
The Presidium of the National Assembly,
The People's Republic of Bulgaria
Comrade Georgi Damyanov:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Bulgaria, I convey sincere and warm congratulations to you and through you, to the Bulgarian people and government.

Over the past ten years, the Bulgarian people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, and following the teachings of Comrade Dimitrov, have consolidated the peoples' democratic system and attained glorious achievements in the socialist construction of their country. This has not only inspired the Chinese people who are in the midst of their socialist construction, but also has strengthened the forces for world peace and democracy headed by the

Soviet Union.

May the Bulgarian people achieve even greater new victories in the struggle to build socialism and to safeguard world peace.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, September 9, 1954.*

Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Albania

September 13, 1954

Comrade Ambassador:

I am very happy to accept this letter of credence from the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania which you have presented and which appoints you as its first ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the People's Republic of China, and I sincerely thank you for your congratulations.

The Albanian people are an industrious and courageous people and have a glorious revolutionary historical tradition. In the ten years since their liberation, the Albanian people, under the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, have smashed all the schemes of both domestic and foreign enemies to carry out sabotage, are confidently building happy lives for themselves, and have achieved brilliant successes. The patriotic spirit and incomparable enthusiasm for labor demonstrated by the Albanian people in the struggle for socialist construction and for the defense of their homeland's independence and security are objects of great admiration for the Chinese people.

For the first time in history, the two peoples of China and Albania have established friendly diplomatic relations. In the last five years, our people have already knit together a brotherly friendship. I deeply believe that after the exchange of ambassadors, the sincere, friendly and cooperative relations between our two countries is bound to achieve yet further development. This not only will contribute to the enhancement of the happiness of our two peoples, but moreover will help strengthen the forces for world peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union.

Comrade Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as the first ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of Albania to the

People's Republic of China. In your work of consolidating the friendship and cooperation between Albania and China you will receive my full support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I wish you complete success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, September 14, 1954.*

Reply to Minister of the Confederation of Switzerland

September 13, 1954

Mr. Minister:

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence presented by Your Excellency from the Federal Council of Switzerland, and express my gratitude for the greetings conveyed by you, from the President of the Confederation of Switzerland to the people of the People's Republic of China and myself.

Over the last five years, the friendly relations between China and Switzerland have already been enhanced on the basis of peaceful coexistence. During the time of the Geneva conference the delegation from the People's Republic of China received the hospitality and assistance of the government and people of Switzerland. Let me take this opportunity to express my gratitude. From now on, the economic links and cultural exchange between China and Switzerland will be further enhanced. This will not only benefit the development of the friendship between the peoples of our two countries, but will also aid the consolidation of world peace.

I warmly welcome Your excellency as the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Confederation of Switzerland to the People's Republic of China. In your work of strengthening the friendship and cooperation between China and Switzerland, you will surely have my support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I wish Your Excellency success in your work, and happiness for your people, and good health for your head of state.

Source: *People's Daily, September 14, 1954.*

Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Hungary

September 22, 1954

Comrade Ambassador:

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence from the Presidium of the People's Republic of Hungary which you have presented and which appoints you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the People's Republic of China, and sincerely thank you for your greetings.

In nine years, the Hungarian people have victoriously carried out socialist construction under the leadership of the Hungarian Workers Party and have fundamentally changed the face of their country. The Chinese people note with gladness and admiration the tremendous successes achieved by the fraternal Hungarian people in their work of national construction.

Over the past five years, the friendly relations between the Chinese and Hungarian people and their close cooperation in the areas of politics, economy, and culture have had great success. The continuous growth of these relations of brotherly friendship will not only further enhance the prosperity of the two countries of China and Hungary and the friendship between the two peoples, but will also strengthen the forces for world peace and democracy headed by the great Soviet Union.

Comrade Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of Hungary to the People's Republic of China. In your work of further developing and consolidating the friendship and cooperation between China and Hungary you will receive my total support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I wish you complete success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, September 23, 1954.*

Toast at China's National Day Celebrations

September 29, 1954

Welcome, friends who have come to China!

We thank you for the friendship our various friends have brought!
We wish our friends good health!
May our mutual friendship be further enhanced!
May world peace be further consolidated!

Source: *People's Daily, September 30, 1954.*

Telegram to the German Democratic Republic

October 5, 1954

Comrade Wilhelm Pieck,
President of the German Democratic Republic
Dear and Respected Comrade President:

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic, on behalf of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese people, and on my own behalf, I express sincere and warm congratulations to the German Democratic Republic, to the peace-loving people of all Germany, and to yourself.

The people of the German Democratic Republic, under the leadership of the German Socialist Unity Party and yourself, and with the sincere aid of the great Soviet Union, have already attained glorious successes in consolidating the people's democratic political power, as well as in developing the national economy and raising the people's living standards. Over the last five years the German Democratic Republic has united all the progressive patriotic forces among the German people in carrying forward an unrelenting struggle, striving for a unified, peaceful, democratic, and independent Germany, and for establishing collective security in Europe and safeguarding world peace. Thus it has won the enthusiastic support of the peace-loving peoples of Europe and throughout the world. These successes and efforts by the German Democratic Republic have inspired all the peace-loving German people and have strengthened then confidence in fighting for the peaceful unification of Germany.

The brotherly friendship and the close economic and cultural cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic are growing with each passing day. The German people have the profound sympathy of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people in the just cause that they have undertaken in order to strive to establish a unified, peaceful, democratic, and independent Germany. The communique of July 25, 1954 on the discussion between our country's premier and the premier of the German Democratic Republic shows our two people's mutual concern and support in the great cause of peace.[341]

Comrade President, may you achieve even greater successes in leading the German people in the great struggle to realize the unification of their homeland and to defend world peace, and may you be in good health!

(Signed as chairman of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 7, 1954.*

Letter to the Delegation of the USSR

October 12, 1954

Dear Comrade Khrushchev and the Delegation of the Government of the Soviet Union:[342]

The letter of October 5, 1954 from the delegation of the government of the Soviet Union has been received.

On behalf of the government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I sincerely express our gratitude to the government of the Soviet Union for the gift made to us by the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of eighty three pieces of machine tools and agricultural machinery now on display in Beijing at the exhibition of the achievements in economic and cultural construction of the Soviet Union.[343] The Chinese people see this generous gift as a concrete expression of the intimate friendship of the people of the Soviet Union toward the Chinese people.

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[341] Discussions were held between Otto Grotewohl, the German representative and Zhou Enlai the Chinese premier on July 25, 1954 in which the issue of Germany's peace and non-armament principle was discussed.

[342] The delegation of the government of the USSR to the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the PRC arrived in China on September 29, 1954 and left China on October 13. A communique and a set of attending agreements were jointly issued by the Chinese government and the Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev on October 12.

[343] An exhibition of the Soviet Union's achievements in economic and cultural construction was held beginning October 2, 1954, in the western sector of Beijing. Mao and other Chinese leaders visited the exhibition on October 25.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, October 13, 1954.*

Letter to the USSR

October 12, 1954

Dear Comrade Khrushchev and the Delegation of the Government of the Soviet Union:

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the delegation of the government of the Soviet Union, representing the Soviet People, has given the Chinese people a gift of the machinery and equipment necessary for the organization of a grain-producing state farm with a sown acreage of twenty thousand hectares. During the period of organizing this grain- producing state farm and in the first year of learning to master production on the farm, the government of the Soviet Union, in order to render China both organizational and technical assistance in establishing and managing this grain-producing state farm, is prepared to send a group of experts to the People's Republic of China as advisers so that the Chinese personnel in charge of this grain-producing state farm can, working together with the Soviet experts, master the technology and method of managing this large-scale grain-producing farm in the shortest [possible] time. On behalf of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I sincerely express warm welcome and sincere gratitude to the government and people of the Soviet Union for this important, tremendous, friendly assistance.

This state grain-producing farm will, beyond a doubt, not only play an important role as a model for the promotion of the socialist transformation of agriculture in China, but moreover will also aid China in training technical personnel in agricultural production and learning the valuable experience of the Soviet Union in the opening of virgin soil and reclamation of idle land. With this generous aid from the people of the Soviet Union, the Chinese people have once again seen the Soviet People's deep friendship toward the Chinese people and their concern and support for the Chinese people in their cause of construction.

Long live the great brotherly friendship between China and the Soviet Union!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, October 13, 1954.*

Telegram to the USSR[344]

October 16, 1954

Dear Comrades!

Permit us on behalf of the entire Chinese people to express heartfelt gratitude to you for your friendly congratulations on the fifth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic.

The successes of our country's peoples during the last five years in social reforms, restoration of the national economy, socialist construction, and socialist reconstruction are inseparable from the sincere and unselfish aid of the great Soviet people, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet government.

We ask you to convey our most sincere gratitude to all the Soviet people.

Long live the indestructible brotherly friendship of the peoples of China and the Soviet Union!

Implement the Correct Policy in Dealing with Doctors of Traditional Chinese Medicine

October 20, 1954

The medical lore of our country has a history of several thousand years. It is rich in content and contains valuable clinical experience, and it has played an immense role in the people's struggle against disease through the ages.

To inherit and to develop this cultural heritage, to study it earnestly and to research its theories and its practical experience, in order to organize and summarize it with scientific methods, and thus gradually to raise its scholarly and clinical standards so as to make it become of even more effective service to the people — this is an immensely glorious and arduous task facing the medical profession in our country. If this work is done well, it will not only greatly facilitate the development and enhancement of our people's health care and medical enterprise, but will also further enrich the contents of the medical science of the world.

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[344] The message was addressed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU and was issued in the name of Mao himself as Head of State of the PRC, and in the name of the Standing committee of the NPC, the State Council of the PRC, and the Central Committee of the CPC. The telegram appeared in Pravda and Izvestia both Oct 9, 1954.

The Chinese Communist Party and the People's Government have always held our homeland's cultural legacy in esteem; the policy adopted by the Party and the People's Government with regard to doctors of traditional Chinese medicine has always been clear. The Party has consistently appealed to doctors of both Chinese and Western medicine to unite and cooperate, to help and encourage each other for the general purpose of raising the standards of modern medical science and clinical capabilities and to even better serve the interests of the people and make a joint effort to study and research the medical heritage of the homeland so as to develop it unceasingly and to make it play an even greater role. Over the last several years, however, the leadership in the departments of the administration of health care has consistently failed to carry out this policy adopted by the Party and the People's Government seriously and has not concretely implemented the accurate principle of uniting doctors of Chinese and Western medicine. Obviously in the mobilization and organization of doctors of traditional Chinese medicine to take part in the hygiene and vaccination programs and in organizing clinics of Chinese doctors or joint clinics of doctors of Chinese and Western medicine, it has done some work and has had some achievements. Nevertheless, such work has not fundamentally resolved the problem of giving play to traditional Chinese medicine and certainly has not represented the adoption of an effective method in mobilizing and organizing doctors of both Chinese and Western medicine to jointly research and develop the homeland's medical heritage and to enrich the contents of modern medical science. Furthermore, the leadership in the departments of health care administration has often even violated the Party's and the People's Government's policy and adopted an attitude of disdain, discrimination, and exclusion toward doctors of traditional Chinese medicine, using all sorts of restrictive methods in dealing with them. This has been an attack on the positive attitude of the doctors of Chinese medicine in their work, has abetted the cadres in health care work and doctors of Western medicine in their erroneous mentality of despising Chinese medicine and Chinese pharmacology itself, and has adversely affected the development and improvement of the profession of traditional Chinese medicine severely. Other related work departments and public opinion in society have also shown insufficient regard or concern for Chinese medicine. These mistakes must be rectified.

The reason that the leadership cadres in health care administration are unable to implement the Party and People's Government's policy toward Chinese doctors is that they have been afflicted by the remnant poison of bourgeois ideology and consequently look down upon the medical legacy of the homeland. They do not realize the importance of inheriting and developing the homeland's cultural heritage to the construction of a new culture; they do not realize the importance of enhancing the medical legacy of the homeland to the raising of the standards of modern medical science and clinical ability and to the development of the people's cause of health care and medical treatment. Consequently they are also unaware of the importance of uniting with doctors of traditional Chinese medicine, enhancing it, and thus allowing it to take its full effect. They neglect the practical needs of the broad masses of the people for Chinese medicine and Chinese pharmacology; they ignore the traditional Chinese doctor's rich experience and obvious clinical effectiveness; they do not study or investigate in earnest; they do not carefully analyze and sum up the situation but they jump ahead and make the generalization that Chinese medicine is "backward" and "unscientific" and negate it wholesale. Such an attitude of not recognizing facts and not emphasizing practical experience is an attitude of extremely "unscientific" arbitrariness. This erroneous attitude adopted by the leadership cadres in health care administration toward Chinese medicine and Chinese pharmacology concretely manifests gravely sectarian mentalities and sentiments. Such mentalities and sentiments of looking down upon Chinese medicine and Chinese pharmacology have not, over a long period of time, been fundamentally turned around. This has caused the situation in which there has been no apparent change in the serious and persistent backwardness in the work in traditional Chinese medicine.

Therefore if we are to make a serious effort to improve the work in Chinese medicine, we must first resolutely correct the serious mistake that exists within the leadership of the departments of health care administration and other related areas in that they look down upon the homeland's medical heritage and neglect the role played by Chinese medicine and Chinese pharmacology in our people's health care, and we must actively call upon and organize doctors of Western medicine to study and research Chinese medical science. This is the immediate key to the resolution of our problem.

There can be no doubt that it is necessary to appeal to and organize doctors of western medicine to study and research Chinese medical science. This is because the enormous and arduous task of developing the homeland's legacy of medical science can be accomplished gradually only through the long-range cooperation between doctors of Chinese and Western medicine. The irrefutable clinical effectiveness of Chinese doctors and Chinese medicine has proved that Chinese medical knowledge has a rational and useful content. Its major weakness is that it has lacked a systematic scientific theory and has not yet taken hold of a reliable methodology of chemical experimentation and scientific inspection. This has greatly limited the scope of its development and enhancement. Therefore, the basic problem of developing the homeland's medical heritage is a problem of gradually integrating it with modern scientific theory through serious study, research and practice. This means that we must, based on the theories of modern science, organize the principles of traditional Chinese medical science and summarize its clinical experience by scientific methods and absorb from it the essentials and eliminate the dross so as to gradually channel it into modern medical science and turn it into an important component of modern medical science. Thus we should gradually establish a modern school of medicine of this nature. It should reflect the special characteristics of China's geography and climate, reflect the special characteristics of the application of pharmaceutical material produced specially in China, and reflect the particular features of the life and labor of the various peoples of China. This is the long-range and grand goal of our development of the medical legacy of the homeland. In order to attain this goal, doctors of traditional Chinese medicine will naturally have to make an arduous and sustained effort over a long period of time, but doctors of Western medicine who are endowed with relatively rich scientific knowledge, also have their especially glorious assignment in this as well. In the current situation in which the medical heritage of the homeland is not regarded with esteem or comprehended in general by doctors of Western medicine, the emphasis on the importance of having doctors of Western medicine study and research Chinese medical science has a particularly great practical significance. It is only through their own study and research of the medical heritage of the homeland that doctors of Western medicine can promote the role played by modern medical scientific knowledge in organizing and enhancing that heritage.

To identify the promotion of the medical heritage of the homeland with the development of modern science makes perfect sense. To constantly discover, by the combined effort of Chinese and Western medicine, scientific truths from this invaluable cultural legacy will surely bring about daily enrichment of the treasury of modern medical science. In the last few years some doctors of Western medicine have achieved some success in their study and research of Chinese medicine. This is illustrated for example by the accomplishments in the study of Chinese acupuncture treatment on the basis of the scientific theories of neuropathology. In general, doctors of Western medicine are willing to apply methods of treatments and prevention that have a scientific foundation both in theory and in practice; this is correct as far as it goes. However, they have cast aside the several thousand years of practical experience of Chinese medicine and do not excavate new knowledge new medicines or new methods from the experience of Chinese medical science, and this is very wrong. In this way, curtain limits have been placed on the development of modern medical science itself. For example, if we were to delve into the method of acupuncture treatment, possibly we could write a new page in the history of modern medical principles: we might therefore be obliged to revise existing theory about the mechanical mobility and neuro-adaptation of healthy and sick people alike. As long as we launch the work of studying Chinese medicine and Chinese pharmacology in a well-planned, well organized fashion and with good leadership, we are bound to make a major contribution to modern medical science and to the cause of the people's health care. To the individual doctor of Western medicine, to study and research Chinese medicine by scientific methods not only does not pose any danger to the medical knowledge or clinical technique that he or she possessed to begin with, but indeed it can bring about enrichment and enhancement of this knowledge and technique.

In emphasizing the importance of having doctors of Western medicine study and research Chinese medical science, we have not removed in the slightest from the broad ranks of doctors of Chinese medicine the great task of promoting the medical heritage of the homeland. In the past, some doctors of Chinese medicine have carried out organization and research in the art and science of Chinese medicine by applying relatively modern viewpoints and methods and their accomplishments have been considerable. The majority of doctors of traditional Chinese medicine however, neglect research work. This situation should be reversed now. In order to strengthen their own research work in cooperation with doctors of Western medicine, doctors of Chinese medicine will not only have to constantly dig into the principles of Chinese medicine and have a good grasp of their clinical experience, but they must also learn the necessary fundamental scientific knowledge so as to play a greater role in organizing and summarizing the principles and experience of Chinese medicine.

In order to unite doctors of Chinese and Western medicine in a combined effort to promote effectively the medical heritage of the homeland, the leadership organs in health care ought to base themselves on the spirit of premier Zhou Enlai's *Report on the Work of the Government*[345] and penetratingly examine the conditions of the past within their own departments regarding the issue of carrying out the policy adopted by the Party and the People's Government toward Chinese medicine and earnestly correct the erroneous attitudes toward Chinese medicine and Chinese pharmacology. At the same time they must meticulously carry out ideological work and policy education among doctors of Western medicine, remove their ideological obstacles, and on the ideological basis of their own awareness and voluntarism, stir up their enthusiasm for studying and researching the medical legacy of the homeland. Furthermore, they must adopt, in a well-planned and methodical way, a series of organizational measures and utilize necessary systems and structures to ensure an improvement in the work of Chinese medicine.

Naturally, to do this work well is very complicated. The methods of treatment are different for doctors of Chinese and Western medicine, and to make them support and complement each other, to direct them toward one goal, one result, when they begin with different paths, we must have a powerful ideological and organizational leadership, one that will guarantee that they will constantly maintain a high level of initiative and activism and will struggle for a common goal. The principle of the integration of theory and practice must be carried out; in all things we must proceed on the premise of practice and conduct research work for the purpose of resolving practical problems. The special characteristics of doctors of both Chinese and Western medicine, and particularly those of doctors of Chinese medicine, must be given attention. The preliminary experience of certain clinical units in carrying out consultations between doctors of Chinese and Western medicine must be summed up, and new experiences must be carefully planned and assigned clear priorities to serve as a basis for directing work in general. We must make realistically solid and reasonable arrangements for the cooperation between doctors of Chinese medicine and doctors of Western medicine on the basis of their practical circumstances in all areas in each locality, so that they will not have to worry, and, cooperating in a friendly and intimate atmosphere, each can fully develop his or her own special skill. Only this type of cooperation will succeed in constantly reinforcing the unity of doctors of Chinese and Western medicine, and only then can they effectively carry out the enormous task of promoting the medical heritage of the homeland.

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[345] This is a reference to the *Report of the Work of the Government* delivered by Zhou Enlai, at the First Session of the First National People's Congress.

The work of Chinese medicine covers a very broad area. Not only does it call for the positive and active effort of the departments of health care administration; it also requires the close coordination of all other related departments and the resolute support of public opinion in society. In particular, it requires the unified leadership of the Party; this is the greatest guarantee of the successful implementation of this task. Party committees in every locality must shoulder their responsibilities seriously, constantly instruct and urge all related areas to implement the Party's policy toward Chinese medicine, and actively make improvements in this major area of work that concerns the life and death as well as the general health of the people.

Source: *Editorial, People's Daily, October 20, 1954.*

Toast at Reception for Prime Minister Nehru

October 21, 1954

The peoples of China and India both resolutely advocate peace. Our two peoples, like people throughout the world, resolutely strive for peace.

[Let's drink]

To the cooperation between the peoples of China and India and to their prosperity,

To world peace,

To the health of President Prasad of the Republic of India,

To Prime Minister Nehru's visit to China and to his health,

To the health of the host of today's banquet[346], Ambassador Raghavan. Bottoms up!

Source: *People's Daily, October 22, 1954.*

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[346] The Reception was held by Indian Ambassador Raghavan at the Indian embassy in Beijing.

Telegram to the People's Republic of Hungary[347]

October 22, 1954

On behalf of the Chinese People's Republic and the Chinese people, I have the honor of expressing my heartfelt thanks for your greetings on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic. May the indissoluble friendship between China and Hungary strengthen and develop.

Source: *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington D.C., Daily Report, October 27, 1954*

Inscription Expressing Gratitude to the Soviet Union

October 25, 1954

After visiting the exhibition of the Soviet Union's achievements in economic and cultural construction, we feel very gratified and happy. This exhibition is concrete evidence of the swift progress of the Soviet Union's industrial and agricultural economy, the high level of development of the Soviet Union's technology and sciences, the flourishing of its undertaking in education, culture, and the arts, and the happiness in its people's lives. Through all of this, the exhibition has also vividly shown the boundless initiative and creativity of the Soviet people, demonstrated in their labor, the solidarity within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government, and among the people of the various nationalities in the Soviet Union. It has also demonstrated the correctness of the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We are proud to have such a powerful ally. The might of the Soviet Union is an important factor in the general economic and cultural upsurge in the various countries in the camp striving for peace and democracy and an important factor in striving for world peace and human progress.

The glorious success of the Soviet Union in its economic and cultural construction has greatly inspired the enthusiasm of the Chinese people for building socialism and has set the best example for the Chinese people to learn from. The government and the people of the Soviet Union have consistently given us tremendous assistance in all areas of our construction work. This aid was further expanded through the recent discussions between China and the Soviet Union, and the holding of the exhibition of the achievements of the Soviet Union in economic and cultural construction is itself an expression of the enthusiastic aid given by the Soviet Union to our country. On behalf of all the Chinese people we express our gratitude for this brotherly friendship.

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[347] The telegram was addressed to President Istvan Dobi of the People's Republic of Hungary and was signed by Mao.

MAO ZEDONG	LIN BOQU
LIU SHAOQI	DONG BIWU
ZHOU ENLAI	PENG DEHUAI
ZHU DE	PENG ZHEN
CHEN YUN	DENG XIAOPING

(DATED)

Source: *People's Daily, October 31, 1954.*

Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

October 25, 1954

Premier,
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Comrade Kim Il Sung:

I have received your telegram of October 24, 1954. On behalf of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese people, and on my own behalf, I express sincere gratitude and respect to the entire Korean people, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and yourself.

In the course of the righteous struggle against aggression and in defense of peace, the heroic Korean and Chinese peoples have already forged a friendship-in-arms that resembles a flesh and blood relationship; this is an important factor in defending peace in the Far East. In the struggle to strive for the peaceful unification of Korea and to defend peace in Asia, this friendship between our two peoples is bound to attain further consolidation and development.

May the Korean people score even greater achievements in their solemn cause of the quick recovery of the national economy of their own homeland.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, October 25, 1954.*

On Criticizing *Hongloumeng Yanjiu*

October 1954

Hu Shi's school of thought has not undergone any substantial criticism.[348] In the area of classical literature we are still guided by the thought of the Hu Shi school.

Some people say that once a person gets criticized he can no longer lift up his head; well, there will always be one side that cannot lift up its head. If everybody raised his head it would be capitulationism.

It is not that they are not on the alert. In fact they are very alert. Their tendency is very obvious. They defend bourgeois thought, they like things that oppose Marxism, and they view Marxism with hostility.

The abominable thing is that Communist Party members do not propagate Marxism. If Communist Party members do not propagate Marxism, what is the point of their being Communist Party members? *Wenyi Bao* [Literary Gazette] must be criticized. Not to do so would be unfair.

All new things are brought up by "nobodies". The young people have great aspirations and resolution to fight. We must open up paths for the young people and support "nobodies"

Source: *The Sayings of Chairman Mao on Literature and Art, p. 97, Red Guard Publication.*

Directive on the Film *Qing Gong Mishi*

October 1954

For five years there has been no criticism of *Qing Gong Mishi.* If we do not criticize it, we would be doing ourselves a great disfavor. *Qing Gong Mishi* is actually a treasonous film that supports imperialism. One must not sympathize with the Guangxu Emperor indiscriminately.[349]

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[348] See Mao's article *Letter Concerning the Study of the Dream of the Red Chamber*, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V.

Source: *The Sayings of Chairman Mao on Literature and Art, p. 97, Red Guard Publication.*

Telegram to the USSR

November 6, 1954

Comrade Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Comrade Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Comrade Molotov, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

On the occasion of the thirty-seventh anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution, on behalf of the people and government of China, we extend to you, and through you, to the great people and government of the Soviet Union our sincere and warm congratulations.

In thirty-seven years, the brilliant success of the great Soviet people in the cause of building a communist society have played an inestimable role in furthering human progress and defending world peace. Progressive peoples of the whole world rejoice at and are inspired by the historic victory secured by the Soviet People and see the great Soviet Union as a beacon illuminating the path on which to advance.

In recent years, the forces for defending peace throughout the world, headed by the Soviet Union, have been increasingly strengthened and developed. The number of supporters of peaceful coexistence has grown larger and larger. Warlike plots to restore German and Japanese militarism have constantly met with resolute resistance from the German and Japanese peoples and from peoples of all countries. The struggle to oppose the creation of an aggressive military bloc; to ban atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons for mass extermination; and to reduce armaments in general is developing on an extensive scale. All this serves to convince us that as long as the people of all countries take up the cause of defending peace and uphold it to the end, world peace can then be preserved and consolidated.

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[349] See *Letter Concerning the Study of the Dream of the Red Chamber, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.*

The great alliance between China and the Soviet Union increasingly reveals its extraordinarily great role in promoting the common prosperity of the two countries and defending peace in the Far East and throughout the world. The recent discussions between the delegation of the government of the Soviet Union headed by Comrade Khrushchev and the Chinese government signifies a new development in the great friendship between the two countries and have again demonstrated the unanimous aspirations and common interests of the eight hundred million Chinese and Soviet people. This friendship will accelerate the socialist construction undertaken by the Chinese people and enhance the further consolidation of peace in the Far East and throughout the world.

Long live the great Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics!

Long live the eternal and unbreakable friendship between China and the Soviet Union!

> (Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, November 7, 1954.*

Letter to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, et al.

November 18, 1954

Comrades Liu, Zhou, Li, Chen, Luo, and Tao Zhu:[350]

The November 13 and November 14 issues of *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily] carried the translation of the text of Chapter 22 of the new Soviet publication, *Textbook on Political Economy,*[351] please take a look at them. I think you will find there is adequate evidence that the argument that "socialist economic laws cannot exist before the construction of socialism has become complete (or [at least] for the most part complete)" is wrong.

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[350] This letter was addressed to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, Chen Boda, Luo Mai [Li Weihan] and Tao Zhu, all of whom were in Guangzhou, attending a conference at the time.

[351] Mao is referring to the first edition of the Soviet publication *Political Economy, A Textbook* which was published by the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences (*Academia Nauk*) of the USSR in the fall of 1954. This edition of the textbook was quite different from the later (the second and especially, the third revised) editions on which Mao based his later work *Reading Notes on the Soviet Textbook of Political Economy*.

(Signed and dated)

P.S. Comrade Boda, please take a look at the articles that discuss the issues of economic laws in the transitional period in [the publications] *Xin Jianshe* [New Construction] and *Xuexi* [Study] and see if they contain any errors.[352]

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 484-485.*

Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

November 22, 1954

Comrade Kim Du Bong, Chairman, The Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Comrade Kim Il Sung, Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Comrade Nam Il, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Korean Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation, we express warm congratulations to the Korean people, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and yourselves.

The signing and implementation of this agreement has brought about further consolidation and development of the friendship-in-arms between the Chinese and Korean peoples formed in the war during which they stood shoulder to shoulder in resistance against the United States aggressors. The Chinese people greet with admiration and gladness the glorious achievements of the Korean people in carrying out the three-year plans for restoring and developing their national economy.

The Korean people and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have always enjoyed the deep concern and sympathy of the Chinese people and government in their unflagging struggle for the peaceful unification of Korea. The Korean problem must be resolved on the principle of respect for the Korean people's national rights and benefit for the safeguarding of Asian and world peace. The Chinese people will continue to give full support to the Korean people in this just cause until a final victory is won.

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[352] *Xin Jianshe* (New Construction) was a multidisciplinary scholarly magazine, published monthly in Beijing and distributed nationwide. The focus of the magazine was on philosophy and the social sciences. *Xuexi* (Study) is a periodical published by the propaganda department of the CC of the CPC.

Long live the brotherly and ever-consolidating friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples!

(CO-SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF PRC WITH LIU SHAOQI AS CHAIRMAN OF STANDING COMMITTEE OF NPC AND ZHOU ENLAI AS PREMIER OF STATE COUNCIL AND FOREIGN MINISTER, DATED IN BEIJING)

Source: *People's Daily, November 23, 1954.*

Letter to Huang Yanpei

November 23, 1954

Mr. Renzhi:[353]

I have received your gracious letter of October 30. Concerning the matter of grain requisition, what I have heard in the capital is as you have described.[354] As I was on my way here to Guangzhou,[355] I made some investigations and only then found out that problems still exist; but in general things are not too bad and, according to some reports, much better than they were last year. I have asked Vice-premier Chen Yun[356] to pay attention to the lingering cases of the "Five-evils". I am very concerned about how you are, with your illness. I hope you will pay attention to nursing yourself back to recovery.

In reply and with my respect,

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 486.*

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[353] See *Letter to Huang Yanpei*, p. 116 of this volume.

[354] See *Letter to Tan Zhenlin*, p. 184 of this volume.

[355] See *Letter to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai et al.*, p. 286 of this volume.

[356] Chen Yun became vice-premier of the newly established state council (replacing the GAC) in September 1954. He was then in charge of the Fifth Office of the State Council, whose focus was on financial and commercial matters.

Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia

November 25, 1954

Comrade Jamsarangiyn Sambuu, Chairman of the Presidium of the Greater People's Hural of the People's Republic of Mongolia, Comrade Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Mongolia,

Comrade B. Jargalsaikhan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Mongolia:

On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of Mongolia, on behalf of the Chinese people and the government of the People's Republic of China, we express our sincere congratulations to all the Mongolian people, the government of the People's Republic of Mongolia, and yourselves.

Thirty years ago, the Mongolian people, under the leadership of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, overthrew, by their valiant struggle, the reactionary feudal rule and established a people's democratic stale. With the tireless efforts of the Mongolian people and the selfless assistance of the Soviet Union, the Mongolian people have freed themselves forever from poverty and backwardness, and they have stepped onto the glorious path of economic prosperity and cultural development. The Chinese people are joyous at and inspired by the brilliant successes of the Mongolian people.

May the Mongolian people attain still greater victories in their cause of building socialism and safeguarding world peace.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, November 26, 1954.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Albania

November 28, 1954

Comrade Haxhi Lleshi, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania,

Comrade Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania,

Comrade Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Albania, on behalf of the Chinese people and the government of the People's Republic of China, we extend our sincere and warm congratulations to you and, through you, to the Albanian people and the government of the People's Republic of Albania.

In ten years, the Albanian people, under the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor and the government of the People's Republic of Albania, have attained tremendous successes in the areas of politics, economy, and culture. We express our best wishes to the government and people of Albania.

May the Albanian people win yet more glorious successes in their cause of struggling for the prosperity and development of their homeland and for the safeguarding of world peace.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, November 29, 1954.*

Telegram to Petru Groza

December 1, 1954

Comrade Petru Groza, Chairman of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the People's Republic of Romania:

Please accept my warm congratulations on the occasion of your seventieth birthday. May you achieve even greater successes in your activities undertaken for the prosperity and happiness of the Romanian people, and may you have good health and a long life.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, December 3, 1954.*

Telegram to Rajendra Prasad

December 1, 1954

President Rajendra Prasad,
The Republic of India
Your Excellency:

On the occasion of your seventieth birthday, I wish to extend to you my sincere congratulations.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, December 3, 1954.*

Toast at Dinner for Prime Minister U Nu

December 4, 1954

Let us drink:

To the friendship, unity and peaceful coexistence between the peoples of China and Burma,
To Asian peace and international peace,
To the health of Dr. Ba U, president of the Union of Burma,
To Prime Minister U Nu's visit to China[357] and to his health,
To the host of today's dinner, Ambassador U Hla Maung, and to his health,
Bottoms up!

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[357] Prime Minister U Nu of the Union of Burma arrived at Beijing on December 1, 1954, at the invitation of the PRC government.

Source: *People's Daily, December 5, 1954.*

Telegram to the Republic of Finland

December 5, 1954

President Juho Kusti Paasikivi,
The Republic of Finland
Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the Republic of Finland's National Day, please accept my sincere congratulations.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, December 6, 1954.*

Telegram to Antonin Zapotocky

December 16, 1954

President,
The Republic of Czechoslovakia
Dear Comrade Zapotocky:

On the occasion of your seventieth birthday, please accept the sincere congratulations of the Chinese people and myself.

You have carried on a prolonged and heroic struggle for the cause of the liberation of the Czechoslovakian laboring people and have made outstanding contributions. Now the Czechoslovakian people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and yourself, are in the midst of bidding their homeland into an increasingly prosperous and happy country and carrying out an unrelenting struggle to safeguard European peace and security. The Chinese people express profound sympathy and support for this righteous cause of the Czechoslovakian people.

May you attain even greater successes in your cause of leading the Czechoslovakian people in building socialism and defending world peace, and may you have good health and a long life.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, December 19, 1954.*

Inscription for Workers on the Kangding-Tibet and Qinghai-Tibet Highways

December 25, 1954

Congratulations on the opening to traffic of the Kangding-Tibet and the Qinghai-Tibet highways. Let us consolidate the unity of the people of all nationalities and build our homeland!

Source: *China Youth Daily, December 25, 1954. According to that daily, the inscription already existed on December 25, 1954, when the ceremonies to open the two highways to traffic were held; the ceremonies to award the inscribed banner to the workers was not held, however, until February 3, 1955, in Lhasa.*

Letter to Li Da

December 28, 1954

Dear Haoming:[358]

I have received and read your letter of December 20 and the two attached articles,[359] and I think they are very good; especially the article on political ideology, which is of even greater help to the readers. There seems to be some wrong words; for instance, [when you said] "the pragmatists maintain that it is matter that comes first and consciousness that comes second." Besides, when one criticizes pragmatism, a comparison and explanation is needed for [the terms] "utility" and "effects" as used by the pragmatists and broadly similar terms used by us. This is because people in general are still confused and unclear about them. “The cosmos is an unfinished manuscript...”[360] these few sentences also need to be explicitly criticized. Your writings are in a popular language and easy to understand. This is good. When you write again, I suggest that you make use of appropriate occasions to explain certain basic concepts in philosophy so that cadres in general can read and understand them. We must use this opportunity to help the millions of cadres, both inside and outside the Party, who have no knowledge of philosophy to understand some Marxist philosophy. What do you think? My respects.

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[358] See *Letter to Li Da*, p. 120 of this volume and also *Letter to Comrade Li Da,* p. 176 of this volume.

[359] This refers to two articles written by Li Da to criticize Hu Shi, titled, respectively, *Hu Shi De Zhengzhi Sixiang Pipan* (Criticism of Hu Shi's Political Thought) and *Hu Shi Sixiang Pipan* (Criticism of Hu Shi's Thought). The first was published in *People's Daily* (December 31, 1954) and the latter in *Xin Jianshe* (New Construction), 1955.

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 487.*

Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

December 31, 1954

Comrade Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
Comrade Pham Van Dong, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

On the occasion of the ceremony of the return of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to Hanoi, we, on behalf of the Chinese people and the government of the People's Republic of China, express warm congratulations to you and, through you, to the Vietnamese people and the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The return of the government of Vietnam to Hanoi is the result of the brilliant victory scored by the heroic Vietnamese people, under the leadership of the Vietnam Workers' Party and President Ho Chi Minh, in eight years of arduous war of resistance. It is also the result of the peace policy consistently upheld by the government of Vietnam. May the Vietnamese people attain new successes in the coming new year in their struggles to consolidate peace and to achieve national unification, independence, and democracy, and in their cause of restoring the national economy.

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[360] Pursuant to Mao's opinion, Li Da, when compiling the book *Hu Shi Fandong Sixiang Pipan* (Critique of Hu Shi's Reactionary Ideology) in 1955, made a comparison and explanation of the terms “utility” and “effect” as used by the pragmatists and broadly similar terms used in dialectical materialism. He also made an explicit criticism of the line “the cosmos is an unfinished manuscript...”

(Co-signed with Zhou Enlai, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, January 22, 1955.*

On Writing Essays to Criticize Hu Shi

December 1954

Essays criticizing Hu Shi's thought must be written in a vernacular and popular manner and should propagate Marxism in a direct way.[361] Every one of Hu Shi's essays had a political purpose. We too should have targets in mind when we write.

Source: *Red Flag in Literature and Art; 5, May 30, 1967, Red Guard Publication*

Speech at a Standing Committee Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC (Excerpts)

Winter 1954

1. I believe that China makes great contributions to the world, and one of these is Chinese medicine. Chinese medicine was born on the basis of handicraft and agricultural production. Theories regarding gold, wood, water, fire and soil may be criticized,[362] but precious experiences must be protected and promoted. Those who make criticism must understand this. What is science? Correct and systematic knowledge is called science. Isn't Western medicine a science? It is also somewhat idealistic. Mechanical materialism, for instance, must be transformed. China should have one medical service, and not two medical services, as they have existed for a long time. The term doctor of Western medicine is improper; as materialist dialectics would have it, there should

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[361] See *On Criticizing Hongloumeng Yanjiu* pp. 284 of this volume. Also see *Letter Concerning the Study of the Dream of the Red Chamber, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V, and *Letter to Li Da*, December 28, 1954, p. 293 of this volume.

[362] Mao is referring here to the ancient Chinese cosmological theory that the universe is made up of these five fundamental elements or forms of matter (*wuxing*). In the traditional sense of the words, *jin*, here translated as "gold" is more appropriately translated as "metal", and tu as "earth" rather than "soil". The earliest written formulation of this theory appears in the ancient book *Hongfan* (Framework of the Cosmos) in *Shangshu* (Book of History).

be one unified term for doctors. It is wrong for some to over-exaggerate the importance of Chinese medicine. Traditional Chinese hospitals should be run experimentally at key points. In regard to the question of further training of traditional doctors, it is right and proper to require them to study fundamental subjects and to exchange experiences. It may be difficult, I am afraid, for them to learn the pharmacology of Chinese medicine.

2. From now on, graduates from medical programs in the universities must study traditional Chinese medicine for two years.

3. China ought to have one [integrated school of] medicine, and not two [schools of] medicine [coexisting] over a long period of time. The terms Chinese medicine and Western medicine are inappropriate; there ought to be only one integrated school of medicine based on dialectical materialism. The health of the six hundred million people in China primarily relies on Chinese medicine, and not on Western medicine.

4. To look down on traditional Chinese medicine is a slavish bourgeois mentality.

Source: *These excerpts were culled from Selections from China's Mainland Magazines, Weekly, Hong Kong (Supplement, April 8, 1969) and Compilation of Red Guard Materials, p. 371.*

Comment on the National Budget

1954

Increasing production, practicing economy, and selling aside more reserves are the three reliable defense lines to fortify the budget of the state.

Source: *Extract from the article To Have Room for Maneuvering is a Positive Policy in the Magazine, Red Flag: 16, August 31, 1969.*

Instructions on the Work of Doctors of Traditional Chinese Medicine

1954

An inappropriate policy of restriction and discrimination has been adopted toward traditional Chinese medicine in many respects, with the result that for a long time there has existed in society the situation where doctors of traditional Chinese medicine are opposed to doctors of Western medicine and are discriminated against, and this situation hasn't been changed. This is an extremely grave policy mistake of the health departments... If this situation is allowed to exist for a long time, not only will our country's health protection service continue to suffer serious losses, but there is the danger of this part of the cultural legacy of our country being lost.

Source: *Selections from China Mainland Magazines, Weekly, (supplement 22) April 8, 1968 (Hong Kong).*

Inscription on the Triumph of the People of Wuhan over the Flood[363]

1954

We must still be prepared to do battle against and overcome similarly severe floods that may occur in the future.

Source: *Quoted in The Hills and Rivers of our Country Sparkle with the Glory of Mao Zedong Thought in Peoples' Daily, October 2, 1976.*

Inscription for Historical Pavilion in Caixi *xiang*, Fujian Province

1954

Glory Pavilion[364]

Source: *From "Glorious Caixi xiang" in Liberation Army Pictorial; 67, July 1, 1967.*

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[363] In 1954, the stretch of the Yangtze River near Wuhan overflowed its banks and caused severe damage. Mao's inscription here was awarded to the people of Wuhan who took part in bringing the deluge under control.

[364] This was an inscription written upon the rebuilding of a pavilion in Caixi *xiang*, Shanghang *xian*, Fujian, which was First built in 1933 when Caixi *xiang* was commended by the Central Soviet as a model village. It was intended for the display of awards, banners, and rolls of the revolutionary martyrs of Fujian Province. It was destroyed, and subsequently rebuilt in 1954.

1955

Telegram to the Union of Burma

January 2, 1955

President Dr. Ba U,
Union of Burma
Your Excellency:

On behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend to the Burmese people and to Your Excellency warm congratulations. On this occasion of the National Day of the Union of Burma, may the relationship of friendly cooperation between China and Burma be further consolidated and developed in the cause of defending peace in Asia and the world.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, January 4, 1955.*

Telegram to the Republic of India

January 24, 1955

President Rajendra Prasad, Republic of India.
Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the fifth National Day of the Republic of India, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend to the Indian people and to Your Excellency warm congratulations. May the relationship of friendly cooperation between China and India grow daily firmer and develop with each passing day in the cause of defending peace in Asia and the world, and may the Republic of India prosper and the Indian people be happy.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, January 26, 1955.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of Finland

January 28, 1955

Mr. Ambassador:

It is with great pleasure that I accept the letter of credence from the President of the Republic of Finland which you have presented to us, and I am grateful for his friendly wishes which you have just conveyed.

In the last four years, the economic ties and cultural exchange between China and Finland have, on the foundations of equality and mutual benefit, greatly developed. Il is commonly known that the friendly exchange between our two governments and our two peoples have, over the last few years, taken place in many diverse forms. Particularly satisfying has been the situation of smooth development in the trade relations and cultural lies between our two nations. There has been progress in our trade relations every year, and our trade agreements have all been satisfactorily fulfilled. The visit of the Chinese acrobatic troupe to Finland in 1952, as well as the visit to China of the Finnish cultural delegation led by Madame Kekkonen in 1953, and the visit to Finland in July 1954 of Deputy Minister Lei Renmin of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade at the invitation of the Finnish government have all left lasting and good impressions on our peoples and have contributed greatly to the strengthening of the friendly feelings between the people of China and the people of Finland, and to their mutual confidence in peaceful cooperation. The friendly cooperative relationship between China and Finland provides ample evidence that nations of diverse social systems can coexist peacefully and be in friendly cooperation with one another. Now we have escalated our legations to each other to the status of embassies and we have exchanged ambassadors. This signifies that a further step has been taken in the consolidation and promotion of friendly relations between our two countries.

China and Finland share a common hope for the defense and consolidation of peace, and the enhancement of economic and cultural exchange between our two countries is bound to have a beneficial effect on the safeguarding and consolidating of world peace. We are convinced that the trade relations and the cultural inter-flow between China and Finland will continue to be strengthened and develop. Mr. Ambassador, I welcome your expressed wish that there be more direct contact between the representatives of our countries.

I heartily welcome your assuming the position of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Finland to the People's Republic of China and pledge to you my assistance and the assistance of the government of the People's Republic of China in your work of strengthening the friendly cooperation between China and Finland.

I wish you success in your mission, and I express my good wishes for the prosperity of the Republic of Finland the happiness of the people of Finland and the health of President J. K. Paasikivi of the Republic of Finland.

Source: *People's Daily, January 29, 1955.*

Criticism of Hu Feng[365, 366]

January 1955

We must never permit bourgeois idealism and thought such as Hu Feng's, which stands in opposition to the people and to the Party, to get away from us under the cover of [being merely regarded as a] "petty bourgeois viewpoint." Instead, we ought to criticize and repudiate them thoroughly.

Source: *Red Flag in Literature and Art* 5, *May 30, 1967, Red Guard Publication.*

Telegram to the USSR

February 12, 1955

Comrade K. E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Comrade V. M. Molotov, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

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365. This document comes as a directive accompanying the decision to publish Hu Feng's *Letters of Opinions*. In the source it was titled *Mao Zhuxi Dui Wenyi Gongzuo de Zhongyao Zhish* (Chairman Mao's Important Directive on Literary Work)

366. For more material on Hu Feng see *In Refutation of Uniformity of Public Opinion, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V, and also see *Preface and Editor's notes to Material on Counter Revolutionary Hu Feng Clique, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V.

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, we represent the Chinese people and the government of the People's Republic of China in sincerely extending our warm congratulations to you and, through you, to the great people and government of the Soviet Union.

In the past five years, the overall political, economic, and cultural cooperation between China and the Soviet Union has developed extensively. The Government and people of the Soviet Union have given all-round and systematic assistance—assistance that leaves no detail unattended—to us, the Chinese people, who are in the midst of pursuing socialist construction. The government of the Soviet Union has successively helped China build from scratch and expand 156 huge industrial enterprises, sent excellent experts in large numbers to assist China in its construction, extended to China favorable loans several times, transferred to China without cost the Sino-Soviet jointly managed China-Changchun railway and property in Northeast China acquired by Soviet organizations from Japanese owners in 1945, sold to China shares owned by the Soviet Union in Sino-Soviet joint enterprises, and decided to place totally at China's disposal the naval base at Lüshun and installations in that area jointly used by China and the Soviet Union. Moreover, it has also proposed to offer to China scientific, technological, and industrial assistance in promoting research in peaceful uses for atomic energy. Such friendly cooperation and sincere aid have greatly promoted the development of our country's undertakings in construction and demonstrate to the world the great vitality of this new kind of international relations. The government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people deeply appreciate the unmatched treasure that this brotherly friendship represents. On behalf of the government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, we express sincere gratitude for the tremendous assistance of the government and people of the Soviet Union.

The consolidation and development of the friendship and alliance between China and the Soviet Union has been invaluable in guaranteeing our two countries' security and maintaining peace in the Far East and in the world. The peace policy of China and the Soviet Union has promoted and brought about the Korean armistice and the restoration of peace in Indochina, bringing about a certain degree of relaxation in international tensions and inspiring all peace-loving countries and peoples. The Chinese people enthusiastically support the Soviet Union's struggle for the establishment of a European collective security system and its opposition to the rearmament of West Germany. China and the Soviet Union are willing to establish normalized relations with Japan and to actively support the Japanese people in taking the road of independent development and international cooperation. The sincere cooperation between China and the Soviet Union conforms to the interests not only of the people of the two countries, China and the Soviet Union, but also of all the peace—loving countries and peoples of Asia, Europe, and the rest of the world. It is a reliable guarantee for the maintenance of peace in the Far East and the world.

At this very moment, the aggressive clique of the United States and its followers are pursuing a policy of war and creating international tension everywhere, and the aggressive behavior and war provocations carried out by the United States in the Taiwan area are a grave threat to China's security. It has given rise to just reprobation by peace-loving countries and peoples throughout the world. The struggle of the Chinese people to liberate their own territory of Taiwan is just. A just cause is something that no force can stop. The friendship and alliance of China and the Soviet Union, in view of the emerging international tension, will play an increasingly vital role in the cause of opposing aggression and guaranteeing peace.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance is a great peace treaty, a symbol of the great friendship between China and the Soviet Union. The events of the last five years have proved this treaty's great role in promoting world peace and human progress. From now on, in life and in practice, this treaty's great force and boundless brilliance will be further exhibited.

For the sake of the common prosperity of the two peoples of China and the Soviet Union and the consolidation of peace in the Far East and in the world, may the great friendship between China and the Soviet Union develop daily.

Long live the eternal, indestructible friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples!

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, February 14, 1954.*

Speech at Banquet Celebrating Fifth Anniversary of Sino-Soviet Treaty

February 14, 1955

I celebrate the great cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. Such cooperation advances the cause of socialism, opposes imperialism's plans for aggression, and is for international peace. I believe this cooperation will be strengthened further.

Given the cooperation between our two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, I believe that imperialism's plans of aggression will be smashed.

Given the great cooperation between our two countries, we can all perceive that there are no imperialists' aggressive plans that cannot be destroyed. They are bound to be thoroughly destroyed. Should the imperialists launch an aggressive war, we, together with the people of all the world, are bound to wipe them off the face of the earth!

Let us drink to the health of Comrade Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics!

Source: *People's Daily, February 15, 1955.*

Telegram to the USSR

February 21, 1955

Comrade K. E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Comrade N. A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Comrade V. M. Molotov, First Vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

On the occasion of the thirty-seventh anniversary of the founding of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, please accept our warm congratulations.

In the Second World War, the glorious armed forces of the Soviet Union, with their invincible might, devastated the forces of Fascism, defended European and world civilization, and made invaluable contributions to the cause of human progress. Now, at the very moment when the imperialist war bloc is intensifying its creation of international tension, preparing for atomic war, carrying out war provocations, and gravely threatening world peace, the strong and long-tested armed forces of the Soviet Union are an invincible force for defending the peace of the world.

The armed forces of the Soviet Union that were stationed at the Lüshun naval base in accordance with the Sino-Soviet agreement have played an important role in defending peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world in the last five years. They have provided powerful support to the Chinese people in their cause of socialist construction. Now, as they depart from the Lüshun naval base in accordance with the Sino-Soviet communique of October 1954, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China, we extend our heartfelt thanks to the government of the Soviet Union and to the great Soviet people and their armed forces.

May the armed forces of the Soviet Union achieve even more brilliant successes in the tasks of strengthening the national defense forces of their own homeland and defending world peace and security.

(CO-SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF PRC WITH LIU SHAOQI AS CHAIRMAN OF STANDING COMMITTEE OF NPC AND ZHOU ENLAI AS PREMIER OF STATE COUNCIL AND FOREIGN MINISTER, DATED IN BEIJING)

Source: *People's Daily, February 23, 1955.*

Toast at Banquet Celebrating Tibetan New Year

February 24, 1955

On the occasion of the Tibetan New Year, let us greet the Dalai Lama, Panchen Gnoertehni, all the Tibetan personnel now in Beijing, and the Tibetan people in Tibet and all other regions! We all should strive to further strengthen and consolidate the unity among our country's various nationalities and further strengthen and consolidate the unity between the Han and Tibetan nationalities and within the Tibetan nationality itself, and together build our great homeland.

Let us [drink]:

To the health of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Gnoertehni, to all the Tibetan ecclesiastical and secular personnel now in Beijing, to the great unity among all nationalities of our country!

Source: *People's Daily, February 25, 1955.*

Letter to Lin Tie

March 5, 1955

Comrade Lin Tie:[367]

Please take care of this problem.[368] This is a copy of a letter which a body guard of mine brought back from a visit to his native village of Anping *xian.*[369] I presume that the situation [described therein] is not unique to a *xiang* in Anping *xian*—it may also be prevalent elsewhere, and is well worth our attention.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 489.*

Letter to Zhou Dungu

March 6, 1955

Comrade Dungu:[370]

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[367] Lin Tie (b. circa 1905, also known as Lin Guohua) was at the time of this letter chairman of the provincial government of Hebei Province and ranking Party secretary of that province. Lin played a significant role in promoting the cooperativization movement at this time, and later, in the Socialist education movement in the countryside.

[368] This refers to the problem that was reflected in a letter written by the masses in Anping *xian*. In this letter, they reported that, in the process of promoting agricultural cooperativization, the local cadres in that *xian* simplistically used such propaganda and coercive tactics as saying "either you follow the Communist Party or you follow Lao Jiang (Old Chiang [Kai-shek])" to force the peasants into joining the cooperatives. Such tactics had led to a serious problem of lowering the peasants productivity and activism.

[369] Anping *xian* is in Hebei Province, south of Beijing Municipality near Baoding. The area around Anping including such *xian* as Anguo and Ding, is an important agricultural district.

[370] Zhou was an acquaintance of Mao's from the early years when they were in school together in Changsha, Hunan, of which Zhou is a native. Mao studied in Changsha over a rather lengthy period, first as a student in Xiangxiang middle school and several vocational schools from 1910 to 1913, during which time he also briefly joined the new Hunan Army

I have received your letter of February 28. I do not intervene directly in affairs related to the enrollment of any student in any school, and therefore begging your understanding and forgiveness, I cannot gratify your request. It would really be up to you to decide for yourself whether or not you can wait until this summer to apply and take the examination in Beijing then.

I wish you good health.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 490.*

Letter To Wei Lihuang

March 17, 1955

Mr. Wei Junru![371]

I have received your telegram of March 16. I warmly welcome your return to China. I hope that you will come to Beijing soon, so that we may meet. If you are interested you may of course take a look at the conditions in [various parts of] the country along your journey, and arrive at Beijing either at the end of this month or early next month; that too would be excellent.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 491.*

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and then from 1913 to 1918 as a student of Hunan Normal School. At the time of this letter Zhou was an instructor at the Literary Training Institute of the Chinese Federation of Writers.

[371] Junru is the honorific name of Wei Lihuang (1896-1960) a former KMT general who was the deputy commander of Chiang Kai-shek's North East Military Headquarters ("Bandit Suppression Headquarters") during the Third Revolutionary Civil War period (i.e., August 1945-October 1949). He was relieved of his command after his defeat by PLA troops at the battle of Shenyang in November 1948. Wei fled to Hong Kong in 1949, and in March 1955 returned to the mainland. He was invited to be a special delegate to the National Committee of the CPPCC and held this position from 1956 to 1959. He was also a member of the Standing Committee of the KMT and a Vice-chairman of the National Defense Council. In many ways, therefore, he stood as an example of how progressive elements of the KMT could cooperate with the people's government.

Inscription for the First Congress of Heroes and Model Soldiers of the Air Force[372]

March 21, 1955

Build a strong People's Air Force to defend the homeland and be prepared to defeat the aggressor.

Source: *People's Daily, March 22, 1955.*

Speech at Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC[373]

Spring 1955

Last year Comrade XXX was instructed to sum up and examine the work of traditional Chinese doctors.[374] This year, it has been found that people at the lower level are against traditional doctors and medicinal herbs. The Chairman has instructed Comrade XXX to see that good results are produced in respect of the work of traditional doctors and medicinal herbs within a time limit. For the past several years almost everything has been liberated. Operas, too, have been liberated. Yet traditional Chinese medicine has not been liberated. The health of six hundred million people in China depends primarily on traditional Chinese medicine, and not on Western medicine. This is because the number of Western doctors is small. Doctors of traditional Chinese medicine play a very significant role in the health of people, but this fact is seldom reflected in the leadership because doctors of traditional Chinese medicine are out of power while doctors of Western medicine are in power.

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[372] This inscription was written in Mao's calligraphy on a banner displayed at the First Congress of Heroes, Model Soldiers, and Meritorious Members of the Air Force of the PLA, which was convened on March 21, 1955, in Beijing.

[373] These are parts from a speech Comrade Mao delivered at a meeting of the CC of the CPC, with many indirect quotations interspersed between what Comrade Mao actually said. These were extracted from Selections from China Mainland Magazines (Supplement 22) April 8, 1968, Hong Kong.

[374] Also see *Directive on Work in Traditional Chinese Medicine*, p. 261 of this volume and also *Implement the Correct Policy in Dealing with Doctors of Traditional Chinese Medicine* p. 275 and *Speech at a Standing Committee Meeting of the CC of the CPC (Excerpts)* p. 295 of this volume.

Chinese medicine has a long history, and this very fact proves that it has made great contributions to the people. It is necessary to set up institutions to study Chinese medicine. Some doctors of Chinese medicine are so influenced by Western medicine in their advanced studies that they say Chinese medicine is unscientific. While it is unscientific for them to say so, they must not be criticized too early, and should be treated in the same manner as national minorities are treated. They should play a part in various institutions. To look down upon Chinese medicine is a slavish bourgeois idea, and something must be wrong that no good results have been produced for the past several years...

In the future, graduates of medical universities shall be required to study Chinese medicine for two years.

It should be admitted that doctors of Chinese medicine are capable and should be treated as specialists and received and paid as specialists. Haven't they performed great merits? We must oppose sectarianism among doctors of Chinese medicine and step up research of Chinese medicine. (Turning to He Zheng) Isn't there a Qizhou in Hebei? That is the place for concentration and dispersal of medicinal herbs. Commercial departments must study it.

Telegram to the People's Republic of Hungary

April 2, 1955

Comrade Istvan Dobi, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Republic of Hungary,

Comrade Andros Hegedus, Acting Chairman of the Council of the People's Republic of Hungary,

Comrade Janos Boldoczki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Hungary's liberation, we convey to you and, through you, to the Hungarian people and the government of the People's Republic of Hungary sincere and warm congratulations on behalf of the Chinese people and the People's Republic of China.

In the last ten years, the Hungarian people, under the leadership of their own Hungarian Workers' Party and the government of the People's Republic of Hungary, have victoriously consolidated the people's democratic system and have achieved brilliant successes in the socialist construction of their country. These successes have strengthened the socialist camp for peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union and have inspired the Chinese people who are in the midst of pursuing their socialist construction. The Chinese people greet the victories of our brothers, the Hungarian people with very joyful feelings.

We wish the Hungarian people new victories in the cause of socialist construction in their own homeland and in the struggle to smash the new war plans of the imperialist aggressive bloc and to ensure peace in Europe and throughout the world.

(CO-SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF PRC WITH LIU SHAOQI AS CHAIRMAN OF STANDING COMMITTEE OF NPC AND ZHOU ENLAI AS PREMIER OF STATE COUNCIL AND FOREIGN MINISTER, DATED IN BEIJING)

Source: *People's Daily, April 4, 1955.*

Order to Terminate State of War between the PRC and Germany[375]

April 7, 1955

Owing to the fact that Hitler's Germany had unleashed a fascist war of aggression that undermined world peace and had supported Japan's war of aggression against China, China proclaimed itself to be in a state of war with Germany on December 9, 1941. After the Hitlerian aggressors were wiped out, the Potsdam Conference of 1945 resolved that Germany ought to develop into a peaceful, democratic, and unified state and also decided on the approach to concluding a peace treaty with Germany.[376]

However, because of the policy consistently pursued by the United States, Britain, and France of dividing Germany, reviving militarism in West Germany in order to bring it into aggressive military blocs, Germany is still divided and it is still impossible to conclude a peace treaty with Germany. Now the three countries, the United States, Britain, and France, are all actively plotting by implementing the Paris agreements[377] to further obstruct the peaceful unification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, thus posing a serious threat to peace and security in Europe.

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[375] Comrade Mao drafted the above resolution, which was adopted by the Ninth meeting of the Standing Committee of the First National People's Congress.

[376] The Potsdam Conference was the last summit conference held among the heads of the governments of the US, Britain, and the USSR—during the Second World War. It took place July 17 to August 2, 1945. One of its resolutions was to create a foreign ministers' Council consisting of the US, Britain, the USSR, France, and eventually China, to draft the peace treaties with Germany and the other Axis powers.

The People's Republic of China resolutely supports the German Democratic Republic and the people of all of Germany, as well as the Soviet Union and all peace-loving countries and peoples, in their struggle to attain the peaceful unification of Germany, the promotion of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, the safeguarding of European collective security, and the defense of world peace. At the same time, [the People's Republic of China,] in the interests of the Chinese people and the people of all Germany, and based on the resolution adopted by the Ninth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on April 7, 1955, proclaims:

The state of war between the People's Republic of China and Germany shall end forthwith. Peaceful relations between the two countries shall be established.

The termination of the state of war between the People's Republic of China and Germany does not in any way change Germany's international obligations. At the same time it also does not in any way affect the rights or commitments of the People's Republic of China under international agreements relating to Germany.

(Signed as chairman of PRC and dated)

Source: *People's Daily, April 9, 1955.*

Reply to Ambassador of Pakistan

April 27, 1955

Over the past four years, the friendly and cooperative relations between China and Pakistan in the areas of the economy and culture have made progress. With the efforts of Your Excellency, I believe the friendly relations between our two countries will, on the existing basis, grow even more intimate with each passing day. The advancement of such friendly relations will not only further consolidate the friendship between the people of our two countries but will also contribute to the peace in Asia and in the world for which the people of all nations are striving.

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[377] The Paris conference, a crucial prelude to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was held October 20-23, 1954. It resulted in the signing of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupational Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany (FDR) on October 23, 1954, and on May 5, 1955, the formal accession of the FDR to NATO was ratified.

The government of the People's Republic of China and myself welcome Your Excellency's appointment as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Pakistan to the People's Republic of China and pledge our full assistance in your work to strengthen the friendly cooperation between our two countries and to safeguard international peace.

Source: *People's Daily, April 28, 1955.*

Inscription for Czechoslovakian Exhibition

April 28, 1955

The exhibition[378] on the achievements of ten years of socialist construction in Czechoslovakia has made a deep impression on us. Over the past ten years, socialist Czechoslovakia has made rapid progress in the areas of the economy and culture. This comes as a result of the correct leadership of the Communist Party and the government of Czechoslovakia and the efforts of all the laboring people of Czechoslovakia in striving for a happy life for themselves. The fact that Czechoslovakia has made rapid progress in the area of industry, especially in the machine-building industry, greatly strengthens the confidence of the Chinese people in their undertaking of industrialization which has just begun. It also projects an ever broadening vista for future trade development and scientific and technical cooperation between China and Czechoslovakia. May Czechoslovakia become more prosperous and powerful with each passing day. May the friendship between the people of Czechoslovakia and the people of the People's Republic of China always continue to grow and be consolidated.

(Co-signed with Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Lin Boqu, Dong Biwu, Kang Sheng, Zhang Wentian, Deng Xiaoping, and dated)

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[378] The Exhibition of Czechoslovakia's Achievements in Socialist Construction was held in Beijing from late April through mid-May 1955. This inscription was written for the exhibition on April 28.

Source: *People's Daily, May 15, 1955.*

Letter to Jiang Zhuru

May 1, 1955

My Dear Zhuru:[379]

Your gracious letter of February has been received; thank you very much. You are engaged in linguistic studies and have proposed some unconventional opinions. Although I cannot agree with you [on these views], I am sure that the debate would be beneficial [to all of us]. Your letter has been sent to the Committee for Language Reform for studying. A phonetic language is by and large a form of language that is more convenient and easy to handle. Chinese characters are too complicated and difficult. At the moment we are only engaged in reforming [the language] by simplifying them; in the future, there will come the day when we have to carry out some basic reforms.

In response, and with best regards for your work in teaching,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 492.*

Telegram to the German Democratic Republic

May 6, 1955

Comrade Wilhelm Pieck, President of the German Democratic Republic,

Comrade Johannes Dieckmann, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic,

Comrade Otto Grotewohl, Premier of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the German people's achievement of liberation, the Chinese people and the government of the People's Republic of China express warm congratulations to you and, through you, to our brothers the German people and the government of the German Democratic Republic.

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[379] Jiang Zhuru was a fellow native of Mao's of Xiangtan *xian*, Hunan. He was Mao's schoolmate at the First Normal School of Hunan in Changsha, and an early member of the Xinmin Xuehui (New People's Study Society) founded by Mao. He was engaged in education work.

After the army of the Soviet Union smashed Hitler's fascist rule, the German people, under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, carried out all sorts of democratic reforms and established their own German Democratic Republic. In the past five years, the people of the German Democratic Republic have triumphantly built a new life with their own creative labor and have made gigantic achievements in the areas of politics, the economy, and culture. The German Democratic Republic has become the strong bulwark of the German people in their struggle to attain unification, peace, democracy, and independence.

Ignoring the national interests of the German people, the ruling cliques of the United States and Britain have actively revived German militarism and deepened the division of Germany in an attempt to convert West Germany into the hotbed of a new war. The recent ratification of the Paris Agreement has greatly increased the danger of war and posed a serious threat to peace in Europe and the world. The Chinese people fully support all the necessary measures that the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and other peace-loving European countries have taken to ensure their own security and to safeguard European and world peace. They also deeply believe that the powerful unity of the countries within the socialist camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union is bound to thoroughly smash all the imperialist plans for war and that the righteous cause of the German people is bound to achieve success.

We sincerely wish the German people new successes in their struggle to oppose the implementation of the Paris Agreement and in their cause of building the German Democratic Republic.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing).

Source: *People's Daily, May 8, 1955.*

Telegram to the Republic of Czechoslovakia

May 7, 1955

Comrade Antonin Zapotocky, President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia,

Comrade Zdenek Fierlinger, Chairman of the National Assembly of the Republic of Czechoslovakia,

Comrade Viliam Siroky, Prime Minister of the Republic of Czechoslovakia:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the achievement of liberation by the Czechoslovakian people, the government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people extend to the government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovakian people their warm and heartfelt congratulations.

Over the past ten years, the Czechoslovakian people, under the correct leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and with the selfless help rendered by the Soviet Union, have made brilliant achievements in the area of consolidating the political power of the people's democracy and laying the foundation for the construction of socialism. These achievements add to the strength of the world camp of peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the Soviet Union and lend great encouragement to the Chinese people who are in the midst of pursuing socialist construction.

Currently the imperialist aggressive bloc is sparing no effort to carry into effect the Paris Agreement and is actively reviving German militarism, thus forcing the people of Europe and of the entire world to confront the threat of a new war. The Chinese people fully support all necessary measures taken by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other peace-loving countries and peoples in Europe to safeguard their own security and European peace. We are deeply convinced that with the sympathy and support of the people all over the world, the powerful camp of peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the Soviet Union is bound to smash the imperialists' war plans.

We wish the Czechoslovakian people still greater triumphs in their cause of building socialism and defending peace.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State

Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, May 9, 1955.*

Letter to the Party Committee of Xiangxiang *xian*[380]

May 17, 1955

Comrades of the CPC Party Committee of Xiangxiang *xian* and, through them, comrades of the Second District Committee and the Party Branch of Shidong *xiang*:

Tan Shiying of Shidong *xiang* was a classmate of mine some forty years ago at the Dongshan School of Xiangxiang. Since Liberation, he has sent me several letters and I sent several letters in reply. Because he claimed and complained that he is in [financial] difficulty, recently I sent him some money. Lately, he came down with an eye ailment and went to Hankou to look up Comrade Tan Zheng for help in getting treatment.[381] When he couldn't find Tan there, he came to Beijing to look me up. At the moment he is interned at a hospital for the treatment of his eye and will be on his way back to the village in two or three weeks. I have bade him to listen well to the teaching and discipline of the Party and government cadres of the local district and the *xiang*. According to what he told me, two of his sons were executed some three years ago in the struggle to suppress counterrevolutionaries. One of them was a battalion commander and the other a squad commander. Allegedly they were executed because they had committed crimes involving the shedding of other people's blood. He himself was deprived of his civilian rights and was subjected to control and surveillance for a year. At the present moment, that has been lifted but he still cannot join the peasant's association. His wife and two other sons, meanwhile, retained their civilian rights and have joined the peasants' association. He claims that his background is that of a poor peasant. He also claims that he had been a schoolteacher for several decades, and that except for the fact that twenty-seven years ago he had been, for five months, a member of the staff in the Kuomintang Shaoyang *xian* government, he has never done anything criminal or bad. I know absolutely nothing about this person's past. Please investigate and let me know.

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[380] Xiangxiang *xian* is adjacent to Xiangtan in the province of Hunan (Xiangtan is Mao's native village). Shidong *xian* is also in the area.

[381] Tan Zheng (b. 1903) is a veteran political officer of the Red Army. According to the source, he was at the time of this letter, a deputy minister of Defense and a deputy secretary of the Control Commission of the Central Committee of the CPC. He was also a member of the National Defence Council and a director of the General Political Department of the PLA.

I wish you smooth success in your work.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 493.*

Telegram to Ho Chi Minh

May 19, 1955

Dear Comrade Ho Chi Minh:

On the occasion of your sixty-fifth birthday, please accept the warm congratulations of the Chinese people and of myself.

Under the outstanding leadership of the Vietnam Workers' Party and yourself, the Vietnamese people have carried on a heroic struggle in striving for the independence and freedom of their homeland, and they have already achieved a major victory. The brilliant contributions you have made in the past decades command the respect and admiration, not only of the Vietnamese people, but also of the Chinese people.

May you achieve even greater success in the glorious cause of fighting for Vietnam's peace, independence, unity, and democracy and for the restoration and development of its national economy.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, May 20, 1955.*

Letter to Huang Yanpei

May 26, 1955

Mr. Renzhi:[382]

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[382] See *Letter to Huang Yanpei*, p. 116 of this volume.

I have received and read your gracious letter of May 25. It is always to our advantage to patiently and painstakingly ask for [people's] opinions on critical problems. Recently I contacted the comrades in positions of responsibility in fifteen provinces and municipalities and solicited their opinions on the various issues regarding grain [production and requisition], the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, and the [establishment of agricultural producers'] cooperatives. I managed to get [from them] even more material, confirming what I said at the Supreme State Conference. Nevertheless, a further investigation and study is needed to ascertain whether or not things are truly as we have thought. When you, dear sir, go down [to the lower levels] to make your inspection and investigation, I hope you will use a method of comprehensive, all-round analysis. I have seen the material of the Association for Democratic National Construction, and I am very much interested. I suggest that it may be distributed to the other parties for their reference.[383]

With my respect,

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 495.*

Telegram to Afghanistan

May 26, 1955

Mohammed Zahir Shah,
King of Afghanistan
Your Majesty:

On the occasion of the Independence Day of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, I send warm congratulations to the people of Afghanistan and to you on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf and wish the Kingdom of Afghanistan prosperity and the people of Afghanistan all happiness.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, May 28, 1955.*

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[383] According to the source, this refers to material that Huang Yanpei sent to Mao, reporting on a forum held by the Association for Democratic National Construction (of which Huang was chairman) on the subjects of suppressing counterrevolutionaries and a general amnesty.

Toast at Banquet for Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo

May 29, 1955

I propose that we drink:

To the ever-growing friendship and cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Indonesia,

To peace in Asia and throughout the world,

To the health of President Sukarno of the Republic of Indonesia,

To Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo's visit to China and to his health and that of his wife,

To the health of the host of today's banquet, Ambassador Mononutu. Bottoms up!

Source: *People's Daily, May 30, 1955.*

Conversation with Security Guards on Taking Literacy Courses

May 1955

Mao: What is the purpose of our work?

The troops: For Communism! To serve the people!

Mao: You are all engaged in security work. Now I'd like to give you the extra assignment of taking literacy courses. Do you accept it?

The troops: Yes!

Source: *Quoted in the article "Chairman Mao Cares About the Security Guards Studying to Become Literate" published in the People's Daily of May 23, 1960.*

Letter to Tan Shiying

June 8, 1955

Dear Shiying:[384]

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[384] See *Letter to the Party Committee of Xiangxiang xian*, p. 318 of this volume. Here Mao

I have received your letter of June 4 and your masterpiece. Thank you very much. I approve of your idea of returning to your native village soon. The *xian* committee of the Chinese Communist Party of Xiangxiang [*xian*] sent me a letter (I also received one from the Party branch of the *xiang*) which clarified a few things concerning your family's circumstances. According [to these reports]: your two sons are indeed guilty; this is because, even after having been forgiven and released several times, they kept returning to their criminal ways, and because they have committed serious crimes. Therefore it is only their just deserts that the government and the people have dealt with them in accordance with the law. On your part, [it was decided that] you only have some of the shortcomings brought over from the old society and a few improprieties regarding the attitude with which you have treated your two sons. For that reason you have been subjected to a year of probationary control and surveillance; now that has been lifted. The letter of the *xian* [party] committee indicates that they have not found you guilty of anything else. I think that the comments that the [Party] committee made regarding you are fair and just.

You ought to [learn to] look at problems from the perspective of the fundamental changes between the old and the new societies, and gradually change around your own thoughts and temperament. In this way you can become more open-minded, and you can change and get rid of some of your faults and lead your entire family in promoting diligence and hard work at production. The most important thing is for you to obey the laws and ordinances of the government and listen to the cadres. In this way, in a few years, people's attitude toward you will change even more for the better.

If you feel the need to do so, you may show this letter to the comrades in positions of responsibility in the *xian,* or district, or *xiang.*

I wish you peace.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 496-497.*

Conversation with Soldiers (Excerpt)

June 17, 1955

We, whose job is to make revolution must be prepared to be maligned. As

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used *xiong* (brother).

a matter of fact, being maligned by [our] enemies is something for us to be happy about.

Source: *Quoted in the article As a Guest at Chairman Mao's Home by Lin Jinlai, in China Youth (Semi-monthly), Beijing, January 1, 1959.*

On Swimming (Excerpts)

June 20, 1955

Whether the water is clean or muddy is not the main criterion for determining whether or not the water is suitable for swimming. The point you raise here does not merit concern. Did Zhuang Zi not say: "Unless water is accumulated to a great depth it is powerless to carry big boats"?.[385] The deeper the water, the greater its buoyancy, and the more convenient it makes for swimming. How can you say that it is not suitable [for swimming]? I need no rest unless I am tired. I'll not board the boat until I get to my destination.

Source: *Excerpts from an article Stories of Chairman Mao's Swimming in SPORTS Magazine, May 31, 1965.*

Telegram to Jamsarangiyn Sambuu

June 27, 1955

Chairman,
The Presidium of the Greater People's Khural,
The Mongolian People's Republic
Comrade J. Sambuu:

On the occasion of your sixtieth birthday, I extend to you sincere and warm congratulations on behalf of the People's Republic of China and on my own behalf.

(Signed as chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing).

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[385] This is a sentence from the book *Zhuangzi* in the chapter *Xiao yao you* (On Free Roaming). The book is a collection of essays attributed for the most part to Zhuang Zhou, a philosopher of the Warring States period (ca. fifth to third century BC).

Source: *People's Daily, June 29, 1955.*

Toast to Ho Chi Minh

June 28, 1955

I propose that we drink:

To the intimate friendship between the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples,

To peace in Asia and the world,

To the visit to China of President Ho Chi Minh and the delegation of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam led by him,

To President Ho Chi Minh's health,

To the health of the host of today's banquet—Ambassador Hoang Van Hoan,

Bottoms up!

Source: *People's Daily, June 29, 1955.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia

June 30, 1955

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very glad to accept the letter of credence from the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia which you have presented and thank you for your greetings.

The various peoples of Yugoslavia have a glorious revolutionary tradition. The Chinese people express sincere congratulations to the Yugoslavian people for their efforts in achieving independence for their homeland and building happy lives [for their people]. The recent discussions carried on between the governments of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and its results were important contributions to world peace and the cause of human progress.[386]

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[386] Talks between the USSR and Yugoslavia with the purpose of improving relations between the two countries began on May 27, 1955 and concluded with an agreement on June 2, 1955 The agreement did not completely resolve the ideological differences between

Now, the two countries of Yugoslavia and China have already established diplomatic relations. Our two countries have a common desire to develop mutual friendship and cooperation in the areas in politics, economy, and culture. I deeply believe that the strengthening of the friendly relations between our two peoples and governments not only conforms to the interests of the two countries of China and Yugoslavia but also has great significance in the cause of promoting world peace and cooperation.

Mr. Ambassador I warmly welcome you as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the People's Republic of China. In your work of developing the friendship and cooperation between China and Yugoslavia you will receive my assistance and support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China. I wish you success in your work.

Source: *People's Daily, July 1, 1955.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia

July 9, 1955

Comrade Jamsarangiyn Sambuu, Chairman of the Presidium of the Greater People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, Comrade Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal, Prime Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic,

Comrade S. Lavdan, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic:

On the occasion of the thirty-fourth anniversary of the victory of the Mongolian People's revolution, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China, I express sincere congratulations to the government and people of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The government and people of the Peoples Republic of China note with happiness and excitement the brilliant successes achieved in the past thirty-four years by the Mongolian People's Republic in its cause of construction in advancing toward socialism. We wish the Mongolian people, under the leadership of the long-tested Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, even greater

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the Communist Parties of the two countries but was rather a declaration of resumption of diplomatic relations between the two states. The USSR delegation was headed by Khrushchev.

victories in triumphantly carrying out the second five-year plan for the development of the national economy and culture and in the struggle to defend world peace.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, July 11, 1955.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Poland

July 19, 1955

Comrade Aleksander Zawadzki, Chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Poland,

Comrade Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland,

Comrade Stanislaw Skrzeszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland:

On the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the National Day of the People's Republic of Poland, on behalf of the government and people of the Peoples Republic of China we express sincere congratulations to you and, through you to the government and people of the People's Republic of Poland.

In the last eleven years, under the correct leadership of the Polish United Workers Party and with the Soviet Union's unselfish assistance, the Polish people have attained tremendous successes in the area of socialist construction. As a result of the successful implementation of the six-year plan, which laid the economic foundation of socialism, the People's Republic of Poland has already become a socialist industrialized country with a tremendous economic potential.

The prosperity and wealth of the People's Republic of Poland greatly add to the strength of the socialist camp for world peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union and to the forces defending world peace. For this the Chinese people are joyful and encouraged.

The Chinese People wish our brothers the Polish people even greater success in the cause of building socialism. May the friendship between the two peoples of China and Poland be consolidated and developed with each passing day in their continuous struggle to ease international tension and safeguard world peace.

> (CO-SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF PRC WITH LIU SHAOQI AS CHAIRMAN OF STANDING COMMITTEE OF NPC AND ZHOU ENLAI AS PREMIER OF STATE COUNCIL AND FOREIGN MINISTER, DATED IN BEIJING)

Source: *People's Daily, July 22, 1955.*

Conversation with Security Guards[387]

Mid-July, 1955

This report isn't badly written; it contains analysis as well as supporting examples...

We must make them study some more cultural matters and some general scientific knowledge; [let them] learn some geography, history, mathematics, physics and chemistry, so that they can attain the level of a middle-school graduate in three to five years...

You are all good comrades; it is just that your reading and writing [levels] are a little low. If you earnestly raise your literacy level somewhat, you will then be able to master scientific knowledge, do more things for the people and serve the people better... In our cause we need a great many intellectuals who come from the ranks of the workers and peasants.

Source: *Excerpts from Chairman Mao cares about the Security Guards studying to become Literate, People's Daily, May 23, 1960.*

Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

August 12, 1955

Comrade Kim Du Bong, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

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[387] In May 1955 Mao instructed the security guards to train themselves by writing reports about their experiences after they had gone home for vacations. Most of these reports were about their home villages and districts. Mao personally made comments and corrections on these reports. Some of these conversation excerpts reflect Mao's responses.

Comrade Kim Il Sung, Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

Comrade Nam Il, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the liberation of the Korean people, on behalf of the Chinese government and people of the Peoples Republic of China we extend to you, and through you, to the government and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea our sincere and warm congratulations.

In the ten years since the great army of the Soviet Union defeated the Japanese militarists, the Korean people, under the leadership of the Korean Worker's Party and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, have carried out unflagging struggle for the peace, unification and independence of their homeland. After the Korean Armistice in 1953, the Korean people have also carried out the arduous task of restoring and developing their national economy and have achieved great successes. These achievements of the Korean people have given the greatest inspiration and support to the Chinese people, who are in the midst of their socialist construction.

Since the Korean Armistice, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have strictly abided by the agreements of the Korean Armistice, and the two governments of Korea and China have all along worked for a peaceful resolution of the Korean question by the principle of negotiation; but the enemies of peace have seized every opportunity to plot to undermine the Armistice, such that the Korean Armistice is still in a state of instability. Nevertheless, the Korean Armistice agreement cannot be allowed to be undermined and a peaceful resolution of the Korean question must be actualized.

May the Korean people achieve even greater victories in their struggle for the peace, unification, and independence of their homeland. The Korean people will forever have the deep sympathy and fullest support of the Chinese people and government in this struggle.

May you achieve even greater successes in the cause of strengthening the democratic bases and restoring and developing your national economy.

(Co-signed as chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 15, 1955.*

Telegram to the Republic of Indonesia

August 15, 1955

Mr. Sukarno,
President,
The Republic of Indonesia,
Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Republic of Indonesia, I express warm greetings to Your Excellency and the people of your country. May the Indonesian nation prosper, may its people thrive, and may Your Excellency enjoy good health,

(SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF PRC, DATED IN BEIJING)

Source: *People's Daily, August 17, 1955.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Romania

August 21, 1955

Comrade Petru Groza, Chairman of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the People's Republic of Romania,
Comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Romania,
Comrade Simion Bughici, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Romania:

On the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of Romania's liberation, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China, we extend to you and, through you, to the government and people of the People's Republic of Romania our warm and heartfelt congratulations.

With feelings of boundless elation, the government and people of the People's Republic of China have watched the great successes achieved during the past eleven years by the People's Republic of Romania under the leadership of the Romanian Workers' Party in the cause of socialist construction. These successes have added to the strength of the socialist camp for peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union. May our brothers, the Romanian people, achieve new victories in the cause of consolidating and winning prosperity for their homeland and in defending peace in Europe and throughout the world. May the unbreakable friendship between China and Romania be further consolidated and developed.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, August 23, 1955.*

Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

September 1, 1955

Comrade Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

Comrade Ton Duc Thang, Acting President of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Vietnam,

Comrade Pham Van Dong, Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Vietnam:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China, we extend to you and, through you, to the government and people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam our warm and heartfelt congratulations.

In the last ten years, the Vietnamese people, under the leadership of the Vietnam Workers' Party and President Ho Chi Minh, have carried out a heroic and arduous struggle in opposing colonial aggression and in striving for peace, unification, independence, and democracy, and have achieved great victories. These victories not only have inspired all peoples struggling for national independence and freedom but have also contributed greatly to the cause of defending peace in Asia and throughout the world. The Chinese people are overjoyed and filled with admiration for this.

In 1954, at the Geneva Conference an agreement was reached on restoring peace to Indochina and actualizing Vietnam's unification through nationwide elections; however, at present the enemies of peace are still scheming to undermine the implementation of the Geneva Agreements. This is totally impermissible by all those who uphold justice. The Chinese people give all their sympathy and support to the Vietnamese people in their continuous efforts in struggling to actualize the Geneva Agreements thoroughly and to convene a consultative conference between the north and the south in preparation for free elections throughout the country.

May the Vietnamese people achieve even greater victories in the struggle for peace, independence, unification, and democracy!

May you achieve further successes in the tasks of consolidating the democratic political power, healing war wounds, and restoring and developing your national economy!

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing).

Source: *People's Daily, September 2, 1955.*

Telegram to Antonin Zapotocky

September 1, 1955

President,
Republic of Czechoslovakia,
Dear Comrade Antonin Zapotocky:

On hearing the news of your illness, the Chinese people and myself express to you, with the deepest concern, our earnest good wishes and sincerely hope that your health will soon be restored.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, September 3, 1955.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Bulgaria

September 7, 1955

Comrade Georgi Damyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria,

Comrade Valko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria,

Comrade Mincho Neychev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria:

On the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of Bulgaria's liberation from fascist enslavement, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China we express to you, and, through you, to the government and people of the People's Republic of Bulgaria our sincere congratulations.

The government and people of the People's Republic of China note with great excitement and elation the tremendous achievements in the cause of socialist construction that the People's Republic of Bulgaria, under the leadership of the glorious Communist Party of Bulgaria, has made during the past eleven years. These achievements have enabled the Bulgarian people to achieve a daily prospering and happy life, and has strengthened the forces of the camp for peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the Soviet Union. May our brothers the Bulgarian people achieve even greater victories in their causes of implementing the second five-year plan and safeguarding European and world peace. We are deeply convinced that the fraternal friendship between the two countries of China and Bulgaria is bound to further consolidate and develop with the advance of our two countries' cause of building socialism.

(CO-SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN OF PRC WITH LIU SHAOQI AS CHAIRMAN OF STANDING COMMITTEE OF NPC AND ZHOU ENLAI AS PREMIER OF STATE COUNCIL AND FOREIGN MINISTER, DATED IN BEIJING)

Source: *People's Daily, September 9, 1955.*

Inscription for Tokuda Kyuichi[388]

September 12, 1955

Immortal glory to Comrade Tokuda Kyuichi.

Source: *People's Daily September 14, 1955.*

Letter to Tian Jiaying

September 27, 1955

Comrade Tian Jiaying:[389]

Please send [the enclosed] to the [print] shop and have them make corrections accordingly. The title for each province and for each article should be amended as I have indicated on the table of contents. As for the rest, you do not need to send them over for my inspection today.[390]

Please type up eight copies speedily (in addition, one copy should go to Comrade Chen Yun)[391] and the best thing would be if you could have them delivered this afternoon or tonight to the various Comrades.

You and Qiaomu[392] each taking half [of the material], must go through [this material] once thoroughly, and make corrections to the language, including making the titles more lively. Please forward [this instruction] to Qiaomu.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 498-499.*

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[388] This inscription, written by Mao personally on a memorial banner, was draped over the portrait of Tokuda Kyuichi at a funeral ceremony held by the Communist Party of Japan at Toyoshima Hall, Tokyo, on October 15, 1955. Tokuda was general secretary of the Communist Party of Japan (*Nihon Kyosanto*).

[389] See *Letter to Tian Jiaying*, p. 255 of this volume.

[390] This refers to the material in the impending publication *Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside*.

[391] Chen's position at the time–which is relevant to the matter at hand–was secretary of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC.

[392] This refers to Hu Qiaomu, who was then Mao's secretary and deputy secretary general of the Central Committee of the CPC.

Letter to Zhou Shizhao

October 4, 1955

My Dear Dunyuan:[393]

I received some time ago your gracious letter, and I apologize for being so tardy in responding. I am very grateful to you for sending me a copy in your hand of the works of Cheng Songwan.[394] Please convey my feelings of gratitude also to Mr. Cao Zigu.[395] Concerning [your suggestions about my] writing editorial comments and inscriptions [for the book], I would be happy to write something when I have the time, but at the present moment and in the immediate future I am afraid I will not be able to give this any attention. I am greatly interested when I read your various masterpieces [so much that] I wrote, in response, a piece of my own. I hope that you will reward me with your kind instruction.

On the banks of the rolling Spring River I tarry for a moment
Then stretch my steps upon the layered mountains.
My yearning eyes are blessed with an unfolding vista.
The wind arises over the green islet and chases away the billows
While the rain pursues the verdant forests up the hill-slopes.
My friends, we remain the same as we gather for our tales and laughter around the drinking table
Though the trivial affairs that bother us beyond our borders are indeed saddening.
Let us not lament that time has passed us by so fleetly;
Thirty years have gone, and we are once more met at Kexi Terrace.

I hope you have been well of late,

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[393] See *Letter to Zhou Shizhao*, p. 11 of this volume.

[394] Cheng Songwan was a poet of the late-Qing period.

[395] Cao Zigu (1876-1960 also known as Cao Dianqiu) was, before liberation, director of the Department of Education of the Hunan provincial government and the chancellor of Hunan University. Since 1949 he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Hunan Political Consultative Council and deputy director of the Hunan Province Historical and Cultural Studies Institute.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, pp. 500-501.*

Telegram to the German Democratic Republic

October 6, 1955

Comrade Wilhelm Pieck, President of the German Democratic Republic,
Comrade Johannes Dieckmann, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic,
Comrade Otto Grotewohl, Premier of the German Democratic Republic:

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China, we extend to you and, through you, to the government of the German Democratic Republic and the people of all Germany our warm congratulations.

In the last six years, the German Democratic Republic has achieved significant successes in the areas of consolidating the system of the people's democracy, building socialism, and raising the people's standard of living. The German Democratic Republic has already become a strong bulwark in the fight for the peaceful unification of Germany and an important factor in maintaining peace and security in Europe. The Chinese people totally support the German people in their struggle carried out for peace, unification, and democracy and the efforts made by the Soviet Union for a peaceful resolution of the German question.

May the friendly and cooperative relations between the People's Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic develop and become more consolidated with each passing day! We wish the German Democratic Republic new successes in the cause of economic and cultural construction and in the struggle for the peaceful unification of Germany and the collective security of Europe!

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated.)

Source: *People's Daily, October 8, 1955.*

Conversation with Members of the Japanese Diet[396]

October 15, 1955

"Communism arose from war — the Soviet Union after World War One, and many other Communist nations after World War Two. If world war three should start, at least 80 percent of the world will become communized. If you want, I'll make a wager on that. So, there is no reason for us to be fearful of war. Moreover, we have no colonies. We have nothing to lose."

"Conditions have changed in Japan. I did not like Japan before because there were militarists, but now I like Japan because there are no more militarists. I sympathize with Japan because she is being ill-treated by other countries. Our ideologies and social systems differ, but I believe that this is no obstacle to mutual respect and friendly relations between Red China and Japan. What is past is past, and the question is the future.

"Everyone has good and bad points. We have many bad points, and there is need for us to learn many things from Japan. Japan is an industrial nation. China is still an agricultural nation, but I would like to say that Red China is exerting efforts to become an industrialized agricultural nation. Japan is more advanced than my country in industry, economy, and culture, and there is need for the Chinese People's Republic to learn many things from Japan.

"I would like to go to Japan sometime in the future, ft would not be for the purpose of creating trouble. I want to go sightseeing in Japan and inform Japan of the friendship of the Chinese people. I would like to go to the United States too, but there is no possibility for the time being. I wonder if Japan and the United States won't invite [...][397]

"Japan profited from its disaster (war defeat—ASAHI). Japan is in a position of leadership; that is, she is in a position to criticize the United States, France, the Netherlands, Britain and Portugal (for their colonial policies—ASAHI). The day will come when both the United States and Japan will recognize Red

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[396] Excerpt from a release in the *Ashai Evening News* (October 21, 1955) of the report of Yasushi Okubo. correspondent for Ashai Shimbun. Parts of this report (all but the first paragraph here) were based on notes released by Tokio Nakamura, delegate of the Japanese Socialist Party, who was present at the conversation with Comrade Mao. This was published in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Washington D.C., Daily Report of October 21, 1955.

[397] Mao was, of course, referring here to the foreign ministry of the Japanese Government.

China, even if it is one hundred and one years from now. It will take time for the hand of the oppressor (the United States—ASAHI) to he removed from Japan, South Korea, Formosa, and the Philippines. We understand you well. The day will come when the Foreign Office, which recognizes the Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, will be criticized. The day will surely come when we will chase the United States out of Formosa.

"Japan believes that Red China is also an independent nation, but we are not completely independent. Japan is also semi independent. This is a common point. The hand of the United States is long and extends over Formosa, the Philippines and South Korea, but this will not continue for long. Asia would be controlled by Asians, not by occidentals."

Telegram to the USSR[398]

October 24, 1955

Your congratulations on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the formation of the Chinese People's Republic have inspired us and the peoples of our country, for which we express our sincere gratitude to you and to the Soviet people.

On the joyful occasion of our national day, the Chinese people taking stock of all their achievements over the past 6 years, cherish a feeling of cordial gratitude to the great Soviet Union for the tremendous help given us in all spheres. Every achievement of the Chinese people is inseparably linked with this help of the great Soviet Union.

On its own initiative the Soviet Union has recently taken a series of steps in the field of foreign policy which has already resulted in a lessening of international tension. The Chinese people and the Chinese Government will give full support to the Soviet Union in all its efforts for the sake of peace.

Long live the bulwark of peace throughout the world, the great Soviet Union.

Source: *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington D.C., Daily Report, October 26, 1955.*

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[398] The telegram was addressed to Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Molotov, first vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. It was signed by Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai.

Letter to Zhang Naiqi

November 1, 1955

Minister Naiqi:[399]

I have received and read both of your letters. I am grateful for your sending me the information on these circumstances and also your opinions. There are bound to be one-sided points of view among the cadres; the problem is to do a good job of helping them to learn that [the attitude of] seeking truth in facts is the [proper] method for making a comprehensive analysis of things. I have not yet had time to read the article you enclosed; when I have done that I shall send it back to you. My best regards.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 502.*

Telegram to the USSR

November 6, 1955

Comrade K. E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme-Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Comrade N. A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Comrade V. M. Molotov, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

On the occasion of the thirty-eighth anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution, on behalf of the Chinese people and the Chinese government, we extend to you and, through you, to the great Soviet people and the Soviet government, our warmest congratulations.

With extremely great joy, the Chinese people congratulate our brothers the Soviet people on the brilliant successes they have achieved in the past year in the noble cause of building communism. These successes further strengthened the camp for peace, democracy, and socialism, inspiring the confidence of the people of the various people's democracies in building socialism and of the people of the entire world in their struggle to attain peace and progress.

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[399] Zhang was at the time of this letter, minister for Food Administration.

The great Soviet Union is the strong bulwark of world peace. Over the preceding year, the Soviet government has made a series of great efforts to relax the tension in the international situation and promote international cooperation, and moreover it has achieved significant results. The recent proposals and propositions put forward by the Soviet government concerning European security and the German question, disarmament, and the development of East-West contacts are in accordance with the common interests of the people of the whole world.[400] The Chinese government and the Chinese people completely support these efforts made by the Soviet government.

The brotherly friendship and firm unity between the Chinese and Soviet peoples play an increasingly important role in enhancing the common prosperity of both countries and maintaining peace in the Far East and throughout the world. The overall economic and cultural cooperation between the two countries of China and the Soviet Union and the great assistance given by the Soviet Union to China has immense significance for the cause of building socialism in our country. May the great unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples develop and become more consolidated with each passing day!

Long live our great ally, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics!

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, November 7, 1955.*

Letter to Huang Yanpei

November 17, 1955

Mr. Renzhi:[401]

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[400] In July 1955 the USSR proposed the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization in favor of an all-European security system, including the US dissolution.

[401] See *Letter to Huang Yanpei (February 17, 1951)*, p. 116 of this volume.

I have received your letter which was sent to me from the hospital. I am extremely happy that you are completely recovered from your illness. I hope that you will continue to pay attention to taking good care of yourself so that your health may be fully restored.[402] There is marked improvement in the work of reforming the industrial and commercial circles [in our country], which is very gratifying. It appears to me that, evidently, it is possible to adopt the method of self-criticism in [this work of reforming] the industrial and commercial circles.[403] The recent experience [which emerged through the] discussions of the [All-China] Federation of Industry and Commerce can be propagated. Owing to the fact that I am on the road, I was unable to respond to your letter earlier.

I send my respect.

(SIGNED AND DATED)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 504.*

Remarks Made to Li Kaiwen[404]

November 20, 1955

That's really subjective; they don't even study the problem a bit first. These things ought to be planted only if people can afford to do so; if they cannot, then just don't plant them!

Source: *Literary Gazette; Semimonthly, Beijing, July 14, 1957.*

Letter to Panchen Gnoertehni

November 24, 1955

Dear Panchen Gnoertehni:

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[402] See *Letter to Huang Yanpei (November 23, 1954)*, p. 288 of this volume.

[403] See *The only Road for the Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V.

[404] Li Kaiwen was an old acquaintance of Mao's from Yanan days. On this occasion Mao, in the company of Li Fuchun and Cai Chang, discussed the matter of centralized state purchasing and marketing and cooperativization in Anhui. Li suggested that there were tendencies toward commandism in some cadres' work-styles.

Your letter to me of August 13, 1955, has been received. I thank you greatly, I am very happy to hear that work in your area has improved. I hope that your unity with the people in Lhasa will grow daily and become even more consolidated. I hope that the entire Tibetan region will prosper more and more each year.

In response, and with best wishes for your health!

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 504.*

Letter to Zhou Shizhao

November 24, 1955

Dear Dunyuan:[405]

I received your letter quite some time ago already, and I have read your masterpiece and all the enclosed material. I am extremely grateful; I have still not had the time to comply with your bidding to write those words for you.[406] I hope that you are not urgently in need of that, and I'd like to let the subject sit for a while; is that all right with you? Have you gone down [to the countryside] for a stroll? It is best if you can go down several times a year, and, each time, for two, three weeks. I went out once recently, and feel that my head is greatly cleared and refreshed. When you go down don't just look at schools; you should look at other things as well. Let us talk again sometime.

Wishing you the best in your teaching.

(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 505.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Albania

November 26, 1955

Comrade Haxhi Lleshi, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania,

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[405] See *Letter to Zhou Shizhao (October 15, 1949)*, p. 11 of this volume.

[406] See *Letter to Zhou Shizhao (October 4, 1955)*, p. 334 of this volume.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania,

Comrade Behar Shtylla, Minster of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania:

On the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the Albanian people's liberation, on behalf of the Chinese people and the Chinese government, we extend to you, and through you, to the heroic Albanian people and our warm and heartfelt congratulations.

In the last eleven years, the Albanian people who have a glorious revolutionary tradition have, under the leadership of the Albanian Workers' Party, already achieved brilliant successes in the areas of consolidating the people's democratic political power, defending the independence of their homeland, and creating a prosperous and happy new life. The Chinese people are joyous at the achievements of our brothers, the Albanian people, and moreover hope that the fraternal friendship and unity between the two people of China and Albania will be further consolidated and developed in our common cause of building socialism and maintaining world peace.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, November 29, 1955.*

Telegram to the People's Republic of Yugoslavia

November 26, 1955

Comrade Josip Broz Tito, President and Chairman of the Federal Executive Council of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Comrade Mosa Pijade, President of the Federal Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia,

Comrade Koca Popovic, Stale Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Federal

People's Republic of Yugoslavia, on behalf of the people and government of the People's Republic of China, we extend warm congratulations to you and, through you, to the heroic Yugoslavian people.

A deep friendship already exists between the two peoples of China and Yugoslavia in the struggle for the independence and liberation of their respective homelands in the past. The friendly cooperation between China and Yugoslavia has made great progress since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. We believe that this friendship and cooperation will continue to be unceasingly strengthened and developed. May the Yugoslavian people attain further successes in the cause of building socialism and maintaining world peace.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, November 29, 1955.*

Reply to Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Germany

December 3, 1955

The Democratic Republic of Germany is the first truly peace-loving democratic state in German history. The Democratic Republic of Germany has achieved tremendous success in the struggles of building socialism, striving for the peaceful unification of Germany, and safeguarding European and world peace. The Democratic Republic of Germany has already become a strong bulwark of the forces of peace and democracy in all of Germany and an important factor in maintaining European security and world peace. I am confident that the construction of socialism in the Democratic Republic of Germany and the German people's struggle for the peaceful unification of Germany are bound to attain even greater victories. In this struggle, the German people will continue to receive the full support of the Chinese people. In the last few years, the close cooperation between our two countries in the areas of politics, the economy, and culture has brought about daily increasing consolidation and development in the friendship between our two peoples. This overall cooperation and brotherly friendship are in accord with our two people's common interests and wishes, and also serve to strengthen the force of the camp for peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the Soviet Union.

Source: *People's Daily, December 4, 1955.*

Telegram to the Republic of Finland

December 5, 1955

President J. K. Paasikivi,
The Republic of Finland
Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the thirty-eighth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Finland, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend warm congratulation to the Finnish people and to Your Excellency. May the Republic of Finland prosper and may the people of Finland be happy.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Source: *People's Daily, December 6, 1955.*

Talk on Opposing Right-Deviation and Conservatism

December 6, 1955

To say the "Left" is better than the Right is incorrect; to say the Right is better than the "Left" is also incorrect. Some people are falling behind reality in their thinking; they have no horns on their heads; they do not posses spirit. In the struggle between the two lines they do not carry out criticism, or if they do, their criticism is blunted. They are afraid of criticism and are afraid of losing votes. All these are manifestations of a Right deviation, and it is necessary to oppose them in the Party. The Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee criticized the Right-deviationist empiricism of the Rural [Work] Department.[407] That the thinking of the leadership has fallen behind reality is a grave problem.

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[407] For criticism on Rural Work Department, see *The Debate On the Co-operative Transformation of Agriculture and the Current Class Struggle, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* Volume V.

In the transformation of capitalism, in the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, and in the cooperativization [movement], it's all like that. We underestimated our own capacity. In the past, agriculture lagged behind industry. After the Seventeen-Article [Program] came out,[408] agriculture caught up with industry and forced industry to make progress. For instance, it would have been to our disadvantage had we allowed the elementary [agricultural producers] cooperatives[409] to remain as they were for three or four years without advancing to the higher stage. It is possible that socialism will be realized in 1959. The idea of the Seventeen Articles is to oppose conservatism. [It involves] overall planning, the strengthening of the leadership, fundamental measures, and advanced experience. Half a year ago, we did not consider these, now we have changed. Tremendous changes and immense productive power have emerged as if a new continent has been discovered. The new continent has been in existence; it's just we did not see it. The socialist transformation of industry and commerce will be ninety percent completed in 1957. The transformation of handicraft industries must also be accelerated. Our [current] plan is too modest; [we aim at] seventy to eighty percent transformation in 1957. Originally the nationalization of industry and commerce was planned for 1962; perhaps this can be accomplished ahead of schedule. After [the stage of] joint state-private ownership is reached, it is not difficult to transform it to state ownership. Instead of taking the eighteen years [called for in the original plan], cooperativization took ten years. This proves that we have fallen behind reality. The masses have tremendous potential; they can tackle many things. [So] we should oppose Right deviations and conservatism in order to accomplish transformation ahead of schedule. I propose that we achieve our goals in excess of the targets before fifteen years and delete such uncertain expressions as "approximately," "basically," and "about fifteen years." We should strive to achieve what can be achieved [through effort]. For instance, when we put in an order for products, we can demand earlier delivery. We should take advantage of this period of cessation of hostilities [with the United States] to speed up the tempo and accomplish our general tasks. This is the idea of the "Eighth Congress." If we can accomplish the general tasks of the period of transition ahead of schedule, things on the battlefield will be easily handled. It is most advantageous to have things done quickly, for then we will be in a better position to fight Taiwan if we have to. But if we don't fulfill our tasks of construction, it will be difficult. We must accelerate and achieve faster, greater, and better [results] in all aspects of our work. We must obtain better results in a shorter period of time. If we undertake things for which there are adequate conditions, if they stem from the masses' demands, and if we accomplish more and better results that would mean that we are advancing steadily. In the past we made [some] mistakes in opposing blind and adventurist advance; we dampened the activism of the cadres and the masses. This was wrong. I he movement to eliminate illiteracy was swept away by the movement to oppose adventurist advance. The good spirit of uprightness was repressed, and there was an upsurge in evil and sinister influence; both the cadres and the masses lost their drive. By not having been able to notice such a problem at the very earliest opportunity the Center has neglected its duty. The masses say. "One can't go wrong in following the Communist Party". In terms of general orientation, we have not been wrong. But in specific cases, we have made mistakes, and the masses have also made mistakes in following us. There are several ways in which to advance: the best, the mediocre, and the not so good. The more correct and reasonable line is to stand in front of the masses and to give them encouragement to go forward, and not to stand behind them and pour cold water on them, if we achieve comparatively great accomplishments in a comparatively short time, we will be advancing steadily, whereas if we do things in the conventional way, spending a longer time but achieving little, we will be following the conservative line. There are two ways to overcome this; overall planning and getting close to the masses. It is not the method of sitting in the office, but rather, getting close to the masses to find out new things, new experiences, [to gather] advanced experiences and popularize them. One does not have to catch many sparrows to know [a sparrow's] insides. If you know that Zhejiang and Anhui can carry out cooperativization quickly, you'll know that the same can be done nationally. Conservatism is not any one individual's problem. Take hold of the advanced [experiences] in order to criticize the backward; discover new productive forces and the potential of the masses. This is a principle of leadership, a method of leadership; only with this can we convince people. It will not do to sit in the office not getting close to the masses and not taking hold of the advanced experiences. Official business has indeed to be transacted, but it will not do to limit yourselves to transacting official business alone. Even when you go out

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[408] For Seventeen Article Programme see *Request for Opinions on the Seventeen Article Document Concerning Agriculture, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V.

[409] The elementary co-operative characterized by the pooling of land as shares and unified management was semi-socialist in nature. It maintained private ownership by the co-operative members of such means of production as land, draught animals and the larger farm implements, and the co-operative had to pay "dividends" to its members for their use. The elementary co-operative was therefore said to have retained semi-private ownership.

[for an inspection], you have to take hold of the advanced; you can't simply engage in some laggardly projects and bring them back with you. People who are in responsible positions should allot seven to ten weeks [a year] as a period for getting close to the masses. The work-style of sitting in the office can only [be used in] dealing with conventional matters. Advanced experience [can be had] only by breaking through convention. In the things of objective reality, breakthroughs are made every day; imbalance is a constant, while equilibrium is only temporary. This is the law of progress. The viewpoint that there can be no further change after equilibrium is achieved is incorrect. On the contrary, it is only when one takes hold of the advanced [elements] in disequilibrium and uses them to bring the rest forward that there can be progress. One should not be afraid of breakthroughs or of the emergence of contradictions. Perpetual peace and tranquility are bound to produce mistakes. There are dialectics only when there are both breakthroughs and the attempt to achieve equilibrium. Only in this way can we stir up the activism of the masses and hasten the construction of socialism. We should [build socialism] with faster, more, and better [results], fulfill [this task] in excess of the targets in less than fifteen years, and thus advance steadily.

Comparing our country with the Soviet Union: (1) We had more than twenty years' experience in the base areas and the practice of the three revolutionary wars. We are extremely rich in experience. By the time of the victory [of 1949] we had already accumulated experience in every area, and we've had Right and Left deviations quite a few times. We quickly formed our state and accomplished our revolutionary tasks [whereas] in the case of the Soviet Union, it was a newly started business for them; at the time of the October Revolution, they had no army, no government, and few Party members). (2) We have the help of the Soviet Union and other democratic countries. (3) Our population is large and our location is good. Though diligent and able to endure hardship, the peasants will have no future if they do not cooperativize. Chinese peasants are even better than British and American workers; we can therefore step into socialism faster and with greater and better results. We should not always compare ourselves with the Soviet Union. After three five-year plans we shall be able to produce twenty-four million tons of steel. This is faster than the Soviet Union. Right now the two flanks are riding high, and the main body is possibly lagging behind. The two flanks are prone to be conceited, but it is the industrial sector that is most prone to be conceited, especially heavy industry. The Anshan [Iron and Steel Works], for instance, has already become conceited. It is very possible for a nation to become socialized without being industrialized (with the proportion [of industry] less than sixty percent, the system is not yet established). Can we ask the peasants to wait? This is impossible. The socialization of the peasants does not hinder industrialization. We cannot make them wait. The work at the two flanks has been seriously examined. In addition, we ought to have a serious examination of the problem of industry and (make industry] go through big campaigns according to schedule. We should investigate financial and fiscal matters, trade, and cultural and educational matters as well. The Eighth [Party] Congress should make a summing- up investigation. This is the central problem. We should oppose conservatism, Right deviation, passivity, and arrogance; we should discover advanced experience, change the method of leadership, and achieve faster and better results. We should mobilize the masses to conduct criticism and self-criticism, to overcome conservatism, and to score greater achievements. The whole Party must be prepared, and the entire nation must be prepared.

Source: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought; Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

Letter to Zhai Zuojun

December 12, 1955

Comrade Zuojun:[410]

Your letter of December 2 has been received. I am very happy to receive it. I guess you have returned to Taiyuan. I have also received some of your earlier letters, but it seems to me that I may not have received all of them. We are all very well here. I hope that you will do a good job of studying. When next you come to Beijing, please let us know ahead of time ([you may] contact Li Yinqiao, the commander of my bodyguards, on the telephone), and we should arrange for a meeting.

My regards,
(Signed and dated)

Source: *Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, p. 506.*

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[410] See *Conversation with Zhai Zuojun (Spring 1952)*, p. 159 of this volume.

1956

Talk at the Conference on Intellectuals Called by the Centre (Excerpt)

January 20, 1956

The target plans of all the departments should be practicable, what can be and should be done but has not yet been done, is [due to] rightist conservatism; what is ill-founded and completely unworkable and yet is being done, is [due to] a blindness or 'leftist' adventurism. In my view, this [the leftist adventurism] is not the general orientation of the whole party, although it is detectable. Some comrades are a bit wooly and dare not say that they are being realistic because of the ugly label of rightist conservatism and opportunism. If they examine and study [things carefully], [they will be able to] say or insist on saying what cannot be done. What cannot be done should be deleted from our plans so that they may rest on a solid, reliable basis.

Source: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, Red Guard Publication.*

Contradictions Under Socialism

April 5, 1956

Some naïve ideas seem to suggest that contradictions no longer exist in a socialist society. To deny the existence of contradictions is to deny dialectics. The contradictions in various societies differ in character, as do forms of their solution, but society at all times develops through continual contradictions. Socialist society also develops through contradictions between the productive forces and the conditions of production. In a socialist or communist society, technical innovations and improvement in the social system inevitably continue to take place; otherwise the development of society would come to a standstill and society could no longer advance. Humanity is still in its youth. The road it has yet to traverse will be no one knows how many times longer than the road it has already traveled. Contradictions between progress and conservatism, between the advanced and the backward, between the positive and the negative, will constantly occur under varying conditions and different circumstances. Things will keep on like this: One contradiction will lead to another, and when old contradictions are solved new ones will arise. It is obviously incorrect to maintain, as some people do, that the contradiction between idealism and materialism can be eliminated in a socialist or communist society. As long as contradictions exist between the subjective and the objective, between the advanced and the backward and between the productive forces and the conditions of production, the contradiction between materialism and idealism will continue in a socialist or communist society and will manifest itself in various forms. Since man lives in society, he reflects, in different circumstances and to varying degrees the contradictions existing in each form of society. Therefore not everybody will be perfect, even when a communist society is established. By then there will still be contradictions among the people, and there will still be good people and bad people, people whose thinking is relatively correct and others whose thinking is relatively incorrect. Hence there will still be struggle between people, though its nature and form will be different from those in class societies. Viewed in this light, the existence of contradictions between the individual and the collective in a socialist society is nothing strange...

Source: *Extracted from an editorial in the People's Daily of April 5, 1956, entitled On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.*

Stalin's Place in History

April 5, 1956

After Lenin's death, Stalin, as the chief leader of the Party and the state, creatively applied and developed Marxism-Leninism. In the struggle to defend the legacy of Leninism against its enemies—the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and other bourgeois agents—Stalin expressed the will and wishes of the people and proved himself to be an outstanding Marxist-Leninist fighter. The reason Stalin won the support of the Soviet people and played an important role in history was primarily that he, together with the other leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, brought about the triumph of socialism in the Soviet Union and created the conditions for the victory of the Soviet Union in the war against Hitler; these victories of the Soviet people conformed to the interests of the working class of the world and all progressive mankind. It was therefore quite natural for the name of Stalin to be greatly honored throughout the world. But, having won such high honor among the people both at home and abroad by his correct application of the Leninist line, Stalin erroneously exaggerated his own role and counter-posed his individual authority to the collective leadership, and as a result certain of his actions were opposed to certain fundamental Marxist-Leninst concepts he himself had propagated

Marxist-Leninists hold that leaders play a big role in history. The people and their parties need forerunners who are able to represent the interests and will of the people, stand in the forefront of their historic struggles, and serve as their leaders. But when any leader of the Party or the state places himself over and above the Party and the masses, instead of in their midst, when he alienates himself from the masses, he ceases to have all-around, penetrating insight into the affairs of the state. As long as this was the case, even so outstanding a personality as Stalin could not avoid making unrealistic and erroneous decisions on certain important matters... During the later part of his life, Stalin took more and more pleasure in this cult of the individual and violated the Party's system of democratic centralism and the principle of combining collective leadership with individual responsibility. As a result, he made some serious mistakes: for example, he broadened the scope of the suppression of counter-revolution; he lacked the necessary vigilance on the eve of the anti-fascist war; he failed to pay proper attention to the further development of agriculture and the material welfare of peasantry; he gave certain wrong advice on the international communist movement, and, in particular, made a wrong decision on the question of Yugoslavia. On these issues, Stalin fell victim to subjectivism and one-sidedness and divorced himself from objective reality and from the masses.

The cult of the individual is a rotten carry-over from the long history of mankind. The cult of the individual is rooted not only in the exploiting classes but also in the small producers. As is well known, patriarchism is a product of small-producer economy...

The struggle against the cult of the individual, which was launched by the Twentieth Congress, is a great and courageous fight by the communists and the people of the Soviet Union to clear away the ideological obstacles blocking their advance...

It must be pointed out that Stalin's works should, as before, still be seriously studied and that we should accept all that is of value in them, as an important historical legacy, especially those many works in which he defended Leninism and correctly summarized the experience of building up the Soviet Union. But there are two ways of studying them—the Marxist way and the doctrinaire way. Some people treat Stalin's writings in a doctrinaire manner and therefore cannot analyze and see what is correct and what is not—and everything that is correct they consider a panacea and apply indiscriminately, and thus inevitably they make mistakes. For instance, Stalin put forward a formula that in different revolutionary periods the main blow should be so directed as to isolate the middle-of-the-road social and political forces of the time. This formula of Stalin's should be treated according to circumstances and from a critical, Marxist point of view. In certain circumstances it may be correct to isolate the middle forces, but it is not correct to isolate them under all circumstances. Our experience teaches us that the main blow of the revolution should be directed at the chief enemy and to isolate him, whereas with the middle forces, a policy of both uniting with them and struggling against them should be adopted, so that they are at least neutralized; and, as circumstances permit, efforts should be made to shift them from their position of neutrality to one of alliance with us in order to facilitate the development of the revolution. But there was a time—the ten years of civil war from 1927 to 1936—when some of our comrades crudely applied this formula of Stalin's to China's revolution by turning their main attack on the middle forces, singling them out as the most dangerous enemy; the result was that, instead of isolating the real enemy, we isolated ourselves and suffered losses to the advantage of the real enemy. In the light of this doctrinaire error, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China during the period of the anti-Japanese war formulated a policy of developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle-of-the roaders, and isolating the diehards for the purpose of defeating the Japanese aggressors...

Some people consider that Stalin was wrong in everything. This is a grave misconception. Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninst, yet at the same time a Marxist-Leninst who committed several gross errors without realizing that they were errors. We should view Stalin from a historical standpoint, make a proper and all round analysis to see where he was right and where he was wrong and draw useful lessons therefrom. Both the things he did right and the things he did wrong were phenomena of the international communist movement and bore the imprint of the times. Taken as a whole the international communist movement is only a little over hundred years old and it is only thirty-nine years since the victory of the October Revolution; experience in many fields of revolutionary work is still inadequate. Great achievements have been made, but there are still shortcomings and mistakes…

Reactionary forces the world over are pouring ridicule on this event: they jeer at the fact that we are overcoming mistakes in our camp. But what will come of all this ridicule? There is not the slightest doubt that these scoffers will find themselves facing a still more powerful, forever invincible, great camp of peace and socialism, headed by the Soviet Union, while the murderous, bloodsucking enterprises of these scoffers will be in a pretty fix.

Source: *Editorial, April 5, 1956.*

Speech at Expanded Meeting of CPC Political Bureau[411]

April 25, 1956

There are those who show no vigor and vitality in their expressions of opinion. The relationship between the lower echelon and the higher echelon is like that of a mouse when it sees a cat. It is as if their souls have been eaten away. Thus many dare not speak up. The various provinces have this same problem. They are not sufficiently democratic, although the exemplary workers speak up quite spiritedly. Our financial and economic conference and the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee have an auxiliary function, because there are several rules and regulations on which not everyone dares speak appropriately and some comrades do not dare express themselves at all.

Another reason for this is that they do not have sufficient understanding of the situation and thus do not speak clearly and profoundly. In regard to the financial and economic system, Comrades XXX and Hsien-nien have their own opinions, but this is not a question of men. Only by changing the system can we change the way of doing things, and we must give some power to those below. Our discipline has come mostly from Soviet Union. By being too strict, we will tie the hands of the people. If we cannot crush bureaucracy in this way, then the proletarian dictatorship must have an appropriate system. In regard to the problem of the division of power between the central government and the local areas, and how the single-head system of the Soviet Union came about, the Political Bureau and the State Council have still been unable to make a decision. If the various localities want division of power, they should not be fearful of talking of independence. Since the central government has not made any decision on this, all of it can be brought up for discussion. It is allowable for the various localities to first work up their own regulations, by-laws, methods, and statutes. We should allow the various localities to be full of creativity, spirit, and liveliness. Starting next year, a large meeting should be held once a year. On 1 May there need not be a large meeting; there can be small meetings and entertainment, and 1 May slogans of the Soviet Union need not be posted.

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[411] In this connection also see comrade Mao's article *On Ten Major Relationships, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V, pp. 284-307.

Since the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee, we have been dull and mechanical, and lacking in spirit. The Fourth Plenary Session should be convened. Its resolutions are very necessary. Letting Gao Gang hold sway for another year is unthinkable. But this has produced an over cautiousness about everything, and some do not dare speak of national affairs, and this is not right. Before the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central committee, there were some sabotage incidents; these must be overcome. The sabotage activities of Kao and Jao should be terminated.[412] But some are overcautious and do not speak of national affairs. A clear distinction should be made between two kinds of national affairs. One type is destructive, like that of Kao and Jao, and should be opposed. One type is constructive and should be thoroughly discussed. At the time of the financial and economic conference,[413] some comrades said the wrong thing and were subject to criticism, but the Kao and Jao affairs should be distinguished from them. The party at the time of the Great Revolution was full for vitality. Later Chen Duxiu committed the mistake of right opportunism, and subsequently also started the blind leftist movement.[414] After defeat, he was no longer lively. In these eight years, the brief period following the "7 August" Conference[415], the Sixth National Congress[416] and the Third Plenary Session of the Party Central Committee were correct.[417] During the period of land reform, there were three leftist tendencies. During the period of the anti-Japanese war, there was a rightist trend. Two of the leftist trends were our own, and the third leftist trend and the Communist International were related to each other. The Fourth Plenary Session's resolutions on the third leftist trend were written by the Russians who forced us to accept them, especially the Wang Ming line. It was the greatest loss to our revolutionary power, the loss incurred amounting to over 90 percent. In view of this lesson, we should accept things analytically and critically. Zhang Guotao was rightist.[418] During the Anti-Japanese War, he was also rightist. The three rightist movements were especially for centralization, and they were not allowed to express a difference of views. In defeat, they were not allowed to talk of defeat. In view of the lessons of history, later every effort was made to remedy the situation, and there was unity and fighting spirit. During the period of the Anti-Japanese War, the spirit of independence of the base areas was very great, and local activism was given expression, but there was a kind of decentralization. Some who were working for independence expressed what should not be expressed. This was related to the Wang Ming line. In order to correct this kind of phenomenon, the central government made the decision to strengthen party nature. There was to be centralization, but a good deal of autonomy was preserved. During the period of the War of Liberation, there was formulated the system of reporting for instructions, rectifying the previous tendency of decentralization.[419] During the past few years, it has been irregular, and there has been more centralization. After all, how much autonomy should the industrial plants, the villages, the cooperatives, and the localities have? The Soviet Union during the past 40 years has had no experience in this, and we have no experience to study this. Since some things are decided neither by the Central Government nor the localities, they are just carried out as such, as for example the single-head system. Comrade Xuefeng would bring up the questions before the central government would discuss it. Our party historically has had the overcentralization of the Wang Ming line and the over-decentralization of the Second Wang Ming line. It is necessary to have an adequate amount of centralization, but too much centralization is not right and not beneficial for the mobilization of power to carry out large-scale economic reconstruction. Our comrades will please study carefully our party's history on this.

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[412] For more on Kao-Jao (Gao Gang-Rao Shushi) affair, see *Speeches at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V.

[413] The National Conference on Financial and Economic Work was held in the summer of 1953.

[414] Chen Duxiu was originally a professor at Beijing University and became famous as an editor of New Youth. He was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. Because of his reputation at the time of the May 4th Movement and owing to the Party's immaturity in its initial period, he became General Secretary of the Party. In the last period of the revolution of 1924-27, the Rightist thinking in the Party represented by Chen Duxiu developed into a line of capitulationism. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has observed that the capitulationists at that time "voluntarily gave up the Party's leadership of the peasant masses, urban petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie, and in particular gave up the Party's leadership of the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of the revolution" (*The Present Situation and Our Tasks, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume IV). After the defeat of 1927 Chen Duxiu and a handful of other capitulationists lost faith in the future of the revolution and became liquidationists. They took the reactionary Trotskyist stand and together with the Trotskyites formed a small anti-Party group. Consequently Chen Duxiu was expelled from the Party in November 1929. He died in 1942.
With reference to Chen Duxiu's Right opportunism, see the introductory notes to *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society* and to *Report on the Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* Volume I, and *Introducing The Communist, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* Volume II.

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[415] The CPC held an emergency conference of the Central Committee on August 7, 1927, at Kiukiang, Jiangxi Province. The conference criticized the erroneous capitulationist line of the Right opportunist Chen Duxiu on the question of revolutionary leadership, revolutionary armed forces and agrarian revolution and removed him from the leading post.

[416] The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in July 1928. It pointed out that after the defeat in 1927, China's revolution remained bourgeois- democratic in nature, i.e., anti-imperialist and anti-feudal, and that since the inevitable new high tide in the revolution was not yet imminent, the general line for the revolution should be to win over the masses. The Sixth Congress liquidated the 1927 Right Capitulationism of Chen Duxiu and also repudiated the "Left" putschism which occurred in the Party at the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928.

The congress adopted the following Ten-Point Programme: (I) overthrow imperialist rule; (2) confiscate foreign capitalist enterprises and banks; (3) unify China and recognize the right of the nationalities to self-determination; (4) overthrow the Kuomintang warlord government; (5) establish a government of councils of workers, peasants and soldiers; (6) institute the eight-hour day, increase wages, and establish unemployment relief and social insurance; (7) confiscate the land of all landlords and distribute the land among the peasants; (8) improve the living conditions of the soldiers, give land and jobs to ex-soldiers; (9) abolish all exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies and adopt a consolidated progressive tax; and (10) unite with the world proletariat, unite with the Soviet Union.

[417] The Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party held in September 1930, and the subsequent central leading body adopted many positive measures to put an end to the Li Lisan line. But latter a number of Party comrades who were inexperienced in practical revolutionary struggle, with Chen Shaoyu (Wang Ming) and Qin Bangxian (Po Ku) in the lead, came out against the Central Committee's measures. In the pamphlet *The Two Lines or The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China* they most emphatically declared that the main danger then existing in the Party was not "Left" opportunism but "Right opportunism" and, to justify their own activities, they "criticized" the Li Lisan line as "Rightist". They put forward a new political program which continued, revived or developed the Li Lisan line and other "Left" ideas and policies in a new guise, and set themselves against the correct line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. It was mainly to criticize the military mistakes of this new "Left" opportunist line that Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote the article Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War. This line was dominant in the Party from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931 to the meeting of the Political Bureau convened by the Central Committee at Zunyi, Guizhou Province, in January 1935, which ended the dominance of this erroneous line and established the new central leadership headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The erroneous "Left" line dominated the Party for a particularly long time (four years) and brought extremely heavy losses, with disastrous consequences, to the Party and the revolution. A loss of 90 percent was inflicted on the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Red Army and its base areas, tens of millions of people in the revolutionary base areas were made to suffer the cruel oppression of the Kuomintang, and the progress of the Chinese revolution was retarded. The overwhelming majority of the errant comrades have realized and corrected their mistakes through a long process of learning from experience and have done much good work for the Party and people. Under Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership they united with the masses of other comrades in the Party on the basis of a common political understanding.

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[418] Zhang Guotao was a renegade from the Chinese revolution. In early life, speculating on the revolution, he joined the Chinese Communist Party. In the Party he made many mistakes resulting in serious crimes. The most notorious of these was his opposition, in 1935, to the Red Army's northward march and his defeatism and liquidationism in advocating withdrawal by the Red Army to the minority-nationality areas on the Sichuan-Xikang borders; what is more, he openly carried out traitorous activities against the Party and the Central Committee, established his own bogus central committee, disrupted the unity of the Party and the Red Army, and caused heavy losses to the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army. But thanks to patient education by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee, the Fourth Front Army and its numerous cadres soon returned to the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and played a glorious role in subsequent struggles. Zhang Guotao however, proved incorrigible and in the spring of 1938 he slipped out of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and joined the Kuomintang secret police.

[419] See *On setting up a System of Reports, Selected works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume IV.

The question of the individual and the state, and the ratio of collective income. I agree that 60-70 percent of the total income should go to the commune members, and 30-40 percent to the state and the commune. At most this should not exceed 40 percent; and 30 percent is the best (including agricultural taxes, besides the cooperative public welfare fund, the public accumulation fund, administrative fees, etc.)

The question of the system of the socialist economy:

The party committee system is not to be doubted. Please study Lenin's directives. The industrial plants and mines, cooperatives, commercial flow and transport, as well as other enterprises must have a definite independence, but the extent to which they should be independent should be carefully studied. We are not Gao Gang's Independent Kingdom, but should encourage open and legal "independent kingdoms" (not above the constitution) if we are to manage our affairs well. If we have none of this at all, we cannot manage our affairs well. How should the State Council have division of labor in management and control? This must be studied in order to find a solution. How many departments the central government should have and how much power they should have are questions which should be decided on shortly. As to how many departments the localities should set up, over what matters they should have jurisdiction, and how much power they should have, we should draft a resolution on this within the next few months. The various departments of the central government should stress the teaching of cadres for the lower levels to solve their problems. When the localities come to the central government and cannot see the people in charge, and there is delay and indecision, some problems do not get to be solved for several years, and the reasons for this should be studied. These two problems need solution: What method should be used so that the people in charge can be seen, and also how can problems be expeditiously solved. Will the various departments of the central government please give this their attention.

The localities have the power to resist all inoperable, impractical, and subjective orders, directives, instructions, and forms which the central government issues to the localities, and if they are restrained a bit more, it would not matter. This power is only given to the provincial and municipal committees (which are comparatively more mature politically), and they are not given to the committees of the localities and the counties.

The Party regulations should show discipline and creativeness: the mass line should be manifested here, and the various provinces should study them a bit. It will not do not to have discipline; but discipline, when enforced inflexibly, can obstruct an attitude of positivism. Discipline which obstructs creativeness and positivism should be abolished In the draft party regulations it would be stipulated that a vice-chairman or several vice-chairmen should be designed. Whether or not it is possible to emulate the methods of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and designate regular delegates with 5-year terms to serve in a supervisory function, is something to which everyone will please give consideration.

In the field of arts, "Let a hundred flowers bloom"; and in the literary field, "Let a hundred schools of thought contend" (as they contended during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period [722-481 BC]). This should be our policy. This was the view of the people 2,000 years ago.

Democratic control of the cooperatives is very important. This is natural. In collectivized labor, the peasants also should be given some free time. It is right to listen to correct orders, but when orders are profuse, they become too inflexible and inoperative. We also must have some liberalism; it will not do otherwise. Strictness is derived from dealing with the unstrict. Discipline arises from dealing with liberalism. What we are opposed to is: We should not stir up the liberalism of the local liberals. But we must have some liberalism in order to facilitate getting things done. It will not do to be strict at all times. It is still necessary to have liberalism within the family, otherwise each family will have to set up supervisory members.

It is necessary to have national balance. Local independence should not obstruct national balance. Only with national balance can there be partial balance for the localities. Without national balance, the country would be in great chaos. Beijing's things cannot match those of Shanghai, and they are afraid that Shanghai goods will flood the market. So it is necessary to have national balance. Without this balance, it will not be possible to make the nation industrialized. When we encourage independence of the localities, we must not lean to one side. Now it is necessary to stress independence.

We must positively touch on the economic activities of this year and next year. Each provincial and municipal committee should report once, and work up some exemplary models. We have had no experience in these matters, and must try to find some departments, districts, and industrial plants to study. Other people say the central government has brilliant leadership. We know some things, but also do not know other things.

In four days of meetings, we cannot talk about everything. We have talked too little about the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, the unification of war efforts, the minority nationalities, and international problems. Will the various areas please stress this to their subordinates. We should take affirmative action in regard to the suppression of counterrevolutionaries. In the past, we have killed, locked up, and controlled 2-3 million such persons, and this was extremely necessary. Without this stroke, it would not do. The democratic parties have divergent views form us. Now the counterrevolutionaries are fewer. We should take affirmative action to see if there are still any counterrevolutionaries, and this year decide upon having some of them killed. They must be liquidated in the strategic organizations and schools. Those not yet liquidated must be liquidated. We cannot be lax and lenient; we must carry out this bitter task. We should telephone once every half month to urge them into action. You can also use the telephone method towards the local committees.

Punishment within the party: In regard to some cadres in the counties, districts, and townships, this has been too much and too severe. In regard to high-level cadres (including bureau chiefs and above) who commit errors and on whom it is difficult to reach a conclusion, the punishment should be carried out (and the reasons therefore should be clearly investigated). It is not right for the punishment to be severe and too heavy. With the exception of the counterrevolutionaries, they should be given the chance to reform.

In regard to the problem of minority nationalities, Comrade XXX has said that Sichuan is right. Although some retribution has been made, attention needs to be paid to other areas.

The question of international relations. Some points should not be blindly followed. On some matters we already have experience. The Soviet Union has already initiated a mass criticism campaign. Some of it is neither suitable for our country nor to the Soviet Union. We have committed many errors in view of their direct leadership. For example, in regard to the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, we would not catch most of them and would not kill many of them. The single-head system is a military standpoint. The mass line is still the standpoint of graceful favors. Whether the method of capital accumulation should be by disparity (in prices between industrial goods and agricultural produce) or by tax collection is a problem. But this is not to say that we have nothing to learn from the Soviet Union. They have many things which are worthy of our study. The Soviet Union helped us in our reconstruction, and socialist countries are still the best at this. Now even with this one country, although it has made many errors, there is still much that merits our study. We should not follow blindly, but should subject everything to analysis. There is good and bad in everything. We cannot say that everything the Soviet Union docs is good. Now, people are saying that we have been following even what is bad. We should learn whatever is suitable for our use. Even the good in capitalism should be learned.

We should adopt an attitude of equal treatment to all small nations abroad, we should not cock our tail. Although we are not imperialists, do not have an "Octoberist Revolution," and in the beginning cannot cock our tail; we shall soon learn a few things and shall soon be able to cock our tail. We should teach our comrades who are sent to foreign countries to be honest and sincere and call a spade a spade; and we must let everyone see what is good, bad, or mediocre in us. The Soviet Union had its Czars; and we have our Chiang Kai-shek. If our country has small feet, and others want to photograph them, let them do it. If our clothes are not good, let us not be afraid they will look unsightly. If we tell lies in front of foreigners, someday these lies will surely be exposed.

As to the problem of communication, some things can be talked about anywhere. The bad things about Stalin and the Third International can be communicated to the local committee secretaries and also to the county committee secretaries. It is out of consideration for the total situation that these are not written about in articles. (This article had one sentence about "certain bad ideas being brought up,") and we have no intention of discussing them in newspapers or among the masses.

Source: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

Chairman Mao's Talk to Music Workers

August 24, 1956

The art of all the nations of the world is similar with respect to fundamental principles, but different with respect to form and style. The art of the various socialist countries each has socialism as its content, but each has its own national character. They have both similarities and differences, common features and individual characteristics. This is a natural law. All things are like this, no matter whether they belong to nature, society, or to the realm of the intellect. Take the leaves of a tree; at first sight they all look much the same, but when you examine them closely, each one is different; to find two absolutely identical leaves is impossible.

Class struggle, social revolution, the transition from capitalism to socialism have the same fundamental principles in all countries. But when it comes to some of the minor principles and manifestations which are dependent on the major principles, then each country is different. The October Revolution and the Chinese Revolution are like this. With respect to fundamental principles the two revolutions are similar, but with respect to the form in which these principles were manifested, the two revolutions have many differences. For example, in Russia the revolution developed from the cities to the countryside, while in our country it developed from the countryside to the cities. This is one of the many differences between the two revolutions.

The art of the various nations of the world each has its own peculiar national form and national style. Some people do not understand this point. They reject their own national characteristics and blindly worship the West, thinking that the West is better in *every* respect. They even go so far as to advocate 'complete Westernization'. This is wrong. 'Complete Westernization' is impracticable; it will not be accepted by the common people of China. The arts and the natural sciences differ in this respect. For example, removing the appendix and taking aspirin have no national form. This is not the case with the arts: with them the question of national form does arise. This is because art is the manifestation of people's lives, thoughts and emotions, and it bears a very close relationship to a nation's customs and language. Historically the artistic heritage has grown up within the framework of the nation.

Chinese art, Chinese music, painting, drama, song and dance, and literature have each had their own historical development. In rejecting Chinese things, the people who advocate complete Westernization say that Chinese things do not have their own laws, and so they are unwilling to study or develop them. This is adopting an attitude of national nihilism towards Chinese art.

Every nation in the world has its own history and its own strengths and weaknesses. Since earliest times excellent things and rotten things have mingled together and accumulated over long periods. To sort them out and distinguish the essence from the dregs is a very difficult task, but we must not reject history because of this difficulty. It is no good cutting ourselves off from history and abandoning our heritage. The common people would not approve.

Of course this by no means implies that we do not need to learn from foreign countries. We must learn many things from foreign countries and master them. We must especially master fundamental theory. Some people advocate 'Chinese learning as the substance, Western learning for practical application'. Is this idea right or wrong? It is wrong. The word 'learning' in fact refers to fundamental theory. Fundamental theory should be the same in China as in foreign countries. There should be no distinction between Chinese and Western things in fundamental theory.

Marxism is a fundamental theory which was produced in the West. How then can we make a distinction between what is Chinese and what is Western in this respect? Are we to refuse to accept Marxism? The practice of the Chinese revolution proves that not to accept Marxism would be bad for us. It would be unreasonable not to accept it. In the past the Second International attempted to deny and revise the fundamental theories of Marxism and put forward some arguments for this, but they were completely refuted by Lenin. Marxism is a general truth which has universal application. We must accept it. But this general truth must be combined with the concrete practice of each nation's revolution. It was only because the Chinese people accepted Marxism and combined it with the practice of the Chinese revolution that they won victory in the Chinese revolution.

We learn foreign things because we want to study and develop Chinese things. In this respect natural and social science are similar. We must master all the good things from foreign countries and then apply them and, in the process, develop them. In the field of natural science we must do our own independent creative work, and use modern scientific knowledge and methods from abroad to sort out China's scientific heritage, until we can form our own schools of thought. Take, for example, Western medical science and other related modern sciences such as physiology, pathology, biochemistry, bacteriology and anatomy. Can you say we do not want to study them? We must study all these modern sciences. But some of those who have studied Western medicine should also study Chinese medicine and use their modern scientific knowledge and method to put in order and study our ancient Chinese medical methods and materials. They should also combine Chinese and Western medicine and pharmacy to create new unified Chinese medical and pharmaceutical sciences.

If this applies to natural and social science, how much the more should it apply to the arts. We must learn from foreign countries and absorb the good things from foreign countries, but when we have learned them we must use them to study and develop the arts of the various peoples of China, otherwise our work will benefit nobody. Our aim in studying foreign arts, studying their fundamental theories and techniques, is to create a new socialist art of the various peoples of China, which will possess its own individual national forms and styles.

We must acknowledge that in respect of modern culture the standards of the west are higher than ours. We have fallen behind. Is this the case in respect of art? In art we have our strengths and also our weaknesses. We must be good at absorbing the good things from foreign countries in order to make good our own shortcomings. If we stick to our old ways and do not study foreign literature, do not introduce it into China; if we do not know how to listen to foreign music or how to play it, this is not good. We must not be like the Empress Dowager Cixi who blindly rejected all foreign things. Blindly rejecting foreign things is like blindly worshipping them. Both are incorrect and harmful.

In learning from foreign countries we must oppose both conservatism and dogmatism. We have already suffered politically from dogmatism. Everything we copied from abroad was adopted rigidly, and this ended in a great defeat, with the Party organizations in the white areas losing one hundred percent of their strength and the revolutionary bases and the Red Army losing ninety percent of their strength, and the victory of the revolution being delayed for many years. The reason is that there were some comrades who did not take reality as their starting point but dogmatism. They did not combine the fundamental theory of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. If we had not rejected this kind of dogmatism the Chinese revolution would not have won today's victory.

In the field of the arts we should also learn this lesson and take good care not to let dogmatism get the better of us. To study foreign things does not mean importing everything, lock, stock and barrel. We must accept things critically. We learn from the ancients in order to benefit the people of today, and we learn from foreigners in order to benefit the people of China.

We must learn good things from foreign countries and also learn good things from China. Half bottles of vinegar are no good; we must change two half bottles into two whole bottles.[420] We must master both Chinese and Foreign things and combine them into an organic whole. Lu Xun did this. He was very well versed in both Chinese and foreign works, but his brilliance was not primarily in his translations but rather in his creative work. His creative work was akin neither to foreign things nor to old-style Chinese things, but it is still Chinese. We should study Lu Xun's spirit, master both Chinese and foreign things, absorb the good points of Chinese and foreign art, fuse them together and create a new art with a characteristic national form and style.

Of course it is not easy to make a successful combination of Chinese and foreign things. It is a process which takes time. There are some Chinese things into which it is possible to blend foreign things. For example, in writing novels, the language, characters and background must be Chinese, but they need not be written in the Chinese 'instalment'[421] form. You can produce some things which are neither Chinese nor Western. If what comes out is neither a donkey nor a horse but a mule, that would be not bad at all. When two things combine, their form is changed. It is not possible for them to remain completely unchanged. Chinese things will change. Politically, economically and culturally, the face of China is undergoing big changes. But however much they change, Chinese things will always have their own characteristics. Foreign things also change. After the October Revolution the face of the world underwent a fundamental change. After the Second World War this change developed in a new direction. We must give our attention to the critical acceptance of foreign things, and especially to the introduction of things from the socialist world and from the progressive people of the capitalist world.

In short, art must have independent creative qualities; it must be distinctly imbued with the character of the times and also with the national character. China's art must not look more and more to the past, nor must it become more and more Westernized. It must increasingly reflect the characteristics of the times and the nation. In trying to achieve this we should show experimentation. Especially in a country such as China, with a long history and a large population, it is even more necessary to carry out such experimentation as will serve the needs of the various nationalities the better. We do not want complete uniformity. Uniformity leads to writing to formulae. No matter whether they are foreign or local formulate both are lifeless and are not welcomed by the common people of China.

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[420] A Chinese proverb 'A half bottle of vinegar shakes, a full bottle does not'.

[421] Traditional Chinese novels grew out of the story tellers art, and are told in installments form.

We have here the question of the treatment of bourgeois intellectuals who have received a Western education. If we do not tackle this question properly, it will have an adverse effect not only on art, but also on the whole revolutionary cause. The Chinese national bourgeoisie and its intellectuals consist of a few million people. Although their numbers are not great, they possess modern culture. We must unite with them, educate them and remould them. The comprador class has its own culture, which is a slave culture. The landlord class also has its culture—feudal culture. The Chinese workers and peasants, owing to their having been oppressed for a long time, still do not have much cultural knowledge. Until the tasks of the cultural and technical revolutions have been completed the bourgeois intellectuals have comparatively more knowledge and skill. Provided our policy is correct and we educate and remould them, we can get them to serve the cause of socialism. Can we educate and remould them? We can. Many of the people here present were bourgeois intellectuals in the past who have crossed over from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat, so why should not they too cross over? In fact there are already many who have crossed over. We must not fail to unite with them, educate them and remould them. Only if we do this will they be of benefit to the revolutionary cause of the working class, to the socialist revolution, and to socialist construction.

You who are here present are all musicians. In studying western music you have many important responsibilities. The ordering and development of Chinese music must depend on you who study Western-style music, just as the ordering and development of Chinese medicine depends on Western-style doctors. The Western things which you study are useful, but you should master both western and Chinese things, and should not ‘completely westernize’. You should devote attention to Chinese things, do your utmost to study and develop them, with the aim of creating our own Chinese things with characteristic national form and style. If you grasp this basic policy your work will have a great future.

Source: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, Red Guard Publication, 1967.*

Instructions at a Discussion Meeting Attended by some of the Delegates to the Second Session of the First Committee of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce

December 8, 1956

I am a layman in economics and therefore I shall give a laymen's talk. You have raised many questions which are very helpful to me. I heard quite a few within the limited time. Yesterday I had a meeting with the chairman and the vice-chairman at which I heard a number of things and began to understand certain general conditions. As to details, you should hold a meeting to discuss them. Chen Yun and XXX, vice premiers of the State Council, will make a report to you. The government would like to discuss with you ways to solve your problems. All solvable problems will have to be solved. Some of the problems I haven't studied and therefore I cannot offer any solutions. The government will make a study of the problems that you have brought up and Vice Premier Chen Yun will consider ways to solve those solvable problems.

Since the inauguration of public-private joint enterprises,[422] great progress has been achieved by industrial and commercial circles. We feel we have come to know you better and to be closer with you. Subsequent to the inauguration of public-private joint enterprises, the only problem of the capitalists is that of fixed interests.[423] Their reputation in society has changed, and they have shown great enthusiasm in learning politics, current events, skills and methods of administration. I was told that training classes have been inaugurated at all places with several hundred people joining in each city. In Shanghai several thousand people take part in one session. In 10 sessions there will be tens of thousands of participants. This is a manifestation of great patriotism and the fervent spirit of learning of the industrial and commercial circles. They are anxious to work for a new state, to study economics, and to acquire skills. All members, large, medium or small, are willing to learn.

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[422] Public-private joint enterprises were established as per article 31 of the *Common Programme of the CPPCC*. The article 31 stipulates: "Enterprises jointly operated by state and private capital are enterprises of a state-capitalist character. Whenever necessary and feasible, private capital shall be encouraged to develop in the direction of state capitalism by such means as undertaking processing work for state enterprises, operating enterprises jointly with the state, or, in the form of concessions, operating stale enterprises and exploiting national resources, etc."

[423] The payment of a fixed rate of interest was a means employed by the state in the course of Socialist transformation to implement its policy of redemption with regard to the national bourgeoisie's means of production. After the conversion of capitalist industry and commerce into joint state-private enterprises by whole trades in 1956, the state paid the national bourgeoisie a fixed annual rate of interest on the money value of their assets for a given period of time. In its nature this interest was still a form of exploitation.

My classification of capitalists in three categories—large, medium and small—shows the improvement of my understanding of them. Previously, I thought it would be very difficult to reform them. Even you yourselves had not expected that you would have reformed so quickly and that the tide of learning would be so high. Are you going to develop self-criticism? (Answer: "We will.") At last year's conference of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce many made a self-examination. This is a technique of the Communist Party. We have thought of promoting this technique among democratic parties but as yet without too much success. This technique was recently employed at the conference of the China Democratic National Construction Association, developing criticism and sell-criticism. This is a technique for the people to solve their internal problems—advancing opinions, presenting demands, solving problems, and achieving unity.

We have undergone two revolutions. The democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie is over and presents no more problem. Now the socialist revolution has been essentially accomplished, but not yet fully accomplished, for many problems remain unsolved such as agricultural cooperativization, handicraft cooperativization and public-private joint enterprise. Even when the whole reform program has been completed, there will still be many problems, endless problems. What are said to be problems are contradictions, disharmony, and disequilibrium. Problems of livelihood and employment, as well as domestic and foreign problems are full of contradictions. Somebody has said: Why should there have been a Beria in Russia? Even Stalin himself made mistakes. In China there was Gao Gang. Even Hong Kong was engulfed in turmoil. There were problems of Poland, Hungary[424] and the Suez Canal. The world is full of problems. The problems that we brought up today are of one type: they are the problems of the industrial and commercial circles and of the large, medium and small components of these circles.

Let me now talk about current events.

Do you think that socialism will succeed? Do you have doubts about its success? Do you fear that the socialist camp will collapse? In my opinion, even if it should collapse, there will be no big danger. But I don't think it will collapse, not at all. The principal components of the socialist camp are the Soviet Union and China. China and the Soviet Union stand together. This is a right policy. But there are still people who have doubt about this policy. They say, "Don't stand together". They think that China should take a middle course and be a bridge between the Soviet Union and the US. This is the Yugoslav way, a way to get money from both sides. Is this a good way? I don't think it is good at all, for it does no good to the nation. For on one side is powerful imperialism under whose oppression China had been for a long time. If China stands between the Soviet Union and the US, she appears to be in a favorable position and to be independent, but actually she is not. The US is not dependable. She would give you something but not much. How could we expect imperialism to give us a full meal? It won't. Imperialism has been oppressive to Asia, Africa and Latin America. India has suffered oppression for more than 200 years. She has never been given a full meal. Imperialism is stingy. The imperialist powers are such nations as Britain, the US, France, and the Netherlands. It was the eight powers whose allied expeditionary forces burned down the Summer Palace.[425] It was also the imperialist powers that seized Hong Kong and Taiwan. Hong Kong is Chinese territory. Why should it have been ceded to Britain?[426] Why was the Bandung Conference able to unify the Afro-Asian countries? Because these countries had been under the oppression of imperialism which, in this case, was the US Latin Americans who came to visit China were very friendly to us. Just today I received a Brazilian representative. Brazil is a large country with a population of 60 million and an area as large as China's. It has been under the oppression of US imperialism all these years. Illusions of serving as a bridge between the Soviet Union and the US and Britain for profit — this kind of thinking is wrong. We do not know how to design a big plant. Who would do it for us? Who would design large plants for us —such as chemical industry, steel industry, petroleum industry, tanks, airplanes and manufacture of automobiles? Britain had never designed these for India. Recently, because the Soviet Union designed a steel and iron works for India, Britain and the US each followed up with designing one, too, just to try to win her over. India's first alkali plant was designed by a Chinese engineer Hou Debang. Imperialism wants to keep its technology secret. No imperialism has ever designed anything for us. Democratic parties, democratic personages with no party affiliations, high-class intellectuals, religious circles, industrial and commercial circles and certain proletarians still have the illusion that the US and Britain would help us. We should launch a propaganda campaign on the rationale of leaning to one side. When we lean to one side, we are with the Soviet Union and on equal footing with her. We won't encounter problems such as those Poland and Hungary have faced. We are followers of Marxism, but we do not blindly copy Soviet experience. To do so would be a mistake. Our industrial and commercial transformation and agricultural cooperativization differ with the Soviets'. In the several years after agricultural cooperativization, their production decreased, but our production has increased. We have reformed all capitalist industrialists and businessmen, eliminating them as a class and taking them all into our fold as individuals. Industry and commerce are not a burden to the state but rather a source of wealth. In the past they have been a positive force. Economically, they have been modernized; they are no longer in the handicraft stage. Politically, they are against imperialism. Therefore, they have two-sidedness, one of which is its revolutionary character. Since the establishment of the people's government, they have cooperated with it and all enterprises have been put under public-private joint operation. For these things we cannot say that the bourgeoisie is useless to us; it is useful, very useful. The workers do not understand this because, in the past, they have had conflicts with the capitalists in the factory. We should therefore explain the situation to the workers. Especially since the high tide of learning of the industrial and commercial circles and in view of your desire for learning, the workers would change their altitude toward you. Our propaganda aimed at the capitalist should stress the importance of linking individual interests with state interests, promoting patriotism, and, in short, keeping in mind the state. In the cooperativization movement in Hebei province the former slogan was “If you want to develop your home, plant cotton.” The result was that people only took care of their homes. The slogan was defective and has since been changed to: “If you love your country and want to develop your home, plant more cotton,” thereby linking the home with the country. You should now link up your home and your country to which you belong. Our country is poor, very poor. This year steel production amounts to only 4.5 million tons. Not until next year will there be 5 million tons. Japan’s production is 7 million tons. If we want to catch up with Japan, we will have to wait until the third five-year plan before reaching a production of 10 million tons.

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[424] This refers to the riot that occurred in Poznan, Poland, in June 1956 and to the counter-revolutionary rebellion that took place in Hungary in October of the same year.

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[425] In 1900 eight imperialist powers, Britain, France, Japan, tsarist Russia, Germany, the United States, Italy and Austria, sent a joint force to attack China in an attempt to suppress the Yihetuan Uprising of the Chinese people against aggression. The Chinese people resisted heroically. The allied forces of the eight powers captured Dagu and occupied Tianjin and Beijing. In 1901 the Ching government concluded a treaty with the eight imperialist countries; its main provisions were that China had to pay those countries the enormous sum of 450 million taels of silver as war reparations and grant them the special privilege of stationing troops in Beijing and in the area from Beijing to Tianjin to Shanhaiguan.

[426] For many decades, beginning with the end of the 19th century, Britain exported an increasing quantity of opium to China. This traffic not only subjected the Chinese people to drugging but also plundered China of her silver. It aroused fierce opposition in China. In 1840, under the pretext of safeguarding its trade with China, Britain launched armed aggression against her. The Chinese troops led by Lin Tse-hsu put up resistance, and the people in Guangzhou spontaneously organized the *Ping Ying Tuan* (Quell-the-British Corps), which dealt serious blows to the British forces of aggression. In 1812, however, the corrupt Ching regime signed the *Treaty of Nanking* with Britain. This treaty provided for the payment of indemnities and the cession of Hong Kong to Britain, and stipulated that Shanghai, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo and Guangzhou were to be opened to British trade and that tariff rates for British goods imported into China were to be jointly fixed by China and Britain.

The main point of discussion of this meeting concerns your own affairs, but they should be linked with state affairs. When you return to your own town, your propaganda on education should also be linked with state affairs. It will take decades and even centuries for us to produce tens of millions or hundreds of millions of tons of steel. We should stimulate patriotism. Why must we promote public-private joint enterprises? Why must we promote socialism? Because we want to develop our country, to develop a national economy and a culture better than the system of private ownership and to ensure national independence. Economically, we are still not independent. We cannot manufacture big machines or precision instruments. We can manufacture only medium-sized machines. We have just begun manufacturing airplanes and automobiles. Which country made the designs for us? It was the Soviet Union. We should cooperate with the Soviet Union. In our country there is no anti-Soviet movement as in Poland and Hungary; nor in industrial and commercial circles or among college students. About 70 percent of our college students are the sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie and the landlords. We need to rally and educate them. Since they are your sons and daughters, solving your problems will also benefit them. The Youth League wishes to solve their problems of enrolling in schools, joining the League, getting stipends, and wearing the red scarf. Stipends should be given on the basis of scholastic achievements and family conditions. They should not be given to those from big families, but from middle, small and poor families. Joining the League and the Party should also be on this basis. These conditions can be fully carried out in China. Colors and thoughts are not uniform. There is always two-sidedness—progressiveness and backwardness. This is a fact. One’s duty is to learn. If everything were good, then everybody would be Confucius. If everybody in the street was a sage, would Chiang Kai-shek and Hitler, who had also been in the street, be sages too? Would aggressors against Egypt and secret agents be sages also? Men are different from each other. If we say that all capitalists are patriotic, the statement is untrue. There are positive and negative elements. To differentiate them is to learn. Otherwise one doesn't need to learn and can automatically become a sage. Jiang Yuwei said that before he was 30 he could write a well-developed essay. After 30, his power of learning was developed to the highest point. It was not without reason that he later played a leading role in the restoration movement. One should not feel satisfied with one's knowledge. Even when one is 70 or 80, there is much that one doesn't know. We should make a greater effort to learn, for there are still many things we don't know. Uncle Chen, you are a Hanlin [holder of a literary degree in the old system]. You know astronomy, geography, all the ancient philosophers, the three religions and the nine schools of thought.[427] Are you really well-versed in all these fields? You are a Hanlin. I am nobody. I don't even have a degree. I know very little. To admit one's shortcomings has its merits. Among you are holders of second and third [advanced] degrees who will be given the task of aiding others in study.

Was the Hungarian incident good or bad? Problems should be exposed. It is good to expose them. A pustule will burst and emit pus. Those countries that imitated the Soviet pattern and failed to face up to reality have not been doing well and, in fact, have gone wrong. Herein we learn a lesson. What we do should be based upon the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism and should be in accordance with the reality of China. We have brought up the slogan "Learn from Soviet experience," but never have we proposed to learn from the Russians' backward experience. Do they have any backward experience? Yes, they do. For instance, their suppression of counterrevolutionaries is carried out by public security organs. In China it is carried out by organizations and schools under the direction of local party committees, not by public security organs. We do it under total mobilization and in full array but the Russians do it mysteriously. Democratic parties do it themselves. Are there some persons who are afraid of suppressing the counterrevolutionaries? Are they afraid that the move might affect themselves? You have your hardships; the workers have theirs. The government will listen to the views of both sides, you have problems of employment; so do the workers. Your unemployment problem has not been solved; nor has the workers'. The Hungarian incident shows that underground counterrevolutionaries had established a counterrevolutionary command and started plotting rebellion several months ago in collusion with foreign powers. The situation in China is different. Counterrevolutionaries have been largely liquidated. They have also been liquidated from industrial and commercial circles. Only a few individuals remain. We can absolve those who connived and dealt with the Kuomintang in the past, especially prominent men who were compelled by circumstances Io cooperate with them. Even our party cooperated with the Kuomintang at one time I was a member of the legislature in the capacity of a distinguished personage of society. I went to Chongqing to attend meetings. In the past I participated in the Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I Youth Corps.[428] I mention this fact but no importance need be attached to it. Some counterrevolutionaries are active right now. If anyone is now a transgressor, then we should not let him go, no matter to which class he belongs. I think the number is small. Today industrial and commercial circles are purer than before. Unlike their old selves, they have far fewer counterrevolutionaries. We can set our minds at case. The few individuals are exceptions. No Hungarian incident would happen in our country. Since the Pan Hannian and Hu Feng affairs of last year to the present, over 4 million people have been investigated. Of 160,000 suspects, only 38,000 were counterrevolutionaries, or 1.2 percent. The previous estimate of 5 percent was inaccurate because it was based on subjective observation, not objective fact. Actually, there is only 1.1 percent in organizations and schools and the percentage in society is even smaller. If these germs are not eliminated, they will multiply to tens of thousands and will cause disturbance from within. Eliminating them is an education for the broad masses. The remaining 120,000 suspects were declared innocent. We apologize to them for having accused them wrongly. Those 38,000 counterrevolutionaries will not be killed. About 1 percent will be reformed through labor while the rest will remain in their original positions. This year we are planning to clean up... persons, using far better methods. There are about 4 million people who

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[427] In ancient China, the three religions were Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism and the nine schools of thought were the Confucians, the Taoists, the Yin-Yang, the Legalists, the Logicians, the Mohists, the Political Strategists, the Eclectics and the Agriculturists. Later the "three religions and nine schools of thought" took on a broader meaning to indicate the different religious sects and academic schools. In the old society the phrase was also used to mean people in dubious trades.

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428. In 1923 Sun Yat-sen, with the help of the Chinese Communist Party, decided to reorganize the Kuomintang, bring about Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and admit members of the Communist Party into the Kuomintang. In January 1924, he convened in Guangzhou the Kuomintang's First National Congress at which he laid down the Three Great Policies—alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. Mao Zedong, Li Dazhao, Lin Bozhu, Qu Qiubai and other comrades attended the Congress and played an important part in helping the Kuomintang to take the road of revolution. Some of these comrades were elected members, and others alternate members, of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

need to go through this process. Major factories and private enterprises will not be included so that they won't be distributed for the present. Later on, when they are subject to being cleaned up, we shall need your participation. The All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the China Democratic National Construction Association, the urban Communist Party organizations will all have to take part in this cleaning up. It will still be directed at individuals—the genuine counterrevolutionaries, not those who had associated with the Kuomintang, or had joined the Kuomintang or the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, nor those who first did bad things but later did good things. My talk today is on political problems. You are concerned with economic problems. You may not be too interested in my talk. To sum up, China's position vis-à-vis foreign powers is good. The Hungarian incident has been basically settled, though there may be further disturbance in the world. Don't feel upset because of Gao Gang, Beria, Stalin's mistakes, or the Hungarian incident. Sleep at ease. On 19 October many people in Hong Kong could not sleep. But after a few days they were able to sleep again. If you think the government has not given you enough help, you may bring this up. The government can give you more help. By now you should know well the characteristics of the government. We are the same group. We consult the people, the workers, the peasants, the capitalists, the petty bourgeoisie, and the democratic parties on whatever we plan to do. You can call us the consulting government. We do not put on a stern face and lecture people. We do not give anyone a stunning blow if his opinions are not sound. We are called the people's government. You may bring up whatever ideas you have. We don't ill-treat people under any pretext.

You are concerned about how to solve the problems of the large, medium and small enterprises and the problem of fixed interest. The large, medium and small ones should be separated into different levels. I have some suggestions to make in this regard and wish you to think them over to see whether they are feasible. The small ones, which represent 80-90 percent of the total, should not be included in the bourgeois group, but should be called upper-level petty bourgeoisie. This was done before. For example, a doctor with 2 or 3 apprentices was considered a petty bourgeois, fishermen and boatmen employing 10-odd persons were also not classified as bourgeois. During land reform, some owners of small plots of land for lease were not called landlords. This benefited several tens of thousands of people who were very interested in their title. Capitalists' agents and those drawing low interests who do not want to participate and who want to remain the same may be excluded for the next 2 years. This delay will make it possible for 90 percent of the people to continue to receive their fixed interest, while only 10 percent of the people will suffer a loss. The remaining ones are the large ones. According to economics and the American system, more than 30 persons constitute a big plant. Those with less than 20 or 15 persons may give up [their fixed interest] if they wish; those who do not want to may continue to receive it. All of you are very much concerned about the duration of the fixed interests. The basic principle is to solve problems, not to damage the benefits of enterprises; particularly those of the large ones. Do the large ones or small ones play a more important role in the national economy and the people's livelihood? The small ones represent more people, 90 percent of the total. But their economy has no decisive effect upon the nation's economic life. The greater effect upon the national economy still comes from the large organizations. You say that the Chairman takes special care of the big capitalists but not the small capitalists. Is this right opportunism? You should analyze the situation to see if it is right to take special care of the small organizations. The small organizations have more people. It is wrong not to plan for them and solve their various problems. But the large organization has its claim for its size. A large one can match several tens of thousands of small ones. For the capitalists, our party has established certain lines, such as the United Front Department. For the medium and small organizations these lines are not correctly drawn. The medium and small ones should of course be taken care of. We now put them in the petty bourgeois groups to solve their problems accordingly. The peasants are the petty bourgeoisie of the villages. There are also petty bourgeoisie in cities. Those who receive fixed interests worth only several packages of cigarettes are petty bourgeoisie. Capitalists agents are also classified in that category. The importance to the state of the large public-private joint enterprises and their nationalization is great. Without industry we cannot live and without agriculture we won't have food. If we do not take care of the large capitalists, 90 percent of them will break away. The few left behind will present a sordid sight. When all others are red, the few white will feel ill at ease.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has discussed the duration of fixed interests. It felt that the duration should not be too short. Redemption should be true redemption without deception. Actually not much money is involved in payment. Some people ask how many more years will go by before the redemption. In the documents of the Eighth Party Congress the subject is broached but we still want to consult you on whether this problem can be solved. The small enterprises and the workers will object. The workers will say we are making it too advantageous for the capitalists. In their opinion they should be canceled immediately. For the medium and small enterprises this can be done in one or two years. Why should it take so long? There are two oppositions. The first is the workers. The second is that 90 percent of the medium and small enterprises are envious of the comfortable life of the large ones. We have to convince these people that redemption should be carried out thoroughly, not half redemption and half confiscation. The Chinese national bourgeoisie has two sides, one of which is revolutionary. Its actual capital is not big. Private industrial shares total 1.7 billion yuan equivalent to less than US $7 billion. With this small capital how could China not be put at a disadvantage? Imperialism has taken advantage of us not without reason. In view of this small national capital we should redeem it fully. We need not save this money. We should convince the workers that we should not do anything detrimental to the interests of the large capitalists for they are beneficial to the state. We should not save this small amount of money but carry through the project of redemption with fervency. If necessary, we can prolong it to the third five-year plan. What do you think of a little prolongation? If it can be completed in seven years, that will be fine. But if it cannot, we can prolong it to the third five-year plan so long as this is feasible. We should help the medium and small enterprises solve their problems because their number is larger. The number of large capitalists is small, but their capital is larger, much larger than that of the medium and small enterprises. For this reason the medium and small line is wrong. It should be a large, medium and small line. The people's reconstruction is a large line. It is right to use the large as a basis. At the conference of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce delegates of medium and small enterprises form the majority. We should help them to solve problems and at the same time enjoin them not to do anything detrimental to the interests of the large enterprises, because the latter plays a great role in the national economy. Any detriment to their interests would not be good for workers, peasants, the state and the medium and small enterprises. The medium and small enterprises wish to dispose of their interests as soon as possible, whereas the large enterprises wish to hold on to them as long as possible. You may do what ever you like to dispose of your interests as early as you like. The highest value of any enterprise in the first seven years. If the medium and small want to reclaim them, they can. Would this be satisfactory? No law has yet been enacted. We can consult on what we should do. If, after seven years, we still find no solution, we can postpone settlement a little longer. We should first take care of the interests of the workers. There are 1.6 million workers in capitalist industries and 900,000 employees in capitalist businesses, totaling 2.5 million persons. Workers and employees in state enterprises will also be involved. All of them will be opposed to what we plan to do for the capitalists. On this problem they are in contradiction with the party. Are we falling into right opportunism? Are we becoming a capitalist party? We have to explain to them that what we are doing is beneficial to the entire nation, to the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the medium and small enterprises. They may not understand what "beneficial" is at the moment. Among college students 70 percent are the sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie. These students don't want any inheritance, but they will be satisfied with how the government is treating the capitalists. Members of democratic parties, democratic personages with no party affiliations, leaders of the upper level of minorities, and religious circles will agree with us. But they won't agree to an early cancellation of fixed interests. Then there are foreigners visiting China who always go to Shanghai to see Mr. Rong Yiren and to see how many automobiles he owns, one or two, and whether there is a piano in his house. After seeing him, a French capitalist said that if the French communists did the same to the capitalists he would feel satisfied. The effect upon Afro-Asian and West European countries would be great too. Therefore, it will do no good but harm if we abolish fixed interests at an early date. Actually not much money is involved in paying interests—in one year, only 125 million yuan and some people say, 110 million yuan, totaling 800 million yuan in seven years. This money is not given to Japanese or Americans but to Chinese. "The fertile water is not flowing into other people's fields." "A horse of Ch'u is caught by a man of Ch'u." This money represents the state's purchasing power. It also redeems state bonds. It may also be used to run factories. It is worth spending from all considerations. Among the delegates at this conference those from medium and small enterprises form the majority. You can do the job of explaining. You who are from medium and small enterprises should bear the responsibility of explaining to your people. The delegates from large enterprises cannot very well do this. When they try to name some advantages, they cannot very well say for instance, that the duration of fixed interests should be seven years. We need Vice Premiers XXX, XXX and delegates from medium and small enterprises to go and explain whether the Communist Party is going to abolish the fixed interests for large enterprises. Mr. Rong Yiren's capital is worth half of Beijing. All eyes are turned on him. Of more than 10,000 capitalists in the country there are probably only several thousand large ones. We should watch them rather than the 120,000 medium and small ones. It is easy for us to handle the large ones. We need only launch a campaign against them with much sound and fury. Handling the medium and small enterprises needs even less effort, nothing to be published in the press—once anything is published in the press, they surrender—and no campaign to be launched. Any report on this conference needs to say only that delegates and group leaders of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce and China Democratic National Construction Association participated and that I had analyzed domestic and foreign politics and also discussed the economic problem. But the report need not go into the details of my talk. Should the details be divulged, the workers and those of medium and small enterprises would rebuke us. They would say that communists are after all communists; why should they not communize property? People allege that communists have three heads and six arms and are very fierce. But actually we have only one head and two arms. What we do is "in accordance with heavenly principles, human relationships, the world's trends and the people's needs. Men with foresight and vision who act resolutely cannot help but succeed." This is what Dr Sun Yat-sen, the great revolutionary leader, said. Our two revolutions are a continuation of the work bequeathed by Dr. Sun—consummation of the democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie and completion of the socialist revolution. These two revolutions paved the way for national construction. They were a means to an end. They aimed at changing production relationship and the superstructure—the government, ideology, laws, politics, economics, culture, and the arts. But the basic problem has not yet been solved. The objective is not to establish a new government and a new production relationship but to develop production. During the past 7 years production has been developed but to a very limited extent. In spite of our boast, our production of steel this year is only 4 million tons. Next year it is estimated at only X million tons, and 5 years after, only some 10 million tons. With a population of more than 600 million, China can easily surpass Japan and France in production. But it will take at least 40-50 years for China to catch up with the U.S. in steel production. May I ask you to turn your attention to this matter. Comrade Chen Yun met a Swedish friend who told him that Sweden has a population of only several million but every person has an average of two tons of steel. Their total population has therefore several hundred million tons of steel. The U.S. has only 100 million tons of steel. To reach Sweden's output the U.S. has to increase its steel production several times. That's why the U.S. underwent a democratic revolution[429] and is now engaged in a socialist revolution. When the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce and the China Democratic National Construction Association hold meetings, what do they study? None other than how to reach these goals of several hundred million tons of steel and also opening more schools installed with radio receivers. The people all over the country should at least be graduates of junior middle schools. In a few more years street scavengers, cooks and all other persons would be college graduates who would know astronomy and geography. All work aims at this goal. Chiang Kai-shek deserves a sound beating because he had not done a single good thing. In 20 years he had produced only 50,000 tons of steel. In eight years (including next year) we will have produced 5 million tons of steel. Chiang's mind was not on his work. I hope you will lead these 10 million and more people in the direction of production. With several decades of work, we can reform ourselves culturally. Therefore, we should unite all who can be united.

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[429] A reference to the bourgeois revolution of 1775-83, known as the War of Independence in which the people of North America opposed British colonial rule.

In January of this year, at a conference of the State Council, I said that it would probably take about three more years for us to basically complete the socialist revolution. This statement caused considerable reaction. Some people asked whether it could really be so quick. I used such modifiers as "probably," "basically," and "about." What is "basically"? It means that in public-private joint enterprises, interests have not yet been cancelled. I think it is wise to fix a longer period so that we can complete the project ahead of schedule. Nobody had expected that public-private joint management could have been carried out so soon. But nationalization is not being enforced as hastily. If it is hastily carried out, it won't do any good to the state or the nation. We need not spend much money and we keep our promise. Our action will affect foreign capitalism. It would help inform the world's capitalists. Nehru, Sukarno, U Nu, and the French capitalist Pathe Co. are all watching us, watching Rong Yiren... The present situation and that which I talked about last spring are the same. I talk only about "basic" completion by which I mean public-private joint enterprises. Total completion will take seven years. Excluding the current year there are six more years to go. We have to take care of all parties concerned. We should explain the situation clearly to the bourgeoisie, democratic personages without party affiliations, the enterprises, handicraftsmen, organizations, schools, and all workers. Lack of understanding of the situation will do no good at all.

Source: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

1957

Interjections at Conference of Provincial and Municipal Committee Secretaries (Collected)[430]

January 1957

1. The problem of Ideological Struggle

Since the latter part of last year, there has been a trend toward right opportunism, and there has been a counter-current of anti-socialism within and without the party.

The bad social customs must be eradicated. Eradication requires persuasive power. A few reproachful remarks and rudeness would make the situation worse.

At the National People's Congress in May and the People's Consultative Conference in June there will be many strange arguments. Problems involved include law codification, the plight of the peasants, and shortage of meat. The crucial point is whether socialism has its superiority. All delegates at these two conferences should participate in the debate. Everyone of them should prepare an analytical statement.

The ideological struggle with the petty bourgeoisie and the rich middle peasants will have to continue for several years. The rich middle peasants are very influential and powerful. We should take note of this fact.

If we attend only to administrative work and overlook ideological work, there is bound to be trouble.

Every province needs one or two Marxists or Lu Xuns.[431] You ought to write articles. All of you who are below 60 should write.

Every province should train theorists. We are training actors and actresses and painters but not theorists. This is a deficiency of the system. You rely upon the central government but the central government has never prohibited you from doing anything on your own.

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[430] Also see *Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V, pp. 350-383.

[431] Lu Xun (1881-1936) was the father of modern Chinese literature and the greatest and most militant standard-bearer of China's cultural revolution. Apart from *The True Story of Ah Q, A Madman's Diary* and *The New Year's Sacrifice*—his most famous works—he wrote many short stories and essays, in which he vehemently attacks feudalism and imperialism, gives force to the aspirations of the oppressed and exposes the people's enemy in his true colours. He always identified his work with the Chinese people's revolution, for which he waged a relentless struggle until his death in October 1936.

2. The Problem of Trouble-Making

Should we be afraid of trouble-making? I think we should not. Whatever amount of trouble there may be should not scare us. There is trouble every year and there will be more trouble in the years to come. What's the use of being afraid? Only by exposing contradictions can problems be solved. Society is a unity of opposites. Professors and students always have contradictions and disputes with us. After 20 years when the old have died, the new will still have problems. Forty years after the Soviet Revolution there is still trouble. In factories about 30 percent of the workers were formerly landlords, rich peasants and capitalists. At universities about 80 percent of the students come from the families of landlords, rich peasants and capitalists. We are not afraid of their creating trouble, even coming to Beijing to create trouble. We should take positive, not negative, attitude toward them. When Gero returned to Budapest from Yugoslavia, he reprimanded the masses. He lost his prestige and dignity and was driven off the platform. If you are prepared for any major untoward incident, probably none will happen. If anything should happen, take a positive attitude and correct measures to win over or split up the audience. Capable men would create a situation out of the turmoil in Poznan and Hungary.

We wish a peaceful world but we must put ourselves in the worst position and be prepared for major disasters. We came from Yanan and must be prepared to return there. We had not seen Mei Lanfang in the past, but during the last seven years we have seen him off and on. In the eighth year we should be prepared to return to Yanan because of the atomic bomb, a possible world war, blunders committed and the Hungarian incident. If in our thinking we are prepared for the worst, we need not have fear. If we are unprepared, we are bound to regret it. The Seventh National Party Congress proposed a 17th article on "a thousand *li* of wasteland." With a population of 600 million, China need not be afraid of any untoward incident. It is going to rain. Mother wants to get married again. Such happenings are inevitable.

Labor strikes, student strikes, petitions... Some are provided for in the constitution while others are not prohibited. While we should not encourage these activities, we should let them take place, whether the demands are rational or not. If the demands are rational, we should take remedial measures. If they are not rational, then we should explain. If professors want to air their views, let them do so. Exposing contradictions may lead to settlement of problems;

they should not be suppressed. But if we tolerate contradictions, we shall be vanquished.

The petty bourgeoisie want to establish a dictatorship. It attempts to overthrow you so that it can set up its dictatorship. Any attempt to seize Hungary needs a full ten or 20 years. Mass meetings, lecture meetings and debating meetings are to be held in various provinces. Wide discussion is to be held to see who is to emerge victorious. However, preparations must be made beforehand. At small meetings your opponents will speak and act arrogantly, but they may be cowed at big rallies. If they want a major debate in the democratic way, let them have it. Let them say all they want to. If they don't, it won't do you any good. If they do, you can judge whether they are right or wrong. When society disintegrates, we should try to win people to our side. If the people think they are wrong, then they are isolated.

Don't fear trouble-making. The bigger and longer the trouble-making, the better. A series of trouble-making occurrences will bring results—bring out right and wrong. However serious trouble-making may be, don't be afraid. The more you are afraid, the more the demons will be after you. At the same time, don't panic. It is no good to panic at any lime.

Nationwide trouble is not likely to occur. Wherever there are boils or germs, there will be bursts. In a big province there may be 50,000 troubles a year, in a medium-size province 30,000 and in a small province 10,000. Be prepared for trouble-making and make a reckoning at the end of the year. If the figures given above are not reached, the work must be considered to have been done fairly well.

Secretaries of district and county committees should hold meetings to discuss and make preparations for trouble-making. County secretaries and chiefs and others in higher positions should be mentally prepared. Should there be peace all the time and we grow passive and timid, once trouble starts, we would be put in a passive position. Our thinking would be paralyzed and then we would have to accede to all demands.

Without fighting, many problems cannot be solved. Contradictions can be settled only through struggle. The Mohammedans at one place were put under restrictions regarding the slaughter of cattle. They roughed up the cadres and the problem was solved. Some clashes are rational while others are irrational. Even irrational moves are good. Grievances should be aired.

How should we dispose of renegades? Should we dismiss them summarily? Personally I feel we should not dismiss them in a hurry nor should we kill them (except counterrevolutionary criminals). We should utilize their labor, use them for political instruction, and deprive them of their political capital. A simple way of disposal is to refuse to accept them as ideological rivals.

Regarding people like Xiao Zhun and Ting Ling, execution, imprisonment or control would be ineffective. What we should do is to find their faults and disgrace them in society.

Party members who make trouble in schools should be subject to thorough criticism and then expelled from the party. We should not hurriedly expel them from the party or the school.

The survey of the components of the workers in Shaanxi was well done. In Hungary no such survey was done and so even when trouble broke out, the authorities were ignorant of the causes behind it. This should be taken as a lesson and a thorough investigation of components of workers should be made, ascertaining the numbers of dependables, neutrals and problematic ones. According to a recent survey, only about 25 percent are dependables. We should stress the importance of workers. After three five-year plans, the situation may have changed. It will take 20 years to change the components of the college student body. We cannot make any radical change now even if we put many workers and peasants in college.

At the 20th Soviet Congress, Stalin was downgraded: Very neatly done. But now Stalinism has been revived. What they did first was sincere but what they did recently was not so. They struck down imperialism with one blow. They struck down socialism with several blows. They denounced Poznan and Hungary but they would not admit that their moves were not sincere.

3. The Philosophical Problem

Whoever can analyze, understands dialectics. Lenin said, "In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This grasps the kernel of dialectics but it requires explanations and development".[432] He added "The unity of opposites (coincidence, identity, equal action) is conditional, temporary, transient, relative. The struggle of the mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and movement are absolute."[433] Balance is temporary and subject to continuous destruction—lasting for a few days or a few months. Balance soon becomes imbalance. Unity means uniformity, oneness and unanimity. If there is a divergence of views, discussion at a meeting will result in unanimity. But two months later, new problems will arise and another meeting must be held. Practicality and subjectivism are opposites of unity. Subjectivism always exists, even 10,000 years from now.

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[432] V. I. Lenin, *Conspectus of Hegel's The Science of Logic, Collected Works*, Vol. XXXVIII, Russian ed., Moscow, 1958.

[433] V. l. Lenin, *On the question of Dialectics, Collected Works*, Vol. XXXVIII, Russian ed., Moscow, 1958.

Materialism and idealism are opposites of unity. Dialectics and metaphysics are opposites of unity. There is perpetual struggle in philosophy. Whoever talks about philosophy has to struggle. Some people talk only about one-sided philosophy. When they talk about the blooming of hundred flowers, they overlook weeding of poisonous weeds. We admit that socialism has its opposites. Thus Stalin had his metaphysics and subjectivism. The Soviet Union does not recognize opposites and does not permit them in law. But many errors are hidden under socialism.

Lenin contended that materialism alone cannot solve problems, and that the way to solve problems is to struggle against idealism. If we want to struggle against idealism, we have to study it. The three components of Marxism were derived through a study of the struggle against capitalism.

Philosophy consists of a struggle between two opposites; Cosmology is a struggle between materialism and idealism; methodology is a struggle between dialectics and metaphysics. We and Chiang Kai-shek are opposites of unity. We and the democratic personages are also opposites of unity. All things have contradictions which may be obliquely reconciled. Stalin made mistakes in dialectics. “Negation of negations.” The October Revolution negated capitalism but it refused to admit that socialism may be negated too. We believe that the world is both stable and unstable. Even socialism may cease to exist one day. If anyone says that the superstructure of society won’t be extinct, that kind of talk is not Marxism but smacks of religion.

4. The Problem of the Villages

A bounteous harvest is very important. Last year the Soviet Union had a bounteous harvest and it was easy to do a lot of things. With last year’s experience we should try to reap a bounteous harvest this year. If we all work hard to get it, it will be of great significance to the world communist movement. This will be an unprecedented event in a socialist movement. In history, the socialist cooperative movement resulted in decreased production. Our increase in production in 1956 was not much. We should strive for a major increase in 1957.

One of our objectives is to increase the income of cooperative members 90 percent. We shall see if we can do this in three or four years. Hubei has had a bounteous harvest, but still about 15 percent of its cooperative members had no increase in income. We should explain to party members, public functionaries, servicemen and civilians that cooperativization has a history of only one to one and one-half years. We have participated in the revolutionary movement for practically our entire lives and still we made mistakes. Participants in the cooperative movement have carried on for only over one year. How could they make no mistakes? In three years' time it is possible that 90 percent of the cooperative members will have higher incomes.

About 15 percent of the peasants have a hard life. It is not right to generalize that the peasants are leading a hard life when only 10 to 15 percent of them are doing so. There should be an accurate analysis. When we say that the peasants are leading a hard life, actually this means that the income of the rich middle-class peasants has decreased whereas a portion of the old cadres have become rich. It reflects the thinking of the landlords, rich peasants and rich middle-class peasants.

Article 40 was discussed at least year's National Party Congress. It should be publicized. We should strive to reach the target production of 400, 500 and 800 catties per *mou* a year[434] ahead of schedule and complete the 12-year plan in 11 years.

The beginning is always difficult. There are three stages for every performance. We completed the first stage this year. We need to carry out three five-year plans to reach our goal.

Since ancient times, all progressive plans have incurred criticism in the beginning. The theory of evolution, Marx, Sun Yat-sen, and the Communist Party have all incurred criticism. Even 10,000 years hence progressive things will still incur criticism.

So long as one cooperative shows its superior quality, it can refute all groundless criticism. We can use it for propaganda.

5. Economic Problems

Every province has established its own chemical fertilizer plant.

We should pay attention to food-grain production. It will be disastrous if we don't. When we have food, we have everything. If there is food to eat even during a labor strike or a student strike, no great disturbance will occur. Oils and pork are the province of cooperatives. The state does not get involved in it. Food-grains collected are similarly handled (except in areas of economic products). The state handles unified purchasing but not unified marketing in the rural area. Cooperatives and teams handle it themselves.

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[434] See *Request for Opinions on the Seventeen-Article Document Concerning Agriculture, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V, pp. 277- 280 (article 11).

Two years hence there should be no contending with the people for grain or fear that the state won't purchase grain. It needs only to handle unified purchasing and not unified marketing. This is being done in Hsiao-kan county in Hubei province.

State farms should be established in new industrial and mining districts to solve the problems of grain, oils, meat and vegetables.

We need big [industrial] plants, but not too many. We need small plants even more, the more the better. Like everything else they grow from small to big. Small plants should be established in accordance with the principle of availability of raw materials and marketing possibilities whereas the number of big plants should depend upon the resources of the state.

6. The Problem of Schools

Agriculture should be added to the curriculum of junior-middle schools.

The provincial and municipal committees should commission cadres to strengthen the schools. They should invigorate the schools as well as other cultural and educational work.

Members of the provincial area and county committees should take part in educating the students.

Each province should hold a students congress and a teachers congress every year. Adequate preparations should be made beforehand. One day should be devoted to reports and three days to discussion and problem solving. No arrangement has yet been made for work on the students. Every year there should be one or two meetings and one or two talks. Try to discover problems. Don't wait for problems to rise and then try to cope with them. Get after them now. Plants, cooperatives stores and schools are the units concerned.

7. The Problem of Literature and Art

There is advantage in having "a hundred schools contend," for then all evil elements will be exposed. All provinces should pay attention to this: Let one person take command over major and far advanced problems. Organize some people to write articles, one article per month, to suppress evil influences.

Vaccination creates bodily resistance to diseases (causing the body to develop antibodies). Why can't we inject vaccines in literature and art?

The Department of Propaganda should hold one or two press conferences in one or two months. It would be all right to hold one press conference in two months. Right now there is not one press conference in one year.

8. The Problem of Cadres

Cadres have been promoted to higher positions, but they don't have much to do in these positions. The fewer people in leadership positions the better. They do nothing but write articles and talk on the phone.

The state is the vehicle for class struggle. Only a limited number of people are required to run the state. Do we need as many as 500 million people to run the state? How can we promote university professors? Shouldn't they be university professors until their hair is snow white? How can we promote workers and peasants? Shouldn't they be workers and peasants until their hair is snow white? Promotion to a higher position creates a problem. Once anyone dies, we have to appoint someone else to succeed him.

Ultra democracy and ultra equality won't work. Yen Yuan automatically became a second-rank sage.

The numbers of cadres from elsewhere and those local-born should be adjusted. Of members of the county committee, half should be from elsewhere and half local-born.

9. The Problem of Leadership

Members of the Party Central Committee, secretaries of provincial committees and ministers should pay a visit to plants and villages every year so as to familiarize themselves with the conditions there and not to become another Rakasi.

Secretaries of provincial committees and ministers have seen so much of their various departments that they are blind to what they see. They should go instead to the plants and cooperatives.

Real knowledge comes from the plants, cooperatives, stores, and schools.

The higher you go, the less knowledge you get. If you want to solve problems, you have first to go down and secondly to summon people to report to you. Beijing is not a good place to acquire knowledge. By comparison the province is better for this purpose. You must go down. Ministers of industries should go down to the plants and heads of rural departments should go to the rural areas.

Members of the Party Central Committee, ministers and secretaries of provincial committees should each take sometime to visit the rural areas and study the problems there. It takes only two months to get a clear picture of a county or a township. If for two months they don't read telegrams, they still can read and understand them when they pick them up again. But I have been told that they don't go to the rural areas any more on the excuse that there is too much office work to do.

The secretary of a provincial committee can concurrently be the secretary of a county or municipal committee. The incumbent may be demoted to be second secretary. Secretaries of provincial area and county committees can concurrently be plant managers, school principals and secretaries of party committees. In this manner, they can go deep into reality and acquire knowledge.

There should be two meetings of district party committees secretaries so that they are compelled to study various problems.

The wind that I have broken does not smell good. It has opposites too—part of it smells good but part of it bad (including Beijing). You have to smell to know.

All provinces should take note of this fact: Cities depend upon the working class, villages upon poor peasants, and schools upon leftists—all have to have something to depend upon.

Source: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, Red Guard Publication.*

Talk at the Hangzhou Conference of the Shanghai Bureau

April 1957

(During the discussion of ideological questions, Chairman Mao interjected and set five questions straight.)

1. Since the Supreme State Conference and the Propaganda Conference,[435]

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[435] See *Speech at the CCPs National Conference on Propaganda Work, Selected Works of Mao*

the tense atmosphere with the intellectuals has become more moderate and intellectuals outside the party have taken steps to draw near to us, their hesitant mood rather more open. The report is not a panacea; we must still administer medicines specific to the individual. If we do not give them those things which are necessary, they will become passive. Once the things are given them, they will assume responsibility for contending, whether well or badly. In any case there will always come a day when the rectification will descend upon ourselves. Our methods are first to rectify ourselves and rectify the party well, to rectify modestly and to speak reasonably. The present problem is not our problem. Leftist intellectuals want democracy (freedom to speak out) from us and students want democracy from their professors. At that time they have to ask us for help. When we allow speaking out, they contend among themselves; when we curtail, they make demands on us.

Last year over 11,000 democratic parties developed in Shanghai. The problems among them multiplied. Only the proletariat does not fear political change, when it is wrong, it makes corrections. Their internal problems multiplied.

We must allow speaking out, be thick-skinned, and let them attack for a year. As long as we have dogmatism, it is good to finish it off. If the attack is excessive, let all freaks and monsters come out to stir up trouble. The Communist Party must let them curse for a moment, let them curse for several months; we will reflect on what they say. During the "three evils" period, Comrade Chen I said, "Our dictatorship has ruled for all these years, so we can let people swear for a week." You pour a torrent of question upon us, and we too can be greatly amazed. Some intellectuals are still afraid of casting a long line to catch big fish. Some say this is correct. The prestige of the Communist Party is high. If there are but one or two sentences in a newspaper, a rustle of wind in the grass, some people are afraid. Those outside the party are afraid, and those inside the party are afraid. Even when the affair is correct, we must still be rather modest. When pressure is great, we must understand things well; some say there is some reason in casting a long line to catch big fish. We now let people criticize and then analyze the matter once again. The intellectuals are like birds startled at the twang of a bowstring; they have to look at facts, maybe for 20 years. Those within the party must also take a look at what happens; for instance, in curing the sickness to save the patient, some people are unbelieving until afterwards when they have seen the facts; only then do they believe. We must undergo

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Tse-tung, Volume V.

several tests, the politics of the Communist Party must be tested, leaders must be tested by those they lead. In the past the intellectuals served the old rulers. Now the production relationships have been transformed and they no longer have a social base. Intellectuals in the past entrusted themselves to feudalism, capitalism, and the individual system of production. The intellectuals serve the class they were born into. The classes of their birth have now been destroyed, so they hang in mid-air, they do not stand on firm ground. They are now crawling upon our bodies. The workers and peasants, through the Communist Party, let them work and eat. We must still cleanse their brains for a dozen years, using the method of unity — criticism — unity. They think they do not have to have criticism, that they are unable to speak. At present there are over 10 million people suspended in mid-air with old brains, but this is nothing to be afraid of. Hanging in mid-air they very much need us to reach out and draw them in. If we reach out to them warmly, it can go a bit faster. It will not be that simple for the majority to come over. It is the proletariat which most welcomes change. The peasants most hope that Chiang Kai-shek, the American imperialists, and the landlords are transformed, but they do not hope that the small private ownership system will be transformed. The democratic parties and the intellectuals who see the advent of a cultural revolution as too unexpected, too hurried, can also change. The hair has left their hide, but their soul is still on the old hide. When their hair is attached to a proletarian body, their soul is often restless. If they do not change they cannot be restless, restlessness is a manifestation of change. The world view of some intellectuals cannot change for a long time... To test the world view of writers we must test whether they can work as one with the workers and peasants, or as two. Send to the country-side those who cannot tell the truth to the peasants. The world view of bureaucrats within the party also creates problems and is divorced from the masses. Such people advocate Marxism, but have nothing in common with the masses. What kind of Marxism is that? There is a group of people in society whose only fear is that everything is not stirred up. They have anti-Communist thoughts and advocate fighting their way out. It will take decades to reform them. Some will die unreformed, but the majority can reform. There is that portion who are old bigots and will die unreformed.

2. We must allow airing of views. To fear airing of views means we have not put the truth across, or not convincingly. This is anti-bureaucratism in leadership. Whenever airing of views is not allowed, without the slightest preparation

there is a massive airing of views. We advocate airing of views so that even the worst disturbance is only temporary. When they manage the affairs of the people but the people are still dissatisfied, some do not think it through and become very troubled. There are always dissatisfied people; some are satisfied, others dissatisfied. They are more satisfied than in the past, but they are dissatisfied compared to what they will be or compared to others who are now better off. It will be the same 10,000 years from now. If everyone becomes satisfied, we might as well go to sleep. There has as yet been no airing of views, so how do we know that there may be a disturbance? In the past our alertness to class struggle was too high; now we are a bit conservative. One school of thought has contended alone for so many years. Let there be some disturbances for a while and we will see what happens. Not to criticize egregious errors over a long period is not good. Where there is a lot of grass, you may use a tractor. Chiang Kai-shek is not grass, but he was beaten in three years. Ten percent of China's intellectuals comprehend Marxism; 80 percent are patriotic and support socialism. One can see that poisonous weeds are only a minority. Weeds among the fresh flowers, which seem poisonous but are not, are in the majority. This is a reflection of social reality.

This is a new problem. The cadres have not examined it yet. When they check it out, taste it, their worries will vanish. Even if it is not explained clearly, can the people still oppose the Communist Party? Those which seem poisonous but are not are the majority; the poisonous weeds are in the minority.

I do not encourage the people to make trouble or to organize troublemaking groups. Making trouble by attacking government offices must be punished. Nonetheless there will be some disorder.

Sprits are now running high outside the party. In a while, spirits within the party may also rise up, first low then high.

To solve some problems, get some experience. Every policy of the party must be tested by being carried to the masses. We should let the cadres test it in their work.

Fearing and not fearing, being happy and being unhappy, solving problems and not solving them: this is dialectics. For instance, in waging war, at the beginning one is quite afraid, but the more he fights, the more courageous he becomes. Without having had several errors in line, we could not be so good today. If good things abound, one may become proud and bad things may arise. The Soviet Union is like that. Wang Ming's errors were great; he made no self-examination, had no prestige. When you make a mistake, be tense for a week. Examining the situation will make things better and will also have an immunizing effect. I would like to attack Deng thoroughly on the question of the... cooperatives. Attacking is a way of helping a cadre. At the most I will lose a vote and he will not nominate me.

Ba Jin says miscellaneous writings are hard to write. 1) When the rectification of the Communist Party is complete, there will be an atmosphere of freedom; 2) thoroughgoing materialists are fearless. Wang Xifeng said, "He who is not afraid of death by a thousand cuts dares to unhorse the emperor." The more difficult the time, the more one should help him. If we do not help him, he will not be able to survive.

What is wrong with making an athletic field out of Lu Xun's tomb? Chen Qitong and Zhong Tianfei represent two different one-sided views. I too am a one-sided believer in not mourning.... This could be transformed into a cyclical theory, but dialectics is not a cyclical theory.

When one-sidedness has multiplied, dialectics must be brought out. Since these people just want us to have bad luck, we can think of an even worse situation. At present it seems that we have become somewhat conservative, but in persuading the masses we cannot use simplified methods. This is not a thorough solution to the problem of the creation of disturbances. It will not do to handle affairs excessively. Who says we want monsters and freaks? The masses want to see them. We cannot suppress it, just give better performances. We should let society be a bit complicated, put the center of gravity on science. Some people say we should be more brutal than the Kuomintang in expelling students who cause disturbances. We should be a bit wiser than the Kuomintang, so that a comparison between it and us will be all the better. The Kuomintang is digging its own grave; we should not study it. I still feel bad because the Guangdong students were prevented from coming to Beijing with their petitions. The Kuomintang exercises dictatorship over the people, the Communist Party preaches democracy. This point should be clear. Some take the atom bomb of dictatorship and hang it over the people's heads. This is not good.

3. Let 100 flowers bloom, let 100 schools of thought contend. We must change the relationship between the party and the intellectuals. Some think it is not the time for that, that there are contradictions in political—ideological work. Widespread political struggle is already basically at an end. The Eighth Party Congress concluded it. This guideline submits that now is precisely the

time.

Between party and non-party there is a ditch which is very deep. I think that to say there is no ditch, or there is no line of demarcation, is not good, but it is not good to dig a ditch, for if there is a ditch, we will be divorced from the masses.

In one of the 1,000,000 factories in Shanghai less than one in 10,000 caused disturbances. One percent would be better; it could wipe out bureaucratism.

From inside the party to outside the party, those inside the party and those outside the party speak with each other, act in the same play. In this way many people can be drawn onto the political stage.

Whose newspaper is *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily]? It must be rectified.

Some feel they cannot move to the left or the right and it is difficult to do anything. To know it is difficult to do anything is good, it gets the brain moving; otherwise there will just be talk of dictatorship, of centralism (that is, suppression).

Must there be struggle within the party? Of course. The peasants hoe weeds every year. Errors must be criticized with the power of persuasion. One cannot rely on suppression. It will not do to rely on several documents. We must persuade people with reason, not rely on our qualifications.

Preach force towards enemies, reason towards the people. If there is no reason, it is not historicism. It is not enough to have a high position. We must study and do more research. It is very dangerous for cadres to pull rank and speak with force.

Can we do without the democratic parties? No. The Soviet Union does not have them and does not hear contrary opinions. But the war was still fought victoriously, and they did not kill the intellectuals. The Soviet Union does not consider letting 100 flowers bloom, 100 schools of thought contend. Democratic party members are all big intellectuals. The Peasants and Workers Democratic Party has no peasants or workers. We must give them something to do.

Unite both ends and criticize the middle. Not to criticize is rightist. The articles by Zhong Dianfei have not been criticized for a long time since they appeared.

The criticisms in *Wenhui Bao* must be throughly analyzed.[436] This criticism is beneficial.

We must speak the truth to members of the democratic parties. If they have flaws, tell them. Belonging to a democratic party has its suffering. One cannot hear or see or grasp the basis of the Communist Party. We can also talk of some of the party's defects. If we strike down the democratic personages, they will rise to oppose us. It is quite necessary to learn from them with an open mind.

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[436] See *Wen Hui Bao's Bourgeois Orientation Should be Criticized, Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Volume V, pp. 451-456. Also see the following article in this volume.

A number of meetings have been held, but no news of them has appeared. The *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily] is the *Guomin Ribao* [Citizen's Daily].

Chen Qitong represents 90 percent of the comrades within the party, so I have no mass base.

Between inside the party and outside it there should be a line, not a wall. The first secretary should regularly meet with personages outside the party, to explain our basis to them. We can also talk with the enemy in order to attract him to us more deeply. Not to talk is not democratic. Allowing talk is also attracting the enemy further; what can be done about that? We must proceed from our 600 million people and become a bit more adventurous. There are 5 million intellectuals. We must win them over. Mo Pu is a sectarian. We should check out his party affiliation. Why does he not want traditional Chinese paintings? He does not do works of art, but works of hideousness. Even the Kuomintang has traditional paintings. What is his party? Probably a third party! Social reality cannot be denied. Since there is counterrevolution in social reality, we must suppress it. Problems have existed for a long time within the framework of democracy. How can he use the Stanislavsky system for the *Huoshao Hung-lien Shih?* Jiang Feng and Mo Pu use the dialectic method—why do they not want traditional paintings? Do they want to go it alone? Even husbands and wives come in pairs! Experienced cadres must take into account that the past is only a set of methods, and now we must resolve problems among the people. I have read several copies of the *Hsin Min Bao.* It is not yellow journalism. Just not too serious. It cannot lead science. It should not be contrary just to be contrary. It must ask for guidance. Even Liu Bei asked a Zhuge Liang for guidance. What personages outside the party say must be taken into account. Sometimes they are in error, but do not just be contrary or inflexible.

4. On the problem of recognizing several problems:

There were over 200 letters opposing the article by Fan Ruizhuan. I do not think it is obscene. "Daily I ascend into the *Kan Ling,* how can I do without my husband?" You have to have some pressure to write something; a donkey has to be ridden by someone. Lead, select reports, prepare, persuade, benefit: five conditions. Of all these, only the force of persuasion is relatively concrete.

All the others are quite difficult to change, but we must not be dogmatic.

Can one polemize over party policies? Everyone goes along with articles in *Renmin Ribao.* But the articles of Chen Jilong and others are not correct. In my opinion it would be better if each province had two newspapers, one run by those outside the party to provide some competition.

There are always some things which are difficult to carry out in areas where intellectuals are bunched together, but it would not do for them not to be bunched together. Of the 6 million people in Shanghai, there are only over 200 who are in opposition, obviously a minority. Nor should the newspapers encourage them day after day. Hold several meetings a year, in spring, summer, autumn, winter. The task of culture and education is a matter of teaching the people. We must supervise it regularly, so as to prevent having to treat every headache and foot ache. Some people in film studios say to strive for fragrant flowers, not produce poisonous weeds. This spirit is incorrect. We are not afraid of one-third coming up poisonous weeds. To avoid poisonous weeds is an empty phrase.

One-sidedness. It will never be possible to demand that all outside the party avoid one-sidedness and become experts in dialectics. The preceding time I spoke from my own position. There will always be work which is done well and that which is not done well.

The question of intellectuals entering the party. We should strive to have one-third enter the party. The democratic party members may cross over into the party, but not the leaders. Within 6 years one-fourth, within three 5-year plans one-third will enter the party. This year strive for 15 percent — we must proceed at a measured pace. If we do not win over a group of intellectuals into the party this year, it will not be good for socialism. Let 100 flowers bloom, 100 schools of thought contend is a policy for winning over the intellectuals. If we shut the door to them organizationally, we will not be consistent. Our party has no great authors, great poets, great professors — we must recruit them. In the past it was not to be done, now we must exert ourselves to do it. Gorky attended school for only two years and Sun Yat-sen did not receive a very high level of education. People can be trained.

There is a reason for instability in education. Beginning without experience, once we make several changes, things will become stable. Among teaching materials for junior middle schools there should be history, geography, the study of cultural relics, and the like. In the past, middle and primary schools studied foreign cultures, which they should do. There are too many courses in junior middle schools. We could chop off one-third. How can 100 schools of thought contend in a classroom? We should focus on one or a few.

The checkup on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries was done in 1955 and 1956. In the past there was no checkup.

It is incorrect to speak of a contradiction between a progressive social system and backward forces of production.

The question of birth control. Malthus' conclusions are wrong,[437] but must there be war when there are too many people? In China's birth control we must consider provincial make up. There are many people in Jiangsu, few in the Northeast. We must not change the marriage laws, but should do more persuading against early marriage.

I once said that there will still be revolution in 1000 years. But this is not certain.

After 10,000 years production relationships will definitely be transformed. In the future it will not be a matter of nationalization but of globalization.

If contradictions among the people are not handled well, we can be overthrown. There have already been some individual township governments and party branch headquarters.

5. The question of leadership: we must improve the relationship between the Communist Party and the intellectuals. It is the fault of the Communist Party that it has not been close to the intellectuals. I do not blame the Ministry of Propaganda, the first secretary must take the responsibility. The first secretary must not only grasp the leadership of ideology but also read documents, history, philosophy, literature... periods of history. When much activity is going on but the first secretary does not do any reading, how can he resolve anything? Some say that peripheral things should be done a little less so as to grasp ideological work. One must read printed matter, literature, natural science, social science. Get into the habit, then you will gradually become interested in it. You must also discuss within the party. You may think there is no time for discussion, but even if you do not discuss, there may still be no time. In the

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[437] T. R. Malthus. Anglican clergyman and reactionary economist. In his Essay on Population (1798), he wrote that "population unchecked... increases in geometrical ratio... [while] the means of subsistence... could not possibly be made to increase faster than in an arithmetical ratio". Basing himself on this arbitrary assumption, he came to the conclusion that all poverty and all evils in human society are permanent phenomena of nature. According to him, the only ways to solve the problem of poverty of the working people were to shorten their life-span, reduce the population or stop its increase. He regarded famine, pestilence and war as means to cut down population.

phrase “100 schools of thought contend,” some people misread “chang-ming” [contend] as “cheng-wu” [complain]. They do not understand that they must continue to go to class. Zhou Yu is over 20 years old, Cheng Pu over 50. Now they are arch enemies. Who is in command? We must have culture in doing cultural and educational work. When Zhuge Liang was young he did not serve in any important capacity. Later he did. At that time one could break the rules and appoint him, why not now? When we were evaluating ranks, there was much disagreement. There were very many hindrances to promotion which breaks the rules. It is hard to have soldiers without education, they too should study in their spare time. Now we are fighting another battle. Generals, colonels, captains, lieutenants, and enlisted men must make renewed preparations. Cadres at all levels must master social science, literature, and natural science. Otherwise, when a commander rides into battle and needs a few tricks up his sleeve, his guns will fall silent. University party committees must be reorganized. Their assumption of cadre tasks is over. Now they can be transferred, leaving someone at the school to take care of business. “A hundred schools of thought contend” must not become the principal of the school.

We must do propaganda work, circumstances are forcing you to talk, go to the universities to talk, first have a chat with the professors and students. Today no talk, then tomorrow no talk, this year no talk, then next year no talk, never any talk; how can we go on this way?

Ask the Minister of Culture and Education, the Minister of Propaganda, and the party secretaries to go and have talks. They are always considerably better at it than the political instructors.

The question of fixed interest. The nature of enterprises has been transformed. The two major characteristics no longer exist. When the skin has gone, what can the hair adhere to? The hair is on a proletarian body, but the soul is still there. To shorten and reduce the fixed interest so that after a long time there will be nothing left but an excuse is not worth it. Now it is 100 million a year. In 10 years it will still be 10 million. If they do not demand that we cancel it, we will still pay it out. Don’t knock the hat off the petty bourgeoisie, for if the small ones lose their interest, the big ones will be dissatisfied. In the end it will all be canceled automatically.

Our 600 million people have their faults. Any person may be criticized and not listened to when he is incorrect. When he is correct you must accept what he says. Documents opposing the suppression of counterrevolutionaries or collectivization may be repudiated somewhat. This is not called leading the enemy out; it is called entrapping oneself. When Sun Dayu says someone is a counterrevolutionary, we should publish it in the papers. Publishing the articles on Hu Feng[438] and Tito in the newspapers to divorce them from the masses is also a helpful method. We must have a method in doing political work, not fear publishing; we must repudiate them.

Each province must exchange experiences. They must not avoid each other.

Source: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

The Bourgeois Orientation of the *Wen-Hui Bao* for a Period of Time[439]

June 14, 1957

This article reproduced below appeared in the *Wen-hui Bao* on 10 June, entitled *For Reference*[440] Although for a period of time in the past the *Wen-hui Bao* in Shanghai and the *Kwangming Jih-Bao* in Beijing published a large number of good reports and good feature articles, their basic political orientation was that of a capitalist newspaper. In a period of time these two papers, making use of the slogan, 'A Hundred Schools Contend', and the CCP's rectification campaign, carried many seditious reports showing the bourgeois point of view which [the papers] were not prepared to criticize. These issue of the papers are there for anyone to consult. Some people on the staff of the papers seriously misconstrued the functions of newspapers. They confused the principles of the press of a capitalist country with those of the press of a socialist country. Similar confusion can be found among the editors and reporters of other newspapers and among the staff of some departments of journalism at the universities. It is not confined to the *Wan-huipao* and *Kwang-ming Jih-Bao* alone, though it is more prominent with these papers. Mistaken views can be studied, examined, criticized, and then reformed. [This is what] we expect from these papers. In the last few days their policy seems to have changed somewhat. Of course, non-party newspapers should not be exactly the same as party organs;

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[438] For more material on Hu Feng, see *In Refutation of Uniformity of Public Opinion* and *Preface and Editors Notes to Material on the Counterrevolutionary Hu Feng Clique, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V.

[439] Also see *Wen-hui Pao's Bourgeois Orientation Should be Criticized, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* Volume 5.

[440] This was by Yao Wenyuan.

they should have their individualities. None the less, their general orientation should be the same as other papers, because in a socialist country the press reflects through its reports the planned socialist economy based on public ownership. This is different from the press of a capitalist country which reflects through its reports the anarchy and group competition of the capitalist economy. As long as class distinction exists in the world, newspapers are instruments of class struggle. We hope a discussion on this issue will be developed in order to arrive at a common understanding. Some journalists who are members of the CCP or the Communist Youth League also have a bourgeois view on journalism; they, too, should study, examine, criticize, and then reform their view. Doctrinaire views on journalism and the style of the 'eight-legged essay' should also be criticized. These nauseating mistakes are shared by party organs as well, including this paper. They should be criticized in the discussions. In that case, a struggle on the two fronts against both the 'left' and the right in the field of journalism should be waged. Yao Wenyuan's article points out, albeit reservedly, the bourgeois tendencies of the *Wen-hui pao* and sees clearly the harmful tendencies of some people on it to wage a struggle from the standpoint of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. It is a good article and therefore it is reproduced here. We take this opportunity to clarify our views to our professional friends on the *Wen-hui pao* and *Kwang-ming Jih-pao* for their consideration.

Source: *People's Daily, June 14,1957.*

Letter to Zhou Enlai

July 7, 1957

In both colleges and middle schools it is necessary to strengthen ideological and political leadership as well as to revamp ideological and political education. It is also necessary to cutdown the curricula, restore political classes for middle schools, abolish the Constitution class and compile new textbooks, on ideology and politics.

Comment on Class Education with Leaders from Shanghai Motor Power Institute

July 1957

We must strengthen ideological and political work for youth; we must teach them not to despise labor so that they will be able to construct our nation successfully! Even if the youth is a young worker, because he has not undergone the hardship of the old society it is all the more necessary to strengthen class education in order to enhance his ideological awareness.

Talk at the Enlarged Third Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CCP[441]

October 7, 1957

China has had two revolutions. During the period of democratic revolution it was anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, and anti- bureaucratic capitalism; only within the party was there a struggle against the capitalist ideology of the national bourgeoisie. At that time there were two roads, the road of liberation and the road of colonialism. The socialist revolution is to eradicate classes, to eliminate exploitation; it is the proletarian revolution. In declaring that there is a primary contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, I hold that in theory there is no problem.

In 1953 at the Finance and Economics Meeting the general line was set forth;[442] initially we did not dare to propagate it throughout the entire party but instead we first discussed it at the county level. At the end of 1953 it was discussed at the Political Consultative Conference. The Propaganda Department drafted an outline for dissemination of the general line. During these past three and one-half years, we have dealt a severe blow to the bourgeoisie; we have also dealt a blow to the individual economy. Consequently this was reflected in the resolutions of the 8th Party Congress, which said that the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat had been fundamentally resolved. This statement was not incorrect, but fundamental resolution is not equivalent to complete resolution. Once the problem of political authority was resolved, the problem of ownership was fundamentally resolved, but in the economic and political spheres there was not a complete resolution.

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[441] Also see *Be Activists in Promoting Revolution, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V.

[442] See *The Party's General Line for the Transition Period, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V.

Among the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals, the rightists in the democratic parties, and a portion of the well-to-do middle peasants, there were those who opposed the people while standing among them. At that time this was not seen so clearly, but it was not totally unperceived either (at that time we were still carrying out transformation). At that time they were very submissive and obedient, so we said that there was a fundamental resolution. Today I emphasize this contradiction because they wanted to rebel. At the Qingdao Conference this year[443] we saw clearly and pointed out that in the urban and rural areas there was still a struggle between the two roads. As this sort of class struggle has not been eradicated and the rightist elements at this time are wildly advancing, it must be said that there is a primary contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. But strategically the Qingdao documents have said it well; it is all right if those at the meeting know what is primary and what is secondary. We have not talked about this for a long time. If we now add on to it, shaking heaven and earth, it would be bad. Now we must continue with the Qingdao method of expression for three months.

There is also bourgeois ideology among the workers. Within the party the three big "isms" have also been unfurled over the bourgeoisie. The two roads—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, socialism and capitalism—are the primary contradictions of the transitional era; for the time being we will not discuss them in the report. Have we discussed whether or not it is possible to mitigate the contradictions among the great mass of the people? On the other hand there are internal bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism; we can write about this problem theoretically.

The relationships among the working people—the contradictions in the relationship between the party and the masses, in the relationship between cadres and the masses, between the individual and the collective, between the young and the old, and among the workers—are very numerous. If we declare suddenly that the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is primary, could this have an effect on the frank airing of views? Not necessarily, but it could cause squabbling among the workers.

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[443] The Qingdao Conference was held in July 1957, it was attended by the secretaries of provincial and municipal party committees. See *The Situation in the Summer of 1957, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V.

There are two segments of the people; one segment has exploited people and one segment has not exploited people. In one segment few have been influenced by bourgeois ideology while in the other many have been influenced. After several hundred years it will be impossible to unfurl again the banner of the bourgeoisie; that is the struggle between the advanced and the backward. When we say that large-scale class struggle has fundamentally ended and that contradictions have been fundamentally resolved, we are speaking of the political system and the problem of ownership. But in building the superstructure, the question of ideology and political power in large measures has not been resolved. Individualism, bureaucratism, idealism are also a matter of building the superstructure and must be resolved.

After the capitalists began to beat their gongs and drums last year, we immediately put forth the idea of opposing the bourgeoisie. They were unable to speak out. This was unpopular, and the result was disadvantageous to us. Afterwards we had a frank airing of views, and it was easier to manage; we acquired experience and it was easier to manage. We brought forth "let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend," and so they let themselves go. In the past the bourgeoisie had been subservient, and now they raised a great clamor. We had only brought forth frank airing of views and the rightists aired their views and made a great racket. We said that there should be a frank airing of views in literature, art, and academic issues, but they wanted to progress to politics. This year the Communist Party and the rightists have cooperated to find a method, which is good: a loud and frank airing of views, posting of big-character posters, and carrying on great debates, meant the discovery of a comparatively more appropriate form. In Yanan we were not so daring, we had no experience, we did not forbid, but we also did not express. We had not carried out the socialist revolution and had no experience, and this episode of frank and loud airing of views had increased our experience. In the future we shall still wish to have a frank airing of views. Let a hundred flowers blossom does not embrace counterrevolution, however. We are able to have a frank airing of views once a year. To suppress the people as though they are enemies is very dangerous. In discussing contradictions among the people one must guard against adopting the method of suppression and coercion.

The first road is to assert that during the transitional period the primary contradiction is the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The second road during a prescribed period should not be discussed in the newspapers, but the struggle between the two roads should continue to be propagandized. Do not add these two characters and avoid stirring up a lot of trouble.

The contradiction among the working people is today being resolved in the course of the frank airing of views and great debates. As soon as it is mentioned that the class contradiction is primary, there will be an adverse effect on rectification and transformation.

Three classes are included among the people: the proletariat, the bourgeoisie, and the petit bourgeoisie. A contradiction exists among these three segments of the people. This contradiction is a contradiction among the people, and it is also a class contradiction. There is a distinction between class contradictions and contradictions between the enemy and ourselves. Generally speaking, a contradiction among the people is non- antagonistic, while a contradiction with the bourgeoisie has an antagonistic side. The central question is the contradictions among the three segments of the people. Among these a portion are covertly antagonistic. The contradiction with Zhang Bojun, for example, was an antagonistic contradiction. In confronting this kind of antagonistic contradiction one should adopt the policy of peeling away the outer skin of a bamboo shoot. Each year peel away a little. This year peel away some of the outer skin, but don't peel it all away. After two years of not propagandizing socialism begin again, and afterwards peel away a little more. The work *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*[444] was not mistaken, but it was not as complete as the Qingdao document. Now the primary problem is not the remnants of feudalism or the remnants of imperialism (the contradiction still exists). Who hasn't said that Hunan seized 7,000 landlords and rich peasants, but suddenly there is a problem when you try to seize one Zhang Bojun. The socialist revolution is a problem for the bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals, totaling 30 million including dependents, are a big problem. At most the working class totals 40 million people. The targets of the socialist revolution are the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intellectuals, and the upper petit bourgeoisie (in the countryside the well-to-do middle peasants). The bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals have leftists, while the great majority are centrists and the right wing accounts for only one or two percent. For more than 90 percent it is a question of education and a question of criticism. While we say that contradictions among the people embrace class struggle, the bourgeoisie still enjoys civil rights. It cannot be said that the socialist revolution is anti-imperialist and anti- feudal, but the remnants of imperialist and feudal powers are the allied army of the rightists of the bourgeoisie. Therefore the landlord paper *Ai-wen Hui-pao* is anti-socialist.

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[444] See *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V.

At present there are 60,000 rightist elements (10,000 acting and 50,000 writing). In the future at most there will be 150,000 to 200,000. Of this number those that can be separated should be separated. For example, towards some engineering and technical personnel, natural scientists, and scholars, it is even better if they can be separated. We should work on them. Some people we should criticize seriously buy treat with leniency, as for example Rong Yiren and others.

Now it is clear-cut: in proceeding through the transitional era from capitalism to socialism, the main (or fundamental) contradiction is the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between socialism and capitalism. Thus in social relations and interpersonal relations there has been a fundamental resolution, but there has not been a complete resolution. The landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and bad elements endorse capitalism, and those who exploit people endorse capitalism. This is also a contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The struggle between the two roads will be resolved after a long period of struggle. “Main” and “fundamental” have the same meaning.

The resolutions of the 8th Party Congress declare that the main contradiction is the contradiction between the advanced social system and the backward productive forces. Speaking reasonably, one cannot speak in that manner. Now there are contradictions, and in the future there will also be contradictions. When cooperatives have all been transformed into state farms which pay out wages there will still be contradictions. Socialism is comprised of two sectors: public ownership and collective ownership. In the future, contradictions will also arise between the two. The socialist system and the productive forces are fundamentally in conformity, but they also have areas where there is not total conformity. There are still shortcomings and it is incorrect to say that there is perfect conformity. When Stalin mentioned perfect conformity (official report, page 14) there arose a problem. The ideology of religion is not in accord with socialism, but we still want to repair temples. Repairing temples is done to achieve the goal of tearing down temples. Why do we say this is by and large in accord? Because it can develop the productive forces. India undertook a five-year plan and increased its steel output by 300,000 tons. We raised our output by 94 million tons. Our system does not impede the development of the productive forces. After several tens of years the contradiction between the collective and the state-owned sectors will be resolved, but there will still be new contradictions. When we have arrived at communism, we will not need the law of value and we will not need an army, the international environment permitting of course. Marx, Engels, and Lenin never said this sentence, which is in the resolutions of the 8th Party Congress, but there is no harm in it. The meaning is that we must hurriedly develop production, strengthen the material foundation of socialist society; it is only that this was not said clearly. The essence of the stylistic faults is that we have not seriously talked about contradictions. It has drawn comparisons with foreign countries and with the future. It is not necessary to change this sentence now; there is no need to discuss this question now. Lenin said that there is a contradiction between Soviet power and backward technology. We will not talk about this now. Afterwards it will be all right to explain it more clearly. Strictly speaking, it is of course incorrect to say that the socialist system and the productive forces are not in accord. We are a socialist system developing its productive forces. A good many economists say that there is a contradiction between our system and the productive forces and that the productive forces of a socialist system are backward. This sort of talk is bad.

Source: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, Red Guard Publication, 1969.*

No Power on Earth Can Separate Us

November 2, 1957

Dear Comrades Khrushchev, Voroshilov, and Bulganin:
Dear Comrades and Friends:

The anniversary of the October Revolution is a great festival of victory for the Soviet people and for the proletariat, the laboring masses, and all oppressed peoples of the world. The victory won by the Soviet people under the leadership of the great Lenin and the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union forty years ago initiated a new epoch in human history. In the process of forty years of construction, the Soviet Union has made brilliant achievements at an extraordinary speed and in many fields has advanced to the forefront of the countries of the world, thus setting an outstanding example for the peoples who are striving for progress and happiness. The launching of the first man-made earth satellite by the Soviet Union is no simple feat. It marks the beginning of a new era of man's further conquest of nature.

The socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union is a strong bulwark ensuring world peace and a faithful friend to all peoples who refuse to suffer imperialist oppression and enslavement...

The October Revolution enabled the Chinese people to find the way to emancipation, prosperity, wealth, and power *[fu ch'iang].* In their own cause, the Chinese people have received tremendous sympathy and generous assistance from the people of the Soviet Union. The peoples of our two countries have already formed a fraternal alliance in their common struggles, and there no is force on earth which can separate us.

Comrades, we will stand together forever, fighting for world peace and for the victory of our common cause!

Glory to the great October Socialist Revolution!

Glory to the great Soviet people and to the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union!

Long live the great friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples!

Long live world peace!

Source: *Extracted from Mao's speech at the Moscow airport, November 2, 1957. (Mao Chu-hsi tsai Su-lien-ti yen-lun, pp. 1-2).*

Speech at Moscow Celebration Meeting[445]

November 6, 1957

Dear Comrades:

On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, I myself and the other members of the Chinese delegation, representing the National People's Congress and the State Council of the People's Republic of China, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and all the people and Communist Party members of China, have the honor to offer warm fraternal congratulations to the people, government and Communist Party of the great Soviet Union (enthusiastic applause), and to all the comrades and friends present here. (Enthusiastic applause.)

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[445] Speech at a joint meeting of the two Soviets of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (namely the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities) in celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

As our revolutionary teacher Lenin pointed out time and again, the great revolution carried out by the Soviet people forty years ago initiated a new epoch in world history.

Historically there have been revolutions of many kinds, but none to compare with the October Socialist Revolution.

For thousands of years the working people of the world and all progressive humanity have dreamed of building a society in which there would be no exploitation of man by man. This dream was realized on one-sixth of the earth's land surface for the first time in history by the October Revolution. This revolution proves that, without the landlords and the bourgeoisie, the people are completely capable of building a free and happy new life in a planned way. It also proves that different nations of the world are completely capable of living together amicably once there is no imperialist oppression.

Country which develops its social productive forces at a speed of which the capitalist countries are incapable—and a country which truly practices proletarian internationalism, genuinely opposes national oppression and helps oppressed nations to emancipate themselves. Such a country enjoys the enthusiastic support of all its own people and of the peoples of all other countries in the world. The Soviet Union enjoys these two kinds of support to a degree without parallel in the history of nations.

The face of the Soviet Union has changed completely in the past forty years. Before the revolution Russia was relatively backward economically and technically. Now the Soviet Union has become one of the world's first-class industrial powers. The living standards of the Soviet people have been steadily rising. The scale of development of educational, scientific and cultural establishments in the Soviet Union far surpasses that of the capitalist countries. The Soviet Union set up the world's first atomic power station, made the world's first batch of passenger jet planes and intercontinental ballistic rockets and launched the world's first and second man-made earth satellites. The whole world acknowledges that the success of the Soviet Union in launching the man-made earth satellites on two occasions has opened up a new era in the conquest of nature by man. Not only the Soviet people, but also the world proletariat and all mankind can take pride in all this. (Applause.) Only a few reactionaries are unhappy about it.

The creative application of Marxism-Leninism by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in tackling practical tasks has ensured unbroken success in the Soviet people's construction work. The fighting program for communist construction in the Soviet Union put forward by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a good example. The wise measures taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the questions of overcoming the cult of the individual, developing agriculture, reorganizing the administration of industry and construction, extending the power of the union republics and local organizations, opposing the anti-Party group, consolidating unity within the Party and improving the Party and political work in the Soviet army and navy, will undoubtedly promote still further the consolidation and development of all undertakings in the Soviet Union.

Throughout the world the people have begun to see their own future ever more clearly in the successes gained by the Soviet people. Essentially, the path of the Soviet Union, the path of the October Revolution, is the bright common way for the progress of all mankind. (Enthusiastic applause.) The masses of the people throughout the world celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution warmly, because the history of the past forty years has convinced them that the proletariat is

In the past forty years the Soviet people have traveled a hard road. The imperialists tried by every means to destroy the world's first socialist republic. The enemies of the Soviet Union appeared for a time to be stronger than the Soviet Union and twice launched armed attacks against it. But the courageous Soviet people, led by their glorious Communist Party, thoroughly smashed the attacks of the aggressors. (Applause.)

The Soviet Union has been invincible because it is a country in which the socialist system has replaced the capitalist system and the dictatorship of the proletariat has replaced the dictatorship of the exploiting classes — a certain to defeat the bourgeoisie, socialism is certain to defeat capitalism, and the oppressed nations are certain to defeat the imperialists. Of course, difficulties, twists and turns still face the people. But it was well said by Lenin thirty-six years ago: "The important thing is that the ice has been broken, the road is open and the path has been blazed." (Enthusiastic applause.)

The people's revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party has always been a part of the world socialist revolution of the proletariat initiated by the October Revolution. The Chinese revolution has its own national characteristics and it is entirely necessary to take these into consideration. But in our own revolution and socialist construction we have made full use of the rich experience of the Communist Party and the people of the Soviet Union. The Chinese people are fortunate in having the experience of the October Revolution and of the socialist construction in the Soviet Union, which enables them to make fewer mistakes, to avoid many others and to pursue their cause fairly smoothly, although they still face many difficulties.

It is clear that, after the October Revolution, if a proletarian revolutionary of any country should overlook or not seriously study the experience of the Russian revolution, of the proletarian dictatorship and of socialist construction of the Soviet Union, and should fail to use these experiences analytically and in a creative way in the light of the specific conditions in his own country, he would not be able to master Leninism, which represents new stage in the development of Marxism, and he would not be able to solve the problems of revolution and construction in his own country correctly. He would either commit doctrinaire or revisionist mistakes. We must oppose both these deviations simultaneously, but at present, to oppose revisionist deviation is a particularly urgent task.

It is equally clear that, since the October Revolution, any government that refuses to be on friendly terms with the Soviet Union only harms the real interests of its own people. (Prolonged, enthusiastic applause.)

In the world today a series of European and Asian countries with an aggregate population of over nine hundred million people have victoriously taken the path of the October Revolution and form a powerful world system of socialism. Capitalism has for some time lost its superiority, and socialism has become invincible.

In the end the socialist system will replace the capitalist system. This is an objective law independent of human will. No matter how hard the reactionaries try to prevent the advance of the wheel of history, revolution will take place sooner or later and will surely triumph. (Prolonged, enthusiastic applause.) "To lift a rock, merely to crush one's own foot" is a Chinese saying to describe the action of fools. The reactionaries of every country are just such fools. Their persecution of the revolutionary people will only end in rousing the people to broader and fiercer revolution. (Enthusiastic applause.) Did not persecution by the Russian tsar and Chiang Kai-shek of the revolutionary people serve precisely to stimulate the great Russian and Chinese revolutions?

As well as staking their fate on the oppression of the peoples at home and in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the imperialists put their hope in war. But what can they expect out of war? In the past half century, we have experienced two world wars. After the First World War, the Great October Socialist Revolution took place in Russia. And after the Second World War, more revolutions took place in East Europe and in the East. If the imperialist warriors are determined to start a third world war, they will bring about no other result than the end of the world capitalist system. (Enthusiastic applause.)

The governments and peoples of the socialist countries are the builders of a new peaceful life. We absolutely do not want war, and are firmly opposed to a new world war. The Soviet Union, China and the other socialist countries have been consistently working for the relaxation of international tension. The proposals made again and again by the Soviet Union for disarmament and the prohibition of the manufacture, use and testing of weapons of mass destruction, represent the common stand of the socialist countries, and accord at the same time with the interests of all peoples. We firmly stand for peaceful competition between the socialist and the capitalist countries, and for the settlement of the internal affairs of each country by its own people in accordance with their own desires. We firmly maintain that all nations should practice the well-known Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.

The US imperialists obstinately try to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, including those of the socialist countries. For example, they are interfering with the liberation of Taiwan by China and they engineered the counter-revolutionary riots in Hungary. They are particularly rabid in interfering in the internal affairs of those countries situated in the area between the US and the socialist camp. The US is still planning to invade independent Syria through Turkey or Israel, it is still conspiring to subvert the anti-colonialist Egyptian Government. This maniac aggressive policy of the US has not only precipitated a crisis in the Middle East, but has also created the danger of a new world war. All people in the world who love peace and freedom stand by Syria and oppose the US and Turkish aggressors, just as they stood by Egypt and opposed the British, French and Israeli aggressors in October last year. The Soviet Government has served warning on the US and Turkey to give up their aggressive plan immediately. The Chinese Government and people resolutely support Syria in its struggle to defend itself and firmly endorse the just position of the Soviet Union. (Prolonged, enthusiastic applause.)

The imperialist wolves should remember that the days when they could manipulate the fate of humanity and carve up the Asian and African countries as they liked have gone forever.

The US imperialists have tried and are still trying hard to undermine the liberation of the Chinese people. But in the end they could not prevent the six hundred million Chinese people from bravely taking the path of socialism. (Applause.) In the short period of eight years, China has already achieved such results in various fields of construction as it was not able to achieve in the past hundred years. In China, a handful of bourgeois rightists try to oppose taking the path of socialism and oppose the leading position of the Communist Party in national life, and the close alliance between China and the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Their vain efforts have been utterly defeated by the counter-attack of the people throughout our country. (Applause.)

The Chinese people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, are carrying out a vigorous rectification campaign in order to develop socialism in China rapidly and on a firmer basis. It is a campaign to resolve correctly the contradictions which actually exist among the people and which have to be resolved immediately, by means of a nation-wide debate which is both guided and free, carried out in the urban and rural areas on such questions as the socialist road and the capitalist road, the basic systems and major policies of the state, the working style of the Communist Party and government functionaries, and the welfare of the people—a debate conducted by bringing out the facts and by argument. This is a socialist campaign of self-education and self-remolding by the people and great successes have already been recorded in it. The socialist consciousness of the people has been rapidly raised, false ideas clarified, shortcomings in work overcome, unity within the ranks of the people strengthened, and labor discipline and productivity increased, wherever the campaign has been carried out. (Applause.) We are now carrying forward this people's self-education campaign among our six hundred million people stage by stage and section by section and it is probable that in another few months nation-wide success will have been achieved. In future we intend to conduct a rectification campaign every year or every other year—the time it takes can be greatly shortened—as one of the main methods of resolving various social contradictions in our country during the whole period of transition. The basic starting point in practicing this method is the firm confidence that the majority of the masses are after all on our side and that they will listen to reason. This point has been proved by all our experience in the campaign.

In many years of revolutionary practice we have developed the method of the rectification campaign in accordance with the Leninist principles of keeping in close contact with the masses, recognizing the initiative of the masses, and practicing criticism and self-criticism. The correctness of this method has once again been proved by the present socialist self-education movement.

China has received brotherly assistance towards its socialist construction in many fields from the Soviet Union. In celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution, please allow us to express our heartfelt gratitude to the Communist Party, the government and the people of the Soviet Union, for giving China such friendly help. (Enthusiastic, prolonged applause.)

Soon after it was founded, the People's Republic of China concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. This is a great alliance of two great socialist countries. We share the same destiny and the same life-spring with the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp. (Enthusiastic applause.) We regard it as the sacred international obligation of all socialist countries to strengthen the solidarity of the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union. (Applause.)

All possible means of sowing discord are used by the imperialist powers headed by the US in their efforts to disrupt the friendship and solidarity of the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union. But reality is sure to disappoint the imperialists. The socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union are more closely united than ever. Since the dawn of history, it was not possible for relations between nations to be based on such identity of interests, such mutual respect and confidence, and such mutual assistance and inspiration as between the socialist countries. This is because the socialist countries are of an entirely new type in which the exploiting classes are overthrown and the working people are in power. The principle of integrating internationalism with patriotism has been practiced in the relations between these countries. We are closely bound by common interests and ideals. Marx said in his inaugural address to the Workingmen's International Association: "Past experience has shown how disregard of that bond of brotherhood which ought to exist between the workmen of different countries, and incite them to stand firmly by each other in all their struggles for emancipation, will be chastised by the common discomfiture of their incoherent efforts." This teaching of Marx more than ninety years ago will never be out-of-date for us. (Applause.)

Dear comrades, the fact that representatives of the working class and masses of the people of various countries of the world are here today to attend this grand meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, held to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution demonstrates in itself the great solidarity of the people's forces of the world and symbolizes the flourishing condition of the international socialist movement. Let us continue our efforts to strengthen the solidarity of the socialist countries, and of the working people and oppressed nations of the world, in order to attain new and greater victories. (Prolonged, enthusiastic applause.)

Long live the Great October Socialist Revolution! (Prolonged, enthusiastic applause.)

Long live the solidarity and friendship of the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union! (Prolonged, enthusiastic applause.)

Long live the great banner of Marxist-Leninist internationalism! (Prolonged, enthusiastic applause.)

The proletariat and peace-loving people of the whole world, unite! (Prolonged, enthusiastic applause.)

Source: *Extracted from the magazine People's China, Beijing, December 1, 1957.*

The East Wind Prevails Over the West Wind

November 17, 1957

…Chairman Mao pointed out first of all that the October Socialist Revolution marks a turning point in world history; the appearance in the heavens of two artificial satellites and the coming to Moscow of delegates from the sixty-four communist and workers' parties to celebrate the holiday of the October Revolution mark a new turning point. The forces of socialism surpass the forces of imperialism The imperialist forces have a leader, America; our socialist camp must also have a leader, and that leader is the Soviet Union. If we do not have a leader our forces might disintegrate!

Chairman Mao... said it was an event of great significance that the communist and workers' parties of sixty-four countries attended the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution. It showed the solidarity of the socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, it showed the solidarity of the communists and workers' parties the world over, with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as their center.

Chairman Mao said that the direction of the wind in the world had changed. In the struggle between the socialist and capitalist camps, it was no longer the west wind that prevailed over the East wind, but the East wind that prevailed over the West wind. The whole world now has a population of 2.7 million, of which the various socialist countries have nearly one billion, the independent former colonial countries more than 700 million, the countries now struggling for independence or for complete independence plus the capitalist countries with neutralist tendencies 600 million, and the imperialist camp only about 400 million, besides which they are also divided internally. Earth quakes are likely to occur over there.

At present, Chairman Mao said, it was not the west wind that was prevailing over the East wind, but the east wind prevailing over the west wind.

Source: *Extracted from Mao's remarks to Chinese students in Moscow, 17 November 1957. (Mao Chu-hsi tasai Su-lien ti yen-lun, pp. 14-15.)*

Index of Chinese Names

An Ziwen 145-146
Ba Jin, Pa Chin 395
Bi Mingqi 101
Bo Yibo, Po I-po 102, 194
Cai Chang, Tsai Chang 5, 340
Cai Tingkai, Tsai Ting-kai 5
Cao Zigu, Cao Dianqiu 334
Chen Boda, Chen Po-ta 46, 286
Chen Duxiu, Chen Tu-hsiu 356-357
Chen Jiageng, Tan Kah-kee 5, 161
Chen Jilong, Chen Chi-lung 398
Chen Jisheng 87
Chen Mingshu, Zhenru 72
Chen Pixian 110, 247
Chen Qitong, Chen Chi-tung 395, 397
Chen Sheng 165-166
Chen Shutong, Chen Shu-tung 5, 102, 137, 141, 209, 217
Chen Yi, Chen I 5, 98, 172
Chen Yun 5, 56, 102, 184, 283, 288, 314, 333, 368, 379
Chen Yuying 146
Chen Zaidao 188
Cheng Pu 400
Cheng Qian, Songyun 156
Cheng Xingling 122
Chiang Kai-shek, Jiang Jieshi 128, 183, 267, 337, 362, 372, 380, 387, 393-394, 412,
Confucius 372
Deng Xiaoping 5, 98, 113, 118, 283, 314
Deng Zihui 5, 118, 135
Dong Biwu, Tung Pi-wu 5, 142, 283, 314
Dowager Cixi 365
Fan Ruizhuan, Fan Jui-chuan 397
Fang Linliu 16
Feng Youlan, Feng Yu-lan 10
Fu Dingyi, Yucheng 220
Fu Zuoyi, Fu Yisheng 5, 19-20
Gao Chongmin 5
Gao Gang, Kao Kang 5, 356, 359, 369, 375
Guan Songfang 181
Guo Moruo 5
He Long, Ho Lung 5
He Xiangning 5
Hu Feng 303, 374, 401
Hu Peiheng 181
Hu Qiaomu 69, 97, 237, 333
Hu Shi 284, 293, 295
Hu Zongnan 50
Huang Yanpei, Renzhi, Huang Ren 5, 110, 116, 129, 157, 165, 174, 209, 217, 221, 256, 288, 319, 339-340
Jiang Feng, Chiang Feng 397
Jiang Qing, Chiang Ching 65
Jiang Zhuru 111, 315
Kang Sheng 5, 31
Ke Qingshi 427
Lei Renmin 302
Li Da, Haoming 120, 176, 293,
Li Dao 98
Li Dazhao, Li Ta-chao 60
Li Fuchun 230, 286
Li Jinxi, Shao Xi 69
Li Jishen, Li Chi-shen 5, 39, 163
Li Kaiwen 340
Li Lisan 5
Li Shuqing 24, 172, 179, 185, 186, 225
Li Shuyi 58, 255

Li Sian 111
Li Weihan, Luo Mai 112, 123, 286,
Li Xijiu 5
Li Yinqiao 348
Liao Jingwen 245
Lin Boqu, Lin Po-chu 5, 283, 314
Lin Tie, Lin Guohua 308
Lin Zexu, Lin Tse-hsu 165-166
Liu Bei, Liu Pei 397
Liu Bocheng, Liu Po-cheng 5, 98
Liu Geping 5
Liu Kuiyi, Linsheng 52
Liu Shaoqi 5, 70, 145, 237, 283, 286, 288-289, 305, 307, 312, 314, 316-317, 326-328, 330-332, 335, 337, 339, 342-343
Liu Yazi 5, 31, 163
Long Yun 5
Lu Xun, Lu Hsun 366, 383, 395
Luo Ronghuan, Lo Jung-huan 5
Luo Ruiqing 84
Ma Bufang, Ma Pu-fang 22
Ma Liangjun 14
Ma Xulun, Yichu 75, 112, 233
Ma Yinchu 5
Mao Anying 100
Mao Xishen 232
Mao Xusheng 24
Mao Yuanti 143
Mao Yueqiu 232, 258
Mao Yuju, Mao Yizhu 66, 179, 257
Mao Zelian 143, 179
Mao Zerong, Sunwu, Songwu 180, 238
Mao Zetan 62
Mei Lanfang 384
Mo Pu 397
Nie Rongzhen, Nieh Jung-chen 5
Pan Hannian 374
Peng Dehuai 5, 22, 283
Peng Zhen 5, 163, 238, 314
Pu Xuezai 181
Pu Yizai 181
Qi Baishi 181
Qi Yanming 98
Qin Shi Huang, First Emperor 220
Rao Shushi, Jao Shushi 5, 110, 118, 142, 237, 356
Ren Bishi, Jen Pi-shih 50
Rong Yiren 378, 380, 407
Sa Zhenbing 159, 163
Shao Lizi 126
Shen Junru, Shen Chunju 5, 65, 231
Shen Yanbing, Shen Dehong, Mao Dun 5
Situ Meitang, Szeto Mei-tong 5, 124
Song Qingling, Soong Ching-ling, Madame Sun 5, 183
Su Yu 83
Sun Dayu, Sun Ta-yu 401
Sun Yat-sen, Sun Zhongsan 379, 388, 398
Tan Zheng 318
Tan Zhenlin 184
Tao Zhiyue, Tao Chih-yueh 3
Tao Zhu 286
Tian Jiaying 255, 333
Ting Ling 386
Wang Chuanshan, Wang Fuzhi 142
Wang Huayun 188
Wang Jiaxiang, Wang Jiaqing 80, 218
Wang Ming, Chen Shaoyu 358-359, 394
Wang Shensheng 181
Wang Shoudao, Wang Fanglin 7, 94

Wang Xifeng, Wang Hsi-feng 395
Wang Zhen 23
Wei Lihuang, Wei Junru 309
Wen Banxiang 64
Wen Bingzhang 258
Wen Dongxian 232
Wen Jianquan 61, 64
Wen Jiuming 238
Wen Nansong 64
Wu Guang 165-166
Wu Jingchao, Wu Ching-chao 119
Wu Yuzhang 5
Wu Zhipu 189
Xianfeng Emperor 188
Xiang Jun 58
Xiang Mingqing 58
Xiao Zhun, Hsiao Chun 386
Xu Beihong, Hsu Pei-hung 29, 87, 111, 245
Xu Haidong 85
Xu Shixue 181
Xu Xiangqian 5
Xue Muqiao 98
Yan Huiqing 69
Yang Kaihui 255
Yang Kaizhi, Zizhen 7-8, 55, 255
Yang Shangkun 98, 237
Yang Xiusheng 255
Yao Wenyuan 402
Ye Gongzuo, Yuhu 162, 222
Ye Jianying, Yeh Chien-ying 5
Yi Nanping 193
Yin Yigang 145-146
Yu Feian 181
Yuan Zhongqian 95
Zhai Zuojun 159, 348
Zhang Bojun, Chang Po-chun 406
Zhang Dongsun 5
Zhang Guotao, Chang Kuo-tao 358
Zhang Lan, Biaofang 5, 112
Zhang Naiqi 338
Zhang Nanxian 5
Zhang Shichao 163
Zhang Wentian, Luo Fu 314
Zhang Youcheng 167
Zhang Yuanji, Jusheng 130
Zhang Zhizhong, Wenbai 5, 126
Zhao Kuangyun, Emperor Taizu 189
Zhao Xiguang 9
Zhen Wenxin, Chen Wenxin 125
Zheng Zhenduo 141
Zhong Dianfei 396
Zhong Tianfei, Chung Tien-fei 395
Zhou Enlai, Chou En-lai 5, 31, 47, 50, 166, 222, 227, 268, 280, 283, 286, 288-290, 295, 305, 307, 312, 316-317, 326-328, 330-332, 335, 337, 339, 342-343, 402
Zhou Rong, Zhou Zanxiang 67
Zhou Shizhao, Dunyuan 11, 104, 147, 334, 341
Zhou Wennan, Zhou Renfang 65
Zhou Yu, Chou Yu 400
Zhu De, Chu Teh 4, 5, 9, 14, 28, 283, 314
Zhuge Liang, Chu-ko Liang 397, 400
Zou Puxun, Heng Er 67

Index of Chinese Places

Anhui, Anhwei 346

Anping 308

Anshan 192, 247, 347

Baipangkou 61, 64

Beidaihe 174, 176

Beijing, Peking 5, 84, 98, 111, 180, 237, 255, 258, 273, 307, 309, 318, 348, 360, 378, 384, 391, 395, 401

Caixi 297

Changdu 191

Changsha 104, 122, 143, 146, 180, 232, 255

Chengdu 167,

Chongqing, Chungking 11, 65, 167, 374

Chu 138

Dalian 30

Dapingyao 70

Dongbatou 188

Fengyin 70

Fujian, Fukien 297

Gansu, Kansu 22, 263

Guangdong, Kwangtung 116, 183, 395

Guangxi, Kwangsi 116

Guangzhou, Kwangchow, Kwong Chow 4, 165-166, 288

Guanting 259

Hankou 318

Haoshan 125

Harbin 50

Hebei, Hopeh 145-146, 311, 372

Heilongjiang 50

Hong Kong, Xianggang 22, 25, 369-370, 375

Huai 126

Hubei, Hupeh 388-389

Hunan 7-8, 12, 24-25, 52-53, 55, 58, 61, 65, 94-95, 104, 122, 232, 406

Ili 15, 27

Jiangsu, Kiangsu 81, 110, 184-185, 399

Jiangxi, Kiangsi 24

Jimei, Zhimei 1611

Jing 98, 162

Kaifeng 189

Kangding 191, 293

Kexi 173, 334

Lanzhou 22-23, 178

Lhasa 130, 341

Liuyuankou 189

Lüshun 30, 207, 304, 307

Miaogaofeng 95

Moganshan 248

Nanjing, Nanking 183

Ninggang 24

Ningxia, Ningsia 22

Qingdao, Tsingtao 84, 404, 406

Qinghai 22, 84, 144, 263, 293

Qizhou 311

Shaanxi, Shensi 22, 50, 386

Shanghai 184, 360, 368, 378, 391-392, 396, 398, 401, 403

Shaoshan 24, 143, 232, 238

Shaoyang 319

Shen 190

Shicheng 232, 258

Shidong 318

Shijingshan 134

Sidu 70

Suiyuan 19-20

Summer Palace, Yuanmingyuan 370

Sunan 81

Tacheng 15, 27
Taiwan, Formosa 12, 78, 268, 305, 337, 346, 370, 413
Taiyuan 348
Tangjiaduo, Tangjiatuo 61, 232, 258
Tianjin, Tientsin 89, 101, 183
Tianshui 167, 178
Tongwaxiang 188
Tumen 227
Wuhan 297
Xian 23, 119
Xiangtan, Xiangton 124, 172
Xiangxiang 70, 318, 322
Xiangya 180
Xiaozheng 184
Xikang, Sikang 191
Xinhua 95, 186
Yalu 227
Yanan, Yenan 11, 50, 384, 405
Yangtze, Changjiang 202
Yellow River, Huanghe 187-190
Zhejiang 184-185, 346

Index of Places and Non-Chinese Names

Afghanistan 320
Shah, Mohammed Zahir 320
Albania 18-19, 99, 223, 237-238, 269-270, 290, 341-342
Hoxha, Enver 18, 237
Lleshi, Haxhi 290, 341
Nishani, Omer 99
Shehu, Mehmet Ismail 290, 342
Shtylla, Behar 290, 342
Algeria 17-18
Bouhali, Larbi 17-18
Brazil 371
Bulgaria 46-47, 88-89, 92-93, 133, 266-269, 332
Chervenkov, Vâlko Velyov 46, 332
Damyanov, Georgi Purvanov 88, 133, 268, 332
Kolarov, Vasil Petrov 46-47
Neychev, Mincho Kolev 332
Burma 83, 109, 135-136, 151, 199, 291, 301
Ba U 291, 301
Sao Shwe Thaik 109, 151
U Hla Maung 291
U Nu 291, 380
Czechoslovakia 15-16, 20, 60, 95, 158, 214, 292, 314, 317, 331
Fierlinger, Zdeněk 317
Gottwald, Klement 20, 60, 95, 214
Zápotocký, Antonín 292, 317, 331
Denmark 76-77, 244
Egypt 373, 413
Finland 164, 242-243, 292, 302-303, 344
Kekkonen, Urho Kaleva 302
Paasikivi, Juho Kusti 292, 303, 344
France 53, 59, 103, 312-313, 336, 370, 379
Duclos, Jacques 103
Saillant, Louis André 17
Thorez, Maurice 59, 103
Germany, German Democratic Republic (GDR) 13-14, 77-78, 80-81, 93, 136-137, 168, 181-182, 233-234, 241-242, 272-273, 285, 304, 312-313, 315-316, 335, 339, 343
Dieckmann, Johannes 315, 335
Grotewohl, Otto 13, 315, 335
Pieck, Wilhelm Reinhold 13, 77, 80, 93, 110, 136, 168, 181, 233, 272, 315, 335
Engels, Friedrich 200, 213, 408
Hitler, Adolf 77, 312, 316, 352, 372
Marx, Karl 200, 213, 221, 388, 408, 415
Greece 18
Partsalidis, Dimitrios (Mitsos) 18
Hungary 54, 155-156, 271, 282, 311-312, 369, 371-375, 384-386, 413
Boldóczki, János 311
Dobi, István 311
Gerő, Ernő 384
Hegedus, Andros 311
Rákosi, Mátyás 155
Szakasits, Árpád 54
India 25-26, 47, 68, 82, 90, 114-115, 151, 160-161, 177-178, 259, 281, 291, 301, 370-371, 407
Bose, Sarat Chandra 26
Meer, A. I. 90
Nehru, Jawaharlal 281, 380
Prasad, Rajendra 47, 114, 151, 160, 281,

291, 301
Raghavan 281
Ranadive, Bhalchandra Trimbak 25
Singh, J. N. 90
Indonesia 28-29, 85, 132, 239, 260-261, 266-267, 304, 321, 329
Mononutu, Arnold 321
Sastroamidjojo, Ali 321
Sukarno, Achmed 85, 132, 321, 329, 380
Iran 26-27
Ireland 141
Israel 413
Italy 113, 214-215
Longo, Luigi 113
Togliatti, Palmiro 113, 241
Japan 34, 133, 152, 173-174, 205, 226-227, 267-268, 285, 304-305, 312, 328, 333, 336-337, 354, 358, 372, 378-379
Tokuda, Kyūichi 333
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 78, 84-85, 101, 131, 143-144, 157-158, 171, 187, 200, 221-223, 226-229, 244-245, 257, 264-265, 283-284, 287-288, 327-328
Kim Du Bong 84, 131, 171, 222, 256, 264, 287, 327
Kim Il Sung 223, 283, 287, 328
Nam Il 287, 328
Mongolia 79-80, 152, 179, 219-220, 231, 289, 323, 325
Bumatsende, Gonchigiyn (Bumtsend) 80, 152, 231
Choibalsan, Khorloogiin 152, 231
Jargalsaikhan, Bayaryn 289
Lavdan, S. 325
Sambuu, Jamsarangiyn 289, 323, 325
Tsedenbal, Yumjaagiin 289, 325
Ulanhu (Yun Ze) 5
Netherlands 336, 370
Pakistan 131, 141, 313-314
Nazimuddin, A. K. 131
Philippines 78, 337
Poland 73, 82, 160, 163-164, 260, 326-327, 369, 371-372
Bierut, Bolesław 82, 160, 163
Cyrankiewicz, Józef Adam Zygmunt 326
Skrzeszewski, Stanisław 326
Zawadzki, Aleksander 260, 326
Portugal 336
Romania 51, 86, 105, 140, 194, 265, 290-291, 329-330
Bughici, Simion 329
Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe 140, 194, 329
Groza, Petru 265, 290, 329
Parhon, Constantin Ion 86, 105
South Africa 59, 82, 90, 259
Andrews, William H. 59
Cachalia, Yusuf 259
Mistry, D. Fu 259
Sweden 74, 96, 191, 379,
Adolf, Gustaf (Gustaf VI) 96
Adolf, Oscar Gustaf (Gustaf V) 96
Switzerland 270
Turkey 413
United Kingdom (Britain) 10, 30, 91, 97, 141, 147, 312-313, 316, 336, 370-371
Deliben, Jack 30
Gallacher, William 147
Hutchinson, Hugh Lester 10
Malthus, Thomas Robert 399
Mills, John Platts 10
Pollitt, Harry 91, 97

Pritt, Denis Nowell 10
Solley, L. J. 10
Zilliacus, Konni 10
United States 6-7, 10, 13, 78, 85, 101, 103, 113, 144, 157-158, 171, 215, 222, 228, 244, 267-268, 287, 305, 312-313, 316, 336-337, 345
Davis, Benjamin 6
Dennis, Eugene 6
Foster, William Z. 6
Hall, Gus 7
Potash, Irving 7
Stachel, Jacob Abraham (Jack) 6
Thompson, Robert G. 6
Williamson, John 6
Winston, Henry 6
Winter, Carl 6
USSR, Soviet Union 12, 20, 37-41, 45-46, 48-49, 55, 96, 109, 115, 133, 138-140, 153-154, 158, 169, 173-174, 179, 187, 190, 193-195, 200-202, 206, 208-209, 211-216, 220-221, 224, 226-228, 230, 234, 236-237, 241-242, 245-247, 253-254, 260, 265, 267-269, 272-275, 282-283, 285-286, 289, 304-307, 312-313, 316-317, 324, 326, 328, 330, 332, 335-337, 339, 344, 347, 352-353, 355-358, 361-362, 370-372, 387, 394, 396, 408-416
Beria, Lavrentiy Pavlovich 369, 375
Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich 306, 338, 408
Gorky, Maxim 398
Khrushchev, Nikita 273-274, 286, 408
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov 37, 46, 200, 208, 210-213, 352, 359, 364, 386-387, 408, 410-411
Malenkov, Georgy Maximilianovich 213, 221, 226, 229, 240, 253-254, 267, 285
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich 221, 226, 267, 285, 303, 306, 338
Roshchin, N. V. 12
Shvernik, Nikolai Mikhailovich 208
Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich 20, 37-39, 47-49, 96, 103, 115, 117, 133, 139, 153-154, 173, 190, 195, 200-201, 206-213, 230, 352-354, 362, 369, 375, 386-387, 407
Trotsky, Leon 352
Voroshilov, Kliment Yefremovich (Klim) 285, 303, 306, 338, 408
Zinoviev, Grigory Yevseyevich 352
Vietnam, Indochina 29, 48-49, 66, 78, 88, 132, 152-153, 219, 225, 234, 253, 260-261, 266, 294, 319, 324, 330-331
Ho Chí Minh 29, 66, 88, 132, 152, 219, 234, 260, 266, 294, 319, 324, 330
HoTùng Mau 48
Hoàng Văn Hoan 324
Pham Văn Đong 294, 330
Tôn Đuc Thang 330
Xinjiang (Uyghur Autonomous Region) 3-4, 9, 14-15, 22, 27-28, 155, 173, 178
Abduklimu 27-28
Ahamaitikiang 27-28
Aisihaiti Itzhakov 15
Azizi, Saifuddin (Seypidin) 5
Dalerhan 27-28
Izhakbek 27-28
Luo Zhi 27-28
Shahidi, Burhan (Bao Erhan) 3
Xizang (Tibet) 12, 28, 127-128, 138, 144, 162, 182-183, 191, 235-236, 293, 307, 340-341
Gnoertehni, Panchen 28, 128, 144, 162, 307, 340
Yugoslavia 324-325, 342-343, 353, 370,

384
Pijade, Moša 342
Popović, Konstantin (Koča) 342
Tito, Josip Broz 19, 342, 401

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Talks At The Nanning Conference

January 11, 12, 1958

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication, 1969]

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1. Talk on 11 January, 1958

As for the report to the People's Congress, I have not read it in two years (in order to maintain solidarity this has not been mentioned in the newspapers and I am not responsible). Chang Po-chun[1] said that the State Council provided only the finished product and did not allow others to participate in the planning. I am quite sympathetic; however, he is trying to set up a bourgeois political planning council while we constitute the proletariat's political planning council. Some people have only finished products from the very start. They called meetings in haste and practically forced people to approve them. They provided only the finished products instead of the materials. It is necessary to discuss problems from a practical standpoint, exchange ideas of importance, and explain why things are being done this way rather than that way. The finance and economics departments do not keep the Political Bureau informed. Generally, the reports, too, do not lend themselves to discussions as they do not mention textual research, phraseology, and essence. The former is a question of rhetoric and the latter are questions of concepts and reasoning.

For the comrades in the party committees the main danger is to be "red but not expert," mindless politicians divorced from reality. Not only are they not expert but they also gradually lose their redness We are working with "intangibles" and you are working with "tangibles." The "tangibles" and "intangibles" must be integrated. Those dealing in "intangibles" must do some research on "tangibles" and those dealing in "tangibles" must use some politics. Hung-an county report on their experimental plots is a very important document. I have read it twice and ask all of you read it. The "four abundances," the "three desirables" and the "three undesirables" mentioned in the Hung-an report are nationwide problems. That is, people want to lead without fully understanding "tangible" matters. Criticizing others as expert but not red will lack forcefulness if this problem is not resolved. Party committee leaders cover three areas: industry, agriculture and ideology. The provincial committees should also operate some experimental fields. Shouldn't they? Otherwise, those mindless politicians will change color.

People working with "tangibles" who become high, middle or low level officials early, think of themselves as red. They became entangled and can not extricate themselves, and they will not even discuss essence, as, for example, opposing "bold advances."[2] In 1956 it was "bold advances." It was "boldly advance" in 1957, and in that same year it was oppose "bold advances." But in 1958 it was again "bold advances." Let us see which is better, to "boldly advance" or oppose "bold advances"? In 1956 Hopei province undertook construction of water-conservancy projects covering 17 million mou, in 1957, 20 million mou, and in 1958, 27 million mou. Seven or eight years after liberation, 1.2 billion yuan was spent on the control of the Huai River to build only 1.2 billion cubic meters of earthwork. This year, Anhwei province worked 1.6 billion cubic meters at a cost of only a few tens of millions of yuan.

Please do not mention this term opposition to “bold advances,” all right? This is a political problem. Any opposition would lead to disappointment, and 600 million disappointed people would be an overwhelming problem. Put out both hands for people to see how many fingers have sores. “The storehouses are empty,” “The market is tense,” using too many people spending too much money — should we oppose them? All these must be opposed. At that time it would have been best not to bring up the subject of opposition to “bold advances,” and merely say that one finger had a sore. Thus it would not have raised the storm which blew away three things: 1) the achievement of greater, faster, better and more economical results; 2) the forty article program; and 3) the promotion committees.[3] These are all political rather than functional problems. If one finger has a problem it can be cured with a little treatment. Did not “storehouses are empty” and “the market is tense” finally change half year later?

The problem of the ten fingers must be clarified since it is a problem that concerns 600 million people. After all, are achievements important or are mistakes important? Are we to preserve enthusiasm, encourage hard work and the spirit of surging ahead, or are we to dampen spirits and be discouraging? The Rightists grasped this point and launched full-scale opposition to “bold advances.” Ch’en Ming-shu[4] criticized me for “craving after greatness and success, listening to and believing only one side, having inconstant feelings and disliking antiquities.” Chang Hsi-jo (not yet classified as a rightist)[5] criticized me as “having a fondness for greatness and success, seeking quick success and instant benefits, belittling the past and superstitious about the future.” In the Past, per mou production in the north was some 100 catties and 200 to 300 catties in the South. With an accumulated experience of 20 years Generalissimo Chiang left us only 40,000 tons of steel. If we do not belittle the past and have faith in the future what hope do we have? As for listening to and believing one side, it is impossible not to do so. The question is which side you should listen to, the bourgeoisie or the proletariat? There are some comrades who are not one sided enough and need to lean more. We cannot listen only to Liang shu-ming[6] or Ch’en Ming-shu. As for inconstant feelings it it’s not necessarily good to be constant. One cannot always be fond of the bourgeois rightists. As for the dislike of antiquities, it is a question of either emulating the advanced, or being backward, and things of antiquity are always a little backward. We eradicated the four pests, wiping out flies, mosquitoes and sparrows. There has been no precedent, and it will not be done again. Generally, newcomers are better, and i! t is not “the present is inferior to the past.” One cannot help being fond of antiques, but one also cannot be too fond of them. When the memorial arches were dismantled in Peking and tunnels were driven through the city walls, Chang Hsi-jo wept. This is politics.

The New Year editorial advocated going all out and aiming high (Ch’en Po-ta interrupted to say that there should be more stockpiling).

On the question of reducing personnel, the commercial section and the cooperatives are not responding to political guidance. I have talked about this for several years but they will not reform. Any thing handed down to the local level [for implementation] is halved. Since my arrival in Peking the pedicabs have not been reduced by even one unit. There were too many of our “imperial edicts”, leaving no room for thoughts. I would be a little happier if you said you would give it some thought. Our status quo faction is too large. The study of value judgment must be done again. For example, “Chiang Kai-shek is counter-revolutionary.” Value judgments must be made anew on some concepts.

Chang Po-chun intends to set up a bourgeois planning council. Our planning council is the Political Bureau, which operates through an exchange of information. They don’t carry notebook and talk about guidelines. How about establishing an agreement? If you don’t agree I have a way to resist you, and that is to not read your reports. I have not read for two years and the local finance departments have also chosen this approach.

These few years of opposing departmentalism has produced a saying: seize the great powers and divide up minor powers; the party committees make decisions and each locality carries them out; carrying out decisions is a form of power and so does not deviate from the principle. Investigation of work is the responsibility of the party committees.

A number of people in political and legal organizations have noted that party and government are not separate. Do we want half for each? That will not do. There should be no division at first, although, later they can be divided. Otherwise, it will just be seizing minor powers, and how will such things as the forty article program be divided? Twenty for the Central Committee and twenty for agriculture? This cannot be done. The Central Committee worked up the forty articles and then divided them up for implementation. This is the way to divide. We cannot have the central committee operating under one constitution and some other organizations operating under another. When minor powers are divided up small, the major powers then cannot be monopolized. Was not everybody in favour of group leadership? Was not the unified command system abolished (The army of the Soviet Union implemented the system of unified command; Chu-ko-fu committed an error)

2. Talk on 13 January, 1958

For the past eight years I have struggled for such a work method. I have said it a thousand times, ten thousand times. This is an exaggeration, but when it is said once too often it becomes empty talk. Invariably, a man’s thinking is influenced gradually. It should be a “steady drizzle” instead of a “heavy downpour”, because the latter will cause washouts. The Political Bureau dose not have a sufficiently cohesive granular structure to absorb a heavy downpour; it will simply run off (they must have a book each on pedology and agriculture, otherwise they will not be able to remain as secretaries of provincial party committees. Inevitably, there will be a day when they will be dismissed from office. This is not a threat). Like the United Nations of Dulles[7], the Political Bureau has become a voting machine. You give it a perfect document and it has to be passed. Like the opera, you have to go on stage and perform since the show has been announced. The document itself does not go in to textual research and essence, and it also has foreign words. I do have a method, and that is passive resistance. I will not read it. For two years I have not read your documents and I do not expect to read them this year either.

Did comrade Chou En-lai mention what I said at the Hangchow conference?[8] In December of 1955, I wrote a foreword to the book *Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside*.[9] It made a tremendous impact on a nation-wide scale. Regardless of whether it was because of a personality cult or idolatry, it was published by area newspapers throughout the country and by major and minor periodicals, producing a great impact. I have thus become the chief culprit of "bold advances". I have said that a condition of inadequacy in situational analysis exists in various departments. The army has been increased by 800,000 men, worker apprentices by one million, but why should there be an increase in the ranks of those opposing right conservatism? I don't understand and I also don't know.

The "bold advances" of the Peitaiho conference held in the summer of 1955 was for the purpose of increasing steel production to 15 million tons (second five-year plan). The opposition to "boldly advance" occurring at the Peitaiho conference held in the summer of 1956 influenced the National People's Congress's report adversely. It is always so, that people do not think alike. Imbalance is the law of universal progress. Menicus said: "All things are not alike, and all things complement each other." People do not think alike and yet it is possible to reach accord. Progress is made in a zigzag spiral pattern. Of course everyone is for the party and for the country, and not for himself.

My method against departmentalism is passive resistance and also criticism in small meetings. The finance and economics departments do not go into textual research, phraseology, and essence. They must operate in a gentle fashion, giving out some information beforehand. With them it has always been a heavy downpour causing washouts. They have been always ungracious, inadequately prepared, and incomplete. This is blockade. This is a Stalinist method. Ten minutes before the conference opens, the document is produced for resolution, without any consideration being given to the state of mind of people. You are experts, and also red. The majority in the Political Bureau is red but not expert. My attack is directed chiefly at cadres at the ministerial level and above in the Central Government and it is not levelled at everyone. It is an attack on those who caused heavy downpours and who set up blockades. If small group conferences do not resolve this problem, then a plenary session of the Central Committee will be convened (an article settled this matter but it has not been seriously resolved. In the letter to the Kwangsi provincial party committee the question of newspapers was discussed.[10]) While I was in the Soviet Union I wrote a letter saying that it will not be beneficial to your work if you do not have the support of the Central Committee. By doing otherwise you will become isolated, like the "gentleman on the beams" (a burglar).

The Political Bureau is not the Planning Council. The heavy downpour has run off our bodies but [they] kept on saying it didn't do a good job. This is, in reality, a blockade. There is also departmentalism in it, but not very serious. Now, each has his own feelings and, placing myself in your position, I imagine you must be thinking that the Central Committee is a model of perfection. You feel that even though it is not all perfect, it is still near perfection. Besides, it is like Marguerite, the heroine of the novel “La Dame Aux Camelias”, who felt it necessary to put on makeup when she saw her lover, although she was dying. In *Fei-yen Wai-chan* (Biography of Fei Yen) Chao Fei-yen became ill and refused to see Emperor Han Wu. After all, she was simply unwilling to meet people because of her poor appearance. What is wrong with seeing people in a dishevelled ungroomed condition? You write them down one at a time as they come to mind, setting forth opinions which are not yet well defined in your mind and ideas which are not yet crystal-clear, and discuss them with others. Don’t treat everything that has been issued as an “imperial edict”, and that once it has been discussed, it becomes inflexible. It was like that with the forty articles. In the beginning, 11 articles were drafted in Hangchow, then it was increased to 17 in Tientsin, and only upon arrival in Peking were they increased to 40. “A widow bringing up her son is beholden to the efforts of all the people”. This is a question of work method.

I perceive that we will have to create a unity of opposites. It just will not do without having a tit-for-tat confrontation. It will either be you persuading me or my persuading you. Or be a middle-of-the-roader. Some people are just that; they will not take a stand on major issues. Marxism is supposed (to teach us) not to camouflage one’s own view, is it not? If that is so, then I don’t understand. The banner should be displayed clearly. Probably it is desirable to be like Ch’u Chuany Wang (A prince in the State of Ch’u) who “for three years emitted no sound, but when he did, people remarked: for three years he did not fly, but when he did, he soared into the heavens.[11]”

Another one is that obdurate Hu X X arrived. Speak of the devil and he is bound to appear. The revolutionary party of *Jen-min Jih-pao* [Peoples Daily] does not make revolution. The democratic parties and factions took the speech I made at the Supreme State Conference held on 29 February[12] and expanded on it, extracting what they needed. The *Jen-min Jih-pao* did not make a single move. It did write an editorial beginning with Engels. Ever since the beginning of February I have been telling them: since you are not carrying it out why don’t you resign? At the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee held in November,[13] the January Conference of Provincial Party Committee Secretaries[14], and the Propaganda Conference held in March[15], as well as at the I-nien-t’ang Conference, contradiction among the people was mentioned. They were told not to worry, that it was resolvable. But it did not convince Comrade XXX. I said that it would be fine if I had one out of ten cadres supporting me. He would not say he was opposed to it but simply would not implement it. I would be well of if a thousand out of the ten thousand deputy secretaries of district party committees and above supported me. Who could have opened up the schools in Peking? In making his report at the Chung-chih Conference held on 22 May, Comrade X X X had a well-known saying: “An opportune moment that cannot be bought with one thousand ounces of gold” as well as “an inch of gold cannot buy an inch of time.” This brought about an opening up. During the blooming and contending, several party branches in Tsinghua University rebelled, and the rightists were happy. Otherwise, there would be no way to uncover these rebellious elements. There is a certain kind of i! ndolence in people which cannot be easily discarded. The arctic ice could not have thawed for Comrade X X X if it had not been for that conference. XXX is a good man; He is just incompetent. I described him as a professor running a newspaper, a student running a newspaper. I also said that he was like a corpse running a newspaper.

More on textual research, phraseology, and essence. Workers in the field of finance and economics have made great achievements. Of the ten fingers only one is bad. I have said this ten thousand times, but to no effect. I hope work methods will be reformed. I am the one with the least knowledge and I am not a member of a committee. I have talked with democratic people and told them that I was only an actor playing the part of an old domicile, while they were the stars. Anyway, I do have some seniority, and I should be informed. I am rather disappointed. Letting you come from far away places to the south was a suggestion made by the Premier.

I am the culprit. In December of 1955, I wrote an article opposing rightist tendencies[16]. On impulse I held a discussion with 34 ministers. Ten major relationships[17] were discussed, my head swelled, and I "boldly advanced." After that I was afraid to come near a minister. At the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee I said that three things were abolished last year (greater, faster, better, and more economical results, the forty articles, and the promotion committees)[18] and there was no opposition. I had a stroke of luck, I was restored [to favor]. I then had the courage to talk with the ministers again. There has been a set-back in these three years. The rightists attacked, throwing back some of our comrades to a distance only 50 meters away from the rightists. The rightist launched full-scale opposition against "bold advances," asserting that the present is inferior to the past, and "bold advances are more injurious than conservatism." Let us study it, study which is more injurious. The opposition to "bold advances" discouraged 600 million people. The anti-bold advance editorial of June 1956 opposed right conservatism and also hasty bold advances. It seemed to be impartial, but, actually, the emphasis was on opposition to bold advances. It was not one finger having a sore. On this editorial I noted "will not read." Why should I read something that attacks me? It was so frightening, it has such power to sway. This writing seemed to be even-handed, but in reality, it was in opposition to "bold advances." It has not formed the pattern well. The ten fingers form a pattern, and only one finger has a sore. This is a nine-to-one ratio. It is a bourgeois method, if this relationship of the ratio is not clarified, a method like that of Ch'en Chi-! tung, Huang Yen-pei[19] and Ch'en Ming-shu.

I must have the opportunity to speak. From January to November of 1956 it was opposition against "bold advances." The Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee devised seven articles[20]. It was a compromise formula, and the solution was not thorough. The conference of provincial and municipal party committee secretaries admitted that part of the money was not properly spent. However, the discussion was not carried through thoroughly enough, thereby causing the trend of opposing "bold advances" to spread all over. Liao X X reflected to me that there seemed to be no regrets although the forty articles had been blown away. How many people regretted it? How many people breathed a sigh (of relief)? Three things were blown away, and there were three kinds of people: the first kind said: "China can be saved only by blowing away the forty articles;" the second kind is the middle-of-the-roader. It did not affect him either way. When a mosquito bites he took slap at it and let it go at that; and the third kind sighed. It is necessary to clearly define the demarcation line between the Kuomintang and the Communist party. The Kuomintang is for bold retrogression, and the Communist Party is for bold advance.

X X X was full of anxiety for party and country, and opposed "bold advances". He became divorced from the majority of the ministers and secretaries of provincial party committees, and from the 600 million people. Please read the article by Sung Yu, "Ode to Teng Tu-tse's Fondness of Women". For two thousand years Teng Tu-tse was unable to recover from this article. Sung Yu's method was to "attack a single point and ignore the rest". Teng Tu-tse reported to King Hsiang of Ch'u that Sung Yu was beautiful, articulate, and fond of sex. Sung Yu repudiated point by point. Sung Yu counterattacked Teng Tu-tse as being fond of sex by relating that Teng Tu-tse married a pockmarked, hunched-back woman and had seven children from her. Was this not fondness of sex? The attack was just on fondness of sex. In judging cadres we should take into account morality, talent, and qualifications. We cannot ignore morality and talent and consider qualifications only. Mentioning only one finger and ignoring the other nine is the very same kind of method. I see that we must have gentle rain, not heavy downpours, for several years. We must have a gentle attitude and refrain from sudden attacks and catching people off-guard.

In May, the rightists attacked, heightening the level of consciousness of those comrades with rightist tendencies in their minds. This is an "achievement" of the rightists, a way to spur people on.

Government procurement for the 1954-1955 grain year was 92 billion catties, and it purchased another 10 billion catties. Talking about bold advances, there was some boldness here. It created a storm of "every one talking about centralized purchasing, every family discussing food rations." Chang Nai-ch'i was the Minister for Food and he approved this plan. Was it an attempt to turn the farmers against us? There could be a conspiracy. Quite a lot of food was sold last year, and this reflected the fact that the farmers were discouraged. Are we not advocating the mass line? What mass line would there be once 600 million people become discouraged? In reviewing problems we must proceed from the standpoint of 600 million people and place in proper perspective the main trends, side issues, basic nature, and phenomena of matters coming to our attention.

The major powers grasped by the Central Committee consist only of revolution and agriculture. The rest in the hands of the State Council.

People are superstitious and indolent. For instance, there was an intervening 30 years in my swimming.

In the extermination of the four pests "everyone talks about public health, every household discusses hygiene." There are 12 months in a year and inspections are to be carried out once every month. In this way hospitals will run schools, doctors will go to do farming, the number of sick people will drop sharply, every one will be mentally alert, and rates of attendance will increase greatly. These must be done in a concerted way, and the best will be to complete it in two years.

I have made an agreement with the five provinces in East China to hold four meetings this year — small scale meetings — in order to bring about a coordination of two elements. Once the two elements of the central and the local are coordinated things will be different. Small scale meetings will also be held in the various provinces.

Liao X X told me to observe the first five years of a ten-year [program], the first three of a five-year [program], and the first year of a three-year [program]. In one year I will hold four meetings for you and inspect 12 times. Double accounting systems, striving to over-fulfil quotas — this is an invention of the Soviet Union.

Please read once again Hung-an County's report. One man setting a precedent pushed it forward. A deputy secretary of the county committee bought a hoe, and 80 percent of the people bought hoes. There is also the example of that commune in Ying County, Shantung province. [But] one example is enough.

Notes

[1.] Chang Po-chun, a Rightist member of the Democratic League, and director of the Newspaper Wen Hui Pao. Also refer to comrade Mao's article "Wen Hui Pao's Bourgeois Orientation Should be Criticized", *S.W.*, Vol. V, pp.451-456.

[2.] In the year 1956 the Rightists launched a campaign to oppose the so called 'Rash advances'. This campaign dampened the enthusiasm of the masses.

[3.] In this connection refer to comrade Mao's article "Be Activists in Promoting the Revolution", *S.W.*, Vol. V, pp 491-492.

"Greater, faster, better and more economical results" — Comrade Mao set forth the ideas underlying the general line for building socialism with greater, faster, better and more economic results in his speech delivered at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPC, held on April 25, 1956. (See "On Ten Major Relationships" *S.W.*, Vol. V, pp. 284-307. See also "Talk On Opposing Right Deviation and Conservatism", *S.W.*, Vol. VII, pp.355-358, (Kranti Publications).

The 40 articles of the Programme for Agricultural Development, refers to the revised draft of the National Programme for Agricultural Development (1956-67). The draft was adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese

Communist Party convened from September 20 to October 9, 1957 and was published on October 25 after discussion at the Supreme State Conference.

This programme for building China's socialist countryside defined the goals for the 500 million Chinese peasants to strive to attain in 12 years and worked out basic methods for their realization. It called for consolidation of the agricultural co-operative system and a substantial increase in the output of grain and other farm products; it called on the majority of the co-operatives to promptly catch up with or surpass the level in production and income reached by well-to-do middle peasants during the period of individual farming. It also stipulated that, wherever necessary and possible a big leap forward should be brought about within 12 years in agriculture and in all fields of rural work as well, including measures to be worked out for boosting agricultural production, popularization of advanced production experience, production in forestry, animal husbandry, side-line occupations and fishery, and in the work of science, culture, education, public health, family planning, communications, commerce and credits as well as the reforming of landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements.

[4.] Chen Ming-shu (1889-1965), was a member of the standing committee of the CC of the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT, and was also a member of the Central People's Governing Council.

[5.] Chang' Hsi-jo (c.1889-), a political scientist educated at Columbia University in New York and at the London School of Economics, where he studied under Harold Laski, was Minister of Education until February 1958, when he became chairman of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. He made the criticisms to which Mao is referring on 15 May 1957, at a forum called by the United Front Department.

[6.] Liang Shu-ming (1894-1977), a traditionist philosopher. He served as a General Secretary of the China Democratic League, and as a specials nominated member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Please also see Comrade Mao's article "Criticism of Liang Shu-ming's Reactionary Ideas". *S.W.*, Vol. V, pp. 121-130.

[7.] A reference to the then American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

[8.] For Comrade Mao's talk at the Hangchow conference, see "Talk at the Hangchow Conference of the Shanghai Bureau", *S.W.*, Vol VII, pp. 396-405 (Kranti Publications).

[9.] *S.W.*, Vol V, pp. 235-280.

[10.] Please see the next article in this volume.

[11.] A quotation from Shin-chi, the Historical Records, — meaning achieving great success in one attempt.

[12.] See “On The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among The People”, *S.W.*, Vol. V, pp. 384-421.

[13.] See “Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eight Central Committee of the Communist Party of China”, *S.W.*, Vol. V, pp 332-344.

[14.] See “Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Comminees”, *S.W.*, Vol V, pp. 350-383.

[15.] See “Speech at the Chinese Communist Party’s National Conference on Propaganda Work” *S.W.*, Vol V, PP. 422-435.

[16.] See “Talk on Opposing Right Deviation and Conservatism”, *S.W.*, Vol VII, pp. 355-358 (Kranti Publications).

[17.] See “On the Ten Major Relationships”, *S.W.*, Vol V, pp. 284-307.

[18.] See “Be Activists in Promoting the Revolution”, *S.W.*, Vol. V, pp.483-497, especially pp. 491-492.

[19.] Hung Yen-pei (1878-1965) was the Chairman of the Democratic National Construction Association in 1945. He was also a founding member of the China Democratic League. From 1949 to 1954 he served as a minister of Light Industry.

[20.] See note 13 above.

To The Kwangsi Regional Party Committee On Newspapers

January 12, 1958

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication, 1969.]

Comrades Liu Chien-hsun[1] and Wei Kuo-ch’ing,

Here attached for your reference are a few copies of local papers each one of which has its characteristics and is well edited. They are attractive to the reader and their contents are good.

Provincial newspapers are an exceedingly important problem which deserves careful study. A solution can be found in a few months if you work with the editors of the *Kwangsi Daily* (‘Kwanghsi Jih-pao’), to study the format, news items, editorials, features on theoretical problems, and literature and art [supplements], and think and analyze [these] over and over again, and if you compare it with other provincial newspapers. Careful writing of editorials is extremely important work. This must be studied by you, by the head of the propaganda department, the secretary-general, and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper. It is imperative that the first secretary must have full authority in revising major editorials. The papers will help to organize, encourage, stimulate, criticize, and promote the work of all the people in a province. Would you like to give some thought to this problem.

Notes

[1.] Liu was born in Shansi, 1908, a graduate of the Teachers' Training College, Taiyuan, and a member of the Sacrifice League during the Anti-Japanese War. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, he was the first secretary of the CPC Honan branch and concurrently the first political commissioner of the military district of Honan.

Speech At The Supreme State Coference

28 January, 1958

Today we shall talk about more general questions.

When I review the past seven or eight years, I see that this nation of ours has a great future. Especially in the past year you can see how the national spirit of our 600 million people has been raised to a level surpassing that of the past eight years. After the great airing of views, blooming and debating, our problems and tasks have been clarified: we shall catch up with Britain in about fifteen years; the publication of the Forty Point Programme for Agricultural Development has given great encouragement to the masses. Many things which we could not do before we can do now, and we have the confidence to do them: for example the extermination of the four pests,[1] for which the masses have great enthusiasm. As for me, I may not be able to catch rats, but I can have a go at catching flies and mosquitoes!

Anyway isn't it generally the flies and mosquitoes which attack us? . . . In ancient times there actually was a man who wrote an essay advocating the extermination of rats. Now we are going to exterminate the four pests. For 4,000 years nobody — not even Confucius — made it their ambition to exterminate the four pests. Hangchow municipality is planning to exterminate the four pests in four years; some other places are planning to do it in two years, three years or five years. So there is great hope for the future development of our nation. There are no grounds for pessimism. Pessimism is wrong. When we criticize the pessimists we should not come to blows but reason with them. We must tell them that we really have great hope and not just a little hope. The stress here should be placed on the word ‘great’. Or as the Japanese say [in speaking Chinese] we have ‘great great hope’ (*laughter*).[2]

Our nation is waking up, just like anybody waking from a night’s sleep. We have overthrown the feudal system of many thousands of years and have awakened. We have changed the system of ownership; we have now gained victories in the Rectification Campaign as well as in the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Our country is both poor and blank. Those who are poor have nothing to call their own. Those who are blank are like a sheet of white paper. To be poor is fine because it makes you inclined to be revolutionary. With blank paper many things can be done. You can write on it or draw designs. Blank paper is best for writing on.

If we are to have drive, if we are to see to it that the Western world is left far behind, do we not have to rid ourselves of bourgeois ideology? If the West wanted to rid itself of bourgeois ideology, who knows how long it would take! If Dulles had the desire to get rid of bourgeois ways he would have to ask us to be his teachers (*laughter*).

Whenever we talk about it we say that our country has such an enormous population, it has such a vast territory, abundant resources, so many people, 4,000 years of history and culture . . . we have bragged so much about this, yet we cannot compare with a country like Belgium. In short we are an outstanding people with a very long history, yet our steel output is so low. We only harvest 100+ catties of grain per *mu*[3] in the north and 300+ in the south; our literacy rate is so low. We cannot compare with Belgium on any of these counts. Yet we have great drive and we must catch up. We shall catch up with Britain within fifteen years.

These fifteen years depend on the first five. The first five depend on the first three, the first three on the first one, and the first year depends on the first month.

Now our enthusiasm has been aroused. Ours is an ardent nation, now swept by a burning tide. There is a good metaphor for this: our nation is like an atom . . . When this atom’s nucleus is smashed the thermal energy released will have really tremendous power. We shall be able to do things which we could not do before. When our nation has this great energy we shall catch up with Britain in fifteen years; we shall produce forty million tons of steel annually — now we produce only just over five million tons; we shall have a generating capacity of 450,000 million kWh. of electricity — at present we can generate only 40,000 million kWh., which means increasing our capacity ten times, for which we must increase hydro-electric production and not only thermo-electric. We still have ten years to carry out the Forty-Point Programme for Agricultural Development[4], but it looks as if we shall not need ten years. Some people say five years, others three. It would seem that we can complete it in eight.

To reach those targets in the present situation we must have great drive. When I was in Shanghai a professor discussed with me the *People's Daily* editorial, 'Ride on the Wind and Break through the Waves'. He said that we must summon up our energy to swim upstream. What he meant was to swim from Shanghai to Szechwan. This needs hard work; it's not like swimming downstream. He was quite right. I really appreciate this man. He is a good man with a sense of what is right. Some people[5] criticize others for 'craving greatness and success, being impatient for quick results, despising the past and putting blind faith in the future'. What sort of craving for greatness and success? Is it the craving for greatness and success of the revolutionaries or of the reactionaries? Is it a subjectivist, formalistic craving for greatness and success or is it a realistic one? When in olden times people used to talk about 'good fortune as wide as the Eastern Ocean, long life as extensive as the Southern Mountains', this was craving greatness and success, and what was wrong with that? Being impatient for quick results is not so bad either! . . .

As for despising the past, this is not to say that there was nothing good in the past. There were indeed good things in the past. But always to put so much stress on the past, every day thinking of Yü, T'ang, Wen Wang, Wu Wang, the Duke of Chou and Confucius — I don't believe in this way of looking at history . . . I consider that human history advances. One generation is not as good as another — people who went before are not as good as those who follow later . . .

As for blind faith in the future, our aims are concerned with the future. We believe that to put trust in the future is quite right, though our trust should not be . . .

There are two ways to give leadership. One is good, the other not so good. I do not mean that one is Dulles's way and one is ours, nor that one is the rightist way and the other ours. I mean that in building socialism there are two methods of leadership, two styles of work. On the question of cooperativization some people advocate more speed, others a more gradual approach. I believe that the former method is correct. It is better to strike while the iron is hot and to get it done in one go than to spin it out. For example, is it right to have a rectification campaign or not? It is right. To carry it out properly it is best to have a great airing of views and blooming . . .

I stand for the theory of permanent revolution. Do not mistake this for Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution. In making revolution one must strike while the iron is hot — one revolution must follow another, the revolution must continually advance. The Hunanese often say, 'Straw sandals have no pattern — they shape themselves in the making.' Trotsky believed that the socialist revolution should be launched even before the democratic revolution is complete. We are not like that. For example after the Liberation of 1949 came the Land Reform; as soon as this was completed there followed the mutual-aid teams, then the low-level cooperatives, then the high-level cooperatives. After seven years the cooperativization was completed and productive relationships were transformed; then came the Rectification. After Rectification was finished, before things had cooled down, then came the Technical Revolution. In the cases of Poland and Yugoslavia, democratic order had been established for seven or eight years, and then a rich peasantry emerged. It may not be necessary to establish a New Democratic government, but even so one must still unite all those forces which can be united.

It is possible to catch up with Britain in fifteen years. We must summon up our strength and swim vigorously upstream . . .

Our strength must be aroused and not dissipated. If we have shortcomings or make mistakes, they can be put right by the method of great airing of views and blooming. We must not pour cold water. We are criticized for craving greatness and success. Well then, should we seek pettiness and failure? Should we value the past and despise the future? We must crave greatness and success. The people who say so are good people. We must indeed keep up our fighting spirit.

‘The revolution has not yet been completed. Comrades must still bend every effort.’[6]

Notes

[1.] At this time, and earlier, the ‘four pests’ which the entire population was mobilized to destroy included rats, flies, mosquitoes and sparrows. The following year, sparrows having been found to play a useful role in controlling insects, they were replaced on the list by bed-bugs.

[2.] ‘Ta-ta yu’. Mao is here making fun of a characteristic peculiarity of Japanese speakers of Chinese, the repetition of the adjective or adverb.

[3.] The *mu* or *mou* is a traditional Chinese unit of area, about 0.15 acre.

[4.] Put forward by Mao in January 1956. For his speech at that time, see H. Carrère d’Encausse and S. Schram, *Marxism and Asia* (Allen Lane, 1969), pp. 291-3.

[5.] In *Talks at the Chengtu Conference*, Mao identifies the culprit.

[6.] This is a quotation from Sun Yat-sen’s political testament to his comrades of the Kuomintang.

Red And Expert

January 31, 1958

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication, 1969.]

Red and expert, politics and business are the unification of two pairs of opposites. [We] must criticize the a-political attitude. (We) must on the one hand oppose empty-headed politicos and on the other confound practical men.

There is no doubt that politics and economy, and politics and technology should be united. It has been so in the past and will be so for ever. This is what red and expert mean. In future, the term ‘politics’ will continue to exist but in a different sense. To pay no attention to politics and to be fully occupied with business matters is to become a perplexed economist or technician. And that is dangerous. Ideological and political work is the guarantee for the accomplishment of our economic and technological work; it serves the economic basis. Ideology and politics are the commanders, the soul. A slight relaxation in our ideological and political work will lead our economic and technological work astray.

Political workers must have some knowledge of business. It may be difficult for them to have a lot, but it may not do for them to have only a little. They must have some. To have no practical knowledge is to be pseudo-red, empty-headedly political. Politics and technology must be combined together. In agriculture, this means carrying out experiments; in industries, understanding advanced models, trying out new techniques, and producing new goods.

Sixty Points On Working Methods – A Draft Resolution From The Office Of The Centre Of The CPC

February 2, 1958

The people of our country, under the leadership of the CP, having won basic victories in the socialist ownership system in 1956, achieved further basic victories on the ideological and political front in the rectification campaign of 1957. In that year, [they] also over-fulfilled the first Five-year Construction Plan. In this way, more than 600 million people of our country, led by the CP, clearly see their own future and duties and have exorcized the evil anti-party, anti-people, and anti-socialist wind fanned up by bourgeois rightists. At the same time they have rectified, and are still rectifying, the mistakes and weaknesses rooted in the subjectivism which the party and people have inherited from the old society. The party has become more united, the morale of the people further heightened, and the party-masses relationship greatly improved. We are now witnessing greater activity and creativity of the popular masses on the production front than we have ever witnessed before. A new high tide of production has risen, and is still rising, as the people of the whole country are inspired by the slogan — ‘Overtake Britain in Iron and Steel and Other Major Industrial Production in Fifteen or More Years’. To meet this new situation certain methods of work of the party Center and local committees have to be modified.

Not all the points listed below are new. Some are; others come from years [of experience]. They are the conclusions reached at the Hangchow and Nanning conferences of the comrades in the Centre and regions in January 1958. These points, largely indebted to the inspiration of what was said at the conferences, are thought over and written down by me. Some are simply notes of what other comrades have said; the important points (on rules and regulations) are drafted by Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i after consultations with comrades working in the regions; only a few are put forward by me. Not all the points concern working methods — some are on actual w! ork tasks and some on theory and practice, but mostly on working methods. Our main purpose is to improve our working methods so as to meet the changed political conditions and needs. The points are suggestions for [your] comments. Their number can be increased or reduced, as it is by no means definite. Comrades, you are hereby invited to study them and make known your views on them. These points will be revised in the light of your comments before being submitted to the Politburo for approval, in the hope that they may become a document for internal circulation.

Mao Tse-tung
31 January, 1958

1. Party committees above the county level must get down to the work of construction and there are fourteen items: *a*. industries; *b*. handicrafts; *c*. agriculture; *d*. village subsidiary production; *e*. forestry; *f*. fishery; *g*. animal husbandry; *h*. transport and communications; *i*. commerce; *j*. public and other finance; *k*. labor, wages, and populations; *l*. sciences; *m*. culture and education; *n*. public health.

2. Party committees above the county level must get down to socialist industrial work and here there are also fourteen items: *a*. targets of output; *b*. quality of products; *c*. experiment in new products; *d*.new techniques; *e*. advanced targets; *f*. raw material economy and discovery and use of substitutes; *g*. labor organization, labor insurance, wages, and welfare; *h*. costs; *i*. sinking fund and variable capital for production; *j*. division of labor and co-ordination between enterprises; *k*.equilibrium of supply, manufacture, and sales; *l*. geological exploration; *m*. uses of resources; *n*. design and manufacture. These are preliminary items. Later [we] must step by step develop a forty-point program for industrial development.

3. Party committee at all levels must get down to socialist agricultural work. Again fourteen items: *a*. targets of output; *b*. irrigation; *c*. fertilizers; *d* soil; *e*. seeds; *f*. changes in the system of farming, such as enlarging the areas of a second crop, changes from late to early crops, from dry [rice] to paddy, etc.; *g*. diseases and pests; *h*. mechanization (modern tools, two-wheel and two-blade ploughs, pumps, tractors designed to suit different local conditions in China, motorized transport vehicles, etc.); *i* intensified farming; *j*. animal husbandry; *k*. subsidiary products; *l*. afforestation; *m*. elimination of the 'four pests', *n*. medical and health services. These are fourteen items in the forty-point program of agrarian development, which should be put into practice as a whole.

The purpose of singling out these fourteen items is to show where the emphasis of the program lies. Once they are grasped, the program as a whole will consequently be materialized.

4. The three important methods are: over-all planning, regular inspection, and annual reviews and comparisons. By them, both the over-all situation and the details will receive appropriate attention, experiences can be summed up and outstanding achievements can be made known in time; morale can be heightened in order to make a concerted progress.

5. The method of timing is: the previous winter determines what can be done in this year, this year determines what can be done in the next two years, and the first three years determine what can be done in a quinquennium. [We] should have greater confidence [in our work] with emphasis on different periods of time.

6. There must be at least four inspections per annum — once each season at the Center and the provincial level whereas [the number of inspections] at lower level is to be decided according to [local] conditions. Monthly inspection is necessary before an important task gets into a smooth running order. This is a method of timing over the period of a year.

7. How to review and compare? Province with province, city with city, county with county, commune with commune, factory with factory, mine with mine, and work site with work site. Agreed rules of comparison are not absolutely necessary. It is easier to review and compare agricultural [than industrial achievements]. In industries, [we] just compare what is comparable in a given line of production.

8. When to submit plans? Province, autonomous regions, cities, special regions, and counties should formulate their plans according to Points 1, 2, and 3, which must have foci of attention. They must not try to do everything at the same time. The plans of districts, villages, and communes must essentially be based on Point 3, but the items may be increased or reduced in the light of local conditions. They should draw up a five-year plan first, which may be in an outline form, to be submitted before 1 July 1958. The plans should be examined level after level. To facilitate comparison, a provincial committee should select the best and worst from county, district, village, and commune plans and submit them to the Center for consideration, but all provincial and special region plans should be sent up to the Center.

9. There are three production plans: two are central plans — one must be fulfilled; this is the one to be published and the other is expected to be fulfilled but not to be published. Two are local plans — the first local plan is the second central plan which from the point of view of a locality must be fulfilled, and the other is expected to be fulfilled. The second central plan is the basis of comparison.

10. From this year onward, the party committees of provinces, cities, and autonomous regions must really get down to manufacturing industries, public and business finance, and commerce. Each year, they should review these problems four times, especially in

July (or August), November, and the first ten days in January. If we refuse to come to grips with them the slogan of ‘Overtaking Britain in Fifteen Years’ will be like a burst bubble. Cadres shouldering important responsibilities in industrial, financial, and commercial departments should go to local meeting places — those at the Central level should go to the regions; those at the provincial, city, and autonomous region levels should go to special regions, suburbs, and counties. This is also what the comrades at the Center and in the regions want to do.

11. The [total] value of industrial output at a place (including those of the factories and mines taken over from the center and of the publicly Owned industries and handicrafts which have always been managed by local authorities, but excluding those of the factories directly managed by the center) must within five, seven, or ten years overtake the (total) value of agricultural output of that place. All the provinces and cities must at once get down to drawing up their plans before 1 July. This is in the main to make industries serve agriculture. All of us should do some industrial work so that we know what it is all about.

12. The forty-point program for agrarian development should be fulfilled in five, six, seven, or eight years and it should be discussed by all the provincial, city, and autonomous region party committees. In the country as a whole, it may not be possible to fulfil all the forty points in five years, but it may be generally possible in six or seven years or more likely in eight years.

13. [We] must strive to make a basic change in the appearance of most areas in three years and the [next] three years will determine [the achievement] of the [next] decade. In the rest of the country [we] may fix a longer period [for the task]. Our slogan: Bitter struggle for three years. Our method: Arouse the masses in an entirely uninhibited manner — and everything must be tried out first.

14. Oppose wastefulness. During the rectification, each unit must devote a few days to a bloom-contend-rectify-reform campaign directed against wastefulness. Every co-operative, every shop, every office, every school, and every military unit must seriously conduct its own anti-wastefulness campaign and will continue to do so once every year.

15. In our national economy, the question of an optimum ratio between [capital] accumulation and consumption is one of cardinal importance to our economic development, which should be studied by all of us.

16. What should also be studied is the question of the ratio between accumulation and consumption in the agricultural co-operatives. The views of comrades in Hupei are as follows. On the basis of the production and distribution of 1957, future increases in production should be divided 40/60 (i.e. 40 per cent to members of co-operatives and 60 per cent for co-operative accumulation), 50/50, or 60/40 (i.e. 60 per cent to members of co-operatives and 40 per cent for co-operative accumulation). At places where production and income have reached the level of wealthy middle peasants, after bloom-contend debates and after agreement has been reached among the masses, the increase in

production may be either divided 30/70 (i.e. 30 per cent to the members of co-operatives and 70 per cent for co-operative accumulation) or not divided at all in one or two years in order to enlarge the accumulation in preparation for a great leap forward. All the regions are requested to discuss the adequacy of this suggestion.

17. The contradiction between collective and individual economies must be resolved by fixing an adequate ratio between them. The present situation is like this. In the income of some rural households at some places, the ratio between individual and collective economies is 60/40 or 70/30 (i.e. income from domestic subsidiary production and the private plot makes up 60 or 70 per cent of the total income of a household). This situation inevitably affects the peasants' enthusiasm for socialist collective economy and must be altered. The provinces can find a way to control it through bloom-contend debates, and make suitable readjustment of the economic relations. On the basis of encouraging the peasants' enthusiasm in production and a comprehensive development in production, [we] must in a few years gradually change the ratio of individual and collective economies to 30/70 or 20/80 (i.e. the peasants get 70 or 80 per cent of their income from co-operatives).

18. Popularize experimental fields. This is a very important method of leadership. In this way the style of our party's leadership in the field of economy will rapidly change. In the country, the experimental fields are important; in the cities it is the advanced factories, mines, machine-tool shops, work sites, or work sections. A break-through at one point may induce the rest [of the entire system] to move.

19. Seize both ends and drag the middle along with them. This is an excellent method of leadership. Every situation has two ends — the advanced and backward extremes. Once you seize them, the middle can be dragged along with them. This is a dialectical method, too, [because] to seize the two ends, the advanced and backward extremes, is to seize a pair of opposites.

20. Two other good methods of leadership are to organize tours for cadres and the masses to see and learn from advanced experience and to organize exhibitions of good quality products and their techniques of production. These methods can raise the technological level, popularize advanced experience and encourage competition. Many problems can be solved by an on-the-spot inspection. Communes, villages, provinces and counties may organize tours to visit each other, while the Center, provinces, cities, special regions and counties may organize exhibitions of manufactures.

21. Uninterrupted revolution. Our revolutions come one after another. Starting from the seizure of power in the whole country in 1949, there followed in quick succession the anti-feudal land reform, the agricultural co-operativization, and the socialist reconstruction of private industries, commerce and handicrafts. The three great socialist reforms — i.e. the socialist revolution in the ownership of means of production — were basically completed in 1956 and there came the socialist revolution on the ideological and political front last year. This revolution may draw to the end of one stage by 1 July this year, but the problems [involved] are not yet solved. For a considerable

period of time to come they will continue to be solved by annual bloom-contend-rectify-reform campaigns. [But] now we must start a technological revolution so that we may overtake Britain in fifteen or more years. Chinese economy is backward and China is materially weak. This is why we have been unable to take much initiative; we are spiritually restricted. We are not yet liberated in this sense. We must make a spurt [forward in production]. We may have more initiative in five years, and more still in ten. After fifteen years, when our foodstuffs and iron and steel become plentiful, we shall take a much greater initiative. Our revolutions are like battles. After a victory, we must at once put forward a new task. In this way, cadres and the masses will forever be filled with revolutionary fervour, instead of conceit. Indeed, they will have no time for conceit, even if they like to feel conceited. With new tasks on their shoulders, they are totally preoccupied with the problems for their fulfilment. The technological revolution is designed to make every one learn technology and science. The rightists say that we are small intellectuals incapable of leading big intellectuals. Some even suggest that we 'buy' old cadres — pensioning them off, because they do not understan! d science and technology although they know how to fight and how to conduct land reform. We must summon up our energy to learn technology so as to accomplish the great technological revolution history has left to us [to accomplish]. This question must be discussed at a conference of cadres, to find out what other talents we have. In the past we had talents in fighting and land reform. These talents are not enough now and we must learn new things such as a real understanding of business matters, science and technology. If we do not, we shall not be able to lead. In 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship', which I wrote in 1949, I have said: 'The serious task of economic reconstruction lies before us. We shall soon put aside some of the things we know well. This means difficulties. . . . We must overcome difficulties. We must learn what we do not know.' Eight years have passed [since this was written]. In the eight years, one revolution followed another. They preoccupied our thoughts, thus leaving little time for us to learn science and technology. From this year onward, simultaneously with the accomplishment of the continued socialist revolution on the ideological and political front, [we] must shift the foci of attention of the whole party. Members of party committees at all levels may prepare the ground for this by explaining it to the cadres, but for the time being there is not yet the need to publicize it in the newspapers. We shall say a great deal about it after 1 July when the basic level rectification will have been more or less completed and when the party's focus of attention can be transferred to a technological revolution. With the focus on technology, [we are] apt to neglect politics. Therefore [we] must carefully combine technology with politics.

22. Red and expert, politics and business—the relationship between them is the unification of contradictions. We must criticize the apolitical attitude. [We] must oppose empty-headed 'politicoes' on the one hand and disoriented 'practicoes' on the other.

It is beyond any doubt that politics and economy, politics and technology must be unified. This must be so and will for ever be so. This is the meaning of 'red and expert'. The term, 'politics', will continue to exist, but in a different sense. To ignore ideology and politics, to be always preoccupied with business matters—the result will be a disoriented economist or technologist and that is dreadful. Ideological and political work is the guarantee for the completion of economic, technological work and it serves the economic base. Ideology and politics are, moreover, the commanders, the ‘sour’. A slight relaxation in our ideological and political work will lead our economic and technological work astray.

At present there is on the one hand the grave class struggle between the socialist and imperialist worlds; on the other there still exist classes and class struggle within our country. [We] must give these two aspects [of class struggles] our full consideration. In the past politics meant basically struggles against [our] class enemies. But once the people have seized political power, the relationship between the people and the government is essentially an internal relationship among the people. The method [of political struggle] to be employed is [therefore] persuasion not suppression. This is a new political relationship. This government uses various degrees of suppression only temporarily on the criminals who break the law and order of society, and used them to supplement persuasion. In the transition from capitalism to socialism, there are still anti-socialist elements hiding among the people, e.g. the bourgeois rightists. With regard to the problems of these people, our solutions are essentially the bloom-contend type of mass debate. Suppression applies only to serious counter-revolutionary saboteurs. When the transition is over and classes are eliminated, the politics of a country become purely a matter of internal relationship among the people. Even then, ideological and political struggles between men and revolutions will continue to occur; they will never cease. The laws of unification of contradictions, of quantitative to qualitative changes and of affirmation and negation will hold good universally and eternally. However, the nature of struggles and revolutions will be different. They will not be class struggles, but struggles between advanced and backward techniques. The struggle during the transition from socialism to communism will also be a revolution. In the communist era there will be many, many phases of development. The development from one phase to another must necessarily be a relationship between quantitative and qualitative changes. All mutations, all leaps forward are revolutio! ns which must pass through struggles. The theory of cessation of struggles is sheer metaphysics.

Political workers must have some knowledge of business matters. It may be difficult to know a lot [about them]; but it will not do to know only a little. They must know something. [Those who] have no practical knowledge are pseudo-red, empty-headed politicoes. . [We] must unite politics and technology. In agriculture [this means] experimental fields and in industries it means picking out the advanced types and trying out new techniques and new products. The method to be used is comparison. Compare the advanced with the backward under identical conditions and encourage the backward to catch up with the advanced. They are the two extremes of a contradiction and comparison is the unification of them. Disequilibria exist between enterprises, machine shops, teams and individuals. Disequilibrium is a general, objective rule. The cycle, which is endless, evolves from disequilibrium to equilibrium and then to disequilibrium again. Each cycle, however, brings us to a higher level of development. Disequilibrium is normal and absolute whereas equilibrium is temporary and relative. The changes into equilibrium or disequilibrium in our national economy consist of the process of an over-all quantitative change and many qualitative changes . After a certain number of years, China will complete a leap by transforming herself from an agrarian to an industrial country. Then she will pick up the process of her quantitative changes again.

Comparison applies not only to production and technology, but also to politics, i.e. to the art of leadership in an endeavor to find out who are better leaders.

23. The superstructure must meet the needs of the development of the economic base and productive force. A part of the superstructure is the rules and regulations formulated by government departments. Many of them, drawn up during the past eight years, are still applicable, but a considerable number of them have become obstacles to heightening the activism of the masses and the development of the productive force. The latter kind should be revised or abolished. Recently, the masses had acquired many advanced experiences, e.g. the improved workers' welfare scheme at the Shihchingshan Power Station, the improved workers' dormitory system at the Hsiangchiang Machine Manufacturing Factory, the improved bonus system at the Ch'iyeh Power Station in Kiangsu, and the amalgamation of several first-grade commercial enterprises in Kwangsi thereby reducing their employees from 2,400 to 350 (i.e. a cut of six-sevenths). In revising or abolishing irrational rules and regulations, [we] must establish a general principle — under the premise of developing socialist enterprises according to the principles of 'more, faster, better and more economical', of planning and of [keeping things] to the right proportions, on the basis of raising [the standard] of understanding of the masses, [we] permit and encourage the masses to break those rules and regulations which restrict the development of the productive force.

All the departments of the Center and the party committees of all the provinces, cities and autonomous regions should send responsible comrades to the basic level units of all localities to sum up advanced experiences of the masses. They should develop innovations of this kind [attained] at the basic level and by the masses which are beneficial to socialist construction, recommend them to the authorities concerned for approval, stop the operation of some articles in the existing rules and regulations in these basic level units and spread their advanced experiences to other units.

All departments of the Center and the party committees of all the provinces, cities and autonomous regions should in this respect systematically sum up exemplifying and mature advanced experiences. The more important and nationally significant kinds should have the approval of the Center and the State Council; the locally significant kinds need only have the approval of the local party committees or local governments; the technically significant kinds have to have the approval of the departments concerned. Then they are popularized among similar units throughout the country or province. After a period of time, if it is necessary, old rules and regulations will be revised or new ones introduced in the light of new experiences. This is the mass-line method of formulating and revising rules and regulations.

24. The rectification must be carried through to the end. The party as a whole should summon up its energy to get rid of bureaucratism, to come to grips with reality, and to

unite with the people. It must do its best to rectify the mistakes and weaknesses in its work, style and institutions.

25. Members of the party committees of the Center, provinces, cities and autonomous regions, apart from the old and sick, should leave their offices for four months every year, to investigate and study at a lower level and to attend meetings at various places. They ought to adopt the methods of ‘flower viewing on horse back’ and ‘flower viewing at a lower level’. It is of some use even if [one] pays a flying visit to a place for only three or four hours [one] must contact workers and peasants and enhance one’s real understanding. Some of the conferences of the Centre may be held away from Peking; some of those of a provincial [party] committee may be held away from the capital of the province.

26. [We] must adopt an attitude of genuine equality towards cadres and the masses and make people feel that relationships among men are truly equal. [We] must make others feel that there is full and openhearted communication. [We] must learn from Lu Hsun, who communicated with his readers and evoked responses from them. People do different work and hold different jobs. No matter how high one’s position is, one must appear among people as an ordinary worker. One must not assume airs; one must get rid of bureaucratism. One must patiently listen to the end [of what others say] and consider the divergent views expressed by the lower grades. One must not lose one’s temper as soon as one hears an opinion different [from one’s own] and take it as a personal insult. This is one way of treating people as one’s equal.

27. Members of party committees at all levels, especially those responsible ones who resolutely follow the correct line of the Centre, must be prepared for criticism. If the criticism is correct, we must accept it and reform ourselves; if it is not, especially if it is foul, we must toughen the skin of our head[1] and take [whatever is showered upon us]. Then we investigate [the charges] before acting on the criticism. Under such circumstances, [we] must not bend ourselves to whichever way the wind is blowing; [we] must fearlessly stand up against the wind. We have already passed the test in 1957.

28. The party’s leadership principles must be discussed at the cadre meetings of the provincial, district and county and perhaps also the village levels, in an attempt to make sure whether the principles are correct.

‘Concentrate important powers in one hand;
Diffuse less important ones.
Decisions are to be taken by party committees
And to be carried out by all concerned.
Implementation implies decision-making,
But this must not deviate from the principles.
As to inspecting work
Party committees have that responsibility.’

In these few lines, the responsibility of party committees is shown to consist of decision-making on matters of importance and inspecting the implementation of the decisions. ‘Concentrate important powers in one hand’ is an old saying which normally means personal dictatorship. We use it to mean that essential powers should be concentrated collectively in the hands of the party committees of the Center and regions, so as to combat the diffusion of powers. How can important powers be diffused? These eight lines were coined in 1953 with the diffusion of powers at that time in mind. ‘And to be carried out by all concerned’ does not mean implementation of decisions by members of the party alone. It means that members of the party should get in touch and discuss and consult with others in government organizations, in co-operatives, in independent bodies and in cultural and educational institutions, modify what is inadequate and obtain a general agreement before carrying out the decisions. The word ‘principles’ in the third couplet refers to the party representing the highest form of proletarian organization, democratic centralism, the unification of collective leadership and the role of the individual (i.e. the unification [of the contradiction] between a party committee and its first secretary) and decision-taking at the Center or a high level.

29. Is it necessary to consult the first secretary on everything? No, only on important matters. There must be the second and third in command who can take over when the first secretary is absent.

30. Party committees must handle military affairs, placing armed units under their supervision. Basically this remains the situation today and this has been a good tradition of our armed forces. Comrades engaged in military work want central and local party committees to handle these matters. In recent years, [however], we handled less because of our preoccupation with social reform-and economic construction. This tendency must be averted by dealing with military matters periodically every year.

31. Meetings of large, medium and small sizes are necessary and should be arranged well by the departments or at various places. Small size meetings of a few or one or two dozen are better for discovering and discussing problems. Large ones of over a thousand can adopt only the method of discussion following reports and they should not be too frequent, perhaps twice a year. But there must be at least four small and medium size meetings which are better held at a low level. [For instance] a provincial [party] committee may call a meeting of the county party secretaries of a district or of several districts; members of the Center or of the State Council may go to districts separately to call meetings there. An economic co-operative district may call a meeting whenever there are problems to discuss, at least four times a year.

32. The method of meeting must be the unification of [factual] materials and views. It is a very bad method if it fails to link up material with views, to review material without any view, or to expound views without material [to substantiate them]. The worst is to present a great pile of material without either a favourable or an unfavourable view. [We] must learn to use material to explain our views. [We] must have material but [we must] also have a clear and definite view [on how] to control it. There must not be too much material, just enough to make clear our views. [We] need anatomize only one or two

sparrows, not too many [so to speak]. Although [we] must have a great deal of material at our disposal, [we] present only the representative pieces. [We] must understand that to hold a meeting is not to write a *magnum opus*.

33. Generally speaking, [we] must not impose a huge pile of material and views in a matter of a few hours on those who are not familiar with them. There must be several meetings a year to make people familiar with them. There must be several meetings a year to familiarize people with business matters. [We] must give them the kind of primary and processed source materials they need. [We] must not present to them only the finished products, the conclusions, suddenly in a morning [so to speak]. [They] need a trickle not a deluge of several hundred centimeters. The system of 'compulsory instruction' must be abolished. 'Rubber stamping' must be reduced to the minimum. Perfect communication comes from sharing the necessary information in the first place.

34. The question of ten fingers. A man has ten fingers and a cadre must learn to see the differences between nine fingers and one, or the difference between a majority and minority of fingers. Nine fingers are not the same as one finger. This seems an elementary matter, but not many people understand it. Therefore we must publicize this point of view — the differences between the larger and smaller situations, general and specific [situations] and main and subsidiary trends [of development]. We must seize upon the main trend unless we want to tumble down. This is a question of understanding, of logic. It is more vivid and more suitable to our work to put it in the form of nine fingers and one finger. Unless there is a mistake in its basic line, our work depends mainly on its achievements. This view, however, does not apply to some people, e.g. the rightists. All the fingers of many extreme rightists are diseased. That is why they may remain at school.

35. 'Attack one or a few points, exaggerate them and ignore the rest.' This is an unpractical, metaphysical method. In 1957 the bourgeois rightists virulently attacked socialism in precisely this way. Our party had been harmed grievously by this method in its [past] history, i.e. when it was dominated by dogmatism. The [Li] Li-san line, revisionism, or rightist opportunism, the Ch'en Tu-hsiu line and Wang Ming line during the anti-Japanese war period, [all] employed this method. In 1935 Chang Kuo-t'ao used it and in 1953 the Kao Kang-Jao Shu-shih anti-party alliance used it too. We must sum up our experience in the past and criticize this method from the point of the theory of knowledge and methodology in an attempt to awaken our cadres so that they may not be harmed by it any more. Even good people when they are wrong may unconsciously adopt this method; therefore it is necessary for them to study methodology.

36. The process of conceptualization, judgment and reasoning, are the processes of investigation and study and thinking. The human brain can reflect the objective world, although it is not easy to do so correctly. Correct reflection or the reflection which is closest to reality can be arrived at only after thinking and rethinking. Having arrived at the correct point of view and correct thought, [we] must design an adequate way of expressing them [to make them intelligible] to others. The processes of conceptualization, judgment, reasoning are the processes 'from the people'; those of communicating one's

own points of view and thoughts to others are the processes ‘to the people’. This simple truth is perhaps not yet grasped by many of our cadres. However great a man may be, his thoughts, views, plans and methods are a mere reflection of the objective world and the raw materials and half-digested facts [for this conceptualization] come from the practice of the masses or his own scientific experiments. His mind is only a processing plant in which finished products are manufactured. Otherwise it is utterly useless. The usefulness and correctness of such finished products are tested by the popular masses. Unless our comrades understand this, they will bang their heads on a nail.

37. Essays and documents must be written precisely, clearly and in a lively [manner]. Precision is a matter of logic, of concepts, judgments and reasoning. Clarity and liveliness are matters of both logic and rhetoric. Most essays nowadays suffer from, *a*. vague conceptualization, *b*. inadequate judgment, *c*. a lack of logic in the process of using concepts and judgment in reasoning, *d*. a lack of literary merit. [As a result] reading an essay becomes an ordeal, a gigantic waste of energy for very little reward. This bad tendency must be averted. Comrades engaged in economics work must pay attention not only to precision but also to clarity and liveliness when they are drafting [something]. [They] must not think [clarity and liveliness] are [only] for language and literature teachers, not for gentlemen like themselves. Important documents must be written, not by the second or third, but by [the first in command] himself or jointly [with the others].

38. [We] must not depend on secretaries or ‘back-benchers’ [underlings?] entirely. [We] must do things ourselves, accepting only other people’s help. The secretary system should not be allowed to become an epidemic. Wherever a secretary is unnecessary, there should not be one. To depend entirely on secretaries for everything is a symptom of the decline of revolutionary spirit.

39. Learn some natural and applied sciences.

40. Learn some philosophy and political economy.

41. Learn some history and jurisprudence.

42. Learn some literature.

43. Learn some grammar and logic.

44. [I] propose that responsible comrades in the Centre, provinces, and cities voluntarily learn a foreign language, aiming at the middle school standard in five or ten years.

45. Those who are shouldering heavy responsibility at the Centre and the provincial level may each have an apprentice secretary.

46. A cadre from another place should learn the dialect of the place [where he works]; all cadres should learn the *p’u-t’ung-hua* [the standard Han-Chinese]. [We] must draw up a five-year plan, aiming at a certain [linguistic] standard. Han cadres who work in minority

area must learn the language of that minority. Likewise cadres of a minority must learn Han-Chinese.

47. All the departments of the Centre, provinces, special regions, and counties should foster '*hsiu-ts'ai*' [young people of intellectual potential]. It will not do to be without an intelligentsia. [But] the proletariat must have its own intelligentsia which knows more about Marxism and has achieved a certain cultural standard, scientific knowledge, and literary facility.

48. All secondary technical schools and schools for technicians should, if possible, experiment in setting up workshops and farms to attain complete or partial self-sufficiency by engaging in production. Students should do part-time study and part-time work. Under favorable conditions, these schools can take on more students but should not at the same time cost the country more money

All the industrial colleges should try to set up laboratories and workshops for teaching and research and also for production. In addition, their students and teachers may sign contracts with local factories to take part in their work.

49. All agricultural schools, apart from productive work on their own farms, may sign work contracts with local agricultural co-operatives. Their teachers should be sent to the co-operatives enabling them to unite their theory with practice. Local co-operatives should recommend qualified students to study at these schools.

The middle and primary schools of a village should sign contracts with local co-operatives to take part in agricultural and subsidiary production. Rural students should make use of their summer vacation, other holidays, and leisure time to work in their own village.

50. Under favourable conditions, universities and urban middle schools may jointly set up factories or workshops and they may sign work contracts with factories, work sites, or service industries.

All universities and middle and primary schools which have land should run their own farms. Those which do not have land of their own may participate in the production work of the agricultural co-operatives on the outskirts of a city.

51. Develop a patriotic public health campaign centering on the elimination of the 'four pests', and have monthly inspections this year, so that the groundwork of [this campaign] may be laid. Other pests may be added to the list according to local conditions.

52. The Center, provinces, and special regions may set up chemical fertilizer plants. The chemical industrial departments of the Center ought to help the regions in designing medium or small-scale plants of this kind and the engineering departments of the Center ought to help equip them.

53. The provinces, autonomous regions, and cities should set up farming-tool research institutes specially responsible for the improvement of tools and medium to small sized machines. They should have a close association with farming-tool factories so that once an improved tool is designed it can be given to a factory to produce.

54. In the Lien-meng commune of Hsiaokan, Hupei, some land produces 2,130 catties per mou in one crop a year; in the Ch'ien-chin commune of Jenshou, Szechwan, the land produces 1,680 catties per mou in one crop a year; in the Ch'ing-ho commune of Ichun, Shensi, some of its hilly land produces 1,650 catties per mou; in the Na-p'o commune of Paise, Kwangsi, some land produces 1,600 catties per mou in one crop a year. The experience gained by these examples of high yields in one crop should be studied and emulated by other places.

55. The problem of adequate proportions of different kinds of seeds [i.e. the sowing of several types of seed of the same crop in a given area] should be studied at various places.

56. Root-crops are extremely useful things — for human and pig consumption, for distilleries, for making sugar, and for making noodles, which may be manufactured at various places. The planting of root-crops should be popularized in conjunction with adequate planning.

57. Afforestation. Trees that can be planted at any time of the year should be planted every season; those that can be planted only in two or three seasons of the year should be planted in those seasons.

58. In the special region, Shanglo, in Shensi, every household grows a pint of walnuts. This experience is well worth studying. It may be extended to other cash crops such as fruit, mulberry, oak, tea, cashew and oil, if the masses agree to it after a bloom-contend type of discussion.

59. Forests should be measured in terms of covered areas. The covered areas and their ratios [to the un-covered areas] in all the provinces, special regions, and counties should be measured and then the target for covered areas [at each place] can be determined.

60. Before September this year the question of my retirement from the Chairmanship of the Republic should be raised at the bloom-contend type of meetings, first among cadres of all grades and then in factories, in an attempt to sound out the views of both the cadres and the masses and to arrive at a majority agreement to it. My retirement from the Chairmanship of the Republic and concentration on [the duties] of the Chairman of the party Center will enable me to save a great deal of time in order to meet the demands of the party. This is also the way most suitable to my condition. If during discussions the masses are opposed to this proposal, it must be explained to them. Whenever the nation is urgently in need [of my services] and if the party decides [to recall me], I will shoulder this leadership task once again. Now the country is at peace, it is better for me to be relieved of the Chairmanship. This request has been agreed to and regarded as a good

move by the Politburo of the Center and by many comrades in the Center and other places. Please explain all this clearly to cadres and the masses so as to avoid misconstruction.

The method of communication [of the results] of these conferences: The views should be explained clearly and gradually to cadres. Do not adopt the method of a ‘sudden deluge’.

The views recorded here are all suggestions. Our comrades should take them back [to their respective regions] to sound out the cadres. They can be refuted or developed. They are to be drawn up as a formal documents after a few months.

Notes

[1.] To receive a setback in one’s career is, in a Chinese metaphor, ‘to knock one’s head against a nail’. Therefore one needs to toughen the skin of one’s head so as to be able to sustain setbacks.

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung

Talks At The Chengtu Conference

March 1958

(a) Talk of 10 March

Codes and conventions constitute a problem, and I would like to use this problem as an example to discuss the question of ideological method — upholding principles while displaying the creative spirit.

Internationally we should be on friendly terms with the Soviet Union, all the people’s democracies and the communist parties and working classes of all nations; we should pay proper attention to internationalism, and learn from the good points of the Soviet Union and other foreign countries. This is a principle. But there are two methods of learning: one is merely to imitate, and the other is to apply the creative spirit. Learning should be combined with creativity. To import Soviet codes and conventions inflexibly is to lack the creative spirit.

From its foundation up to the Northern Expedition (from 1921 to 1927) our Party was comparatively lively, even allowing for Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s[1] bourgeois ideology dressed up as Marxism. We founded our Party in the third year following the victory of the October Revolution. Those who founded the Party were all young people who had participated in the May Fourth Movement and been influenced by it. After the October Revolution, while Lenin was still alive, while the class struggle was very acute and Stalin had still not come to power, they too were full of life. The origin of Ch'en Tu-hsiu-ism lay in foreign social democracy and our native bourgeoisie. During this period, though there occurred the mistakes of Ch'en Tu-hsiu-ism, generally speaking there was no dogmatism.

From the beginning of the Civil War period up to the Tsunyi Conference (from 1927 to 1935) three separate 'leftist' lines arose in the Chinese Party, and the one from 1934 to 1935 was the worst.[2] At that time the Soviet Union had won victory over the Trotskyites, though on the theoretical plane they had only defeated the Deborin school.[3] The Chinese 'left' opportunists had nearly all been influenced while in the Soviet Union. Of course, this is not to say that all those who went to Moscow were dogmatists. Among the many who were in the Soviet Union at the time, some were dogmatists, others were not; some were in touch with reality, others had no contact with reality but saw only foreign conditions. What is more, Stalin's role was beginning to be consolidated (it became firmly consolidated after the purge of counter-revolutionaries). The Comintern at that time was [run by] Bukharin, Pikov[4] and Zinoviev, while the head of the Eastern Bureau was Kuusinen and the head of the Far East Department was Mif. XXX[5] was a good comrade, humane, creative, but a bit too nice a chap. Mif's influence was the greater. These were the conditions which enabled dogmatism to develop, and some Chinese comrades were influenced by it too. Among young intellectuals there was also 'Leftist deviation'. At that time Wang Ming[6] and others set themselves up as the so-called '28½ Bolsheviks'. When several hundred were studying in the Soviet Union, how was it that there were only 28½? It was because they were so terribly 'left' that they became self-restricting and isolated, thus reducing the Party's contacts.

Chinese dogmatism had its own Chinese characteristics. These were expressed in warfare and in the question of the rich peasants. Because the number of rich peasants was very small we decided in principle to leave them alone, and to make concessions to them. But the 'Leftists' did not agree. They advocated 'giving the rich peasants bad land, and giving the landlords no land'. As a result the landlords had nothing to eat, and some of them fled to the mountains and formed bandit guerrilla bands. On the question of the bourgeoisie they advocated overthrowing them completely, destroying them not only politically but also economically, thereby confusing the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution. They made no analysis of imperialism, considering it all to be one uniform indivisible block supporting the Kuomintang.

In the period following the liberation of the whole country (from 1950 to 1957), dogmatism made its appearance both in economic and in cultural and educational work. A certain amount of dogmatism was imported in military work, but basic principles were upheld, and you still could not say that our military work was dogmatic. In economic work dogmatism primarily manifested itself in heavy industry, planning, banking and statistics, especially in heavy industry and planning. Since we didn't understand these things and had absolutely no experience, all we could do in our ignorance was to import foreign methods. Our statistical work was practically a copy of Soviet work; in the educational field copying was also pretty bad, for example, the system of a maximum mark of five in the schools, the uniform five years of primary school,[7] etc. We did not even study our own experience of education in the Liberated Areas. The same applied to our public health work, with the result that I couldn't have eggs or chicken soup for three years because an article appeared in the Soviet Union which said that one shouldn't eat them. Later they said one could eat them. It didn't matter whether the article was correct or not, the Chinese listened all the same and respectfully obeyed. In short, the Soviet Union was tops. In commerce it was less so, because there was more contact and exchange of documents with the Centre. There was also less dogmatism in light industry. The socialist revolution and the cooperativization of agriculture was not influenced by dogmatism because the Centre had a direct grasp of them. During the past few years the Centre has chiefly grasped the revolution and agriculture, and to a certain extent commerce.

Dogmatism appears under different sets of circumstances, which should be analysed and compared, and reasons for its appearance discovered.

1. We couldn't manage the planning, construction and assembly of heavy industrial plants. We had no experience, China had no experts, the minister was himself an outsider, so we had to copy from foreign countries, and having copied we were unable to distinguish good from bad. Also we had to make use of Soviet experience and Soviet experts to break down the bourgeois ideology of China's old experts. The greater part of Soviet planning was correctly applied to China, but part of it was incorrect. It was imported uncritically.

2. We lacked understanding of the whole economic situation, and understood still less the economic differences between the Soviet Union and China. So all we could do was to follow blindly. Now the situation has changed. Generally speaking, we are now capable of undertaking the planning and construction of large enterprises. In another five years we shall be capable of manufacturing the equipment ourselves. We also have some understanding of Soviet and Chinese conditions.

3. Having cleared away blind faith, we no longer have any spiritual burdens. Buddhas are made several times life-size in order to frighten people. When heroes and warriors appear on the stage they are made to look quite unlike ordinary people. Stalin was that kind of a person. The Chinese people had got so used to being slaves that they seemed to want to go on. When Chinese artists painted pictures of me together with Stalin, they always made me a little bit shorter, thus blindly knuckling under to the moral pressure exerted by the Soviet Union at that time. Marxism-Leninism looks at everyone on equal terms, and all people should be treated as equals. Khrushchev's complete demolition of Stalin at one blow was also a kind of pressure, and the majority of people within the Chinese Party did not agree with it. Others wished to submit to this pressure and do away with the cult of the individual. There are two kinds of cult of the individual. One is correct, such as that of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and the correct side of Stalin. These we ought to revere and

continue to revere for ever. It would not do not to revere them. As they held truth in their hands, why should we not revere them? We believe in truth; truth is the reflection of objective existence. A squad should revere its squad leader, it would be quite wrong not to. Then there is the incorrect kind of cult of the individual in which there is no analysis, simply blind obedience. This is not right. Opposition to the cult of the individual may also have one of two aims: one is opposition to an incorrect cult, and the other is opposition to reverence for others and a desire for reverence for oneself. The question at issue is not whether or not there should be a cult of the individual, but rather whether or not the individual concerned represents the truth. If he does, then he should be revered. If truth is not present, even collective leadership will be no good. Throughout its history, our Party has stressed the combination of the role of the indivi! dual with collective leadership. When Stalin was demolished some people applauded for their own personal reasons, that is to say because they wanted others to revere them. Some people opposed Lenin, saying that he was a dictator. Lenin's reply was straightforward: better that I should be a dictator than you! Stalin was very fond of Kao Kang[8] and made him a special present of a motor car. Kao Kang sent Stalin a congratulatory telegram every 15 August. Every province now has examples of this. Is Chiang Hua a dictator, or is Sha Wen-han?[9] This sort of problem has arisen in Kwangtung, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Chinghai, Kansu, Anhwei and Shantung. Don't run away with the idea that the world is at peace. The situation is unstable. You may think you are 'on firm ground', but it will not remain firm. One day the continents will sink, the Pacific Ocean will become dry land, and we'll have to move house. Small earthquakes are a frequent occurrence. The Kao-Jao affair[10] was an earthquake of the eighth degree of magnitude . . .

4. We have forgotten the lessons of historical experience, and do not understand the comparative method, nor the establishment of opposites. As I said yesterday, many of our comrades, when confronted by numerous codes and conventions, do not consider whether there might be alternative formulae, and that they should choose those which are more suited to Chinese conditions, and reject the others. They do not make any analysis, nor use their brains. They do not make comparisons. In the past when we were opposing dogmatism, their journal, the *Bolshevik,* indulged in self-adulation saying that they were one hundred per cent correct. Their method was to attack one point or a few points and not to mention the rest. Their journal *True Words* attacked five big mistakes of the Central Soviet Area, without mentioning one single good point.[11]

In April 1956 I put forward the 'Ten Great Relationships', which made a start in proposing our own line for construction.[12] This was similar to that of the Soviet Union in principle, but had our own content. Among the 'Ten Great Relationships' five are primary: industry and agriculture; the coast and the interior; the Centre and the regions; the state, the collective and the individual; defence construction and economic construction. Expenditure on national defence should be small in peacetime. Administrative expenditure should be small at all times.

When Stalin was criticized in 1956, we were on the one hand happy, but on the other hand apprehensive. It was completely necessary to remove the lid, to break down blind faith, to release the pressure, and to emancipate thought. But we did not agree with demolishing him at one blow. They do not hang up his picture, but we do. In 1950 I argued with Stalin in Moscow for two months. On the questions of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Chinese Eastern Railway, the joint-stock companies and the border[13] we adopted two attitudes: one was to argue when the other side made proposals we did not agree with, and the other was to accept their proposal if they absolutely insisted. This was out of consideration for the interests of socialism. Then there were the two 'colonies', that is the North-East and Sinkiang, where people of any third country were not allowed to reside.[14] Now this has been rescinded. After the criticism of Stalin, the victims of blind faith had their eyes opened a bit. In order that our comrades recognize that the old ancestor[15] also had his faults, we should apply analysis to him, and not have blind faith in him. We should accept everything good in Soviet experience, and reject what is bad. Now we are a bit more skilful in this, and understand the Soviet Union a bit better, and understand ourselves.

In 1957, in 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People', I raised the questions of the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture, of the road to industrialization, cooperativization, birth-control, etc. In that year a big thing happened, that was the nationwide Rectification Movement, the Anti-Rightist Movement, the mass criticism of our work. This was a great stimulus to the people's thinking.

In 1958 we have held three meetings at Hangchow, Nanning and Chengtu.[16] Everyone has expressed a lot of opinions at these meetings, we have done some hard thinking, and summarized our experience of the previous eight years. This was also a great stimulus to thought. A question which emerged at the Nanning Conference was the codes and conventions of the various departments of the State Council. They can be changed and they ought to be changed substantially. One way would be to meet the masses. Another way would be to promote big-character posters. Another question was that of devolution of power to the regions. We have begun to put this into effect. Now centralized power and devolved power exist simultaneously. It was decided at the Third Plenum last year that centralized power and devolved power should exist simultaneously, that power should be centralized where appropriate and devolved where that is appropriate. The devolution of power should, of course, not follow the pattern of bourgeois democracy. Before the advent of socialism bourgeois democracy is progressive, but once socialism has come it is reactionary. In the Soviet Union the Russian nationality comprises fifty per cent of the population, and the national minorities are fifty per cent, while in China the Han nationality is ninety four per cent, while the national minorities are six per cent. So we cannot go in for a union of republics.

The Chinese revolution won victory by acting contrary to Stalin's will. The fake foreign devil [in Lu Hsün's *True Story of Ah Q*] 'did not allow people to make revolution'. But our Seventh Congress advocated going all out to mobilize the masses and to build up all available revolutionary forces in order to establish a new China.[17] During the quarrel with Wang Ming from 1937 to August 1938, we put forward ten great policies, while Wang Ming produced sixty policies.[18] If we had followed Wang Ming's, or in other words Stalin's, methods the Chinese revolution couldn't have succeeded. When our revolution succeeded, Stalin said it was a fake. We did not argue with him, and as soon as we fought the war to resist America and aid Korea, our revolution became a genuine one [in his eyes]. But when we brought out ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People’ we talked about this question but they didn’t, and what’s more they said we were going in for liberalism, so it seemed that we were not genuine again. When this report of ours was published, the *New York Times* printed it complete, and also carried an article which claimed that China was being ‘liberalized’. It is quite natural for the bourgeoisie to clutch at straws when drowning. But bourgeois politicians are not altogether without discernment. For example when Dulles heard about our report he said he wanted to see it. Within a couple of weeks he had come up with a conclusion: China was bad through and through; the Soviet Union was a little better.[19] But the Soviet Union couldn’t see it, and sent us a memorandum because they feared we were moving to the right. When the Anti-Rightist Movement started, naturally our ‘liberalization’ vanished.

In short, our basic line is universal truth, but details differ. This applies to each country and to each province. There is unity and there are also contradictions. The Soviet Union stresses unity, and doesn’t talk about contradictions, especially the contradiction between the leaders and the led.

(b) Talk of 20 March

I am going to talk about four problems:

1. The mass movement for the improvement of agricultural implements must be extended to every single locality.[20] Its significance is very great, it is a sprout of the technical revolution, it is a great revolutionary movement. Several hundreds of millions of peasants are striving mightily to negate the negative aspect of carrying things on a pole over the shoulder.[21] Whenever they succeed in doing this, they reduce the labour force required to a fraction of what it was before; the economies resulting from the replacement of carrying-poles by mechanization greatly increase labour efficiency, and this, in turn, permits a further step forward in mechanization. This great country of China cannot be completely mechanized; there will always be some corners where mechanization is impracticable. In 1,000 years, 500 years, 100 years, 50 years, there will always be some things which are only partly mechanized — for example, making wooden boats. There are also some handicrafts which may yet survive hundreds of millions of years hence, such as the preparation of food, which will eternally remain a handicraft. Such activities constitute a unity of opposites with mechanization: their natures are different, but they must be combined.

2. Honan has put forward the slogan of carrying out the [grain-production targets of] four [hundred], five [hundred], and eight [hundred catties per mu][22], irrigation, the elimination of the four pests, and the abolition of illiteracy — all in the space of one year. It is possible that some of these things can be achieved, but even if all of them can be achieved, we should not say so in published reports. We should not even print reports

saying that it can all be done in two years, though such reports can be circulated for internal use. It is like land reform: in the beginning, we did not publish reports, but published them only when we could announce that the reform had been partly implemented. If everyone is trying to surpass everyone else, the country may be thrown into confusion [*kao-te t'ien-hsia ta luan*] as a result. The thing is to go ahead and carry it out energetically. Every province should not follow the same wind, as though when they say it can be done in one year in Honan, everyone should do it in one year, and when they say Honan is number one, every other province should strive to be first. That would not be good. There must always be a number one: 'Every three years, there is a *chuang-yüan;* a beauty is scarcely found once in a thousand years.'[23] Let Honan try it for a year, and if Honan achieves miracles, next year every province can launch another drive for a great leap forward — wouldn't that be better?

If, in the space of one year, they carry out the four, five, and eight, and abolish illiteracy, naturally there may be very great shortcomings. At the very least, the work will be crude, and the masses will be overly tense. We should do our work boldly and joyfully, not hesitantly and coldly.

All that is necessary is that the line should be correct — going all out and aiming high to achieve greater, faster, better, and more economical [results][24] (or an even more popular formulation of these phrases) — and then, within the next year, two years, or three to five years, we will carry out the Forty Articles. In that case, we certainly can't be regarded as not having any face, it can't be considered as dishonourable, and perhaps it could even be said to be a bit better than that. As for comparisons, they should be made four times a year. Cooperativization made Chou Hsiao-chou extremely tense.[25] In the transition to higher-stage cooperatives in Szechuan, XXX[26] took it easy and didn't hurry things, so that it was finished only in 1957, and conditions there weren't at all bad. What does it matter if it takes a year longer? It may even be a bit better. On the other hand, it isn't correct either to say that it will certainly take four or five years to complete [these tasks]. The problem is to see what the conditions are, and whether the level of consciousness of the masses has been raised or not. How many years are required will depend on objectively existing circumstances. There are two lines for building socialism: is it better to go about it coldly and deliberately, or boldly and joyfully? If we carry out the Forty Articles in eight or ten years, building socialism will not involve excluding [anyone] from the Party. In forty years, the Soviet Union has been able to produce only such a little bit of food and other stuff. If, in eighteen years, we can equal what they have done in the past forty years, it will naturally be all right, and we should do precisely that. For there are more of us, and the political conditions are different, too: we are livelier, ! and there is more Leninism here. They, on the other hand, have let part of Leninism go by the boards, they are lifeless and without vitality. Lenin's writings of the revolutionary period attacked people very fiercely, but his attacks were justified, he was in tune with the mood of the masses, he had given his heart to the masses.

The speed of construction is a thing that exists objectively. Everything which, objectively and subjectively, is capable of achievement, we must endeavour to achieve by going all out, aiming high, and producing greater, faster, better, and more economical results. But that which cannot be achieved, we should not try to force ourselves to do. Right now there is a gust of wind, amounting to a force 10 typhoon. We must not impede this publicly, but within our own ranks [*nei-pu*] we must speak clearly, and damp down the atmosphere a little. We must get rid of the empty reports and foolish boasting, we must not compete for reputation, but serve reality. Some of the targets are high, and no measures have been taken to implement them; that is not good. In a word, we must have concrete measures, we must deal in reality. We must deal in abstractions, too — revolutionary romanticism is a good thing — but it is not good if there are no measures [for giving it practical effect].

3. Every two months, each province, city, and autonomous region must hold a meeting to make an investigation and sum up the results, a small meeting of from several people to a dozen or so. Coordinated regions[27] must also hold a meeting every two or three months. The changes in the course of the movement are very great, there must be exchange of information. The aim of the meetings is to coordinate the rhythm of production. While one wave has not yet fallen, another rises in turn; this is the unity of the opposites, fast and slow. Under the general line of going all out and aiming high to achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results, a wave-like form of progress is the unity of the opposites, deliberation and haste, the unity of the opposites, toil and dreams. If we have only haste and toil, that is one-sided. To be concerned only with the intensity of labour — that won't do, will it? In all of our work, we must use both deliberation and haste. (For example, the Party secretary in Wuchang *hsien* did not take account of the peasants' sentiments, and wanted them to go on working on the reservoirs on the twenty-ninth day of the twelfth [lunar] month, so half of the civilian workers just took off.) This means also the unity of hard fighting with rest and consolidation. In the past, when we waged war, there had to be an interval between two campaigns for rest and consolidation, bringing our forces up to strength and training the soldiers. We could not keep fighting one battle after another — there is a rhythm in warfare, too. The one hundred per cent 'Bolshevization' carried out in the Central Soviet Area was opposed to rest and consolidation, and advocated: 'Be audacious and resolute, follow up victories and pursue the foe immediately, crush Nanchang.' How could that work?[28] The unity of the op! posites, hard fighting, and rest and consolidation, is a law; moreover, they are transformed into one another. There is nothing which does not undergo such transformation. 'Haste' is transformed into 'deliberation', and 'deliberation' is transformed into 'haste'. 'Toil' is transformed into 'dreams', and 'dreams' are transformed into 'toil'. It is the same with rest and consolidation, and hard fighting. Toil and dreams, deliberation and haste, also have [an element of] identity; rest and consolidation and hard fighting also have an element of identity. Going to bed and getting up is also a unity of opposites. I ask you, for example, who can guarantee that after getting up he will not go to bed? On the contrary: 'He who has been lying down for a long time thinks of getting up.' Going to bed is transformed into getting up, and getting up is transformed into going to bed. Convening a meeting moves towards its opposite, and is transformed into dismissing a meeting. As soon as a meeting is called, it bears within itself factors leading to its own dismissal. We can't meet for 10,000 years here in Chengtu. Wang Hsi-feng says, 'However grandiose the banquet, it must always come to an end.'[29] This is the truth. A statement cannot be rejected because of the speaker; our

judgement must be based on whether it is true or not. After a meeting is dismissed, problems accumulate again, until there is once more a transformation into convening a meeting. We unite, and then after we have carried out our work for a while, ideas diverge, and this is transformed into struggle; divergences arise, and once more there are splits. We can't go on uniting day after day and year after year. As soon as we talk about unity, there is disunity; disunity is unconditional. At the very time we talk of unity, there still remains disunity — ! sp; this is why we have work to do. To talk all the time about monolithic unity, and not to talk about struggle, is not Marxist-Leninist. Unity passes through struggle, only thus can unity be achieved. It is the same within the Party, as regards classes, and among the people. Unity is transformed into struggle, and then there is unity again. We cannot talk of monolithic unity alone, and not talk about struggle, about contradictions. The Soviet Union does not talk about the contradictions between the leaders and the led. If there were no contradictions and no struggle, there would be no world, no progress, no life, there would be nothing at all. To talk all the time about unity is 'a pool of stagnant water'; it can lead to coldness. We must destroy the old basis for unity, pass through a struggle, and unite on a new basis. Which is better — a stagnant pool, or 'the inexhaustible Yangtse comes roaring past'?[30] It's like this with the Party, and it's like this, too, with classes and the people. Unity-struggle-unity: this means we have done our work. Production is transformed into consumption, consumption is transformed into production. Production is carried out for the sake of consumption; production is carried out not merely for the sake of other toilers, the producers themselves are also consumers. If a person doesn't eat, he has no energy at all, and he can't produce. If he eats hot meals, he can do more work. Marx says: production also includes consumption. Production and consumption, construction and destruction, are unities of opposites, they are transformed into one another. The production of the Anshan Iron and Steel Works is done for the sake of consumption; in a few decades, the installations will be replaced. Sowing is transformed into reaping, reaping is transformed into sowing. Sowing consists in consuming seeds; after the seeds are sown, they move towards their opposite! , and are not called seeds, but rice plants, crops; after the crops are harvested, new seeds are once more obtained.

We must cite abundant examples, put forward several dozen or a hundred examples in order to explain the concepts of the unity of opposites and their transformation into one another. Only thus can we correct our ideology and raise our level of understanding. Spring, summer, autumn and winter are also transformed into one another. Elements of spring and summer are contained in autumn and winter. Birth and death are also transformed into one another. Living is transformed into dying, lifeless matter is transformed into living beings. I propose that when people over the age of fifty die, a party should be held to celebrate, for it is inevitable that men should die, this is a natural law.[31] Grain is an annual plant, every year it is born once, and dies once; moreover, the more that dies, the more that is born. To take [another] example, if pigs were not slaughtered, there would be fewer of them all the time; who would feed them?

The *Concise Philosophical Dictionary* makes a specialty of opposing me. It says the transformation of birth into death is metaphysical, and the transformation of war into peace is wrong.[32] In the last analysis, who is right? Let me ask: if living beings do not result from the transformation of inanimate matter, where do they come from? In the beginning, there was nothing but inorganic matter on earth; organic matter appeared only subsequently. All living substances result from changes in twelve elements such as nitrogen and hydrogen.[33] All living beings result from the transformation of inanimate matter.

Sons are transformed into fathers, fathers are transformed into sons; women are transformed into men, men are transformed into women. Such transformations cannot take place directly, but, after marriage, sons and daughters are born; is this not transformation?

The oppressors and the oppressed are transformed into one another, as in the relations between bourgeoisie and landlords on the one hand, and workers and peasants on the other. Naturally, when we talk about these oppressors, we are referring to the old ruling classes, it is a matter of class dictatorship and not of individual oppressors.

War is transformed into peace, peace is the opposite of war. When there had been no fighting, that was peace; as soon as the 38th Parallel was crossed, that was war, and as soon as the armistice was concluded, that was peace again. Military affairs are politics under particular circumstances, they are the continuation of politics; politics is also a kind of war.

To sum up, quantitative changes are transformed into qualitative changes, and qualitative changes are transformed into quantitative changes. Europe is heavily infested with dogmatism, and the Soviet Union has some shortcomings, but all of this is bound to change, and if we don’t do our work well, we can become rigid again. If, at such a time, our industry has become number one in the world, we might grow cocky, and then our thinking might ossify.

The finite is transformed into the infinite, the infinite is transformed into the finite. The dialectics of ancient times was transformed into the metaphysics of the Middle Ages, and the metaphysics of the Middle Ages was transformed into the dialectics of modern times. The universe, too, undergoes transformation, it is not eternal. Capitalism leads to socialism, socialism leads to communism, and communist society must still be transformed, it will also have a beginning and an end, it will certainly be divided into stages,[34] or they will give it another name, it cannot remain constant. If there were only quantitative changes and no qualitative changes, that would go against dialectics. There is nothing in the world that does not arise, develop, and disappear. Monkeys turned into men, mankind arose; in the end, the whole human race will disappear, it may turn into something else, at that time the earth itself will also cease to exist. The earth must certainly be extinguished, the sun too will grow cold — it is already much cooler than it was in ancient times. During the ice age, there was one change in two million years. When the ice came, a large part of all living creatures perished. Beneath the South Pole there is a great deal of coal, so you can see that in ancient times it was very warm there. In Yen-ch’ang *hsien* they have discovered petrified bamboo. (An author of the Sung dynasty said that bamboo grew in Yen-ch’ang in ancient times, but now it can’t.)

All things must have a beginning and an end. Only two things are infinite: time and space. The infinite is made up of the finite. All things of whatever kind develop and change step by step.

I have talked about all this in order to extend and enliven our thinking. Whenever the mind becomes rigid, it is very dangerous. We must educate our cadres. The Central, provincial, regional, and hsien-level cadres are very important. Including all the various system,[35] there are several hundred thousand of them. In a word, we must do more thinking, we must not have constantly in mind the classic writings,[36] but we must make use of our brains and enliven our thinking.

4. The line for building socialism is still being created, but we already have the basic ideas. Of the 600 million people of the whole country, and the 12 million Party members, only a minority — only a few millions, I fear — feels that this line is correct. It may be that a great many people still have doubts, or are not aware. For example, when the peasants carried out irrigation, you couldn't say they were doubtful, but when it comes to the line, they are not aware. Or, to take another example, the number of those who really have faith in the campaign to get rid of the four pests has now gradually increased. I myself used to have doubts, and whenever I ran into someone, I would ask: 'Is it really possible or not to get rid of the four pests?' It was the same with cooperativization; so long as we had not demonstrated [its feasibility] there were bound to be doubts. There was also a part of the people who basically mistrusted it, amounting perhaps to a few tens of millions landlords, rich peasants, bourgeois, intellectuals, democratic personages, and even including some from within the labouring people, and a part of our cadres. At present, we have already induced a minority of people to feel that this line is correct. As for ourselves, we recognize that this line is correct, in theory and as demonstrated in practice in some of our work — for example, there is a substantial increase in production, we have had quite a few successes in our work, and the majority of the people feel at ease. Nevertheless, the Forty Articles, and overtaking England in fifteen years, are in the domain of theory. The four, five and eight have, for the most part, not yet been carried out, the industrialization of the whole country has not yet been carried out, overtaking England in fifteen years is still a slogan, the 156 key projects[37] have not yet all been built. There remains a question in my! mind about producing, in the course of the second five-year plan, 20 million tons of steel. Is this a good thing, or will it throw everything into confusion? I'm not sure at present, so I want to hold meetings. We'll meet four times a year, and if there are problems, we will make adjustments. The situation after construction has been carried out must be one of the following: excellent, fairly good, not too good, bad, or great disorder [*ta luau*]. It looks as though, if disorder results, it won't be all that great, there will be just a spell of disorder, and then things may well move towards 'order' [*chih*]. The appearance of disorder contains within it some favourable elements, we should not fear disorder. In the course of building up industry in Hungary, disorders occurred, but now things are all right again.

The line has already begun to take shape, it reflects the creations of the masses in their struggles. This is a law. The leading organs have put forward some directives which reflect these creations. So many things we did not foresee. Laws exist objectively, they cannot be diverted by man's will. For example, in 1955, when the high tide of cooperativization was seething, we did not foresee the emergence of the question of Stalin, of the Hungarian affair, and of the slogan 'Oppose adventurism'.[38] How will it be next year? What else is likely to happen? What 'ism' will they oppose? Who can predict this? Concrete affairs cannot be foretold.[39]

At present the reciprocal relations between people are determined by the relationship between three big classes:

The first is [composed of] imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, the rightists and their agents. If we do not carry out a revolution aimed at these, our productive forces will be fettered. The rightists make up two per cent of the bourgeoisie. The great majority of these can in future be changed and transformed — but that's another question.

The second is the national bourgeoisie, by which I mean all [the members of this class] except for the rightists. They are of a divided mind about the new China. They are drawn to us in spite of themselves, and at the same time they want to engage in capitalism. Now that they have passed through rectification, there have been some changes; we may perhaps have the support of two thirds of them. Incidentally, the democratic parties and groups in Peking have called a big meeting for self-criticism, reform, and oath-taking;[40] such meetings should be held in the whole country.

The third is the left, that is to say the labouring people, the workers, the peasants. (In reality there are four classes — the peasants are a separate class.)

The line has already begun to take shape, but it has yet to be perfected and verified in practice, so we cannot say that it is finally complete. The workers put on airs of extravagance *vis-a-vis* the peasants, and some cadres strive for fame and position — all this is bourgeois thinking. If we do not resolve these problems, we will not do well in production; if we do not sort out these reciprocal relations, how can we do our work well? In the past, we put far too little thought into construction; most of our energy was devoted to making revolution. Mistakes will inevitably be committed. It is impossible not to commit them. The commission of mistakes is a necessary condition for the formation of a correct line. The correct line is formulated with reference to the erroneous line, the two constitute a unity of opposites. The correct line is formed in the struggle with the incorrect line. To say that mistakes can all be avoided, [so that] there are only correct things, and no mistakes, is an anti-Marxist proposition. The problem lies in committing fewer mistakes, and less serious ones. The correct and the erroneous are a unity of opposites, the theory of inevitability is correct. That there should be only correct things, and nothing erroneous, as without precedent in history, it amounts to denying the law of the unity of opposites. It is metaphysical. If there were only men and no women, if women were negated, what would we do then? It is possible to strive for a situation in which very few mistakes are committed. The number of mistakes [should be like] the relation between a giant and a dwarf. It is possible to commit few errors, and we must achieve this. Marx and Lenin achieved it.

(c) Talk of 22 March

'People do not go to a Buddist temple for no reason,'[41] and I have a number of problems on which I would like to exchange views with you. In the play *The Story of the Western Chamber*[42] there is an episode involving the two characters Chang Sheng and Hui Ming. Tiger Sun has surrounded the P'u Chin Monastery and the scholar Chang Sheng wants to get a message through to his friend, the White Horse General, to bring him to the rescue. There is nobody to carry the message and so they hold a mass meeting at which Hui Ming steps forward and volunteers to go. Hui Ming is depicted as a courageous, bold and resolute fellow. I hope that China will have more Hui Mings to develop a movement of 'great airing of views, great blooming and big-character posters'[43] among the hundreds of thousands of people at county [*hsien*] committee level and above, in order to criticize the leadership. This will make for a proletarian atmosphere, a communist atmosphere. When the masses give you a good telling-off to vent their feelings, this does not mean that they are going to cut off your head or take away your job. It just means that they are in a lively militant mood, that they have a very good communist style. The way that the masses are now carrying out these struggles is excellent, and we comrades should also promote such a style among ourselves.

Ch'en Po-ta[44] has just written to me. Before this nothing would induce him to run a journal. Now he has made a 180-degree turn and agreed to start one this year. This is fine. Our Party used to have several journals — *Guide, Struggle, Truth,* etc. Although we now have the *People's Daily* we have no theoretical magazine. We originally made plans for the Centre and Shanghai to publish one each, in order to bring about a direct confrontation of competing views, but now it is proposed that each province should start a separate one. This is very good. In this way our theoretical level can be raised and our thinking enlivened. Each provincial journal should have its own individual characteristics, and whilst each one should base its discussion mainly on the situation in its own province, they may also talk about China as a whole, or about the whole world, the universe — even the sun and the Milky Way.

Comrades working in the provinces will sooner or later come to the Centre. Comrades at the Centre will sooner or later either die or leave the scene. Khrushchev came from a local area. At the local level the class struggle is more acute, closer to natural struggle, closer to the masses. This gives the local comrades an advantage over those at the Centre. Ch'in was a kingdom before it proclaimed itself an empire.

We must improve our style of work, speak with sincerity, take a firm hold of ourselves and possess the spirit to sweep all before us and climb to the highest peak. To do this we must have a thorough understanding of Marxist theory and of the basic contradictions in our work. But at present our comrades have no ambition to be invincible, rather they have a lethargic air about them. This is no good. It. exemplifies a slave mentality, like that of Chia Kuei, who had become so used to standing up that he was afraid to sit down. We must respect the classics but we must not follow them blindly. Marxism was itself created, not copied or lifted straight from books. On this point Stalin was relatively good. The *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* says in its conclusion: 'Particular points of Marxist principle which are not in accord with reason[45] may be changed, such as the principle that one country cannot be victorious*.' [*i.e., that socialism cannot first be victorious in one country alone.] Confucian scholars worshipped Confucius so blindly that they dared not use his name K'ung Ch'iu. Li Ho of the T'ang dynasty was, however, quite different. He referred to Emperor Wu of Han by his name Liu Ch'e, or Master Liu, and to the Empress as Mistress Wei.[46]

Once we give in to blind faith our minds become cramped and our thought cannot burst out of its confinement. Unless you have a conquering spirit it is very dangerous to study Marxism-Leninism. Stalin could be said to have had this spirit, though it became somewhat tarnished. The Leninist foundation of his writing on linguistics and economics was relatively correct — basically correct. But there are some issues worth studying, for example the role of the theory of value in the socialist stage. Should we take the amount of time expended in preparing people for labour as a criterion for fixing wages? Under socialism private property still exists, the small group still exists, the family still exists. The family, which emerged in the last period of primitive communism, will in future be abolished. It had a beginning and will come to an end. K'ang Yu-wei perceived this in his book *Universal Harmony*.[47] Historically, the family was a production unit, a consumption unit, a unit for the procreation of the labour force of the next generation, and a unit for the education of children. Nowadays the workers do not regard the family as a unit of production; the peasants in the cooperatives have also largely changed, and peasant families are generally not units of production. They only engage in a certain amount of subsidiary production. As for the families of government workers and members of the armed forces, they produce even less; they have become merely units of consumption, and units for rearing and bringing up labour reserves, while the chief unit of education is the school. In short, the family may in future become something which is unfavourable to the development of production. Under the present system of distribution of 'to each according to his work', the family is still of use. When we reach the stage of the communist relationship of distribution of 'to each according to his need', many o! f our concepts will change. After maybe a few thousand years, or at the very least several hundred years, the family will disappear. Many of our comrades do not dare to think about these things. They are very narrow-minded. But problems such as the disappearance of classes and parties have already been discussed in the classics. This shows that the approach of Marx and Lenin was lofty, while ours is low.

Professors — we have been afraid of them ever since we came into the towns. We did not despise them, we were terrified of them. When confronted by people with piles of learning we felt that we were good for nothing. For Marxists to fear bourgeois intellectuals, to fear professors while not fearing imperialism, is strange indeed. I believe this attitude is another example of the slave mentality, a relic from the time of 'gratitude for His Majesty's favours'. We must not tolerate it any longer. Naturally we cannot go out tomorrow and beat them up. We have to make contact with them, educate them and make friends with them. They may have studied more natural science than we have, but they do not necessarily know more social science. They may have studied more

Marxism-Leninism but they are incapable of entering into the spirit of it, or really understanding it. Wu Ching-ch'ao[48] read a great deal, but opposed Marxism at every opportunity.

We should not feel ashamed of ourselves. Bernstein, Kautsky, Plekhanov in his late period, all studied Marxism-Leninism much more than we have, yet they were not much good. They transformed the Second International into the servant of the bourgeoisie.

Now the situation has changed, as indicated by Comrade Ch'en Po-ta's speech 'Stress the Present, not the Past', his letter 'To the Chairman', and his communication 'Be prepared to explain to the lower levels'. All of these are very forceful. Yet there are many comrades who are indifferent to the struggle on the ideological front, such as the criticism of Hu Feng, Liang Shu-ming, *The Life of Wu Hsün*, *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, and Ting Ling,[49] etc. Our basic views on the elimination of the bourgeoisie were stated in the resolution of the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee. During the democratic revolution we used to say that the revolution had two stages, and that the first stage was a preparation for the second.[50] We believe in permanent revolution, yet many comrades gave no thought to the timing of the socialist revolution or to what should be done after land reform. They closed their eyes to sprouts[51] of socialism even after such forms had appeared. The mutual-aid teams in Jui-chin[52] and in the anti-Japanese bases were such sprouts.

Wang Ming and Ch'en Tu-hsiu were of the same ilk. Ch'en Tu-hsiu considered that after the bourgeois revolution had succeeded, the bourgeoisie should hold political power, and the socialist revolution should not be launched until the proletariat had been consolidated and enlarged. Hence Ch'en Tu-hsiu was not a Marxist-Leninist but a bourgeois-democratic revolutionary radical. Yet thirty years later there are still people like him. Bad people like Ting Ling and Feng Hsueh-feng and good people like XXX are nothing but bourgeois democrats. They proclaim the 'four great freedoms',[53] assert that peasants are afraid of showing off, thus sharply opposing us. The rich middle peasants in Honan did not want the cadres to see their valuables and feigned poverty. They bought cloth from pedlars when nobody was looking. This was excellent. It meant that the poor and lower-middle peasants were so strong that the rich middle peasants were afraid to show off. It meant that socialism has a great future. But some people did not like it and felt that this fear should be removed. They issued announcements proclaiming the 'four great freedoms', while failing to ask for instructions or even to consult others. Clearly this was defiance of the policies laid down by the Second Plenum. They were not spiritually prepared for socialism, though now they have become convinced and have become activized.

From ancient times the people who have created new schools of thought have always been young people without great learning. Confucius started at the age of twenty-three; and how much learning did Jesus have? Sakyamuni founded Buddhism at the age of nineteen; his learning was only acquired gradually later on. What learning did Sun Yat-sen have in his youth? He only went through higher middle school. Marx was also very young when he first created Dialectical Materialism. His learning was also acquired later on. He was about thirty when he wrote the *Communist Manifesto*, by which time his school of thought was already established. When he started to write books he was only in his twenties. The people whom he criticized were all learned bourgeois scholars of the time like Ricardo, Adam Smith, Hegel, etc. In history it is always those with little learning who overthrow those with much learning. The things Chang T'ai-yen[54] wrote in his youth were lively and full of the spirit of the democratic revolution. His aim was to overthrow the Manchus. K'ang Yu-wei was the same. Liu Shih-p'ei[55] made his name when he was only twenty and was only thirty when he died. Wang Pi[56] was in his teens when he annotated Lao-tzu and died from mental strain when still in his twenties. Yen Yüan[57] (a sage of the second rank) was only thirty-two when he died. Li Shih-min[58] was in his teens when he rebelled and became commander-in-chief. At twenty-four he ascended the imperial throne. He was neither particularly old nor learned. The question is whether your direction is right or not. Ch'in Shu-pao[59] was also very young. When young people grasp ! a truth they are invincible and old people cannot compete with them. Lo Ch'eng and Wang Po-tang[60] were only in their twenties. When Liang Ch'i-ch'ao[61] was young, he too was invincible, yet when we are faced by professors we become feeble and afraid that their scholarship will show us up.

Once our journals are published, provided that their direction is correct, they will do fine. Lei Hai-tsuag had studied Marxism-Leninism, but he was not as good as us because while we believed in it, the more he read the more right-wing he became. Now we want to run journals and to prevail over the bourgeois intellectuals; we only need to read a dozen or so books and we can beat them. Once we start to run our journals we shall be forced to study the classics, to think about problems, and turn our hands to writing. All this will raise our ideological level. Now a whole pile of publications has come to our attention. If we do not produce our publications people will not be reading books: they will only be discussing abstract matters and not talk about how to be 'red'.

Each province can run a journal and thus set up a kind of confrontation. They can also be responsible for sending articles to the central publication. Six articles a year from each province would be sufficient. Anyway, there should be less than ten. You people go and organize this. This is the way to produce heroes.

Ever since ancient times the people who founded new schools of thought were all young people without too much learning. They had the ability to recognize new things at a glance and, having grasped them, they opened fire on the old fogeys. The old fogeys with learning always opposed them. When Martin Luther founded the Reformation, and Darwin's theories appeared, many people opposed them. The inventor of sleeping-pills was not even a doctor, let alone a famous doctor; he was only a pharmacist. At first the Germans did not take him seriously, but the French welcomed him. That was how sleeping-pills started. I am told that penicillin was invented by a man who worked as a laundryman in a dyers and cleaners. Franklin of America, who discovered electricity, began as a newspaper boy. Later he became biographer, politician and scientist. Gorky only had two years of elementary schooling. Of course some things can be learnt at school; I don't propose to close all the schools. What I mean is that it is not absolutely necessary to attend school. The main thing is whether your direction is correct or not and whether you come to grips with your studies. Learning has to be grasped. As soon as they had grasped the truth the young founders of new schools embarked on discoveries, scorning the old fogeys. Then those with learning oppressed them. Isn't that what history is like? When we started to make revolution, we were mere twenty-year-old boys, while the rulers of that time, like Yüan Shih-k'ai and Tuan Ch'i-jui[62] were old and experienced. They had more learning, but we had more truth.

I am glad to see how spirited the big-character posters have been recently. Their sharp criticism and lively style have blown away the stale atmosphere. Yet we always walk sedately with measured tread. 'Meeting people we only say three tenths of what we mean, afraid to lay bare our whole heart.' We don't speak sincerely.

Wang He-shou's second article dares to criticize dogmatism. P'eng T'ao's article is also good.[63] It has persuasive power, although it is not sharp enough. It is 'attacking others and elevating oneself', though not in an individualistic way. Rather it attacks incorrect ideas and elevates correct ideas, which is absolutely necessary. (Of course the errors also include his own.) T'eng Tai-yüan's article is also good, but he is deficient in persuasive power. He should explain the reasons for building so many railways, otherwise people will be frightened off. Chang Hsi-jo[64] criticized us for 'craving greatness and success, being impatient for quick results, scorning the past and putting blind faith in the future'.

This is just what the proletariat is like! Any class 'craves greatness and success'. Should we rather 'crave pettiness and failure'? King Yu valued every moment of time. We too must treasure every minute. Confucius said: 'Three days without seeing my lord makes me worried.' He also said: 'I never sit long enough to warm my mat.' Mo-tzu's 'stove was not used long enough to be blackened'. They were both men who were hungry for success and quick results. We too follow this role. Irrigation, rectification, anti-rightism, 600 million people engaged in a great movement. Isn't this 'craving for greatness and success'? In setting average advanced norms for workers, aren't we 'being impatient for quick results'? Unless we despise the old system and the old reactionary productive relationships, what do we think we are doing? If we do not have faith in socialism and communism, what do we think we are doing?

We have made mistakes and we have been subjectivist, but it is correct to 'crave greatness and success, to be impatient for quick results, to despise the past and put blind faith in the future'. Although they oppose me, the spirit of the letters from Tientsin and Nanking is praiseworthy. I think they are good. The one from Tientsin is the better, the one from Nanking being insipid and weak. As for Ch'en Ch'i-t'ung and the other three,[65] apart from Ch'en I who is a rightist, their courage in speaking out is praiseworthy. It is very bad to whisper behind people's backs and not to speak out to their faces. We should have general agreement — at least in principle. We should be able to speak either more sharply or more tactfully, but we must speak out. Sometimes we must be sharp and clear-cut. But in any case, if we take our desire for unity as our starting-point and adopt a helpful attitude, then sharp criticism cannot split the Party, it can only unite the Party. It is very dangerous to leave unsaid things which you want to say. Of course, we must choose our time to speak, and it does not do to ignore strategy. Take, for example, the three big cases of the Ming dynasty. Those who opposed Wei Chung-hsien paid too little attention to strategy and were themselves eliminated.[66] Among those who fell into disfavour with the emperor at that time, there was a Szechwanese, Yang Shen,[67] who was exiled to Yunnan. Those who spoke the truth in history, such as Pi Kan,[68] Ch'ü Yüan,[69] Chu Yün[70] and Chia I,[71] all failed in their! purpose but they fought for a principle. Those who are afraid to speak out are afraid of being called opportunists, afraid of getting the sack, afraid of being expelled from the Party, afraid of being divorced by their wives (and thus losing face), afraid of being confined to the guardroom, afraid of having their heads chopped off. I feel that as long as you are prepared for these eventualities and are able to see through the vanities of this world, you need be afraid of nothing. If you make no psychological preparation, you will not dare to speak. But should fear of martyrdom seal our lips? We must create an environment in which people will dare to speak out and reveal what is in their hearts. The Report to the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said: We must create an environment. From the masses' point of view this is correct, and advanced elements should not be afraid of this sort of thing. They should have the spirit of Wang Hsi-feng who said: 'He who is not afraid of the death by a thousand cuts dares to unhorse the emperor.'

We ought to be leading the masses, yet the masses nowadays are more advanced than us. They have the courage to put up big-character posters criticizing us. Of course this is different from Ch'u An-p'ing.[72] In his case it was the enemy cursing us. Today it is criticism among comrades. Some of our comrades' style of work is not good. There are some things they don't dare to say. They only say three-tenths. This is first because they are afraid of being unpopular, second because they are afraid of losing votes. This is a vulgar working style which must be changed, and now we have the possibility of changing it.

In 1956 three things were blown away: the general line of achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results, the promoters of progress, and the Forty Articles. There were three kinds of people with three kinds of reaction: distress, indifference, and delight. A millstone had dropped from their neck and there would be peace in the world. Of those exhibiting these three attitudes the ones in the middle were numerous, while the two extremes were small. In 1956 there were the same three attitudes towards many problems. They were comparatively unanimous on the question of opposing Japan and Chiang Kai-shek and on land reform. But on the question of cooperativization there were these three attitudes. Is this a correct assessment?

This conference has solved a number of questions and reached agreement, and prepared some documents for the Politburo. Its weakness is that there has been relatively little discussion of ideology. Should we devote two or three days to talking about ideology, and say what is on our minds?

The comrades say that this conference is a rectification conference. But we do not talk about ideology or fulfil our pledges. Isn't there a contradiction here? We have neither been carrying out struggles nor identifying rightists, but talking in gentle tones like light breezes and sweet showers, so that everyone can say what is on his mind. My purpose is to get people to dare to speak out with vigour and invincible force, like Marx or Lu Hsün, freeing themselves from inhibitions. We should make a breakthrough at the level of the local Party secretariat, within groups of about three people. This would create a new atmosphere. When he was eighteen or nineteen, Tsou Jung wrote a book entitled *The Revolutionary Army* which directly denounced the emperor.[73] When Chang T'ai-yen wrote his article refuting K'ang Yu-wei he too was still full of spirit. The older you get the less useful you are. You must not underestimate yourself, but mobilize all your energies. Of course we still need old people: they must also take the helm. Liu Pei of the Three Kingdoms period was no good; this too was a case of an old man taking command. We must break out of the dull atmosphere in the Party.

All the poems which have been published are relics of the past. Why not produce some folk poems? Will every comrade on his return please be responsible for collecting folk poems. Each social stratum, as well as the young people and children, have many folk poems. We should have a go at this. Everyone can be issued with a few sheets of paper to write folk poems on. Those among the labouring people who cannot write can ask others to write for them. We can set a time limit of ten days. We can collect large numbers of old folk songs, and next time publish a collection.

The future of Chinese poetry is folk songs first and the classics second. On this basis we can produce a new poetry. In form it should be in the folk-song style, while in content it should combine the two opposites, realism and romanticism. If you are too realistic you can't write poetry. The new poetry of today is formless. Nobody reads it. Anyway I wouldn't read it, not unless you gave me a hundred dollars. In the field of collecting folk poetry, Peking University has done a lot of work. If we do this job it is possible that we may discover millions and millions of folk poems. This will not involve much work, and they will be much easier to read than the poems of Tu Fu and Li Po.[74]

Notes

[References are given here as provided by the Maoist Documentation Project. They are significantly different in at least one existing edition of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. VIII. — *Transcriber, MIA*.]

[1.] Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942) was Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party from its foundation in 1921 until August 1927, when he was made the scapegoat for the failure of Stalin's policies. Prior to his conversion to Communism he had been an eloquent advocate of Western democratic and scientific thought as the remedy for China's ills. In recent decades, Chinese Communist authors have acknowledged his contribution to the intellectual revolution of the May Fourth period, but have denied that he ever really accepted or understood Marxism. They characterize him as a bourgeois radical who had wormed his way into the Party thanks to the ideological confusion prevailing in the early 1920s. Mao himself, talking to Edgar Snow in 1936, dismissed Ch'en Tu-hsiu as bourgeois not only in his ideas, but in his instinctive reactions: 'Ch'en was really frightened of the workers and especially of the armed peasants. Confronted at last with the reality of armed insurrection, he completely lost his senses. He could no longer see clearly what was happening, and his petty-bourgeois instincts betrayed him into panic and defeat.' (*Red Star over China*, enlarged edition, Penguin, 1972, pp. 190-91).

[2.] The official view regarding the errors committed by Mao's rivals during the period 1927-35 had been laid down in the 'Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party' adopted by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1945. The text is included in Volume III of the *Selected Works* (Peking, 1965), pp. 177-220. Since the onset of the Cultural Revolution, the resolution of 1945 has not been considered wholly orthodox, and it no longer appears in the *Selected Works*. As for the three 'left' lines, however, the view put forward by Mao as recently as September 1971 remains basically the same (see below, *Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades at Various Places during his Provincial Tour*). For other statements of the 'Great Leap' period about this question, see *Speech at the Lushan Conference* and *Speech at the Enlarged Session of the Military Affairs Committee and the External Affairs Conference*.

[3.] Abram Deborin (1881-1963), a leading Soviet philosopher who stressed the omnipresence of contradictions and the link between dialectics and the natural sciences, was condemned by Stalin in December 1930 for his 'Menshevizing idealism', and subsequently forced to recant.

[4.] This name is transcribed as 'P'i-k'o-fu', which might be an error for Rykov, though the latter occupied an important position in the Soviet state apparatus rather than in the Comintern. It could also stand for Pieck, or Piatnitsky, who were members of the Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the International in the early 1930s. In any case, Mao's picture of the Comintern leadership is rather approximate, for Bukharin was removed from all work in the International in mid-1929, and Zinoviev had disappeared well before. Regarding the personnel more directly concerned with China, he was better informed. Kuusinen, a member of the Executive Committee and of the Secretariat, was influential in drafting many Comintern directives on China and on the non-European countries generally. Pavel Mif's title was Deputy Head of the Eastern Secretariat, which Mao calls the Eastern Bureau (tungfang pu), but his main responsibility was China. (There does not seem to have been a separate Far Eastern Department, though details regarding the organization of the Comintern are hard to come by. The above information about Mif is from his biography in *Vidnye Sovetskie Kommunisty — Uchastniki Kitaiskoi Revolyutsii* [Moscow: 'Nauka', 1970], p. 92.)

[5.] It is hard to guess who the 'good comrade' referred to here might be. Mao speaks of him as if from personal knowledge, but Mao himself did not go abroad until 1949, and of those representatives of the Comintern who had visited China in the 1920s and 1930s, there were few with whom he had come in direct contact, and even fewer of whom he had anything good to say. Because of the way ‘XXX’ is contrasted with Mif, it is just possible that it stands for Kuusinen, who had attacked Mao and the Chinese very rudely in 1964 (see *Marxism and Asia*, pp. 330-35), so that any favourable comment would have been removed, or made anonymous, by the editors of Wan-sui (1969). Perhaps any other Comintern figure, even if known only at second or third hand, would have been imagined by Mao to be more likeable than Pavel Mif, who came to China at the end of 1930 and personally installed as the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party the very ‘dogmatists’ about whom Mao is complaining here.

[6.] Wang Ming (pseudonym of Ch’en Shao-yü) (1904-74) was the leading figure in the group of ‘Returned Students’, trained in Moscow, with whom Mao contended for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s and 1940s. He resided in the Soviet Union from 1957 until his death; during the Cultural Revolution, he published two vitriolic attacks on Mao (see *Talk at the First Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee of the CPC*, note 1).

[7.] Mao would appear to be concerned here rather with the uniform introduction of a system of education ill-adapted to Chinese rural reality than with the precise length of the primary course, which was not necessarily five years in the 1950s. For a detailed discussion of the educational system, including the curriculum and the length of schooling, see below, *Remarks at the Spring Festival*.

[8.] Kao Kang (c. 1902-c. 1954) was one of the leaders in setting up the base in Shensi to which Mao Tse-tung and his comrades retreated after the Long March. In the late 1940s, he emerged as the dominant figure in the North-east Region, where he cumulated all the top Party, government, and army posts. As the leader of China’s most highly industrialized area, he played an important role in Peking as well, and in 1952 he became the first Chairman of the State Planning Commission. He was publicly denounced in 1955, and at that time it was stated that he had committed suicide in February 1954. His fall undoubtedly resulted in part from personal rivalries, but it has also been commonly assumed that he was regarded as too close to the Soviets.

[9.] In the mid-1950s, Chiang Hua was First Secretary of the CCP in Chekiang, and Sha Wen-han was governor of the same province. In December 1957, in the context of the ‘anti-rightist’ campaign which had begun during the summer, Sha was violently attacked for corruption, immorality, and anti-Party activities, and also for his provincial and sectarian viewpoint, and removed from office. Chiang Hua delivered the main report at the meeting held to denounce Sha and other leading Chekiang officials; he also called for more rapid development in industry and agriculture, and referred to a ‘leap’ in production. Thus, his attitude towards questions of policy was indubitably correct in Mao’s eyes. As the previous sentence, ‘Every province now has examples of this’ linking the relationship between Chiang and Sha to the case of Kao Kang — makes plain, Mao is talking here about two things: the correctness or incorrectness of leadership; and loyalty to the nation as a whole rather than to one’s own province or region or to the Soviet Union. The two issues of the tempo of economic development, and of the manner and extent to which decision-making power should be decentralized, were central to the debates on policy going on in the spring of 1958, on the eve of the formal proclamation of the Great Leap Forward at the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress in May. As Mao makes plain, they had to be fought out in every province, as well as at the national level.

[10.] The purge of Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih (c 1901-), First Secretary of the CCP East China Bureau, and seven others in 1955, on the charge of having formed an anti-Party group with the aim of seizing power, was indeed an earthquake — by far the most serious upheaval in the Chinese Communist Party from the Rectification Campaign of 1942-3 to the fall of P'eng Te-huai in 1959.

[11.] The *Bolshevik* and *True Words* (*Shih Hua*) were theoretical organs edited in the early 1930s by the Moscow-trained leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, which often criticized Mao's guerrilla tactics. Since a complete run of *Shih Hua* is not available, it is impossible to say which 'five big mistakes' are referred to here.

[12.] In 1962, Mao put forward a periodization of the history of the Chinese People's Republic which dated the establishment of an independent and creative line for building socialism from 1958, i.e. from the beginning of the Great Leap Forward (*Talk at an Enlarged Central Work Conference*, pp. 176-8). This is complementary rather than contradictory to the statement here; Mao began to sketch out a new policy in 1956, and the process came to fruition in 1958.

[13.] Mao here confirms that, apart from the terms of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed on 14 February 1950, and the thorny question of the Sino-Soviet border, two main issues on which his position clashed with that of Stalin were the arrangements for the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the joint Sino-Soviet stock companies in certain key industries, both of which gave Moscow a degree of economic and political leverage within China all too reminiscent of the old colonial days.

[14.] The supplementary agreement of 27 March 1950 between China and the Soviet Union provided for joint-stock companies to develop oil and non-ferrous metals in Sinkiang. There was no provision such as Mao cites, but it was widely believed at the time to contain secret clauses.

[15.] Here Mao deliberately applies to Stalin the term 'old ancestor' (lao tsu-tsung) which was employed in his own youth to designate the Dowager Empress Tz'u-hsi.. Clearly he wishes to suggest that these two individuals (both of whom had at one time stood in authority over him) inspired in him a similar mixture of distaste and grudging respect.

[16.] The Hangchow conference of early January 1958, and the Nanning conference of late January, were attended, like the Chengtu conference at which Mao made this speech, by provincial Party secretaries and some Politburo members; it was at the two January meetings that the Sixty Articles on Work Methods, which constituted the veritable blueprint for the Great Leap Forward, were drafted. (See the text of this document in CB 892, pp. 1-14).

[17.] The Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, in April 1945, in fact advocated the establishment of a coalition government with the Kuomintang, as is indicated by the title of Mao Tse-tung's own report on that occasion. ('On Coalition Governrnent', *Selected Works*, III, pp. 255-320.) It did, however, lay the foundations for an effort on the part of the communists, in the new political context which would grow out of Japan's defeat, to establish themselves as a political (as well as a military) force which would have to be reckoned with. In particular, it marked the formal consecration of the ideological independence and maturity of the Chinese Communist Party by the elevation of 'Mao Tse-tung's Thought' to the status of guide in all the Party's work. (See Liu Shao-ch'i's report on this theme in *Marxism and Asia*, pp. 259-61.)

[18.] The Ten-Point Programme, or Ten Great Policies, of the CCP for Anti-Japanese Resistance and National Salvation put forward on 15 August 1937 laid down a policy line mid-way between the two extremes of excessive sectarianism and abject submission to the Kuomintang. (For the text, see Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, pp. 242-5.) Wang Ming, who had displayed leftist tendencies in the early 1930s, has been accused since 1945 of rightist and capitulationist errors following his return to China from Moscow in 1937, but I know of no document in sixty points summarizing his views at this time.

[19.] This refers to Dulles's speech of 28 June 1957, two weeks after the New York Times report of 13 June on Mao's February speech.

[20.] For a brief discussion of the problems raised by the effort to improve agricultural implements and techniques in the course of the Great Leap Forward, with extracts from the 'Opinions' regarding agricultural mechanization adopted at the Chengtu meeting, which spell out some of the implications of what Mao is saying in this paragraph, see Jack Gray, 'The Two Roads: Alternative Strategies of Social Change and Economic Growth in China', in *Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China*, pp. 139-43.

[21.] The expression chien-t'iao, 'to carry on a pole over the shoulder', is used here both in a literal sense, to evoke images such as the building of dams by the massive use of labour-power, and as a symbol of traditional Chinese ways of doing things in general. In the remainder of this paragraph, Mao sketches out the approach, characteristic of the Great Leap Forward and of his economic thinking ever since, of 'walking on two legs', i.e. of combining modern and traditional methods.

[22.] According to Mao's speech of 13 October 1957 (Wan-sui (1969), p. 141), 'four, five, eight' was used as shorthand for the goals for grain production originally put forward in point 6 of the Twelve-year Programme for Agricultural Development (see p. 93 and note 4 to *Speech at the Supreme State Soviet*). This called for yields of 400 catties per mu in areas north of the Yellow river, 500 catties per mu between the Yellow and Huai rivers and 800 catties per mu south of the Huai, to be achieved by the end of 1967.

In October 1957 Mao still accepted this target date. Now, although he does not endorse the extreme optimism of the Honan leadership, he has been carried away by enthusiasm for the emerging ‘Great Leap’ to such an extent as to suggest that it might well be possible to attain these goals in one third to one half of the period previously stipulated. He adds, however, that even if the original schedule were adhered to, China would still have done far better than the Soviet Union. The targets set in 1956 amounted to two or three times existing yields (see above, p. 92).

[23.] The chuang-yüan or ‘number one palace graduate’ was the highest-ranking successful candidate in the triennial examinations for the chin-shih degree (see below, note 18 to *Remarks at the Spring Festival*). True beauty, according to this proverb, is rarer still.

[24.] The ‘Ceneral Line’ for building socialism, symbolized by the four characters to, k’uai, hao, sheng (more, faster, better and more economically), had been put forward by Mao in 1956, and has been regarded ever since, both by Mao and by his opponents, as summing up the essence of his approach to economic development. From mid-1956 to mid-1957 it had been seldom mentioned, though not explicitly repudiated; for Mao’s resentment at this, see his speech of 22 March 1958, p. 122. In 1958 it burst forth again and became one of the ‘Three Red Banners’ of the Great Leap.

[25.] Chou Hsiao-chou (c. 1912-) was, at this time, First Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party for Hunan Province, and concurrently Political Commissar of the Hunan Military District. At the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956, he had presented a written speech on the strengthening of agricultural cooperatives. During the year 1958, he played an acting role in Party affairs, but after the Eighth Plenum in December 1958 he dropped from view, and in 1959 he was relieved of his post as provincial secretary, and purged as a member of the ‘anti-Party group’ headed by P’eng Te-huai (see *Speech at the Lushan Conference* and *Speech at the Enlarged Session of the Military Affairs Committee and the External Affairs Conference*). This would indicate that, like P’eng, he came to have doubts about the communes, but it was not previously known that Mao had been dissatisfied with his attitude at the time of cooperativization in 1955-6.

[26.] This presumably stands for Li Ching-ch’üan (1905-), ranking Party secretary for Szechuan province (in which the city of Chengtu is located) from 1952 to 1965, and by 1958 the leading figure in the Party organization for the whole of South-West China.

At the time when Mao made this speech, his star was definitely on the rise, and in fact Mao’s reference, two days later, to Khrushchev as an example of those vigorous elements which come to the Centre from the provinces (see the speech of 22 March 1958, p. 114) may well be meant as a compliment to Li, who was elected to the Politburo in May 1958 at the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress. Li Ching-ch’üan’s name — assuming that it is he who is meant — would have been omitted by the editors of the 1969 volume because he was attacked and removed during the Cultural Revolution. He reappeared at the Tenth Congress in 1973.

[27.] The organization of the Party and of the state administration on a regional basis had been abolished in 1954. Regional Party bureaus were publicly re-established only in the early 1960s, but Mao here confirms that they had already been set up in 1958, in the context of the decentralizing policies of the 'Great Leap'.

[28.] As indicated here, Mao clashed with the Moscow-trained leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in the early 1930s not only on political issues, but on military tactics. For his own criticism of previous errors in this domain, see 'Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War', *Selected Works*, I, pp. 179-249.

[29.] This remark was actually made by a minor character in Chapter 26 of the *Dream of the Red Chamber*; Wang Hsi-feng said the same thing, in different words, in Chapter 13 (*The Story of the Stone*, pp. 257, 509).

[30.] I have not been able to find the source of this quotation.

[31.] For a more extended discussion of why the death of older people is a cause for rejoicing, which reveals the roots of this attitude on Mao's part in the Chinese tradition, see below *Talk on Questions of Philosophy*, p. 227, and note 40.

[32.] This dictionary (Chien-ming che-hsüieh tz'u-tien) is, in fact, a Chinese translation, first published in 1940, and reprinted in 1949 and 1951 by the San-lien Shu-tien in Peking, of a Soviet reference work, the *Kratkii Filosojskii Slovar*, by Rozental and Yudin, which had appeared in Moscow in 1939. I have not been able to find in it the statements quoted by Mao, but he was no doubt correct in his judgement that the Soviet understanding of dialectics in the late 1930s was different from his.

[33.] Because of the way numbers are written in Chinese, the figure 'twelve' in this sentence could easily be a typographical error for 'ninety-two'. If Mao really meant to say 'twelve', I am unable to identify the source from which he could have taken this theory.

[34.] Wan-sui (1969) has here 'classes' (chieh-chi) instead of 'stages' (chieh-tuan), but this appears to be a typographical error, for Wen-hsüan has 'stages', which makes better sense and is in accord with similar statements in some of Mao's other writings, for example in *Talk on Questions of Philosophy*, p. 228.

[35.] The term translated here as 'system' (hsi-t'ung) is that commonly used in Chinese communist parlance to refer to one organization or apparatus among many; by 'all the various systems', Mao means the Party apparatus, the state bureaucracy, the PLA, etc.

[36.] This refers, of course, to the Marxist-Leninist classics, not to the Confucian canon.

[37.] The 156 key industrial projects scheduled to be built during the first five-year plan, 1953-7, with Soviet aid.

[38.] The ‘emergence of the question of Stalin’ refers, of course to Khrushchev’s secret speech of February 1956; the slogan ‘oppose adventurism’ was the rallying-cry of those who, in 1956-7, opposed Mao’s economic policies. (See below, p. 138, his comments on this group, which apparently included many top leaders in the Party.)

[39.] The meaning here is obviously that Marxism lays down only general historical tendencies, not the precise sequence of events.

[40.] In the autumn of 1957, during the anti-rightist campaign, ceremonies were held in schools and elsewhere, at which participants swore to give their hearts to the Party.

[41.] i.e., it is not like some other places of worship where one goes every Sunday out of habit.

[42.] A celebrated thirteenth-century drama.

[43.] ta ming, ta fang, ta-tzu-pao. The first two phrases (sometimes translated ‘great blooming and contending’) summarize the slogan of the ‘Hundred Flowers’ campaign of 1956-7: ‘Let a hundred schools of thought contend, let a hundred flowers bloom.’ Big-character posters, or wall newspapers, which reached their utmost development during the Cultural Revolution, have long been familiar in China; Mao wrote one as a student at the time of the 1911 revolution.

[44.] Ch’en Po-ta (1904-). Once the leading interpreter of Mao Tse-tung’s thought, and Mao’s former political secretary, Ch’en rose to high eminence when he became the head of the ‘Cultural Revolution Group’ under the Central Committee in 1966. He disappeared from the political scene in 1970, in the course of the purge of the ‘ultra-leftists’. Whatever his precise role in the events of the Cultural Revolution, he had indeed distinguished himself by his enthusiasm for the ‘Paris Commune’ model, which Mao repudiated in February 1967. (See the Introduction, and *Talks at Three Meetings with Comrades Chang Ch’un-ch’iao and Yao Wen-yuan*.)

[45.] In fact, this passage refers to the abandonment of conclusions which are ‘antiquated’ or no longer ‘correspond to historical conditions’. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, (Moscow, 1954), pp. 553-4.

[46.] Emperors in traditional China were referred to by their dynastic titles; their names were taboo to such an extent that even the characters composing them could not be used in other contexts.

[47.] Ta t’ung or ‘great harmony’ is a very ancient utopian vision which has continued to inspire many Chinese thinkers down to the present day. (See, for example, Mao Tse-tung’s ‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship’, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 412.) The work on this theme by K’ang Yu-wei, the intellectual leader of the reformers of 1898, has been translated by Laurence Thompson under the title, Ta T’ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of Kang Yu-wei (Allen & Unwin, 1958).

[48.] Wu Ching-ch'ao, a disciple of Hu Shih and a contributor to his magazine Tu-li p'ing-lun, was a Kuomintang civil servant in the 1930s and 1940s.

[49.] The literary critic Hu Feng, the philosopher Liang Shu-ming, the interpretation of the *Dream of the Red Chamber* by Yü P'ing-po, and the novelist Ting Ling all came under attack in the period 1953-5. (For a general account of the context see Merle Goldman, *Literary Dissent in Communist China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), Chapters 6 and 7.) Mao himself was directly involved in several of these campaigns, especially in that against Hu Feng; he also wrote an anonymous editorial in 1951 attacking the film, *The Life of Wu Hsün*. (This campaign is also discussed by Mrs Goldman, *op. cit*., pp. 89-93.) In 1967, in the course of the Cultural Revolution, Mao's comments on two of these themes were published among the 'Five Militant Documents on Art and Literature', translated in *Peking Review*, No. 23, 1967, pp. 5-8.

[50.] See the extract from Mao's speech of 7 May 1937, in S. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (Penguin, 1969), p. 226-8.

[51.] The use of the term 'sprouts' ('meng-ya') here echoes the controversy which took place in the 1950s about 'sprouts of capitalism under the Ming dynasty', i.e. as to whether elements of a new social system were developing in the 'feudal' society of China at that time, before the impact of the West.

[52.] Capital of the Chinese Soviet Republic in 1931-4. The 'mutual aid teams', which were formed both at that time and during the Yenan period, as well as in the early 1950s, represented the lowest stage in the development of agricultural cooperatives.

[53.] Mao defines these below on p. 216. As can be grasped from the context, they relate to policies for encouraging the pursuit of individual economic interest at the expense of the collective economy.

[54.] Chang T'ai-yen (also known as Chang Ping-lin) was an influential intellectual of the early twentieth century, politically radical but conservative in cultural and literary matters.

[55.] Liu Shih-p'ei (1880-1919) was a scholar active in the revolutionary movement prior to 1911. Thereafter, he became a conservative and an advocate of restoration.

[56.] As his dates indicate, Wang Pi (A.D. 226-49) did indeed die early, after leaving commentaries on Lao-tzu and on the Book of Changes.

[57.] Yen Yüan (Yen Hsi-chai) was one of the Ming loyalist philosophers who refused to bow to the Manchus when they conquered China in the early seventeenth century. They had great influence on Mao's generation, and on Mao in particular; Yen is mentioned in Mao's first published article, which appeared in 1917 (*The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 24, 155).

[58.] Li Shih-min (597-649) overthrew the Sui dynasty and placed his father on the throne as the first T'ang emperor in 618. He was, in fact, slightly older than Mao indicates when, in 626, he became emperor himself with the dynastic title T'ai-tsung.

[59.] Ch'in Ch'iung, also known as Ch'in Shu-pao (6th-7th century A D.), distinguished himself as a military commander under both the Sui and the T'ang dynasties.

[60.] Lo Ch'eng and Wang Po-tang were political adventurers of the late Sui dynasty (early 7th century), who made their mark at a very early age.

[61.] Disciple of K'ang Yu-wei, perhaps the most influential polemicist among the Reformers of 1898; Mao read him while an adolescent.

[62.] Yüan Shih-k'ai, a high official who helped Tz'u-hsi to repress the Reform Movement of 1898, betrayed his imperial masters to become President of the Republic in 1912; he died in 1916 after an abortive attempt to restore the monarchy with himself as emperor. Tuan Ch'i-jui, one of his lieutenants, played an important role during the early years of the 'warlord era', which opened with Yüan's death.

[63.] Wang He-shou (c. l908-) and P'eng T'ao (1913-61) were respectively Minister of Metallurgical Industry and Minister of Chemical Industry at this time. It is not certain what articles Mao is referring to.

[64.] Chang Hsi-jo (c. 1889-), a political scientist educated at Columbia University in New York and at the London School of Economics, where he studied under Harold Laski, was Minister of Education until February 1958, when he became chairman of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. A non-communist, he made the criticisms to which Mao is referring on 15 May 1957, at a forum called by the United Front Department.

[65.] Ch'en Ch'i-t'ung, Vice-Director of the Cultural Section of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army, together with three other senior army political workers, published an article in People's Daily on 7 January 1957, at a time when the scope of the 'Hundred Flowers' campaign was a subject of dispute within the leadership, some members of which opposed Mao's policy of 'opening wide' the floodgates to criticism from outside the Party. (Ch'en I is a homonym of the late Foreign Minister.)

[66.] Wei Chung-hsien (d. 1627), a self-made eunuch who enjoyed the favour of the emperor Hsi Tsung, was the real ruler of China until the death of his protector. He was notorious for the cruelty with which he disposed of his opponents.

[67.] Yang Shen (1488-1529), who came first in the palace examination in 1511, was exiled in 1524 when he wept so loudly to indicate his disapproval of two proposed appointments to the Han-lin academy as to be heard all over the palace.

[68.] Pi Kan (twelfth century B.C.) remonstrated with the tyrannical last ruler of the Shang dynasty upon his excesses, and was disembowelled before the Emperor as a result.

[69.] Ch'ü Yüan (340-278 B.C.), one of China's greatest poets, is celebrated not only for his literary talents, but for drowning himself in despair when, his advice having been neglected, the state of Ch'u, of which he had formerly been a leading minister, came to ruin. For a selection of his poems, see *Li Sao and Other Poems of Chu Yuan* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), with an introductory sketch by Kuo Mo-jo.

[70.] Chu Yün (first century A.D.) had a chequered career; his life was in fact spared by the Emperor in his most celebrated adventure.

[71.] Chia I (second century B.C.) became a member of the Imperial Academy at such an early age that he aroused great jealousy, and was finally exiled. In his article of 1917 on physical education, Mao cited his example to make a different point: that too much study at an early age was destructive to health. See my complete French translation of this text, *Mao Ze-dong: Une Etude de l'éducation physique* (Paris: Mouton, 1962), p. 46.

[72.] Ch'u An-p'ing, editor of the Kuang-ming jih-pao, organ of the China Democratic League, took the lead in criticisms of the Party in April 1957, when the 'blooming and contending' was in full flood. He came under sharp attack in June 1957. See *Literary Dissent in Communist China*, pp. 192, 198, 205-6.

[73.] See John Lust's translation, Tsou Jung: *The Revolutionary Army*, a Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903 (Paris: Mouton, 1968). This pamphlet was extremely influential at the time, and Mao certainly read it as an adolescent.

[74.] The two most famous poets of China's literary golden age during the T'ang dynasty. For a recent appreciation of their work see the extracts from Kuo Mo-jo's book on the subject in Chinese Literature, No. 4, 1972, pp. 61-94.

National Minorities

March 1958

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

The Mongols and Han should co-operate closely and have faith in Marxism. All our minority nations should trust each other, no matter what nationalities they are. They must see on which side truth lies. Marx himself was a Jew, Stalin belonged to a minority nation; and Chiang Kai-shek is a Han, a bad one, whom we strongly oppose. We must not insist that only people of a given province take charge of the administration of that province. The place of origin of a man is irrelevant — northerner or southerner, this national minority or that minority, [they are all the same]. The questions are whether they have communism and how much. This point should be explained clearly to our national minorities.

To begin with, the Han was not a big race, but a mixture of a great number of races. The Han people have conquered many minority nations in history and driven them to the highlands. [We] must take a historical view of our nationality question and find out that we either depend on minority nationalism or on communism. Of course we depend on communism. We need our regions but not regionalism.

Speech At The Hankow Conference

April 6, 1958

[SOURCE: '*Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*,' a Red Guard Publication.]

What is the situation of the class struggle in the transition period?

There probably won't be more than a few more rounds in the struggle between the two roads. We must have a strategy, cooling off for a while and then letting loose. Without such cooling off and letting loose, it won't flare up. As I mentioned at the Ch'eng-tu Conference, there are four classes in China: two exploiting and two working classes. The first exploiting class consists of imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, Koumintang remnants, and 300,000 rightists. The landlords have split up, some having reformed and others not yet. The unreformed landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists are firmly against communism. They are the current Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang, and they constitute the hostile class, such as Chang Po-chun[1]. The rightists in the party are the same, including those leaning toward the right, currently classified as intermediates who have not yet made a move toward the right. Those who have been discovered but not yet classified, or not yet discovered, also belong to this class. The grand total of this class probably constitute five per cent of the population, or 30 million, which is a reasonable estimate. It is a hostile class and needs reform. Struggle and getting hold of them are required. If 70 per cent of them are split up, it will be a big victory. They must be activated, turning passive strength into active. If 10 per cent of them are reformed, it will be a success. After a few years, when they demonstrate a sincere change of heart and become genuinely reformed, their exploiting class hat may be removed. The right may turn into the left or middle-roaders; the left may also turn into the right, such as Kautsky. The second exploiting class consists of the national bourgeoisie and its intellectuals, plus a part of the upper level petit bourgeoisie, such as Liu Shao-t'ang, Ch'en Po-hua, and the rural well-to-do middle peasants. They belong to the bo! urgeoisie in essence. Most of the national bourgeoisie and its intellectuals are middle-roaders. They are exploiters, but different from the first exploiting class. They are opposed, and yet not opposed, to communism. They are a vacillating class. They are opposed to communism, but not firmly committed, and they are different from Chiang Kai-shek. They bend with the wind. There was a capitalist in Hankow. From Hankow to Peking, he made a living by relying on the slogan "Support the Communist Party; Support Government Representatives" and would not say one word more. Actually his thinking did not change much. Had we not firmly resisted when the rightists attacked last year, and had Nazism appeared in China and the rightists gained power, these people would surge upward and they wouldn't have hesitated to knock down the Communist Party. They are two-minded about the Communist Party, wavering between for and against, while the rightists have no intention of supporting the Communist Party. After the struggle for all of this past year, these people are changing their political thinking, but they are still half-hearted. Last year most of them were without direction. However, after the big blooming and big contending, the victory of the rural and urban rectification campaign, and the great leap forward in production, they had to change by force of the situation. Whether it can be considered as 30 and 70 per cent, I hope everyone will give it consideration. A situation is man-made. Men form crowds, and the majority overwhelms the minority. The great Yangtze River Bridge, industrialization, and so on, can be classified as part of the situation. The second exploiting class is relatively civilized, and we can handle it with civilized methods, adopting the formula of criticism, which is different from the method of the anti-rightist struggle. Towards the rightists we resort to a method rather coercive in essence, for no other purpose than to make them notorious. Our policies are also different towa! rds the two exploiting classes. We rally the second while isolating and knocking down the first. In other words, we rally the middle-roaders and isolate the rightists.

Though the landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists number as many as 30 million, they are scattered in the country, surrounded and isolated. They would never have imagined the holding of a rightist congress; it would be equivalent to an imperial favor and amnesty. All big cities (cities with a population of 300,000 or more) should hold such a congress, with speeches by major responsible comrades, and the speeches should be intensive and penetrating. There should first be lectures and then rallying. The lecture should be cold and bleak and the rallying wild and enthusiastic, pointing out the future and giving them hope. Similar to Old Woman Liu entering the Ta-kuan Garden to borrow money, Sister Feng was unscrupulous. Some people say that she would be an able statesman in peace time and cunning politician in times of unrest.

There are two working classes, the workers and the peasants. In the past, their mind was not at one, and they were not clear about the ideology and their mutual relations. They worked and farmed under the leadership of our party, and we did not properly handle the problem of their mutual relations. Generally speaking, the work style of our cadres is fundamentally different from that of the Kuomintang, but some of them are more or less the same. Similar to the overlord toward the common citizen, or the slave master toward the slave, they convince by force instead of persuasion. One woman cadre in the Hunan Hospital usurped a lavatory and forbade anyone else from using it. The bad work style of certain cadres is almost the same as the Kuomintang, and a few individuals even surpass it. Hence, the workers and peasants regard them as the Kuomintang. For this reason, the world philosophy of the workers and peasants did not change, and they struggled for the "five big items." They are afraid to express themselves for fear of being rectified, forced to "wear small shoes," and given a hard time. Who would have the nerve to display "big character posters?" Since the big blooming, big contending, big rectifying, and big reforming, there has been a great change in such relations. The workers criticized themselves for their struggle for the "five big items", and their work attitude improved. The bath workers declared against their own wage increase. Immediately upon becoming a cadre, a store worker in Wu-han turned arrogant toward the store clerks. It was the work style of the Kuomintang. Once they changed their overlord style, the cadres of Hung-an County became one with the masses and a transformation occurred in their relations. The ownership system, mutual relations, and distribution relations are the three issues in production relations. When we tackle the middle, it is to tackle the mutual relations. Our rectification is to solve the mutual relations issue. Cer! tain individuals among the Communist Party members learned the style of the slave master in society and school. Liu chieh-mei learned it in society. Let us rectify the mutual relations, the relations between the party and political work groups and the workers in the plant, between the cadres and members in the cooperative, between the party and political personnel of all levels and the lower echelons, between the cadres and the masses, between the principal and teachers and the students. In other words, the internal contradictions in the people should be solved by persuasion, not by coercion. By so doing, the cover is lifted, and the people feel comfortable, mentally liberated, and will have the courage to write big character posters. It is Leninism, not opportunism. Lenin died too young. His writings, especially his books written in the revolutionary period, should be carefully studied. His reasoning is vivid and lively and he bares his heart to the people in his sincerity, without any hedging. The same holds true even in his struggle against the enemy. Comrade Stalin had a slight overlord flavor. Educated in a missionary school, he was not so good in dialectics, nor materialism. He was divorced from reality and did not handle successfully the mutual relations. He was relatively rigid. In the past, the relations between the Soviet Union and us were those between father and son, cat and mouse, and the thinking was inflexible. Now, it is somewhat better. Our democratic tradition has a long history. Promoting democracy at our base, with neither money, grain, weapons, nor outside aid, we had no choice but to rely on the people. The party had to become one with the people, the troops with the masses, and the officers with the soldiers. To handle such relations successfully, we had to resort to the three main rules of discipline and eight points for attentions[2]. We treated the people with equality, abolished physical punishment among the troops, repeal! ed the death penalty for deserters, constantly taught and struggled, and educated the new soldiers after each battle. Therefore, though there was some overlord attitude, we also learned some democratic work style. It was tempered in the long and arduous struggle. Yet even now, there are still some who do not subscribe to the method of persuasion toward the people. Some people in Tsinan, for instance, said that the tendency in the spring of 1957 was toward the right, and that they approved of the summer situation but not the spring situation. In fact, the summer situation was not so commendable either. As mentioned in the article on the summer situation[3], if democracy can be practiced in the troops, why can't it be practiced in the people? One can see that this problem has not been solved. After rectification last year, the bumper harvest this year especially, and the (fundamental or preliminary) transformation of our backwardness with three more years of hard struggle, the people will understand and become convinced. But we must still perform work, write articles, and use reasoning to convince. In view of the situation of the class struggle in the transition, I feel that there will be five percent of germs (hostile class). The middle road faction may also deteriorate. They have criticisms in their mind. Temporarily they are keeping quiet, but they will express themselves in the future. We must remember that the struggle is protracted, repetitious, and complex. Nevertheless, the fundamental battle of the class struggle has been fought, and a victory has been basically won. Hundreds of million have risen. The rightists are isolated. The 300,000 rightists have become notorious and are without capital. The national bourgeoisie has also become notorious, and the same with the three-evils and five evils elements[4]. Two titles are conferred on the intellectuals: bourgeois intellectuals and in! tellectuals without bearing. Leadership figures have appeared in their leftist and rightist factions. The heroes are among the leftists, and they are of us. Those making mistakes in the future will also be among the leftists, because the leftists have capital. Any carelessness will lead to mistakes. XXX, for instance, was a member of the political bureau for 40 years, but he divorced himself from the masses and did not set foot in one plant or one rural village. His good point had been visiting everywhere in the field, and he was known as a traveler. I feel that being a traveler has its benefits. When we were engaged in guerrilla warfare in the past, we were travelers, travelling for decades. Now we are still travelling from the south to the north and we still want to remain travelers. Under the present provisions, those in the central government and the provincial levels must spend four months a year travelling, and a longer period for those in the regions and counties. We must think of the ways and means to chase them out of the front door and turn them into travelers.

Just how is the class struggle in the transition period? We must expect repetitions. There will be repetitions in the class struggle. If a momentous event should happen in the world, if a major problem appears in China, or if there is a world war or severe famine, the rightists may revolt, and the middle-roaders may rise up to resist us. Nevertheless, the fundamental battle has been fought and the situation is good, but we must be prepared for the bad.

In sum, the cadres are learning Marxism. To learn Marxism, we must break down superstition. We must not feel that only foreigners can succeed in learning. There is nothing unusual about foreigners. The foreigners think of us as foreigners also, and those on the moon regard us as gods. I believe we can succeed in learning. Four things are needed: a guiding ideology, state wealth, successors, and grain. We must have mental preparation. Bad things will occur. There may be incidents in the provinces, involving 20,000, 30,000 or 40,000 people. We must break down superstition, believing in, yet disbelieving in, the scientists. Since ancient times, the children have always excelled the parents, the students the teachers, the young the old, and the spectators the performers. Whenever a problem is discussed, we must also discuss ideology. Some comrades always talk about mathematics. It is not good to leave ideology out. We must not follow the example of the Soviet academicians who give no attention to the internal contradictions among the people.

The Monkey King disregarded the laws and the heavens[5]. Why don't we all emulate him? His anti-dogmatism was demonstrated in his courage to do whatever he wanted. Chu Pa-chieh represented liberalism, but he had a touch of revisionism in him also, because he was always threatening to quit. Of course it was not a good party, it was the Second International. Monk T'ang was equivalent to Bernstein.

The people's and party congresses at the provincial level and above should publish big character posters. There are many in our party who are doubtful of the internal contradictions among the people. Such internal contradictions include those between the exploiters and exploited, those among the workers, peasants, and the Communist Party, and those between the leaders and the led. All contradictions are internal contradictions among the people, except those with the rightists and counter revolutionaries. Failure to visit the plants or the farms and bad work styles are internal contradictions among the people. Like the Yangtze River roaring down 10,000 *li*, the big character posters will wash away the dregs in the mind of many people.

How can we catch the snake if we don't let it come out? We must let the scoundrels appear and put on performances and talk nonsense in the newspapers. Let them express and feel pleased with themselves, so that the people can see them clearly and understand them. Our method is to force and capture, and to struggle against and capture. Capturing in the city and struggling in the village make it easy to do things. We issued directives at the beginning of the rectification movement, but such directives were distributed to a small minority, the majority remaining ignorant of them. We wanted to see whether the lower echelon cadres and party members used their brains and we wanted to know their attitude.

We were forced by the situation into technical revolution. The appearance of the XX issue and imperialism were also due to the force of the situation. Things are forced to appear by the presence of opposites. (When Hung-niang was beaten, she enumerated many good principles.) Many things in the world make their appearance due to the force of the situation. When we study a problem we must control the material with a viewpoint and activate the affair at hand with politics. When discussing work appearances, we must not inundate it like a pouring rain, but must go into the details like a fine rain. How can there be a level when only numbers are discussed, without politics? Politics and numbers are the relations between the officers and soldiers, and politics is the commander. Let us hold a newspaper meeting this year. We are not afraid to activate the masses. Activating the masses is the true Marxist-Leninist work style. Lenin went to the villages and the plants in order to associate with the people, and he was vigorously opposed to bureaucraticism.

In rectification we must clarify the line between the enemy and ourselves. The People's Government practices democracy toward the people and dictatorship over the enemy. Rectification requires attacking from both the inside and the outside, but the line between the enemy and ourselves must be clarified, dictatorship enforced over the enemy, and persuasion practiced toward the people. Rectification and anti-rightism have the essence of another power seizure in many areas and units. A class includes many strata within it, and the problems are complex. There is the distinction between the middle and the poor among the peasants, and between the new and the old among the workers. The relationship between the upper and lower levels is also an internal contradiction among the people. The contradictions between the rightists and the people are the conflicts between the enemy and ourselves. After rectification and anti-rightism, the political root is settled, and the cadres and the masses have gained experience and clarified the two types of contradictions.

A rightist faction in a county in Chekiang attempted to become active. As it did not have the support of the masses, it failed.

Notes

[1.] Chung Po-chun; see note 1, p 10 of this volume.

[2.] For three main rules of discipline and eight points for attention see *S.W.*, Vol. IV. pp l55-156.

[3.] See comrade Mao's article 'The Situation In the Summer of 1957' *S.W.*, Vol. V, pp 473-482.

[4.] The three evils are corruption, waste and bureaucracy. The five evils are, bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing of economic information.

[5.] Sun Wu-kung is the Monkey King in the Chinese novel Hsi Yu chi (Pilgrimage the West) written in the 16th century.

Introducing A Co-operative

April 15, 1958

The article "A Co-operative That Transformed Itself in Two Years of Bitter Struggle"[1] is worth reading. The communist spirit is growing apace throughout the country. The political consciousness of the broad masses is rising rapidly. The backward sections among them are exerting themselves to catch up with the advanced, which demonstrates that the socialist revolution in our country is forging ahead in the economic field (in those places where the relations of production have not yet been completely transformed) and in the political, ideological, technical and cultural fields. Judging from this, it will probably take less time than previously estimated for our industry and agriculture to catch up with that of the capitalist powers. In addition to the leadership of the Party, a decisive factor is our population of 600 million. More people mean a greater ferment of ideas, more enthusiasm and more energy. Never before have the masses of the people been so inspired, so militant and so daring as at present. The former exploiting classes have been completely swamped in the boundless ocean of the working people and must change, even if unwillingly. Undoubtedly there are people who will never change, who would prefer to keep their thinking ossified down to the Day of Judgment, but that does not matter very much. All decadent ideology and other incongruous parts of the superstructure are crumbling as the days go by. To clear away the rubbish completely will still take some time, but there is no doubt of their inevitable and total collapse. Apart from their other characteristics, the outstanding thing about China's 600 million people is that they are "poor and blank". This may seem a bad thing, but in reality it is a good thing. Poverty gives rise to the desire for change, the desire for action and the desire for revolution. On a blank sheet of paper free from any mark, the freshest and most beautiful characters can be writt! en, the freshest and most beautiful pictures can be painted. The big-character poster[2] is a very useful new weapon, which can be used in the cities and the rural areas, in factories, co-operatives, shops, government institutions, schools, army units and streets — in short, wherever the masses are to be found. It has already been widely used and should always be used. A poem written by Kung Tzu-chen[3] of the Ching Dynasty reads:

Only in wind and thunder can the country show its vitality;

Alas, the ten thousand horses are all muted!

O Heaven! Bestir yourself, I beseech you,

And send down men of all the talents.

Big-character posters have dispelled the dullness in which "ten thousand horses are all muted". Now I wish to recommend one co-operative to the comrades in the more than 700,000 co-operatives in the countryside and to the comrades in the cities. Situated in Fenghiu County, Honan Province, and called the Yingchu Co-operative, it provides us with much food for deep thought. Do the Chinese working people still retain any of their past slavish features? None at all; they have become the masters. The working people on the 9,600,000 square kilometers of the People's Republic of China have really begun to be the rulers of our land.

Notes

[1.] This article introduce the Yingchu Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Fengchiu County, Honan Province. It is situated on low-lying land where water-logging has often been disastrous, and before liberation the people there lived in poverty and hardship. After liberation their life improved and in 1955 the co-operative was formed. In its first two years, it suffered a succession of serious floods. Relying on their own strength and putting their collective wisdom to work, the cadres and members of the co-operative waged a bitter struggle against natural disasters. In the short space of two years the co-operative basically freed itself from drought and flood and drastically changed its appearance by building extensive water conservancy works, bringing dry land under irrigation and converting alkaline land into paddy fields.

[2.] The Tatsepao, or big-character poster, is powerful new weapon, a means of criticism and self-criticism which was created by the masses during the rectification movement; at the same time it is used to expose and attack the enemy. It is also a powerful weapon for conducting debate and education in accordance with the broadest mass democracy. People write down their views, suggestions or exposures and criticisms of others in big characters on large sheets of paper and put them up in conspicuous places for people to read.

[3.] Kung Tzu-chen (1792-1841) of Jenho (now Hangchow), Chekiang Province, was a progressive thinker and writer of the Ching Dynasty. He wrote this poem on worshipping the gods at Chenkiang on his way back to Hangchow from Peking in 1839.

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung

Speeches At The Second Session Of The Eighth Party Congress

May 8-23, 1958

[SOURCE: '*Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*,' a Red Guard Publication.]

The First Speech May 8, 1958

Let us discuss the breaking down of superstition. Didn't a comrade mention it just a while ago? Some of our comrades have many fears. Some are afraid of being college professors, but they have gradually lost or reduced their fear after the rectification. Some have already accepted letters of employment as professors. I read in the newspapers that comrade K'o Ch'ing-shih accepted the professorship at Fu-tan university. It was a manifestation of fearlessness. Others are preparing to serve as college professors. The above concerns the fear of being bourgeois professors. Is there also the fear of being proletarian professors? I think there is. For instance, there is the fear of Marx. He lived in a very tall building, and one had to climb many flights of stairs to reach him, something unattainable in a lifetime. As I mentioned at the Ch'eng-tu conference, do not be afraid, because Marx was also a human being, with two eyes, two hands, and one brain, not much different from us, except that he had a lot of Marxism in his mind. He wrote many books for us to read. We do not have to read all of them. Is Comrade X X X here? (Answer: Here.) Have you finished reading them? If you have finished reading them, then you have ascended the stairs. I have not finished reading them; therefore I am still downstairs. As we have not finished reading his books, we all belong downstairs, but do not be afraid. It is not necessary to read all of Marx's books. Reading some of the fundamental things will be sufficient, but what we have done has surpassed Marx. What Lenin said and did surpassed Marx in many aspects. Marx did not undertake the October Revolution, but Lenin did; therefore, Lenin surpassed Marx in the practical aspect. At that time, he had the conditions of the time. Marx never undertook China's great revolution; therefore, our practice also surpassed Marx. Principles are created in practice. Marx did not succeed in his revolution, but we did. When such revolutionary practice is ref! lected in ideology, it becomes theory.

Our theoretical level is not high. It is not high now, but we must not be afraid. As long as we exert ourselves, we will go forward. Stairs can be made, and so can elevators. We must not belittle ourselves or hold ourselves in contempt. As I have often said to some comrades, China was oppressed by imperialism for over 100 years and the people were intimidated by the propaganda of obedience to foreigners and foreign countries spread by imperialism; they were afraid of everything. Feudalism propagandized obedience to Confucius, making us feel inferior. We were inferior in the face of Confucius. Since the Opium War[1], we have been inferior in the face of foreigners, and we were afraid of them. Before that we were afraid of Confucius. Old Tung did you not once obey Confucius? What was the reason? At that time, the saying was "rejecting the Sage is violating the law." Opposing the Sage was violating the constitution. In regard to the foreigners, I am inferior to them; in regard to Confucius, I am inferior to him. What kind of reasoning is this? I once asked some comrades around me whether we lived in heaven or on earth. They all shook their head and said that we lived on earth. I said no, we live in heaven. When we look at the stars from the earth, they are in heaven. But if there are people in the stars, when they look at us, wouldn't they think that we are in heaven? Therefore I say that we live in heaven while also on earth at the same time. The Chinese like the gods. I asked them whether we were gods. They answered no. I said wrong. The gods live in heaven . We live on earth, but also in heaven; so, why shouldn't we be considered gods also? If there were people in the stars, wouldn't they also consider us as gods? My third question was whether the Chinese were also foreigners? They said no, only the foreigners were foreigners. I said wrong, the Chinese were also foreigners, because when we consider the people of fore! ign countries as foreigners, wouldn't they also consider us as foreigners? It explains the superstitious ideas on the this point.

There is a kind of microbes which are called germs. Though small in size, from a certain standpoint, they are more powerful than men. They have no superstition and are full of energy. They strive for the upper reaches and for greater, faster, better, and more economical results. They are not afraid of heaven or earth. They do not respect anyone. If they want to eat people, they will crawl into them regardless of who you are. Even if you should weigh 80 kilograms, they can destroy you. No one counts as far as they are concerned. Isn't their fearless spirit much stronger than certain people?

Since ancient times, whenever the scholars or inventors created a new school of thought, they have always started young, possessed not much learning, and were scorned and oppressed. Not until later did they grow into adults and become learned. Are all the people like this? Is it a universal law? We cannot be completely sure, and it requires investigation and study. However, one can say that the majority are like that. Why did they become inventors, scholars, or heroes? They succeeded because their bearing was correct. Regardless of the amount of learning, if the bearing is wrong, it is of no use. "Man dreads fame and a hog dreads fat." The famous people are often the most backward, most fearful, and most lacking in creativity. Why? Because they have already attained fame. They have seniority and position, and are no longer oppressed. Being busy, they do not study any more. Of course, we cannot discredit all famous people. There are exceptions. Instances of young people knocking down the old people, or the uneducated knocking down the highly educated, are numerous.

There was a man named Kan Lo in the Kingdom of Ch'in during China's Warring States period. He was probably the grandson of Kan Mao. He became prime minister at the age of 12. He was truly a "red scarf." When his grandfather Kan Mao did not know what to do, he did. He solved a major problem in the Kingdom of Chao.

Chia I in the Han Dynasty was sought by Emperor Wen when the former was only 17 years old and was promoted three times in one day. Later on he was exiled to Ch'ang-sha. There he wrote two poems entitled "Mourning Ch'u Yuan" and "The Enormous Bird." Returning to the court, he wrote two books entitled *The Strategy to Maintain Peace and The Faults of the Ch'in Dynasty*. I think he was also an expert on the history of Ch'in and Han. Is Comrade Fan Wen-lan here? Am I correct? Please look into it. Chia I wrote dozens of books and what we have today are the two poems and two treatises discussed above. At the time of his death he was only 33 years of age.

Liu Pang of the Han Dynasty was older. Hsiang Yu launched an uprising at age 24 and became a feudal prince five years later. Subsequently, he conferred on himself the title of the King of Ch'u. He died at age 32. He was very young when he said his famous farewell to his queen. Now he wears a beard in the opera. I think it is wrong. He should be portrayed only as a young man.

Han Hsin was also scorned. During his youth, he suffered the insult of being forced to crawl between someone's legs.

Confucius had no position in his youth. He worked as a bugler and drummer and served as the master of ceremony at funerals. Later on he taught. Although he became a government official and once served as the chief of the judicial department in the Kingdom of Lu, it was only for a short time. The Kingdom of Lu had a population of only la few hundred thousand, not any bigger than one of our counties. Confucius' position as chief of the judicial department was only equivalent to a section chief in our county government. He also served as a minor official in charge of money, equivalent to an accountant in our agricultural cooperative, but he acquired much skill.

Yen Yuan was a disciple of Confucius. He could be considered as a second grade sage. He died at age 32.

Shakyamuni created Buddhism in his youth, while still in his teens or possibly 20. He belonged to an oppressed race in India at that time.

Hung Niang in the *Western Chambers* was a famous figure, known to everyone[2]. She was a young slave girl, but she was just and brave. She had the courage to break through the conventions and render aid to Ts'ui Ying-ying and Scholar Chang. What she did at that time was illegal and in violation of the marriage law. The old mistress gave her a sound beating, but she would not capitulate. Instead, she reprimanded the old mistress. Was the old mistress or Hung Niang better educated? Which one was creative? Which one was an inventor?

Hsun Kuan-niang (of Lin-yin County, Honan) of the North and South Dynasties was a 13-year-old girl, with an educational level of first year middle school at the most. When she and her father were trapped in Hsiang-yang, she had the courage to lead several dozen men to break through the enemy line and get help from Ch'ang-sha. How capable she was!

Poet Li Ho in the T'ang Dynasty died at age 27.

Li Shih-min, the first emperor of the T'ang Dynasty, was only 18 when he launched an uprising and only 26 when he became emperor. Both Li Ho and Li Shih-min were of aristocratic origin.

Lo Shih-hsin of Tung-li-ch'eng at the end of T'ang Dynasty started an uprising at age 24. He fought battles at age 14 and was very brave. Tu Fu-wei (of Chang-ch'iu, Shantung) became a general at age 16.

Wang Po, the author of the poem entitled "T'eng-wang-ko" and one of the four eminents at the beginning of T'ang Dynasty, was also a young man. At the time of his death, he was only 29.

Yueh Fei, the famous general in-the Sung Dynasty, was only 38 when he died.

Comrade Fan Wen-lan, am I right? You are a historian. Please correct me if I am wrong.

Marx did not create Marxism during his adulthood or old age, but in his youth. He was only 29 when he wrote the *Communist Manifesto*.

Lenin was only 32 years old when he founded Bolshevism in 1903.

Both Chou Yu and K'ung Ming were young men. K'ung Ming served as the military chief of staff at age 27. Sun Wu's original commanding general Ch'eng P'u was an old man, but when Sun Wu attacked Ts'ao Ts'ao, he used Chou Yu as the commanding general, ranking him above Ch'eng P'u. The latter resented it, but Chou Yu won the battle. Chou Yu died at age 36. Huang Kai, who came from Li-ling, Hunan, established merits in the same battle. I felt honoured for his deeds as we came from the same place.

Wang Pi of the Ch'in Dynasty wrote annotations to *Chuang-tzu* and *I-chang*. He was a philosopher at age 18. His grandfather was Wang Su. He died at age 24.

The inventor of the sleeping pill was not an expert. It is reported that he was in charge of drugs in a small pharmacy. I read about it in a pamphlet. He almost lost his life when he experimented on the sleeping pill. After he succeeded in his experiments, the French Government did not approve of him and accused him of violating the law. The Germans invited him over, held a celebration in his honour and published his books.

The inventor of penicillin was a dyer. When his daughter fell sick, he had no money to send her to hospital. So, he scooped up a handful of dirt from the vat and mixed it with something. The daughter recovered after taking the mixture. Later on, after experimenting, penicillin was discovered.

Darwin, the great inventor, was also a young man. He was religious in his early days and was also scorned by others. He studied biology and traveled everywhere, North and South America and Asia, but he did not get to Shanghai.

Recently Hu Shih[3] returned to Taiwan and ran the Academy of Science. Two American inventors, Li Cheng-tao and Yang Chen-ning, were included among the members. These two men are also young.

Hao Chien-hsiu, a national people's congress delegate, created an advanced spinning method when she was only 18.

Nieh Erh, the great musician who wrote the national anthem, is also a young man.

No-cha, the son of Heavenly King Li Chin, was also a young man. But he was very talented!

King Lan-ling of the North and South Dynasties was also a young man. He was skilled in battle and very brave. There is a song which eulogizes him entitled "The Song of King Lan-ling Entering the Battle." I hear that this song is in Japan.

Many outstanding cadres in the townships and communes are young people. In general, there are many capable young men.

My purpose in citing so many examples is to show that the young people must surpass the old and the less educated can excel the more educated. Do not be intimidated by famous people and scholars. We must be courageous in thinking, speaking and doing. We must not be afraid to think, speak, or do. We must liberate ourselves from the condition of having our hands and feet tied.

The initiative and creativity of the laboring people have always been abundant. In the past, they were held in restraint under the old system. Now they have been liberated and have begun to produce results.

Our method is to lift the lid, break down superstition and let the initiative and creativity of the laboring people explode.

In the past, many people felt that to develop industry was something too high to attain and very mysterious. They said: “it is not easy to achieve industrialization!” In general, there was a big superstition in regard to industry.

Neither do I understand industry. I know nothing about it, yet I do not believe that it is unattainable. I discussed the subject with several persons in charge of industry. It seems to be incomprehensible at the beginning, but becomes comprehensible after a few years of study. There’s nothing much to it! I think that in 10 years or so our country will become an industrial nation. We must not consider industrialization as something so serious. We must first hold it in contempt and then give it serious attention.

“Make the high mountain bow its head; make the river yield the way.” It is an excellent sentence. When we ask the high mountain to bow its head, it has to do so! When we ask the river to yield the way, it must yield!

Is such a hypothesis groundless? No, we are not insane; we are pragmatists; we are Marxists seeking truth from facts.

We do not want big nation chauvinism. It means ugly and evil behaviour and low class interest.

Chia Kuei is a character in the play entitled *Fa-men Temple*. He served under Liu Chin. The latter was a court eunuch in the Ming Dynasty, but actually the “prime minister”, possessed great powers. One time Liu Chin asked Chia Kuei to take a seat. Chia Kuei said: “I am used to standing; I do not dare to sit.” It was a slavish behaviour. The Chinese people served as slaves to imperialism for a long time. It is inevitable that a tail from this slavish behavior is carried over to the present. This tail must be chopped off; the work style of Chia Kuei must be knocked down.

There are two kinds of modesty One is ordinary modesty and the other is modesty compatible with reality.

The dogmatists copy from foreign countries. This is excessive modesty. Why do they not use their brains in whatever they do? In China’s classical poetry, there is a kind, which is imitation classical poetry. It is excessive modesty Without any creative style of their own, they have to imitate others.

The revisionists are also guilty of excessive modesty. Tito, for instance, does nothing but copy from Eduard Bernstein and borrow from his bourgeois mentors.

When a proletariat copies from the proletariat of another country, it is dogmatism, copying the bad as well as the good. This is not good. One must copy, but what one should copy is the spirit, the essence, not the superficial. The nine common outlines of Moscow (said to be five outlines in *Re-discussion,* but there are nine in the Moscow Declaration), for instance, are things in common among the nations and not one can be left out. The universal truth must be combined with China's concrete reality. If not combined, it will be copying, and excessive modesty. Anything which is not a universal truth cannot be copied as is. Even things domestic must not be copied without modification. At the time of the land reform, the Central [Government] did not stress the experience of any one particular area. It was for fear of copying. This issue must be given attention in the current work.

The revisionists are influenced by the bourgeoisie; they copy the bourgeoisie. Tito's copying Eduard Bernstein is one example.

We must study Lenin and be courageous in hoisting the red flag, the redder the better. We must be courageous in advocating something new and establishing something different. There are two kinds of advocating something new and establishing something different: Hoisting the red flag is proper; hoisting the white flag is improper. Lenin advocated something new and established something different for the Second International and it was proper for him to hoist another red flag. The red flag has to be hoisted in any case. If you fail to do so, the bourgeoisie will hoist the white flag. Rather than permitting the bourgeoisie to hoist the flag, it is better for our proletariat to do so. We must be courageous in hoisting the flag, leave no room [for the bourgeoisie]. We must uproot and discard the flags hoisted by the bourgeoisie. We must be courageous in hoisting and uprooting.

Lenin once said: "Progressive Asia and backward Europe." It was the truth. Even now it is still thus. We are progressive; Western Europe is backward.

We regard with contempt the bourgeoisie, the gods and God, but we must not belittle small nations or our own comrades.

When we become a modernized, industrialized and highly cultured great power 15 years hence, we may possibly become too cocky and raise our tail sky high. We must not be afraid. Let us make it clear now. When a dog raises his tail, he doesn't necessarily indicate that he is ready to fight. He can be off with a splash of cold water. Sometimes we also need to have cold water splashed on us.

Improper self-confidence, mediocre self-confidence and false self-confidence are all not permissible. Modesty without a scientific foundation is not true modesty. True modesty must be compatible with reality. For example, when we tell the foreigners that China is still an agricultural nation and its industrial construction is just beginning . . ., it is reality, but the foreigners will find us modest. Modesty must be compatible with reality. Some kind of modesty is less than reality, or excessive modesty. Generally speaking, it has to be compatible with reality.

This view is similar to Lu Hsun's satire. Lu Hsun said: Depicting true things with a well tempered or slightly exaggerated pen is satire.

I was happy to read a recent article by Comrade Fan Wen-lan. It was straight talk. Many facts cited in the article prove that respecting the modern and belittling the ancient is a Chinese tradition. He quoted Ssu-ma Ch'ien[4], Ssu-ma Kuang . . . but it is regrettable that he did not quote Ch'in-Shih-huang. He was an expert in respecting the modern and belittling the ancient. Of course I do not like to quote him either. (Comrade Lin Piao interrupts: "Ch'in-shih-huang burned the books and buried the scholars alive".) What did he amount to? He only buried alive 460 scholars, while we buried 46,000. In our suppression of the counter-revolutionaries, did we not kill some counter-revolutionary intellectuals? I once debated with the democratic people: You accuse us of acting like Ch'in-shih-huang, but you are wrong; we surpass him 100 times. You berate us for imitating Ch'in-shih-huang in enforcing dictatorship. We admit them all. What is regrettable is that you did not say enough. We have had to say it for you. (Laughter.)

Things will always march toward the opposite side.

The dialectics of Greece, the metaphysics of the Middle Ages, the Restoration. . . . It is the negation of negation.

It is also true in China. The hundred scholars expressing themselves in the time of the Warring States was dialectics. The classics of the feudal era were metaphysics. Now dialectics is being promoted.

Am I right? Comrade Fan Wen-lan, you are familiar with such things.

I feel that after 15 years we will become cocky and big nation chauvinism may appear. We are not afraid of the appearance of big nation chauvinism. Should we stop struggling for the construction of a socialist power just because we are afraid of big nation chauvinism? Even if it should appear, it will march toward the opposite direction and something correct will replace it. What is there to fear? In a socialist nation, it is impossible for all the people to become big nation chauvinists. Lenin's dialectics, Stalin's partial metaphysics and today's dialectics are also the negation of negation.

Stalin was not completely a metaphysicist. He understood dialectics, but not very thoroughly.

The creativity of the people exists objectively. It is important to set up an opposite. Opposites exist objectively. With regard to the rightists, for example, we let them express themselves. We do so purposely, our goal is to set up the opposite. After rectifying the rightists, some comrades overlooked rectification and reform. Thus, we stressed the big character posters and the double antis, thus setting up the opposite. After publishing 100 million big character posters, they were forced to reform.

When we say setting up the opposite, it does not mean setting up something not in objective existence. The so-called opposite can only be set up when it is in objective existence. What is not in objective existence cannot be set up.

I have finished my speech. The subject matter is breaking down superstition. Do not be afraid of being professors or of Marx.

The Second Speech

May 17 1958

1. The International Situation

There are many troubles in the capitalist world. We have less in our world. We are firmly united. Yugoslavia is not in our camp; it doesn't count. We did not exclude it. It does not want to join us. The situation of the 12 nations in our camp is very good. It has always been good. There hasn't been any bad day. But at times there are dark clouds in the sky. Some people feel that we are not capable while others are. We say that we are capable. I listed 10 pieces of evidence at the Moscow conference[5] to prove that we have always been capable. When Chiang Kai-shek was in Nanking and we in Yenan, which one was capable? At that time Yenan had only 7,000 people, including the suburbs. Nanking is very big. Big cities like Nanking and Shanghai were all in Chiang Kai-shek's hands. He had millions of troops while we had only several hundred thousand guerrillas. It has always been the case for the small to defeat the big and for the weak to conquer the strong. The small and the weak have vigor, while the big and the strong do not. The general situation is very good. We need not talk about Hitler, Chiang Kai-shek and U.S. imperialism. We have always regarded U.S. imperialism as a paper tiger. Pity there is only one U.S. imperialism; even if there were 10 of them, it would not bother us. It will perish sooner or later.

The Japanese in Peking apologized to me for attacking us. I said: you did a good deed. Precisely because of your invasion and occupation of more than half of China we were able to unite, lead the people of the entire nation to chase you away and come to Peking. When we were in Yenan, we wondered when we would be able to see the operas of Mei Lan-fang and Ch'eng Yan-ch'iu. Some thought they would never have a chance in their lifetime. However, we did get to see the operas. The revolutionary situation has been developing rapidly. In seven years, the entire party united and overthrew Chiang Kai-shek. Now we want to unite and undertake construction. The “Seventh Party Congress” had a program[6]. This congress was also a congress of unity, a congress of victory. It also had a common program. The entire party unanimously formulated a general line for the building of socialism, which also serves as the general line of the people of the entire country. The situation at home is one of unity in the party and among the people.

The international scene is troubled with much disorder. There are internal squabbles in the imperialist camp. The world is not at peace. There are troubles in France, Algeria, Latin America, Indonesia and Lebanon. All the troubles are in the capitalist world. But they all concern us. Anything that is adverse to imperialism is advantageous to us. Imperialism is squabbling within itself; it is suppressing Indonesia, Lebanon and Latin America and fighting over Algeria. (I shall not repeat the details. I refer you to the materials.) Generally speaking, sometimes the situation seems to be bad, dark clouds in the sky. At such times we must be far-sighted. We must not be confused by the temporary darkness and feel that things are wrong with us and with the world and that we will have bad luck. There is no such thing! In the past, our worst period was the Long March[7], blocked in front and pursued from behind and our troops, our land and our party were reduced, with only one of our ten fingers left. Overcoming these difficulties tempered us. Later on, new opportunities appeared and we again developed ourselves. Our one finger grew into ten. We developed all the way to the founding of the People’s Republic of China and gained a national victory. The very first page of the first chapter of the Soviet Communist Party History discussed the dialectics of growing from small to big. The Soviet communists developed from a cell organized by a few individuals into a great party leading the nation. They had not even a single rifle. Yet, first the Czar and then the Kerensky Government, both fully armed numbered among their enemies. Which one was stronger, the fully armed or the one without a rifle? I say that the latter was stronger. Who conquered whom at the end? The condition of our party was similar to it. In 1921 our party was founded, consisting of only a few dozen members. Chou Fu-hai of the First Party Congress was a “good comrade” (sound o! f laughter) and Ch’en Kung-po another “good comrade” (sound of laughter)[8]. Ch’en Tu-hsiu did not come to the meeting, but because of his prestige, he was elected the secretary general. But he was unfit. He subscribed to Bernstein-ism. He was a radical and willing to promote a democratic revolution, but he did not understand the socialist revolution or the theory of the continuous revolution; therefore, he made mistakes. Let us recall our party history and see how much difficulties we have encountered! There was the Long March and there was also the period from the Third to the Fourth Plenum [of the Sixth Central Committee?][9]. The Fourth Plenum was held in Shanghai and there were very few people left. It was life or death. The party was splitting.

At the time of the Long March of 25,000 li, the party was also splitting. After splitting, it united again. Chang Kuo-t’ao took off and unity was restored. Subsequently in Yenan, Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese surrounded us, cutting us into more than 10 bases. Under such a difficult situation, was Yenan or Nanking stronger? Were we or was Chiang Kai-shek stronger? Now it has been proven that we were stronger, for how else would we be holding a meeting in Huai-jen Hall? Why did he flee to Taiwan? Who was the victor?

2. The Domestic Situation

China is an important component of international society. When we discuss the international situation, we must discuss China. China is the proof that the laboring people, the oppressed, have vigor. Currently, socialism has many allies. The national independence movement of Asia, Africa and Latin America is our ally. They are the rear areas of imperialism and we have allies there. Lenin said: Progressive Asia and backward Europe." England, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium and Portugal in Europe are all backward; the U.S. is also backward. Are they progressive or are we? Stalin understood this point. In June 1949, when Comrade XXX led our party delegation to the Soviet Union and Stalin toasted China at a banquet for surpassing the Soviet Union in the future, Comrade XXX said: "I cannot drink this toast. You are the teacher and we the pupil. When we catch up with you, you will have progressed even further." Stalin replied: "Incorrect. If the pupil cannot surpass the teacher, he is not a good pupil. You must drink this toast." After a deadlock of 20 minutes, Comrade XXX finally drank the toast. When the teacher teaches the pupil, the latter will be undeserving if he does not catch up with the former. The incident indicated that not just Lenin, but even Stalin saw the East as progressive. When the teacher is eminent, the pupil is outstanding. We must not be arrogant and cocky, nor must we feel inferior, considering ourselves worthless without cause. We must break down superstition and place ourselves in the proper level. We should be courageous in thinking, speaking, and doing, with Marxism-Leninism as the foundation. Tito has courage in thinking, speaking, and doing, but his foundation is imperialism and capitalism, not Marxism-Leninism. Our foundation is Marxism-Leninism; therefore, we are correct, and we will not get into trouble when we think, speak, and do with courage.

Let us discuss the domestic problem. The peasant alliance remains to be the domestic problem. China's revolution has always been the issue of this alliance. Without it, the working class could not have gained liberation; it would not be able to build a powerful nation. Prior to the liberation, China's working class numbered only four million (excluding handicraft). Now there are 12 million, or three times as many. When we include the family members, the number is only around 40 million, while the peasant population reaches over 500 million. Therefore, China's problem has always been the problem of the peasant alliance. Some comrades are not very clear about this, not even after having worked in the rural village for decades. Why did we make anti-adventurist mistakes in 1956? The major cause rested with the problem of the peasant alliance. The thinking and feelings of the peasants were not thoroughly understood; therefore, there was no basis and, the moment there was a storm, vacillation could easily occur. In 1956 we published a book on the rural socialist high tide, including material from 190 cooperatives in the provinces and regions:[10] Each province contributed several articles except Tibet. In fact, we did not need that many. Just the material of the Wang Kuo-fan Cooperative, Tsun-hua County, Hopeh Province, would have been enough[11]. Then, there was the case of a poor cooperative in central Hopeh. All the middle peasants fled, leaving only three poor peasant households, but these three families held on. They pointed out the direction of the 500 million peasants. Each and every province had many cooperatives with production increases. The increases ranged one to several folds. Do you still refuse to believe it? The 40 articles of agriculture will definitely be realized. Can you still refuse to believe it? I feel that they can be realized. In 1955, 1956 and the fi! rst half of 1957, the number of disbelievers was considerably big and there were many tide-watchers in all levels including the Central. At present, XXX are talking about settling accounts after the fall. They look only for the negative elements, not the positive. When a few cadres are overheard to say that the rural village is not so good, three or four individuals would whisper into one another's ears that the cooperative is not so good, the future looks bleak, the peasants do not have enough to eat, there is no output increase nor reserve grain, etc. When the family writes for money, they will always exaggerate, making life sound harder than it is and complaining about the lack of grain, oil and fabric, for otherwise you will not remit. You must analyze all these. Is it true that there is no grain, oil, or fabric? Comrade K'o Ch'ing-shih[12] told me about the statistics of Kiangsu Province. In 1955, 30 percent of the cadres of the county, district and township levels made loud protests, complained about the "hardships" on behalf of the peasants and objected to the excessive "control" in the "unified" purchasing and selling. What kind of people were those cadres? They were all well-to-do middle peasants, or formerly poor and lower-middle peasants who had become well-to-do middle peasants. The so-called hardships of the peasants were the hardship of the well-to-do middle peasants. The well-to-do middle peasants wanted to hoard their grain instead of surrendering it and they wanted to promote capitalism. Therefore, they squawked about the hardships of the peasants. The lower levels squawked, but did someone in the regional, provincial, or central level complain also? Was there anyone who was not more or less influenced by his family in the home village? The question is the standpoint you take in looking at a problem. Do you take the standpoint of the working class and poor and lower-middle peas! ants, or do you take that of the well-to-do middle peasants?

Now it is a little better. The rural areas have made a great leap forward. After the rectification, the anti-rightist movement, cadre participation in labor and worker participation in a part of the management, the urban and rural political atmosphere has changed. One can say that the agricultural "pessimism" and "hopelessness", and the lack of confidence in realizing the "40 articles" have been swept clean. However, some of the "tide watchers" and "fall account settlers" have not been swept clean. Therefore, attention must be given to this work. The XXX report suggested guarding against fancy words without substance, surface without depth and generalization without detail. The suggestion was made by Kiangsu. What they mean is to see one's own defects. Among the 10 fingers, nine of them are bright and the remaining one in darkness. "Fancy" means flowery, blooming without bearing fruit. In regard to "generalization without detail", Chang Fei[13] gave attention to the details even though he dealt in generalization. We want to be Chang Fei and give attention to the details. We must not bloom without bearing fruit or give attention to the general while ignoring the details, for otherwise we may not attain our quota in the fall. Comrades of all occupations, professions and units must pay attention, regardless of their type of work, whether industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, or writing novels.

The domestic situation is very good and the future looks bright. In the past, thinking was not unified. There was no confidence in achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results. Industry, agriculture and communication are concerned with these results. The basic issue is agriculture, the issue of the 40 articles. Now confidence has increased because of the great leap forward in agricultural production. The agricultural leap forward creates a pressure on industry and causes it to catch up, leaping forward together and motivating the entire work. A proposal was made at the Nan-ning Conference. The provinces should make plans on just how long it would take, five, seven, or so many years, for the value of industrial production to catch up with or surpass that of agricultural production. In only three months after the proposal, industries at the local provincial, county and township levels flourished. Now this is understood by many comrades. In the second half of 1956 some of the Central comrades did not understand is very clearly. After 1956 and the first half of 1957, the problem has been solved. Comrade Chou En-lai's report at the People's Congress in June of last year was very good, declaring war on the bourgeoisie with the posture of the proletarian warrior. That article should be read over again. At that time, the problem was truly solved, but profound understanding did not come until later.

Now the Center has decided that its responsible comrades must go into the field for four months out of the year to do detailed work, visit plants and cooperatives, settle among the masses and familiarize themselves with the conditions of the people. Settling roots is to settle one's roots among the people. I thank the first secretary of Ch'ang-ko County, Honan Province, for his report. It is very good. (I have re-read it). He reports on turning the soil over deeply in the entire 1.12 million mou of land once a year to a depth of 1.5 ch'ih. in order to attain the output of 900 catties per mou. This brings up a new problem. Can all the counties do it? Since Ch'ang-ko County can do it, do you mean to say that the other counties cannot? If it can't be done once every year or every two years, what about every three years? I feel once every five years should be possible. The second five-year plan of Ch'ang-ko County calls for turning over once all the soil in the county. If you do not have good tools, then use those similar to Ch'ang-ko County and follow their method. If you have no method for the second five-year plan, then follow their method. Maybe there are still other methods. Their method is as follows: First pile the surface ripe soil on one side. Then apply fertilizer on the raw soil. Turn over the raw soil with shovels and mix it with the fertilizer. After breaking up the clods, leave the fertilizer mixed soil where it is. Then start with the next row and move the ripe soil of the second row on the raw soil of the first row. Continue to do the same row by row. Thus, the top soil remains on top. This is a big invention. One deep soil turn-over results in an output increase of 100 percent, or at least 90 percent. Soil is the first consideration for production increase. Water, fertilizer, soil improvement, seeds and close planting should be considered as another item. Close planting must be rational. In Kwangtung, each mou is divided into 30,000 "to" 1;, in each "to" is planted three rice seedlings, each seedling produces three sprouts, bearing 27 ears of grain and each ear averages 60 [kernels of] grain, totalling 16.2 million [kernels of] grain. 20,000 [kernels of] grain equal one catty and one mou produces 810 catties. Isn't this the way to compute the 800-catty per mou output? The same computation can be used for wheat, corn, spiked-millet, kaoliang and soybeans in the North. Close planting is the full utilization of air and sunshine. Currently are we not in the process of eliminating waste? Then we must also eliminate the waste of air and sunshine. Sunshine works hard everyday and yet you do not utilize it! When absorbed by plants, the carbon dioxide in the air turns into carbohydrates which become matters needed by plants by means of photosynthesis. Carbohydrates are carbon dioxide plus sunshine. Grain is the storehouse of heat. The structure of each grain is similar to a miniature reservoir. I am going too far afield. Mainly I want to discuss settling one's roots and contacting the people, such as visiting a few cooperatives and plants, a few units in the troops, a few schools in education and a few stores in commerce. There is no need to contact too many. Anyway, a few units in each occupation and profession should be studied in detail before one can have a profound impression. One must respect materialist dialectics. Materialism is the most important. Why? The words philosophy, epistemology and methodology are one and the same. Where does man's thinking come from? Does it come with one's birth, or after observation and practice? Man's thinking is not endowed by nature, but consists of concepts formed through the reflection of external matters. Deductions and judgments only become possible after the preliminary formation of concepts, such as dog, man, child, tree, horse, rock, etc. If a three-year old child is asked whether his mother is a human being or a dog, he will be able to reply that she is a h! uman being, not a dog. This is the judgment of the child. Mother is an individual, while human being is general, yet there is an identity between the two. It is the unity of opposites between the individual and the general. It is dialectics. Thus, a three-year old child understands the unity of contradictions and dialectics. Our thinking can only be formed through the stimulation of our senses by the objective world. It is formed from objective practice. Where do concepts come from? They come from the objective world. The current concept of greater, faster, better and more economical results has been formed only through the accumulation of many experiences, including those of China, of the Soviet Union, of our base and of several years of construction. The phrase "go all out and strive for the upper reaches" is also indispensable. We cannot do without it. Without energy, or sufficient energy, it is hard for an individual, a group of people, or a party, to do anything successfully. Naturally we want to strive for the upstream, all the way up to Szechuan, not the lower stream, which is Kiangsu. This is illustrating the issue with natural geography. We must keep pace with the advanced.

Our comrades must associate with the masses, truly understand their feelings and impress our mind with their thinking and emotions. If our mind is not deeply impressed with the feelings of the masses, it becomes easy to waver. If our mind is thus deeply impressed, even if we should run into problems in our work, we will be able to handle them. In the past we often encountered difficulties in battles. Sometimes we couldn't find a solution even by midnight. But, after sleeping over it, we would have the solution the next day. Difficulties appear constantly. Sun Yat-sen said that he accumulated 40 years of experience. We have accumulated decades of experience. We well know that, whenever we encounter a difficult problem, we can solve it by consulting with the masses, sleeping over it and holding a meeting. Currently, do we not have problems, or difficulties? Do not be frightened by temporary darkness. We constantly have two elements: Light and dark. Now the northern part of Hopeh has no rainfall. Do you think the comrades of Hopeh are not worried? They produced four billion catties last year and are planning for eight billion this year. Even if there should be drought, the output will be increased to five or six billion cattiest The domestic situation is pretty good. Do not be afraid of any darkness. There are two sides: Light and dark. The comrades who made mistakes understood the matter in June of last year. There are still many “tide watchers” and “fall account settlers”, but it doesn’t matter. Let us explain the reasons more frequently and convince them by persuasion. Let us set forth the domestic situation and carry out an education.

3. Elimination of the Four Pests

Let us discuss the elimination of the four pests. Is it good to eliminate the four pests? I find it very interesting. According to *Reference News,* the Indians are also interested and they also wish to eliminate pests. They have the pest of monkeys which eat up a lot of grain. No one dares to touch them because they are considered sacred.

We do not propose the slogans “cadres decide everything” or “technology decides everything,” or the slogan “communism is the Soviet Union plus electrification.” But does it mean we do not want electrification? We want electrification just the same and even more urgently. The first two slogans were Stalin’s way and rather one-sided. If “technology decides everything,” then what about politics? If “cadres decide everything”, then what about the masses? Dialectics is missing here. Stalin sometimes understood dialectics and sometimes not. I mentioned this at the Moscow Conference.

Our slogan is: A little more, a little faster, a little better and a little more economical. I think our slogan is a little more intelligent. We should be more intelligent, because the pupil should be better than the teacher. Green comes from blue, but it excels blue. The late-comer should be on top. I feel our communism may arrive in advance of schedule.

There must be tenseness and relaxation when we do something. To be constantly tense is no good. One must be both tense and relaxed. Excessive exhaustion is no good. Honan is extensively promoting red and expert schools. It is very good. But everyone is too tired. Some people dozed off in class. The teachers are also too tired, but they dared not doze off. Excessive exhaustion is not good. There must be a few days of rest. We must be both tense and relaxed, with both democracy and centralization. This principle applies everywhere.

We must struggle against the “tide watchers” and “fall account settlers.” But the goal of such struggle is to rally them, not to exclude them from revolution. What hurt Ah Q most was, not being permitted to engage in the revolution. One must refrain from criticizing without helping the wrongdoers to correct their mistakes. Whether it is in struggling against or helping others, one must have good intentions. It is not good to be without good intentions. It would merely be knocking you down so that I could get on top. Should we have more people or less people? More people are better. We must activate all positive elements.

Dialectics should develop in China. We are not concerned about other places; we are concerned about China. What we do are more compatible with dialectics and with Lenin, but not very compatible with Stalin. Stalin said that the socialist society's production relations completely conformed to the development of the production force; he negated contradictions. Before his death, he wrote an article to negate himself. He stated that complete conformity did not indicate the absence of contradictions and that improper handling could develop into antagonistic contradictions. One couldn't say that he lacked dialectics. He had some. While there were superstition and one-sidedness, his method did succeed in building socialism, defeating the enemy, producing 50 million tons of steel, possibly 55 million tons this year and in putting three satellites in orbit. His was one kind of method. Can we find another method? The purpose is to promote socialism and Marxism-Leninism. Take the class struggle as an example. We have adopted Lenin's method, not Stalin's. When discussing the socialist economy, Stalin said the post-revolutionary reform was a peaceful reform proceeding from the top to the bottom levels. He did not undertake the class struggle from the bottom to the top, but introduced peaceful land reform in Eastern Europe and North Korea, without struggling against the landowners or the rightists, only proceeding from the top to the bottom and struggling against the capitalists. We proceed from the top to the bottom, but we also add the class struggle from the bottom to the top, settling the roots and linking together. We struggled against the bourgeoisie in the "five-evils movement."[14] Now we are promoting construction and the mass movement. We require some things from the top to the bottom, such as government directives and orders, regulations and systems, but the masses must undertake a large number of things. We are! opposed to favoritism and peaceful land reform. We call the method of Eastern Europe and North Korea favoritism. Peaceful land reform, without class struggle and without struggling against the landowners and capitalists, is of the wrong line and will produce harmful results.

Why is the speed of our construction faster than the Soviet Union? Because our conditions are different. We have 600 million people. We follow the road traveled by the Soviet Union; we have its technical aid. Therefore, we should develop faster than the Soviet Union. We expand the tradition of the October Revolution and the mass line of Lenin and rely on the masses, on the poor peasants in the rural areas, except that Lenin did not say this.

Yesterday a comrade said that one couldn't go wrong if one followed a certain individual. By "a certain individual," he meant me. This statement needs modification. One should follow and yet not follow. An individual is sometimes right and sometimes wrong. Follow him when he is right and do not follow him when he is wrong. One must not follow without discrimination. We follow Marx and Lenin and we follow Stalin in some places. We follow whoever has the truth in his hands. Even if he should be a manure carrier or street sweeper, as long as he has the truth, he should be followed. Our cooperativization is for the poor and lower-middle peasants. We advocate the concept of greater, faster, better and more economical results because it came from the masses. We look for the advanced and the good among the plants, rural villages, stores, schools, troops. . . . Wherever truth is, we follow. Do not follow any particular individual. It is dangerous to follow an individual without discrimination. One must have independent thinking.

Our comrades are often not clear about the principle of the 10 fingers. The moment there is trouble, they forget that there are 10 fingers. The internal contradictions among the laboring people and the mistakes made by them are always the issue of the nine fingers and the one finger.

Our comrades who have committed mistakes are also like them. I am not talking about XXX. The statements of XXX, XXX XX and XXX are very good. Why was XXX not discussed in Anhwei's statement? Chekiang said too little about XXX. You must share what you have for everyone's edification. Why didn't you? The trouble with those individuals is not a question of nine fingers and one finger. XXX has 10 blackened fingers; XXX has nine blackened fingers, leaving only one clean. What I am talking about now are those who waver in times of mighty storms. With them it is the question of nine fingers and one finger. Now it is clear. They are different from those with nine or 10 blackened fingers. We must rally and protect them. We must firmly protect the positive elements of all levels. They might have made mistakes, but they are positive. They are afraid of expressing themselves freely and being unable to make a graceful exit. Given firm protection, they will. Their mistakes are only 10 percent. We must firmly protect such cadres in the rectification. The issue of protecting the cadres was discussed in the documents of the Tsingtao Conference[15]. It was discussed even before that. The internal contradictions among the laboring people are generally the relations between the nine fingers and one finger, with individual exceptions. Among the bourgeois middle-of-the-roaders, the problem is five fingers and five fingers (five fingers of capitalism and five of socialism) with the middle-middle, six and four with the middle-left and six to seven blackened fingers with the middle-right. The brains of the bourgeois intellectuals cannot be cleansed all at once, but require several repetitions. The bourgeoisie may still make trouble, not big ones, but possible small ones. . . . Storms may appear in the bourgeoisie. In the face of typhoons of the 12th grade, some of our comrades will waver. With the experience of last year and the tempering undergone by! the party, we will be able to ignore the storms and remain steady in our boat. Our boat was not overturned in the mighty storms of last year. Some say that the editorial entitled "Why Is This?" was premature. It was not premature. If postponed, some leftists might have rotted away. Actually, over 100,000 rightists were found among elementary school teachers after December of last year, constituting one-third of the 300,000 rightists in the nation. They dared to launch reckless attacks. Do you mean to say that Chang and Lo would not attack any more after being classified as rightists? They will just the same. As soon as the temperature is suitable, reaching 37 or 38 degrees, those rascals will emerge.

Do not forget the issue of the nine fingers and one finger. The anti-adventurist case of 1956 was a result of forgetting this issue and failing to look at problems concretely. This lesson must be learned.

4. Preparation for the Final Disaster

I now wish to discuss the gloomy side of things. We must prepare for major disasters. With thousands of li of bare earth, great droughts and great floods are possible. We must also prepare for major wars. What should we do if the war maniacs drop atom bombs? Let them drop the atom bomb! The possibility is there as long as the warmongers exist. We must also prepare for troubles in the party — splits. There will be no splits if we handle it right, but it is limited to certain situations and one cannot say that splits are impossible. Was there not a split in the Soviet Union?. . . .

Between war and peace, the possibility of peace is greater. Currently the possibility of peace is greater than in the past. The strength of the socialist camp is greater than the past and the possibility of peace is greater than at the time of World War II. The Soviet Union is powerful and the national independence movement is our strong ally. The Western nations are not stable. The working class, a part of the bourgeoisie and the American people do not want war; therefore, the possibility of peace is greater than that of war. Nevertheless, there is also the possibility of war. There are the maniacs and imperialism wants to extricate itself from economic crises. The duration of atomic warfare today will be short, three instead of four years. We must be prepared. What should be done if war really comes? I want to discuss this problem. If there is war, we will fight. Let imperialism be swept clean and we will start construction again. Thereafter there will not be any more world war. Since a world war is possible, we must prepare for it. We must not spend our time napping. Do not be alarmed either if there should be war. It would merely mean getting people killed and we've seen people killed in war. Eliminating half of the population occurred several times in China's history. The 50 million population in the time of Emperor Wu in the Han Dynasty was reduced to 10 million by the time of the Three Kingdoms, the two Chin Dynasties and the North and South Dynasties. The war lasted for decades and intermittently for several hundred years, from the Three Kingdoms to the North and South Dynasties. The T'ang Dynasty began with a population of 20 million and did not reach 50 million until Emperor Hsuan. And Lu-shan staged a revolt and the country was divided into many states. It was not reunited until the Sung Dynasty, some 100 or 200 years later, with a population of just over 10 million. I once discussed this with XXX. I maintained that modern weapons were not as powerful as the big sword of C! hina's Kuan Yun-Ch'ang, but he did not agree with me. Not very many people were killed in the two World Wars, 10 million in the first and 20 million in the second, but we had 40 million killed in one war. So, how destructive were the big swords! We have no experience in atomic war. So, how many will be killed cannot be known. The best outcome may be that only half of the population is left and the second best may be only one-third. When 900 million are left out of 2.9 billion, several five-year plans can be developed for the total elimination of capitalism and for permanent peace. It is not a bad thing.

If the party should split, there would be chaos for a time. If there are people who do not consider the overall situation, like XXX and Kao Kang, the party will split and imbalance will appear, though balance will return finally. When imbalances move in opposite directions, the result is balance. It is even more important for the members of the Central

Committee to consider the overall-situation. Whoever failing to do so will fall. . . . Did those disregarding the over-all situation and clamoring for splits have a good ending? Chang Kuo-t'ao clamored for splits, but what did he get our of it? Clamoring for and promoting splits are wrong. Only one kind of split is permissible: During the Second International, Germany's Social Democratic Party voted for the imperialist war and Lenin broke with them. We must make legitimate struggles and fight for the majority. We must not promote splits and ignore the over-all situation.

We wish to activate the strength of the 600 million people. We want to work on even the rightists, assimilate them and get seven out of 10 to reform. After their reform is completed in eight or 10 years, they will take our side. After their rightist cap is taken off, if they promote rightism again, they will be made to ware it again.

The Third Speech May 20, 1958

1. I will discuss again the breaking down of superstition. The First Ministry of Machine Building issued a pamphlet containing the biographies of 41 inventors. Seven of them were engineers, with social position and the remainder came from poor families, or were workers or peasants. Watt was a worker. The pamphlet began with the 18th century and covered over 100 years. Regardless of the period, it is beneficial to the breaking down of superstition. It will help us break down superstition and discard our inferiority complex. The agricultural, forestry, water conservation, political-legal, cultural-education and public health units should follow suit and collect such material.

2. I will discuss again the issue of taking the attitude of the common laborer. This issue is very important. It is important because some people feel that they are first in the world, look down on others, do not treat others as equals, rely on their qualifications to make a living, especially the high level officials and do not take the attitude of the common laborer. If this problem can be tackled by the majority, things will be easy to do. In the past many bureaucrats did not take the attitude of the common laborer. "I have authority over you." Relying on these words to conduct business, they blocked the development of creativity. Such things must be eliminated. The bureaucratic air must be swept aside in the majority of the people. Whoever has the truth will be obeyed, be he a manure carrier, coal miner, street sweeper, or a poor peasant. No matter how high the official position, if truth is not in his hands, there is no reason to obey him. When the majority get rid of their bureaucratic air, the minority will become isolated and will not dare to make trouble. One should say that bureaucratic air is a sort of low class interest, not high class, not of the communist spirit. On the contrary, appearing with the attitude of the common laborer is high class interest. By so doing, the big nation chauvinism, which we condemn, will be prevented. If the majority of the party members especially the leadership cadres are modest (scientific modesty), chauvinism can be prevented and even if it should appear, we do not need to worry.

3. The non-professional leading the professional is a general rule. One cannot almost say that only the non-professional can lead the professional. Last year the rightists brought up this question and created a lot of trouble. They claimed that the non-professional could not lead the professional.

Can one say that only the non-professional can lead the professional? On this issue, we are in a passive position. In the past, the newspapers were not systematic in criticizing the rightists over this issue and their discussions not penetrating. Why do we say that the non-professional leading the professional is a general rule? Because everyone is a professional and a non-professional. There are 10,000 fields in the world and 10,000 sciences and technologies, but a person is only expert in one. Take the famous Peking Opera star Mei Lan-fang for instance. He can only play the female role. The female role is further subdivided into five different types and he can only do one of them. Then there are still many other roles, such as old man. young man. . . . A person can only master one profession out of the 10,000. Thus we say that everyone is a professional and everyone can become a professional. But everyone is also a non-professional, because he cannot master the remaining 9,999 professions. If a person can master two or three, or four or five professions, he will be amazing. If a person can master the 18 military arts, similar to Hsueh Jen-kuei, there are still 9,982 things which he doesn't know. There are more non-professional than professionals. So, isn't it true that everyone is also a non-professional? In leadership work, besides the leader's own field, he must have some knowledge of other fields and become familiar with a few of them. Common sense is necessary. Those in party work, for example, must be familiar with industry and agriculture. But it is impossible to be expert in them. I can ride in an airplane, but I cannot fly one. The middle school has a few science courses; the college has more. Many things are a result of spare-time pursuits. Take Sun Yat-sen, for example. At the beginning he was not respected. He was a minor physician and undertook the revolution at 20 years of age. It was not legitimate. As a physician he was a professional and politics was his sideline. S! ubsequently, concentrating on the revolution, politics became his main field. He no longer practiced medicine, which became his sideline. He even gave up medicine and became a non- professional. But he could be in control of the physicians. Politicians handle the mutual relations among men; they promote the mass line. we must study this issue carefully, because many engineers and scientists do not respect us and many among us do not respect ourselves, arbitrarily insisting on the difficulty of non-professionals leading professionals. We must have the ways and means to refute them. I say that the non-professionals leading the professionals is a general rule. Mei Lan-fang, for example, cannot serve as the president; he can only sing operas.

4. One must hoist the red flag and determine the wind direction. The red flag is our five-star red flag. What flag should one hoist? The red flag or the white flag? Flags have to be hoisted everywhere in the world, from the North Pole to the South Pole, wherever there are inhabitants. If it isn't the red flag, it is the white flag, or maybe even gray flag. If it isn't the proletarian flag, it is the bourgeois flag. What flag did the organizations, schools and plants hoist in May and June of last year? Both sides fought. Currently what kind of flag is still hoisted by a few backward plants, or workshops in the plants, cooperatives, schools, military units and organizations or parts of them? If it isn't the white flag, it is

the gray flag. We should visit the backward places and activate the masses to hoist the red flag.

Mediocre modesty is failure to hoist the red flag. Failure to hoist the red flag is a low class orientation and false modesty. Such modesty should be criticized. There is a sort of social public opinion which encourages a sort of work style: Do not come forward fearlessly; do not think, speak and do courageously. This is an influence of *Ju-lin Wai-shih*. To hoist the flag, one must sharpen one's sense of smell, learn the wind direction and determine what wind is blowing. If it is not the east wind prevailing over the west wind, then it is the west wind prevailing over the east wind. These were the words of Lin Tai-yu of Soochow. There will always be parties and factions in the world and the people in society will always be divided into left, middle and right, some in an advanced position, others in the middle or backward positions. The current task is for the advanced elements to fight for those in the middle and make them shift to the left and hoist the red flag. The white flag hoisted by the rightists is the flag of the bourgeoisie. The flag of the middle is gray or white. According to Liu-Chih of the T'ang Dynasty, to write history, one must have talent, learning and understanding. Understanding does not indicate knowledge it indicates a knowledge of the wind direction. We must give special attention and be expert in determining the wind direction and possess the power to make distinctions. This is extremely important. Even though some people may be very talented and learned, they may be slow in distinguishing wind direction. Stalin stressed foresight. Foresight is to distinguish wind direction and foresee a gale when there is only a breeze. It is not good to stand on the observation deck and see nothing. The lack of foresight is not seeing what is already there. Such condition affords the rightists an opportunity. If you don't see them, they will come.

Do not be afraid of hoisting the red flag. Wherever it should be hoisted, hurry up and hoist it. It should be hoisted in each and every hilltop and rural settlement. It should be hoisted in each and every party committee, organization, military unit, plant and cooperative. Wherever there is no red flag, it should be hoisted. Currently there are many places without the red flag. They are not evenly advanced. Some of them become backward again right after hoisting the red flag-and the flag is no longer red. Constant change is also a natural condition. If the flag turns color, it should be replaced.

There are red and white happy events. Last time I discussed the handling of possible disasters, mainly war and party splits. There are big, medium and small disasters. What I discussed were the big ones: war and splits.

The Chinese people consider weddings as red happy events and funerals white happy events. I find them very rational. The Chinese know dialectics. Weddings will produce children. A child is split out of the body of the mother. It is a sudden change, a happy event. One individual is split into two or three, or even 10, like the aircraft carrier.

The common people find the deaths, changes and occurrences of new matters happy events. When a person dies, a memorial meeting is held. While the bereaved weep in mourning, they feel it is also a happy event. Actually, it is. Just imagine if Confucius were still living and here at this meeting in Huai-jen Hall, he would be over 2,000 years old and it wouldn't be so good! If one subscribes to dialectics and yet disapproves of death, it will be metaphysics. Disasters are social phenomena, natural phenomena. Sudden changes are the most fundamental law of the universe. Birth is a sudden change; so is death. In the several decades from birth to death, it is a gradual change. If Chiang Kai-shek should die, we would clap our hands in joy. If Dulles should die, none of us would shed a tear. This is because the death of matters of the old society is a good thing, hoped for by everyone. While the birth of new things is good, their death is naturally not good. The failure of Russia's 1905 revolution and the loss of our base in the South were equivalent to the seedlings destroyed by hailstorm and downpour. It is naturally not good. And the problem of replacing the destroyed seedlings arises. We communists hope for changes. The so-called leap forward means a change from the past. . . Sudden change is better than quantitative change. But without quantitative change, there can be no sudden changes. Quantitative change is indispensable and negating it will lead to adventurism. The destruction of balance constitutes leaping forward and such destruction is better than balance. Imbalance and headache are good things. The First Ministry of Machine Building, the Ministry of Metallurgy and the Ministry of Geology, for example, are experiencing a hard time and receiving pressure from all sides. Therefore, they must develop extensively, which is a good thing. Balance, quantitative change and unity are temporary and relative. Imbalance, sudden changes and disunity are absolute and permanent. Many disunities have b! een overcome and changed to unity. Unification is proposed because of disunity. There is unity in one person, but disunity occurs when there are two persons. Our party has 12 million members, with all kinds of backgrounds. Meetings must be held often in order to unite them. Therefore, we talk about unity every year, because there is disunity every year. Each person has his own way of thinking and the levels of the party members differ. Therefore, meetings must be held. The standing delegates made a correct draft. In the past we did not have the systems of holding a delegates' congress every year; we held other kinds of meetings. Now we hold a congress every year. As our ideas are different, we can, at a meeting, adopt the more rational ideas, make resolutions, publish a report and reach unanimity in the whole nation. The participation of some local and county secretaries makes our meeting even more successful. They have many good ideas.

Not only must we talk about unity every year, but must do so everyday, because there are splits everyday. Fission of the cells, metabolism — if the old cells do not die, it will be detrimental to the development of the child. Metabolism means discarding the old and bringing in the new. In the Yangtze River, the wave behind pushes the wave ahead. All matters change. Currently there are 102 chemical elements. At the beginning there weren't so many, but they increased through changes. Several hundred million years later, possibly there will be over 200 elements instead of 102. Matters always change and convert toward their opposite. Among our 12 million party members and everyday there are those leaving the party, every day there are struggles, and everyday there are those undergoing criticism. In Hupeh there were a brother and a sister competing in big character posters. The brother was an old hand and had the bureaucratic style. The truth, however, was in the hands of the sister. In the end the brother lost and the sister won. In Chekiang, a father and his son argued about close planting. The son was for it, but not the father. In the end the father lost and the son won. It is a general law. The father and brother always run a considerable risk, but it does not matter much. They only have to admit their defeat to the son and sister. One must take the attitude of the common laborer, in order to avoid risks.

We must prevent possible big disasters, such as world war, or party splits. Our party underwent four splits, involving Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Lo Chang-lung, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Kao Kang[16]. They set up their own Central Committees and collapsed. Wang Ming appeared in a legal way with his "leftist" line three times. We adopted toward him the attitude of curing the illness to save the patient and rallied him by means of criticism. New splits may occur. As long as there is a party, splits are possible. They are possible even 100 years from now. Our method is unity-criticism-unity, punishing as a deterrent and curing the illness to save the patient.

Maybe this way of talking is making everyone uncomfortable, but I can only be comfortable after speaking my mind. Do not be superstitious. By talking about it, everyone will be mentally prepared. Isn't Yugoslavia promoting a split? There is also America's Foster. In the past we had Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Lo Chang- lung, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Kao Kang promoting splits. Recently we had Li Feng, Sha Wen-han, Li Shih-nung, Sun Tso-pin, Ch'en Tsai-li. . . . also promoting splits. Peking's political-legal system collapsed; the cultural-art system collapsed even more. What is bad about such collapses? There are always splits in the world. It is merely metabolism! Every year there are splits and every month there are splits, like the death of cells. There is unity every year and every month, like the growth of cells. The First, Second and Third Internationals all underwent the process of birth, development and death. The Information Bureau is no longer in existence. Now we can use the form of the Moscow Conference to replace it. By agreement of 12 nations, the Soviet Union serves as the convener and calls a meeting whenever necessary.

There are two kinds of opposites.

One includes things already in existence in society. The rightists, for example are in existence to start with; but whether to bring them out or not is a policy issue. We are determined to bring them out, set them up as opposites, launch the laboring people to debate and compete with them and knock them down. There are many rightists among the elementary school teachers, numbering 100,000 among the 300,000 rightists. The 300,000 rightist opposites exist and bringing them out to educate our 600 million people is beneficial to us.

The other includes what is not in existence in nature. It has some material conditions. To build a dam, for example, we can use artificial means to set up an opposite. The water level is raised to make it flow and produce a fall, resulting in power generation and shipping. Building a plant also involves setting up opposites. The An-shan Steel Mill was built by the Japanese. The Ch'ang-ch'un Motor Vehicle Plant is new, an opposite established artificially. What is absent in nature can be manufactured by man, but there must be a material foundation. The satellite in orbit is man-made. It can be placed in orbit when the law is found.

We are optimists. We are not afraid of splits, as they are natural phenomena. . . . The splits of Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Lo Chang-lung, Chang Kuo-t’ao and Kao Kang were helpful to us. The two Wang Ming lines and the three “leftists” lines during the civil war period taught our party a lesson. All these opposites had their benefits. Naturally, it is not necessary to create Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Kao Kang, etc., artificially. They will emerge when the climate is favorable. There is nothing to fear. We will overcome them.

Optimism is our main outlook. We also have worries. Can we not worry when the rightists emerge? I am somewhat worried. If we worry, then we must think of a way. We must give attention to leadership skill. With good leadership, a split will turn from something bad into something good. If it is foreseen, it may not come at all, like weeding. We will have no fear if 20,000 or 30,000 of our party members among the 12 million possess a higher consciousness. Higher consciousness means foresight. What is there to fear? Fear will do no good. We do not want to fight a world war, but if we have to, we are not afraid either.

Punishment as a deterrent, curing the illness to save the patient, we must permit the wrongdoers to correct themselves, such as P’an XX. Currently we are very united. Nothing is happening. Both the central and the local governments are very good. The anti-adventurist matters have been clarified and we have reached a new unity on a new foundation. Let us elaborate a little: We are optimists. We want to make everyone conscious and ready.

Among workers, peasants, soldiers, students, merchants and ideology, it is good for Heilungkiang to place ideology first, letting the abstract lead the concrete, politics lead the professions and the red lead the expert. Thus, the order becomes ideology, workers, peasants, soldiers, students and merchants. Stalin’s two slogans lack dialectics. If technology decides everything, what about politics? If cadres decide everything, what about the masses? Lenin said it well: The Soviet plus electrification equals communism. The Soviet is politics and electrification, technology. The combination of politics and technology creates communism. Politics and technology are the unity of opposites. Their wedding will produce a son.

The Fourth Speech May 23, 1958

Our congress has been successful. We have worked conscientiously and have formulated our general line. Conscientiousness is most important in whatever one does. As long as one is conscientious, one will find a way regardless of the difficulties. China’s population is the largest in the world and its land vast. The people have been liberated, the bourgeois democratic revolution has succeeded, the socialist revolution has achieved basic victory and construction has developed greatly. These accomplishments have enabled us to see into our future. In the past it was riot very clear. We did not know when we would extricate ourselves from the passive and backward situation. In the past we commanded no prestige or respect in the world. Dulles does not think much of us. It is not compatible with our position, but he does have his reasons. Though we have a large population, we have not yet demonstrated our strength. One day when we catch up with Great Britain and the U.S., Dulles will respect us and acknowledge our existence as a nation. Our policy is that we will not invite him as a guest, but if he should knock on our door, we would entertain him. Things were not very clear in the past several years, even as recent as the year before the last. There were still those opposing the general line and many doubted the policy of greater, faster, better and more economical results. This was inevitable, because it existed objectively. Many people doubted or opposed the building of socialism with better. . . . and more economical results. Some people could see the point, while others could not. Those who could not see the point must undergo some tortuosity. After a period of time, more people saw the point. The road is always tortuous; there will be twists and turns in the future. The congress adopted the general line to go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results. But it has to be proved in objective practice. Some of it has been proved in the past. The past three years w! ere like a saddle, high at both ends and low in the middle. The year before the last was high, last year low and this year high again. With such changes, the congress this time is successful. It reflected the people's sentiments, demands and stamina in building socialism with greater, faster, better and more economical results. Such results were not very evident at the time of the third plenum [of the 8th central committee] in November 1956 but began to manifest themselves from the time of the third plenum in September 1957.

In the winter of 1956, two events were unexpected — the international antagonism toward Stalin and the Poland and Hungary incidents. An anti-Soviet and anti-communist high tide appeared in the world, affecting the whole world and our party. Domestically, we did not expect the resistance against adventurism or the international incidents. As was mentioned at the Ch'eng-tu Conference, all the comrades present here should pay attention to twists and turns that may still occur in the future. I hope all the provincial committees will study the situation and be ready. As I mentioned the last time, there is the possibility of war and there is the possibility of splits, but it doesn't matter if we can foresee them. Everyone must study this matter. All provinces must further study the possibilities of war, splits. . . . because we will not be afraid if they are expected. Not that there is a war now, but there is the possibility. There are maniacs in the world. As discussed at the Moscow Conference, we must be prepared against the maniacs. Should there be war, they will be finished. Wisdom belongs to us. There may be trouble, but unjust forces will always be condemned and the just forces will always win, but we must foresee what's coming. The party must also ponder. More than half of the provincial, municipal and autonomous regional committees had problems, no committee was overthrown, nor all the problems were overcome. They were numerous. Various regional, county and branch committees have more or less had some problems. It is a normal phenomenon of the class struggle. Some of the mistakes were made by good people, such as misunderstanding the greater, better, faster and more economical policy, others were a result of bad people infiltrating the party. XXX was a good man making mistakes. . . .

Ting Ling was a bad individual concealed in the party. She has long ago revolted against the party.

I wish to discuss the problem of whom to follow. Whom should one follow first of all? First of all, one should learn from the people and follow them. The people have so much energy, better and faster qualities, many inventions and creations; they have first class cooperatives producing 1,000-2,000 catty per mou and above-norm industrial production. In general, there are all types of talented people in industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, military affairs and in the ideological and theoretical fields. There are so many experiences reported at this congress! I wouldn't have been able to do that! You talk better than I do. You have correctly reflected the people's demands, thinking and feelings. A more perfect system is formulated on the basis of correct reflections, such as the resolutions and reports of this congress. It was not like this before. It has taken eight years, especially the first-year plan and the 1956 great developments, for this change to come about. The year 1957 was like the low section of the saddle. The inspirations of the third plenum in 1957 gave the party and the people a clearer direction. After the effort of the entire party, we had the great leap forward of the recent half year, from last winter to this spring. The Hang-chou, Nan-ning and Ch'eng-tu conferences laid the groundwork for this congress and drafted summaries and resolutions. The 60 articles were undertaken, but they have not been completed. They are to be revised. But the general idea has been formed. They will be revised a few months later. Therefore, we follow the people first and later on the people follow us. Theory first comes from practice, and later on it is used to guide practice. The unity of theory and practice is Marxism. There was no Marxism to start with. It came to the people's mind from their practice in class struggle. It was first reflected in the minds of the forerunners, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. The reflection of the objective law in the subjective ! world resulted in a theoretical summary, which was developed into theories by them to serve as our models. If political errors are to be avoided, then we must use theory to guide practice, but theory must originate from practice. Apart from objective practice, it will be impossible to form theory. No reality can be formed behind closed doors. The general line formulated at the congress is not the result of any spur of the moment ideas of certain individuals. Regardless of one's position, authority and fame, if one does not go into the field and associate with the people, or contact the cadres who are close to the people and the positive elements in the people, if one does not contact or associate with the people for six months, one will know nothing and become impoverished. Therefore, the provision that everyone must spend four months out of the year in the field is necessary. One must go into the field and associate with the people, with the cadres who are close to the people and with the positive elements in the people, clarify their thinking, action and hardships and summarize them.

The slogan "go all out, aim high" is very good. It reflects the people's energy. "Go all out" is better than just "go out." There is an element of quantity in truth. The people's energy has long been stimulated. The question is whether it is adequate. It should be at least 60-70 percent stimulated, but 80-90 percent or 100-percent is best. Therefore, "go all out" is a better term. Energy can be of different levels. "Go all out" is a new phrase. "Aim high" is not new. We have had it before. . . . .

"Go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results" are not easily understood by foreigners. They don't seem to make sense, as there are no subjects. I had thought of adding the phrase "activating all positive elements" as the subject, but now I feel it's all right not to have it. The 600 million people are the subject. The word "energy" is the energy of the absolute majority of the 600 million, except Chang Po-chun, Lo Lung-chi, Chang Nai-ch'i, XX, etc. The energy of those individuals may not be great.

Hoist the red flag and find the wind direction. If you do not hoist the flag, others will. On a big mountain or small hill, on the field, hoist it wherever there is no flag and uproot the white flag wherever it is found. The gray ones must also be uprooted. The gray ones are no good; they must be uprooted. The yellow flag is also bad. Yellow trade unions are equivalent to white flags. On any big mountain, any small hill, the red flag must be hoisted after debates.

The wind direction discussed last time does not mean policy direction. Wind direction means whether it is east wind or west wind. The "anti-adventurist" wind, for example, began to blow in June 1956. At that time we already had the 10 major relationships, greater and better results and promotion meetings. No clear resolution was made at the enlarged conference of the Political Bureau in mid-April participated by provincial and municipal committee secretaries. It was a gentlemen's agreement, approved by everyone, but unlike the clear resolutions and reports of this congress. The second plenum held in November 1956 did not issue a clear-cut resolution, but only a report stressing practice economy in various measures. The blast of the wind was not checked, but it was a bad thing turning into a blessing, allowing us to make comparisons. This was mentioned in Nan-ning and Ch'eng-tu. Our comrades have made many good statements at this congress. . . . Tito specialized in being disappointed. His energy belongs to that side. The Moscow Declaration is the strength of our side. The Yugoslavia program checks the ambition of the proletariat and encourages the arrogance of the enemy.

We must pay attention to the wind direction hereafter. When a gale blows, houses and people are knowled down. Therefore, it is easy to recognize. But a light breeze is hard to discern. It is worthwhile to read Sung Yu'a poetry on the wind. He said there were two kinds of wind: The wind of the aristocrat and the wind of the poor ("the wind of the great kings" and "the wind of the common men"). There are small, medium and big winds. Sung Yu said: "The wind is born on the ground, rises from the tip of the water weed, permeates the streams and roars. . . ." Then it is hard to tell the difference.

Notes

[1.] Opium War: "For many decades, beginning with the end of the 18th century, Britain exported an increasing quantity of opium to China. This traffic not only subjected the

Chinese people to drugging but also plundered China of her silver. It a roused fierce opposition in China. In 1840, under the pretext of safeguarding its trade with China, Britain launched armed aggression against her. The Chinese troops led by Lin Tse-hsu put up resistance and the people in Canton spontaneously organized the "Quell-the-British Corps", which dealt serious blows to the British forces of aggression. In 1842, however, the corrupt Ching regime signed the Treaty of Nanking with Britain. This treaty provided for the payment of indemnities and the cession of Hongkong to Britain and stipulated that Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Ningpo and Canton were to be opened to British trade and that tariff rates of British goods imported into China were to be jointly fixed by China and Britain.

[2.] A celebrated 13th century drama.

[3.] Hu Shih, who was formerly a university professor, university president and ambassador of the Kuomintang government to the United State, is a well-known apologist for U.S. imperialism among Chinese bourgeois intellectuals.

[4.] Ssu-ma Chien (145-90 B.C.) was China's first great historian, who compiled *Shih-chi* (Historical Records) relating the history of China from the origins to his own day.

[5.] Moscow conference: A reference to the meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries held in Moscow, November 14-16, 1957.

[6.] The Seventh Party Congress of the CPC was held in Yanan between April 23 and June 11, 1945. The congress laid down the Party line: go all out mobilize the masses, expand the people's forces and, under the leadership of our Party, defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the Chinese people and build a new-democratic China. It adopted a Party Constitution designating Mao Zedong Thought, which integrates the Marxist-Leninist theories with the practice of the Chinese revolution, as the guideline for all Party work. This congress witnessed unprecedented Party unity ideologically, politically and organizationally.

[7.] The Long March of 25,000 li (12,500 kilometres) was made by the Red Army from Kiangsi Province to northern Shensi Province. In October 1934 the First, Third and Fifth Army Groups of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (that is, the First Front Army of the Red Army, also known as the Central Red Army) set out from Changting and Ninghua in Western Fukien and from Juichin, Yutu and other places in southern Kiangsi and started a major strategic movement. In traversing the eleven provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi crossing perpetually snow capped mountains and trackless grasslands, sustaining untold hardships and frustrating the enemy's repeated encirclements, pursuits, obstructions and interceptions, the Red Army covered 25,000 li (12,500 kilometers) on this march: and finally arrived triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi in October 1935.

[8.] Ch’en Kung-po (1892-1946) left the Chinese Communist Party shorty after its foundation and joined the Kuomintang, becoming a close associate of Wang Ching-wei. He participated in Wang’s Japanese-sponsored puppet government during the period 1939-45 and was executed for treason in 1946. Chou Fo-hai also collaborated with the Japanese.

[9.] i.e., the period of Li Li-san and Wang Ming lines — See note 5 on p.61 of this volume.

[10.] A reference to the book *Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside* which was published in 1955.

[11.] The Wan Kuo-fan cooperative was once known as “paupers co-op” because its twenty three poor peasant households owned only “three legs” of a donkey. They were woefully short of means of production. Instead of asking for state loans, the cooperative organized its members to go into the mountains some thirty 1i away to collect firewood which they sold to pay for means of production. So the co-operative members said that they “made the mountains yield” a substantial amount of the means of production. In this connection also see comrade Mao’s “Editors Notes from *Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside*”. Item 1 and 28 *pp*. 242-244, *pp*. 265-266 *S.W.* Vol. V.

[12.] Ko Ching-shih (1902-65) a member of the Political Bureau.

[13.] Chang Fei, one of the heroes of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a celebrated Chinese novel.

[14.] The movement against “five evils” was the struggle against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing economic information, started at the beginning of 1952 among owners of private industrial and commercial enterprises.

[15.] The Tsingtao conference was held in July 1957.

[16.] For Chen Tu-shiu see note 2, on p 60 of this Volume. Lo Chang-lung, (1901-49) was a founding member of the CPC. In 1931 he was expelled at the Fourth plenum. There after he joined hands with Ho meng-hsiong in setting up a rival CC. He latter became a Trotskyist.

Speech At The Conference Of Heads Of Delegations To The Second Session Of The 8th Party Congress

May 18 1958

Let us write the brief biographies of all types of scientific and technological inventors in the past 300 years, giving their age, origin and background and see whether they were all without much education. Each occupation and profession should undertake the biographies of those in its own field.

Scientist Hua Lo-keng was a middle school student.

Tsiol'kovsky who succeeded in making the man-made satellite in the Soviet Union was an unknown middle school teacher. He was mainly a mathematics teacher and the satellite was his sideline. Gradually he became an expert.

Naturally the U.S. also has inventors, but it is not Dulles. Just who they are is unknown.

Education and age are not prerequisites for a person to be an inventor. As long as he had the correct direction and the courage to dream, he can become an inventor at age 20 or 30. Too much education will not help.

The whole world couldn't find a way to control the white ant, but a young student in Kwangtung who only attended junior middle school found a way.

K'a Ho (Ho Shih of the *Ho-shih Jade*) of the Kingdom of Ch'u in ancient China found an uncut jade in Chat Mountain. He offered it to King Li and got his left shin cut off. He then offered it to King Wu and got his right shin cut off. When King Wen ascended the throne, he carried the uncut jade to the bottom of Ching mountain and had it cut by a lapidiary before the jade was appreciated. It was the same piece of jade referred to in the saying "returning the jade intact to Chao."

Watt was a worker.

Franklin was a shepherd.

The three-way alliance, the leadership, technicians and old peasants (old workers) are required in cultivating experimental farms.

In general, what I want to prove by my information is one point: Isn't it true that the lowly are the most intelligent and the elite the most ignorant when it comes to robbing the cocky high level intellectuals of their capital? There should be less servility and more self-respect. The workers, peasants, old cadres and low level intellectuals should be encouraged in their self-confidence and creativity.

I once asked some people: Are we in heaven? Are we considered gods? Are we foreigners? They answered in the negative. They were superstitious.

In my speeches, I discussed; 1) breaking down superstition, 2) international and domestic situations and 3) disasters.

Generally speaking, the international situation is bright, but war is also possible.

The domestic situation is the issue of the relationship with the 500 million peasants. The peasants are our allies. If they are not rallied, there will be no politics; if no attention is given to their problems, mistakes will occur. With them as our allies, we will win. Lenin also stressed the workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship — arousing the consciousness of the rural semi-proletariat to take part in uninterrupted revolution. Some people felt that, since it took 80 years to develop capitalism, socialism could only be introduced when the workers became more numerous and the peasants conscious of themselves. But practice proved that it did not require several decades to advance from democratic revolution to socialism. The Soviet Union's February Revolution proved Lenin was correct.

China is even more different. We have several decades of experience in the democratic revolutionary base. After the liberation, the peasants' morale was high. The rural semi-proletariat numbered 350 million. A considerable number of people in China's Communist Party do not understand the importance of the peasant issue and that is where mistakes will occur. Those who do not believe in greater, faster, better and more economical results primarily have no confidence in the 40 articles in agriculture. They do not believe that agriculture can be developed relatively fast.

Why do we talk about the 10 major relationships? They constitute the basic viewpoint. It is for the purpose of comparison with the Soviet Union. Besides the Soviet method, is it possible to find another method which is even faster and better than the Soviet Union and the European nations? The road of China's industrialization includes the simultaneous promotion of the large, medium and small [enterprises] and of industry and agriculture. We do not say that we are competing with the Soviet Union, but actually we are vying with the teacher. We have two parents: the Kuomintang society and the October Revolution. We follow Lenin in the mass line and the class struggle. We want to eliminate the bourgeoisie thoroughly including its ideology, but without confiscating the property and destroying the people of the bourgeoisie. Stalin did not promote the mass line. He played favoritism and was too excessive in the class struggle.

The domestic situation is mainly the issue of the peasantry.

Irrigation, fertilizer, soil improvement, seeds, close planting and deep plowing — the method of Chang-ko County is a model.

I feel that heavy industry, metallurgy, machinery, coal, chemistry, and foreign trade should be discussed. I would rather delay the closing of the meeting for one day.

Of the 26 provinces, municipalities, and regions, 13 of them have problems. There is confusion in the political and legal systems and in the literary and art circles throughout the country. Two types of people cause the problems: rightists and right opportunists. Those making the mistake of the line will be permitted to participate in the revolution. As for P'an Han-nien[1], Ku Ta-ts'un, and Feng Pai-chu, it is better not to discipline them at this meeting. It is correct to propose disciplining, but not disciplining is also right.

Several documents should be printed, including the statements of Wang Ming and K'u Hsi-ning and the letters of a branch secretary in Tientsin and the party committee secretary of Nanking University (to the Chairman).

The branch secretary of Tientsin was very good. He did not give in. As not very many people were informed in the past, whether to let loose or not, it was impossible to keep pace at that time. A branch in Tsinghua University deteriorated. It is a rare opportunity for a party purge.

The annotations to *Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside* should be printed. It is correct to say that the ownership system has been basically solved, but the mutual relationship between the political and ideological fronts have not yet been solved. It was a little too optimistic to predict that the socialist revolution had gained a basic victory. I did not expect such a big revolution. As for China's bourgeoisie, I predict there will still be struggles, long term struggles, to eliminate the deep-rooted influence of the bourgeoisie and its intellectuals. A socialist revolution involving a battle on the political and ideological fronts is inevitable; another one is necessary after a basic solution to the ownership system has been found. This time, I did not expect the revolution will be fundamentally over in a few months, nor did I expect that the rectification would be implemented ahead of schedule. The rectification was forced on us by circumstances, and the struggle against the bourgeoisie was inevitable. But the resistance against "adventurism" also accelerated the rightists' attack. I consciously used the rightists to carry out the rectification. Turn it loose first before thinking of a method; struggle a few rounds and see. The Tsingtao Conference printed some material. A student of Hua-tung normal college was very firm, asking "What will happen if the Communist Party collapses?"

The above is about the peasant issue. Urban population is 15 percent of the total and rural population 85 percent. Some of the comrades have spent several decades in the rural areas but they remain untouched by the peasants' feelings and cannot understand them. When one cannot understand the masses, one will not see the good things. Have the likes of P'an Han-nien never worked in the rural areas? If so, they have not been influenced. The workers number 12 million, or 40 million if the family members are included;

therefore, their number is far smaller than the peasants. The well-to-do peasants who do not follow us number several ten millions. After the great leap forward, possibly 50 percent of them will be against socialism and 20 percent will maintain their [present] position.

What are your opinions on the election?

It is not good to be without horns on the head, but too many is not good either. A cow should have two horns, four would be too many. If we elect a group of alternate committee members, there will be a balance; to have a few more alternates is no problem.

Among the workers, peasants, and soldiers, there are several hundred million peasants. The “Trotsky factions”[2] has always scoffed at us for peasant-ism, and imperialism calls ours a peasant revolution. China’s working class cannot sit firm without the peasants. Since Lenin also stressed the peasant problem, did he also advocate peasant-ism? I asked our European comrades; What about you? In Europe, besides the farm workers, conflict between the landowner peasants (many with their own farm machinery) and socialism is great. In my conversations with the comrades of South America and India the issue of rallying the peasants was also discussed. I asked them to study a rural village, clarify the class relations, and analyze matter in minute detail. Being backward has its advantages.

The great leap forward should not be pushed too urgently. The students of red and expert schools dozed off in class. This won’t do at all. The two “encirclement and suppression” campaigns in Kiangsu involved five battles in two sleepless weeks, but it was only a short-term surprise attack. We must not push too hard.

How are the cooperative areas? It is the negation of a negation.

After one day’s rest at the conclusion of the congress, there will be two days of meetings, attended by one delegate from each province and a certain number from the Central Committee.

A meeting will be held again on 5 August. You have two whole months to handle your work in industry, commerce, culture- education, and military matters. Fall farm production must be prepared and arranged now.

The whole people including five-year old children must be mobilized to eliminate the four pests.

All the provinces where there are problems in the party must issue a statement. The statement will be discussed if there is time, or printed if there is no time. The statements at this meeting will be collected and printed for our own comment and comparison. There are many good and rich experiences.

The commerce work of Hsin-hui County, Kwangtung, is well handled. An on-the-spot meeting should be held there.

Ch’ang-ko County should be emulated in deep plowing. If it cannot be done once a year, it certainly can be done once three, four, or five years. The production increase is 100 percent.

We are not afraid of a population of 800 million or one billion. American reporters say that, after 100 years, the Chinese population will constitute 50 percent of the world population. By that time, our cultural level will be high. When all the people are college educated, they will naturally practice birth control. China’s topography is good, with oceans in the east and mountains in the west.

China has its own language. The pronunciation of the words “communism” and “imperialism” is basically the same in Russian and English, but ours is completely different. Ever since *Ch’in-Shih-huang,* the Chinese people have never respected the foreigners, calling them barbarians. By the end of the Ch’ing Dynasty, when the foreigners attacked and entered China, the Chinese were frightened, became slaves and felt inferior. Arrogant before, now we are too humble. Let us have the negation of a negation.

With 11 million tons of steel next year and 17 million tons the year after, the world will be shaken. If we can reach 40 million tons in five years, we may possibly catch up with Great Britain in seven years. Add another eight years and we will catch up with the U.S.

The Central Committee holds four meetings a year, with one party congress. The provinces hold six meetings, with two big check-ups on the results and four small-scale meetings.

When I see the peasants concealing production, I am very happy. If you have more, I also have more. What the peasants have is equivalent to ours.

The task of reforestation should be undertaken in local areas. Bamboo must be extensively developed. Bamboo is not native to the North. We don’t know when it will grow there.

Notes

[1.] Pan Han-nien, a former Comintern representative, was vice Mayor of Shanghai from 1949 until 1955.

[2.] Originally an anti-Leninist faction in the Russian working-class movement, the Trotskyite group later degenerated into a downright counter-revolutionary gang. In his report to the plenary session of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.) in 1937, Comrade Stalin explained the course this group of renegades had run as follows:

In the past, seven or eight years ago, Trotskyism was one of such political trends in the working class, an anti-Leninist trend, it is true and therefore profoundly mistaken, but nevertheless a political trend. . . . Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working class, but a gang without principle and without ideas, of wreckers and diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies, murderers, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, working in the pay of the intelligence services of foreign states.

After the of the Chinese revolution in 1927, a small number of Trotskyites appeared in China, too. Ganging up with Chen Tu-hsiu and other renegades, they formed a small counter-revolutionary clique in 1929 and spread such counter-revolutionary propaganda as that the Kuomintang had already completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution and they became a dirty imperialist and Kuomintang instrument against the people. The Chinese Trotskyites shamelessly joined the Kuomintang secret service. After the September 18th Incident, to fulfil the order given by the criminal renegade Trotsky "not to impede the occupation of China by imperial Japan", they began collaborating with Japanese secret agents, received subsidies from them and engaged in all kinds of activities facilitating Japanese aggression.

Speech At The Group Leaders' Forum Of The Enlarged Meeting Of The Military Affairs Committee

June 28, 1958

(Excerpts)

This has been a good conference. Some comrades' speeches were very good. [XXX asked the Chairman especially to read the speeches of nine comrades. The Chairman read the speeches of Comrades Chang Tsung-hsün and Liu Ya-lou.[1]] Comrade Chang Tsung-hsün's speech was very good. I agree with it. He wrote it under pressure from the fourth-grade cadres conference of the Military Training Headquarters. This proves that when you compel people, they can write good stuff. There is just one point I don't agree with. Chang Tsung-hsün says that the reason he made mistakes was that he had not studied Mao Tse-tung's writings properly. This is not correct. He should have said that it was primarily because his Marxist-Leninist level was not high enough. Comrade Ya-lou's speech is also pretty good. This illustrates the point that the army comrades' level is high and that they can write. The best thing would be to organize some of the comrades at army and divisional level to speak and write because they are the people who do the practical work, and they have contact with the lower echelons. The stuff they write can achieve unity of theory and practice. The content of conferences should be rich and varied and should introduce advanced experience in the work. In our articles and speeches we should not criticize the Soviet Union. Dogmatism is a problem in our own study; it is not just a question of whether the Soviet Union is advanced or not.

From the beginning there has existed in our army a struggle between two lines in military construction. We had a struggle at the Kut'ien Conference,[2] but we were unable to convince the comrades who held incorrect ideas. Some comrades still adhere to their incorrect line right up to today. Comrade Hsiao K'e[3] was not only guilty of dogmatism, but had a warlord mentality marked by bourgeois ideology, dogmatism and feudal ideology.

In wartime it will not do to implement orders according to Soviet army regulations. It is better for us to have our own regulations. I don't know how much Marxism-Leninism there is in the Military Academy and the Military Training Command. Marxism-Leninism should be a guide for action, yet they use it as a dogma for recitation. If Marx and Lenin were still alive, they would certainly criticize these comrades as being dogmatic. Today the dogmatists advocate copying the Soviet Union. Whom, I would like to know, did the Soviet Union copy in the past? In the resolutions of the Eighth Congress there is a passage dealing with the problem of technological reform. From the point of view of present conditions this is inappropriate because it over-emphasizes Soviet aid. It is very necessary to win Soviet aid, but the most important thing is self-reliance. If we over-emphasize Soviet aid, the question I would like to ask is, on whom did the Soviet Union depend for aid in the past?

The Great Leap Forward in industry and agriculture has destroyed blind faith. We can catch up with Britain in – years, and in from – to – years catch up with America. Next year our steel output will reach from – to – tens of thousands of tons. It is reported that the north-east will produce – tens of thousands of tons by 1962. This is all the result of rectification. The Nanning Conference and the Chengtu Conference broke down blind faith, liberated our thinking and resulted in the Great Leap Forward in industry. Yet we have been training armies for over eight years and have not produced even one book of combat regulations. Now we must gather together some comrades who have rich experience in work and combat to produce a book of combat regulations of our own. Some people mentioned that when the Soviet comrade advisers saw that we were not copying theirs, they made adverse comments and were displeased. We might ask these Soviet comrades: Do you copy Chinese regulations? If they say they don't, then we will say: If you don't copy ours, we won't copy yours.

Why is it that XX hasn't performed well since the victory of the revolution? Apart from the fact that he has not made a sufficiently deep appraisal of his experience in the former period and learned the historical lessons, the reasons are: first, he has blindly accepted old things and old dogmas; second, he has put blind faith in foreign dogmas and in the Soviet Union; third, he has blind faith in himself. He has been very active, hard-working and conscientious, but his direction was haywire and he was not strong enough on politics. The main aim of this conference is to overthrow the slave mentality and to bury dogmatism; also to use the methods of rectification, with a great airing of views and great blooming, to break down blind faith, raise our ideological level, absorb the lessons of experience and, above all, to educate the whole Party and whole army and to unite the whole Party and whole army. Therefore during the conference we can criticize people by name. But I would suggest that when we are formulating resolutions, we only need to distinguish between right and wrong and clarify problems. We do not have to put in the names of those comrades who have made mistakes. After all, in the resolutions of the Kut'ien Conference no names were mentioned.

With X it is mainly a case of blind faith in foreigners. He has an inferiority complex. He hasn't been able to rid himself of this blind faith. He doesn't regard our own experience as of primary importance. Nowadays even a cooperative has to summarize its experience, otherwise it would lag behind. The five cooperatives of Hsinchou in Hupei Province did pretty well, Mach'eng was not so good. But Hsinchou paid no attention to summarizing its experience. Mach'eng sent people round to Hsinchou to study their experience so that they could summarize and extend their own work. In the end the work in Mach'eng went into the lead. When the army went into battle in the past, did it not summarize the experience of its various units, re-train them, and then go into battle again? In all our work we must pay attention to the summing up of our good experience in order to publicize it.

The Soviet Union defeated the intervention of fourteen imperialist countries. That was a long time ago. The Soviet Union has had the experience of the Second World War. We defeated Chiang Kai-shek, Japanese imperialism, American imperialism. We have rich experience, more than the Soviet Union. We should not regard our own experience as worthless. This is wrong. (Chief Lin[4] interjected: 'Our experience is very rich. We must not throw gold away as though it were yellow dust.') We must think of our experience as of primary importance, while studying other people's advanced experience. We must also study the conditions of enemy countries and of friendly countries. In the past we did study conditions in enemy and friendly countries as well as our own. We translated American and Japanese things. In future wars in the East, America won't get anywhere without depending on Japan, so we must make a thorough study of Japanese conditions. We must study the Soviet army's experience. Weapons technology is continually developing and evolving. Therefore in studying the Soviet army's technical experience, we must do so from the standpoint of development. In the past the Russians were very much afraid of Napoleon because he led his army to Moscow. In the end the Russians defeated him and so the Russians often boasted that they were more formidable than Napoleon. Nowadays the stuff produced by the Soviet military advisers (combat plans and ways of thinking) all deal with the offensive and are all concerned with victory. They have no defensive material and do not provide for defeat. This does not conform with real situations. Some people say that summing up the Resist America, Aid Korea War constitutes empiricism, but we know that the Korean War was a big war in which we defeated America and obtained valuable experience. This experience must be summed up. As for their calling us empiricists, well, we can say to them: Your stuff ! about the Soviet Union in the Second World War is also empiricism.

The errors committed by Comrade Hsiao K'e are serious ones. In the past we had no chance to convene such a big conference. Now that we have that chance we can dig out the roots of dogmatism.

As regards learning from the Soviet Union, for internal use we say 'study critically'. In speaking publicly, in order to avoid misunderstanding, it would be better to put it: 'Study the advanced experience of the Soviet Union analytically and selectively.' It is most important that in studying the advanced experience of the Soviet Union, we should combine it with our own independent creative achievements. The universal truth of Marxism must be combined with Chinese practice. We must not eat pre-cooked food. If we do we shall be defeated. We must clarify this point with our Soviet comrades. We have learned from the Soviet Union in the past, we are still learning today, and we shall learn in the future. Nevertheless our study mast be combined with our own concrete conditions. We must say to them: We learn from you, from whom then did you learn? Why cannot we create something of our own? Moreover there have recently been changes among Soviet experts. Changes took place after the Twentieth Congress and the Zhukhov incident. (Chief Ch'en [vice-premier Ch'en I] interjected: 'Soviet comrades who have returned home said that when they came, they brought their experiences with them; now they are returning they are taking our experiences back.') This shows that the situation of the Great Leap Forward inspired not only us in China, but also our Soviet comrades. (Chief Lin said: 'In political matters, such as Party leadership and in political work, our army has a fine tradition of its own. Our Party's Marxist-Leninist level is very high, not to speak of the Chairman's. The Chairman has said that our editorials are at a higher level than those of Pravda. When it comes to the superstructure, in military science, in problems of strategy, we have our own fully developed system. Lenin died too early. He did not have time to attend to this question. Stalin had no developed system. We do not have to learn from the Soviet Union. As regards tactics, we can ! learn half and leave half. Their tactics are questionable both ideologically and as regards their attitude to the masses. The half we learn would consist of the use of naval and air forces and the coordination of the services. As for the half we don't learn, such as tactical thinking, we have Chairman Mao's so we don't need to learn theirs. We should study technology and science and also the organization of modern warfare, but we should use the methodology of the mass line to study it. We should take advantage of the fact that our generation is still alive to organize a group of cadres to put together our own system properly, and to pass it on.') That's the way.

Li Shih-min, Ts'ao Ts'ao[5] etc., all knew how to fight wars. China's past has quite a lot to offer. Comrade K'ai Feng[6] said that the *Sun-tzu ping-fa*[7] contained no Marxism, but when we asked him whether he had read it he could not answer. Obviously it is quite wrong to make categorical statements without having read it. (Chief Lin interjected: '*Sun-tzu ping-fa* does contain both materialism and dialectics. It is a collective work. The authors included Sun-tzu, Sun Pin, Ts'ao Tstao, Tu Yü, etc.')

The elimination of blind faith was brought up at the Chengtu Conference. It has progressed very rapidly in the last four months. Since the second session of the Eighth Congress it has further developed in every domain throughout the country. For example, Anshan, which originally planned to produce – tens of thousands of tons of steel, has now revised its target and next year will reach an output of from – to – tens of thousands of tons. They have also gone in for the combination of large, small and medium plants and of native and foreign methods. According to a letter from Comrade XXX in the north-east, in the second five-year plan the north-east can reach an output of – tens of thousands of tons. If we have steel and modernized industry, then we can easily develop a modernized defence industry. I am in favour of producing more light weapons so that we can arm a mass militia. (Chief Lin interjected: 'The militia is very important.') In the past others have looked down on us. The main reason for this was that we were short of food, steel and machines. Now we have produced some things for all to see.

Notes

[References are given here as provided by the Maoist Documentation Project. They are significantly different in at least one existing edition of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. VIII. — *Transcriber, MIA*.]

[1.] Chang Tsung-hsün (c. 1898-), who had participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising organized by Mao Tse-tung in 1927, and accompanied him to the first base on the Chingkangshan, was in 1958 a Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA. Liu Ya-lou (1910-65) was then commander of the PLA Air Force; he had long been closely associated with Lin Piao.

[2.] At the conference of Communist Party organizations in the Red Army, held at Kut'ien in Fukien Province in December 1929, Mao presented a resolution on political and organizational problems in the army which has been regarded ever since as the classic statement of his views on these matters.

[3.] Hsiao K'e (1909-), a veteran of the Nanchang Uprising and of the Chingkangshan, was director of the PLA General Training Department in early 1958. Shortly thereafter, he was shunted into a subordinate post as Vice-Minister of State Farms and Land Reclamation, and his thirty-year military career came to an end.

[4.] The title given to Lin Piao here, 'Chief' (tsung), an abbreviation for 'Commander-in-Chief' (tsung ssu-ling), does not correspond to any precise function, since he did not replace P'eng Te-huai as Minister of Defence until September 1959. This term is frequently used loosely in Chinese writings to designate a high-ranking officer; prior to 1954, both Lin, and Ch'en I, to whom the same title is given later in this speech, had been commanders, respectively, of the Fourth and Third Field Army.

[5.] Ts'ao Ts'ao (155-220), known posthumously as Emperor Wu of the Wei dynasty, was an outstanding statesman and military leader of the period of the Three Kingdoms.

For Mao's attitude towards him, see *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 162, 166.

[6.] K'ai Feng (1907-55), also known as Ho K'ai-feng, was a member of the 'Returned Student' faction in the 1930s. It was therefore natural that Mao should charge him with lack of knowledge of Chinese culture, and of respect for things Chinese.

[7.] Sun-tzu, who flourished about 500 B.C., is undoubtedly, with Clausewitz, one of the two most celebrated military writers in world history. His Art of War has been most recently translated by General Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, 1963), who also includes a selection of the commentaries by Ts'ao Ts'ao, Tu Yü and others, which this text, like all other classical Chinese writings, has accumulated over the centuries. It is to these that Lin Piao is referring in calling it a 'collective work'.

Communes Are Better

August 9, 1958

[SOURCE: Extracted from the account of Mao's inspection tour in Shantung on 9 August 1958, as reported in *People's Daily*, 13, August, 1958]

Chairman Mao emphasized particularly that arrangements for all types of work must be the subject of vigorous and uninhibited debate by the masses. He said that if plans and directions were not debated by the masses, the ideas would be yours [i.e., those of the cadres]. After such debates, the masses themselves became the masters, and were naturally prepared to work more energetically. Chairman Mao emphasized once more that the leading cadres must go frequently to the lower levels to have a look, to aid the basic-level cadres in summing up their experience, and to give guidance on the spot. When T'an Ch'i-lung (Shantung provincial secretary) reported that Pei-yuan *hsiang* in Li-ch'en *hsien* was preparing to set up large [collective] farms, Chairman Mao said: 'It is better to set up people's communes. Their advantage lies in the fact that they combine industry, agriculture, commerce, education and military affairs. This is convenient for leadership.'

Speech At The Supreme State Conference

(Excerpts)

September 8, 1958

U.S. imperialism invaded China's territory of Taiwan and has occupied it for the past nine years. A short while ago it sent its armed forces to invade and occupy Lebanon. The United States has set up hundreds of military bases in many countries all over the world. China's territory of Taiwan, Lebanon and all military bases of the United States on foreign soil are so many nooses round the neck of U.S. imperialism. The nooses have been fashioned by the Americans themselves and by nobody else, and it is they themselves who have put these nooses round their own necks, handing the ends of the ropes to the Chinese people, the peoples of the Arab countries and all the peoples of the world who love peace and oppose aggression. The longer the U.S. aggressors remain in those places, the tighter the nooses round their necks will become.

* * * * * *

If the U.S. monopoly capitalist groups persist in pushing their policies of aggression and war, the day is bound to come when they will be hanged by the people of the whole world. The same fate awaits the accomplices of the United States.

Interview With A Hsinhua News Agency Correspondent

September 29,1958

Imperialism will not last long because it always does evil things. It persists in grooming and supporting reactionaries in all countries who are against the people, it has forcibly seized many colonies and semi-colonies and many military bases, and it threatens the peace with atomic war. Thus, forced by imperialism to do so, more than 90 per cent of the people of the world are rising or will rise up in struggle against it. Yet imperialism is still alive, still running amuck in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In the West, imperialism is still oppressing the people at home. This situation must change. It is the task of the people of the whole world to put an end to the aggression and oppression perpetrated by imperialism, and chiefly by U.S. imperialism.

It is my opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today, the East Wind and the West Wind. There is a Chinese saying, "Either the East Wind prevails over the West Wind or the West Wind prevails over the East Wind." I believe it is characteristic of the situation today that the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.

The Masses Can Do Anything

September 29, 1958

[SOURCE: Extracted from a statement to a reporter of the *Hsin Hua Agency,* on 29 September 1958, following a tour of the country.]

During this trip, I have witnessed the tremendous energy of the masses. On this foundation it is possible to accomplish any task whatsoever. We must first complete the tasks on the iron and steel fronts. In these sectors, the masses have already been mobilized. Nevertheless, in the country as a whole, there are a few places, a few enterprises, where the work of mobilizing the masses has still not been properly carried out, where mass meetings have not been held and where the tasks, the reasons for them, and the methods have still not been made perfectly clear to the masses or discussed by the masses. There are still a few comrades who are unwilling to undertake a large-scale mass movement in the industrial sphere. They call the mass movement on the industrial front 'irregular' and disparage it as 'a rural style of work' and 'a guerrilla habit'. This is obviously incorrect.

However, while devoting ourselves to iron and steel production on a large scale, we must not sacrifice agriculture. . . The 1959 task in agriculture is to achieve a leap forward even greater than that of 1958. Consequently, we must organize the industrial and agricultural labour force effectively and extend the system of people's communes throughout the whole country. . . .

Instructions

June-September 1958

***Atom Bombs*. June 1958**

Let us work on atom bombs and nuclear bombs. Ten years, I think, should be quite enough.

***At the University of Tientsin*. August 13, 1958**

In future, schools should have factories and factories schools.

Teachers should do manual work. It will not do to move only their lips and not their hands.

Colleges should grasp three things: party committee leadership, mass line, and the co-ordination of education and production.

***At the University of Wuhan*. September 12, 1958.**

It is a good thing that the students themselves spontaneously ask for part-time study and part-time work; this is a logical result of the campaign to build workshops at schools. More permissions should be given to this kind of request and also active encouragement and support. In school reform, notice must be paid to the development of the activism of the broad teaching staff and students and to the gathering together of the wisdom of the masses.

***At the Hupei Iron and Steel Works*. September, 1958.**

Large-scale enterprises like the Wuhan Iron and Steel Works should be gradually built up as industrial complexes. In addition to a wide range of iron and steel products, machinery, chemical products, and building materials may be attempted.

. . . In such a large-scale industrial complex, there must also be some affiliated agriculture, commerce, education, and military service.

On Huan Hsiang's Comment On The Disintegration Of The Western World

November 25, 1958

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Huan Hsiang's theory is correct. The Western World is disintegrating. Currently it is in the process of breaking up, though not yet completely. But is heading in that direction. Final disintegration is inevitable. The transitional period may last quite a while; it will not happen overnight. The so-called Western unity is an empty term. There is unity; Dulles is striving for it, but it has to be under U.S. control. Under the atomic bomb, the big and small partners must rally around the U.S., pay tribute, and prostrate themselves as inferiors. This is the so-called unity of the Americans. Such a situation will inevitably head toward the opposite of unity, to disintegration. Comrades, under today's situation, to whom does the world belong?!

A Letter To Chou Shih-chao

November 25, 1958

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought,* a Red Guard Publication.]

Dear Tun-yuan

I received your letter of 17 October and was happy to read it.

When undertaking a new duty, one must not choose the light and shun the heavy, but must choose the heavy and scorn the light. The ancients said: The virtuous and the able: it is impossible to combine the two into one. I feel that the two can be combined into one in you. Years and months, days and hours, you feel that your ability is not up to par. Actually, the reasons are first, you do not know yourself, and secondly, you do not understand objective matters. Those returned overseas students and big professors, with their confused personal relationships and complicated psychology, hold you in contempt, not in so many words, but by innuendoes. All these are common occurrences in society which almost everyone has to experience. Beyond this there is one's own lack of political-economic experience and the fear when confronted with decisions. These are good; they are all facts and understandable. I feel that [your] intelligence and honesty are adequate to resolve all difficulties. It seems that I have discussed this point with you before. Intelligence means asking many questions and thinking a lot; honesty entails seeking the truth through facts. Practicing them constantly and regularly will make one more successful. Your courage seems to have greatly increased. After not having seen a person for three days, one must look at him with new eyes. My rambling is merely to add some oil and put in a dash of vinegar.

"Covering 80,000 *li* a day when sitting on the ground." Chiang Chu-ju was wrong in his statement. There is a numerical basis. The diameter of the earth is approximately 12,500 kilometers. Multiplied by 3.1416, it becomes 40,000 kilometers, or 80,000 *li*. This is the mileage of the earth's revolution (one day's time). One must pay to ride a train, ship, or bus. It is called traveling. But no fare is required (no purchase of a ticket required) when sitting on the earth and covering 80,000 *li*. Is this traveling?! One is constrained by customs and habits, and one's superstition is not eliminated. It is nothing but daily life, yet many people find it odd. Patrolling the skies, our solar system (including, the earth) threads back and forth in the Silver River [Milky Way] every day and every hour. What is the Silver River? It is without limit; "1,000" merely indicates infinity. Mankind merely "patrols" in a river, but what he sees is infinite. The Herd-boy, the men of Chin, schistosomiasis, dropsy, commonly known as bloat, the dynasties of Chou, Ch'in and Han — all are recorded in books many times. The Herd-boy Star is naturally concerned about his fellow villagers. One must ask the god of Plagues how things are. The Ursa Major, commonly known as the Herd-boy (do I remember it wrong?) belongs to the Silver River system. Please convey my explanations to Chu-ju. Any dissent can be argued. As I may not be in Peking in November we probably will not see each other.

Speech At The First Chengchow Conference

November 1958

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought,* a Red Guard Publication.]

Before the realization of the system of ownership by all the people in the rural area, the peasants remained peasants, and there was a certain dual nature when they walked the socialist path. We can only guide them step by step to divorce themselves from relatively small collective ownership and more toward the system of ownership by all the people via the relatively large collective ownership system, but we cannot ask them to complete the process in one stroke — just as before when we could only guide them step by step to give up the private ownership system in favor of the collective ownership system.

On The Question Of Whether Imperialism And All Reactionaries Are Real Tigers

December 1, 1958

[SOURCE: *Peking Review,* Nos. 37 & 38, September 13, 1977]

Here I should like to answer the question of whether imperialism and all reactionaries are real tigers. The answer is that they are at once real tigers and paper tigers, they are in the process of being changed from real into paper tigers. Change means transformation. Real tigers are transformed into paper tigers, into their opposite. This is true of all things, and not just social phenomena. I answered this question several years ago: Despise the enemy strategically and take full account of him tactically. But why take full account of him if he is not a real tiger? Apparently there are still people around who do not get the point, so we must do some more explaining.

Just as there is not a single thing in the world without a dual nature (this is the law of the unity of opposites), so imperialism and all reactionaries have a dual nature — they are at the same time real tigers and paper tigers. In the past, before they won state power and for some time afterwards, the slave-owning class, the feudal landlord class and the bourgeoisie were vigorous, revolutionary and progressive; they were real tigers. But with the lapse of time, because their opposites — the slave class, the peasant class and the proletariat — gradually grew in strength and struggled against them ever more fiercely, these ruling classes changed step by step into the reverse, changed into reactionaries, changed into backward people, changed into paper tigers. And eventually they were overthrown, or will be overthrown, by the people. The reactionary, backward, decaying classes retained this dual nature even in the face of the people's final decisive struggle against them. On the one hand, they were real tigers; they devoured people, devoured people by the millions and tens of millions. The cause of the people's struggle went through times of difficulty and hardship, and along the path there were many twists and turns. The destruction of the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism in China took the Chinese people more than a hundred years and cost them tens of millions of lives before victory in 1949. Look! Weren't they living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers? But on the other hand, they eventually changed into paper tigers, dead tigers, bean-curd tigers. These are historical facts. Haven't people seen or heard about these facts? There have been thousands and tens of thousands of them! Thousands and tens of thousands! Hence, imperialism and all reactionaries, looked at in essence, from a long-term point of view, from a strategic point of view, must be seen for what they are — paper tigers. On thi! s we should build our strategic thinking. But they are also living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers, they can devour people. On this we should build our tactical thinking. This holds true of the struggle against nature as well as against the class enemy. Both the 12-year 40-article programme for agricultural development and the 12-year programme for the development of science which we published in 1956 proceed from this basic concept of Marxism, the concept of the unity of opposites, that is, the concept of the dual nature of the development of the universe, the concept of the dual nature of the development of things, the concept that a thing invariably manifests itself in a process and that every process without exception has a dual nature. On the one hand, we should take these struggles lightly, they are easy to handle, they are not much of a problem, there is nothing to worry about, and we shall certainly achieve success and be victorious. On the other hand, we should take them seriously, they are not so easy to handle, they present quite a problem and must not be treated casually, and we cannot be victorious without hard work and arduous struggle. Fear and fearlessness fall under the law of the unity of opposites. There is no such thing in this world as an absolutely fearless person, a carefree type without a single worry. Worry attends men from their birth. Students are worried about exams and children about their parents' partiality for their brothers or sisters. Besides, there are numerous adversities and calamities, infirmities and diseases, running a fever of 41 degrees and other mishaps, as expressed in the saying, "In nature there are unexpected storms and in life unpredictable vicissitudes," and so on and so forth. The difficulties we encounter in class struggle and the struggle against nature are far greater in number. But except for cowards and the opportunist gentlemen, most people, and primarily the proletariat and the Communists, invariably put optimism and contempt for! difficulties first. And only then do they take full account of things, of every piece of work, of scientific research, analyse each contradictory aspect of things, dig into them and come to understand the laws of motion of nature and society. It will then be possible to grasp these laws and become relatively free to apply them to successively solving the problems facing us, to handling contradictions and accomplishing our tasks so that hard going can be transformed into easy going, real tigers into paper tigers, the lower stage of a revolution into its higher stage, the democratic revolution into the socialist revolution, socialist ownership by the collective into socialist ownership by the whole people, socialist ownership by the whole people into communist ownership by the whole people, an annual production of several million tons of steel into one of tens of millions of tons or even several hundred million tons of steel, and an output of over a hundred catties or several hundred catties of grain per *mou* into one of several thousand or even tens of thousands of catties of grain per *mou*. Comrades, it is our task to bring about these transformations. Comrades, possibility and reality are two things and they are two opposites of a single unity. Spurious possibility and genuine possibility are again two things and two opposites of a single unity. We should keep our heads cool and our heads hot, which are also two opposites of a single unity. Soaring enthusiasm means hotheadedness and scientific analysis cool-headedness. Some people in our country are a bit too hotheaded at present. They are in no mood to allow a cooling off period, unwilling to make an analysis and all for hotheadedness. Comrades, such an attitude is not good for people in positions of leadership and they may trip and fall. These persons should make a point of cooling off their heads. Some others prefer cool-headedness to hotheadedness. They do not like some of the things that are going on and cannot keep pace with them.! Those who take a wait-and-see attitude and those who want to eventually settle accounts with their opponents belong to this category. In regard to these people, we must gradually make their heads hotter.

Talks With Directors Of Various Cooperative Areas

November, December 1958

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

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1. Speech of November 30, 1958

No matter what the undertaking, the central and the local governments must coordinate the strips and the pieces. This is a rule of democratic centralism and the mass line method; otherwise it will not be successful. Is cold water being thrown on Li Fu-ch'un[1] this time? Plans must be positive and reliable, on a stable foundation. Encouragement is required. The people’s enthusiasm must not be checked, and the lessons of 1956 must be learned. In the local area, there is also the relationship between pieces and strips. The first secretary is the piece and the divisions of labor secretaries the strips. They must also coordinate. The first secretary must coordinate with the industrial secretary. The enthusiasm at the Peitai-ho Conference was for 30 million tons, of which 10 million was subjectivism. One does not know the difficulties of a thing without experiencing it. (Premier’s interruption: Definitely not mysterious; by no means simple. XX: The various areas may give further consideration to the iron and steel quotas. A little reduction will not affect the state plan. Steel, power, and communication should follow the second plan; other quotas the first plan.)

The Plenary Session of the Central Committee will be held on the 6th and 7th. Should the outline of the matter be discussed? We should follow the plan for a while and see what happens. We will decide by 1 July next year. Originally there was no plan for increased grain output, but after a few meetings, it was brought up. The “Eight-point Charter” for agriculture deals only with things on the ground, not in the sky (sunshine and air can not be controlled). The sky and the earth are the unity of opposites. Voluminous words are not required when it comes to good things. Lao-tzu wrote only a little over 5,000 words in his lifetime. Industry is different from agriculture. In industry, many factors affect one another through their mutual relationships. To develop steel, we must develop coal, electricity, etc. There can be no missing link. In agriculture, there are fewer factors affecting one another. There is the three-way alliance of the party, the masses, and the technicians. Experimental fields and high yields constitute a big liberation of mankind and mankind’s comprehension of nature. The three-three system has broken down many insurance coefficients. It is better to write it in. We must make the time more flexible and do some more revisions. In the majority of the areas in the nation, each person has about one *mou*.

The people’s commune should be discussed for two more days and the revisions completed. Many issues have been brought up to this time. Whether people’s communes should be established in the city has been answered. They will be established. In regard to the question of the militia and the family, Dulles accuses us of slave labor and the destruction of the family. Capitalism has long destroyed the family. For the sake of money, father disowns son. Now our society takes care of the old. “Take care of our old and thereby other people’s old; take care of our young and thereby other people’s young.” The wage disparity is rather great, around four fold or more. The peasants have the tendency toward egalitarianism, but there should not be too big a gap, nor should there be no difference. The wage disparity in the Soviet Union is too great. We cannot follow suit. In the future, what will a small wage amount to? What does 15 yuan amount to? It should be 30 to 45 yuan. When everyone’s wage is raised to several tens of yuan, there won’t be any difference. This is in regard to the rural areas. The disparities in the city may be a little more, which is necessary. In the city, the wages of Huang Yen-p’ei[2], Mei Lan-fang[3], and the professors should not be cut. In the future, when social products become more abundant and the low wages are raised and get closer to the high wages, we will be entering communism. In regard to “to each according to his labor” and “to each according to his need”, how do we equalize? It goes from low to high.

Let us spend a half day to discuss the question of work style. Currently, the main problems are coercion and false reporting. Tsao-yang Country did not eliminate illiteracy, yet it reported wiping out illiteracy. In coercion, there are two types of people: One type consists of alien class elements and the other idiots. Just how many are there practicing coercion and issuing orders? One per cent, five per cent, ten per cent? In December this year or January next year, all areas must hold a party congress to discuss the question of work style.

Two major questions arose in the latter half of this year; one is the people's communes, the other is taking steel as the key link. Everyone is a little tense; regulations are now being formulated to ease everybody's mind. The document on people's communes was prepared at the Chengchow Conference. Plans for the meeting were carefully made. The East Chine [Bureau] is deteriorating. In the past such conditions were unthought of. It has coal, but it is not being shipped out.

In regard to the 1959 farm output, the grain output this year is 750 billion catties; next year there will be an increase of 300 billion catties, reaching 1,050 billion catties and averaging over 1,500 catties per capita. With three years of hard struggle, we will reach 2,000 catties per capita. There should also be some tuber crops. This year let us practice the policy of reporting less than the amount and make some allowances. Cotton output this year is reported as 67 million piculs. Next year there will be 100 million piculs. Just how much is the grain output? Has it been doubled more or less? Probably it is better to record a 90 percent increase. On the question of food to eat, should no allowances be made, or should some allowances be made? Next spring will there be areas where the people cannot get three meals a day? Kwangtung issued an order to have three meals a day. The people of Shangung say that they are now eating thin pancakes. What will they do next spring? At present we cannot determine just how much grain we have. Should we eat less now and more later? All areas should discuss it.

In the international situation, Khrushchev held a press conference and did some manipulation on the Berlin issue. If you do not let go, then I will. Khrushchev also knows how to create a tense situation. Let us also create some tension, so that the West will ask us not to do so. Let the West fear tension, because it will be to our advantage. After the publication of the official report of the Sino-Soviet conference, Taiwan held an emergency meeting. But the Taiwan issue was not discussed at all at the conference. The holding of the four-power summit meeting was cancelled reportedly because of China's influence, but actually it was not mentioned at the conference either. It is safe to travel a long distance? Stalin's nerves were not sound and never went anywhere before. All kinds of information has proven that imperialism has adopted a defensive posture, not an offensive one. In his statement of the 18th, Dulles said: "If you communists promote the people's commune, then do not go beyond that sphere. If you mind your own affairs and do not interfere in things beyond yourselves, we will feel at ease. You do not bother me; I do not bother you." Dulles says that we promote slave labor and totalitarianism, and that we have excessive reserve. He says that reserve is that which is left after deducting wages from total income. He calls such as reserve capital. Colonialism – nationalism – communism is Lenin's formula. Read Dulles' statement of the 18th carefully. He admits our large reserve and organizational strength. Philosophically he cannot beat us. His words are low-toned. He does not mention the brink of war or strength and position. He is relatively systematic. He is America's helmsman. The English are sly and cunning. The Americans are relatively short-tempered. The English constantly make strategic and tactical moves. Dulles discusses the five big issues in the world: nationalism. bipolarism, atomic energy, outer space, and communism. He is a t! hinking man. To read his statements, one must study it word by word and resort to the English dictionary. At the World Order Study Conference, 37 million religious disciples issued a letter urging the recognition of China. Dulles says that churches can only decide on ethical principles, but cannot get involved in the details.

Are the eight viewpoints discussed at the Pei-tai-ho Conference intelligent? Yes. The North Atlantic Treaty is an attack on nationalism and domestic communism (the emphasis in to attack the intermediate zone, Asia, Africa, and Latin America) and defense against the socialist camp, unless another Hungarian Incident occurs. However, in our propaganda it is another matter; we must still claim that it is an attack. We must not be hoodwinked by our own propaganda. Lippmann wrote an article saying that it was not an attack, but he could not convince the Soviet people. Who is more afraid of whom? Lippmann advocates building up India to resist us. It seems that they are afraid of us, afraid that we will fight for leadership in Asia and Africa, afraid of our economic high tide. Tension, in the final analysis, is advantageous to us. De Gaulle made his appearance. He would have to appear anyway. His appearance is detrimental to the French proletariat. It is better for the U.S. army to withdraw from the Middle East sooner or is it better later? Only a little over a month and they are all gone, indicating that they have withdrawn. It was good for Taiwan to fire artillery shots, for otherwise the militia could not have been organized so quickly. The boycott, joining the UN, peace, war, and the atomic bomb issue: to whom are they more beneficial? It is better to be afraid or better not to be afraid? Make up one's mind: to not be afraid is better. Discuss the matter together and one will not fear ghosts. Dulles likes war. Being criticized is a false appearance, not the true essence. Dulles is the true helmsman. The provincial committees must appoint special persons to read *Reference Materials*.

Khrushchev is too cautious, too unbalanced. He is lame in one leg. He does not walk with both legs. For their livelihood, the people get 200 rubles, slightly higher than us. Soviet heavy industry is too big and too centralized, disregarding the local areas. It stresses administration and lacks the mass line.

The meeting this time is rather long and rather relaxed. Mainly two documents have been concentrated on. Many people inside and outside the party still fail to understand the paper tiger issue. Some people say that, since it is a paper tiger, why don't we attack Taiwan; why should we advocate catching up with and surpassing Great Britain? I wrote a short article to explain this issue. It is both real and false. The temporary appearance is real, but in the long run it is made of paper. We have always maintained that we must give it serious attention tactically but regard it with contempt strategically. This holds true in the struggle against nature as well as in the class struggle. Eliminating the four pests, wiping out illiteracy, reforestation and [wiping out] schistosomiasis; they cannot be realized in one year, but require several years.

2. Speech of December 12, 1958

1. Regarding the Official Report. The West may possibly fall apart. It looks as if it will, but one cannot be sure. The European continental block is to deal with Great Britain and the U.S., but its internal conflicts are many. There are conflicts between Germany and France, and also between Great Britain and the U.S. They unite together and struggle against each other simultaneously. Stalin predicted war within capitalism. We have long ago said so. In our article written in 1946, we discovered the buffer zones between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The struggle for the buffer zones is the major aspect. Why fight the Soviet Union instead of the buffer zones? Under the name of anti-communism, they promote the policy of aggression. If the buffer zones are attacked, it will create resistance by the buffer zones, and with the vastness of the buffer zones, they cannot come over. This includes the U.S., France, Germany, and Italy. Asia, Africa, and Latin America are their rear areas. There are troubles in Europe, Asia, and Africa. So, how can the U.S. come out and fight the Soviet Union?

The object of exploitation is man. Only by exploiting man can the earth be exploited. Only with man can there be soil; only with soil can there be wealth. If man is killed; what's the use of occupying soil? I don't see the reason for the atom bomb. Conventional weapons are still the thing. We think that as long as the atom bomb is not dropped, Germany, France, and Italy will acquiesce, and many nations will not fear the U.S. Can there be a treaty whereby there is mutual agreement not to use the atom bomb? With the existence of monopolistic capital, it is impossible not to have war. This is because of the lack of raw materials and markets.

The assessment of the international situation in the Official Report: Imperialism will definitely disintegrate, and there will be war within itself. Nixon says: To promote economic competition, India must be built up. How can India be built up? A pessimistic atmosphere covers the West; ours is a joyous one. The term "disintegrating" must be weighed. It is the truth, but once it is said, will it alert them? But then there is no other way. The U.S. wants to force liberal elements into Taiwan. There is tension in Iraq. A large number of counter-revolutionaries were arrested in the past few days, but the outcome has not been decided. Mainly, the U.S., Great Britain, Turkey, and Iran are forming a conspiracy. (Why did Khadjamu disband the labor union? I wonder why Iraq's intelligence is so efficient?)

2. The three documents have been drafted. In regard to the resignation issue, there has to be an "idol".[4] A class must have a class leader. The Central Committee must have first secretary. Without the atom as the nucleus, there would not be rain. Rather than chaos after death, it is better to have chaos now, while the persons is there. It will be impossible to be without a nucleus. There must be consolidation. After a while, an "idol" emerges,

and it becomes relatively difficult to eliminate [him]. This is a psychological condition of long standing. In the future, my duties may increase or decrease, be elevated or lowered. Actually, I am only serving as half a chairman, without charge of daily affairs.

In regard to the 1959 plan, let's work on it for a couple of months first. We will meet again in the middle of February.

How are the people's communes? The provincial and municipal committee secretaries meeting will be held on 1 February, either in Peking, or Ch'eng-to or Shanghai.

Hong Kong newspapers berated Chiang Kai-shek for "hastily bidding farewell to the ancestral shrine and fleeing to Taiwan."

The People's Congress will be held on 15 March.

At the 1 February meeting, besides examining the two resolutions, it is necessary to reorganize the state structure. The People's Congress report must be prepared, and the education issue discussed. We need more internal directives for the people's communes.

Has the people's commune violated the constitution? The issue of integrating politics and the commune, for example, was not passed by the People's Congress, nor is it in the constitution. Many parts of the constitution are obsolete, but it cannot be revised now. After surpassing the U.S., we will formulate a written constitution. Now we are imitating the U.S.; what we have is an unwritten constitution. The U.S. has an unwritten constitution; it is put together article by article.

To enter communism, 15 years, 20 years, or an even longer period is required. To accomplish the socialist system of ownership by all the people may take at least three or four years, during the second five-year plan, or as long as five or six years, during the third five-year plan.

3. The people's commune document must be further revised here and there and reconsidered. Three days, including the 15th, 16th, and 17th, will be spent on the revision. On the 18th the Official Report will be published and the issue of the Chairman's resignation announced. The resolution on the people's commune will be published on the 19th.

If there are more questions on the issue of the Chairman's resignation a telephonic conference may be held again for clarification.

4. I made a mistake at the Pei-tai-ho Conference. Concentrating on the 10.7 million tons of steel, the people's commune, and the bombardment of Quemoy, I did not think of other things. The Pei-tai-ho Conference resolution must now be revised. I was enthusiastic at that time, and failed to combine revolutionary fervor and the practical spirit. The two were combined at the Wu-ch'ang Conference. The resolution must be

revised. Walk on both legs, with Russia's revolutionary fervor and Amercia's practical spirit.

Ch'en Chieng-ming is colluding with a county tax bureau chief in Tung-chiang. Select one of them as the bureau chief, and then change in two months.

It still boils down to two sentences: "The important and the unimportant, the urgent and the non-essential; they must be put in perspective. Self-reliance [depends on] small indigenous groups." Horizontally on top is "political supremacy."

A meeting must be held in the afternoon. Announcements must be issued. Dictatorship is required. The provincial committee secretaries must know what to do. [China] is after all backward. Since we were already backward, what difference does it make to remain so for a few more years? The provincial committee secretaries must consider all angles and give consideration to the whole situation. The idea of the whole country as one chessboard must be combined with local enthusiasm. When there are still conflicts, the national interest must come first. Giving consideration to the whole is the supreme ethic, and having it, one will not suffer a loss. Anyone not giving consideration to the whole will suffer a loss. Yang I-ch'en did not give consideration to the whole situation but attempted to take advantage of the occasion and knock down Chou and Ch'en. All those wishing to do such things are merely picking up a rock only to drop it on their own foot. There are those who give consideration to the whole situation. All those failing to give consideration to the whole situation in history did not come to a good end, such as Yang I-ch'en, Kao Kang and Lo Chang-lung.

Be prepared to suffer a wrong and give consideration to the whole situation. How much Marxism-Leninism did Yang I-ch'en possess? Not one iota.

Some provinces are extremely poor. It does not matter if they remain poor for another few decades, but actually they will not remain poor for that long.

Sacrifice ourselves and help others. Hung-niang stood outside at night and was beaten. What was it for?

Notes

[1.] Li Fu-ch'un (1899-), a Hunanese, has been a long-time close associate of Mao Tse-tung. He worked with Mao at the Peasant Movement Training Institute in 1925-6, and is married to Ts'ai Ch'ang, the sister of Mao's best friend, Ts'ai Ho-sen. He has been Chairman of the State Planning Commission since 1954.

[2.] Huang Yan-pei, see note 2, p 19 of this volume. [Correction: note 19, p 12 of this volume. – *Transcriber, MIA*]

[3.] Mei Lan-fang (1894-1961) was one of the most famous and celebrated actors of Peking Opera.

[4.] A reference to comrade Mao's proposal that he will step down from the Chairmanship of the PRC.

Speech At The Sixth Plenum Of The Eighth Central Committee

December l9, 1958

[SOURCE: *Long live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

These are merely opinions, not conclusions. The resolutions will be the conclusions of the meeting.

1. The appearance of the people's commune. The appearance of the people's commune was not foreseen at the Ch'eng-tu Conference in April and the Party Congress in May. Actually it had already appeared in Honan in April, but remained undiscovered through May, June, and July. It was not discovered until August. A resolution was formed at the Pei-tai-ho Conference. It was a momentous event. A form to build socialism was found, facilitating the transition from collective ownership to ownership by the people and from socialist ownership by the people to the communist ownership by the people, making [life] easier for the workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers, and rendering possible many undertakings on a large scale and by many people. We once said that we must be prepared for unlucky happenings. Nothing can be more unlucky than war or a split in the party. But there are also unexpected good things. We did not expect the formation of the people's commune in April, and the resolution was not made until August. The framework was erected throughout the country in four months. Now the organization must be consolidated.

2. The issue of safeguarding labor fervor. Cadres make mistakes mostly by practicing coercion, telling lies, and making false reports, reporting either more or less than the actual figures. It is not very serious to report less for more, but it is very serious to report more for less. Reporting 100 catties as 50 does not matter, but reporting 50 catties as 100 is serious. The main trouble is the lack of concern over the people's livelihood and giving attention only to production. How should it be remedied? Those making mistakes constitute a minority among the cadres. In regard to those making mistakes, 90 percent or more of them should be handled by means of patient persuasion, once, twice ... without

punishment, only self-criticism. Let us all discuss this matter. My individual opinion cannot be considered as a conclusion. Cadres at the country, district, and township levels seriously violating law and disobeying discipline and isolating themselves from the people constitute approximately 1-5 percent of their total, and that's about all. Conditions vary in different areas. Some distinctions must be made. Those who have isolated themselves from the people should be punished. The people do not like them. If we do not refrain from punishing the more than 90 percent of the cadres who have committed mistakes, we will be unable to protect the cadres and we will be checking the enthusiasm of the laborers as well as the cadres. In regard to those who have seriously violated the law and disobeyed discipline, if we do not discuss their cases, make some distinctions, and mete out punishment accordingly, we will also damage the people's enthusiasm. Some especially serious cases will be handled as criminal cases. In general, individual cases must be analyzed to determine which ones are class dissenters and which are not. However, in extreme cases, such as beating people, swearing at people, detaining people, or tying people up, they must be punished. Hupeh Province already dismissed the first se! cretary of a county committee. When the drought was very severe, he did not fight it but reported that he had. Anyway, punishment should be given to the minimum number of offenders while education should be given to the maximum. By so doing, the enthusiasm of the cadres and laborers will be safeguarded. As for those among the people who have committed mistakes, the policy should be the same.

3. The issue of "basically transforming the entire country after three years of hard struggle". Is this slogan appropriate? Can it be done in three years? This slogan was first introduced by a Honan comrade. We adopted it at the Nan-ning Conference. It was aimed at the rural areas at that time. Subsequently, we don't know when, it was expanded into "transforming the entire country after three years of hard struggle." Tseng Hsi-sheng[1] wanted to convince me. He showed me maps of three river networks and maintained that the rural areas could be basically transformed. Maybe it is possible to accomplish this in the rural areas, but as for the entire country, I feel that further consideration is required. It is possible that within three years, we may be able to produce 30 to 40 million tons of steel annually. When a large nation of 650 million population produces 30-40 million tons of steel, how could it be called a basic transformation? I feel this standard has been set too low. Otherwise, we would not have to strive for further improvement. What would we call it when our production reaches 50, 60, 100, or 200 million tons annually? I feel that great improvements are yet to come! Therefore, we cannot speak of basically transforming the country in three years. By 1962 steel production may reach 50 or 60 million tons a year. By that time it may be said that we have basically transformed the entire country. We will then have reached the standards in Britain and America of today. By that time should we still refrain from speaking about basically transforming the entire country? Transforming a nation of over 600 million at such a speed seems incredible. What should we call it? It should be discussed, because the newspapers are already vigorously propagandizing it. Maybe we can strive for basic transformation in five years and thorough transformation in 10-15 years. What is the best? I hope our comrades will think about it. ! Maybe we can call it basic transformation when Great Britain is surpassed and complete transformation when the U.S. is surpassed. When we force ourselves to surpass others, we will become exhausted. It is better to take it a little easier.

If we do not require these many years and surpass them in three or four years, then what should we do? If it can be realized in advance, it's all right! The sooner we achieve our goal in advance of plans, the sooner we will get the results. I don't believe that will be a loss! Tseng Hsi-sheng has an idea which is nothing but "opportunism." Last winter and this spring, Anhwei began to undertake 800 million cubic meters of earth and stone work in water conservation. Subsequently it was doubled to 1.6 billion. Eight hundred million was opportunism; 1.6 billion was Marxism-Leninism. In a short time, it was increased to 3.2 billion, and 1.6 billion looked like "opportunism." Later on it was increased to 6.4 billion. When we set the time for the transformation a little longer, we are not being anything but "opportunists." Such opportunism is very interesting and I am willing to practice it. Marx appreciated such opportunism. He would not have criticized me.

4. Certain disputes inside and outside the party. There are all kinds of opinions concerning the people's communes inside and outside the party. Hundreds of thousands or millions, of cadres are discussing it. Many questions have not been cleared up. Each man has his own opinion, and 10 men have 10 opinions. There is no general or intensive analysis. There are also some opinions in the international society which holds several viewpoints. One is that there is too much haste; that their great determination and high revolutionary fervor are extremely valuable, but they have not made any historical, situational, or international analysis; that enthusiasm is their good point but haste their defect; that it is premature to announce the transition to ownership by the people and the entry into communism in two or three years. The resolution this time is aimed mainly at this viewpoint. In other words, don't be in too great a haste, for it won't do any good. With this resolution, after this resolution, after a period of weeks, months, they will come to this realization through practice and debate. There will always be "leftists," but there is no need to worry about them. As long as the majority of the cadres are united in their thinking, it can be handled easily. Possibly a few cadres who are good comrades and loyal to the party and the country may believe we are being too hasty. They are not tide watchers, or account settlers. They are not on the opposite side. They are concerned, concerned that we may fail. They are good people. This resolution may possibly convince them, because we are not in that much of a haste. The resolution is aimed mainly at the hasty people, it is also a reply to the tide watchers and account settlers. They do not have good intentions. They do not realize the urgent demand of the current situation or that the opportunity is ripe.

There are two transitions. How can they be achieved? This question came up in the past two months. It is good that this question has come up. We have the answer for it. It was not solved at the Ch'eng-tu Conference. But some preparations were made at the Chengchow Conference and were completed a month later. Communism is divided into two stages. More than a 100 years have passed since Marx, 40 years since Lenin's October Revolution, 30 since our party started building a base, and nine since the national victory. Therefore, this question is not premature, and the conditions for an answer have ripened. Currently, there are many opinions inside and outside the country concerning this question. Dulles is also expressing his opinion. He says that we practice slave labor and destroy the family; that the great speed of our construction is a result of our excessive exploitation and the accumulation of a large reserve; that they are slow because there is less exploitation [of the U.S. people]. The intermediate strata, the proletariat, and the communists are also voicing their opinions. The proletariat of all nations and the comrades of foreign countries are defending us. Their basis is the Pei-tai-ho Conference and newspaper information. If we do not give an answer, there will be much confusion and an anarchic situation may develop. Everyone will be for himself. The provinces and regions will not be able to control the counties and the counties will not be able to control the communes. it will be like a reinless horse. Therefore, we must oppose haste on the one hand and answer this question on the other.

5. The study of political economy. In the next few months, please study Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism, Textbook on Political Economy* (third edition), and *Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on the Communist Society*. All provinces should spend a few months on organization. Studying economic theories in conjunction with reality has a great theoretical and practical significance for the cause of our undertakings at the present time. I made this suggestion at the Chengchow Conference and wrote a letter suggesting it for everyone's consideration.

6. The study of dialectics. At the time of the Chengchow Conference, a comrade, I don't remember who it was, introduced the saying "big collective; small freedom." This is a good saying. If it had been "big freedom; small collective." it would have pleased Dulles, Huang Yen-p'ei and Jung I-jen.

We must take hold of both production and livelihood problems. "Walking on both legs" is a theory of the unity of opposites and within the realm of dialectics. Marx's theory on the unity of opposites made great progress in China in 1958 which, under the premise of preferential development of heavy industry, included the simultaneous promotion of industry and agriculture, of heavy and light industries, of central and local industries, of large, medium, and small enterprises, of small plants using indigenous methods and large plants using foreign methods, of native and foreign methods, and simultaneous development in other fields. Then there are also the management systems — centralized leadership by the Central Government, and management by levels in the local areas. From the Central Government, province, region, counties, all the way down to the production team, some authority is conferred. It serves no good purpose for them to be completely without authority. These concepts are already firmly established in our party. This is good. Both indigenous methods and modern methods are simultaneously promoted. There are plants using both Chinese and modern methods. Were not Chinese methods used at T'ang-shan and Huang-shih-kang? Are there also small plants using foreign methods? There are. There are also plants using both foreign and native methods. In general, it is very complex. Some of these [combinations] are considered wrong and may not be practiced in some nations of the socialist camp. We permit them; we consider them proper here. Is it better to permit them or not to permit them? We have to wait a few years and see. However, for a nation like ours which is extremely poor, it is all right to use some indigenous methods to build small plants. It will be too monotonous to concentrate only on big projects. Agriculture is also full of complexities. We have high, medium, and low yields at the same time. The "three-three system" of cultivation was created ! by the people and adopted at the Pei-tai-ho Conference. In this system, the land available for cultivation is divided into three parts; one for growing food, one for afforestation, and one is to be left fallow. This may be the direction of the agricultural revolution. The “eight-character code” was also introduced. They are, water for irrigation, fertilizer, soil improvement, seeds, close planting, crop protection, farm tool reform, and field management. Man needs water to drink; so do plants.

In regards to the socialist system, two kinds of ownership exist simultaneously in the socialist stage. They are opposites, and also united. They are the unity of opposites. Collective ownership contains the nucleus of the socialist ownership by the people. Its basic essence is collective ownership, but it also contains the element of the communist ownership by all the people. Yu Chin said recently that it is all right for the collective ownership in China to contain the elements of communism. A capitalist society does not allow the socialist form of production. But in nations under the leadership of the communist party, it is proper to allow the elements of communism to grow. Stalin did not solve this problem. He polarized the collective ownership, the socialist ownership by all the people, and the communist ownership by all the people. This is wrong.

Can these be called the development of dialectics?

“Big collective, small freedom” was proposed at the Chengchow Conference. Now, it is “grasping revolution and grasping livelihood problems.” These are the expansion of dialectics. The Wu-ch’ang conference resolved that we must “seek the truth from facts.” We must be hot and cold at the same time when we do our planning. We must not only proceed with determination, but also earnestly engage in scientific analysis. Of course, this resolution alone will not solve all our problems. I think it is better to delay its announcement. We should issue only an official report, then publish the resolution next March at the People’s Congress. This is in accord with our great ambition and determination. It will avoid certain impractical ideas that emerged from the 1958 great leap forward. It will be given a firmer basis and a better scientific analysis. As for steel production, I had once favored producing 30 million tons next year. I have also had some second thoughts after Wu-ch’ang. In the past I thought of 100 or 120 million tons in 1962. At that time I was only concerned with the question of demand. I was worried over the problem of who would be using this steel, but did not think of the problem of whether it is possible. Later on I considered this problem. One is capacity and the other is need. Producing 10.7 million tons this year has been exhausting; therefore, capacity becomes a question. To produce 30 million tons next year, 60 million tons the year after, and 120 million tons in 1962 is not possible or realistic. Now, we should shorten the time and plan for 18 to 20 million tons. Can this be exceeded? Let us wait until next year and see. 22 to 23 million tons may be possible. It may be exceeded when there is extra capacity. Now our goal should be small. We should not set it too high and leave a margin of safety. We should let the people surpass our plans in practice. This also is a problem of dialectics. Practice includes the effort of our leading cadr! es and the practice of the people. When the goal is set low but raised higher in practice, it is not opportunism. The growth from 11 million to 20 million tons is about a 100-percent increase. There has never been such “opportunism” in the world since ancient times. Here, it must also be linked with internationalism, with the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp, and with the entire world working class and international unity. On this subject we must not struggle to be first. Currently, some counties are always struggling to be first; they want to enter communism first. In fact, An-shan Iron and Steel, Fu-shun, Liaoning, Shanghai, and Tientsin should be the first to enter communism. It would not look right for China to enter communism ahead of the Soviet Union. Whether this is possible is also a question. The Soviet Union has 1.5 million scientists, several million higher intellectuals, and 500,000 engineers, more numerous than the U.S. It has 55 million tons of steel, but we have only this little bit. Its reserve strength is great and cadres numerous, while we have just begun. Therefore, capacity is a question. The seven-year plan proposed by Khrushchev is a preparation to enter communism. The proposed two systems of ownership will gradually become one. This is good. But one is "impractical" and the other "impossible." Even if it is possible for us to be the first, we should not do so. The October Revolution was Lenin's cause. Are we not emulating Lenin? So, what's the need of hurrying? It would be only for the purpose of seeking credit from Marx. If we rush, we may possibly commit errors in international matters. We must give attention to dialectics and mutual benefits. Dialectics has made great developments and this is one of them.

7. The 15-year program brought out at the Chengchow Conference. This time we have laid aside the 15-year program brought out at the Chengchow Conference. There is no basis to determine whether it is needed and whether it is possible. We not only lack sufficient basis, but also preliminary basis. The experiences of the Soviet Union and the U.S. do not provide a basis for us to do that much. Is it possible? Even if it is possible, customers cannot be found. Therefore, the program will not be set firmly for the time being. We can bring it out every winter and discuss it. Such long-range plans will not be made next year, the year after next, or three years hence. Probably a long-range plan can be formulated by 1962, but not earlier. The party and the people have been promoting industry for several years, and they may have some idea about the questions of capability and need. Some comrades are probably disappointed that it was laid aside and not discussed at this conference.

8. Military work in 1958. Military work developed considerably in 1958, including the all-out rectification, the officers joining the soldiers in the units, the participation in production, and militia building. Ever since the rectification conference in Peking in June, all levels have also been holding rectification conferences. By now they have probably been completed. Training cannot be disregarded. If everyone is assigned to conduct rectification, production, steel refining, commune building, or water conservation, it won't work either. Troops are, after all, troops, and training is a constant task.

9. Change in the education system. Implementing the system of combining education and labor production is a momentous matter. Naturally, some problems have cropped up. Some students, for example, do not want to study, but find labor production more interesting. If many of them do not want to study, then it becomes a problem. When it becomes a problem, a meeting will be held. After the meeting they will study again.

10. The question of two possibilities. There are always two opposing sides in a thing. Will the dinning hall, nurseries, and communes be consolidated? It seems that they will be, but we must also be prepared for some collapses. Consolidation and collapse are two possibilities which exist simultaneously. If we are not prepared, there may be a big collapse. Consolidation and collapse are two opposites. Our resolution is for the purpose of consolidation. Without a few collapses, there will not be consolidation. For example, if a few infants die in the nurseries or a few oldsters die in the happiness halls, what would be the superiority of such institutions? If cold rice is served in the dining halls, or if there is only rice and nothing else, a group of them will also collapse. To feel that not one should collapse is not practical. Collapse due to bad handling is rational. Generally speaking, collapses are partial and temporary, not permanent. The general tendency is development and consolidation. Our party also has two possibilities: consolidation and split. In Shanghai one Central Committee split into two Central Committees; in the Long March, we split with Chang Kuo-t'ao; the Kao-Jao Incident was a partial split. Partial splits are normal. Since last year, splits occurred within the leadership group in half of the provinces in the nation. Take the human body for instance. Everyday hair and skin are coming off. It is the death of a part of the cells. From infancy on, a part of the cells will die. It benefits growth. Without such destruction, man cannot exist. It would have been impossible if men did not die since the time of Confucius. Death has benefits; fertilizer is created. You say you don't want to become fertilizer, but actually you will. You must be mentally prepared. Partial splits occur everyday. There will always be splits and destruction. The absence of splits is detrimental to development. Destruction in entirety is also a historical inevitability. As a whole, the party and the ! state, serving as the tools of the class struggle, will also perish. But before the completion of its historical mission, we must consolidate it. We do not hope for splits, but we must be prepared. Without preparation, there will be splits. With preparation, we will avoid big splits. Large and medium splits are temporary. The Hungary Incident was a large split; the Kao-Jao and Molotov Incidents are medium ones. Changes are occurring in each and every party branch. Some are dismissed while others join; some work successfully while others make mistakes. It is impossible for changes never to occur. Lenin constantly said: "A nation always has two possibilities: success or destruction." Our people's Republic of China also has two possibilities: continue to succeed, or become destroyed. Lenin did not conceal the possibility of destruction. China also has two possibilities, and we must recognize them. We are not in possession of the atom bomb. Should there be a war, running away is the best of the 36 stratagems. If Peking, Shanghai, and Wu-han are occupied, we will resort to guerrilla warfare. We will regress one or two decades and return to the Yanan era. Meanwhile, we must actively make preparations, vigorously promoting iron and steel, machinery, and railways, striving for several ten million tons of steel output in three or four years, establishing an industrial foundation, and becoming more consolidated than today. Currently our prestige in the world is high, resulting from such big events as the bombardment of Quemoy, the people's commune, and the 10.7 million tons of steel output. I feel that, though our prestige is high, our strength is not superior. We are still "poor and blank", we have no weapons in our hands, and we have not accomplished anything. Now we have some weapons, but our nation is actually weak. Politically ours is a strong nation, but militarily and economically we are a weak nation. Therefore, the mission confronting us is to change from weakness to st! rength. Can the

transformation be accomplished after three years of hard struggle? I am afraid not. Three years of hard struggle can only produce partial changes, not fundamental transformation. If we take four more years, making it a total of seven, it will be better, and the name will correspond with the substance. Now our prestige is very high but our strength very small. This point must be clearly recognized. Currently, the foreigners do a lot of bragging, and many newspapers have nothing but exaggerations. We must not let such bragging turn our head. Actually, there is only 9 million tons of good grade steel; milling it into steel material will result in only 70 percent, or a little over 6 million tons. We must not deceive ourselves. The volume of grain is great. After discounting in all areas, the amount is 860 billion catties. We say 730 billion catties, or a little more than double. We do not count the 110 billion catties. When it is there and we do not count it, it is not a loss, because it is there. We are only afraid that it is not there. Whether it's there has not been verified. All of you present here have not verified it. Let us consider it as 860 billion catties, but one-fourth belongs to the potato family. The estimate must include the unhappy side. We might as well make it clear. We should hold a meeting in the provinces, regions, and counties and spread the unpropitious things. What's wrong with that? We don't like to hear others talking about them, but I shall talk about unpropitious things everywhere, such as the collapse of public dining halls and communes, party splits, isolation from the masses, U.S. occupation, destruction of the nation, guerrilla warfare. We follow a Marxist law. No matter what, all such unpropitious things are only temporary and partial. The point has been proved by the many failures in our history. The Hungary incident, the Long March, the 300,000 troops reduced to 20,000, the 300,000 party members dwindling to several tens of thousands ! — these were all temporary and partial. The destruction of the bourgeoisie and imperialism will be permanent. The setbacks, failures, and destruction of socialism are temporary, and it does not take long for us to recover. Even total failure is also temporary, and there will be recovery. After the big failure of 1927, we picked up the gun again. "Heaven has unexpected winds and clouds; man has misfortunes and good luck at any moment". We must be prepared. "It is rare for a man to live three score and ten." Death is inevitable. One cannot live 10,000 years. One must be prepared at all times. All my words are depressing. Every man dies. The individuals will always die, but mankind will always continue to live. Both possibilities must be discussed; there is no harm in it. If one must die, one dies. As for socialism, I would like to devote myself to it for few more years. After surpassing the U.S., we can go and report to Marx. Our several old comrades are not afraid to die. I am not willing to die, but strive to live on. But if I must die, then let it be so. There is still some "Ah Q" flavor, but then if there is no "Ah Q" flavor at all, it won't be easy to live.

11. The issue of my resignation as the Chairman of the Republic. A formal resolution must be made this time, and I hope my comrades will agree, I ask that within three days, the provinces hold a telephonic conference to notify the regions, counties, and people's communes. The official report will be published three days later, so that the lower levels will not find it a total surprise. Things are really odd in this world! One can go up but not come down. I expect that a part of the people will agree and another part disagree. People do not understand, saying that while everyone is so full of energy in doing things, I am withdrawing from the frontlines. It must be clearly explained. This is not true. I am not withdrawing. I want to surpass the U.S. before I go to see Marx!

12. International situation. There has been great developments this year. The enemy is in disarray, more and more so. We are getting better, better and better everyday. Everyday the newspapers confirm this point. The truly discouraged is imperialism. They are rotting, becoming disorderly, full of conflicts, splitting apart, experiencing a bad time. Their good days are over. Their goods days were before they turned into imperialism, when they had only capitalism. Our situation will improve day by day. Of course, we must also expect long term, tortuous, and complex struggles, and the possibility of war. There are those who want to take risks. The most reactionary is the monopolistic bourgeoisie, while the majority of the people do not want war.

Notes

[1.] Tseng Hsi-sheng (c 1905-) a graduate of Whampoa who participated in the Long March, was elected to the Central Committee in 1956. He was also First Secretary of the CPC for Anhwei province, from 1952 to 1960, and in that capacity he showed himself a strong supporter of the Great Leap Forward.

Reply To Article “Tsinghua University Physics Teaching And Research Group Inclines Toward The ‘Left’ Rather Than Right In Handling Teachers”

December 22, 1958

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

I suggest printing and distributing the article to the party committees, general branches, and branch committees of all universities, special schools, and scientific research organs for their perusal. There should be a discussion to correct the main orientation and strive to make as many professors, lecturers, assistants, and research personnel as possible serve proletarian education and culture and science. What do you think? It should also be distributed to the party committees and general branches of literary and art organizations, newspapers, periodicals, and publishing organs for their study and discussion. Please consider and decide.

Appendix

Tsinghua University Physics Teaching and Research Group Inclines toward the 'Left' Rather Than Right in Handling Teachers.

Recently the party general branch of the Tsinghua University Public Teaching and Research Group inspected the work of the Physics Teaching and Research Group Branch and organized the party members to discuss its policy toward intellectuals. The following problems were uncovered in the discussion:

1. It is felt that the intellectuals are the objects of revolution in the socialist revolution period, and even more so when entering communism, because the absolute majority of them are bourgeois intellectuals and belong to the exploiting class. Even league member assistant professors are considered the objects of revolution.

2. It is felt that, to start from the interest of the working class, the class line should be followed, but not the mass line, as it is not suitable in the school. To clarify the dividing lines, they incline toward the "left." They feel that "bringing out the role of old teachers" will confuse the class line and relax the struggle.

3. It is felt that all high level intellectuals are fundamentally opposed to the party's education policy, that they set up a formation to attack us; that we must counter-attack. All the objects of the united front are retrogressive. To have them here is for the purpose of setting up opposites.

4. It is felt that party prestige and mass consciousness have been raised and that the time has arrived for replacement by party members. As the work load is heavy now, performing united front work will impede the great leap forward. The leaders of all organizations should be replaced by party members.

As a result of such wrong ideas, they adopted some wrong methods in their work. The director of the teaching and research office, Liu Shao-t'ang (medium left), had always made a relatively good showing, yet the branch felt that he could only serve as a negative example. He was asked to compile the teaching outline together with several backward assistants. Meanwhile, the party and league members compiled another outline behind his back and prepared to compete with him. Liu manifested extreme enthusiasm, finishing the task by working through the night. No fault could be found with it. Yet the party members laid his outline aside and handed the outline compiled by the party and league members to the masses for discussion.

During the socialist and communist education movement, the party and league members declared at the small group meetings: "If we do not promote communism now, it is a withdrawal in face of the bourgeoisie. The principal rejects salary reduction; it is a compromise with the high level intellectuals. If they are [politically] conscious, they should voluntarily cut their salary. If these people still do no reform, they should be sent to the old age home!"

All the work of the teaching and research group was handled by the party branch, without consulting the group chairman. The party general branch wanted to stimulate the enthusiasm of all the teachers. but the branch could not see the point. It felt that if the prestige of these people was not knocked down, it would not be able to stimulate the enthusiasm of the party and league members. When the party general branch proposed motivating the masses to summarize the experiences in implementing the education policy, the branch was also reluctant, saying: “Why is it necessary to summarize experiences in company with the objects of revolution?”

The Tsinghua University party commission recently corrected such erroneous methods.

Speech At Conference Of Provincial And Municipal Committee Secretaries

February 2, 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

In regard to matters in a high tide, some people may have doubts. This is not odd. Doubts will occur year after year. There are two kinds of people: One kind consists of those who have good intentions and who are concerned; another kind consists of hostile elements, such as Lo Lung-chi[1] and the landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements. A distinction must be made. When others doubt or make detrimental remarks, we must not consider it as something bad, but instead, pay attention and analyze. There will always be defects. It is not strange for some people to have doubts. In fact, it is beneficial.

There has been an air of cutting back for two months. Now it is 1 February. We must go all out. The general line cannot be changed. It is still to go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results. We must exert out utmost efforts. . . . go all out, strive for the upper reaches, not the middle reaches, nor the lower reaches. There was some cutting back in November and December. The people needed a rest. It is nothing unusual to relax a little, but we must exert efforts again.

After one year’s effort, a great leap forward situation has unfolded. Is this something temporary? Will there be a leap forward every year for the next several years? With a nation like ours, large population, vast area, and resources, and the Soviet Union’s experience, it is possible. The U.S. can also be considered as a great leap forward, first in the world for over 100 years. It is capitalist. Now it is no longer progressing. Be it a great, medium, or small leap forward, we probably will leap forward. If not a great leap forward, we will make a small leap forward. Most likely it will be a great leap forward every year. Is a great leap forward situation unfolding? I hope you will all think it over whether we will have great, medium, or small leaps forward in the future. I am inclined toward leaping forward.

The so-called work method is dialectics. There must be planned and proportionate development, and subjective activity. When discussing the defects of last year, some people dwell on the defects. With dozens of defects in their mind, they fail to see any achievement at all. It is the question of nine fingers and one finger. Is it metaphysics or dialectics? Metaphysics has several characteristics. First, looking at problems in an isolated and one-sided manner: instead of regarding the world as a single entity and with the parts mutually linked, it regards it as disconnected, like sand. Second, looking at problems superficially. instead of looking at problems from their essence, it regards them in their external form only, ignoring the contents. Third, looking at problems statically: it does not regard problems from their development, failing to see the contents through the forms, or the essence through the superficial. The "*Internal Reference*" of the New China News Agency must be read, but it isn't good to read it too much either. The report on the Peking University problem in 1957, for example, indicated that the rightists were making a reckless attack and creating a terrible situation. Ch'en Po-ta went there to see for himself, and found that it wasn't that bad at all. Or, take the speech of Lin Hsi-ling: the first day it was marvellous, the second day the number of people refuting him increased, and by the third day, he was rebutted. What is written in the "*Internal Reference*" is history. It must be read, but it must not be over-read. If one believes everything in books, it is better not to read books at all. When King Wu chastised Chou, blood flew so profusely that it floated pestles. Mencius refused to believe it. Now when we say books we mean newspapers and periodicals, and "*Internal Reference*" is one of them. We cannot believe everything in them. When we listen, we must listen to both sides. Regardless of the number ! of defects we have, when it comes right down to it, it is a question of nine fingers and one finger. Several hundred millions of laboring people and several millions or tens of millions of cadres cannot be doing only bad things. This I believe. It would be unimaginable for all the leading cadres present here to be engaged in bad things everyday after dinner. As it was mentioned in Wu-ch'ang, those doing bad things in the counties, communes, and production brigades constitute at most one to five percent. In regard to the high and medium-level cadres, whether they are present here or not, they all want to do good; there cannot be too many wanting to do bad things. As for those with good intentions but doing something bad, a distinction must be made. The tragedy of Stalin was that he wanted to do good deeds but ended up doing bad deeds. Subjective matters can only produce an effect in objective practice.

We must praise this method taking one big stride forward and propagandizing it: We must have key points, yet also walk on both legs. The raw material industry, for example, is a key point at present. It should be increased somewhat, while the processing industry should be reduced slightly. It is correct to increase investments XX billions, XX million U.S. dollars, for X tons of rolled steel in order to promote light and chemical industries. This method must be propagandized, discussed, and developed. As economic work is very complicated, with the factors mutually serving as cause and effect, improper handling will produce a chain reaction. We must delve into it, investigate and study, and uncover, expose, and solve the problems. Without delving, we will only hit the skin, not the blood vessel. We might as well be fearless, delve in, and expose. Short of fully exposing the contradictions, it will be impossible to solve them. Problems are contradictions. Many a time when a thing is said to be without problem, actually there are problems. We must discover, understand, and solve problems. The “Three Attacks on Chu-chia Chuan” in *Water Margin* began with a visit to the village by Shih Hsiu.[2] Once this problem was solved, another one was solved. After winning the battle and breaking up the three villages, Chu-chia Chuang was isolated. The third problem was ignorance of the internal conditions of Chu-chia Chuang. Men were sent in to surrender to the enemy in order to attack from the outside with cooperation from the inside. This is a good tick. Why not resort to it? In the past we always surveyed the conditions for a battle, and victories were won when the conditions became ripe. Now, in promoting construction and fighting nature, we must also investigate and study. We had no experience in construction. The first secretaries of the provinces and myself did not begin to tackle it until the latter half of last year. In the past we ma! inly tackled agriculture, but not industry. Is agriculture actually placed on a solid foundation? XX catties of grain, XX piculs of cotton, hemp, oil, large cattle, small domestic fowl — are their quota on a solid foundation? Or are they exaggerations? Can they be fulfilled? One must not resort to false reporting in order to get through. The proper method is to surpass the norm. XX catties of grain is to be produced, but only XX catties to be reported, because otherwise it will be difficult next year. The year before last we started early, last year was just right; this year we began a little late. Was there deep plowing? According to the newspapers, fertilization was handled fairly well. How is the fertilizer situation in Honan? How are we doing in regard to water conservation, fertilizer, and soil improvement? In water conservation we strive for 30 billion cubic meters of earthwork. I am concerned over fertilizers this year. Dropsy in humans is due to lack of meat and vegetables. When the crops get no fertilizer, they also suffer from dropsy. Therefore, we must vigorously promote native chemical fertilizer, bacterial fertilizer, compost, green fertilizer, smoked fertilizer, human waste, and animal waste. Centering on these main items, we must work concretely. The wheat crop requires additional fertilizing, watering, and cultivating. Cultivation will temporarily sever the capillaries and reduce water evaporation. In regard to the XXX billion catties of grain undertaken for this year, the order of soil improvement, fertilizer, irrigation, seeds, close planting, crop protection, field management, and farm tool reform should be followed. Soil is at the center. When there is soil, there is grain. When water is available, soil improvement should be placed first. Next is fertilizer, and irrigation comes third. But no revision should be made for the time being. I hear that the labor required for fertilization is about half of the farm labor. Tool reform is very important. Every people’s ! commune should set up a farm tool plant. It should be organized according to local conditions, and not fizzle out after a flourishing start. A special farm tool research institute and a school should be set up to collect, study, design, and trial manufacture farm tools. (Chekiang has weather and soil research organs, but nothing for farm tool research.) Is manual labor required to dig so many cubic meters of earth and apply so much fertilizer? We must have machinery. “Collecting and cutting” should read “cutting and collecting.” How can manual labor take care of cutting, transporting, threshing, and collecting, without any machinery?!

There are two other problems I wish to discuss. Some criticize us for not having leapt forward. The tone of 30 percent of the well-to-do middle peasants is similar to the landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists. The democratic people may hold opinions in their mind, but they don't express them aloud. I talked about this problem at the Wu-ch'ang Conference. Five percent among us violate the law and disobey discipline. As for those loyal to the party and the state, they cannot be included in the one to five percent. The labor enthusiasm of the cadres and laboring people must be protected. Distinction must also be made even among those within the five percent. According to circumstances, education should be conducted to correct their mistakes. It is not good to exaggerate the problems. This experience must be reviewed every year. Like the Buddhist monks chanting scripture, it is repeated everyday. This is the question of the relationship between the individual and the general, between the large and small parts, and between the partial and the whole. Our party has decades of experience. If a small mistake by a basically good individual is exaggerated it can make him look all bad. Lenin said: These words were originally correct, but their essence was changed when uttered slightly in excess. Currently, there are some people with good intentions, but their method is wrong and they cannot distinguish the relationship between the part and the whole. Thus, dozens of defects are listed against them, and there is not one thing right with them. We must take heed of this point. In the process of commune reorganization, the people must be permitted to point out the defects. Self-criticism comes first, and correction is required. Thereafter, clarify the fact that the defects are the relationship between one and nine fingers. When analyzing and handling problems, the question of one or two or three fingers must be clarified. Of course, I am talking about the majority. ! A small number of individuals are very bad, a big mess, but the majority must correct their mistakes. Enthusiasm must be protected, for otherwise people will be afraid to take responsibilities. As for those individuals who have truly committed errors of line, it is not one finger, but nine fingers, rotting, and they are the exceptions. Conclusions must be just right, for otherwise mistakes will be made. Those feeling a strong hostility toward the people should be punished, but of course not necessarily each and everyone should be executed. Some people in the rural areas beat up people by the hundreds, and it will not be good not to punish them, because it will affect the people. However, regarding the over 95 percent of cadres, they must be protected. Our party has decades of experience in this problem. Take Lo Chang-lung[3] for instance. Currently this man is a professor in Wu-han. I know him well. He was vigorously opposed to the central committee, finding nothing right with it, feeling that only he was correct, and establishing his own central committee. As a result, he picked up a rock only to drop it on his own foot. Then there was the Li Li-san line. He also insisted that everyone else was wrong except him and negated everything. It was the same with the Wang Ming line. They all considered themselves 100 percent Bolshevik and others inveterate right opportunists and narrow empiricists. There was also the Chang Kuo-t'ao line. He also set up his own central committee, wrote plays and songs to overthrow Mao, Chou, Chang and Po, and considered himself a follower of Leninism and the International line. As a result, he destroyed himself, fled to Hong Kong, and sent his son to the Sun Yat-sen University, showing that he was not a Leninist. The second Wang Ming line was the same. He presented six big outlines, with a tremendous flourish, basically negated everything of the central committee, and misled many people. It was not the problem of one ! individual; he represented many unstable elements in the petit bourgeoisie. Wang Ming appealed to the foreign countries and brought three criminal charges against Mao: resisting the international line; forcing 80 percent of the people to examine themselves in the rectification movement; promoting sectarianism. During the Wu-Ch'ang Conference, Wang Ming sent a letter. He sounded somewhat better than before and announced his resignation. Kao-Jao's anti-party clique went to the extreme. They were too excessive. They opposed X and Chou, with X as the key point. They declared that there were two centers, two blocs. They had their own outline, misled some people, negated everything, attacked one part while forgetting the rest, exaggerated one point into the whole, and destroyed themselves as a result. There are many secondary matters which I have not mentioned, and they are not included here. Historically there were the Ch'en Tu-hsiu line, the Lo Chang-lung line, the Wang Ming line twice, the Chang Kuo-t'ao line, the Kao-Jao anti-party clique. . . These big incidents were different from the 1955 and 1956 resistance against rash advances in degree and nature. . . Whether in China or foreign countries, one cannot negate everything. All those negating everything will end up negating themselves, destroying themselves. But as for Chiang Kai-shek, we can negate everything. However, which one is better to serve as the president in Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Shih, or Ch'en Ch'eng? Chiang kai-shek is still better. But in places of international activity, when he is there, we won't go. As for serving as president, he still is better. Finally, the U.S. may possibly not want Taiwan and consider it a cancer on its body. We will then take advantage of the situation. As long as this gourd is hung on our waist, there will be a way. There will be changes in 10 years, 20 years. Give it some rice to eat, give it some troops, and let it handle special duties, and Sun Yat-sen-ism. In rega! rd to anything in history which should not be negated, appropriate assessments must be made. One should not negate everything. The result of negating all is self-destruction. I have discussed this part of history when we were criticizing defects. It is to instruct our comrades with history.

At the Nan-ning Conference, the relationship between one and nine fingers was brought out. When a problem is illustrated, it becomes easier to understand. It is to explain to the cadres the question of whether to give consideration to the general situation or not to do so. It is the problem of the relationship between the big situation and the small, between the part and the whole.

In regard to the problem of planned and proportionate development of the national economy, I am not very clear, and study is required. Just how does the subjective conform to objective rules? Lenin mentioned the union of Russia's revolutionary fervor and America's practical spirit. In the union of theory and practice, theory is the spirit, and spirit reflects substance, something, which approaches the practical. The universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the concrete practice of China's revolution are combined. The universal and the concrete are the union of opposites. Objective law is reflected differently in the various nations as a result of different historical conditions. We must study, understand, master, and become familiar with objective rules. Stalin discussed this issue a lot, but he did not follow through. He did not abide by the ratio. Russia's industry was big and its agriculture small. He stressed the big and scorned the small. We are now doing it differently. From 1956 we began to create the dual development and leap forward of industry (including communication and transportation) and agriculture, and we began to find the way for planned and proportionate development. After cooperativization in 1955, the people's enthusiasm rose, and we began to find economic development hopeful and opposed conservatism. Failing to exert oneself to do something which can be done by exertion is called conservatism. But one must not attempt something which cannot be done. If one persists, it is called subjectivism. When the subjective reflects the objective, it becomes subjective activity, not subjectivism. There are two kinds of subjective activity: one kind is divorced from practice and it is subjectivism; the other conforms with objective law, and it is subjectivism compatible with practice. Anything violating objective law will suffer a setback. There is some lack of coordination, for example, in supplementary foods and daily use articles. If not taken hold of, it will b! e dangerous.

The Japanese say that we stress hands rather than population. We have so many people who can work. The 1953 great leap forward might be basically suitable. As for concrete figures, whether a little more or a little less, that is something else. But it proves: that a great leap forward is possible. There can be a great leap forward every year, whether it means 10 million tons of steel more or 10 million tons less. The Soviet Union had a steel output increase of 4 million tons, which was unprecedented in history. The year before the increase was only 3 million tons. In the 20 years from 1921 to 1940, the increase was only 14 million tons; the increase in the 13 years after the war was 37 million tons; thereafter there was an increase of 5 million tons per year. We are different from them. We undertake the large, medium, and small, doing several things at the same time. We have the mass line, "two participations, one reform and three combinations," and the alliance of the party with the masses. Meanwhile, our geographical and climatic conditions are good, and we have a population of 680 million. Therefore, it was possible for us to launch a great leap forward in 1958. May be we can compare it to hog raising. The bone structure is formed in the first four months. 1958 was the K'e-lang hog: It had [a good] bone structure, but not much flesh. It was still not fat, and had to be fed. Currently, our great leap forward is to build the bone structure.

We began with the "10 Major Relations" proposed in 1955, continued with the 1958 New Year editorial entitled "Go All Out; Strive for the Upper Reaches," two excellent phrases which developed into the general line at the Ch'eng-tu Conference. It is correct when we look at it now. Is extra effort necessary? Should it be exerted? Should we strive for the upper reaches? Or the middle reaches, or the lower reaches? Do we want greater and faster? Do we want better and more economical (quality)? The first two sentences concern man's mental attitude, or subjective activity; the latter sentence concerns material.

Naturally we have defects and mistakes. Tackling one side and overlooking another, causing waste in labor, the tense situation of supplementary foods, the still unsolved light industrial raw material problem (diversified operations), the lack of adjustment in transportation, undertaking too many projects in capital construction — all these are our defects and errors. Like a child playing with fire, without experience, knowing pain only after getting burned. In economic construction, like a child without experience, we declared war on the earth, unfamiliar with the strategy or tactics. We must frankly admit such defects and errors. Some people tried to comfort me by asking whether the Ch'eng-tu Conference did not propose the combination of labor and leisure and the advance of production in waves? But no concrete timetable was proposed, which was not good. Then, tackling production without tackling living would definitely result in tens of thousands of dropsy cases. Only when one person received one ounce of vegetable in Peking was attention aroused. The objective reality, planning, and ratios are only recognized in the midst of practice and struggle. We developed a K'e-lang hog in 1958, but we are still without a fat hog. We have found the way (great leap forward) in the process of practice. Possibly the four big targets of the Wu-ch'ang Conference are close to reality, but they are only on paper, not a reality. Grain is not yet in our hands, and there is only one month of iron and steel and coal (production not very good). With more effort it may become a reality. After the conference this time, by exerting more effort, the problems in all aspects may become better resolved. With experience, it will be better than 1958. All items of work and the people's livelihood will improve somewhat. Hindsight turns into foresight. There is waste in manpower, lack of attention to the inadequacy of supplementary foods in big cities, insufficient attention to some segments of! light industry, and insufficient attention to diversified operations and transportation. One kind is lack of attention and the other insufficient attention, resulting in inadequate supply and partial maladjustment. The failure to come to a conclusion on these problems now becomes one problem, and I hope the standing committee of the provincial committees will study it. . .

. Generally speaking, whether our plans, targets and editorials are suitable or not, we are always seeking experience through practice. Even if not completed, it is only because of insufficient experience and too much bragging. I approve of writing poetry in the newspapers. There should be optimism even if not completed, because lessons can be learned. . . .If we have no experience, let us try one more year, next year. After struggling hard for three years, our experience will increase. If anything is not suitable, we will correct it. Let the world curse us. Our general line cannot be changed. It won't do to build socialism by "reducing our efforts, striving for the lower reaches, and less-slow-inferior-waste." We must always go all out, strive for the upper reaches, and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results. What is greater and what is faster? These must be determined in practice. Now we propose to build a great socialist nation with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science and culture in 15 years. If impossible, then take a little more time! Just what is planned and proportionate development? We have just begun to come in contact with this problem. I hope our comrades will study it.

Notes

[1.] Lo Lung-chi (1896-1965), a political scientist educated at the London School of Economics and Columbia University, was a leading member of the China Democratic

League. He was Minister of Timber from 1956-8. One of the Chief Righitist who attacked the Party during 1957-58.

[2.] *Water Margin*, a traditional Chinese novel.

[3.] Lo Chang-lung. See note 16, p. 111 of this volume.

Talk At Symposium Of Hsin, Lo, Hsu And Hsin Local Committees

February 21, 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Just what is the nature of the people's commune? Is it commune ownership or brigade ownership? There are poor and rich brigades, poor and rich villages. When you were in the agricultural producer cooperatives, what method of distribution did you use? Were there discrepancies then? Were the contributions all the same then? It is mainly differences in resources, conditions, administration and history which result in differences of output and the divergence of rich and poor brigades, rich and poor villages. The agricultural producer cooperatives used to use the method of labor and production contracts, with incentives for the best producers. Was there equalization, then, in the agricultural producer cooperatives? The Soviet Union's 55 million tons of steel and our over ten million tons of steel cannot be equalized because that would be appropriating others' labor without reimbursement. This is permissible towards landlords and capitalists, and in the past we did appropriate property without compensation from the landlords and capitalists, because they had not labored for it — it was the people's, the peasants'. So the proposals at the time to return the land to its proper owners, to return Anshan Steel to its proper owners, were not expropriation. We act differently towards the national bourgeoisie, because they are friends, and with them we adopt a policy of purchase. The property of the national bourgeoisie was clearly produced by the working class and is not the capitalists'; but because they are friends we still adopt a purchase policy, making use of them in uniting the intellectuals and letting them redeem the property that they got by exploitation of the workers. Now it would be unreasonable to use equalization on the poor and rich brigades and the poor and rich villages; it would be banditry, piracy. It would amount to writing out receipts and IOU's for everything down to tables, chairs and benches, with a promise to pay for them in ten ye! ars.

In the past the advanced cooperatives lived better or worse according to how much they had. Work points embody the difference in the results of the labor of different people, and labor and production contracts embody the differences between brigades and between villages, but we did not remember this experience. This problem arose because we did not remember our experience with food allocation in 1956, in the first year of the advanced cooperative movement. Old women blocked the way and wouldn't let the food be taken, and this problem is reappearing now in the first year of the communes. At this point it is well worth considering just what methods to use. This year we will proclaim some policies, to be carried out by both rich and poor, aimed at helping the poor and raising China to the level of the Soviet Union. In the future after the dictatorship of the proletariat is established in the nations of the West, we won't be able to chop off some of what the Western nations have to supplement the Asian and African nations, the Asian and African nations will have to raise themselves. Investments in the Asian and African nations of course ought not be confiscated, but we won't be able to go to Europe and set up machinery. This is to say that at the Soviet Union's present level of development it cannot give things to us gratis, because to Soviet Union has workers and with workers you have to pay wages, with machinery you have to take care of depreciation; so how would it be possible to chop off some of what the Soviet Union has and give it to us? It will be necessary to have an equal-value exchange. (During the discussions on the report it was stated that some people were afraid of the commercial departments buying up their pigs. So they turned the pigs loose on the land and let them run off and some people hid them in the cotton.) I approve of this method. (In the discussion on the report it was stated that in some places not all the peanuts could be collected, but when they used a p! ercentage allotment system, in some places the peanuts were all collected in a single night.) The method of percentage allotment should be adopted. I approve of doing everything possible, eating them up or letting them run off. This practice is not particularism; this is the fruit of their labor. If we are anti-particularistic and collect by force we make matters worse. Now this really is expropriation without compensation and if you call it particularism you are applying the term incorrectly. This is a question of ownership. At present a part of the ownership is by the commune. but the main ownership is by the brigades. If the commune expands its accumulation a little every year, then after seven or eight years commune ownership will take shape.

On 8 January a party committee meeting was held in Hopeh and they wanted to get unity of thought, absolute unity and they adopted a resolution; but by the last third of the month they felt that there were things wrong with it and the provincial committee members hastily changed their minds. In the last third of the month they had a telephone conference, but after the conference there were some area committees and some county committees that did not understand and some communes did not understand. At present in ownership the production brigades are really eight or nine fingers and communes are one or two fingers, or three at most. Accumulation cannot exceed 18 percent and taxes cannot exceed 7 percent, so together they cannot exceed 25 percent, or one-fourth; production expenses are 20 percent and the distribution to the masses 55 percent. There is some concealment at lower levels, so that in reality they don't distribute more than 30 percent. Everybody wants to accumulate more and carry on some industry and this is well-intentioned. Stalin followed this kind of policy in the 30 years from the founding of the state until 1953, Stalin never solved this problem. He carried out a collectivization and a mechanization. In the Czarist era there was no collectivization and no mechanization. They collectivized, but didn't mechanize. Then they mechanized, but in the year he died the output was the same as in the Czarist era and if XXXX had not changed the policy, the situation would have become increasingly grave. If we do not change our policy now, we will make Stalin’s mistake.

Now when we talk about production brigades, the brigades are the communes! At present the commune is really a federalistic government. The commune’s power cannot be very great; the commune should have control over public grain and over accumulation, but distribution of products should rest with the brigades. (In the discussion for the report it was stated that the commune did too much; for one thing it had too many investments and for another it did too much requisitioning of the labor force.) This policy should be changed. We used to just talk about the relationship between individual, collective and state, but now this is just half of the chess-board; and the several hundred million peasants are a greater half of the chess-board; it won’t do to simply carry on state accumulation and commune accumulation. We used to say, “If the people don’t have enough then how can the ruler have enough?” At present the “people” are the communes and the “ruler” is the state. Stalin’s actions of 30 years were a matter of walking on one leg. If we are contributing 70 percent to the state, the masses only get 30 percent, just as with the landlords. Of course we are essentially different from the landlords: if we accumulate a little more it is for construction and the construction in turn is for the benefit of the people. This point needs to be analyzed and to be made clear, that the desire for rapid industrialization is well-intentioned, but though I say it is well-intentioned it is not a good idea. The way that we differ from the landlords is that we are not aiming at getting rich. At the moment we have not made this clear; at the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee we didn’t make it clear. We merely talked about distribution according to work and about production responsibility, but we did not tell how to distribute according to work and we didn’t clarify the collective ownership system. Now the distribution program needs to be changed. ! Commune ownership has to be arrived at by a process, because what we have now is basically brigade ownership. There are only these two. The peasants don’t have to worry about their land, because the provincial and local party committees and the Central Committee can’t take it away, what they are disputing about is products and the labor force. When we say that land is under collective ownership, within that we ought to draft a document stating that in fact it is under brigade ownership. If land, tools and means of production plus human labor and the commune only come to 25 percent, don’t you think that’s too little? Our present opposition to particularism has brought about a tense situation that is growing tenser. Really, 15 percent kept back ought to be made legal. The state’s and commune’s accumulation of 25 percent and production costs of 20 percent and the mass distribution of 55 percent, form a fixed proportion, but as production develops year by year the absolute numbers will increase. The practice of taking away their cabbage and pigs and not giving them a cent must be changed.

In addition, let’s discuss how to run industry. At present, industry is taking up too much capital and labor and conflicts are arising. All conflicts involving human strength and material and financial means ought to be adjusted. You couldn’t handle all that many schools at once either. Everything has to be done gradually for instance would it be possible to get rid of the four pests all at once? Forestation has to be done gradually, illiteracy has to be eliminated gradually, schools have to be set up group by group and at different times. If the finance and trade organization recovers all the loans, then it ought to give them all back now; more recently there is the compromise suggestion that they give back half. This is carrying a stone only to drop it on one's own foot; if you've recovered all the original loans they don't have any money to pay wages and so they still need loans to pay wages. We will have to start by making announcements to calm people down. There will have to be regulations covering transfers. We will also have to look into the matter of distribution. We should be aware that the collective ownership of the people's communes would take shape gradually. We have passed through four periods: in the mutual aid teams there was only a little collective ownership: in the early stage cooperatives collective ownership had increased — it could be called semi-collective ownership; as for the advanced cooperatives, you could say there was 70 percent collective ownership. At this time equalization won't do; if the accumulation is great the people will oppose it and it won't be "one chessboard" at all. The true "one chessboard" consists of first, the peasants, second, the communes and third, the state. In this way the peasants will be won over to us and will in turn develop a concern for the state. When this happens, will we be likely to have trouble collecting things? I am speaking from the point of view of! the peasants and supporting "particularism." Because at the moment we have brigade ownership, it will be several years before we can put commune ownership into practice. We must pay attention to the fact that everything must be arrived at through a process. We must recognize that we have partial commune ownership, but basically we have brigade ownership and the communes are a foster-father put in mid-course. When there are differences between food-production brigades, then there should be differences in wages as well. Hopeh is fixed on top and flexible below, so we can adopt this method and call it "fixed [work] grades, flexible evaluation [of work points], remuneration according to labor."

Speech At Cheng-chow

February 27, 1959

In 1958 we achieved great successes on every front. On the ideological and political front, the industrial front, the agricultural front, the communications and transport front, the commercial front, the cultural and educational front, the national defence front, as well as in other areas, no matter where, it was the same in all. Especially remarkable was the fact that there was a magnificent leap forward in the area of industrial and agricultural production. In 1958 people's communes were established everywhere throughout the rural areas of the entire nation.

The establishment of the people's communes has enlarged the original system of collective ownership of the means of production and raised it to a higher level and, moreover, it begins to embody certain elements of the system of ownership by the whole people. The scale of the people's communes is much larger than that of the agricultural producers' cooperatives and, moreover, has put into operation the unity of workers, peasants, merchants, students and soldiers and of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, subsidiary productive activities and fish culture. This has given a powerful push to the development of agricultural production and the entire rural economy. . . .

In a new and historically unprecedented social movement that involves several hundred million people and for which previous experience is lacking, like the setting up of the people's communes, both the people and their leaders can only acquire experience step by step, from their practice and step by step deepen their knowledge of the essence of things, expose the contradictors within things, solve these contradictions and affirm the achievements and overcome the shortcomings of their work. Anyone who says that a broad social movement can be completely without shortcomings is nothing but a dreamer, or a tide-watcher, or an account-settler, or simply a hostile element. As for the relationship between our achievements and defects, it is, just as we have often said, like the relationship between nine of the ten fingers and the one remaining finger. There are some people who doubt or deny the achievements of the Great Leap Forward of 1958 and doubt or deny the superiority of the people's commune. This kind of viewpoint is completely mistaken. . . .

Now I'm going to talk a little bit about the problems of the people's communes. I think that there is a contradiction in the people's communes, a contradiction that should be said to be quite serious, which has not yet been recognized by many comrades. Its nature has not been revealed and thus it has not been solved. And I think that this contradiction must be resolved quickly and that only then will the situation be favorable to mobilizing the still greater enthusiasm of the broad masses of people, only then will it be favorable to improving our relationship with basic-level cadres, which is essentially the relationship between the *hsien* party committee or the people's commune party committee and the basic-level cadres. In the final analysis what kind of contradiction is this? As everybody can see, there exists at present in our relationship with the peasants a rather tense state of affairs in some matters. The outstanding phenomenon in this regard is the fact that the state's task of purchasing agricultural products, such as food grains, cotton, edible oils and so on after the bumper harvest of 1958, is to date still partly uncompleted. Furthermore, throughout the entire country (except in a small number of disaster areas) there has appeared almost everywhere the practice of the peasants' "concealing production and dividing it among themselves" and great unrest about food grains, edible oils, pork and vegetables being "insufficient." The large scale of the unrest clearly surpasses that of both the 1953 and the 1955 periods of unrest over food. . . . I think that we should look for the answer to the problem mainly in the area of what we know about the ownership system in the rural people's commune and the policies we have adopted.

Should the system of ownership in the rural people's commune go through a process of development? Or should the commune, as soon as it is set up, immediately have a complete system of ownership by the commune and can it immediately eliminate ownership by the production brigade. . . (which generally corresponds to the former higher-level agricultural producers' cooperative)? Even now there are a good many people who still don't recognize that the system of ownership by the commune must go through a process of development. Within the commune there needs to be a process of transition from ownership by a small collective, the production brigade, to ownership by a large collective, the commune and this process requires a period of several years before it can be completed. They mistakenly believe that as soon as the people's commune is set up, the means of production, the manpower and the products of each production brigade can all be directly controlled by the leadership organs of the commune. They mistake socialism for communism, they mistake distribution according to labor for distribution according to need and they mistake collective ownership for ownership by the whole people. In many places they deny the law of value and deny the necessity for exchange at equal value. Thus, within the confines of the commune they carry out the levelling of the poor and the rich and equal distribution. They have transferred the ownership of some of the property of the production team upward without compensation; in the area of banking, they have recalled all loans in a good many rural areas, too. What is known as "equalization, transferring and recalling loans" has given rise to great fear and anxiety among the broad masses of peasants. So this is a most fundamental problem in our present relationship with the peasants. . .

Before the system of ownership by the whole people in the countryside has been put into effect, peasants are still always peasants and on the path of socialism they still always have a definite dual character. We can only lead the peasants step by step to divorce themselves from the system of ownership by a relatively small collective and move, by way of the system of ownership by a relatively large collective, toward ownership by the whole people. We cannot demand that they complete this process all at once, just as in the past we could only lead the peasants step by step to divorce themselves from the system of ownership by individuals and move toward the system of ownership by the collective. To move from an incomplete system of ownership by the commune to a complete, unitary system of ownership by the commune is a process of raising the comparatively poor production brigades to the level of production of the comparatively rich production teams. It is also a process of expanding the commune's capital accumulation, developing the commune's industry, accomplishing agricultural mechanization and electrification and accomplishing the industrialization of the commune and the industrialization of the nation. The things owned directly by the commune at the present time are still not many, such as commune-run enterprises, commune-run undertakings, the common fund and the welfare fund controlled by the commune, etc. Although this is the case, our great, glorious and brilliant hope also lies right here. Because the commune can draw its capital accumulation from the production brigades year by year and it can increase its capital accumulation from the profits of the commune-run enterprises and add to this the state's investment, its development will not be very slow, but rather will be very rapid.

With regard to the question of state investment, I propose that within seven years the state invest in the communes between several billion and more than ten billion *yuan* to help the communes develop industry and help the poor production brigades develop their production. I believe that it won't be very long before the poor communes and poor brigades will be able to catch up with the rich communes and rich brigades and develop tremendously. Once the communes have acquired great economic power, we will be able to put into effect a complete system of ownership by the commune and can also proceed to put into effect the system of ownership by the whole people besides. As for time, about two five-year plans are needed. Hurrying won't do. . . This is also precisely what the Pei-tai-ho Resolution said, that it will take three or four years, or five or six years, or even a bit longer. After that, we will go through several more developmental stages and in fifteen or twenty years or a bit longer, the socialist commune will develop into the communist commune. . . .

We must first investigate and correct two tendencies of our own, namely the tendency toward egalitarianism and the tendency toward excessive concentration. By the tendency toward egalitarianism I mean the tendency to deny that there should be differences in income among the various production brigades and various individuals. And to deny such differences is to deny the socialist principles of "to each according to his labor" and "the more work, the more reward." By the tendency to excessive concentration I mean the tendency to deny the system of ownership by the production brigade, and to deny the rightful authority of the production brigade, and to arbitrarily transfer the property of the production brigade upward to the commune. At the same time, a good many communes and *hsien* have extracted too much capital accumulation from the production brigades and, moreover, the administrative expenditures of the communes include a great deal of waste. (For example, there are some large communes that have as many as a thousand or more working personnel who eat without doing any labor and there are even cultural work teams which are divorced from production altogether.) The two above-mentioned tendencies both incorporate the kind of thinking that denies the law of value and denies exchange at equal value. . . .

At the time of the unified decision on distribution, the commune should recognize that there are reasonable differences in income between one production brigade and another and between one commune member and another and that there should be differences in food and wages between poor production brigades and rich production brigades. When it comes to wages, we should act on the principle of "fixed grades and flexible assessment." The commune should implement a down-ward transfer of authority, a three-level system of accounting and, moreover, use the accounting of the production brigade as the basis. Between the commune and the production brigade and between production brigades we should carry out exchange at equal value . . . .

After the communes were set up in the autumn of 1958, for a while there blew up a "communist wind." It consisted mainly of three elements: the first was the levelling of the poor and the rich brigades, the second was that capital accumulation by the commune was too great and the commune's demand for labor without compensation was too great and the third was the "communization" of all kinds of "property." This so-called "communization" of all kinds of "property" included all kinds of different situations. Some of it was things that should have belonged to the commune, like the greater part of the private plots, some of it should simply have been borrowed by the commune, like some of the buildings, tables, chairs, benches and stools needed for the commune's public undertakings and the knives, cooking pots, bowls and chopsticks needed for the dining hall. Some were things that belonged to the commune when they should not have, like chickens, ducks and some of the pigs, which belonged to communes without being paid for. . . . The phenomenon of uncompensated takeover of the fruits of other people's labor is something we do not permit. Just take a look at our history. The only things we took without compensation were the means of production of Japanese, German and Italian imperialism, of feudalism and bureaucratic-capitalism and some of the landlords' houses, food and other means of livelihood. . . .

In addition to the tendencies to egalitarianism and excessive concentration, at present there are also very irrational aspects to the allocation of the rural labor force. These are, specifically, that the labor force used in agriculture (including agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, subsidiary production and fish culture) is generally too small, while too many personnel are used in industry, the service industries and administration. The latter three types of personnel must be reduced. . . .

We must simultaneously take into consideration and do unified planning for, our work in making arrangements for these three areas: the livelihood of the people, the commune's accumulation of capital and satisfying the needs of the state. Only in this way can it be said that we have truly succeeded in doing things as if the affairs of the entire nation were a single game of chess. Otherwise, the so-called chess game is actually only half a chess game, or it is an incomplete chess game. Generally speaking, the accumulation of the commune in 1958 was a little in excess. Therefore each area should fix an appropriate limit, on the basis of concrete conditions, for the commune's accumulation in 1959 and should announce this to the people in order to set people's minds at ease and increase the broad masses' enthusiasm for production.

Intra Party Correspondence

March 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Comrades First Secretaries of provincial, municipal, and special district party committees:

The Central Committee has scheduled an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau to be held in Shanghai on 25 March. All of you must attend the meeting. The conference of cadres from six levels to be held by the provincial, municipal, and special district party committees in the spirit of the Chengchow Conference (*Ed note*: that is, the second conference held in Chengchow in March of 1959), and which has the discussion of people's communes as its major theme, will require approximately 10 days. Therefore the meeting should be convened immediately. For example, the Hupeh provincial party committee has scheduled a meeting to be held on 11 March. Any delays would not be to our interest. If the period of time for the meeting were too short, there definitely would not be enough time to bring up, analyze, and discuss various problems, and their resolution would not be fitting and thorough. In other words it will be shallow and superficial. The conferences held by the various provinces, municipalities, and special districts should pass resolutions on the question of administrative system for people's communes and on problems of concrete policies. The first secretary should make a summing-up speech in order to explain in depth, and thoroughly, the principal contradictions and various policy problems presently facing the people's communes. These two documents should be issued immediately to lower levels so that they will have a clear and precise base [for action]. And it will require time to formulate ideas and draw up the drafts for these two documents. If the conference were to convene on 11 March, it could possibly last until 20 or 22 March before it could be concluded. Then the first secretaries would be able to get away and come to Shanghai for the meeting on 25 March. There would be more leeway and time would not be too pressing this way. The conference of cadres from six levels in Honan Province will be concluded by 10 March. The final drafts on the resolutions and the summation! speech can be completed by 9 March. The Central Committee will have these documents brought to you by plane before 14 March for your reference. The next step for Honan province is to hold the conference of cadres from four levels in the counties for the purpose of conveying to them the guidelines set for the by the conference of cadres from six levels in the province, and for discussing concrete ways to implement these guidelines by the various counties, communes, and production teams. Those attending the county conference of cadres from four levels are to be composed of; (1) several persons from the county level; (2) several persons from the commune level; (3) one or two persons from each brigade at the production brigade level; and (4) one person from each team at the production team level. In addition, a certain number of observers and auditors should also attend the conference. In all there will be at least 1,000 or 2,000 persons at most in attendance. The meeting is to be in session 7-10 days. The various counties is Honan Province have scheduled the convening of this meeting beginning on 13 or 14 March and ending before 23 of 24 March. There will be a week left in the month of March reserved for the communes, production brigades and production teams to hold their meetings. In brief, it will be possible to basically clear up and resolve in March the mass of confused thinking and conflicting contradictions on the commune problems. Beginning with April, the entire party and all the people can, with one mind, unfold this year's big leap-forward. I hope the various provinces, municipalities, and special districts will carry it out accordingly. Like that of Hupeh Province, if the conference of cadres from six levels in various provinces, municipalities, and special districts can be held on 11 and March and brought to a conclusion before 20 or 22 March, then the conference of cadres from four levels in the counties can be concluded by the end of March, and the discussions by communes and production! teams before 10 April. That means they will be only 10 days or so late in comparison with Honan Province. Some comrades may feel that this is too pressing, leaving them no time for preparations and that the conference should be delayed. I don't think this should be done. Since we already have clear guidelines, we should speedily gather together the cadres from six levels and issue these to them at once. In three or four days the major contradictions will be thrashed out, and thus, it will be possible to win the support of the majority. By taking the initiative we will take the wind out of the observers and the auditors. Of course, some people will not be able to reach an understanding and will berate us for going backwards. Because of this these people will lose some sleep over it and will not be able to eat well for a few days. But, after that, they will be able to come around to an understanding. In short, delay will be detrimental, speed is essential. Some preparatory work can be done, firstly, by quietly bringing understanding to the people at district and county levels. Complete understanding is not mandatory, and three days will be enough to achieve this. From 4-10 March there will be six or seven days available for preparations. Is that not enough? It is more than enough. Delay, on the other hand, is not advantageous.

The foregoing is my suggestion. It is entirely up to you to determine whether or not it is acceptable to you in the light of conditions in your areas.

Mao Tse-tung

0400 hours, 9 March 1959

At Chengchow

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Comrades First Secretaries of provincial, municipal and special district party committees:

I have been in Wu-ch’ang for five days now. I have read the materials on the conference of cadres from six levels in Hupeh Province. At the same time, I have received materials from some provinces, municipalities, and special districts. From these materials, I have found that there is a question that needs to be discussed with you. The documents of Honan province have already been delivered to you, and these documents called for the setting up of production brigades as basic accounting and distribution units of the people’s communes. While I was in Chenghow, I received the articles adopted by the Hupeh provincial committee on 8 March concerning the administrative system of people’s communes and the problem of food grains. These articles called for the: “resolute establishment of the original higher stage cooperative, that is, the present production team, as the basic accounting unit. Former higher stage cooperatives that had been divided into several production teams should merge immediately to form the basic accounting unit, and they must not be separated again. A few of the former very small higher stage cooperatives with generally similar economic conditions that have already merged to form a production team may be set up as a basic accounting unit as long as the cadres and the members of the commune are willing. The commune party committee can then investigate and decide, and report it to the county party committee for approval.” After my arrival in Wuchang, I had comrade Chou Hsiao-chou[1] come here and, together with comrade Wang Jen-chung[2], we discussed this for a while. I asked Hsiao-chou, do you agree with the Honan method or the Hupeh method? He said that they agreed with the Honan method, that is, with the production brigade (administrative area) as the basic accounting unit. Because, in their area, a production brigade has administrative control of! only six production teams and, generally, these six production teams were formed from three original higher stage cooperatives with one cooperative splitting into two production teams. Afterward, I again received the 31 March report from Kwangtung Province. They advocated the three fixes and five grades. The first of the three fixes is the fixing of the basic accounting unit, "without exception, the original higher stage cooperatives (formerly, Kwangtung Province had 3,000 higher stage cooperatives averaging 320 households in each cooperative) are to be the basis. Some cooperatives which were equivalent to the present production team (or brigade) and some which had been divided into two or three production teams after the forming of the communes can merge immediately to form a new production team for the purpose of using it as a basic accounting unit. If the former higher stage cooperatives are too small and a hamlet has several of these cooperatives, they may also merge, with the approval of the masses, to form a basic accounting unit of the commune. Although some of these cooperatives are not in the same hamlet, they do not vary greatly in their economic conditions." From these we find that Honan and Hunan Province are both advocating the production brigade (administrative area) as the basic accounting unit and Hupeh and Kwangtung Provinces are upholding the production team, i.e., the original higher stage cooperatives, as the basic accounting unit. Which one of these two is better? Could both be implemented? According to Comrade Wang Jen-chung, the Hupeh conference discussed precisely this question during the past few days. The struggle of viewpoints between the two factions has been fierce. Generally speaking, the majority of the county party committees, commune party committees and production brigades (administrative areas) wanted the production brigade as the basic accounting unit, whereas, an absolute majority of the production teams (i.e., the original higher stage cooperatives) and ! party branch secretaries maintained the position of wanting the production teams as the basic accounting units. I feel that this question has very important bearings. It bears on the direct interests of basic unit cadres consisting of more than 30 million production teams and production group leaders and of several hundred million peasants. We must have the earnest approval from the basic units' cadres before adopting the method of Honan and Hupeh Provinces. If these cadres feel they could barely cope with it, we would rather select the production teams (i.e., the former higher stage cooperatives) to be the basic accounting units so that the cadres will not become separated from the masses. It is very dangerous for them to become divorced from the masses at this time, for it could very well prevent the attainment of production targets for this year. Honan Province has already made its decision, but the comrades of the provincial party committee are still asked to solicit the views of basic level cadres at the county's conference of cadres from four levels which is being held currently. If they agree with the decision of the provincial party committee, then implement it accordingly. Otherwise, it will be helpful to make some changes. The "tui as the foundation" stated in the "Minutes of the Chengchow Conferences" is meant to be the production team, i.e., the original higher stage cooperative and not the production brigade (administrative area). In short, work must be done in accordance with the wishes of the masses. No matter what the method is, it will be workable only if it meets with the requirements of the masses. Otherwise, it will not work in the long run. Please reflect and decide on what you will do.

Mao Tse-tung

15 March 1959

At Wu-ch'ang

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Comrades First Secretaries of provincial, municipal and special district party committees:

This is a matter concerning the conferences to be held by the counties and communes.

The conference of cadres from six levels in various provinces, municipalities and special districts will soon be concluded. Should the 4-level or 5-level cadres conferences of the counties be held? My suggestion is that they should and they should be held on a massive scale The only thing is that they should not be reported in the newspapers. The counties in Honan Province are now holding the conferences of cadres from four levels. The conferences are very lively and most beneficial. Responsible comrades at the provincial level in Honan Province are directly leading several counties and guiding these counties with their own experience. Hupeh, Kwangtung and Kiangsu Provinces have all made arrangements for the counties throughout their provinces to hold these conferences. The party committee of Chiangyin County in Kiangsu Province has made arrangements for a conference of 10,000 people. There are two counties in Honan Province holding meetings with 10,000 people and a majority of the other counties are having meetings of 4,000 – 5,000 people. I suggest that the counties hold conferences of cadres from five levels, namely at the county, the commune party committee, the production brigade (or administrative area), the production team (i.e., former higher stage cooperative) and production squad (production group, also called work group) level. Each level must send representatives to attend these conferences. In this way, all production squad leaders of the communes, party branch secretaries of administrative areas, production brigade leaders and a number of cadres from the commune level will attend the conferences. There must be people with confused thinking, observers and auditors attending the meeting. The best is to keep their ratio at 10 to one. You can also find a few activists from among the commune members to attend the meeting. Make arrangements so that all these people will be able to hear the speech made by the first secretary of the county party committee, because the speech at this level i! s higher than those by the first secretaries of the commune party committees. Later, launch discussions, placing no blame on anyone who dares to speak out and allowing the vigorous airing of views. In a few days, unify their thinking. At the conference, the three types of confrontations must be made to cross swords: one type of confrontations is the crossing of swords between basic level cadres and their higher levels (the commune and the county); another type of confrontation is to pit those with confused thinking against those who have gained understanding; and yet another type of confrontation is to have positive characters who account for 90 percent of the people to go against the observers and auditors (many of those who have been regarded by the people as observers and auditors are, in fact, not such persons, but have been mistakenly identified by the people as such), who account for 10 percent. Three or four days will be enough for the debates. Follow that and allow three or four days for discussions to resolve concrete problems. Seven or eight days will be more than sufficient enough for these purposes. The conference of cadres from five levels in the counties will be even more lively and spirited than the conference of cadres from six levels in the province. The secretaries of the commune and county party committees must be informed on how to carry out their work. During the conference, make a special effort to get these comrades together and chat with them so that they will gain some experience from the sharp lessons of becoming temporarily divorced from the masses, because they had put into practice certain improper measures, generated the "communist wind," and practiced indiscriminate expropriation of property and funds over the past few months. Henceforth, they should be good at thinking through problems and carrying out work. In this way they will be integrated with the masses. Besides the discussions on the management of the three-level ownership systems of communes, administra! tive areas (i.e., production brigades) and production teams (formerly the higher stage cooperatives) and three-level accounting system, the question of part ownership system of production squads (production groups or work groups) should also be discussed. This question was brought out by Wang Jen-chung, Tao Lo-chia and several other comrades. I consider this to be reasonable and worthy of discussion. By the latter part of March, the county conferences will be concluded, and in April we can dispense with the representatives' meeting of the communes and busy ourselves with production. In the meanwhile we can hold small meetings and resolve some concrete problems. Let the production teams hold party members' meetings in their leisure time and follow that up with mass meetings, thus bringing about discussions joined in by all the people. It will be possible to hold mass discussions, because by then several hundred people will have attended conferences in the counties and the problems will have been thoroughly discussed. Some counties in Hupeh province have already carried out such discussions. In May, three days are to be set aside by all the communes in the county (three days will be more than enough) for convening the first representatives' meeting of commune members. The representatives should include men and women, the old and the young and the positive and negative elements (excluding landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements, but including well-to-do middle peasants). They are to discuss some problems and elect commune administrative committees. It is suggested the such representatives' meetings should be held four times a year, with each meeting lasting one or two days and at most, three days. The first secretary of the commune should master his ability to preside over this kind of meeting. Our comrades of the commune party committees must constantly concern themselves with the interests of the masses. They must always bear in mind that their own polici! es and measures must be in accord with the current level of consciousness of the masses and with their immediate and pressing needs. Anything that goes counter to these two conditions will not do and will invariably fail. Both the county and district party committees should give attention to strengthening the leadership of the communes. They must send comrades who are politically strong to help communes weak in this respect. District party committees should give attention to dispatching personnel to assist county party committees comparatively weaker in leadership. The county and communes both must give attention to strengthening the backbone leadership of production teams (generally meaning the former higher stage cooperatives) which are to be the basic accounting units. The above is presented only as a suggestion. Please think it over and decide on how it could be handled in a more satisfactory manner and implement it with speed. When the county convenes a meeting, the communes and all levels below them should leave people behind to direct production. Perhaps a rotational attendance of the meeting could set up in order not to neglect farm work.

Mao Tse-tung

0700 hours, 17 March 1959

At Wu-ch'ang

* * *

To the members of various party central committee departments, to the secretaries of various party committees, party branches and to the secretaries of various municipal, provincial and autonomous region party committees.

The materials from several counties in Shanghai are worth reading.

In the suburban areas, the factories and mining enterprises, communications and transportation enterprises, financial and trade enterprises and education and other enterprises must definitely solicit the opinions of basic level cadres (party branch secretaries, workshop foremen and work-section chiefs) and activists from among the masses in matters concerning the formulation and implementation of major policies. An overwhelming majority of these people must be made to attend meetings and air their views. Only thus can opposite views be established, contradictions exposed, the truth uncovered and the movement unfolded. Please firmly bear in mind that we must not believe too much the statements made by such people as general branch secretaries, secretaries of factories and mines party committees, responsible persons of organizations under the municipal government and secretaries of party groups and the comrades among bureau and department chiefs at the Central Government level. Many of these people have become almost completely divorced from the masses and are acting arbitrarily. They feign compliance with, or entirely ignore instructions form higher levels if these instructions do not suit them. On many issues they only believe in themselves and do not trust the masses. They do not care about the mass line. In light of this, we must henceforth annually convene two conferences of cadres from five, six, or seven levels. Each conference is to be held for 10 days. The higher echelons and the basic levels will attack the middle level on both flanks. Only by so doing can erroneous views held by the middle-level cadres be rectified and flexibility restored to their stubborn thinking and only thus will it be possible for them to make improvements. Otherwise it will be utterly hopeless for them. If we listen to them long enough, we will be assimilated into their ranks. We will commit errors and become benighted with regard to existing state of affairs and communication between top and bottom or vice versa will ! break down. This is an extremely dangerous situation. It will be very much to our interest to hold such conferences twice a year. It will enable us to understand the situation and remedy errors. Although we are talking about the problems of urban areas here, it is the same for rural areas, too. I have already discussed this generally in my previous correspondence.

Mao Tse-tung

29 March 1959

Notes

[1.] Chou Hsiao-chou, see note 23, p 63 of this volume.

[2.] Wang Jen-chung (c.1906-) became first secretary of the Hupei Party organization in 1954; he actively supported the Great Leap and was often in Mao's company when the Chairman visited Wuhan in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Comment On T'ao Lu-Ch'ieh's Report On The Five-Level Cadre Conference

March 30, 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

The saying that "old debts are seldom collected" was written into the talks at Chengchow, but it is incorrect and ought to be altered to: "only with old debts can we put into practice the objective law of value"; this law is a great school and only by making use of it can we teach our several tens of millions of cadres and several hundred million people and build our socialism and communism. Otherwise, everything is impossible. For the masses there would be no possibility of venting their indignation; for the cadres, it would mean being destroyed by us. There are innumerable disadvantages and no advantages. If one commune can pay back its original advanced cooperative cash receipts of four million *yuan* to the original owners, why cannot others pay them back? Don't act as if "money for charity is hard to part with." It must be recognized that this is money from robbery. Uncompensated appropriation of other people's labor is not permissible.

Intra Party Correspondence

April 29, 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Comrades at the provincial, district, county, commune, production brigade and production team levels:

I wish to confer with you on several questions, all of which are on agriculture.

The first question concerns the fixing of production targets. Rice transplanting is being carried out in the south and the north is also engaged in spring cultivation. Fixing production targets must be based on realities. Just do not pay any attention to those stipulations made in the instructions from higher levels. Ignore them and simply concentrate on practical possibilities. For instance, if production per mou was actually only 300 catties last year, it will be very good indeed if production could be increased by 100 or 200 cattiest Elevating it up to 800, 1,000 or 1,200 catties and even more is mere bragging and cannot be achieved at all. So what is the use in exaggerating? Again, for example, the achievement will be very great indeed if an increase of 200 or 300 catties can be achieved this year from land producing 500 catties per mou last year. To increase further, generally speaking, is impossible.

The second question concerns close planting. It should not be too thinly spread out, nor planted too closely. Many of the young cadres and some higher level organizations, lacking in experience, doggedly called for close planting only. Some even claimed that the closer the planting, the better it will be. This is incorrect. The older people doubt this and so do the middle-aged. It will be excellent to hold a meeting of these three types of people and arrive at a suitable degree of closeness to be maintained in planting. Since production targets are to be fixed, the question of close planting should be discussed and determined by production teams and production groups. Rigid orders from above regarding the closeness to be maintained are not only useless, but also very harmful. Therefore, we should completely refrain from issuing such rigid orders to those in the lower levels. The provincial party committee may suggest the width to be applied to close planting. This should not be issued as an order, but as a reference for lower levels. Besides, the higher levels should give great care to the study of what degree of closeness would be best. After accumulating some experience, a more scientific stipulation on the degree of closeness to be applied should be drawn up on the basis of differences in climate, differences in localities, differences in the condition of soil, fertilizer, water, seeds, differences in the crops and differences in the levels of efficiency in field management. And it will be fine if, in a few years, a standard which is both practical and applicable is developed.

The third question concerns economizing on food grains. This problem must be grasped most firmly and food rationed in accordance with the number of people. We should eat more during the busy season and less during the slack season. During the busy season, we should eat solid food, during the slack season, we should eat semi-solid rations mixed with sweet potatoes, green vegetables, melons, beans and taro. This matter must be grasped tightly. Harvesting, storage and consumption (reap, store and eat) must be grasped very, very tightly every year. Furthermore, they must be grasped at the right time, for opportunity knocks only once and time lost can never be recovered. There must be reserve grains. Set aside a little each year and increase reserve grains year by year. After eight or 10 years of struggle, the problem of food production will be solved. In 10 years, there should be no boasting or exaggerating; to do so will be highly dangerous. Keep in mind that ours is a big country with a population of 650 million and eating is a matter of great importance.

The fourth question concerns broader acreage in planting. The plan calling for less planting with higher yields and richer harvests is a long-range one and it is workable. However, this plan cannot be implemented in its entirety or even the greater part of it in 10 years. It should be put into effect step by step in accordance with the conditions in the next 10 years. The greater part of this plan cannot be carried out in the next three years. In the coming three years strive for extensive planting. The guideline for the next few years is the simultaneous implementation of extensive planting with low yields and less planting with richer harvests of high quota, high yield farmland.

The fifth question concerns mechanization. The fundamental way out for agriculture lies in mechanization. Ten years will be needed to achieve this. There will be minor solutions in four years, intermediate ones in seven and major solutions in ten. This year, next year, the year after and the year after, we will be relying mainly on improved farm tools and semi-mechanized farming implements. Every province, every district and every county must establish farm tools research stations and concentrate a group of scientific-technological personnel and experienced carpenters and blacksmiths of the rural areas to gather together all kinds of more advanced farm tools from every province, district and county. They should compare them, experiment with them and improve them. New types of farm implements must be trial-produced. When they are successfully trial-produced, test them out in the fields. If they are found to be truly effective, then they can be mass produced and widely used. When we speak of mechanization, we must also include mechanized manufacturing of chemical fertilizers. It is a matter of great importance to increase chemical fertilizer production year by year.

The sixth question concerns candor. State exactly what production targets can be achieved. When you have exerted all efforts but failed to achieve something, do not force yourself to make false claims of success. State exactly how much you have harvested and refrain from making false statements, which are contrary to facts. There must be honesty in the measures taken to increase production and to implement the Eight Character Constitution on Agriculture. An honest man has the courage to speak the truth and in the end, it will be beneficial to the people's cause and to himself. People who are fond of making false statements are firstly hurting the people and secondly, themselves. It should be said that many of these false statements were the result of pressure from above. "Exaggeration and pressure from and pledges to" higher levels create difficulties for the lower levels. Therefore we must be vigorous, but we must not make false claims.

Comrades, please study the aforementioned six problems and feel free to set forth differing opinions so as to achieve our objective of searching out the truth. We are still woefully inexperienced in running agricultural and industrial enterprises. Year by year we accumulate experience and in another ten years we will, step by step, come to understand objective necessity. We will then become free to a certain degree. What is freedom? Freedom is the recognition of necessity.

In comparison with the high-sounding talks currently making the rounds what I am saying here is very much low-keyed. The objective is to stir up activism and achieve the target of increased production. If it (production) is not actually as low as I make it out to be and it has achieved a relatively higher target, I will then become a conservative. Thank heavens, if that is so. It will be a great honor indeed.

Mao Tse-tung

April 29, 1959

Talk At Seventh Plenum Of The Eighth Central Committee

April 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

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1. Ample planning for satisfactory decisions. In this phrase the emphasis is on "planning." We have to plan a great deal; lack of planning will not do. We should discuss with all sides and oppose insufficient planning and arbitrary decisions. In the past, we often did a great deal of planning with people of the same opinion but little with people of differing opinions; we planned much with the cadres but little with the production personnel. Inadequate discussion and arbitrary decision means that affairs will not be managed well. Planning is fundamental and only with ample planning can we have satisfactory decisions. There are many methods for ample planning, for instance fact-

finding meetings or forums. The goal of planning is deciding and it is undesirable to make arbitrary decisions on the basis of inadequate planning as some comrades do.

2. Make allowances. This is not only a matter of work methods, but a political one as well. When we are arranging work plans we need to make some allowances to give subordinates some initiative. If you don't give subordinates some leeway, you don't leave any leeway for yourself. Making allowances has advantages for both superiors and subordinates. For example, if in a rural area production contract, the target figure is set at 2,000 catties, there is no leeway for subordinates or superiors. In the past when we were waging war we held troops in reserve, but now in managing production we have forgotten that. Economic work cannot be attacked in a haphazard way and production work cannot come to a stop. Allowances must be made in planning work. It is essential to insure the central point; if you lack a central point you lack a policy. We operate in accordance with a policy.

3. Wave-like advance. All movements consist of waves; in natural science there are sound waves and electromagnetic waves. That all movements advance in wave-like fashion is a law of the development of motion; it is objective and does not change in response to human will. In our work we always go from point to area, from small to large and always in wave-like fashion, not as a continuously rising line.

4. Be skilled in observing circumstances. We must constantly be attentive to political circumstances and economic circumstances. By "political circumstances" is meant observing the ideology of all classes, as well as changes in their viewpoints. The secretaries should observe these things and so should individual committee members. Individual committee members should do good collective work as well as good individual work.

5. Decisiveness at the critical moment. Grasp changes in a situation in order to alter plans. The critical moment cannot be allowed to slip by. The time will not return and so we must be decisive at the critical moment, not hesitate and avoid decision. In capital construction, when the scale has over-expanded a little, it will contract a little. We must also act decisively at the crucial moment in dealing with certain bad tendencies in the party.

6. Maintain communication with people. Superiors and subordinates, colleagues and co-workers should maintain communication with each other. The Central Committee and local [committees] should have discussions and maintain communication, as should party committee members with each other and with the secretary. In the past communication decreased and we had to work at maintaining it. Now we are using the device of writing letters; the method is to write one a month. We shouldn't be content to let the secretary take care of things and especially we shouldn't keep information back from the provincial committee.

7. An individual sometimes wins over the majority. This is because truth is sometimes in one person's hands only. Truth is sometimes in the hands of a minority, as when

Marxism was in Marx’s hands alone. Lenin said that you have to have the spirit of going against the current. Party committees at every level ought to consider views from many quarters; they ought to listen to the opinion of the majority and also those of the minority and others. There ought to be created within the party an atmosphere of speaking out and of correcting shortcomings. Criticizing is sometimes rather painful, but so long as criticism results in correction it is all right. When people don’t dare speak out it is for one of six reasons: fear of admonition, fear of demotion, fear of loss of prestige, fear of dismissal from the party, fear of execution, fear of divorce. It was only after his execution that Yueh Fei became famous. Speaking out should involve no penalty and according to party regulations people are entitled to their own opinions. In the past under the court system I don’t know how many people were put to death; but there were still many who braved death to oppose the court.

8. Concentration. Concentration in the secretariat and the standing committee requires that the minority should follow the majority, but within the party there should be created an atmosphere of liberating the spirit and carrying on criticism; criticism is comradely assistance.

Sixteen Articles Concerning Work Methods

May 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Everybody supports the party’s general line. The principal political objective last year was to define the general line, but we did not achieve as much as we had anticipated. This concerns our work method. Our central problem today is the work method.

Sixteen articles concerning the work method have been laid down.

1. Be Resourceful and Decisive

Some of our comrades are not very resourceful and unable to make decisions. Resourcefulness involves willingness to listen to assorted opinions from subordinates, secretaries, plant managers, workers and peasants and in particular divergent opinions. Collect and analyze all opinions and then make a judgment.

2. Make Allowances

A common saying has it that one should make allowances for future operation. Maneuverability in work is important. In our operations against Kuomintang forces we assembled troops several times their number in order to crush them and we would not fight any battle without preparations. Socialist construction and planning also need allowances for operation. Both long-term and short-term planning should have such allowances. Our work should exceed our plan. We should make allowances for the masses to exceed a plan. If the target is set too high, it will be difficult to reach, to say nothing about exceeding it. Heads of production teams like to say, “We don’t mind a target of 10,000, but we fear a 10,000 to 1 chance of failure.” In the past this saying often adversely affected the workers’ zeal for work. If we purposely let the masses exceed a production target, they will be encouraged and will work harder. At the same time we should maintain a focus on production for no focus means no policy. It is the same with literature and art work. The performance of a play should allow for reflection and discussion by the audience. If after seeing the first half of the play, you know what is going to happen in the second half, the performance will be a failure. A speaker should likewise leave something unsaid.

3. Proceed in Wave-like Motion

In 1957 we opposed adventurism. As a result, progress took a saddle-like form. In that year we had to lower production targets. Work should proceed in a wave-like motion. This year we have also lowered the production target slightly. The increase has been 40 percent. This year we are determined to produce 16.5 million tons of steel and we are confident that we shall be able to fulfil the quota of coal. Among the agricultural targets, we have to exert greater efforts in the production of grain and cotton. Next year the production figures may be lowered further. In 1961 we will have another great leap forward. Socialist construction should proceed in a wave-like motion. “As heaven waxes, so man’s life is prolonged; as spring comes upon the world, so blessing visits the home.” We cannot have a high tide everyday. I am not against progress in a wave-like motion but I am against adventurism.

4. Strive for the Greatest Effect

Plan for the greatest effect. Change plans with the change of circumstances. If circumstances have changed, a man’s thought had better change accordingly. If not, he will be put in a passive position. Let the brain not be fossilized. Formulate plans according to the amount of materials and the number of people, not according to subjectivity.

5. Be Adept at Observing the Situation

Don’t let your brain be fossilized. Be able to assess the political situation, to detect the trend of people’s thought and to find out the economic conditions. At the Pei-tai-ho Conference the goal was set high. On my visit to Hopeh and Shantung I discovered that it was not practical. The Sixth CPC Plenum reduced the steel production target to 20 million tons. The Shanghai Conference reduced it further. Thus step by step we put production into full effect.

6. Decide at the Moment

Only by observing the situation can you decide at the crucial moment. Some comrades cannot understand the situation fully. Others can make decisions while they are working, but not properly. Wavering and indecision are bad. A decision must be made with resolution. Don’t miss an opportunity, for time, once gone, never returns. The commune problem is very obvious. At what level they should be managed was not made clear last year. After a lapse of time, on 27 January, the problem was thoroughly discussed. I later read the report of Chao Tzu-yang; then in Tientsin I visited Liu Tze-hao; in Shangtung Tan Chi-lung and the Lu Hung Pin commune. I discovered the following problem; a slip of paper, a scale, a cap for the dissenter, a bunch of keys, a proclamation and a staircase. Only then did I discover the system of ownership by the team. The last conference settled this problem. Some comrades are very much afraid of their superiors as well as their subordinates. Henceforth let the superiors and subordinates launch a coordinated attack against the middle level.

7. Let There be Some Airing

Work meetings should not be held without an airing. Before any discussion there should be a period of preparation. Some meetings have no subject at all. I have pointed this out no less than a hundred times. No airing is bad. Don’t insulate a problem. Don’t let people fail to know exactly what the problem is. Before solving a problem there should be full understanding and discussion.

8. Break the Blockade

There should be a point of view in a report. Suggest several alternate measures to solve a problem. Explain your basic situation, different views, the crux of the problem and the actual working conditions. Let there be no blockade.

9. One Man May Win Over the Majority Because He Holds Truth in His Hand

Lenin said that one should have the courage to oppose the trend, have one’s independent views and dare to speak out. Some of our comrades fear ill consequences. We should therefore promote the communist character of daring to think and talk, xxx was not afraid of being sliced to pieces, dragged the emperor down from his horse.

10. Look at Problems from the Historical Point of View

Any change of plan should be subjected to a historical process. Last year we had a great leap forward. If it is 20 percent, it is a great leap forward. If it is 30 percent, it is a sustained great leap forward.

11. Write in the Mandarin style, Not Half Literary and Half Colloquial, or Half Classical and Half Modern. Insist Upon the Mandarin Style and Take a Clear-cut stand

The reports of the New China News Agency on the rebellion in Tibet have a clear sequence of events. When we write, we should keep in mind the interest of the party and the nation. Some articles have no persuasive power which shows that the writers have no clear understanding of their own fields of work and neither know nor understand mass psychology. Han Yu, the famous writer of the T’ang dynasty is known for his prose. He was a native of Hsiu-wu Honan. He advocated the adoption of his teachers ideas, but not his wording. He was against following routine and tradition. He insisted that one should have one’s own characteristics and style and disregard praise for and criticism of it. P’an Tsung-tz’u’s writings of parallel constructions are difficult to read. It seems that he purposely made them difficult to understand.

12. Be Responsible

With power in your hand you can give orders. Bear responsibilities bravely and follow leadership.

13. Liberate Your Thinking

Don’t be afraid of demons, nor be shy and timid. Be brave and strong. Some of our comrades are weak in character. Their thinking has not been liberated. They fear rectification. Cadres should have the courage to uphold truth and not follow personages of the feudal period. What are you afraid of? None other than these six things: dismissal from office, demotion, expulsion from the party, divorce by your wife, imprisonment and decapitation.

14. Concerning Criticism

We are all good comrades. Criticism among comrades is for the purpose of doing work well and seeking efficient work methods. It is unimaginable for one to have no regrets. Criticism and self-criticism are the party's weapons to educate the people. We owe no grievances against each other in our former lives, nor shall we in our after lives. Pains are an incentive to progress.

15. Collective Leadership

The party central committee's meeting is the nucleus. Its decisions should be carried out everywhere.

16. Relationship between Different Departments

Relationships with the industrial departments should be strengthened. Relationship with the three state commissions (State Planning Commission, State Economic Commission and State Capital Construction Commission) and the two ministries (Ministry of Metallurgical Industry and First Ministry of Machine Building) should be close.

(Note: This is not an official document; it is intended for reference only).

Several Important Instructions

June 29, July 2, 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

In view of last year's lack of understanding by many leadership comrades and county and commune cadres regarding socialist economic problems and laws of economic development and also in view of the lingering pragmatism in current work, these people should study [these instructions] diligently. Members of central, provincial, municipal and local committees, including secretaries of county committees, should study books on political science and economics. Three books should be compiled by county and commune cadres. One is to deal with “good people and good events.” It is to be a collection of incidents of people who upheld truth, did not bend with the wind, did good work, did not make false reports, did not exaggerate and strove for the full effect in doing things during the Great Leap Forward last year. A second is to tell about “bad people and bad events.” It is to be a collection of incidents of people who told lies, violated law and discipline or committed serious blunders in their work. A third is to be a systematic compilation of the Central Committee’s directives and documents from last year to date.

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How is the internal situation? In general, there have been great accomplishments; there are many problems; but prospects are bright. Basic problems are: 1) Comprehensiveness and balance; 2) the mass line; 3) unified leadership; and 4) emphasis on quality and quantity.

Among these problems comprehensiveness and balance and the mass line are most important. We prefer to produce less but of better quality and greater variety. We need all kinds and all varieties. In agriculture, we need grain, cotton, oils, hemp, silk, tobacco, tea, sugar, vegetables, fruits, insecticides and miscellaneous items; in industries, we also need all types of light and heavy industry products. Last year we concentrated our attention on production from small-sized blast furnaces, neglecting other forms of production. This won’t do.

One of the major lessons from the Great Leap Forward is the lack of balance. When we walk, both legs should move, but we did not do so. In national economy comprehensiveness and balance are a basic problem. Only with comprehensiveness and balance can we have the mass line.

There are three balances:

1. In agriculture, a balance of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, agricultural sideline production and fishing.

2. In industry, a balance of all departments and all links.

3. A balance between agriculture and industry.

Only when we have accomplished these three balances can we fix the ratios in national economy.

The order we set in our economic planning in the past has been heavy industry, light industry and agriculture. Henceforth we may have to reverse the order. Should it be agriculture, light industry and heavy industry? In other words, we have to do well in agriculture and to change the order of heavy industry, light industry, agriculture, commerce and communications to agriculture, light industry, heavy industry, communications and commerce. In this order we have to first develop means of production. This in no way contradicts Marxism. Comrade Ch'en Yun said, "We should arrange the markets before we go into capital construction." Many comrades disagreed. But now we realize that comrade Ch'en Yun was right. We have to solve the problems of clothing, food, housing, utilities and travel, first for they concern the stable life of 650 million people. After we have solved these five problems, the people will live comfortably, though there may still be criticisms and blames. This will be advantageous to reconstruction and the state will be able to accumulate its resources.

The masses are demanding the restoration of the three fixes policies: fixed production, fixed purchasing and fixed marketing. They probably will have to be restored. If we have to fix production, purchasing and marketing, what should be the amounts? Can we tax 40 percent of increased production and leave 60 percent with the owners? There should be a reduction of tax in case of disaster and exemption of tax on private plots. These problems should be discussed at the forthcoming conference.

We have to restore the primary market in rural areas and make the production teams a half accounting unit.

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Positiveness is of two types. One is the positiveness that strives for full effect and the other is positiveness that moves about blindly. Of the Red Army's three great disciplines two may be universally applicable: "All actions must follow command," which means unified leadership and opposition to anarchism; "Take not a single needle or piece of thread from the masses," which means do not practice equalitarianism and do not transfer material.

Regarding the form of government, there is now some semi-anarchism. We have granted too much of the "four powers" and too soon, causing the present confusion. We should now emphasize unified leadership and centralization of power. Powers granted should be properly retracted. There should be proper control over the lower level. Semi-anarchism should be opposed.

Neither too much inactivity nor too much activity is good. At the moment too much activity should be avoided.

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung

Speech At The Lushan Conference

July 23, 1959

Now that you have said so much, let me say something will you? I have taken sleeping-pills three times, but I can’t get to sleep.

These are the ideas I want to talk about. I have read the comrades’ reports, speeches and documents, and talked to a certain number of them. I feel they have two tendencies and I want to say a few words about them here. One is the tendency to be touchy — with these people it’s very much a case of: ‘If you touch him he jumps.’ Wu Chih-hui used to say that Sun Fo jumped if anyone touched him.[1] So some people feel the pressure; that is, they don’t want others to say bad things about them. They don’t want to hear bad things, only good things. I advise these comrades to listen. There are three kinds of words, and the mouth has two functions. A person has only one mouth and its duty is firstly, to eat, and secondly, to speak. Ears are for listening with. If someone wants to talk, what can you do about it? The trouble with some comrades is that they don’t like listening to bad words. But good words and bad words are all words and they should listen to both kinds. There are three kinds of words: one is correct, the second is basically correct, or not too correct, and the third is basically incorrect, or just plain incorrect. The two extremes are opposites: correct and incorrect are opposites.

We are under combined attack from within and outside the Party. The rightists say: Why was Ch’in Shih Huang overthrown? Because he built the Great Wall. Now that we have built the T’ien An Men[2] we shall collapse; this is what the rightists say. I have not entirely finished reading the criticisms from within the Party. They were expressed in their most concentrated form by the Kiangsi Party School, but they are to be found everywhere. All the speeches of the rightists have been published, and the Kiangsi Party School is their representative within the Party. Some of them are rightists and wavering elements. They do not see the whole picture. But if we do some work on them, they will come round. Some of them have had problems in the past and have been criticized. Moreover they think we are in a mess. An example of this is the material from the Kwangtung Military Region. These things were all expressed outside the conference. Now we shall combine things from within and without the conference. What a pity that the summit of Lushan is so small. We can’t invite them all: the Kiangsi Party School, Lo Lung-chi, Ch’en Ming-shu, etc.[3] This is the responsibility of the Kiangsi people. This building is too small!

Whenever they speak they say we are in a mess. This is fine. The more they say we are in a mess the better, and the more we should listen. During the Rectification Movement we invented the phrase, ‘Toughen our scalps and bear it.’ This is what I have said to some of the comrades, ‘Toughen your scalp and bear it.’ But how long do we have to bear it? One month, three months, six months, one year, three years, five years, eight years, ten years? Some comrades talk of ‘protracted war’. I quite agree. These comrades are in the majority.

Gentlemen, all of you have ears, so listen. They all say we are in a mess. Even if it is hard to listen to it, we must listen to it and welcome it. As soon as you think in this way, it ceases to be unpleasant to the ears. Why should we let the others talk? The reason is that China will not sink down, the sky will not fall. We have done some good things and our backbones are strong. The majority of comrades need to strengthen their backbones. Why are they not all strong? Just because for a time there were too few vegetables, too few hair-grips, no soap, a lack of balance in the economy and tension in the market, everyone became tense. People became psychologically tense. I did not see any reason for tension, but I was also tense nevertheless; it would be untrue to say I wasn't. In the first part of the night you might be tense, but once you take your sleeping-pills the tension will go away for the rest of the night.

People say that we have become isolated from the masses, yet the masses still support us. I think this was temporary, just for two or three months before and after the Spring Festival. I think that we and the masses are now combining well. There is a bit of petit-bourgeois fanaticism, but not all that much. I agree with the view of our comrades, the problem is that of the commune movement. I went to Suip'ing and discussed the matter in detail for more than two hours. The secretary of the Party Committee of the Cha-ya-shan Commune told me that on the average, during the three months of July, August, and September, 3,000 people a day came for a visit. That makes 30,000 in ten days and 300,000 in three months. I hear that there was an equally large number of visitors at Hsu-shui and Ch'i-li-ying.[4] They came from everywhere except Tibet to have a look. It was like the monk of the T'ang dynasty going in search of the scriptures.[5] These people were all *hsien*, commune, and brigade cadres; there were also provincial and local cadres. Their reasoning was: 'The people in Honan and Hopei have created the truth from experience, they have smashed Roosevelt's "freedom" from want.' How should we look upon such enthusiasm for communism? Shall we call it petit-bourgeois fanaticism? I don't think we can put it that way. It's a matter of wanting to do a bit more, it's nothing else but wanting to do a bit more, a bit faster. Is this analysis appropriate? In these three months, there were three times 300,000 people going to the mountains to burn incense.[6] We must not pour cold water on this kind of broad mass movement. We can only use persuasion and say to them: Comrades, your hearts are in the right place. When tasks are difficult, don't be impatient. Do things step-by-s! tep. When you eat meat you have to do it one mouthful at a time; one bite won't make you a fatty. Lin X eats a catty of meat a day and he's still not fat, even after ten years of it. The ample figures of the Commander-in-Chief[7] and myself were not achieved in a day and a night.

Those cadres are leading several hundreds of millions of people. At least thirty per cent of them are activists, thirty per cent are passive elements including landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, undesirables, bureaucrats, middle peasants, and some poor peasants, and forty per cent follow the stream. How many people is thirty per cent? 150 million people. They are keen on running communes, communal canteens, large cooperative enterprises. They are very active, very keen to do these things. Do you think that this is petit-bourgeois fanaticism? They are not the petit bourgeoisie, they are poor peasants, lower-middle peasants, proletarians and semi-proletarians. Those who follow the stream are also prepared to do these things. There are just thirty per cent who won't. Now thirty per cent and forty per cent equals seventy per cent — so at one time there were 350 million fanatics. They wanted to do it.

Then during the two months before and after the Spring Festival they became dissatisfied and changed. When the cadres went into the countryside they would no longer talk to them; they gave them only sweet potato gruel to eat and their faces were unsmiling. This has been called ‘blowing a communist wind’. We should make an analysis of this. Among these people there are some who are afflicted with petit-bourgeois fanaticism. Who are they? Those who ‘blew a communist wind’ were primarily *hsien-* and commune-level cadres, especially commune cadres who extorted things from production brigades and teams. This is bad. The masses disliked it. They were resolutely corrected and persuaded. It took about a month during March and April for the wind to be stilled. Those measures which had to be withdrawn were withdrawn, and the accounts between the communes and the brigades were cleared.

This period of over one month of settling accounts and education had its good effects. In a very short time they came to understand that egalitarianism was no good — ‘First equalize, second adjust, third withdraw funds’[8] will not do. I hear that the majority have come round and only a minority still hanker after ‘communism’ and won’t give it up. Where else can one find such a school, or intensive training course, which will enable a population of several hundreds of millions as well as several millions of cadres to be educated?

The things must be given back. You cannot say that what is yours is mine and just pick things up and walk off. No such rule has ever existed since ancient times. In another 10,000 years’ time people will still not be able to pick things up and walk off. The Red and Green Gang[9] behaved like this, stealing and robbing away in broad daylight, expropriating the fruits of others’ labour without recompense, and violating the principle of the exchange of equal values. Sung Chiang’s government was called the Hall of Loyalty and Righteousness. He robbed the rich to help the poor and could take what he wanted since he had justice on his side. What they took belonged to the local despots and evil gentry, and so his code of behaviour was acceptable. What Sung Chiang took was ‘a birthday tribute’. His action was like our attacks on the local despots. He took their ill-gotten property.[10] ‘Ill-gotten gains can be taken with impunity.’ What has been extorted from the peasants should be returned to the peasants. It is a long time since we attacked the local despots. When we attacked them, it was quite all right to divide their fields and return them to the people because they too were ill-gotten property. If we ‘blow a communist wind’ and seize the property of the production brigades and work teams, helping ourselves to their fat pigs and big white cabbages, this is quite wrong. Even when we deal with the assets of imperialist countries we have other methods: requisition, procurement and economic pressure. So how can we expropriate the working people’s property? How did we succeed in suppressing this wind within a month? It proves that our Party is great, just and correct. If you don’t believe it, I have historical material to prove it. In March, April and May, several million cadres and several hundred million peasants received an educa! tion. The situation was explained to them and they thought it out. It was mainly the cadres who had not understood that this kind of wealth was [not] ill-gotten.[11] They could not make the distinction between the two kinds. They had not properly studied political economy. They had not clearly understood the laws of value, exchange of equal values, and remuneration according to work done. In a few months they were convinced and stopped doing it.

There may not be anyone who understands all this completely. There are some who have understood some of it, perhaps seventy or eighty per cent. If they have not understood the textbooks, let them study them some more. If the top cadres in the communes do not understand a little political economy, this won't do. If people can't read, you can explain it to them and they will understand a certain amount. They do not have to read books; they can be educated by facts. Emperor Wu-ti of Liang had a prime minister called Ch'en Fa-chih. He could not read a single word. When he had to write poems, he recited them and got others to write them down, saying: 'You scholars are not as good as me, who learnt by ear.' Of course I am not opposing the campaign to get rid of illiteracy. Old K'o[12] said that everyone should attend university. I agree. But that would prolong the period of education to fifteen years.

In the Southern and Northern dynasties there was a general called Ts'ao[13]] who wrote this poem after a battle:

When I went to war,
My children were sad.
On my return
I was greeted with horns and drums.
I asked someone passing by,
'Knowest thou Huo Ch'u-ping?'

There was also the *Song of Ch'i-lo* by Hu-lü-chin of the Northern dynasties:

By the Ch'i-lo river, below the Yin mountains,
The sky is like a great canopy,
Spanning the plains.
The sky is blue, the wilderness is vast.
When the wind blows,
The grass bends and cattle and sheep appear.

Neither of these poets could read a word.

If an illiterate can become a prime minister, why can't our commune cadres and peasants listen to some political economy? I think they can learn it. If it is explained to them, they can learn some political economy even if they can't read. Explain it to them and they will understand it. In fact they can understand things better than intellectuals. I myself have not read the textbooks, and I have no right to discuss them until I have. We must squeeze out some time; the whole Party should run a study campaign.

Goodness knows how many inspections they have made. Since last year's Chengchow Conference they have gone in for them in a big way. A report had to be made even when a sixth-grade meeting affected a fifth-grade meeting. The people from Peking talked and talked, but made no impression on them. We made many reports, but you did not get to hear them. I would advise comrades: since people have mouths, let them speak. You must listen to the other person's point of view. I think that at this conference there are some problems which cannot be solved, and some people who will not give up their point of view, so they just procrastinate — one year, two years, three years, five years. It won't do if you can't listen to strange ideas. One should get into the habit of listening. I say we should toughen our scalps and listen. At the worst they will curse three generations of your ancestors. I know it's not easy. When I was a boy, and when I was in middle school, I used to get all steamed up whenever I heard unpleasant things [about myself]. If people don't attack me, I won't attack them. If people attack me, I will certainly attack them. They attack me first, I attack them later. This principle I have never abandoned down to the present time. Now I have learnt to listen, to toughen my scalp and listen for one or two weeks and then counter-attack. I would advise comrades to listen. Whether you agree or not is your business. If you don't agree and if I am wrong, then I will make a self-criticism.

Second, I advise some other comrades not to waver at this crucial time. I have observed that a proportion of comrades are wavering. They too say the Great Leap Forward, the General Line and the people's communes are correct. But when they speak we must note on whose side they stand as regards their ideological tendency, and what is the thrust of their words. This group is in the second category: those who are fundamentally correct, but partly incorrect and a bit unstable. Some people will waver in times of crisis and show a lack of resolution in the great storms of history. There were four lines in our history: the Li Li-san Line, the Wang Ming Line, the Kao-Jao Line, and now the General Line.[14] These people are not steady: they dance the Yang-ko dance[15] (the Kuomintang said that we are the Yang-ko dynasty). They are terribly anxious in their desire to make things better for their country. This is good. What is the class background of this? Is it bourgeois or petit bourgeois? I shall not discuss this now; I talked about it at the Nanning Conference, the Chengtu Conference and the Party Congress. As for the people who wavered in 1956-7, we did not put tall hats[16] on them; we regarded it as a question of ideological method. If we talk about the fanaticism of the petit bourgeoisie, then the opposite of this — the anti-adventurism of that period — is the sad and dismal flatness and pessimism of the bourgeoisie. We are not going to put tall hats on these comrades. They are different from rightists in that they are all engaged in building socialism. It is just that they lack experience. As soon as the wind starts blowing and the grass waves, they become unsteady on their pins and turn anti-adventurist. Yet those who were anti-adventurist at that time have now stood firm. An example is Comrad! e En-lai. He has a lot of energy. After this lesson I believe that Comrade Ch'en Yün will also stand firm. Strange that the people who criticized En-lai at that time, this time find themselves in his shoes. They are no longer adventurous; they even give the impression of being anti-adventurist. For instance, they say: 'While there is loss, there is also gain.' The fact that they put the word 'gain' second is the result of careful consideration. For example, when it comes to putting on tall hats, this is the wavering of the bourgeoisie; or to fall one step lower, the wavering of the petit bourgeoisie. For the nature of rightists is to be constantly influenced by the bourgeoisie. Under the pressure of the imperialists and the bourgeoisie they have moved to the right.

There are about 700,000 production brigades; if each brigade makes one error, and you wanted to publish all 700,000 errors within a year, how could it be done? Moreover some articles are long and some short; it would take at least a year to publish them all. What would the result be? Our state would collapse and even if the imperialists didn't come, the people would rise up and overthrow us. If the paper you publish prints bad news every day, people will have no heart for their work. It wouldn't take as long as a year; we would perish within a week. To print 700,000 items all about bad things is not proletarian. It is more like a bourgeois country or party, like the political planning department of Chang Po-chün.[17] Of course nobody present is in favour of this. I am exaggerating. But if we do ten things and nine are bad, and they are all published in the press, then we will certainly perish, and will deserve to perish. In that case, I will go to the countryside to lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If those of you in the Liberation Army won't follow me, then I will go and find a Red Army, and organize another Liberation Army. But I think the Liberation Army would follow me.

I would advise some comrades to pay attention to the tendency of what they say. The content of your speech may be basically correct, but parts are not apposite.

If you want others to stand firm, you must first stand firm yourselves. If you want other people not to waver, you must not waver yourself: this is another lesson. As I see it these comrades are not rightists but middle-of-the-roaders. They are not leftists (i.e. leftists without quotation marks). I am talking about tendencies because there are some people who have run into difficulties. They have suffered broken heads and they are anxious. They were unable to stand firm; they wobbled into the middle of the road. The question is whether they are more inclined to the right of the middle or to the left of the middle. We must analyse this. They have gone the same way as those comrades who made mistakes in the second half of 1956 and the first half of 1957. They are not rightists, but they are on the verge of becoming rightists. They are still thirty kilometres away from the rightists. The rightists very much welcomed the trend of what they had to say and it would be surprising if they didn't. These comrades' brinkmanship is rather dangerous. If you don't believe me, wait and see what happens. I am saying these things before a big audience. Some of what I say may hurt people. But if I remained silent now, this would not be in these comrades' interest.

To the subjects which I have raised might be added another one: the question of unity. But I will write a separate piece on it: 'Raise the banner of unity, unity of the people, the nation and the Party.' I am not saying whether this is good or bad for these comrades. Even if it is harmful I must still talk about it. Our Party is a Marxist political party. Those on one side must listen; so must those on the other side. Both sides should listen. Didn't I say I wanted to speak? One should not only speak, but also listen to others. I have not been in a hurry to speak: I have toughened my scalp to endure it. Why don't I go on doing so? I have done it for twenty days already and it's nearly time for the conference to adjourn. We may as well go on to the end of the month. Marshall came up to Lushan eight times.[18] Chou En-lai came up three times. Why shouldn't we come up once? We have every right to do so.

Now about the problem of canteens. Canteens are a good thing and should not be criticized too severely. I am in favour of their active and successful development on the basis of voluntary membership. Grain should go to individual households and any savings should be retained by individuals. If one third of the canteens in the whole country can be maintained, I will be quite content. As soon as I said this, Wu Chih-p'u[19] became quite tense. Don't be afraid. In Honan Province ninety per cent of the canteens are still running. We should try them and see how they go, not abolish them. I am talking on a nationwide scale. In dancing are there not four stages? 'Stand on one side; try it out; dance as hard as you can; do or die.' Does such a saying really exist? I am a rough fellow, not cultured at all. If one-third of the peasants, amounting to 150 million, persevere, then this would be wonderful. My next hope is for a half of them to do so: 250 million. If we can gain experience from such example as Honan, Szechwan, Hunan, Yünnan, Shanghai, we can do it and some of the canteens which have been disbanded can be reformed. We did not invent them; they were created by the masses. They had canteens in Hopei Province in 1956 before the establishment of the communes. In 1958 they were set up very rapidly.

Tseng Hsi-sheng[20] said that canteens liberate labour power. I think that there is another point, which is that they save materials. Without the latter benefit they would not last. Can we do it? We can. My proposal is that the Honan comrades should carry out some mechanization, such as laying on running water, so that the water does not have to be carried. In this way both labour and materials can be saved. It is a good thing that half of them have now been disbanded. Commander-in-chief, I approve of your way of putting it, but I also differ with you. We should not stop disbanding them altogether, but neither should we disband too many. I'm a middle-of-the-roader. Honan, Szechwan, Hupei are all leftists. But a right wing has emerged. The Ch'angli investigation committee of the Chinese Academy of Sciences say that the canteens have no merit at all, attacking them on one particular point and not mentioning any others. They imitate Teng T'u-tzu's 'Ode on Love of Sex'. Teng T'u-tzu attacked Sung Yü on three points: he was handsome, sex-mad, and eloquent.[21] Also he did not like his own wife and was very dangerous. Sung Yü retorted: 'My good looks I owe to my parents, my eloquence is due to my teachers, and it is not true that I am sex-mad. No other place has such beautiful women as the state of Ch'u. Among the beautiful women of Ch'u, the most beautiful are to be found in my own district. And the most beautiful woman of my district is the daughter of my neighbour on the East. If you increased her stature by one inch she would be too tall, and if you decreased it by one inch she would be too short.' ... Teng T'u-tzu was a *tai-fu* which is the equivalent of the head of a ministry today. His 'ministry' was a big one, like the Ministry of Metallurgy, the Ministry of the Coal Industry or the Mi! nistry of Agriculture. The investigation group of the Academy of Sciences attacked only one point and ignored the rest. The way they attacked was to concentrate on such things as pork, hairgrips, etc. Everybody has faults. Even Confucius made mistakes. I have also seen Lenin's handwritten manuscripts which had been altered so much that they looked a real mess. If he had not made mistakes why did he have to correct them? We can have more canteens: after we have experimented with them for one or two years, I reckon that we can make a go of them.

Could the people's communes collapse? Up to now not one has collapsed. We were prepared for the collapse of half of them, and if seventy per cent collapsed there would still be thirty per cent left. If they must collapse, let them. If they are not well run they are sure to collapse. The Communist Party aims to run things well, to run the communes well, to run all enterprises well, to run agriculture, industry, commerce, communications, transport, and culture and education well.

Many things have happened which we could not possibly predict beforehand. Hasn't it been said that the Party does not concern itself with Party affairs? Now the planning organs do not concern themselves with planning: for some time they have not been concerning themselves with it. The planning organs are not confined to the Planning Commission; they also include other ministries as well as local governments. The local organs can be forgiven if for a time they did not concern themselves with the overall balance of the economy. But the Planning Commission and the central ministries have been in existence for ten years, and suddenly at Peitaiho they decided not to concern themselves with it. They called it a directive on planning, but it was tantamount to doing away with planning altogether. By doing away with planning I mean that they dispensed with overall balances and simply made no estimates of how much coal, iron and transport would be needed. Coal and iron cannot walk by themselves; they need vehicles to transport them. This I did not foresee. I and XX and the Premier did not concern ourselves with this point. You could say that we were ignorant of it. I ought not to make excuses, but I shall too, because I am not the head of the Planning Commission. Before August of last year my main energies were concentrated on revolution. I am a complete outsider when it comes to economic construction, and I understand nothing about industrial planning. At the West Tower [In the Chung-nan-hai, Peking.] I said: 'Don't write about [my] wise leadership, I do not control a thing so how can you talk about wisdom?' But comrades, in 1958 and 1959 the main responsibility was mine, and you should take me to task. In the past the responsibility was other people's — En-lai, XX — but now you should blame me because there are heaps of things I didn't attend to. Shall the person who invented burial puppets be deprived of descendants?[22] Shall I be deprived of descendants too (one son was killed, one went mad)?[23] Who was responsible for the idea of the mass smelting of steel? K'o Ch'ing-shih or me? I say it was me. I had a talk with K'o Ch'ing-shih and spoke of six million tons. Afterwards I sought out people to talk about it: XXX also said it was possible. In June I talked about 10,700,000 tons. Then we went ahead and did it. It was published in the Peitaiho communique; XX put forward some ideas and believed that it would be all right. With this, we rushed into a great catastrophe, and ninety million people went into battle. As I said, the person who invented burial puppets should have neither sons nor grandsons. Small native-type blast furnaces were built ... I read a lot of discussion reports; everyone said it could be done. Provided that we came to grips with the problem and worked really hard, we could raise the quality, reduce cost, lower the sulphur content, and produce really good iron. The Communist Party has a method which it calls 'coming to grips' with something. The Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek have both got two hands. The Communist Party's hands are communist hands. When they grip things they pick them up. We must take a grip on steel and iron as well as staple crops, cotton, oil, hemp, silk, tea, sugar and vegetables; also tobacco, fruit and condiments. There are twelve items in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, subsidiary crops and fisheries, which must be grasped and which must achieve overall balance. Conditions vary in different localities. There cannot be a single model for every county. At Chikungshan in Hupi they grow bamboo in the mountains. It would be very wrong for them only to tend the crops and neglect the bamboos. There are places where tea and sugar will not grow. Things must be grown according to local conditions. Didn't the Soviet Union make them ! grow pigs in Moslem areas? Ridiculous.

There is an article on industrial planning which is quite well written. As for the Party not concerning itself with Party affairs, the Planning Commission not looking after planning or drawing up overall balances, what have they been doing? They were not in the least worried about things. The Premier was worried, but they weren't. If someone is not worried and they have no energy or enthusiasm, they will not do anything properly. Some people in criticizing Comrade Li Fu-ch'un, head of the Planning Commission, say: 'His foot wants to move, but he hesitates; his mouth wants to speak, but he stammers.' But don't be like Li K'uei;[24] impetuosity is no good either. Lenin was full of enthusiasm, which the masses liked. If people want to speak but can only stammer, it is because they have a lot of worries. During the first half of the month people had a lot of worries. Now these worries have all come out into the open. If you have anything to say, say it and it will all be written down in the minutes. Spoken evidence has to be written down. If you have things to say, then say them. If you find faults in me, then you should correct me. Don't be afraid if your shoes pinch. I said at the Chengtu Conference that one should not fear the guardroom. One should not even be afraid of execution or expulsion from the Party. If a communist and senior cadre has so many inhibitions it is because he is afraid of saying the wrong thing and being corrected. This is what is called, 'The wise man looks after number one!' Disease enters through the mouth and trouble comes out through the mouth. If I cause trouble today, two kinds of people will not like it: one is the touchy ones and the other those whose direction is open to question. If you don't agree with me then argue back. I don't agree with the idea that the Chairman cannot be contradicted. Anyway the fact is that you have been contradicting me one! after the other, though not by name. The ideas of the Kiangsi Party School and of the Intermediate Party School both contradict mine. When I said that the inventor of burial puppets should have no descendants, I was referring first to the target of smelting 10,700,00 tons of steel, which resulted in ninety million people going into battle and the expenditure of — dollars of People's Currency. 'The gain did not compensate for the loss.' This was my suggestion and my resolution. Next I was referring to the people's communes. I do not claim to have invented the people's communes, only to have proposed them. The Peitaiho Resolution was drafted according to my suggestion. At that time, it was as though I had found a treasure in the regulations of the Cha-ya-shan [Commune]. When I was in Shantung a reporter asked me: 'Are the people's communes good?' I said: 'They are good,' and he published it in a newspaper. There was a spot of petit-bourgeois fanaticism there, too. In future reporters should keep away.

I have committed two crimes, one of which is calling for 10,700,000 tons of steel and the mass smelting of steel. If you agreed with this, you should share some of the blame. But since I was the inventor of burial puppets, I cannot pass on the blame: the main responsibility is mine. As for the people's communes, the whole world opposed them; the Soviet Union opposed them. There is also the General Line. Whether it has any substance or not, you can share some of the responsibility for this. The proof is to be seen in its implementation in industry and agriculture. As for the other big guns, other people should also take some of the responsibility. Boss T'an[25], you have fired a lot of big shots, but your shooting was inaccurate, you had a rush of blood to the head and did not take enough care. You communized too quickly. It was talked about first in Honan, then accounts of it spread rapidly in Kiangsu and Chekiang. If you are careless in your speech, you will not keep control of things. You must be more cautious. Your strength is that you are energetic and willing to take responsibility; much better than those who are sad and dismal. But when you fire big guns on important questions, you should take care. I have also fired three big shots: the people's communes, the steel smelting, and the General Line. P'eng Te-huai said that he was a coarse fellow with no refinement. I am like Chang Fei who, though rough, had a certain delicacy.[26] About the people's communes, I said that they were a system of collective ownership. I said that for the transition to be completed from collective ownership to communist ownership by the whole people, two five-year plans was too short a period. Maybe it will take twenty five-year plans!

If you want to talk about haste, Marx also made many mistakes. Every day he hoped that a European revolution would arrive, but it did not arrive. There were many ups and downs and it had still not arrived when he died. It only arrived in Lenin's time. Wasn't this a case of impatience? Wasn't this petit-bourgeois fanaticism? (XX interjected: 'Lenin said that conditions were ripe for world revolution, but it did not come.') Marx at first opposed the Paris Commune, while Zinoviev opposed the October Revolution. Zinoviev was put to death later. Should Marx also have been killed? When the Paris Commune rose up he supported it, although he reckoned that it would fail. When he realized that it was the first proletarian dictatorship, he thought it would be a good thing even if it only lasted three months. If we assess it from an economic point of view, it was not worthwhile. We also had our Canton Commune,[27] but the Great Revolution failed. Will our present work also fail, like what happened in 1927? Or will it be like the 25,000 li Long March, when most of our bases were lost and the Soviet areas were reduced to one tenth of their former size? No, it will not be like these. Have we failed this time? All the comrades present say there have been gains; it is not a complete failure. Is it mainly a failure? No, it's only a partial failure. We have paid a high price. A lot of 'communist wind' has blown past, but the people of the whole country have learned a lesson.

I have spoken twice at Chengchow on the question of Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism*. But these were only speeches. Now we must study it in depth, otherwise we cannot develop and consolidate our cause.[28]

When talking of responsibility, XXX and XXX both have some responsibility, as does XXX of the Ministry of Agriculture. But the one with the most responsibility is me. Old K'o, does any responsibility rest on you for your invention? (Old K'o said: 'Yes.) Was it lighter than mine? Yours is a question of ideology, mine of 10,700,000 tons and ninety million people going into battle. The chaos caused was on a grand scale and I take responsibility. Comrades, you must all analyse your own responsibility. If you have to shit, shit! If you have to fart, fart! You will feel much better for it.

Notes

[References are given here as provided by the Maoist Documentation Project. They are significantly different in at least one existing edition of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. VIII. — *Transcriber, MIA*.]

[1.] Wu Chih-hui (1864-1954) was a leading figure in the anarchist movement at the beginning of this century, and perhaps the most famous Chinese eccentric of modern times. Sun Fo (also known as Sun K'o) was Sun Yat-sen's son, an insignificant politician.

[2.] Mao is obviously referring here to the 'Great Hall of the People' and other edifices built during the Great Leap Forward, flanking the square in front of the T'ien An Men (Gate of Heavenly Peace), not to the gate itself, which dates from Ming times and was rebuilt in its present form in 1651.

[3.] Lo Lung-chi (1896-1965), a political scientist educated at the London School of Economics and Columbia University, was a leading member of the China Democratic League. He was Minister of Timber from 1956-8, when he was removed after being denounced for over-zealous criticism of the Party during the Hundred Flowers of 1957. Ch'en Ming-shu (1890-1965), a leader of the Kuomintang faction which chose to collaborate with the Communists after 1949, was also criticized in 1957.

[4.] The Cha-ya-shan Commune (also known as the Wei-hsing or 'Sputnik' Commune) in Suip'ing hsien, Honan Province, was one of the first communes set up on an experimental basis in the early summer of 1958; its draft regulations, adopted on 7 August 1958, served as a document for study throughout the country following the decision of the Central Committee at a meeting in Peitaiho on 29 August 1958. (For the Peitaiho resolution, and the Cha-yashan regulations, see *Communist China* 1955-1959 [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962], pp. 454-6, 463-70.)

Ch'i-li-ying Commune in Hsin-hsiang hsien, Honan, and communes in Hsü-shui hsien, Hopei, were also among the earliest models, set up in the summer of 1958.

[5.] i.e., the Chinese monk who, in the seventh century, brought Buddhist scriptures from India.

[6.] Mao says below (p. 145) that he himself felt, in the summer of 1958, as though he had 'found a treasure' in the regulations of the Cha-ya-shan Commune. Here he suggests that visitors came to the three model communes in the same reverent spirit as Buddhists burning candles on the mountains at dawn.

[7.] Chu Te, who occupied this position most of the time from the union between his forces and Mao's in 1928 until 1954.

[8.] A slogan prevalent among the peasantry in the summer of 1958, reflecting their understanding of communism as sharing wealth, rather than collective organization for production.

[9.] The Shanghai underworld in the 1920s was dominated by gangs which had grown out of secret societies with names such as this.

[10.] Sung Chiang was the leader of the outlaw heroes of the novel Water Margin, translated by Pearl Buck under the title *All Men are Brothers* (New York: John Day, 1968). The incident of the birthday tribute occurs in Chapters 14-16; this episode is translated in Cyril Birch (Ed.) *Anthology of Chinese Literature* (Penguin, 1967), pp. 448-84. For a similar comparison between the ideals of the Communist Party and those of traditional defenders of the underdog, see Mao's appeal of 1936 to the secret society called the Ko Lao Hui: *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 260-61.

[11.] The Chinese text here says 'that this kind of wealth was ill-gotten'. This must be a misprint, since Mao is criticizing leftist errors of confiscating things that ought not to have been confiscated, and is making the cadres responsible for these excesses.

[12.] K'o Ch'ing-shih (1902-65), a member of the Politburo, was then Mayor of Shanghai, and head of the Shanghai Party organization, as well as being First Secretary of the Eastern Bureau.

[13.] Ts'ao (457-508) [i.e., Ts'ao Ching-tsung of the Southern Liang dynasty], who had originally distinguished himself by his prowess as a hunter, helped to establish the Liang dynasty in 502. In the poem, he identifies himself with Huo Ch'ü-ping, a general of Han Wu Ti who distinguished himself against the Huns.

[14.] As already indicated (see above, *Talks at the Chengtu Conference* (a), note 2), the official viewpoint at the time of this speech regarding lines in the 1930s is given in the 'Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party', adopted on 20 April 1945, in *Selected Works*, Vol. III, pp. 177-225. The 'Li Li-san Line' of 1930, and the 'Left Opportunist Line' promoted by Wang Ming and the other representatives of the 'Returned Student Faction' in the years 1931-5 are discussed both there and in the many Western accounts of this period. The Kao-Jao Line is discussed in Mao's speech of 10 March 1958 (*Talks at the Chengtu Conference* (a) and notes 8 and 10 to that text) [and comrade Mao's "Speeches At The National Conference Of The Communist Party Of China", S.W. Vol. V, pp 154-171]. The juxtaposition of these three deviationist lines with the General Line of building socialism 'more, faster, better, and more economically', put forward by Mao in 1956 and with which he continued to identify himself, is slightly odd.

[15.] Folk songs and dances adapted to carry a political message, widely promoted in the Yenan base area beginning in 1942.

[16.] The custom of parading people in dunce caps in order to humiliate them has a long history in China; its modern manifestations extend from the activities of the Hunan peasants, chronicled by Mao in 1927, to the Cultural Revolution.

[17.] Chang Po-chün, Minister of Communications and leader of the China Democratic League, criticized the Chinese Communist Party severely in the spring of 1957, and then recanted in July. His case thus paralleled that of the editor of his party's newspaper, Ch'u An-p'ing (see note 72 to *Talks at the Chengtu Conference*). He was removed as minister in early 1958.

[18.] General George C. Marshall organized a number of meetings on Lushan while US mediator in China in 1946-7.

[19.] Wu Chih-p'u (c. 1906), at this time First Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party for Honan province, who had taken the lead in establishing communes in the summer of 1958. For the background to Mao's remarks here, see his discussion of the role of Honan as the vanguard of social change in his speech of 20 March 1958 (*Talks at the Chengtu Conference* (b), pp. 104-5). He was demoted in 1961 for 'adventurism'.

[20.] Tseng Hsi-sheng (c. 1905-), a graduate of Whampoa who participated in the Long March, was elected to the Central Committee in 1956. He was also First Secretary of the CCP for Anhwei province, from 1952 to 1960, and in that capacity he showed himself a strong supporter of the Great Leap Forward. He faded from the political scene in the early 1960s.

[21.] Teng T'u-tzu, a high official of the state of Ch'u, offended in this way Sung Yü, a nephew of the famous poet Ch'ü Yüan, who attacked him in return (fourth century B.C.).

[22.] A quotation from Book 1, Part A, Ch. 4 of Mencius (p. 52 of D.C. Lau's translation) referring to the practice of burying wooden figures with the dead so they might be their servants in the hereafter. According to another passage from the classics (Li Chi, IV, 19), Confucius regarded this custom as inhuman because it suggested metaphorically the idea of burying actual human beings for the same purpose. In subsequent Chinese usage the expression 'he who first made burial puppets' has come to designate the author of any diabolical invention, or more generally the bringer of misfortune.

[23.] The two referred to are Mao's sons by his first wife, Yang K'ai-hui. The eldest, Mao An-ying, born in 1922, was killed in 1950 in Korea. The younger, Mao An-ch'in, was left with a 'bourgeois' family following his mother's execution in 1930, and was so mistreated, according to Red Guard sources, that his mind was affected.

[24.] A good-hearted but exceedingly short-tempered figure in Water Margin, whose personality is conjured up by his nickname, 'Black Whirlwind'.

[25.] T'an Chen-lin (1902-), Politburo member and the Party's top agricultural spokesman in 1958, had espoused radical policies in the countryside at the time of the Great Leap Forward. He was made a vice-premier of the State Council in April 1959, and was regarded as a spokesman for Mao Tse-tung.

[26.] P'eng Te-huai (1898-) Minister of Defence, who launched a sharp attack on the Great Leap policies at the Lushan meetings. In his 'Letter of Opinion', dated 14 July 1959, P'eng had excused his frankness by saying that he was a simple fellow like Chang Fei (one of the heroes of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms), but shared only Chang's roughness, not his subtlety. Mao's remark echoing this sentence is an obvious warning to his adversaries that he possesses both a subtle tactical sense, and the firmness (or harshness) to act as circumstances may require.

[27.] The abortive uprising in Canton in December 1927. On December 11, 1927, the workers and revolutionary soldiers of Canton united to stage an uprising, and set up the people's political power. They fought fiercely against the counter-revolutionary forces, which were directly supported by imperialism, but failed because the disparity in strength was too great.

[28.] Mao himself shortly produced some comments on Stalin's last work, as well as a much more detailed analysis of the Soviet manual on political economy published after Stalin's death. See his (undated) remarks on Stalin's 1952 essay, followed by notes (dated 1960) on the Soviet textbook in *Wan-sui* (1967), pp. 156-66 and 167-247. Another version of the latter, dated 1961-2, appears in *Wan-sui* (1969), pp. 319-99.

Talk At The 8th Plenary Session Of The CPC 8th Central Committee

August 2, 1959

[SOURCE: This document, published in a Red Guard Publication, bears the title of "*Talk at the 8th Plenary Session of CPC 8th Central Committee,*" on the above date. It is a very short piece. It might be that Mao gave a short talk on the occasion; or, it might be an excerpt from his talk.]

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1. The Question of Revising the Targets

The 6th Plenary Session of the Central Committee held at Wuhan[1] decided on the targets for this year. At the 7th Plenary Session held in Shanghai[2] there were proposals to revise the targets. The Majority did not agree. It seems that any revision cannot be thorough. At present, we still have five months to go. When the revision has been made, we can put through the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The high targets are a Buddhist idol, which we set up for our own worship. Now, we have to break them, break the impractical targets for steel, coal, gram, cotton, etc.

2. The Question Concerning the Lines

Some comrades begin to have doubt: Have we been correct or not? Before they came up the Lushan Mountain, they did not understand clearly. After they came up, some people asked for democracy, asked for freedom, and said that they did not dare to speak, and there was pressure. At that time, I was confused, and could not understand what democracy they were talking about. In the first half of the month, a kind of Meetings of Immortals[3] were held. The situation was not tense. They said that there was no freedom. They tried to attack the general line and break it down. They said that they wanted to have freedom, the freedom of breaking down the general line, and the freedom of speech to criticize the general line. The tense situation of their demand was mainly on criticizing last year, also criticizing the work of this year. They said that in last year all the work had been done badly. Since the first Chengchow Meeting in November last year, we have rectified the wind of communism, and rectified such "Leftists" tendencies as "equalitarianism, harmony and deduction of money " They could not see the work in these months, and were dissatisfied. They demanded to hold a new discussion; otherwise, they thought that it was the suppression of democracy. They thought that it was not enough to hold the enlarged conference of the Political Bureau, which they thought not democratic. Now, democracy in meetings seems a major theme; we might make preparations for holding the National Party Congress in spring next year. If the situation requires, it may be held in September or October this year. Did we not demand great democracy and the blooming and contending and mass debate in 1957?[4] The Lushan Meeting has been going on for one month already. Comrades who have just arrived do not know what it is all about. At first, group meetings will be held for nine days, then the general meeting ! is to be held, and finally resolutions are to be made.

The procedure of the meeting to be adopted should be one which all will have approved, by proceeding from the wish of unity. The unity of the Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee is connected with the destiny of China's socialism. As far as we are concerned, we should be united. At present, there is a tendency toward a split. Last year, at the 8th National Party Congress, I said that the only two dangers were, the world war and the split of our Party. At that time there was no clear sign of a split. Now there is such sign. The method of unity proceeds from the wish for unity, through criticism and self-criticism and attains the goal of unity on a new basis. For comrades who have committed mistakes, the policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones" and "curing the illness to save the patient" should be adopted. The comrades who have committed mistakes should be given a chance, and should be allowed to correct their mistakes and make further revolution. Don't imitate the old gentleman Mr. Chao in The *True Story of Ah Q*, who forbade Ah Q to make revolution. We should watch and help comrades who have committed mistakes. It is not good to watch only without giving them help, and refuse to do the work. We are opposed to mistakes. Poison is not eatable. We cannot appreciate the bad smell of mistakes. Criticism and struggle should make them come nearer to us and make shortcomings and mistakes leave us as far as possible. We should make analyses on comrades who have committed mistakes. There cannot be more than two possibilities. One is that correction is not possible. I said that we should watch, I mean to watch whether or not it is possible to correct. I said that we should help, I mean to help them to make correction. Some comrades followed others to the other side for the time being. Through criticism and persuasion, plus the change of the objective conditions, many comrades again turned back to us and left these people. The Li Li-san line! and the Wang Ming line were rectified at the Tsunyi Meeting. Afterwards, through a period of 10 years till the 7th National Party Congress, there has been four years of rectification. It was necessary to go through this period of 10 years. To rectify mistakes, one has to go through several stages. You cannot force anybody to rectify his mistakes at one stroke. Marx said: "The double character of commodity is recognized through its exchange several hundred and thousand times." Lo-fu[5] did not admit his mistake of line at the beginning. At the time of the 7th National Party Congress, through struggles Lo-fu admitted his mistake of line. Through these struggles, Wang Ming had not changed himself, nor had Lo-fu. He relapsed into his old illness, and is still having malaria.[6] Whenever there was a chance, it would come back. Most of our comrades have corrected themselves. As far as the mistake of line is concerned,: historical events have proved that it can be corrected. We must have this faith. Those who cannot correct themselves have been very few. Therefore, it can be seen that the policy of "curing the illness to save the patient" is effective. We must have the kind heart to help them. We have sympathy for the person, but not for his mistake. His mistake is a poison, which must be deeply detested and thoroughly rejected. However, we should not use methods of Wu Sung, Lu chih-sheng and Li Kuei[7]. They were very determined and might have joined the Communist Party. Their shortcoming was that they did not understand strategy, and did not know how to do political work. We should adopt methods of putting forward the facts and explaining the truth, such as the big debate, the big character poster, the "medium-size-character poster" and the brief Bulletin of Lushan Meeting.

After I came up the Lushan Mountain, I made three remarks: "Our achievement is great. There are quite a lot of problems. The future is bright." Later, quite a lot of problems did come up. They are problems of the Rightist opportunism launching a frantic attack against the Party. There is no more wind of communism blowing. There are no more equalitarianism, harmony and drawing out money. There is also no more pompous exaggeration. At present, the problem is not to oppose the "Left", but to oppose the Right. It is a problem of the Rightist opportunism frantically attacking the Party, attacking the 600 million people, and attacking the vigorous socialist movement. At present, there are people who propose that the more down-to-earth the better. After we have opposed the "Left" inclination for several months, it is natural that a Rightist tendency would come up. There were truly shortcomings and mistakes; but these have been corrected. They are still making demands for correction. Clinging to these things, they attack the general line, and try to lead the general line astray.

Notes

[1.] The 6th plenary session was held from November 28 to December 10, 1958, during which it was announced that Mao Tse-tung would be a candidate of the Chairmanship of the State no more.

[2.] 7th plenary session was held in April 1959.

[3.] Meetings of Immortals is a peculiar term used by Chinese to mean meetings without rigid agenda or control, i.e., informal meetings.

[4.] i.e., during the ‘Let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend’ campaign period.

[5.] Lo-fu is an alias of Chang Wen-tien, who had been General Secretary of CPC Central Committee after Tsunyi Meeting in January 1935, and was a Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs from April 1954 to September 1959.

[6.] Please see the succeeding article “Letter to Chang Wen-Tien”.

[7.] Three warriors in the novel *Heroes of the Marshes*, all famous for their hot temper.

Letter To Chang Wen-tien

[Excerpt]

August 2, 1959

[SOURCE: Red Guard Publication.]

. . . .

. . . Confusion. It’s like drawing water from a well by means of 15 buckets, seven of them coming up and the other eight going down. [You] are being tied up by others and can’t get free. You are getting the consequences of your own doings. Whom can you blame? In my opinion, you have relapsed into your old illness. You haven’t got rid of the original germs of your old and old disease of malaria. Now you are having spells of cold and fever again. A scholar of former days composed a poem on malaria as follows: “When the spell of cold comes, one feels as if sleeping on the ice. When the spell of fever comes, one feels as if sitting in a cooking steamer. When pain comes, one feels that one’s scalp is cracking. When one trembles, one has to grind one’s teeth. It hurts so much, it hurts so much. Really one passes the difficult time of winter and summer back and forth.” Comrade, is not like this? If so, then that is fine. One like you needs to go through a serious illness. In the *Literary Selections of Chao Ming*, Vol. 34, Mei Sheng’s “*Chi Fa*” [1] says in its last part; “This is also an important saying and wonderful truth in the world. My prince, wouldn’t you want to hear it? Then, the Prince arose from the bed and said: ‘After I have heard what the sage scholar said, I have perspired, and my illness is entirely gone.’ ” Your illness is similar to that of this prince of the Chu Kingdom. If you are interested in, you may read Mei Sheng’s “*Chi Fa*”. Indeed, it’s a wonderful literary piece. You have entirely forgotten the important saying and wonderful truth of Marxism. Therefore, you joined the Military Club, truly a combination of men of civil and military services. What is to be done now? Comrade, I would like to give you a piece of advice: “Thoroughly rectify yourself.” Thanks to your courtesy in calling! me over the telephone several times and saying that you wished to come to my place to talk to me. I am willing to talk with you but I am busy these days. You’ll have to wait for some other day. I have written this letter first to give you a piece of my sincere thought.

Mao Tse-tung

August 2, 1959

Notes

[1.] “Chi Fa” is the title of Mei Sheng’s article, meaning literally “seven shots” or “seven utterances”. See Mao’s exposition of this article in “Concerning Mei Sheng’s Chi Fa”, pp 232-234 of this volume.

Comment On A Report: “The Tao-chu Production Brigade Of Tan-ling Commune In Pingchiang County, Hunan, Abolished Scores Of Mess-halls And Then Restored Them Again”

August 5, 1959

Print and circulate this document among the comrades. It is very worthwhile to read. The scores of mess-halls of a production brigade were disbanded at a stroke; then, after a while, they were restored again. The lesson to learn from them is: We should never bow our heads in the face of any difficulty. Things such as the people's commune and the collective mess-hall have their profound economic origin. They should not be blown way by a gust of wind. It is also not possible. Certain mess-hall may be blown away by a gust of wind. However, there will always be some people, even a majority of the people, who will run them again. They will run them again after a few days, or after scores of days, or after several months, or after a still longer time. In short, the wind will blow them back again. Sun Chung-shan[1] said: "There must be the thing following the heavenly truth, answering people's sentiments, conforming to the world trend, and agreeing with human needs which men of foresight and vision will carry out with determination, it will definitely not fail." This statement is correct. Our great leap forward and people's commune belong to this category. There have been difficulties. Mistakes will certainly be committed. However, they can be overcome and corrected. The pessimistic trend of thought corrodes the Party and the people. It is a very bad trend of thought which runs counter to the will of the proletariat and poor people, and goes against Marxism-Leninism.

Mao Tse-tung

August 5. 1959

Notes

[1.] Dr. Sun Yat-sen

Comment On Two Reports: "The Situation Of Wang-kuo-fan Commune Has Always Been Very Good" And "Who Are The People Engaged In Idle Talks Now In The Countryside"

August 6, 1959

Print and circulate these two articles among the comrades. The comrades of Party committees of all provinces, municipalities and districts are requested to print and circulate the report on Wang-kuo-fan Commune among all Party committees of people's communes with necessary introductory notes. All Party committees of communes are requested to study it and see what experiences from it can be adopted by them. In my opinion, all of them can be adopted: First, run the commune with diligence and frugality; second, raise more pigs (except Moslems who keep no pigs); third, breed more big animals; fourth, increase the number of big farm tools; fifth, mess-hall operation; sixth, do work on a solid ground by seeking truth from facts; and seventh consult with the masses on anything and persist in the mass line. All these are very good. I believe that in every special district there must be one or several communes which are well run as the Wang-kuo-fan Commune. You are requested to try carefully to find them out. When you have found them, you are to study them, write articles for publication and publicize their experiences. This article on “Who Are the People Engaged in Idle Talks Now in the Countryside” is also worthwhile to read. They are connected with those who are now engaged in idle talking at Lushan.

Mao Tse-tung

August 6, 1959

Comment On A Report On Secretary Chang Kai-fan Of Secretariat Of CPC Anhwei Provincial Committee Giving Order To Abolish Mess-Halls In Wu-Wei County

August 10, 1959

Print and circulate it among the comrades. There are right opportunists in the Central Committee, that is, those comrades in the Military Club. There are also right opportunists at the provincial level, such as Secretary Chang Kai-fan of the Secretariat of the Anhwei Provincial Party Committee. I suspect that these people are opportunists who have sneaked into the Party. During the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, they maintain the bourgeois stand and try to undermine proletarian dictatorship, split the Communist Party, organize factions within the Party, spread their influence, disintegrate the vanguards of the proletariat, and establish their opportunist party. A clear evidence is the fact that the main components of this clique were originally important members of Kao Kang’s clique of conspirators and renegades. During the period of the bourgeois democratic revolution, they gladly took part in it, and did have some revolutionary spirit. Yet on the method of revolution, they often made mistakes. They had no spiritual preparation for the socialist revolution. When the socialist revolution came, they began to feel uncomfortable. They very early joined the anti-Party clique of Kao Kang, which tried to attain its reactionary goal by means of conspiracy. Now, the remnants of the Kao Kang’s clique, who evaded the dragnet, are again trying to make trouble. They are impatient and anxious for a showdown. It will be beneficial to both the Party and to such people for them to be exposed quickly. So long as they are willing to wash their brains, there is still the possibility to win them over, because they posses the duplicity of being reactionary and revolutionary. At present, they have their anti-socialist program in opposition to the great leap forward and the people’s commune. To save them, it is necessary to completely expose them among the broad cadres so that their market will be made to shrink smaller and smaller. The policy of curing the illness to save the patient mu! st be carried out. The method of putting forward facts and explaining the truth must be employed. They should also be given the chance to make revolution and to work. Criticism should be strict, but treatment may be lenient.

Mao Tse-tung

August 10, (1959).

Comment On The Report On Liaoning Province Carrying Out CPC Central Committee’S Directive To Oppose Right-Deviation

[Excerpt]

August 12, 1959

Print and circulate it among all provinces and municipalities. How is the situation in the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions? Have they already made the same arrangements as the Liaoning province in opposing right-deviation and going all out? What are their results? It seems that all the places have right-deviationist sentiments, rightist ideas and rightist activities in existence and growing. They are different in degrees, In some localities, the right opportunists are present with their sentiments of making frantic attacks against the Party. It is necessary to make analyses in accordance with the concrete conditions in order to put down this evil wind and wicked influence. Liaoning province has done it quickly in proper steps and with remarkable results. They gained the initiative and forced the right opportunists to the passive position. This experience is worthwhile to ...

Concerning Mei Sheng’s “*Chi Fa*”[1]

August 16, 1959

This article has been printed and circulated earlier, and is worthwhile to read. It is a descendant of the ancient *sau* style of writing poems, but also had some creative development. The *sau* style had its democratic color, belonged to the romantic school, and threw a dagger of criticism at the corrupt rulers. Among the poets of this school, Chu Yuan was by far the most prominent; Sung Yu, Ching Cha, Chia Yi and Mei Sheng were a little inferior but had their delightful points. Look at the atmosphere of “*Chi Fa*”, is there not plenty of the color of criticism? “The Prince of Chu Kingdom was ill, a visitor from Wu Kingdom went to enquire after his health.” From the start, he denounced the decadent upper ruling class: “Well, to travel in a sedan-chair or a carriage is to atrophy you limbs. To live in a magnificent and cool palace is the medium of cold and fever. To keep beautiful girls with white teeth and crescent eyebrows is to destroy your sexual health. To take rich foods is to get ulcers for your stomach." These words are truths good for ten thousand years. At present, our country being under the leadership of the Communist Party, all the intellectuals and working personnel of the Party, the government and the army must do some labor, including walking, swimming, mountain climbing and calisthenic exercises, as Pavlov said, not to mention going to the countryside to participate in such still more concrete labor as farming. In short, we must exert our efforts and oppose right-deviation. Mei Sheng directly attacked Chu Prince: "Now Your Highness have a sallow complexion and weak limbs, stiff muscles and drained veins, and languid and thin hands and feet. You have girls from Yueh waiting on before you, and concubines from Chi following behind you, playing around and feasting all the time, and indulging in pleasures in hidden chambers. This is to take poisons deliberately and to play with the claws of ferocious beasts. Your illness has a ! very deep and long origin; and you have constantly indulged in this. Even if you get the best physician and the best surgeon in the world, what can they do for you?" What Mei Sheng said is somewhat like our method of shouting aloud to comrades who have committed mistakes: "You are extremely seriously ill. You'll die if not cured." Then, the patient will be unable to sleep for several days, or several weeks, or several months. He is worried. In this way, there will be some hope. For illness such as right or "left" opportunism has its historical and social sources. "Your illness has a very deep and long origin; and you have constantly indulged in this." The method of cure is what we call "criticism". The visitor said: "Your Highness need no medicine or any treatment, but can be cured by some important saying and wonderful truth. Do you not like to hear?" This saying and truth constitute the main theme of the article. The first paragraph of the article is a prologue. The following seven paragraphs deal with affairs which were not proper but attractive and new. They show the negative side of the author's main theme. The writing is fine. The paragraph on "watching Great Waves at Kuang-ling" attains its climax of literary art. The ninth paragraph is its conclusion, coming back to the important saying and wonderful truth. Then, the Prince was elated, "began to perspire and suddenly recovered from his illness." The method of persuasion was used, not the method of pressure. The method of putting forward facts and explaining the truth was immediately effective. It is somewhat like our "leninet treatment." The first and last two paragraphs are the main theme, which must be read. If you have no interest, you may omit reading the other paragraphs. We should invite Engels, Kautsky, Plekhanov, Stalin, Li Ta-chao, Lu Hsun, Chu Chiu-pai and others to "explain the essential details of the world and truth! s of all things," to explain the necessity of leaping forward and the reasons for the commune. They should also talk about the extreme importance of putting politics in command. Let Marx "make his survey" and Lenin "make his calculation." There can never be any failure. I read this article in my boyhood, but have not touched it for more than 40 years. Recently, I suddenly had an inkling so I took it out for a look, and it seemed as if meeting an old friend. With my sincerity of a country-folk who offers basking as a tribute, I wish to offer this to my comrades. What Mei Sheng represented was the lower stratum of the landlord class, which had a line of striving upstream and exerting efforts. Of course, this was about the upper and lower strata of the feudalist class, and not about the two antagonistic classes of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the socialist society. Our line of striving upstream and exerting efforts represents the will of the revolutionary proletariat and the hundreds of millions of laboring peasants. Those whom Mei Sheng attacked were people of the despondent, pessimistic, degenerated and rightist upper ruling class. Now we also have this kind of people. Mei Sheng was a native of Huai-yin in Han Dynasty. He was a literary official in the service of Liu Pi, King of Wu, during the reign of Emperor Han Wen Ti. He wrote this article for the nobles of Kingdom Wu to read. Later, the literary style of "*Chi*" flourished, but none of the writings is good. *The Literary Selections of Chao Ming* includes Tsao Chih's "*Chi Chi*" ("Seven Addresses"), and Chang Hsieh's "*Chi Ming*" ("Seven Commands") which contained words to summon hermits for the ruling class, and with the tune in opposition to those of Chu, Sung, Chia and Mei. They are all quite insipid.

Mao Tse-tung

August 16, (1959).

Notes

[1.] This is a very interesting article, which Mao Tse-tung wrote and circulated among the participants of the Lushan Meeting on the last day of the conference. This is evidently connected with his letter to Chang wen-tien on August 2, 1959 (35) in which he quoted from Mei Sheng's "Chi Fa", See pp 225-226 of this volume.

Why Do Right Opportunists Now Launch An Offensive?

August 16, 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Comrades who committed errors of right opportunism did not air their opinions at the Changchow conference last November, nor at the Pei-tai-ho conference on high production targets, nor at the Wu-chang conference last November, nor at the Peking conference last January, nor at the Chengchow conference last February, nor at the Shanghai conference toward the end of last March and the beginning of last April, but they did air them at the Lu-shan conference.

Why didn't they bring up their opinions on those occasions, but did so now? Because what they advocate could not be brought up on those occasions. If they had correct ideas, better than ours, they should have brought them up at the Pei-tai-ho conference. They waited until the Central Committee had solved the problems, or most of the problems, and then brought up their opinions, believing that if they did not bring them up now, they could not very well do so later. They felt that if they did not bring them up now, the situation would have changed for the better a few months from now. Once the opportune time is gone, they will be put in a very unfavorable position. That's why they were anxious to make the move now.

Comment On Chang Wen-tien's Letter

August 18, 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Print more than 160 copies and distribute them to our comrades. Send copies by air or regular mail to those who have left. I warmly welcome this letter from Comrade Lo Fu (Chang Wen-Tien)

Mao Tse-tung

18 August 1959

Attachment:

Lo Fu's Farewell Message to Mao Tse-tung
on the Morning of 18 August

Comrade Tse-tung:

I have just undergone a major operation, which should be beneficial to my health. I sincerely thank you and other comrades of the Central Committee for your help. I must sever relations with my reactionary self of yesterday. Today, I read your comments on Mei Sheng's essay, "*Ch'i Fa*", on machine guns and other subjects, and was greatly moved.

I did not call on you because I did not receive any notification from you. I descend the hills today. I hope to see you in Peking and to receive more instructions from you.

Chang Wen-t'ien

Forenoon, 18 August

Comment On P’eng Te-huai’s Letter Of 9 September

September 9, 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

This document is to be printed and distributed to party organizations at all levels from the Central Committee down to branch headquarters and also to all comrades attending the Peking conference on military and foreign affairs.

I warmly welcome Comrade P’eng Te-huai’s letter, believing that his stand and viewpoint are correct and his attitude is sincere. If he thoroughly changes and makes no more major vacillations (minor vacillations are inevitable), he will “instantly become a Buddha,” or rather a Marxist. I recommend that all comrades of our party welcome the attitude shown by P’eng Te-huai in this letter. Let us severely criticize the mistakes he has made and at the same time welcome every improvement he has made. We should take this two-sided attitude to help an old comrade who has been with us for 31 years. We should take the same attitude toward all other comrades who have made mistakes but have indicated their intention to amend. We are confident that this policy will be able to influence people and that under certain circumstances people will change, except for certain individuals. I believe that Comrade P’eng Te-huai’s suggestion concerning the assignment of work to him in the coming period is basically right. It is a good idea to study for a few years. However, a man advanced in age is not fit for physical labor. It is all right for him to go to factories and rural areas to observe and investigate and to do research work for a period of time every year. The Central Committee will discuss this matter with Comrade P’eng Te-huai and make a proper decision.

Mao Tse-tung

9 September 1959

Appendix:

P’eng Te-huai’s Letter

Chairman:

The Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee and the expanded meeting of the Military Commission have thoroughly disclosed and criticized my mistakes and have eliminated the peril of dissension within the party. It gives me the last opportunity to correct my mistakes. I sincerely thank you and other comrades for your patience in educating and helping me. The party's systematic and historical criticism of my mistakes was absolutely necessary. Only by such criticism could I be made to truly realize the extreme danger of my mistakes and thus make it possible to eliminate the bad influence of my mistakes within and without the party. I now fully realize that my bourgeois world outlook and methodology were deep rooted, and my individualism was most serious. I now also realize what big price the party and the people have paid in cultivating me, and that if I had not been exposed and criticized in time, what danger there would be! In the past because of my bourgeois stand, I considered all your well-intentioned and sincere criticisms as blows at me. For this reason in each struggle against the erroneous line I did not receive any education nor any enlightenment. My serious errors were not corrected. I have been unworthy of your teaching and patience with me for the past 30 years. I am filled with indescribable shame and remorse. I have been ungrateful to the party, the people and you. Henceforth I must make a serious effort to thoroughly reflect upon my mistakes and study the theories of Marxism-Leninism in order to reform my own thought and make sure that I won't again do anything detrimental to the party and the people in my old age. I therefore petition the Central Committee to consider permitting me to study after the adjournment of the expanded meeting of the Military Commission or to go to a people's commune in Peking where I may learn and labor so that in the collective life of the working class I may get physical training and thought reform. Whether my proposal is prop! er or not I petition you to consider and favor me with a reply.

Respectfully yours,

P'eng Te-huai

Speech At The Enlarged Session Of The Military Affairs Committee And The External Affairs Conference

September 11, 1959

Comrades! This has been a very good meeting. I think that people who bear malice in their hearts will move towards their own opposites. Those who bear malice in their hearts towards the world class, the world parties, the Party's cause, the class cause and the people's cause will move towards their own opposites. That is to say, their aims cannot be achieved. For instance, when someone wants to reach a certain goal and this goal finally cannot be reached, he suffers a moral defeat and becomes isolated from the masses. There are, for example, a number of comrades who in my view are not Marxists, and who hitherto have never been Marxists. What are they? They are fellow-travellers of Marxism. If we want to argue this point further there is plenty of material. For example, a lot of material has been published recently — material from the period of the anti-Japanese war, from the period of the Long March, for example about activities tending to sow discord. The material from the period of the war against Japan contained such things as 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity'; 'the anti-Japanese front cannot be divided into left, centre and right'; 'it is incorrect to make a division into left, centre and right'; 'what you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others'. Where class relationships prevail, where there is the proletariat and bourgeoisie, the oppressors and the oppressed, to put forward such principles as this, to say things like 'when the prince commits a crime the people are implicated' such a viewpoint cannot be called Marxist: it absolutely cannot be said to be a Marxist viewpoint. It is an anti-Marxist viewpoint which deceives the people, a bourgeois viewpoint. Later on the anti-Party views of Kao, Jao, P'eng, Huang[1] — such as their theory of an 'army party' disrupted the proper relationships within the Party, ! holding that there was a domain here and a domain there. Their views and their behaviour were not those of Marxists. This time much material has come to light about their splitting activities many years before the Lushan Conference as well as about their Lushan Programme. In addition there is much material about the period of the Li Li-san Line. Most of this has been written down. What everybody has been bringing to light is what I have talked about just now. So if we want to argue the point of view which I have just talked about — that they have never been Marxists but only fellow-travellers and that they are merely bourgeois elements and opportunist elements who have infiltrated into our Party — if we are to prove this point and argue it to a conclusion there is plenty of material. I have no intention of doing so now because this would mean writing articles and could give a lot of comrades work to do. So I merely raise it. It is perfectly understandable that bourgeois revolutionaries should enter the Communist Party and that their bourgeois world outlook and standpoint should not have changed. They cannot avoid making mistakes. At crucial times it is impossible for such fellow-travellers not to make mistakes.

The Lushan Conference, this meeting, and the various levels of Party organization throughout the country have all discussed the resolutions of the Eighth Session of the Eighth Plenum and we have made use of this affair to educate the broad masses and enable them to raise their level and become more conscious. This has proved completely that the great majority of people, the great majority of the cadres of the whole Party, say ninety-five per cent, do not agree with them. It also proves that our Party is mature as demonstrated by the comrades' reaction to their attitude.

Bourgeois elements have infiltrated our Communist Party. Amidst our Party membership there are many bourgeois and petit-bourgeois elements. These should be analysed and divided into two groups. The great majority are good people. They can enter Communism because they are willing to accept Marxism. The minority are probably one, two, three, four or five per cent — this sort of figure — perhaps one per cent, perhaps two per cent, perhaps three per cent, perhaps four per cent, perhaps five per cent. During the past few weeks at provincial level conferences, quite a few high cadres have been exposed as right-opportunist elements and trouble-makers, whose one fear is that the world should be free of trouble. Whenever there is trouble they are happy. Their principle is: ‘If the world is at peace, the four quarters are tranquil and work goes well: they are uncomfortable. As soon as the wind blows and the grass waves, they are happy.’ For example if there is not enough pork, not enough vegetables, not enough soap, not enough women’s hair-grips, they seize the opportunity to say, ‘You have done things badly! They say it is your affair and not theirs. When organizations hold meetings and reach decisions they don’t utter a murmur. For instance at the Peitaiho Conference not a murmur, at the Chengchow Conference not a murmur, at the Wuch’ang Conference not a murmur. At the Shanghai Conference they did mumble something but we could not hear them. Then when things happened (when they thought things had happened) then, as you can see, it was all vegetables, pork, grain in a number of areas, soap and even umbrellas. For example there was a shortage of umbrellas in Chekiang and they called it a ‘maladjustment of proportions’, ‘petit-bourgeois fanaticism’, etc. It will be very difficult for this small minority of people to enter communism, to become real Marxists. When I say it will be difficult, I don’t mean that it w! ould be impossible. As Liu Po-ch’eng said: ‘It is necessary to be completely reborn.’ Those who were warlords were after all warlords, but what about those who were not warlords, such as Comrade XXX? How could he be counted as a warlord? He was a literary lord, an academic lord. If you are not completely reborn you cannot enter the door of communism.

Five times there have been mistakes of line: the [Li] Li-san Line, the first and second Wang Ming Lines,[2] the Kao-Jao Line and now this P’eng-Huang-Chang-Chou Line. Some people have made mistakes five times, some have not made mistakes five times. For example comrade XXX was not yet with us at the time of the Li-san Line. As for P’eng and Huang they were attacked at the time of the Li-san Line. This is no coincidence. Regarding the serious nature of the five erroneous lines, on the last two occasions — that is during the Kao-Jao and P’eng-Huang Lines plots were hatched to split the Party. This contravenes Party discipline. A Marxist party must have discipline. They do not know that Lenin said that the party of the proletariat must have discipline, iron discipline. As for these comrades, what kind of discipline do they have? Iron discipline, steel discipline or metal, wood, water, fire and earth discipline, or wooden discipline, or is it bean-curd discipline? Water discipline means no discipline at all. In that case how can we talk of iron discipline? To carry out splitting activities is to break discipline, the purpose and result necessarily being to destroy the proletarian dictatorship and to establish another kind of dictatorship.

The banner of unity is exceedingly important. The Marxist slogan for unity is ‘Proletarians of the world unite!’ But not them! For them it would seem the fewer the better! They want to have their own clique and to do their own thing, acting against the wishes of the broad masses. At the Lushan Conference I said that they do not mention the slogan of unity because if this slogan were raised they would be unable to carry out their activities. This slogan is not in their interests so they do not dare to mention it. The unity in question even includes people who have made mistakes, who will be helped to correct their mistakes in order to unite with them once again, let alone those who have not made mistakes. But these people wish to destroy them. Their policy is a destructive policy, not a policy of unity. The banner which they wave is the banner of destruction — the destruction of those who hold opinions differing from their own. They consider that such people are bad. Yet these so-called bad people are really the great majority, more than ninety-five per cent.

If you want unity you must have discipline, in order that our whole nation may build a strong country within the space of a few five-year plans. The present task is for the people of the whole country, together with the whole Party, to build a strong country within the space of a few five-year plans. For this iron discipline is needed, it cannot be done without it, so we must unite. I ask you, how can we achieve this aim otherwise? Is it possible to build a great socialist country within the space of a few five-year plans? In the past we had to make revolution, now we must carry out construction. Is this possible or not? Without discipline nothing is possible. Unity requires discipline. As for the many documents about P'eng Te-huai in the T'aihang Mountains,[3] will comrades please compare Sun Yat-sen's Manifesto of the first National Congress of the Kuomintang with the views expressed by P'eng Te-huai in the T'aihang Mountains at the time of the anti-Japanese war. One was a Kuomintang member, the other a Communist Party member. As regards time, one was written in 1924, the other in 1938, '39 and '40. The communist had retrogressed in comparison with the Kuomintang member. The name of the Kuomintang member was Sun Yat-sen and he wanted to progress. Sun Yatsen was influenced by the Communist Party. Why did he write that piece? Recently I found the text and had a look at it. Sun Yat-sen's Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang contained the idea of class-analysis. How could he have the iron discipline of the communists? How could he be in agreement with proletarian discipline? Without speaking the language of the communists, without a common standpoint and common views, discipline cannot be established. I say that P'eng Te-huai is not the equal of Sun Yat-sen. As for Chang Wen-t'ien,[4] he is not Sun Yat-sen'! s equal either. Sun Yat-sen was revolutionary at that time; these comrades were retrogressing. They wanted to destroy the organization which had already been built up. The slogans which they raised were beneficial to the enemy and detrimental to the class and to the people. There were more views of this kind, for example ...

It is absolutely impermissible to go behind the back of our fatherland to collude with a foreign country. Comrades have held meetings to criticize this affair because they are all in organizations of the Communist Party; they are all Marxists. We cannot allow one group to sabotage another. We cannot allow Chinese Communist Party members to sabotage the party organizations of foreign countries and to provoke one group of people to oppose another group. At the same time we cannot allow people to entertain foreign provocation behind the back of the Centre.

Now I am going to admonish some comrades who have made mistakes. Prepare yourselves to listen to some off-hand remarks. In the past I have admonished others, for example Comrade Lo Ping-hui, who had committed mistakes during that period.[5] He got very angry, and afterwards I exhorted him further, saying 'Don't get angry. You have committed mistakes, so let people talk — let them talk until they have no more to say. The reason they won't have any more to say is that you will have corrected your errors. If you adopt a friendly attitude towards people, and if you display a spirit of self-criticism towards your own errors, why would others go on talking? They won't talk any more.' You comrades who have committed errors at present, I urge you to prepare to listen to some offhand remarks. As soon as your errors are mentioned, you shouldn't be frightened out of your wits, as though people were going to talk about you for years on end. I can't go on all that long. It depends on how you go about correcting your errors. If you correct them quickly, people will stop talking about you within a few months. If you correct them more slowly, then they'll stop talking about you after a few years. The main thing is to correct your errors, whether it be fast or slowly. You must be sincere with people, and not dissemble. You must be honest, and speak honestly. I appeal to you comrades who have committed mistakes, you must place yourselves on the side of the overwhelming majority, you must cooperate with the overwhelming majority; you must not cooperate only with the minority who share your tastes. If only you can carry out these two points. First, you must be able to listen to remarks, you must prepare to listen, you must stiffen your scalps. When you spoke, I listened; I agreed that what you said was correct! I did indeed commit that error! This fellow Ah Q had some defects, which were manifested in! the fact that his head wasn't all that pretty, it was covered with ringworm. Because he couldn't bear to speak of it, others insisted on talking about it, and as soon as they did he would fly into a rage. For example, even when his ringworm scars got bright red he wouldn't speak of it, and if others mentioned brightness, he flew into a rage. The author describes a naive peasant who has not yet awakened to consciousness. Ah Q is a good man, he definitely didn't organize a faction, but he was a man who was not conscious, he couldn't bear to talk about shortcomings. He didn't take the initiative, and because he didn't take the initiative, others wanted to talk about it; as soon as they spoke of it, he flew into a rage, and as soon as he flew into a rage he got into a fight, and when he got into a fight he never won, and then he would say it was [like] a father being beaten by his son. People would say to him: 'Ah Q! If you don't want me to beat you, talk about a father beating his son, and then I won't beat you.' 'All right,' [he would say]. 'It's a father beating his son.' But as soon as the person who was beating him had gone away, he would say it was a son beating his father, and he would once again feel satisfied with himself.

Comrades who have committed mistakes must prepare to listen to some remarks, they must prepare to listen quite a lot. They must be honest and sincere with people, and not lie to people. Another point is that they must stand with the majority. All they have to do is to observe these few points, and I think they can definitely reform. Otherwise, they will not be able to reform. If they aren't prepared to listen to remarks, if they aren't sincere with people, if they tell lies, and if in addition they do not stand with the majority, then it will be very difficult. 'Who save sages and worthies can avoid making mistakes?' In reality, this proverb is not appropriate either, for even the sages made mistakes. 'The faults of the superior man are like the eclipses of the sun and moon. He has his faults, and all men see them; he changes again, and all men look up to him.'[6] We are not Confucius, but we see that even Confucius made mistakes, so we must conclude that all men without exception make some mistakes, more or fewer, bigger or smaller. It doesn't matter if we make mistakes, we must not let mistakes become a burden to us, we mustn't see them as something extraordinary, we should just go ahead and correct them. 'The faults of the superior man are like the eclipses of the sun and moon.' It's like when the celestial dog eats the sun and the moon[7] — he makes a mistake, and everyone sees it. When he corrects his mistake, 'all men look up' to him.

We must learn some things, we must study Marxism-Leninism. I am very much in favour of XXX's proposals regarding our tasks in the domain of study. All of us without exception must study. What shall we do if there isn't enough time? If there isn't enough time, we must squeeze in the time. The problem lies in cultivating the habit of study; once we have done this, we will be able to go on studying. I say these things first of all for the benefit of those comrades who have committed errors, but my words are also directed to all of us comrades, including myself. There are many things I haven't studied. I am a person with many shortcomings, I am by no means perfect. Very often, there are times when I don't like myself. I have not mastered all the various domains of Marxist learning. And, for example, I don't know foreign languages well either. I have only just begun recently to study economic work. But, comrades, I study with determination, and I will go on studying until I die; when I die, that will be the end of it! In sum, as long as I am alive I shall study every day. Let us all create an environment of study. I think I can learn a bit too; otherwise, when the time comes for me to see Marx, I shall be in an embarrassing fix. If he asks me a few questions and I am unable to answer, what will I do? He is certainly very interested in all aspects of the Chinese revolution. I'm not very good either in natural science or engineering.

There are so many things to study now, how shall we go about it? Just keep on in the same way, learning a bit, persevering and penetrating a bit deeper. I say that, if you are resolved to do it, you can certainly learn, whether you are young or old. I will give you an example. I really learned to swim well only in 1954; previously I had not mastered it. In 1954, there was an indoor swimming-pool at Tsinghua University. I went there every evening with my bag, changed my clothes, and for three months without interruption I studied the nature of the water. Water doesn't drown people! Water is afraid of people, people aren't afraid of water, of course, there are exceptions, but it should be possible to swim in all kinds of water. This is a major premise. For example, the Yangtse at Wuhan is water, so it's possible to swim in the Yangtse at Wuhan. So I refuted those comrades who opposed my swimming in the Yangtse. I said, 'You haven't studied formal logic.' If it's water, you can swim in it, except in certain conditions: for example, if the water is only an inch deep you can't swim in it; if it's frozen solid you can't swim in it; you can't swim in places where there are sharks, nor where there are whirlpools, as in the three gorges of the Yangtse. Apart from certain circumstances, it should be possible to swim wherever there is water, this is the major premise, the major premise derived from practice. Thus, for example, the Yangtse at Wuhan is water; hence, the conclusion follows that it is possible to swim in the Yangtse at Wuhan. The Milo and Pearl rivers are water, you can swim in them. You can swim in [the sea off] Peitaiho; it's water, isn't it? Wherever there's water, you should be able to swim. This is the major premise; apart from the fact that you can't swim in one inch of water, and you can't swim in water that's at a temperature of over 100 degrees, or in water that's so cold it's f! rozen, or where there are sharks or whirlpools — apart from these circumstances, all water can be swum in; this is a fact. Do you believe it? If you are resolute, if you only have the will, I am convinced that all things can be successfully accomplished. I exhort you comrades to study.

Recently, we have seen the great ceremonial hall at the T'ien An Men. It's really quite a thing. Would you all like to go and have a look? (All those present loudly shout: 'Yes!') Get Comrade Wan Li to tell you about it. This chap's name is Wan, isn't it? He should be able to run ten thousand *li* in a day.[8] It has been only ten months; so many people said they didn't believe it [could be done], the Soviet experts we called in said they didn't believe it. By June of this year, the Soviet experts said it might be possible, and when September came, they expressed great admiration, saying that China really had a Great Leap Forward. 12,000 people, brought from all over the country, [representing] the force, the technical capacity, the human capacity, of all the provinces in the country, taking no Sundays off at all, working three shifts a day, and not working on any piecework wage system; many of them began working eight hours a day, and ended up working twelve hours, without a stop. Did they want to be paid for the extra four hours? They didn't. There were also people who would not stop work as long as [a particular] project was not completed, who did not sleep for two days and nights; they remained at their place of work not for eight hours, or twelve hours, but for forty-eight hours. Did they need material incentives? Did they want a few extra *yüan*? Say one *yüan* for each hour? They didn't want it, these people did not want it. The material incentive remained just the material incentive, it was nothing but those 50 *yüan* of [monthly] wages, just that little bit but they were striving for a common cause. 12,000 staff and workers completed this big piece of work in the space of ten months; this is not merely 'to each according to his work', but it also involved Lenin's great contribution called the 'Communist Saturday #8217;, it included work which was not compensated for.

Comrades, go and have a look ... There is also the Miyün reservoir ... I think the combination of politics in command and material incentives, of political work and the necessary remuneration according to work, is a good thing. We are all resolute, and firm of will. That which people thought could not be successfully completed has in fact been completed; I'm talking about this big auditorium, which a great many people thought could not be completed. Very many people are hurling insults at our Great Leap Forward and people's communes, but they will nevertheless succeed, and indeed have already succeeded, or are going to continue achieving results. For example, we will progress rapidly in iron and steel, in industry, and also in agriculture. Studying is like this too; if only we are resolute, I think we can study well. We need not fear that there will be too much to do, and that the time will be too short, we can fit it in! Let us develop this habit. We must conquer this world, our objective is this world; as for how we should go about our work on the sun, we won't talk about that for the present. As for the moon, Mercury or Venus, and any of the other eight planets apart from the earth, we may investigate them in the future, and visit them if we can get up there. As for our work, our struggles, I think they're still going to be on earth. If we're going to build up a strong country, we must definitely be resolute like this, as we have had to be to build this big auditorium, so many dams, factories, etc. I think this is definitely the way.

Let the whole Party and the whole people unite! Proletarians of the world, unite! We can certainly attain our goal!

Notes

[References are given here as provided by the Maoist Documentation Project. They are significantly different in at least one existing edition of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. VIII. — *Transcriber, MIA*.]

[1.] Huang K'o-ch'eng (1902-), PLA Chief of Staff from October 1958 to September 1959, was regarded as P'eng Te-huai's principal accomplice and dismissed from office at the same time. The link between the 'P'eng-Huang' (or 'P'eng-Huang-Chang [Wen-t'ien] — Chou [Hsiao-chou]') group and that of Kao and Jao was further elaborated on at the time of the Cultural Revolution. See *Talk at the Central Work Conference*.

[2.] i.e.; the left line of the Russian Returned Students, mentioned above (*Speech at the Lushan Conference*, note 14), and Wang Ming's line of the Yenan period, which was denounced as right opportunist or capitulationist, not stressing sufficiently the independence of the Chinese Communist Party vis-à-vis the Kuomintang.

[3.] For Mao's criticism of P'eng's line in the 1940s, see his 'Letter Criticizing P'eng Te-huai's Talk on Democratic Education', 6 June 1943, in *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol. I, No. 4, Winter 1968-9, pp. 7-9.

[4.] Chang Wen-t'ien (c. 1898-), pseudonym Lo Fu, a member of the 'Returned Student Faction', succeeded Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku) as Secretary-General at the Tsunyi Conference of January 1935. He was Chinese Ambassador to Moscow from 1951 to 1955, and thereafter a vice-minister of Foreign Affairs until his fall in September 1959.

[5.] Lo Ping-hui (1897-1946) was an important military leader from the time he joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1929 until his death. It is not known how he exposed himself to Mao's criticism, but it may have been in connection with his participation in the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941, in which he commanded a detachment.

[6.] *Analects*, Book XIX, Ch. 21.

[7.] According to Chinese mythology, eclipses occur when the celestial dog eats the sun or the moon.

[8.] Wan Li was Minister of Urban Construction from May 1956 to February 1958, and thus responsible for projects such as this. Subsequently he became a secretary of the

Peking Party Committee and Vice-Mayor of Peking. His name (presumably a pseudonym) means literally ‘ten thousand *li*’; hence Mao’s pun.

Intra Party Correspondence

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Comrade X X X:

This item is very good. Please have it published after it has been studied within the New China News Agency. It looks like the hog raising enterprise will develop on a massive scale. Except for the minority nationalities that ban pork, the entire country should carry it out in accordance with the methods used by the Wang Chien Shou People’s Commune of Wu Chiao County, Hopei Province. In Wu Chiao County the accumulation of capital was easy, the policy was correct, the drive was strong and development was rapid. Very high enthusiasm is the key to it all. Procrastinating feeling that neither this nor that could be done and that there are layers upon layers of difficulties — these are the world outlook of a coward, a lazy bone. It has none of the driving ambition and strong determination of Marxism-Leninism. These people are a long way from the style of a true communist. I have advised them to think it over carefully and rectify their incorrect world outlook. I suggested that the communist party committees of the provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions, districts, counties and communes, as well as the party organizations of administrative areas, production teams and production squads seriously consider and study the hog-raising enterprises and the raising of cattle, sheep, donkeys, mules, horses, chickens, ducks, rabbits and other enterprises and plan and adopt concrete measures for running such enterprises. I also suggested the establishment of a committee or group on animal husbandry and domestic fowl raising enterprises. This is to consist of three or 5-9 persons. A comrade who is knowledgeable and has the enthusiasm for this kind of work and good at carrying out work is to be the responsible leader of this committee or group. That is to say a strong person should be assigned to provide the leadership. The production of animal fodder should be carried out on a large scale. There are various fine and coarse animal fodder, but it seems that corn is king of them all. This is t! he way it is being done in the U.S.; and the Soviet Union is also vigorously carrying this out now. In China, the Wu Chiao County of Hopeh province has also begun this and it makes a person very happy to see it. In hog raising, there certainly must be many areas, which are as good as Wu Chiao County. The entire country should unfold this operation on a massive scale. And this matter must be reviewed as equally important as that of raising food grains and elevating corn to staple food. Some suggest elevating hog raising to the leading position among the raising of six types of domestic animals and not in the order of “horse, cattle, sheep, chicken, dog and pig.” I raise both hands in approval. For hogs to be in the leading position is perfectly reasonable. The great pedologist and agriculturist, Mr Wei Lien [Verin ?] of the Soviet Union stressed that agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry are interdependent. Each is indispensable to the other and the three must be placed on the same level of importance. This is entirely correct. We hold that agriculture and forestry are the progenitors in the development of animal husbandry and animal husbandry is the progeny of agriculture and forestry enterprises. After that, animal husbandry becomes the progenitor of agriculture and forestry enterprises (mainly agriculture) and agriculture and forestry become the progenies. This is the principle underlying the balanced and equal positions the three occupy and their interdependence. In the U.S. the planting enterprise is carried out in conjunction with animal husbandry. Our country must also take this route because it is an experience proven to be truly effective. The source of fertilizers in our country is, first of all, from the raising of hogs and big stock animals. If we could achieve the objective ratio of one hog to a person and one hog to a *mou* of land, the major source of fertilizer will then be resolved. This is chemical fertilizer 10 times better than inorganic chemical fertilizer. A ! hog is a small scale, organic chemical fertilizer factory. Furthermore, a hog has meat. It has bristles, skin, and bones, and it has viscera (which can be used as raw materials for manufacturing medicine). So why don't we take advantage of it? Fertilizer is food for plants, plants are food for animals and animals, in turn, are food for humankind. Therefore, from this it can be seen that it is definitely within reason to raise hogs and other stock animals on a big scale. It seems that it will be possible to accomplish this glorious and great mission within one or two five-year plans. Providing agriculture with machinery is the decisive factor in the development, on a huge scale of the three-in-one combination of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry. The ministry of agricultural machine building [referring to the Eighth Ministry of Machine Building] has been established this year. From all appearances, the mechanization of agriculture is not too far off.

Mao Tse-tung

11 October 1959

Comments On Reply To Comrades A. V. Sanina And V. G. Vinshire

Circa 1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Fundamentally, this is incorrect. The basic standpoint is mistrust of the peasants, distrust of the peasants. Agricultural machines were tightly held, and as a result, the state has the peasants under rigid control. Likewise, the peasants rigidly controlled the state.

From an overall point of view we do not perceive the role played by man. In the two transitions, Stalin was unable to find the means and method. He spoke only on the relationship of production and did not talk about the superstructure. In China, the rectification movement, the sending down of cadres to lower levels to do manual labor, the two participations and one reform [workers' participation in management and cadres participation in production and the reform of irrational rules and regulations], the elimination of old rules and regulations, for example, are all political problems. They are problems belonging to the superstructure. He talked about economics but said nothing about politics.

It appears that the problems of the transition from the system of collective ownership to the system of ownership by all the people has not been resolved. Let us air it a little and study it.

"All for one, one for all." This phrase is incorrect. It was not translated properly. Systems are the principal manifestations of the concept of bourgeois rights. A portion of our educational system has been destroyed. The three bad styles of work and the five undesirable airs have also been eliminated. With the production of commodities and the law of value yet to be implemented, it is not possible to expect the elimination of all concepts of bourgeois rights.

With the exception of rights and rich peasants, everyone wants to join the communes. However, success cannot be attained in a single step. The commune must, on one hand, develop production for its own consumption and, on the other hand, develop the production of marketable commodities. Our nation is deficient in commodities. It is a country insufficient in marketable grains. Communes should further develop the production of commodities to improve livelihood. This is the problem our economists avoid discussing. If the production of commodities is not carried out wages cannot be paid. The concept of bourgeois rights must definitely be eliminated. Wages, [preferential] treatment and grades are all wrong. The 1956 wage reform was correct and the concessions made at that time were necessary. There were flaws when it was implemented. The number of grades grew too large. Similar to the relationship of the cat and the mouse, all these must be eliminated.

Attention should be given to the system of communes. A responsible organizational corps is still necessary for it plays an effective role in the deployment of labor forces. The communes' mess must be managed well and the element of nutrition should be given study. It is all right to struggle strenuously for several consecutive days and nights, but be mindful of rest. The adoption of the system of ten hours of work and two hours of study in the rural areas is not exactly the same as in the urban areas. Hot brick beds are still needed in northern Shensi province and the big cities should slow down the pace of setting up communes. Peking will not willingly fall behind.

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung

Examples Of Dialectics

(Abstracted Compilation)

1959

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

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1. To Understand Analysis is to Understand Dialectics

To understand analysis is to understand dialectics. Lenin said dialectics could be summed up as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. Such being the case, the core of dialectics can be grasped immediately. But it is necessary to explain and develop this doctrine. The unity of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitional, relative and mutually exclusive. On the other hand, the struggle of opposites is absolute, just as development and movement are absolute. Therefore, balance is temporary and can be disrupted and it is our responsibility to acquire balance more steadily with each passing day. As far as a person of ability is concerned, it does not depend upon whether or not he could have prevented the Hungarian and Polish incidents from arising, but upon whether or not after the incidents had arisen he had the ways and means to resolve the problems.

2. Dialectics is to Present Two Methods for Comparison in Everything

The integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the specific practice of China is materialism. Both are the unity of opposites, which is dialectics. Why insist on arguing? It is simply to avoid discussing dialectics. The Soviet Union has its own way of doing things. The Soviet experiences are one side and China's practice is also one side. This is the unity of opposites. The Soviet Union should pick the good ones from among its experiences and follow them, pick the bad ones and discard them. To isolate the Soviet experiences and not integrate them with the Chinese practice is not to pick the good experiences and follow them. If one publishes a newspaper and argues in the same way as *Pravda,* which is not analytical, he will be like a 3-year-old child, which needs support everywhere, inasmuch as it has lost its independent thinking. In everything, it is necessary to present two methods for comparison. This is dialectics. Otherwise, it will be metaphysics.

3. Dialectics is to Study the Main Trend and the Side Issues, the Essence and the Outward Appearance

Dialectics is to study the main trend and the side issues, the essence and the outward appearance. In contradictions there are principal contradictions and secondary contradictions. In the past, such errors as anti-venturesome advance arose because we did not grasp the principal contradictions and the essence and tried to solve the secondary contradictions as principal contradictions and because we took the side issues as the main trend and did not grasp the essence. The State Council and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held meetings and solved many isolated questions, but they did not grasp the essential questions. At this meeting we brought up many questions from the past for consultation and resolution.

4. To Examine a Question It is Necessary to Consider the Essence and the Main Trend

Marxism tells us that to examine a question, it is necessary to consider the essence, the main trend and the line. This is to see whether or not he builds socialism at home, opposes imperialism internationally and works for internationalism within the socialist camp. These three items constitute a line. As members of the Chinese Communist Party, we also are a party, which opposes imperialism and is for socialism and internationalism. So are the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. These aspects manifest the essence of the Marxist-Leninist line. We can make a comparison to see if they are steadfast or not. Take Tito. Is he steadfast? It seems to me that all three items are Lacking in the things that he does. He does not want any part of anti-imperialism. He is always talking about how good American imperialism is and how bad the Soviet Union is.

5. The Unity of Opposites and Mutual Transformation

All provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions should call meetings once every two months to review and sum up their work. They should call small meetings of several persons or a dozen or so persons. In the coordination and cooperation aspect they also can hold a meeting every two or three months. Many changes can occur in a movement and it is all the more necessary to exchange information. The meetings are for the purpose of harmonizing the rhythm of production. Work and production should have rhythm. One wave comes in as another crests. This is the unity of the opposites of high speed and low speed. Wave-like advances under the General Line of going all out, aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results is the unity of the opposites of high speed and low speed, as well as the unity of opposites of labor and rest. If there are high speed and labor only, it will be one-sided. If it is labor alone and no rest, then how can it be! In doing anything there has to be a period of high speed and a period of low speed. In fighting a war in the past, there had to be periods of consolidation, replenishment and rest between two campaigns. It would be impossible to fight one campaign after another. In fighting a war there also has to be a tempo. The Central Soviet Area was 100 percent Bolshevized. “It objected to consolidation and advocated resoluteness, fearlessness, firmness and daringness, pressing forward in victory and making a direct attack on Nan-Ch’ang[1].” How is it possible? Hard battle and rest and consolidation are the unity of opposites. This is the law. They also are mutually transformable. There isn't anything that is not mutually transformable. High speed turns into low speed and low speed turns into high speed. Labor turns into rest and rest turns into labor. Rest and consolidation and hard battle are also like this. Labor and rest and high speed and low speed also have identity. ! Rest and consolidation and hard battle also have identity. Getting out of bed and going to bed are also the unity of opposites. An old saying goes: "He who has slept for a long time thinks of getting up." Sleeping transforms into getting up and getting up transforms into sleeping. Opening a meeting transforms into closing a meeting! Once a meeting is opened, it immediately embraces the factor of closing the meeting. This is just what Wang Hsi-feng[2] meant when she said: "Though awnings were put up for a thousand *li*, there never was a permanent feast." Lin Tai-yu was deeply moved when the feast ended and the guests dispersed. This was metaphysics. It was from ignorance of the objective laws that when there is a gathering there must be separation. Wang Hsi-fang did not try to seek the favor of Lin, but she said: "Though awnings were put up for a thousand *li*, there never was a permanent feast." Nevertheless, that was dialectics. This is the truth. It cannot be decided by man. It should be decided by whether it is the truth or not. After a meeting is closed, problems pile up and transform into opening a meeting. After unity has been implemented for a while, there will be a difference in opinion and it will transform into a struggle. When differences arise, disunity begins anew. It is not possible to have unity every day or every year. When unity is talked about, then there must be disunity. Disunity is unconditional. Sometimes there still is no unity even when unity is talked about. Therefore, it is necessary to do something in order to attain unity. To talk all the time about unity, and never about struggle, is not Marxism. Unity must go through struggle before unity can be attained. This is the same within the ranks of the party, class or people. Unity transforms into struggle and again into unity. One cannot talk about unity alone without talking about struggles and contradictions. The Soviet Uni! on does not talk about contradictions between the leadership and the led. Without contradictions and struggles, there will be no world, no development; no life, no anything. To talk all the time about unity can be likened to a pool of stagnant water. It is dreary. We must break down the old basis of unity, go through struggle and attain unity on a new basis. Which is better, a pool of stagnant water or the endless flow of the streaming waters of the Yangtze River? The party is this way and so are the people and the class. Unity-struggle-unity. Then there will be work to do. Production transforms into consumption and consumption transforms into production. Production is for the sake of consumption. Producers are not merely for the sake of other workers, but they themselves are also consumers. Marx said that production implies consumption. Production and consumption and construction and destruction are the unity of opposites and mutually transformable. The production of the whole country is for the sake of consumption and the renovation of equipment and installations over a few decades. Seeding turns into harvesting and harvesting turns into seeding. Seeding is to use up seeds. After seeds are sown, they will grow into seedlings. If no seeds are sown, there will be no seedlings. After harvesting, new seeds are sown. Life and death are also mutually transformable. Life transforms into death and lifeless things transform into living things. I maintain that henceforth celebrations be held for people who passed away at over 50 years of age. This is because people inevitably will die. It is a natural law. Grains are annual plants. Every year they live once and die once. Moreover, the more they die, the more they grow. If pigs are not slaughtered, they will become fewer and fewer. Who is going to feed them? The Soviet Union's "Concise Dictionary of Philosophy" takes upon itself to differ with me. It says that the transformation of life and death is metaphysical and that the transformation of wa! r and peace is erroneous. Who is right after all? Please ask if living things are not transformed from lifeless-things, whence do they come? The earth is composed of inorganic matters and organic matters. All living organisms are converted from nitrogen, hydrogen and 10 other elements. Living things invariably are transformed from lifeless things. Sons transform into fathers and fathers transform into sons. Females transform into males and males transform into females. Direct transformation is not possible. But after marriage when sons and daughters are begotten, is that not transformation? The mutual transformation of the oppressed and the oppressor refers to the relationship between landlords and capitalists on the one side and workers and peasants on the other. Of course, by oppressor we mean the ruling class, not the people. We are talking about class dictatorship and not about individual oppressors. War transforms into peace, and peace transforms into war. Peace is the opposite of war. When there is no war, it is peace. When hostilities break out at the 38th Parallel, it is war. Once war stops, it is peace again. Military affairs are a special kind of politics. War is an extension of politics. Politics is also a kind of war. At any rate, quantity transforms into quality and quality transforms into quantity. Dogmatism is intense in Europe. Since the Soviet Union has some shortcomings, transformation is absolutely necessary. Likewise, if we do not make good, we also will transform. If at that time our industry becomes the first in the world, we will possibly be cocky and become rigid in our thinking. Infinite transforms into finite, and finite transforms into infinite. Ancient dialectics transforms into medieval metaphysics and medieval metaphysics transforms into modern dialectics. The universe is transformable. So is society. Capitalism transforms into socialism and then communism. Communism also will transform itself. It also has a beginning and an end. To be sure, it will be divided into stages. P! erhaps it will be given another name. It will not be fixed. If there is quantitative change only and no qualitative change, it will act contrarily to dialectics. There is nothing in this world that does not go through emergence, development and extinction. Ape changed into man and man emerged. The ultimate outcome of mankind as a whole is extinction. Man will possibly change into another kind of thing. By then the earth will no longer exist. The sun will have cooled. Even now the heat of the sun has cooled considerably, as compared with ancient times. In the glacial period, changes occurred every 12 million years. When the glaciers came, living things died in great numbers. Under the South Pole there are deposits of coal. Thus it can be seen that it was very hot there in ancient times. In Yen-ch'ang County, fossils were dug out bearing traces of bamboo of the Sung Dynasty. In ancient times, bamboo was grown in Yen-ch'ang. Now it won't grow there.

Things invariably have a beginning and an end. There are only two infinites: time and space. Infinites are composed of finites. All kinds of things develop and change gradually.

To talk about all this is to make us think and enliven our thought. It is very dangerous to immobilize one's brains. Leading cadres and cadres at central, provincial, regional and county levels are all very important. All systems included; there are several hundred thousand cadres. They have to think more. They should not always read classical works, but rather set their brains into motion so as to enliven their thinking.

6. Correct Line is Formed in the Course of Struggle with Incorrect Line

Mistakes will still be made. It is impossible not to make mistakes. To make mistakes is an indispensable prerequisite to the formation of a correct line. A correct line is spoken of in regard to an incorrect line. The two of them of are the unity of opposites. A correct line is formed in the course of struggle with an incorrect line. To say that all mistakes are avoidable and that only accuracy is free of mistakes is a viewpoint which violates Marxism-Leninism. The question is making fewer mistakes or making smaller mistakes. Accuracy and inaccuracy are the unity of opposites. The two-point theory is correct, while the single-point theory is incorrect. Historically, there is no such fact as only accuracy being free of mistakes. It is merely to deny the unity of opposites. This viewpoint is metaphysical. If there were only men and no women, or denied [the existence of] women, what would we do? It is possible to strive for making the least mistakes. Making fewer mistakes can be, and should be, done. Both Marx and Lenin were able to do it.

7. Things will Invariably Head Toward Their Opposites

Things will invariably head toward their opposites. The dialectics of Greece, the metaphysics of the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance. It was a negation of negation. China was also like this. The contention of one hundred schools of thought in the period of Warring States was dialectics and the classical learning of the feudal times was metaphysics. Now we have returned to talking about dialectics, is it not? Comrade Fan Wen-Lan, you are well acquainted with this. The way I look at it is that after 15 years, our tail will definitely be wagging in the air. Of course, because things will head toward their opposites, I cannot but exert my utmost efforts. Even if big-nation chauvinism emerges in the future, it will also head toward its opposite. If there is one correct thing that will substitute for big-nation chauvinism, what is there to fear? It is not possible for all socialist countries to become chauvinistic. Lenin’s dialectics Stalin’s metaphysics and present-day dialectics. All this is also a negation of negation.

8. There is Tension and There are Relaxation and Consolidation

There is tension and there are relaxation and consolidation. It won’t do to have continual tension. There ought to be tension and relaxation. Overworking is no good. Overstraining won’t do. Red and expert schools are being organized extensively in Hopeh and Honan provinces. This is very good. But everything is too intense. People doze off in class.

Teacher are also tired, but they don't dare to doze off. We must be both fast and slow. If there were tension without relaxation, even [Emperors] Wen and Wu [of Chou Dynasty] would not have been able to continue for long. If there were relaxation without tension, Wen and Wu also would not have been able to continue for long! Both Emperor Wen and Emperor Wu were saints! But still, they would not have been able to do it. There is tension and there is relaxation. There is unity and there is struggle. It won't do to have unity only and no struggle. We must struggle against the doubting Thomases and those who advocate settling accounts after the fall, but our purpose in so doing is for unity. What Ah Q feels most deeply about is that he has been refused permission to make revolution. It is not good to criticize him persistently and not help him to reform. Firstly, struggle; secondly, assist. We must be good-hearted. It is bad not to have a good heart or to beget an evil desire, which is nothing more than down with you and let me take over. Is it better to have one man too many or one man too few? To have a few more people is better. We must bring all positive factors into play.

9. Transformation of Opposites

China has an advantage. It is poor and blank. This also has a dual character. Being poor means revolution is necessary. It is not good to have only limited knowledge. But it is comparable to a sheet of white paper. One side has been written on. There is not much more writing to be done. The other side has not been written on. It is blank. There is much writing to be done. For after a few decades we will be able to catch up with foreign countries.

10. The Question of Death and Life Struggle

The question of death and life struggle. There has been 10,000 years of death and life struggle. Should death be held in check or not? It won't do to have no deaths. It won't do either to have nothing but deaths. Like the steel quota, the dead guarantee the key point, while the living stay beyond the key point and do not obstruct it. The system of free public care includes both the dead and the living and takes care of everybody. The two aspects of death and life are centralization and decentralization, which unite and have both. Precisely, the system of free public care is the unity of the contradictions between death and life. That is the principle of assuming arbitrary power and decentralizing some of it.

11. Truths and Fallacies are Contradictory; Accuracies Result from Struggles with Inaccuracies

Truth and fallacies are contradictory. Accuracies result from struggles with inaccuracies. Beauty and ugliness are contradictory. If there are no good people, there will be no bad people. If there are no bad people, there will be no good people. If there are no very good people, there will be no very bad people. Fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds. We are not afraid of poisonous weeds. When they have overgrown, everybody will come and dig them out. Truths are developed from struggle with fallacies. In the course of these struggles good people increase in number and bad people decrease. What are poisonous weeds? I once put the question to Bulganin. Over 100 years ago, tomatoes were poisonous weeds in Europe. I have also said that many historical personalities like Jesus Christ, Galileo, Copernicus, Martin Luther and Sun Yat-sen and Communist Parties have been considered by people as poisonous weeds. This class may take something as poisonous weeds, while that class may be convinced that they are fragrant flowers. John Foster Dulles, for example, was a fragrant flower of the American bourgeoisie, but people of the whole world regarded him as a poisonous weed. What is Chiang kai-shek? He was fragrant for a time. During the Great Revolution he was fragrant. During the War of Resistance people shouted, Long live Chiang kai-shek. Generalissimo Chiang is an old friend of mine. All this is the unity of opposites, the struggle of opposites. Only when there is comparison can a distinction be made and development materialize. When there is no comparison, how is it possible to develop and create? Marxism-Leninism has been developed in the course of struggle with the bourgeoisie.

12. Establish Opposites

There are two kinds of established opposites. One kind has originally existed in society. For example, the rightists. Whether we let them loose or not is a question of policy. When we decided to organize a frank airing of views, we let them out to serve as opposites and mobilized the laboring people to debate with them, oppose them and knock them down. There were many rightists among primary school teachers. Of the 300,000 rightists, primary school teachers consisted almost one-half. Opposites did exist in the persons of the 300,000 rightists. We have let them loose so as to educate the people and enable the people to analyze them. The other kind of established opposite does not exist in nature, but it possesses material conditions. For example, after building a dam, we can employ artificial methods to establish opposites so that the level of the water can be raised or lowered to generate power or to sail a boat. Putting a factory into operation is also an artificially established opposite. The An-shan Steel Mill was constructed by the Japanese. The Ch’ang-ch’un Motor Vehicle Plant was new. It is an opposite established by the people. What nature does not have can be built artificially, but there must be a material basis. Satellites are launched into space artificially. They can be sent into space once the laws governing them are found. We are objectivists and are not afraid of secession, because secession is a natural phenomenon. It seems to me that the secession of Vyacheslav M. Molotov was to the advantage of the Soviet Union, the secessionist endeavors of Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Lo Chang-lung, Chang Kuo-t’ao and Kao Kang were to our advantage and the Wang Ming line once and again and the “left” deviationist line thrice during the civil war period have educated our Party. These many opposites all have their advantages. Of course, it is not necessary to create Molotov, Kao Kang or Ch'en Tu-hsiu artificially. As long as there is that certain climate he will emerge. Th! ere is nothing to fear, though. We must overcome them. So-called optimism is our principal aspect. We also have our worries. When the rightists emerged, could anybody not have worried? I was a bit worried. It was necessary for me to talk about the art of leadership so as to turn a bad thing into a good thing. If earlier one had the foresight he could have prevented it from occurring or after it had occurred, turned it into a good thing. We will not be afraid if among the 12 million Party members there are 20,000 or 30,000 who possess awareness and foresight. What is there to be afraid of, anyway! It won't do to be afraid! We will strive for not having to fight a world war. But if we have to fight, we will not be afraid. The general policy is: "To take warning from the past in order to be more careful for the future; to treat the illness in order to save the patient." We must allow people who have made mistakes in line to correct those mistakes. Today we are very much united. Everything is calm. All is well in the center and locally. We have now resolved the anti-venturesome advance problem and attained new unity on a new basis.

13. To Establish Opposites is Very Important

The initiative of the masses exists objectively. It is very important to establish opposites. If we allow the rightists to turn loose or speak up, it is according to plan. We do this in order to establish opposites. After the Rectification Campaign, some comrades overlooked rectification and remolding and laid stress on big-character wall newspaper and the 2-anti movement [against waste and conservatism] for the purpose of establishing opposites. So-called opposites can only be established if they are things which exist objectively. Things, which do not exist objectively, cannot be established as opposites.

14. Listen to the Opinions of Opposites

To respect materialist dialectics is to encourage debate. We must listen to the opinions of opposites, raise questions and expose the opposites.

15. Study Questions of Dialectics

I don't know which comrade brought up at the Chengchow Conference the question of "Big Collective and Small Freedom." Anyway, it is very good. If it were "Big Freedom and Small Collective," John Foster Dulles, Huang Yen-p'ei and Jung I-jen would have welcomed it. We have to grasp production and livelihood as well. This is the unity of opposites. To walk on two legs is also the unity of opposites. All this belongs to the domain of dialectics. Karl Marx's theory concerning materialist dialectics made great progress in our country in 1958. For example, under the prerequisite of giving priority to the development of heavy industry, we have carried out the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture, of heavy industry and light industry, of national industries and local industries, of big, medium and small-sized enterprises, of small indigenous groups and large modern groups and of indigenous and modern methods. Then there is the system of administration — central unified leadership and local level-to-level administration. Authority must be distributed among all places from the central government down through provinces, regions, counties, and communes to production teams. It is not beneficial to give them no authority at all. These several conceptions have been affirmed in our Party and this is very good. Small indigenous groups and large modern groups are also being promoted simultaneously. There still are medium modern groups. Are T'ang-shan and Lien-yun-kang, for example, not medium-sized? Are there small modern groups? Yes, there are. Besides there are modern-indigenous integrated groups. In a word, this is very complicated. Some countries in the socialist camp will consider these things as illegitimate and not permissible. We permit them. In a country such as ours, which is poor in the extreme, it is very well to organize some small indigenous groups! It will be too monotonous to concentrate on organizing large modern groups. In! agriculture, it is also very complicated. There are high yields and low yields. High and low yields exist simultaneously. The policy of "three thirds system" now being implemented extensively in cultivation was a creation of the masses. It was grasped by the Pei-tai-ho Conference, which set forth one-third of the land for growing food stuffs, one-third of the land for lying idle, and one third of the land for growing trees. It is possible that this will be the trend of agricultural development. The Pei-tai-ho Conference also came out with an "Eight-Point Charter for Agriculture" — irrigation, fertilizer, soil improvement, seeds, close planting, crop protection, reform of farm tools and field management. Irrigation means water. Man can't do without water. Likewise plants can't do without water.

With regard to social systems, there are in the socialist stage two kinds of ownership which exist side by side and are the unity of opposites. Collective ownership contains the factors of communist ownership by all the people. Yu-chin recently said that China is correct in presenting the viewpoint that collective ownership contains the communist factors and that the Soviet Union's collective ownership and ownership by all the people also contain the communist factors. Capitalist society does not permit organizing the mode of production of the socialist collective, but the communist factors should be allowed to grow in socialist enterprises under the leadership of communist parties. Stalin was wrong in rendering absolute the three kinds of ownership, namely collective ownership, socialist ownership by all the people and communist ownership by all the people and describing them as distinctly separate. Will the above constitute the development of dialectics or not?

The Chengchow Conference put forth the slogans, "Big Collective and Small Freedom." and "Grasp Production and Grasp Livelihood." This is an extension of dialectics. The Wu-ch'ang conference brought up the question of combining enthusiasm with scientific analysis. In mapping out a plan, which can be blowing hot and cold, one needs to have not only great determination and zeal, but also considerable scientific analysis. Of course, it will not be possible for this resolution to resolve all our problems. It seems that it is better to delay proclamation of this resolution for a while. We will issue only a communiqué for now. Next year, in March, we will make public the resolution at the National People's Congress. In this way it will be consistent with our determination and zeal on the whole. It will avoid certain impractical notions conceived as a result of the Great Leap Forward in 1958. It will be more authoritative and more analytical scientifically. For a time I was in favor of producing 30 million tons of steel next year. Upon arrival in Wu-ch'ang, I thought it was not such a wonderful idea after all. Until then I was worried only about the question of whether there was a need and had not considered the question of whether it was possible. Later, I took the question of possibility into account. This year the output of 10.7 million tons has already been a great strain on us. The production of 30 million tons next year, 60 million tons in the year after that, and 120 million tons in 1962 is a deceptive possibility and not a realistic possibility. Now we should cut down the fixed production quota a bit and not set it so high. We should make some allowance and let the practice of the masses exceed our plan. This is also a question in dialectics. The practice of the masses also includes the efforts of us leading cadres. If we set the quota a little lower and practice raises it, it is not opportunism. After liberation, steel production doubled again and agai! n. In this world, from of old this had never happened. How can it be called opportunism? Here there is an international link. The socialist camp led by the Soviet Union is linked up with the international solidarity of the working class of the whole world. On this question we must not try to be the first in line. Nowadays, some counties are struggling somewhat for precedence. In fact, if we must be the first to enter into communism, it should be the An-shan Steel Mill, Fu-shan, Liaoning Province, Shanghai or Tientsin. It seems shameful for China to be the first to enter into communism. Besides, whether there is a possibility or not is also a question. The scientists of the Soviet Union number 1.5 million, highly qualified intellectuals several million and engineers half a million, all more than the United States. The Soviet Union already has 55 million tons of steel, while we still have only this little tiny bit. Their accumulation is ever growing, while we have just begun to build up. That is why possibility is also a question. Khrushchev has served notice that the Soviet Union prepares to enter into communism 15 years from now and that the two kinds of ownership will be merged into one gradually. This is a very good thing. Even if it is possible for us to be the first to enter into communism, we should not do so. The October Revolution was Lenin's undertaking. Are we not all learning from Lenin? What is the sense of hurrying? It is nothing but an attempt to go to Karl Marx and ask for a reward. If that is the case, we will probably commit a mistake on an international question. This also is a problem. We should talk about mutual benefit.. Dialectics has been developed substantially and it immediately involves this problem.

16. It is Necessary to Adopt Dialectical Methods to Treat Our Comrades

In treating our comrades, regardless of who they are, so long as they are not hostile or subversive elements, we should adopt an attitude of unity and dialectical methods instead of metaphysical methods. What is meant by dialectical methods? It means that we must analyze everything and that we must acknowledge that man invariably will make mistakes and not negate his everything because he has made mistakes. Lenin once said that there is not even one person in the whole world who has not made a mistake. I have committed many mistakes. These mistakes have been useful to me and have educated me. Any one person needs the support of others. “A good fellow still needs three helpers, a bamboo fence still needs three posts.” This is a Chinese proverb. Another Chinese proverb has this to say: “Although the water lily is well and good, it still needs green leaves to lend support.” You, Khrushchev, although your water lily is well and good, it still needs green leaves to lend support. I, X X X, my water lily isn’t well and good, it needs green leaves to give support all the more. We in China have yet another proverb, which goes something like this: “Three cobblers with their wits combined can equal Chu-ko Liang, the master mind[3].” We are dealing with collective leadership. A lone Chu-ko Liang just isn’t complete and will always have shortcomings. To me it seems an ill-advised attitude to call oneself omniscient and almighty like God. Therefore, what attitude should we adopt toward comrades who have committed mistakes? We should be analytical and adopt dialectical methods and not metaphysical methods. Our Party had previously bogged down in metaphysics — dogmatism — by completely destroying those people whom it did not like. As time passed, we criticized dogmatism and learned dialectics bit by bit. The basic viewpoint of dialectics is the unity of opposites. After acknowledgi! ng this viewpoint, what are we to do with a comrade who has made mistakes? Firstly, we will conduct a struggle to criticize thoroughly and eradicate completely his erroneous ideology. Secondly, we will help him. One, to struggle; two, to help. Starting from this, we will help him to correct his mistakes so that he will have a way out.

It will be different to treat another type of people. People like Tito and China’s own Ch’en Tu-hsiu. Toward them there is no way to adopt a helpful attitude, because they are beyond remedy. People like Hitler, Chiang Kai-shek and the Czars are also incorrigible and there is nothing to do but knock them down. This is because, as far as we are concerned, they are not of a dual nature, but of a sole nature. In the final analysis, it is also like this with regard to the imperialist and capitalist systems. In the end, they will certainly be displaced by the socialist system. The same with ideology. We will substitute materialism for idealism and atheism for theism. This is strategically speaking. Tactically, it will be different. It will be necessary to make compromises. In Korea, on the 38th Parallel, did we not make compromises with the Americans? In Vietnam, did [we] not make compromises with the French? In every tactical stage, we must be skilled in conducting struggles and at the same time in making compromises. Now let us go back to the relationship between comrades. I suggest that where there is estrangement between comrades, they should start negotiations. Some people appear to believe that once they enter into communism they will all become saints, with no disagreement and no shortcomings. When one cannot make analysis, that is to say when he is like an iron plate adjusted to uniformity, there is no need for negotiations. It looks as if once we enter into communism, it won’t do unless we are 100 percent Marxists. In reality, there are various shades of Marxists. There are 100 percent Marxists, 90 percent Marxists, 70 percent Marxists, 60 percent Marxists, 50 percent Marxists. Some people are only 10 percent or 20 percent Marxists. Can we or can we not hold negotiations within a small circle, say, between two or among several persons? Can we or can we not negotiate, starting from unity and in the spirit of helpfulness? These of course are not negotiations with the imperialists, b! ut negotiations within the ranks of communist people. This time, are we and 12 other countries conducting negotiations or not? Internationally, are 60 plus parties conducting negotiations or not? They are in fact conducting negotiations. This is to say that under the principle of not prejudicing Marxism-Leninism, we should accept some of the acceptable opinions of others and discard some of the discardable opinions of our own. In this way we will have two hands. With one hand we will struggle against at a comrade who has made mistakes and with the other hand we will talk about unity with him. Struggle is for the purpose of standing resolutely for the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. This is one hand. The other hand is to talk about unity. Unity is for the purpose of giving him a way out and making compromises with him. This is called flexibility. The integration of the matter of principle and flexibility is a tenet of Marxism-Leninism. This is the unity of opposites.

No matter what world, particularly a class society, of course, it is always full of contradictions. Some people say that it is possible to "find" contradictions in a socialist society. To me it seems this interpretation is incorrect. One cannot say, "find" contradictions, when the world is full of them. Nowhere do contradictions exist. No person cannot be analyzed. If a person is regarded as unanalyzable, then it is metaphysics. You look at the inside of an atomic bomb. It too is full of contradictions and unities of contradictions. There is the unity of the two opposites of atomic nucleus and electrons. Inside the nucleus there are the opposites of neutrons and protons. Inside a proton there are protons and anti-protons and inside a neutron there are neutrons and anti-neutrons. In a nutshell, the unities of opposites are endless. Concerning the viewpoint of the unity of opposites and dialectics, we have to carry on extensive propaganda. Our dialectics should leave the circle of philosophers and go into the midst of the broad masses. I suggest that we discuss this problem in political bureau meetings and central committee plenary sessions of the communist party of every country and at different levels of local party committees. As a matter of fact, our branch secretary understands dialectics. When he prepares to make his report to the branch congress, he often writes down two points on his small notebook. The first is merits, the second defects, which is one dividing into two. This is a universal phenomenon. This precisely is dialectics.

17. The Relationship Between Right and Wrong

Within the party, or outside the Party, we must distinguish between right and wrong. An important question is how to treat people who have made mistakes. The correct attitude is to allow everybody to make revolution. When he has made a mistake, it is necessary to adopt the general policy of "taking warning from the past in order to be more careful for the future and treating the illness in order to save the patient," and help him to correct his mistake. "*The True Story of Ah Q*" is a fine piece of writing. I would advise those people who have read it to reread it and those who have not read it to read it carefully. In this story, Lu Hsun wrote about a backward and unconscious peasant who feared most the criticism of others and would quarrel with anyone who criticized him. On his scalp there were ringworm scars in some places. Ah Q himself did not want to talk about these scars and was afraid that others would talk about them. The more he acted like this, the more people would talk. In the end, Ah Q would be put on the defensive. However, Lu Hsun specially wrote a chapter under the heading, “Barred from the Revolution,” in which Magistrate Chao was said to have prevented Ah Q from making revolution. Actually, what Ah Q called a revolution was merely to loot a few things for himself. But Magristrate Chao would not even let him make revolution in this way. As to comrades such as Huang I-feng and Chang Hsiu-yun who have committed mistakes, some people say that we will have to see whether they reform or not. I say that it won’t do just to see. We still have to help them to amend. This is to say, firstly, to see and secondly, to help. The ideology of people who have not been “helped” sufficiently cannot be correct. If people make mistakes and you take pleasure in their calamity, then it is sectarianism. This is where Kao Kang had his fall, head over heels. He fabricated things such as a four-man clique and two market stalls. Assuming that these w! ere true, what he should have done was firstly, to see, and secondly, to help. But he was not ready to do that. In the end, he fell down so hard he could not get up again. As far as the revolution is concerned, it is always better to have a few more people. Aside from a handful who persevere in mistakes or have a share in them whenever mistakes are made, the majority of people who have committed errors can be rectified. They are exactly like people who obtained immunity after being afflicted with, say, typhoid fever. As long as they are good at drawing lessons from mistakes in the future. On the contrary, people who have never made mistakes are especially prone to them, because they are too cocky. We must take note that if one excessively rectifies people who have committed mistakes, it often ends up having himself rectified. If we sincerely treat people who have made mistakes, we can gain popular support and solidarity with the people. Whether a hostile attitude or a helpful attitude is adopted m the treatment of comrades who have made mistakes will be a criterion by which to distinguish the good-hearted form the black-hearted people; The general policy of treating the illness in order to save the patient is the general policy uniting the whole Party. We must hold fast to this general policy.

18. The Question of Ten Fingers

It is permissible to arouse emotions, but not to give vent to them. Sometimes, due to inexperience, we cause the masses to suffer setbacks For a time, mistakes occurred on a number of questions. Examples: There were people who said too many cooperatives had been organized and wanted to chop off 10,000 of them. The two-wheeled double-share plow was given a bad name in the South. Now take the lewd poetry of a lecherous man for instance. Sung Yu attacked one point and came up short of the rest. The method is not good. But it was with this method that the rightists attacked us. A person has 10 fingers. If a boil appears on one of them, he will have to ask a doctor to treat it. He cannot chop it off. The other nine fingers are still good. Frequently, when people see that one finger is injured, they will say all ten fingers are defective. The rightists have attacked us in this way. However, good people sometimes also look at it the same way and there are such people in the Communist Party. Be they members of the Communist Party or democratic parties or business circles, or be they highly qualified intellectuals, the majority of people can make progress. Even the rightists, the majority of them can become good again. If you don't believe in the majority, then you have lost confidence. And it is not good to lose confidence in the cause of the people. Today, 70 percent to 80 percent of the university students come from families of the exploiting class. But rightists constitute only 2 percent to 3 percent of these students. Aside from individual cases, these students will not be expelled from school. By employing such a policy, we can reform them.

19. The Question of Nine Fingers and One Finger

Our comrades often are confused by their 10 fingers. Whenever something goes wrong, they will forget the 10 fingers. When shortcomings appear within the ranks of the labouring people, it is a question of nine fingers and one finger. When our comrades make mistakes, it is also like this. Here I am not talking about Ku Ta-ts'un, Li Shih-nung, P'an X X, Ch'n Tsai-li and Li Feng. Comrade Wu P'u-chih made a very fine speech. Why did the Anhwei provincial delegation not talk about Li Shih-nung in its speech? The Chekiang provincial delegation did talk about Sha Wen-han, but not enough. They should offer their valuable opinions and let everybody share their experience and knowledge. Why did they not talk about these people? These people are not a question of one finger and nine fingers. Sha Wen-han is a man with 10 black fingers. So is Ch'en Tsai-li. Li Shih-nung has nine black fingers only one of his finger's is clean. Comrades who have made mistakes and to whom I have referred as people with nine and one fingers, wavered in stormy times, but are now seeing clearly. I do not mean these people. We should unite with activists at various lavels and protect them and persist in protecting them. Although they have made mistakes, they are activists. They were afraid of blaming themselves during the full and frank airing of views. If we insist on shielding them, then every thing will be all right. Their mistakes are only one-tenth. In the Rectification Campaign we should persist in protecting these cadres. The question of protecting the cadres is mentioned in the documents of the Tsing-tao conference. As in the past, contradictions within the ranks of the laboring people are by and large a relationship between nine fingers and one finger, individual cases excepted. Of the bourgeois middle-of-the roaders, those in dead center are bourgeois things with five and five fingers, those left of center are bourgeois things with six to seven good fingers and those right of center are bourg! eois things with six to seven black fingers. They have opposed the ideology of the people for so long that they cannot wash themselves clean all at once and need cleansing over and over again. Bourgeois ideology will still seek restoration. There will be no big restoration, but small restoration is quite likely. Lo X X said that counter-revolutionary restoration would still come and mentioned the mass line. He spoke well. Indeed, the bourgeoisie are also capable of stirring up a storm. Some of our comrades will still waver in the face of a grade 12 typhoon. The moment unrest sets in, restoration will follow. But the whole party has gone through another year of tempering with the experience of last year and should be able to sit tight in its fishing boat in spite of the wind and the waves. During the Polish and Hungarian incidents we did not have any problem. And although last year's storm was so big, our boat did not capsize. Some people say that our editorial entitled “Why Is This?” was written a bit too soon. It wasn’t too soon. If we had waited longer, some of the leftists would have rotted. As a matter of fact, after December last year, we still exposed among the primary school teachers over 100,000 rightists, who constituted one-half of the 300,000 rightists all over the country. They were then making frenzied attacks on us. Didn’t somebody say that after Chang and Lo delimited the rightists clearly, they would not attack us any more? They attacked just the same. As long as the temperature reaches a certain degree, these things will be let out in the same old manner. Don’t forget nine fingers and one finger. We precisely forgot this question during the anti-venturesome advance movement of 1956. We must not look at a problem in its essence. We should draw a lesson from it.

20. The Question of 10 Fingers

The question of 10 fingers. Man has 10 fingers. We must enjoin the cadres to be good at learning how to distinguish nine fingers from one finger, or the majority of fingers from the minority of fingers. There is a difference between nine fingers and one finger. This thing looks simple, but many people don’t understand it. We must publicize this viewpoint. There is a difference between general situation and local situation, between generally and individually and between main trend and side issues. We must be mindful of grasping the main trend. If we grasp the wrong thing, we will certainly fall head over heels. It is a question of recognition and a question of logic as well. We say one finger and nine fingers, because it is a more lively way of speaking and more in conformity with our work conditions. Unless mistakes arise in the basic line, we have always netted major achievements in our work. However, this way of speaking does not apply to some people. For example, almost all the 10 fingers of rightists, many of them ultra-rightists, have rotted. Among the students, the majority of ordinary rightists have more than one rotting fingers. But then not all of their fingers are rotting. That is why they still can remain in school.

“Attack one or several points, exaggerate as much as possible and come up short of the rest.” This is a metaphysical method, which is divorced from actual conditions. It was the method used by bourgeois rightists when they launched their frenzied attacks on socialism in 1957. Historically, our Party suffered great damage through the use of such a method. It was during the time when dogmatism reigned supreme. The Li Li-san line was also like this. Revisionism or right opportunism also employed this method. The Ch’en Tu-hsiu line and the Wang Ming line during the war of resistance against Japan were like this. In 1934, Chang Kuo-t’ao also used this method.

21. Dialectics is to Approach Problems Through Opposites and Unity, Hence in a Comprehensive Way

Life and death, war and peace are antagonistic and contradictory. Nevertheless, there is an inner connection between them. Hence, these opposites sometimes can be united. In our approach to problems, we cannot just look at one side. We should make a comprehensive analysis in order to see through its essence. Thus, so far as judging a person is concerned, it cannot be that all at once he is all good or he is all bad with not even one merit. Why is our Party correct? It is because we can start from objective conditions in assessing and resolving all problems. In this way it can be relatively complete and not absolute.

22. Theory of Uninterrupted Revolution and Theory of Revolution by Stages

The development of cooperatives requires that progress be made in wave-like fashion — one wave succeeding another with a trough in between, like a valley between two peaks.

The leadership should trim the sails according to the wind and adapt to the circumstances. And when conditions are unfavorable, they should immediately apply the brakes. At an opportune moment they should compress the people's heads, which is a necessary thing to do when heads swell. Some people ask whether we have need of concern or of taboos and commandments. Of course, we have need. We have need of the necessary concern and the necessary taboos and commandments. Chu-pa-chieh (Pigsy) [character in the Ming dynasty novel, "*The Pilgrimage to the West*"] also has three taboos and five commandments. We have need of the necessary rest, the necessary pauses, the necessary braking or closing of the gate. The method to be tried when people start wagging their tails in the air is to set forth new tasks for them, like the quality emulation drive we are now putting forward, so that they won't have time to feel haughty.

23. Onesidedness is of Dual Nature

There are two kinds of onesidedness: dogmatism and opportunism (revisionism). Lu Ting-i has said so in an article. Dogmatists want to affirm everything and are 100 percent Bolshevik. Later we did some checking. After 10 years (1935-1945), they almost went out of existence. Dogmatists exist in China, as well as in foreign countries. To render onesided Marxism-Leninism, they explain it from metaphysics. About work, they let you talk about the good side, but not the bad side. You can only praise, but not criticize. In the "Encirclement and suppression of Wang Ming", I also gave a magnified account of the facts. Now let us lift the encirclement to relieve Wang Ming. There were defects in his writings, but could he not criticize bureaucratism like he did, or talk about people in official circles? In the past we definitely had much knowledge in talking about class struggle. But we also generated some over-simplification and administrative decrees. Earlier, due to urgency in organizing revolutionary struggles, we certainly could not spend a lot of time in discussions to find a solution to problems. That was our mode of action in the period of power seizure. Some comrades have cultivated this working style.

It is easy for them who have had only this kind of experience and known only this mode of action, especially those who have engaged in army work for a long time, to commit such faults. The encirclement and suppression of Wang Ming was the same as the Liberation Army transferring a few regiments to encircle the enemy in battle. The other kind of one-sidedness is to “negate everything” — negate the undertakings of the workers and peasants, negate the struggle of several hundred million people so as to make them lose confidence and render everything dark. This does not correspond with facts. That everything is well in the colossal task of building socialism also does not correspond with facts. Chung Tien-fei did a good thing in exposing the shortcomings in cinema work.! We must take care to correct all the shortcomings that have already been exposed, but we must point out the one-sided ones. The article by Ch’en Ch’i-t’ung and three others have been mistransmitted. Today, I must say this to their face. I disagree very much with that article. I have said that their loyalty in trying to safeguard the interests of the Party and of the working class is sentiments of hatred against poisonous weeds. But after only several months of “blooming” there have appeared Wang Ming and other monsters and freaks. The opinion is expressed that achievements are few and mistakes are many. “Reporting to my lord, something, disastrous has happened! A ghost has appeared!” Conditions are such that it certainly doesn’t look like its going to reach the end of the day. Now, this is an incorrect appraisal of the situation and an expression of doubts about the general policy of the Party. The method followed here is over-simplification. It doesn’t have the power to persuade. The method used to criticize Wang Ming is the “brief shock” method. It leaves people who read it unconvinced. I am unconvinced. I have so far not made the acquaintance of Wang Ming. Nor does he have marriage relationships with my sons or daughters. But I am unconvinced. Dogmatism and opportunism are two kinds of one-sidedness. One affirms everything and the other denies everything. Both dogmatists and opportunists are metaphysical. However, we must help them to correct their mistakes. This is not just their personal problems. They represent a great number of people. There are dogmatists and opportunists among Communist Party members. Is there none outside the Party? There are dogmatists as well as opportunists among five million people. Within the Communist Party there are “leftists” and rightists. This means there are dogmatists and opportunists. Some people say that in writing it is impossible not to be one-sided. There is something to this stateme! nt. What I have just said is a lot of Marxist thought, which demands that everybody discard one-sidedness. This is not possible. Also it does not conform to reality. As a matter of fact, in making criticism, everybody speaks out in accordance with his own experience and standing on one side. But on the other hand, one-sidedness goes against dialectics. Can we or can we not ask that a little more dialectics be used? It is possible or not to popularize dialectics gradually so that more dialectics will be used gradually. I think it can, and should, be done. Day by day, year by year, there will be more people, more writers and professors, who take a more comprehensive approach to problems. That is why I say the existence of one-sidedness is a fact. But I ask that one-sidedness be overcome gradually. Is it so or not there will be one-sidedness in the future? There still will be. There will be one-sidedness even after 10,000 years. We have to popularize dialectics and dialectics has to be developed. In a word, I ask that dialectics be popularized step by step so that we will have 600 million dialecticians. With regard to affairs within the ranks of the people, it is necessary to analyze and to reason, not to rely on name calling, but to practice dialectics.

In writing, we must be persuasive. Also, we must not give ourselves bureaucratic airs or act in a bureaucratic manner, considering that we are heads of a ministry or bureau or department. These notions we must discard. We must forget we are officials; we must be on an equal footing with everybody. Your post may be high, but still it won't do when you make a mistake. Wasn't Stalin's post high enough? It wouldn't do when he made a mistake. Some people put on the airs of a veteran by saying: "When I was making revolution, you were still crawling under the table!" If you employ that line, people won't like to hear it. As dialectics increases little by little, metaphysics decreases little by little. This will get rid of ! one-sidedness gradually.

24. Two Kinds of Onesidedness

Within the ranks of the Communist Party there are all sorts of people. There are Marxists, who comprise the greater majority. They also have shortcomings; but these are not serious. A portion of the people harbor dogmatic misconceptions. For the most part, these people are loyal and devoted to Party and country. Only their method of approach to problems is one-sidedness of the "left." When they have put a stop to this kind of one-sidedness, they will have taken a big step forward. Another portion of the people entertains right opportunist or revisionist misconceptions. These people are relatively dangerous, because their thinking is a reflection of bourgeois ideology within the Party. They hanker after bourgeois liberalism and negate everything, and their relationship with the bourgeois intellectuals in society is extremely complicated. For several months now, people have been criticizing dogmatism, but have omitted revisionism. Dogmatism should be subjected to criticism. If dogmatism is not criticized, many misconceptions cannot be corrected. Now we should begin to see to it that revisionism is criticized. Dogmatists may head toward the opposites, that is either Marxism or revisionism. In the light of the experience of our Party, more dogmatists will head toward the former, while only isolated cases will head toward the latter. This is because they are an ideological faction of the proletariat, which has been affected by the frantic viewpoint of the petty bourgeoisie. Some of the "dogmatists" who were attacked were in fact people who have made mistakes in their work. Some "dogmatists" who were attacked were in fact Marxists; they were attacked by certain people who wrongly took them for "dogmatists." Real dogmatists have a reason to feel that "left" is better than right. The reason is that they want to make revolution. However, in terms of factual losses of the revolution, "left" is not better than right. Therefore, it should be ! corrected resolutely.

25. The Question of Red and White Joyful Events

— Sudden changes are the most fundamental laws of the universe —

The question of red and white joyful events. When in the past we spoke of coping with possible sudden great changes, we were referring principally to questions of war or disruption within the Party. The Chinese people term weddings as red joyful events and funerals as white joyful events. It seems that there is something to it. The Chinese people understand dialectics. Because they will have children after getting married, mothers will split off three or two, or even as many as ten or eight of them, much the same as an aircraft carrier splits off airplanes.

Too many children are also no good. When a human being gives birth to a human being, it is a joyful event. One becomes two, two becomes four. As to death, people will cry ever it and hold a funeral ceremony. It is also a joyful event. Man invariably will die. If Confucius were still alive and attending the meeting here at Huai-jen T'ang (Hall of Benevolence), he would have been over 2,000 years old. That would have been bad. Dialectically speaking, it is incorrect and metaphysical to have no deaths. When there is a disaster, it should be called a kind of natural phenomenon. Sudden changes are the most fundamental laws of the universe. Birth is a sudden change and so is death. If Chiang Kai-shek dies, we may clap our hands. If John Foster Dulles dies, we will shed no tears. But when new things die, like the defeat of the 1905 Russian revolution or the loss of our basses in the South, then it is no good. When seedlings are brought down by a storm or hail, this of course is no good, because the question of replacing the seedlings immediately arises. Our Communist Party hopes that things will . . .

26. . . . .

27. The Question of Two Possibilities

The question of two possibilities. Will messhalls, nurseries and communes be able to consolidate or not? It seems that they will be able to consolidate. But we also must be prepared against some of them collapsing. Two possibilities — consolidation and collapse — exist simultaneously. If we are not prepared, we may fail utterly. Our resolution is to make it possible for them to consolidate. If some of them do not collapse, then consolidation work cannot be done well. For example, several children have died in the nurseries and several elderly people have died in the happiness homes. When happiness can no longer be found in the happiness home, in what way are they still superior? A group of messhalls also will fail if they serve their rice cold or serve rice without the dishes that go with it. To think that none of them will fail is not in agreement with reality. They fail because of mismanagement. This is very reasonable. On the whole, failure will be partial and temporary. The general trend is development and consolidation. Our party also has two possibilities. One possibility is consolidation and the other is splits. when in Shanghai, one central committee was split into two. During the Long March, Chang Kuo-t'ao again split one central committee into two. Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih represented a partial split. Partial splits are frequent. Since last year, splits have occurred within the leading groups of one-half of the provinces in the country. Inside a human body cells die off every day. From childhood on this phenomenon occurs. Only in this way can growth be benefited, If there are no deaths, man can no longer survive. If man does not die, then that is not possible. Death can be of benefit; fertilizer can result from it. Partial splits exist every day. Total extinction is also a historical inevitability. All in all, both party and state, which have served as the tools of class struggle, must perish. But before the historical task of the Party is completed, ! it is a question of consolidation. We do not hope for splits, but we should prepare against them. If we are prepared, we will possibly avoid big splits. Big and medium splits are temporary. The Hungarian incident was a big split, while the Kao and Mo incidents were medium splits. Every party branch is undergoing a change. Some members are being expelled, some are being admitted. Some are doing a very good job, some are committing mistakes. It is impossible not to ever undergo a change. Lenin often said that a thing invariably has two possibilities: either victory or extinction. Our People's Republic of China also has two possibilities: victory after victory or extinction. Since Lenin did not conceal the possibility of extinction, the People's Republic must not deny such a possibility. We do not have an atomic bomb in our hands. If the enemy occupies Peking, Shanghai and Wuhan, we will go into the mountains and engage in guerrilla warfare. We will go 10, 20 years backward and return to the Yenan period. Therefore, we must make vigorous preparations, exert our energies to produce tens of million tons of steel within three or four years and establish an industrial base so that we will be more consolidated than now. At present our name is quite famous throughout the world. One, because of the shelling of Quemoy; two, because of the People's Communes; and three, 10.7 million tons of steel. It seems that because of these several things, our reputation is great. But our strength is not. We are still poor and blank. We have acquired tool of an inch long in our hands, and we have accomplished not a thing, though we now have an inch of iron, our country is actually weak. Politically we are a powerful country. Economically and militarily we are a weak country. That's why the task before us is to transform from weakness to strength. We must exert our energies to undergo a change for the better in three years time. Within three years we can bring about only a partial change, and not a basic ch! ange. After another four years, which makes it seven years altogether, everything will be better and our reputation will correspond to reality. Now our reputation is great and our strength insignificant. This we must understand thoroughly. Don't start walking on air the moment you are praised by a foreigner or the moment you open a newspaper and see that it is full of accounts of our soaring enthusiasm and our miraculous doings. In fact, good steel amounted to only 9 million tons. Rolled steel production should be figured at 30 percent less, hence only 6 million tons. We must not deceive ourselves. A lot of grain was produced. After reductions have been allowed, the production in all places was 860 billion *catties*. We have said it was 750 billion *catties*. This is to say that they turned up a little more after poking here and there. The 110 billion *catties* which they turned up have not been taken into account. Nobody suffers if we really have but do not take into account those 110 billion *catties*. Things will still be there. We were only afraid of being without and so we made a reduction. Granting that there were 860 billion *catties*, allowances should be made for one-fourth of the output being tuber crops. We might as well make this clear. A meeting should be held in every province, region or county to discuss this problem. Some people don't like to hear what I'm saying. But I insist on talking about this very unfortunate thing. Whether it is the collapse of the communes or public messhalls, splits in the Party, divorce from the masses, occupation by the U.S., extinction of the nation, or engagement in guerrilla warfare, we have a Marxist law, which takes care of everything. And that is, all these unfortunate things are temporary and partial. Historically, our many defeats have proved this point. During the Long March, the reduction of our forces from 300,000 in number to a little over 20,000 and that of Party members from 30,000 to a few thou! sand were all temporary and partial. The extinction of the bourgeoisie and imperialism is permanent, however. The setbacks, defeat or extinction of socialism will be temporary because it will be restored before long. Even if restoration is defeated, it also will be temporary. After the great revolution of 1927 was defeated, we took up arms again to fight a guerrilla war. “Unforeseen wind and clouds may appear in the sky suddenly. Fortune or misfortune may befall man ’tween morn and evening.” All of us must be prepared. “From of old, men of seventy years have rarely been seen.” Man invariably will perish. A person always will die. He cannot live to 10,000 years. Man should prepare to set his affairs in order before he dies. This is all gloomy talk. All men will die. But mankind as a whole will grow and flourish. If die we must, we will die. As for socialism, we still want to occupy ourselves with it for a few more years...

28. Two Kinds of Practical Possibilities

There are two kinds of practical possibilities. One kind is realistic possibility and the other kind is unrealistic possibility. If one now wants to go to the planet Mars, it is an unrealistic possibility. However, it can be a realistic possibility in the future. Possibilities are of two kinds. If it is possible to transform into reality, it is realistic possibility. The other kind of possibility is something that is not possible to transform into reality. Like dogmatism in the past, was it not 100 percent proof? Was it not discarded everywhere? It seems to me that not marrying until production per *mou* reaches 800,000 *catties* is also an unrealistic possibility.

29. Wave-like Advance is Inevitable

Economic construction is not something which does not have the slightest forward and backward movements, but which advances surely and steadily. Construction also can be sometimes a little more in volume and sometimes a little less. A horse gallops sometimes a little faster, sometimes a little slower. Sometimes, one mounts the horse, sometimes he dismounts it. Such conditions are completely possible. This is because, firstly, we are inexperienced, and secondly, our economic construction devolves on circumstances. For example, economic construction was possibly completed at a somewhat faster rate in the past, because conditions of war existed at that time. If war is imminent, then it is imperative that we develop heavy industry on a greater scale. Economic construction proceeds in wave-like fashion with its ups and downs, and one wave chasing another. This is to say that there are balance, disruption, and balance restored after disruption. Of course, wave-like advances cannot be too big. If too big, suddenly it will become a venturesome advance and suddenly it will become a conservative advance. Nevertheless, it is inevitable that economic construction will follow the law of wave-like advances and make progress. If you acknowledge this point, then it will no longer startle you when we make a venturesome advance this year and perform a little less next year. That is all there is to it. Taking it as a whole, our first Five-Year Plan was correct.

30. Everything Has its Unity and Independence

Now let us talk about the question of the independence of every factory under centralized leadership. Everything has its unity and independence. Man also has his unity and independence. Now that this meeting is going on, it is unity. After the meeting is over, it is independence. Some people will go for a stroll, some will go and read a book, some will go and have their meals. Everybody has his independence. A sense of discipline and a sense of non-discipline are mutually contradictory things. It is necessary to have a sense of discipline as well as a sense of non-discipline. It is necessary to have collectivism as well as "liberalism." If we do not give an individual his post-meeting independence, a sense of non-discipline and "liberalism," but continue the meeting without break or end, will the people not all die? Therefore, every factory, every cooperative, every person must have its or his independence — an independence that is linked up with unity. We must look after workers in the factories and all peasants in the collectives. This is a big problem, one which concerns 600 million people. We must call the Party's attention to this.

31. We Want Unity and Also Specifics

We Want Unity, we also want specifics. Each place must have its specifics which are suited to local conditions for the purpose of bringing local initiative into full play. Such specifics will not be Kao Kang's kind of specifics, but specifics in the interests of the collective and indispensable to the strengthening of national unity.

32. We Should Have the Proper Initiative and the Proper Independence

We should all have the proper initiative and the proper independence. Provinces, regions, counties, areas and townships should all have them. The Central Government should not grasp the provinces and municipalities too tightly, and in turn, the provinces and municipalities should not grasp the regions, counties, areas and townships too tightly. All that can be united should, and must, be united; all that cannot be united should not be united and must not be united by force. The different regions should fight for this right and not be afraid of being given the label of localism. This kind of fight for a right proceeds from the whole interests of the country and not from local interests. It cannot be called localism. Independence sanctioned by the Central Government is proper independence. It cannot be called assertion of independence.

Notes

[1.] A reference to the 'leftist' line in the CPC during the early 30'. In this connection see "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party" *S.W., Vol. III,* pp. 177-220 (1965, Peking).

[2.] A character in the novel *Story of the Stone*.

[3.] Chu-ko Liang (1818-234), prime minister of the Shu Han or Minor Han dynasty, was one of the most famous military strategists of ancient China. He is a central character in the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, and was, as Mao says, known throughout his career for his great prudence and foresight.

Note On The "Charter Of The Anshan Iron And Steel Company"[1]

March 22, 1960

[SOURCE: *Peoples Daily*, March 22, 1960.]

This report of the Anshan party committee is very good. The more one reads it the more delighted one gets. It doesn't strike one as too long, in fact, one would be willing to read it even if it were longer; this is because the problems raised in the report are factual, well reasoned, and very absorbing. With more than 100,000 workers and staff members, the Anshan Iron and Steel Company is the country's biggest enterprise. Formerly, people there thought that their enterprise was a modernized one and there was no need for technical revolution. They were opposed to launching vigorous mass movements, to the principle of cadre participation in productive labor and worker participation in management, of reform of irrational and outdated rules and regulations and of close cooperation among cadres, workers, and technicians, and opposed to putting politics in command..; they relied on just a few people working in seclusion. Many favored the system of placing responsibility solely on the factory director and were against the system of the factory director designated to undertake responsibility under the leadership of the party committee. They held that the "Charter of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Combine" (a set of authoritative rules practiced in a big steel plant in the Soviet Union) was sacred. That was the situation up to the Great Leap Forward in 1958, which marked the first stage. The year 1959 marked the second stage, when people began to think things over, began to have faith in the mass movement, and began to question the system of placing responsibility solely on the factory director and the Charter of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Combine. During the Lushan Meeting of July 1959, the Central Committee received a good report from them, which spoke in favor of the Great Leap Forward, of opposing the right deviation and making utmost exertions; it also put forward a high but practicable target. The Central Committee was extremely pleased with the report and had it circulated ! to the comrades concerned with its comment. They immediately relayed it by telephone to their respective provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, thus helping the struggle going on at the time to criticize right opportunism. The present report (March 1960) takes another step forward; it does not smack of the Charter of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Combine, but has given birth to a Charter of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company. Here emerges the Charter of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company in China, in the Far East. This marks the third stage. Now this report is being passed on to you and you are asked to transmit it to the large and medium-sized enterprises under your administration and to party committees of all large and medium-sized cities and, of course, you may also transmit it to prefectural party committees and other cities. It should be used as a document for study by cadres in order to stimulate their minds and make them think about the affairs in their own units, so that under due leadership a great Marxist-Leninist movement of economic and technical revolution will be carried out link by link and wave upon wave in the cities and the country side during the whole year of 1960.

Notes

[1.] The Anshan Iron and Steel Works, constructed in the period of Japanese rule in Manchuria was China’s first large modern enterprise and the center of its heavy industry. The focus of industrialization during the first five-year plan, today it is an advanced complex with more than 100,000 workers supplying 25 percent of the nation’s steel, the foundation of the industrial economy. The Charter of the Anshan Steel Company was proposed by the workers of Anshan.

On The Anti-China Question

March 22, 1960

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Comrades, please take a look at the appendix. This is a piece of material concerning the opening of an exhibition in Pakistan by our country. After all, who are the people of the so-called anti-China [movement]? How many are there? They are comprised of imperialist elements from certain Western countries, reactionaries and semi-reactionaries from some other countries, and revisionists and semi-revisionists from the international communist movement. The above three categories of people are estimated to constitute a small percentage, say 5 percent, of mankind. At the most they cannot be more than 10 percent. Let us assume that 10 out of every 100 people are against us. Of the world's population of 2.7 billion, no more than 270 million oppose us. The rest, and there are 2.43 billion, either support us, or are not against us, or are temporarily deceived by our enemies in suspecting us. The last condition is similar to the situation obtaining in China prior to 1949. Then the Kuomintang fabricated rumors to the effect that the Communist Party committed murder and arson and that its members shared property as well as wives. Most people did not believe them and were skeptical. Not long afterward, the real facts became clear. The Communist Party was recognized by the people as the most disciplined and most virtuous, and as having a line and a policy that best conformed to the wishes of the people. And the Kuomintang was the worst party. Among our own population of 650 million, those who are really anticommunist at the most constitute no more than 10 percent. This is to say no more than 65 million people. And 585 million people either stand up for us or are temporarily suspicious of us. The situation in Pakistan is like this, so is the situation in India. Those who are truly anti-China are no more than a handful. In the New Delhi exposition, the agricultural pavilions of the different countries were opened in a so-called anti-China atmosphere. However, people who visited the China pavilion numbered as man! y as 3.5 million, surpassing the attendance at the agricultural pavilion of any country. I advise you comrades to make an analysis of all three categories of elements, the imperialist elements of Western countries, reactionaries and semi-reactionaries of other countries, and the revisionists and semi-revisionists of the international communist movement. Firstly they are really small in number. Secondly their anti-China activities cannot harm even one hair on our head. Thirdly, their anti-China activities will instigate the entire party and the entire people to unite and set their ambition and determination to catch up with and surpass the most developed western countries economically and culturally. Fourthly, they will certainly lift a rock only to drop on their own feet. This is to say that they will expose their own ugliness before the more than 90 percent, who are good people. Therefore, so far as we are concerned, their anti-China activities are a good thing, and not a bad thing. They prove that we are true Marxist-Leninist and that our work is not bad. To them, it is a bad thing, not a good thing, and an unlucky omen. Bad luck began to dog Chiang Kai-shek the moment he opposed communism. In 1946, he launched an all-out attack against us. Only three and one half-years later, he was crushed by the people. Everybody understands this event. At present, when foreigners engage in anti-China activities, they merely abuse us verbally a little and do not beat us with their hands. If they try to beat us with their hands they will certainly not be able to escape the fate which befell Chiang Kai-shek, Hitler and Tojo. Comrades, please ponder this. Supposing that the above mentioned 10 percent bad people and semi-bad people are not anti-China but pro-China, they are friendly to us, they praise us and say good things about us, where will that put us? Could we not become revisionists who have betrayed Marxism and the people. Furthermore, the bad and semi-bad people of the different countries are not engaging in an! ti-China activities on a daily basis. Rather, they are doing it intermittently and under various pretexts. For example, under the pretext of the Tibet question and the Sino-Indian border question they conducted anti-China activities for a while. But then they could not do so forever under the pretext of these questions. This is because they were short of reason and over 90 percent of the people did not believe what they said. If they continued their anti-China activities every day, their position would become more and more untenable. The hatred between the U.S. and us is somewhat deeper. But they do not engage in anti-China activities daily. They also do it intermittently. This is also because there is no reason for them to attack us every day. Their listeners will get disgusted with them. When the market dwindles, it can only be closed. After a time, when there is a new pretext, they will set their anti-China activities in motion again. Not only is there now a brief pause between two waves of anti-China activities, but also there may be a pause of a longer duration in the future. This will depend on how well we perform our work. For example: if the entire party and the entire people really unite as one and the gross output and per capita output in our main production items approximate or overtake theirs, then such pauses will be prolonged. This is to say that this will compel the Americans to establish diplomatic relations with us and do business with us on an equal basis, or else they will be isolated. We have the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union to go by. In the past several decades, no one has opposed the Soviet Union with good results. The most brutal opposition came in the form of an armed attack against the Soviet Union. This principally refers to Hitler's savage onslaught during the Second World war. His defeat was also the most disastrous. Therefore, I would like to advise you comrades to utilize this material on Pakistan to ponder our tasks and work and through the nature and sign! ificance of this so-called anti-China question, to make sufficient preparations mentally to accept the fact that about 10 percent of the people in the world will oppose us intermittently over a prolonged period of time. You have to contemplate what is called a prolonged period in terms of 10 years, at the very least, or even the entire balance of 40 years of the 20th century. If we are given the 40 years, the world situation will have greatly changed by the end of the century. The majority or vast majority of that 10 percent of bad people or semi-bad people most likely will have been overthrown by their own people. In our country, on the average, everybody most likely will have 1,000 tons of steel and 3,000 to 4,000 *catties* of grain and feed, and the majority of the people will have a college education. By then, the people's level of political consciousness and theoretical level will be far higher than now. Most likely, the whole society will pass over to a communist society at that time. In short, the heart of all questions lies in our own unity and how well we perform our work.

Comments On Vice Premier Nieh Jung-chen's Report On The Technical Revolution

March 25, 1960

The mass movements of technical revolution and cultural revolution on our industrial and communication fronts, agricultural, forestry, livestock, subsidiary products, and pisciculture fronts, finance and trade fronts, education and health fronts and national defense are fiercely developing. New hope and new things are emerging in abundance. We urge you to examine them carefully, be ready to sum up, and popularize them.

The People Of Asia, Africa And Latin America Should Unite And Drive American Imperialism Back To Where It Came From

May 7, 1959

[SOURCE: "Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Important Talks with Guests from Asia, Africa, and Latin America," Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1960, pp 2-8.]

(On 7 May, in Chengchow, Comrade Mao Tse-tung received public personages, workers for peace, trade union, youth, and student delegations and delegates from twelve African countries and regions who were then visiting China...)

Comrade Mao Tse-tung spoke of the ever-growing national and democratic movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. He said that what imperialism fears most is the awakening of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples, the awakening of the peoples of all countries. We should unite and drive U.S. imperialism from Asia, Africa and Latin America back to where it came from...

Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf of the 650 million Chinese people, expressed full sympathy and support for the heroic struggle of the African people against imperialism and colonialism. He also expressed sympathy and support for the patriotic and just struggles of the South Korean people and the Turkish people against U.S. imperialism and its running dogs. He held that these struggles of the South Korean people and the Turkish people indicated that the storm of the struggles waged by the oppressed peoples of the various countries in Asia against imperialism and its running dogs will witness an even greater upsurge. These struggles will constitute a support to the just struggles of the African people, the Latin American people and people the world over. The just struggles of the peoples of various countries in the world support each other, Comrades Mao Tse-tung said. He thanked the African friends for their profound friendship for the Chinese people, hailed the great unity of the Chinese and African peoples and expressed firm confidence that ultimate victory will certainly be won in the common struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

(On 8 May, in Chengchow Comrade Mao Tse-tung received friends from eight Latin American countries then visiting China...)

Comrade Mao Tse-tung thanked them for their friendship for the Chinese people. The Chinese people, he said, just like the Latin American people had long suffered from imperialist oppression and exploitation. Relying on their own unity and support from the peoples of various countries, the Chinese people had carried on hard and prolonged struggles and ultimately had over-thrown the rule of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic-capitalism in China. They are now building their own country and changing its appearance of ‘poverty and blankness’. The Chinese people are fully confident that they can build their country and therefore they need time, peace, and friends. The Cuban people, the people of Latin America and the people of the whole world, he said, are all friends of the Chinese people; and imperialism and its running dogs are our common enemy, but they are a tiny minority. The winning of world peace, he said, depends primarily on the struggles of the peoples of the various countries. Comrade Mao Tse-tung expressed admiration for the heroic struggle of the Cuban people against U.S. imperialism. The struggles of the peoples of Cuba and other Latin American countries have helped the Chinese people, he said, and the struggle of the Chinese people has also helped the peoples of Cuba and other Latin American countries. The people are the decisive factor. Reliance on the unity and struggle of the people is bound to bring about the defeat of imperialism and its running dogs and achieve lasting world peace.

(On 9 May, Chairman Mao Tse-tung received in Chengchow friends from the Iraqi Cultural Delegation, the Iraqi workers Delegation, the Iranian Trade Union Delegation, and the Delegation of the Cyprus Confederation of Workers....)

Comrade Mao Tse-tung said that U.S. imperialism is the biggest imperialism in the world today. It has its running dogs in many countries. Those backed by imperialism are precisely those discarded by the broad masses of the people. Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, Kishi, Batista, Said, Menderes and their ilk have either been overthrown or will be overthrown by the people. The rising of the people in these countries against the running dogs of U.S. and other imperialism are also fights against the reactionary rule of imperialism itself. The Japanese people are rising in action, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said. The broad masses of the Japanese people are now holding demonstrations on a bigger scale than ever to fight against the aggressive military alliance treaty signed between the Kishi Government and U.S. imperialism. The Chinese people resolutely support this struggle waged by the Japanese people. The just struggles of the peoples of the various countries in the world, he said, have received and will continue to receive firm support from the 650 million people of China. The days of imperialism are numbered, he said. The imperialists have committed all manners of evils and all the oppressed peoples of the whole world will never forgive them. To defeat the reactionary rule of imperialism, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said, it is necessary to form a broad front and unite with all forces, except the enemy, and continue to wage arduous struggles....

(On 14 May, in Wuhan, Comrade Mao Tse-tung received friends from Japan, Cuba, Brazil and Argentina...)

Summing Up Ten Years

June 18, 1960

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

The power of initiative is like “building tiles on a high roof and “breaking bamboo link by link.” This power of initiative is derived from the realistic and the practical, it comes from the honest reflection in objective conditions of the mind of the people, and it results from the people’s process of understanding the dialectic of the objective environment. In the course of this process there will be a good many mistaken understandings, a gradual correction of these errors, and finally a return to the correct.

It is impossible not to commit errors. As Lenin said, there has never been a man who did not commit errors. An earnest Party will view seriously the commission of errors, search out the reasons for the commission of the errors, and openly correct them. Our Party’s general line is correct, and actual work has basically been carried out well. There are some errors, which are difficult to avoid. Where is the so-called saint who never commits errors and who at once carries out truth to completion? Knowledge of truth is not achieved at once, but is gradually achieved. We are adherents of the theory of dialectical materialism, not of the theory of metaphysics. Freedom is inevitable knowledge; from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom is a flying leap, which is accomplished only gradually in the course of a long process of knowledge. We already have ten years of experience in our socialist revolution and construction and we already understand quite few things. But we still have insufficient experience in socialist construction. Remaining before us is a great, still unrecognized realm of necessity. We are still unable to understand it penetratingly. From now on we must continue to investigate and analyze it from practice; we must seek out its constant rules and beneficially utilize these rules in the service of the socialist cause.

Dissemination Of The CC, CPCs' Criticism Of The Shansi Provincial Party Committee's Report On The Rural Labor Force Problem

October 27, 1960

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

The Politburo of the Central Committee, party committees of the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, party committees of the various central ministries, and party groups of the various central state organs:

Shansi Provincial Party Committees' report on the rural labor force problem is very good and is now being distributed for your scrutiny.

The problem of the rural labor force is a great problem in the current development of agricultural production. It is a great problem which touches on the continuing leap forward of the entire national economy. It must receive the serious scrutiny of comrades in the entire party. The report of the Shansi Provincial Party Committee is stated very correctly. If we don't immediately change the current situation on the agricultural production front of a labor force which is too small and too weak, then the so-called "national economy with agriculture as the foundation" and "grain as the foundation of that foundation" will become empty talk. Man must eat every day, whether engaged in industry, communication, education, capital construction, or any other enterprise; no one can do without grain. No member of the communist party ought to forget this very simple and absolutely true and correct principle. For three months the Shansi Provincial Committee conscientiously adopted measures, reduced the labor force by 1.1 million and returned them to the agricultural production front. The situation of the agricultural labor force has taken a great turn for the better. The Central Committee requires that all levels of party committees and leading organs of various departments seriously study Shansi's report, use Shansi's experience as a reference, analyze from many sides, and comply strictly with the various directives promulgated by the Central Committee on conservation of labor force. On the basis of your actual conditions, adopt all effective measures, squeeze out all of the labor force that can be squeezed out, strengthen the first line of agricultural production, and speedily change the grave situation of the present insufficiency of labor force.

Opinion On The Free Supply System

1960

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

In handling the free supply system, the Marxist style of work and the bourgeois style of work stand opposed in communist life. In my view the rural area work style and the guerrilla attitude are still good; in 22 years of war these were victorious.

Why is building communism unacceptable? Why must we grasp a wages system? This is offering concessions to the bourgeoisie and borrowing the rural area work style and guerrilla attitude to debase us. The result is development of individualism. We have forgotten that we must persuade through words and not by oppression; is it the PLA unit leaders who have restored the free supply system?

We must eradicate bourgeois jurisdiction and ideology. For example, contesting for position, contesting for rank, wanting to increase wages and giving higher wages to the intellectual worker and lower wages to the physical laborer are all remnants of bourgeois ideology. To each according to his worth is prescribed by law and it is also a bourgeois thing. In the future do we want to have a division into classes when riding vehicles? We don't necessarily want to have a special car. We want to show some consideration toward the elderly and the weak, but we don't want different classes for the others.

Our party is a party which continuously fought a war for more than 20 years. For a long time it has implemented the free supply system. From several tens of thousands of persons it grew to several million, right up to liberation. In the very beginning the collective lived an egalitarian life. In work everyone was industrious and in warfare all were courageous. There was absolutely no reliance on material incentives, but rather a reliance on the drumbeat of revolutionary spirit.

Classical Works Recommended To High-Ranking Cadres

1960

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Marx:

1) The Communist Manifesto

2) Wage-Labour and Capital

3) Preface and Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy

4) The Class Struggles in France, 1848-50

5) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte

6) To Kugelmann

7) Wages, Price and Profit

8) The Civil War in France

9) Critique of the Gotha Programme

Engels:

1) The 1852 War of the Holy Alliance Against France

2) Introduction to Dialectics of Nature

3) Socialism Utopian and Scientific

4) Anti-Duhring (the section on violence)

5) Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy

Lenin:

1) Philosophical Note books.

2) What is To Be Done?

3) Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution

4) Materialism and Empirio-Criticism

5) On Imperialism

6) The State and Revolution

7) The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky

8) “Left Wing” Communism an Infantile Disorder

9) Concerning Marx, Engels, and Marxism

Stalin:

1) Problems of Leninism

2) Concerning Reactionaries (*Collected Works*)

3) Short Course of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)

4) Marxism and Problems of Linguistics

5) Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR

Plekhanov:

1) Concerning the Evolution of the Monist View of History

2) Concerning Literature and Art

Principles Of Educating Youth

1960

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

The principles of educating youth are:

1. Teach them to grasp Marxism-Leninism and to overcome petit-bourgeois consciousness.

2. Teach them to have discipline and organization and to oppose anarchism and liberatarianism in organization.

3. Teach them to penetrate resolutely into the lower levels of practical work and to oppose looking down on practical experience.

4. Teach them to become close to the workers and peasants, to serve them resolutely, and to oppose the consciousness of looking down on workers and peasants.

Directive On The Question Of Class Distinction

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

It is necessary to determine class status. Although bad people are in the minority, they nevertheless occupy some of the crucial departments and are in authority. . . There should be distinction between one's class component and one's own performance, primarily the latter. To draw class lines is to ferret out the bad elements.

It also important to distinguish between class background and one's own performance, with emphasis on the latter. The exclusive component theory is incorrect. The question is whether you take the stand of your original class or take a changed class stand, that is, taking the side of workers and poor and lower-middle peasants. Moreover, you are not supposed to engage in sectarianism, but must unite with the majority, even including some of the landlords and rich peasants, as well as their children. There are some counter revolutionaries and saboteurs who should be transformed, and if they wish to transform, we should have them, one and all. But if we consider only the background, then even Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin would be unacceptable. For instance, Marx studied idealism first and Materialism later before he developed Marxism. Both Hegel and Fueurbach were his mentors in the field of philosophy.

In undertaking class determination in factories, our purpose is mainly to find out those Kuomintang secretaries, generals, reactionary officers, escaped landlords, and landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements. As in Pai-Yin Factory, it was to check the bad people, not every body, and not the technical staff who came from exploitative classes. Some of them used to serve the exploitative class. If their present performances are good, we should trust them, and even though it is not too good, they must be transformed. Some of them have come from exploitative classes, and so we must see how their performance is.

In order to produce socialist theory, it behoves intellectuals to study the existing phenomena of class struggle, to enhance the results of their study theoretically, and to proselytize them, thus changing the working class from a diffused into an organized class, and from a self-developing in to a self-conscious class. The workers, because they have to work and earn their living everyday under exploitation and oppression, cannot produce Marxism by themselves. Marx was not a worker himself, but he could perceive the trend of development, and after studying analytically, succeeded in changing bourgeois philosophy into proletarian philosophy, and bourgeois political economy into proletarian political economy, thereby educating the workers. In point of fact, it is impossible for a worker to read so many books or to read such bulky volumes, though the advanced ones could perhaps read more. The phenomenon of class struggle has existed for millenniums and even the bourgeoisie conceded that there was class struggle. It was only Marx and Engels who made it into a theory and systemized it. We must knock down the bourgeoisie. Socialism has succeeded capitalism. I myself also learned from the landlord class by studying Confucius's book for six years and by attending bourgeois schools for seven years, spending 13 years altogether. I was then only 20-odd years of age, and was basically ignorant about Marx. It was only after the October revolution that I heard of Marx and read his books.

Speech At The Ninth Plenum Of The Eighth CPC Central Committee

January 18, 1961

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Let me talk about investigation and study, as I did at the work conference. In the period of the Democratic Revolution we made many mistakes of line; those on the right did no investigation or study and neither did those on the left. The questions of what the circumstances in China were then, and of what line and what tactics to use, were not resolved. After the Great Revolution and the Second Revolutionary Civil War met defeat, we went through the Tsun-yi conference and the rectification movement of the Seventh Central Committee, and by 1949 we gained a revolutionary victory.

During the War of Liberation, the circumstances in the fight against Chiang Kai-shek were fairly clear; we were fairly familiarly with the various aspects of revolution and circumstances were relatively straightforward.

After the victory, dealing with the lives of several hundred million people, the situation was more complicated. With the mistakes of the past, it had been easy to educate the whole party. For several years everybody was doing investigation and study, but not much. We had no deep understanding of conditions. The restoration of the landlords was an example. It was not something we tried to pin on them — it was how things really were. They were flying the Communist Party flag, but what they were doing was in fact restoration. Only after disturbances broke out did we realize that all three levels of cooperative units had, on the whole, connections with the counterrevolution. Rigid bureaucrats were the allies of the Democratic Revolution; in addition there were some confused people who did not understand the three-level ownership system and did not understand that if the Communist wind cannot blow, the counter-revolution will use it to attain its evil ends.

In Honan we had the "four highs" — high targets, high production estimates, high rate of government purchase and high level of food use; but we are not using them any more

— instead we are lowering standards and taking the pressure off them. Things are going the other way, and this is more in accord with reality.

We have been talking for five years about “agriculture, light and heavy industry,” “simultaneous development of industry and agriculture,” “walking on two legs,” and last year these were not realized, but it appears that this year they may possibly be realized. We can only say “possibly,” because they haven’t yet been realized, but this fact is reflected in the plans.

Investigation and study were also lacking in regard to landlord restoration. We paid more attention to the urban counter-revolutionary elements. After the events in Hungary, we allowed scattered free expression of opinion and tens of thousands of little Hungaries appeared; little Hungaries appeared at Peking University, People’s University and Tsinghua University and over four hundred thousand rightists had to be purged. The rural areas were also purged, not thoroughly; but we never anticipated the problem of landlord restoration — or we did abstractly, for we always used to talk about contradictions between bourgeoisie and proletariat, and in the Eighth Central Committee resolution the contradiction between advanced production methods and backward production methods was cited.

The Lushan Conference anti-rightist program threw the movement for correction of “leftists” into disorder. At the time anti-rightism was an absolute necessity. The Communist wind began to blow again and we did some “large-scale undertakings.” Indeed, large-scale water conservancy and large-scale industry had great and undeniable achievements.

Of the problems of the Communist wind, rigid bureaucrats, confused people, and landlord restoration within the revolutionary ranks, some were not made clear, and some were discussed but without much result.

At the Lushan Conference, the problem of the movement for correction of “leftists” had not been made clear, but P’eng Te-huai forced us to accept the challenge and scatter the anti-Leftists.”

Last year the central leadership comrades devoted their main energy to international questions.

At Shanghai in January, Canton in February, Hangchow in March, Shanghai in May, Pei-tai-ho in September, and at Moscow Conference, the Central Committee paid attention to [international] matters and adversely influenced the local comrades.

Why was Khrushchev so anxious to convene the Bucharest Conference and in July the Soviet Plenum began to attack us? Because if he hadn’t done so he would have been in trouble: at home his position was none too solid, and they had incorrectly evaluated the situation. They feared the three articles like the plague, while we were not afraid of the “three dont’s.” We reprinted several hundred thousand revisionist books — weren’t afraid of all that, and they had to be studied. But they said we were stirring up factions, that China was stirring up factions, and that the three articles were our program for stirring things up against the Soviet Union.

Not only we, but many foreigners as well, said that the three articles were good.

Why was he so anxious to convene the Bucharest Conference? Because he wanted to secure his position, and they thought that this way they could force us down.

We have to summon up all our energies to deal with the situation at home. For the working class to unite with the majority of the peasants, it must start by relying upon poor and lower-middle peasants, and upon middle peasants with a good attitude.

The Moscow Conference abated the anti-Chinese trend, which originated with rightist opportunists in the fraternal parties in the U.S., India and Yugoslavia.

I agree with the opinion of Comrade Liu Hsiao that the problems have not been solved because they have a social basis.

In our party there are also those who represent the landlord class and the bourgeoisie.

We should not harm the interests of the well-to-do middle peasants. They cannot exploit the peasants. This would be anti-Marxist. Just as soon as we reimburse and indemnify them, the masses will be satisfied, and their mood will change.

This year we are not going to do “two accounts” or put more weights into the balance; in everything we will start out from reality. We will simply weigh and store foodstuffs; we will not use the “four highs”; we’ll lower them a bit and resolutely carry out a single account, equal-value exchange, distribution according to labor, work-more-get-more; and we will resolutely purge the “five habits.”

In the urban rectification we will run pilot programs. Cities have special urban characteristics, different from those of the rural areas.

This year it appears that the plans won’t be much higher than last year. Some people are suggesting there be no changes in steel production this year and that its output should stay at 18,500,000 tons, or possibly 19,000,000 tons, but not much above last year. This is a reasonable suggestion. Since the targets of the Second Five-Year Plan have long since been attained, quantity need not jump, but quality will. With steel not going up, the imperialists and revisionists may say that our Great Leap Forward has failed, They can run us down as much as they like, but in reality we are working on quality, technology, standards, management, rate of production... lowering production costs, the right material for each purpose, overcoming insufficiencies, adjustments, and consolidation, rounding out, upgrading, in reality it’s case of raising fat pigs in the hall.

England’s steel output is greater than ours for the time being, but we will certainly be able to catch or even surpass England in seven more years. Can we catch West Germany (34 million tons)? We must wait and see. We lack experience in economic construction (I have discussed this with Edgar Snow), and our understanding of the laws will have to be repeated a few times, but we hope we will not take 28 years to be successful as the Democratic Revolution did. In reality, 28 years isn’t very long. There are many fraternal parties that were founded at about the same time as ours, and they still have not succeeded. We can cut that number by eight years and still get our experience, but it cannot be cut by much more as we used to hope. We cannot transform what we do not know about. Finally, we have to urge people forward; we don’t want to have to oppose rightism again at the March meeting — everybody ought to be genuinely revolutionary. We should hold resolutely to the general line, and aim high. Some people have said we should only stress “better and more economical results” now and not “greater and faster results.” In food we need “greater and faster results,” and also in industry with respect to material grades, standards and quality we need “greater and faster results.”

On the question of unity, the unity of the Central Committee is the heart of the whole party’s unity. At the Lushan Conference a small number of comrades opposed unity, but we hope to unite with them no matter how many errors they have made. If they say “you have made errors too,” I say that’s fine: everybody makes mistakes, in this we’re alike; but there are differences in size and gravity, differences in nature, number and quality. If you’ve made a mistake, don’t be afraid to hold your head up, and if some comrades’ work positions are lowered that’s all right.

P’eng Te-huai’s letter reporting on his year of study is welcome regardless of whether or not he has progressed.[1]

Beyond this, when there are comrades working in the Central Committee and the local areas who have also made errors, we welcome their correcting themselves in the course of their work. The situation was grave in Shantung, Honan and Kansu. They didn’t understand the circumstances at all, and so their resolution was not great, and their methods not very correct. Now that they understand the circumstances it’s easier to manage. Hsin-yang, Honan, which we were all worried about, has now become a good area, a revolutionary area that has turned over a new leaf and seized political power, Kansu has also taken a turn for the better. Of the other places, about 20 percent have broken down. This is not only because of the food problem; according to Commander-in-Chief Lin’s report, 400 out of 10,000 army units — 4 percent — have broken down, and this was not due to the food problem but to the fact that the leadership had fallen into the hands of the enemy. This was also the case in the cities, factories and schools.

According to our policy, we should get rid of the enemy. Rigid bureaucrats should be reformed into creative bureaucrats. If after a long time they can’t become creative, then we should get rid of them.

More than 90 percent of the population are good people, but there are confused people among them. We have been confused ourselves — otherwise why did we have the Long March? Because we didn't understand circumstances and our policies were not suitable.

Now in handling the new questions of social revolution and social construction, we should institute training squads and train county, commune and brigade cadres, so that they will understand policy.

We can't say that most cadres are unreliable or are KMT people — we should unite everybody we can — but also we can't kill a lot of counter-revolutionary elements. We should be wary of killing people and should not repeat our past mistakes. The Soviet Union killed too many people. At Yenan we declared that no cadre was to be killed. Even P'an Han-nien[2] couldn't be killed, because one killing leads to another, and more and more people would be getting killed. If we wanted to practice the Buddhist injunction against killing — there are a few people who should be killed because otherwise the people's indignation could not be relieved. When the Central Committee makes a mistake, it does not involve the question of killing. We will not make Stalin's mistake, but we will also not make Khrushchev's more civilized mistake of dismissing the Central Committee.

We must unite with the Soviet Union, with fraternal parties, with the 87 national parties, no matter what charges they make against us. We shouldn't fear criticism, for there has been criticism ever since there has been a Communist Party, and without it we wouldn't be the Communist Party. No matter what their attitude, we should adopt a policy of unity. In time of necessity, for instance at a conference, in case of a departure from the right principles, any person, no matter who, should be criticized. They have upbraided us on five counts: being a paper tiger, "the east wind prevails over the west wind," the longer Nehru is anti-China the better, and the sinification of Marxism-Leninism.

Marxism-Leninism is basically one with different twigs and leaves, like a single tree that has many different twigs and leaves. Circumstances vary in different countries. In the past we suffered from having only paying attention to universal truths without paying attention to investigation and study. I hope this year will be a year of investigation and study, one in which investigation and study will flourish. When I talked about these things nobody opposed them, but not many people supported them either, or if they did, they didn't make good on their support. In investigation and study, it's fine to do specialized investigation and study. If you're in favor of them, you can make them work. But if you're not in favor of them, there's nothing to be done.

If we really arouse the masses, they can determine who are the good and bad elements. Some are landlord elements or bad elements who have seized leadership, some are cadres who have fallen away and been won over... The masses can determine, but we on the other hand have not been very well able to determine. We must have resolution, we must send out large numbers of cadres to profoundly link up and profoundly star the masses into action: otherwise we will not be able to solve the problem.

When we go into the work of inspection, we must see with our own eyes, not someone else's, and hear with our own ears, we must feel with our hands, discuss with our mouths, hold fact-finding meetings ... These last few years we haven't been investigating, we've been doing things on the basis of estimates; I urge the comrades to promote a resurgence of investigation. In everything we must start out from actuality, and not express an opinion or make a resolution if we are not sure of the situation. It's not that hard to do investigation, and it doesn't take that many people or that much time; in the rural areas, you can investigate one commune unit or in the city one or two factories, stores or schools, no more than a dozen or so in all. You don't have to do it all yourself: if you do one or two yourself you can organize a squad for the rest and lead it yourself... This is very important: party committee secretaries and members should all do investigation and study, or they may not have a clear understanding of conditions. You should understand good, average and bad typical cases.

In our work three things are required: understanding of circumstances, great determination and correct orientation. Clear understanding of circumstances comes first and is the basis of all work, because if circumstances are not understood there is no basis for discussion.

Even correct policy is no help if the circumstances are not understood. The policy of the Chengchow Conference was correct, but they said we would not settle accounts, and would not reimburse and indemnify anyone. But this was reversed later. The Shangai conference adopted eighteen articles, criticized the Ma-cheng report, and said that we would make reimbursement and indemnification. In 1959 I put out thirty or forty thousand words of material, but it is clear that a mere "battle on paper" is useless, because circumstances were covered up. There were differences in understanding; but now the understanding of the comrades on the provincial and local committees is more profound.

In 1961 we wanted to have a year of "seeking the truth from reality'. We have a tradition of "seeking the truth from reality" but probably as the pressure of official work increased we no longer paid attention to getting to the bottom of things. If you do not understand typical cases, then you will not be able to do your work easily. From now on everybody must do investigation and study and not just run other people down.

In the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal period of the Democratic Revolution, we emphasized investigation work, and the habit of investigation and study in the party as a whole was rather good. In the 10 years or so since Liberation, our work has rather fallen off in this respect. Why? We need to analyze this. Because in the period of the Democratic Revolution, we made several mistakes in line... both the right and the left failed to do investigation and study. For a long time the questions of what the circumstances were in China at the time and what strategy, tactics and policies to adopt were not solved. During the war of liberation, in the fight with Chiang Kai-shek, we paid a lot of attention to investigation, and circumstances were relatively clear. We were fairly familiar with the various aspects of waging revolution, and the problems were relatively straightforward. After Liberation the situation became more complicated. In the past when we had made some mistakes, it was fairly easy to educate the whole party. After liberation for several years we did some investigation and study, but not enough, and we didn't have a very good understanding of circumstances, as for example in the case of landlord restoration. It was only after disturbances broke out that we realized that the landlords were being restored. Generally, all three levels, the counties, the communes and the brigades, were somewhat counter-revolutionary. Rigid bureaucratic elements who took no account of party policy or of whether the masses lived or died belonged to the third category of bad elements. In the second category are the degenerate elements; in the first category, the landlord elements. The first and second are contradictions between ourselves and the enemy.... contradictions with rigid bureaucrats are contradictions among the people, but they must be strictly dealt with, by removing them from leadership positions and educating and reforming them. All who wish to correct themselves may do so through their work. There is ! another category of those who don't know how to go about things, who are muddled and confused; this is the fourth category. In the fifth are those with an average knowledge on policy matters who are not clear on some questions. In the sixth category are those who are not clear in their minds, know what to do, and do it fairly well. Throughout the country, over 90 percent of the cadres are good or fairly good. Of communes and brigades, 80 percent are good or fairly good, Rigid bureaucrats subjectively are not necessarily aiding the counter-revolution, but in actuality they are aiding it, and a part of them are its direct allies. All three collective elements have connections with the counter-revolution. When rigid bureaucrats pay no attention to whether people live or die, then no matter how they are subjectively, they are in fact the allies of the counterrevolution. If there are people who do not understand the three-level ownership system, then the Communist wind cannot blow. The counter-revolution will make use of them to achieve its evil deeds.

We were lacking in investigation and study concerning the restoration of the landlord class, but we were better informed about the urban counterrevolution. After the events in Hungary in 1956, by means of free expression of opinion we got to the bottom of things and purged several hundred thousand rightists; we also did a purge of the collectives in the countryside, but we did not anticipate the landlord restoration. Theoretically speaking, we anticipated it, because we had discussed the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Is it the landlords' and bourgeoisie's world or the proletariat's world? But we didn't carry out investigation or study, and so we did not understand the circumstances and our determination was not great. In 1959 the Communist wind was blowing, but because we did not understand the circumstances, our determination was not great. In the interval came the Lushan Conference. There emerged the right opportunist anti-party clique. We could not but be forced into fighting the right opportunists and could not but oppose them. But afterwards the Communist wind began to blow unprecedentedly hard, and we did some great undertakings: large-scale water conservancy, large-scale industry, large-scale agriculture, large-scale socialized economy, large-scale local railroads. We won a great achievement, this is undeniable. But how did we manage to carry on such large-scale undertakings? After the Lushan Conference, circumstances were not very dear, and a gust of wind blew from the right, in response to international revisionism and internal right wing. Last year the comrades on the Central Committee concentrated their force on international questions, and the circumstances were understood, the determination great, and the methods correct. We need to collect our forces to deal with internal problems too, to oppose counter-revolutionary elements and rigid bureaucratic elements, and to organize poor and lower-middle peasant committees to replace them, to u! nite the (poor and lower-middle) peasants. In our party there are elements representing the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie; we must cleanse the party of them.

As to the question of unity within the party: the unity of the Central Committee is the heart of the unity of the whole party. At the Lushan conference there was a small number of people who were opposed to unity. But we must stress unity. Making progress is well and good, but are we really making progress? They say “you have made mistakes too.”. This is right. Everybody makes mistakes; but they differ in size and nature. If you make a mistake, don’t be afraid to hold up your head: the Central Committee and the locals have all made mistakes.

This year we will stress work on quality and on product variety. The figure of X X X tons is not small, but the problem is that the quality is not high enough, so we will not lay stress on increasing quantity but on variety, quality, standards.

There has been some achievements in industry. But we must continue to strive for new achievements. We must contract industry, heavy industry, particularly on the basic construction front, and we must extend the agriculture and light industry fronts. This year we will not inaugurate new basic construction; some parts of old construction we will continue to do, while other parts we will leave where they are. Judging from the present, socialist construction cannot be too fast; we have to stress wavelike advances. Comrade Chen Po-ta has raised the question whether socialism has a periodic law. Just like an army on the march, it must have long and short rests; in between battles it must rest and regroup, must combine hard work and relaxation.

I have talked about “light industry, heavy industry, agriculture,” “simultaneous development of industry and agriculture,” and “walking on two legs” for five years, but they have not been realized. Now they may possibly be realized. I only say “possibly,” because the 1961 plan reflects the relationships among agriculture, and light and heavy industry, so there is a possibility.

At this conference, circumstances have gotten steadily clearer and determination has gotten steadily greater, but they are still uneven. Some comrades have said that “when the Communist wind blows we will have to go bankrupt and pay back our debts.” This way of speaking sounds bad at first, but in reality we will have to go bankrupt and pay back our debts. Once the county and commune levels have gone bankrupt and paid off their debts they will then have to “build their house with their bare hands.” In the past they built their house with others’ work. We Marxist-Leninists cannot exploit the workers, we can only exploit the exploiters. This is the basic principle of Marxism. Building the house with others’ work is getting it through exploitation, and is contrary to Marxism-Leninism. The landlords and the bourgeoisie are the ones who exploit the people; their method is to gradually cause the working people to go bankrupt. We practice equalization and use this method to set up a cooperative-ownership and public-ownership economy. If the state-run economy does not purchase goods at an equal price but at a lower price, they may be exploiting the peasants and may be causing the proletariat to desert its ally — the peasantry. It's easy to talk, but it's not very easy to put into practice. Has the First Secretary really the determination to break up the property and pay back the debts? If this is not practiced by even a single province, then the leadership is lacking in determination.

After the Chengchow Conference (March 1959) the sentiment for thorough reimbursement and indemnification had largely evaporated, but in some quarters it still exists. At the beginning of this fall, the Central Committee was not clear about various conditions; did not understand them, and still did not rectify them thoroughly. It was good that this kind of meeting was held last spring. Many meetings were held last year, but statements on the problems were not very concentrated, and conditions not very well understood, determination not very great, and methods not very correct.

Notes

[1.] For Peng's letter see pp 237-238 of this volume.

[2.] Pan Han-nien, once served as a vice-mayor of Shanghai. Previously he had secretly capitulated to the Kuomintang and had become a member of the notorious CC Clique.

Preface To "Oppose Book Worship"[1]

March 11, 1961

This is an old article which was written to oppose dogmatism in the Red Army at that time. At that time we did not use the term *Chiao-t'iao-chu-i* (dogmatism) but rather *Pen-pen-Chu-I* (bookworship). The article was written approximately in the spring of 1930. It has already been 30 years since I have read it. In January 1961, I suddenly found it in the Central Revolutionary Museum. The Central Revolutionary Museum had found it in the Fukien Lung Yen Area committee. In reading it I find that it still has some use, so I have had printed a good many copies as reference for comrades.

Notes

[1.] For the article Oppose Book Worship, see *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol VI. pp. 28-36 (Kranti Publications, 1990).

To The Communist Labour University In Kiangsi

August 1, 1961

Comrades

I wholeheartedly support your venture. Your schools, including your primary and secondary schools, and universities which follow the principle of part-time work and part-time study, hard work and hard study, thus costing the government nothing to run them, and which are situated on the mountain tops and in the plains of the province, are good schools indeed. Most of the students are young people, but there may also be some middle-aged cadres. I hope in other provinces besides Kiangsi there will be schools of this type. Other provinces should send competent and knowledgeable comrades in responsible positions to Kiangsi to investigate your schools and to absorb your experience. At the beginning there must not be too many students. Their number can be increased later to 50,000 as now in Kiangsi. Moreover the party, government and people's organizations (e.g. trade unions, youth league and women's associations) should also run their own schools on the principle of part-time work and part-time study. But there should be a difference [between] the work and study of your schools [and theirs]. Your work consists of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and so on; your studies are [also] on these subjects. The schools run by the party, government and people's organizations, on the other hand, should work in their own institutions and study cultural sciences, current affairs, Marxism-Leninism and so on. They are quite different from you. The central organizations have established two schools. One was created by the military police corps, which has been in existence for six or seven years. There the soldiers and cadres began by learning to read and write in the primary section, then they were promoted into the secondary section and finally entered the university section in 1960. They felt happy and wrote me a letter. I shall have the letter printed and show it to you. The other was established last year (1960) by the party institutions in Chungnanhai [Peking] on the same principle of part-tim! e work and part-time study. Its work means the work in the institutions, [and its students] include senior members of the staff, members of the manual staff, members of the liaison staff, members of the medical staff, members of the security staff and others. The military police, on the other hand, is an armed force whose work is security, i.e. sentry duties and so on. It also goes through military training. Naturally its school is different from civilian schools.

The Communist Labour University of Kiangsi celebrates its third anniversary on 1 August 1961 and I was asked to write a few words for the occasion. It is a big occasion for which I have written the above.

Talk At An Enlarged Working Conference Convened By The Central Committee Of The Communist Party Of China

January 30, 1962

[SOURCE: Extracted from *Peking Review*, No. 27, July 7, 1978.]

[Text and references are given here as provided by the Maoist Documentation Project. They are significantly different in at least one existing edition of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. VIII. — *Transcriber, MIA*.]

Comrades! I have a few points to raise (*enthusiastic applause*). Altogether there are six points I want to talk about. The main substance of what I want to say is the problem of democratic centralism, but at the same time I want to talk about a number of other problems.

(1) *The way this conference is being run*

This enlarged central work conference is being attended by over 7,000 people. At the start of the conference Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i and several other comrades prepared a draft report. Before this draft had been discussed by the Political Bureau, I suggested to them that instead of first holding a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss it, we should rather immediately issue it to the comrades who are participating in this conference so that everyone could comment on it and put forward ideas. Comrades, there are among you people from various fields and localities, various provincial, district and county committees, and from the Party committees of various enterprises. There are people from various departments at the Centre. The majority of you have more contact with the lower levels, and should have more understanding of situations and problems than us comrades on the Standing Committee, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat.

Furthermore, since you all hold different positions you can raise problems from different angles. That is why we invited you to put forward ideas and issued the draft report to you. The result has been a lively discussion in which many ideas have been put forward, not all of them along the lines of the basic policy of the Central Committee. Later Comrade Shao-ch'i presided over a drafting committee of twenty-one, including responsible members of the various central bureaux. After eight days of discussion they produced a second draft written report. It should be said that in this second draft report the Centre has collected together the results of over 7,000 people's discussion. Without your ideas this second draft could not have been written. In it both the first and second parts have many revisions. This is due to your efforts. I hear that you all consider the second draft to be not bad, and an improvement on the first. If we had not used this method, but held the conference in the usual manner, we would have heard the report first and held a discussion aft! erwards. Everyone would have approved it with a show of hands and we wouldn't have done as well as this.

This is a question of how to hold meetings. First of all, draft reports are distributed, and those present are invited to submit their ideas and amendments. Then a new report is prepared. When this report is presented it shouldn't be read out word by word, but some supplementary ideas should be expounded and the changes should be explained. In this way we can promote democracy more fully, gather wisdom from all directions, and compare all the different points of view. Also our meetings will be more lively. The purpose of this conference is to sum up the working experience of the past twelve years and especially the working experience of the last four years. There are many problems, so there may be many ideas being put forward, thus creating conditions favourable for this type of conference. Is it possible for all conferences to adopt this method? No, it is not possible. To use this method we must have plenty of time. We can sometimes use this method at meetings of our people's congresses. Comrades from provincial committees, district committees, and county committees, when you convene conferences in future you may also adopt this method under suitable conditions. Of course when you are busy you usually cannot spend a lot of time on conferences. But when conditions are right, why not try it out?

What sort of method is this? It is a democratic centralist method; it is a mass-line method. First democracy, then centralism; coming from the masses, returning to the masses; the unity of the leadership and the masses. This is the first point I wanted to talk about.

(2) *The problem of democratic centralism*

It seems that some of our comrades still do not understand the democratic centralism which Marx and Lenin talked of. Some of those comrades are already veteran revolutionaries, with a 'three eight style'[1] or some other style — anyway they have been Party members for several decades, yet they still do not understand this question. They are afraid of the masses, afraid of the masses talking about them, afraid of the masses criticizing them. What sense does it make for Marxist-Leninists to be afraid of the masses? When they have made mistakes they don't talk about themselves, and they are afraid of the masses talking about them. The more frightened they are, the more haunted they become. I think one should not be afraid. What is there to be afraid of? Our attitude is to hold fast to the truth and be ready at any time to correct our mistakes. The question of right or wrong, correct or incorrect in our work has to do with the contradictions among the people. To resolve contradictions among the people we can't use curses or fists, still less guns or knives. We can only use the method of discussion, reasoning, criticism and self-criticism. In short, we can only use democratic methods, the method of letting the masses speak out.

Both inside and outside the Party there must be a full democratic life, which means conscientiously putting democratic centralism into effect. We must conscientiously bring questions out into the open, and let the masses speak out. Even at the risk of being cursed we should still let them speak out. The result of their curses at the worst will be that we are thrown out and cannot go on doing this kind of work — demoted or transferred. What is so impossible about that? Why should a person only go up and never go down? Why should one only work in one place and never be transferred to another? I think that demotion and transfer, whether it is justified or not, does good to people. They thereby strengthen their revolutionary will, are able to investigate and study a variety of new conditions and increase their useful knowledge. I myself have had experience in this respect and gained a great deal of benefit. If you do not believe me, why not try it yourselves. Ssu-ma Ch'ien said: Wen Wang was imprisoned and the result was the development of the *Chou l;* Confucius was in dire straits and so compiled the *Spring and Autumn Annals;* Ch'u Yüan was exiled and so wrote the *Li Sao*; Tso Ch'iu became blind and then wrote the *Kuo-yü;* Sun-tzu was mutilated and mastered military strategy; Lu Pu-wei was transferred to the kingdom of Shu and so the world could read his work; Han Fei was imprisoned in the kingdom of Ch'in and wrote because he could not keep his anger to himself. Of the hundreds of poems and prose works written the majority were written by sages who were experiencing anger and frustration.[2]

In modern times people have had doubts about the truth of these statements about Wen Wang developing the *Chou I* and Confucius compiling the *Spring and Autumn Annals,* but we don't have to worry about that — let the experts study those problems! Ssu-ma Ch'ien believed that this was true, and it is a fact that Wen Wang was imprisoned and Confucius was in dire straits. The things which Ssu-ma Ch'ien mentioned, apart from the example of Tso Ch'iu's going blind, all referred to the incorrect handling of the people concerned by the top leadership of the time. In the past we have also handled some cadres in an incorrect way. No matter whether we were completely mistaken in our handling of these people, or only partially mistaken, they should all be cleared and rehabilitated according to the actual circumstances. But generally speaking, this incorrect treatment — having them demoted or transferred — tempers their revolutionary will and enables them to absorb much new knowledge from the masses.

I must point out that I am not advocating the indiscriminate wrong treatment of our cadres, our comrades, or anybody else, in the way in which the ancients detained Wen Wang, starved Confucius, exiled Ch'u Yüan, or cut off Sun-tzu's kneecaps. I am not in favour of this way of doing things — I oppose it. What I am saying is that in every stage of mankind's history there have always been such cases of mishandling. In class societies such cases are numerous. Even in a socialist society such things cannot be entirely avoided either, whether it be in a period of leadership by a correct or an incorrect line. There is however one distinction: namely, that during a period of correct line of leadership, as soon as it has been discovered that things have been mishandled, people can be cleared and rehabilitated, apologies can be made to them, so that their minds can be set at rest and they can lift up their heads again. But during a time when leadership follows an incorrect line, this way of doing things becomes impossible. Then the only thing for those who represent the correct line, at a suitable opportunity to use the methods of democratic centralism to take the initiative to set mistakes right. As for those who have themselves made mistakes, after their mistakes have been criticized by comrades and their cases have been appraised by the higher levels and they are given correct treatment, then if they are demoted or transferred one hardly need say that this demotion or transfer may be helpful to them in correcting their mistakes and gaining new knowledge.

Now there are some comrades who are afraid of the masses initiating discussion and putting forward ideas which differ from those of the leaders and leading organizations. As soon as problems are discussed they suppress the activism of the masses and do not allow others to speak out. This attitude is extremely evil. Democratic centralism is written into our Party Constitution and State Constitution, but they don't apply it. Comrades, we are revolutionaries. If we have really committed mistakes of the kind which are harmful to the people's cause, then we should seek the opinions of the masses and of comrades and carry out a self-examination. This sort of self-examination should sometimes be repeated several times over. If once is not enough and people are not satisfied, then it should be done a second time. If they are still not satisfied, it should be done a third time until nobody has any more criticisms. Some provincial Party committees have done this. Some provinces are taking more initiative and letting everyone talk. Those who started self-criticism earlier did so as early as 1959. The late-starters started self-criticism in 1961. Some provincial Party committees were compelled to carry out self-examinations, such as Honan, Kansu and Chinghai. According to some reports there are other provinces which are only now starting on self-criticism. It does not matter whether you take the initiative on the question of self-examination, or whether you are forced into it. It does not matter whether you do it earlier or later, provided you look squarely at your mistakes and are willing to admit them and correct them, and you are willing to let the masses criticize you — provided only that you adopt this kind of attitude you will be welcomed.

Criticism and self-criticism is a kind of method. It is a method of resolving contradictions among the people and it is the only method. There is no other. But if we do not have a full democratic life and do not truly implement democratic centralism, then this method of criticism and self-criticism cannot be applied.

Do we not now have many difficulties? Unless we rely on the masses, and mobilize the enthusiasm of the masses and of the cadres, we cannot overcome these difficulties. But if you do not explain the situation to the masses and to the cadres, if we do not offer our hearts to them and let them voice their own opinions, they will still be afraid of you and not dare to speak out. It would then be impossible to mobilize their enthusiasm. In 1957 I said: ‘We must bring about a political climate which has both centralism and democracy, discipline and freedom, unity of purpose and ease of mind for the individual, and which is lively and vigorous.’ We should have this political climate both within the Party and outside. Without this political climate the enthusiasm of the masses cannot be mobilized. We cannot overcome difficulties without democracy. Of course, it is even more impossible[3] to do so without centralism, but if there’s no democracy there won’t be any centralism.

Without democracy there cannot be any correct centralism because people’s ideas differ, and if their understanding of things lacks unity then centralism cannot be established. What is centralism? First of all it is a centralization of correct ideas, on the basis of which unity of understanding, policy, planning, command and action are achieved. This is called centralized unification. If people still do not understand problems, if they have ideas but have not expressed them, or are angry but still have not vented their anger, how can centralized unification be established? If there is no democracy we cannot possibly summarize experience correctly. If there is no democracy, if ideas are not coming from the masses, it is impossible to establish a good line, good general and specific policies and methods. Our leading organs merely play the role of a processing plant in the establishment of a good line and good general and specific policies and methods. Everyone knows that if a factory has no raw material it cannot do any processing. If the raw material is not adequate in quantity and quality it cannot produce good finished products. Without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below; the situation will be unclear; you will be unable to collect sufficient opinions from all sides; there can be no communication between top and bottom; top-level organs of leadership will depend on one-sided and incorrect material to decide issues, thus you will find it difficult to avoid being subjectivist; it will be impossible to achieve unity of understanding and unity of action, and impossible to achieve true centralism. Is not the main item for discussion at this session of our conference opposition to dispersionism and the strengthening of centralized unification? If we fail to promote democracy in full measure, then will this centralism and this unification be true or false? Will it be real or empty? Will it be correct or incorrect? Of course it must be false, empty and incorrect.

Our centralism is built on democratic foundations; proletarian centralism is based on broad democratic foundations. The Party committee at various levels is the organ which implements centralized leadership. But the leadership of the Party committees is a collective leadership; matters cannot be decided arbitrarily by the first secretary alone. Within Party committees democratic centralism should be the sole mode of operation. The relationship between the first secretary and the other secretaries and committee members is one of the minority obeying the majority. For example, in the Standing Committee and the Political Bureau situations like this often arise: when I say something, no matter whether it is correct or incorrect, provided that everyone disagrees with me, I will accede to their point of view because they are the majority. I am told that the situation exists within some provincial Party committees, district Party committees and county Party committees, whereby in all matters whatever the first secretary says goes.

This is quite wrong. It is nonsense if whatever one person says goes. I am referring to important matters, not to the routine work which comes in the wake of decisions. All important matters must be discussed collectively, different opinions must be listened to seriously, and the complexities of the situation and partial opinions must be analysed. Account must be taken of various possibilities and estimates made of the various aspects of a situation: which are good, which bad, which easy, which difficult, which possible and which impossible. Every effort must be made to be both cautious and thorough. Otherwise you have one-man tyranny. Such first secretaries should be called tyrants and not 'squad leaders' of democratic centralism. Once upon a time there was a certain Hsiang Yü, who was called the Tyrant of Western Ch'u. He hated listening to opinions which differed from his. He had a man called Fan Tseng working for him who offered him advice, but Hsiang Y&u! uml; did not listen. There was another man called Liu Pang, who became Emperor Kao-tsu of Han, who was better at accepting ideas different from his own. An intellectual called Li I-chi went to see Liu Pang, and announced himself as a scholar of the school of Confucius. Liu Pang said: 'There's a war on, I don't want to see scholars.' Li I-chi flared up. He said to the gatekeeper: 'You bloody well go in and say that I am a drinking man from Kaoyang and not a scholar at all.' The gatekeeper went in and announced him as he was told. Liu Pang said: 'Good, ask him in.' He was invited in. Liu Pang was washing his feet at the time, but he quickly got up to welcome him. But Li I-chi was still furious because Liu Pang had refused to see a scholar and he gave Liu Pang a telling off. 'Do you want to conquer the world or don't you? Why do you look down on your elders? At that time Li I-chi was over sixty and Liu Pang was younger, so Li called himself 'your elder'. At these words Liu Pang apologized and at once accepted his plan of seizing the county of Ch'en-liu. This incident can be read in the biographies of Li I-chi and Chu Chien in the Shi-chi.[4]

Liu Pang was a hero whom the historians of the feudal period called a straightforward, open-minded man, who listened to advice and was as relaxed as a flowing river. Liu Pang fought Hsiang Yü for many years. In the end Liu Pang won and Hsiang Yü was defeated. This was no mere chance. We now have some first secretaries who cannot even match Liu Pang of the feudal period, and are somewhat like Hsiang Yü. If these comrades don't reform, they will lose their jobs. You all know the play called *The Tyrant Bids His Lady Farewell*;[5] if these comrades don't reform, the day will surely come when they too will be saying farewell to their ladies (*laughter*). Why do I say this so bluntly? It is because I intend to be mean and make some comrades feel sore so that they think over things properly. It wouldn't be a bad thing if they couldn't sleep for a night or two. If they were able to sleep, then I wouldn't be pleased because it would mean that they have not yet felt sore.

There are some comrades who cannot bear to listen to ideas contrary to their own, and cannot bear to be criticized. This is very wrong. During this conference one province held a meeting which started off in a very lively manner, but as soon as the provincial Party secretary arrived a hush fell on the proceedings and nobody spoke. Comrade provincial Party secretary, what is the purpose of your attendance at meetings? Why don't you stay in your own room and think about problems and let others all take part in the discussion? When this kind of atmosphere is engendered and people don't dare to speak in your presence, then it is up to you to keep away. If you have made mistakes, then you should carry out self-criticism, let others speak, let others criticize you. On 12 June last year, during the last day of the Peking Conference called by the Central Committee, I talked about my own shortcomings and mistakes. I said I wanted the comrades to convey what I said to their various provinces and districts. I found out later that many districts did not get my message, as if my mistakes could be hidden and ought to be hidden. Comrades, they mustn't be hidden. Any mistakes that the Centre has made ought to be my direct responsibilty, and I also have an indirect share in the blame because I am the Chairman of the Central Committee. I don't want other people to shirk their responsibility. There are some other comrades who also bear responsibility, but the person primarily responsible should be me. All you who are our provincial committee secretaries, district Party committee secretaries, county Party committee secretaries, down to ward Party and other secretaries, enterprise committee secretaries and commune Party committee secretaries, since you have taken on the job of first secretary you must bear the responsibility for mistakes and shortcomings in the work.

Those of you who shirk responsibility or who are afraid of taking responsibility, who do not allow people to speak, who think you are tigers, and that nobody will dare to touch your arse, whoever has this attitude, ten out of ten of you will fail. People will talk anyway. You think that nobody will really dare to touch the arse of tigers like you? They damn well will!

Unless we fully promote people's democracy and inner-Party democracy in our country, and unless we fully implement the system of proletarian democracy, it will be impossible to achieve a true proletarian centralism. Without a high degree of democracy, it is impossible to achieve a high degree of centralism, and without a high degree of centralism, it is impossible to establish a socialist economy. If our country does not establish a socialist economy, what kind of situation shall we be in? We shall become a country like Yugoslavia, which has actually become a bourgeois country; the dictatorship of the proletariat will be transformed into a bourgeois dictatorship, into a reactionary fascist type of dictatorship. This is a question which demands the utmost vigilance. I hope comrades will give a great deal of thought to it.

Without the system of democratic centralism, the proletarian dictatorship cannot be consolidated. To practise democracy among the people and to practise dictatorship over the enemies of the people, these two aspects are inseparable. When these two aspects are combined, this is then proletarian dictatorship, or it may be called people's democratic dictatorship. Our slogan is: 'A people's democratic dictatorship, led by the proletariat, and based on the alliance of the workers and peasants.' How does the proletariat exercise leadership? It leads through the Communist Party. The Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat. The proletariat unites with all classes and strata who approve of, support and participate in the socialist revolution and socialist construction, and exercises dictatorship over the reactionary classes or the remnants thereof. In our country the system of exploitation of man by man has already been eliminated. The economic foundations of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie have been eliminated. The reactionary classes are now no longer as ferocious as hitherto. For example, they are no longer as ferocious as in 1949 when the People's Republic was founded, nor as ferocious as in 1957 when the right-wing bourgeosie madly attacked us.[6] Therefore we speak of them as the remnants of the reactionary classes. But we may on no account underestimate these remnants. We must continue to struggle against them. The reactionary classes which have been overthrown are still planning a come-back. In a socialist society, new bourgeois elements may still be produced. During the whole socialist stage there still exist classes and class struggle, and this class struggle is a protracted, complex, sometimes even violent affair. Our instruments of dictatorship should not be weakened; on the contrary they should be strengthened. Our security system is in the hands of comrades who follow the correct line. It is po! ssible that the security departments in some places may be in the hands of bad people. There are also some comrades engaged on security work who do not rely on the masses or on the Party. In the work of purging counter-revolutionaries, they do not follow the line of purging them with the help of the masses under the leadership of the Party committee. They rely solely on secret work, on so-called professional work. Professional work is necessary; it is absolutely necessary to use the methods of detection and trial to deal with counter-revolutionary elements, but the most important thing is to carry out the mass line under the leadership of the Party committee. When we are concerned with dictatorship over the whole reactionary class, it is especially important to rely on the masses and the Party. To exercise dictatorship over the reactionary classes does not mean that we should totally eliminate all reactionary elements, but rather that we should eliminate the classes to which they belong. We should use appropriate methods to remould them and transform them into new men. Without a broad people's democracy, proletarian dictatorship cannot be consolidated and political power would be unstable. Without democracy, without the mobilization of the masses, without mass supervision, it will be impossible to exercise effective dictatorship over the reactionary and bad elements, and it will be impossible effectively to remould them. Thus they would continue to make trouble and might still stage a come-back. This problem demands vigilance, and I hope comrades will give a great deal of thought to this too.

(3) ***Which classes should we unite with?***

Which classes should we unite with? Which classes should we repress? This is a question of basic standpoint.

The working class should unite with the peasant class, the urban petit bourgeoisie, and the patriotic national bourgeoisie; first of all it should unite with the peasant class. The intellectuals such as, for example, scientists, engineers and technicians, professors, writers, artists, actors, medical workers and journalists, do not constitute a class; they are either appendages of the bourgeoisie or of the proletariat. As regards the intellectuals, do we unite only with those who are revolutionary? No. As long as they are patriotic we will unite with them and let them get on with their work. Workers, peasants, urban petit-bourgeois elements, patriotic intellectuals, patriotic capitalists and other patriots together comprise more than ninety-five per cent of the whole country's population. Under our people’s democratic dictatorship, all of these come within the classification of the people. And among the people we must practise democracy.

Those whom the people’s democratic dictatorship should repress are: landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionary elements, bad elements and anti-communist rightists. The classes which the counter-revolutionary elements, bad elements and anti-communist rightists represent the landlord class and the reactionary bourgeoisie. These classes and bad people comprise about four or five per cent of the population. These are the people we must compel to reform. They are the people whom the people’s democratic dictatorship is directed against.

On which side do we stand? Do we stand on the side of the popular masses, who comprise over ninety-five per cent of the whole country’s population? Or do we stand on the side of the landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionary elements, bad elements and rightists who comprise four or five per cent of the whole country’s population? We must stand on the side of the popular masses and absolutely mustn’t stand on the side of the people’s enemies; this is a question of the basic standpoint of a Marxist-Leninist.

This holds true both within our country and in the international sphere. The people of all countries, the great masses of the people who comprise more than ninety-five per cent of the [world’s] population certainly want revolution, they certainly support Marxism-Leninism and cannot support revisionism. Some may support revisionism temporarily, but later they will finally reject it. They will all gradually awaken and oppose imperialism and the reactionaries of various nations; they will all oppose revisionism. A true Marxist-Leninist must stand resolutely on the side of the popular masses who comprise over ninety-five per cent of the world’s population.

(4) *Acquiring an understanding of the objective world*

In acquiring an understanding of the objective world, in making a flying leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, man must pass through a process. On the question of how China was to carry out the democratic revolution, from the founding of the Party in 1921 to the Seventh Congress in 1945 it was altogether twenty-four years before our Party’s understanding reached complete unity. In the meantime we had the experience of the Rectification Movement on an all-party scale which lasted from the spring of 1942 to the summer of 1945, altogether three and a half years. This was a very searching movement, which adopted the method of democracy, which is to say that no matter who it was who had made mistakes, provided he acknowledged them and corrected them, things would be all right, and everybody helped him to acknowledge and correct his mistakes. This is called ‘taking warning from the past in order to be more careful in future; treating the illness in order to save the patient’, ‘taking the desire for unity as a starting-point, passing through criticism or struggle, distinguishing between right and wrong, and reaching a new unity on a new basis’. The formula ‘unity-criticism-unity’ was created at that time. The Rectification Movement helped the comrades of the whole Party to reach unity of understanding. The question of how to carry out the democratic revolution, how to devise the Party line and various concrete policies were all completely solved at that time, and especially after the Rectification Movement.

Between the founding of the Party and the War of Resistance to Japan came the Northern Expeditionary War and the ten years' Agrarian Revolutionary War, when we experienced two victories and two defeats. The Northern Expeditionary War was victorious, but in 1927 the revolution suffered a defeat. In the Agrarian Revolutionary War we won great victories, the Red Army grew to a strength of 300,000, but later we again met with setbacks and after the Long March these 300,000 men were reduced to some 20,000-odd. After we reached North Shensi the numbers increased a little, but still did not reach 30,000; that is to say they were still less than a tenth of the original 300,000. In the final analysis which was the stronger the army of 300,000 or the army of under 30,000? Having suffered such great setbacks and encountered such hardships we had become hardened, we had acquired experience, we had corrected our wrong line and restored the correct line. Therefore the army of under 30,000 was stronger than the previous army of 300,000. Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i said in his report that in the past four years our line was correct. and that our achievements were the main feature; we made some mistakes in our practical work and suffered some hardships, but we gained experience; therefore we are stronger than before, not weaker. This is how things actually are. During the period of the democratic revolution, it was only after experiencing first victory, then defeat, victory again and again defeat, and after comparing the two [victories and defeats], that I came to understand this objective world of China. On the eve of the War of Resistance to Japan and during that war I wrote a number of articles, such as 'Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War', 'On Protracted War', 'On New Democracy', 'Forward to the *Communist*', and I drafted a number of documents on policy and strategy for the Central Committee. All these served to summarize revolutionar! y experience. These articles and documents could only have been produced at that time, and not before, because until I had been through these great storms and had been able to compare our two victories with our two defeats, I did not yet have sufficient experience, and could not yet fully understand the laws of the Chinese revolution.

Speaking generally, it is we Chinese who have achieved understanding of the objective world of China, not the comrades concerned with Chinese questions in the Communist International. These comrades in the Communist International simply did not understand, or we could say they utterly failed to understand[7] Chinese society, the Chinese nation, or the Chinese revolution. For a long time even we did not have a clear understanding of the objective world of China, let alone the foreign comrades!

It was not until the period of the Resistance to Japan that we formulated a general line for the Party and a complete set of concrete policies which were appropriate to the actual situation. By this time we had been making revolution for more than twenty years. For so many years previously we were working very much in the dark. If anyone were to claim that any comrade, for example any member of the Central Committee, or I myself, completely understood the laws of the Chinese revolution right from the beginning, then that comrade would be talking through his hat. He should definitely not be believed. It was not like that at all. In the past, and especially at the beginning, all our energies were directed towards revolution, but as for how to make revolution, what we wanted to change, which should come first and which later, and which should wait until the next stage — for a fairly long time none of these questions were properly understood, or we could say they were not thoroughly understood.

When I explain how our Chinese Communist Party during the period of democratic revolution, after much difficulty successfully came to understand the laws of the Chinese revolution, my aim in bringing up these historical facts is to help our comrades to appreciate one thing: that understanding the laws of socialist construction must pass through a process. It must take practice as its starting-point, passing from having no experience to having some experience; from having little experience to having more experience; from the construction of socialism, which is in the realm of necessity as yet not understood, to the gradual overcoming of our blindness and the understanding of objective laws, thereby attaining freedom, achieving a flying leap in our knowledge and reaching the realm of freedom.

With regard to socialist construction we still lack experience. I have discussed this problem with delegations of fraternal parties from quite a few countries, and I said to them that we have no experience of the construction of a socialist economy.

I have also discussed this problem with several journalists from capitalist countries, among whom there was an American called Snow. For a long time he had wanted to come to China, and in 1960 we let him come. I had a discussion with him. I said: ‘As you know, we have a set of experiences, general and specific policies and methods on politics, military affairs and class struggle; but as for socialist construction we have never done any in the past, and we still have no experience. You may say: “Haven’t you done it for eleven years?” Yes, we have done it for eleven years, and we still lack knowledge and experience. Even if we are beginning to have a little, it still isn’t much.’ Snow wanted me to say something about China’s long-term construction plan. I said: ‘I don’t know.’ He said: ‘You are being too prudent.’ I said: ‘It’s not a question of being prudent. It’s just that I really don’t know, we just haven’t any experience, that’s all.’ Comrades, it’s true that we don’t know; we really do lack experience and it is a fact that we have no such long-term plan. 1960 was the year when we ran into a lot of difficulties. In 1961 I had a discussion with Montgomery, at which we talked about these ideas again. He said: ‘In another fifty years you will be terrific.’ What he meant was that after fifty years we might become powerful and ‘invade’ other countries, but not within fifty years. He had expounded his opinions to me when he came to China in 1960. I said: ‘We are Marxist-Leninists, our state is a socialist state, not a capitalist state, therefore we wouldn’t invade in a hundred years, or even ten thousand years. As for the construction of a strong socialist economy, in China fifty years won’t be enough; it may take a hundred years or even longer. In your country the development of capitalism took several hundred years. We won’t count ! the sixteenth century, which was still in the Middle Ages. From the seventeenth century to now is already 360 years. In our country, the construction of a great and mighty socialist economy I reckon will take more than one hundred years.’ What period was the seventeenth century? It was the end of the Ming and the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasties in China. A century later, in the first half of the eighteenth century, was the Ch'ien-lung period of the Ch'ing dynasty. The author of the *Dream of the Red Chamber,* Ts'ao Hsüeh-ch'in, lived in that period. It was the period which produced the character Chia Pao-yü, who was dissatisfied with the feudal system. In China, in the Ch'ien-lung period, the sprouts of capitalist relationships of production already existed, but it was still a feudal society. This is the social background of the characters who appeared in Prospect Garden.[8] Before this, in the seventeenth century, a number of European countries were already in the process of developing capitalism. It has taken over 300 years for capitalist productive forces to develop to their present pattern. Socialism is superior in many respects to capitalism, and the economic development of our country may be much faster than that of capitalist countries. But China has a large population, our resources are meagre, and our economy backward so that in my opinion, it will be impossible to develop our productive power so rapidly as to catch up with, and overtake, the most advanced capitalist countries in less than one hundred years. If it requires only a few decades, for example only fifty years as some have conjectured, then that will be a splendid thing, for which heaven and earth be praised. But I would advise, comrades, that it is better to think more of the difficulties and so to envisage it as taking a longer period. It took from three to four hundred years to build a great and mighty capitalist eco! nomy; what would be wrong with building a great and mighty socialist economy in our country in about fifty or a hundred years? The next fifty or hundred years from now will be an epic period of fundamental change in the social system of the world, an earth-shaking period, with which no past era can be compared. Living in such a period, we must be prepared to carry out great struggles, differing in many respects from the forms of struggle of previous periods. In order to carry out this task, we must do our very best to combine the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete reality of Chinese socialist construction and with the concrete reality of future world revolution and, through practice, gradually come to understand the objective laws of the struggle. We must be prepared to suffer many defeats and set-backs as a result of our blindness, thereby gaining experience and winning final victory. When we see things in this light, then there are many advantages in envisaging it as taking a long period; conversely, harm would result from envisaging a short period.

In our work of socialist construction, we are still to a very large extent acting blindly. For us the socialist economy is still in many respects a realm of necessity not yet understood. Take me as an example: there are many problems in the work of economic construction which I still don't understand. I haven't got much understanding of industry and commerce. I understand a bit about agriculture, but this is only relatively speaking — I still don't understand much. In order to have a deeper understanding of agriculture one should understand pedology, botany, crop cultivation, agricultural chemistry, agricultural mechanization, etc. There are also different forms of agricultural production such as food grains, cotton, oil, hemp, silk, tea, sugar, vegetables, tobacco, fruit, medical herbs, and miscellaneous grain crops, etc. There are also animal husbandry and forestry. I myself am a believer in Vilensky's penology. In his works on penology Vilensky advocated the combination of farming, forestry and animal husbandry. I think we must have this three-way combination or agriculture will suffer. I advise, comrades, when you have some moments to spare after work, please will you seriously study all these problems of agricultural production. I myself also would like to study more. Up to now however my knowledge of these matters has been very scanty. I have paid rather more attention to problems relating to the system, to the productive relationships. As for the productive forces, I know very little. As regards our Party as a whole, our knowledge of socialist construction is extremely inadequate. We should from now on spend a period of time in summarizing our experiences and in hard study, and in the course of practice gradually deepen our understanding of it through clarifying its laws. We must put in a lot of hard work and make thorough investigations. We must go down to the countryside to squat on a selected spot. We must go and squat in the production brigades and ! production teams, and go to the factories and shops. As to making investigations and studies, we used to do them rather well but since we came into the cities we have no longer taken them seriously. In 1961 we did advocate it once again, and now there have already been some changes. But amongst the leading cadres, especially the higher-level leading cadres, some districts, departments and enterprises still haven’t adopted this style. There are same provincial Party secretaries who have still not gone down to squat on selected spots. If the provincial Party secretaries don’t go, how can they ask district Party secretaries and county Party secretaries to go down to squat? This is no good — it must be changed.

Since the founding of the Chinese People’s Republic, twelve years have already gone by. These twelve years can be divided into a first period of eight years and a second period of four years: 1950 to the end of 1957 constitute the first eight years; 1958 to now is the second four years. In this conference of ours, we have already initially summarized the experiences of our past work, mainly the experiences of the second period of four years. This summary is reflected in the report by Comrade Liu Shao-ch’i. We have already formulated, or are formulating, or shall formulate, concrete policies in various fields. What we have already formulated are things such as sixty regulations on work in the countryside, seventy regulations on industrial enterprises, sixty regulations on higher education, and forty regulations on scientific research. All these draft regulations have already been implemented or are being experimented with; they will be revised in future — some may have to be greatly revised. Among those regulations which are in the process of formulation are the regulations on commerce. Among the regulations which are going to be formulated in future are the regulations on middle-school and primary-school education.[9] We should also formulate some regulations on the work of our Party, government and mass organizations. The army has already formulated some regulations. In short, in industry, agriculture, commerce, education, army, government and Party, in those seven aspects of the work we must properly summarize experience and formulate a complete set of general and specific policies and methods suited to our conditions, so that they may progress along correct lines.

It is not enough to have the General Line; it is also necessary that, under the leadership of the General Line, in the domains of industry, agriculture, commerce, education, army, government and Party, there should be a complete set of concrete general and specific policies and methods which are suited to our conditions. Only then is it possible to persuade the masses and the cadres. We should use these as teaching materials to educate them, so that they may be united in understanding and action. Only then will it be possible to attain victory in the task of revolution and construction; otherwise it is impossible. On this point, even as far back as the War of Resistance to Japan, we already had a profound understanding. At that time we acted in this way, and therefore the cadres and masses had a unified understanding of the complete set of concrete general and specific policies and methods of the democratic revolutionary period, and thus there was unified action and we therefore attained victory in the democratic revolutionary task of that period. This everybody knows. During the period of socialist revolution and construction, our revolutionary tasks in the first few years were: in the countryside to complete the reform of the feudal land system and then to implement agricultural cooperation; in the cities to implement the socialist transformation of capitalist industrial and commercial enterprises. In the field of economic construction our task then was to rehabilitate the economy and implement the first five-year plan. Both in the revolution and in construction at that time we had a General Line which was appropriate to the objective conditions and which had abundant persuasive power. We also had a complete set of general and specific policies and methods under the leadership of the General Line. Therefore we could educate the cadres and masses, unify their understanding, and the work was carried out relatively well. This everybody also knows. But in those days the situation was such that, since we! had no experience in economic construction, we had no alternative but to copy the Soviet Union. In the field of heavy industry especially, we copied almost everything from the Soviet Union, and we had very little creativity of our own. At that time it was absolutely necessary to act thus, but at the same time it was also a weakness — a lack of creativity and lack of ability to stand on our own feet. Naturally this could not be our long-term strategy. From 1958 we decided to make self-reliance our major policy and striving for foreign aid a secondary aim. At the Second Session of the Party's Eighth Congress in 1958, we adopted the General L ine of 'going all out and aiming high to achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism'. In the same year the people's communes were also established, and the slogan of a 'Greet Leap Forward' was issued. For a certain period after the General Line of socialist construction was proclaimed, we still hadn't had the time nor the possibility to formulate a complete set of concrete general and specific policies and methods which were appropriate to the conditions, since our experience was still not sufficient. Under these circumstances the cadres and the masses still did not have a complete set of teaching materials, nor had they received any systematic education on policy and so it wasn't possible to have genuinely unified understanding and action. It only became possible after the passage of time, the experience of setbacks and difficulties, and the gaining of both positive and negative experience. Now it's all right, we already have these things or are now formulating them. Thus we can now more judiciously carry out the socialist revolution and socialist construction. In order to formulate a complete set of concrete general and specific policies and methods under the guidance of the General Line, it is necessary to allow ideas to come from the masses and to adopt t! he method of systematic and thorough investigation and study, and examine historically the successful and unsuccessful experiences in our work. Only then may we discover the laws inherent in objective things and not created by people's subjective imaginations; and only then may we be able to formulate various regulations which are appropriate to the circumstances. This is a very important matter. Will you comrades please pay attention to this point.

In industry, agriculture, commerce, education, military affairs, government and Party, in all these seven domains the Party leads in all things. The Party has to lead industry, agriculture, commerce, culture, education, the army and government. Generally speaking, our Party is very good. Our Party is mainly composed of workers and poor peasants. The great majority of our cadres are good, they all work industriously, but we must also see that in our Party there still exist some problems; we mustn't imagine that everything is good with the state of our Party. At present we have over seventeen million Party members, and among these members almost eighty per cent became members after the founding of the state: they joined the Party in the fifties. Only twenty per cent joined before the founding of our state, and among these twenty per cent of our members, those who joined the Party before 1930, that is to say those who joined the Party during the twenties according to the estimate of eight years ago were some 800-odd people. Some of these have died in the past two years so now I am afraid there may only be 700-odd people left. Among both old and new Party members — especially among the new members there are always some people whose characters and working styles are impure. Those people are individualists, bureaucrats, subjectivists: some have even become degenerate elements. There are some people who adopt the guise of Communist Party members, but they in no way represent the working class; instead they represent the bourgeoisie. All is not pure within the Party. We must see this point, otherwise we shall suffer.

The above is my fourth point. Our understanding of the objective world must pass through a process. First of all we do not understand, or do not completely understand it, but after repeated practice and after we have obtained results through practice, when we have won victories and also had tumbles and setbacks, we are able to compare our victories and defeats. Only then is there a possibility of developing to the point of achieving complete understanding or relatively complete understanding. By that time we shall be exercising more initiative, we shall be more free and we shall become more intelligent. Freedom means the recognition of necessity and it means transforming the objective world. Only on the basis of recognizing necessity can man enjoy freedom of activity; this is the dialectical law of freedom and necessity. What we call necessity is an objectively existing law. Before we recognize it our behaviour cannot be conscious; it has elements of blindness. At this time we are stupid; during the last few years haven't we made many stupid blunders?

(5) *The international communist movement*

On this question I am only going to say a few simple sentences. No matter whether in China or in other countries of the world, over ninety per cent of the people will support Marxism-Leninism in the long run. In this world at present there are still many people being deceived by social-democratic parties, by the revisionists, the imperialists, or by the reactionary elements of various countries, who have not yet awakened. But eventually little by little they will awaken, they will support Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism is truth; it cannot be resisted. The masses want revolution; the world revolution will finally be victorious. Those who forbid revolution such as the characters in Lu Hsün's book, Squire Chao, Squire Ch'ien and the Fake Foreign Devil who did not allow Ah Q to make revolution, will finally be defeated.

The Soviet Union was the first socialist country, and the Soviet Communist Party was the party created by Lenin. Although the Party and the state leadership of the Soviet Union have now been usurped by the revisionists, I advise our comrades to believe firmly that the broad masses, the numerous Party members and cadres of the Soviet Union are good; that they want revolution, and that the rule of the revisionists won't last long. No matter when: now, in the future, in our generation or our descendants', we should all learn from the Soviet Union, study the experiences of the Soviet Union. If we don't learn from the Soviet Union, we will make mistakes. People may ask: since the Soviet Union is under the rule of the revisionists, should we still learn from them? What we should learn is about the good people and good things of the Soviet Union, the good experiences of the Soviet Communist Party. As for the bad people and bad things of the Soviet Union and the Soviet revisionists, we should treat them as teachers by negative example and learn lessons from them.

We should always uphold the principle of the unity of proletarian internationalism. We always advocate that the socialist countries and the world communist movement must unite firmly on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. The international revisionists are ceaselessly cursing us. Our attitude is, let them go on cursing us. When it becomes necessary we can give them some appropriate answers. Our Party has become accustomed to being cursed. Leaving aside those who attacked us in the past, what about the present? Abroad, the imperialists curse us, the reactionary nationalists curse us, the revisionists curse us; in our country Chiang Kai-shek curses us, the landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, bad elements and rightists curse us. They had always done so in the past . . . Are we isolated? I myself don't feel isolated. In this room alone there are already over 7,000 people; how can we be isolated with over 7,000 people? The popular masses of all countries of the world are already standing, or are going to stand, together with us. Can we be isolated?

(6) *We must unite the whole Party and the whole people*

We must unite the progressive elements and active elements within and without the Party, and unite the middle elements in order to bring forward those who lag behind. Only in this way can we unite the whole Party and the whole country; only by relying on such unity can we carry out our work, overcome difficulties and properly build up China. To unite the whole Party and the whole people is not at all to suggest that we do not have our own definite orientation. Some people say that the Communist Party is 'a party of the whole people', but we do not see things in this way. Our Party is a proletarian party; it is the vanguard of the proletariat; it is a fighting force armed with Marxism-Leninism. We stand on the side of the popular masses who comprise over ninety-five per cent of the total population. We definitely don't stand on the side of the landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, bad elements and rightists who constitute four to five per cent of the total population. It is the same in the international sphere, we speak of unity with all Marxist-Leninists, all revolutionary comrades, the whole people. We definitely do not speak of unity with the anti-communist, anti-popular imperialists and reactionaries of various countries. Whenever possible we also want to establish diplomatic relations with these people, and strive to have peaceful coexistence with them on the basis of the five principles. But these matters are in a different category from the matter of uniting with the people of all countries. In order to unite the whole Party and the whole people it is necessary to promote democracy and let the people speak out. It should be so within the Party; it should also be so outside the Party. Comrades from provincial Party committees, comrades from district Party committees, and comrades from county Party committees, when you return, you must definitely let people speak out. Those of you who are present here must act and those who are not here must also act thus. All leading members ! within the Party must promote democracy and let people speak out. What are the limits? One is that we must observe Party discipline, the minority must obey the majority, and the whole Party should obey the Centre.

Another limit is the prohibition on organizing secret factions. We are not afraid of open opposition groups, we are only afraid of secret opposition groups. Such people do not speak the truth to your face; what they say to your face is all falsehood and deceit. They do not express their real aims. But as long as they do not break discipline, as long as they are not carrying on any secret factional activities, we should always allow them to speak and even if they should say the wrong things we should not punish them. If people say the wrong things they can be criticized, but we should use reason to convince them. What should we do if we persuade them and they are not convinced? We can let them reserve their opinions. As long as they obey resolutions and obey decisions taken by the majority, the minority can be allowed to reserve their various opinions. Both within and outside the Party there is advantage in allowing the minority to reserve their opinions. If they have incorrect opinions they can reserve them temporarily and they will change their minds in future. Very often the ideas of the minority will prove to be correct. History abounds with such instances. In the beginning truth is not in the hands of the majority of people, but in the hands of a minority. Marx and Engels held the truth in their hands, but in the beginning they were in the minority. Lenin for a very long period was also in the minority. We had this kind of experience within our own Party. Both under the rule of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and during the period of rule of the ‘Left-wing’ Line truth was not in the hands of the majority in the leading organs, but rather in the hands of the minority. In history doctrines of natural scientists such as Copernicus, Galileo and Darwin were for a very long period not recognized by the majority of people, but instead were thought to be incorrect. In their time they were in the minority. When our Party was founded in 1921 we only had a few dozen members; we were also in the minority, but! these few people represented the truth and represented China’s destiny.

There is also the question of arrests and executions on which I want to say something. At present, only a dozen or so years after the victory of the Revolution, while elements of the overthrown reactionary classes have not yet been reformed, and while there are people still attempting a restoration, a few people have to be arrested and executed;

otherwise the people's anger cannot be appeased and the people's dictatorship cannot be consolidated. But we must not arrest people lightly, and we must especially not execute people lightly. There are some bad people, bad elements and degenerate people who have infiltrated into our ranks, and degenerate elements who sit on the heads of the people and piss and shit on them, behaving in a vicious and unrestrained way, seriously disobeying laws and discipline. Those people are petty Chiang Kai-sheks. We must find a way to deal with this type of people, and arrest some and execute a few of the worst who have committed the biggest crimes and the greatest evils, because if we do not arrest or execute any of this type of people, we won't be able to appease the anger of the people. This is what we mean when we say: 'We cannot refrain from arresting them, we cannot refrain from executing them.' But we must not on any account arrest too many and must not execute too many. All those who might be arrested but need not be arrested, and all those who might be executed but need not be executed, we must resolve not to arrest or to execute. There was a man called P'an Han-nien who had once been vice-mayor of Shanghai. In the past he had secretly surrendered to the Kuomintang. He was a man of the C.C. Clique.[10] Now he is detained in custody; we have not executed him. If we kill one person like P'an Han-nien and thereby break the ban on executions, then we would have to kill all people like him. There was another man called Wang Shih-wei who was a secret agent working for the K! uomintang. When he was in Yenan, he wrote a book called *The Wild Lily,* in which he attacked the revolution and slandered the Communist Party.[11] Afterwards he was arrested and executed. That incident happened at the time when the army was on the march, and the security organs themselves made the decision to execute him; the decision did not come from the Centre. We have often made criticisms on this very matter; we thought that he shouldn't have been executed. If he was a secret agent and wrote articles to attack us and refused to reform till death, why not leave him there or let him go and do labour? It isn't good to kill people. We should arrest and execute as few people as possible. If we arrest people and execute people at the drop of a hat, the end result would be that everybody would fear for themselves and nobody would dare to speak. In such an atmosphere there wouldn't be much democracy.

Also we mustn't put hats on people indiscriminately. Some of our comrades are in the habit of persecuting people with hats. As soon as they open their mouths hats come flying out; they frighten people so that they don't dare speak. Of course one cannot avoid hats altogether. Are there not many hats in the report made by Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i? Isn't 'dispersionism' a hat? But we mustn't put hats on people without due consideration, so that every Tom, Dick and Harry is labelled with 'dispersionism', and everybody becomes labelled with 'dispersionism'. It is better that hats should be put on by people themselves and they should fit the wearers, rather than that they should be put on them by others. If people put a few hats on themselves and other people don't agree that they should wear those hats, then they should be removed. This will make for a very good democratic atmosphere. We advocate not to grasp at others' faults, not to put hats on people, not to flourish the big stick. The aim is to make people unafraid in their hearts and let them dare to express their opinions.

We should adopt a well-intentioned helpful attitude towards those who have made mistakes, and towards those who do not allow people to speak out. We must not create the kind of atmosphere in which people feel that they cannot afford to make mistakes and that there would be terrible consequences if they made any mistakes, and if once they made mistakes they would never raise their heads again. When a person has made mistakes, as long he sincerely wants to make amends, as long as he has really made a self-criticism, then we must show that we accept him. When people make their self-criticism the first or second time, we must not ask too much of them. It does not matter if their self-examinations are not yet thorough, we should allow them to think again and give them well-intentioned help. People need help from others; we should help those comrades who have made mistakes to understand their mistakes. If people sincerely carry out self-criticism and are willing to correct mistakes, then we should forgive them and adopt a lenient policy towards them. As long as their achievements are still of primary importance, as long as they are competent, they can be allowed to continue in their posts.

Here in my speech I have criticized certain phenomena and criticized certain comrades, but I have not named them. I have not pointed out who Tom, Dick and Harry are. You yourselves must have some ideas in your minds (*laughter*). For shortcomings and mistakes made in the last few years, the primary responsibility should be borne by the Centre; at the Centre the primary responsibility is mine; next the responsibility belongs to the provincial committees, municipal committees, and autonomous region Party committees; and third, to the regional committee level; fourth, to county committee level; and fifth, to the enterprise Party committees and commune Party committees. In short everyone has his share of the responsibility.

Comrades, when you have gone back you must build up democratic centralism. The comrades of the county committees should lead the commune Party committees to build up and strengthen democratic centralism. First of all we must establish and strengthen collective leadership, and not practise the type of leadership which has long been diagnosed as ‘dispersionism’. Under this method the Party committee secretaries and members do their bits separately; they cannot have real collective discussions, nor can they have real collective leadership.

If we are to promote democracy we must encourage others to criticize us and listen to their criticisms. To be able to withstand criticism we must first take measures to carry out self-criticism. We must examine whatever needs examining for one hour or at most two hours. If everything is to be brought out in the open, it will take as long as that. If others consider we have not done enough, then let them say so. If what they say is right, we will accept their opinion. When we allow others to speak, should we be active or passive in our attitude? Of course it is better to be active. What can we do if we are forced on to the defensive? In the past we were undemocratic and so we find ourselves on the defensive. No matter. Let everybody criticize us. As for me, I will not go out during the day; I will not go to the theatre at night. Please come and criticize me day and night (*laughter*). Then I will sit down and think about it carefully, not sleep for two or three nights, think about it until I understand it, and then write a sincere self-examination. Isn’t that the way to deal with it? In short, let other people speak out. The heavens will not fall and you will not be thrown out. If you do not let others speak, then the day will surely come when you are thrown out.

Today I will confine myself to the above matters. The central point that I have spoken about is the question of how to realize democratic centralism and how to promote democracy within and without the Party. I recommend comrades to consider this question carefully. Some comrades still do not think in terms of democratic centralism. Now is the time to adopt this way of thinking and begin to acquire some understanding of this question. If we do our utmost to promote democracy, then we can mobilize the enthusiasm of the broad masses of people within and without the Party. We can unite the broad popular masses who comprise more than ninety-five per cent of our total population. When we have achieved this, our work will get better and better and we will more quickly overcome the difficulties we encounter. Our cause will develop much more favourably (*enthusiastic applause*).

Notes

[1.] The work style of the PLA, defined by Mao Tse-tung in 1960 in three phrases calling for a correct political orientation, an industrious and thrifty work style, and flexible and mobile strategy and tactics, and in eight characters (four pairs) meaning unity, earnestness, seriousness and liveliness. The use of precisely these figures echoed the 'Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention' originally laid down in 1928, which guided the conduct of the Red Army during the struggle for power, and thus represented an attempt to establish a symbolic link with the past. For the earlier rules, see Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works,* Vol. IV, pp. 155-6.

[2.] Ssu-ma Ch'ien (c. 145-90 B.C.) was China's first great historian who compiled the *Shih-chi (Historical Records)* relating the history of China from the origins to his own day. The foregoing passage is from his autobiography, appended to that work.

[3.] This reading, 'even more impossible' (*keng pu-hsing*), is that of *Wen-hsüan* and of *Wan-sui* (1969). The version in *Wan sui!* says merely that it is 'also impossible' (*yu pu-hsing*) without centralism.

[4.] This story is indeed recounted in the *Shi-chi* in the biographies of Li I-chi and Chu Chien, and also in that of Liu Pang, the founder of the Han dynasty. See Burton Watson's translation, *Records of the Grand Historian of China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), Vol. I, pp. 86-7, 269-70,. and 283. Mao has drawn on all three versions, taking some picturesque details (such as the remark, 'I am a drinking man') from the biography of Chu Chien, which is commonly regarded as a later interpolation and is therefore not translated by Watson.

[5.] A Peking opera, based on the account in the *Shi-chi* (Watson *op. cit.,* pp. 70-71) about Hsiang Yü's farewell from his favourite the lady Yü, on the eve of his final defeat. Mao alluded with admiration to the first two lines of the poem composed by Hsiang Yü on this occasion in his own first article of 1917: *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, pp.* 157, 160.

[6.] The reference is, of course, to the sharp criticism of the Party and the regime in April and May 1957, before a halt was called to the policy of ‘blooming and contending’.

[7.] This is the reading in *Wen-hsüan Wan-sui* (1969) has rather ‘did not understand very well’ (*pu hen liao-chieh* instead of hen pu liao-chieh).

[8.] Chia Pao-yü is the chief male character in the *Dream of the Red Chamber.* Mao’s criticism of Yü P’ing-po’s interpretation of this novel related precisely to the point that, in his view, the book should be regarded as a condemnation of feudal society as a whole, and not, as Yü held, simply as a lament about individual misfortune The new garden was created for the use of the imperial concubine on the occasion of a visit to her family (*The Story of the Stone,* Ch. 18), and it is here that much of the subsequent action takes place. Regarding the relationship between the novel and the author’s own family background, see David Hawkes’s introduction, especially pp. 22-32.

[9.] For the revised text of the sixty articles on rural work adopted at the Tenth Plenum in September 1962, and a summary of the seventy articles on industrial work drafted in December 1961, see *Documents of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, September 1956 - April 1969* (Hong Kong: URI, 1971), pp. 689-725. For the regulations on middle and primary schools drafted in 1963, see the article by Susan Shirk in *China Quarterly,* No. 55, July - September 1973, pp. 511-46.

[10.] A reactionary Kuomintang faction led by the two Ch’en brothers, nephews of Chiang Kai-shek’s first patron Ch’en Ch’i-mei, who played a role in creating the quasi-fascist ‘Blue Shirts’ in the 1930s.

[11.] For details on Wang Shih-wei, see *Literary Dissent in Communist China,* pp. 25-7 and passim.

Speech At The Tenth Plenum Of The Eighth Central Committee

(The morning of 24 September 1962 in the Huai-Jen Hall)

It is now ten o’clock. The meeting is in session.

This plenary session of the Central Committee has solved a number of important problems. One is the problem of agriculture, another is that of commerce. Both of these are important problems. There are also the problems of industry and of planning which are secondary problems. The third is the problem of inner-Party unity. Several comrades have made speeches. The agricultural problem was explained by Comrade Ch’en Po-ta, the problem of commerce by Comrade Li Hsien-nien, and the problems of industry and planning by Comrades Li Fu-ch’un and XXX. In addition to these problems we also had the questions of increasing the membership of the Control Commission and of the vertical and horizontal interchange of cadres.

This conference did not open today: it has already been in session for over two months. It met for a month in Peitaiho and has continued for almost a month since transferring to Peking. The practical problems were discussed and clarified in August and September by various small groups (all of you present participated) which were in fact large groups. So now the plenary session will not take too long — three to five days will probably suffice. If we cannot finish by the twenty-seventh, we will stay over until the twenty-eighth, by which date the meeting must adjourn.

At Peitaiho I presented three problems: those of class, the situation and contradictions. I raised the problem of class because this problem had not been solved. Leaving aside the internal situation, internationally there are imperialism, nationalism, and revisionism. I am talking about capitalist countries which have not solved the class problem. So we have an anti-imperialist task. We have the task of supporting national liberation movements, that is to say we must support the broad masses of people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, including workers, peasants, the revolutionary national bourgeoisie, and the revolutionary intellectuals. We want to unite with so many people. But they do not include the reactionary national bourgeoisie like Nehru, nor the reactionary bourgeois intellectuals like the Japanese renegade communist Shojiro Kasuga[1] who, with seven or eight others, supports the theory of structural reforms.

Now then, do classes exist in socialist countries? Does class struggle exist? We can now affirm that classes do exist in socialist countries and that class struggle undoubtedly exists. Lenin said: After the victory of the revolution, because of the existence of the bourgeoisie internationally, because of the existence of bourgeois remnants internally, because the petit bourgeoisie exists and continually generates a bourgeoisie, therefore the classes which have been overthrown within the country will continue to exist for a long time to come and may even attempt restoration. The bourgeois revolutions in Europe in such countries as England and France had many ups and downs. After the overthrow of feudalism there were several restorations and reversals of fortune. This kind of reversal is also possible in socialist countries. An example of this is Yugoslavia which has changed its nature and become revisionist, changing from a workers’ and peasants’ country to a country ruled by reactionary nationalist elements. In our country we must come to grasp, understand and study this problem really thoroughly. We must acknowledge that classes will continue to exist for a long time. We must also acknowledge the existence of a struggle of class against class, and admit the possibility of the restoration of reactionary classes. We must raise our vigilance and properly educate our youth as well as the cadres, the masses and the middle- and basic-level cadres. Old cadres must also study these problems and be educated. Otherwise a country like ours can still move towards its opposite. Even to move towards its opposite would not matter too much because there would still be the negation of the negation, and afterwards we might move towards our opposite yet again. If our children's generation go in for revisionism and move towards their opposite, so that although they still nominally have socialism it is in fact capitalism, then our grandsons will certainly rise up in revolt and overthrow their fathers, b! ecause the masses will not be satisfied. Therefore, from now on we must talk about this every year, every month, every day. We will talk about it at congresses, at Party delegate conferences, at plenums, at every meeting we hold, so that we have a more enlightened Marxist-Leninist line on the problem.

The situation in our country has not been very good for the past few years, but now it is starting to take a turn for the better. In 1959 and 1960 a number of things were done wrongly, mainly because most people had no experience to enable them to understand the problems. The most serious fault was that our requisitioning was excessive. When we did not have very much grain, we insisted on saying that we had. Blind commands were issued in both industry and agriculture. There were also some other large-scale mistakes. In the second half of 1960 we started to put these right — in point of fact it was quite early on, starting at the First Chengchow Conference in October 1958. Next came the Wuhan Conference in November and December 1958, while in February and March 1959 we held the Second Chengchow Conference. At the Shanghai Conference in April of that year we also paid attention to correcting our mistakes. Meanwhile there was a period in 1960 when we did not pay enough attention to it because revisionism came and put pressure on us. Our attention was diverted to opposing Khrushchev. From the second half of 1958 he wanted to blockade the Chinese coastline. He wanted to set up a joint fleet so as to have control over our coastline and blockade us. It was because of this question that Khrushchev came to our country. After this, in September 1959 during the Sino-Indian border dispute, Khrushchev supported Nehru in attacking us and Tass issued a communique. Then Khrushchev came to China and at our Tenth Anniversary Celebration banquet in October, he attacked us on our own rostrum. At the Bucharest Conference in 1960 they tried to encircle and annihilate us.[2] Then came the conference of the Two Communist Parties, the Twenty-six-Country Drafting Committee, the Eighty-one-Country Moscow Conference, and there was also a Warsaw Conference, all of which were concerned with the dispute between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. We spent the w! hole of 1960 fighting Khrushchev. So you see that among socialist countries and within Marxism-Leninism a question like this could emerge. But in fact its roots lie deep in the past, in things which happened very long ago. They did not permit China to make revolution: that was in 1945. Stalin wanted to prevent China from making revolution, saying that we should not have a civil war and should cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, otherwise the Chinese nation would perish. But we did not do what he said. The revolution was victorious. After the victory of the revolution he next suspected China of being a Yugoslavia, and that I would become a second Tito. Later when I went to Moscow to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, we had to go through another struggle. He was not willing to sign a treaty. After two months of negotiations he at last signed. When did Stalin begin to have confidence in us? It was at the time of the Resist America, Aid Korea campaign, from the winter of 1950. He then came to believe that we were not Tito, not Yugoslavia. But now we have became 'Left adventurists', 'nationalists', 'dogmatists', 'sectarians', while the Yugoslavs have become

‘Marxist-Leninists’. Nowadays Yugoslavia is quite all right, she’s doing fine. I hear that she has become ‘socialist’ again. So the socialist camp is internally highly complicated too. It is, in fact, also very simple. There is only one principle involved: that is the problem of the class struggle — the problem of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the problem of the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and anti-Marxism-Leninism, the problem of the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism.

As for the situation, it is good both internationally and domestically. In the initial period after the founding of our state, some people, including myself as well as Comrade X X, took the view that the parties and trade unions of Asia and the parties of Africa might suffer serious damage. It was later proved that this point of view was incorrect: it did not turn out as we expected. Since the Second World War, thriving national liberation struggles have developed in Asia, Africa and Latin America year by year. There was the Cuban revolution, the independence of Algeria, the Asian Games in Indonesia; tens of thousands of people demonstrated and smashed the Indian consulate and India became isolated; West Irian was handed over by the Netherlands; armed struggle developed in South Vietnam — a very good armed struggle. There was also the victory of armed struggle in Algeria, the victorious struggle in Laos, the Suez Canal affair, the independence of Egypt. The United Arab Republic is inclined towards the right, but then Iraq emerged. Both are to the right of centre, but both oppose imperialism. Although the population of Algeria is less than ten million, and France had an army of 800,000 fighting for seven or eight years, yet Algeria won in the end. Thus the international situation is excellent. Comrade Ch’en I has given a very good report on this.

The contradiction I want to talk about is that between us and imperialism The contradiction between the people of the whole world and imperialism is the primary one. There is the opposition of the people of all countries to the reactionary bourgeoisie and to reactionary nationalism. There are also the contradictions between the people of all countries and revisionism, the contradictions among imperialist countries, the contradiction between nationalist countries and imperialism, internal contradictions within imperialist countries, and the contradiction between socialism and imperialism. I think that right-wing opportunism in China should be renamed: it should be called Chinese revisionism. The two months’ conference at Peitaiho and Peking has been concerned with problems of two different kinds. One kind was the problem of political work; the other was the problem of class struggle — that is to say, the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. The problem of work is also the problem of struggle against bourgeois ideas, which is identical with struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. There are several documents on problems of work: in industry, agriculture, commerce, etc. Various comrades have spoken on those questions.

As for how the Party should tackle the problem of revisionism within the country and within the Party and the problem of the bourgeoisie, I think we should adhere to former policies without changing them. No matter what sort of errors a comrade has committed, we should follow the line of the Rectification Campaign of 1942-5.[3] So long as comrades admit their mistakes and reform, we will welcome them. We must unite with them and cure the disease in order to save the patient; take warning from the past in order to safeguard the future. Unity-criticism-unity. But we must be quite specific about what is right and what is wrong. We must not mince words, or only spit out one word at a time. Why does the monk knock the wooden fish drum when he chants his sutra? The *Journey to the West* explains it by telling how the sutras collected in India were devoured by the black fish demon, who would spit out just one word each time it was knocked. This is the explanation of the wooden fish. We must not take this attitude and behave like the black fish demon. We must think things over carefully. We will unite with you, comrades, who have made mistakes, provided that you recognize your errors and return to a Marxist standpoint. Some of you comrades here present, I welcome you too. Do not be shy because you have made mistakes. We permit people to make mistakes and, having made them, we also permit you to correct them. Do not be intolerant of mistakes and do not prevent people from correcting them. Many comrades have corrected them well, which is excellent. The speech of Comrade Li Wei-han.[4] is a case in point. Comrade Li Wei-han has corrected his mistakes and we trust him. We must be resolute first in observing people, and then in helping them. There are many other comrades. I have also committed mistakes. I talked about that last year. You must also let me make mistakes, and let me correct them. Whe! n I correct them, you should welcome it. Last year I said that we must be analytical towards people. No man can be without error. Consider the sages: to say that they were without shortcomings would be a metaphysical point of view, not a Marxist dialectical-materialist point of view. Anything can be analysed. I urge comrades, no matter whether you have had connections with foreign countries, or whether you belong to secret anti-Party groups — as long as you spill the beans and tell the whole truth we welcome you and will give you work to do. We must on no account take the attitude of ignoring such people, still less resort to the method of execution. We cannot break our ban on executions so there have been many counter-revolutionaries whom we have not killed. Wasn't the Hsüan T'ung emperor[5] a counter-revolutionary? There were also war criminals like Wang Yao-wu, K'ang Tse, Tu Yü-ming, Yang Kuang, and a whole lot of others whom we did not kill. Many people corrected their mistakes and we reprieved them. We didn't kill them. Those rightists who have corrected their mistakes have had their hats removed.[6] The recent trend towards the reversal of verdicts is incorrect. Only those verdicts which were truly incorrect can be reversed. Those verdicts which were correct cannot be reversed. As for the reversal of those verdicts which were truly wrong, when they were wholly wrong they should be wholly reversed, when they were partly wrong they should be partly reversed. When they were not wrong they should not be reversed. We cannot reverse all of them indiscriminately.

On the question of work, comrades will please take care that the class struggle does not interfere with our work. The first Lushan Conference of 1959 was originally concerned with work. Then up jumped P'eng Te-huai and said: 'You fucked my mother for forty days, can't I fuck your mother for twenty days?' All this fucking messed up the conference and the work was affected. Twenty days was not long enough and we abandoned the question of work. We really mustn't do that this time, we must really pay attention. In transmitting their reports of the conference, all localities and departments should take care to put work first. Work and the class struggle should proceed simultaneously. The class struggle must not be placed in a very prominent position. We have now formed two Special Case Review Commissions to clarify problems, to elucidate the problems and then convince people. We have to engage in the class struggle, but there are special people to take care of this kind of work. The security departments are specially charged with carrying on the class struggle. P'an Han-nien[7] is a counter-revolutionary! Hu Feng and Jao Shu-shih are also counter-revolutionaries We haven't killed any of them! We must not let the class struggle interfere with our work. We can wait until the next Plenum or the one after that and then make another attempt to clarify these matters. The main task [of the security organs] is to deal with enemy sabotage.[8] If people engage in sabotage, then we will break our ban on executions. But this is only directed at people who destroy factories or bridges, throw bombs in the vicinity of Canton, who kill people or commit arson. The task of security is to defend our cause, to defend factories, enterprises, communes, production brigades, schools, the government, the army, the Party, mass organizations, and also cultural organs such as newspa! pers, publishing houses and news agencies; i.e. to protect the superstructure.

Writing novels is popular these days, isn't it? The use of novels for anti-Party activity is a great invention. Anyone wanting to overthrow a political régime must create public opinion and do some preparatory ideological work. This applies to counter-revolutionary as well as to revolutionary classes. Our ideology is revolutionary Marxism-Leninism; it is the combination of the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. If these are well combined then the problems will be more easily solved. If they are not well combined, then we will meet with failure and setbacks. As regards socialist construction, this is also a combination of universal truth with the practice of construction. Have we combined them well or not? We are in the process of solving this problem. The same thing is true in military construction. For example, the military line of a few years ago is not the same as the military line today. Comrade Yeh Chien-ying[9] wrote a book which is very sharp; it is never confused on crucial points. I have always criticized you for not being sharp enough, but this time you wore sharp. Here are a couple of sentences for you: 'Chu-ko Liang was cautious all his life, while Lu Tuan was clear-headed in big matters.'[10]

Will Comrade XX please announce the names of those who are not attending this plenum? The Standing Committee of the politburo decided that five people should not attend.

(*Comrade XX intervened to say*: *The Standing Committee of the Politburo decided that five people should not attend the Plenum. P'eng, Hsi, Chang, Huang and Chou*[11] *are important individuals presently under investigation. While they are under investigation, they are not qualified to attend meetings*.)

Because their crimes are really too great, they are not qualified to attend meetings, and should not attend important meetings, nor be allowed to appear on the T'ien An Men, until the situation has been clarified through investigation. We mast distinguish through analysis between important and unimportant individuals, there is a difference between them. Unimportant individuals have attended our meeting today. When unimportant individuals have thoroughly corrected their errors, they should be given work to do. If important individuals have thoroughly corrected their errors, they should also be given work to do. We are particularly hopeful that unimportant individuals will become conscious [of their errors]; naturally we hope that important elements will also become conscious.

Notes

[References are given here as provided by the Maoist Documentation Project. They are significantly different in at least one existing edition of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. VIII. — *Transcriber, MIA*.]

[1.] A Japanese 'revisionist' who founded a new party in the aftermath of de-Stalinization.

[2.] The term 'encircle and annihilate' *(wei-ch'ao) is* the same as that employed in the 1930s to designate the campaigns of extermination launched by Chiang Kai-shek against the communists. Its use here vividly reflects the degree of hostility which Mao perceived in his erstwhile comrades.

[3.] The *cheng-feng* or 'rectification' movement of 1942-5 was the first great campaign for the ideological remoulding of the Chinese Communist Party, and for the establishment of Mao Tse-tung's thought as the standard of orthodoxy. For the documents studied at the time, see Boyd Compton (ed.), *Mao's China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1950). The most recent account of the political context as a whole is contained in Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 177-276. For my own interpretation, see the introduction to *Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China* (Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 17-22.

[4.] Li Wei-han (1897-), a Hunanese, played a leading role in the Chinese Communist Party from its foundation in 1921. From 1944 until his eclipse in December 1964, he was Director of the Party's United Front Work Department. It is not clear exactly why he was criticized by Mao in 1962, but the charge was probably related to the 'capitulationism' of which he was accused two years later.

[5.] The last Manchu emperor, deposed in 1911, and restored by the Japanese in the 1930s as the emperor of the puppet country of 'Manchukuo'. For his own story, see *From Emperor to Citizen*: *the Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi*, 2 vols. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964-5.)

[6.] i.e., they have had their social dignity restored by the removal of the dunce-caps, real or metaphorical, which they had been wearing.

[7.] P'an Han-nien, a former Comintern representative, was Vice-Mayor of Shanghai from 1949 until 1955, when he was expelled from the Party and arrested.

[8.] In the early 1960s, in the tense conditions created by the economic difficulties which arose after the Great Leap Forward, Kuomintang commando raids on the coast and other subversive activities were a particularly serious problem.

[9.] Yeh Chien-ying (1898-), a professional soldier who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 and participated in the Nanchang Uprising, became a member of the Central Committee in 1945. During the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, in 1966-7, he was appointed to the Secretariat and the Politburo. At the Tenth Congress in August 1973, he became one of the five vice-chairmen of the Central Committee.

[10.] Chu-ko Liang (181-234), prime minister of the Shu Han or Minor Han dynasty, was one of the most famous military strategists of ancient China. He is a central character in the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms,* and was, as Mao says, known throughout his career for his great prudence and foresight. Lü Tuan was a minister of Emperor T'ai Tsung of the Sung dynasty in the tenth century who used to say of him that he was a fool in small matters, but not in great ones.

[11.] Four of these men have long been known as members of the 'P'eng-Huang-Chang-Chou Anti-Party Group'. (See above, *Speech at the Enlarged Session of the Military Affairs Committee and the External Affairs Conference*, note 1.) The other person named, Hsi [Chung-hsün] (1903-), remained in public view as a vice-premier until 1962, but had lost all his posts by 1965. This reference confirms that, as some observers had guessed, his fall was linked to that of P'eng Te-huai, with whom he had been closely associated in the early 1950s.

Reading Notes On The Soviet Text *Political Economy*

1961-62

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Part I.
Chapters 20-23

1. From Capitalism to Socialism

The text says on pages 327-28 that socialism will “inevitably” supersede capitalism and moreover will do so by “revolutionary means.” In the imperialist period clashes between the productive forces and the production relations have become sharper than ever. The proletarian socialist revolution is an “objective necessity.” Such statements are quite satisfactory and should be made this way. “Objective necessity” is quite all right and is agreeable to people. To call the revolution an objective necessity simply means that the direction it takes does not hinge on the intentions of individuals. Like it or not, come it will.

The proletariat will “organize all working people around itself for the purpose of eliminating capitalism.” (p. 327) Correct. But at this point one should go on to raise the question of the seizure of power. “The proletarian revolution cannot hope to come upon ready-made socialist economic forms.” “Components of a socialist economy cannot mature inside of a capitalist economy based on private ownership.” (p. 328) Indeed, not only can they not “mature”; they cannot be born. In capitalist societies a cooperative or state-run economy can not even be brought into being, to say nothing of maturing. This is our main difference with the revisionists, who claim that in capitalist societies such things as municipal public enterprises are actually socialist elements, and argue that capitalism may peacefully grow over to socialism. This is a serious distortion of Marxism.

2. The Transition Period

The book says, “The transition period begins with the establishment of proletarian political power and ends with the fulfilment of the responsibility of the socialist revolution — the founding of socialism, communism’s first stage.” (p. 328) One must study very carefully what stages, in the final analysis, are included in the transition period. Is only the transition from capitalism to socialism included, or the transition from socialism to communism as well?

Here Marx is cited: from capitalism to communism there is a “period of revolutionary transformation.” We are presently in such a period. Within a certain number of years our people’s communes will have to carry through the transformation from ownership by the basic team to ownership by the basic commune,[1] and then into ownership by the whole people.[2] The transformation to basic commune ownership already carried out by the people’s communes remains collective ownership [and is not yet ownership by the whole people: *Note in brackets inserted by translator for clarity*].

In the transition period “all social relations must be fundamentally transformed.” This proposition is correct in principle. All social relations includes in its meaning the production relations and the superstructure — economics, politics, ideology and culture, etc.

In the transition period we must "enable the productive forces to gain the development they need to guarantee the victory of socialism." For China, broadly speaking, I would say we need 100-200 million tons of steel per year at the least. Up to this year our main accomplishment has been to clear the way for the development of the productive forces. The development of the productive forces of China's socialism has barely begun. Having gone through the Great Leap Forward of 1958-1959, we can look to 1960 as a year promising great development of production.

3. Universal and Particular Characteristics of the Proletarian Revolution in Various Countries

The book says, the October Revolution "planted the standard," and that every country "has its own particular forms and concrete methods for constructing socialism." This proposition is sound. In 1848 there was a Communist Manifesto. One hundred and ten years later there was another Communist Manifesto, namely the Moscow Declaration made in 1957 by various communist parties. This declaration addressed itself to the integration of universal laws and concrete particulars.

To acknowledge the standard of the October Revolution is to acknowledge that the "basic content" of the proletarian revolution of any country is the same. Precisely here we stand opposed to the revisionists.

Why was it that the revolution succeeded first not in the nations of the West with a high level of capitalist productivity and a numerous proletariat, but rather in the nations of the East, Russia and China for example, where the level of capitalist productivity was comparatively low and the proletariat comparatively small? This question awaits study.

Why did the proletariat win its first victory in Russia? The text says because "all the contradictions of imperialism came together in Russia." The history of revolution suggests that the focal point of the revolution has been shifting from West to East. At the end of the eighteenth century the focal point was in France, which became the center of the political life of the world. In the mid-nineteenth century the focal point shifted to Germany, where the proletariat stepped onto the political stage, giving birth to Marxism. In the early years of the twentieth century the focal point shifted to Russia, giving birth to Leninism. Without this development of Marxism there would have been no victory for the Russian Revolution. By the mid-twentieth century the focal point of world revolution had shifted to China. Needless to say, the focal point is bound to shift again in the future.

Another reason for the victory of the Russian Revolution was that broad masses of the peasantry served as an allied force of the revolution. The text says, "The Russian proletariat formed an alliance with the poor [Only in the 1969 text: *Note by translator*.] peasants." (p. 328-29, 1967 edition) Among the peasants there are several strata, and the poor peasant is the one the proletariat relied on. When a revolution begins the middle peasants always waver; they want to look things over and see whether the revolution has any strength, whether it can maintain itself, whether it will have advantages to offer. But the middle peasant will not shift over to the side of the proletariat until he has a comparatively clear picture. That is how the October Revolution was. And that is how it was for our own land reform, cooperatives, and people's communes.[3]

Ideologically, politically, and organizationally the Bolshevik-Menshevik split prepared the way for the victory of the October Revolution. And without the Bolsheviks' struggle against the Mensheviks and the revisionism of the Second International, the October Revolution could never have triumphed. Leninism was born and developed in the struggle against all forms of revisionism and opportunism. And without Leninism there would have been no victory for the Russian Revolution.

The book says, "Proletarian revolution first succeeded in Russia, and prerevolutionary Russia had a level of capitalist development sufficient to enable the revolution to succeed." The victory of the proletarian revolution may not have to come in a country with a high level of capitalist development. The book is quite correct to quote Lenin. Down to the present time, of the countries where socialist revolution has succeeded only East Germany and Czechoslovakia had a comparatively high level of capitalism; elsewhere the level was comparatively low. And revolution has not broken out in any of the Western nations with a comparatively high level of development. Lenin had said, "The revolution first breaks out in the weak link of the imperialist world." At the time of the October Revolution Russia was such a weak link. The same was true for China after the October Revolution. Both Russia and China had a relatively numerous proletariat and a vast peasantry, oppressed and suffering. And both were large states. . . . [Ellipsis in original: *Note by translator*.] But in these respects India was much the same. The question is, why could not India consummate a revolution by breaking imperialism's weak link as Lenin and Stalin had described? Because India was an English colony, a colony belonging to a single imperialist state. Herein lies the difference between India and China. China was a semicolony under several imperialist governments. The Indian Communist Party did not take an active part in its country's bourgeois democratic revolution and did not make it possible for the Indian proletariat to assume the leadership of the democratic revolution. Nor, after independence, did the Indian Communist Party persevere in the cause of the independence of the Indian proletariat.

The historical experience of China and Russia proves that to win the revolution having a mature party is a most important condition. In Russia the Bolsheviks took an active part in the democratic revolution and proposed a program for the 1905 revolution distinct from that of the bourgeoisie. It was a program that aimed to solve not only the question of overthrowing the tsar, but also the question of how to wrest leadership from the Constitutional Democratic Party in the struggle to overthrow the tsar.

At the time of the 1911 revolution China still had no communist party. After it was founded in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party immediately and energetically joined the democratic revolution and stood at its forefront. The golden age of China's bourgeoisie, when their revolution had great vitality, was during the years 1905-1917. After the 1911 revolution the Nationalist Party was already declining. And by 1924 they had no alternative but to turn to the Communist Party before they could make further headway. The proletariat had superseded the bourgeoisie. The proletarian political party superseded the bourgeois political party as the leader of the democratic revolution. We have often said that in 1927 the Chinese Communist Party had not yet reached its maturity. Primarily this means that our party, during its years of alliance with the bourgeoisie, failed to see the possibility of the bourgeoisie betraying the revolution and, indeed, was utterly unprepared for it.

Here (p. 331) the text goes on to express the view that the reason why countries dominated by precapitalist economic forms could carry through a socialist revolution was because of assistance from advanced socialist countries. This is an incomplete way of putting the matter. After the democratic revolution succeeded in China we were able to take the path of socialism mainly because we overthrew the rule of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. The internal factors were the main ones. While the assistance we received from successful socialist countries was an important condition, it was not one which could settle the question of whether or not we could take the road of socialism, but only one which could influence our rate of advance after we had taken the road. With aid we could advance more quickly, without it less so. What we mean by assistance includes, in addition to economic aid, our studious application of the positive and negative experiences of both the successes and the failures of the assisting country.

4. The Question of “Peaceful Transition”

The book says on page 330, “In certain capitalist countries and former colonial countries, for the working class to take political power through peaceful parliamentary means is a practical possibility.” Tell me, which are these “certain countries”? The main capitalist countries of Europe and North America are armed to the teeth. Do you expect them to allow you to take power peacefully? The communist party and the revolutionary forces of every country must ready both hands, one for winning victory peacefully, one for taking power with violence. Neither may be dispensed with. It is essential to realize that, considering the general trend of things, the bourgeoisie has no intention of relinquishing its political power. They will put up a fight for it, and if their very life should be at stake, why should they not resort to force? In the October Revolution as in our own, both hands were ready. Before July 1917 Lenin did consider using peaceful methods to win the victory, but the July incident demonstrated that it would no longer be possible to transfer power to the proletariat peacefully. And not until he had reversed himself and carried out three months’ military preparation did he win the victory of the October Revolution. After the proletariat had seized political power in the course of the October Revolution Lenin remained inclined toward peaceful methods, using “redemption” to eliminate capitalism and put the socialist transformation into effect. But the bourgeoisie in collusion with fourteen imperialist powers launched counter-revolutionary armed uprisings and interventions. And so before the victory of the October Revolution could be consolidated, three years of armed struggle had to be waged under the leadership of the Russian party.

5. From the Democratic Revolution to the Socialist Revolution — Several Problems

At the end of page 330 the text takes up the transformation of the democratic revolution into the socialist revolution but does not clearly explain how the transformation is effected. The October Revolution was a socialist revolution which concomitantly fulfilled tasks left over from the bourgeois democratic revolution. Immediately after the victory of the October Revolution the nationalization of land was proclaimed. But bringing the democratic revolution to a conclusion on the land question was yet to take a period of time.

During the War of Liberation China solved the tasks of the democratic revolution. The founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 marked the basic conclusion of the democratic revolution and the beginning of the transition to socialism. It took another three years to conclude the land reform, but at the time the Republic was founded we immediately expropriated the bureaucratic capitalist enterprises — 80 percent of the fixed assets of our industry and transport — and converted them to ownership by the whole people.

During the War of Liberation we raised antibureaucratic capitalist slogans as well as anti-imperialist and antifeudal ones. The struggle against bureaucratic capitalism had a two sided character: it had a democratic revolutionary character insofar as it amounted to opposition to comprador capitalism,[4] but it had a socialist character insofar as it amounted to opposition to the big bourgeoisie.

After the war of resistance was won, the Nationalist Party [KMT] took over a very large portion of bureaucratic capital from Japan and Germany and Italy. The ratio of bureaucratic to national [i.e., Chinese] capital was 8 to 2. After liberation we expropriated all bureaucratic capital, thus eliminating the major components of Chinese capitalism.[5]

But it would be wrong to think that after the liberation of the whole country "the revolution in its earliest stages had only in the main the character of a bourgeois democratic revolution and not until later would it gradually develop into a socialist revolution." [No page reference]

6. Violence and the Proletarian Dictatorship

On page 333 the text could be more precise in its use of the concept of violence. Marx and Engels always said that "the state is by definition an instrument of violence employed to suppress the opposing class." And so it can never be said that "the proletarian dictatorship does not use violence purely and simply in dealing with the exploiter and may even not use it primarily."

When its life is at stake the exploiting class always resorts to force. Indeed, no sooner do they see the revolution start up than they suppress it with force. The text says, "Historical experience proves that the exploiting class is utterly unwilling to cede political power to the people and uses armed force to oppose the people's political power." This is not a complete way of stating the matter. It is not only after the people have organized revolutionary political power that the exploiting class will oppose it with force, but even at the very moment when the people rise up to seize political power, the exploiters promptly use violence to suppress the revolutionary people.

The purpose of our revolution is to develop the society's forces of production. Toward this end we must first overthrow the enemy. Second we must suppress its resistance. How could we do this without the revolutionary violence of the people?

Here the book turns to the "substance" of the proletarian dictatorship and the primary responsibilities of the working class and laboring people in general in the socialist revolution. But the discussion is incomplete as it leaves out the suppression of the enemy as well as the remoulding of classes. Landlords, bureaucrats, counter-revolutionaries, and undesirable elements have to be remoulded; the same holds true for the capitalist class, the upper stratum of the petit bourgeoisie, and the middle [Only in the 1969 text. *Note by translator*.] peasants. Our experience shows that remoulding is difficult. Those who do not undergo persistent repeated struggle can not be properly remoulded. To eliminate thoroughly any remaining strength of the bourgeoisie and any influence they may have will take one or two decades at the least and may even require half a century. In the rural areas, where basic commune ownership has been put into effect, private ownership has been transformed into state ownership. The entire country abounds with new cities and new major industry. Transportation and communications for the entire country have been modernized. Truly, the economic situation has been completely changed, and for the first time the peasants' worldview is bound to be turned around completely step by step. (Here in speaking of "primary responsibilities" the book uses Lenin's words differently from his original intention.)

To write or speak in an effort to suit the tastes of the enemy, the imperialists, is to defraud the masses and as a result to comfort the enemy while keeping one's own class in ignorance.

7. The Form of the Proletarian State

On page 334 the book says, "the proletarian state can take various forms." True enough, but there is not much difference essentially between the proletarian dictatorship in the people's democracies and the one established in Russia after the October Revolution. Also, the soviets of the Soviet Union and our own people's congresses were both representative assemblies, different in name only. In China the people's congresses included those participating as representatives of the bourgeoisie, representatives who had split off from the Nationalist Party, and representatives who were prominent democratic figures. All of them accepted the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. One group among these tried to stir up trouble, but failed.[6] Such an inclusive form may appear different from the soviet, but it should be remembered that after the October Revolution the soviets included representatives of the Menshevik rightist Social Revolutionary Party, a Trotskyite faction, a Bukharin faction, a Zinoviev faction, and so forth. Nominally representatives of the workers and peasants, they were virtual representatives of the bourgeoisie. The period after the October Revolution was a time when the proletariat accepted a large number of personnel from the Kerensky government

— all of whom were bourgeois elements. Our own central people's government was set up on the foundation of the North China People's Government. All members of the various departments were from the base areas, and the majority of the mainstay cadres were Communist Party members.

8. Transforming Capitalist Industry and Commerce

On page 335 there is an incorrect explanation of the process by which capitalist ownership changed into state ownership in China. The book only explains our policy toward national capital but not our policy toward bureaucratic capital (expropriation). In order to convert the property of the bureaucratic capitalist to public ownership we chose the method of expropriation.

In paragraph 2 of page 335 the experience of passing through the state capitalist form in order to transform capitalism is treated as a singular and special experience; its universal significance is denied. The countries of Western Europe and the United States have a very high level of capitalist development, and the controlling positions are held by a minority of monopoly capitalists. But there are a great number of small and middle capitalists as well. Thus it is said that American capital is concentrated but also widely distributed. After a successful revolution in these countries monopoly capital will undoubtedly have to be expropriated, but will the small and middle capitalists likewise be uniformly expropriated? It may well be the case that some form of state capitalism will have to be adopted to transform them.

Our northeast provinces may be thought of as a region with a high level of capitalist development. The same is true for Kiangsu (with centers in Shanghai and the southern part of the province). If state capitalism could work in these areas, tell me why the same policy could not work in other countries which resemble these provincial sectors?

The method the Japanese used when they held our northeast provinces was to eliminate the major local capitalists and turn their enterprises into Japanese state-managed, or in some cases monopoly capitalist enterprises. For the small and middle capitalists they established subsidiary companies as a means of imposing control.

Our transformation of national capital passed through three stages: private manufacture on state order, unified government purchase and sale of private output, joint state private operation (of individual units and of whole complexes). Each phase was carried out in a methodical way. This prevented any damage to production, which actually developed as the transformation progressed. We have gained much new experience with state capitalism; for one example, the providing of capitalists with fixed interest after the joint state-private operation phase.[7]

9. Middle Peasants

After land reform, land was not worth money and the peasants were afraid to "show themselves." There were comrades who at one time considered this situation unsatisfactory, but what happened was that in the course of class struggles which disgraced landlords and rich peasants, the peasantry came to view poverty as dignified and wealth as shameful. This was a welcome sign, one which showed that the poor peasants had politically overturned the rich peasants and established their dominance in the villages.

On page 339 it says that the land taken from the rich peasants and given to the poor and middle peasants was land the government had expropriated and then parcelled out. This looks at the matter as a grant by royal favour, forgetting that class struggles and mass mobilizations had been set in motion, a right deviationist point of view. Our approach was to rely on the poor peasants, to unite with the majority of middle peasants (lower middle peasants) and seize the land from the landlord class. While the party did play a leading role, it was against doing everything itself and thus substituting for the masses. Indeed, its concrete practice was to "pay call on the poor to learn of their grievances," to identify activist elements, to strike roots and pull things together, to consolidate nuclei, to promote the voicing of grievances, and to organize the class ranks — all for the purpose of unfolding the class struggle.

The text says "the middle peasants became the principal figures in the villages." This is an unsatisfactory assertion. To proclaim the middle peasants as the principals, commending them to the gods, never daring to offend them, is bound to make former poor peasants feel as if they had been put in the shade. Inevitably this opens the way for middle peasants of means to assume rural leadership.

The book makes no analysis of the middle peasant. We distinguish between upper and lower middle peasants and further between old and new within those categories, regarding the new as slightly preferable. Experience in campaign after campaign has shown that the poor peasant, the new lower middle peasant, and the old lower middle peasant have a comparatively good political attitude. They are the ones who embrace the people's communes. Among the upper middle peasants and the prosperous middle peasants there is a group that supports the communes as well as one that opposes them. According to materials from Hopei province the total number of production teams there comes to more than forty thousand, 50 percent of which embrace the communes without reservation, 35 percent of which basically accept them but with objections or doubts on particular questions, 15 percent of which oppose or have serious reservations about the communes. The opposition of this last group is due to the fact that the leadership of the teams fell to prosperous middle peasants or even undesirable elements. During this process of education in the struggle between the two roads, if the debate is to develop among these teams, their leadership will have to change. Clearly, then, the analysis of the middle peasant must be pursued. For the matter of whose hands hold rural leadership has tremendous bearing on the direction of developments there.

On page 340 the book says, "Essentially the middle peasant has a twofold character." This question also requires concrete analysis. The poor, lower middle, upper middle, and prosperous middle peasants in one sense are all workers, but in another they are private owners. As private owners their points of view are respectively dissimilar. Poor and lower middle peasants may be described as semiprivate owners whose point of view is comparatively easily altered. By contrast, the private owner's point of view held by the upper middle and the prosperous peasants has greater substance, and they have consistently resisted cooperativization.

10. The Worker-Peasant Alliance

The third and fourth paragraphs on page 340 are concerned with the importance of the worker-peasant alliance but fail to go into what must be done before the alliance can be developed and consolidated. The text, again, deals with the need of the peasants to press forward with the transformation of the small producers but fails to consider how to advance the process, what kinds of contradictions may be found at each stage of the transformation, and how they may be resolved. And, the text does not discuss the measures and tactics for the entire process.

Our worker-peasant alliance has already passed through two stages. The first was based on the land revolution, the second on the cooperative movement. If cooperativization had not been set in motion the peasantry inevitably would have been polarized, and the worker-peasant alliance could not have been consolidated. In consequence, the policy of "unified government purchase and sale of private output"[8] could not have been persevered in. The reason is that that policy could be maintained and made to work thoroughly only on the basis of cooperativization. At the present time our worker-peasant alliance has to take the next step and establish itself on the basis of mechanization. For to have simply the cooperative and commune movements without mechanization would once again mean that the alliance could not be consolidated. We still have to develop the cooperatives into people's communes. We still have to develop basic ownership by the commune team into basic ownership by the commune and that further into state ownership. When state ownership and mechanization are integrated we will be able to begin truly to consolidate the worker-peasant alliance, and the differences between workers and peasants will surely be eliminated step by step.

11. The Transformation of Intellectuals

Page 341 is devoted exclusively to the problem of fostering the development of intellectuals who are the workers' and peasants' own, as well as the problem of involving bourgeois intellectuals in socialist construction. However, the text fails to deal with the transformation of intellectuals. Not only the bourgeois intellectuals but even those of worker or peasant origin need to engage in transformation because they have come under the manifold influence of the bourgeoisie. Liu Shao-t'ang, of artistic and literary circles, who, after becoming an author, became a major opponent of socialism, exemplifies this. Intellectuals usually express their general outlook through their way of looking at knowledge. Is it privately owned or publicly owned? Some regard it as their own property, for sale when the price is right and not otherwise. Such are mere "experts" and not "reds"[9] who say the party is an "outsider" and "cannot lead the insiders." Those involved in the cinema claim that the party cannot lead the cinema. Those involved in musicals or ballet claim that the party cannot offer leadership there. Those in atomic science say the same. In sum, what they are all saying is that the party cannot lead anywhere. Remoulding of the intellectuals is an extremely important question for the entire period of socialist revolution and construction. Of course it would be wrong to minimize this question or to adopt a concessive attitude toward things bourgeois.

Again on page 341 it says that the fundamental contradiction in the transition economy is the one between capitalism and socialism. Correct. But this passage speaks only of setting struggles in motion to see who will emerge the victor in all realms of economic life. None of this is complete. We would put it as follows: a thoroughgoing socialist revolution must advance along the three fronts of politics, economics, and ideology.

The text says that we absorb bourgeois elements so that they may participate in the management of enterprises and the state. This is repeated on page 357. [Page 341, according to the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] But we insist on the responsibility for remoulding the bourgeois elements. We help them change their lifestyle, their general outlook, and also their viewpoint on particular issues. The text, however, makes no mention of remoulding.

12. The Relationship Between Industrialization and Agricultural Collectivization

The book sees socialist industrialization as the precondition for agricultural collectivization. This view in no way corresponds to the situation in the Soviet Union itself, where collectivization was basically realized between 1930 and 1932. Though they had then more tractors than we do now, still and all the amount of arable land under mechanized cultivation was under 20.3 percent. Collectivization is not altogether determined by mechanization, and so industrialization is not the precondition for it.

Agricultural collectivization in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe was completed very slowly, mainly because after land reform, they did not strike while the iron was hot but delayed for a time. In some of our own old base areas too, a section of the peasantry was satisfied with the reform and unwilling to proceed further. This situation did not depend at all on whether or not there was industrialization.

13. War and Revolution

On pages 352-54 it is argued that the various people’s democracies of Eastern Europe “were able to build socialism even though there was neither civil war nor armed intervention from abroad.” It is also argued that “socialist transformation in these countries was realized without the ordeal of civil war.” It would have been better to say that what happened in these countries is that a civil war was waged in the form of international war, that civil and international war were waged together. The reactionaries of these countries were ploughed under by the Soviet Red Army. To say that there was no civil war in these countries would be mere formalism that disregards substance.

The text says that in the countries of Eastern Europe after the revolution "parliaments became the organs for broadly representing the people's interests." In fact, these parliaments were completely different from the bourgeois parliaments of old, bearing resemblance in name only. The Political Consultative Conference we had during the early phase of Liberation was no different in name from the Political Consultative Conference of the Nationalist period. During our negotiations with the Nationalists we were indifferent to the conference but Chiang Kai-shek was very interested in it. After Liberation we took over their signboard and called into session a nationwide Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which served as a provisional people's congress.[10]

The text says that China "in the process of revolutionary struggle organized a people's democratic united front." (p. 357) Why only "revolutionary struggle" and not "revolutionary war?" From 1927 down to the nationwide victory we waged twenty-two years of long-term uninterrupted war. And even before that, starting with the bourgeois revolution of 1911, there was another fifteen years' warfare. The chaotic wars of the warlords under the direction of imperialists should also be counted. Thus, from 1911 down to the War to Resist America and Aid Korea, it may be said that continual wars were waged in China for forty years — revolutionary warfare and counter-revolutionary warfare. And, since its founding, our party has joined or led wars for thirty years.

A great revolution must go through a civil war. This is a rule. And to see the ills of war but not its benefits is a onesided view. It is of no use to the people's revolution to speak onesidedly of the destructiveness of war.

14. Is Revolution Harder in Backward Countries?

In the various nations of the West there is a great obstacle to carrying through any revolution and construction movement i.e., the poisons of the bourgeoisie are so powerful that they have penetrated each and every corner. While our bourgeoisie has had, after all, only three generations, those of England and France have had a 250-300 year history of development and their ideology and *modus operandi* have influenced all aspects and strata of their societies. Thus the English working class follows the Labour Party, not the Communist Party.

Lenin says, "The transition from capitalism to socialism will be more difficult for a country the more backward it is." This would seem incorrect today. Actually, the transition is less difficult the more backward an economy is, for the poorer they are the more the people want revolution. In the capitalist countries of the West the number of people employed is comparatively high, and so is the wage level. Workers there have been deeply influenced by the bourgeoisie, and it would not appear to be all that easy to carry through a socialist transformation. And since the degree of mechanization is high, the major problem after a successful revolution would not be advancing mechanization but transforming the people. Countries of the East, such as China and Russia, had been backward and poor, but now not only have their social systems moved well ahead of those of the West, but even the rate of development of their productive forces far outstrips that of the West. Again, as in the history of the development of the capitalist countries, the backward overtake the advanced as America overtook England, and as Germany later overtook England early in the twentieth century.

15. Is Large-Scale Industry the Foundation of Socialist Transformation?

On page 364 [Page 349, according to the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] the text says, “Countries that have taken the road of socialist construction face the task of eliminating as quickly as possible the after-effects of capitalist rule in order to accelerate the development of large industry (the basis for the socialist transformation of the economy).” It is not enough to assert that the development of large industry is the foundation for the socialist transformation of the economy. All revolutionary history shows that the full development of new productive forces is not the prerequisite for the transformation of backward production relations. Our revolution began with Marxist-Leninist propaganda, which served to create new public opinion in favor of the revolution. Moreover, it was possible to destroy the old production relations only after we had overthrown a backward superstructure in the course of revolution. After the old production relations had been destroyed new ones were created, and these cleared the way for the development of new social productive forces. With that behind us we were able to set in motion the technological revolution to develop social productive forces on a large scale. At the same time, we still had to continue transforming the production relations and ideology.

This textbook addresses itself only to material preconditions and seldom engages the question of the superstructure, i.e., the class nature of the state, philosophy, and science. In economics the main object of study is the production relations. All the same, political economy and the materialist historical outlook are close cousins. It is difficult to deal clearly with problems of the economic base and the production relations if the question of the superstructure is neglected.

16. Lenin’s Discussion of the Unique Features of Taking the Socialist Road

On page 375 a passage from Lenin is cited. It is well expressed and quite helpful for defending our work methods. “The level of consciousness of the residents, together with the efforts they have made to realize this or that plan, are bound to be reflected in the unique features of the road they take toward socialism.” Our own “politics in command” is precisely for raising the consciousness in our neighbourhoods. Our own Great Leap Forward is precisely an “effort to realize this or that plan.”

17. The Rate of Industrialization Is a Critical Problem

The text says, “As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the rate of industrialization is a critical problem.” At present this is a critical problem for China, too. As a matter of fact, the problem becomes more acute the more backward industry is. This is true not only from country to country but also from one area to another in the same country. For example, our northeastern provinces and Shanghai have a comparatively strong base, and so state investment increased somewhat less rapidly there. In other areas, where the original industrial base was slight, and development was urgently needed, state investment increased quite rapidly. In the ten years that Shanghai has been liberated 2.2 billion Chinese dollars[11] have been invested, over 500 million by capitalists. Shanghai used to have over half a million workers, now the city has over 1 million, if we do not count the hundreds of thousands transferred out. This is only double the earlier worker population. When we compare this with certain new cities where the work force has increased enormously we can see plainly that in areas with a deficient industrial base the problem of rate is all the more critical. Here the text only says that political circumstances demand the high rate and does not explain whether or not the socialist system itself can attain the high rate. This is onesided. If there is only the need and not the capability, tell me, how is the high rate to be achieved?[12]

18. Achieve a High Rate of Industrialization by Concurrent Promotion of Small, Medium, and Large Enterprise

On page 381 the text touches on our broad development of small- and medium-scale enterprise but fails to reflect accurately our philosophy of concurrent promotion of native and foreign, small, medium, and large enterprise. The text says we "determined upon extensive development of small and medium-scale enterprises because of the utter backwardness of our technological economy, the size of our populations and very serious employment problems." But the problem by no means lies in technological age, population size, or the need to increase employment. Under the guidance of the larger enterprises we are developing the small and the medium; under the guidance of the foreign we are adopting native methods wherever we can — mainly for the sake of achieving the high rate of industrialization.

19. Is Long-Term Coexistence Between Two Types of Socialist Ownership Possible?

On page 386 it says, "A socialist state and socialist construction can not be established on two different bases for any length of time. That is to say, they can not be established on the base of socialist industry, the largest and most unified base, *and* on the base of the peasant petty commodity economy, which is scattered and backward." This point is well taken, of course, and we therefore extend the logic to reach the following conclusion: The socialist state and socialist construction cannot be established for any great length of time on the basis of ownership by the whole people *and* ownership by the collective as two different bases of ownership.

In the Soviet Union the period of coexistence between the two types of ownership has lasted too long. The contradictions between ownership of the whole people and collective ownership are in reality contradictions between workers and peasants. The text fails to recognize such contradictions.

In the same way prolonged coexistence of ownership by the whole people with ownership by the collectives is bound to become less and less adaptable to the development of the productive forces and will fail to satisfy the ever increasing needs of peasant consumption and agricultural production or of industry for raw materials. To satisfy such needs we must resolve the contradiction between these two forms of ownership, transform ownership by the collectives into ownership by the whole people, and make a unified plan for production and distribution in industry and agriculture on the basis of ownership by the whole people for an indivisible nation.

The contradictions between the productive forces and the production relations unfold without interruption. Relations that once were adapted to the productive forces will no longer be so after a period of time. In China, after we finished organizing the advanced cooperatives, the question of having both large and small units came up in every special district and in every county.

In socialist society the formal categories of distribution according to labor, commodity production, the law of value, and so forth are presently adapted to the demands of the productive forces. But as this development proceeds, the day is sure to come when these formal categories will no longer be adapted. At that time these categories will be destroyed by the development of the productive forces; their life will be over. Are we to believe that in a socialist society there are economic categories that are eternal and unchanging? Are we to believe that such categories as distribution according to labor and collective ownership are eternal — unlike all other categories, which are historical [hence relative]?

20. The Socialist Transformation of Agriculture Cannot Depend Only on Mechanization

Page 392 states, “The machine and tractor stations are important tools for carrying through the socialist transformation in agriculture.” Again and again the text emphasizes how important machinery is for the transformation. But if the consciousness of the peasantry is not raised, if ideology is not transformed, and you are depending on nothing but machinery — what good will it be? The question of the struggle between the two roads, socialism and capitalism, the transformation and re-education of people — these are the major questions for China.

The text on page 395 says that in carrying through the tasks of the early stages of general collectivization the question of the struggle against hostile rich peasants comes up. This of course is correct. But in the account the text gives of rural conditions *after* the formation of cooperatives the question of a prosperous stratum is dropped, nor is there any mention of such contradictions as those between the state, the collectives, and individuals, between accumulation and consumption[13] and so forth.

Page 402 says, “Under conditions of high tide in the agricultural cooperative movement the broad masses of the middle peasantry will not waver again.” This is too general.

There is a section of rich middle peasants that is now wavering and will do so in the future.

21. So-Called Full Consolidation

". . . fully consolidated the collective farm system," it says on page 407. "Full consolidation" — a phrase to make one uneasy. The consolidation of anything is relative. How can it be "full"? What if no one died since the beginning of mankind, and everyone got "fully consolidated"? What kind of a world would that be! In the universe, on our globe, all things come into being, develop, and pass away ceaselessly. None of them is ever "fully consolidated." Take the life of a silkworm. Not only must it pass away in the end, it must pass through four stages of development during its lifetime: egg, silkworm, pupa, moth. It must move on from one stage to the next and can never fully consolidate itself in any one stage. In the end, the moth dies, and its old essence becomes a new essence (as it leaves behind many eggs). This is a qualitative leap. Of course, from egg to worm, from worm to pupa, from pupa to moth clearly are more than quantitative changes. There is qualitative transformation too, but it is *partial* qualitative transformation. A person, too, in the process of moving through life toward death, experiences different stages: childhood, adolescence, youth, adulthood and old age. From life to death is a quantitative process for people, but at the same time they are pushing forward the process of partial qualitative change. It would be absurd to think that from youth to old age is but a quantitative increase without qualitative change. Inside the human organism cells are ceaselessly dividing, old ones dying and vanishing, new ones emerging and growing. At death there is a complete qualitative change, one that has come about through the preceding quantitative changes as well as the partial qualitative changes that occur during the quantitative changes. Quantitative change and qualitative change are a unity of opposites. Within the quantitative changes there are partial qualitative changes. One cannot say that there are no qualitative changes within quantitative changes. And within qualitative changes there are quantitative changes. One cannot say that there are no quantitative changes within qualitative changes.

In any lengthy process of change, before entering the final qualitative change, the subject must pass through uninterrupted quantitative changes and a good many partial qualitative changes. But the final qualitative change cannot come about unless there are partial qualitative changes and considerable quantitative change. For example, a factory of a given plant and size changes qualitatively as the machinery and other installations are renovated a section at a time. The interior changes even though the exterior and the size do not. A company of soldiers is no different. After it has fought a battle and lost dozens of men, a hundred-soldier company will have to replace its casualties. Fighting and replenishing continuously — this is how the company goes through uninterrupted partial qualitative change. As a result the company continues to develop and harden itself.

The crushing of Chiang Kai-shek was a qualitative change which came about through quantitative change. For example, there had to be a three-and-a-half-year period during which his army and political power were destroyed a section at a time. And, within this quantitative change qualitative change is to be found. The War of Liberation went through several different stages, and each new stage differed qualitatively from the preceding stages. The transformation from individual to collective economy was a process of qualitative transformation. In our country this process consisted of mutual aid teams, early-stage cooperatives, advanced cooperatives, and people's communes.[14] Such different stages of partial qualitative change brought a collective economy out of an individual economy.

The present socialist economy in our country is organized through two different forms of public ownership, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership. This socialist economy has had its own birth and development. Who would believe that this process of change has come to an end, and that we will say, "These two forms of ownership will continue to be fully consolidated for all time?" Who would believe that such formulas of a socialist society as "distribution according to labor," "commodity production," and "the law of value" are going to live forever? Who would believe that there is only birth and development but no dying away and transformation and that these formulas unlike all others are ahistorical?

Socialism must make the transition to communism. At that time there will be things of the socialist stage that will have to die out. And, too, in the period of communism there will still be uninterrupted development. It is quite possible that communism will have to pass through a number of different stages. How can we say that once communism has been reached nothing will change, that everything will continue "fully consolidated," that there will be quantitative change only, and no partial qualitative change going on all the time.

The way things develop, one stage leads on to another, advancing without interruption. But each and every stage has a "boundary." Every day we read from, say, four o'clock and end at seven or eight. That is the boundary. As far as socialist ideological remoulding goes, it is a long-term task. But each ideological campaign reaches its conclusion, that is to say has a boundary. On the ideological front, when we will have come through uninterrupted quantitative changes and partial qualitative changes, the day will arrive when we will be completely free of the influence of capitalist ideology. At that time the qualitative changes of ideological remoulding will have ended, but only to be followed by the quantitative changes of a new quality.

The construction of socialism also has its boundary. We have to keep tabs: for example, what is to be the ratio of industrial goods to total production, how much steel is to be produced, how high can the people's living standard be raised, etc.? But to say that socialist construction has a boundary hardly means that we do not want to take the next step, to make the transition to communism. It is possible to divide the transition from capitalism to communism into two stages: one from capitalism to socialism, which could be called underdeveloped socialism; and one from socialism to communism, that is, from comparatively underdeveloped socialism to comparatively developed socialism, namely, communism. This latter stage may take even longer than the first. But once it has been passed through, material production and spiritual prosperity will be most ample. People's communist consciousness will be greatly raised, and they will be ready to enter the highest stage of communism.

On page 409 it says that after the forms of socialist production have been firmly established, production will steadily and rapidly expand. The rate of productivity will climb steadily. The text uses the term *steadily* or *without interruption* a good many times, but only to speak of quantitative transformation. There is little mention of partial qualitative change.

22. War and Peace

On page 408 it says that in capitalist societies "a crisis of surplus production will inevitably be created, causing unemployment to increase." This is the gestation of war. It is difficult to believe that the basic principles of Marxist economics are suddenly without effect, that in a world where capitalist institutions still exist war can be fully eliminated.

Can it be said that the possibility of eliminating war for good has now arisen? Can it be said that the possibility of plying all the world's wealth and resources to the service of mankind has arisen? This view is not Marxism, it has no class analysis, and it has not distinguished clearly between conditions under bourgeois and proletarian rule. If you do not eliminate classes, how can you eliminate war?

We will not be the ones to determine whether a world war will be waged or not. Even if a non-belligerency agreement is signed, the possibility of war will still exist. When imperialism wants to fight no agreement is going to be taken into account. And, if it comes, whether atomic or hydrogen weapons will be used is yet another question. Even though chemical weapons exist, they have not been used in time of war; conventional weapons were used after all. Even if there is no war between the two camps, there is no guarantee war will not be waged within the capitalist world. Imperialism may make war on imperialism. The bourgeoisie of one imperialist country may make war on its proletariat. Imperialism is even now waging war against colony and semicolony. War is one form of class conflict. But classes will not be eliminated except through war. And war cannot be eliminated for good except through the elimination of classes. If revolutionary war is not carried on, classes cannot be eliminated. We do not believe that the weapons of war can be eliminated without destroying classes. It is not possible. In the history of class societies any class or state is concerned with its "position of strength." Gaining such positions has been history's inevitable tendency. Armed force is the concrete manifestation of the real strength of a class. And as long as there is class antagonism there will be armed forces. Naturally, we are not wishing for war. We wish for peace. We favor making the utmost effort to stop nuclear war and to strive for a mutual nonaggression pact between the two camps. To strive to gain even ten or twenty years' peace was what we advocated long ago. If we can realize this wish, it would be most beneficial for the entire socialist camp and for China's socialist construction as well.

On page 409 it says that at this time the Soviet Union is no longer encircled by capitalism. This manner of speaking runs the risk of lulling people to sleep. Of course the present situation has changed greatly from when there was only one socialist country. West of the Soviet Union there are now the various socialist countries of Eastern Europe. East of the Soviet Union are the socialist countries of China, Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam. But the guided missiles have no eyes and can strike targets thousands or tens of thousands of kilometers away. All around the socialist camp American military bases are deployed, pointed toward the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Can it be said that the Soviet Union is no longer inside the ring of missiles?

23. Is Unanimity the Motive Force of Social Development?

On page 413 and 417 it says that socialism makes for the “solidarity of unanimity” and is “hard as a rock.” It says that unanimity is the “motive force of social development.”

This recognizes only the unanimity of solidarity but not the contradictions within a socialist society, nor that contradiction is the motive force of social development. Once it is put this way, the law of the universality of contradiction is denied, the laws of dialectics are suspended. Without contradictions there is no movement, and society always develops through movement. In the era of socialism, contradictions remain the motive force of social development. Precisely because there is no unanimity there is the responsibility for unity, the necessity to fight for it. If there were 100 percent unanimity always, then what explains the necessity for persevering in working for unity?

24. Rights of Labor Under Socialism

On page 414 we find a discussion of the rights labor enjoys but no discussion of labor’s right to run the state, the various enterprises, education, and culture. Actually, this is labor’s greatest right under socialism, the most fundamental right, without which there is no right to work, to an education, to vacation, etc.

The paramount issue for socialist democracy is: Does labor have the right to subdue the various antagonistic forces and their influences? For example, who controls things like the newspapers, journals, broadcast stations, the cinema? Who criticizes? These are a part of the question of rights. If these things are in the hands of right opportunists (who are a minority) then the vast nationwide majority that urgently needs a great leap forward will find itself deprived of these rights. If the cinema is in the hands of people like Chung Tien-p’ei,[15] how are the people supposed to realize their own rights in that sector? There is a variety of factions among the people. Who is in control of the organs and enterprises bears tremendously on the issue of guaranteeing the people’s rights. If Marxist-Leninists are in control, the rights of the vast majority will be guaranteed. If rightists or right opportunists are in control, these organs and enterprises may change qualitatively, and the people’s rights with respect to them cannot be guaranteed. In sum, the people must have the right to manage the superstructure. We must not take the rights of the people to mean that the state is to be managed by only a section of the people, that the people can enjoy labor rights, education rights, social insurance, etc., only under the management of certain people.

25. Is the Transition to Communism a Revolution?

On page 417 it says, “Under socialism there will be no class or social group whose interests conflict with communism and therefore the transition to communism will come about without social revolution.”

The transition to communism certainly is not a matter of one class overthrowing another. But that does not mean there will be no social revolution, because the superseding of one kind of production relations by another is a qualitative leap, i.e., a revolution. The two transformations — of individual economy to collective, and collective economy to public — in China are both revolutions in the production relations. So to go from socialism’s “distribution according to labor” to communism’s “distribution according to need” has to be called a revolution in the production relations. Of course, “distribution according to need” has to be brought about gradually. Perhaps when the principal material goods can be adequately supplied we can begin to carry out such distribution with those goods, extending the practice to other goods on the basis of further development of the productive forces.

Consider the development of our people’s communes. When we changed from basic ownership by the team to basic ownership by the commune, was a section of the people likely to raise objections or not? This is a question well worth our study. A determinative condition for realizing this changeover was that the commune-owned economy’s income was more than half of the whole commune’s total income. To realize the basic commune-ownership system is generally of benefit to the members of the commune. Thus we estimate that there should be no objection on the part of the vast majority. But at the time of changeover the original team cadres could no longer be relatively reduced under the circumstances. Would *they* object to the changeover?

Although classes may be eliminated in a socialist society, in the course of its development there are bound to be certain problems with “vested interest groups” which have grown content with existing institutions and unwilling to change them. For example, if the rule of distribution according to labor is in effect they benefit from higher pay for more work, and when it came time to change over to “distribution according to need” they could very well be uncomfortable with the new situation. Building any new system always necessitates some destruction of old ones. Creation never comes without destruction. If destruction is necessary it is bound to arouse some opposition. The human animal is queer indeed. No sooner do people gain some superiority than they assume airs . . . it would be dangerous to ignore this.

26. The Claim That “for China There Is No Necessity to Adopt Acute Forms of Class Struggle”

There is an error on page 419. After the October Revolution Russia’s bourgeoisie saw that the country’s economy had suffered severe damage, and so they decided that the proletariat could not change the situation and lacked the strength to maintain its political power. They judged that they only had to make the move and proletarian political power could be overthrown. At this point they carried out armed resistance, thus compelling the Russian proletariat to take drastic steps to expropriate their property. At that time neither class had much experience.

To say that China's class struggle is not acute is unrealistic. It was fierce enough! We fought for twenty-two years straight. By waging war we overthrew the rule of the bourgeoisie's Nationalist Party, and expropriated bureaucratic capital, which amounted to 80 percent of our entire capitalist economy. Only thus was it possible for us to use peaceful methods to remold the remaining 20 percent of national capital. In the remoulding process we still had to go through such fierce struggles as the "three-antis" and the "five-antis" campaigns.[16]

Page 420 incorrectly describes the remoulding of bourgeois industrial and commercial enterprises. After Liberation the national bourgeoisie was forced to take the road of socialist remoulding. We brought down Chiang Kai-shek, expropriated bureaucratic capital, concluded the land reform, carried out the "three-antis" and "five-antis" campaigns, and made the cooperatives a working reality. We controlled the markets from the beginning. This series of transformations forced the national bourgeoisie to accept remoulding step by step. From yet another point of view, the Common Program stipulated that various kinds of economic interests were to be given scope. This enabled the capitalists to try for what profits they could. In addition, the constitution gave them the right to a ballot and a living. These things helped the bourgeoisie to realize that by accepting remoulding they could hold onto a social position and also play a certain role in the culture and in the economy.

In joint state-private enterprises the capitalists have no real managerial rights over the enterprise. Production is certainly not jointly managed by the capitalists and representatives of the public. Nor can it be said that "Capital's exploitation of labor has been limited." It has been virtually curtailed. The text seems to have missed the idea that the jointly operated enterprises we are speaking of were 75 per cent socialist. Of course at present they are 90 percent socialist or more.

The remoulding of capitalist industry and commerce has been basically concluded. But if the capitalists had the chance they would attack us without restraint. In 1957 we pushed back the onslaught of the right.[17] In 1959, through their representatives in the party, they again set in motion an attack against us.[18] Our policy toward the national capitalists is to take them along with us and then to encompass them.

The text uses Lenin's statement that state capitalism "continues the class struggle in another form." This is correct. (p. 421)

27. The Time Period for Building Socialism

On page 423 it says that we "concluded" the socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts in 1957.[19] We would rather say that we won a decisive victory.

On the same page it says that we want to turn China into a strong socialist country within ten to fifteen years. Now this is something we agree on! This means that after the second five-year plan we will have to go through another two five-year plans until 1972 (or 1969 if we strive to beat the schedule by two or three years). In addition to modernizing industry and agriculture, science and culture, we have to modernize national defence. In a country such as ours bringing the building of socialism to its conclusion is a tremendously difficult task. In socialist construction we must not speak of "early."

28. Further Discussion of the Relationship Between Industrialization and Socialist Transformation

On page 423 it says that reform of the system of ownership long before the realization of industrialization was a circumstance created by special conditions in China This is an error. Eastern Europe, like China, "benefited from the existence of the mighty socialist camp and the help of an industrialized country as developed as the Soviet Union." The question is, what was the reason Eastern European countries could not complete the socialist transformation in the ownership system (including agriculture) before industrialization became a reality? [Cf. Chapter 28, paragraph 1, of the 1967 edition: Page 423 says, "Given the special conditions in China, before socialist industrialization became a reality, it was thanks to the existence of the mighty socialist camp and the help of a powerful, highly developed industrial nation like the Soviet Union that the reform of the ownership system (including agriculture) achieved victory." This is an error. The countries of Eastern Europe no less than China "had the existence of the powerful socialist camp and the help of as highly developed an industrial nation as the Soviet Union." Why could they not complete socialist transformation in the ownership system (including agriculture) before industrialization became a reality? *Note by translator*.] Turning to the relationship between industrialization and socialist transformation, the truth is that in the Soviet Union itself the problem of ownership was settled before industrialization became a reality.

Similarly, from the standpoint of world history, the bourgeois revolutions and the establishment of the bourgeois nations came before, not after, the Industrial Revolution. The bourgeoisie first changed the superstructure and took possession of the machinery of state before carrying on propaganda to gather real strength. Only then did they push forward great changes in the production relations. When the production relations had been taken care of and they were on the right track they then opened the way for the development of the productive forces. To be sure, the revolution in the production relations is brought on by a certain degree of development of the productive forces, but the major development of the productive forces always comes after changes in the production relations. Consider the history of the development of capitalism. First came simple coordination, which subsequently developed into workshop handicrafts. At this time capitalist production relations were already taking shape, but the workshops produced without machines. This type of capitalist production relations gave rise to the need for technological advance, creating the conditions for the use of machinery. In England the Industrial Revolution (late eighteenth-early nineteenth centuries) was carried through only after the bourgeois revolution, that is, after the seventeenth century. All in their respective ways, Germany, France, America, and Japan underwent change in superstructure and production relations before the vast development of capitalist industry.

It is a general rule that you cannot solve the problem of ownership and go on to expand development of the productive forces until you have first prepared public opinion for the seizure of political power. Although between the bourgeois revolution and the proletarian revolution there are certain differences (before the proletarian revolution socialist production relations did not exist, while capitalist production relations were already beginning to grow in feudal society), basically they are alike.

Part II.
Chapters 24-29

29. Contradictions Between Socialist Production Relations and Productive Forces

Page 433 discusses only the “mutual function” of the production relations and the productive forces under socialism but not the contradictions between them. The production relations include ownership of the means of production, the relations among people in the course of production, and the distribution system. The revolution in the system of ownership is the base, so to speak. For example, after the entire national economy has become indivisibly owned by the whole people through the transition from collective to people’s ownership, although people’s ownership will certainly be in effect for a relatively long time, for all enterprises so owned important problems will remain. Should a central-local division of authority be in effect? Which enterprises should be managed by whom? In 1958 in some basic construction units a system of fixed responsibility for capital investment was put into effect. The result was a tremendous release of enthusiasm in these units. When the center cannot depend on its own initiative it must release the enthusiasm of the enterprise or the locality. If such enthusiasm is frustrated it hurts production.

We see then that contradictions to be resolved remain in the production relations under people’s ownership. As far as relations among people in the course of labor and the distribution relations go, it is all the more necessary to improve them unremittingly. For these areas it is rather difficult to say what the base is. Much remains to be written about human relations in the course of labor, e.g., concerning the leadership’s adopting egalitarian attitudes, the changing of certain regulations and established practices, “the two participations” [worker participation in management and management participation in productive labor], “the three combinations” [combining efforts of cadres, workers, and technicians], etc. Public ownership of primitive communes lasted a long time, but during that time people’s relations to each other underwent a good many changes, all the same, in the course of labor.

30. The Transition from Collective to People's Ownership Is Inevitable

On page 435 the text says only that the existence of two forms of public ownership is objectively inevitable, but not that the transition from collective to people's ownership is also objectively inevitable. This is an inescapable objective process, one presently in evidence in certain areas of our country. According to data from Cheng An county in Hopei province, communes growing industrial crops are thriving, accumulation levels have been raised to 45 percent,[20] and the peasants' living standard is high. Should this situation continue to develop, if we do not let collective ownership become people's ownership and resolve the contradiction, peasant living standards will surpass those of the workers to the detriment of both industrial and agricultural development.

On page 438 it says that "state-managed enterprises are not fundamentally different from cooperatives. . . . there exist two forms of public ownership. . . . sacred and inviolable." There is no difference between collective and people's ownership with reference to capitalism, but the difference becomes fundamental within the socialist economy. The text speaks of the two forms of ownership as "sacred and inviolable." This is allowable when speaking of hostile forces, but when speaking of the process of development of public ownership it becomes wrong. Nothing can be regarded as unchanging. Ownership by the whole people itself also has a process of change.

After a good many years, after ownership by the people's communes has changed into ownership by the whole people, the whole nation will become an indivisible system of ownership by the whole people. This will greatly spur the development of the productive forces. For a period of time this will remain a socialist system of ownership by the whole people, and only after another period will it be a communist system of ownership by the whole people. Thus, people's ownership itself will have to progress from distribution according to labor to distribution according to need.

31. Individual Property

On page 439 it says, "Another part is consumer goods. . . . which make up the personal property of the workers." This manner of expression tends to make people think that goods classified as "consumer" are to be distributed to the workers as their individual property. This is incorrect. One part of consumer goods is individual property, another is public property, e.g., cultural and educational facilities, hospitals, athletic facilities, parks, etc. Moreover, this part is increasing. Of course they are for each worker to enjoy, but they are not individual property.

On page 440 we find lumped together work income and savings, housing, household goods, goods for individual consumption, and other ordinary equipment. This is unsatisfactory because savings, housing, etc. are all derived from working people's incomes.

In too many places this book speaks only of individual consumption and not of social consumption, such as public welfare, culture, health, etc. This is one-sided. Housing in our rural areas is far from what it should be. We must improve rural dwelling conditions in an orderly fashion. [Only in the 1969 text.: *Note by translator*.] Residential construction, particularly in cities, should in the main use collective social forces, not individual ones. If a socialist society does not undertake collective efforts what kind of socialism is there in the end? Some say that socialism is more concerned with material incentives than capitalism. Such talk is simply outrageous.

Here the text says that the wealth produced by collective farms includes individual property as well as subsidiary occupations. If we fail to propose transforming these subsidiary occupations into public ownership, the peasants will be peasants forever. A given social system must be consolidated in a given period of time. But consolidation must have a limit. If it goes on and on, the ideology reflecting the system is bound to become rigidified, causing the people to be unable to adjust their thinking to new developments.

On the same page there is mention of integrating individual and collective interests. It says, "Integration is realized by the following method: a member of society is compensated according to the quantity and quality of his labor so as to satisfy the principle of individual material interest." Here, without discussion of the necessary reservations, the text places individual interest first. This is one-sided treatment of the principle of individual material interest.

According to page 441, "Public and individual interests are not at odds and can be gradually resolved." This is spoken in vain and solves nothing. In a country like ours, if the contradictions among the people are not put to rights every few years, they will never get resolved.

32. Contradiction Is the Motive Force of Development in a Socialist Society

Page 443, paragraph 5, admits that in a socialist society contradictions between the productive forces and the production relations exist and speaks of overcoming such contradictions. But by no means does the text recognize that contradictions are the motive force.

The succeeding paragraph is acceptable; however, under socialism it is not only certain aspects of human relations and certain forms of leading the economy, but also problems of the ownership system itself (e.g., the two types of ownership) that may hinder the development of the productive forces.

Most dubious is the viewpoint in the next paragraph. It says, "The contradictions under socialism are not irreconcilable." This does not agree with the laws of dialectics, which hold that all contradictions are irreconcilable. Where has there ever been a reconcilable contradiction? Some are antagonistic, some are non-antagonistic, but it must not be thought that there are irreconcilable and reconcilable contradictions.

Under socialism [*The transcriber of the 1967 text comments that Comrade Mao may have meant "under communism"*.] there may be no war but there is still struggle, struggle among sections of the people; there may be no revolution of one class overthrowing another, but there is still revolution. The transition from socialism to communism is revolutionary. The transition from one stage of communism to another is also. Then there is technological revolution and cultural revolution. Communism will surely have to pass through many stages and many revolutions.

Here the text speaks of relying on the "positive action" of the masses to overcome contradictions at the proper time. "Positive action" should include complicated struggles.

"Under socialism there is no class energetically plotting to preserve outmoded economic relations." Correct, but in a socialist society there are still conservative strata and something like "vested interest groups." There still remain differences between mental and manual labor, city and countryside, worker and peasant. Although these are not antagonistic contradictions they cannot be resolved without struggle.

The children of our cadres are a cause of discouragement. They lack experience of life and of society, yet their airs are considerable and they have a great sense of superiority. They have to be educated not to rely on their parents or martyrs of the past but entirely on themselves.

In a socialist society there are always advanced and backward persons, those who are steadfastly loyal to the collective effort, diligent and sincere, fresh of spirit and lively, and those who are acting for fame and fortune, for the personal end, for the self, or who are apathetic and dejected. In the course of socialist development each and every period is bound to have a group that is more than willing to preserve backward production relations and social institutions. On many many questions the prosperous middle peasants have their own point of view. They cannot adapt to new developments, and some of them resist such developments, as proved by the debate over the Eight-Word Constitution[21] with the prosperous peasants of the Kuangtung rural areas.

Page 453, the last paragraph, says, "Criticism and self-criticism are powerful motive forces for the development of socialist society." This is not the point. Contradictions are the motive forces, criticism and self-criticism are the methods for resolving contradictions.

33. The Dialectical Process of Knowledge

Page 446, paragraph 2, says that as ownership becomes public "people become the masters of the economic relations of their own society," and are "able to take hold of and apply these laws fully and consciously." It should be observed that this requires going through a process. The understanding of laws always begins with the understanding of a minority before it becomes the knowledge of the majority. It is necessary to go through a process of practice and study to go from ignorance to knowledge. At the beginning no one has knowledge. Foreknowledge has never existed. People must go through practice to gain results, meet with failure as problems arise; only through such a process can knowledge gradually advance. If you want to know the objective laws of the development of things and events you must go through the process of practice, adopt a Marxist-Leninist attitude, compare successes and failures, continually practicing and studying, going through multiple successes and failures; moreover, meticulous research must be performed. There is no other way to make one's own knowledge gradually conform to the laws. For those who see only victory but not defeat it will not be possible to know these laws.

It is not easy "to possess and apply these laws fully and consciously." On page 446 the text quotes Engels. "Only at this time does the fully conscious self begin to create history. For the first time to a great extent and to an ever greater extent people can create the effects they aspire after." "Begin to" and "to an ever greater extent" are relatively accurate.

The text does not recognize the contradictions between appearances and essences. Essences always lie behind appearances and cannot be disclosed except through appearances. The text does not express the idea that for a person to know the laws it is necessary to go through a process. The vanguard is no exception.

34. Unions and the Single Leadership System

On page 452 when speaking of the mission of trade unions, the text does not say that the primary task of the unions is to develop production; it does not discuss ways to strengthen political education; it merely overemphasizes welfare.

Throughout, the text speaks of "managing production according to the principle of the single-leader system." All enterprises in capitalist countries put this principle into effect. There should be a basic distinction between the principles governing management of socialist and capitalist enterprises. We in China have been able to distinguish our methods strictly from capitalist management by putting into effect factory leader responsibility under the guidance of the party.

35. Starting From Fundamental Principles and Rules Is Not the Marxist Method

From the second chapter on a great many rules are set up. The analysis of capitalist economy in *Das Kapital* commences with appearances, searches out essences, and only then uses the essence to explain the appearance, making through this method effective summaries and outlines. But the text does not pursue an analysis. Its composition lacks order. It always proceeds from rules, principles, laws, definitions, a methodology Marxism-Leninism has always opposed. The *effects* of principles and laws must be subjected to analysis and thorough study; only then can principles and laws be derived.

Human knowledge always encounters appearances first. Proceeding from there, one searches out principles and laws. The text does the opposite. Its methodology is deductive, not analytical. According to formal logic, “People all will die. Mr. Chang is a person. Therefore Mr. Chang will die.” This is a conclusion derived from the premise that all human beings die. This is the deductive method. For every question the text first gives definitions, which it then takes as a major premise and reasons from there, failing to understand that the major premise should be the result of researching a question. Not until one has gone through the concrete research can principles and laws be discovered and proved.

36. Can Advanced Experience Be Popularized Effortlessly?

Page 461, paragraph 2, says, “In a socialist national economy science’s latest achievements, technical inventions, and advanced experience can be popularized in all enterprises without the slightest difficulty.” This is far from necessarily so. In a socialist society there are still “academic overlords” who control the organs of scientific research and repress new forces. This is why science’s latest achievements are not simply popularized without the slightest difficulty. Such a manner of speaking essentially fails to recognize that there are contradictions within a socialist society. Whenever something new appears it is bound to meet with obstacles, perhaps because people are unaccustomed to it or do not understand it, or because it conflicts with the interests of a particular group. For example, our practices of close planting and deep furrowing have no class nature in and of themselves, yet they have been opposed and resisted by a particular group. Of course, in a socialist society such inhibiting conditions are fundamentally different from those in a capitalist society.

37. Planning

Page 465 quotes Engels as saying, “Under socialism it will become possible to carry out social production according to a predetermined plan.” This is correct. In capitalist society equilibrium of the national economy is achieved through economic crises. In socialist society there is the possibility of making equilibrium a reality through planning. But let us not deny, because of this possibility, that knowledge of the required proportions must come through a process. Here the text says, “Spontaneity and *laissez faire* are incompatible with public ownership of the means of production.” It should not be thought, however, that spontaneity and *laissez faire* do not exist in a socialist society. Our knowledge of the laws is not perfect all at once. Actual work tells us that in a given period of time there is such and such a plan by such and such people, or by a different group. No one can say that one particular group’s plan conforms to the laws. Surely, some plans will accord or basically accord, while others will not or basically will not.

To think that knowledge of the proportions does not require a process — comparison between successes and failures, a tortuous course of development — is a metaphysical point of view. Freedom is the recognition of necessity, but necessity is not perceived in a glance. The world has no natural sages, nor upon attaining a socialist society does everyone become prescient. Why was not this text on political economy published at some earlier time? Why has it been revised time and again after its publication? And after all, is not the reason for this that knowledge was imperfect in the past and even now remains so? Take our own experiences — at the beginning we did not understand how to make socialism work; gradually, through practice, we came to understand a little, but not enough. If we think it is enough then nothing will be left to do!

On page 466 it says that an outstanding feature of socialism is “the conscious regular maintaining of due proportion.” This is both a responsibility and a demand, and a difficult one to fulfill. Even Stalin said that the plans of the Soviet Union could not be regarded as already fully reflecting what the laws demanded.

The “regular maintaining of due proportion” is at the same time the regular appearance of imbalances. For when due proportion is not achieved then the task of keeping things in proportion arises. In the course of the development of a socialist economy the regular appearance of imbalances requires us to balance things by holding to proportionality and comprehensiveness. For example, as the economy develops, shortages of technical personnel and cadres are felt all over, and a contradiction between needs and supply appears. This in turn spurs us to operate more schools and train more cadres to resolve this contradiction. It is after the appearance of imbalances and disproportion that people further understand the objective laws.

In planning, if no accounting is made, if we let things run their course, or are overly cautious insisting on everything being foolproof, then our methods will not succeed, and as a result proportionality will be destroyed.

A plan is an ideological form. Ideology is a reflection of realities, but it also acts upon realities. Our past plans stipulated that no new industry would be built on our coasts, and up to 1957 there was no construction there. We wasted seven years. Only after 1958 did major construction begin. These past two years have seen great developments. Thus, ideological forms such as plans have a great effect on economic development and its rate.

38. Priority Growth in Producing the Means of Production; Concurrent Promotion of Industry and Agriculture

On page 466 the problem of priority growth in producing the means of production is addressed.

Priority growth in producing the means of production is an economic rule for expanded reproduction common to all societies. If there are no priorities in producing the means of production in capitalist society there can be no expanded reproduction. In Stalin’s time, due to special emphasis on priority development of heavy industry, agriculture was neglected in the plans. Eastern Europe has had similar problems in the past few years. Our approach has been to make priority development of heavy industry the condition for putting into effect concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture, as well as some other concurrent programs, each of which again has within it a leading aspect. If agriculture does not make gains few problems can be resolved. It has been four years now since we proposed concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture, though it was truly put into effect in 1960. How highly we regard agriculture is expressed by the quantity of steel materials we are allocating to agriculture. In 1959 we allocated only 590,000 tons but this year (including water conservancy construction) we allocated 1.3 million tons. This is truly concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture.

Here the text mentions that between 1925 and 1958 production of the means of production in the Soviet Union increased 103 times, while consumer goods increased 15.6 times. The question is, does a ratio of 103:15.6 benefit the development of heavy [Only in 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] industry or not? If we want heavy industry to develop quickly everyone has to show initiative and maintain high spirits. And if we want that then we must enable industry and agriculture to be concurrently promoted, and the same for light and heavy industry.

Provided that we enable agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry to develop at the same time and at a high rate, we may guarantee that the people's livelihood can be suitably improved together with the development of heavy industry. The experience of the Soviet Union, no less than our own, proves that if agriculture does not develop, if light industry does not develop, it hurts the development of heavy industry.

39. "Distribution Is Determinative" — An Erroneous View

In chapter 20 it says, "The precondition for the high tide in state-managed industry was utilizing the workers' concern for their individual material interest in the development of socialist production." In chapter 21 it says, "Fully carry out economic accounting using the economic law of distribution according to labor (a law which combines workers' individual material interest with the interests of socialist production) to serve an important function in the struggle for national industrialization." In chapter 25 it says, "The goals of socialist production cause workers to be keenly concerned to make vigorous efforts to raise production and project personnel to be concerned with the fruits of their own labor, out of material interest. This is a powerful motive force for the development of socialist production." To make an absolute out of "concern for individual material interest" in this fashion is bound to entail the danger of increasing individualism.

Page 452 says that the law of distribution according to labor "is one of the determining motive forces for socialist production in that it causes all workers out of material interest to be concerned for the carrying out of plans to raise productivity." One cannot help asking, "If the fundamental economic laws of socialism determine the direction of development of socialist production, then how does it follow that individual material interest is alleged to be a determining motive force of production?" To treat distribution of consumer goods as a determining motive force is the erroneous view of distribution as determinative. Marx said, in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, "Distribution in the first place should be distribution of the means of production: in whose hands are the means of production? This is the determinative question. Distribution of the means of production is what determines distribution of consumer goods." To regard distribution of consumer goods as the determining motive force is a distortion of Marx's correct view and a serious theoretical error.

40. "Politics in Command and Material Incentive"

Page 452, paragraph 2, places party organization after local economic organs; these latter become the heads under the direct administration of the central government. Local party organizations cannot take the political lead in those areas, making it virtually impossible for them to mobilize all positive forces sufficiently. The text on page 457, although conceding the creative activities of the masses, nonetheless says, "One of the most important conditions for accelerating communist construction is the participation of the masses in the struggle to fulfill and overfulfill plans for national economic development." Page 447 also says, "Initiative of farm personnel is one decisive factor in developing agriculture." To regard the mass struggle as "one important factor" flies in the face of the principle that the masses are the creators of history. Under no circumstances can history be regarded as something the planners rather than the masses create.

Immediately afterward the text raises this point: "To begin with, we must utilize material incentives." This makes it seem as if the masses' creative activity has to be inspired by material interest. At every opportunity the text discusses individual material interest as if it were an attractive means for luring people into pleasant prospects. This is a reflection of the spiritual state of a good number of economic workers and leading personnel and of the failure to emphasize political-ideological work. Under such circumstances there is no alternative to relying on material incentives. "From each according to his ability, to each according to his labor." The first half of the slogan means that the very greatest effort must be expended in production. Why separate the two halves of the slogan and always speak one-sidedly of material incentive? This kind of propaganda for material interest will make capitalism unbeatable!

41. Balance and Imbalance

Page 432, paragraph 1, is mistaken. The development of capitalist technology is balanced in certain respects, unbalanced in others. The point is that balance and imbalance in technological development is essentially different under capitalism and under socialism. Under socialism there is balance and imbalance; for example, in the first period of Liberation we had barely over 200 geological project workers, and prospecting was altogether out of phase with the needs of the development of the national economy. After several years' intense efforts the situation was practically rectified when fresh imbalances arose. At present there is in China an overwhelming preponderance of manual labor, a situation quite out of phase with our needs for developing production and raising labor productivity. This is why we have to launch a broad technological revolution and resolve this imbalance. With the appearance of every new technical department imbalance of technological development is bound to become noticeable again. For example, we are now tackling higher technology so we are conscious of the incompatibility of many things. But this Soviet text not only denies a degree of balance under capitalism but also a degree of imbalance under socialism.

Technology and the economy both develop in this way. The text seems to be unacquainted with the wavelike advances of the development of socialist production and speaks of the development of socialist economy as perfectly linear, free of dips. This is unthinkable. No line of development is straight; it is wave or spiral shaped. Even our studying has this pattern. Before studying we do something else. Afterward we have to rest for a few hours. We cannot continue studying as if there were neither day nor night. We study more one day, less the next. Moreover in our daily study sometimes we find more to comment upon, sometimes less. These are all wavelike patterns, rising and falling. Balance is relative to imbalance. Without imbalance there is no balance. The development of all things is characterized by imbalance. That is why there is a demand for balance. Contradiction between balance and imbalance exists in all parts of the various areas and departments, forever arising, forever being resolved. When there is a plan for the first year there has to be one for the next year as well. An annual plan requires a quarterly plan, which in turn requires a monthly plan. In every one of the twelve months contradictions between balance and imbalance have to be resolved. Plans constantly have to be revised precisely because new imbalances recur.

But the text has not adequately applied the dialectical method to research the various problems. The chapter devoted to the laws of planned proportional development of the national economy is quite long, yet no mention is made of the contradiction between balance and imbalance.

The national economy of a socialist society can have planned proportional development which enables imbalances to be regulated. However, imbalance does not go away. “Unevenness is in the nature of things.” Because private ownership was eliminated it was possible to have planned organization of the economy. Therefore, it was possible to control and utilize consciously the objective laws of imbalance to create many relative temporary [Only in the 1969 text.: *Note by translator*.] balances.

If the productive forces run ahead, the production relations will not accord with the productive forces; the superstructure will not accord with the production relations. At that point the superstructure and the production relations will have to be changed to accord with the productive forces. Between superstructure and production relations, between production relations and productive forces — some say balance is only relatively attainable, for the productive forces are always advancing, therefore there is always imbalance. Balance and imbalance are two sides of a contradiction within which imbalance is absolute and balance relative. If this were not so, neither the superstructure nor the production relations, nor the productive forces, could further develop; they would become petrified. Balance is relative, imbalance absolute. This is a universal law which I am convinced applies to socialist society. Contradiction and struggle are absolutes; unity, unanimity, and solidarity are transitional, hence relative. The various balances attained in planning are temporary, transitional, and conditional, hence relative. Who can imagine a state of equilibrium that is unconditional, eternal?

We need to use balance and imbalance among the productive forces, the production relations, and the superstructure as a guideline for researching the economic problems of socialism.

The main object of study in political economy is the production relations. But to study clearly the production relations it is necessary to study concomitantly the productive forces and also the positive and negative effects of the superstructure on the production relations. The text refers to the state but never studies it in depth. This is one omission. Of course, in the process of studying political economy, the study of the productive forces and the superstructure should not become overdeveloped. If the study of the productive forces goes too far it becomes technology and natural science. If the study of the superstructure goes too far it becomes nation-state theory, class struggle theory. Under the heading of socialism (one of Marxism's three component parts) what we study are: theories of class struggle, theories of the state, theories of revolution and the party, as well as military strategies and tactics, etc.

There is nothing in the world that cannot be analyzed. But circumstances differ and so do essences. Many fundamental categories and laws — e.g., unity of contradiction — are applicable. If we study problems in this way, if we observe problems in this way, we will then have a solid, integral worldview and methodology.

42. "Material Incentives"

Page 486 says, "In the socialist stage labor has not yet become the primary necessity in the lives of all members of society, and therefore material incentives to labor have the greatest significance." Here "all members" is too general. Lenin was a member of the society. Had *his* labor not become a "primary necessity" of his life?

Page 486 raises this point: there are two kinds of individuals in socialist society, the great majority who faithfully discharge their duties and the few who are dishonest about their duties. This is correctly analyzed. But if we want to bring around this latter group we can not rely exclusively on material incentives. We still have to criticize and educate them to raise their consciousness.

This section of the text speaks of workers who are comparatively diligent and positive. Conditions being equal, these are the ones who will produce more. Plainly, whether a worker is diligent and enthusiastic or not is determined by political consciousness, not by the level of technical or cultural expertise. Some whose technical and cultural level is high are nonetheless neither diligent nor enthusiastic; others whose level is lower are quite diligent and enthusiastic. The reason lies in the lower political consciousness of the former, the higher political consciousness of the latter.

The book says that material incentive to labor "spurs increases in production" and "is one of the decisive factors in stimulating the development of production." But material incentive does not necessarily change every year. People may not require such incentive daily, monthly, or yearly. In times of difficulty when incentives are reduced people must still carry on, and that satisfactorily. By making material incentive a one-sided absolute the text fails to give due importance to raising consciousness, and cannot explain why there are differences among the labor of people in the same pay scale. For example, in scale no. 5,[22] one group may carry on very well, another rather poorly, and a third tolerably well on the whole. Why, with similar material incentive, such differences occur is inexplicable according to their way of reasoning.

Even if the importance of material incentive is recognized, it is never the sole principle. There is always another principle, namely, spiritual inspiration from political ideology. And, while we are on the subject, material incentive can not simply be discussed as individual interest. There is also the collective interest to which individual interest should be subordinated, long-term interests to which temporary interests should be subordinated, and the interests of the whole to which partial interests should be subordinated.

In the section “Material Incentives to Labor, Socialist Emulation,” there are some fairly well written passages concerning emulation. What is missing is the discussion of politics!

First, don’t work people to death. Second, don’t ruin their health, but even bring about gradual strengthening. These two points are basic. As for other things, if we can have them, fine, if not, well and good! We want the people to have some consciousness. The text seems to lay almost no emphasis on the future, the generations to come, only emphasizing material interest, constantly taking the road of material interest and rashly turning it into the principle of individual interest, as if it were a magic wand.

What they do not say is that individual interest will be satisfied when the interests of the whole people are satisfied. The individual material interest they emphasize is in reality myopic individualism, an economistic tendency from the period of proletarian class struggle against capitalism manifesting itself in the period of socialist construction. During the era of bourgeois revolutions a number of bourgeois revolutionaries made heroic sacrifices for the interests of their class and future generations of their class, but certainly not for immediate individual interest.

When we were in the base areas we had a free [nonmarket] supply system.[23] People were tougher then, and there was no wrangling at all on account of seeking preferential treatment. After liberation we had a wage system, and agreed upon scales, but our problems only multiplied. Many people wrangled frequently in a struggle for status, and we had to do a lot of persuading.

Our party has waged war for over twenty years without letup. For a long time we made a nonmarket supply system work. Of course at that time the entire society of the base areas was not practicing the system. But those who made the system work in the civil war period reached a high of several hundred thousand, and at the lowest still numbered in the tens of thousands. In the War of Resistance Against Japan the number shot up again from over a million to several millions. Right up to the first stage of Liberation our people lived an egalitarian life, working hard and fighting bravely, without the least dependence on material incentives, only the inspiration of revolutionary spirit. At the end of the second period of the civil war we suffered a defeat, although we had victories before and after. This course of events had nothing at all to do with whether we had material incentives or not. It had to do with whether or not our political line and our military line were correct. These historical experiences have the greatest significance for solving our problems of socialist construction.

Chapter 26 says, “Workers in socialist enterprises who, out of material interest, are concerned with the results of their own work are the motive forces developing socialist production.” (p. 482)

Chapter 27 says, “Compensation for skilled labor is comparatively high. . . . And this stimulates workers to raise their cultural and technical level, causing the essential difference between manual and mental labor to diminish.” (pp. 501-03)

The point here is that higher compensation for skilled labor has spurred unskilled workers to upgrade themselves continuously so they can enter the ranks of skilled workers. This means that they studied culture and technology in order to earn more money. In a socialist society every person entering school to study culture and technology should recognize before anything else that they are studying for socialist construction, for industrialization, to serve the people, for the collective interest, and not above all for a higher wage.

Chapter 28 says, “Distribution according to labor is the greatest force propelling the development of production.” (p. 526) And at the end of this page, after explaining that wages rise steadily under socialism, the unrevised third edition of this textbook even goes so far as to say, “Socialism is fundamentally superior to capitalism precisely in this.” Now to say that socialism is fundamentally superior to capitalism because wages steadily rise is very wrong. Wages are distribution of consumer goods. If there is no distribution of the means of production, there can be no distribution of the goods produced, of consumer goods. The latter is predicated on the former.

43. Interpersonal Relations in Socialist Enterprises

Page 500 says, “Under socialism the prestige of economic leaders is contingent upon the trust the masses have in them.” This is well said indeed. But to reach this goal it will take work. In our experience, if cadres do not set aside their pretensions and identify with the workers, the workers will never look on the factory as their own but as the cadres’. “Master-of-the-house” attitudes make the workers reluctant to observe labor discipline in a self-conscious way. Do not think that under socialism creative cooperation between the workers and the leadership of the enterprises will emerge all by itself without the need to work at it.

If manual workers and enterprise leaders are both members of a unified production collective then “why do socialist enterprises have to put ’single leadership’ into effect rather than leadership under collective guidance” i.e., the system of factory head responsibility under party committee guidance?

It is when politics is weakened that there is no choice but to talk about material incentive. That is why the text follows right up with “fully putting into effect the principle of having workers deeply concerned with the results of their own labor out of individual material interest is the mainspring for progressively grasping and raising socialist production.”

44. Crash Programs, Accelerated Work

Page 505 says, “Do away with the phenomenon of accelerated work. Carry on production in a well-balanced way according to the blueprints.” In the unrevised third edition this sentence reads, “We must fight against ‘crash programs’ and work in a well-balanced way according to predetermined schedules.” This utter repudiation of crash programs and accelerated work is too absolute.

We can not completely repudiate crash programs. Their use or nonuse constitutes a unity of opposites. In nature there are gentle breezes and light rains, and there are high winds and violent rains. Use of crash programs appears and disappears, wavelike. In the technological revolution in production the need for them continually arises. In agriculture we must grapple with the seasons. The drama must have its climax. To gainsay crash programs is in reality to deny the climax. The Soviet Union wants to overtake the United States. We expect to reach the Soviet’s level in less time than it took the Soviets. That is a kind of crash program.

Socialist emulation means that the backward overtakes the advanced. This is possible only through crash programs. Relations between individuals, between units, between enterprises, as well as between nations, are all competitive. If one wants to overtake the advanced, one cannot help having crash programs. If construction or revolution is attacked with executive orders (e.g., carrying out land reform or organizing cooperatives by administrative order) there is bound to be a reduction in production because the masses will not have been mobilized, and not because of crash programs.

45. The Law of Value and Planning

On page 521 there is a small print passage that is correct; it is critical, it joins the issues.

The law of value serves as an instrument of planning. Good. But the law of value should not be made the main basis of planning. We did not carry through the Great Leap on the basis of the demands of the law of value but on the basis of the fundamental economic laws of socialism and the need to expand production. If things are narrowly regarded from the point of view of the law of value the Great Leap would have to be judged not worth the losses and last year’s all-out effort to produce steel and iron as wasted labor. The local steel produced was low in quantity and quality, and the state had to make good many losses. The economic results were not significant, etc. The partial short-term view is that the campaign was a loss, but the overall long-term view is that there was great value to the campaign because it opened wide a whole economic construction phase. Throughout the country many new starts in steel and iron were made, and many industrial centers were built. This enabled us to step up our pace greatly.

In the winter of 1959 over 75 million people were working on water conservancy nationwide. The method of organizing two large-scale campaigns could be used to solve our basic water conservancy problems. From the standpoint of one, two, or three years the value of the grain to pay for so much labor was naturally quite high. But in the longer view the campaign could considerably increase grain production and accelerate it too, and stabilize agricultural production, and so the value of commodities per unit gains. All this then goes toward satisfying the people's need for grain. The continuing development of agriculture and light industry creates further accumulation for heavy industry. This too benefits people in the long run. So long as the peasants and the people of the entire country understand what the state is doing, whether money is gained or lost, they are bound to approve and not oppose. From among the peasants themselves the slogan of supporting industry has been put forward. There is the proof! Stalin as well as Lenin said, "In the period of socialist construction the peasantry must pay tribute to the state." The vast majority of China's peasants is "sending tribute" with a positive attitude. It is only among the prosperous peasants and the middle peasants, some 15 percent of the peasantry, that there is any discontent. They oppose the whole concept of the Great Leap and the people's communes.

In sum, we put plans ahead of prices. Of course we cannot ignore prices. A few years ago we raised the purchase price for live pigs, and this had a positive effect on pig-breeding. But for the kind of large-scale, nationwide breeding we have today, planning remains the main thing we rely on.

Page 521 refers to the problem of pricing in the markets of collective farms. Their collective farm markets have too much freedom. It is not enough to use only state economic power to adjust prices in such markets. Leadership and control are also necessary. In our markets, during the first stage, prices were kept within certain bounds by the government. Thus small liberties were kept from becoming big ones.

Page 522 says, "Thanks to our command of the law of value, the kind of anarchy in production or waste of social labor power the law entails under capitalism is not found in a socialist economy." This makes too much of the effects of the law of value. In socialist society crises do not occur, mainly because of the ownership system: the basic laws of socialism, national planning of production and distribution, the lack of free competition or anarchy, etc., and not because we command the law of value. The economic crises of capitalism, it goes without saying, are determined by the ownership system too.

46. Forms of Wages

Page 530, in its discussion of wage forms, advocates taking piecework wages as primary and the time-rate as supplementary. We do the reverse. One-sided emphasis on piece rates is bound to create contradictions between older and younger, stronger and weaker laborers, and will foster among the workers a psychology of "going for the big ones." This makes the primary concern not the collective cause but the individual income. There is even evidence that the piece-rate wage system impedes technological innovation and mechanization.

The book concedes that with automation, piece-rate wages are unsuitable. On the one hand they say they want automation widely developed; on the other they say they want piece-rate wages used widely. This involves a contradiction.

We have put into effect the time-rate system, plus rewards. The year-end "leap forward" bonuses of the last two years are an example. With the exception of governmental and educational workers, all staff and workers have had year-end leap forward bonuses in varying amounts determined by the staff and workers themselves in the particular units.

47. Two Questions About Prices

There are two questions that deserve study.

The first is the pricing of consumer goods. The text says, "Socialism has all along been putting into practice a policy of lowering the prices of consumer goods for the people." Our approach is to stabilize prices, generally neither letting them rise nor lowering them. Although our wage levels are comparatively low, universal employment and low prices and rents have kept the living standard of staff and workers decent enough. In the last analysis whether it is preferable to keep lowering prices or neither to raise nor lower them is a problem deserving study.

The other question concerns pricing of products of heavy and light industry. Relatively speaking, they have low prices for the former, and higher ones for the latter. We do the reverse. Why? Which is the better way in the last analysis is another problem deserving study.

Part III.
Chapters 30-34

48. Concurrent Promotion of the Foreign and the Native, the Large, Medium, and Small

Page 547 expresses opposition to dispersing construction funds. If they mean that not too many major projects should be undertaken at one time lest none can be completed on schedule, then of course we agree. But if the conclusion is to be that during major construction small- and medium-scale projects should be opposed, then we disagree. The principal new industrial centers in China were established on the basis of medium- and small-scale enterprises developed in large numbers in 1958. According to initial arrangements in the steel and iron industry, construction of twenty-nine large, nearly a hundred medium, and several hundred small-scale centers will be completed over the next eight years. The medium- and small-scale ones have already had a major effect on the steel and iron industry. Speaking from the standpoint of 1959, raw iron production nationwide has exceeded 20 million tons, half of which was produced by medium- and small-scale enterprises. In the future the medium- and the small-scale enterprise will continue to have major importance for the development of the steel and iron industry. Many small ones will become medium, many medium, large; backward ones will become advanced, local models will become like foreign ones — this is the objective law of development.

We will adopt advanced technology, but this cannot gainsay the necessity and the inevitability of backward technology for a period of time. Since history began, revolutionary wars have always been won by those whose weapons were deficient, lost by those with the advantage in weapons. During our civil war, our War of Resistance Against Japan, and our War of Liberation, we lacked nationwide political power and modernized arsenals. If one cannot fight unless one has the most modern weapons, that is the same as disarming one's self.

Our desire to make all-around mechanization such as the text describes a reality (p. 420) in our second decade appears still short of fulfillment; probably it will be in our third decade. In a future time, because of inadequate machinery, we will be calling for partial mechanization and improvement of our tools. For now we are holding off on general automation. Mechanization has to be discussed, but with a sense of proportion. If mechanization and automation are made too much of it is bound to make people despise partial mechanization and production by native methods. In the past we had such diversions, when everybody was demanding new technology, new machinery, the large scale, high standards; the native, the medium, or small in scale were held in contempt. We did not overcome this tendency until we promoted concurrently native *and* foreign, large *and* medium *and* small.

At the present time we have not proposed chemicalization of agriculture. One reason is that we do not expect to be able to produce much fertilizer in the next however many years. (And the little we have is concentrated on our industrial crops.) Another reason is that if the turn to chemicals is proposed everybody will focus on that and neglect pig-breeding. Inorganic fertilizers are also needed but they have to be combined with organic; alone they harden the soil.

The text speaks of adopting new techniques in every department. But this is not so easy to do. There must always be a process of gradual development. Moreover, even as some new machine is being adopted many old ones remain. The text is correct when it says that as you build new enterprises and renew equipment in existing factories, you should put existing machinery and mechanical equipment to use rationally and to the fullest extent. (p. 427) Things will be no different in the future.

As to the "large" and the "foreign," we must work on these in a spirit of "self reliance for new growth." In 1958 we proposed slogans on ridding ourselves of superstition and working with our own hands. The facts show that working on our own is quite feasible. In the past backward capitalist countries relied on the application of new techniques to catch up with advanced capitalist countries in production. The Soviet Union likewise relies on the application of advanced technology to catch up with the capitalist countries. We too must do the same, and we can.

49. Which First, Tractors or Cooperatives?

Page 563 says, “In 1928 on the eve of overall collectivization, spring crop areas were tilled 99 percent with wood or horse-drawn ploughs.” This fact refutes the text’s repeated assertion that “tractors must precede cooperatives.” On the same page we find, “Socialist production relations cleared a wide field for the development of agricultural productive forces and progress in agricultural technology.” That is true.

First the production relations have to be changed, then and only then the productive forces can be broadly developed. This rule is universal. In some countries of Eastern Europe the cooperatives were not organized very energetically, and even today they remain uncompleted. The main reason is not that they lacked tractors (they had many more than we, comparatively speaking) but that their land reform was a top-down royal favor. Land was expropriated by quota (in some countries no expropriation was carried out on farms under 100 hectares); the work of expropriation was carried out by executive order; and after the land reform instead of striking while the iron was hot they let a full five or six years go by without doing much. We did quite the reverse. We put a mass line[24] into effect, roused the poor and lower-middle peasants to launch class struggle and seize all the land of the landlord class and distribute the surplus land of rich peasants, apportioning land on a per-capita basis. (This was a tremendous revolution in the rural areas.) Immediately afterward, we followed up with the mutual aid and cooperative movements. And from that point, steadily advancing step by step, we led the peasants on to the road to socialism. We had a massive party and army. When our forces went south a full complement of cadre squads had been set in place in every province to do local work at provincial, regional, county, and district levels. As soon as our forces would arrive they would penetrate deeply into the agricultural villages, “paying call on the poor to learn of their grievances,” “striking roots and pulling things together,” and getting the active elements of the poor and lower middle peasants organized.

50. Two Goals: Large and Public

The collective farms of the Soviet Union have undergone merger twice. Over 250,000 farms were merged into over 93,000, then these were again merged into about 70,000. In the future they will surely expand again. The text says (p. 568), “We must strengthen and develop the production relations of the various collective farms and organize publicly used production enterprises among the collective farms.” Here, actually, there are many similarities to our own methods, they simply express things differently. In the future, even if their approach is like ours, it appears doubtful they will use the term commune. Differences in expression and terminology do include a substantive issue, namely, whether or not a mass line is being put into effect.

To be sure, the large scale of the Soviet Union’s collective farms may never approach ours in terms of households and population because their rural population is sparse and their land area great. But who can say that for this reason their collective farms now need no further expansion? In places like Sinkiang and Ch'inghai the communes still need to enlarge even though there are few people for much land. Some counties in our southern provinces (e.g., northern Fukien) got large communes together under like conditions.

Enlarging the communes is a major issue. Changes in quantity are bound to bring on changes in quality, to stimulate such changes. Our people's communes are a good example — "Large! and Public!" First comes "Large!" — it will raise the level of "Public." This means that quantitative changes bring on partial qualitative changes.

51. What Is the Fundamental Reason for the Special Emphasis on Material Interest

In the chapter on the collective farm system there is continual discussion of individual material interest. (pp. 565, 571, etc.) The present special emphasis on material interest is for a reason. In the time of Stalin there was excessive emphasis on collective interest; individual gain was neglected. The public was overemphasized, the private underemphasized. Now they have gone to the opposite extreme, overemphasizing material incentive, neglecting collective interest. And if they persist in this course it will surely go to the opposite side again.

"Public" is in relation to "private," and vice-versa, a unity of opposites. One without the other is impossible. We have always spoken of joint consideration of public and private and long ago made the point that there is no such thing as all the one or the other, but that the public takes precedence over the private. The individual is a part of the collective. If the collective interest advances, the individual's lot will improve in consequence.

Duality is an attribute of all things, and for all time. Of course, duality is manifested through different concrete forms, and so the character of things varies. Heredity and mutation are a duality of opposites in unity. If there were only the latter without the former the succeeding generation would be utterly unlike the prior. Rice would no longer be that which makes it rice, nor dogs, nor people. The conservative side can have a good, a positive function. It can give living things in the midst of uninterrupted change a provisional constancy or stability. So, improved rice is still rice. But heredity without mutation would mean no advance, and development would come to a halt.

52. It Is for the People to Act

Page 577 says, "Collective farms offer the natural and economic conditions for allowing differential rent to be arranged." Differential rent is not altogether determined by objective conditions. Actually the matter rests with the people's doing. For example, in Hopei province there are many mechanized wells along the Peking-Hankow Railway, but very few along the Tientsin-Pukow. The natural conditions are similar, the communications equally convenient, but land improvements are never the same from place to place. There may have been reasons why the one locale was receptive (or unreceptive) to improvement, or there might have been varying historical reasons. But after all, the main thing is that it is for people to act.

While we are on the subject, some of the outlying districts of Shanghai are able to breed pigs properly, others not. In Ch'ung Ming county it was originally thought that certain natural conditions, e.g., the large number of lakes, would not be favorable for pigbreeding. But after getting rid of people's fears of difficulties, and after people adopted a positive attitude toward the business of breeding, it was realized that far from presenting an obstacle, these very natural conditions offered advantages. Actually, whether it is a matter of deep ploughing, fine horticulture, mechanization, or collectivization, it is for people to act.

Ch'ang P'ing county, Peking, has always been plagued by flood and drought. But things changed after the construction of the reservoir at the Ming Tombs. Does not this again illustrate that it is for people to act? In Honan they are planning after 1959 and 1960 to spend another three years to tame the Yellow River by completing construction of several large-scale conduits. All this shows again that it is for people to act.

53. Transport and Commerce

Transport and packaging do not increase use value, but they do increase value. The labor they use is a part of socially necessary labor. For without transportation and packaging the process of production would remain incomplete, would not enter the stage of consumption, and the use value produced could not be said to have been realized. Take coal. After the ore is mined, if it is left around the site and not delivered to the consumer by rail, steamer, or truck, its use value is completely unrealizable.

Page 585 says that they have two systems of commerce, state-operated and cooperative. In addition, they have "unorganized markets," i.e., the collective farm markets. We have only one system. We merged the cooperative trade into the state-operated trade, and the system now seems easy enough to run. There are lots of economies on all sides.

Page 587 refers to public supervision of commerce. For this we rely on party guidance in the main; with politics in command there is supervision by the masses. The labor of commercial workers is socially necessary and without it production cannot culminate in consumption (including productive consumption and individual consumption).

54. Concurrent Promotion of Industry and Agriculture

Page 623 discusses the rule of giving priority to increasing the means of production. The unrevised third edition mentions particularly here, "giving priority to increasing the means of production means that industry will develop at a faster rate than agriculture."

"Industry developing faster than agriculture" has to be posed in an appropriate way. One cannot emphasize industry to an inappropriate degree or trouble is sure to occur. Take our Liaoning: with its many industries, this province has an urban population that is one-third the total. In the past they had always put industry in first place, without attending at the same time to the vigorous development of agriculture. The result was that the province's agriculture could not guarantee supplies of grain, meats, and vegetables for the urban markets, and they always had to ship these items in from other provinces. The key issue is that agricultural labor is under great strain and is short of needed machinery. This limits the development of production; growth is comparatively slow. What we had failed to understand was that it was precisely in such places as the Northeast, particularly Liaoning, where we should have taken firm hold of agriculture. So one cannot emphasize only taking firm hold of industry.

Our position is that industry and agriculture should be developed together with priority given to developing heavy industry. The phrase "concurrent promotion" in no way denies priority in growth or faster development of industry than agriculture. At the same time, "concurrent promotion" is not equal utilization of our strength. For example, this year we estimate we can produce about 14 million tons of steel materials, of which 10 percent is to be applied to agricultural technological transformation and water conservancy construction. The remaining 90 percent is to be used mainly in heavy industry and communications and transportation construction. Under this year's conditions this is concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture. This should not be detrimental to priority growth of heavy industry or accelerating development of industry. [Agriculture in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator.*]

Poland has 30 million people, but only 450,000 pigs. Now meat supplies are badly strained. Even today it would seem that Poland has not placed agricultural development on its agenda.

Page 624 says, "At different times it is necessary to accelerate the development of backward agriculture, light industry, and the food industry." Well and good, but imbalances and maladjustments created by backwardness in agriculture and light industry cannot be alleged to be merely "partial imbalances and maladjustments." These are questions of the totality.

Page 625 says, "Rational allocation of capital is necessary to maintain, at whatever time, correct proportions between heavy and light industry." This paragraph speaks only of heavy and light industry, not of industry and agriculture.

55. Standards for Accumulation

This has become a major issue in Poland. At the start Gomulka emphasized material incentive. He raised workers' wages but neglected to raise their consciousness, with the result that workers thought only of making more money but did not take the right spirit to their tasks. Increases of wages outstripped increases in productivity, and wages were eating up capital. The pressure has now forced them to come out in opposition to material incentive and to champion spiritual inspiration. Gomulka has even said, "Money cannot buy people's minds."

Overemphasis on material incentive always seems to lead to the opposite. Writing lots of checks naturally keeps the high-salary strata happy, but when the broad masses of workers and peasants want to cash in and find they cannot, the pressure to go to the “spiritual” is no surprise.

According to what is described on page 631, in the Soviet Union accumulated capital amounts to one-fourth of the national income. In China the figures were as follows: 27 per cent in 1957, 36 percent in 1958, 42 percent in 1959, and it appears that in the future it will be possible to maintain regularly a figure of over thirty percent. The main problem lies in the vast development of production. Only if production increases and the percentages of accumulation go up a bit can people’s livelihoods be finally improved.

It is our regular responsibility to practice economies and to accumulate large amounts of materials and wealth. It would be wrong to think that this should be done only in adverse conditions. It is difficult to believe that when hardships ease economies and accumulation are not needed.

Part IV.
Chapter 35 To The Conclusion

56. The Communist State

Page 639 says, “In the higher stages of communism the state will become unnecessary and gradually diminish.” Nonetheless this will require certain international conditions. If someone else has state machinery and you do not, it is dangerous. Page 640 says that even after communism is established, as long as imperialist countries exist, the state will continue to be necessary. This position is correct. Immediately after, the book says, “But the nature and the form of such a state will be determined by the particular features of the communist system.” This sentence is hard to understand. The nature of the state is that it is a machinery for suppressing the opposed forces. Even if such a function is no longer needed internally, the coercive nature of the state will not have changed with respect to external opposing forces. The so-called form of the state means nothing more than armed forces, prisons, arrests, executions, etc. As long as imperialism still exists, what differences in form will there be when communism is reached?

57. Transition to Communism

Page 641 says, “In a socialist society there are no antagonistic classes,” but “there are still vestiges of antagonistic classes.” The transition from socialism to communism need not be made a reality through social revolution. All that can be said is that there is no need for a social revolution in which one class overthrows another, but there will be a social revolution in which new production relations and social institutions supersede old ones.

Here the text goes on to declare, “This certainly does not mean that society, as it develops along the road to communism, will not need to conquer internal contradictions.” This declaration is merely incidental. Though there are places where this text recognizes contradictions, it does so only incidentally. One thing missing from this text is that it does not proceed from the analysis of contradictions in explaining issues. As a branch of science, political economy should begin its analysis with contradictions.

When a communist society is attained, labor discipline is bound to be even more strict than it is presently because the high level of automation will require ever higher exactitude of people’s labor and conduct.

For now we are speaking of communist society as divided into two stages, a lower and a higher. This is what Marx and his circle foresaw based on conditions of social development at that time. After entering the higher stage communist society will develop into a new stage, and new goals and tasks will assuredly present themselves.

58. The Future Development of Collective Ownership

Page 650 says, “The production relations of the collective farms and the cooperatives have forms which accord fully with the present level and the present needs of the productive forces in the rural areas.” I wonder if this is indeed true.

Introducing the Red October collective farm, a Soviet article says, “Before merger, some farms were difficult to manage in a good many respects. Afterward the problems cleared up.” The article says that the farm has a population of ten thousand and that a housing project for three thousand residents is planned. This suggests that the present form of the farm is no longer fully compatible with the development of the productive forces.

The same passage says, “We must bend every effort to strengthening and further developing the cooperatives and the collective farm ownership system.” If development is needed, a process has to be gone through, so why “bend every effort to strengthen?” Socialist production relations, social systems — of course one must speak in terms of consolidating them, but not to the point of ruining them. The text speaks vaguely of the road ahead, but the moment it comes to concrete measures it loses all clarity. In many ways (mainly production) the Soviets continue to progress, but with respect to the production relations fundamentally they have ceased to progress.

The text says that it is necessary to make a transition from collective ownership to indivisible ownership by the whole people. But from our point of view it is first necessary to turn collective ownership into socialist ownership by the whole people, i.e., to make the agricultural means of production entirely state owned, and to turn the peasants entirely into workers under uniform contract to the state for wages. At present, nationwide, each Chinese peasant has an average annual income of 85 [65 in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] yuan. In the future, when this amount will reach 150 yuan and the majority of workers are paid by the commune, it will be possible to make a commune ownership system basically work. In this way taking the next step to state ownership should be easy.

59. Eliminating the Difference Between Urban and Rural

The last paragraph on page 651 has a good position on rural construction. Since they want to eliminate the difference (the book says “basic difference”) between urban and rural, why does the text make a point of saying that it is not “to reduce the functions of the big cities?” The cities of the future need not be so large. Residents of large cities should be dispersed into the rural areas. Building many smaller cities is a relative advantage in case of nuclear war.

60. The Problem of the Various Socialist Countries Setting Up an Economic System

Page 659 says, “Each country could concentrate its own manpower and material resources to develop its own most advantageous natural and economic conditions and departments with production experience and cadre. The respective countries would not need to produce goods which other countries could supply.”

This is not a good idea. We do not suggest this even with respect to our own provinces. We advocate all-round development and do not think that each province need not produce goods which other provinces could supply. We want the various provinces to develop a variety of production to the fullest extent, provided there is no adverse effect on the whole. One of the advantages Europe enjoys is the independence of the various countries. Each is devoted to a set of activities, causing the European economy to develop comparatively quickly. Since the time of the Chin, China has taken shape as a major power, preserving its unity on the whole over a long period of time. One of the defects was bureaucratism, under the stifling control of which local regions could not develop independently, and with everyone temporizing, economic development was very slow. Now the situation is completely different. Within the unity we want to work toward, the various provinces will also have independence. This is relative unity and it is relative independence.

The provinces resolve their own problems independently while submitting to the resolutions of the central authorities and accepting their control. On the other hand, the center’s resolutions on major issues are all made in common, through consultation between the center and the provinces. The resolutions of the Lushan Conference were like this, for example.[25] Not only did they accord with the needs of the whole country, they accorded with the needs of the various provinces. Who could take the position that only the center, not the localities, needs to oppose right opportunism? We champion having the provinces devote themselves fully to a set of activities under a unified plan for the whole country. Provided there are raw materials and markets, provided materials can be obtained and sales made locally, whatever can be done should be done to the fullest possible extent. Previously, our concern was that after the provinces had developed, a variety of industry, industrial goods (e.g., from a place like Shanghai) would in all likelihood not be wanted. Now it appears this is not the case. Shanghai has already proposed developing toward higher, larger scale, finer, and more excellent production. They still have things to do!

I wonder why the text fails to advocate each country's doing the utmost for itself rather than not producing goods which other countries could supply? The correct method is each doing the utmost for itself as a means toward self-reliance for new growth, working independently to the greatest possible extent, making a principle out of not relying on others, and not doing something only when it really and truly cannot be done. Above all, agriculture must be done well as far as possible. Reliance on other countries or provinces for food is most dangerous.

Some countries are so small that, exactly as the text says, "To develop all industrial departments would be economically irrational, a task to which their strength is unequal." In that case of course a country should not force it through. It would be very difficult for some of our own provinces with low population — Ch'inghai or Ninghsia — to have comprehensive development.

61. Can the Development of the Various Socialist Countries Be Evened Up?

Paragraph 3 on page 660 says, ". . . to have the overall level of economic and cultural development of the various socialist countries gradually draw parallel." The populations, resource bases, and historic conditions of these countries are not the same. Some of their revolutions were more backward, others more advanced. How can they be evened up? If a father has some dozen children, some tall, some short, some big some small, some bright, some slow, how can they be evened up? This is Bukharin's theory of balance. The economic development of the various socialist countries is not in balance, nor is that of the provinces within a country, or the counties within a province. Take public health in Kuangtung province. Fo Shan city and Chihlo commune have done a good job. Consequently Fo Shan is not in balance with the whole province. Chihlo is not in balance with Shaokuan. To oppose imbalances is wrong.

62. The Ultimate Question Is One of System

Page 668 says that socialist loans are different from imperialist loans. This tallies with the facts. Socialist countries are always preferable to capitalist ones. We understand this principle. The ultimate question is systemic, institutional. Systems determine the direction a country will take. Socialist systems determine that socialist countries will always stand opposed to imperialist countries and that their compromises are always provisional.

63. Relations Between the Two Economic Systems in the World

Page 658 speaks of "competition between the two world systems." In *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Stalin offered arguments about the two world markets. The text here emphasizes peaceful competition between the two systems and building up “peacefully developing” economic relations. This turns the actually existing two world markets into two economic systems within a unified world market — a step back from Stalin’s view.

Between the two economic systems there is in fact not only competition but also fierce, broad-ranging struggle, a struggle the text has kept its distance from.

64. Criticism of Stalin

Stalin’s *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, like his other works, contains erroneous arguments. But the two accusations referred to on page 681 are not convincing.

One accusation is that Stalin held that “circulation of commodities seems to have already become an obstacle to the development of the productive forces. The necessity for gradually making the transition to direct exchanges of production between industry and agriculture is fully formed.”

In this book Stalin said that when there are two kinds of ownership system then there is commodity production. He said that in the enterprises of the collective farms, although the means of production (land, tools, etc.) belong to the state, the goods produced are all the property of the separate collectives. The reason is that the labor on the collectives (like the seeds) is owned by the collectives, while the land that the state has given them for permanent use is in fact controlled by the collectives as if it were their own property. Under such conditions “the collective farms are willing to release into circulation what they produce only in the commodity form, in expectation of obtaining the commodities they need in exchange. At the present time the collective farms will not enter into any economic relations other than exchange through purchase and sales.” Stalin criticized the current view in the Soviet Union that advocated doing away with commodity production, holding that commodity production was no less necessary than it was thirty years earlier when Lenin declared the need for bending every effort to develop commodity circulation.

The text says that Stalin seemed to be advocating instant elimination of commodities. This accusation is difficult to make good. As to the question of commodity exchange, for Stalin it was only a hypothesis. For he had even said, “There is no need to promote this system with urgency; it must be decided according to the degree of accumulation of goods manufactured in the cities.”

Another accusation is that Stalin underestimated the workings of the law of value in the sphere of production and especially with reference to the means of production. “In the sphere of socialist production the law of value plays no regulating role. This role is played by the law of planned proportional development and state planned economy.” This argument offered by the text is in reality Stalin’s own argument. Even though the text says that the means of production are commodities, nonetheless, in the first place, it must say that they are in the category of ownership by the whole people. Purchase and sale of the means of production in no way changes ownership. In the second place, the text ought to concede that the law of value functions differently in the sphere of production and in the process of circulation. All these arguments are consistent with Stalin's. One real difference between Stalin and Khrushchev is that Stalin opposed selling such means of production as tractors, etc. to the collective farms while Khrushchev sold them.

65. The Text's General Point of View

Do not think there is no Marxism-Leninism in this text, for it contains a good many views that are Marxist-Leninist. On the other hand, do not think it is entirely Marxist-Leninist, for it contains a good many views that deviate. We are not, however, ready to conclude that this text is basically negative.

The text emphasizes that a socialist economy serves the whole people, not the profit calculations of a minority of exploiters. The basic economic laws of socialism discussed in the text cannot be regarded as wholly in error. And these laws are the fundamental subject of the book. Also, the text explains planning, proportionality, high rate of development, etc., and in these respects is still socialist and Marxist. But once planning and proportionality are acknowledged, how these things are done is quite another matter. Each of us has his own approach.

Notwithstanding, this text has certain fundamental arguments that are in error. "Politics in command" and the "mass line" are not stressed. There is no discussion of "walking on two legs," and individual material interest is one-sidedly emphasized. Material incentives are proclaimed and individualism is far too prominent.

In studying socialist economy the text does not proceed from contradictions. In truth, it does not acknowledge the universality of contradiction nor that social contradictions are the motive force of social development. The truth is that in their own society [Socialist society in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] there is still class struggle, that is, struggle between socialism and capitalist remnants. But this they do not concede. Their society [Socialist society in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] has three types of ownership: by the whole people, by the collective, and by the individual. Of course, such individual ownership is unlike individual ownership before collectivization, when the peasants' livelihood was entirely based on individual ownership. Now they have one foot on the boat and one still on shore, mainly relying on the collective but on the individual at the same time. If there are three types of ownership, there will be contradiction and struggle. But the text has no discussion of this. There is no encouraging of the mass movement. There is no acknowledgment of having collective ownership under socialism make the transition to public ownership under socialism, of turning the whole society into the indivisible possession of the whole people as a precondition for the transition to communism.

The text uses such vague terms as "rapprochement" and "concord" to take the place of the conception that one ownership system becomes another, one kind of production relations becomes another. In these respects the book has serious faults and serious errors and has partially deviated from Marxism-Leninism.

The text is very poorly written, neither persuasive nor interesting to read. It does not proceed from concrete analysis of the contradictions between the productive forces and the production relations nor the contradiction between the economic base and the superstructure. In posing questions, in researching problems, it always proceeds from general concepts or definitions. It gives definitions without making reasoned explanations. In fact, a definition should be the result, not the starting point, of an analysis. Quite without foundation the book offers a series of laws, laws which are not discovered and verified through analysis of concrete historical development. Laws cannot be self-explanatory. If one does not work from the concrete processes, the concrete historical development, laws will not be clearly explained.

The book does not deal with problems masterfully, with overall control of its subject. Issues do not stand forth clearly. The composition is not persuasive but is dull and illogical, lacking even formal logic. It appears as if written by different authors, each taking a chapter — a division of labor without unity. It lacks the systemic order a textbook should have. On top of this, its method is to proceed from definitions, and it reads like an economics dictionary. The authors are passive, contradicting one another in many places, later chapters at odds with earlier ones. Cooperative division of labor and collective authorship is one method. But the best method is to have one leader writing alongside of several assistants. This is the way Marx and his circle wrote, and their works were integral, and strictly, systematically scientific.

When writing the result will be exciting only if there is a target of criticism. Although this text has some correct things to say, it does not unfold a critique of views considered wrong. This makes the reading tedious.

In many places one feels as if a scholastic is speaking, not a revolutionary. The economist who does not understand economic practice is not a true expert. The book seems to reflect the following kind of situation: there are those who do practical work but lack the ability to generalize, as they lack concepts and laws; on the other hand, those who do theoretical work lack practical experience. These two types have not been integrated; that is, theory and practice have not been integrated.

The book shows that its authors do not have a dialectical method. One has to think philosophically to write an economics text. Philosophers should participate in the writing, otherwise it will not be possible to produce a satisfactory text.

The first edition of this text appeared in early 1955. But the basic framework seems to have been set even before then. And it looks as if the model Stalin set at that time was not very enlightening.

In the Soviet Union there are presently those who disagree with how the book was done. G. Kozlov wrote an article called “A Scientific Course of Study of Socialist Political

Economy” which criticized this book. His views go to the root of the matter. He points out methodological faults of the book and calls for explanations of laws that proceed from an analysis of the process of socialist production. He also makes suggestions as to structure.

In view of the criticism of Kozlov and others it is possible that another textbook with an opposite approach will be produced in the Soviet Union. Opposition is always to the good.

From a first reading of this text one comes to realize its method and viewpoint. But that is not yet thorough study. What would be best in the future is to take the issues and arguments as the core, do some meticulous research, bring together some materials, and look over other available articles, books, reports, etc., with views that differ from those in this text. One should get an idea of the different opinions on controversial issues. To clarify issues the views of at least two sides have to be understood.

We must criticize and oppose wrong opinions, but we must also protect all correct things. Both courage and caution are needed.

No matter what, for them to have written a socialist political economy is a great task on the whole. Regardless how many problems it contains, this book at the least furnishes us with material for debate, and thanks to this has led to further study.

66. How to Write a Text on Political Economy

In principle it is permissible for the text to proceed from the ownership system. But there is an even better way. In researching the capitalist economy Marx, too, studied mainly ownership of the means of production under capitalism, examining how distribution of the means of production determined the distribution of commodities. In capitalist society the social nature of production and the private nature of ownership is a fundamental contradiction. Marx began with the commodity and went on to reveal the relations among people hidden behind commodities (the relations among things). Commodities in socialist society still have duality; nonetheless, thanks to the establishment of public ownership of the means of production and the fact that labor power is no longer a commodity, duality of commodities under socialism is not the same as their duality under capitalism. The relations among people are no longer hidden behind commodity relations. Thus, if socialist economy is studied beginning with the duality of commodities, copying Marx’s method, it may well have the opposite effect of confusing the issues, making things harder for people to understand.

Political economy aims to study the production relations. As Stalin saw it, the production relations include three things: ownership, relations among people during labor, and the distribution of commodities. In writing a political economy of our own we could also begin with the ownership system. First, we describe the conversion of ownership of the means of production from private to public: how we converted private ownership of bureaucratic capital and the capitalist ownership system into socialist ownership by the whole people; how private ownership of the land by the landlords was turned first into private ownership by individual peasants and then into collective ownership under socialism; only then could we describe the contradiction between the two forms of public ownership under socialism and how collective ownership under socialism could make the transition to people's ownership under communism. At the same time, we must describe how people's ownership itself changes: the system of transferring cadres to lower levels, administration by different levels, right of autonomy of enterprises, etc. Although alike in being owned by the whole people, our enterprises are variously administered, some by departments of the center, others through provinces, municipalities, or autonomous regions, yet others through local special districts or counties. Some commune-run enterprises are semi-owned by the whole people, semi-owned by the collective. But whether centrally or locally administered, the enterprises are all under unified leadership and possess specific autonomous rights.

Turning to the problem of the relations among people during productive labor, the text, aside from such comments as "relations of comradely cooperation and mutual assistance," has completely failed to come to grips with the substantive issues, having conducted no research or analysis into this area. After the question of the ownership system is solved, the most important question is administration — how enterprises owned either by the whole people or the collective are administered. This is the same as the question of the relations among people under a given ownership system, a subject that could use many articles. Changes in the ownership system in a given period of time always have their limits, but the relations among people in productive labor may well, on the contrary, be in ceaseless change. With respect to administration of enterprises owned by the whole people, we have adopted a set of approaches: a combination of concentrated leadership and mass movement; combinations of party leaders, working masses, and technical personnel; cadres participating in production; workers participating in administration; steadily changing unreasonable regulations and institutional practices.

As to the distribution of commodities, the text has to be rewritten, changing its present approach altogether. Hard, bitter struggle, expanding reproduction, the future prospects of communism — these are what have to be emphasized, not individual material interest. The goal to lead people toward is not "one spouse, one country house, one automobile, one piano, one television." This is the road of serving the self, not the society. A "ten-thousand-league journey begins where you are standing." But if one looks only at the feet without giving thought to the future, then the question is: What is left of revolutionary excitement and ardor? ["What energy is left for travelling?" in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.]

67. How to Study Appearances to Reach Essences

In studying a problem one must begin with the appearances that people can see and feel, in order to research the essences that lie behind them, and then go on from there to reveal the substance and contradiction of objective things and events.

At the time of the civil war and the War of Resistance Against Japan our study of the problems of war proceeded from appearances. The enemy was big and strong, we were small and weak. This was the most obvious appearance at that time, one which all could see. We were the ones who studied and resolved problems, proceeding from appearances to study how the side which was small and weak might defeat an enemy which was big and strong. We pointed out that although we were small and weak we had mass support, and that the enemy, though big and strong, was vulnerable to thrusts in certain areas. Take the civil war period, when the enemy had several hundred thousand men, we had several tens of thousands. Strategically, the enemy was strong and on the offensive, we were weak and on the defensive. But to attack us they had to divide their forces into columns, and the columns again into detachments. Typically, one company would attack a strong point while the others were still maneuvring. We would then concentrate several tens of thousands to attack one column, even concentrating the majority of our forces to take a single point of the enemy column, as another group would divert those enemy troops still maneuvring. In this way we achieved superiority at the particular point. The enemy had become small and weak, and we large and strong. Another thing is that when they would arrive at a place conditions would be unfamiliar to them, the masses would not support them, and so we would be able to wipe out an enemy group completely.

Ideology becomes systematic, generally speaking, in the wake of the movements of phenomena. The reason is that thought and understanding are reflections of material movements. Laws are things which appear over and over, not accidentally, in the movements of phenomena. It is only after the repeated appearance of something that it becomes a law and thus an object to be understood. For example, crises of capitalism occurred about every ten years. When this had happened over and over it then became possible for us to understand the laws of economic crisis in capitalist society. In land reform we had to distribute land according to population rather than labor power. But we did not understand this clearly until we had done it many times. In the late period of the second civil war "left" adventurist comrades called for distribution of land according to labor power and disapproved of distribution of land per capita. In their view even distribution of land according to population was not rigorous as to class outlook and not sufficiently from the outlook of the masses. Their slogan was: no land to the landlord, poor land to the rich peasant; to all others land according to labor power. Facts proved this approach to be wrong. How land should be distributed was made clear only after we had gone through experiences repeated over and over again.

Marxism requires that logic be consistent with history. Thought is the reflex of objective existence. Logic comes from history. Though this textbook has an abundance of materials, there is no analysis, there is no logic, the laws are not discernible, and it is not satisfactory. But a lack of materials is also unsatisfactory. Then people will see only logic and not history. Moreover, it will be only subjective logic. Here exactly are the faults of this text.

It is vital to produce a history of the development of Chinese capitalism. If those who study history do not study the different societies, the different historical eras, they will surely be unable to produce good comprehensive histories. Studying the different societies means having to find the particular laws governing those societies. Once the particular laws have been studied and made clear, it will be easy to know the general laws of society. It is necessary to discern the general from the study of many particularities. If the particular laws are not understood clearly, the general cannot be either. For example, in studying the general laws governing animals it is necessary to study separately those governing vertebrates, invertebrates, etc.

68. Philosophy Must Serve the Political Tasks Facing Us

Any philosophy is in the service of its contemporary tasks.

Capitalist philosophy has this function. And every nation, every era has new theoreticians producing new theory for the political tasks of the day. In England such bourgeois materialists as Bacon and Hobbes appeared; materialists like the Encyclopedists then appeared in eighteenth-century France; the German and Russian bourgeoisie also had their materialists. All of these were bourgeois materialists, all of whom served the political tasks of the bourgeois class. Thus the existence of English or bourgeois materialism certainly did not make French bourgeois materialism unnecessary, nor did the existence of English and French bourgeois materialism make the German or the Russian unnecessary.

The Marxist philosophy of the proletarian class is even more vitally concerned to serve contemporary political tasks. For China, Marx, Lenin, and Stalin [Omitted in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] are necessary reading. That comes first. But communists of any country and the proletarian philosophical circles of any country must create new theory, write new works, produce their own theoreticians to serve the political tasks facing them.

No nation can at any time rely only on what is old. Having Marx and Engels without Lenin's *Two Tactics* and other works could not have solved the new problems of 1905 and afterward. Having only *Materialism and Empirico-Criticism* of 1907 would not have sufficed to cope with the new issues that arose before and after the October Revolution. To meet the needs of this time Lenin wrote *Imperialism*, *State and Revolution* and other works. After Lenin, Stalin was needed to write *Foundations of Leninism* and *Problems of Leninism* to deal with reactionaries and preserve Leninism. At the end of our second civil war and the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan we wrote *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*. They had to be written to meet the needs of the times.

Now that we have entered the period of socialism a whole new series of problems has appeared. If we do not meet the new needs, write the new works, give form to new theory, it will not do!

Supplement

1. China’s Industrialization Problems

After the Soviet Union’s first five-year plan had been completed, when the value of all large industrial production was 70 percent of the value of all industrial and agricultural production, they promptly declared that industrialization had been made a reality. We too could quickly reach such a standard, but even if we did, we still would not claim that industrialization had become a reality, because we have over 500 million peasants devoting themselves to agriculture. If industrialization is claimed when industrial production is 70 per cent, not only would we be unable to reflect accurately the actual conditions of our national economy, but we could even create a mood of laxity.

At the first plenary session of the Eighth National People’s Congress we spoke of the necessity to establish a firm foundation for socialist industrialization in the second five-year plan. We also said that within fifteen years or so we would build an integrated industrial system. These two statements are somewhat contradictory, for without a fully equipped industrial system how can we speak of having a “firm foundation” for socialist industrialization? As things now stand, in another three years we may surpass England in output of primary industrial products. In another five years we can fulfill our task of establishing the industrial system as a practical reality.

In the long term, we expect to be known as an industrial agricultural nation. [“. . . we will not be known as an industrial nation” in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] Even if we make over 100 million tons of steel it will still be so. If our per capita output were to surpass Great Britain’s we would need to be producing 350 million tons of steel at least!

There is a special significance to picking out a country and competing with it. We are always talking about catching up with England. Our first step is to catch up in terms of primary product output, next in terms of per capita output. In shipbuilding and motor vehicle manufacture we are still far behind that country. We must strive to overtake it in all respects. Even so small a country as Japan has 4 million tons’ capacity of commercial shipping. It is inexcusable for a country as large as ours to lack the shipping to move our own goods.

In 1949 we had 90,000 or more sets of machine tools. By 1959 the number had increased to 490,000. In 1957 Japan had 600,000. The number of machine tools is an important index of the level of industrial development. Our level of mechanization still is quite low, as one can tell simply from Shanghai, where, according to the most recent survey mechanized labor, semi-mechanized labor, and manual labor each constituted one-third.

Labor productivity in Soviet industry has not as yet surpassed that of the United States. We are even further behind. Though our population is very large our labor productivity is a long way from comparing with that of others. From 1960 on we will still have to work intensively for thirteen years.

2. Social Position and Individual Capacity

On page 488 it says that in a socialist society a person’s position is determined only by labor and individual capacity. This is not necessarily so. Keen-minded people are always coming from among those in a lower position. They are looked down on by others, they have suffered indignities, and they are young. Socialist society is no exception. In the old society it was always the case that the oppressed had scant culture but were a bit keener; the oppressors had higher culture but were a little on the slow side. There is some danger of this today. The higher salaried strata of a socialist society have a bit more cultural knowledge but tend to be a trifle slow when compared to the lower strata. Thus our cadres’ sons and daughters do not quite compare with the children of non-cadres.

From small plants have come many creations and discoveries. Larger factories may have superior facilities, newer technology, and for that very reason the staff all too often assume airs of self-importance, are satisfied with things as they are and do not seek to advance and reach out ambitiously. All too often their creativity does not compare at all with that of the staff of the smaller factory. Recently in Ch’angchou there was a textile mill in which the workers created devices that raised the efficiency of the looms. This will help cotton spinning, textile weaving, and printing and dyeing achieve a balanced capability. The new technique did not come from Shanghai or Tientsin but from a small place called Ch’angchou.

Knowledge is gained by coming through adversity. If Ch’u Yuan had remained in office his writings would not exist.[1] Only because he lost his position and was “transferred downward to perform labor” was it possible for him to get close to the life of society and produce so fine a work of literature as the *Li Sao.* And it was not until he had been rebuffed in many states that Confucius also turned around and devoted himself to his studies. He rallied a group of the unemployed who expected to go from place to place to sell their labor power. But no one would have them. Frustrated at every turn, he had no alternative but to collect the folk songs now known as the *Book of Odes* and put in order the historical materials known as the *Spring and Autumn.*

Historically, many advanced things came not from advanced countries but from comparatively backward ones. Marxism did not come from the comparatively developed capitalist countries of the time — England, France — but from Germany, whose level of capitalist development was in between. There is a reason for this.

Scientific inventions likewise do not necessarily come from those with a high level of culture and education. At present there are many university professors who have not invented anything. Of course, this is not to deny the difference between an engineer and a worker. It is not that we do not want engineers. But there is a real question here. Historically it is usually a case of the culturally inferior defeating the culturally superior. In our civil war our commanders at various levels were culturally inferior to the Kuomintang officers, who came from military academies at home or abroad. But we defeated them.

The human animal has this flaw: looking down on others. Those who have accomplished some small thing look down on those who have yet to. Great powers, rich nations look down on the smaller, poorer ones. The Western nations looked down on Russia, historically. China is still in a similar position. There is reason for this, for we are still nothing much; such a large country, so little steel. So much illiteracy. It can do us good to have people look down on us! It will drive us to exert ourselves, to push forward.

3. Relying on the Masses

Lenin put it well when he said, "Socialism is vigorous, spirited, creative — the creation of the masses of the people themselves." Our mass line is like this. Does it not agree with Leninism? After quoting this statement the text says, "The broad laboring masses increasingly participate in a direct active way in the management of production, in the work of state bodies, in the leadership of all departments in the country's social life." (p. 332) This is also well put. But saying is one thing and doing another. And to do this is by no means easy.

In 1928 the Central Committee of the CPSU passed a resolution which said: "We will be able to solve the task of overtaking and surpassing the capitalist countries technically and economically only when the party and the worker and peasant masses get mobilized to the limit." (p. 337) This is very well put. And this is exactly what we are now doing. At that time Stalin had nothing else to rely on except the masses, so he demanded all-out mobilization of the party and the masses. Afterward, when they had realized some gains this way, they became less reliant on the masses.

Lenin said, "Truly democratic centralism requires that the manifold paths, forms, and methods by which local creativity and spirit of initiative attain general goals have a sufficiently unhindered development." (p. 454). Well said. The masses can create the paths. The masses created Russia's soviets. And they created our people's communes.

4. The Soviet Union and China: A Few Points to Compare in the Development Process

On page 422 the text quotes Lenin: "If state power is in the hands of the working class it is possible to make the transition to communism through state capitalism." And so forth. This is well put. Lenin was a solid worker. Because he realized that the proletariat after the October Revolution had no experience in managing the economy, he attempted to develop the proletariat's competence in this area by using the ways and means of state capitalism. The Russian bourgeoisie underestimated the strength of the proletariat at that time. Refusing Lenin's conditions, they carried out slowdowns and destructive activities, forcing the workers to confiscate their properties. That is why state capitalism could not develop.

During the civil war period Russia's problems were truly enormous. Agriculture was in ruins. Commercial links were disrupted. Communications and transport were hardly functioning. Raw materials could not be obtained, and many factories that had been expropriated could not commence operations. Because they really had no answer to this they had no choice but to turn to a system of requisitioning the peasants' surplus grain.

Actually, this was a means of taking the fruits of the peasants' labor without compensation, a method that meant ransacking the jars and boxes of the peasants — not a sound practice. Only when the civil war ended was this system replaced with a grain tax.

Our civil war lasted much longer than theirs. For twenty-two years it was our practice in the base areas to collect public grain and to purchase surplus grain. We had a correct strategy toward the peasantry and during the war we relied heavily on them.

For twenty-two years we developed our political power in the base areas, and we accumulated experience in managing the economy of the base areas. We trained cadres to manage the economy and built an alliance with the peasantry, so that after the whole country was liberated we speedily carried to its completion the work of economic recovery. Immediately after that we raised the general line of the transition period, namely, putting our primary effort into socialist revolution while beginning construction under the first five-year plan. As we carried out socialist transformation we worked together with the peasantry to deal with the capitalists. There was, however, a time when Lenin said that he could bear to negotiate even with the capitalists in hopes of turning capitalism into state capitalism as a means of coping with the spontaneity of the petty bourgeoisie. Different policies arise in different historical conditions.

In the New Economic Policy (NEP) period the Soviet Union had a restrained policy toward the rich peasants because they needed the grain. We had a similar policy toward the national bourgeoisie in the early stages after liberation. Not until the collective farms and the state farms had produced in all 400 million food of grain did they move against the rich peasants, putting forward the slogan of eliminating the rich peasants and making overall collectivization a reality.[*] What about us? We did things differently, actually eliminating the rich peasant economy as early as land reform.

In the Soviet Union cooperative movement "agriculture paid a heavy price at the beginning." (p. 397) This is what caused many of the East European countries to have plenty of anxiety over the question of cooperativization and to be fearful of organizing big. When they did get started they moved slowly. Our production was not reduced by the cooperatives. On the contrary, it increased enormously. At the beginning many were dubious. Now the number of converts is slowly increasing.

5. The Process of Forming and Consolidating a General Line

These past two years we have been conducting a great experiment.

In the early stages of Liberation we had no experience of managing the economy of the entire nation. So in the period of the first five-year plan we could do no more than copy the Soviet Union's methods, although we never felt altogether satisfied about it. In 1955, when we had basically completed the "three transformations"[2] (at the end of the year and in the spring of the following year), we sought out over thirty cadres for consultation. As a result of those discussions we proposed the "ten great relationships" and "More!

Faster! Better! More economically!” At that time we had read Stalin’s 1949 election speech, which stated that tsarist Russia was producing 4 million tons of steel annually. The figure increases to 18 million by 1940. If one reckons from 1921, there is an increase of only 14 million tons in twenty years. And to think they were socialist the whole time! Could we not do a little better, faster? After that we put forward the question of “two methods” and at the same time we worked out a forty-article program for agricultural development.[3] No other measures were proposed at the time.

After the forward leap of 1956, opposition to [Only in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] adventurous advances appeared. Bourgeois rightists took us by our pigtails and attacked savagely in an attempt to negate the accomplishment of socialist construction. In June 1957, at the National People’s Congress, Premier Chou En-lai’s report struck back at the rightists. In September the same year the party’s third plenary session of the Central Committee revived such slogans as “More! Faster! Better! More economically!” the general program in forty articles, the society for the promoting of progress, [“Great Leap Forward” in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] etc. In November in Moscow we revised a *People’s Daily* editorial on “More! Faster! Better! More economically!” Thus, in the winter we launched a nationwide mass movement for large-scale water conservancy.

In 1958 there were meetings, first in Nanning, then in Ch’engtu. We tore into our problems, criticizing those opposed to daring advances. We decided not to allow further opposition to daring advances. We proposed a general line for socialist construction. If there had been no Nanning meeting we could not have come up with a general line. In May a representative [Liu Shao-Ch’i in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] of the Central Committee reported to the Eighth National People’s Congress, second session. And the assembly officially passed the general line. But the line was not consolidated, so we followed with concrete measures, mainly concerning division of authority between the center and the local areas. In Peitaiho we proposed doubling steel output and got a mass movement in steel and iron underway — what the Western papers called backyard steel. At the same time we launched the people’s communes. Right after came the shelling of Quemoy. These things perturbed some and offended others. Errors appeared in our work. By not paying for food we ate ourselves into a crisis in grains and nonstaple foods. The ultracommunist wind was blowing. A certain percent [12 percent in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.] of daily necessities could not be supplied. Steel output for 1959 was set at 30 million tons at Peitaiho. The Wuchang meeting lowered this to 20 million. The Shanghai meeting lowered it to 16.5 million tons. Sometime in June 1959 it was cut again to 13 million. All this was seized upon by those who disagreed with us. But when the Central Committee was opposing the “left” they did not raise their objections, nor did they do so at the two Ch’engchou conferences, the Wuchang Conference, the Peking Conference, or the Shanghai Conference. They waited until the “left” had been opposed out of existence and goals had been confirmed. Further opposition to the “left” made opposition to the right necessary. At the Lushan Conference, when we needed opposition to the right, they came out against the “left.”[4]

All this goes to show that things were far from peaceful in our world, and the general line was certainly not consolidated. Now that we have come through a period of difficult zigzags and the Lushan Conference, the general line is comparatively consolidated. But "things come in threes," so perhaps we have to prepare for a third period of zigzags. If so, we can expect that the line will be consolidated even further. According to Chekiang Provincial Committee information "equalization" and "indiscriminate transfers of property" have reappeared very recently in certain communes. The ultracommunist wind may yet appear again!

The incidents in Poland and Hungary occured in 1956, the time of the zigzags of the campaign against "daring advances." Then the world turned against the Soviet Union. During the zigzags of 1959 the world turned against us.

The two rectification and antirightist campaigns, one in 1957, one at Lushan, subjected the effects of bourgeois ideology and remaining bourgeois influences to comparatively thoroughgoing criticism, enabling the masses to be liberated from the danger. At that time we also struck down many superstitions, including the so-called Ma Anshan Iron and Steel Constitution. ["An authoritarian refining method at a major Soviet mill" — note in the 1967 text.: *Note by translator*.][5]

In the past we did not know how to get a socialist revolution going. We thought that after the cooperatives, after joint public-private management, the problem would be solved. The savage attacks of the bourgeois rightists caused us to put forward socialist revolution as a political and an ideological line. Actually, the Lushan Conference carried forward this revolution, and it was a sharp revolution. It would have been very bad if we had not beaten down the right opportunist line at Lushan.

6. Contradictions Among the Imperialist Nations and Other Matters

Struggles among the respective imperialisms should be seen as a major thing. That is how Lenin saw them and Stalin too, something they called the indirect reserve force of the revolution. In getting the revolutionary base areas going China enjoyed this advantageous circumstance. In the past we had contradictions among various factions of the landlord and comprador classes. Behind these domestic contradictions lay contradictions among the imperialists. It was because of these contradictions among the imperialists that only a part of the enemy rather than all of them would do battle with us directly in a particular time, so long as we utilized the contradictions properly. In addition, we usually had time to rest and reorganize. Contradictions among the imperialists was one important reason why the October Revolution could be consolidated. Fourteen nations sent intervention forces at the time. But none alone sent much. Moreover, their purposes were not coordinated. They were engaged in intrigues. During the Korean war American purposes were not coordinated with those of their allies. The war was not fought on the largest scale. Not only could America not determine its own course, France and England were not so eager.

Internationally the bourgeoisie are now extremely uneasy, afraid of any wind that might stir the grass. Their level of alertness is high, but they are in disarray.

Since the Second World War the economic crises in capitalist society are different from those of Marx’s day. Generally speaking, they used to come every seven, eight or ten years. During the fourteen years between the end of the Second World War and 1959 there were three.

At present the international scene is far more tense than after the First World War, when capitalism still had a period of relative stability, the revolution having failed everywhere except Russia. England and France were full of high spirits and the various national bourgeoisies were not all that afraid of the Soviet Union. Aside from the taking away of Germany’s colonies the entire imperialist colonial system was still in tact. After the Second World War three of the defeated imperialisms collapsed. England and France were weakened and in decline. Socialist revolution had triumphed in over ten countries. The colonial system was breaking apart. The capitalist world would never again enjoy the relative stability it had after the First World War.

7. Why China’s Industrial Revolution Can Be Very Rapid

In Western bourgeois public opinion there are now those who acknowledge that “China is one of the countries having the most rapid industrial development.” (The U.S. Conlon report on United States diplomatic policy mentions this.)

There are many countries that have carried through an industrial revolution. Compared to all previous national industrial revolutions China promises to have one of the most rapid.

The question is, why? One of the main reasons is that our socialist revolution was carried through fairly thoroughly. We carried through the revolution against the bourgeoisie thoroughly, doing our utmost to eradicate all bourgeois influences. We struck down superstitions and energetically sought to enable the masses to win thoroughgoing liberation in all areas.

8. Population [This section is found in the 1969 text only.: *Note by translator*.]

In eliminating the problem of excess population, rural population is the major problem, the solution of which calls for vast development of production. In China over 500 million people are devoting themselves to agriculture. But they do not eat their fill, although they toil year in year out. This is most unreasonable. In America the agricultural population is only 13 percent and on the average each person has 2,000 catties[6] of grain. We do not have so much. What shall we do to reduce the rural population? If we do not want them crowding into the cities we will have to have a great deal of industry in the countryside so that the peasants can become workers right where they are. This brings us to a major policy issue: do we want to keep rural living conditions from falling below that in the cities, keep the two roughly the same, or keep the rural slightly higher than the urban? Every commune has to have its own economic center, its own upper-level schools to train its own intellectuals. There is no other way to solve the problem of excess rural population really and truly.

Notes

[References given here have been compiled from sources other than the Maoist Documentation Project as well. — *Transcriber, MIA*.]

[1] There are three levels of collective ownership in the Chinese countryside. The smallest unit, the production team, usually consists of between fifteen and thirty-five families. The team is the basic ownership and production unit, owning the land it works, a number of draught animals, and small agricultural tools such as threshers and crushers. The next unit, the production brigade, is made up of from five to fifteen teams. The brigade owns larger means of production too expensive for the team to buy and too large for them to use effectively, such as tractors and irrigation equipment. The brigade also takes care of tasks, such as hill terracing, for which the team is too small. The commune, with a population from several thousand to some fifty thousand, is composed of ten to thirty brigades. In addition to providing overall coordination among the brigades, the communes own and run large industrial enterprises and projects too large for the brigade to handle, such as large water conservancy projects.

[2] The various forms of collective ownership, taken as a whole, are distinct from ownership by the whole people. Collective ownership signifies that the means of production are owned by a sector of the total population. This sector, be it a team, brigade, or commune, basically organizes and runs production. The product of a collectively owned unit, aside from taxes, belongs to the units which produced it. The unit uses part of the product for reproduction and investment and the remainder for worker income.

Ownership by the whole people, on the other hand, signifies ownership by the whole society, not a sector of it. Such enterprises are subject to direct central planning and organization. Their products are owned by the whole society and can be distributed according to need within the whole system of units under ownership by the whole people. Since these various production units are treated as a unified accounting unit, the profits or losses of an individual production unit do not affect either investment in the unit or the income of its workers.

In 1973, industry under the ownership of the whole people accounted for 97 percent of total fixed assets, 63 percent of the people engaged in industry, and 86 percent of total industrial output. Industry under collective ownership covered 3 percent of fixed assets, 36.2 percent of the industrial workforce, and 14 percent of total output. Individual handicrafts made up the other 8 percent. In commerce, 92.5 percent of retail sales were under ownership of the whole people with collectively owned units accounting for 7.3 percent of total retail sales. In agriculture, on the other hand, 80 to 90 percent of the means of production were still under collective ownership.

[3] The land reform movement refers specifically to the post-Liberation land reform campaign of 1949-1952. The agricultural producers' cooperatives were established for the most part during the high tide of collectivization in 1955 and early 1956. The people's communes were organized throughout China in the fall of 1958 during the initial stages of the Great Leap Forward.

[4] Comprador capitalism refers to foreign commercial establishments in China staffed by Chinese who served these foreign interests.

[5] For Comrade Mao's discussions of the importance of bureaucratic capital and policy toward it at that time, see "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," December 25, 1947, and "Report to the Second Session of the Seventh Central Committee," March 5, 1949, in *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), pp. 167-68 and 361-75.

[6] Here Comrade Mao is referring to the activities of Chang Po-chün (Zhang Pojun) and Lo Lung-chi (Luo Longji). In the summer of 1957 Chang suggested giving more power to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which consisted largely of members of the various democratic parties. This unit would serve as an "upper house" with veto power over the CCP-dominated National People's Congress. Lo proposed a set of "rehabilitation committees" to examine the treatment of democratic persons who he argued were unfairly treated in the anti-counter-revolutionary campaigns of the early 1950s.

[7] Fixed interest was a specific part of the CCP's strategy of "buying out" the national bourgeoisie. After Liberation, policy toward them went through several stages. The first stage was the placing of orders by the state with private enterprises for manufacturing and processing and the unified purchase and distribution of products produced by these enterprises. After the rectification campaign in private industry in 1952, a second phase of "dividing the profits into four shares" was implemented. The four relatively equal shares were: (1) taxes paid to the state; (2) contributions to the worker welfare fund; (3) enterprise development funds; and (4) profits for the capitalists.

The third stage was the implementation of joint state-private ownership, first of individual enterprises and then of entire trades. In this "highest phase of state capitalism," the income of the capitalists would come from the income they received for the work they did within the units and from "fixed interest." Fixed interest was to be paid for twenty years at the annual rate of 5 percent of the value of the assets of the enterprises regardless of the annual profits or losses of the individual firms. Fixed interest payments were terminated during the Cultural Revolution.

[8] The policy of unified purchase and supply meant that the government would buy certain products at fixed prices, thus eliminating the private market and conditions for speculation in these goods. Unified purchase and supply of grain, edible oils, and oilseeds was instituted in March 1954, and in September 1954 the policy was instituted for cotton and cotton cloth.

Under the system of unified purchase and supply, there are three categories of goods. Goods in the first category (which, as of April 1959, included 38 products) are sold to state companies at fixed prices. Second category goods (293 products as of April 1959) are sold to the state according to quotas reached on a contractual basis. Above-quota production can, but need not, be sold to the state. Third category goods (those not included in the first or second categories) may still be sold on the market.

[9] "Red and expert" describes a unity of opposites in building a socialist society. Redness suggests political and ideological aspects of work; expertness the technical aspects. Both are necessary aspects of all work. But in line with his reasoning that every contradiction must have a primary aspect, Comrade Mao has long held that "ideological and political work is the guarantee . . . the 'soul'" of economic and technical work. On the other hand if redness is emphasized to the exclusion of expertness, then the unity of opposites will be destroyed and the task of building socialism will become impossible.

[10] In March 1949 the CCP began to organize a People's Political Consultative Conference representing twenty-three parties and groups. In September 1949 the Preparatory Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference met and passed the Common Program, a general statement of the aims of the new government, and the Organic Law of the Central People's Republic which made the working class the leaders of the Republic. Subsequently, the National People's Congress, first convened in 1954, was established as the dominant long-term national legislative body in China.

[11] One Chinese dollar (yuan) has a value of U.S. $.53 (April 1977). The value of the yuan has been stable at approximately U.S. $.50 for over twenty years, the variations coming mainly as a result of devaluations of the U.S. dollar.

[12] Here Comrade Mao is probably referring to his own experiences during the Great Leap Forward. At Wuchang (Wuzhang) in November 1958, Comrade Mao admitted that at the Peitaiho (Beitaihe) Conference in August 1958, during the height of enthusiasm for the Great Leap, he had made a similar error of considering only need and not capacity.

[13] This formulation of these crucial contradictions is contained in Comrade Mao's April 1956 speech, "On the Ten Major Relationships."

[14] Mutual aid teams were an early form of collective agricultural organization. Based on traditional peasant seasonal labor-sharing practices in parts of China, they were extensively implemented in the early 1950s. In 1955, nearly 60 percent of China's peasant households were in mutual aid teams.

These teams were supplanted in 1955 by elementary agricultural producers' cooperatives (APCs). Each APC contained several mutual aid teams; land and other capital goods continued to be privately owned, but other resources were pooled and used according to annual plans prepared by cooperative decision-making. By June 1956, however, 63 percent of the peasant households had progressed to larger, advanced APCs in which land, labor, and the means of production were pooled.

[15] Chang Tien-p'ei (Zhung Dian-pei) was a film critic in the mid-1950s who later took part in the antiparty, antisocialist current of 1957.

[16] The "three-antis" (Sanfan) campaign, begun in the northeast in August 1951 and nationally in January 1952, was directed against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism among government employees, many of whom were still carryovers from the Nationalist regime. The "five-antis" (Wufan) campaign was directed at the national bourgeoisie. Its specific foci were the elimination of bribery, theft of state property, tax evasion, theft of state economic secrets, and embezzlement in carrying out government contracts.

[17] Here Comrade Mao is referring to the rightist criticisms of the CCP during the "blooming and contending" period in the spring of 1957, shortly after he had delivered his talk, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," in February 1957.

[18] In July 1959, at the Lushan Conference, a group of party leaders headed by then Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai (Peng De-huai) criticized the Great Leap Forward and its leadership as "petty bourgeois fanaticism." They argued that it had created far more damage than good. After a major struggle at the plenum conference, P'eng and other rightists were removed from their positions of responsibility in the party and the government.

[19] The argument presented by the textbook that the socialist revolution in the ideological and political fronts was concluded in 1957 is similar to the argument in the Resolution of the Eighth Party Congress in 1956. That is to say, the main contradiction in China was no longer that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but between the advanced relations of production (the ideological and political fronts on which the revolution was "concluded") and the backward forces of production.

[20] The 45 percent rate of accumulation noted here by Comrade Mao is an exceptionally high one used to demonstrate an exemplary advanced situation. During the Great Leap Forward, Comrade Mao had consistently argued against excessive rates of accumulation which would reduce the peasants' incentives to produce. As a general rule, he prescribed the following breakdown for agricultural production: taxes (7 percent); production expenses (20 percent); accumulation (18 percent); distribution to the masses (55 percent).

[21] The Eight-Character Charter for Agriculture, propagated during the Great Leap Forward, called for paying attention to water, fertilizer, soil (conservation), seeds (selection), closeness (in planting), protection (of plants), implements, and (field) management.

[22] Here Comrade Mao is referring to the fifth grade in China's present eight-grade wage system.

[23] During the War of Liberation, cadres received goods according to need, not according to work done. These goods were distributed directly for use, not through any

market mechanism based on exchange value. Under these circumstances, however, needs were defined quite spartanly.

[24] The mass line is the method of leadership which the CCP strives to achieve. Its classic formulation by Comrade Mao is as follows:

In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily “from the masses, to the masses.” This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them, and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas be coming more correct, more vital, and richer each time.

From: “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership,” June 1, 1943, *Selected Works*, vol. 3, p. 119.

[25] Comrade Mao is referring again to the July-August 1959 Lushan Conference at which the conflict with P’eng Teh-huai came to the fore.

Supplement

[1] Ch’u Yuan (Qu Yuan) was an aristocrat of the Chou period who lived during the beginning of the third century B.C. After being dismissed from the royal court, he wrote the *Li Sao*, an allegorical, fanciful search for an understanding ruler. He subsequently drowned himself out of despair.

[2] The “three transformations” refers to the transformation of agriculture, private industry, and handicrafts production.

[3] The forty-articles program represented a plan for agricultural development supported by Comrade Mao. The forty articles advocated relying on agricultural production and the domestic agricultural market, rather than foreign markets, to provide the primary accumulation needed to finance China’s industrialization. The articles also advocated changing the relations of production as a condition for further developing the forces of production and increasing cooperativization. The vast majority of the peasants were to increase their income through this process. Although the forty articles were shelved during 1956 and most of 1957, they became an integral part of the Great Leap Forward.

[4] As Comrade Mao here indicates, a series of meetings were held from November 1958 through early 1959. At these meetings the errors of the Great Leap were criticized and efforts made to correct them. However, it was only after these errors had been criticized

and corrections made that, in July 1959, the rightists launched what Comrade Mao saw as an opportunist attack on the Great Leap and the leadership who had supported it. This perception of the rightist criticisms is reflected in the titles of the two talks Comrade Mao gave at the Lushan Conference "Why Do the Right Opportunists Now Launch an Offensive?" and "Machine Guns, Mortars, and Other Things" (reflecting the antagonistic nature of the attack.)

[5] The Ma Anshan Iron and Steel Constitution refers to the authoritarian constitution of the Soviet Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, which the Anshan Works, China's most advanced iron and steel works, had adopted in the 1950s. This constitution remained unchallenged until 1958. During the Great Leap Forward, the "Ma-An" principles of one person in command and technology in command were challenged in a report to the central leadership.

By March 1960, with Comrade Mao's participation, a new Anshan Constitution had been written. It combined the five principles of (1) politics in command; (2) strengthening party leadership; (3) launching vigorous mass movements; (4) instituting the "two participations, one reform, and three combinations" (cadre participation in productive labor and worker participation in management; reform of irrational and outdated rules; cooperation between workers, cadres, and technicians); and (5) go full speed ahead with technical innovations and the technical revolution. Although Comrade Mao authorized the issue, publication, and implementation of the new Anshan Constitution in March 1960, it was not until the Cultural Revolution that it was publicized in a big way.

[6] A catty is 1.1 pounds.

[*] In "Several Questions Concerning Soviet Land Policy" (December 1929) Stalin said, "In 1927 the rich peasants produced over 600 million food of grain, of which 130 million were sold through rural exchange. This is a substantial force which we can not slight. Tell me, how much had our collective and state farms produced at that time? About 80 million food, of which 30 million were commodity grains." So Stalin decided, "Under these circumstances we can not resolutely attack the rich peasants." And Stalin continued, "Now we have a sufficient material basis to attack them." That was because in 1929 the collective and state farms produced no less than 400 million food, of which over 130 million were commodity grains. (Josef Stalin, *Complete Works*, vol 12, p. 142.) [*Transcriber's Note*: See Stalin's "Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R.".]

Concerning *Economic Problems Of Socialism In The USSR*

November 1958 [1]

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Provincial and regional committees must study this book. [1] In the past everyone read it without gaining a deep impression. It should be studied in conjunction with China's actual circumstances. The first three chapters contain much that is worth paying attention to, much that is correct, although there are places where perhaps Stalin himself did not make things clear enough. For example, in chapter 1 he says only a few things about objective laws and how to go about planning the economy, without unfolding his ideas; or, it may be that to his mind Soviet planning of the economy already reflected objective governing principles. On the question of heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture, the Soviet Union did not lay enough emphasis on the latter two and had losses as a result. In addition, they did not do a good job of combining the immediate and the long-term interests of the people. In the main they walked on one leg. Comparing the planning, which of us after all had the better adapted "planned proportionate development?" Another point: Stalin emphasized only technology, technical cadre. He wanted nothing but technology, nothing but cadre; no politics, no masses. This too is walking on one leg! And in industry they walk on one leg when they pay attention to heavy industry but not to light industry. Furthermore, they did not point out the main aspects of the contradictions in the relationships among departments of heavy industry. They exaggerated the importance of heavy industry, claiming that steel was the foundation, machinery the heart and soul. Our position is that grain is the mainstay of agriculture, steel of industry, and that if steel is taken as the mainstay, then once we have the raw material the machine industry will follow along. Stalin raised questions in chapter 1: he suggested the objective governing principles, but he failed to provide satisfactory answers.

In chapter 2 he discusses commodities, in chapter 3 the law of value. Relatively speaking, I favor many of the views expressed. To divide production into two major departments and to say that the means of production are not commodities — these points deserve study. In Chinese agriculture there are still many means of production that should be commodities. My view is that the last of the three appended letters[2] is entirely wrong. It expresses a deep uneasiness, a belief that the peasantry cannot be trusted to release agricultural machinery but would hang on to it. On the one hand Stalin says that the means of production belong to state ownership. On the other, he says that the peasants cannot afford them. The fact is that he is deceiving himself. The state controlled the peasantry very, very tightly, inflexibly. For the two transitions Stalin failed to find the proper ways and means, a vexing matter for him.

Capitalism leaves behind it the commodity form, which we must still retain for the time being. Commodity exchange laws governing value play no regulating role in our production. This role is played by planning, by the great leap forward under planning, by politics-in-command. Stalin speaks only of the production relations, not of the superstructure, nor of the relationship between superstructure and economic base. Chinese cadres participate in production; workers participate in management. Sending cadres down to lower levels to be tempered, discarding old rules and regulations — all these pertain to the superstructure, to ideology. Stalin mentions economics only, not politics. He may speak of selfless labor, but in reality even an extra hour's labor is begrudged. There is no selflessness at all. The role of people, the role of the laborer — these are not mentioned. If there were no communist movement it is hard to imagine making the transition to communism. "All people are for me, I for all people." This does not belong. It ends up with everything being connected to the self. Some say Marx said it. If he did let's not make propaganda out of it. "All people for me," means everybody for me, the individual. "I am for all." Well, how many can you be for?

Bourgeois right is manifested as bourgeois law and education. We want to destroy a part of the ideology of bourgeois right, the lordly pose, the three styles [the bureaucratic, the sectarian, and the subjective] and the five airs [the officious, the arrogant, the apathetic, the extravagant, and the precious]. But commodity circulation, the commodity form, the law of value, these, on the other hand, cannot be destroyed summarily, despite the fact that they are bourgeois categories. If we now carry on propaganda for the total elimination of the ideology of bourgeois right it would not be a reasonable position, bear in mind.

There are a few in socialist society — landlords, rich peasants, right-wingers — who are partial to capitalism and advocate it. But the vast majority are thinking of crossing over to communism. This, however, has to be done by steps. You cannot get to heaven in one step. Take the people's communes: on the one hand, they have to develop self-sufficient production, on the other, commodity exchange. We use commodity exchange and the law of value as tools for the benefit of developing production and facilitating the transition. We are a nation whose commodity production is very underdeveloped. Last year we produced 3.7 trillion catties of food grains. Of that number, commodity grains amounted to about 800 or 900 billion catties. Apart from grain, industrial crops like cotton and hemp are also underdeveloped. Therefore we have to have this [commodity] stage of development. At present there are still a good many counties where there is no charge for food but they cannot pay wages. In Hopei there are three such counties, and another that can pay wages, but not much: three or five yuan. So we still have to develop production, to develop things that can be sold other than foodgrains. At the Sian Agricultural Conference this point was insufficiently considered. In sum, we are a nation whose commerce is underdeveloped, and yet in many respects we have entered socialism. We must eliminate a part of bourgeois right, but commodity production and exchange must still be kept. Now there is a tendency to feel that the sooner communism comes the better. Some suggest that in only three or five years we will be making the transition. In Fan county, Shantung, it was suggested that four years might be a little slow!

At present there are some economists who do not enjoy economics — Yaroshenko[3] for one. For now and until some time in the future we will have to expand allocation and delivery to the communes. And we will have to expand commodity production. Otherwise we will not be able to pay wages or improve life. Some of our comrades are guilty of a misapprehension when, coming upon commodities and commodity production, they want to destroy bourgeois rule every single day, e.g., they say wages, grades, etc., are detrimental to the free supply system. In 1953 we changed the free supply system into a wage system.[4] This approach was basically correct. We had to take one step backward. But there was a problem: we also took a step backward in the matter of grades. As a result there was a furor over this matter. After a period of rectification grades were scaled down. The grade system is a father-son relation, a cat-and-mouse relation. It has to be attacked day after day. Sending down the cadres to lower levels, running the experimental fields [5] — these are ways of changing the grade system; otherwise, no great leaps!

In urban people's communes capitalists can enter and serve as personnel. But the capitalist label should stay on them. With respect to socialism and communism, what is meant by constructing socialism? We raise two points:

(1) The concentrated manifestation of constructing socialism is making socialist, all-embracing public ownership[6] a reality. (2) Constructing socialism means turning commune collective ownership into public ownership. Some comrades disapprove of drawing the line between these two types of ownership system, as if the communes were completely publicly owned. In reality there are two systems. One type is public ownership, as in the Anshan Iron and Steel Works, the other is commune-large collective ownership. If we do not raise this, what is the use of socialist construction? Stalin drew the line when he spoke of three conditions. These three basic conditions make sense and may be summarized as follows: increase social output; raise collective ownership to public ownership; go from exchange of commodities to exchange of products, from exchange value to use value.

On these two abovementioned points we Chinese are (1) expanding and striving to increase output, concurrently promoting industry and agriculture with preference given to developing heavy industry; and (2) raising small collective ownership to public ownership, and then further to all-embracing public ownership. Those who would not draw these distinctions [among types of ownership] would seem to hold the view that we have already arrived at public ownership. This is wrong. Stalin was speaking of culture when he proposed the three conditions, the physical development and education of the whole people. For this he proposed four conditions: (a) six hours' work per day; (b) combining technical education with work; (c) improving residential conditions; (d) raising wages. Raising wages and lowering prices are particularly helpful here, but the political conditions are missing.

All these conditions are basically to increase production. Once output is plentiful it will be easier to solve the problem of raising collective to public ownership. To increase production we need "More! Faster! Better! More economically!" And for this we need politics-in-command, the four concurrent promotions, the rectification campaigns, the smashing of the ideology of bourgeois right. Add to this the people's communes and it becomes all the easier to achieve "More! Faster! Better! More economically!"

What are the implications of all-embracing public ownership? There are two: (1) the society's means of production are owned by the whole people; and (2) the society's output is owned by the whole people.

The characteristic of the people's commune is that it is the basic level at which industry, agriculture, the military, education, and commerce are to be integrated in our social structure. At the present time it is the basic-level administrative organization. The militia deals with foreign threats, especially from the imperialists. The commune is the best organizational form for carrying out the two transitions, from socialist (the present) to all-embracing public, and from all-embracing public to communist ownership. In future, when the transitions have been completed, the commune will be the basic mechanism of communist society.

Notes

[References given here have been compiled from sources other than the Maoist Documentation Project as well. — *Transcriber, MIA*.]

[1] The book at issue in this critique is Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR by J.V. Stalin. The full contents of this work are available through the Joseph Stalin Reference Archive. The Marxists Internet Archive version of *Economic Problems* is a transcription of the edition published by Foreign Languages Press, Peking: 1972 (First Edition)

The date for this document in the 1967 edition of *Selected Works,* Volume 6 is 1959. The 1969 edition dates it in 1958. There was no Ch'engchou (Chengzhou) Conference in November 1959, but there was one in November 1958. The document almost certainly dates from this earlier time.

[2] Reply to Comrades A. V. Sanina and V. G. Venzher, included in *Economic Problems.*

[3] Recipient of Stalin's second letter, included in *Economic Problems.*

[4] The wage system established in 1953 emphasized predominately short-term individual material incentives. It established an eight-grade wage point system ranging

from 139 to 390 wage points per month. Similar work in different regions would receive an equal number of work points, but the value of work points varied according to regional costs of living. By 1956, the wage point system had been replaced by a wage system, but the eight-grade structure was retained.

[5] Experimental fields sought to develop new and advanced techniques, such as close planting, early planting, deep ploughing, etc. If successful in increasing output, the techniques would be popularized throughout China. By increasing production and thus the total wage fund, the experimental field concept could help undermine the ideological base of the graded wage system by demonstrating that specialists could learn from the peasants.

[6] This is identical, in Chinese, to ownership by the whole people.

Critique of Stalin's *Economic Problems Of Socialism In The USSR*

[SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.]

Stalin's book from first to last says nothing about the superstructure. It is not concerned with people; it considers things, not people. Does the kind of supply system for consumer goods help spur economic development or not? He should have touched on this at the least. Is it better to have commodity production or is it better not to? Everyone has to study this. Stalin's point of view in his last letter[*] is almost altogether wrong. The basic error is mistrust of the peasants.

Parts of the first, second, and third chapters are correct; other parts could have been clearer. For example, the discussion on planned economy is not complete. The rate of development of the Soviet economy is not high enough, although it is faster than the capitalists' rate. Relations between agriculture and industry, as well as between light and heavy industry, are not clearly explained.

It looks as if they have had serious losses. The relationship between long- and short-term interests has not seen any spectacular developments. They walk on one leg, we walk on two. They believe that technology decides everything, that cadres decide everything, speaking only of "expert," never of "red," only of the cadres, never of the masses. This is walking on one leg. As far as heavy industry goes, they have failed to find the primary contradiction, calling steel the foundation, machinery the heart and innards, coal the food. . . . For us steel is the mainstay, the primary contradiction in industry, while foodgrains are the mainstay in agriculture. Other things develop proportionally.

In the first chapter he discusses grasping the laws, but without proposing a method. On commodity production and the law of value he has a number of views that we approve of ourselves, but there are problems as well. Limiting commodity production to the means of subsistence is really rather doubtful. Mistrust of the peasants is the basic viewpoint of the third letter. Essentially, Stalin did not discover a way to make the transition from collective to public ownership. Commodity production and exchange are forms we have kept, while in connection with the law of value we must speak of planning and at the same time politics-in-command. They speak only of the production relations, not of the superstructure nor politics, nor the role of the people. Communism cannot be reached unless there is a communist movement.[**]

1. These comrades . . . it is evident . . . confuse laws of science, which reflect objective processes in nature or society, processes which take place independently of the will of man, with the laws which are issued by governments, which are made by the will of man, and which have only juridical validity. But they must not be confused.

1. This principle is basically correct, but two things are wrong: first, the conscious activity of the party and the masses is not sufficiently brought out; second, it is not comprehensive enough in that it fails to explain that what makes government decrees correct is not only that they emerge from the will of the working class but also the fact that they faithfully reflect the imperatives of objective economic laws.

2. Leaving aside astronomical, geological, and other similar processes, which man really is powerless to influence, even if he has come to know the laws of their development. . . .

2. This argument is wrong. Human knowledge and the capability to transform nature have no limit. Stalin did not consider these matters developmentally. What cannot now be done, may be done in the future.

3. The same must be said of the laws of economic development, the laws of political economy — whether in the period of capitalism or in the period of socialism. Here, too, the laws of economic development, as in the case of natural science, are objective laws, reflecting processes of economic development which take place independently of the will of man.

3. How do we go about planning the economy? There is not enough attention given to light industry, to agriculture.

4. That is why Engels says in the same book: “The laws of his own social action, hitherto standing face to face with man as laws of nature foreign to, and dominating, him, will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him.” (*Anti-Dühring*)

4. Freedom is necessary objective law understood by people. Such law confronts people, is independent of them. But once people understand it, they can control it.

5. The specific role of Soviet government was due to two circumstances: first, that what Soviet government had to do was not to replace one form of exploitation by another, as was the case in earlier revolutions, but to abolish exploitation altogether; second, that in view of the absence in the country of any ready made rudiments of a socialist economy, it had to create new, socialist forms of economy, "starting from scratch," so to speak.

5. The inevitability of socialist economic laws — that is something that needs to be studied. At the Ch'engtu Conference I said that we would have to see whether or not our general program ("More! Faster! Better! More economically!" the three concurrent promotions, and the mass line) would flop;[1] or if it could succeed. This can not be demonstrated for several or even as many as ten years. The laws of the revolution, which used to be doubted by some, have now been proved correct because the enemy has been overthrown. Can socialist construction work? People still have doubts. Does our Chinese practice conform to the economic laws of China? This has to be studied. My view is that if the practice conforms generally, things will be all right.

6. This [creating new, socialist forms of economy "from scratch"] was undoubtedly a difficult, complex, and unprecedented task.

6. With respect to the creating of socialist economic forms we have the precedent of the Soviet Union and for this reason should do a bit better than they. If we ruin things it will show that Chinese Marxism does not work. As to the difficulty and complexity of the tasks, things are no different from what the Soviet Union faced.

7. It is said that the necessity for balanced (proportionate) development of the national economy in our country enables the Soviet government to abolish existing economic laws and to create new ones. That is absolutely untrue. Our yearly and five-yearly plans must not be confused with the objective economic law of balanced, proportionate development of the national economy.

7. This is the crux of the matter.

8. That means that the law of balanced development of the national economy makes it *possible* for our planning bodies to plan social production correctly. But *possibility* must not be confused with *actuality.* They are two different things. In order to turn the possibility into actuality, it is necessary to study this economic law, to master it, to learn to apply it with full understanding, and to compile such plans as fully reflect the requirements of this law. It cannot be said that the requirements of this economic law are fully reflected by our yearly and five-yearly plans.

8. The central point of this passage is that we must not confuse the objective law of planned proportionate development with planning. In the past we too devised plans, but they frequently caused a storm. Too much! Too little! Blindly we bumped into things, never sure of the best way. Only after suffering tortuous lessons, moving in U-shaped patterns, everyone racking their brains to think of answers, did we hit upon the forty-article agricultural program which we are now putting into effect. And we are in the

midst of devising a new forty articles. After another three years' bitter struggle we will develop further; after full and sufficient discussions we will again proceed. Can we make it a reality? It remains to be proved in objective practice. We worked on industry for eight years but did not realize that we had to take steel as the mainstay. This was the principal aspect of the contradiction in industry. It was monism. Among the large, the medium, and the small, we take the large as the mainstay; between the center and the regions, the center. Of the two sides of any contradiction one is the principal side. As important as eight years' achievements are, we were feeling our way along, nonetheless. It cannot be said that our planning of production was entirely correct, that it entirely reflected the objective laws. Planning is done by the whole party, not simply the planning committee or the economics committee, but by all levels; everyone is involved. In this passage Stalin is theoretically correct. But there is not yet a finely detailed analysis, nor even the beginnings of a clear explanation. The Soviets did not distinguish among the large, the medium, and the small, the region and the center; nor did they promote concurrently industry and agriculture. They have not walked on two legs at all. Their rules and regulations hamstrung people. But we have not adequately studied and grasped our situation, and as a result our plans have not fully reflected objective laws either.

9. Let us examine Engels' formula. Engels' formula cannot be considered fully clear and precise, because it does not indicate whether it is referring to the seizure by society of *all* or only part of the means of production; that is, whether *all* or only part of the means of production are converted into public property. Hence, *this* formula of Engels' may be understood either way.

9. This analysis touches the essentials! The problem is dividing the means of production into two parts. To say the means of production are not commodities deserves study.

10. In this section, Commodity Production Under Socialism, Stalin has not comprehensively set forth the conditions for the existence of commodities. The existence of two kinds of ownership is the main premise for commodity production. But ultimately commodity production is also related to the productive forces. For this reason, even under completely socialized public ownership, commodity exchange will still have to be operative in some areas.

11. It follows from this that Engels has in mind countries where capitalism and the concentration of production have advanced far enough both in industry and agriculture to permit the expropriation of *all* the means of production in the country and their conversion into public property. Engels, consequently, considers that in *such* countries, parallel with the socialization of all the means of production, commodity production should be put an end to. And that, of course, is correct.

11. Stalin's analysis of Engels' formula is correct. At present there is a strong tendency to do away with commodity production. People get upset the minute they see commodity production, taking it for capitalism itself. But it looks as if commodity production will have to be greatly developed and the money supply increased for the sake of the solidarity of several hundred million peasants. This poses a problem for the ideology of

several hundred thousand cadres as well as for the solidarity of several hundred million peasants. We now possess only a part of the means of production. But it appears that there are those who wish to declare at once ownership by the whole people, divesting the small and medium producers. But they fail to declare the category of ownership! Is it to be commune-owned or county-owned? To abolish commodities and commodity production in this way, merely by declaring public ownership, is to strip the peasantry. At the end of 1955, procurement and purchase got us almost 90 billion catties of grain, causing us no little trouble. Everyone was talking about food, and household after household was talking about unified purchase. But it was purchase, after all, not allocation. Only later did the crisis ease when we made the decision to make this 83 billion catties of grain. I cannot understand why people have forgotten these things so promptly.

12. I leave aside in this instance the question of the importance of foreign trade to Britain and the vast part it plays in her national economy. I think that only after an investigation of this question can it be finally decided what would be the future [fate] of commodity production in Britain after the proletariat had assumed power and *all* the means of production had been nationalized.

12. Fate depends on whether or not commodity production is abolished.

13. But here is a question: What are the proletariat and its party to do in countries, ours being a case in point, where the conditions are favorable for the assumption of power by the proletariat and the overthrow of capitalism [where capitalism has so concentrated the means of production in industry that they may be expropriated and made the property of society, but where agriculture, notwithstanding the growth of capitalism, is divided up among numerous small and medium owner-producers to such an extent as to make it impossible to consider the expropriation of these producers?][***] . . . [This] would throw the peasantry into the camp of the enemies of the proletariat for a long time.

13. In sum, the principle governing commodity production was not grasped. Chinese economists are Marxist-Leninist as far as book learning goes. But when they encounter economic practice Marxism-Leninism gets shortchanged. Their thinking is confused. If we make mistakes we will lead the peasantry to the enemy side.

14. Lenin’s answer may be briefly summed up as follows: (a). Favorable conditions for the assumption of power should not be missed — the proletariat should assume power without waiting until capitalism has succeeded in ruining the millions of small and medium individual producers;

15(b). The means of production in industry should be expropriated and converted into public property;

16(c). As to the small and medium individual producers, they should be gradually united in producers’ cooperatives, i.e., in large agricultural enterprises, collective farms;

17(d). Industry should be developed to the utmost and the collective farms should be placed on the modern technical basis of large-scale production, not expropriating them, but on the contrary generously supplying them with first-class tractors and other machines;

18(e). In order to ensure an economic bond between town and country, between industry and agriculture, commodity production (exchange through purchase and sale) should be preserved for a certain period, it being the form of economic tie with the town which is *alone acceptable* to the peasants, and Soviet trade — state, cooperative, and collective-farm — should be developed to the full and the capitalists of all types and descriptions ousted from trading activity.

The history of socialist construction in our country has shown that this path of development, mapped out by Lenin, has fully justified itself.

19. There can be no doubt that in the case of all capitalist countries with a more or less numerous class of small and medium producers, this path of development is the only possible and expedient one for the victory of socialism.

14. This passage has a correct analysis. Take conditions in China. There is development. These five points are all correct.

15. Our policy toward the national bourgeoisie has been to redeem their property.

16. We are developing the people's communes on an ever larger scale.

17. This is precisely what we are doing now.

18. There are those who want no commodity production, but they are wrong. On commodity production we still have to take it from Stalin, who, in turn, got it from Lenin. Lenin had said to devote the fullest energies to developing commerce. We would rather say, devote the fullest energies to developing industry, agriculture, and commerce. The essence of the problem is the peasant question. There are those who regard the peasant as even more conscious than the workers. We have carried through or are in the process of carrying through on these five items. Some areas still have to be developed, such as commune-run industry or concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture.

19. Lenin said the same thing.

20. Commodity production must not be regarded as something sufficient unto itself, something independent of the surrounding economic conditions. Commodity production is older than capitalist production. It existed in slave-owning society, and served it, but did not lead to capitalism. It existed in feudal society and served it, yet, although it prepared some of the conditions for capitalist production, it did not lead to capitalism.

21. Bearing in mind that in our country commodity production is not so boundless and all-embracing as it is under capitalist

22. conditions, being confined within strict bounds thanks to such decisive economic conditions as social ownership of the means of production, the abolition of the system of wage labor, and the elimination of the

23. system of exploitation, why then, one asks, cannot commodity production similarly serve our socialist society for a certain period without leading to capitalism?

20. This statement is a little exaggerated. But it is true that commodity production was not a capitalist institution exclusively.

21. The second plenary session of the Central Committee suggested policies of utilizing, restricting, and transforming (commodity production.)

22. This condition is fully operative in China.

23. This point is entirely correct. We no longer have such circumstances and conditions. There are those who fear commodities. Without exception they fear capitalism, not realizing that with the elimination of capitalists it is allowable to expand commodity production vastly. We are still backward in commodity production, behind Brazil and India. Commodity production is not an isolated thing. Look at the context: capitalism or socialism. In a capitalist context it is capitalist commodity production. In a socialist context it is socialist commodity production. Commodity production has existed since ancient times. Buying and selling began in what history calls the Shang ["commerce"] dynasty. The last king of the Shang dynasty, Chou, was competent in civil and military matters, but he was turned into a villain along with the first emperor of the Ch'in[2] and Ts'ao Ts'ao.[3] This is wrong. "Better to have no books than complete faith in them."[****] In capitalist society there are no socialist institutions considered as social institutions, but the working class and socialist ideology do exist in capitalist society. The thing that determines commodity production is the surrounding economic conditions. The question is, can commodity production be regarded as a useful instrument for furthering socialist production? I think commodity production will serve socialism quite tamely. This can be discussed among the cadres.

24. It is said that, since the domination of social ownership of the means of production has been established in our country, and the system of wage labor and exploitation has been abolished, commodity production has lost all meaning and should therefore be done away with.

24. Change "our country" to "China" and it becomes most intriguing.

25. Today there are two basic forms of socialist production in our country: state, or publicly owned production, and collective farm production, which cannot be said to be publicly owned.

25. “Today” refers to 1952, thirty-five years after their revolution. We stand but nine years from ours.

He refers to two basic forms. In the communes not only land and machinery but labor, seeds, and other means of production as well are commune-owned. Thus the output is so owned. But don’t think the Chinese peasants are so wonderfully advanced. In Hsiuwu county, Honan, the party secretary was concerned whether or not, in the event of flood or famine, the state would pay wages after public ownership was declared and the free supply system instituted. He was also concerned that in times of bumper harvest the state would transfer away public grain but not pay wages either, leaving the peasants to suffer whether the harvest succeeds or fails. This represents the concerns of the peasants. Marxists should be concerned with these problems. Our commodity production should be developed to the fullest, but it is going to take fifteen years or more and patience as well. We have waged war for decades. Now we still have to have patience, to wait for Taiwan’s liberation, to wait for socialist construction to be going well. Don’t hope for early victories!

26. [How the two basic forms of ownership will ultimately become one] is a special question which requires separate discussion.

26. Stalin is avoiding the issue, having failed to find a method or suitable formulation [on the transition from collective to public ownership.]

27. Consequently, *our* commodity production is not of the ordinary type, but is a special kind of commodity production, commodity production without capitalists, which is concerned mainly with the goods of associated socialist producers (the state, the collective farms, the cooperatives), the sphere of action of which is confined to items of personal consumption, which obviously cannot possibly develop into capitalist production, and which, together with its “money economy,” is designed to serve the development and consolidation of socialist production.

27. The “sphere of action” is not limited to items of individual consumption. Some means of production have to be classed as commodities. If agricultural output consists of commodities but industrial output does not, then how is exchange going to be carried out? If “our country” is changed to “China,” the paragraph becomes all the more interesting to read. In China not only consumer goods but agricultural means of production have to be supplied. Stalin never sold means of production to the peasants. Khrushchev changed that.

28. (Chairman Mao commented on page 13 of the original text): Let us not confuse the problem of the dividing line between socialism and communism with the problem of the dividing line between collective and public ownership. The collective ownership system leaves us with the problem of commodity production, the goal of which is consolidating the worker-peasant alliance and developing production. Today there are those who say that the communism of the peasants is glorious. After one trip to the rural areas they think the peasantry is simply wonderful, that they are about to enter paradise, that they are

better than the workers. This is the surface phenomenon. We shall have to see if the peasants really have a communist spirit, and more than that, we shall have to examine the commune ownership system, including the extent to which the means of production and subsistence belong to communal collective ownership. As the county party committee secretary of Hsiuwu, Honan, said, we still have to develop commodity production, and not charge blindly ahead.

29. Further, I think that we must also discard certain other concepts taken from Marx's *Capital* — where Marx was concerned with an analysis of capitalism — and artificially applied to our socialist relations. . . . It is natural that Marx used concepts (categories) which fully corresponded to capitalist relations. But it is strange, to say the

30. least, to use these concepts now, when the working class is not only not bereft of power and means of production, but, on the contrary, is in possession of the power

31. and controls the means of production. Talk of labor power being a commodity, and of "hiring" of workers sounds rather absurd now, under our system, as though the working class, which possesses means of production, hires itself and sells its labor power to itself.

29. In particular, the means of production in the industrial sector.

30. Commodity production has to be vastly developed, not for profits but for the peasantry, the agricultural-industrial alliance, and the development of production.

31. Especially after rectification. After the rectification and anti-rightist campaigns labor power was no longer a commodity. It was in the service of the people, not the dollar. The labor power question is not resolved until labor power is no longer a commodity.

32. It is sometimes asked whether the law of value exists and operates in our country, under the socialist system.

32. The law of value does not have a regulative function. Planning and politics-in-command play that role.

33. True, the law of value has no regulating function in our socialist production.

33. In our society the law of value has no regulative function, that is, has no determinative function. Planning determines production, e.g., for hogs or steel we do not use the law of value; we rely on planning.

Notes

[References given here have been compiled from sources other than the Maoist Documentation Project as well. — *Transcriber, MIA*.]

[1] Mao is here talking about the excessive purchase of grain at the end of 1954 and the consequent rural grain shortages in the spring of 1955. Subsequently, the quota for state purchases was reduced by 7 billion catties and tension in the countryside eased. These occurrences, however, took place in the spring of 1955, not at the end of that year, which was characterized by the continuing high tide of collectivization in China's countryside.

[2] Ch'in Shih Huang Ti (Qin Shi Huangdi), the first emperor, was a king of the state of Ch'in who, between 230 and 221 B.C., conquered the neighboring states and unified China. Under his rule, a feudal system was established, weights and measures and coinage were standardized. The legalist philosophy was the philosophical basis of the Ch'in. The first emperor is remembered for his burning of all non-utilitarian, "subversive" literature in 213 B.C.

[3] Ts'ao Ts'ao (Cao Cao) was a famous general and chancellor of the latter Han dynasty (25-220 A.D.) who played a significant role in the wars which finally toppled the Han and led to the epoch of divided empire called the three kingdoms.

[*] Reply to comrades A. V. Sanina and V. G. Venzher.

[**] These first four paragraphs comment critically on the entire text. There follows a series of comments criticizing specific sections. Before each comment Stalin's original text is given, as translated for *Jen min ch'u pan she*, 3rd ed., January 1938. [This is an obvious misprint; it should be 1958: *Transcriber's note*.] (We used the English edition of Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1972).

[***] Material in brackets added from Stalin's text to clarify the point.

[****] Mencius. Mao seems to mean "Let's not make a stock villain out of commodity production pedantically."

SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume IX

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume IX

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NOTE TO THE READER

We take it as a prevelege in releasing the volume IX of selected works of Mao Tse-Tung on 26.12.1994, the concluding day of Mao centunary celebrated world wide by the practicing Marxixts.

This volume covers the period 1963-71.

These essays cover the background of the great proleteriat cultural revolution of China generally known as socialist education movement (Four cleanups and Five antis). Hence it can be called as the volume of socialist education movement and great cultural revolution.

We request the reader to note that "(Excerpt)" below a title indicates that the document was excerpted from a larger document by the original publishers (source) and wherever the excerpting was done by others, from a larger document presenting more interesting or significant portions of the original, the title is followed by "(Excerpts)". As a rule parentheses ( ) indicates editorial remarks of the editors of those texts (other than the editors of the original source).

We extend our sincere thanks and acknowledgements to all those pioneers who translated, edited and published these works in different forms earlier. We are particularly thankful to KRANTI PUBLICATIONS, Secunderabad, (Andhra Pradesh, India) for permitting us to bring this volume, and the translations of selected works of Mao Tse-Tung in Telugu and other Indian languages.

We whole heartedly extend our thanks to all those comrades the respected scholars and loving friends - whose unstinted cooperation and painstaking efforts contributed in a big way in the success of this venture.

It is our fond hope that our effort will be rewarded by the warm and enthusiastic response of the esteemed readers.

PUBLISHERS

About our publications......

In the year of Mao's birth centunary, we have revised 'Sramika Varga Prachuranalu' and decided to bring out hitherto unpublished writings of Mao in volumes. We wish to publish Mao's volumes, which are not available not only in English and Telugu but also in Hindi, Bengali and all languages and rare Marxist-Leninist literature as and when necessary.

In the context of the developments in East Europe and Socialist Russia, even China adopting the capitalist road, the study of Mao's writings assume greater significance. On the other hand the class struggles in the third world including philippines and peru reinforces the relevence of Mao's thought for the revolutions in the oppressed countries. In India Mao's thought is the guiding red star since the days of Naxalbari and it continues to be.

During the great proletariat cultural revolution a nationwide programme of studying the works of chairman Mao were launched and it was in hightide. Then Mao himself observed :

"The Selected Works of Mao, how much of it is mine! It is a work of blood. The struggle in the soviets was very acute. Because of the errors of the Wang Ming line we had to embark on the 25,000 li Long March. These things in Selected Works of Mao were taught to us by the masses and paid for with blood sacrifices."

How aptly it applies to present time!

Dr. A. Ramanatham, who fought till his last breath for civil liberties and democratic rights, founded "Sramika Varga Prachuranalu" in 1972 in warangal (A.P.) and published some classics and Marxist-Leninist literature in Telugu.

Now after two decades, we resume 'Sramika Varga Prachuranalu' to cherish his martyrdom and to rededicate our selves to the cause of revolution. Hope the readers will receive us with the same revolutionary spirit.

Hyderabad
26.12.1994.

Sramika Varga Prachuranalu

CONTENTS

WHERE DO CORRECT IDEAS COME FROM? 1
INSTRUCTION ON THE COMMUNE EDUCATION MOVEMENT 3
SPEECH AT THE HANGCHOW CONFERENCE 4
OPPOSE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BY U.S. IMPERIALISM 22
STATEMENT OPPOSING AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTHERN VIETNAM AND SLAUGHTER OF ITS PEPOLE BY THE U.S.- NGO DINH DIEM CLICQUE 25
THE RACIAL QUESTION IS A CLASS QUESTION 26
OPERAS 28
COMMENTS ON COMDRADE KO CHING-SHIH'S REPORT 29
THE CENTRE'S INSTRUCTION ON LEARNING FROM EACH OTHER AND OVERCOMING COMPLACENCY AND CONCEIT 30
STRIVE TO LEARN FROM EACH OTHER AND DON'T STICK TO THE BEATEN TRACK AND BE COMPLACENT 37
U.S. IMPERIALISM IS THE MOST FEROCIOUS ENEMY OF THE WORLD'S PEPOLE 40
STATEMENT EXPRESSING THE CHINESE PEPOLE'S SUPPORT FOR THE JAPANESE PEPOLE'S GREAT PATRIOTIC STRUGGLE 42
TALK ON HEALTH SERVICES 44
REMARKS AT THE SPRING FESTIVAL 45
TALK AT THE HANTAN FORUM ON FOUR CLEAN-UPS WORK 65
REMARKS AT A BRIEFING 68
DIRECTIVE ON LABOR REFORM 81
SOME INTERJECTIONS AT A BRIEFING OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION LEADING GROUP 84
INTERJECTION AT A BRIEFING BY FOUR VICE-PREMIERS 86
TALK ON THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN 88
TALK ON PUTTING MILITARY AFFAIRS WORK INTO FULL EFFECT AND CULTIVATING SUCCESSORS TO THE REVOLUTION 92
CONVERSATION WITH ZANZIBAR EXPERT M.M. ALI AND HIS WIFE 99

TALK WITH MAO YUAN-HSIN 112

WE MUST PREVENT CHINA FROM CHANGING COLOUR 120

COMMENT ON REPORT BY COMRADE WANG TUNG-HSING 121

INTERVIEW WITH THE JAPANESE SOCIALISTS ON THE THEORY OF THE INTERMEDIATE ZONE 122

TALK ON QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY 125

TALK ON SAKATA'S ARTICLE 147

INTERJECTIONS AT AN ANTI-REVISIONIST REPORTS MEETING 154

AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IS CLOSELY SURROUNDED BY THE PEPOLES OF THE WORLD 156

CHINA WILL TAKE A GAINT STRIDE FORWARD 158

HIGHLIGHTS OF FORUM ON CENTRAL COMMITTE WORK 159

INTERJECTIONS AT A CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE 184

SPEECH AT THE CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE 187

WHY THE "FIRST TEN ARTICLES" AND "SIXTY ARTICLES" CAN MOBILIZE MANPOWER 194

ON EDUCATION-CONVERSATION WITH THE NEPALESE DELEGATION OF EDUCATIONISTS 196

INSTRUCTIONS 199

TALK ON THE FOUR CLEAN-UPS MOVEMENT 201

DIRECTIVES AFTER HEARING THE REPORTS OF KU MU AND YU CHIU-LI ON PLANNING WORK 212

YOU FIGHT YOUR WAY AND I'LL FIGHT MY WAY- A CONVERSATION WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION DELEGATION 214

DIRECTIVE ON PUBLIC HEALTH 216

NOTES ON THE REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEKING TEACHERS TRAINING COLLEGE 218

LETTER TO COMRADE CHEN YI DISCUSSING POETRY 220

SPEECH AT HANGCHOW 223

TALK AT THE NATIONAL WORK CONFERENCE OF THE POLITBURO 232

COMMENT ON THE ARTICLE- "HOW TO PLAY TABLE TENNIS" BY COMRADE HSU YIN-SHENG 232

NOTES ON COMRADE CHEN CHENG-JEN'S REPORT ON HIS "SQUATTING POINT" 233

TALK AT A WORK CONFERENCE OF THE CENTER 234

BROADCASTING 234

INTERVIEW WITH ANDRE MALRAUX 235

TALK WITH MAO YUAN-HSIN 238

DOWN WITH THE PRINCE OF HELL, LIBERATE THE LITTLE DEVIL - A TALK WITH SUCH COMRADES AS KANG SHENG 242

LETTER ON FARM MECHANIZATION 251

TALK AT ENLARGED STANDING COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU 254

TALK AT ENLARGED MEETING OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU 256

CRITICIZE P'ENG CHEN 265

NOTES ON THE REPORT OF FURTHER IMPROVING THE ARMY'S AGRICULTURAL WORK BY THE REAR SERVICE DEPARTMENT OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION 266

TALK TO THE LEADERS OF THE CENTRE 268

SPEECH AT A MEETING WITH REGIONAL SECRETARIES AND MEMBERS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTIONARY GROUP OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 271

A LETTER TO THE RED GUARDS OF TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY MIDDLE SCHOOL 276

THE ANTI-JAPANESE MILITARY AND POLITICAL UNIVERSITY 277

INTERJECTION AT ENLARGED MEETING OF CCPCC STANDING COMMITTEE 278

BOMBARD THE HEAD-QUARTERS -- MY FRIST BIG-CHARACTER POSTER 280

SPEECH AT THE CLOSING CEREMONY OF THE ELEVENTH PLENUM OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE 281

TALK AT THE WORK COFERENCE OF THE CENTRE 292

LETTER 294

TALK AT THE GENARAL REPORT CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRE'S POLITICAL WORK 295

TALK AT THE REPORT MEETING 298
THE SOVIET LEADING CLIQUE IS A MERE DUST HEAP 306
TALK AT THE CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE 309
TALK AT A MEETING OF THE CENTRAL CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP 314
TALK AT THE ENLARGED MEETING OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION 326
TALK AT THREE MEETINGS WITH COMRADES CHANG CHUN-CHIAO AND YAO WEN-YUAN 328
SPEECH TO THE ALBANIAN MILITARY DELEGATION 338
DIRECTIVE ON EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA WORK 345
DIALOGUES DURING INSPECTION OF NORTH, CENTRAL-SOUTH AND EAST CHINA 346
LETTER TO LIN, CHOU, AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE
CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP 352
THE DAYS OF THE U.S. AGGRESSORS IN VIETNAM ARE NUMBERED 353
CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER CHOU ON POWER STRUGGLE 355
A NEW STROM AGAINST IMPERIALISM 357
DIALOUGES WITH RESPONSIBLE PERSONS OF CAPITAL RED GUARDS CONGRESS 359
ADDRESS AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE NINTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 394
TALK AT THE FRIST PLENUM OF THE NINTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 397
DIRECTIVES REGRADING CULTURAL REVOLUTION 405
TWENTY MANIFESTATIONS OF BUREAUCRACY 429
PEOPLE OF THE WORLD, UNITE AND DEFEAT THE U.S. AGGRESSORS AND ALL THEIR RUNNING DOGS 433
CONVERSATIONS WITH WANG HAI-JUNG 435
TALKS WITH RESPONSIBLE COMRADES AT VARIOUS PLACES DURING PROVINCIAL TOUR 441
APPENDIX:- "SOUTH OF THE MOUNTAINS TO NORTH OF THE SEAS" - INTERVIEW WITH EDGAR SNOW 453

WHERE DO CORRECT IDEAS COME FROM?

May 1963

Where do correct ideas come from? Do they drop from the skies? No. Are they innate in the mind? No. They come from social practice, and from it alone; they come from three kinds of social practice, the struggle for production, the class struggle and scientific experiment. It is man's social being that determines his thinking. Once the correct ideas characteristic of the advanced class are grasped by the masses, these ideas turn into a material force which changes society and changes the world. In their social practice, men engage in various kinds of struggle and gain rich experience, both from their successes and from their failures. Countless phenomena of the objective external world are reflected in a man's brain through his five sense organs–the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. At first, knowledge is perceptual. The leap to conceptual knowledge, i.e., to ideas, occurs when sufficient perceptual knowledge is accumulated. This is one process in cognition. It is the first stage in the whole process of cognition, the stage leading from objective matter to subjective consciousness from existence to ideas. Whether or not one's consciousness or ideas (including theories, policies, plans or measures) do correctly reflect the laws of the objective external world is not yet proved at this stage, in which it is not yet possible to ascertain whether they are correct or not. Then comes the second stage in the process of cognition, the stage leading from

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This passage is from the "Draft Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Certain Problems in Our Present Rural Work", which was drawn up under the direction of Comrade Mao Tse–tung. The passage was written by Comrade Mao Tse–tung himself.

consciousness back to matter, from ideas back to existence, in which the knowledge gained in the first stage is applied in social practice to ascertain whether the theories, policies, plans or measures meet with the anticipated success. Generally speaking, those that succeed are correct and those that fail are incorrect, and this is especially true of man's struggle with nature. In social struggle, the forces representing the advanced class sometimes suffer defeat not because their ideas are incorrect but because, in the balance of forces engaged in struggle, they are not as powerful for the time being as the forces of reaction; they are therefore temporarily defeated, but they are bound to triumph sooner or later. Man's knowledge makes another leap through the test of practice. This leap is more important than the previous one. For it is this leap alone that can prove the correctness or incorrectness of the first leap in cognition, i.e., of the ideas, theories, policies, plans or measures formulated in the course of reflecting the objective external world. There is no other way of testing truth. Furthermore, the one and only purpose of the proletariat in knowing the world is to change it. Often, correct knowledge can be arrived at only after many repetitions of the process leading from matter to consciousness and then back to matter, that is, leading from practice to knowledge and then back to practice. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge, the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge. Among our comrades there are many who do not yet understand this theory of knowledge. When asked the sources of their ideas, opinions, policies, methods, plans and conclusions, eloquent speeches and long articles they consider the questions strange and cannot answer it. Nor do they comprehend that matter, can be transformed into consciousness and consciousness into matter, although such leaps are phenomena of everyday life. It is therefore necessary to educate our comrades in the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, so that they can orientate their thinking correctly, become good at investigation and study and at summing up experience, overcome difficulties, commit fewer mistakes, do their work better, and struggle hard so as to build China into a great and powerful socialist country and help the broad masses of the oppressed and exploited throughout the world in fulfillment of our great internationalist duty.

INSTRUCTION ON THE COMMUNE EDUCATION MOVEMENT

May 1963

First of all read the 20 materials in order to inspire discussion by everybody; first of all read these for three days. The various central bureaus and the provincial meetings should also be like this. You should not transmit central committee documents having only a framework. Don't be hasty. In any case prepare to handle it for a year, two years, and if in two years it hasn't been handled to completion then handle it for three years. This kind of big movement needs time, don't be hasty.

This revolutionary movement is the first great struggle since land reform[1]. There has not been this sort of scope, breadth, or pervasiveness for several years. This time it is from within the Party to the outside, from the top to the bottom. The 3-evils and 5-evils campaigns were handled in the cities[2], the anti-rightist campaign in 1957 was carried out on the ideological line, and the anti-Kao, anti-Jao campaign[3] was waged within the Party. This kind of class struggle involving all, both within the Party and outside the Party, has not been waged for over ten years. This time it is from within the party to outside the Party, from top to bottom, and from the cadres to the masses. This kind of understanding is beneficial. This is the first great struggle since land reform. First of all we must train the cadres at the county level and above, retrain the cadres at the production brigade level and above, and train the cadres in production teams[4] and the positive elements among the poor and lower-middle peasants.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

In areas where there are no ants we must not insist on going to find ants. For example, there was one category of communes and brigades which in the past advanced class struggle and advanced socialist education by initiating a movement to "by all means you must go and find landlords and rich peasants, there must be no exceptions"; this is also bad.

Among the people there are many contradictions of practically every kind, big and small. The Honan materials speak of a party branch which is very good; other material states the after a certain commune party branch underwent cleansing, there were only two persons who truly had not been reformed. You cannot say that this branch is bad, it was still better than 95 percent. Looking at our cadre today there are those who have not reformed, but we cannot say the number is very large. There are a few who are not at all tainted with extravagance and waste, with the idea of eating more and enjoying more benefits; the majority is imbued with this. The cleansing method of handling is very good! During this 'four clean-ups' and '5–anti campaign'[5] everybody sweated a little and took a steam bath. Only when you are relaxed and happy can you lightly make ready for the front and unite against the enemy. Why can you unite against the enemy when you are relaxed and happy? When our bodies are dirty we have no strength, but after we became clean we are able to unite against the enemy. There are some cadres who eat more and take more advantages, and there are some who illicitly cohabit with the daughters of landlords and rich peasants. If you are not clean you are unable to face the enemy. There are some persons who are very energetic in struggling against the enemy but who are not very positive and are hesitant about confronting contradictions among the people.

In resolving contradictions among the people, eating more and taking more advantages may be resolved by merely running out yourself and returning the bribes; having done this you will no longer be considered a corrupt element. In the future, organizations, factories, and enterprises can also handle things in this manner. Announce on the spot that they will not be considered corrupt elements and that their names will not be publicized. In the Northeast Bureau there were several who were corrupted by 100 or 200 yuan. They spoke out themselves. A meeting was convened and they were not regarded as corrupt. In handling cases where the corruption is great, meaning over 10,000 yuan, if the person himself handles the matter and returns the money, the punishment may be mild. There must be both strictness and a policy. There must certainly be the four clean-ups and the five antis; without the antis it won't do. We certainly must handle the matter clearly. Not returning the bribes and the plunder won't do. But we must return in accord with the situation and in accord with reason. When there is a case of eating more and enjoying more benefits, we don't want to refund with excessive humiliation; it would be bad to make it impossible for the cadre to continue to make a living. There are those who have already eaten or used what they took. In such cases educate them to undergo examination by the masses and return a portion and participate in labor. In this way the masses will not be able to demand again that there be a return and there will be a return by stages and by groups so that it will be possible to continue to make a living. It is also possible to adopt the method of self-assessment and public discussion, but this policy is complicated. One perceives himself as good.

In the course of this campaign those requiring criticism and those requiring removal from positions constitute a minority. Those requiring punishment are also a minority. Those cadres needing punishment possibly do not constitute even one percent. We don't want too many. We must instead do more education work and strengthen leadership over the campaign. Sometimes we need to rely on the broad masses of cadres of the communes and brigades of various regions. Those who have gone to the top should not monopolize all undertakings but should mobilize the broad masses of cadres and should rely on the broad masses of cadres to handle it. When we use this sort of method – the method of self- education and the method of mobilizing the broad masses of cadres – the resulting strength is great.

One resolutely grasps the campaign, and one is afraid of stirring up trouble.

(Comrade X X says: I understand the Chairman's mood – first of all handle, and second handle well. When we regularly reflect the situation to the Chairman and receive instructions from the Chairman, we must not create Trouble.)

In the three great revolutionary struggles it won't do if we don't grasp well; we must grasp well.

Pay attention to summing up experience. Return to the central bureaus and hold ten days of meetings, handle a month of work. In

July hold a central bureau meetings to sum up experience, handle the situation for a whole, and then at the end of July and in August the central committee will convene a meeting. Besides this, you must still handle other things.

Only with strong leadership is it possible to mobilize a campaign, by stages and by groups, to criticize and handle without being considered backward. This campaign must raise high the self-awareness of various regions. The central bureau, province, municipality, and country persons must go down and campaign together.

The four clean-ups campaign has been waged, but class struggle is still unpolished. We must enhance self-awareness; we must loyally and sincerely help the communes and brigades handle work well, help the cadres bathe in warm water, and help handle well the four clean-ups. Except for those cases where it would be impractical, in cases which are rotten, which are degenerate and cannot be helped, or which are too decayed, we must send a work team to handle it in their stead; otherwise we must honestly and sincerely help them to handle their work.

I am not clear as to how you have been approaching cadres. Now it seems that you must educate cadres by persuasion, and you must expecially employ concrete evidence to educate by persuasion. You can speak according to reason and say that something is so or you can take concrete evidence and speak; there is concrete evidence of class struggle. The concrete evidence of Hsi-Yang County, Chekiang's participation in labor, and the four good documents are concrete evidence. Examine for a while whether or not we have spoken more according to reason and spoken comparatively less according to evidence.

Have you had an opportunity to go to a region and handle affairs for ten days or so? (We said no.) Have you gone down to see whether or not the cadres are very anxious? Once familiar one is not so anxious. Respect people more, don't find fault; the "three don't" are correct. We must link up with the cadres, we must wash our hands and bathe, and we must grasp for a while.

This campaign must manifest killing without leaving any traces.

Mobilizing the masses to handle the four clean-ups is a serious matter. The Hopeh experience shows that some public security organs were perplexed in handling the mobilization of the masses in the four

clean-ups. Some people said that the public security department handles class struggle while the control commission handles problems among the people. Of course we must handle, but besides this we still must thoroughly mobilize the masses and rely on the masses.

Once the program is grasped this campaign is easy to manage. Handle it by groups and by stages, handle the second and the third groups and don't think that there is no honor; there is still honor.

(The mass opinion: there are places where we have gone on the spot and the rain has moistened our skin.) After going on the spot then handle some more, just don't harm people, don't act as though it is enemy against enemy, no...

(Everybody's opinion: If the rascals don't come out, it won't do. Does the Chairman agree with our viewpoint? On the 19th there were people murdered at the big building. In Heilungkiang a landlord-rich peasant element killed 38 people and last year 13 counterrevolutionaries were executed and buried. In Shanghai a man was killed, he was hanged in a lavatory. But he had been long absent from home, a "transient gentleman." Speaking correctly, he wanted to redress a grievance; there was basically no question of struggling against him, so he died.)

We must resolutely conduct education by persuasion, undertake experiments on-the-spot by groups and by stages, draw a clear line of demarcation, and unite more than 95 percent of the masses and cadres. When there is a strong leadership, it is only necessary to handle things well and few troublemakers will emerge.

Don't fight an unprepared war. If materials haven't been prepared and the troops haven't been trained well, don't go and handle it. This war is a nationwide revolutionary movement and we must make war as we did during the War of Liberation, during the Liao-Shen campaign, and during the Chinchou, Huai-Hai, and crossing the Yangtze campaigns[6]. We don't want to fight a great battle of 100 regiments[7], we don't want to use the method of fighting employed during the southern Anhwei incident[8].

Secondly, during the War of Liberation several campaigns achieved a nationwide victory. In this war if we fight it well there will be a nationwide revolutionary victory, and there will be an even greater contribution to world revolution.

NOTES

1. A reference to the land reform movement that was conducted during the period from October 1947 to the last quarter of 1952.

2. The Struggle against the "three evils" refers to the struggle against corruption, waste and bureaucracy unfolded in the government, army, schools and state-owned enterprises. The struggle against the "five evils" was waged in the private industrial and commercial units to oppose those capitalists who violated the law by bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing economic information. The former began towards the end of 1951 and the latter, early the next year, both coming to a close in October 1952. As a revolutionary mass movement, this struggle repulsed the attack against the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, strengthened the ties between the People's Government and the people, improved the style of work and brought a change in social customs and habits. It also created favourable conditions for the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce and contributed much to consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country.

3. Kao Kang (1905-1954) was one of the earliest CPC members in Shensi Province and played a key role in developing the Shensi–Kansu–Ningsia Border Region, which served as a base of operations after the Long March in 1935. Kao became the senior CPC official in Manchuria in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1952 he was a Political Bureau member and the chairman of the State Planning commission.

Jao Shushi (1903-?) was the political commissar of the New Fourth Army in 1943; the first Party secretary of the CPC East China Bureau and the Shanghai Municipal Committee in 1951 and,in 1952. the director of the CPC's Organizational Department.

Kao and Jao formed an anti Party clique at the National Conference on Finance and Economic Work in the summer of 1953 and at the Conference on Organizational Work of the Central Committee in September 1953. This cliqu inflated the role of Kao Kang in the Northeast, advocated the appointment of Guo Feng, a protege of Kao Kang, to the directorship of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, and circulated a membership list of the Political Bureau, secretly made up by An Ziwen, in an attempt to control the Political Bureau. Furthermore. They were lobbying for Kao to become first Party secretary, vice-chairman of the PRC, and premier of the State Council when Mao was on inspection tours outside the capital. The two had instigated a group of people to write a joint letter asking Mao to relinquish power. Both were expelled from the Party in 1955.

4. There were three levels of collective ownership in the Chinese countryside. The smallest unit the production team, usually consists of between fifteen and thirty-five families. The team is the basic ownership and production unit, owning the land it works, a number of draught animals, and small agricultural tools such as threshers and crushers. The next unit, the production brigade, is made up of from five to fifteen teams. The brigade owns larger means of production too expensive for the team to buy and too large for them to use effectively, such as tractors and irrigation equipment. The brigade also takes care of tasks, such as hill terracing, for which the team is too small. The commune, with a population from several thousand to some fifty thousand is composed of ten to thirty brigades. In addition to providing over all coordination among the brigades, the communes own and run large industrial enterprises and projects too large for the brigade to handle, such as large water conservancy projects.

5. The 'Socialist Education Movement', launched by comrade Mao after the Tenth Plenum in the autumn of 1962, was known as the 'four clean-ups' in the countryside, and as the 'five antis'(wu-fan) in the cities. The four clean-ups were: socialist rectification in the fields of politics, ideology, organization, and economy.

6. The Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was a gigantic campaign fought by the Northeast People's Liberation Army in the western part of Liaoning province and in the Shenyang-Changchun area between September 12 and November 2, 1948. On the eve of the campaign, the total strength of the Kuomintang forces in northeastern China consisted of 4 armies, made up of 14 corps, or 44 divisions. These forces had shortened their lines and dug themselves in at three sectors isolated from each other, Changchun, Shenyang and Chinchow. With the aim of completely wiping out the enemy troops in the Northeast and quickly liberating the whole of the Northeast, the People's Liberation Army in this region, supported by the broad masses of the local people, began the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign in September 1948 with a main force of 12 columns, 1 artillery column and regional armed forces, altogether totalling 53 divisions or over 7,00,000 men. Chinchow, on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, was the strategic link between northeastern and northern China. The enemy forces garrisoning the Chinchow sector consisted of 8 divisions, with more than 1,00,000 men under Fan Han-chich, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang's Northeast "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters. The capture of Chinchow was the key to the success of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign. Acting on the directives of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Northeast People's Liberation Army used 1 column and 7 independent divisions to continue the siege operations against Changchun; 6 coloumns, 1 artillery column and 1 tank battalion to surround and attack Chinchow: and 2 columns, placed in the Táshan-Kaochiao sector south-west of Chinchow, along with 3 columns in the Heishan-Tahushan-Changwu sector to intercept any reinforcements the enemy might send from Chinhsi and Hulutao and

from Shenyang to relieve Chinchow. The fighting in the Chinchow area started on September 12. Just as our army was mopping up the enemy in the outskirts of Chinchow, after taking Ihsien, Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly flew to the Northeast to take personal charge of the operations and urgently summoned 5 enemy divisions from the Northern China "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters on the Peiping Liaoning Railway and 2 divisions from Shantung Province to join the 4 divisions in Chinhsi; all these 11 divisions began a furious attack on our positions at Tashan on October 10 but could not break through. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang 9th Army under Liao Yao-hsiang, with 11 divisions and 3 cavalry brigades, which had sallied out from Shenyang to rescue Chinchow, was intercepted by our army northeast of Heishan and Tahushan. Our army began the assault on Chinchow on October 14 and, after thirty-one hours of fierce fighting, completely wiped out the defending enemy forces, capturing Fan Han-chieh, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the North east "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, Lu Chun-chuan, Commander of the 6th Army, and more than 1,00,000 men under their command. The liberation of Chinchow impelled part of the enemy forces at Changchun to revolt against the Kuomintang and the rest to surrender. The complete collapse of the Kuomintang troops is the Northeast then became a foregone conclusion. But Chiang Kai-shek, still dreaming of recapturing Chinchow and of reopening the line of communications between northeastern and northern China, gave strict orders to the army under Liao Yao-hsiang to continue its advance towards Chinchow. After taking Chinchow, the People's Liberation Army immediately swung back to the northeast and closed in on Liao's Army from the north and south of Heishan and Tahushan. On October 26 the People's Liberation Army succeeded in surrounding the enemy in the Heishan. Tahushan-Esinmin sector and, after stiff fighting lasting two days and one night completely wiped them out, capturing army commander Liao Yao-hsiang, corps commanders, Li Tao, Pai Feng-wu and Cheng Ting-chi, and more than 1,00,000 men. Our army vigorously followed up this victory and liberated Shenyang and Yingkow on November 2, wiping out over 1,49,000 enemy troops. The whole of the Northeast was thus liberated. A total of more than 4,70,000 enemy troops were wiped out in the campaign.

The Huai-Hai campaign was a campaign of decisive importance fought by the people's Liberation Army over a large territory in Kiangsu, Shantung, Anhwei and Honan Provinces, centring on Hsuchow, and extending as far as Haichow in the east, Shangchiu in the west, Lincheng (now renamed Hsuehcheng)in the north and the Huai River in the South. The Kuomintang forces massed in this theatre of war consisted of 5 armies and the troops of three Pacification Zones – the 4 armies and the troops of three Pacification Zones under Liu Chih and Tu Yu-ming (respectively Commander and Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters at Hsuchow) and the army under Huang Wei, which was later dispatched there from central China as reinforcements. On the side of the People's Liberation Army, a force more than 6,00,000 strong took part in the campaign – it included 16 columns from the Eastern China Field Army, 7 columns from the Central Plains Field Army and regional armed forces from the Eastern China Military Area, the Central Plains Military Area and the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Military Area (then a part of the Northern China Military Area). The campaign lasted sixty five days, from November 6, 1948 to January 10,1949; 22 corps, or 56 divisions, of the Kuomintang's crack forces, comprising 5,55,000 men, were completely wiped out (including 41/2 divisions which revolted and came over), and 2 armies under Liu Ju-ming and Li Yen-nien (reinforcements from Nanking) were repulsed. As a result of the campaign, those parts of the eastern China and Central Plains areas north of the Yangtse River were almost entirely liberated. The campaign took place in three stages. During the first stage. November 6-22, the Eastern China Field Army, in co-ordination with the Central Plains Field Army, surrounded and wiped out the army under Huang Po-tao in the Hsinanchen-Nienchuang sector east of Hsuchow, killing Huang Po-tao and liberating large territories on both sides of the Hsuchow-Pengpu section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, and to the west and north of Hsuchow. In the Taierhchuang-Tsaochuang sector, 31/2 divisions of the Kuomintang 3rd Pacification Zone, totalling over 23,000 men, revolted and came over to us. During the second stage, from November 23 to December 15, the Central Plains Field Army, surrounded and wiped out the army under Huang Wei and Wu Shao-chou, the commander and deputy commander of the army; 1 division of this army revolted and came over to us. At the same time, our forces wiped out the army under Sun Yuan-liang which was fleeing west from Hsuchow. Only Sun Yuan-liang managed to escape. During the third stage, from January 6 to 10, 1949, the Eastern China Field Army, in co-ordination with the Central Plains Field Army, surrounded and annihilated in the Chinglungchi-Chenkuanchuang sector, northeast of Yungcheng, 2 Kuomintang armies which were fleeing westward from Hsuchow and were commanded respectively by Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi, under the personal command of Tu Yu-ming. Tu Yu-ming was captured, Chiu Ching-chuan was killed and Li Mi barely escaped. This marked the successful end of the great Huai-Hai campaign.

After the reactionary Kuomintang government refused to sign the Agreement on Internal Peace, the People's Liberation Army acted on the order issued by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Commander-in- Chief Chu Teh and embarked upon a general advance, unprecedented in scale, into the vast areas which had not yet been liberated. On the morning of April 21, 1949, the Second Field Army led by

Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and other comrades, forced the Yangtse River on a front extending more than five hundred kilometres from Hukou (northeast of Kiukiang)in the west to Kiangyin in the east and completely destroyed the defence line along the Yangtse which the enemy had painstakingly built in three and a half months. On April 23 these forces liberated Nanking, which had been the centre of the counter-revolutionary rule of the Kuomintang regime. Then they thrust south along separate routes, liberated Hangchow on May 3 and Nanchang on May 22 and captured Shanghai, China's biggest city, on May 27. In June they began their march into Fukien Province; they liberated Foochow on August 17 and Amoy on October 17. On May 14 the Fourth Field Army led by Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan and other comrades forced the Yangtse on a front of more than one hundred kilometres in the Tuanfeng-Wuhsueh sector east of Wuhan. On May 16 and 17 it liberated Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow, cities of strategic importance in central China. Then it marched south into Hunan. Cheng Chien, Kuomintang governor of Hunan Province, and Chen Ming-jen, Commander of the 1st Army, renounced their allegiance to the Kuomintang on August 4, and Hunan Province was peacefully liberated. The Fourth Field Army fought the Hengyang-Paoching campaign in September and October, wiped out the main force of the Kuomintang troops under Pai Chung-hsi and then pushed on to Kwangsi Provinces. It liberated Canton on October 14, Kweilin on November 22 and Nanning on December 4. While the Second and Third Field Armies were forcing the Yangtse River, the armies in northern China led by Nieh Jung-chen, Hsu Hsiang-chien and other comrades captured Taiyuan on April 24, 1949. The First Field Army led by Peng Teh- huai, Ho Lung and other comrades, after liberating Sian on May 20, continued its march into the Kuomintang areas in the Northwest together with two armies from northern China. They captured Lanchow on August 26, liberated Sining on September 5 and Yinchuan on September 23 and completely annihilated the Kuomintang troops under Ma Pu-fang and Ma Hung-Kuei. Late in September Tao Chih-yueh, Kuomintang Garrison Commander-in-Chief of Sinkiang Province, and Burhan, the governor, renounced their allegiance to the Kuomintang, and Sinkiang was peacefully liberated. At the beginning of November the Second Field Army led by Liu Po-cheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and other comrades, together with the 18th Army of the Northern China Field Army and part of the First Field Army led by Ho Lung, Li Ching-Chuan and other comrades, began their march into southwestern China. They liberated Kweiyang on November 13 and Chungking on November 30. On December 9 Lu Han, Kuomintang governor of Yunnan Province, Liu Wen-hui, Kuomintang governor of Sikang Province, and Teng Hsi-hou and Pan Wen-hua, deputy directors of the Kuomintang Bureau of Military and Administrative Affairs in the Southwest, renounced their allegiance to the Kuomintang, and the two provinces of Yunnan and Sikang were peacefully liberated. In late December the People's Liberation Army which had entered the Southwest fought the Chengtu campaign, completely wiped out the Kuomintang troops under Hu Tsung-nan and liberated Chengtu on December 27. By the end of December 1949 the People's Liberation Army had wiped out all the Kuomintang troops on China's mainland and liberated the entire mainland except Tibet. For comrade Mao's directives for these campaigns see "Concept of Operations for the Liaohsi-Snenyung Campaign", "The Concept of Operations for the Huai-Hui Campaign" "Order to the Army for the Country- wide, Advance", Selected works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume IV, pp 261-266, 279-282, 387-396.

7. The 'Hundred Regiments Offensive' launched by P'eng Te- huai in August 1940 inflicted very extensive damage on the Japanese forces, but provoked a reaction which ultimately inflicted very heavy damages on the PLA. Peng launched this campaign without consulting comrade Mao.

8. In January 1941, as demanded by Chiang Kai-shek, the Headquarters of the New Fourth Army led by the Communist Party of China and the units under the direct command of this headquarters moved north from southern Anhwei Province to cross the Yangtse River. While on the march they were encircled and ambushed by Chiang Kai-shek's troops and lost more than 9,000, killed, wounded and captured. Subsequently Chiang Kai-shek's announced the cancellation of the designation of the New Fourth Army and ordered attacks against its other units. The event was called the Southern Anhwei Incident.

SPEECH AT THE HANGCHOW CONFERENCE

May 1963

(Based on discussions held on 7, 8, and 11 May; the following is a condensed summation of the four great problems.)

(1) The problem of the state of affairs. The condition of production is better and better each year. The state of class struggle is grave and sharp. (Following are examples of the situation of class struggle in the countryside.) Why has such a grave situation appeared in the countryside? There are three reasons: a class reason, a historical reason, and the reason of understanding.

The class reason. The main reason is that the socialist society still is a class society with classes and class struggle existing. Correctly understanding and handling class contradictions and class struggle, correctly handling the contradictions between the enemy and us and the contradictions among the people are the guarantees of leading and uniting the whole party, leading and uniting all the masses, and smoothly advancing socialist revolution and socialist construction.

The historical reason. On one hand there are regions where the task of democratic revolution has still not been completed. There are areas where feudal landlords have not been overturned. This is a problem of renewed revolution. On the other hand there is the reason of the history of work. After land reform we did not handle class struggle again. We handled for a while the 3-evils, the 5-evils, and the anti-rightist struggle of 1957, but we didn't use this sort of method. After 1932 the Soviet Union waged two purges in 1937 and 1938. Following these 16 years passed in which there was no class struggle.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

Their collectivization relied upon whom? If class struggle is not waged, the dictatorship of the proletariat has no reliable social foundation.

The North China Bureau organs handled the 5-anti campaign well. One can say that it is a "*Ch'ing-shui* [Clear Water] *Yamen*," but after purging, it purged again and many special cases arose.

The reason of understanding: class struggle objectively exists, but it is not understood. How should class struggle be led?

(2) The problem of understanding. After the Tenth Plenum[1], [they] ran to 11 provinces, and only Tzu-hou and Yen-ch'un talked fluently and unceasingly about socialist education while the others did not speak. After the February meeting the situation again changed. For five months Honan had not grasped class struggle, but after the February meeting it grasped it very well. There was a change, but it was not an all-encompassing one. There were some regional committee secretaries who after the February meeting did not understand thoroughly, and only after going down to conduct on the spot experiments did they understand thoroughly.

I looked at Hunan's second material. Only now do I understand a little, and that is that there is a two-road struggle between planning and production management.

I have asked a good many people where thought comes from. All were unable to respond. It is a common phenomenon of life that the material changes the mental and the mental changes the material. Illiterate peasants even understand this point. For example, you ask a peasant if he knows that Chang San is a landlord who oppresses us. Once you have the concept of "Chang San" and "landlord," one can reason out: a landlord is a person who oppresses people. The peasants' understanding is derived from life, and an illiterate can also understand philosophy. Genghis'khan was an illiterate.

A single word may rejuvenate a country, a single word may bring disaster to country. This is the mental changing the material. Marx is one word which says there must be proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship; isn't this a case of a single word rejuvenating? Khrushchev is also one word, one which does not want class struggle and does not want revolution. Isn't this a case of a single word bringing disaster?

Philosophy must be discussed in the course of practical work, it must be discussed at meetings. You must tell your comrade by your side that philosophy is not at all difficult. Military studies are also not difficult. Among the marshals and generals of our people's Liberation Army only a few like Lin piao and Liu po- ch'eng arose from military academies[2]. Turning the pages of a book on military studies and reading the history of European wars are not relevant to the Chinese situation. It wasn't the Whampoa Academy "foreigners" who defeated the "locals," but rather the "locals" who defeated the "foreigners." Comrade Lin Piao was enrolled at the Whampoa Academy for half a year... when he was sent out to command a company he was basically unable to fight. He had to listen to his squad leaders and fight according to how they said to fight. Military affairs are learned from practice. Therefore we must not look at Marxism as something so mysterious, nor must we regard philosophy as so mysterious. I looked at a portion of Hsueh-feng's diary and this person understood a little philosophy.

If university students study for five years, can they learn philosophy well? I don't believe it. A good many philosophers did not study in universities. Of China's philosophers, including Wang Ch'ung, Fan Chen, Fu Hsuan, Liu Tsung-yuan, Wang Ch'uan- shan, Li Chih, Tai Tung-Yuan, and Wei Yuan, none were specialists in philosophy. Hegel also was not a specialist in philosophy and his learning was very profound. Kant was an astronomer, and his theory of heavenly bodies is still valuable today. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin also were not specialists in philosophy.

Philosophy comes out of the mounts and valleys. A report as good as Ling-ling's did not emerge in Hsiang-t'an nor did it emerge in Ch'ang-te, it emerged in Ling-ling. Philosophy is only able to emerge amidst adversity and struggle. Philosophy arises from an adverse situation. Is philosophy able to arise from a propitious situation? Huang Kai-hsiung of the Three Kingdoms was a man of Ling-ling; Ch'eng I and Ch'eng Hao's teacher Chou Lien-hsi, a great legalists of the Sung Dynasty and of the same school as Chus Hsi, were also men of Ling-ling – from Tao-hsien of the Ling-ling special district. Chang Tsai was from age 30 to age 40 in Ling-ling. At that time it was named Yung-chou. His article on landscapes and his article on debates with Han-Yu were written there.

Therefore we must smash superstition. However, we must pay attention so that we don't act as we did during the past few years, smashing even that which shouldn't be smashed.

A thing has both an apperance and an essence; we must penetrate the superficial to see the essence. The superficial and the essence are the unity of opposites. The essence cannot be seen, so we must penerate the superficial and grasp the essence. For example, if cadres do not participate in labor this will certainly give rise to revisionism. To cite another example, when we ordinarily walk along the road we do not see the ants and when we take great strides we see even less. We must squat down, and only then can we see many things. Otherwise it is not only the fresh sprouting things which we cannot see, it is also the majority of ordinary, existing things which we don't see. For example, class struggle and cadres not participting in labor exist in large quantities, but there are people who nonetheless cannot see this. We must employ the scientific method and advance investigation and study. Some people subjectively and boldly hypothesisze, subjectively and cautiouly seek evidence. In Hopeh various regional party committees went down to investigate and study; only the Pao-ting area party committee was scientific; the others were all subjective. At first the Pao-ting area party committee did not go down to handle the four clean-ups; it went down to handle distribution. The masses did not agree and raised the handling of the four clean-ups. When the Pao-ting area party committee heard the opinion of the masses, it changed its plan and handled the four clean-ups. This then is genuine investigation and study.

In discussing philosophy we shouldn't exceed one hour. Finish discussing it within one-half hour, if we discuss more we become muddled.

At the Moscow Conference I discussed philosophy and the Moscow Declaration[3] incorporated it but within the country no one discussed it.

(3) Main points.

What are the main points of the campaign? There are ten problems. Among these a portion are problems of understanding which require resolution by high-ranking leading cadres and by leading cadres. There are also some problems which can be resolved in ordinary work. In the course of ordinary work there are the following five main points:

(a) Class and class struggle. What methods should be employed to advance class struggle? We certainly must use the class viewpoint to analyze problems. The first to write the four great families was Ts'ao

Hsueh-ch'in *(Dream of the Red Chamber)*,[4] who wrote the four great families of Chia, Chih, Wang, and Pi. They were slavelords numbering 32 persons. Writing of slaves like Yuan-yang, Ch'ing-sha, Hsiao-hung, and so on is very good; these were the persons who were harmed. Lin Tai-Yu did not belong to the four great families.

(b) Socialist education. There are two great methods of socialist education: the first is to take the spirit of the central committee and meet with the cadres and masses, discuss and understand clearly, link up with the concrete actions, concrete work, and concrete actuality of the region, and allow the masses to open the lid.

The second is to urge the older generation to recollect again the history of oppression and exploitation, inspire a class sentiment,urge the younger generation to recognize that the fruits of the revolutionary struggle were not easy to acquire, and made them read the family history of the proletarian class.

(c) Rely on the poor and lower-middle peasants. For 10,000 years there has been the question of whom to rely on. In the future there will still be idealism and materialism, the advanced and the backward, and contradictions between the left, the center, and the right. Who should we rely on today? There must always be a class. Rely on the whole people? To say rely on the whole people actually is to rely on a minority of the people. Some people say the landlords and rich peasants are obedient, the middle peasants are troublesome, and the poor peasants are muddled. How can the landlords and rich peasants not be obedient? After giving presents and giving women, they want you to listen to them.

What is "peace of mind?" When the poor and lower-middle peasants suffered oppression and were unable to lift up their heads how could there be peace of mind? If the poor and lower-middle peasants cannot be at ease, how can the cadres be at ease?

The bourgeoisie say that they will have no successors. How can they say that they will have no successors? The successor of Hegel was Marx, and the successor of the bourgeoisie is the proletariat. The bourgeoisie grasped "three freedoms and one contract"[5] and thought about rolling up land again. We must attack them in this aspect, strike them down at their foundation, don't allow them to have successors like them.

(d) The four clean-ups.

What is corruption? 50 yuan? 100 yuan? 200 yuan? It is necessary only to return the plunder forthrightly and it will not be considered corruption.

Plunder must be returned, and it must be in accord with the situation and with reason. It must be returned so that the hands and feet are clean, but the cadres also must be able to live after it is returned. To handle it in this manner requires the return of how much? Should the method of self-assessment and public discussion be adopted or not?

Those punished must be limited to one percent.

This year we will not prohibit killing, but next year we will discuss it some more. When the crime is extremely great proceed slowly. Handle counter-revolutionaries according to regulations. If the masses demand nothing less than death, and it is reasonable, your leadership can wait a bit.

(e) Cadre participation in collective productive labor. The problems of corruption and enjoying more benifits can be resolved only when there is participation in labor. Hence it is possible to understand the situation of production, not simply float on the surface. If cadres do not participate in labor they inevitably must become divorced from the laboring masses and revisionism must inevitably arise.

The cadres of Hsi-yang have labored very well. Hsi-yang is on a mountain and is very poor, very poor, so there was a revolution.

We must take the basic-level organizations of the party in the countryside and place them in the hands of the advanced workers and the positive elements among the workers. (Some people say that there are labor models who do not participate in labor.)

If labor models do not participate in labor, what kind of models are they? Do away with them. There are some who because of too many meetings are too busy to make inquiries. This problem must be resolved. You can go down to the fields to make inquiries!

County cadres also must participate in labor.

If basic-level cadres do not participate in labor, aren't they indistinguishable from the Kuomintang's pao-chia leaders[6]. There are big officials and little officials among you. Even the authority of a little official is great. In the past an organization leader received a good deal of pay for his work. Now as for our basic-level cadres one is participating in labor and one in the four clean-ups; if you are unwilling to do this return home and become one of the common folk.

Cadres participating in labor who are corrupt, steal, and speculate are few. There has always been corruption, theft, and speculation; for 10,000 years this has been so. Otherwise dialectics would be extinguished and there would be no opposites to unify.

The more corruption is exposed the happier I will be. Have you caught lice or not? When there are many on your body, the more that you catch the happier you are.

(4) Method.

We must adopt a positive attitude.

(a) We must pay attention to training and educating cadres.

(b) Don't be anxious. If we don't finish this year, then next year; if we don't finish next year, then the year after that. Wasn't land reform handled for three or four years? Some people do not believe. Don't admonish them. As soon as you surround them, they become anxious and confusion results. You must slowly persuade. Why should you be anxious? wasn't our revolutionary victory more than 30 years later than the Soviet Union's?

(c) We must have on-the-spot experience, grasp deeply and grasp penetratingly while striding firmly and securely, we must guard against acting in a perfunctory manner while carrying out work, and we certainly must grasp on-the-spot experience.

(d) We must distinguish between dissimilar situation, we must not handle national minority regions and border regions in the same manner. (Told the story of Ch'en P'ing of the Western Han Dynasty.) (To X X X) Your Szechwan is such a large province, can you handle it all at once?

(e) Simplification. We must simplify and have some cadre go down to be tempered in labor, to be tempered in class struggle. I originally had by my side 20 or 30 people, while now there remain only some ten-odd persons. I said to Chiang Wei-ch'ing that Kiangsu has a population of more than 40 million and the 5,000 workers of the provincial party organs can be reduced to 1,500 or 2,000 persons. This is an old problem which for a long period of time has not been resolved.

(f) We must grasp the key point. "Don't sing of heaven and don't sing of earth, just sing the volume *Hsiang-shan-chi*. The volume *Hsiang-shan–chi* tells the story of the return to King Chuang by a young girl (namely Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva). There are seven characters to a line, and the first two lines are these. Heaven and earth can be parted, don't sing of heaven and earth, only sing the *Hsiang-shan–chi*. This is grasping class struggle.

NOTES

1. The tenth plenum of the CC of the CPC was held during June 1962 in Peking.

2. The academy referred to here is the Whampoa Military academy. It was located at Whampoa near Canton, and was established by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 after the reorganization of the Kuomintang with the help of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Before Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, the academy was run jointly by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Comrades Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Yun Tai- Ying, Hsiao Chu-nu and others held responsible posts in the academy at one time or another. Many of the cadets were members of the Communist Party or the Communist Youth League, and they formed the revolutionary core of the academy.

3. Moscow conference: A reference to the meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries held in Moscow, November 14-16, 1957.

4. *Dream of Red Chamber* is an eighteenth century novel.

5. "Three freedoms and one contract" mean: 'the extension of plots for private use and of free markets, the increase of small enterprises with sole responsibility for their own profits and losses, and the fixing of output quotas [in communes] based on the household [individual enterprise].' Its implications tended towards adoption of 'economism' and revisionism, and directly contradicted the Socialist Education Movement.

6. *Pao-chia* was the administrative system by which the Kuomintang reactionary clique enforced its fascist rule at the primary level. On August 1, 1932, Chiang Kai-shek promulgated the "Regulations for the Organization of *Pao* and *Chia* and for a Population Census in the Counties" covering the provinces of Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei. The "Regulations" provided that "the *pao* and *chia* are to be organized on the basis of households; there is to be a head of each household, of each *chia*", which is made up of ten households, and of each *pao*, which is made up of ten *chia*. Neighbours were required to watch and report each other's activities to the authorities, and all were punishable when one was found guilty; various counter-revolutionary measures for exacting compulsory labor were also laid down. On November 7, 1934, the Kuomintang government officially announced that this system of fascist rule was to be established in all the provinces and municipalities under its rule.

OPPOSE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BY U.S. IMPERIALISM

August 8, 1963

An American Negro leader now taking refuge in Cuba, Mr. Robert Williams, the former President of the Monroe, North Carolina, Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, has twice this year asked me for a statement in support of the American Negroes' struggle against racial discrimination. I wish to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Chinese people, to express our resolute support for the American Negroes in their struggle against racial discrimination and for freedom and equal rights.

There are more than nineteen million Negroes in the United States, or about eleven per cent of the total population. Their position in society is one of enslavement, oppression and discrimination. The overwhelming majority of the Negroes are deprived of their right to vote. On the whole it is only the most back-breaking and most despised jobs that are open to them. Their average wages are only from a third to a half of those of the white people. The ratio of unemployment among them is the highest. In many states they cannot go to the same school, eat at the same table, or travel in the same section of a bus or train with the white people. Negroes are frequently and arbitrarily arrested, beaten up and murdered by U.S authorities at various levels and members of the Ku Klux Klan and other racists. About half of the American Negroes are concentrated in eleven states in the south of the United States. There, the discrimination and prosecution they suffer are especially startling.

SOURCE: *Peking Review* No. 33, 1963

The American Negroes are awakening, and their resistance is growing ever stronger. In recent years the mass struggle of the American Negroes against racial discrimination and for freedom and equal rights has been constantly developing.

In 1957 the Negro people in Little Rock, Arkansas, waged a fierce struggle against the barring of their children from public schools. The authorities used armed force against them, and there resulted the Little Rock incident which shocked the world.

In 1960 Negroes in more than twenty states held 'sit in' demonstrations in protest against racial segregation in local restaurants, shops and other public places.

In 1961 the Negroes launched a campaign of 'freedom riders' to oppose racial segregation in transport, a campaign which rapidly extended to many states.

In 1962 the Negroes in Mississippi fought for the equal right to enrol in colleges and were greeted by the authorities with repression which culminated in a blood bath.

This year, the struggle of the American Negroes started in early April in Birmingham, Alabama. Unarmed, bare-handed Negro masses were subjected to wholesale arrests and the most barbarous repression merely because they were holding meetings and parades against racial discrimination. On 12 June, an extreme was reached with the cruel murder of Mr Medgar Evers, a leader of the Negro people in Mississippi. These Negro masses, aroused to indignation and undaunted by ruthless violence, carried on their struggles even more courageously and quickly won the support of Negroes and all strata of the people throughout the United States. A gigantic and vigorous nationwide struggle is going on in nearly every state and city in the United States, and the struggle keeps mounting. American Negro organizations have decided to start a 'freedom march' on Washington on 28 August, in which 2,50,000 people will take part.

The speedy development of the struggle of the American Negroes is a manifestation of the constant sharpening of class struggle and national struggle within the United States; it has been causing increasingly grave anxiety to the U.S ruling clique. The Kennedy Administration has resorted to cunning two-faced tactics. On the one hand, it continues to connive at and take part in the discrimination against and persecution of Negroes; it even sends troops to repress them. On the other hand, it is parading as an advocate of the 'defence of human rights' and the 'protection of the civil rights of Negroes', is calling upon the Negro people to exercise 'restraint', and is proposing to Congress so-called 'civil rights legislation'. in an attempt to numb the fighting will of the Negro people and deceive the masses throughout the country. However, these tactics of the Kennedy Administration are being seen through by more and more of the Negroes. The fascist atrocities committed by the U.S. imperialists against the Negro people have laid bare the true nature of the so-called democracy and freedom in the United States and revealed the inner link between the reactionary policies pursued by the U.S. Government at home and its policies of aggression abroad.

I call upon the workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, enlightened elements of the bourgeoisie, and other enlightened personages of all colours in the world, white, black, yellow, brown, etc., to unite to oppose the racial discrimination practiced by U.S. imperialism and to support the American Negroes in their struggle against racial discrimination. In the final analysis, a national struggle is a question of class struggle. In the United States, it is only the reactionary ruling clique among the whites which is oppressing the Negro people. They can in no way represent the workers, farmers, revolutionary intellectuals, and other enlightened persons who comprise the overwhelning majority of the white people. At present, it is the handful of imperialists, headed by the United States, and their supporters, the reactionaries in different countries, who are carrying out oppression, aggression and intimidation against the overwhelming majority of the nations and peoples of the world. They are the minority, and we are the majority. At most they make up less than ten percent of the 3,000 million people of the world. I am deeply convinced that, with the support of more than ninety per cent of the people of the world, the just struggle of the American Negroes will certainly be victorious. The evil system of colonialism and imperialism grew on along with the enslavement of the Negroes and the trade in Negroes; it will surely come to its end with the thorough emancipation of the black people.

STATEMENT OPPOSING AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTHERN VIETNAM AND SLAUGHTER OF ITS PEOPLE BY THE U.S.-NGO DINH DIEM CLIQUE

August, 1963

U.S. imperialism has violated the agreements reached at the first Geneva Conference by obstructing the unification of Vietnam, conducting open armed aggression against southern Vietnam and engaging in so-called special warfare over many years. It has also violated the agreements of the second Geneva Conference by its flagrant intervention in Laos in an attempt to rekindle the civil war there. Apart from those who are deliberately deceiving the people or are utterly naive, no one will believe that a treaty can make U.S. imperialism lay down its butcher's knife and suddenly become a Buddha, or even behave itself a little better.

The oppressed people and oppressed nations must not entrust their liberation to the "wisdom" of imperialism and its lackeys. Only by strengthening their unity and persevering in their struggle will they triumph. This is what the people of southern Vietnam have been doing.

Source: *Statements of Mao Tse-tung*, Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1964

THE RACIAL QUESTION IS A CLASS QUESTION

August 9, 1963

Chairman Mao Tse-tung received visitors from Africa here this afternoon [8 August1963]. During the reception, Chairman Mao Tse-tung made a statement calling upon the people of the world to unite against racial discrimination by U.S. imperialism and support the American Negroes in their just struggle against racial discrimination.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung had a very cordial, friendly talk with the friends from Africa. During the talk, he condemned the racial discrimination practised by U.S. imperialism, as well as that of the colonialist authorities of South Africa and in every part of the world. 'Racial discrimination', he said, 'is found in Africa, in Asia, and in other parts of the world. The racial question is in essence a class question. Our unity is not one of race; it is the unity of comrades and friends. We should strengthen our unity and wage a common struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and their running dogs, to attain complete and thorough national independence and liberation.'

After explaining how China's revolutionary struggle had won through to victory, Chairman Mao said: 'This proves that a revolution by the people can triumph and that imperialism and its running dogs can be defeated. The tide of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism is sweeping through all Africa. All countries whether or not they have already attained independence, will sooner or later win complete and thorough independence and liberation. All the Chinese people support

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This is the full text of Comrade Mao's remarks to his African visitors on this occasion, as reported in Jen-min jih-pao on 9 August 1963.

you. The people of Africa are awakening with each passing day; so are the people of the whole world. The workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and all other revolutionary people, who constitute over ninety per cent of the world's population, can be united in the fight for the victory of the revolution.'

'In the fight for thorough emancipation,' Chairman Mao said, 'the oppressed peoples rely first of all on their own strength and then, and only then, on international assistance. The people who have already won victory in their revolution should help those who are still struggling for liberation. This is our internationalist duty.'

OPERAS

September 1963

(At a work conference of the Centre)

Operas should develop what is new from what is old, rather than what is old from what is old. They must not sing only of emperors, kings, generals, ministers, talented young gentlemen, pretty ladies, and their maids and escorts.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard publication.

COMMENTS ON COMRADE K'O CHING-SHIH'S REPORT[1]

December 12, 1963

This ought to be [widely] read.

Problems abound in all forms of art such as the opera, ballads, music and fine arts, the dance, the cinema, poetry and literature, and the people involved are numerous; in many departments very little has been achieved so far in socialist transformation. The 'dead' still dominate in many departments. What has been achieved in the cinema, new poetry, folk songs, the fine arts, and the novel should not be underestimated, but there, too, quite a few problems exist. As for such departments as the opera, the problems are even more serious. The social and economic base has changed, but the arts as part of the superstructure, which serve this base, still remain a serious problem. Hence we should proceed with investigation and study and attend to this matter in earnest.

Isn't it absurd that many communists are enthusiastic about promoting feudal and capitalist art, but not socialist art?

NOTES

[1] K'o's report entitled, *Ta-hsien shih-san nien* (Write prolifically on the thirteen years), 1 January 1963. Mao's comments are translated into English and published by the FLP, Peking, under the title 'Instruction on 12 December 1963' in *Five Documents on Literature and Art* 1967, pp. 10-11.

THE CENTRE'S INSTRUCTION ON LEARNING FROM EACH OTHER AND OVERCOMING COMPLACENCY AND CONCEIT

December 13, 1963

To be complacent and conceited; to refuse to apply Marxist dialectical, analytical method, i.e. the method of splitting one into two (both achievements and shortcomings); to work in one's own field, studying only the achievement but not the shortcomings and mistakes; to like flattering but dislike critical words; to have no interest in organizing competent high and middle cadres to learn and investigate the work of other provinces, cities, regions, or departments so as to link the result with one's own circumstances and improve the work of one's own province, city, region, or department; to be blindly conceited, i.e. to limit oneself to one's own district, the small world of one's department, the inability to widen one's scope, and the ignorance of other spheres of work; to show and talk to foreigners, visitors from other places, and people sent by the Centre only about the achievements, not the weaknesses; in one's own area of work; to talk only superficially and perfunctorily [– these are the faults common to all our comrades]. The Centre has more than once raised this problem to our comrades: a communist must have at his disposal the Marxist dialectical method of 'splitting one into two': achievements and shortcomings, truth and mistakes. All matters (economic, political, ideological, cultural, military, party, and etc.) are always in a process of development; this is common sense to a Marxist. However, many of our comrades in the Centre and regions do not use this method of thinking and working. There is a formal logic deeply planted in their minds which they cannot uproot. Formal logic denies the unification of the opposites of things, the contradiction of opposites ('splitting one into two'), and under given conditions the transformation of one pair of opposites into another. Therefore,these comrades become complacent, conceited, observant of achievements only, blind to weaknesses, capable of hearing only favourable words but not criticisms, unwilling to criticize themselves (i.e. splitting into two), and afraid of other people's criticism. The old saying, 'Conceit courts harm while modesty is beneficial' still holds good from the point of view of the proletariat and the interest of the people.

Source: An anthology without a title

1. Conceit grows under all circumstances and in all forms. Generally, it is likely to grow with success and victory. This is because under adverse condition one can easily see one's own weaknesses and is comparatively more cautious. Under the pressure of difficulties, modesty and caution are the only attitudes to adopt. But with success comes the gratitude of other people. Even one-time enemies may turn round and pay tribute [to one's prowess]. One can therefore easily lose one's head in favourable circumstances following success and feel light enough to fly. 'From now on the empire will be at peace,' one believes. We are fully aware that the party is more vulnerable to attack by the virus of conceit at a time of victory and success.

2. Conceit grows under conditions of victory – i.e., the conceit of swollen-headedness and an inflated ego. This is one kind of conceit. Another kind grows under normal conditions with neither spectacular victory nor ignominious defeat, when people intoxicate themselves with such thoughts as 'Not as good as the better but better than the worse' and 'To have served as a daughter-in-law for twenty years automatically makes one a mother-in-law.'

There is a third kind which flourishes in backward conditions. Some people take pride in being backward, because they think: 'Our work is not all that good, but it is better than in the past,' or 'So and so are even X X worse than us.' Whenever they want to show off their history, they make a quick switch from any other subject, their faces light up, and they begin thus: 'Once upon a time.'

3. We become conceited as soon as we overlook the strength of the masses; as soon as our subjective understanding lags behind the development of the objective reality; as soon as we overrate our own achievement.

4. Essentially, conceit is derived from individualism and nurses the growth of individualism. It is individualistic.

5. Speaking from a class analytical point of view, conceit comes first from the ideology of the exploiting class and then from that of small producers.

6. As workers, small producers have many good qualities. They are industrious, thrifty, not afraid of hardships, cautious, and realistic. But as small owners, they are individualistic and what is more important, limited by their working conditions and methods and their use of outdated means of production, they are scattered, narrow-minded, and ill-informed. They are often blind to the strength of the collective; they see only that of the individual. Furthermore, they are easily satisfied. A small achievement may induce them to think: 'That's not bad at all,' 'This is super,' 'Ah, let's enjoy a bit,' and 'Not as good as the better but better than the worse'.

7. Conceit is based on the bourgeois, idealist world view. It can lead people to X X, to a way of dealing with reality which is against the laws of the development of reality and eventually to failure. The materialist historical view provides that the history of social development is not the history of big men, but of the labouring masses. None the less, conceited people always exaggerated the role of the individual, take [undue] credit, and become proud of themselves. They underestimate or completely overlook the strength of the masses.

8.Hence, conceit is against Marxism-Leninism, against the dialectical and historical materialist world view of our party.

9. Conceited people cannot forget their merits. They hide their own shortcomings and disregard other people's strong points. They often compare their own merits with other people's demerits, thereby drawing satisfaction. When they see the strong points of others, they say: 'Not much,' or 'Nothing to make a song and dance about.'

10. In fact, the more one overrates oneself, the worse the result is likely to be. Leo Tolstoy, the great Russian writer, put it humorously: 'A man is like a mathematical fraction, whose actual talent can be compared to a numerator and his own estimate of it to a denominator. The bigger the denominator, the smaller the fraction.'

11. Modesty is a necessary virtue for every revolutionary. It benefits the people's cause whereas conceit leads the people's cause to defeat. Therefore modesty is an expression of one's responsibility to the people's cause.

12. A revolutionary in name and practice must be able to: First, respect the creativeness of the masses, listen to their views, and regard himself as one of the masses. He must not have a single grain of selfishness or exaggerate his own role and must work honestly for the masses. This is the spirit which Lu Hsun describes as 'Hanging my head low, I willingly serve as the young people's ox.' This is modesty.

13. Second, he must have an indefatigable progressive spirit and must be forever alert and clear-minded. He must be observant of new things and consider them well. He must therefore have modesty so that he does not accredit himself with undeserved merits; nor be satisfied with his own achievements. This is a realistic attitude, the noble virtue of modesty.

14. If a man can learn seriously from work, life and actual struggles, if he can regularly sum up his thought and action in a effort to find out his deficiencies, shortcomings, and errors, if he can ruthlessly and resolutely fight against his conceit and self-satisfaction and unreservedly overcome them, it is absolutely within his powers to train himself to be a man of humility.

15. A truly modest man is also a man who enthusiastically, unconditionally, loyally, and actively works for the cause of the party, the people, and the collective. He works not to show off or for awards and fame, not for any selfish desire, but whole-heartedly for the happiness and interests of the people. Therefore, he is always buried in hard work for the benefit of the party and people, never giving a thought to his own distinction, status, reputation, or salary. He does not brag about his achievements to other people; he does not ever entertain such thoughts in his mind. He considers nothing more than how to serve the people better.

16. Why must a true collectivist demand humility from himself?

First, because he understands that although he plays a part in the achievements of knowledge or other results, the part the masses play is far greater. Without the help and support of the masses, he would not be able to have knowledge; nor would his work be successful. As a collectivist, he must not discount the merits of the masses, or 'rob other people of their merits'. He knows that it is shameful to be conceited.

Second, he understands that what he has learnt and done forms only a tiny drop in the ocean of revolutionary knowledge and work: it is infinitesimal. Moreover, revolutionary knowledge and work are incessantly developing. As a collectivist, he must do his utmost to acquire the knowledge which is useful to the people and to devote his ability to the revolution. Therefore, he must feel that there is no room for complacency, for becoming stagnant.

Third, he knows that work is constructed like a huge machine with its wheels, screws, steel frames, and other parts of different sizes and shapes, each being indispensable. As a collectivist, he should respect each man's work and each man's achievement. For the perfection of the revolutionary work, he must co-ordinate his own work with that of others. He must feel that he cannot bear to be left out of the collective, and that he passionately loves his colleagues. Because of this, he must treat people with modesty, never with pride or conceit.

Fourth, he understands that the scope of an individual view is narrow and limited, whereas the scope of revolutionary work and knowledge is broad and their contents extremely rich and complex. Thus he understands that it is inevitable for an individual to have faults and be likely to commit mistakes. These faults and mistakes often escape his full attention. Since he is a collectivist, he would demand of himself a deeper and wider vision to detect his own faults and mistakes in time and to correct them quickly, so that he can do revolutionary work well and be responsible to the people. Because of this, he is modest, humbly learns from others, and sincerely welcomes other people's criticism.

From these points [we] may see a true collectivist possesses humility, a fact that reflects his progressive spirit and realistic attitude.

17. Another method of overcoming one's conceit and nurturing one's humility is to heighten one's communist consciousness. This requires more intensive study of Marxism-Leninism. Why?

18. Because the theories of Marxism-Leninism can help us to understand scientifically the world and the relationships between individuals and the masses, individuals and collectives,individuals and organization, and individuals and the party.

[They also help us to] understand correctly the roles of the masses and individuals in revolutionary struggles. Marxism- Leninism tells us that the working people are the creators of social wealth and the mainstay in a revolutionary struggle. In order to build socialism and communism in China, we must depend on the creative power of the working class and the millions of labouring people under the leadership of their vanguard. As for an individual, he is no more than a small screw in the revolutionary works. Marxism-Leninism tells us: all achievement is the result of the strength of the collective, no individual can detach himself from a collective, and an individual, without the party to lead him or an organization and the masses to support him, cannot accomplish anything. If we do really understand the part played by the masses and the individual in history and their mutual relationship, we automatically become modest.

Marxism-Leninism can raise our understanding of the future and the destination we are going to, can widen our scope, and can free our thought from parochialism. When people see only what is under their feet, not what lies above the mountains and beyond the seas, they are likely to be as boastful as 'the frog at the bottom of a well'. But when they raise their heads to see the immensity of the world, the kaleidoscope of man's affairs, the splendour and magnificence of the cause of humanity, the richness of man's talents, and the breadth of knowledge, they become modest. What we are dedicated to is a world-shaking task. We must focus not just on the work and happiness in front of our eyes, but also on the work and happiness of all of us in the distant future. Marxism-Leninism helps us to overcome self-satisfaction of a small producer due to a small success or a small achievement. It arouses our desire for ceaseless progress. At the same time, it helps us to eliminate our idealistic subjective way of thinking.

19. Modesty and self-abasement are not synonymous. Modesty does not mean belittling oneself; it is an expression of a realistic attitude and the progressive spirit which enables one to see facts objectively, whereas self-abasement is an expression of unrealism, a lack of self-confidence, and a fear of difficulty.

Self-abasement and self-advertisement or a feeling of superiority are based on subjectivism and wrong. They represent two extreme and erroneous subjective estimates of oneself. The boastful person detaches himself from reality and overestimates himself, exaggerates his actual ability and role. He feels superior, out of the ordinary, and therefore stops making progress or learning new things. Inevitably, he must make mistakes. The self-abasing person is apparently the opposite of the boastful, but he is just as unrealistic. He underestimates himself, forgets that he can be improved and disciplined in his work, and belittles the part he has played and will play in the revolution. Consequently, he loses his courage and confidence in making progress and relaxes his fighting spirit.

In short, both self-abasement and conceit are wrong, because both represent an erroneous assessment of one's part in the revolution, and an unrealistic and unscientific attitude. Both can do harm to the revolution. That is why we must resolutely oppose conceit and boastfulness, and also strictly distinguish modesty from self-abasement. In this way we may avoid drifting from one extreme to another.

NOTES

1. A line from the introductory poem to Lu Hsun's *Hua-kai Chi*.

STRIVE TO LEARN FROM EACH OTHER AND DON'T STICK TO THE BEATEN TRACK AND BE COMPLACENT

December 13, 1963

Here is a report prepared by Comrades Li Jui-shan and Hua Kuo-feng of the Hunan provincial Party committee, on November 6, 1963 on their visit to Kwangtung to look at the progress of its agricultural production. Attached to the report are instructions written by the Hunan provincial party committee dated December 7, 1963. You are requested to study them. The Central Committee considers that this attitude and method of learning modestly from the good experience of other provinces, municipalities and districts is fine and constitutes an important way of promoting our economic, political, ideological, cultural, military and Party work. Some comrades stick to the beaten track, are conceited and complacent, do not take an analytical approach towards the work in their own area in accordance with Marxist dialectics (i.e., one dividing into two, into shortcomings and mistakes as well as achievements), but notice only achievements and not shortcomings and mistakes. They welcome praise but not criticism. They take little interest in arranging for competent high and middle-ranking cadres to study modestly and

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An inner-Party directive drafted on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

SOURCE: *Peking Review*, Nos. 37–38, September earnestly what is being done in other provinces, municipalities, districts or units in order to introduce improvements by applying the findings to their own province, municipality, district or unit. They confine their vision always to the small world of their own area or unit, but fail to see beyond it and to notice any world other than their own, which is sheer parochial arrogance. They show to foreign visitors, comrades from other parts of the country or comrades sent by the central authorities to their area only what is good and not what is bad. They tell these visitors only the achievements, and not the shortcomings and mistakes which, if taken up at all, will not be gone into at any great length but dismissed perfunctorily in a few words. The Central Committee has called our comrades' attention to this problem time and again, maintaining that a Communist must acquire the Marxist dialectical concept of one dividing into two with regard to achievements and shortcomings, truth and falsehood. Without exception everything (economy, politics, ideology, culture, military and Party work, etc.) develops as a process. And every process develops through the interconnection and mutual struggle of its two contradictory aspects. This should be A B C for a Marxist. However, many comrades at the central and local levels seldom think and work conscientiously in accordance with this viewpoint. They find it difficult to shake off their customary metaphysical way of thinking. By metaphysics is meant the denial of the unity of opposites and the struggle of opposites in things (the method of one dividing into two), the denial of the truth that under given conditions two contradictory things that stand in opposition transform themselves into each other and turn into their opposite. Metaphysics also finds expression in the following – to stick to the beaten track, to be conceited and complacent, to notice only achievements and not shortcomings, to welcome praise and not criticism; to be unwilling to criticize oneself (to apply the method of one dividing into two to oneself) and, worse still, to be afraid of being criticized by others. Among the dozens of ministries under the Central Government there are obviously several which have done better and have a better style of work, for instance, the Ministry of Petroleum Industry. Yet other ministries simply pay no attention and have never bothered to visit them, study their experience and learn from them. Of the various units under a ministry, there are obviously many factories and mines, enterprises, undertakings and scientific research institutions, together with their personnel, that have done well. Yet its leadership, through its ignorance, is in no position to encourage people to learn from them. Comrades, when the Central Committee here speaks about comrades committing errors in succumbing to metaphysics, this refers only to some comrades, not to all. Nevertheless it must be pointed out that large numbers of fine comrades are frustrated by those comrades who are highly placed with fat emoluments and live in style, who are conceited and complacent and are only too glad to stick to the beaten track, and who are addicted to bourgeois metaphysics; in other words, these fine comrades are frustrated by the bureaucrats. This situation must be changed right now. To any comrade who rejects the dialectical and analytical method of Marxism and doesn't modestly and conscientiously analyse either his own locality, his own unit and himself or other localities, other units and other people, we must give comradely advice and criticism, so as to bring about a change in this undesirable state of affairs. We must make it a practice to learn from the good experience, good style and good methods of other ministries, provinces, municipalities, districts and units. This is an important question and you are requested to discuss it. Later on, the Central Committee will also take it up at its working conferences and plenary sessions. For quite some time the Hunan provincial Party committee made no attempt at investigation and study and issued a spate of subjectivist directives to the lower levels, ramming many things down their throats while getting little factual information in return, and thus alienating itself from the masses and bringing tremendous difficulties upon itself. From 1961 onwards, a change came over its work and things rapidly looked up. Nevertheless it felt that it was still lagging far behind Kwangtung and Shanghai. Therefore, it organized two survey teams composed of large numbers of cadres at the provincial, prefectural and county levels, and sent them on study tours to Kwangtung and Shanghai. Please try and see if you can do the same. The Central Committee holds that it can and must be done. If you think otherwise, please transmit your views.

U.S.IMPERIALISM IS THE MOST FEROCIOUS ENEMY OF THE WORLD'S PEOPLE

January 12, 1964

The heroic struggle now being waged by the people of Panama against U.S. aggression and in defence of their national sovereignty is a great patriotic struggle. The Chinese people stand firmly on the side of the Panamanian people and fully support their just action in opposing the U.S. aggressors and seeking to regain sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone.

U.S. imperialism is the most ferocious enemy of the people of the entire world.

It has not only committed the grave crime of aggression against the Panamanian people, and painstakingly and stubbornly plotted against socialist Cuba, but has continuously been plundering and oppersing the people of the Latin American countries and suppressing the national-democratic revolutionary struggles there.

In Asia, U.S. imperialism has forcibly occupied China's Taiwan, turned the southern part of Korea and the southern part of Vietnam into its colonies, kept Japan under its control and semi-military occupation,sabotaged the peace, neutrality and independence of Laos, plotted to subvert the Royal Government of Cambodia, and committed intervention and aggression against other Asian countries. More recently, it has decided to send a U.S. fleet to the Indian Ocean, menacing the security of all the countries of south-east Asia.

Full Text of Comrade Mao's statement of 12 January 1964 in support of the Panamanian people, *Hung-Ch'i* No. 2-3-1964, pp. 2-3, *Peaking Review, no.2, 164*

In Africa, U.S. imperialism is feverishly pursuing its neocolonialist policies, seeking vigorously to take the place of the old colonialists, to plunder and enslave the peoples of Africa, and to undermine and stamp out the national liberation movements.

The policies of aggression and war of U.S. imperialism also seriously threaten the Soviet Union, China, and the other socialist countries. Moreover, it is vigorously seeking to push its policy of'peaceful evolution' in the socialist countries, in order to bring about the restoration of capitalism there and disintegrate the socialist camp.

Even toward its allies in Western Europe, North America and Oceania, U.S. imperialism is pursuing a policy of the'law of the jungle' trying hard to trample them underfoot.

The aggressive plans of U.S. imperialism to dominate the whole world run in a continuous line from Truman through Eisenhower and Kennedy to Johnson.

The people of the countries in the socialist camp should unite, the people of all the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America should unite, the people of all the continents of the world should unite, all peace-loving countries and all countries that are subject to U.S. aggression, control, interference and bullying should unite, and so form the broadest united front to oppose the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war and to safeguard world peace.

Riding roughshod everywhere, U.S. imperialism has placed itself in the position of the enemy of the people the world over, and has increasingly isolated itself. The atom bombs and hydrogen bombs in the hands of the U.S. imperialists can never cow people not willing to be enslaved. The raging tide of the people of the world in opposition to the U.S. aggressors is irresistible. The struggle of the people the world over against U.S. imperialism and its running dogs will assuredly win still greater victories.

STATEMENT EXPRESSING THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S SUPPORT FOR THE JAPANESE PEOPLE'S GREAT PATRIOTIC STRUGGLE

January, 1964

The Massive anti-U.S. demonstration by the Japanese people on January 26 is a great patriotic movement. On behalf of the Chinese people, I wish to express deep respect for the heroic Japanese people.

Recently, a large-scale mass movement has started throughout Japan to oppose the entry and stationing in Japan of U.S. F-105D aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines and to demand the dismantling of all U.S. military bases, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces, the return of Japan's territory of Okinawa, the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. "Security Treaty," etc. All this reflects the will and aspiration of the entire Japanese people. The Chinese people wholeheartedly support the just struggle of the Japanese People.

Ever since the end of World War II, Japan has been subjected to U.S. imperialist political, economic and military oppression. The U.S. imperialists have not only oppressed the workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, urban petty bourgeoisie, religious circles, and medium and small entrepreneurs of Japan; they have also brought many big Japanese entrepreneurs under their control, interfered in Japan's foreign policy, and treated Japan as a dependency. U.S. imperialism is the most ferocious enemy of the Japanese nation.

Source: *Statement by Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964 pp. 14–16)

Japan is a great nation. It will certainly not allow U.S. imperialism to ride roughshod over it for long. The last few years have seen the constant broadening of the patriotic united front of all strata of the Japanese people against U.S imperialist aggression, oppression, and control. This is the surest guarantee of victory in their patriotic, anti-U.S. struggle. The Chinese people are convinced beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Japanese people will be able to drive the U.S. imperialists from their soil and realize their aspirations for independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality.

The Chinese and Japanese peoples should unite, the people of various Asian countries should unite, all oppressed people and nations of the world should unite, all peace-loving countries should unite, all countries and individuals subjected to U.S. imperialist aggression, control, interference, and bullying should unite and from a broad united front againstU.S. imperialism to frustrate its plans for aggression and war and to safeguard world peace.

U.S. imperialism, get out of Japan, get out of the Western pacific, get out of Asia, get out of Africa and Latin America, get out of Europe and Oceania, get out of the countries and places subjected to U.S. aggression, control, interference, and bullying!

TALK ON HEALTH SERVICES

January 24, 1964

China's health service emulates that of the Soviet Union,and I cannot completely accept what health doctors say. I have a gentlemen's agreement with my doctor: When I have a fever I will call you, and when I do not have one I will not bother you and you will not bother me. I said that if I did not have to call on him for an entire year, that would be testimony of his great merit. If I had to bother him every month, this would be proof that he had failed in his work. I only follow half of what the doctor says and expect him to follow me in the other half. If we abide by everything the doctor says sickness will multiply and life will be impossible. I have never before heard of so much high blood pressure and liver infections. If a person doesn't exercise but only eats well, dresses well, lives comfortably, and drives wherever he goes, he will be beset with a lot of illnesses. Excessive attention to food, clothing, housing, and means of transportation are the four underlying, causes of illness among high-level cadres. Our health service emulates the Soviet Union. It makes specialists out of general practitioners. They must treat all types of illnesses and improve themselves.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse–tung Thought,* a Red Guard Publication.

REMARKS AT THE SPRING FESTIVAL

(Summary Record)

February 13, 1964

Chairman Mao: Today is the Spring Festival[1], and we are holding a forum to discuss both foreign and domestic problems...Do you think our state is likely to collapse or not? Imperialism and revisionism, in concert have struck right up to our borders, do [you] democratic personages[2] fear the atom bomb? If the atom bomb should explode, we would simply find ourselves back in Yenan. The whole Shen-Kan-Ning Border Area had a population of 1.5 millions, and in the city of Yenan there were 30,000[3]. People cannot reply publicly unless they are first attacked. There was a time when the Kuomintang was cleverer than usual, and did not denounce us publicly. They put out a document using the method of restraining 'alien' parties, of restraining the Communist Party[4]. Do you know about that?

Chang Shih-Chao[5]: I don't know about it.

Chairman Mao: You people aren't very well informed. In January 1941, the Kuomintang launched the South Anhwei Incident, in which we lost more than 17,000 men. After this, they staged several more anti-communist high tides, and thus taught [our] Party a lesson. Chiang Kai-shek is no good, every time he had a chance he tried to regiment us. After the end of the anti-Japanese war, Chiang talked about peace, and invited me to go to Chungking for negotiations, but he also gave

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SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought,* a Red Guard Publication.

underhand orders. During the negotiations, he carried out a campaign against our Party and annihilated the three divisions of Kao Shu-hsun[6].

XXX: Kao has already joined the Party. People can change.

K'ang Sheng: The Hsuan T'ung emperor has come to present his New Year's greetings (at the Political Consultative Conference).

Chairman Mao: We must unite very well with the Hsuan T'ung emperor. Both Kuang Hsu and Hsuan T'ung used to be our bosses[7] Hsuan T'ung's monthly salary of a little over a hundred *yuan* is too small – this man is an emperor.

Chang Shih-Chao: Hsuan T'ung uncle, Tsai-t'ao[8], is in wretched straits.

Chairman Mao: This fellow Tsai-t'ao is a high military official. He was a student in France. I know him, though not intimately. Would it be all right to aid him through you, so that he can eat a bit better? After all, he is our guest. We should improve his standard of living.

It's no fun being a running dog. Nehru is in bad shape, imperialism and revisionism have robbed him blind. Revisionism is being rebuffed everywhere. It was rebuffed in Romania, it is not listened to in Poland. In Cuba they listen to half and reject half; they listen to half because they can't do otherwise, since they don't produce oil or weapons. Imperialism is having a hard time, too. Japan is opposing the United States, and it's not only the Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese People that are opposing the United States – the big capitalists are doing so too. Not long ago, the Kita-iron works rejected an American inspection. De Gaulle's opposition to the United States is also in response to the demands of the capitalists. They are also behind his establishment of diplomatic relations with China. China opposes the United States; formerly in Peking there was Shen Ch'ung[9] the whole country opposed US imperialism. The Khrushehevite revisionists abuse us as dogmatists, pseudo-revolutionaries – they really curse us. Not long ago, a letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party put forward four points: (1) An end to open polemics; (2) The return of the [Soviet] experts [to China]; (3) Talks on the Sino-Soviet border; (4) The expansion of commerce. We can have talks about the border; they will begin on 25 February. We can do a little business, but we can't do too much, for Soviet products are heavy, crude, high-priced, and they always keep something back.

K'ang Sheng: The quality is inferior.

Chairman Mao: They are first crude, second expensive, third inferior, and fourth they keep something back, so it's not so good to deal with them as with the French bourgeoisie, who still have some notion of business ethics.

In the past there have been mistakes in our work. The first was issuing blind commands, the second was excessive requisitioning; these have now been corrected. Now we have gone to the opposite extreme; we have gone from issuing blind commands to no commands, and as a result we are not doing our utmost. So we must emulate the Liberation Army, we must emulate the Petroleum Ministry's Tach'ing[10]. In the Tach'ing oil fields they have invested more than – and in the space of three years they have built up an oilfield producing – tons, and a processing plant for – tons of oil. The investment has been small, the time has been short, the successes have been great, and the many writings on this subject are worth having a look at. All ministries should learn from the Petroleum Ministry, learn from the Liberation Army, and get some good experience, so as to be combat brigade in relation to the enemy, and a work brigade in relation to ourselves. University students should also learn from the Liberation Army. They should make full use of their successes, set up models for emulation, praise them extensively, and at the same time criticize mistakes. Praise should be the main thing, and criticism should be supplementary. Among those working for our cause, there are many good people, and many good models, which should be praised.

Last year in Hopei there were great natural diasters. In the south there was a drought; originally the harvest was good, but there were heavy rains causing the loss of 20,000 million *chin* [approximately 12 million metric tons] of grain; nevertheless, last year the total production rose by more than 10,000 million *chin*, and this year we want to do even better. At present we are learning from the Liberation Army, we are learning from the Petroleum Ministry, we are learning from models in the cities, the villages, the factories and the schools, we are overcoming mistakes in our work, and endeavouring to do our work some what better this year.

At this forum today, we have discussed international problems, but our basic concern is with internal problems. If we don't deal effectively with our internal problems, there's no good talking about international affairs. At present, there are some countries that want to establish relations with our country, such as the Congo. The Congo of Lumumba launched a guerrilla war, but they have no modern weapons at all – only things like Kuan Kung's Black Dragon Crescent Sword, and Chang Fei's eighteen-foot spear[11].

XXX: There are also Huang Chung's arrows.

Chairman Mao: It is nothing but the weapons of Kuan, Chang, Chao, Ma and Huang – they have no modern weapons. In the past we didn't have any either. After the Nanchang Uprising[12]. we lost two divisions; then Chu Te, Ch'en I, and Lin Piao led the remnant up the Chingkangshan. I didn't know how to fight myself. In 1918 I worked in the library of Peking University: I was paid eight dollars a month, and got along without worrying about clothing, food, or lodging. Chang Shih-chao didn't want to be an official for Yuan Shih-K'ai[13], so he let him be President of Peking University, he went to Peking University to run a journal. Old Huang[14], are you a constitutionalist?

Huang Yen-P'ei: I am a revolutionary not a constitutionalist,

I participated in the T'ung Meng Hui[15].

Chang Shih-Chao: He's a revolutionary.

Chairman Mao: Old Ch'en[16], you belonged to the Research Clique, Chang Shih-chao participated in the Second Revolution[17] and in 1925 he was a minister. Now all of you are marching together with us, participating in socialist construction in the new China. When I say we hope to do our work somewhat better this year, this is not merely the Central Committee's hope, it is also your hope. Hsu Te-heng, are you in charge of an industrial ministry[18]

XXX: There is great hope for his ministry.

Chairman Mao: Old Huang, your family seems to include every possible party and faction – the Democratic League, the Association for Promoting Democracy[19], the Communist Youth League. The poem by your son Huang Wan-li, entitled 'Greatings to the Bridgeroom', is very well written. I admire it. There is a member of the September Third Society who also writes good poems. I admire him too. You don't know your ten-odd children very well, you are like Kuo Tzu-i[20].

All Ministries should learn from the Liberation Army, set up a political department, and strengthen their political work. They must encourage achievement, set up model workers for emulation, praise them extensively, and at the same time criticize mistakes. Praise should be the main thing, and criticism should be supplementary. Among those working for our cause, there are many good people and good things, there are many good models which we must praise.

Today I want to talk to you about the problem of education. Progress has been made in industry, and I think that there should be some changes in education too. The present state of affairs won't do. In my opinion the line and orientation *[fang-chen]* in education are correct, but the methods are wrong, and must be changed. Present here today are comrades from the Central Committee, comrades from within the Party, comrades from outside the party, comrades from the Academy of Sciences. Comrade XXX will now give a talk.

XXX: At present, an urgent problem in the domain of education is that of the educational system, i.e., the fact that the prescribed length of studies is excessive. At present, children begin school at the age of seven, and spend six years in primary school, six years in middle school, and in some cases six years at university, generally five, thus making in all seventeen or eighteen years. They graduate from university only at the age of twenty-four or twenty-five, and afterwards they engage in manual labour for a year, and then undergo a further period of one year's on-the-job training, so that they finally emerge [from the whole process] when they are already twenty-six or twenty-seven. This is two or three years longer than it takes in the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, primary and middle school last for ten years, and the university for four or five, so that at twenty-three or twenty-four they take up a post and begin work.

In the study of the humanities, there is no great problem about students growing too old. In the case of the natural sciences they manifestly [remain at their studies] too long. This is particularly the case with the science of atomic energy, with the most advanced sciences, the students are too old when they graduate. On the basis of the experience of all countries of the world, it is possible to make a contribution to the natural sciences by the time one reaches the age of twenty-four or twenty-five. For example, in the United States and in the Soviet Union, those who have some achievements to their credit in the natural sciences, in the field of atomic energy, are commonly all twenty-four or twenty-five. At that age, the brain functions most effectively, but at that age, our students are still at university, and have not taken up a post and begun work. They start working only at twenty-six or twenty-seven; this is not advantageous to the development of the sciences. The prescribed course length is exceedingly great, we must give some thought to the system of education.

Chairman Mao: The period of schooling should be shortened somewhat.

XXX: Recently Comrade XX had an idea: there should be five years of primary school and four years of middle school, so that students would graduate from middle school at sixteen. If there were six years of primary school, they would graduate from middle school at seventeen. The problem is that the facilities for higher education are inadequate; each year, the universities take only 1,20,000 or 1,30,000 students, or 1,50,000 at the outside. The others could begin work at sixteen. They could receive two years of vocational training after graduating from middle school, and then at eighteen they could go to work in the factories or the villages; in this way, they would be more in touch [with reality]. Or they could attend two years of preparatory courses, thus establishing links with the university, and begin work at twenty-four or twenty-five. In a word, studies must be shortened somewhat. At present, the Central Committee has set up a small group *[hsiao-tsu]* under the leadership of Comrade XX, especially to study the question of the educational system. If we adopt this suggestion for improving our national education, then students could graduate in general at fifteen or sixteen. There is however, one problem – that of military service. They would be too young for this, but they could undergo preliminary training.

Chairman Mao: That's not important; those who are not old enough for military service can also experience military life. Not only male students, but also female students can undergo military service. We can form a red women's detachment. Girls of sixteen or seventeen can also experience six months to a year of military life, and at seventeen they can also serve as soldiers.

XXX: Thus, the problem of schools teaching literary subject is not so great. The problems with faculties of science and engineering are somewhat greater. The universities have preparatory courses of one or two years; after graduating from middle school, students can either go on to the university preparatory courses, or enter a vocational school, and after two years training they can go on to work in a factory or in the countryside at eighteen, thus they will be relatively in touch [with reality]. If they study engineering, they will also be relatively in touch, when they graduate at twenty-three or twenty-four they can take up a post and begin work.

Chairman Mao: At present, there is too much studying going on, and this is exceedingly harmful. There are too many subjects at present, and the burden is too heavy, it puts middle-school and university students in a constant state of tension. Cases of short sight are constantly multiplying among primary and middle- school students. This can't be allowed to go on un-changed.

XXX: The subjects covered by the syllabus are too many and too complicated. Many old teachers have remained at their posts. The students are not able to bear it; they are tense in the extreme, and they have no extra-curricular activities, and no time for extra-curricular reading.

Chairman Mao: The syllabus should be chopped in half. The students should have time for recreation, swimming, playing ball, and reading freely outside their course work. Confucius only professed the six arts – rites, music, archery, chariot-driving, poetry and history – but he produced four sages: Yen Hui, Tseng-tzu, Tzu Lu and Mencius. It won't do for students just to read books all day, and not to go in for cultural pursuits, physical education, and swimming, not to be able to run around, or to read things outside their courses, etc.

XXX: The students are extremely tense. When I'm at home the children say, what's the point in getting top marks in every thing?

Chairman Mao: Throughout history, very few of those who came first in the imperial examination have achieved great fame. The celebrated T'ang dynasty poets Li Po and Tu Fu were neither *chin-shih* nor *han-lin*[21]. Han Yu and Liu Tsung yuan[22] were only *chin-shih* of the second rank. Wang Shih-fu, Kuan Han-ch'ing[23] Lo Kuan-chung, P'u Sung-ling[24], Ts'ao Hsueh-ch'in were none of them *chin-shih* or *han-lin*, P'u Sungling was a *hsiu-ts'ai*, all who had received promotion, he wanted to rise to the next higher rank, but he was not a *chu-jen*[25]. None of those who became *chin-shih* or *han-lin* were successful. Only two of the emperors of the Ming dynasty did well. Tai-tsu and Ch'eng-tsu. One was illiterate, and the other only knew a few characters. Afterwards, in contrast, in the Chia- ch'ing reign, when the intellectuals had power, things were in a bad state, the country was in disorder[26]. Han Wu Ti and Li Hou- chu[27] were highly cultivated and ruined the country. It is evident that to read too many books[28] is harmful. Liu Hsiu was an academician, whereas Liu Pangis was a country bumpkin[28].

XXX: There is too much on the syllabus, and there are too many exercises to hand in, the students cannot reflect independently. The present method of examination . . . .

Chairman Mao: Our present method of conducting examinations is a method for dealing with the enemy, not a method for dealing with the people It is a method of surprise attack, asking oblique or strange questions. This is still the same method as the old eight-legged essay. I do not approve of this. It should be changed completely. I am in favour of publishing the questions in advance and letting the students study them and answer them with the aid of books. For instance, if one sets twenty questions on the *Dream of the Red Chamber*, and some students answer half of them and answer them well, and some of the answers are very good and contain creative ideas, then one can give them 100 per cent. If some other students answer all twenty questions and answer them correctly, but answer them simply by reciting from their textbooks and lectures, without any creative ideas, they should be given 50 or 60 per cent. At examinations whispering into each other's ears and taking other people's places ought to be allowed. If your answers is good and I copy it, then mine should be counted as good. whispering in other people's ears and taking examinations in other people's names used to be done secretly. Let it now be done openly. If I can't do something and you write down the answer, which I then copy, this is all right. Let's give it a try. We must do things in a lively fashion, not in a lifeless fashion. There are teachers who ramble on and on when they lecture; they should let their students doze off. If your lecture is no good, why insist on others listening to you? Rather than keeping your eyes open and listening to boring lectures, it is better to get some refreshing sleep. You don't have to listen to nonsense, you can rest your brain instead.

XXX: If we shorten the period of schooling, there will be time for engaging in labour, or for military service. We can also consider having the outstanding students skip a grade, we don't have to keep them eternally in the same place. In the same grade as my child, there is a classmate who was originally an outstanding student; afterwards, he

skipped a grade, and he is still an outstanding student. Thus we see that it is possible to skip grades. Ask Comrade XX to organize a small group to conduct a thorough study of this problem of the school system.

Chairman Mao: Let both XX and XXX participate in this small group. At present we are doing things in too lifeless a manner. There is too much on the syllabus, and examinations are conducted in too rigid a manner. I cannot approve this. The present method of education ruins talent and ruins youth. I do not approve of reading so many books. The method of examination is a method for dealing with the enemy, it is most harmful, and should be stopped.

XXX: At present, the head of the Department of Education has just called a meeting, at which two questions are being considered: one is that the students' burden is too heavy, and there is homework in every subject the second is that there are three pedagogical systems, those of Confucius, the Soviets, and Dewy.

Chairman Mao: Confucius wasn't really like that. We have cast aside the mainstream of Confucianism. He had only the six subjects: rites, music, archery, chariot-driving, *'shu'*, and mathematics. (Chairman Mao asked XXX whether *'shu'* meant calligraphy or history[29].)

XXX: It means calligraphy.

Chairman Mao: It means history. As in the *Shu Ching* or the *Han Shu*[30].

XXX: At present, middle-school students take continuing their studies as their sole aim. After graduating, they are not willing to engage in labour, this is a very big question, and we must solve it. We must put into practice the union of education and productive labour, in addition, we must also walk on two legs[31]. Last year there was flooding in Hopei, and the Department of Education was under great strain. Many buildings collapsed, and they had to set up simple schools as best they could. As a result, the number of primary and middle-school pupils actually increased.

Chairman Mao: The flood engulfed dogmatism. We must get rid of dogmas, both foreign and indigenous.

XXX: Other places have carried out a regularization, and introduced teaching all in one class, rather than separately according to subject. The number of students has declined, and the number of poor and lower-middle peasants has declined, very many poor and lower-middle peasants do not continue their schooling. In Hopei Province they have some good experience. In Hsin-hui *hsien* in Kwangtung Province, they have investigated ten- odd agricultural middle schools, and ordinary middle schools. In an ordinary middle school, the state spends 120 *yuan* per year on each student, whereas in an agricultural middle school they spend only 6.80 *yuan* a year on each student. There is no problem at all about the graduates of an agricultural middle school filling a job, whereas if a graduate of an ordinary middle school does not succeed in the university entrance examination, there is a great deal of difficulty about placing him in employment. Thus, primary and middle schools should all walk on two legs. At the same time, we must pay attention to improving quality . Previously, everything was done according to Soviet methods, but in 1958 we struck a blow at this, and more provision was made for labour, but then study was neglected in turn, but now that things have been further altered it is all right. It is the same with literature and art, the level is relatively high now, but if there had not been 1958, we would not have attained our present level[32].

Chairman Mao: We must drive actors, poets, dramatists and writers out of the cities, and pack them all off to the countryside. They should all periodically go down in batches to the villages and to the factories. We must not let writers stay in the government offices; they will never get anything written if they do not go down. Whoever does not go down will get no dinner; only when they go down will they be fed.

XXX: At present, there are a little over two per cent bad elements among the primary and middle-school teachers, and there are also notoriously bad elements among the primary and middle- school students.

Chairman Mao: That doesn't matter, they can change jobs.

XXX: At present, the worst students go to normal school; the good students go into engineering. Henceforth, we might think about not taking graduates of higher middle school directly into normal school or faculties of letters, but accepting only higher middle- school graduates who have engaged in labour for a year or two. The students of the natural sciences should also go down. They have some experience at the XX School in Harbin; they send the teachers down for a year or two. Those who were not so good originally are all pretty good when they come back from labour, they become part of the core.

Chairman Mao: They must go down. At present, there are some

people who do not attach much importance to going to work in the countryside. In the Ming dynasty, Li Shih-chen[33] went hither and thither, and climbed the mountains to gather herbs. Tsu Ch'ung-chih[34] never went to middle school or university. Confucius was from a poor peasant family; he herded sheep, and never attended middle school or university either. He was a musician, he did all sorts of things. When someone had a death in the family, he would be invited to play at the funeral. He may also have been an accountant. He could play the *ch'in*[35] and drive a chariot, ride a horse and shoot with bow and arrow. '*Yu*' means to drive a chariot; it is like being the chauffeur of an automobile. He produced seventy-two sages, such as Yen Hui and Tseng-tzu, and the he had 3,000 disciples. In his youth, he came from the masses, and understood something of the suffering of the masses. Later he became an official in the state of Lu, though not a terribly high official. The population of Lu was over a million, and for a long time people looked down on him. When he traveled around to different countries, people cursed him. This person liked to talk frankly, and said he had not experienced misery, and could not bear insults. Later, Tzu Lu acted as Confucius' bodyguard, and did not allow people to speak ill of Confucius, but would beat anyone who opened his mouth. From this time forward, no more unpleasant sounds entered his ears, and the masses did not dare approach him. We must not cast aside the tradition of Confucius. Our general policy is correct, but our methods are wrong. There are quite a few problems regarding the present school system, curriculum, methods of teaching, and examination methods, and all this must be changed. They are all exceedingly destructive of people.

XXX: We can get by with five years of primary school.

Chairman Mao: Primary school teaching should not go on too long, either. Gorki had only two years of primary school; his learning was all self-taught. Franklin of America was originally a newspaper seller, yet he discovered electricity. Watt was a worker, yet he invented the steam-engine. Both in ancient and modern times, in China and abroad, many scientists trained themselves in the course of practice.

XX: When the school system has been reformed in the future, students will be able to take up a post when they reach the age of twenty-three or twenty-four. Seven is a rather late age for beginning school, we can bring it forward to six. There is a problem with buildings, but if primary school is changed to five years we can dispense with some. Then four years of middle school, and one or two years of a preparatory course at university. In view of the different nature of the various courses at university, we can diversify, and take in 140,000 or 150,000 students each year for a one or two-year preparatory course.

XXX: Before entering university, they can take off a period and go to work in a factory or in a village.

Chairman Mao: They can also go to the army for training.

XX: This is all right as regards literary subjects, but in physics there is the problem of the use of mathematics, and if they work for two years they might forget it.

XX: In the Soviet Union they work for two years after graduating from middle school, and then enter the faculties of physics and chemistry, they don't take them directly.

XX: Except for some special schools, the universities are divided into three course-lengths: six years, especially for medicine, five years for engineering, and four years for literary subjects. In most cases of university courses, four years is sufficient. In the future, the system should be diversified, there should be different course-lengths. In the cities, there should be two kinds of middle schools one leading to university and the other where students graduate in two years, after which they enter specialized training.

Chairman Mao: That's right, we must diversify.

XX: The main problem with the curriculum is a lack of centralization, and there are also those problems we studied in the past, many subjects are studied several times, every semester there are eight or nine subjects to study, there are many examinations, and this creates great tension.

Chairman Mao: Nowadays, first, there are too many classes; second, there are too many books. The pressure is too great. There are some subjects which it is not necessary to examine. For example, it is not necessary to examine the little logic and grammar which is learned in middle school. Real understanding must be acquired gradually through experience at work. It is enough to know what logic and grammar are.

XX: At present it's all cramming, mechanical memorizing and reciting.

XXX: There are two schools of thought nowadays. One school advocates teaching subjects thoroughly, while the other advocates teaching them in outline, teaching how to go about mastering subjects, though teaching somewhat less. At present many schools follow the first pattern, but isn't it true that this won't work. By advocating doing things in this way, they petrify thought.

Chairman Mao: This is scholasticism. The annotations to the Four Books and the Five Classics are exceedingly scholastic, and nowadays they have all become completely indigestible. Scholasticism must inevitably die out. For example, in the study of the classics very many commentaries were written, but now they have disappeared. I think that students trained by this method, no matter whether it be in China, in America or in the Soviet Union, will all disappear, will all move towards their opposites. The same applies to the Buddhist classics, of which there are so many. The version of the *Diamond Sutra* edited by Hsuan-tsang[36] of the T,ang dynasty was comparatively simplified, only a thousand-odd words and it still exists. Another version, edited by Kumarajiva[37], was too long, and has died out. Won't the Five Classics and the Thirteen Classics also come to the end of the road? They have been very copiously annotated, and as a result nobody reads them. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they indulged in scholastic philosophy; only in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did [the world] enter the age of enlightenment and the Renaissance take place. We shouldn't read too many books. We should read Marxist books, but not too many of them either. It will be enough to read a dozen or so. If we read too many, we can move towards our opposites, become bookworms, dogmatists, revisionists. In the writings of Confucius, there is nothing about agricultural. Because of this, the limbs of his students were not accustomed to toil, and they could not distinguish between the five grains. We must do something about this.

XXX: There is another question, which is a political question, that of the student's nourishment, which must be improved. Each student eats food costing 12.5 *yuan* every month. We should spend another 40 million *yuan*.

Chairman Mao: It is all right to spend another 40 million yuan.

XXX: We should increase it by 2 to 4 *yuan*[38].

Chairman Mao: If you read too many books, they petrify your mind in the end. Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty did pretty well in his early years, but afterwards he read many books, and didn't make out so well any more. He died of hunger in Tai Ch'eng[39].

NOTES

1. Spring Festival is new years day in the Chinese Lunar Calender.

2. The term "democratic parties" often referred to in CPC literature, especially in united front work, refers specially to a small group of political parties that were made up largely of members of the national bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and patriotic "democratic personages." (These were distinguished from "democratic personages with no party affiliations.") These political parties were not considered to be proletarian in class identity or inherently inclined toward the socialist revolution. However, they had been developed in the period of the New Democratic Revolution, and to varying degrees of intensity, were aligned with the CPC in the struggle to bring about the socialist transformation of China, and to consolidate China's interests vis-a-vis imperialist encroachment. The institutions of 1949 and 1954 provided for the participation of 'democratic personages', not affiliated with any party, in the political life of the country. The most famous of these was Sung Ch'ing-ling, Sun Yat- sen's widow. Some of the non-communists present at the forum of February 1964 belonged to this category; others were representatives of the minor parties.

3. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region was the revolutionary base area which was gradually built up after 1931 through revolutionary guerrilla war in northern Shensi. When the Central Red Army arrived in northern Shensi after the Long March, it became the central base area of the revolution and the seat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was named the Shensi-Kansu Ningsia Border Region after the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front in 1937, and it included twenty-three counties along the common borders of the three provinces.

4. The "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" were secretly issued by the central authorities of the Kuomintang in 1939. They imposed severe restrictions on communist and all other progressive ideas, speech and action with the aim of disrupting all the anti-Japanese organizations of the people. They also stipulated that in places where in the opinion of the Kuomintang, "Communists were most active", the "Law of collective responsibility and collective punishment" was to be enforced and an "information network", or counter-revolutionary secret service, was to be generally established within the *Pao-chia* organizations. *Pao* and *chia* were then the basic administrative units of the Kuomintang's fascist regime.Ten households formed a *chia* and ten *chia* a *pao*.

5. Chang Shih-chao (1881-1973) had been active in the revolutionary movement as a journalist from the early years of the twentieth century. He was evidently one of the non-party 'democratic personages' Mao was addressing in his opening remarks.

6. On October 30, 1945 Kao Shu-hsun, Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's 11th War Zone, revolted at the civil war front in Hantan, southern Hopei Province, and came over to our side with one corps and one column. This had a great influence throughout the country. In order to intensify the work of dividing and disintegrating the Kuomintang troops and arousing them to revolt, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to start a propaganda campaign calling upon other Kuomintang officers and men to follow the example of Kao Shu-hsun and his troops, refuse to attack the Liberated Areas, sabotage the civil war at the front, fraternize with the people's Liberation Army, rise in revolt and come over to the side of the people. This was known as the Kao Shu-hsun movement. The Koumintang thereupon turned on Kao and smashed his forces.

7. Both the Kuang Hsu emperor (reigned 1875-1908) and his successor the Hsuan Tung emperor had occupied the throne during Mao's lifetime.

8. Tsai-t'ao was in control of the imperial guards at the time of the 1911 revolution. He was regarded, during the last years of the dynasty, as one of the more liberal-minded among the imperial clansmen.

9. On 24 December 1946, Shen Ch'ung, a girl student at Peiping University, was raped by an American Marine. This incident led to widespread anti-American demonstrations by students in many Chinese cities, and to demands for the immediate with-drawal of all US Military forces.

10. In 1964, Mao was to launch the slogan, 'In industry learn from Tach'ing, in agriculture learn from Tachai', and since that time both of these have generally been regarded as 'Maoist'models. Here Mao credits the Petroleum Ministry with the achievements of the Tach'ing oil-fields in Heilungkiang Province.

11. Kuan Yu (also known as Kuan Kung, the God of War) and Chang Fei were the two principal companions-in-arms of Liu Pei, the founder of the Shu Han Dynasty, during the period of the Three Kingdoms in the third century A.D. In the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, the celebrated novel they are

described as wielding the weapons referred to here. Huang Chung, Chao [Yun], and Ma[Su] were the remaining three of Liu Pei's 'five tiger generals'. Although Liu Pei, like his two rivals, claimed to be the rightful ruler of the whole empire, the territory actually controlled by him was primarily that of the Kingdom of Shu, centering on Present-day Szechuan, where Mao and his comrades were meeting.

12. Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province, was the scene of the famous uprising on August 1, 1927 led by the Communist Party of China in order to combat the counter-revolution of Chiang Kai- Shek and Wang Ching-wei and to continue the revolution of 1924- 27. More than thirty thousand troops took part in the uprising which was led by comrades Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ho Lung and Yeh Ting. The insurrectionary army withdrew from Nanchang on August 5 as planned, but suffered a defeat when approaching Chaochow and Swatow in Kwangtung Province. Led by Comrades Chu Teh and Chen Yi, part of the troops later fought their way to the Chingkang Mountains and joined forces with the First Division of the First Workers' and Peasants Revolutionary Army under Comrade Mao Tse- tung.

13. Yuan Shih-kai was the head of the Northern warloords in the last years of the Ching Dynasty. After the Ching Dynasty was overthrown by the Revolution of 1911, he usurped the presidency of the Republic and organized the first government of the Northern Warlords, which represented the big landlord and big comprador classes. He did this by relying on counter- revoluntionary armed force and on the support of the imperialists and by taking advantage of the conciliationist character of the bourgeoisie, which was then leading the revolution. In 1915 he wanted to make himself emperor and, to gain the support of the Japanese imperialists, accepted the Twenty one demands with which Japan aimed at obtaining exclusive control of all China. In December of the same year an uprising against his assumption of the throne took place in Yunnan Province and promptly won nation-wide response and support. Yuan Shih-kai died in Pekig in June 1916.

14. Huang Yen-p'ei, an advocate of American-style vocational education, had been a leading figure in the Democratic League during the civil war of 1964-9, and was Minister of Light Industry from 1949 to 1954. In 1964, he was Chairman of the China Democratic National Construction Association, as well as being a member of the Standing Committee of the Democratic League.

15. In 1894, Dr. Sun Yat-sen formed a small revolutionary organization in Honolulu called the *Hsing Chung Hui* (Society for China's Regeneration). With the support of the secret societies among the people, he staged two armed insurrections in Kwangtung Province against the Ching government after its defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, one at Canton in 1895 and the other at Huichow in 1900.

Tung Meng Hui, or the Chinese Revolutionary League (a united front organization of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and a section of the landed gentry opposed to the Ching government), was formed in 1905 through the merging of the *Hsing Chung Hui* and two other groups, the *Hua Hsing Hui* (Society for China's Regeneration) and the *Kuang Fu Hui* (Society for Breaking the Foreign Yoke). It put forward a programme of bourgeois revolution advocating "the expulsion of the Tartars (Manchus), the recovery of China, the establishment of a republic and the equalization of landownership". In the period of the Chinese Revolutionary League, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, allying himself with the secret societies and a part of the New Army of the Ching government, launched a number of armed insurrections against the Ching regime, notably those at Pinghsiang (Kiangsi Province), Liuyang and Liling (Human Province) in 1906, at Huangkang Chaochow and Chinchow (Kwangtung Province), and at Chennankuan (Kwangsi Province) in 1907, at Hokou (Yunnan Province), in 1908 and at Canton in 1911. The last was followed in the same yea by the Wuchnag Uprising which resulted in the overthrow of the Ching Dynasty.

16. Old Ch'en' is apparently Ch'en Shu-t'ung, Chairman of the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce since 1953. Both 'Old Huang' and 'Old Ch'en' were thus 'democratic personages', who had worked with the new regime since 1949.

17. The 'Second Revolution' was the attempt, in 1913,by forces under the leadership of Ts'ai Ao, to overthrow Yuan Shih-k'ai and halt the movement away from genuine republicanism towards a restoration of the monarchy. On the other hand, the government of which Chang Shih-chao was minister in 1925 was that of the warlord-dominated regime in Peking, Mao deliberately mentions these two contrasting episodes in Chang Shih-chao's life in order to evoke the wide variety of experience through which his generation has passed in its search for an answer to China's problems.

18. Hsu Te-heng (1895-) was a student leader during the May Fourth Movement. He has been Chairman of the *Chiu-san* (September third) Society, referred to below by Mao, since its foundation in 1945. (The Society, named for the date of Japanese surrender, is one of the minor parties participating in the united front). The 'industrial ministry' about which Mao asks here in the Ministry of Aquatic Products, which Hsu had headed since 1956.

19. The Association for Promoting Democracy was another of the minor

parties, founded originally in Shanghai in 1945, which included mainly intellectuals in its ranks.

20. Kuo Tzu-i (697-781), a celebrated general of the T'ang Dynasty, had eight sons and seven sons-in-law; his grandchildren and great-grandchildren are reported to have been so numerous that he could not recognize them, and had to be content with bowing when they came to pay their respects.

21. *Chin-shih*, a successful candidate at the highest ('metropolitan', followed by 'palace') examinations, according to the system of examinations adopted by China's autocractic dynasties. It was a method used by the feudal ruling class for selecting personnel to govern the people and also for enticing the intellectuals. The system, dating from the 7th century, persisted into the early 20th century. *Han-lin*, a member of the *Han-lin* Academy, which became from Ming times the preserve of those who had achieved special distinction in the palace examinations.

22. Han Yu (768-824) and Liu Tsung-yuan (773-819) were friends as well as contemporaries, distinguished poets and essayists who both experienced periods of banishment in the course of their official careers. Han Yu especially is regarded as one of the greatest prose writers in the history of China; as a student in Changsha, Mao was taught to take him as a model in writing essays.

23. Wang Shih-fu and Kuan Han-ch'ing were celebrated dramatists of the Yuan dynasty, who flourished towards the end of the thirteenth century. Wang is the author of the *Story of the Western Chamber*.

24. Lo Kuan-chung (14th century A.D.), was the author of the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, the historical novel.

P'u Sung-ling (b. 1622) is known for a celebrated collection of tales of the supernatural.

25. *Hsiu-ts'ai*, literally 'cultivated talent', popular name for a successful candidate at the lowest or prefectural examinations, more correctly known as a *sheng-yuan* or 'licentiate'. Though he 'received promotion' by imperial favour to the rank of senior licentiate, he failed to pass the next higher stage in the examination system proper, the provincial examination, and therefore did not obtain the corresponding title of *chu-jen* ('selected man'), or the opportunity to sit the metropolitan examination.

26. Ming Tai-tsu, the founder of the dynasty, reigned from 1368 to 1399; Ch'eng-tsu, the third emperor of the dynasty, reigned from 1403 to 1425. The Chia-ch'ing reign extended from 1522 to 1567.

27. Han Wu Ti, the 'Martial Emperor' of the Han dynasty, reigned 140-86 B.C.

28. Liu Hsiu (4 B.C-A.D. 57) overthrew the usurper Wang Mang in A.D.25 and founded the Later Han (or Eastern Han) dynasty. Liu Pang (247-195 B.C.), founded the original Han dynasty in 206 B.C.

29. The character read *shu* may be either a noun, meaning book or written document (in this case, a book of history) or a verb meaning to write, especially in the sense of writing out in a fine hand. Normally, in Confucius' list of six subjects or arts, it is taken to mean calligraphy.

30. The *Shu Ching* ('Historical Classic') is one of the Thirteen Classics', together with the Confucian *Analects, the Book of Odes*. etc. The *Han Shu* is the standard history of the Han dynasty.

31. 'Walking on two legs' was one of the principal slogans of the Great Leap Forward of 1958-9. It was used primarily with reference to economic development, to characterize a policy combining large scale modern technology and the use of small- scale, indigenous methods. Here it is used to suggest a similar approach to education, combing schools (mainly in the cities) with modern equipment and an elaborate curriculum, with simpler and more basic schools adapted to the needs and possibilities in the countryside.

32. XXX, whoever he is offers only a rather half-hearted defence of the 'Great Leap' policies: the downgrading of expertise, he argues, though useful as a corrective to the Soviet- style technocratic attitudes prevalent earlier, went much too far, and would have led to unfortunate results if the pendulum had not swung back again. His emphasis contracts sharply with that of comrade Mao Tse-tung in the next paragraph.

33. Li Shih-chen (1518-98) was the author of the *Pen-ts' ao kang mu* (Index of Roots and Herbs), a treatise listing more than 1,000 plants useful for medicinal purposes.

34. A mathematician of the tenth century.

35. A stringed instrument similar to a lute; skill in playing it was part of the general culture expected of the literati.

36. On his return to China in 645, after a pilgrimage of sixteen years to India, whence he brought back a quantity of Buddhist scriptures, the monk Huan-tsang (602-64) presided over the translation of no less than 1,338 chapters in the course of the remaining years of his life.

37. Kumarajiva (350-413), a Buddhist scholar who had studied in Kashmir, was brought to the imperial capital of Ch'ang-an in 401, and placed in charge of the translation of Buddhist scriptures These versions, the best of their time, were later superseded by the 'new translations' of Hsuan-tsang and his successors, not

because of their length but because they were insufficiently precise.

38. Obviously the figure of 40 million *yuan* refers to the total annual bill for subsistance, while the figure of 2 to 4 *yuan* indicates the corresponding increase in the monthly amount per student. According to the best available estimates, there were, at this time, approximately three quarters of a million students in Chinese institutions of higher education. Thus the two figures are roughly consistent.

39. Hsiao Yen (464-549) occupied Nanking in 501 and was proclaimed the first emperor of the Liang dynasty in the following year. A student of Buddhism and lover of books, he was unable to implement his good intentions by reforming the administration. When T'ai Ch'eng fell to a rebellious ally in 549, he was allowed, to die of hunger and despair in a monastery to which he had retired.

TALK AT THE HANTAN FORUM ON FOUR CLEAN-UPS WORK

March 28, 1964

1. Forty or fifty years ago I read a book, Record of Hsiang Shan *(Hsiang Shan Chi).* The two opening lines were "I do not sing of heavens nor of earth, I only sing of the book Record of Hsiang Shan." When you sing of this, you can sing of no other.

2. We have not had a class struggle for 10 years. We had one in '52 and one in '57[1] but those were just in the administration organs and in the schools. This time we must do the socialist education campaign in the countryside well, for at least three or four years. I say at least three or four years; otherwise, five or six years. Some places plan to complete 60 percent this year. We must not hurry. Haste makes waste. Of course this is not to say that we can nibble away at it slowly. The problems is that the campaign has already begun. Honan is in too much of a hurry. It would be reasonable to say this is a second land reform.

3. (Some people report that the work teams use contracts to claim the blue skies as theirs)

Does not contracting for the public assist the local despots and evil gentry?

(Some people report that some work teams strike at people)

Contracting for the public is to strike at people.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought,* a Red Guard Publication.

4. It is not strange that the test points [experiments] failed. We must still have them even though they failed. We must pay special attention to summing up the lessons of failure.

5. (Some people say that some people advocate replacing the "Four Cleans-ups" with a study of Ta-ch'ing and the Liberation Army).

This represents the faction which does not carry out class struggle. Is it possible that Ta-ch'ing does not oppose corruption and waste? That it does not oppose thievery?

6. The Five Antis directives of the Central Committee did not speak of class struggle.

7. We should let the monsters and freaks come out. Halfway will not do; if they are halfway out they can still slip back in.

8. With regard to the downward transfer of the four rights of authority, it proves that the opinion of the deputy director of the Rural Work Department of the Shantung Provincial Committee is correct. Chou Hsing did not agree with him and said that we could not transfer downward to the team. In actuality it was a minority opinion representing the opinion of the majority.

9. (Some say that university professors who have gone to the countryside for the four clean-ups say they do not understand anything themselves)

Intellectuals are really the most ignorant. Now they have acknowledged defeat. The professors are not like the students and the students are not like the peasants.

10. They have turned over all the machineguns and do not want to arrest him again. Arrest is to hand contradictions to those above. The higher levels in turn do not understand the situation, but would do well to transfer the supervision to the masses.

11. Everyone must read documents, except for those who are old and ill, whose cultural level is so low they cannot read documents, and those whose political prestige is very low, such as P'eng Te-huai.

12. "On the Present Situation and Our Tasks" was spoken by me in 1947[2]. Someone transcribed it and it was revised by me. At that time I had contracted a disease whereby I could not write. Now when I want something written, it is all done by a secretary, not by my hand. Of course, some things may be written for me by other people. For instance, the speeches delivered by the premier when he leaves the country are done by Juang Chen and Ch'iao Kuan-hua. When you are ill, you may have someone write down what you say. But if you never take the initiative and rely on a secretary, it is just like having a secretary assume your responsibility for leadership work.

13. My 1933 investigation at Ku-t'ien reflected the opinions of the peasants, and was the opinions of the peasants issuing from my lips.

Opinions do not come from Peking. If a factory has no materials to work with, it does not produce anything. We rely on your raw materials to do our processing.

NOTES

1. Struggle in 52 refers to the campaign against "3 evils" and "5 evils" (see note 2 on page 6 of this volume.)

Struggle in 57 refers to the anti-rightist struggle of 1957.

2. For this article see Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Volume V pp 157-176.

REMARKS AT A BRIEFING

March 1964

I have read your letter asking to have a talk with me. Recently I have been occupied with the struggle against revisionism and the like, so it has taken me some time to come and talk with you.

As you can see, we are struggling against Khrushchev. Can we win? We have struggled against enemies for a generation. We dared to struggle against imperialism, and defeated it. Who says we cannot defeat Khrushchev?!

We are now principally in a struggle against imperialism and revisionism. As for reactionaries like Nehru they don't amount to too much!

(On the high targets for grain production proposed by some at the 1960 Shanghai meeting)

Truth, all truth, is ever in the hand of minority in the beginning. They will always have some compulsion exerted on them by the majority. Four hundred years ago Copernicus, a great Polish astronomer, discovered that the earth moves. The theory that heavens revolve about the earth had ruled astronomy for over 1,000 years. The greatest achievement of Copernicus in his life time was to replace this theory with the scientific theory that the earth revolves about the sun. The religious circles of that time rallied together to attack him, to oppose him and accuse him of heresy. He was oppressed on all

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SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication

sides. His *De Revolutionibus* was not published until he was on his deathbed (1543). He rejoiced in it. In Italy during that period the brilliant physicist and astronomer Galileo (1564-1642) subscribed to Copernicus "heliocentric theory". Beginning in 1609 he observed the heavens with a homemade telescope to see whether the stars moved, but he was persecuted by the religious circles of that time and convicted by the reactionary Roman court. Another person was burned to death. Burning an individual is nothing! Truth does not lie in his hands! Burn someone to death and the earth still moves. A German invented sleeping potions. He was an apothecary in a druggist's shop. The several men did their experiments in the shop. At first their aim was to alleviate the pain of women during childbirth. They carried out several experiments. Once eight people were poisoned and almost died, but finally they discovered a sleeping potion. But the Germans did not allow them to manufacture it or promote its sale. The French purchased their patent rights and invited the apothecary to France and held a meeting to welcome him. Only then was it disseminated. And most curiously, it did not thrive in one place, but did elsewhere. This kind of thing happens very frequently. For instance, Buddhism was born in India, but it was not so tolerated in India; however, it thrived when it reached China and other places. As another example, at present Marxism-Leninism is not thriving in Europe or the Soviet Union, but it is in China. Darwin personally believed in religion. When his *Origin of Species* was published, he was persecuted by religious circles which opposed him.

(On socialist education)

Recently we held a discussion to ratify two documents from the members of the Central Committee to the members of county committees. These documents are being read to the masses. It will take one or two years to finish this reading. I have recommended that whoever is not old and inform (such as Hsu or Wu), whoever is not illiterate, and whoever has prestige among the masses (of course this does not mean rightists; for instance, P'eng Teh-huai[1] must not go) should take part in this reading. The generals have all gone among the troops to read – they say it can be done! Why don't others do it?

In actuality, reading documents to the masses means to learn from the masses. If you want to go to a region to read, you first carry out investigation and study.

The "Four Clean-ups" and "Five Antis" were taught to us by the masses. Nothing was engendered in our brains. The "Four Clean- ups" was proposed by the Pao-t'ing Special District Party Committee. Of the eight special district committees in Hopeh Province, only Pao-t'ing presented it. At the beginning even the Pao-t'ing Special District Party Committee did not understand how to carry out the "Four Clean-ups." Afterwards the masses submitted to them that it would not do to leave out the "Four Clean-ups", so they accepted it. Cadre participation in labour was taught to us by Hsi-Yang County, Shansi. Later there were also some materials on this from Chekiang Province.

(On the current nationwide launching of a high tide in studying the works of Chairman Mao.)

The *Selected Works of Mao*, how much of it is mine! It is a work of blood. The struggle in the soviets was very acute. Because of the errors of the Wang Ming line we had to embark on the 25,000 li Long March[2]. These things in *Selected Works of Mao* were taught to us by the masses and paid for with blood sacrifices.

Some articles should be rewritten, with new things included. The "Two On's" ["On Contradiction," "On Practice"] were written several decades ago. By now everything has developed and the contents have become richer. They should be revised.

(On the lessons of experience during the three years of great development from 1958-1960)

It was most beneficial. We could not have escaped the experience, for we would not have been able to learn how to engage in construction. We had no experience in nationwide construction. During the revolution we gained some experience in economic construction in the base areas. At that time the problems most urgently requiring solution were three: we needed food, we needed clothing, and we needed salt. Thus we had to develop production. These were the reasons for our engaging in economic construction at that time[3].

I spent 10 years before and after the land reform program (documents of 1933). I could not have done it without the 10 years. During the great revolution I held two lecture and study sessions on the peasant movement, one in Canton and one in Wuhan, and did some investigation and study, but still did not have a solution. Only later when I carried out eight investigations in Hsing-kuo and other regions and investigated Ch'ang-kang Township and Ts'aichi Towship, Could I solve the problem. The masses taught it to me; they told me how to do it.

We spent 25 years studying revolution, from, 1921 to the Seventh Party Congress in 1945[4]. During the Yenan rectification[5], we had come to know the rightist opportunism of Ch'en Tu-hsiu[6] and the three "left" deviationist lines, especially that of Wang Ming[7]. We summed up these experiences. We were thereby able to develop into an army of 1.2 million, not counting the militia, by the close of the war of Resistance against Japan. The Seventh Congress was excellent; it unified our thoughts and united the entire party. Of course, there were still some problems, such as Kao, Kang and P'eng Te - haui, but we still had faith in them. P'eng Teh-huai later served as commander of the Northwest Field Army. In 1946 he had skirmishes with the Kuomintang, in July 1947 he began to counterattack - every month he exterminated eight brigades. What bravado! By 1948 he had successively taken Shichiachuang and Tsinan and later waged three great battles.

It took me 15 years to learn how to fight a war. In the beginning I did not know how to fight and did not even consider fighting. When the great revolution was defeated, we had 50,000 party members divided into several groups, one of which was killed, another capitulated, and still another did not venture to do anything and ran away. Only 1,000-2,000 people were left. According to statistics, there were still 800 at the time of the Seventh Congress. In the several years since, some have died of age, so that only 600 are left, only 30 of them from Ching-kang Shan. At that time we had our backs to the wall and were compelled to pick up guns and learn to wage war. We had not entered any military academy. Only a minority had been to a military academy. The study of waging war was mainly taught to us by "teacher" Chiang Kai-shek. He smashed the soviets and caused us to undertake the 25,000 *li* Long March, 300,000 troops, of whom there remained only 20,000 when we reached north Shensi. And not all of these 20,000 people came on the Long March. They advanced through Yun-yang and Tung-cheng in Ch'ing-yang and Kuan-chung in the Shensi-Kansu border areas. At that time I said that the 20,000 people were as strong as 300,000, not weaker. They traveled 25,000 *li*, their legs did the "talking," made their speeches. In this way our brains had to think a bit. Only after the Ts'un-i Conference[8] did we change our ways and learn how to fight. Everything was forced upon us.

(On the necessity to learn their revolutionary spirit in learning from the Liberation Army and the Ministry of Petroleum, and to fight a war of annihilation)

We cannot be hasty. The socialist education campaign in the countryside must fight a war of annihilation. It is not enough time without these X or X years. At least four years: last year, this year, next year, the year after that are needed. We cannot be hasty. It will probably take X or X years or X or X years to completely master learning from the Liberation Army and the Ministry of Petroleum. We cannot be hasty with that either. Some provinces want to finish socialist education this year. That's too fast. It is a construction of X years or X years (indicates that a coal mine producing over X X tens of thousands metric tons per year in the past required X years to construct). To speed this up or hurry it too much will not do. If you press it excessively it will be done in a phoney manner.

(On what it means to support the General line, the Great Leap Forward, and the peoples' communes)

Class struggle, the struggle for production, and scientific experimentation must be linked up. Only carrying out the struggle for production and scientific experimentation but not grasping class struggle cannot kindle the spirit and enthusiasm of the people, nor can the struggle for production or scientific experimentation be done well. Will it do to only carry out the struggle for production and not scientific experimentation? To only carry out class struggle but not the struggle for the production or scientific experimentation, and to say "support the General line," are meaningless. I say that the Ministry of Petroleum has made great achievements; it kindled the revolutionary spirit of the people and also built a X X tens of thousands metric ton oil field. Moreover, it is not just a X X tens of thousands ton oil field, but also a X X ton refinery, of very high quality and up to international standards. This is the only way to convince people!

(On the decline in revolutionary will of some comrades and the necessity to promote young cadres)

In the final analysis, are some people ill or is their revolutionary will declining? Or did they go dancing six times a week? Or is it love of beauty but not country? Some say they are so sick that they cannot do their work. Can an illness be that bad?!... Like certain comrades, in the final analysis, do they love beauty or country? In my view, when we ask them to do X X, they may not necessarily be able to do it well. We should give them a "prime minister".

For many years we have advocated going out to do investigation and study. But they did not go out. They have been engaging in industry for so many years yet they do not know what industry is. They do not understand machinery or equipment: what can they do?!

At present we must promote young cadres. At the time of the Ch'ih-pi War and the Ch'un-ying-hui, Chuko liang was 27 years old, as was Sun Ch'uan. Sun Tse was doing things when he was only 17 or 18 years old. When Chou Yu died he was not over 36 years old; at that time he was about 30. Ts'ao Ts'ao was 53. In fact, young people beat the old. "In the Yangtze River the rear waves push those in front; in the world new people chase after the old".

(On Ch'en Yung-kuei of Tachai Production Team)

But we should not look down on the under educated? During the National People's Congress, X X X, a comrade of mine who is now a lieutenant governor of Hupeh Province, asked to speak with me. He said that he has now come to understand that intellectuals have the least knowledge. Throughout history, many emperors were intellectuals but were unsuccessful: Sui Yang-ti could write essays and poetry; Ch'en Hou-chu and Li Hou-chu could write poetry and were good at narrative verse; Sung Hui Tsung could write poetry and paint. Some of the under educated can do great things: Genghis Khan was an illiterate. Liu Pang too could not read a dozen characters, and was under educated. Chu Yuan-chang was also illiterate, a cattle herder. In our military ranks there are many under educated, but only a few intellectuals. Hsu Shih-yu[9] studied for a few days! X X X has never had any formal education, nor have Han Hsien-chu or Ch'en Hsi-lien. X X went to senior primary school, as did Liu Ya-lou[10]. Of course, we cannot do without several intellectuals. We consider Lin Piao, Hsu Hsiang- ch'ien, X X X, X X X, . . . to be middle grade intellectuals. My conclusion is that the under educated can defeat the students of Whampoa.

(On how current practices are all right, wherein everyone wants to engage in criticism and self-criticism and to learn from others).

Everything is one divided into two. I personally am also one divided into two. I was a primary school teacher, and when I was young, I also believed in the spirits. I went with my mother to distant temples to burn incense. Before the October Revolution, I did not even know there was a Marx, or anything which occurred after Marx.

Is there anyone who has not committed a mistake? Some of our comrades enjoy metaphysics. What is mètaphysics? It is one- sidedness, allowing only the good to be said and not the bad and being fond of only hearing the good and not the bad. Like X X X, a good comrade, but he does not want to let people see their bad points, only their good; they are mortally afraid they will touch a sore point.

Marx was also one divided into two. Marx' philosophy was learned from Hegel and Feuerbach, his economics from England's Ricardo and others, and from France he studied utopian socialism. All this was bourgeois. From this, one divided into two and produced Marxism. Let me ask you, when Marx was young did he ever read Marx's works?

This party of ours is also one divided into two.

Before opposing an encirclement and suppression, some people said that one could not run an army without beating people; how could one lead the troops without beatings? At that time warlordism was really vicious! The soldiers said, "Cherish the soldiers, cherish the soldiers, the company commander rides the horse." This phase was incorrect, the company commander should ride the horse.

P'eng has always carried out splittism. During the time of the central soviet-controlled areas, Li Li-san's line emerged. They were so "left"! They wanted to strike against the large cities, against Chiu-chiang, Wuhan, and Changsha. I said it would not work; they said we had to strike. At that time there was a Chi-an area party committee secretary, Li Wen-lin, who wrote a letter to the Central Committee stating emphatically that it was the consciousness of the peasants to divide the land and develop and consolidate the land reform and that to first attack Chi-an then Chiu-chiang would definitely throw away the revolution. That is to say that we had to attack Chiu-chiang was quite "left"! We have had 10 years of civil war. The intraparty struggle is very serious.

The Fifth Plenum elected Chang Weng-t'ien to the Political Bureau when he was not even a member of the Central Committee. If we now investigate whether or not Chang was a party member, when he entered the party, or who introduced him, we will not be able to find the answer. Nonetheless he was elected to the Political Bureau, while I, a member of the Political Bureau, was not allowed to participate in the congress.

By the Tsun-i Conference on the Long March, the situation had some changes. There should be a differentiation made in the Wang Ming line. It was different before and after the Tsun-i conference.

In parleying with the Fourth Front Army, we spoke honestly and told Chang Kuo-t'ao[12] that we began with 80,000 men, but then only had 30,000 left. We did speak honestly! At that time the Fourth Front Army still had 80,000 men. Chang Kuo-t'ao demanded the power of leadership from us, but we did not give it. Chang Kuo-t'ao's errors were errors of line.

Afterwards we arrived in north Shensi. The War of Resistance was also not without problems. There was the Wang Ming line and things like P'eng Teh-huai's Hundred Regiments Battle. Before the Seventh Party Congress, we held a conference to struggle against P'eng Teh-huai. Did he not say at the Lushan Conference. "You curse me for 40 days, so I curse you for 20 days." You participated at the Yenan struggle meeting! He did not disperse (indicating the Hundred Regiments Battle); he insisted on concentrating his forces. In actuality, at that time a platoon could have developed into a regiment or a division.

Was it still one divides into two after liberation? The Kao-Jao antiparty clique in 1953 was a great revelation. At the finance conference they said X X and X X were sectarians. I said that the Chinese revolution has scaled many peaks. Without peaks, where is the revolution? At that time we also did not have a common program.

P'eng and Kao Kang united together in north Shensi. I had not thought that Teng Hua would also work with them. Teng Hua told me that he felt that Ching-kang Shan had no peak and was very unattractive. Afterward he sought out P'eng. The late Ch'en Kuang also felt there were no peaks and was dissatisfied.

In 1962 they were again unable to speak of classes and class struggle – how unsteady would each department be! Teng Tzu-hui wanted to "contract to the households." In the past Wang Chia- hsiang had always been ill. For that half a year he was healthy and wanted to have "three reconciliations and one reduction," with such activism! What we must now do is "three struggles and one increase." The United Front Department wants the political parties of the bourgeoisie to become socialist political parties and drew up a five-year plan. They softly, softly fell; it was a surrender to the bourgeoisie. At that time they wanted to carry out "three reconciliations and one reduction" internationally and "three freedoms and one contract" domestically. P`eng Teh- huai`s letter of attack also came out at that time as did Hsi Chung-hsun`s book Liu Chih-tan.

(On reading)

There is some truth in the foolish old man who moved the mountains. Within one or several million years a mountain may flatten. The foolish old man put it correctly: after his death would come his sons, and after them more sons. The grandsons would have sons, and sons and grandsons will continue to be produced. But the mountain will not increase in height. There must eventually come a day when it is levelled.

To talk about philosophy for half an hour is enough: if you talk longer you would not talk clearly. We also do not want to read too many books. Reading several dozens will do. The more you read, the more unclear things become.

(On grain levies, purchases and transfers in the countryside)

Some districts do not have basic food rations. I do not approve. They should have basic food rations

NOTES

1. Peng Te-hui (1818) was up to 1959 the minister of defence. In July 1959, at the Lushan Conference, a group of party leaders headed by him criticized the Great Leap Forward and its leadership as "Petty bourgeois fanaticism. "They argued that it had created far more damage than good. After a major struggle at the plenum conference, P`eng and other rightists were removed from their positions of responsibility in the party and the government.

2. The Long March of 25,000 *li* (12,500 kilometres) was made by Red Army from Kiangsi Province to northern Shensi Province. In October 1934 the First. Third and Fifth Army Groups of the Chinese Workers and Peasants' Red Army (that is, the First Front Army of the Red Army, also known as the Central Red Army) set out from Changting and Ninghua in Western Fukien and from Juichin, Yutu and other places in southern Kiangsi and started a major strategic movement. In traversing the eleven provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi, crossing perpetually snow capped mountains and trackless grasslands, sustaining untold hardships and frustrating the enemy's repeated encirclements, pursuits, obstructions and interceptions, the Red Army covered 25,000 *li* (12,500kilometers) on this march and finally arrived triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi in October 1935.

3. In this connection see Comrade Mao's report entitled "Economic and Financial Problems in the Anti-Japanese War" *S.W.* Vol. VI pp241-405.

4. The Seventh Party Congress of the CPC was held in Yanan between April 23 and June 11, 1945. The congress laid down the Party line: go all out mobilize the masses, expand the people's forces and under the leadership of our Party, defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the Chinese people and build a new- democratic China. It adopted a Party Constitution designating Mao Tse-tung Thought, which integrates the Marxist-Leninist theories with the practice of the Chinese revolution, as the guideline for all Party work. This congress witnessed unprecedented Party unity ideologically, politically and organizationally.

5. This refers to the movement for rectifying the style of work conducted by the Communist Party of China in 1942-43 throughout the Party; its content was the combating of subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped writing. Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, this rectification movement adopted the principles of "learning from the past mistakes to avoid their repetition, curing the sickness to save the patient" and "clearing up wrong thinking while uniting with comrades". Through the method of criticism and self-criticism, the movement corrected the "Left" and Right errors which had occurred on various occasions in the history of the Party by getting down to their ideological roots, greatly raised the ideological level of the broad ranks of Party cadres, helped immensely to unify thinking within the Party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and thus brought about a high degree of unity in the whole party.

6. Chen Tu-hsiu was originally a professor at Peking University and became famous as an editor of *New Youth.* He was one of the founders of Communist Party of China Owing to his reputation at the time of the May 4th Movement and owing to the Party's immaturity in its initial period, he became General Secretary of the Party. In the last period of the revolution of 1924-27, the Rightist thinking in the Party represented by Chen Tu-hsui developed into a line of capitulationism. In "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" Comrade Mao Tse-tung said that the capitulationists

at that time "voluntarily gave up the Party's leadership of the peasant masses, urban petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie, and in particular gave up the Party's leadership of the armed force, thus causing the defeat of the revolution". After the defeat in 1927 Chen Tu- hsui and a handful of other capitulationists lost faith in the future of the revolution and became liquidationists. They took the reactionary Trotskyist stand and together with the Trotskyites formed a small anti-Party group. Consequently Chen Tu-hsiu was expelled from the Party in November 1929. He died in 1942. With references to Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opporunism, see the introductory notes to "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" and to "Report on the Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan". *Selected Works of Mao Tae-tung*, vol. I and "Introducing the communist", *Selected works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II

7. A reference to Li Li-san and Wang Mings lines. The "Left" opportunism of Li Li-san generally known as the "Li Li-san line", refers to the "Left" opportunist line which existed in the Party for about four months beginning from June 1930 and which was represented by Comrade Li Li-san, then the most influential leader of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The Li Li-san line had the following characteristics: It violated the policy of the Party's Sixth National Congress; it denied that masses strength had to be built up for the revolution and denied that the development of the revolution was uneven; it regarded as "extremely erroneous... localism and conservatism characteristics of peasant mentality" the ideas of Comrade Mao Tse-tung that for a long time we should devote our attention mainly to creating rural base areas, use the rural areas to encircle the cities and use these bases to advance a high tide of country-wide revolution, and it held that preparations should be made for immediate insurrections in all parts of the country. On the basis of this erroneous line, Comrade Li Li-san drew up and adventurist plan for organising immediate armed insurrections in the key cities throughout the country. At the same time, he refused to recognize the uneven development of the world revolution, holding that the general outbreak of the Chinese revolution would inevitably lead to general outbreak of world revolution, without which the Chinese revolution could not be successful; he also refused to recognize the protracted nature of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, holding that the beginnings of victory in one or more provinces would mark the beginning of the transition to socialist revolution, and thus formulated a number of inappropriate "Left" adventurist policies. Comrade Mao Tse-tung opposed this erroneous line, and the broad masses of cadres and members in the Party also demanded its rectification. At the Third Plenary Session of the Party's Sixth Central Committee in September 1930 Comrade Li Li-san admitted the mistakes that had been pointed out and then relinquished his leading position in the Central Committee. Over a long period of time Comrade Li Li-san corrected his wrong views, and so he was re-elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress of the Party.

The Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party held in September 1930, and the subsequent central leading body adopted many positive measures to put and end to the Li Li- san line. But later a number of Party comrades who were inexperienced in practical revolutionary struggle, with Chen Shao-yu (Wang-Ming) and Chin Pang-hsien (Po Ku) in the lead, came out against in the Central Committee's measures. In the pamphlet, 'The two Lines or The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China', they most emphatically declared that the main danger then existing in the Party was not "Left" opportunism but "Right opportunism" and to justify their own activities they "criticized" the Li Li-san line as "Rightist". They put forward a new political programme which continued, revived or developed the Li Li-san line and other "Left" ideas and policies in a new guise, and set themselves against the correct line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. It was mainly to criticize the military mistakes of this new "Left" opportunist line that Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote the article "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War". This line was dominant in the Party from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931 to the meeting of the Political Bureau convened by the Central Committee at Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, in January 1935, which ended the dominance of this erroneous line and established the new central leadership headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The erroneous "Left" line dominated the Party for a particularly long time (four years) and brought extremely heavy losses, with disaster consequences, to the Party and the revolution. A loss of 90 per cent was inflicted on the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Red Army and its base areas, tens of million of people in the revolutionary base areas were made to suffer the cruel oppression of the Kuomintang, and the progress of the Chinese revolution was retorded.

8. The Tsunyi Meeting was the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau called by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, in January 1935.

9. Hsu Shih-yu (c. 1906-) was at this time Commander of the Nanking Military Region, and Vice-Minister of National Defence. (He had been appointed to this latter post in 1959, when Lin Piao took over the Ministry from P'eng Te-huai). At the Ninth Congress in April 1969, he had become a member of the Politburo.

10. Liu Ya-lou, a commander of the PLA Air Force.

11. Chang Wen-t'ien (c. 1898-), pseudonym Lo Fu, a member of the 'Returned Student Faction', succeeded Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku) as Secretary- General at the Tsunyi Conference of January 1935. He was Chinese Ambassador to Moscow from 1951 to 1955, and thereafter a vice minister of Foreign Affairs until 1959. He was a member of the Peng anti-party clique. For some more details see comrade Mao's "Letter to Chang Wan-tien") (S.W. Vol. VIII pp225-226) and "Comment on Chang Wan-tien's Letter" (S.W. Vol. VIII p 236).

12. Chang Kuo-tao was a renegade from the Chinese revolution. In early life, speculating on the revolution, he joined the Chinese Communist Party. In the Party he made many mistakes resulting in serious crimes. The most notorious of these was his opposition in 1935, to the Red Army's northward march and his defeatism and liquidationism in advocating withdrawal by the Red Army to the minority nationality areas on the Szechuan-Sikang borders; what is more, he openly carried out traitorous activities against the Party and Central Committee, established his own bogus central committee, disrupted the unity of the Party and the Red Army, and caused heavy losses to the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army. But thanks to patient education by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee, the Fourth Front Army and its numerous cadres soon returned to the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and played a glorious role in subsequent struggles. Chang Kuo-tao, however, proved incorrigible and in the spring of 1938 he slipped out of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and joined the Kuomintang secret police.

13. The Lushan conference was held during July, 1959.

14. Teng Tzu-hui (1895-1972) had been head of the Rural Work Department since 1952. See also notes 16, 17 on p 143 of this volume.

15. Wang Chia-hsiang (1907-74) was, a member of the 'Returned Student' faction. He was China's first ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1949-51, and participated in the Chinese delegation to the Moscow meeting of November 1957, led by Mao Tse-tung, but he faded from the scene in early 1960s. He was, however, re-elected to the Central Committee at the Tenth Congress in 1973.

16. Hsi Chang-hsun, a member of the Peng anti-party clique.

17. See *Selected Works,* Volume III pp 271-274.

DIRECTIVE ON LABOR REFORM

April 28, 1964

Comrade Hsieh Fu-chih during a briefing said: Last year we paid close attention to grasping [labor] reform; yet it was one of the best years in production in recent years. However, the problem of the relationship between reform and production in our labor reform work has not been solved even now.

The chairman said: What is the key to reform, reform of men or labor reform in production, or put stress on both? Should we attach more importance to men, to things, or to both? Some comrades think only things, not men, are important. In fact, if we do our work on men well, we shall have things as well.

Hsieh Fu-chih: I read the double-ten articles to the prisoners of the Shou-shih production team of the First Prison of Chekiang Province. They were also read by other comrades of the working group to the Ch'iao-shih farm 5th brigade. Afterward the overwhelming majority of the prisoners who had not confessed before now admitted their guilt and many recalcitrant prisoners also changed for the better.

The chairman: In general, those people are still useful. Why do they feel interested in the double-ten articles?

Hsieh Fu-chih: Once they understood the Party's policy, they felt that they themselves, in particular their family and children, had a future in their life.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought,* a Red Guard Publication.

The chairman: So it is! If they have a future, they have confidence in reforming themselves. Otherwise all they see is darkness so they cannot confidently reform themselves.

Hsieh Fu-chih: At first, many cadres had objected to reading the double-ten articles to the prisoners. However, having heard them read, the prisoners became more amenable. So the attitude of the cadres also changed.

The chairman: Many cadres objected to reading the double-ten articles because they were afraid that this would make their way of things ineffectual. They don't believe they are capable of turning the overwhelming majority of the prisoners into new men. In the past, officers of the Red Army had relied on beating, scolding, detaining, shooting, and so forth to lead their troops. A company commander or a platoon leader could not lead his men without beating or scolding them, or showing them an air of his importance. This state of affairs had gone on for many years. Later after summing up experiences it changed gradually with the result that the soldiers became more easily led. To do work on men well is not to press them into submission but to convince them by persuasion. At present, your way of doing things has begun to take effect, but even a beginning takes so many years to take effect.

The original level of labour reform cadres has not changed.

Hsieh-Fu-chih: The quality of these cadres is weak but their tasks are heavy. Their work runs the gamut of class struggle, struggle for production and scientific experiment.

The chairman: So it is! If you are not good at anything, how can you reform anybody? (Comrade Hsieh Fu-chih: Through study at selected basic units we proposed labour reform's "four first," "two predominant factors," and "two leniencies and two stringencies." For handling prisoners who had served their sentence and became employed, we brought out "four retain and four do not retain," and labour reform cadres were required to have "four knows" regarding their prisoners.)

The chairman: This is quite good. What are you doing in other areas?

Hsieh Fu-chih: We are ready to carry out these measures at certain test points and extend them step by step. We have done our work well in reforming Japanese and Chinese war criminals. After their release, expect in some individual cases, the overwhelming majority of them have given a good account of themselves.

The chairman: Under certain conditions, when the enemies have laid down their arms and surrendered themselves, the overwhelming majority of them can be reformed, but there must be a good policy and a good method to make them consciously reform themselves without relying exclusively on submission by compulsion.

SOME INTERJECTIONS AT A BRIEFING OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION LEADING GROUP

May 11, 1964

1. In formulating the plan it is necessary to include certain needs of North Korea and North Vietnam. I hear North Vietnam is in need of X X thousand tons of oil.

2. It is not certain that we shall have a population of 720 millions in 1965. There will be 800 millions in 1970? This is serious.

3. Intellectuals are quite important; [we] cannot do without them. They are needed in the realm of theory; theory cannot do without them. However, they still need to sum up the things indicated below.

4. There are two fists and one rear end in the national economy. Basic industry is one fist, national defense industry is the other, and agriculture is the rear end.

5. The Soviet Union today is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the grand bourgeoisie, a fascist German dictatorship, and a Hitlerite dictatorship. They are a bunch of rascals worse than De Gaulle.

SOURCE: Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought, a Red Guard Publication.

6. Class identifications should be drawn in all units, factories, streets, schools, and official organs.

7. The wage question. It is difficult to further reduce wages at the upper levels. From now on, we will stabilize wages at the upper levels and raise them gradually at the lower levels.

8. Whom is Industry to serve? It should be made to serve agriculture. Of course, there is the question of interrelationship between sectors of heavy industry, but the whole spectrum of industry should be made to serve agriculture.

9. Stable-yield output and high-yield output are relative. Last year Hopeh Province had torrential rains. This downpour was willed by the Lord in Heaven! It couldn't be helped! It is hard to be Lord in Heaven. Too much rain isn't good; too little isn't good either.

10. Do as much as one's strength allows. Don't let any individual decide on this. "I am old and about to die, but before I die, I want to accomplish...?" This isn't right.

11. I want to finish reading *The Twenty-four Histories*. *The Old Book of T'ang History* is better than *The New Book of T'ang History*. *The Southern History* and *The Northern History* are still better than *The Old Book of T'ang History*. The most unsatisfactory is the History of *Ming Dynasty*.

12.The purpose of drawing class identifications in factories is to expose the 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 percent of the workers. Among the workers 8 to 15 percent do not have a working class origin.

INTERJECTION AT
A BRIEFING BY FOUR VICE-PREMIERS

May 1964

1. Close attention must be paid to class struggle. The four clean-ups in the rural areas is a class struggle; the five anti's in the cities is likewise a class struggle. Cities must not brag about themselves. The five anti's work cannot be concluded either this winter or next spring. It must be continued for a period of 3 to 5 years before it can be finished. Class identifications must also be drawn in the cities. As to how they should be drawn, certain criteria should be formulated when we come to do this work in the future. We should not take account of the class origin alone. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, none of them had their origin from the working class.

2. On the Third Five-Year Plan. We must go all out and put forth the utmost effort to set aside all reserve. We cannot formulate any plan based on our age. Planning must have an objective basis. I am over 70 years old, older than you people, but we cannot rely on what we see of communism shortly before we die as the basis for planning. In the present Third Five-Year Plan I feel we must pay attention to increasing quantity without losing sight of improving quality.

The plan must not be based on subjective expectations; it must have an objective basis. It must be practical and dependable.

3. On self-reliance. Self-reliance is very important. It should be practiced not only by a state, but also by a factory, a people's commune, and a production team. In managing people's communes, those which practiced self-reliance showed real achievements whereas those communes and production teams which were supported by loans did not fare so well. At present, we have three truly self-reliant communes in the whole country: one is the Ch'en Yung'k'ang commune in Kiangsu Province; another is the Ch'en Yung–kuei commune in Shansi Province; and still another is the Ch'en X X commune in Ch'u-fou, Shantung Province. These three communes have never asked for a penny from the state as they were built up completely on the strength of their own effort.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse–tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

4. On the question of cadres participating in labor. Cadres must take part in labor. At present, this question has not yet been satisfactorily resolved. Leading cadres should go and stay in selected primary units and should not solely listen to briefings and reports. Even ministers should go and stay in some primary units. Otherwise no meetings would be held.

5. This year's wheat output is estimated to have an increase of 5 billion *catties* over last year. It appears that there is an abundance of rain this spring. This will do more good than harm.

6. The Third Five-Year Plan calls for moving such a large number of people from the rural areas to the cities to be workers. This is not good.

TALK ON THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN

June 6, 1964

In the past, the method of planning was essentially learned from the Soviet Union and comparatively easy to do. First you determine how much steel is needed, then on this basis estimate how much coal, electricity, transport force, and so on are needed; and then based on these assumptions estimate the expected increase in urban population and the livelihood benefits. This is the method of using the calculator. Once the output of steel is reduced, all other items are correspondingly reduced. This kind of method is impractical and unworkable. This type of calculation cannot take into account what the Lord in Heaven will do to the plan. Suppose a natural disaster comes and you just won't have such a quantity of foodgrains, support to the urban population cannot increase to the extent desired and then everything else comes to naught. Besides you cannot figure in what war will do. We are not the chief of staff of the U.S. so we don't know when they will strike against us. Furthermore, revolutions in various countries cannot be figured into the plan. Suppose in some countries the people's revolutions have succeeded and they need our economic assistance. How can this be foretold?

It is necessary to change the method of planning. This is a revolution. After we learned the Soviet method, it has become a force of habit with us and it seems hard to change.

In the last few years we have been groping our way and found some other method. Our policy is to take agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor. Pursuant to this policy, when we

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SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

map out a plan we first see what quantity of foodgrains can be produced, then estimate how much fertilizer, pesticides, machinery, iron and steel, and so on are needed.

How do we plan for an annual harvest? It will be determined by the assumption that in 5 years there will be 1 year of good harvest, 2 years of ordinary harvest, and 2 years of poor harvest. This is more practical and dependable. It should first be ascertained what quantity of foodgrains, cotton and other economic crops can be produced under such conditions and then how much industry can be planned for on this foundation. If the harvest of the year is better, so much the better.

Moreover, we should consider war and make strategic plans. Party committees in various localities should not manage civil affairs alone and ignore the military, should not manage money alone and ignore guns. As long as imperialism exists, there is always the danger of war. We must build up the strategic rear... This does not mean that we no longer care about the sea coast which must also be well guarded so that it can play the role of supporting the construction of new bases.

Two fists and one rear end. Agriculture is one fist, and national defense is another fist. To make the fist strong, the rear end must be seated securely. The rear end is basic industry.

At present, the main problem of basic industry is one of variety and quality which must be solved. Last year although the output of steel was less, it had more variety and better quality and consequently more uses than in the past. The key does not lie in the quantity of output. The Soviet Union takes quantity as the criterion. If they fail to fulfill the quantity target of steel output, it looks as if their total socialist construction is lost. They have kept on raising their quantity target every year and they have been making empty boasts every year. As a matter of fact, a state will not collapse simply because a planned quantity target has not been fulfilled. Given a definite quantity of output, variety will increase, and thus the foundation will be strengthened.

In agriculture we must mainly rely on the spirit of Ta-chai and self-reliance. This is not to say that it does not need the support of industry. Water conservancy, chemical fertilizer, and pesticides all need the support of basic industry.

We should take hold of the objective relationship of proportions in mapping out any plan.

Planning should not be done merely by adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing. As soon as calculations have been completed, all departments and all localities will be fighting four figures, personnel, and money and engaged in litigation... We must let politics take command, entertain an over-all viewpoint, and formulate a plan not in accordance with the desire of any particular locality but with the laws governing the objective existence of the things themselves.

Don't fight for money all the time. Don't spend money wastefully as soon as it comes into hand. Chou Hsin-fang earns 1,700 yuan in wages every month, and regardless of the number of performances, still deposits money in Hong Kong. Some young actors already have their "10-year plan," hoping to surpass Chou Hsin-fang....Bourgeois intellectuals may be bought if necessary according to our policy. But why should we buy proletarian intellectuals? He who has plenty of money is bound to corrupt himself, his family and those around him... In the Soviet Union the high-salaried class first came from the literature and art circles.

Strive for several years so that we no longer have to import foodgrains, and use the foreign exchange thus saved to buy more technological equipment and materials...

We must not waste money. As soon as situation gets better, don't try to "do it in a big way" again freely. "Make some allowances." I have said this so many times in the past and no one acted accordingly. However, you have so acted in the past 2 years; don't go back again when the situation turns better.

The majority of workers in official organs can work and participate in manual labor half of the time, respectively. This is worth promoting. Laziness is one of the root causes of revisionism.

Why are there so many literature and art associations in Peking? They have nothing to do. Maybe they are doing some disorderly things. At the literature and art festivals, the performance of the army ranks first, the localities second, and Peking (Central) the worst. This association, that association, this sort of thing is also transplanted from the Soviet Union. The central literature and art organizations are still ruled by foreigners and dead men... We must go deeply into the life of the living. If we keep on playing with dead men and foreigners, our nation will doomed. We must serve the workers and poor and lower-middle peasants. Physical cultural should also be beneficial to revolutionary struggle and construction.

Among cadres in general, many are "three door" cadres (leaving family door, entering school door, and entering office door). Cadres cannot be reared and trained well through the "three doors." It is dangerous to rely on this type of cadres to take hold of the future of the state. Nor will it do to depend on those cadres who have entered the "primary school door, middle school door, and college door," It will not do to not read books, nor will it do to read too many books. Ability does not depend on books alone; it must depend on practice. Our state will chiefly rely on those cadres who have read books through practice to take hold of its future.

All provinces should manage military defense industry. We should squeeze some money from industry, agriculture, and culture and education. We don't need to establish so many regular schools. Tsinghua University has over 10,000 students and 40.000 professors, staff and family members. The spirit of leadership is going to be greatly wasted in this way.

We don't really have make academicians and PhD's.

TALK ON PUTTING MILITARY AFFAIRS WORK INTO FULL EFFECT AND CULTIVATING SUCCESSORS TO THE REVOLUTION

June 16, 1964

I shall talk about two problems. The first is the question of local party committees paying attention to military affairs, and the second is the question of dealing with successors... it will not do to merely observe demonstrations. It is necessary to pay attention to troops, it is necessary to operate armament plants... the provinces must inquire into the matter of troop units and the militia. You first secretaries of provincial committees are also political commissars. You have not carried out your duties for a number of years, you have been political commissars in name only and have not paid attention to military affairs. When a problem arises, you become confused without help. Regardless of which direction the enemy may come, it is necessary that you be ready, then our country shall not perish. The various levels of party committees must all pay attention to military affairs work and to militia work... How can only we rely on the several millions of Liberation Army troops of the central government in a country such as ours and on such a large battle front? We cannot depend on them. You must make up your own minds. The local authorities have the responsibility... needless to say, they will want to fight an atomic war! We shall run away when they drop the atom bombs. When they enter the city, we shall also enter the city and the enemy will not dare to use the atom bomb. We shall engage in street fighting. At any rate, we shall fight them.

It is necessary that the militia be organized a little better organizationally, politically, and militarily. Organizational improvement is to have some sort of an established organization of cadre-militiamen and ordinary militiamen, to have fighters, squad and platoon leaders, and company, battalion, regiment, and division commanders, and to become really functional. It is also necessary that political work personnel be organized so that in case something happens, they may take up their arms and go. Some people have said that their psychological outlook improved greatly after three months of service in the militia. The militia must have organization, it must have soldiers, it must have officers, and it must be put into full effect. At present, many localities have not put it into full effect. It is necessary to carry out political work and the work of the people. To put politics into full effect, it is necessary to have a political structure, political commissars, political officers, and political instructors. To do political work is to perform the work of the people. It is necessary to distinguish between the good and the bad people in the militia and eliminate the bade ones. It is necessary to clearly explain to the militiamen that regardless of whatever important matter which may occur, they must not become flustered, for how can one win battles if one is flustered? One must not become flustered in fighting with rifles, guns, or atom bombs. One will not become flustered if one is well prepared politically. When the atom bomb is dropped, there is nothing else but to see Marx; since the days of old there has always been death. Without a belief, one cannot establish oneself. Those who are doomed to die shall die, and those who do not die shall go on. To kill all the Chinese people. I cannot see that, the imperialists will not do that, for who will they have to exploit!... in 20 years of war, have we not lost many people? Huang Kung-lueh, Liu Hu-lan, and Huang Chi-kuang... we did not die, we are the remaining dregs. When the burden is too heavy, death is the way out. Indeed, death called on Comrade XXX, but he did not go, so he is still alive. It is necessary to be prepared militarily. It is necessary to be prepared with rifles during peacetime, it will be too late when war starts... if one only cares about dealing with civil and not military affairs, if one only wants people and not rifles. When war begins, it will be necessary to depend upon China to hold on, it will not do to depend on the revisionists. When

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SOURCE: Long Live Mao Tse-Tung Thought, a Red Guard Publication.

the enemy fight their way in, we will be able to fight our way out. In general, we must be ready to fight, we must not become flustered when the fighting starts, we also must not be flustered in fighting the atom bomb. Do not be afraid. It is nothing but a big disorder throughout the world. It is nothing but people dying. Man eventually must die, he may die standing up or lying down. Those who do not die will go on with their work, if one-half meets with death, there is still another half...Do not be afraid of imperialism. It will not do to be afraid, the more one is afraid, the less enthusiasm one will have. Being prepared and unafraid, one will have the enthusiasm.

The second problem is to prepare for the future and to bring up successors.

The imperialists have said that our first generation presented no problem, the second generation did not unchange, and that there is hope for the third and fourth generations. Will this hope of the imperialists be realized? Will these words of the imperialists come true? I hope that it will not come true; however, it can also come true. In the Soviet Union, it was the third generation that produced the Soviet Khrushchev Revisionism. We can also possibly produce revisionism. How can we guard against revisionism? How can we cultivate successors to the revolution? As I see it, there are five requirements.

1. It is necessary to regularly observe and educate our cadres, they must have some knowledge of Marxism-Leninism; it would be best if they have a bit more knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. They must practice Marxism-Leninism, not revisionism.

2.They must serve the majority of the people and not the minority. The must serve the majority of the people of China. They must serve the majority of the people of the world and not the minority, or the landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists. Without this prerequisite, one cannot serve as a party branch secretary. Moreover, one cannot serve as the central (committee) secretary or the central chairman, Khrushchev was for the minority, we are for the majority of the people.

3.They must be able to unite the majority of the people. What is meant by uniting the majority of the people includes those people who had previously and erroneously opposed ourselves. Regardless of which mountain peak they belong to, we must not seek revenge, we cannot have a new group of officials for each emperor. Our experiences have proven that we would not have been victorious in our revolution if it had not been for the correct guidelines of the 7th National Congress. As for those people who engage in intrigues, they must take note that more than 10 persons, such as Kao Jao, P'eng, Huang', Chang, Chou, T'an and Chia had emerged from the [party] central[1]. Everything is one divided into two. If some people wish to engage in intrigues, what can be done about it? Even now there are still those who wish to engage in intrigues! For example, we have Wu Tzu-li, the Pai-yin plant, and also the small station mentioned by Ch'en po-ta. The various departments and the various localities all have people who engage in intrigues. There are officials in the imperial palace and the masses under them. Without such people, it cannot be called a society. I had mentioned the last time that I was not pleased that there were such people. It was an objective existence. Otherwise, there would have been no confrontation, only metaphysics. All things are a unity of opposites. Of the five fingers of a hand, four face one direction while the thumb faces another direction. In this way, one can pick up and grasp things. If they all faced in the same direction, they would have been useless. There are no pure substances and no true vacuum in the world, this is only 99.9 percent purity. Then there is the other 0.1 percent. Many people have failed to comprehend this theory. There is no complete purity. There has to be some impurity before there can be a society, matters, and nature. If it is pure, it does not conform with the rules. Impurity is absolute. Purity is relative. This is the unity of opposites. In sweeping the floor, dust still exists even if the floor was swept 24 hours a day, morning until night. Look, in which year have we been pure? The history of our party shows five dynasties of leadership. The first dynasty was Ch'en Tu-hsiu. The second dynasty was Chu Ch'iu-pai. The third dynasty was Hsiang Chung-fa, (actually, it was Li-san.). The fourth dynasty was Wang Ming and Po Ku. The fifth dynasty was Lo Fu (Chang Wen-t'ien.)[2] The leadership of the five dynasties all failed to bring us down. To bring us down is not so easy. This is a historical experience. Whether it was done by the imperialists or by ourselves, they all failed to bring us down. After liberation, there came forth Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, and P'eng Te-huai. Did they bring us down? They did not. P'eng Te-huai held the post of Minister of National Defense for seven years and he failed to bring down the Liberation

Army. Several ranking officials were hopeless as soon as they emerged. We must let others have their say. We must not practice "what I say counts." We must unite the majority of the people. A decision was reached by democratic process. But still they said they did not approve it. X X X said: China must preserve the use of reasoning, the People's Liberation Army must preserve the use of reasoning. Because we have these qualities, P'eng Te-huai was unsuccessful.

4. They must have a democratic style of work. When something comes up, they must consult with the comrades, give full deliberation to matters, and absolutely listen to the various views. Opposite views must be presented. Do not practice "what I say counts." People can change. Didn't old X change? Oxen can be trained to plow the fields, so why can't people change? There are a few people who cannot be changed. People like Yu Hsueh-chung, Chang Po-chun[3], Liu Li-ming, and X X and X X X in the party can never be changed. They do nothing but curse at people. There is also Cheng Jen-san who has not changed. The various provinces have an extremely few who have not changed. Let them remain unchanged, let them curse away. It is necessary to to unite the majority of the people. The way I see it, it is not necessary to expel Wu Tzu- li from the party, we must urge them to repent. We must unite 95 percent [of both groups]. We must practice democracy. We must not consider it as being enough merely because I said that it is so; we must not reverse a decision at meetings which had been passed. This is democracy in practice. To personally speak for several hours at a meeting as if all the truth is in my hands... When I was young, I showed bad temper towards Mao Tse-t'an[4], and threatened him with a stick because he said that the Communist Party was not the ancestral temple of the Mao family. The way I see it, those words of his make sense. The Communist Party must deal with democratic style of work, it cannot deal with patriarchal behavior.

5.When one has committed errors, one must conduct self-criticism. One must not consider oneself as being always correct. One must have relatively less mistaken ideas. It is better to do a little less of saying the wrong things and expressing wrong ideas. It is relatively good for a commander, in fighting three battles, to lose one and win two because he can go on being a commander... do not go too far in waging struggles. One must help others to rectify their mistakes, it is only necessary that they conscientiously correct their errors. One must not always criticize them without end.

Successors must be Marxist-Leninists, they must serve the interest of the majority of the people, they must unite the majority, they must display the democratic style, and they must conduct self criticism. What I have in mind is not complete, you must make further study on your own and do a little planning. You must also bring up some successors. You must not always think that you alone will do and that everything done by others is no good, as if without you in the world, the earth would not turn and there would be no party. Do you think that with the death of the butcher Chang, one would have to eat pork with bristles on it? There is no need to fear for the death of anyone. Whose death would be a great loss? Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, are they all not dead? The revolution must still go on. How can the death of a single person be such a tremendous loss? There is no such a thing. Man always must die, there are various ways of dying. Some were killed by the enemy, some died in airplane crashes, some drowned while swimming, some died from bacteria, and some died of old age. We must include those who may be killed by an atomic bomb. We must be prepared at all times to leave our work posts and we must be ready with successors at all times. Each person must be ready with successors. One must have three lines of successors. One must have one, two, and three pairs of hands, and one must not be fearful of heavy storms...

NOTES

1. Kao-Jao, see note 3 on p 8 of this volume.

Peng-Huang, Chang, Chou, i.e. Peng Te-hui, Huang Ko-cheng, Chang Wen-tien, Chou Hsiao-chou — members of the anti-party group that was purged at the Lushan conference of 1959. The link between this group and that of Kao-Jao group came much more in to light during the GPCR.

2. Chen Tu-hsiu, see note 6 on p 77 of this Volume.

Li Li-san, see note 7 on p 78 of this Volume.

For Wang Ming and Po Ku see note 7 on p 78 of this Volume.

(Lo-Fo) Chang Wan-tien, see note 11 on p 79 of this Volume.

Chu Chiu-pai (1899-1935), a member of the CC of the C.P.C. from 1923 until his death, became secretary of the party in August 1927 and was responsible for the 'first leftist line' of late 1927 and early 1928. He nevertheless remained influential in the Party, and also made a name for himself as a translator of Gorki and other Russian and Soviet writers. Left behind in Kiangsi at the time of the Long March, he was captured by the Kuomintang, and executed in June 1935. While in prison, he wrote an autobiographical work entitled `Superfluous Words'. During the Cultural Revolution he was denounced as a big traitor, and `Superfluous Words' has been quoted to substantiate the charge, especially by the Red Guards.

3. Chang Po-chun, Minister of Communications and rightist leader of the China Democratic League, criticized the Chinese Communist Party severely in the spring of 1957, and then recanted in July. He was removed as minister in early 1958. He was also the director of *Wen hui pao*, the organ of the his party.

4. Mao Tse'-tan, was comrade Mao' younger brother. He became a martyr for the cause of revolution in Hunan in 1935.

CONVERSATION WITH ZANZIBAR EXPERT M. M. ALI AND HIS WIFE

June, 18 1964

The chairman: Let us first pose for a photograph! (Picture was taken and everyone was seated)

The chairman: You have come from Africa, from Zanzibar?

Ali: Yes.

The chairman: (to Chiang X) What language are you speaking?

Chiang X X: English.

The chairman: (to Ali) I heard that you have been in China several years.

Ali: Yes, some 4 years.

The chairman: You have done much work for us; you have helped the Chinese people with broadcasting work.

Chin X X: He has helped us with the Swahili language broadcasts, and he helped us train cadres in Swahili.

The chairman: Good!

Ali: Radio Peking has also helped our people, helping them to understand the world situation.

The chairman: Are they able to hear us?

Ali: They are able to hear very well, not only in Zanzibar, but it is also clearly received in the entire Swahili-speaking region.

The chairman: How many countries?

SOURCE:– *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought,* a Red Guard Publication.

Ali: There are Tanganyika, Kenya, a part of Uganda, and also the Congo.

The chairman: Which Congo? Greater Congo?

Ali: In both of the Congos.

The chairman: Thank you! (Spoken in English). Why must you go home?

Ali: My country requested it.

The chairman: Your country has asked you to return home. One of your ministers was in the delegation of your united republic which came this time, did you meet him?

Ali: That was Babu. I met him.

The chairman: I saw him for the first time, he is very tall.

Ali: Yes

The chairman: Is he now working in the capital of Tanganyika?

Ali: No, he is not. Maybe he will go there in the future.

The chairman: You were friends in the past?

Ali: Yes. As a matter of fact, he was the one who suggested that I come to China.

The chairman: When you leave, there will be no one else here.

Ali: There will, there are still six people from Zanzibar who are working here.

The chairman: After you two leave, there will still be four?

Ali: No, I am saying that there still will be six. One at the radio station, four at the Diplomatic Publications Bureau, and one in the Foreign Language Institute.

The chairman: They are all from Zanzibar, none from Tanganyika?

Ali: There is one; he is working at the China Map Publishing House, translating Swahili.

The chairman: Is the climate in your country different from the climate here?

Ali: Yes, but we have become acclimated. We do not have snow in our country.

The chairman: Several winters already!

Ali: But we have become acclimated.

The chairman: Is your country in the southern or northern hemisphere, the southern or northern latitudes?

Ali: It is actually on the equator.

The chairman: Isn't it very hot along the equator?

Ali: Yes, but our country is merely a small island, and it isn't too hot.

The chairman: Maritime climate.

Ali: Yes.

The chairman: Do you have any Chinese friends?

Ali: A great many, a great many.

The chairman: Have you toured and visited other places?

Ali: We have, In 1961, we went to Harbin, Canton, Shanghai, Hangchow, as well as other localities. Recently, we were fortunate enough to go to Ching-kang-shan once.

The chairman: Ah, you climbed the mountain.

Ali: We have also been to Jui-chin.

The chairman: Ah.

Ali: We saw the site of the first soviet administration. We chatted with the people of Ching-kang-shan, we chatted with the old cadres and the people in the old area. They provided us much information on the situation.

The chairman: We were there from 1927 to 1928, that is 37 years ago! We later shifted to Jui-chin. The district of Jui-chin was relatively large, it had a population of several million – not only the one county of Ju-chin, there were several tens of counties, and we won many victories in battles there.

Later, we made the Long March to the north. From 1934 to 1935, I went to the northern part of Shensi. I have also been to Kansu. I have also been to Shansi. We crossed the Yellow River in the vicinity of T'ai-yuan. Shansi is next to Hopeh. Later on, we fought the Japanese mainly in the various provinces north of the Yangtze River, with Yenan as the centre. Afterwards, the fighting spread to Manchuria. After the Japanese had gone, Chiang Kai-shek came again. Chiang Kai-shek fought us, so we fought against him; we fought for 3.5 years and defeated most of Chiang Kai-shek's troops, 90 percent of his troops. The remainder all fled to Taiwan. He has always depended on the U.S. for protection, and he is still depending on their (the U.S.) Seventh Fleet. That is why the U.S. is still not at peace with us. U.S. imperialism is a very ferocious imperialism. It is also the greatest of imperialism. It has an influence on you people, too.

Ali: Yes, the U.S. is devising all ways and means to infiltrate into Zanzibar.

The chairman: Were Tanganyika and Zanzibar formerly colonies or semi-colonies of Britain?

Ali: Britain colonized Zanzibar and called it a "protectorate."

The chairman: There was a king, called a sultan.

Ali: It was because there was a sultan that it was called a "protectorate."

The chairman: What about Tanganyika?

Ali: It was called a "territory."

The chairman: Then it didn't have any king? Was it under the direct control of the British?

Ali: Yes.

The chairman: There are also Kenya and Uganda?

Ali: Kenya is a colony, Uganda still has kings and is also called a "protectorate."

The chairman: How about Northern and Southern Rhodesia?

Ali: There are no kings, they are colonies.

The chairman: Are there still quite a number of white people there?

Ali: Yes, there are immigrants in Tanganyika and Kenya. Because of the relatively cooler climate in Kenya, there are many settlers.

The chairman: How many are there? It is said that there are several hundreds of thousands.

Ali: Yes, there are several hundreds of thousands.

The chairman: It is said that there are 3,00,000.

Ali: Yes.

The chairman: What is the population of Kenya? Three milion?

Ali: Eight and one-half million.

The chairman: It has that many people?

Ali: Yes, and the population of Tanganyika is larger, with some 9 million people.

The chairman: There are 10 million.

Ali: That is possible. My figures came from a census taken a long time ago.

The chairman: Have you ever been in Tanganyika?

Ali: I only passed through it.

The chairman: Have you ever been in Kenya?

Ali: I passed through it when I went to Uganda.

The chairman: Which route* will you be taking when you return home?

Ali: I shall pass through Pakistan and Kenya, and maybe through Tanganyika and then to Zanzibar. There are two routes, one is a direct route from Kenya to Zanzibar, and the other is from Kenya to Zanzibar via Tanganyika.

The chairman: It seems to me that your skin complexion is slightly different from that of the people of Tanganyika.

Ali: Yes, the people of Tanganyika are a bit darker.

The chairman: There is also Madagascar. The skin of the people there is also different from the other localities in Africa.

Ali: Ahem.

The chairman: I hope you will have the opportunity to come back to China again sometime.

Ali: China has already become our home.

The chairman: Come for a trip, tour country. Shall we end our chat here? Do you still have any questions?

Ali: I have; I would like to ask you several question. The struggle of the peoples of Africa at the present time is developing by leaps and bounds, and as the struggle develops, our blows against imperialism become heavier. However, this struggle still has a long way to go. Although I have read quite a number of documents, I still would like to have you digress on whatever views you may have regarding the outlook of the struggle of the peoples of Africa.

The chairman: I am not very familiar with the situation in Africa. However, according to the way I see it, in the past 10 or 11 years, starting with 1952 when Egypt overthrew the regime of King Farouk, the changes in Africa have been tremendous. The British and the French were unwilling to admit their defeat and carried out attacks against the Suez movement. Another place is Algeria, where war was waged for 8 years. Algeria resisted several hundreds of thousands of French troops with a few troops. As a result, French imperialism was defeated and Algeria was victorious. Recently, there were changes in your country; your country merely has a population of 3,00,000, and dared to overthrow the lackey of imperialism, and the imperialists did not dare to do anything. Tanganyika also became independent and the British troops have gone. What about Kenya?

Ali: Kenya has become independent, but after the military coup, the British troops are still there.

The chairman: They are? I heard the troops in the African countries had left.

Ali: That was in Tanganyika.

The chairman: Oh, in Tanganyika.

Ali: In Kenya, the situation is a bit different. Kenya has an agreement with Britain; the British have bases in Kenya. The British troops will be withdrawn by the end of the year.

The chairman: Eventually, they will leave.

Ali: Correct!

The chairman: In the Congo, I speak of Greater Congo, there was a Lumumba, a national hero, who was put to death, but the struggle is still developing. In the recent greater part of the year, there has been development in the struggle. In Southwest Africa and Angola, the Portuguese colony, struggle is still underway. Although I am not familiar with Africa, as I see it, according to the circumstances of the past 10 years, it can be said that there will be still greater changes in the next 10 years. Maybe you also see it that way. We must look at it from the standpoint of history and development! South Africa is a bit more difficult. That area has more than 3 million white people, and they are unwilling to leave. That place must be liberated, but I'm afraid that it will take a little longer.

Asia, Africa, and Latin America, these three continents all have the conditions for revolution at the present time, and these three continents make up the vast majority of the world's population. This is a fact. They constitute the vast majority of the world; Europe, New Zealand, Australia, and North America the minority.

(Ali offers a cigarette to the chairman)

Ali: Africa does not have a communist party at present. Do you believe that the the time is ripe for the establishment of a communist party in Africa? Do you have any views regarding a united front in Africa?

The chairman: The question of establishing a communist party must rest on whether there are any industrial workers. I see that there are industries in Africa. Many of the countries have industries, some have been established by the imperialists and some have been established by the Africans themselves; there are mines, railroads, highways, and other industries. Although there is no communist party at present, there will be one of these days. It isn't that there is no communist party at present time, because there are communist parties in Algeria, Morocco, and South Africa. The Communist Party of Algeria is not a revolutionary party, it is a revisionist party. Revisionist parties, such as the party in Algeria, are not like a national liberation front which conducts a war for national liberation; the communist party in Algeria is against a war for liberation, it follows the dictates of the French communist party. The communist party in Algeria is against us, it opposes China; the Algerian Government and the Algerian National Liberation Front cooperate with us. I do not know why they oppose us. They might be opposing us for some reason that we don't understand.

There is still another example. The Iraqi communist party in Asia also opposes China. It only pays attention to opposing the Communist Party of China and does not pay any attention to the dangers of coups which it faces. Even during the past year a coup took place and Kassem was executed and the secretary general of the party was also killed. Do you know of this incident?

Ali: I know about it. I read about it in the newspapers.

The chairman: Many in the communist party were killed, many of the revisionists were killed, and many progressive persons were killed. You tell me, why does the communist party of Iraq oppose us?

Ali: They follow the conductor's baton.

The chairman: Follow the conductor's baton and carry on peaceful transition.

Then there is Brazil, which is also not in favour of us because we do not agree with peaceful transition. Several months ago, a coup took place and its president was kicked out. The leader of the revisionist party was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment. The leader of this party had been to China. His name is [Luiz Carlos] Prestes. He was a noted member of the communist party who later became a revisionist. The U.S. Imperialists and their lackey did not care whether one was a revisionist or not. Nine Chinese were arrested, of which six were traders and three were newsmen.

This is to say that revisionlsts do not oppose imperialists; they compromise with the imperialists and reactionaries. The working class of Africa will learn their lesson. It is possible that some revisionist parties will make their appearance, and it is also possible that some Marxist parties will make their appearance.

The question of a united front is a question of opposing imperialism or not opposing imperialism. Those who oppose imperialism must unite. Speaking of the categories of bourgeois democratic revolution, they determine whether one opposes imperialism or does not oppose imperialism. As for establishing a genuine socialist state (not one in name only), establishing an economy with systems of ownership by all the people and collective ownership under proletarian leadership, that is another thing. This not only stimulates the interests of the imperialists, but it will stimulate the interests of the bourgeoisie, Let us say, for example, that at the present time, it is possible for Algeria to go socialist. The older group of people will not be able to keep pace, including premier [Ferhat] Abbas of the provisional government and Belkacem. They will be unable to keep pace with the others.

Class struggle. Genuine Marxist-Leninists preach class struggle; there is class struggle in society. On two occasions we had a united front with the Kuomintang. One was the Northern Expedition, in 1927[1]. The second was during the war against Japan. During the first united front, the Northern Expedition fought to the Yangtze River Valley, and when the Kuomintang held the power and opposed us, we could only fight with them. We went up to Ching-kang-shan, and later came to Jui-chin.

After that, the Japanese fought their way in. Chiang Kai-shek felt that it would not do to continue his fight with us. The second united front was then established. This united front lasted for a period of 8 years. On the one hand, the Kuominating united with the Communist Party to oppose Japan; on the other hand, the Kuomintang also opposed us each day. What could we do? On one side, there was Japan; on the other side, there was also the Kuomintang, so we adopted the policy of uniting while waging struggle, with unity as the main factor. In this way, we endured with the Kuomintang for 8 years. With the surrender of Japan, the Kuomintang fought against us, and the united front disintegrated. We did not have any large cities. We did not have the assistance of foreign powers, our troops were few in numbers, we had no air force, we had no navy, we had no airplanes, and we had no artillery. We only had light weapons. They were not made by us; they had been seized by us.

Thus, it is not so that there is no united front? We drove them to Taiwan, but there still is a united front. In reality our united front is more widespread. Our China has eight democratic parties[2]. When the Kuominatang existed, the contacts between the intellectuals, university professors, middle and primary school teachers, and us were not very extensive. After liberation, they did not run away. We united with them. The university professors in Peking, such as the professors at Peking and Tsing-hua universities, and the university professors in Shanghai and Canton did not all run away. They felt that there was no future in following the Kuomintang.

The fundamental united front is the united front with the workers and the peasants. It was also after liberation that the Workers and Peasants' Alliance was realized on a national scale.

The Kuomintang represents the big bourgeoisie, the comprador class, and the feudalist landlord class. I am talking about its later period. The Kuomintang had represented the national bourgeoisie and the broad masses of people. At that time, with Mr Sun Yat-sen as its representative, it was China's only and most progressive political party. There was no Communist Party at that time. The Communist Party only came into being afterwards; it was 1921 before there was a Communist Party. Afterwards, the Communist Party and the Kuomintang set up the first united front.

Later on, the Kuomintang opposed the Communist Party. They fought each other for 10 years. It turned into an agent of imperialism – U.S. and British imperialism. Why were we still able to form the second united front with it when it turned into an agent of big bourgeoisie and the big landlord class? It was because Japan was fighting its way into our country.

When Japan invaded the Northeast, the Kuomintang was still battling us. It was when the Japanese had fought their way down through the pass and were advancing toward the mainland that it felt it would have to make peace with the Communist Party. It was then that the second united front of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang was formed.

Chiang Kai-shek stood on the side of the U.S. Britain, and France in opposing Japan, Hitler, and Mussolini; it was one faction of imperialism fighting another faction of imperialism. The three countries of Germany, Italy, and Japan became vanquished nations. It is necessary to look at certain conditions; at the time, the U.S., Britain, France, and we were also able to cooperate with them. Changes took place after the war; the U.S. wanted to dominate the world. Japan had been defeated; Italy and Germany had been defeated; Britain and France had been weakened. Why did Africa rise up? It was because imperialism had been weakened. Britain and France had been weakened.

In general, Africa..., as far as the broad masses of people are concerned, none have any good feelings toward Britain, the U.S., Belgium, Portugal, or Spain. Why is it that we are on speaking terms with you Africans and the black people? We have things in common.

Ali: We people of Africa carried on a protracted struggle with imperialism. We saw that China had been liberated and the struggle of the Chinese people greatly inspired us. After the liberation of China, we had a much better understanding of China.

Our struggle continued to develop because China provided us with a great deal of experience; China provided the people of Africa with a tremendous amount of support and encouragement for which we are extremely grateful. China issued many statements expressing support for us. In recent years, we have been able to come to China and visit many places, and this has been a great help to us.

The Soviet revisionists told us that we must coexist peacefully and carry out disarmament; they told us that this was our main task and said that they would use the money saved through disarmament to give us aid. However, our struggle must depend on our own efforts.

The chairman: Right!

Ali: In this aspect, the revisionists are colluding more and more with the imperialists. According to your way of thinking, how far will their collusion go?

The chairman: They might carry their collusion a step further. The imperialists and the revisionists have their collusions and they also have contradictions. Revisionists and revisionists also have contradictions. The revisionists have several tens of parties, but they are not very united. The imperialists are also not very united among themselves. You see, France and Britain are not very united either. The Japanese monopolistic capitalists and the Japanese Government first struck the U.S. at Pearl Harbor; afterwards, they occupied the Philipines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia; they fought on

to the eastern part of India and occupied the greater part of China. As for Korea, it goes without saying that it was originally its colony. Now these places have all gained their independence, and some are still under U.S. control. Among those controlled by the U.S. are: South Korea, South Vietnam, and the Philippines. Japan is also partially controlled by the U.S. You can say that Japan, but you must not say the people, is big bourgeoisie. Can they feel comfortable? I don't think so. I do not believe that there are no contradictions between the U.S. imperialists and the Japanese monopolistic capitalists.

We have said that there are two buffer zones. Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the first buffer zone. Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are the second buffer zone. The Japanese monopolistic capitalists were deceived [on this] by the U.S., and we oppose [this] deception. There are other people who subscribe to [this] interpretation of going into the buffer zone.

This is not the first time I am saying this; I said it in 1946[3]. At the time I said nothing about a first and second zone, but only one buffer zone, the buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the U.S., which included China. 1946, 1956, 1964,... that's 18 years ago. At that time, we were in Yenan; I said it to the American correspondent, her name is Strong.

Ali: I know who she is.

The chairman: She is already more than 70 years old!

At that time, the U.S. had taken the place of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and it wanted to dominate the world; its objective was to invade the buffer zone and not to fight the Soviet Union. The anti-Soviet slogan was a smoke-screen. Like the anti-China characteristics, its objective was to manipulate the buffer zone with an anti-China slogan.

Ali: I deeply appreciate the time the chairman has given me. May I be permitted to express my feelings to you? Ever since my arrival in China. I have looked forward to this day. There are no words which can express my feelings.

The chairman: Have you read any Marxism-Leninism works?

Ali: I have, and I have also read your works.

The chairman: I have learned from Marx and Lenin.

Ali: You have developed Marxism-Leninism. Your works are much easier to understand than those of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

The chairman: They are somewhat easier to understand.

Ali: That is my feeling, your works are very readable.

The chairman: I do not have many writings.

Ali: No, you have a great many.

The chairman: Good, let us end our conversation here!

Ali and Mrs Ali: Till we meet again!

The chairman: Till we meet again!

NOTES

1. The Northern Expedition was the punitive war against the Northern warlords launched by the revolutionary army which marched north from Kwangtung Province in May-July 1926. The Northern Expeditionary Army, with the Communist Party of China taking part in its leadership and under the Party's influence (the political work in the army was at the time time mostly under the charge of Communist Party members), gained the warm support of the broad masses of workers and peasants. In the second half of 1926 and the first half of 1927 it occupied most of the provinces along the Yangtse and Yellow Rivers and defeated the Northern warlords. In April 1927 this revolutionary war failed as a result of betrayal by the reactionary clique under Chiang Kai-shek within the revolutionary army.

2. These are: (the date of their respective founding included following parentheses): Zhongguo guomindang geming weiyuanhui (the Revolutionary Commitee of the Chinese Kuomintang). 1948; Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng (the Chinese Democratic League),1941; Zhongguo minzhu jianguohui (the Chinese Democratic Association for National Construction). 1945; Zhongguo minzhu cujinhui (the Chinese Association for the Advance of Democracy), 1945; Zhongguo nonggong minzhudang (the Chinese Peasant-Worker Democratic Party), 1947 Zhongguo Zhigongdang (the Chinese Zhigong Party); Jiusan xueshe (the September Third Study Society), 1944; Taiwan minzhu zizhi tongmeng (the League for Democracy and Autonomy for Taiwan), 1947 Zhongguo renmin Huguohui (the Chinese People's Association for National Salvalton); Sanmin zhuyi tonghzhi lianhehui (the Association of Comrades of the Three People's Principles), and Zhongguo guomindang minzhu cujinhui (the Association of the Chinese Kuomintang to Promote Democracy).

3. See "Talk with The American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* Vol. IV, pp 97-101

TALK WITH MAO YUAN-HSIN

First Talk

July 5, 1964

The Chairman: Have you made any progress in the course of the past half year? Have you raised [your level]?

Yuan-Hsin[1]*:* I'm a bit mixed up about it myself, I wouldn't venture to say that I have made any progress; if I have, it is merely superficial.

The Chairman: I think you have after all made some progress, your way of looking at problems is no longer so simple. Have you read the 'Ninth Reply' or not [2]. Have you seen the five criteria for successors?

Yuan-Hsin: I have seen them. *(Following on from this, he talked for a while, setting forth the main content of the 'Ninth Reply' as regards successors.)*

The Chairman: You have talked about it, all right, but do you understand it? These five criteria are indissolubly linked to one another. The first is theory, or also orientation. The second is the aim – i.e. when you come right down to it, whom do you serve? This is the most important. When you have mastered this point, you can do anything. The third, fourth and fifth criteria relate to questions of methodology. You must unite with the majority, you must implement

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SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

democratic centralism, you must not allow everything to be settled by the word of one man, you must carry out self-criticism, you must be modest and prudent. Isn't all this methodology?

(When talking about the first criterion for successors, the Chairman said:) Are you going to study Marxism-Leninism, or revisionism?

Yuan-Hsin: Naturally, I'm studying Marxism-Leninism.

The Chairman: Don't be too sure, who knows what you're studying? Do you know what Marxism-Leninism is?

Yuan-Hsin: Marxism-Leninism means that you must carry on the class struggle, that you must carry out revolution.

The Chairman: The basic idea of Marxism-Leninism is that you must carry out revolution. But what is revolution? Revolution is the proletariat overthrowing the capitalists, the peasants overthrowing the landlords, and then afterwards setting up a workers' and peasants' political power, and moreover continuing to consolidate it. At present, the task of the revolution has not yet been completed; it has not yet been finally determined who in the end will overthrow whom. In the Soviet Union is not Khrushchev in power, is not the bourgeoisie in power? We too, have cases in which political power is in the grip of the bourgeoisie; there are production brigades, factories, and *hsien* committees, as well as district and provincial committees, in which they have their people, there are deputy heads of public security departments who are their men. Who is leading the Ministry of Culture? The cinema and the theater are entirely in their service, and not in the service of the majority of the people.[3] Who do you say is exercising leadership? To study Marxism-Leninism is to study the class struggle. The class struggle is everywhere; it is in your Institute, a counter-revolutionary has appeared in your Institute, are you aware of this or not? He wrote a reactionary diary filling a dozen or so notebooks, every day he cursed us, shouldn't he be considered a counter-revolutionary element? Are you people not completely insensitive to class struggle? Isn't it right there beside you? If there were no counter-revolution, then why would we still need revolution?

(Yuan-hsin reports on some circumstances regarding the 'five antis' in the factory where he had gone for practical training, from which he had learned a great deal.)

The Chairman: Everywhere there is counter-revolution, how could it be absent from the factories? Middle and low-ranking Kuomintang officers, secretaries of *hsien* [Kuomintang] party offices, etc., have all crept in. No matter what guise they have been transformed into, we must now clean them all out. Every where there is class struggle, every where there are counter-revolutionary elements. Is not Ch'en Tung-p'ing sleeping right next to you? I have read all the various materials [of his] denounced by your Institute. You were sleeping together with a counter-revolutionary, and yet you did not know it!

(The Chairman next asked about political and ideological work in the Institute. Mao Yuan-hsin gave his views of this.)

Yuan-Hsin: They call meetings and talk a lot; outwardly it's very stirring, but they don't solve many real problems.

The Chairman: The whole country is engaged in learning from the People's Liberation Army on a vast scale. You are members of the PLA; why aren't you learning from it? Does the Institute have a political department? What is it doing? Do you have political training or not?

(Yuan-hsin explains the way political training is carried out at the Institute.) All this is nothing but attending classes and discussing things, what is the use of it? You should go and study reality. You have not even applied the principle that ideology comes first, you have no real knowledge at all, so when people talk about those things how can you understand them?

(The Chairman especially advocates swimming in great winds and waves, and moreover urges Mao Yuan-hsin to practice it resolutely every day.) You have already come to know water, and have mastered it, that is excellent. Do you know how to ride horseback?

Yuan-Hsin: I don't know how [to ride].

The Chairman: To be a soldier, and not to know how to ride – this should not be. *(The Chairman calls on Mao Yuan-hsin to go and learn to ride; the Chairman himself constantly practices riding, and has also made his secretary and staff go and learn.)* Have you done any rifle shooting or not?

Yuan-Hsin: I haven't touched a gun for four years.

The Chairman: At present the militia all shoot very well, but you members of the PLA hasn't done any shooting; you discuss this criticism of mine with X X X, what kind of soldier is it that doesn't know how to shoot?

(Once when he was swimming, and the weather was relatively cold,

so that it was warmer in the water than above it, Mao Yuan-hsin, after he had come out and felt a bit cold, said: 'It is after all a bit more comfortable in the water.)

The Chairman: (staring angrily at Mao Yuan-hsin): In fact, you like comfort, and fear difficulties. *(The Chairman, in discussing the second criterion for successors, said:)* You Know how to think about yourself, you spend all your time pondering your own problems. Your father *(Comrade Mao Tse-min)* was dauntless and resolute in the face of the enemy, he never wavered in the slightest, because he served the majority of the people[4]. If it had been you, wouldn't you have got down on both knees and begged for your life? Very many members of our family have given their lives, killed by the Kuomintang and the American imperialists. You grew up eating honey, and thus far you have never known suffering. In future, if you do not become a rightist, but rather a centrist, I shall be satisfied. You have never suffered, how can you be a leftist?

Yuan-Hsin: Is there still some hope for me?

The Chairman: Well, yes, there is hope, but if you surpass the criteria I have set, that will be even better.

(The Chairman also talked about the third criterion, saying:) When you people hold a meeting, how do you hold it? You are a squad leader, how does one go about being a squad leader? When everyone criticizes you, can you accept it? Can you accept their criticisms even if they are wrong? Can you accept a false and unjust charge? If you cannot accept it, then how can you unite people? You must especially learn to work with people who disagree with you. If you like to have people praise you, if you like to have honey on your lips, and songs to your glory in your ears, that is the most dangerous thing, and that is exactly what you do like.

(In talking about the fourth criterion, the Chairman said:) Do you unite with the masses or not? Is it not the case that you spend your time with the sons and daughters of cadres, and look down on other people? You must let people talk, and not be satisfied with letting one person settle everything.

(In talking about the fifth criterion, the Chairman said:) In this respect you have already made some progress, you have engaged in a bit of self-criticism, but it's barely a beginning, you mustn't think everything is all right.

*(Afterwards, the Chairman once again talked about the work at the Institute:)*The most fundamental defect of your Institute is that you have not applied the 'four firsts'[5]. Didn't you say you wanted to study Marxism-Leninism? What method of study do you employ? How much can you learn merely by relying on listening to lectures? The most important thing is to go and learn from practice.

Yuan-Hsin: A faculty of science and engineering and faculty of letters are different; {the former] doesn't provide for so much time to go and enter into contact with society.

The Chairman: That is wrong; the class struggle is your most important subject, and it is compulsory subject. I have already discussed this question with X X. X. Your Institute should go down to the countryside to carry out the 'four clean-ups', from the cadres to the students all of you should go, and not one should remain. You should go this winter, or in the spring of next year; it is better to go earlier than later, you must definitely go. As for you, you must not only spend five months, participating in the 'four clean-ups', you must also go to a factory and spend half a year carrying out the 'five antis'. Isn't it true that you don't understand a thing about society? If you don't carry out the four clean-ups, you won't understand the peasants, and if you don't carry out the five antis, you won't understand the workers. Only when you have completed such a course of political training can I consider you a university graduate. Otherwise, if the Military Engineering Institute lets you graduate, I won't recognize your diploma. If you don't even know about the class struggle, how can you be regarded as a university graduate? If you are to graduate, I will set you this additional subject. Your Institute has not carried out ideological work; so many counter- revolutionaries, and you were not aware of it; Ch'eng Tung-p'ing was right next to you and you didn't know it.

(Mao Yuan-hsin says that while Ch'en Tung-p'ing was at home during the holidays, he listened to the enemy's radio and was thus corrupted.) How can you believe the enemy's radio if you listen to it? Have you listened to it or not? The enemy doesn't even have food to eat, can you believe what he says? Wei Li-huang [6] was in business in Hong Kong; having lost his money, he returned. Everybody looks down on people like Wei Li-huang; it's hard to imagine that the enemy doesn't despise him *(Ch'en Tung- p'ing)* too.

What are the four firsts? *(Mao Yuan-hsin talks about this.)* You know about this; why, then, do you not grasp living ideology? I hear there are a lot of political cadres in your Institute, but they do not grasp the essential, so naturally they do not grasp ideology: Naturally, your Institute has scored some successes; there's nothing so remarkable if it has a few problems. We've been engaged in military engineering for only a decade. Our army has no experience in running technical schools. It's like when we learned to fight in 1927: at first we didn't know how, and we kept being defeated, but a afterwards we learned how.

(The Chairman also asked:) How is it with the reform of teaching in your Institute?

Yuan-hsin: The last time we had examinations, our unit tried out a new method. Everyone thought it was good, and gave a correct evaluation of the level [of each student]. It also had an influence on the method of study as a whole, making it possible to study in a lively fashion.

The Chairman: This should have been done long ago.

Yuan-Hsin: In the past, the notion of marks prevailed, so that we did not study with initiative.

The Chairman: It's good that you are able to recognize this. I can't blame you for this either, for the whole educational system brazenly calls on you to strive for a mark of five. If you don't strike for such a perfect mark, they may block [your advancement] completely. Your elder sister, too, suffered from this kind of thing. There was a student at Peking University who never took notes at ordinary times, and scored between three-and-a-half and four marks in examinations, yet at graduation time the dissertation he presented was of the highest level in the class. There are people who have seen through all this, and have taken the initiative in study. There are some people like that who have seen through marks, and who study boldly, and with initiative. Your teachers teach by inculcation. Every day you attend lectures. Do they really have that much to say? The teachers should distribute their lecture notes to you. What are they afraid of? They should let the students study them by themselves. To keep the lecture notes secret from the students, allowing them only to take notes in class, hampers the students terribly. In the past, when I was teaching at K'ang Ta, I used to distribute lecture notes to my students in advance. I only talked for thirty minutes, and let the students themselves do their own study; afterwards the students would ask questions and the teacher would answer. With university students, especially the senior students, the main thing is to let them study and work out problems. What is the point of talking so much?

In the past they openly called on everyone to strive for perfect marks. People were perfect in school, but they weren't necessarily perfect in their work. In Chinese history, none of the highest graduate of the Hanlin Academy had true talent or learning. These were found rather among those who failed even to pass as second degree graduates. The two greatest poets of the T'ang dynasty [7] did not even obtain the degree of *chu-jen*. Don't put too much emphasis on marks; you should concentrate your energies on fostering and training your ability to analyse and solve problems. Do not run along behind the teachers and be fettered by them. The problem of educational reform is primarily a problem of teachers. The teachers have so many books, and they can do nothing without their lecture notes. Why don't they distribute their lecture notes to you and study problems together with you? When the students in the senior classes ask questions, the teachers will only answer half of them, and will know nothing about the rest, so they will study and discuss the problems together with the students. This is not bad either. They must not put on arrogant airs to frighten people off. Even the bourgeoisie has opposed the cramming method of teaching. Why shouldn't we oppose it? It will be all right so long as the students are not treated as targets of attack, Teachers are the key to educational reform.

(Once Mao Yuan-hsin had urged the Chairman to visit an exhibition of new scientific achievements; the Chairman had said: 'I' am busy now, I can't go and look at it. I haven't time to look at it carefully, and to look at flowers while riding by on horseback isn't worth while either.)

How is it that you are interested in this, but not in Marxism-Leninism? In any case, I rarely hear you ask questions about this aspect of things most of the time. What newspaper do you usually read?

Yuan-Hsin: I read the *People's Daily*.

The Chairman: There's nothing worth looking at in the *People's Daily*. You should read *Liberation Army Daily*, or *Chinese Youth*

Daily[8]. The things the workers and soldiers write are real and lively, and they know how to explain problems, Have you read the discussion on 'two combines into one?'

Yuan-Hsin: I've read only very little, and I didn't understand much of what I did read.

The Chairman: Is that so? Have a look at this newspaper *(the Chairman hands him a copy of Chinese Youth Daily)*, see how the workers analyse things, see how the cadres of the Youth League analyse things, they analyse things very well, it's easier to understand than *People's Daily*.

(The Chairman also said:) Your political study is nothing but talk. If you want to learn a lot of things, the most important point is to go and study in the midst of reality. Why are you interested in your professional speciality, but not in Marxism-Leninism?

When you study history, if you don't combine it with present reality it's no good. If you study modern history and don't carry out work compiling village histories and family histories, it's a complete waste of time[9]. When you study ancient history, this too must be combined with present reality, and cannot be divorced from excavations and archaeology. Did Yao, Shun, and Yu[10] exist or not? I don't believe it, you don't have any real evidence. There are oracle bones to provide evidence regarding the Shang dynasty, we can believe in that. If you go and burrow into a pile of books, the more you study, the less knowledge you'll have.

NOTES

1. Comrade Mao Yuan-hsin is Chairman Mao's nephew who studied at the Harbin Military Engineering Institute.

2. At this time, Mao was intensely preoccupied with the problem of bringing up successors to the revolutionary cause to which he had devoted himself for half a century. The five requirements or criteria for such successors were first publicly stated in mid-July 1964, in the editorial entitled 'On Khrushchev's Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World'. They must be 'genuine Marxist-Leninists and not revisionists'; they must be 'revolutionaries who wholeheartedly serve the majority of the people of China and the whole world'; they must be 'proletarian statesmen capable of uniting and working together with the over-whelming majority'; they must be 'models in applying the Party's democratic centralism', and must master the 'mass line' method of leadership; they must be 'modest and prudent and guard against arrogance and impetuosity'

3. It was in 1964 that Chiang Ch'ing began in earnest her efforts to remedy this situation by developing modern revolutionary Peking opera to replace the old plays about emperors, generals and concubines.

4. Mao's brother, Mao Tse-min, served in Sinkaing from 1938 to 1942 as head of the finance department of the government controlled by the local warlord, General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who was then collaborating with the Soviet Union. When General Sheng shifted his allegiance from Moscow to the Kuomintang, Mao Tse-min was arrested in September 1942 and executed in 1943.

5. In September 1960, Lin Piao presented to a meeting of the Party's Military Affairs Committee a report on what he called the 'four relations', shortly to be reformulated and re-baptized as the 'four firsts': priority of men over weapons, of political work over other work, of ideological work over routine political work, and of living ideology over ideas from books. These points were developed in a resolution revised by Mao himself before being adopted by the Military Affairs Committee.

6. Wei Li-huang (1896-1960) a former KMT general who was the deputy commander of Chiang Kai-shek's North east Military Headquarters ("Bandit Suppression Headquarters") during the Third Revolutionary Civil War period (i.e., August 1945-October 1949). He was relieved of his command after his defeat by PLA troops at the battle of Shenyang in November 1948. Wei fled to Hong Kong in 1949, and in March 1955 returned to the mainland. He was invited to be a special delegate to the National Committee of the CPPCC and held this position from 1956 to 1959. He was also a member of the Standing Committee of the KMT and a Vice-chairman of the National Defense Council. In many ways, therefore, he stood as an example of how progressive elements of the KMT could cooperate with the people's government.

7. The two most famous poets of China's literary golden age during the Tang dynasty.

8. Mao's enthusiasm for this paper, which was the organ of the Communist Youth League, was natural enough at the time, for it was at the Ninth Congress of the League in June 1964 that the problem of 'bringing up successors' for the revolutionary cause had just been extensively discussed for the first time.

9. Such methods of teaching, involving field work to take down the reminiscences of old people, etc., were common in China at the time.

10. Legendary rulers supposed to have ascended the throne respectively in 2356, 2255, and 2205 a.c. The first two especially are regarded as models of what a sage-king should be

WE MUST PREVENT CHINA FROM CHANGING COLOUR

July 14, 1964

Class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment are the three great revolutionary movements for building a mighty socialist country. These movements are a sure guarantee that communists will be free from bureaucracy and immune against revisionism and dogmatism, and will for ever remain invincible. They are a reliable guarantee that the proletariat will be able to unite with the broad working masses and realize a democratic dictatorship. If, in the absence of these movements, the landlords, rich peasants, counter- revolutionaries, bad elements and monsters of all kinds were allowed to crawl out, while our cadres were to shut their eyes to all this and in many cases fail even to differentiate between the enemy and ourselves but were to collaborate with the enemy and were corrupted, divided and demoralized by him, if our cadres were thus pulled out or the enemy were able to sneak in, and if many of our workers, peasants and intellectuals were left defenseless against both the soft and the hard tactics of the enemy, then it would not take long, perhaps only several years or a decade, or several decades at most, before a counter-revolutionary restoration on a national scale inevitably occurred, the Marxist-Leninist party would undoubtedly become a revisionist party or fascist party, and the whole of China would change its colour.

Complete text of a passage attributed to Mao in the Ninth Chinese Reply to the Soviet open letter of 14 July 1963, published on 14 July 1964, and there identified as a note on documents, from Checking province regarding the participation of cadres in physical labour, dated 9 May 1963. (Hung-ch'i, no 13-2.) This extract has now been included in Chapter III of Quotations from Chairman Mao.

COMMENT ON REPORT BY COMRADE WANG TUNG - HSING

July, 1964

Decorations of potted flowers are things which have been handed down from the old society. This is a plaything of the feudalist official class, the bourgeoisie, and those young gentlemen who carry cages with roosting birds. Those people who have nothing to do after eating a meal have the ability to cultivate and dabble in flowers.

It has already been more than 10 years since the liberation of the country. But growing flowers has not been reduced. Instead, it has become more developed than ever before. Now it must be changed. I do not like the display of flowers in the room; during the day, there seems to be some good points. But at night, there are bad points. Long ago, I had them remove the flowers from my room. Henceforth, let them also dispose of the flowers in the courtyard. Wouldn't it be satisfying and fine if you were to plant some trees in the courtyard? They can still be planted. Your flower cellars must be abolished. The majority of the flowers must be reduced and taken away; it is only necessary that a few people take charge of the yards and gardens. Henceforth, more trees must be planted in the yards and gardens and more fruit trees must be planted; some foodgrains, vegetables, and oil-bearing crops may also be planted. The public parks and *Hsiang - shan* in the metropolitan area of the city of Peking must gradually change to planting some fruit trees and oil-bearing crops; thus, while they are pleasant to look at, they will also be practical and beneficial and will be advantageous to the future generations.

Source: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought,* a Red Guard Publication.

INTERVIEW WITH THE JAPANESE SOCIALISTS ON THE THEORY OF THE INTERMEDIATE ZONE

August 11, 1964

Chairman Mao first raised the following subject: Japan and China should act jointly, work together one with the other. Japan is a country which is relatively developed industrially; therefore she can aid us in many ways. But we must also support each other politically. Why should we oppose each other as was the case a few years ago?

Exchanging remarks with Kojo Sasaki and other political leaders about past Japanese aggression against China, Chairman Mao broached the question of American imperialism and of intermediate zones, and developed the following thoughts:

As a result of the war, Japan came under the domination of American imperialism, exactly as American imperialism rules South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and so on. The hands of the United States have stretched out into the western part of the Pacific Ocean and into South–east Asia. These stretched–out hands are very long.

The United States rules over Europe; it rules over Canada; it rules over Latin America, except for Cuba. Its hands reach all the way to Africa.

All the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are rising against imperialism; even Europe, Canada, and other countries are rising against

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SOURCE: Japanese journal *Sekat Shuho*, 11 August, 1964

imperialism. Imperialists are even rising against imperialists. Isn't that what De Gaulle is doing?

At the present time, there exist two intermediate zones in the world. Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute the first intermediate zone. Europe, Northern America, and Oceania constitute the second. Japanese monopoly capital belongs to the second intermediate zone, but even it is discontented with the United States, and some of its representatives are openly rising against the United States. Though Japanese monopoly capital now is dependent on the United States, the time will come when it too will shake off the American yoke.

The Japanese people are a great people. They waged war with the United States, with England and France. They carried out the attack on Pearl Harbor; they occupied Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia. Their advance reached the eastern part of India.

Obviously, this by no means indicates that I favour repetition of aggression by Japanese imperialism.

However, I do not think that Japanese monopoly capital will allow the United States to sit on its neck forever. Wouldn't it be best for Japan to be completely independent, to establish relations and enter into cooperation with those forces in Asia striving for national independence?

On the Sino – Soviet Dispute

Referring to the socalled Sino–Soviet dispute, Mao raised the question of Soviet military aid to India, of the withdrawal from China of Soviet specialists and technicians, and so on. Noting that 'relations between us and the Soviet Union have been getting worse and worse since the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, he further declared:

They challenged us to this, and we are responding. They proposed that we halt open discussions, even for only three months. We indicated that we would not stop them even for three days. We have waged war for twenty–five years, twenty – two of them civil war and the war against Japan, and three of them the war in Korea. Earlier I was a teacher; I did not know what war was. Three instructors taught me what war is: Chiang Kai–shek, Japanese imperialism, and American imperialism. We know this about wars – when one fights them, people die. As a result of twenty–five years of war, the losses of the Chinese people amounted to several tens of millions of killed and wounded.

But when it comes to wars on paper, in such a war no one gets killed. We have been waging such a war for several years now, and not one person has died. And we are ready to continue this war for another twenty five years.

On the Territorial Question

Tetsho Ara, head of the delegation of the staff of the Socialist Party on the island of Hokkaido asked: 'At a time when we had no knowledge of it, the Kurile Islands were taken from us, according to the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Declaration. We demand their return, and we would like to hear the opinion of Chairman Mao in this connection.

The following was said in response:

The places occupied by the Soviet Union are very many. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union, under the pretext of assuring the independence of Mongolia, actually placed that country under its domination. Mongolia covers an area much greater than that of the Kurile Islands. When Khrushchev and Bulganin were in China in 1954 we raised this question, but they refused to speak to us about it. They annexed a part of Rumania. They cut off a part of East Germany and chased the local inhabitants into the western part. They cut off a part of Poland and included it in Russia, and as compensation gave Poland a part of East Germany. The same happened in Finland. They cut off everything that was possible to cut off. Some people have declared that Sinkiang Province and the territory north of the Amur River should be included in the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. is concentrating troops on its borders.

The Soviet Union covers an area of 22 million square kilometers and its population totals 200 million people. The time has come for it to stop annexations. Japan covers an area of 370,000 square kilometers and has a population of 100 million. It has been only 100 years that the land east of the Baikal has been Russian territory, and it is from those times that Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other points can be considered territory of the Soviet Union. We have not yet presented accounts on this score. As far as the Kurile Islands are concerned, the question is clear for us – they should be returned to Japan.

TALK ON QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

August 18, 1964

It is only when there is class struggle that there can be philosophy. It is a waste of time to discuss epistemology apart from practice. The comrades who study philosophy should go down to the countryside. They should go down this winter or next spring to participate in the class struggle. Those whose health is not good should go too. Going down won't kill people. All they'll do is catch a cold, and if they just put on a few extra suits of clothes it'll be all right.

The way they go about it in the universities at present is no good, going from book to book, from concept to concept. How can philosophy come from books? The three basic constituents of Marxism are scientific socialism, philosophy, and political economy[1]. The foundation is social science, class struggle. There is a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Marx and the others saw this. Utopian socialists are always trying to persuade the bourgeoisie to be charitable. This won't work, it is necessary to rely on the class struggle of the proletariat. At that time, there had already been many strikes. The English parliamentary inquiry recognized that the twelve-hour day was less favourable than the eight-hour day to the interests of the capitalists. It is only starting from this viewpoint that Marxism appeared. The foundation is class struggle. The study of philosophy can only come afterwards. Whose philosophy? Bourgeois philosophy, or proletarian philosophy? Proletarian philosophy is Marxist philosophy.

SOURCE : *Mao chu-hsi tui P'eng, Hua-ng, Chang, Chou fan-tang chi-t'uan ti p'i-p'an*

There is also proletarian economics, which has transformed classical economics. Those who engage in philosophy believe that philosophy comes first. The oppressors oppress the oppressed, while the oppressed need to fight back and seek a way out before they start looking for philosophy. It is only when people took this as their starting point that there was Marxism–Leninism, and that they discovered philosophy. We have all been through this. Others wanted to kill me; Chiang Kai-shek wanted to kill me. Thus we came to engage in class struggle, to engage in philosophizing.

University students should start going down this winter – I am referring to the humanities. Students of natural science should not be moved now, though we can move them for a spell or two. All those studying the humanities – history, political economy, literature, law – must every one of them go. Professors, assistant professors, administrative workers, and students should all of them go down, for a limited period of five months. If they go to the countryside for five months, or to the factories for five months, they will acquire some perceptual knowledge. Horses, cows, sheep, chickens, dogs, pigs, rice, sorghum, beans, wheat, varieties of millet – they can have a look at all these things. If they go in the winter, they will not see the harvest, but at least they can still see the land and the people. To get some experience of class struggle – that's what I call a university. They argue about which university is better, Peking University or People's University[2]. For my part I am a graduate of the university of the greenwoods, I learned a bit there. In the past I studied Confucius, and spent six years on the Four Books and the Five Classics[3], I learned to recite them from memory, but I did not understand them. At that time, I believed deeply in Confucius, and even wrote essays [expounding his ideas]. Later I went to a bourgeois school for seven years. Seven plus six makes thirteen years. I studied all the usual bourgeois stuff – natural science and social science. They also taught some pedagogy. This includes five years of normal school, two years of middle school, and also the time I spent in the library[4]. At that time I believed in Kant's dualism, especially in his idealism. Originally I was a feudalist and an advocate of bourgeois democracy. Society impelled me to participate in the revolution. I spent a few years as a primary school teacher and principal of a four year school. I also taught history and Chinese language in a six-year school. I also taught for a short period in a middle school, but I did not understand a thing. When I joined the Communist Party I knew that we must make revolution, but against what? And how would we go about it? Of course we had to make revolution against imperialism and the old society. I did not quite understand what sort of a thing imperialism was, still less did I understand how we could make revolution against it. None of the stuff I had learned in thirteen years was any good for making revolution. I used only the instrument – language. Writing essays is an instrument. As for the content of my studies, I didn't use it at all. Confucius said: 'Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity.' The benevolent man loves others[5]'. Whom did he love? All men? Nothing of the kind. Did he love the exploiters? It wasn't exactly that, either. He loved only a part of the exploiters. Otherwise, why wasn't Confucius able to be a high official? People didn't want him. He loved them, and wanted them to unite. But when it came to starving, and to [the precept] 'The superior man can endure poverty,' he almost lost his life, the people of K'uang wanted to kill him[6]. There were those who criticized him for not visiting Ch'in in his journey to the West. In reality, the poem 'In the Seventh Month the Fire Star Passes the Meridian' in the *Book of Odes* refers to events in Shensi. There is also 'The Yellow Bird', which talks about the affair in which three high officials of Duke Mu of Ch'ien were killed and buried with him on his death[7]. Ssu-ma Ch'ien[8] had a very high opinion of the *Book of Odes*. He said the 300 poems it contains were all written by sages and worthies of ancient times when they were aroused. A large part of the poems in the *Book of Odes* are in the manner of the various states, they are the folk songs of the common people, the sages and worthies are none other than the common people. 'Written when they were aroused' means that when a man's heart was filled with anger, he wrote a poem!

> You sow not nor reap;
> How do you get the paddy for your three hundred round binns?
> You do not follow the chase;
> How do we see the quails hanging in your courtyards?
> O that superior man!
> He would not eat the bread of idleness.[9]

The expression 'to neglect the duties of an office while taking the pay' comes from here. This is a poem which accuses heaven and opposes the rulers. Confucius, too, was rather democratic, he included [in the *Book of Odes]* poems about the love between man and woman. In his commentaries, Chu Hsi characterized them as poems about clandestine love affairs[10]. In reality, some of them are and some of them aren't; the latter borrow the imagery of man and woman to write about the relations between prince and subject. In Shu [present-day Szechwan] at the time of the Five Dynasties and Ten Countries, there was a poem entitled 'The Wife of Ch'in Laments the Winter', by Wei Chuang[11]. He wrote it in his youth, and it is about his longing for his prince.

To return to this matter of going down, people should go beginning this winter and spring, in groups and in rotation, to participate in the class struggle. Only in this way can they learn something, learn about revolution. You intellectuals sit every day in your government offices, eating well, dressing well, and not even doing any walking. That's why you fall ill. Clothing, food, housing, and exercise are the four great factors causing disease. If, from enjoying good living conditions, you change to somewhat worse conditions, if you go into the midst of the 'four clean-ups' and the 'five antis'[12], and undergo a spell of toughening, then you intellectuals will have a new look about you.

If you don't engage in class struggle, then what is this philosophy you're engaged in?

Why not go down and try it? If your illness gets too severe you should come back – you have to draw the line at dying. When you are so ill that you are on the verge of dying, then you should come back. As soon as you go down, you will have some spirit. *(K'ang Sheng interjects: 'The research institutes in the Departments of Philosophy and Social Science of the Academy of Science should all go down too. At present, they are on the verge of turning into institutes for the study of antiquities, of turning into a fairyland nourishing itself by inhaling offerings of incense. None of the people in the Institute of Philosophy read the Kuang-ming jih-pao')* I read only the *Kuang-ming jih-pao* and the *Wen-hui pao*[13], I don't read *People's Daily*, because the *People's Daily* doesn't publish theoretical articles; after we adopt a resolution, then they publish it. *The Liberation Army Daily* is lively, it's readable *(Comrade K'ang Sheng: 'The Institute of Literature pays no attention to Chou Ku-ch'eng*[14]*, and the Economics Institute pays no attention to Sun Yeh-fang*[15]*, and to his going in for Libermanism, going in for capitalism.")*

Let them go in for capitalism. Society is very complex. If one only goes in for socialism and not for capitalism, isn't that too simple? Wouldn't we then lack the unity of opposites, and be merely one-sided? Let them do it. Let them attack us madly, demonstrate in the streets, take up arms to rebel – I approve all of these things. Society is very complex, there is not a single commune, a single *hsien*, a single department of the Central Committee, in which one cannot divide into two. Just look, hasn't the Department of Rural Work been disbanded?[16] It devoted itself exclusively to accounting on the basis of the individual household, and to propagating the 'four great freedoms'– freedom to lend money, to engage in commerce, to hire labour, and to buy and sell land. In the past, they put out a proclamation [to this effect]. Teng Tzu-hui had a dispute with me. At a meeting of the Central Committee, he put forward the idea of implementing the four great freedoms.[17]

To consolidate New Democracy, and to go on consolidating it for ever, is to engage in capitalism[18]. New Democracy is a bourgeois-democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat. It touches only the landlords and the comprador bourgeoisie, it does not touch the national bourgeois at all. To divide up the land and give it to the peasants is to transform the property of the feudal landlords into the individual property of the peasants, and this still remains within the limits of the bourgeois revolution. To divide up the land is nothing remarkable – MacArthur did it in Japan. Napoleon divided up the land too. Land reform cannot abolish capitalism, nor can it lead to socialism.

In our state at present approximately one third of the power is in the hands of the enemy or of the enemy's sympathizers. We have been going for fifteen years and we now control two thirds of the realm. At present, you can buy a [Party] branch secretary for a few packs of cigarettes, not to mention marrying a daughter to him. There are some localities where land reform was carried out peacefully, and the land reform teams were very weak; now you can see that there are a lot of problems there.

I have received the materials on philosophy . *[This refers to the materials on the problem of contradictions – note by stenographer.]* I have had a look at the outline. *[This refers to the outline of an article criticizing 'two combine into one*[19] *— note by stenographer. –]* I have not been able to read the rest. I have also looked at the materials on analysis and synthesis.

It is a good thing to collect materials like this on the law of the unity of opposites, what the bourgeoisie says about it, what Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin say about it, what the revisionists say about it. As for the bourgeoisie, Yang Hsien-chen talks about it, and Hegel of old talked about it. Such people existed in the olden days. Now they are even worse. There were also Bogdanov and Lunacharsky, who used to talk about deism. I have rèad Bogdanov's economics. Lenin read it, and it seems he approved of the part on primitive accumulation. *(K'ang Sheng: 'Bogdanov's economic doctrines were perhaps somewhat more enlightened than those of modern revisionism. Kautsky's economic doctrines were somewhat more enlightened than those of Khrushchev, and Yugoslavia is also somewhat more enlightened than the Soviet Union. After all, Djilas said a few good things about Stalin, he said that on Chinese problems Stalin made a self-criticism.')*

Stalin felt that he had made mistakes in dealing with Chinese problems, and they were no small mistakes. We are a great country of several hundred millions, and he opposed our revolution, and our seizure of power. We prepared for many years in order to seize power in the whole country, the whole of the Anti-Japanese War constituted a preparation. This is quite clear if you look at the documents of the Central Committee for that period, including *On New Democracy*. That is to say that you cannot set up a bourgeois dictatorship, you can only establish New Democracy under the leadership of the proletariat, you can only set up a people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat. In our country, for eighty years, all the democratic revolutions led by the bourgeoise failed. The democratic revolution led by us will certainly be victorious. There is only this way out, there is no other way out. This is the first step. The second step will be to build socialism. Thus, *On New Democracy* was a complete program. It discussed politics, economics, and culture as well; it failed to discuss only military affairs. *(K'ang Sheng: 'On New Democracy is of great significance for the world communist movement. I asked Spanish comrades, and they said the problem for them was to establish bourgeois democracy, not to establish New Democracy. In their country, they did not concern themselves with the three points: army, countryside, political power. They wholly subordinated themselves to the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy, and achieved nothing at all'.)* These are the policies of Ch'en Tu-hsiu! *(Comrade K'ang Sheng: 'They say the Communist Party organized an army, and then turned it over to others.')* This is useless.

(Comrade K'ang Sheng: 'They also did not want political power, nor did they mobilize the peasantry. At that time, the Soviet Union said to them that if they imposed proletarian leadership, England and France might oppose it, and this would not be in the interests of the Soviet Union.')

How about Cuba? In Cuba they concerned themselves precisely to set up political power and an army, and also mobilized the peasants, as [we did] in the past; therefore they succeeded.

(Comrade K'ang Sheng: 'Also, when they [the Spanish] fought, they waged regular war, in the manner of the bourgeoisie, they defended Madrid to the last[20]*. In all things, they subordinated themselves to Soviet foreign policy.)*

Even before the dissolution of the Third International, we did not obey the orders of the Third International. At the Tsunyi Conference we didn't obey, and afterwards, for a period of ten years, including the Rectification Campaign and down to the Seventh Congress, when we finally adopted a resolution ('Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party')[21] and corrected [the errors of] 'leftism', we didn't obey them at all. Those dogmatists utterly failed to study China's peculiarities; ten-odd years after they had betaken themselves to the countryside, they utterly failed to study the land, property, and class relationships in the countryside. You can't understand the countryside just by going there, you must study the relations between all the classes and strata in the countryside. I devoted more than ten years to these problems before I finally clarified them for myself. You must make contact with all kinds of people, in tea houses and gambling dens, and investigate them. In 1925 I was active at the Peasant Movement Training Institute[22] and carried out rural surveys. In my native village, I sought our poor peasants to investigate them. Their life was pitiable, they had nothing to eat. There was one peasant whom I sought out to play dominoes (the kind with heaven, earth, man, harmony, Mei Ch'ien, Ch'ang Sang, and the bench), afterwards inviting him to have a meal. Before, after, and during the meal. I talked to him, and came to understand why the class struggle in the countryside was so acute. The reasons he was willing to talk to me were: first, that I looked on him as a human being; second, that I invited him to have a meal; and third, that he could make a bit of money. I kept losing; I lost one or two silver dollars, and as a result he was very well satisfied. There is a friend who still came to see me twice, after Liberation. Once, in those days, he was really in a bad way, and he came looking for me to borrow a dollar. I gave him three, as non-refundable assistance. In those days, such non-refundable assistance was hard to come by. My father took the view that if a man did not look after himself, heaven and earth would punish him. My mother opposed him. When my father died, very few people followed the funeral procession. When my mother died, a great many followed the procession. One time the Ko Lao Hui robbed our family. I said they were right to do so, for people had nothing. Even my mother could not accept this at all.

Once there broke out in Changsha rice riots in which the provincial governor was beaten up. There were some hawkers from Hsiang Hsiang who had sold their broad beans and were straggling back home. I stopped them and asked them about the situation. The Red and Green Gangs in the countryside also held meetings, and ate up big families. This was reported in the Shanghai newspapers, and the troubles were only stamped out when troops were sent from Changsha. They did not maintain good discipline, they took the rice of the middle peasants, and so isolated themselves. One of their leaders fled hither and thither, finally taking refuge in the mountains, but he was caught there and executed. Afterwards, the village gentry held a meeting and killed a few more poor peasants. At that time there was as yet no Communist Party, these were spontaneous class struggles.

Society pushed us on to the political stage. Who ever thought of indulging in Marxism previously? I hadn't even heard of it. What I had heard of, and also read of was Confucius, Napoleon, Washington, Peter the Great, the Meiji Restoration, the three distinguished Italian [patriots] – in other words, all those [heroes] of capitalism. I had also read a biography of Franklin. He came from a poor family; afterwards he became a writer, and also conducted experiments on electricity. *(Ch'en Po-ta: 'Franklin was the first to put forward the proposition that man is a tool-making animal.')*

He talked about man being a tool-making animal. Formerly, they used to say that man was a thinking animal, 'the organ of the heart can think[23], they said that man was the soul of all creation. Who called a meeting and elected him [to that position]? He conferred this dignity on himself. This proposition existed in the feudal era. Afterwards, Marx put forward the view that man is a tool-maker, and that man is a social animal. In reality it is only after undergoing a million years [of evolution] that man developed a large brain and a pair of hands. In the future, animals will continue to develop. I don't believe that men alone are capable of having two hands. Can't horses, cows, sheep evolve? Can only monkeys evolve? And can it be, moreover, that of all the monkeys only one species can evolve, and all the others are incapable of evolving? In a million years, ten million years, will horses, cows and sheep still be the same as those today? I think they will continue to change. Horse, cows, sheep, and insects will all change. Animals have evolved from plants, they have evolved from seaweed. Chang T'ai-yen knew all this. In the book in which he argued about revolution with K'ang Yu-wei, he expounded these principles[24]. The earth was originally dead, there were no plants, no water, no air. Only after I don't know how many tens of millions of years was water formed; hydrogen and oxygen aren't just transformed immediately in any old way into water. Water has its history too. Earlier still, even hydrogen and oxygen did not exist. Only after hydrogen and oxygen were produced was there the possibility that these two elements could combine to give water.

We must study the history of the natural sciences, it won't do to neglect this subject. We must read a few books . There is a great difference between reading because of the necessities of our present struggles, and reading aimlessly. Fu Ying[25] says that hydrogen and oxygen form water only after coming together hundreds and thousands of times; it is not at all a simple case of two combining into one. He was right about this, too; I want to look him up and have a talk . (Speaking to Lu P'ing[26]) You people should not oppose absolutely everything by Fu Ying.

Hitherto, analysis and synthesis have not been clearly defined. Analysis is clearer, but there hasn't been much said about synthesis. I had a talk with Ai Ssu-ch'i[27]. He said that nowadays they only talk about conceptual synthesis and analysis, and do not talk about objective practical synthesis and analysis. How do we analyse and synthesize the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the landlords and the peasants, the Chinese and the imperialists? How do we do this, for example, in the case of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang? The analysis is simply a question of how strong we are, how much territory we have, how many members we have, how many troops, how many bases such as Yenan, what are our weakness? We do not hold any big cities, our army numbers only 1,200,000, we have no foreign aid, whereas the Kuomintang has a great amount of foreign aid, if you compare Yenan to Shanghai, Yenan has a population of only 7,000; adding to this the persons from the [Party and government] organs and from the troops [stationed in Yenan], the total comes to 20,000. There is only handicrafts and agriculture. How can this be compared with a big city? Our strong points are that we have the support of the people whereas the Kuomintang is divorced from the people. You have more territory, more troops, and more arms, but your soldiers have been obtained by impressment, and there is opposition between officers and soldiers. Naturally there is also a fairly large portion of their armies which has considerable fighting capacity, it is not at all the case that they will all just collapse at one blow. Their weak point lies here, the key is their divorce from the people. We unite with the popular masses; they are divorced from the popular masses.

They say in their propaganda that the Communist Party establishes community of property and community of wives, and they propagate these ideas right down to the primary schools. They composed a song: 'When Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung appear, killing and burning and doing all kinds of things, what will you do?' They taught the primary-school pupils to sing it, and as soon as they had sung it, the pupils went and asked their fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, thus producing the opposite effect of propaganda for us. There was a little child who heard [the song] and asked his daddy. His daddy replied: 'You mustn't ask; 'after you have grown up, you will see for yourself and then you'll understand.' He was a middle of the roader. Then the child also asked his uncle. The uncle scolded him and replied: 'What is this about killing and burning? If you ask me again, I'll beat you!' Formerly, his uncle was a member of the Communist Youth League. All the newspapers, and radio stations attacked us. There were lot of newspapers, several dozen in each city, every faction ran one, and all of them without exception were anti-communist. Did the common people all listen to them? Nothing of the kind! We have some experience of Chinese affairs, China is a 'sparrow'[28]. In foreign countries, too, it's nothing else but the rich and the poor, counter revolution and revolution, Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. You mustn't believe at all that everybody will take in anti-communist propaganda, and join in opposing communism. Didn't we read newspapers at the time? Yet we were not influenced by them.

I have read the *Dream of the Red Chamber* five times, and have not been influenced by it. I read it as history. First I read it as a story, and then as history. When people read the *Dream of the Red Chamber,* they don't read the fourth chapter carefully, but in fact this chapter contains the gist of the book. There is also Leng Tzu-hsing who describes the Jung-kuo mansion, and composes songs and notes. The fourth chapter, 'The Bottle Gourd Monk decides the affair of the bottle gourd', talks about the 'Talisman for Officials', it introduces the four big families:

Shout hip hurrah
For the Nanking Chia!
They weigh their gold out
By the jar.
The Ah-pang Palace
Scrapes the sky,
But it could not house
The Nanking Shih.
The King of the Ocean
Goes along,
When he's short of gold beds,
To the Nanking Wang.
The Nanking Hsueh
So rich are they,
To count their money
Would take all day...[29]

The Dream of the Red Chamber describes each of the four big families. It concerns a fierce class struggle, involving the fate of many dozens of people, though only twenty or thirty of these people are in the ruling class. (It has been calculated that there are thirty-three [in this category].) The others are all slaves, over three hundred of them, such as Yueh Yang, Ssuch'i, Second Sister Yu, Third Sister Yu, etc. In studying history, unless you take a class-struggle view as the starting-point, you will get confused. Things can only be analysed clearly by the use of class analysis. More than 200 years have elapsed since *the Dream of the Red Chamber* was written, and research on the book has not clarified the issues, even down to the present day; from this we can see the difficulty of the problem. There are Yu P'ing-po and Wang K'un-lun, who are both of them specialists[30], Ho Ch'i-fang[31] also wrote a preface. A fellow called Wu Shih-ch'ang[32] has also appeared on the scene. All this refers to recent research on *the Dream of the Red Chamber*, I won't even enumerate the older studies. Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei's view of *the Dream of the Red Chamber* was incorrect; Hu Shih's was somewhat more correct.[33]

What is synthesis? You have all witnessed how the two opposites, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, were synthesized on the mainland. The synthesis took place like this: their armies came, and we devoured them, we ate them bite by bite. It was not a case of two combining into one as expounded by Yang Hsien-chen, it was not the synthesis of two peacefully, coexisting opposites. They didn't want to coexist peacefully, they wanted to devour you. Otherwise, why would they have attacked Yenan? Their army penetrated everywhere in North Shensi, except in three *hsien* on the three borders. You have your freedom, and we have our freedom. There are 250,000 of you, and 25,000 of us[34]. A few brigades, something over 20,000 men. Having analysed, how do we synthesize? If you want to go somewhere, you go right ahead; we still swallow your army mouthful by mouthful. If we could fight victoriously, we fought; if we could not win, we retrated. From March 1947 to March 1948, one whole army [of the enemy] disappeared into the landscape, for we annihilated several tens of thousands of their troops. When we surrounded I-ch'uan, and Liu K'an came to relieve the city, the commander-in-chief Liu K'an was killed, two of his three divisional commanders were killed and the other taken prisoner, and the whole army ceased to exist. This was synthesis. All of their guns and artillery were synthesized over to our side, and the soldiers were synthesized too. Those who wanted to stay with us could stay, and to those who didn't want to stay we gave money for their traveling expenses. After we had annihilated Liu K'an, the brigade stationed in I-ch'uan surrendered without fighting. In the three great campaigns – Liao-Shen, Huai-Hai, and Peking-Tientsin – what was our method of synthesis? Fu Tso-i was synthesized over to our side, with his army of 400,000 men, without fighting, and they handed over all their rifles.[35] One thing eating another, big fish eating little fish, this is synthesis. It has never been put like this in books. I have never put it this way in my books either. For his part, Yang Hsien-chen believes that two combine into one, and that synthesis is the indissoluble tie between two opposites. What indissoluble ties are there in this world? Things may be tied, but in the end they must be severed. There is nothing which cannot be severed. In the twenty-odd years of our struggle, many of us have also been devoured by the enemy. When the 300,000 strong Red Army reached the Shen-Kan-Ning area, there were only 25,000 left. Of the others, some had been devoured, some scattered, some killed or wounded.

We must take life as our starting point in discussing the unity of opposites *(Comrade K'ang Sheng: 'It won't do merely to talk about concepts.')*

While analysis is going on, there is also synthesis, and while synthesis is going on, there is also analysis.

When people eat animals and plants, they also begin with analysis. Why don't we eat sand? When there's sand in rice, it's not good to eat. Why don't we eat grass, as do horses, cows and sheep, but only things like cabbage? We must analyse everything. Shen Nung tasted the hundred herbs[36] and originated their use for medicine. After many tens of thousands of years, analysis finally revealed clearly what could be eaten, and what could not. Grasshoppers, snakes and turtles can be eaten. Crabs, dogs, and aquatic creatures can be eaten. There are some foreigners who don't eat them. In North Shensi they don't eat aquatic creatures, they don't eat fish. They don't eat cat there either. One year there was a big flood of the Yellow River, which cast up on shore several tens of thousands of pounds of fish, and they used it all for fertilizer.

I am a native philosopher, you are foreign philosophers.

(Comrade K'ang Sheng: 'Could the Chairman say something about the problem of the three categories?')

Engels talked about the three categories, but as for me I don't believe in two of those categories. (The unity of opposites is the most basic law, the transformation of quality and quantity into one another is the unity of the opposites quality and quantity, and the negation of the negation does not exist at all). The juxtaposition, on the same level, of the transformation of quality and quantity into one another, the negation of the negation, and the law of the unity of opposites is 'triplism', not monism. The most basic thing is the unity of opposites. The transformation of quality and quantity into one another is the unity of the opposites quality and quantity. There is no such thing as the negation of the negation. Affirmation, negation, affirmation, negation... in the development of things, every link in the chain of events is both affirmation and negation. Slave-holding society negated primitive society, but with reference to feudal society it constituted, in turn, the affirmation. Feudal society constituted the negation in relation to slave-holding society but it was in turn the affirmation with reference to capitalist society. Capitalist society was the negation in relation to feudal society, but it is in turn, the affirmation in relation to socialist society.

What is the method of synthesis? Is it possible that primitive society can exist side by side with slave-holding society? They do exist side-by-side, but this is only a small part of the whole. The overall picture is that primitive society is going to be eliminated. The development of society, moreover, takes place by stages; primitive society, too, is divided into a great many stages. At that time, there was not yet the practice of burying women with their dead husbands, but they were obliged to subject themselves to men. First men were subject to women, and then things moved towards their opposite, and women were subject to men. This stage in history has not yet been clarified, although it has been going on for a million years and more. Class society has not yet lasted 5,000 years, Cultures such as that of Lung Shan and Yang Shao[37] at the end of the primitive era had coloured pottery. In a word, one devours another, one overthrows another, one class is eliminated, another class rises, one society is eliminated, another society rises. Naturally, in the process of development, everything is not all that pure. When it gets to feudal society, there still remains something of the slave-holding system, though the greater part of the social edifice is characterized by the feudal system. There are still some serfs, and also some bond-workers, such as handicraftsmen. Capitalist society isn't all that pure either, and even in more advanced capitalist societies there is also a backward part. For example, there was the slave system in the Southern United States. Lincoln abolished the slave system, but there are still black slaves today, their struggle is very fierce. More than 20 million people are participating in it, and that's quite a few.

One thing destroys another, things emerge, develop, and are destroyed, everywhere is like this. If things are not destroyed by others, then they destroy themselves. Why should people die? Does the aristocracy die too? This is a natural law. Forests live longer than human beings, yet even they last only a few thousand years. If there were no such thing as death, that would be unbearable. If we could still see Confucius alive today, the earth wouldn't be able to hold so many people. I approve of Chuang-tzu's approach[38]. When his wife died, he banged on a basin and sang. When people die there should be parties to celebrate the victory of dialectics, to celebrate the destruction of the old. Socialism, too, will be eliminated, it wouldn't do if it were not eliminated, for then there would be no communism. Communism will last for thousands and thousands of years. I don't believe that there will be no qualitative changes under communism, that it will not be divided into stages by qualitative changes! I don't believe it! Quantity changes into quality, and quality changes into quantity. I don't believe that it can remain qualitatively exactly the same, unchanging for millions of years! This is unthinkable in the light of dialectics. Then there is the principle, 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'. Do you believe they can carry on for a million years with the same economics? Have you thought about it? If that were so, we wouldn't need economists, or in any case we could get along with just one textbook, and dialectics would be dead.

The life of dialectics is the continuous movement toward opposites. Mankind will also finally meet its doom. When the theologians talks about doomsday, they are pessimistic and terrify people. We say the end of mankind is something which will produce something more advanced than mankind. Mankind is still in its infancy. Engels spoke of moving from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, and said that freedom is the understanding of necessity. This sentence is not complete, it only says one half and leaves the rest unsaid. Does merely understanding it make you free? Freedom is the understanding of necessity and the transformation of necessity – one has some work to do too. If you merely eat without having any work to do, if you merely understand, is that sufficient? When you discover a law, you must be able to apply it, you must create the world anew, you must break the ground and edify buildings, you must dig mines, industrialize. In the future there will be more people, and there won't be enough grain, so men will have to get food from minerals. Thus it is that only by transformation can freedom be obtained. Will it be possible in the future to be all that free? Lenin said that in the future, airplanes would be as numerous in the skies as flies, rushing hither and thither. Everywhere they will collide, and what will we do about it? How will we maneuver them? And if we do, will things be all that free? In Peking at present there are 10,000 buses; in Tokyo there are 100,00 [vehicles] (or is it 800,000?), so there are more automobile accidents. We have fewer cars, and we also educate the drivers and the people, so there are few accidents. What will they do in Peking 10,000 years hence? Will there still be 10,000 buses? They may invent something new, so that they can dispense with these means of transport, so that men can fly, using some simple mechanical device, and fly right to any place, and land wherever they like. It won't do just to understand necessity we must also transform things.

I don't believe that communism will not be divided into stages, and that there will be no qualitative changes. Lenin said that all things can be divided. He gave the atom as an example, and said that not only can the atom be divided, but the electron, too, can be divided. Formerly, however, it was held that it could not be divided; the branch of science devoted to splitting the atomic nucleus is still very young, only twenty or thirty years old. In recent decades, the scientists have resolved the atomic nucleus into its constituents, such as protons, anti-protons, neutrons, anti-neutrons, mesons and anti-mesons. These are the heavy ones; there are also the light ones. For the most part, these discoveries only got under way during and after the Second World War. As for the fact that one could separate the electrons from the atomic nucleus, that was discovered some time ago. An electric wire makes use of dissociated electrons from the outside of copper or aluminum. In the 300 *li* of the earth's atmosphere, it has also been discovered that there are layers of dissociated electrons. There, too, the electrons and the atomic nucleus are separated. As yet, the electron has not been split, but some day they will certainly be able to split it. Chuang-tzu said, 'A length of one foot, which is divided in half each day, will never be reduced to zero.' *(Chuang-tzu,* Chapter [33 G] 'On the various schools', quoting Kung-sun Lung). This is the truth. If you don't believe it, just consider. If it could be reduced to zero, then there would be no such thing as science. The myriad things develop continuously and limitlessly, and they are infinite. Time and space are infinite. As regards space, looking at it both macroscopically and microscopically, it is infinite, it can be divided endlessly. So even after a million years scientists will still have work to do. I very much appreciate the article on basic particles in the *Bulletin of Natural Science by Sakata.*[39] I have never seen this kind of article before. This is dialectical materialism. He quotes Lenin.

The weakness of philosophy is that it hasn't produced practical philosophy, but only bookish philosophy.

We should always be bringing forward new things. Otherwise what are we here for? What do we want descendants for? New things are to be found in reality, we must grasp reality. In the last analysis, is Jen Chi-yu[40] Marxist or not? I greatly appreciate those articles of his on Buddhism. There is some research [behind them], he is a student of T'ang Yung-t'ung[41]. He discusses only the Buddhism of the T'ang dynasty, and does not touch directly on the Buddhism of later times. Sung and Ming metaphysics developed from the Ch'an School of the T'ang dynasty, and it was a movement from subjective idealism to objective idealism[42]. There is both Buddhism and Taoism, and it is wrong not to distinguish between them. How can it be proper not to pay attention to them? Han Yu didn't talk sense. His slogan was 'Learn from their ideas, but not from their mode of expression.' His ideas were entirely copied from others, he changed the form, the mode of composition of the essays. He didn't talk sense, and the little bit he did talk was basically taken from the ancients. There is a little something new in writings like the *Discourse on Teachers.* Liu Tzu-hou was different, he knew the ins and outs of Buddhist and Taoist materialism[43]. And yet, his *Heaven Answers* is too short, just that little bit. His *Heaven Answers* is a product of Ch'u Yuan's *Heaven Asks.*[44] For several thousand years, only this one man has written a piece such as *Heaven Answers.* What are *Heaven Asks* and *Heaven Answers* all about? If there are no annotations, to explain it clearly, you can't understand it if you read it, you'll only get the general idea. *Heaven Asks* is really fantastic, thousands of years ago it raised all kinds of questions, relating to the universe, to nature, and to history.

(Regarding the *discussion on the problem of two combining into one:)* Let *Hung Ch'i* reprint a few good items, and write a report.

NOTES

1. I.e. Marxist philosophy, that is, dialectical materialism and historical materialism, which deals with the general law of development of the contradictions existing in nature, human society and man's thought; 2) Marxist

political economy which elucidates the law governing the development of the society's economy and exposes how the capitalist class exploits the working class (the theory of surplus value); and 3) scientific socialism which shows that the capitalist society is bound to develop to a higher stage of society and that the proletariat is the grave-digger of the capitalist system. (For details see Lenin's *The Three Sources and the Three Component Parts of Marxism.*)

2. Peking University, jointly descended from the old Peking University which launched the May Fourth Movement in 1919, and from the American-endowed Yenching University, has continued since 1949 to enjoy the highest prestige in China for general intellectual excellence. People's University (*Jen-min ta-hsueh*), also located in Peking, was specially set up to provide courses more accessible to students from worker and peasant backgrounds.

3. Among the Confucian classics, the Four Books represent the core studied by beginners, the Five Classics a somewhat larger corpus.

4. Among his varied educational experiences, Mao Tse-tung has long singled out the six months he spent reading in the Hunan Provincial Library, in the Winter of 1912-13, as one of the most valuable.

5. The first sentence is from the *Doctrine of the Mean,* the second is from *Mencius,* Book IV,

6. The quotation is from the Confucian *Analects.* The incident in which the people of K'uang detained Confucius and wanted to kill him is referred to in the *Analects.*

7. Mao's reasoning is apparently that, whether or not he went there, Confucius had nothing against Ch'in (a state which existed in the first millennium B.C. in present day – Shensi, whose ruler ultimately conquered the whole of China and founded the Ch'in dynasty in 221 B.C.), since he included in the *Book of Odes.* which he is supposed to have edited, a number of poems from that area, including the two mentioned by Mao.

8. Ssu-ma Chien (145-90 B.C.) was China's first great historian, who compiled *shih-chi* (Historical Records) relating history of China from the origins to his own day.

9. The translation of the above poem, and of the titles of the two mentioned previously, are taken from Legge's version of the *Book of Odes.*

10. Love poems have traditionally been interpreted by Chinese critics as an allegory for the relations between an official and his prince; Chu Hsi(see below, note 42) held that they should be taken at face value. Mao puts the commonsense view that they should sometimes be taken literally, and sometimes not.

11. Wei Chuang (c.858-910) was an eminent poet of the late T'ang and early Five Dynasties (began 907) period. Mao is arguing that the same principles of interpretation should be applied to the *Book of Odes* to all classical poetry.

12. For "Four Clean ups " and "Five antis" see note 5 on p 9 of this volume.

13. *Kuang ming jih-pao* organ of the China Democratic League, took the lead in criticisms of the party in April 1957, when the 'blooming and contending' was in full flood. The *Wen-hui pao,* published in Shanghai, was a non-Party organ which had been criticized by Mao for its bourgeois tendencies in 1957. In November 1965, it was to serve as the channel for the opening shot in the Cultural Revolution.

14. Chou Ku-ch'eng was the author of numerous works on Chinese and world history. Since 1950 he had been a professor at Futan University in Shanghai. In 1962 he published an article on history and art, in which he expressed ideas on the 'Zeitgeist' which were said to be an expression in the realm of esthetics of Yang Hsien-chen's philosophical theories (see below, note 19 to this text)

15. Sun Yeh-fang was at this time Director of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Science; he was dismissed in 1966. As K'ang Sheng's remark indicates, he had adopted the ideas of some Soviet and Eastern European economists with whom he had been in professional contact about the role of the profit motive in a socialist economy.

16. In the summer of 1955, just before Mao's speech of 31 July gave a new impetus to the formation of agricultural producers cooperatives, the Party's Rural Work Department (at the instigation of Liu Shao-ch'i) had disbanded a number of cooperatives which were said to have been hastily and prematurely formed.

17. Teng Tzu-hui (1895-1972) had been head of the Rural Work Department since 1952, though his influence had declined since the late 1950s, because of his share of responsibility for the 'disbanding' or 'weeding out' of cooperatives in 1955. It would appear, however, that he still possessed sufficient status to put his views energetically in opposition to those of Mao when, in the early 1960s, the policies enumerated here by Mao were a subject of dispute within the Party. Both the Rural Work Department and Teng zu-hui were severely criticised by comrade Mao during debate on cooperative transformation. [For more details refer pp 224-225 of S.W. Vol. V.]

18. A right opportunist view advocated by Liu Shao-chi and others. In this connection see comrade Mao's speech at the PB meeting of the CC of the CPC "Refute the Right Deviationist Views that Depart from General Line" S.W.Vol. V pp93-94.

19. The view that 'two combine into one' was put forward in the early 1960s by Yang Hsien-chen (c-1899–), who had been, since 1955, President of the Higher Party School. Beginning in July 1964, this formulation was violently attacked in the press on the grounds that it minimized the importance of struggle and contradiction, and contrasted with Mao's view that 'one divides into two,

i.e. that struggle, and in particular class struggle, constantly re–emerges, even when particular contradictions have been resolved. The 'outline of an article' referred to in the stenographer's note was presumably a summary of one of the forthcoming attacks on Yang, submitted to the Chairman in advance for his approval.

20. The defense of Madrid, starting in October 1936, lasted for two years and five months. In 1936, fascist Germany and Italy made use of the Spanish fascist warlord Franco to launch a war of aggression against Spain. The Spanish people, led by the Popular Front Government, heroically defended democracy against aggression. The battle of Madrid, the Capital of Spain, was the bitterest in the whole war. Madrid fell in March 1939 because Britain, France and other imperialist countries assisted the aggressors by their hypocritical policy of "non-intervention" and because divisions arose within the Popular Front. The point of this criticism is obviously not that the Spanish republicans fought to the end, but that they failed to grasp the axiom that territorial strong points are not in themselves decisive.

21. Please see "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party" adopted on April 20, 1945, S.W. Vol.III, pp 177–225(1965 edition)

22. Mao began his activity at this institute in 1925,but it was in 1926 that he actually served as principal and made his main contribution.

23. The question is from *Mencius*, Book VI

24. This is presumably a reference to Chang Ping-lin's celebrated article, published in 1903, entitled 'A Refutation of K'ang Yu–wei's Letter on Revolution'. In this article, Chang sharply attacked K'ang not only on the issue of revolution versus gradual reform, but on the importance of racial differences between the Chinese and the Manchus, which K'ang tended to minimize. The Manchus, Chang argued, were an alien and decadent race, totally unfit to rule China. It was in this context that he discussed evolution, indicating that the existing racial differences were the product of history.

25. Fu Ying apparently a Chinese scientist who was alive in 1964, since Mao says he wants to look him up.

26. Lu P'ing (c.1910–) was President of Peking University at this time; he was removed and 'struggled against' in June 1966.

27. Ai Ssu–ch'i (c.1910–66) was, at the time of his death, Vice–President of Higher Party School. He was one of the Party's leading philosophical spokesman, who had translated works on dialectical materialism from the Russian, and written many books and articles which aimed to make Marxism accessible to the masses. On 1 November 1964 he published an article in *People's Daily* attacking Yang Hsien–chen, the 'bourgeois' philosopher, Mao refers to earlier in this talk in connection with the principle of 'two combining into one.

28. The metaphor of "dissecting a sparrow is an applied theory and a work method to acquire knowledge and sum up experiences. Instead of attempting to generalize about a vast number of repetitions of a phenomenon, this work method advocates the in–depth analysis thorough study and investigation of a prototype, and a summing–up experience through such analysis. The slogan is derived from the common saying "while a sparrow is small, it contains all the vital organs." Here, Mao makes the point that in the broader international context, China as a whole is a microcosm of the world today.

29. Leng Tzu–hsing discourses on the mansion of the Duke of Jung–kuo in Chapter 2 of the book *(The Story of the Stone)*. The 'Talisman for Officials', was a list of the rich and influential families in the area which the former novice from the Bottle–Gourd Temple said every official should carry in order to avoid offending them and thereby wrecking his career *(The Story of the Stone)*.

30. For comrade Mao's criticisms on this matter see *"Letter Concerning the Dream of the Red Chamber "(S.W. Vol. V pp 150–151)," On Criticising Hongloumeng yuanjia" (S.W. Vol. V pp 293–294).*

Wang K'un–lun was Vice–Mayor of Peking in the 1950s.

31. Ho Ch'i–fang (1911–), a lyric poet and powerful figure in the literary world, had defended Yu P'ing –po up to a point at the time of the campaign against him in 1954, saying that Yu was wrong in his interpretation of the Dream of the Red Chamber, but politically loyal. He himself came under attack at the time of the Great Leap Forward.

32. Wu Shih–ch'ang's work on this subject has been translated into English: On *'The Red Chamber Dream'* (Clarendon Press,1961.)

33. Mao's statement here concords, with the views of Lu Hsun.

34. The figures Mao gives here, as he shifts to the historical present and calls to mind the final showdown with the Kuomintang, are rather those at the beginning of the Anti–Japanese War than those at the beginning of the renewed civil war in 1946, when the People's Liberation Army had grown to at least half a million men.

35. In January 1949, General Fu Tso–i, commanding the nationalist garrison in Peiping (as it was then called), surrendered the city without a fight to avoid useless destruction. He subsequently became Minister of Water Conservancy in the Peking government.

36. The legendary Emperor Shen Nung is said to have taught the art of agriculture in the third millennium B.C., and in particular to have discovered the medicinal properties of plants.

37. The Lung Shan and Yang Shao cultures, located respectively in north–eastern and north–western China, were the two most remarkable cultures of the neolithic period. As Mao indicates, they are particularly noted for their pottery.

38. The book called the *Chuang-tzu*, which was probably composed only in part by the man of the same name who lived in the second half of the fourth century B.C., is not only one of the classic texts of Taoism (with the *Lao-tzu* and the *Book of Changes*), but one of the greatest literary masterpieces in the history of China.

39. Sakata Shiyouchi, a Japanese physicist from the University of Nagoya, holds that 'elementary particles are a single, material differentiated, and limitless category which make up the natural order'. An article by him expounding these views was published in *Red Flag* in June 1965. (Also see the succeeding article in this volume.)

40. Mao is apparently referring to a collection of essays published by Jen Chi-yu in 1963, and reprinted in 1973: *Han T'ang fo-chiao ssu-hsiang lun chi* (Collected Essays on Buddhist Thought in the Han and T'ang Dynasties) (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 348 pp.) In these studies, he quotes from Lenin at considerable length regarding dialectics.

41. T'ang Yung-t'ung (1892–1964), whom Jen Chi-yu acknowledges as his teacher, was the leading historian of Buddhism, who had written on Chinese Buddhism under the Han, Wei, Chin, and Northern and Southern Dynasties, on the history of Indian thought, etc. He was Dean of the Humanities at Peking University from 1948 until he fell ill in 1954.

42. Under the influence of Ch'an Buddhism (better known under its Japanese name of Zen), Chinese philosophers of the Sung and Ming dynasties, of whom, Chu Hsi (1130–1200) is the most famous, developed a synthesis between Confucianism and Buddhism in which a central role is played by the concept *li* (principle or reason), commonly known as Neo-Confucianism.

43. Han Yu and Liu Tsang-yuan. Han Yu sought to recreate the simplicity of the classical period, while avioding excessive archaism. The slogan about "learning from their ideas" quoted by Mao refers to this aim of seeking inspiration from the ancient Confucian sages, while avioding outmoded forms of expression. He adopted attitude towards Buddhism, but none the less borrowed some ideas from it. Liu Tsang-yuan, whom Mao calls here by his literary name of Liu Tzu-hou, was a close friend of Han Yu.

44. Liu Tsung-Yuan's essay *T'ien Tui* (Heaven Answers) undertook to answer the questions about the origin and nature of universe raised by Ch'u Yuan in his poem *T'ien Wen* (Heaven Asks). The latter is translated under the title 'The Riddles' in *Li Sao and Other Poems of Chu Yuan*, pp. 79–97. It is, as Mao says suggestive but extremely obscure.

TALK ON SAKATA'S ARTICLE

August 24, 1964

Chairman: I have asked you to come here today because I want to look into the article by Sakata [Shoichi]. Sakata says that basic particles are indivisible while electrons are divisible. In saying this, he is taking the stand of dialectical materialism.

The world is infinite. In both time and space, the world is boundless and inexhaustible. Beyond our solar system are numerous stars which together from the Milky Way. Beyond this galaxy are numerous other galaxies. Regarded broadly the universe is infinite: regarded narrowly, the universe is also infinite. Not only is the atom divisible, but so too is the atomic nucleus and it can be split ad infinitum. *Chuang Tzu* said: "One can take away half of a hammer measuring one foot long daily, but there will still be no end to it even after ten thousand generations." This is true. Thus, our cognition of the world is also infinite and inexhaustible. Otherwise, the science of physics would not develop any further. If our cognition were finite, we would already have recognized everything, and what would there be left for us to do?

Chairman: Man's cognition of things must undergo a great many repetitions, and there must be a process of accumulation. A large amount of emotional data must be accumulated in order to induce the jump from emotional cognition, to rational cognition. As to the reasons for the leaps from practice to emotion, and from emotion to

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SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

reasoning, neither Marx nor Engels discussed it very clearly. Nor did Lenin discuss it very clearly. In his *Materialism and Empiro Criticism,* Lenin elaborated only on materialism, without elaborating upon the theory of cognition. Recently, Ai Ssu-ch'i discussed this point at the Higher Party School and he was correct in doing so. Even the men of the ancient past in China, including Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, did not explain it clearly. Mo Tzu did discuss some things concerning the theory of cognition, but not very clearly. Others like Chang Tsai, Li Chuo-wu, Wang Ch'uan-shan and T'an Ssu-t'ung also did not explain it clearly. What is philosophy? Philosophy is the theory of cognition, nothing else. I wrote the first ten articles of the *Double-Ten Articles [Shuang-shih T'iao],* I discussed how substance changes into spirit and spirit into substance. I also said that the time devoted to teaching philosophy must not be too long, one hour at most. The more one talks about it, the more confused one becomes. I also said that philosophy ought to be liberated from classrooms and studies. My words touched the soft spots of some people who thereupon came out with "combining two into one" to oppose me.

Chairman: At present our cognition of many things is still rather un-clear. Cognition is always developing. With a large telescope, we will be able to see more stars. In regard to the solar system and the earth, we have not as yet overthrown Kant's nebular hypothesis that both the earth and the sun were formed by the contraction of extremely hot gases. Our earth is most probably still in its youth, and it is growing larger steadily because many things such as meteorites and sunlight, are falling on it every day. The sun has most probably reached its middle age, and it is no longer as hot as before. If the sunshine on the earth's surface is so strong as to reach 100 degrees, how can human beings withstand it? The temperature of the sun's surface is 5,000 or 6,000 degrees, and there is a layer on the surface with a temperature of some 1,000 – 3,000 degrees. If we say that we do not understand the sun too well, it goes without saying that we also are none too clear about the enormous space between the sun and the earth. Now, with the satellites, our understanding in this field has been considerably enhanced. We are not too clear about climatic changes on the earth, and we must study them. In regard to the glacial problem, scientist are still arguing it out. Li Szu-kuang maintains that there is a glacial period every one–million years. Whenever this happens, drastic changes occur in the biological world. Ancient dinosaurs became extinct because they could not withstand the frigid cold of the glacial age. Man was produced in between the two recent glacial periods. When it comes to a later glacial age, it would become a problem to mankind, and one must be prepared to cope with the advent of the next glacial period.

X X X: Chairman just mentioned something about telescope which reminds me of a question: Can't we generally categorize such things as telescopes and satellites as being "tools of cognition?"

Chairman: What you say about the concept of "tools of cognition" seems very plausible. The tools of cognition should comprise such things as the axe, machinery, etc. Man's cognition stems from practice. We use the axe and machinery to transform the world, and our cognition, is thus deepened. Tools are extensions of human organs. The axe is an extension of our arms while the telescope is an extension of our eyes. The human body and its organs can all be extended. Franklin said that man is the animal that creates tools. The Chinese say that the human being is the wisest of all creatures. Animals have their own pecking order, but the ape does not know how to fashion sticks to knock fruit off the trees. There are no concepts in the brains of animals.

XXX: Philosophical works usually only take the individual as the subject of cognition, but in practical life, the subject of cognition is often not an individual, but a collective. Are we right to regard our party as the subject of cognition?

Chairman: A class is the subject of cognition. In the beginning, the working class was a class in and of itself, and it had no knowledge of capitalism. Later, it developed from a class in and of itself into a class that existed for itself, and by that time, it began to understand capitalism. This was a case of the development of cognition based on class as the subject.

Chairman: There was no water on the earth in the beginning. In earliest times, the earth's temperature was so high that it was impossible to have water, for it would have exploded to become hydrogen and oxygen. There was an article two days ago in the *Kuang-ming Daily* which says that it took millions of years for hydrogen and oxygen to combine and form water. Fu Ying said that it would take tens of millions of years. I don't know if the author of that article has discussed it with Fu Ying. Only after there was water was it possible for living things to emerge from the water. Man evolved from fish, and there was a developmental stage in which the human embryo resembled fish.

Chairman: All individual and all specific things have their births, development, and deaths. Every person must die, because he was born. Man must die, and Chang San [i.e., any Tom, Dick or Harry] being a man, Chang San must die. None can see Confucious who lived 2,000 years ago, because he had to die. Mankind is born, and therefore mankind must also die. The earth was born, and so the earth must also die. Nonetheless, when we say that man kind will die and the earth will die, it is different from what Christians say about the end of the world. When we talk about the death of mankind and the death of the earth, we mean that something more advanced than mankind will come to replace it, and this is a higher stage in the development of things. I saw that Marxism also has its birth, its development and its death. This may seem to be absurd. But since Marx said that all things which happen have their death, how can we say that this is not applicable to Marxism itself? To say that it won't die is metaphysics. Naturally, the death of Marxism means that something higher than Marxism will come to replace it.

Chairman: Things are continually in motion. Concerning the theory that the earth revolves around the sun, thus forming a day by self-orbit and a year by complete orbit, there were only three persons in the time of Copernicus in Europe who believed it, namely: Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler. There was not a single person in China. However, there was a Hsin Ch'i-chi of the Sung dynasty who said in his poem that when the moon went down from us here, it would be shining somewhere else[1]. Chang Hua (courtesy name: Chang Mou-hsuan) of the Chin Dynasty wrote in one of his poems: "When T'ai–i [a constellation] moves in its orbit, heaven will return and earth will travel." That poem is found in the *Sources of Ancient Poems (Ku-shih Yuan).*

Chairman: All things are both constant and inconstant. The universe was constant, but later, the Chinese scientists Li Ch'eng-tao and Yang Ch'en-ning who live in the United States said it is not constant. Does this also apply to the constancy of mass and energy? There is nothing in the world that absolutely does not change. Changing and unchanging, then changing and unchanging combine to form the universe. Constancy and inconstancy, this is both equilibrium and disequilibrium. There is also the case where the equilibrium is completely disrupted. A generator is a good example to illustrate movement and transformation. What kind of movement is there when the coal is burning?

X X X: It is the energy emitted by the outer layer of electrons of the atoms of the compound when they change their orbit of motion.

Chairman: The transformation of its form in which the water expands and becomes steam is what produces the movement.

X X X: The movement of the molecules produces energy.

Chairman: But this also causes the rotor of the generator to turn. This is mechanical movement which eventually generates electricity which flows into the copper and lead wires.

Everything in the world is changing; physics is changing; Newton's laws of physics are changing. The world has evolved from one in which there was no Newtonian theory to one in which there was, and thereafter, from Newton's theory to the theory of relatively. This is dialectics in itself.

Things are always happening in unexpected ways. Sun Yat-sen originally studied medicine, but he later became involved in politics. Kuo Mo-jo also started out studying medicine, but he later became a historian. Lu Hsun also studied medicine, but he later became a great writer. I myself have engaged in politics step by step. I studied the Confucian classics for six years, attended seven years of school, became a primary school teacher, and later taught middle school. I did not even know then what Marxism was; nor had I heard of Marx or Engels. I knew only about Napoleon and Washington. It was also like this when I found myself involved with military affairs. I served as director of the propaganda department in the Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army, and I also stressed the importance of fighting at the Institute of the Peasant [Movement], but I never thought that I myself would ever undertake military affairs and fight in battle. Later, I led my own men to fight and went to Ching-kang-shan. While at Ching-kang-shan, I had a small victory at first, but this was followed by two disastrous defeats. I then summed up my experiences and summarized them into a set of guerrilla war tactics:

"When the enemy advances we retreat; when the enemy rests we harass; when the enemy is tired we fight; when the enemy retreats we pursue." Thanks to Generalissimo Chiang who gave us these lessons; thanks to some of those in the party who said that I did not even have a modicum of Marxism and that they were 100 percent Bolsheviks.[2] Nonetheless, it was also these 100 percent Bolsheviks who caused the party in the white area to suffer 100 percent losses, and the party in the Soviet area to suffer 90 percent losses.

Chairman: We produce neither food grains nor machinery, but what we produce are lines and policies. Line and policy are not produced from within a vacuum. For instance, we did not invent the "four clean-ups" or the "five antis," but it was the common people who told us about them. We must thank a counter-revolutionary in Kwangtung for the emergence of the "four clean-ups" and the "five antis." He wrote to X X and X X to get me to abdicate political power and hand over the armed forces.

The scientists should align themselves with the masses; it behooves them to form close links with the young workers and the veteran workers. Our brain is a processing factory. Factory equipment must be renovated, and so our brains must also be renovated. The various cells of our body are being renewed continuously. The cells in our skin are no longer those with which we were born, but have been changed innumerable times.

There are several types of Chinese intellectuals. Engineering and technical personnel have accepted socialism more satisfactorily. Next come those who study science, while those who study liberal arts are the worst. I can see that this Feng Ting of yours must be a revisionist, because what he wrote in his books is all Khrushchev's stuff.

Chairman: Ts'ao Hsueh-ch'in's *Dream of the Red Chamber* was intended to patch up the heaven–the heaven of feudalism. Nonetheless, what Ts'ao Hsueh-ch'in wrote was about the decline of feudal families, and this may be regarded as a contradiction between Ts'ao's world outlook and his creation. Ts'ao Hsueh-ch'in's family fortune declined during the reign of Emperor Yung-cheng. Emperor K'ang-hsi had a number of children among whom Yung-cheng was one. Yung-cheng used his secret service operation to oppress his adversaries, and dubbed two other sons of K'ang-hsi, possibly it was the 9th and 10th, as pig and dog.

Chairman: Dissection is rather important. It is like the cook butchering a cow [*"Chung Tzu"* parable; very skillfully done]. When Engels mentioned medicine, he paid special attention to dissection. Medicine is built upon the foundation of dissection.

We should study the origins of cells. The cell has its nucleus, a mass of protoplasm, and a membrane. The cell is organic, and so there must have been noncellular forms [cytooes] before there was the cell. What was there before the cell was formed? How was the noncellular form changed into the cell? There is a woman scientist in the Soviet Union who has been studying this problem, but no result has been reported.

X X X : After China reported to the International Surgical Conference in Rome about the rejoining of a severed hand, Americans said that they could not assess the ability of China's science and technology, and they were a little scared of us.

Chairman: It is good that they were scared; it would be bad if they were not. We are afraid of America because America is our enemy. When America is afraid of us, it means that we are her enemy, and also a formidable enemy. In science and technology, we should pay attention to security so that they won't be able to assess our secret capability.

NOTES

1. [A lyric piece, written to the tune]

"Mu-lan-hua Man:" At a party with the wine drinking close to dawn, some guest stated that among the poems written by men of old, there were some which spoke about waiting for the moon to arise, but none about bidding farewell to the moon. Thus, this poem is about the direction taken by the moon: Pity the moon of tonight, wither does it go, and will it be gone forever? Is there another world which will see it, with its bright shadow in the east? Out beyond the vastness of heaven are there long winds to send off the mid-autumn moon? Who can fasten the rootless mirror flying, and if the Moon Goddess never marries, who can tie her down?

2. A reference to the "leftists" under the leadership to Wang Ming, who claimed themselves to be 100 percent Bolshivks, and who were firmly opposing comrade Mao`s correct line during the period 1931-35 see note 7 on p 78 of this volume.

INTERJECTIONS AT AN ANTI-REVISIONIST REPORTS MEETING

September 4, 1964

Is it easier to beat the snake by luring it to come out or by crawling into the dark snake hole? (We supported the release of Suslov's report. It was not released, but it came out after eight commentaries were made.)

Ever since 1956, the Soviet Union has denounced Stalin. [1]. After we have published our first and second comments, [2] they lost their own initiatives.

Not only have our two families taken this stand, but Eastern Europe has also begun to follow suit. (The Soviet Union criticized Romania for its self-reliance. Romania fought back, using our own criticisms against the Soviet Union.) This is no longer an internal affair, but has become publicly announced in radio broadcasts.

China is not the first to be involved in the conflict between control and anti-control; it is the countries of Eastern Europe. (Romania has already made preparations to sever her economic relations with the Soviet Union. She cannot make her own armaments, and has asked China to send someone to visit Romania. We won't have to talk to make people scared; we don't have to talk there. It would be very important if we only shake hands with them.)

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, A Red Guard Publication

We must get prepared, prepared for the break, and try to let the situation drag. If anything should happen, it must not catch us by surprise. What happens in the world is that after a long union, there will be division, and after a long division, there will be union. (Sino-Soviet relations)

The Nanchang Uprising [3] was a tremendous event, and in the wake of it, there were left only a few persons, growing later into an outfit of 3,00,000 men. After the Long March, a few thousand troops were left, and they were developed later. A mountain does not have to go very high. (The old Communist party of Brazil had 40,000 members, and a new party has been formed with only 6,000 members. Which is more reliable: 40,000 or 6,000 members?)

It is only with revisionism that there can be long live Leninism!

If one does not pay attention, there is bound to be revisionism. If one pays attention to it, it may appear or may not appear. When one is prepared for its appearance, it may not appear at all.

NOTES

1. i.e. from the 20th congress to the C P S U.

2. In the period 1956-64 the CPC conducted a great ideological struggle under the personnel guidance of comrade Mao against modern revisionism and opportunism. During the course of this struggle which was conducted in the form of a great debate, and in which almost all the Communists parties in the world were involved, the CPC proposed a 'General line' for the International Communist Movement (June 14, 1963), and released 9 documents (9 comments). Here comrade Mao is refering to the first two documents of the 9 comments.

3. "Nanchang up raising", see note 12 on p 60 of this volume.

AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IS CLOSELY SURROUNDED BY THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD

November 28, 1964

U.S. imperialism is the common enemy of the people of the whole world. It is engaged in aggression against South Vietnam, it is intervening in Laos, menacing Cambodia and blustering about extending the war in Indochina. It is trying everything to strangle the Cuban revolution. It wants to turn West Germany and Japan into two important nuclear bases of the United States. It ganged up with England in creating so-called Malaysia to menace Indonesia and other south-east Asian countries. It is occupying South Korea and China's Taiwan province. It is dominating all Latin America. It rides roughshod everywhere. U.S. imperialism has over-extended its reach. It adds a new noose around its neck every time it commits aggression anywhere. It is closely surrounded by the people of the whole world.

In their just struggle, the Congolese people are not alone. All the Chinese people support you. All the People throughout the world who oppose imperialism support you. U.S. imperialism and the reactionaries of all countries are paper tigers. The struggle of the Chinese people proved this. The struggle of the Vietnamese people is now proving it. The struggle of the Congolese people will certainly prove it

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Full text of Mao's declaration of 28 November 1964 in support of the people of the Congo (Leopoldville). The last paragraph, is from Chapter VII of *Quotations from Chairman Mao.*

too. Strengthening national unity and persevering in protracted struggle, the Congolese people will certainly be victorious, and U.S. imperialism will certainly be defeated.

People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs! People of the world, be courageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties and advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people. Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed.

The U.S. imperialist armed aggression against the Congo (Leopoldville) is a very grave matter.

The United States has all along attempted to control the Congo. It used the United Nations forces to carry out every sort of evil deed there. It murdered the Congolese national hero Lumumba, it subverted the lawful Congolese government. It imposed the puppet Tshombe on the Congolese people, and dispatched mercenary troops to suppress the Congolese national liberation movement, And now, it is carrying out direct armed intervention in the Congo in collusion with Belgium and Britain. In so doing, the purpose of U.S. imperialism is not only to control the Congo, but also to enmesh the whole of Africa, particularly the newly independent African countries, in the toils of U.S. neo-colonialism once again. U.S. aggression has encountered heroic resistance from the Congolese people and aroused the indignation of the people of Africa and of the whole world.

CHINA WILL TAKE A GIANT STRIDE FORWARD

December 13, 1964

We cannot just follow the beaten track traversed by other countries in the development of technology and trail behind them at a snail‘s pace. We must break away from conventions and do our utmost to adopt advanced techniques in order to make China a powerful modern socialist country in not too long a historical period. This is what we mean by a giant stride forward. Is this impossible of attainment? Is this boasting or bragging? Certainly not. It can be done. It is neither boasting nor bragging. We need only review our history to understand this. In our country haven‘t we fundamentally overthrown imperialism, feudalism and capitalism, which were seemingly so strong? Starting as we did from "poverty and blankness," haven‘t we scored considerable successes in all fields of socialist revolution and socialist construction after 15 years of endeavor? Haven‘t we too exploded an atom bomb? Haven‘t we wiped out the stigma of "the sick man of the East" imposed on us by westerners? Why can‘t the proletariat of the East accomplish what the bourgeoisie of the west has been able to? Early this century Dr Sun Yat-sen, the great Chinese revolutionary and our precursor, said that China would take a giant stride forward. His prediction will certainly come true in the coming decades. This is an inevitable trend no reactionary force can stop.

This was a passage Comrade Mao Tsetung added when he went over Premier Chou En-lai‘s Report on the Work of the Government to the First Session of the Third National People‘s Congress.

SOURCE: *Peking Review*, no. 52, December, 1977.

HIGHLIGHTS OF FORUM ON CENTRAL COMMITTEE WORK

December 20, 1964

Chairman: The Premier reported that you did not even dare to mention the words of "catching up." I added for you "not only catching up but also surpassing." I also added the passage that "Sun Yat-sen said in 1905 that it could be surpassed." Since I have said this, there is no need to publish it in the newspaper. You should read some modern history. Articles written by men like Wang Ching-wei[1]. Hu Han-min and Chang T`ai-yen[2] are not included in the *Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen.* You should also read the *New People`s Miscellaneous Journal*, Liang Ch`i-ch`ao`s *Collected Essays of Yin-ping-shih*, and especially Sun Yat-sen`s. *Three People`s Principles*. There is not much substance in the *Three People`s Principles*[3], it has no substance. In his later years, Sun Yat-sen`s knowledge declined. He was an orator and an instigator, speaking very eloquently and earning huge applauses. I had listened to his speeches and talked with him. He would not allow others to argue with him or to present their own views. In fact, his words were full of water, but had very little oil, and he was rather undemocratic. I think he could make himself a good emperor for 60 years, without any democracy. When he entered the hall, everybody was supposed to rise and say Mr. Sun. He was so undemocratic and so ignorant that when he was defining communism for the rightists, he would draw a

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SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

T'ai-chi diagram first, and then draw a smaller circle inside it, and write the word communism. On the outside, he would draw still another circle, which he would call socialism. Finally, he would draw a large circle, and write the words "Principle of People's Livelihood." He would say that both socialism and communism are included in "my Three People's Principles." Commander-in-Chief[4] you never thought highly of him.

Premier [Chou En-lai]: When Sukarno[5] speaks of the "Five foundations," he also includes socialism in his "five foundations."

Chairman: Do you know a Hunanese by the name of Mien Yun-shan. He said at first that Sun Yat-sen was unlearned, being dubbed Cannon [loudmouth] Sun. But Huang K'o-ch'iang[6] was better and more erudite because Huang was a *Hsiu-ts'ai* scholar [holding a degree] and could write in Su Tung-po's calligraphic style. Later, he went to Kwangtung, met with Sun Yat-sen, and his attitude changed completely. He said: "Mr Sun is really most remarkable!"

Why can't Yu Ch'iu-li serve as deputy director of planning? Isn't he brave and enterprising? There is also planning work in the Ministry of Petroleum. He must bring with him some new working style.

Premier: Go there to stir up a pool of stagnant water.

Chairman: Do you (pointing toward Ho) endorse it? We have now some people who would never do summing ups, and are concerned only with small matters, not big ones. Four letters are published in today's *People's Daily* [Note: this refers to the four letters published in page 2 of this column: "From where Comes Correct Planning?"] Was this organized by Ku Mu?

XX: No. This was done by Hu Chi-wei and others.

Chairman: I have read all of them. Who wrote the remarks?

XX: The remarks were written by Hu Chi-wei.

Chairman: Not written by Ku Mu? Before I would never read *Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily].* I learned this from Chiang Kai-shek who would not read the *Chung-Yang Jih-pao.* There are now in the *Jen-min Jih-pao* fewer things like how cabbages are grown, and there are some discourses. Let Hu Chi-wei consult *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* and *Chieh-fang-chun Pao* where there are considerable materials of an ideological nature. Some children read only *Jen-min Jih-pao.* I asked them if they read *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* and *Chih-fang-chun Pao* any more.

(*XX:* has come.)

Chairman: You speak up first, and be the commander. If you don't speak up, we will adjourn the meeting.

XX: We have had meetings for several days. Some comrades have talked about a number of problems. We raised many problems, and our basic concept is unanimous. We have all stationed at local points which is a very good thing. Let's have some discussions.

Chairman: Let us discuss what contradictions we have.

XX: We have all been stationed at selected basic units. Our understanding has been unified.

Chairman The time is short.

X X. It's still the preliminary stage and the first time. We haven't seen the mobilization of the masses, matured experience. We haven't seen what it's like after the masses have been mobilized and must wait until after the mobilization.

Chairman: It will be possible only when the provinces, counties, communes, brigades and teams have mobilized the masses and formed poor peasants associations.

XX: I know something about the rural villages, but understand very little about the urban areas. I have seen more data on rural areas. I have been trying to read the data on urban factories. But this is still only a preliminary experience for me.

Chairman: The experiences of Pai-yin-ch'ang [Silver Plant] seem to be more mature.

XX: It has been two years since Pai-yin-ch'ang was established. I have also seen Kao Yang-wen's report which seems to require some further explanation. He could write something more of a summary nature. In short, our experiences of stationing at basic units are still in their preliminary stage and consequently there are many problems which we cannot explain. After you have experienced this for the second and third times, you will have a better idea of where to start and some basis for comparison. After you have acquired some understanding of the rural areas, you will be able to make additional comparison and understand the situation. We have now seen the seriousness of rural problems. In some units, it would take two years to undertake this task, and the methods may vary. You will understand it when you engage in it later. In a county, it may take two years, but in the large factories of the urban areas, it may also take two years.

Chairman: It should take two years! If it is extended, it may take even three years, since we must thoroughly resolve the problems. The time may also be shortened somewhat.

XX: This is true in Hsiang-t'an and Shantung. Ch'en Cheng-jen[7] suggested that the Loyang Tractor Factory should also take two years to do it.

Chairman: We must solve the problem.

XX: After one has become adept, it won't take such a long time. There is a problem, that is, what is the principal contradiction in the rural villages? X X said that a well-to-do stratum and a special stratum have formed in the rural areas. The main contradiction, he said, is that between the broad masses of poor and lower middle peasants and the well-to-do and special stratum. X X X said that this is the contradiction between the masses and a coalition of landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and bad cadres. Is this true? (*XX:* Yes, it is.)

Chairman: Landlords and rich peasants are the masters backstage. On the stage are the four unclean cadres. Power is held by the four unclean cadre[8]. The poor and lower middle peasants won't be satisfied if you struggle against the landlords and rich peasants only. What is more urgent is what to do with the cadres. The landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries and bad elements are not in power yet, and moreover, they have been struggled against before. The masses do not care too much for them, but the main thing is that these bad cadres have been riding over their head, and they are so dismally poor. These landlords and rich peasants have already engaged in the distribution of land, and have thus become odius. But the power holders haven't been struggled against, and haven't become odious. He is a power holder; the upper echelons listen to him; he is also given fixed wage points; he is more-over a member of the Communist party.

XX: This is the first round. In the back of the power holders are landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries and bad elements, or elements of the four categories who have wormed their ways into our ranks. Some bad cadres do not have close relations with landlords and rich peasants. Among landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries and bad elements who have wormed their ways into the organization are included landlords and rich peasants who have escaped class demarcation and become poor peasants and Communist party members. They are also power holders, though not belonging to the former landlords and rich peasants. The latter have become odious, but not this group of people.

Chairman: In the case of Huang-chung County which was mentioned by X X X, it was Ma Pu-fang's chief of staff.

XX: Such cases are in the minority even in the Northwest.

Chairman: They are in the minority in the Northwest and also throughout the country.

XX: We should hold discussions on how to draw a line of demarcation and how to unify our language. How should we discuss principal contradictions?

Chairman: Let's talk about power holders. They want to have more wage points: "The five great leaders?" Aren't the "five great leaders" power holders?

XX: T'ao X has raised this question, and reactions have come from various quarters. Some endorsed him: others did not. I have heard that some one in the Central organs did not endorse him. There are three kinds of people : landlords who have escaped demarcation, the nascent bourgeoisie, and the rotten... The status of most of them is that they come from laboring people, and are not clean in their political, economic, ideological, and organizational stands. They connive with landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements, and some of them have been manipulated by the latter. There are also some landlords and rich peasants who have escaped class demarcation and become power holders. Some landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries and bad elements have rid themselves of these labels and become power holders.

Chairman: Which is more in the latter two categories?

XX: Those who have escaped class demarcation are more numerous.

Chairman: We need not concern ourselves with class or stratum, but with these power holders, Communist power holders, and the "five great leaders" who follow the power holders. Since you are the power holders now, the purpose of mobilizing the masses is to rectify our party.

XX: Some of the production team[9] cadres have also become bad.

Chairman: The majority of production team cadres aren't party members, which is unreasonable. There are several, a dozen or a score of party members in a brigade which is too few. This is a dead situation that has been going on for a long time and it seems to suit someone's taste. The crucial problem is party rectification; otherwise it would be impossible. There can be no hope if the party is not rectified.

Premier: This is also true in government offices. Aren't you Liu Hsiu-feng of the Ministry of Building Industry, Li-Wei-han[10] of the United Front Department and Chang Chih-i of the Political Consultative Conference, all party members who must be removed? We have announced it among the democratic personages, and they were very shocked.

Chairman: The Communist party is a prestigious party. Let's not mention strata which involve too many people who have been scared and offended. Let's discuss party committees only! The local committee is a party committee; so are county committees, commune committees, brigade committees, as well as party branches. They belong to the left, center or right. I believe the rightists are a minority, and those who are ultra right constitute only a small portion. The left is also a minority. The middle-of-the-roaders are more numerous and they must be won over. You should single out these people. X X X has said: Utilize contradictions, strive to secure the majority, oppose the minority, and break them up one by one. It is necessary to rally and to fight, to fight while rallying, and vice versa. We should develop progressive forces, strive to win over middle-of-the-road forces, and isolate the stubborn forces. We haven't discussed these tactics for many years.

XX: This is the tactic of the united front.

Chairman: I think this is still useful; there is Nationalist-Communist coalition even in this party now. There is also a united front.

XX: This is practically so, but we mustn't mention it outside.

Chairman: A few have become rotten, and some provincial committees have also become rotten, such as your committee in Anhwei, yours in Kweichow, yours in Tsinghai and yours in Kansu! (Some said Yunnan also.) Yunnan is an "individual" case, and has not reached this point, yet. Wu Chih-fu[11] of Honan is so extremely "leftist!"

XX: We need not mention the rich class, but call them new exploitative and oppressive elements, or mention them only as the so-called corrupt and theft elements, or speculative and profiteering elements. If they should form into an entity, they may also called a clique.

Chairman: Don't mention strata; it suffices to call them elements or cliques. You should study them. Elements may also have cliques, or cliques elements.

XX: Their contradiction with the broad masses is that these few people oppressed and exploited the majority. It is the majority who are oppressed and who want to make revolution. This minority of oppressors in the world will be isolated as their oppression is intensified. Here lies our faith.

Chairman: Exploited and oppressed, many people are disaffected and so they want to make revolution.

XX: There are certain conditions which must be cleared up. One is that landlords and rich peasants are standing on the forefront. They should be overthrown. The other consists of landlord and rich peasant elements who have escaped class demarcation. This kind of people will never do anything good. After the data on them have been cleared up, it would be easy to deal with them. All landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and bad elements who have wormed their ways into the party should be dealt with like the four category elements. There are also some poor and lower middle peasants who, during the land reform, engaged in revolution. Later, they were won over by landlords and rich peasants, and they have been riding over the heads of the masses to repress them. A severe struggle should be conducted against these people. They should be asked to thoroughly reimburse [the masses].

Chairman: The third group is the principal one, and they form the majority.

X X: Since there were many areas where land reform was peaceful, many have escaped class demarcation.

X X: Landlords could change their personal status after undertaking five years of labor, and rich peasants could change their personal status after undertaking three years of labor. Some people who have rid themselves of their labels have later become bad. This stipulation is no longer practical and it must be changed.

X X: That's easy, we can give them another label.

X X: During the land reform, we suggested the policy of neutralizing the rich peasants.[12]

Chairman: We made some mistakes because of our lack of understanding. At that time, with a view to stabilizing middle peasants, we only took away from the rich peasants that portion of land they had gotten by feudal exploitation. No data were reflected on their infringement against middle peasants, and after the poor and lower middle peasants have been mobilized, they would invade the middle peasants. Are there cases where middle peasants were classified as rich peasants? You have waged struggles against middle peasants in northwestern Shansi.

XX: In Northwest Shansi, there was the mistake of checking the past three generations, and grain was confiscated for the purpose of tiding over the famine.

XX: One group has been given labels; one group has escaped class demarcation; there was another group which used to be poor and lower middle peasants, but they have become powerful and bad. Among the original poor and lower middle peasants (*Chairman:* even middle peasants), most of them can be won over and can enhance their class consciousness. But you must not take away their property, watches, bicycles and new houses. The masses are disaffected. It is necessary to ask for reimbursement and compensation.

Chairman: You may speak about the third group.

XX: If they do not reimburse or make compensation, it is also not conducive to educating the cadres.

XX: By taking away these things, it would educate the new cadres. It is no longer possible to serve as cadres. We must win over the majority, and give labels to the few, and this policy should be fixed.

Chairman: As for a few of the vicious elements, we should give them the label of new bourgeoisie.

XX: In my view, these people, after all, are not Communists. However, the important thing is to rectify the Communist party, regardless of whether you come from among the laboring people or are escaped landlords and rich peasants... In short, as a result of the struggle, the number of families given labels should not exceed 7 percent - 8 percent, and the number of persons should not exceed 10 percent.

Hsueh-feng: Does this include those who are there now?

Chairman: What do you think? Otherwise, too many people would be offended. You must know that they are not a sheet of iron and they change: some rich and some poor, some up and some down, some good and some bad, and some powerful and some not in power. On this question I am somewhat on the right. There are so many landlords and rich peasants, Kuomintang elements, and counter-revolutionaries that they might constitute 20 percent of the people in a peaceful evolution. How many people would there be if 20 percent were marked out in a population of 700 million? I am afraid there will be a tide towards the "left."

Hsueh-feng: We must patiently win over those cadres that can be won over. Otherwise, the proportion of poor and lower middle peasants will be diminished drastically.

Chairman: If the masses should do the demarcating, it would affect your taking the mass line. The masses would demand that more should be demarcated, and the cadres also wanted the same. The result is that this would be inimical to the people as well as to the poor and lower middle peasants. Among the four-unclean cadres, the majority are those who committed 40, 50 or 100 yuan of corruption or graft. When this batch is liberated first, we will then be the majority! After we have explained the reasons to them, those who have committed errors will continue to make revolution. The plant directors, work section chiefs, and group leaders mentioned in that report are all veteran workers. After they admitted their mistakes, they should be allowed to continue their work!

XX: There is well-to-do class with the so-called "three great pieces."

Chairman: They have become well to do first and used the methods of deducting wage points. They bought bicycles and woolen clothes. There are also poor and lower middle peasants who became prosperous afterwards.

Chairman: The original "Four clean-ups" is called "one clean-up" – in economic matters. This was started in Hopeh.

(*General discussion:* The context of "four clean-ups" was positively presented in the First Ten Articles. It was added by the Chairman, and has been reported by X X X later. The Hopeh provincial party committee has also elaborated on it from the opposite viewpoint.)

XX: In North China they consider communes and educational institutions generally as "four cleans."

Hsueh-feng: We spoke first about the four uncleans of economic matters and the four uncleans of politics. Later we added organizational uncleans, and Comrade X X X reported that coupled with ideology, there are four uncleans.

Chairman: I did not have this impression. I won't endorse your way of denigrating X X X. The earliest I have seen this mention was X X X's.

K'ang Sheng:[13] X X's presentation of the four uncleans is very good. I enjoyed his report.

XX: You attributed this to Hopeh, but X X X is also a native of Hopeh Province. All landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries and bad elements who have come into power are bad, and there won't be any good ones. The question is when the poor and lower middle peasants come into power.

Chairman: What we have to do is to liberate those who have committed grafts of 100 to 150 *yuan.*

XX: That may not be so. There are many with corruptions amounting to hundreds of *yuan*, and those who committed grafts and corruption involving several thousand *yuan* or 1,000 *catties* of grain are also numerous. Perhaps we should liberate those who have committed graft amounting to 1,000 *yuan*, and ask them to pay back the money.

Chairman: What can you do since you cannot squeeze out all the tooth-paste? It may be possible to keep some. How can you squeeze it so clean? Let's be lenient!

XX: We must squeeze as much as possible. One exploits the masses, while the other exploits the state. They should pay back, and the reimbursement must be stringent and thorough. Where it is especially vicious, and if one should stubbornly resist to the end, there must be confiscation.

Chairman: The state also belongs to the people. We have nothing ourselves. It is correct to seriously exact repayment. And it should be proper and reasonable. We need not talk about "thoroughness."

XX: To what extent should this be carried out? It may be well to do it on a percentage basis. There are some honest persons among

landlords and rich peasants whose labels could be removed, though the number is extremely small. Conditions of the children of landlords and rich peasants vary. There are some whose family properties have been divided, and some whose family properties have not been divided. Some have behaved well, and some haven't

XX: What is that percentage? From the outset, it would be necessary to divide up the four unclean cadres. There are some landlords and rich peasants whose performance has been good, and they should not have labels. Among poor and lower middle peasants, it may be advisable to put labels on a very few, such as the label of new despot elements. Nonetheless, in regard to the majority, we must divide them and win over them. They can not serve as cadres or party members; they aren't targets to strike at, but are objects to win over.

XX: This is not yet the time, but in future the new exploitation elements will eat more and possess more.

Chairman: Eat more and possess more, this is rather complex! It is primarily people like us who have cars, houses and steam heat, and chauffeurs. I have only 430 *yuan.* I can't afford to hire secretaries, but I must.

XX: How much should be returned and repaid?

XX: It will be all right after this has been carried out to some extent.

Chairman: The masses know that when it gets to a certain extent, it'd be all right. The toothpaste can't be squeezed clean. There are only 18 families in some places, and how can you catch lice if there is none?

XX: It possible to set up one or two such elements in each brigade? Some must be given labels, and after the label of certain elements has been worn, it will be easy to handle them. The labels can be removed later.

Chairman: Just call them elements, and leave some way out for them! Don't involve their families, and the labels can be removed at some point. Among those whose labor is good, no label for corrupt elements should be given.

XX: Where the transformation is good and voluntary, they should not be made to wear any kind of label.

Chairman: Ch'en P'ing was famous for his ability to cut meat evenly. When he became prime minister, he was corrupt. Chou P'u and others charged that whoever bribed him more would get higher offices, and whoever gave him less money would be made a lesser bureaucrat... Liu Pang therefore asked Ch'en for a talk, telling him that people have charged him for corruption. He said: I have to support many people and I have no money myself! Liu Pang said, I will give you 40,000 ounces of gold to engage in the united front. With 40,000 ounces of gold, you would no longer have to commit corruption. This drama entitled *"Banquet at Hung-men"* is no longer performed. Ma X X used to play the role eloquently and exuberantly. People would refer to him (Ch'en p'ing) in citing cases of corruption, especially Ts'ao Ts'ao's. This is in a crucial stage now, and I am afraid that I am pouring cold water!

XX: If the masses are fully mobilized, they will be understanding and reasonable.

Chairman: Sometimes this isn't so. Once the masses are aroused, they become blind, and we have our own blindness too. In the past during the Wu-han epoch, the masses mobilized factory strikes and reduction of wages. There was unemployment and blindness.

XX: I had suspected it then.

Chairman: Now what I fear is the pouring of cold water. It is still in the anti-rightist stage. Not counting December, during January, February and March next year... at least we must work for another five months. The first thing is that the area in which to hit at must not be too wide, and secondly don't pour cold water. Don't announce it to the lower echelons that the toothpaste shouldn't be squeezed too clean and that corrupt elements could also serve as prime ministers.

Hsueh-feng: Among antagonists should be included the serious four unclean cadres, nascent bourgeois elements, and the old bourgeois elements and landlords and rich peasants in the society. (The former) should be called corrupt elements and speculators.

XX: It's all right. In regard to the four unclean cadres, we must ask them to reimburse and make compensations. We have not yet clarified...

Chairman: Where no four clean-ups have been undertaken, it may be possible to first lend some money to the state to relieve the poor. When the movement is launched later and when corruption and graft are found, no repayment would be needed.

XX: How much can be reimbursed in general? Can the repayment and reimbursement reach 70 or 80 percent? If it can only reach 50 percent, it won't pass the hurdle.

Chairman: The question now is whether there are still real goods on hand. If there are no such things, then they cannot be squeezed, and if there are, they can be squeezed all right. They consist usually of the "four big items," gold and silver, houses, and what is buried underground.

(*Hsueh-feng:* In serious four unclean cases, it is generally followed by speculation and profiteering.)

XX: It is even more different in urban areas. In the "three original policy" of joint operation, the United Front Department has never attacked the bourgeoisie. Whenever there was a movement, it would first issue a notice to protect the capitalists and their representatives. The new and the old stay together. This is very serious at the top echelon and in factories and companies. Consequently, the first target should be clear, and we must concentrate our strength, to rectify the department, the factory and the party. For instance, in a department, members of the party group should be rectified first; in a factory, the secretary of party committee and the factory director should be rectified first. It is necessary to make this stipulation clearly, for otherwise the cadres in power would slip away.

Chairman: By catching wolves first and foxes later, we have found the problem. It'd be impossible if we don't start with the power holders.

[Li] Hsien-nien:[14] If we don't rectify the power holders, we will eventually rectify poor and lower middle peasants.

Chairman: The basic problem lies here.

XX: Strike at the wolf first and catch the fox later. We must not talk about strata. Otherwise, if you emphasize the bourgeois enginering and technical personnel, or the petty thieves and pickpockets, or students who come from uninfluential capitalist families, the cadres would be very enthusiastic. The consequence is that the cadres might slip away easily, and it will be impossible to strike at them. For instance, the root of the trouble of Pai-yin plant lies in the provincial committee and Ministry of Metallurgical Industry. Unless this is cleared up, it will be impossible to improve Pai-yin Plant.

Chairman: Who is the root of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry?

XX: I have not heard who is the root of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry.(*XX:* Wang Hao-shou)

XX: The principal contradictions at the present stage and the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat center around the four uncleans, principally four unclean cadres and the power holders.

XX: If they are not cleared up now, they will recur later.

Chairman: It will recur with the lapse of two or three years. This does not depend on the will of man. One will escape class demarcation, one will be born anew, and one will disintegrate. That's the power holders' group, and the principal target. Of Tu Fu's[15] nine poems on "Leaving the Great Wall" *(Ch'ien Ch'u-sai)*, people remember only these four lines: "One often chooses the stronger bow, and one uses the longer arrow in shooting: and when shooting the enemy one shoots the horse first, and one captures the king first when one is out to catch the thieves," but not the other verses. After catching the big ones, we can clear up the foxes later! In regard to the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, we also must catch the king before the thieves are caught, and catch Wang Hao-shou! He shouldn't be minister, and should be demoted to a manager. We will reform him after we have caught him from his horse.

XX: The focal point is the party.

Chairman: The focal point is the party. In the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry it is the party committee and so it is in Pai-yin Plant. It is also the party committee in provincial committees, local committees, *hsien* [county] committees, and commune committees. When one grasps them, it will then be possible to cope with the situation. When you, Kao Yang-wen first went to Pai-Yin Factory, you also harbored him, but once you have stayed at the point, you changed. Have you Wang Hao-shou changed?

XX: When Lu P'ing[16] was being rectified at Peking University, bourgeois professors came out to protect him. Wasn't Comrade X X X considered a rightist at Yenan? It was done well at Tsing Hua University where the masses were mobilized.

Chairman: You of the Lu family name, when X X X was rectifying X X, I had stood on your side. Can X X still be the president of the university? Of course not, X X X X X! It seems that Tsing Hua[17] is better. (Someone asked: are the four cleans and four uncleans the principal contradictions in rural villages? No.) (Someone asked: What's the character of these affluent strata?)

Chairman: What character? Anti-socialist capitalist character. Plus feudalism and imperialism?! This is because what we are undertaking is a democratic revolution which has opened the way for capitalism and also for socialism. By staying at a point, you are opening the way... Anyway, we cannot do everything, and we will leave something for the next generation. Don't take the ages of people like us as a criterion.

XX: Two kinds of contradictions interweave together and that is where the complexity of the problem lies.

Chairman: Others engage in corruption and theft. What socialism is there?

XX: Some of them have no lice, and some lice are very small. There is a tactical problem and bad cadres are responsible for it.

Chairman: If you rectify him will he still be responsible for it?

XX: The four-unclean cadres have created many rumors, alleging that "masses will be rectified first and cadres later." It should be explained clearly that cadres will be rectified.

Chairman: What does this matter? Cadres will be rectified first.

XX: Cadres who ate more and took more than their shares must make reimbursements. What belongs to the commune members need not be returned. It does not mean that only the poor and lower middle peasants are exempted from this. In this way, the misgivings of the masses will be dispelled. Next, liberate those cadres who have taken more than their share. If the things were shared between cadres and commune members, only the excessive portion taken by cadres will be returned.

Chairman: Divide one into two! One for the masses and one for the cadres.

XX: Then concentrate your efforts to deal with a few of the most serious cases.

Chairman: There are so many steps. I won't endorse what has been done in An-yuan[18] in beginning to make connections with small staff members. In An-yuan, you had Hsiao Chih-yuan, Chu Chin-t'ang, and

Chu Shao-chien. The latter had two wives, but we maintained contact with him. When a trade union of the Canton-Hankow Railway was being set up, we did not know a single person there. We found a foreman who also had two wives and was later executed.

XX: Strive to win over the majority and isolate the minority. We must not be deceived. What Comrade Hsueh-feng said about planting the roots in veteran bonafide poor peasants is correct. But what roots laid in the beginning might not be necessarily good, and we could utilize some of the brave elements.

Chairman: Let's utilize some brave elements! When we started to fight battles, we depended on vagrants because they dared to die. There was a time when the army wanted to weed out the vagrant elements, but I opposed it.

XX: It may not be easy to find honest roots as soon as the work team begins to operate. What roots we discover may not be necessarily good, and they will emerge only when the time is ripe. Don't tell a root that he is such.

Chairman: Let's leave the question of roots alone, we are committed to socialism anyway.

XX: One batch of active elements follows another. After undergoing struggle, they would also have gained seniority and how can you say they are not qualified?

Chairman: Wasn't Li Li-san senior in qualification? It was only at the time of emergency when he could no longer cope with the situation that he invited our state chairman to go there.

XX: Not only Li Li-san, but Chiang Hsien-yun also ran away. There were more people who knew Li Li-san because he proclaimed the victory. At that time, nobody was allowed to kill, and if you should kill, we would strike.

Chairman: When that mine suspends work, it will be filled with water in three days.

XX: People may not support us if we try to look into the history of exploitation. In seeking out active elements among the poor and lower middle peasants, one may not get the right ones from the outset. In X X X's place, they have changed some 30 percent of them! It seems better for us to discover them in the process of struggle.

Chairman: You are engrossed with honest people which shows you don't know how to work...

XX: It is better to work on both cadres and the poor and lower middle peasants simultaneously. Back to back, he won't know it. When one cadres exposes another and the masses also expose him, the news will leak out.

Chairman: Are these well informed people? Why then did Chao Tzu-yang live in a poor old peasant's house to feed dogs? He was afraid others might get him.

XX: First, they are back to back, and then they sit on the presidium. Let these poor peasants participate in a cadres' "bath" meeting first, they cannot be chairman at once.

Chairman: He has not read Sun Yat-sen's *First Step of Democracy (Min-ch'uan Ch'u-pu).* Won't it be possible to get a brave element to the chairman? In short, we shouldn't describe that vagrant proletariat so badly.

XX: We still do not have sufficient experiences of the five antis. The number of bad cores in factories may not be too small. There are problems in both the basic and middle strata. In order to rectify the leadership core, we must rectify both the basic level cadres and middle level cadres.

Chairman: Has Wang Hao-shou changed?

XX: He has made progress.

Chairman: I am glad that he has improved. This man has had some relation with me. I don't know whether he has emulated the Liberation Army and the Ta-ch'ing oil fields.

XX: In short, once one becomes separated from physical labor, he will go astray. It is a must to take part in labor.

XX: Whether one can practice "three togethernesses" is the principal key to whether one can stay at the point and align himself with the masses. It's especially important to participate in labor. Once there is participation, any problems can be resolved. Jen Pai-ko went to stay at the Chungking Steel Mill where the "three fixes and one replacement" was implemented successfully. Some cadres there have learned only the skills of making steel.

XX: These people have technology and they should not be kept away from production. To do the work, it suffices to give them some time.

Chairman: How many hours will be required each day?

XX: It's sufficient for a small group leader to have half an hour to an hour, and the plant director to have 1-2 hours.

Chairman: All staff members of sections and offices have gone down. There are tens of thousands of people at Ta-ch'ing and all kinds of public opinions, but they all laboured under strict orders. X X scolded this time! He wanted everybody to stay at selected primary units. I scolded my mother in vain. After X X scolded them they went.

XX: The majority of cadres were veteran workers who should be criticized and won over.

Chairman: This is why we must issue strict orders. There must be a Ch'in Shih-hung. Who is China's Ch'in Shih-huang?[19] It is X X X. I am his aide.

[Hsieh] *Fu-chih:* There is the question of how to deal with so many people. There is also the question of how to handle bonuses which form a part of the workers' wages.

XX: There are many good people in the factory. The cadres there are not any weaker than those we have sent down. If we take them out for training, they won't be able to carry out their tasks! You recruit 20 percent from them and when you have gained some experience, we will reap the benefit. All cadres engaged in the five antis should be recruited from the factory concerned. There are more people in the factory who can be trained into backbone elements. This is what Hsieh Fu-chih did, and Ch'en Cheng-jen has also trained 400 people.

Chairman: It should be undertaken throughout the country. You (referring to Hsieh) will recruit half of the personnel from your factory to develop another factory. Thus, with one factory, we can have two.

XX: The technicians and engineers of the factory should also take part in class struggle, and pay attention to the movement before they can become both red and expert.

Chairman: They are not that expert. They won't unite with the masses, or participate in labor. They won't listen for other people's views. Or they would look and see, but won't make any real effort... Yu Ch'iu-li's method is to issue strict orders. There are 7,000 people like him among an outfit of 60,000. There were all kinds of opinions.

XX: There are all kinds and shades of opinions. "Participation in labor would affect research," "I have just been promoted and they want me to do labor work now..."

Chairman: It would be better to issue a strict order to ask everybody to go down.

(Someone suggested: We should set up revolutionary committees. There is so much corruption in the trade unions which won't work now.)

XX: The Loyang Tractors Factory is launching a five antis representatives conference.

XX: It seems the trade union system is no longer feasible. We must reorganize it. Whenever there is a good one, it can be reorganized under whatever new name, but it must be revolutionary, and we should begin with organizing 20-8- percent of the active elements.

Chairman: It will be wonderful if we can have 30 percent.

XX: Moreover, how should we deal with the surplus personnel from factories and offices? What do we do when they come to us?

XX: They shouldn't be sent up. It should be, as Hsueh-feng said, handled by themselves with one lazybone sandwiched between three diligent persons.

Chairman: It would be better to have three diligent workers mixed with one lazybone in the factory, as Comrade Li Hsueh-feng said! I didn't say it! It won't be good to use one's neighbor as a dumping ground. We can divide one into two in this factory, with three diligent ones and a lazy bone! Do not be afraid! Disperse them properly.

XX: We might just as well give some labels to these bad people, and send them to the countryside to labor.

XX: If one has a home to go back to, can he do that?

Chairman: Who has a home to return to? How many tens of thousands of you have gone to Kiangsi and have returned to it? The factory can be moved. To concentrate on a few thousand, it would take only a few tens of cadres to control them. How can you say there is no way to handle 40 percent of them? If everybody must be sent up, I want to see where to send them. Maybe we can send them to him (referring to the Premier).

XX: I also believe the future is very bright indeed. There are tens of thousands of people in each township, and in each factory... Regarding Comrade Li Hsueh-feng's talk yesterday on the theory of cognition, where do people get their correct ideology? If the leadership is good and Marxism-Leninism is truly practiced, with the enhancement of culture, of the theory of cognition, and of Mao Tse-tung thought, there will be both centralism and democracy, discipline and freedom, a united will and a pleasant individual mood, as well as a vivid and active political situation. But if the methods of thinking and working in a large factory, a county or big city are not sound, then they will change their color. So many cadres have emerged from Hsing-kuo and Shang-hang in Kiangsi.

Chairman: There is also Yung-hsin.

XX: There is the Kirov Factory in the Soviet Union which used to be known as the Hammer and Sickle Factory, and after the October Revolution, its cadres were found throughout the USSR. After setting up a large factory, a large *hisen* or a large city will have cadres to transform the entire nation and even the entire world, thus bringing about a change in people's spiritual outlook. A large factory can influence an entire city, nation and world. If the present work teams continue their efforts, it will have an effect on our new type of personages....

Chairman: Lenin paid great attention to the peasants and founded a worker-peasant alliance. *(Communist Manifesto).* He was afraid of the petty bourgeoisie, over emphasized their weaknesses. The petty bourgeoisie has a dual character, and it depends on which side you emphasize. How many petty bourgeoisie are there in China? There are even more vagrants and proletarians.

He was even more harsh towards vagrant proletarians by stressing their negative aspect. But they also have their positive aspect and according to our experience, are also amenable to transformation.

XX: It is also true of the offices which are very bright. The basic problem is that there must be a strong leadership core, Marxism – Leninism, the proletarian ideological system, 3-8 work style, and the 4 firsts[20] which, when implemented and persisted in, will greatly change nature and man's outlook. After the passage of years, the world will also change. This will be a tremendous contribution to the world proletarian revolution. The October Revolution was brisk and lively. Stalin built socialism. Later, it became dismal with stagnation. Then Khrushchev tried something... The world has not had any experience in freely mobilizing the masses under socialism to engage in revolutionary struggles. A Communist reporter of Iceland asked me what conditions would bring about a capitalist restoration.

Chairman: Two probabilities: One is restoration, and the other is no restoration.

XX: My answer for them is that we should mobilize the masses to engage in the four clean-ups, five antis. Wages should not be too high, and half work and half study should be introduced to gradually eliminate the gap between brain labor and manual labor. Chairman Mao has spoken about the three great revolutions, namely: class struggle, production struggle and scientific experiment, and urged us to avoid revisionism and insure the construction of a powerful socialist state. When we go into action, this will be our working style. As of now, China's population constitutes one-third of the entire world population. After this one-third has done the work, the other two-thirds will come over to us.

Chairman: We hope we can develop and build a very respectable nation, which is one probability. The other probability that we may not succeed. Then what do we do? It does not matter. Don't be impatient; don't hope that it will be consummated during our lifetime. If one-third of a province does its work well, it may not have to work in the other two-thirds, because when this one-third moves, the other two-thirds will also move. You have in Hupeh 71 counties. One-third of this is about 24 counties, which is just well.

XX: But it would be impossible to do well in one county and one factory... unless labor is provided and unless one has Marxism-Leninism and Chairman's Mao's theory of cognition...

Chairman: In teaching the theory of cognition, it has been customary to neglect its link with practical work. But apart from practical work, what's the use of teaching theory of cognition and teaching philosophy!

XX: With it one can create....

Chairman: It does not mean that everybody will feel fine; there is bound to be some who won't feel good. Landlords, rich peasants, bad elements and undesirable elements won't feel good. Otherwise why should they block it?

XX: Should it be necessary to kill people? I think it would be better to kill individually... mass killing would be harmful. Once there is killing, there would be a panic. But this does not mean that no one will be killed, and what time to kill must also be considered.

Chairman: It may be necessary to shock the people. Too many may be killed. What is the harm? First, if we try to use him later, there would not be any living material. Second, it would embitter his family–the vengeance of a father killed. We may incarcerate first the one who must be executed. It is impossible for us not to kill, but we must not kill too many. Kill a few to shock them. There is another aspect, that is, the one killed by mistake won't resurrect.

XX: In a case like Tientsin's Li Hui-liang where no material is available, if she was not killed, it would antagonize the broad mass of people.

Chairman: This has caused problems in the Peking drama circles.

XX: How many children of the landlords and rich peasants should engage in labor?

Chairman: If they are commune members, they of course are peasants! How can you not allow the people to participate in socialism and monopolize it for your family only?

Hsueh-feng: Poor and lower middle peasants are also called commune members, and so this cannot resolve the problem.

Premier: They are all peasants! Let's call them peasants.

Chairman: You better argue some more!

NOTES

1. Wang Ching-wei was a notorious Kuomintang leader and pro-Japanese traitor. He openly surrendered to the Japanese invaders in December 1938 when he was vice-chairman of the Kuomintang and chairman of its People's Political Council. In March 1949 he became president of the puppet central government then formed in Nanking. He died in Japan in November 1944.

2. Chang Tai-yen (also known as Chang Ping-lin) was an influential intellectual of the early twentieth century, politically radical but conservative in cultural and literary matters.

3. The Three People's Principles were the principles and the programme put forward by Sun Yat-sen on the questions of nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution. In the manifesto adopted by the Kuomintang at its First National Congress in 1924 Sun Yat-sen restated the Three People's Principles. Nationalism was interpretted as opposition to imperialism and active support was expressed for the movements of the workers and peasants. Thus the old Three People's Principles were transformed into the new Three People's Principles characterized by the Three Great Policies, that is, alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers. The new Three People's Principles provided the political basis for the co-operation between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang during the First Revolutionary Civil War period.

4. Comrade Chu Te.

5. Sukarno, the then President of Indonesia.

6. Huang K'o-ch'eng (1902-), PLA Chief of Staff from October 1958 to September 1959, was regarded as P'eng Te-huai's principal accomplice and dismissed from office at the same time.

7. Chen Cheng-jen, a vetarn revolutionary. He worked along with comrade Mao in the land reform in Kiangsi Soviet, 1930-31.

8. Four unclean cadres; those who were not clear in their political, economic, ideological, and organisational stands.

9. Production team, see note 4 on p 8 of this volume.

10. Li Wei-han (1897-) a Hunanaese played a leading role in the Chinese Communist Party from its foundation in 1921. From 1944 to 1964 he was Director of the Party's United Front Work Department.

11. Wu Chih-fu (c.1906-) at this time First Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party for Honan province, who had taken the lead in establishing communes in the summer of 1958.

12. The question of the rich peasants in China's land reform was a peculiar one arising from her specific historical and economic conditions. China's rich peasants differed from those in many capitalist countries in two respects: first, they generally and to a great degree had the character of feudal and semi-feudal exploiters and, second, this rich peasant economy did not occupy an important place in the country's agricultural economy. In the struggle against feudal exploitation by the landlord class in China, the broad masses of poor peasants and farm labourers also demanded the abolition of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation by rich peasants. During the War of Liberation, the Communist Party of China adopted the policy of requisitioning the surplus land and property of rich peasants for distribution among the peasants, and thus satisfied the demands of the masses of poor peasants and farm labourers and ensured victory in the People's War of Liberation. As the war progressed towards victory, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in February 1948 laid down new policies for the land reform in the new Liberated Areas. The reform was to be divided into two stages: in the first stage neutralize the rich peasants and

concentrate the blows on the landlords, primarily the big landlords; in the second stage, while distributing the land of the landlords, also distribute the land rented out by rich peasants and their surplus land, but continue to treat the rich peasants differently from the landlords (see "Essential Points in Land Reform in the New Liberated Areas", pp. 201-02 of *SW* Vol. IV). After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Central People's Government in June 1950 promulgated the Land Reform Law, which provided that in the land reform only the land rented out by the rich peasants should partly or wholly be requisitioned, while the rest of their land and property was to be protected. In the subsequent stage of socialist revolution, the rich peasant economy disappeared as the movement for agricultural co-operation depended and the rural economy developed.

13. K'ang Sheng (1993-) was born in Chuch'eng, Shantung, under the name Chang Shao-ch'ing (his other aliases including Chang Wen and Chao Yung). While studying at the middle school of Shanghai University, he joined the Communist Youth League (1920) and the later the CPC when he became a student at the university. He took part in the three uprisings in Shanghai just before the capture of the city by the National Revolutionary Army in 1927. Thereafter, it is reported, he and Ku Shun-chang created the special service branch of the CPC. He was the head of the Organization Department of the party before his departure for Moscow in 1932, whence he went to Germany. In 1937 he went back to China with Wang Ming to become a member of the Politburo and helped Mao in the latter's Rectification Campaign of 1942-4. After 1949, he worked in Shantung and in 1956 he was demoted to an alternate member of Politburo. He visited Romania in 1960, Moscow in 1962 and 1964, and Albania in 1966. In mid 1966 he was elected to the standing committee of the Politburo.

14. Li Hsien-nien (c-1907-) Minister of Finance, Vice-Premier, Politburo member.

15. A most famous poet of China's literary golden age, during the Tang dynasty.

16. See note 26 of p 144 of this volume.

17. A reference to Tsing Hua University on the western outskirt of Peking.

18. See note 1 on p 209 of this volume.

19. Ch'in Shih Huang Ti (Qin Shi Huangdi), the first emperor, was a king of the state of Ch'in who, between 230 and 221 B.C., conquered the neighboring states and unified China, Under his rule, a feudal system was established, weights and measures and coinage were standardized. The legalist philosophy was the philosophical basis of the Ch'in. The first emperor is remembered for his burning of all

nonutilitarian, "subversive" literature in 213 B.C.

20. The 'three-eight style' of the PLA: three phrases, correct political orientation; plain, hard-working style; flexible strategy and tactics. Eight characters: unity, alertness, earnestness, and liveliness.

The 'four firsts' are: in man's relationship with his weapons, man comes first; in all activities, political activities come first; in political work, ideological work comes first; in ideological work, creative study comes first.

INTERJECTIONS AT A CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE

December 27, 1964

(Note: Remarks in brackets were made by Comrade Ch'en Po-ta[1])

[What is the principal contradiction ? The Chairman has summed up everyone's view. The principal contradiction is the contradiction between socialism and capitalism. Four cleans and four uncleans do not explain the nature of the problem. The feudal society is the problem of clean officials and corrupt officials. The drama Four Imperial Scholars (*Ssu Chin-shih)* is one which is opposed to corrupt officials!)

When the viceroy of the province made an inspection tour, the earth would shake and mountains would tremble. It was so formidable!

[Clean officials during the feudal era were fictitious in substance "Serving three years as a clean perfect official, one can earn 100,000 ounces of silver." The word clean has different class meaning in different societies. There are also so-called clean officials in capitalist society, but these clean officials are plutocrats.]

In *Lao-ts'an's Travels (Lao-ts'an Yu-chi* by Liu 0 of the Ch'ing dynasty, it is stated that clean officials were even more pernicious than corrput ones. Later, I discovered that they held the same view in the *Wei-History (Wei Shih)* of the history of Southern and Northern dynasties.

[Which epoch had no internal contradictions? Contradictions intertwine both inside and outside the party, and there are parties within the party. The Kuomintang also has had this problem].

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

There are at least two factions in our party: one is the socialist faction, and the other the capitalist faction.

[The Chairman has stressed that we must listen to the words of all quarters; Good words, bad words, especially words of opposition. We must listen patiently. This determines whether or not work is done well.]

What if one has talked too long? As Comrade Li Hsueh-feng[2] has said one will be given zero for a grade if one is long-winded. Let him ramble on, and anyway, nobody would listen to him!

[Many people have forgotten whence they have come. One should not forget one's origin! If I myself did not join the revolution, I'd be at best a primary school or a middle school teacher.]

Big officials came from small officials, and small officials came from the people. We have all come from the people, and are still common people! "Generalissimo Chinag" was not named Chiang, but his family name was Cheng, and was called Cheng San Fa-tzu. He was a native of Honan. He knows only his mother but not his father. Didn't he also come from the people?

[The Chairman has often said that one must not consider one's self as being right. When a village cadres reaches a position of authority, he'd consider his own opinion as the correct one.]

One must not consider that his own opinion is right when he gains power. When one believes he is always in the right, he would never believe he is. Why then should there be meetings? Because opinions are divided. If they are unanimous, why should they meet?

[One isn't afraid of officials; one is afraid of control!]

Small officials are afraid of big officials; big officials are afraid of foreigners.

NOTES

1. Ch'en Po-ta (1903-) born in Huian in Fukien, studied at a teachers training college in Amoy before he went to Shanghai to study at the Labour University where he joined the CPC. In 1927 he was a student at the Sun Yat-sen University, Moscow, and in 1935 he helped Liu Shao-ch'i organizing the December 9th Student Demonstration against Chiang Kai-shek's appeasement of Japan. He had worked in Yenan since 1937 and became an alternate member of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1947. After 1949 he was a deputy head of the party's Propaganda Department and since 1955 the deputy head of the Academy of Sciences. Ch'en became an alternate member of the Politburo in 1956 and the editor of the party

organ, *Red Flag*, in 1959. Since the Cultural Revolution, his political importance has been greatly enhanced, being the leader of the Cultural Revolution Team, a full member of the Politburo. He is widely believed to have been Mao's secretary for many years.

2. Li Hsueh-feng (1907-), born in Yungchi, Shansi, became a member of the CPC when he studied at the National Teachers Training College, Taiyuan. During the Anti-Japanese war he was active in the T'aihang region and in 1952 became the first deputy secretary of the Central-south Bureau of the party. After his visit to Moscow in 1959, he was appointed the first secretary of the North China Bureau in 1963; after his visit to Indonesia in 1965, he became the first secretary of the Peking branch of the party in 1966.

SPEECH AT THE CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE

December 28, 1964

I don't have much to say. Is this document (referring to the 23 Articles[1] all right?

Article one, regarding the nature of the problem, is such a provision feasible?

There are three kinds of presentation. Are the first two better or is the third one better?

I have discussed it with members of the Standing Committee and also with several local comrades, deeming that the third method of presentation is better.

This is because the name of the movement is the socialist education movement, not a four clean-up education movement , nor an educational movement on intertwining contradictions.

At the Pei-tai-ho conference in 1962, the 10th plenary session of the Central Committee issued a communique, stating that we should undertake socialism, not capitalism.

During the first half of 1962, there was blown the "wind of individual farming." There were also " three conciliations and one reduction" and "three freedoms and one contract" which blew with terrific force. Teng Tzu-hui[2] was one of those in the "wind of individual farming," there being several others beside him. Some comrades were persuaded; others listened, but would not reply or answer questions.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

We have undertaken socialism for so many years, yet some comrades would not respond or answer questions.

In April and May there was not a single local comrade who said that situation was fine, and only army comrades said it was all right. I heard this directly from Hsu Shih-yu[3], X X X, and indirectly from Yang Te-chih and Han Hsien-ch'u. It was then in May, and they would say only that the situation was bad, and that there was such a general atmosphere.

When I went to Tsinan in June, several comrades told me that the situation was good. Why was there this change? They did not reap wheat in May, but in June they did.

Why should I talk about the situation at Pei-tai-ho? It is because someone said then that if " production was not contracted to each household, it would take some eight to ten years to recover." Should we undertake socialism, or capitalism? This was a kind of class struggle. Consequently, it was asked "whether class, and class contradiction exist?"

Thus, it was felt by the standing members of the Political Bureau and through public discussions that the third method of presentation was more appropriate because it envisages the nature of the problem.

The focus was to rectify the power holders within the party taking the capitalist road. Comrade Ch'en I[4] said that he was also a power holder, and if you wouldn't take the capitalist road, you could still be the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Article 16, regarding working attitude; this means that democracy must be stressed.

When you say every day there must be democracy, this is undemocratic. When you ask others to be democratic, you are not democratic yourself.

There have always been three great democracies in the army. When you cannot capture a fortress, you will summon the soldiers, fighters and squad leaders to hold a meeting and discuss strategy. You will then find the way. This is military democracy.

Political democracy – the three great disciplines.

Economic democracy – the mess should be managed by fighters. Do they still manage it now? This cannot be left entirely to the care of the quartermaster. There are two officers in each company: a sergeant clerk and a quartermaster. The sergeant clerk is in charge of copying

work, which is to write reports. It seems terrific, because he knows a few characters.

One should listen to both good words and bad. There is no problem if you prefer to hear good words. The problems is with bad works. I once spoke at a rally of some 7,000 people, saying although "one should not touch the buttocks of a tiger, I *[lao-tzu]* insist on touching it."[5] Later, I realized that expression was uncouth and changed it. In this case the I denotes the laboring people and lower echelon cadres, and people like us aren't too good to touch. If you wish to expose his scar or blister, it won't be too easy!

One should listen to both correct words and incorrect words. You should listen to what is right, but even though it's wrong, continue to listen.If others should criticize you wrongly, what does it matter? You are correct, and when someone makes a wrong criticism, the responsibility is his. What does it matter if you listen to him? But if you won't listen, it is no good. When it is correct, and when the criticism is apt, you must listen. If the criticism is wrong, it behooves you all the more to listen. Moreover, especially when they say something against you, you must listen patiently. That is rather difficult to do.

You must allow the other person to finish his talk which is also somewhat difficult to do. He may talk quite long, and there may be too much water and too little rice, resembling a bowl of congee, I have suffered from such ordeals many times. There was someone who talked for two hours, but still didn't get to the point. I asked him if I could help him, and then he got to the point. When at Yenan, X X X once came to visit me. He rambled on for two hours without getting anywhere. I asked him what he wanted from me, and then he mentioned his purpose. There was then another comrade who would only lecture, and would refuse to answer my questions. I could only listen to his lecturing. There are many such people in the world whose purpose is to lecture others. They want to lecture people like me, copiously and ramblingly.

There is a distinction between propaganda and incitement. In propaganda many concepts are linked together; in incitement, there is only one concept or one slogan. For instance, when you conduct a strike, you present a slogan which is very simple. This is called incitement. When you write articles, make reports, and engage in lengthy discourses, this is propaganda. When you hang up posters, this is incitement (mobilization for a specific event.)

X X X discovered this, and he talked about it twice, taking 50 minutes one time, and zero minutes another time because nobody wanted to listen to him! I have always advocated that in listening to speeches, one must not clap hands. If you don't like to listen, you may take a nap. When your talk is boring, it'd be better for him to take a nap to maintain his health. It is better to maintain one's health against such ordeals. Another way is to read a novel. I did this when I was attending school, and in this way I kicked out the teacher. (He related his story as a student.) This could have been my fault, or perhaps it was because what the teacher lectured on was uninteresting that I began to read novels, and later I invented napping. Don't say that i have had no inventions, because I also invented (laughter). I used this method to punish those who, instead of engaging in some form of dialogue, would merely lecture, and to harass those teachers who were prone to giving lecture, but would not allow their students to ask questions or question their students as a way of stimulation. It there is a teaching syllabus in a class, the teacher won't have to lecture. All he has to do is to let the students read it, and raise some questions for student discussions. When the government work report was presented this time, I suggested that it need not be read. But they said there might be some illiterates, so I conceded and it was read. I also clapped. In this kind of meeting, I am also for clapping hands.

Among comrades, you must not make others afraid of you. But in the case of the enemy, you must make him afraid. One must by no means make others afraid of you among comrades! If you do so, there must be some trouble with you, for otherwise, why would you want others to be afraid of you? When you make others afraid of you, it must be because you are weak in reasoning.

In army units in old days, the squad leader would train his soldiers with these methods: beating, scolding, and detention, and nothing else. He was undemocratic. Later, we said that beating and scolding should not be permitted, and now detention has also been abolished. Soldiers desert, and if they desert, let them go and why apprehend them? To capture the deserter and shoot him, why! Why would others desert? It is most probably because they could not live in your place. Let them run away. If you want to get the deserter back, you will have to admit your errors to him and invite him to eat rice and pork. You should tell him that if he still wants to run away, he could do so, but if not, he could stay. You can't use the method of beating and scolding and incarceration to deal with deserters. Let the deserter run away, because such a soldier has a rather low positiveness, and what is the use of keeping him? He could flee to some foreign country, and what does that matter? China has so many people. They might denounce us, but then so many people have denounced us, including Khrushchev and Kennedy who are not Chinese. The musician Fu Ts'ung has fled to England. I say this is good. What's the use of keeping this kind of person in the country?

I have spoken only on these two points: the nature of the problem, and the working attitude.

NOTES

1. Later this document was issued as a directive of the CC. Extracts from the directive of 14 January 1965 on the socialist education movement in the countryside, known as the twenty-three point directive. (Nung-ts'un she-hui-chu-i chiao-yu yun-tung chung mu-ch'ien t'i-ch'u ti-i-hsien wen-t'i), 14 January 1965, paragraphs 1,2,3,4 and 5 are given below:

> Since the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party in September 1962, as a result of the socialist education movement which has developed in the cities and in the countryside, as a result of the application of a series of Central Committee policies by the whole Party, as a result of the active efforts of the popular masses, numerous party members and cadres, an excellent situation has come into being on the political, economic, ideological and cultural, and military fronts in our country. In the course of the past few months, more than a million cadres throughout the country have gone deep down into units at the grass-roots level in the villages, and a new high tide has emerged in the movement for socialist revolution.
>
> The many great successes which our country has obtained so rapidly in the course of the past year, demonstrate that our Party's general line for building socialism is correct. At the same time, this has demonstrated even further that our Chinese Communist Party, headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, is a great, glorious and correct Party...
>
> Serious and sharp class struggles persist both in our cities and in the countryside. Once the socialist transformation of the system of property has been basically carried out, the class enemies who oppose socialism endeavor to use the method of 'peaceful evolution' in order to re-establish capitalism. This situation of class struggle is necessarily reflected within the Party. The leadership

of some communes, brigades, enterprises, and other units has been corrupted, or usurped... Experience has shown that if only the whole Party... thoroughly applies the various directives of the Party Central Committee regarding the Socialist Education Movement, grasps the essential principle of class struggle, relies on the working class, the poor and lower, middle peasants, the revolutionary cadres, the revolutionary intellectuals, and other revolutionary elements, and takes care to unite over ninety-five per cent of the masses, and over ninety-five per cent of the cadres – provided we do this, the numerous questions still persisting in the cities and in the countryside will not be hard to locate and to solve...

The important point in this campaign is rectifying those people within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road...

Some of those people in authority taking the capitalist road do so openly, others act behind the scenes.

Some of those who support them are at lower levels, some are at higher levels.

At the lower levels, there are landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and other bad elements who have already been identified, and also similar elements who have not been detacted.

At the higher levels, there are those who oppose building socialism in the communes, the *ch'u*, the *hsien*, the special districts, and even in the work of provincial and Central Committee departments. Among them are those who were originally class alien elements; there are those who have shed their skins and changed their nature; and there are those who have taken bribes and traitorously banded together to break the law and cause disorder...

The overwhelming majority of our cadres want to take the socialist road, but there are few people among them who do not have a clear understanding of the socialist revolution, do not employ people properly, do not investigate the work energetically, and commit bureaucratic errors...

The socialist education movement in the cities and the countryside will henceforth be called simply the four clean-ups movement, i.e. political, economic, organizational and ideological clean-up. In the cities, the socialist education movement was known in the past as the 'five -antis' movement. Henceforth, it will also be known as the four clean-ups, and the term five-antis will be abolished...

In June 1964, at a meetng of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee, attended by the first secretaries of all the regional bureaus of the Central Committee, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said:

What are the criteria for carrying out the socialist education movement well?

1. One must see whether the poor and lower middle peasants are really stirred into action or not.

2. Has the problem of the'four uncleans' among the cadres been solved or not?

3. Have the cadres taken part in manual labour or not?

4. Has a good leadership core been established or not?

5. When landlords, rich peasants, counter-revoluntionaries and bad elements are discovered who indulge in disruptive activities, is this contradiction simply handed over to higher authorises, or are the masses mobilized to watch them seriously and reform them on the spot?

6. One must see whether the result is to increase or to decrease production

...Throughout the whole movement, we must make use of contradictions,win over the majority, oppose and smash the minority; those who resolutely take the capitalist road are always an extreme minority. There are some people who have committed errors who can still correct them. As for those people who are the target of the four clean-ups, we must be good at dissociating them, at treating them in a discriminating fashion, and at isolating the worst offenders to the greatest extent possible.........

2. See notes 16,17 on p 143 of this volume.

3. See note 9 on p 79 of this volume.

4. A reference to comrade Chen Yi(C'hen I) the late foreign minister.

5. See "Talk at The Enlarged Working Conference Convened by The CC of the CPC" *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* Volume VIII, pp 313-336.

WHY THE “FIRST TEN ARTICLES” AND “SIXTY ARTICLES” CAN MOBILIZE MANPOWER

1964

It is because they have resolved contradictions among the people, the relationship between leaders and those who are led, and has organized strength. Man is the foremost factor among such factors as productive forces. Man, means of labor (including animal labor, farm implements, fertilizers), and objects of labor constitute the three great elements of productive forces. By implementing the “Sixty Articles” and “Double Ten Articles,”[1] it is possible to bring about vastly different results with the same manpower, animals, farm implements, land, and so forth.

(After talking about rural socialist education, “if the poor and lower-middle peasants are righteous, landlords and rich peasants will be convinced”): This may not be necessarily so. If poor and lower-middle peasants are righteous, there may be such a possibility later, and they must also not be righteous. When you say that landlords and rich peasants will be convinced, it does not imply that they will all be convinced.

(On a spurious labour model at Hsiao-chan who did not work, but earned 15,000 wage points in a year, worth 2,000 *yuan*”): That makes him an exploiter, and we must dismiss him. The accounts must be cleared, and he must be made to return what he has earned.

There are also some little despots who should also be rectified.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

In cases of corruption and violation of laws, there are both bourgeoisie and proletariat. Things are so complex that it would be strange if there were no such cases. It is better to have some opposite sides.

(On Ch‘en Yu-mei of Ch‘en-chia-chuang, Ch‘u-fo, whose per- *mou* production dropped from 500 *catties* to 300 *catties* after she was struggled against, but last year, her per-*mou* yield recovered from 300 catties to 600 *catties*: One must still rely on self-help. Things can always change. To strike down good people is like striking down Molotov, from 500 catties to 300 cattles. When Molotov rises, it increases from 300 to 600 catties. It is possible for people like Ch‘en Yu-mei, who never attended primary school, not to mention college, to do remarkable things.

The advent of revisionism, marks the ascent of the bourgeoisie onto the [political] stage. That is the dismal truth. It is like what has happened to Ch‘en-chia-chuang where they chopped the trees and destroyed the vineyards. They even took away tables and chairs from the house. But good people regained power, everything changed. Khrushchev would also change the Soviet Union into such a dismal place where trees would be chopped down and the vineyards would be destroyed. Were it profitable, he would even borrow money from the devil. We won‘t take such a road. The devil won‘t give us loans, and even if he did we wouldn‘t accept them. We will rely on Ch‘en-chia-chuang‘s Ch‘en Yu-met and Tachai‘s Wang Yung-kuei.

Don‘t just look at the dark side. Anything can be divided from one into two. Ten percent of the models can mobilize the majority, and rectify some 10 to 20 percent of bad elements.

Some of the party branches have been usurped by wayward veteran party members. They have a way of harassing the county committee members. They ask you how many Central Committee members you know and what are their names. If you cannot answer, they say your problems are insoluble. People at the upper echelons basically won‘t go down; they don’t understand the situation.

ON EDUCATION - CONVERSATION WITH THE NEPALESE DELEGATION OF EDUCATIONISTS

1964

Our education is fraught with problems, the most prominent of which is dogmatism. We are in the process of reforming our educational system. The school years are too long, courses too many, and various methods of teaching unsatisfactory. The children learn textbooks and concepts which remain [merely] textbooks and concepts; they know nothing else. [They] do not use use their four limbs; nor do [they] recognize the five kinds of grain.[1] Many children do not even know what cows, horses, chickens, dogs, and pigs are; nor can they tell the differences between rice, canary seeds, maize, wheat, millet, and sorghum. [2] When a student graduates from his university, he is already over twenty. The school years are too long, courses too many, and the method of teaching is by injection instead of through the imagination. The method of examination is to treat candidates as enemies and ambush them. (laughter) Therefore I advice you not to entertain any blind faith in the Chinese educational system. Do not regard it as a good system. Any drastic change is difficult, [as] many people would oppose it. At present a few may agree to the adoption of new methods, but many would disagree. I may be pouring cold water on you. You expect to see something good, but I only tell you what is bad. (laughter)

However, I am not saying that there is nothing good at all. Take industry and geology for instance. The old society left to us only 200 geologists and technicians; now we have more than 2,00,000.

Generally speaking, the intellectuals specializing in engineering are better, because they are in touch with reality. Scientists, pure scientists,

are worse, but they are still better than those who specialize in art subjects. [Liberal] art subjects are completely detached from reality. Students of history, philosophy, and economics have no concern with studying reality; they are the most ignorant of things of this world.

As I have said before, we have nothing marvellous, only things we have learnt from ordinary people. Of course, we have learnt a little Marxism-Leninism, but Marxism-Leninism alone won't do. [We] must study Chinese problems, starting from the characteristics and facts of China. We Chinese, myself included, did not know much about China. We knew that we ought to fight against imperialism and its lackeys, but we did not know how to do it. So we had to study the conditions of China, just as you study the conditions of your country. We spent a long time, fully twenty-eight years from the foundation of the CPC to the liberation of the whole country, in forging step by step a set of policies suitable to Chinese conditions.

The source of [our] strength is the masses. If a thing does not represent the people's wish, it is no good. [We] must learn from the masses, formulate our policies, and then educate the masses. Therefore if we want to be teachers, we have to be pupils to begin with. No teacher begins [his career] as a teacher. Having become a teacher, he should continue to learn from the masses in order to understand how he himself learns. That is why there are courses on psychology and education in teachers' training. What [one] learns becomes useless if [one] does not understand the reality.

There is a factory attached to the science and engineering faculties at Tsingua University [3] because students must learn from [both] books and work. But [we] cannot set up factories for arts faculties such as a literature factory, a history factory, an economics factory, or a novel factory; these faculties, should regard the whole of society as their factory. Their teachers and students should make contact with the peasants and urban workers as well as with agriculture and industries. How else can their graduates be of any use? Take students of law, for example. If they do not understand crimes in a society, they cannot be good students of law. It is out of the question to set up a law factory; so society is their factory.

Comparatively speaking, our arts faculties are the most backward owing to a lack of contact with reality. Students and teachers do only class work. Philosophy is book philosophy. What is the use of philosophy if it is not learnt from society, from the masses, and from nature? It can be composed only of vague ideas. Logic is the same. [One] does not understand much of it if one merely reads through the textbook once. But one understands it gradually through application. I did not understand much when I read logic. The understanding came to me when I used it.

I have been talking about logic. There is also grammar which one does not quite understand simply by reading it. But one grasps the use of sentence structure when one is actually writing. We write and speak according to the customary usages and it is not really necessary to study grammar. As to rhetoric, it is an optional subject. Great writers are not always rhetoricians. I studied rhetoric myself, but did not understand it at all. Do you study it before you write?

NOTES

1. A quotation from the *analects* by Confucius.

2. A quotation from the children's classic, the *San Teu Ching* ('The Three-character Classic')

3. On the western outskirts of Peking.

INSTRUCTIONS

1964

COURSES AND EXAMINATIONS

There are too many courses offered at schools [and universities] which place a heavy burden on students. They are not often properly taught. The examination system treats students like enemies; it pounces on them suddenly. These are detrimental to the development, in a lively and spontaneous manner, of the moral, intellectual, and physical capabilities of the young people. *10-3-1964*

LITERATURE AND ART

In the last fifteen years these associations[1] most of their publications (it is said that a few are good, and *by and large* the people in them (that is, not everybody) have not carried out the policies of the party. They have acted as high and mighty bureaucrats, have not gone to the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and have not reflected the socialist revolution and socialist construction. In *recent years*, they slid right down to the brink of revisionism. Unless they remould themselves in real earnest, at some future date they are bound to become groups like the Hungarian Petofi Club. *27-6-1964*

COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SHOWING AND CRITICISM OF THE FILMS 'SOUTH CHINA IN THE NORTH' (PEI-KUO CHIANGNAN) AND 'EARLY SPRING IN THE SECOND MONTH' (TSAO-CH'UN ERTH-YUEH) -1 BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA OF THE CENTRE.

There may not be only these two films [of this kind]. Others should be criticized also, so that revisionist material is made known to the public. *August 1964*

NOTES ON THE DIRECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING POLITICAL WORK BY LEARNING FROM THE PLA

Now the whole country is learning from the PLA and the Tach'ing [Oilfield] and schools too should learn from the PLA. What the PLA excels in is the field of political ideology. It is also necessary to learn from the advanced units in the cities, agriculture, industries, commerce, and education, throughout the country.

1964

There are people who suggest that the industrial departments at all levels (from the Departments to the factories and communes) throughout the country should learn from the PLA by setting up political departments and political bureaux and appointing political commissars and by adopting the ‘four firsts’ and the ‘three-eight style[2]’. It seems that this is the only way to arouse the revolutionary spirit of millions of cadres and workers in the industrial (as well as agricultural and commercial) departments.

1964

NOTES

1. These are mass organizations in the field of literature and art.

2. For "four firsts" and "three-eight style" see note 20 on p 183 of this volume.

TALK ON THE FOUR CLEAN-UPS MOVEMENT

January 3, 1965

I won't visit your honorable place if there is no business, and when there is, we will hold a meeting. Some comrades ask me, "how do you fight a war of annihilation?" In a county of 280,000 people, 18,000 were assembled together, and after two months, the battle still had not been fought. It took 40 days to study the documents, and why should they be studied so long? I think this amounts to some sort of scholasticism. I don't advocate this kind of study. It's no use merely to read documents. (Liu X X: Several ten thousand people in Honan were concentrated in a few places, and they devoted some 40 days to it, which was to oppose the rightist trend. They have clarified some problems.) (Liu Tzu-hou: We also concentrated on anti-rightism and relieving ourselves of our burdens.) Was there any result? One could study the documents in a day, and discuss them on the ensuing day. It might take a week to discuss, and then go down to the countryside. The main thing is to study in the rural areas and learn from the poor and lower-middle peasants. One of my security guards, 21 years old, has written me saying: "After studying the documents for some 40 days, I basically did not understand them, and only began to understand something after I came down to the countryside." This means one should only study documents for one week, and then go down to the countryside in order to learn from the poor and lower-middle peasants! He said that he was afraid of a number of things: being afraid pepole might die, and the wrong roots would be planted. He was afraid of this and that, and how could it be possible if one was

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SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

so timid? Although there are 18,000 cadres in a county of 280,000 people, they will still say it is not enough. Why should there be so many? I think it is definitely too many. Since the work teams have so many people, and you must rely on the work teams, then why don't you rely on the 280,000 people of that county? When you rely on the good people there, even though there may be a bad one in 28, you will still have 27 good people. Even though there may be two bad persons, you will still have 26 good ones. Why don't you rely on these people? Even with some 10,000 -- 20,000 people, you still could not finish it after one or two months. You say you will take root and make contacts, but what roots and what contacts? It was all so dreary which means that you did not rely correctly. If you had relied on the right people, it would be sufficient to have a dozen or more people for each county. In short, we did not make revolution like this before. Some 10,000 -- 20,000 people were mobilized to undertake the movement in a small county like a torrential rain, and after several months the work still was not launched. When a trade union was launched at the An-yuan colliery before, we did not know a single person among An-Yuan's workers. As soon as we arrived there, we made speeches. We asked who would like to enroll in night school, and found out who the foreman was. He had several wives. Did we organize a club? (X X X: We didn't.) After three months, a strike was launched there.[1]

I think that after entering a village and meeting the masses, we must first of all announce several things:

First, we should announce to commune members that we have not come for the purpose of rectifying them. Maybe we could also announce to some of the honest landlords and rich peasants that we would not rectify them. With the exception of some landlords and rich peasants that have escaped [class] determination and some of the counterrevolutionary elements and speculators with serious problems, all petty thieves and pickpockets could be exempt. We should announce openly that what we would rectify is the inside of the party, not the commune members. We should announce that our purpose is not to rectify you. If you have done something wrong, you should discuss it among yourselves. If there are serious cases among some members, we could discuss them individually, but this number is extremely small.

Second, we should also announce the purpose of our visit to the cadres. Cadres of teams, brigades and communes generally fall into these categories: large, medium, small, and nothing. There are some who eat more and own more, others who eat more but own very little, and still others who have nothing whatsoever. Where it involves a few tens of dollars, 100 dollars or 200 dollars, you can admit to it yourself. If you can return it, good, but if not, it can be canceled with the approval of the masses, since that is all you have done! After you have confessed, there will be no trouble, but there will be trouble if you don't.

Where the reimbursement has been made satisfactorily in the cases of corruption and theft and speculation and hoarding, no labels will be given. Where the performance is good, one can continue to serve as cadre with the approval of the masses.

After entering the village, a rally should be held within a month or so. The rally should be held with the county as the unit; each team being represented by its leader and two poor and lower-middle peasants; and each brigade being represented by the branch party secretary and brigade leader; and each commune being represented by the party secretary and commune leader. Several rallies should be held, each lasting one day. First, we should tell them the purpose of the visit, It should not be long. A half-hour speech should be sufficient, for if one should talk for an hour, they would be bored listening to it. Let them convey the message to lower echelons. In a county with a population of 280,000, there are about 3,000-odd teams. With three persons from each team, there would be some 10,000 people. It would be impossible to assemble everyone at one rally and so it should be divided into two or three rallies, each lasting one day. Then a rally of 10,000 people could be held and the people would feel pacified. What you have been doing seems so insipid. So many work teams have been set up, and after several months of endeavor, the movement still has not developed. They lack experience, and the majority consists of people who don't know how to work. Some 20,000 people went to T'unghsien, and after one year, the work there was not completed. Some of them did not work well, and others were bureaucratic. I think if we make revolution this way, the revolution will take 100 years. Some professors were in the work teams, and they weren't as good as their assistants, while some of the assistants weren't as good as the students. The more books one reads, the more stupid one becomes, knowing almost nothing. That is all.

You won't annihilate the enemy if you fight the battle of annihilation this way. It behooves you to rely on the masses and to mobilize them. You are lackadaisical in taking root and making contacts, and this atmosphere is too thick. This method is different from the method we used before. In order to annihilate the enemy in a matter of months, I think you must change the method. If you don't rely on the masses, the movement cannot be launched in a few months. Please think up some methods!

Your (referring to Liu Tzu-hou and Chang Ch'eng-hsien) local committee's secretary, Li Yueh-nung, is the team leader, and he has not launched the movement after several months. Try to think up some remedy! Why couldn't he get the work done? (Liu: he has been too slow in stressing taking root and making contacts, and while I was in Jen-hsien, big rallies and small meetings were held simultaneously.) Cadre meetings and meetings of poor and lower-middle peasants may be held in the brigade or in the county. Last year, an all-province poor and lower-middle peasants representative conference was held in Hunan with salutary results. Hunan's grain production this year has increased some two billion *catties,* and so it has yielded results. If you are so afraid that you will plant the wrong roots, then where can you hide yourself? A rally must be held as soon as we enter the village, and it should be attended by all poor and lower-middle peasants, including landlords and rich peasants that have escaped [class] determination. We must promulgate a few articles, but not read the Double Ten Articles one by one.

Genuine leaders and good people stand out only in a struggle, but you can't see them by visiting and interviewing the poor and impoverished people. First they aren't relatives, and secondly, they aren't friends. Thus, I don't believe in visiting and interviewing them. I was in Changsha when a strike was being organized by the Hankow-Canton railway. Although we didn't recognize a single person there, we looked for the two foremen. One of them was Chu Shao-lien who had two wives. He also wanted to make revolution because, as foreman, he was oppressed and his wage was too meager. This man was heroically sacrificed later. Where did we get a method to take root and make contacts like this? When you go out to develop and engage in mass movement, or to lead a mass struggle, the masses will do what they want to do in the struggle, and they will then create

their own leaders in the struggle. (Liu Tzu-hou spoke about his own methods of holding struggle meetings when he was stationed at Jen-hsien.) In these struggle meetings one should also discuss last year's distribution and wage points, and pay attention to production. What they have in the south, they don't have in the north. Relieve famine where there is famine; where there is no famine, settle wage points, and engage in distribution for the current year as well as with production. The four clean-ups can be deferred to a later stage. Four clean-ups means cleaning up cadres and cleaning up a few people. Where there is something unclean, clean it up; where it is clean, no cleaning up will be necessary. There must be some clean people! When there are no lice on a person, how can you find lice? (Liu X X: One high tide follows another, and we must not procrastinate). One cannot be thorough by procrastinating. There was a time when it took 40 days to study documents, to engage in scholasticism. My personal security guard wrote to tell me that after studying documents for 40 days, he still did not understand them. After he had gone to the countryside to stay at a selected primary unity, he began to understand. I have always opposed reading documents in this manner. It is a superstition that it takes 40 days to study documents. You should hold rallies, engage in struggle -- three levels of area and county struggle rallies.

Hsieh Fu-chih's method deserves adoption. Recruit 20 percent of the people for training. In a factory of 6,000 people, there must be 5,000 that are reliable. Why won't you rely on these 5,000 people instead of relying on your work team's 500 people? I think it is sufficient to have you alone. How could a minister fail to launch a movement with some 5,000 people to depend on? Don't be engrossed in documents and don't take so long to train. Go and get the struggle under way. When we fought wars before, we fought from the outset. We won some and lost some, and never read any books. Some people say that I brought *Romance of Three Kingdoms* in the fight, but who would fight a battle in accordance with the book. Commander Lin was a professional in fighting before, and X X was also a professional before. X X X is also a professional. Whether one is a professional or an amateur, you can only learn it by fighting. If you don't fight and merely learn, how can it be possible? (Asking Hsieh Fu-chih): Were you also studying the Double Ten Articles when you launched a training class of some 1,000 people or more? How did you study and for how long? (Answer: We studied some, and very soon we went to take up the struggle.) Why cannot training classes be held with the brigade or with the commune as the center? The so-called training class is tantamount to a struggle meeting whose purpose is to understand conditions and understand diverse personalities in order to engage in investigation and study. After most of the people have been struggled against, then someone can be designated to make a summing up. In short, what I mean is we must rely on the worker-peasant masses. Chang Ch'eng-hsien and Li Yueh-nung, who have served as cadres in Hsin-ch'eng County, Hopeh, and still do not understand how to launch a mass movement. With so many people [you] still failed to develop it. Li X X was the secretary of the local committee of Pao-ting. He first suggested the four clean-ups, but when he went to the countryside, he engaged in something else. Yet when the masses insisted that four clean-ups be undertaken, he listened to them. ...This is the Li X X, secretary of Pao-ting local committee, who in 1962 launched the four clean-ups campaign. That was because at that time we were confronted with oppressions. Whether we were fighting, or engaging in a peasant movement, or launching a labor movement, there were capitalists in the factories and landlords and gentry in the countryside. The Kuomintang oppressed us both politically and militarily, and we had no alternative but to rely on the masses. We had then very few cadres who were party members. There was not a single party member in a factory of 1,000 or 10,000 people. If there were one, we could make revolution or stage a strike. There was not a single party member in the Canton-Hankown Railway, yet it launched a mammoth strike. Now that you have founded a party, entered cities, and become bureaucrats, you are no longer adept at launching mass movements.

Why is it that those who attended military academies would not consult books when they were fighting? During five months at the Whampoa Military Academy, cadets became regular officers for four months. The cadets under went some training, did some drill, and then graduated. Comrade Lin Piao said that when he came out to be a company commander, he did not know how to fight. A squad leader was experienced, and so he listened to him. After fighting a few battles, one becomes adept. I won't believe that one will be able to fight after studying. Can an intellectual fight after a few years of reading? Not being able to fight is reasonable, and one will know how after a few years of fighting. Haven't our work teams also offered some ideas? (Liu X X: The poor and lower-middle peasants have plenty of ideas,, and though we also offered some, primarily they are their ideas.) It is necessary to listen to them, to the masses, and to the poor and lower-middle peasants. What we must do is mobilize the masses to revolt against the corrupt and speculative elements. It is important to get the arch wrongdoers, the lesser ones should be left alone. (Liu: One is to mobilize the masses; the other is that after the masses have been mobilized to a certain degree, the work team should control the temperature, and be adept at observing the situation, deciding when to attack and when to retreat.) It is like in a strike: when to strike and when to resume work. The same is true in battle. You must decide whether to attack or to retreat. Won't you retreat if the situation becomes impossible? Sometimes, both sides have to retreat. When we were attacking Kao-hsing-yu, Chiang and Ts'ai retreated towards Kan-chou while we retreated into the mountainous ravines, each on his own.

(Asking Ch'en Po-ta) How big a rally was held at Tientsin? (Ch'en's answer deleted.) Impossible. Terrible! Such a waste of time. Better not to have held it! (Ch'en's rejoinder omitted) So many work teams for 1,000 odd households, and the work could not be developed because there were too many people. It is impossible to engage in a human sea tactic. Where there are some 1,000 households, you can develop the movement by relying on 700 or 800 of them, and one Ch'en Po-ta would be enough. If you feel that there aren't enough men, you can bring another fellow. What you do is nothing more than to announce: My name is Ch'en Po-ta and I won't visit your honorable place if there is no business. If there is, a meeting should be held. Most of the people are innocent, and only a few are guilty. Let's rely on the majority!

(The Premier interjected: Ch'en I just said that Chang Hsi studied for two months before she went into the city). The more she studied the more stupid she became. Strongly anti-rightist, in the end she leaned towards the right. In what county was Chang Hsi? (X X X: In Chu-jung County). I have always opposed the study of documents. It takes only a few hours to read a document. You should bring it down with you to study. When going down to the countryside, the first thing is that you must not study documents; secondly, don't bring too many people; thirdly, don't take root and make contacts isolatedly. Meetings should not be too long: longer when there are things to say, and shorter when there is not much to talk about. It is necessary to give the masses a free hand. It is no good if you trust only work teams, but not the masses. One of my own boys spent 40 days studying documents and still was ignorant about their contents, but he began to understand them as soon as he went to the country-side. There was another one at T'ung-hsien who said that the professors did not understand, though assistants were better, and the students understood even more. I told my boys: You have studied for 10 or more years, and have become all the more ignorant, knowing almost nothing. Tell everybody that for 20-odd years I grew up by eating honeydew, being ignorant about everything. Ask your uncles and aunts for guidance. It seems that students proved to be better than assistants, and assistants better than professors. The professors have read too many books. Otherwise how could they become professors? When these people go down, they obstruct the four clean-ups. Their purpose is not to engage in the four clean-ups movement.

One is Hsieh Fu-chih's experience, in which struggle was launched through training classes. The other is the experience of Honan in which "triple alliance" struggle meetings were held. They undertook struggle for one month to 40 days. They did not read documents; rather they engaged in struggle, mobilized the masses, and understood the conditions. In short, they waged struggle. (X X X: In the brigade where I was stationed, we worked for two months, and succeeded in surfacing some 20,000 dollars [of illicit money] and 100,000 catties of grain.) There is still some oil to squeeze; we can borrow some money from them since they have plenty of money. The masses can still be hopeful, whether it is looking after the five-guarantee households or undertaking production. The meeting should not be too small. Some teams have only a dozen or more households, with a dozen or more members. It would be difficult to talk with them straightforwardly. In a brigade there are usually a dozen or more teams, and when a rally is held, a few hundred people will attend it at the most!

I could never see that so many people would be needed, and with that many people, I believe it cannot be handled well.

In short, we must rely on the masses, not the work teams. The work team either does not understand the situation or is ignorant. Some of them have become bureaucrats and obstruct the movement. Some of the persons on the work teams are not dependable. Now, a front such as this has been formed: one is T'ung-hsien, and the other is Hsin-ch'eng county. If someone says there aren't enough men, we will cut it down by one-half, and if someone still is not satisfied, we can cut the other half. One-half of T'ung-hsien's 20,000 people have been sent to other areas. Is it still impossible if a county has 5,000 people? (K'ang-sheng interjected: Taking root and making contacts was discovered by Old Teng...) True, these were invented by Old Teng! Mystifying! Don't announce the purpose of our visit. It is necessary to announce what we wish to do: production, distribution and wage points, and devote ourselves to these matters. We may talk a little about the four clean-ups. Whether to clean-up or not must be discussed by the masses. If there is something to be cleared up, we will clean it up, but if not, let it go. What belongs to the masses won't be liquidated. There must be several hundred people to hold a rally, which should be based on the brigade as the unit. The team, with its dozen or more households, is too small. When they say that a rally is to be held in the county, news will travels fast. County committee secretaries who have serious problems should go to some other county to serve on work teams. I think the present method of doing it is too erratic. There were some 1,000 households in the area assigned to you – Ch'en Po-ta, and at the beginning, a few persons launched the movement successfully. The number was increased to some 500 later. Why should you have so many people? (Teng X X interjects: Let us set a longer time and oppose rashness.) Wouldn't it be better if it were accomplished in five or six years, three or four years, or two or three years? Methodology is very important. It is too much to concentrate 10,000 or more people in one county. It was developed by the peasants themselves, with only a few cadres. There were then seven or eight departments: agriculture department, finance department, militia department... They were all brave elements at the beginning. It was these elements who besieged the county government. Their demands were too excessive; in reality they could not be that excessive. A few of the power holders wormed their way in, which constituted a serious problem, but the majority could be won over and utilized. If it is excessive, the masses may not approve of it. We can be more liberal, and it may be faster, but not too excessive. (Liu interjects: Reliable workers must constitute a majority in factories.)

The work team is not all that clean. Won't it be necessary to dismiss all questionable persons? Not necessarily. There might be in the work team some corrupt people and speculators. They must confess.

People like us have neither knowledge of nor experience with corruption and speculation, but they have, and so they are indispensable. When concentrating forces to fight a battle of annihilation, how can we fight if the problem of direction is not resolved? So many people, and yet we cannot develop the movement. It would be better to adopt Ch'en Po-ta's method. It is not possible to rely on the human sea tactic which is bound to cause problems.

Wang X raised the question of switching cadres from one county to another and from one commune to another. When there is a newcomer whose background is unknown, the masses will dare to speak out. With a new commune leader and new party secretary, they will dare to talk about their predecessors. The movement can be developed very quickly. Why should it take so long?

For now the work team should not be so pure. Taking root and making contacts is dreary without any mass movement. With some 10 -- 20,000 people concentrated in one county, they still complain it is not enough. (Liu X X, Teng X X...)

It behooves the poor and lower-middle peasant associations to clarify the problems and talk with T'ao [and] X.

NOTES

1. Anyun-a reference to Anyun coal mines in Kiangsi province. After the Party's First Congress in 1921, Comrade Mao Tse-tung had returned to Hunan to lead the Party's work there. After the First National Labour Congress in May 1922, the Trade Union Secretariat moved from Shanghai to Peking, and set up branches in the major cities of the country. Comrade Mao Tse-tung was elected Chairman of the Hunan branch. He worked hard for the working-class movement, leading the strikes of Changsha, the Anyuan Colliery and the Shuikoushan Lead Mine.

The year 1922 and the early part of 1923 witnessed a vigorous development of the working-class movement in Hunan and the country as a whole. Heroic strikes for wage increase and political rights spread over the whole province. The one that had the greatest influence over the working-class movement in Hunan and the rest of the country was the great Anyuan strike.

The Anyuan Colliery was an enterprise owned by bureaucrat capitalists under the control of Japanese imperialism. The successive directors were all corrupt bureaucrats, real power concerning the mining projects being in the hands of foreign supervisors. The entire enterprise was run on the feudal gangmaster system. The workers groaned under the treble oppression of imperialism, bureaucrat-capitalism and feudalism. Therefore the Anyuan Colliery contained immense revolutionary possibilities.

After 1921, the Party at first ran spare-time schools for the workers at the mine to carry on Marxist education; then it organized a trade union, which was formally founded on May 1, 1922. Mean while, a branch of the Socialist Youth League was formed among the workers, the best members of which were later absorbed into the Party.

The big strike of the Anyuan coal-miners, which had repercussions throughout the country, broke out on September 10, 1922.

The authorities of the mine and the railway had delayed payment to the workers for several months and attempted to dissolve their union. Further, the workers were encouraged by the victory of the strike in the Hanyang Iron Works. They demanded the safe-guarding of their political rights, improvement in their working conditions and an increase in wages.

Pickets were organized after the outbreak of the strike to keep order in the mining district. When the warlords of Kiangsi Province sent troops to suppress the strike, the workers under the guidance of the Party went to agitate among the soldiers, and soldiers refused to open fire on them. The authorities tried through sham "negotiations" to arrest leaders of the strike, but thousands of strikers surrounded the meeting place and foiled the warlords' plan.

Owing to the solidarity of the workers and their vigorous struggle, the authorities were forced to accept the workers' demands on the fifth day of the strike and thus the strike was victoriously concluded.

After the victory of the strike the trade union was organized along new lines. The basic unit of organization was a ten-man group. Each group had a representative, every ten groups an intermediate representative, and each pit or workshop a chief representative. Every pit and workshop had its board of representatives or intermediate representatives; and above them all was the supreme conference of the chief representatives. Thus the workers were better and more strictly organized. Their political rights were extended and their living conditions markedly improved. The workers also expanded their schools and opened consumers' co-operatives. The Anyuan trade union was at that time one of the strongest in the country. It alone stood firm when nearly all the unions in the other big enterprises were destroyed during the low ebb of the working-class movement which followed the massacre of the Peking-Hankow Railway workers on February 7, 1923. In the course of the Northern Expedition in 1926 the Anyuan workers gave strong support to the Expeditionary Army. They also took part in the armed struggle during the Autumn Harvest Up-rising in 1927. From 1928 onwards, Anyuan was the liaison center of the Chingkang Mountains revolutionary base.

DIRECTIVES AFTER HEARING THE REPORTS OF KU MU AND YU CH'IU-LI ON PLANNING WORK

January 1965

(In January 1965, Comrades Ku Mu and Yu Ch'iu-li reported to the Chairman on planning work. They mentioned dare to think and dare to do.)

One must dare to think and dare to do, instead of being random; one must break down superstitions, not science. Don't try to spend half a day talking, with planning and with experimenting, or there will be no results in the end.

(They reported on how many X·X ten thousand tons of steel can be produced this year)

Isn't there such a report that when the British heard that we were engaged in making adjustments and consolidation, they were afraid? Don't undertake adventurism, but do concern yourself with quality, variety and specifications; then they will be afraid. Add quantity slowly. Don't be impatient.

(They mentioned three-line construction.)

We must grasp three-line construction firmly, especially during the time of struggle with imperialism and with revisionism.

(They reported that our technology must catch up with and surpass international standards?)

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

Yes, we must have... no matter what country, no matter what missiles, atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, we must surpass them. I have said before, when the atomic bomb is exploded, even if one-half of mankind perishes, there will still be one-half left. When Snow[1] was talking with me, he asked my why I did not deny the rumor, and I said I did not want to. I simply said that if war breaks out and one-half of mankind dies, the other half will still be left[1]. There are some people who are even more terrible than me. There is an American movie which describes the situation so terribly. Khrushchev has said much, much more than I. He said there is a weapon which could wipe out mankind, a death ray. I did not refer to China, but said that one-third of the world's population will perish, and at most, one-half will die! With three-line construction, we will develop the steel industry, national defense, machinery, chemical and petroleum industries, and railway bases. By that time, we won't be afraid if war breaks out. If they are not completed, what can we do if there is war? We can fight them with conventional weapons. Before we did not have aircraft and artillery... and no TNT, and did we not win? We can continue to construct even when we are fighting: you fight your war and we do our construction.

(They mentioned that new technology must be adopted in designing.)

One must compare in designing, as to what costs less and accomplishes more, and what costs more and accomplishes less. Should the design personnel design at their own home or on-the-spot? I have seen an article on the design of a 12,000-ton hydraulic press, and some designs have failed once, twice, or even hundreds of times. There won't be success without failure.

NOTES

[1] Edgar Snow, an American journalist and author of 'Red Star Over China' and other books on China. He had a talk with comrade Mao in 1965, the text of which is given as an appendix at the end of this volume.

YOU FIGHT YOUR WAY AND I'LL FIGHT MY WAY – A CONVERSATION WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION DELEGATION

March 1965

Japan had capitulated, and we were again forced to fight. There were two methods; you fight your way and I'll fight my way. Whatever the military logic, it can be reduced simply to these two sentences. What is you fight your way? He seeks me out to fight, but cannot be found, thus ending abortively. What is I'll fight my way? We concentrate a few army divisions and brigades, and eat him up.

Everything is divisible. Since imperialism is a thing, it also is divisible, and can be eliminated piece by piece. Chiang Kai-shek's 8 million man armed force is also a thing which can be eliminated piece by piece. This is known as smashing the enemy one by one which is the logic expounded in ancient books of Europe and China. It is very simple, and has no profound logic at all. Don't read books, for who would ever bring a book to read when fighting? I would never read when fighting. Read less, for it won't do any good to read a lot.

The battlefield is a school. I don't oppose military academics. They can remain open, but the school term should not be too long. It would be too long if it lasted two or three years. A few months would suffice. No army, naval or airforce academy can be all that outstanding.

SOURCE:- *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

There are certain modern sciences which require a longer time to learn, such as guided missiles and atomic bombs which must be researched and manufactured. It does not take long to train soldiers in the use of weapons. One month is enough to train artillery troops. Several months or at most a year is enough to train drivers and aviators. The principal thing is to train on the battlefield. During peacetime, training should be conducted at night. During wartime, learn by fighting. Haven't you said that you have read my articles? These things may not be very useful, but there are two principal lines: you fight your way and I'll fight my way. The sentence I'll fight my way may be divided into two more sentences: if I can win, I will fight; if I cannot win, I will run away. Imperialists are most afraid of this method. If I can win, I will eat you up; if I cannot win, I will run away, making it impossible for you to find me. In the beginning, we used guerrilla warfare in both offensive and defensive operations. The basic method was guerrilla warfare. When we were fighting Chiang Kai-shek, we moved from small battles to large battles. Later, we used 300,000 troops to wipe out his 500,000 troops. We used three fingers to bite off his five fingers. We were a minority, so how could we eat them? We did it piecemeal. The result is that we swallowed them.

There are some foreigners studying military science in China. I advise them to go back, and not to study too long. A few months will do. There is only lecturing in the classroom, which is of no use. After going back, it would be most useful to take part in fighting. Some logic requires little if any explanation. One should spend most of one's time in his own country. Perhaps, there is no need to go abroad, and one will learn it all right.

DIRECTIVE ON PUBLIC HEALTH

June 26, 1965

Tell the Ministry of Public Health that it only works for fifteen per cent of the total population of the country and that this fifteen per cent is mainly composed of gentlemen[1], while the broad masses of the peasants do not get any medical treatment. First they don't have any doctors; second they don't have any medicine. The Ministry of Public Health is not a Ministry of Public Health for the people, so why not change its name to the Ministry of Urban Health, the Ministry of Gentlemen's Health, or even to Ministry of Urban Gentlemen's Health?

Medical education should be reformed. There's no need to read so many books. How many years did Hua T'o [2] spend at college? How many years education did Li Shih-chen of the Ming dynasty receive? In medical education there is no need to accept only higher middle school graduates or lower middle school graduates. It will be enough to give three years to graduates from higher primary schools. They would then study and raise their standards mainly through practice. If this kind of doctor is sent down to the countryside, even if they haven't much talent, they would be better than quacks and witch doctors and the villages would be better able to afford to keep them. The more books one reads the more stupid one gets. The methods of medical examination and treatment used by hospitals nowadays are not at all appropriate for the countryside, and the way doctors are trained is only for the benefit of

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SOURCE:- *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

the cities. And yet it China over 500 million of our population are peasants.

They work divorced from the masses, using a great deal of manpower and materials in the study of rare, profound and difficult diseases at the so-called pinnacle of science, yet they either ignore or make little effort to study how to prevent and improve the treatment of commonly seen, frequently occurring and widespread diseases. I am not saying that we should ignore the advanced problems, but only a small quantity of manpower and material should be expended on them, while a great deal of manpower and material should be spent on the problem to which the masses most need solutions.

There is another peculiar thing. Whenever a doctor makes an examination, he always has to wear a mask no matter what the illness is. Is this because they are afraid they might catch a disease and thus transmit it to others? I am afraid that it is primarily because they are afraid of catching an illness themselves. Different diseases should be dealt with separately. If they wear masks no matter what the illness, this creates a distance between doctor and patient from the start.

We should leave behind in the city a few of the less able doctors who graduated one or two years ago, and the others should all go into the countryside. The 'four clean-ups' movement was wound up in the year XX and has been basically completed[3], but even though the 'four clean-ups' has been completed, medical and health work in the villages has not yet been completed!

In medical and health work put the emphasis on the countryside!

NOTES

1. Here, and later in this paragraph, the term translated as 'gentlemen' is *lao-yeh*, which also means an official, in particular a district magistrate. Mao is using it ironically of the 'new class' of Party cadres, etc.

2. Hua T'o (d.A.D.220), a celebrated physician and surgeon who served as court physician to Ts'ao Ts'ao; the later had him executed when he proposed to open his skull to cure him of headaches.

3. On the 'four clean-ups', note 5 on p 9 of this volume.

NOTES ON THE REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEKING TEACHERS'TRAINING COLLEGE

July 3, 1965

Students are heavily loaded [with work] and their health suffers. Their study therefore becomes useless.[I] suggest a cut of one third of their total activities [work]. Please ask representatives of staff and students to discuss this problem a few times, take decisions, and carry them out. Please consider whether this is feasible.

The next few decades will be precious and important for the future of our country and the destiny of mankind. The twenty-years-old [of today] will be forty or fifty in twenty or thirty years' time. This generation of young people will take part in building our 'poor and bare' country into a great strong socialist power and will fight and bury imperialism with their own hands. The task is arduous and the road long. Chinese young people of lofty ambitions must dedicate their lives to the accomplishment of our great historic mission! And for this, people of our generation must determine to fight hard for the rest of their lives!

Politics must follow the mass line. It will not do to rely on leaders alone. How can the leaders do so much? The leaders can cope with only a fraction of everything, good and bad. Consequently, everybody must be mobilized to share the responsibility, to speak up, to encourage other people, and to criticize other people. Everyone has a pair of eyes and a mouth and he must be allowed to see and speak up. Democracy means allowing the masses to manage their own affairs. Here are two ways: one is to depend on a few individuals and the other is to mobilize the masses to manage affairs. Our politics is mass politics. Democratic rule is the rule of all, not the rule of a few. Everyone must be urged to open his mouth. He has a mouth, therefore he has two responsibilities to eat and to speak. He must speak up wherever he sees bad things or bad styles of work. He must follow his duty to fight.

Nothing can be done well, if it depends entirely on the leader not on the leadership of the party. [We] must rely on the party and [our]comrades to deal with matters, not on a solitary leader. An active leader followed by inactive masses will not do; it must be established as a practice that the masses use both their hands and their mouths. The only way to have things done well is to depend on the leadership of the party from above and [the support of] the masses from below.

Source:- *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

LETTER TO COMRADE CHEN YI DISCUSSING POETRY

July 21, 1965

Comrade Chen Yi,

You asked me to polish your poems, but I am unable to as I have never learnt how to write *lu shih* in five-character lines and have never published any in that form. Your poems have power and range. Only I feel that in form, or metrically, they are not quite *lu shih.*[1] For it has strict tonal patterns, without which a poem cannot be called *lu shih*. In this respect, I think, both of us are still beginners. I have occasionally written a few seven-character *lu shih*, but none of them satisfies me. Just as you are good at writing unorthodox verse, I know a little about *tzu* [2] with lines of different lengths. Chien-ying [Yeh Chien-ying-Tr.] is good at seven-character *lu shih*, and old Comrade Tung [Tung Pi-wu-Tr.] at five-character *lu shih*. If you want to write in these forms, you can ask for their advice.

Journeying Westward

I speed westward ten thousand li,
Riding the wind over infinite space;
Had not this giant roc spread its wings,
How could man traverse this void crossed only by birds?
The sea below ferments a thousand goblets of wine,
And mountains tower to great heights with onion spires.
Everywhere we find good friends,
As wind and thunder sweep the world.

SOURCE:- *Peking Review, No.2;* January 13, 1978.

I made changes in this poem and am still far from satisfied with the result. I am afraid I cannot do the rest.

Another thing is that poetry uses images to convey ideas and should not communicate plainly as in prose. So we cannot dispense with *pi* (similes and metaphors) or with *hsing* (association). We may also use the technique of *fu* (direct statement) as in Tu Fu's [3] *Northern Journey*, which may be said to "state in plain terms," but here too he used *pi* and *hsing*. "*Pi* means comparing one object to another," and "*hsing* means speaking first of something else to lead up to the main theme." Han Yu[4] used prose techniques in poetry, and some people said he knew nothing at all about poetry, but that was going too far, as some of his poems like *The Rocks, Mount Hengshan* and *To Prefectural Official Chang* on the *Fifteenth Day of the Eighth Moon* are really not bad. We can see, therefore, it is not easy to write poetry. Most Sung poets did not understand that poetry must convey ideas by means of images, and they disregarded the tradition of Tang poetry, with the result that what they wrote was quite flat. These random remarks all refer to classical poetry. To write modern poetry, we must use the method of conveying ideas through images in reflecting class struggle and the struggle for production, and must definitely not go in for classicism. But for the last few decades, poetry in the vernacular has not been successful. There have been some good folk songs, however. It is very likely that the future trend will be to draw nourishment and adopt forms from the folk song and develop a new type of poetry which will appeal to the general reading public. Incidentally, Li Po [5] wrote very few *lu shih*, and Li Ho[6], apart from a few five-character *lu shih*, never wrote any in seven-character lines. Li Ho is well worth reading. I don't know if you are interested.

With best wishes,

Mao Tsetung

July 21, 1965

NOTES

1. *Lu shih* is a traditional form of classical Chinese poetry. With a strict tonal pattern and rhyme scheme, it has eight lines with five or seven characters in each. It was very popular during the Tang Dynasty (618-907).

2. *Tzu* is a verse form which originated in the Tang Dynasty. It is sung to certain tunes each of which prescribes a fixed number of lines of a standardized varying length. Of the 39 published poems of Chairman Mao's, 25 are *tzu*.

3. Tu Fu (712-770) was a great poet in ancient China. Characterized by realism, his poems reflect the age in which he lived.

4. Han Yu (768-824), a noted prose writer and poet of the Tang Dynasty.

5. Li Po (701-762) was another great poet in ancient China. Highly critical in content, his poems are brimful of patriotism and romanticism.

6. Li Ho (790-816) was a poet who lived in the middle period of the Tang Dynasty.

SPEECH AT HANGCHOW

December 21, 1965

I have read three articles in this issue of *Che-hsueh yen chiu* [*Philosophical Research* i.e., the special issue of philosophical articles written by workers, peasants and soldiers, 1965, No.6.]. Those of you who are are engaged in philosophy should go in for practical philosophy, otherwise nobody will read it. Bookish philosophy is very difficult to understand. For whom is it written ? Some intellectuals like Wu Han[1], and Chien Po-tsan[2] are going from bad to worse. Someone called Sun Ta-jen has written an article refuting Chien Po-tsan's idea of the feudal landlord class adopting a policy of concessions towards the peasants. After peasant wars the landlord class would only counter-attack and seek revenge; there was never any question of concessions. The landlord class made no concessions to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom[3]. The Boxers first said: 'Oppose the Ch'ing and eliminate the foreigners,' and later, 'Support the Ch'ing and eliminate the foreigners,' thus gaining the support of the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi. After the Ch'ing dynasty had suffered defeat at the hands of imperialism the Dowager Empress and the Emperor ran away, and Tz'u-hsi started to 'support the foreigners and eliminate the Boxers[4].' Some people say that the *Inside story of the Ching Court* is patriotic, but I think it is treasonable–out-and-out treason[5]. Why is it that some say it is patriotic? Merely because they think that the Kuang Hsu emperor was a pitable man who, together with K'ang Yu-wei[6],opened schools, formed the New Armies and put into effect a few enlightened measures.

SOURCE:- *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought* , a Red Guard Publication.

At the end of the Ch'ing dynasty some people advocated 'Chinese learning for the substance, Western learning for practical application'. The substance was like our General Line which cannot be changed. We cannot adopt Western learning as the substance, nor can we use the substance of the democratic republic. We cannot use 'the natural rights of man' nor the 'theory of evolution'. We can only use Western technology. 'The natural rights of man' represents, of course, an erroneous line of thought. Is there such a thing as rights bestowed by nature? Isn't it man who bestows rights on man? Were the rights we enjoy bestowed by nature? Our rights were bestowed by the common people, and primarily by the working class and the poor and lower-middle peasants.

If you study a little modern history you will see that there was no such thing as a 'policy of concession'. The only concessions were made by the revolutionary forces to the reactionaries. The reactionaries always counter-attacked and sought revenge. Whenever a new dynasty emerged in history they adopted a policy of 'decreased labour service and taxation'. This was because people were very poor and there was nothing to take from them. This policy was of advantage to the landlord class.

I hope that those who are engaged in philosophical work will go to the factories and the countryside for a few years. The system of philosophy should be reformed. You should not write in the old manner and you should not write so much.

A student of Nanking University who came from a peasant family, a student of history, took part in the 'four clean-ups' movement. Afterwards he wrote some articles on the subject of the necessity for those engaged in history to go down to the countryside. In these articles, which were published in the *Nanking University Journal*, he made a confession saying: 'I have studied now for several years and have lost all notion of manual labour.' In the same issue of the *Nanking University Journal* is in article which says: 'The essence is the major contradiction and, in particular, the major aspect of the major contradiction.' Even I have not made such a statement before. The outward appearance is visible; it stimulates the senses. The essence is invisible and intangible; it is hidden behind the outward appearance. The essence can only be discovered through investigation and study. If we could touch and see the essence there would be no need for science.

You should gradually get into contact with reality, live for a while in the countryside, learn a bit of agricultural science, botany, soil technology, fertilizer technology, bacteriology, forestry, water conservancy, etc. There's no need to read big tomes. It's sufficient to read little books and get a bit of general knowledge.

Now about this university education. From entering primary school to leaving college is altogether sixteen or seventeen years. I fear that for over twenty years people will not see rice, mustard, wheat or millet growing; nor will they see how workers work, nor how peasants till the fields, nor how people do business. Moreover their health will be ruined. It is really terribly harmful. I said to my own child: 'You go down to the countryside and tell the poor and lower-middle peasants, "My dad says that after studying a few years we became more and more stupid. Please, uncles and aunts, brothers and sisters, be my teachers. I want to learn from you." In point of fact pre-school children have a lot of contact with society up to the age of seven. At two they learn to speak and at three they have noisy quarrels. When they grow a little bigger, they dig with toy hoes to imitate grown-ups working. This is the real world. By then the children have already learned concepts. 'Dog' is a major concept. 'Black dog' and 'Yellow dog' are minor concepts. His family's yellow dog is concrete. Man is a concept which has shed a great deal of meaning. Man or woman, great or small, Chinese or foreigner, revolutionary or counter-revolutionary — all these distinctions are absent. What is left are only the characteristics which differentiate man from the other animals. Who has ever seen 'man'? You can only see Mr Chang and Mr Li. You cannot see the concept 'house' either, only actual houses, such as the foreign-style buildings of Tientsin or the countryard houses of Peking.

We should reform university education. So much time should not be spent attending classes. Not to reform arts faculties would be terrible. If they are not reformed, can they produce philosophers? Can they produce historians? Today's philosophers can't turn out philosophy, writers can't write novels, and historians can't produce history. All they want to write about is emperors, kings, generals and ministers. Ch'iPen-yu's[7] article is excellent, I read it three times. Its defect is that it does not name names. Yao Wen-yuan's[8] article is also very good: it has had a great impact on theatrical, historical and philosophical circles. Its defect is that it did not hit the crux of the matter. The crux of *Hai Jui Dismissed from Office* was the question of dismissal from office. The Chia Ch'ing emperor dismissed Hai Jui from office. In 1959 we dismissed P'eng Te-huai from office. And P'eng Te-huai is Hai Jui too.

We must reform the arts faculties in the universities. The students must go down and engage in industry, agriculture and commerce. The engineering and science departments are different. They have factories for practical work and also laboratories. They can work in their factories and do experiments in their laboratories. After they have finished high school they should first do some practical work. Only to go to the countryside is not enough. They should also go to factories, shops, army companies. They can do this kind of work for a few years and then study for two years. This will be enough. If the university has a five-year system, they should go down for three years. Teachers should also go down and work and teach at the same time. Can't they teach philosophy, literature and history there too? Must they have big foreign-style buildings to teach them in?

Many great inventors, such as Watt and Edison, came from workers' families. Franklin, who discovered electricity, sold newspapers: he started as a newspaper boy. Many of the great scholars and scientists did not go through college. Not many of the comrades in our Party's Central Committee are university graduates.

You cannot go on writing books the way you write them now. Take the example of analysis and synthesis. In the past books did not explain them clearly. They said, 'Within analysis there is synthesis; analysis and synthesis are indivisible.' This sort of statement may be correct but it has its inadequacy. One should say, 'Analysis and synthesis are both divisible and indivisible.' Everything can be divided. It is all a case of 'one divides into two'. Analysis has to be applied in differing circumstances. Take, for example, an analysis of the Kuomintang and the communists. How did we analyse the Kuomintang in the past? We said that it occupied extensive territory with a large population, it controlled the large and medium sized cities, enjoyed the support of imperialism and had large well-equipped armies. But the fundamental point was that it was divorced from the masses --- the peasants and soldiers. Also it had internal contradictions. Our armies were small, our weapons inferior (only millet and rifles), our territory was small, we had no big cities and no foreign aid, but we had close links with the masses; we had democracy in the three main fields, we had the three-eight working style, and we represented the

demands of the masses. This was the fundamental thing.

Those Kuomintang officers who had graduated from military academies could not fight battles, while those who had studied in the Whampos Military Academy for only a few months could fight. Among our own marshals and generals there are very few who have been to college. I had never studied military books. I had read the *Tso Commentary*[9], *the Mirror of Good Government*[10] and the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*. These books all described battles, but when I actually went into battle I forgot all about them. When we fought we did not take a single book with us. We only analysed the situation of ourselves and the enemy, analysed the concrete situation.

To synthesize the enemy is to eat him up. How did we synthesize the Kuomintang? Did we not do it by taking enemy matterial and remoulding it? We did not kill prisoners, but released some of them and retained most of them to replenish our own armies. We took all the weapons, food and fodder and equipment of all kinds. Those we did not use we have *'aufgehoben'*, to use a philosophical term, as in the case of people like Tu Yu-ming[11]. The process of eating is also one of analysis and synthesis. For example when eating crabs you eat the meat but not the shell. The stomach will absorb the nutritious part and get rid of the useless part. You are all foreign-style philosophers. I am a native-style philosopher. Synthesizing the Kuomintang means eating it up, absorbing most of it and eliminating a small part. I've learnt this from Marx. Marx removed the shell of Hegel's philosophy and absorbed the useful inner part, transforming it into dialectical materialism. He absorbed Feuerbach's materialism and criticized his metaphysics. The heritage had always to be passed on. In his treatment of French utopian socialism and English political economy, Marx absorbed the good things and abandoned the bad.

Marx's *Capital* started with the analysis of the dual nature of commodities. Our commodities also have a dual nature. In a hundred years' time commodities will still have a dual nature. Things which are not commodities have a dual nature too. Our comrades likewise have a dual nature, correct and incorrect. Don't you have a dual nature? I know I have. Young people easily make the mistake of being metaphysical: they cannot bear to talk about their shortcomings. People improve with experience. In recent years however, it is the Young who have made progress; the hopeless cases are some of the old professors. Wu Han is mayor of a city. It would be better if he were demoted to being head of a county. It would be better if Yang Hsien-chen and Chang Wen-t'ien were demoted too. This is the only way we can really help them.

Recently an article was written about the law of adequate justification. What law of adequate justification? I don't think such a thing exists. Different classes have different ways of justifying their actions. Which class does not have adequate justification? Doesn't Russell? He recently sent me a pamphlet which should be translated and read. Russell is now a bit better politically. He is anti-revisionist and anti-American and he supports Vietnam. This idealist has acquired a little materialism. I am talking about his actions[12].

A man should work in many fields, have contact with all sorts of people. Leftists should not only meet leftists but also rightists. They should not be afraid of this and that. I myself have met all sorts of people; I have met big officials and small ones.

In writing philosophy can you change your methods? You must write in a popular style, using the language of the labouring masses. We all talk like students. *(Comrade Ch'en Po-ta interrupts: 'The Chairman excepted.')* I have been involved in the peasant movement, the workers' movement, the student movement, the Kuomintang movement, and I have done military work for over twenty years, so I am somewhat better.

In tackling the study of Chinese philosophy, we must study Chinese history and the historical process of Chinese philosophy. One should first study the history of the past 100 years. Isn't the historical process the unity of opposites? Modern history is a continual process of one dividing into two and continual struggle. In these struggles some people compromised, but the people were disatisfied with them and went on struggling. Before the 1911 Revolution[13] we had the struggle between Sun Yat-sen and K'ang Yu-wei. After the 1911 Revolution had overthrown the emperor there was the struggle between Sun and Yuan Shih-k'ai. Afterwards the Kuomintang had continual internal schisms and struggles.

The Marxist-Leninist classics not only need to have prefaces written, but also annotations. Political prefaces are easier to write than philosophical ones, which are none too easy. It used to be said that there were three great laws of dialectics, then Stalin said that there were four. In my view there is only one basic law and that is the law of contradiction. Quality and quantity, positive and negative, external appearance and essence, content and form, necessity and freedom, possibility and reality, etc., are all cases of the unity of opposites.

It has been said that the relationship of formal logic to dialectics is like the relationship between elementary mathematics and higher mathematics. This is a formulation which should be studied further. Formal logic is concerned with the form of thought, and is concerned to ensure that there is no contradiction between successive stages in an argument. It is a specialized science. Any kind of writing must make use of formal logic.

Formal logic does not concern itself with major premises: it is incapable of so doing. The Kuomintang call us 'bandits'. 'Communists are bandits', 'Chang San is a communist', therefore 'Chang San is a bandit'. We say 'The Kuomintang are bandits', 'Chiang Kai-shek is Kuomintang', therefore we say 'Chiang Kai-shek is a bandit'. Both of these syllogisms are in accordance with formal logic.

One cannot acquire much fresh knowledge through formal logic. Naturally one can draw inferences, but the conclusion is still enshrined in the major premise. At present some people confuse formal logic and dialectics. This is incorrect.

NOTES

1. Wu Han (b.1990) was at this time Vice-Mayer of Peking. He had contributed to the series of articles published in 1961 and 1962 in the Peking press under the title 'Notes from Three-Family Village', which contained thinly veiled attacks on Mao's 'great empty talk' and failure to listen to advice. Above all, he was the author of the play *Hai Jui Dismissed from Office*, published in January 1961, which was in fact a defence of P'eng Te-huai camouflaged as an upright official removed from office by the emperor in Ming times because he had defended the right of the peasants to their land. Yao Wen-yuan's attack on this drama in November 1965 (see note 8 below) gave the signal for the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.

2. A leading historian who also came under attack in the Cultual Revolution, at the time of Mao's speech he was head of the History Department at Peking University.

3. A reference to the war of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. It was a peasant revolutionary war waged against the feudal rule and national opression of the Ching Dynasty in the middle of te 19th century. Hung Hsiu-chuan, Yang Hsiu-

ching and others the leaders of this revolution, staged an uprising in Kwangsi in January 1831 and proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In 1852 the peasant army proceeded northward from Kwangsi and marched through Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei and in 1853 it captured Nanking, the main city on the lower Yangtse. Part of its forces then continued the drive north and pushed to the vicinity of Tientsin, a major city in northern China. Because the Taiping army failed to build stable base areas in the places it occupied and also because, after establishing its capital in Nanking, the leading group in the army committed many political and military errors, it could not withstand the joint attack of the counter-revolutionary troops of the Ching government and the aggressors, Britain, the United States and France, and suffered defeat in 1864.

4. Boxers, a refrence to the Yi Ho Tuan movement. The Yi Ho Tuan Movement was the anti-imperialist armed struggle which took place in northern China in 1900. The broad masses of peasants, handicraftsmen and other people took part in this movement. Getting in touch with one another through religious and other channels, they organized themselves on the basis of secret societies and waged a heroic struggle against the joint forces of aggression of the eight imperialist powers - the United States, Britain, Japan, Germany, Russia, France, Italy and Austria. The movement was put down with indescribable savagery after the joint forces of aggression occupied Tieutsin and Peking . In 1901 the Ching government concluded a treaty with the imperialist powers. Its main provisions were that China had to pay those countries the enormous sum of 450 million taels of silver as war reparations and grant them the special privilege of stationing troops in Peking and in the area from Peking to Tientsin to Shanhaikuan.

5. A reference to a film with that title. Comrade Mao denounced this film as early as a march 1950 and again in October 1954 (see "Directive on the film *Qing gong mishi*" *Selected Works* Volume VII p 53 and p 294.)

6. Kang Yu-wei (1858-1927), of Nanhai County, Kwangtung Province. In 1895, after China had been defeated by Japanese imperialism in the previous year, he led thirteen hundred candidates for the third grade in the imperial examinations at Peking in submitting a "ten thousand word memorial" to Emperor Kuang Hsu, asking for "constitutional reform and modernization" and asking that the autocratic monarchy be changed into a constitutional monarchy. In 1898, in an attempt to introduce reforms, the emperor promoted Kang Yu-wei together with Tan Sze-tung, Liang Chi-chao and others to key posts in the government. Later, the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, representing the die-hards, again took power and the reform movement failed. Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao fled abroad and formed the Protect-the-Emperor Party, which became a reactionary political faction in opposition to the bourgeois and petty bourgeois revolutionaries represented by Sun Yat-sen.

7. Ch'i Pen-yu was, an editor of *Hung-ch'i*. The article to which Mao refers here was entitled *'Wei'ko-ming erh yen-chiu li-sih'* ('Study History for the Sake of the Revolution'), and appeared in issue No.13 of that journal, which was published on 6 December 1965, pp.14-22. As Mao says, it did not name names; it attacked disciples of Hu Shih who had denied the relevance of class struggle to the study of history, and called for a 'supra-class view point' and 'absolute objectivity', but did not identify them except by saying that they had expressed such ideas openly in 1963.

8. Yao Wen-Yuan had first attracted attention by an article of June 1957, attack the bourgeois tendencies of the Shanghai *Wen-hui pao*. Ironically, his article entitled 'On the New Historical Play *The Dismissed of Hai Jul*' appeared on 10 November 1965 precisely in that paper – because, as Mao stated in October 1966 it was not possible to get it published in the Peking press, which was tightly controlled by the Party bureaucracy, headed by Li Shao-chi.

9. The standard commentary on the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, written in the third century B.C.

10. The *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* of Ssu-ma Kuang (1019-86), written between 1072 and 1084, is a general history of China from 403 B.C. to A.D. 1959. It is, with the *Shih-chi* one of China's most famous historical writings.

11. The communists applied the treatment which Mao characterizes in Hegelian terms as *'Aufhebung' (yang-ch'i)* to the Kuomintang general Tu Yu-ming by defeating him in battle and taking him prisoner after he had refused to surrender. See Mao's 'Message Urging Tu Yu-ming and Others to Surrender' of 17 December 1948, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 295 – 7.

12. For Mao's criticism of Bertrand Russell's ideas in 1920, see "Communism and Dictatorship", *Selected works*, vol VI, pp 17 – 19.

13. The Revolution of 1911 overthrew the autocratic regime of the Ching Dynasty. On October 10 of that year, a section of the New Army, at the urging of the revolutionary societies of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, staged an uprising in Wuchang. This was followed by uprisings in other provinces, and very soon the rule of the Ching Dynasty crumbled. On January 1, 1912, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China was set up in Nanking, and Sun Yat-sen was elected Provisional President. The revolution achieved victory through the alliance of the bourgeoisie, peasants, workers and urban petty bourgeoisie. But because the group which led the revolution was compromising in nature, failed to bring real benefits to the peasants and yielded to the pressure of imperialism and the feudal forces, state power fell into the hands of the Northern warlord Yuan Shih-kai, and the revolution failed.

TALK AT THE NATIONAL WORK CONFERENCE OF THE POLITBURO

January 1965

During the transitional period, there exist class struggle, the conflict between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, and the conflict between the socialist and capitalist roads. If we forget this fundamental theory and practice of our party, we may go astray.

COMMENT ON THE ARTICLE – 'HOW TO PLAY TABLE TENNIS' BY COMRADE HSU YIN-SHENG

January 1965

Comrade Hsu Yin-sheng's talk and Comrade Ho Lung's comment should be printed and circulated among the comrades in the Centre, who, I hope, will have more of this kind of thing printed and distributed when they go back to their regions. Comrades, this is young 'generals' challenge to us, the old ones! Should we refuse to learn anything from them? The talk is full of dialectical materialism and is throughout opposed to idealism and metaphysics. [I] have not read anything so good for years. What he [Hsu] talks about is a ball game; what we can learn from it are theory, politics, economy, culture, and military affairs. If we do not learn from the young 'generals', we shall be doomed.

NOTES ON COMRADE CH'EN CHENG-JEN'S REPORT ON HIS 'SQUATTING POINT'[1].

January 29, 1965

Management is a form of socialist education. If the managerial staff do not go to the lathe shop to work on the 'three sames'[2] and to look for teachers from whom they may learn one or two crafts, then they will live in a state of class conflict with the workers. In the end they will be knocked down like capitalists by the workers. They cannot manage well, if they do not learn and remain ignorant of any productive skill. It is impossible to make other people understand, if they themselves are confused.

The bureaucrats and the workers and the middle-poor peasants are acutely antagonistic classes.

Such people [the bureaucrats] are already or are becoming capitalist vampires to the workers. How can they have sufficient understanding? They are the objects of struggle and revolution; socialist education cannot depend on them. We can only rely on those cadres who are not hostile to the workers and are imbued with revolutionary spirit.

NOTES

1.Ch'en is an old comrade of Mao, who worked with him in the land reform, Kiangsi, 1930-1 and his 'squatting point' sounds like a factory where he stayed and worked. He was 'sent down' *(hsia-fang)*, but not as a form of punishment.

2. Same food, same accommodation, and same work.

TALK AT A WORK CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRE

September 1965

If revisionism appears in the Centre, what are you going to do? It is probable that [revisionism] will appear [in the Centre] and this is a great danger.

BROADCASTING

December 9, 1965

Use the broadcasting service well, for the peoples of China and the world.

INTERVIEW WITH ANDRÉ MAL RAUX[1]

1965

Mao reflects "Plekhanov and the Mensheviks were Marxists, even Leninists. They cut themselves off from the masses and ended up by taking up arms against the Bolshiviks or rather they mainly ended up exiled or shot.

"There are now two paths for every Communists: That of socialist construction, and that of revisionism. We are beyond the bark – eating stage, but we have only got as far as a bowl of rice a day. To accept revisionism is to snatch away the bowl of rice. As I told you, we made the Revolution with peasant rebels. Then we led them against the cities ruled by the Kuomintang. But the successor of the Kuomintang was not the Chinese Communist Party, however important that may be, it was The New Democracy. The history of the Revolution, like the weakness of the proletariat of the big cities, forced the communists into collabaration with the petty bourgeoise. For that reason, too, our revolution, in the last analysis, will no more resemble the Russian Revolution than the Russian Revolution resembled yours. Even today, broad layers of our society are conditioned in such a way that their activity is necessarily orientated toward revesionism. They can only obtain what they want by taking it from the masses"

I think of stalin: "We did not bring about the October Revolutior in order to give power to the kulaks!".

Extracted from *Andre Malraux : Anti-Memoirs*.

"Corruption, law-breaking, the arrogance of intellectuals, the wish to do honour to one's family by becoming a white-collar worker and not dirtying one's hands anymore, all these stupidies are only symptoms. Inside the party and out. The cause of them is the historical conditions themselves. But also the political conditions"

I know his theory : you begin by no longer tolerating criticism, then you abondon self-criticism, then you cut yourself off from the masses, and since the party can draw its revolutionary strength only from them, you tolerate the formation of a new class; finally like Khrushchev, you proclaim peaceful co-existence on a durable basis with United States – and the Americans arrive in Vietnam. I have not forgotten his old saying: "Here seventy percent of the people are poor peasants, and their sense of the Revolution has never been at fault." He has just explained how he interprets it: one must learn from the masses in order to be able to teach them.

"That is why" he says, "Soviet revisionism is an...apostasy"

* * *

"When he [Khrushehev] came here for the last time, on his return from camp David, he believed in compromise with American imperiliasm. He imagined that the contradictions had almost disappeared there. The truth is that of the contradictions due to victory are less painful than the old ones, luckily they are almost as deep. Humanity left to its own divices does not necessarily re-establish capitalism (which is why you are perhaps right in saying they will not revert to private ownership of the means of production), but it does re-establish inequality. The forces tending toward the creation of new classes are powerful. We have just suppressed military titles and badges of rank; every `cadre' becomes a worker again, at least one day a weak; whole train loads of city dwellers go off to work in people's communes. Khrushev seemed to think that a revolution is done when a communist party has seized power – as if it were merely a question of national liberation.

"Lenin was well aware that at this juncture the revolution is only just beginning. The forces and traditions he was referring to are not only the legacy of the bourgiousie. They are also our fate... The revisionists mix up cause and effect. Equality is not important in itself, it is important because it is natural to those who have not lost contact with masses... You remember Kosygin at the 23rd Congress!" Communism means the raising of living standards', of course! And swimming is a way of putting on a pair of trunks! Stalin had distroyed the kulaks. It isn't simply a question of replacing the Tsar with Khruschev, one bourgeiousie with another, even if it's called communist. The thought, culture and customs which brought China to where we found her must disappear, the thought, customs, and culture of proletarian China, which does not yet exist, must appear".

* * *

"What is expressed in that common place term 'rivisionism' is the death of revolution. What we have just done in the army must be done everywhere. I have told you that the revolution is also everywhere. I have told you that the revolution is also a feeling. If we decide to make of it what the Russians are now doing – a feeling of the past — everything will fall apart. Our revolution cannot be simply a stabilization of the past".

* * *

I am alone with the masses. Waiting.

NOTES

1. Andre Malraux, prominent French novelist. In 1965 he was minister of culture in deGalle's government.

TALK WITH MAO YUAN - HSIN

(Second talk)[1]
February 18, 1966

[Chairman Mao and his nephew] discussed the question of whether the Military Engineering Institute should go in for two or three years of study first and then do another year of part-time work and part-time study; and also the question of co-ordination and assignment of work.

Chairman Mao: The science and engineering faculties should still have their own language. With their six-year syllabus we could start by trying to do it in three years first and see how it works out, and not necessarily be in a hurry to shorten it to two years. With advanced science, if there is a clear-cut objective, then three years of study would perhaps be all right, and if three years are not enough they could later add on a bit.

Only when there is a clear-cut objective can you do less but do it well, and only then can you combine the general and the particular. The six-year system can then be altered into a three-year system, and after we have done that our direction will be right.

When you try new things, the only way to do it is to carry on for a few years, constantly summarizing your experience.

The science and engineering faculties have their specific nature and have their own special terminology, so you have to read a few books.

SOURCE: *Mao Chu-hsi wen-hsuan.*

But they also have something in common with other subjects, it's no good just to read books. One had only to study at Whampoa Academy for half a year and after graduation one served as a soldier for one year. In that way many talented officers were produced, but after it was changed to the Army University (I have not made a note of how long they studied) the result was that when people graduated, they kept on being defeated in battle and becoming our captives.

I don't know anything about the science and enginerring faculties, but I do claim a little knowledge about the medical faculty. When you listen to an eye doctor talk it all sounds very mysterious, but the human body should be viewed as a whole.

The development of science proceeds from a low level to a high level, from the simple to the complex, but when one teaches one cannot follow the sequence of development. When we study history, we should concentrate on modern history. Now we only have three thousand-odd years of recorded history; what will happen when we have ten thousand years of history, how will we teach it then?

Advanced science, including those fundamental theories which practice has proved useful, must get rid of those parts which practice has proved useless and irrationl.

When one lectures on nuclear physics it will suffice to talk about the Sakata model: one needn't start from the theories of Bohr of the Danish school; otherwise you won't graduate even after ten years of study. Even Sakata uses dialectics–why don't you use it?

Man's understanding of things always starts from the concrete and proceeds to the abstract. In medicine they start by teaching abstract things such as psychology, the nervous system, etc. I think this is wrong: they should start by teaching anatomy. Mathematics was originally derived from physical models. Nowadays one cannot associate mathematics with physical models: instead one has gone a step further and made it abstract.

Third Talk
1966

[Chairman Mao:] Formerly, I was principal of a primary school, and a teacher in a middle school. I am also a member of the Central Committee, and was once a department chief for the Kuomintang[2].

But when I went to the rural areas and spent some time with the peasants, I was deeply struck by how many things they knew. I realized their knowledge was wide, and I was no match for them, but should learn from them. To say the least, you are not a member of the Central Committee, are you? How can you know more than the peasants? When you return, tell your political commissar that I said from now on you should go to the countryside once each year. There are great advantages in this!

You don't understand dialectics; you don't understand that one divides into two. Formerly, you thought you were something extraordinary, and now you do not think you are worth a tinker's damn. Both views are wrong.

Those who are guilty of errors should be encouraged. When someone who has made errors sees his mistakes, you should point out his good points. Actually, he will still have many good points. Those who have made errors should be washed clean in warm water. If it is too hot they can't stand it; warm water is most suitable. Young people who make mistakes should not be dismissed. Dismissal harms them, and there cannot be any confrontations. People like Pu-yi and K'ang Tse[3] were transformed. Among the young people who have not been transformed are some Party members and some [Youth] League members. To dismiss them would be to simplyfy matters to excess.

At the Institute are you a leftist? I saw an article praising you[4]. To have people flatter you is no good at all. Young people like you should be told off. If they tell you off too little it won't do. Everything is subject to this kind of compulsion. When I wrote X X X, I was compelled to do it. If I had to write it now, I could not do it.

What do we mean by advanced? To be advanced is to do the work of the backward, to analyse those who are around us, to be intent on making inquires and making friends wherever we go. Our young people must study dialectics, and master the use of dialectics in analysing problems. Talk me, for example. I am not at all more intelligent than others, but I understand dialectics and I know how to use it in analysing problems. If we use dialectics to analyse an unclear problem, the problem becomes clear in a trice. You must diligently study dialectics, its efficacy is very great.

NOTES

1. For the first talk see pp 111–119 in this volume.

2. Mao was acting head of the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in 1925-6,

3. K'ang Tse was one of the leaders of Chiang Kai-shek's Blue Shirts, with particular responsibility for the Special Task Force which was engaged in the 1930s in propaganda, security, and combat support activities in areas where the Kuomintang was fighting the communists.

4. Mao Yuan-hsin was a Red Guard leader at the Institute in Harbin during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. In January 1967, when a Revolutionary Committee was set up in Heilungkiang Province, he became director of the Propaganda Department. In the spring of 1967, he moved to Liaoning Province, and became Vice-Chairman of the Liaoning Revolutionary Committee in May 1968. At the Tenth Congress in August 1973, he was a member of the presidium.

DOWN WITH THE PRINCE OF HELL, LIBERATE THE LITTLE DEVIL - A TALK WITH SUCH COMRADES AS K'ANG SHENG

February 28, 1966

Wu Han[1] has made public so many essays. They never had to be made known. They never had to be approved. So why do the essays of Yao Wen-yuan[2] have to be made known? Do you mean to say that the decisions of the central government are of no consequence? People who confiscate and suppress the manuscripts of the leftists and protect the rightists are of the university clique. The Central Ministry of Propaganda is the palace of the prince of Hell. It is necessary to overthrow the palace of the Prince of Hell and liberate the Little Devil. I have always advocated that whenever the central organs do something wrong, it is necessary to call upon the local authorities to rebel and attack the central government. The local areas must produce several more Sun Wu-k'ung[3] to vigorously create a disturbance at the palace of the king of heaven. If P'eng Chen, the Peking Municipal Party Committee, and the Central Ministry of Propaganda again protect the bad people, then it will be necessary to dissolve the Peking Municipal Committee, and it will be necessary to dissolves the Five-Man Group[4].Last September, I asked some of the comrades what should be done if revisionism emerged in the central government? This is very possible, and it is also the most dangerous situation. To protect rightists, cultivate the ranks of the rightists in the course of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

NOTES

1. Wu Han-see note 1 of p 229 of this volume.

2. Yao Wen-yuan, see note 8 on p 231 of this volume.

3. Sun Wu-kung, is the monky king in the Chinese novel *Hsi Yu Chi (Pilgrimage to the West)* written in the 16th century.

4. Peng Chen, the then Mayor of Peking and a Polit Bureau member. He was a close confident of Li Shao-Chi. The 'Group of Five' was set up in early 1966, under the leadership of P'eng Chen, and produced a report dated 7 February which sought to orient the Cultural Revolution in the direction of academic and ideological debate rather than 'class struggle'. This was revoked by a circular of the Central Committee dated 16 May, drawn up under Mao's personal guidance, which also dissolved the 'Group of Five' and set up the new 'Cultural Revolution Group' directly under the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The circular is given below:

To all regional bureaus of the Central Committee, all provincial, municipal and autonomous regional party committees, all departments and commissions under the Central Committee, all leading party members' groups and party committees in government departments and people's organizations, and the General Political Department of the PLA:

The Central Committee has decided to revoke the 'Outline Report on the Current Academic Discussion made by the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution' which was approved for distribution on 12 February 1966, to dissolve the 'Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution' and its offices, and to set up a new Cultural Revolution group directly under the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. The outline report by the so-called 'Group of Five' is fundamentally wrong. It runs counter to the line of the socialist cultural revolution set forth by the

Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung and to the guiding principles formulated at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the party in 1962 on the question of classes and class struggle in socialist society. While feigning compliance, the outline actually opposes and stubbornly resists the great Cultural Revolution initiated and led personally by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, as well as the instructions, regarding the criticism of Wu Han, which he gave at the work conference of the Central Committee held in September and October 1965 (that is, at the session of the Standing Committee attended also by the leading comrades of all the regional bureaux of the Central Committee).

The outline report by the so-called 'Group of Five' is actually an outline report by P'eng Chen alone. He concocted it according to his own ideas behind the backs of Comrade K'ang Sheng, a member of the 'Group of Five', and other comrades. In handling such a document regarding important questions which affect the overall situation in the socialist revolution, P'eng Chen had no discussion or exchange of views at all within the 'Group of Five'. He did not ask any local party committee for its opinion; nor, when submitting the outline report, did he make it clear that it was being sent to the Central Committee for examination as its official document, and still less did he get the approval of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee. Employing the most improper methods, he acted arbitrarily, abused his powers, and, usurping the name of the Central Committee, hurriedly issued the outline report to the whole party.

The main errors of the outline report are as follows:

1. Proceeding form a bourgeois stand and the bourgeois world outlook in its appraisal of the situation and the nature of the current academic criticism, the outline completely reverses the relation between the enemy and ourselves, putting the one into the position of the other. Our country is now in an upsurge of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution which is pounding at all the decadent ideological and cultural positions still held by the bourgeoisie and the remnants of feudalism. Instead of encouraging the entire party boldly to arouse the broad masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, and the fighters for proletarian culture so that they can continue to charge ahead, the outline does its best to turn the movement to the right. Using muddled, self-contradictory, and hypocritical language, it obscures the sharp class struggle that is taking place on the cultural and ideological front. In particular, it obscures the aim of this great struggle, which is to criticize and repudiate Wu Han and the considerable number of other anti-party and anti-socialist representatives of the bourgeoisie (there are a number of these in the Central Committee and in the party, government, and other departments at the central as well as at the provincial, municipal, and autonomous region level). By avoiding any mention of the fact repeatedly pointed out by Chairman Mao, namely, that the key point in Wu Han's drama *Hai Jui Dismissed from Office* is the question of dismissal from office, the outline covers up the serious political nature of the struggle.

2. The outline violates the basic Marxist thesis that all class struggles are political struggles. When the press began to tuch on the political issues involved in Wu Han's *Hai Jui Dismissed from Office*, the authors of the outline went so far as to say: "The discussion in the press should not be confined to political questions, but should go fully into the various academic and theoretical questions involved". Regarding the criticism of Wu Han, they declared on various occasions that it was impermissible to deal with the heart of the matter, namely, the dismissal of the right opportunists at the Lushan plenum in 1959 and the opposition of Wu Han and others to the party and socialism. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has often told us that the ideological struggle against the bourgeoisie is a protracted class struggle which cannot be resolved by drawing hasty political conclusions. However, P'eng Chen deliberately spread rumours, telling many people that Chairman Mao believed political conclusions on the criticism of Wu Han could be drawn after two months. P'eng Chen also said that the political issues could be discussed two months later. His purpose was to channel the political struggle in the cultural sphere into the so-called pure academic discussion so frequently advocated by the bourgeois politics and opposing giving prominence to proletarian politics.

3. The outline lays special emphasis on what it calls 'opening wide'. But playing a sly trick it grossly distorts the policy of 'opening wide' expounded by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the party's National Conference on Propaganda Work in March 1957 and negates the class content of 'opening wide'. It was in dealing with this question that Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out: 'We still have to wage a protracted struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology. It is wrong not to understand this and to give up ideological struggle. All erroneous ideas, all poisonous weeds, all ghosts and monsters, must be subjected to criticism; in no circumstance should they be allowed to spread unchecked.' Comrade Mao Tse-tung also said, 'To "open wide" means to let all people express their opinions freely, so that they dare to speak, dare to criticize, and dare to debate.' This outline,

however, poses 'opening wide' against exposure by the proletariat of the bourgeoisie's reactionary stand. What it means by 'opening wide' is bourgeois liberalization, which would allow only the bourgeoisie to 'open wide', but would not allow the proletariat to 'open wide' and hit back; in other words, it is a shield for such reactionary bourgeois representatives as Wu Han. The 'opening wide' in this outline is against Mao Tse-tung's thought and caters for the needs of the bourgeoisie.

4. Just when we began the counter-offensive against the wild attacks of the bourgeoisie, the authors of the outline raised the slogan: 'everyone is equal before the truth'. This is a bourgeois slogan. Completely negating the class nature of truth, they use this slogan to protect the bourgeoisie and oppose the proletariat, oppose Marxism-Leninism, and oppose Mao Tse-tung's thought. In the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the truth of Marxism and the fallacies of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, either the East wind prevails over the West wind or the West wind prevails over the East wind, and there is absolutely no such thing as equality. Can any equality be permitted on such basic questions as the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the superstructure, including all the various spheres of culture, and the continued efforts of the proletariat to weed out those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the communist party and who wave 'red flags' to oppose the red flag? For decades the old-line Social Democrats, and for over ten years the modern revisionists, have never allowed the proletariat equality with the bourgeoisie. They completely deny that the several thousand years of human history is a history of class struggle. They completely deny the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, the proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie, and the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they are faithful lackeys of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. Together with the bourgeoisie and imperialism, they cling to the bourgeois ideology of oppression and exploitation of the proletariat and to the capitalist system, and they oppose Marxist – Leninist ideology and the socialist system. They are a bunch of counter-revolutionaries opposing the communist party and the people. Their struggle against us is one of life and death, and there is no question of equality. Therefore, our struggle against them, too, can be nothing but a life-and-death struggle, and our relation with them can in no way be one of equality. On the contrary, it is a relation of one class oppressing another, that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. There can be no other type of relation, such as a so-called relation of equality, or of peaceful coexistence between exploiting and exploited classes, or of kindness or magnanimity.

5. The outline states: 'It is necessary not only to beat the other side politically, but also, by academic and professional standards, truly surpass and beat it by a wide margin.' This concept which makes no class distinction on academic matters is also very wrong. The truth on academic questions, the truth of Marxism-Leninism, of Mao Tse-tung's thought – which the proletariat has grasped – has already far surpassed and beaten the bourgeoisie. The formulation in the outline shows that its authors laud the so-called academic authorities of the bourgeoisie and try to boost their prestige, and that they hate and repress the militant new-born forces representative of the proletariat in academic circles.

6. Chairman Mao often says that there is no construction without destruction. Destruction means criticism and repudiation; it means revolution. It involves reasoning things out, which is construction. Put destruction first, and in the process you have construction. Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, was founded and has constantly developed in the course of the struggle to destroy bourgeois ideology. This outline, however, emphasizes that 'without construction, there can be no real and thorough destruction'. This amounts to prohibiting the destruction of bourgeois ideology and prohibiting the construction of proletarian ideology. It is diametrically opposed to Chairman Mao's thought. It runs counter to the revolutionary struggle we have been waging on the cultural front for the vigorous destruction of bourgeois ideology. And it amounts to prohibiting the proletariat from making any revolution.

7. The outline states that 'we must not behave like scholar-tyrants who are always acting arbitrarily and trying to overwhelm people with their power' and that 'we should guard against any tendency for academic workers of the left to take the road of bourgeois experts and scholar-tyrants'. What is really meant by 'scholar-tyrants'? Who are the 'scholar-tyrants'? Should the proletariat not exercise dictatorship and over-whelm the bourgeoisie? Should the academic work of the proletariat not overwhelm and eradicate that of the bourgeoisie? And if proletarian academic work overwhelms and eradicates bourgeois academic work, can this be regarded as an act of 'scholar-tyrants'? The outline directs its spearhead against the proletarian left. Obviously, its aim is to label the Marxist-Leninists 'scholar-tyrants' and thus to support the real, bourgeois scholar-tyrants and prop up their tottering monopoly

position in academic circles. As a matter of fact, those party people in authority taking the capitalist road who support the bourgeois scholar-tyrants, and those bourgeois representatives who have sneaked into the party and protect the bourgeois scholar-tyrants, are indeed big party tyrants who have usurped the name of the party, have no contact with the masses, have no learning at all, and rely solely on 'acting arbitrarily and trying to overwhelm people with their power'.

8. For their own ulterior purposes, the authors of the outline demand a 'rectification campaign' against the staunch left in a deliberate effort to create confusion, blur class alignments and divert people from the target of struggle. Their main purpose in dishing up the outline in such a hurry was to attack the proletarian left. They have gone out of their way to build up dossiers about the left, tried to find all sorts of pretexts for attacking them, and intended to launch further attacks on them by means of a 'rectification campaign,' in the vain hope of disintegrating their ranks. They openly resist the policy explicitly put forward by Chairman Mao of protecting and supporting the left and giving serious attention to building up and expanding their ranks. On the other hand, they have conferred on those bourgeois representatives, revisionists, and renegades who have sneaked into the party the title of 'staunch left', and are shielding them. In these ways, they are trying to inflate the arrogance of the bourgeois rightists and to dampen the spirits of the proletarian left. They are filled with hatred for the proletariat and love for the bourgeoisie. Such is the bourgeois concept of brotherhood held by the authors of the outline.

9. At a time when the new and fierce struggle of the proletariat against the representatives of the bourgeoisie on the ideological front has only just began, and in many spheres and places has not even started – or, if it has started, most party committees concerned have a very poor understanding of the task of leadership in this great struggle and their leadership is far from conscientious and effective – the outline stresses again and again that the struggle must be conducted 'under direction', 'with prudence', 'with caution', and 'with the approval of the leading bodies concerned'. All this serves to place restrictions on the proletarian left, to impose taboos and commandments in order to tie their hands, and to place all sorts of obstacles in the way of the proletarian cultural revolution. In a word, the authors of the outline are rushing to apply the brakes and launch a counter-attack in revenge. As for the articles written by the proletarian left refuting the reactionary bourgeois 'authorities', they nurse bitter hatred against those already published and are suppressing those not yet published. But on the other hand, they give free rein to all the various ghosts and monsters who for many years have abounded in our press, radio, magazines, books, text-books, platforms, works of literature, cinema, drama, ballads and stories, the fine arts, music, the dance, etc., and in doing so they never advocate proletarian leadership or stress any need for approval. The contrast here shows where the authors of the outline really stand.

10.The present struggle centres on the issue of implementation of, or resistance to, Comrade Mao Tse-tung's line on the Cultural Revolution. Yet the outline states: 'Through this struggle, and under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought, we shall open up the way for the solution of this problem (that is, "the thorough liquidation of bourgeois ideas in the realm of academic work").' Comrade Mao Tse-tung opended up the way for the proletariat on the cultural and ideological front long ago, in his *On New Democracy, Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art, Letter to the Yenan Peking Opera Theatre after Seeing the Performance of 'Driven to Joint the Liangshan Rebels', On the Correct: Handling of Contradictions among the People, and Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work.* Yet the outline maintains that Mao Tse-tung's thought has not yet opened up the way for us and that the way has to be opened up anew. Using the banner of 'under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought' as cover, the outline actually attempts to open up a way opposed to Mao Tse-tung's thought, that is the way of modern revisionism, the way for the restoration of capitalism.

In short, the outline opposes carrying the socialist revolution through to the end, opposes the line on the Cultural Revolution pursued by the Central Committee of the party headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, attacks the proletarian left and shields the bourgeois right, thereby preparing public opinion for the restoration of capitalism. It is a reflection of bourgeois ideology in the party; it is out-and-out revisionism. Far from being a minor issue, the struggle against this revisionist line is an issue of prime importance having a vital bearing on the destiny and future of our party and state, on the future complexion of our party and state, and on the world revolution.

Party committees at all levels must immediately stop carrying out the 'Outline Report on the Current Academic Discussion made by the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution'. The whole party must follow Comrade Mao Tse-tung's instructions, hold high the great banner of the proletarian Cultural Revolution, thoroughly expose the reactionary bourgeois stand of those so-called 'academic authorities' who oppose the party and socialism, thoroughly criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois ideas in the sphere of academic work, education, journalism, literature and art, and publishing, and seize the leadership in these cultural spheres. To achieve this, it is necessary at the same time to criticize and repudiate those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the party, the government, the army, and all spheres of culture, to clear them out or transfer some of them to other positions. Above all, we must not entrust these people with the work of leading the Cultural Revolution. In fact many of them have done and are still doing such work, and this is extremely dangerous.

Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the party, the government, the army, and various cultural circles are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through, others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev, for example, who are still nestling beside us. Party committees at all levels must pay full attention to this matter.

This circular is to be sent, together with the erroneous document issued by the Central Committee on 12 February 1966, down to the level of county party committees, party committees in the cultural organizations, and party committees at regimental level in the army. These committees are asked to discuss which of the two documents is wrong and which is correct, their understanding of these documents, and their achievements and mistake.

LETTER ON FARM MECHANIZATION

March 12, 1966

Your letter dated March 11 has been received. It is a very good idea that the central planning group send people to Hupeh to discuss with the provincial Party committee its programme for farm mechanization covering five, seven and ten years and have a look at the experimental centres for achieving mechanization through self-reliance. I suggest that the regional bureaus of the Central Committee and the Party committees of the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions also send their people to Hupeh to join in the study. Seven to ten days will suffice. On their return the localities should draft tentative plans covering five, seven and ten years and spend a few months talking the matter over. Then there will be something for discussion at the working conference to be called some time in August or September this year. If no preparations are made in advance, I am afraid the discussion will get nowhere. The task of mechanization should be performed by the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions mainly through their own efforts, and the central authorities can only provide some help in materials, etc., for those areas which are deficient, but these things have to be bought with local funds when the central authorities really have reserves for sale. It won't do to start the work on the spur of the moment, with everyone stretching out his hand for help. In the absence of the necessary conditions, it would be better to postpone the matter for a

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SOURCE: *Peking Review*, December 26, 1977.

few years. In line with the above principle, those localities where materials (iron and steel), machine tools and farm machines are under state control but are produced locally and where output far exceeds the state targets (say by 100 per cent or more) should be permitted to buy 30 to 50 per cent of that portion above the target for their own use. Unless this practice is established, it will be impossible to bring the initiative of the local authorities into play. To mechanize farming and increase output in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, side-lines and fishery, it is necessary to win for the localities some right to the machinery they make. Here some right means the right to share in the above-target portion where it is sufficiently large, but not otherwise. It is not good to concentrate everything in the hands of the central authorities and impose rigid controls. Moreover, mechanization should be linked with getting prepared against war, getting prepared against natural disasters, and doing everything for the people. Otherwise the localities will not go about it with enthusiasm even when the necessary conditions are present. The first point is getting prepared against war, for after all the people and the army must be fed and clad before they can fight, otherwise the rifles and guns will be useless. The second point is getting prepared against natural disasters. It is by no means feasible for the localities to go on for long without reserves of grain, cotton and cooking oil and to depend on other provinces for relief in case of crop failure. The difficulties will be greater still in time of war. And crop failure in limited areas is often unavoidable in any single province. This is still more so when several provinces are considered together. The third point is that the state must not take too much for accumulation but must allow for the fact that even now some of the people have not enough food and very little clothing. Further, it must allow for the need to store reserves among the people against the exigencies of war and natural disaster and, above all, it must allow for the accumulation by the localities of funds for expanded reproduction. Therefore, farm mechanization must be linked with these points before the masses can be mobilized to accomplish the plan for mechanization at a fairly rapid yet steady pace. Soviet agricultural policy has always been at fault; it drains the pond to catch all the fish and alienates the masses. In consequence, the country finds itself in its present straits, the main trouble being that it has long been confined to simple reproduction and is unable even to keep this up in a bad year. For several years we too had the experience of draining the pond to catch all the fish (i.e., higher tax and excessive state purchase of grain) and of being unable to maintain simple reproduction in many areas in lean years. We should at least take warning from this. We have raised the slogan "Be prepared against war, be prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people" (the last is also the best way of doing everything for the state, as the old saying goes: when the people are well off, how can the monarch not be?), but whether this slogan will be conscientiously followed for long, I think, is still a problem, and only time will show if it can be settled. By and large, has not agriculture been mechanized in the Soviet Union? Why is it still impase? This is some thing well worth pondering.

Please weigh the above points and see if they are practicable. Further, as to who from the central planning group should go to Hupeh, it seems comrades Yu Chiu-li and Lin Hu-chia are the suitable choices. If the regional bureaus of the Central committee and the party Committees of the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions are also asked to send people it seems appropriate that they should each send the secretary in charge of agriculture and a member of the planning commission. Altogether there will be only about 70 people going to have on – the – spot meeting fore seven to 10 days, also please consider if this is practicable.

TALK AT ENLARGED STANDING COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE POTITICAL BUREAU

March 17, 1966

Our policy of taking care of the intellectuals after liberation had advantages as well as disadvantages. At present, the bourgeois intellectuals are holding the real power in the academic and the educational circles. The more penetrating the socialist revolution, the more they resist us, and the more they reveal their opposition to the party and socialism. Such pepole as Wu Han and Chein Po-tsan are communist party members, but they also oppose communism. They are, in reality, Kuomintang pepole. At present, this problem is still not properly understood in many places. Academic criticism still has not been unfolded. The various localities must note which hands are grasping the schools, newspapers, periodicals, and publishing houses, and they must carry out sincere criticism against the bourgeois academic authority. We must cultivate our own academic authority among our youths. We must not be afraid that the young pepole will violate the "law of the land." We must not confiscate and suppress their manuscripts. The Central Ministry of propaganda must not become a rural work department. (Note: The Central Ministry of Rural Work was abolished in 1962.)

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

Ch'ien-hsien also belongs to Wu Han, Liao Mo-sha, and Teng T'o.[1] It is also anti-party and anti-socialist .

Literature and art, history, philosophy, law, and economics must carry out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, they must resolutely carry out criticism. After all, how much Marxism is there?

NOTES

1. *Chein-hsien* (Frontlines) a Peking periodical. Liao Mo-sha and Teng-T'o were close collaborators of Wu Han. This trio wrote under a joint pen name. They wrote a series of articles under such titles as *Evening Chats at Yensham and Three Family Village*. In these essays, using the form of dialogues between villagers and intelectuals, they attacked comrade Mao and the "three red banners" i.e. the general line for socialist construction.

TALK AT ENLARGED MEETING OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU

March 20, 1966

1. On Not Attending the 23d Congress of the CPSU

We shall not be attending the "23d Congress" of the Soviet Union. The convening of this congress by the Soviet Union is under a situation of difficulties both at home and abroad. We shall rely on self-reliance. We shall not depend on the Soviet Union. We shall not become befuddled. If we wish people to stand firm, we ourselves must first be unwavering. We shall not go. The leftist faction has stiffened its back, the middle faction is leaning towards us. If we do not attend the "23d congress," then the most they can do is to threaten us with their troops. If they don't, then it would just lead to a battle on paper. We can write a letter to say that we shall not attend. We have said that traitors, scabs, and the Soviet Union oppose China. Once they opposed us, we shall have essays to write. Traitors and scabs have always opposed China. Our banners must be new and fresh in color, they must not be bedraggled. Castro is nothing more than a bad man in an important position. (Someone asked: This time we do not attend, but when the revisionists convene in the future, do we send a congratulatory message?) We will still have to send a congratulatory message, but it will be sent to the Soviet people.

2. An Academic Question, An Educational Question.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

We have been hiding inside a drum and there are many things which we do not know about, in reality, the academic and educational circles are in the hands of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. In the past, our policy towards the intellectuals of the national bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie was to discriminate against comprador bourgeoisie. They should be discriminated against and the discrimination policy is very effective. It is improper to equate them all together. At present, the greater part of the universities, middle schools, and primary schools have been monopolized by intellectuals who have emerged from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and the landlord and rich peasant class. We took care of these people after the liberation. At the time, it was the right thing to do. Now when we are conducting academic critiques, we must also protect some of them, such as Old Kuo and Old Fan (Wen-lan) of the emperor-king group. At present, all medium-sized or large cities and towns have established research departments on literature and art, history, philosophy, law, and economics. In the study of history, there are various kinds of histories. Every academic department has a history. There is history and general history. Philosophy, literature, and natural science all have histories, and there is not a single department that does not have a history. With regard to the natural science department, we have not set anything into motion. From now on, we should do a bit of criticizing of the work done in each 5-or10- year periods, discuss the pros and cons, and train successors. Otherwise, everything will fall into their hands. With regard to natural sciences, the views of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are not the same. Idealism and materialism are also involved in natural sciences. Old Fan is very fond of emperors, kings, generals, and prime ministers. People like him, including persons of the emperor-king school are very fond of emperors, kings, generals, and prime ministers and they opposed the 1958 method of studying history. (Lin Piao: This is class struggle.) When criticizing, one must not shoot off clank cannons, one must study historical data. This is a serious class struggle. Otherwise, revisionism shall emerge. It is this group of people who will be the ones to come up with revisionism in the future. For example, Wu Han and Chien po-tsan were all opposed to Marxism-Leninism. They were members of the Communist Party; Communist Party members who nevertheless opposed the Communist Party, and opposed materialism. (Lin Piao: This is socialist ideological construction.) This is a widespread class struggle. At present, 15 out of 28 provinces and municipalities in the whole country have launched this struggle and there are 13 which have not taken any action.

There are advantages and also disadvantages in our taking care of the intellectuals. Under our care, they earned fixed income, and became teachers and school principals. They were really Kuomintang people. (Lin Piao: We must pay attention to the newspapers, for the newspapers are an important matter. They are the everyday means for transmitting central committee orders.) There is also that Peking periodical *Ch'ien-hsien* [Frontlines], which is, in reality, the frontlines of Wu Han, Teng T'o and Liao Mo-sha. *"San-chia-ts'un"* (Three-family Village] is their work[1]. Liao had previously given moral support to "Li Hui-niang" and advocated the "theory of devils without harm." The class struggle is very sharp and very widespread. The various major bureaus and provincial committees must pay a bit of attention to this. For example they must administer academic work, newspapers, publications, literature and art, motion pictures, and the plays.

The essay by X X has been made public. It is well-written. X X. is the head of the history office, he is the younger brother of Chao X X. His essay was written in 1964 but was suppressed for one-and-a-half years before it was made public. Essays written by young people must not be suppressed, whether they are good or bad. Do not be afraid of running into matter if it does not deprive them of their bread and butter? One must not be afraid of running into "authority."

(X X: The literary and art circles and the medical circles have all organized work teams to go into the countryside.)

They have all gone into the countryside, the half-work and half-study students of the middle, vocational, and technical schools have all gone into the countryside. It will not do to study books of classical literature alone; it is necessary to come into contact with reality. X X X was unable to write anything good. One must not begin learning by studying old writings first. This includes the writings of Lu Hsun[2] and myself: One must learn to write. In the department of literature, students must write prose and novels, they must not study the history of literature. How can you accomplish anything if you do not start with writing? It will be fine if one is able to write. Henceforth, with writing the main factor, it will be the same as learning to hear and speak being the main factors in the study of foreign languages. Writing

is the equalivalent of composing essays. To learn to write essays is to use writing as the main factor. As for learning history, that can wait until the work period. The people in our troop units, those generals and division commanders did not know anything about the kings, Yao and Shun. They had never studied the military tactics of Sun-tzu[3]. Yet, did they not do battle just the same? Not a single person fought any battles in accordance with *Sun-tzu* on the *Art of War*. (Lin Piao: There are so many items in the book, when the time came, one was unable to locate the proper item; there is not a single battle, large or small, which is identical, so it was a bit more simpler to do things according to the actual circumstances.)

There are two kinds of methods. One is to initiate criticism. The other is to engage in half-work and half-study and carry on the four clean-ups campaign. The young people must not be suppressed, let them come forward. Lo Erh-kang was criticized by X X X. X was one of the workers in the mail and visitors' section of the central committee's General Office. Lo was a professor. Do not be afraid of provoking Lo Erh-kang and Chien Po-tsan. Do not suppress either the bad or the good. On Khrushchev, we issued a complete collection of essays! (Lin Piao: We carried out material construction, they carried out the building of the bourgeois spirit.) (P'eng X: Actually, it is their dictatorship. The power of leadership is in their hands. If you oppose them, they would reduce your work points.) Students, lecturers, and a part of the professors were all liberated, it was fine if the remainder of the people were able to reform; if they were unable to reform, they were dragged down. (P'eng X: Promoting a doctrine does not produce co-operation.) (Lin Piao: This is class struggle, they must talk about it.) Nevertheless X X said it properly. X X said that those who were younger and had less education overthrew those who were older and had more education. (Chu X: Overthrow those in authority.) (Ch'en Po-ta: Overthrow the bourgeois authority, bring up newborn strength, establish proletarian authority, and train successors.) Who is the authority at the present time? It is Yao Wen-yuan, X X X, and X X. As to who is able to destroy whom, there is no solution at the present time. (Ch'en Po-ta: The successors must develop naturally. Stalin produced a Malenkov who was not the right man. The former did not wait for him to die. Malenkov met with premature death. Such successors are not wanted.) What is needed are determined people who are young, have little education, a firm attitude, and the political experience to take over the work. This problem is very big.

3. On the Industrial System

There are some questions you do not comprehend. Can you handle so much? (P'eng X: The central and local authorities must be like field armies and territorial armies.) In Nanking, I talked with Chiang X X. When war breaks out; first, the central authorities will not send troops; second, it will not send generals, third, the food it has is not enough, it cannot be delivered; four, there is no clothing; and five, it has some rifles and guns, but not too many. The various administrative areas and provinces must do their own [battles]. The people must fight their own battles. Each province must fight its own battle. The local areas cannot have their own naval and air forces. These forces must be put under the unified control of the central government. When war breaks out, it is best to rely on the local areas. You cannot depend on the central government. The local areas will take charge of the guerrillas and rely on armed struggle.

There are two methods of managing industry in East China. The method practiced in Kiangsu is good. That is, the province has no control in managing industry. This was carried out in Nanking and Soochow; Soochow had 1,00,000 workers with an output value of 800 million *yuan*. The method practiced in Tsinan is another. The large industries are managed by the province and the small industries by the municipalities, but the breakdown is unclear.

(Liu X X: How can we trial implement the general labor system and the general participation in work and participation in voluntary labor. At present, there are too many people who are not taking part in production work; the number of workers and staff members is 800,000 while the number of dependents is also 800,000.) It is necessary to carry out general propaganda now, break down the old ways, and gradually implement [the new] step by step.

This country of ours is made up of 28 "countries." There are large "countries" as well as small "countries." Such "countries" as Tibet and Tsinghai are small "countries," they do not have many people. (Premier Chou: It is necessary to implement mechanization.) You people of the central bureaus, provinces, regions, and municipalities, carry out blooming and contending when you return to your posts; such places as provinces, regions, and municipalities must all carry out free expression of opinions during the months of April, May, June, and July. The free expression of opinions must be connected with "preparedness against war, preparedness against natural calamities, and everything for the people," otherwise they will be afraid to express opinions freely. (Premier Chou: I'm afraid to say that they are for decentralization). The local areas must pay attention to wealth accumulation, now everything belongs to the state treasury. Shanghai has some accumulation. First, it has capital; second, it has raw materials; and third, it has equipment. It will not do to have everything concentrated at the central level. It will not do to drain the pond to catch the fish. It is said that the Soviet Union is the one which drains the pond to catch fish. (P'eng X: Shanghai used machinery to support agriculture and changed from unlawful to lawful.) It is unlawful, but it must be recognized as being lawful. In history, everything changed from unlawful to lawful. Sun Yat-sen was unlawful in the beginning and became lawful afterwards. The Communist Party also changed from unlawful to lawful. Yuan Shih-k'ai changed from lawful to unlawful. Being lawful is reactionary. Being unlawful is revolutionary. At present time, being reactionary is not to permit people to have positiveness: it is to limit the people's role in making revolution. The central government still is in favor of a figure head republic, the Queen of England and the Emperor of Japan are all figureheads of republics. The central government is still in favor of a figure-head republic, caring only for major administrative policies. But these policies also came from local blooming and contending. So the central government opened up a processing plant to produce them. The province, municipalities, districts, and counties have to release them before the central government can produce them. It is fine to let the central government exercise control in name, but not in fact or only to a slight degree in fact. When the central government takes in too many factories, all those who take over the factories should be told to get out of the central government and go over to the local areas, lock, stock, and barrel. (P'eng X: When we operate a trust and have the trust take over the work of the party, we are in fact running an industrial party.) The four clean-ups campaign belongs to you. The central government is only taking care of the *Twenty-three Articles*. What experience do you of the X X political department have? Troop units still depend on the local military units before they can develop into regular troops. I do not have any experience. The summations of the past three months and the summations for the past half-year were not based on the report below. The operation of arsenals were all dependent on the local areas. The central government provided the spirit. The central government did not even have a single bullet or a single grain of food. They only put forth a bit of spirit. At present, grain is being shipped from the south to the north and coal from the north to the south. This will not do. (Premier Chou, the national defense industry should also be returned to the local areas. In general, this industry should be given to the lower levels and not to the upper levels. The central government should handle only important matters). The aircraft factories still have not been relocated. In time of war, even rifles cannot be supplied. Every province must have a small iron and steel plant. There are several hundred thousand people in a province. A hundred thousand tons of steel is not enough. A province must therefore operate several dozen steel plants.

(Yu Ch'iu-li: It is necessary that three veterans take three novices under their wings, that veteran plants lead the way for new plants, and that old bases lead the way for new bases....) (Lin: For the old to lead the new is the Chinese way.) This is similar to the guerrillas during the war of resistance. It is necessary to practice socialism and not individualism. (P'eng X: There are X X small iron and steel plants which have all been controlled by the central government.) Why do you discriminate against what others do? Return them all. (P'eng X: Let's figure out a method next year.) Why wait until next year? You should hold a meeting upon your return. For those who want to take over other people, tell them to become deputy plant directors. (Premier Chou: At present, to promote agricultural mechanization is still like borrowing the east wind [borrowing without any return]. The Eighth Ministry of Machine Building operated a trust and took over quite a number of plants.) Then tell X X X of the Eighth Ministry of Machine Building to go and become the plant director!

Some of them actually imposed hardship on the peasants. In Kiangsi one *tan* [50 kgs] of grain was assessed (delivered) three times. I think that they should be punished. A meeting of all civil and military department should be called to punish those who levied excessive taxes and sought excessive contributions.

The plans of the central government must be coordinated with those of the local areas. The central government cannot administer to everything firmly and the provinces cannot embrace everything firmly.

(Liu X X: Allocate a part of the plans to the local areas.) You can frighten them with war, at the sound of the explosion of an atom bomb, individualism will no longer be practiced. When war starts, will it be possible to issue *Jen-min Jih-pao*? It is necessary to pay attention to the division of power. Do not empty the pond to catch fish. At present, there is no one to administer things at the top. At the lower levels there is no one who has the authority to administer things. (T'ao X: The central government also has no authority!) At present, fighting for one's independence is permitted. There must be independence against bureaucracy. It must be like X X X. The students must also fight, they must bloom and contend on the academic question. There was a manuscript of a lecture delivered by a professor of chemistry which his students failed to understand after studying it for several months. The University students asked him about it but he did not have the answer. The students wanted to uproot his foundations. Wu Han and Chien Po-tsan relied on history for their bread and butter. Yu Po-p'ing is also unlearned. (Lin Piao: He still had to study Chairman Mao's works.) One must not emulate Chien Po-tsan. One must not emulate me. If one wishes to learn, one must excel in learning. One must not be subjected to limitations, one must not solely interpret and merely compile records. One must not be restricted. Lenin refused to be restriced by Marx. (Lin Piao: Lenin was also excellent. We must now advocate the study of Chairman Mao's works. We must sow the seeds of Mao Tse-tung thought.) One might also say that, but one must not be superstitious. One must not be restricted. One must have new interpretations, new viewpoints, and creativity.

That is, it is necessary that the professors be overthrown by the students. (Lin Piao: These people only think of dictatorship.) A culture and education secretary in Kirin wrote an essay criticizing conceptional imagery. It was well-written. The *Kwang-ming Jih-pao* criticized *Revelations of Officialdom*. This was the clarification of the basic dispute. *The Revelations of Officialdom* is reformism. In a word, the so-called "reprimanding novels" are reactionary, anti-Sun Yat-sen, monarchist, and bring on landlord dictatorship. They must be revised a bit, improved a bit, they are heading towards perdition.

NOTES

1. See notel on p 255 of this volume.

2. Lu Hsun (1881-1936) was the father of modern Chinese literature and the greatest and most militant standard-bearer of China's cultural revolution. Apart from *The True Story of Ah Q*, *A Madman's Diary and The New Year's Sacrifice* his most famous works – he wrote many short stories and essays, in which he vehemently attacks feudalism and imperialism, gives force to the aspirations of the oppressed and exposes the people's enemy in his true colours. He always identified his work with the Chinese people's revolution, for which he waged a relentless struggle until his death in October 1936.

3. Sun Wu Tzu, or Sun Wu, was a famous Chinese military scientist in the 5th century B.C., who wrote *Sun Tzu* a (Art of war) a treatise on war containing thirteen chapters.

CRITICIZE P'ENGN CHEN

April 28, 1966

Even a silver needle cannot penetrate into Peking, even a single drop of water cannot fall into Peking. P'eng Chen wants to transform the party according to his world outlook. Things in general are developing towards his negative side and he has set the conditions for his defeat. This is inevitable. It has emerged from inadvertant disclosures and development deeply step by step. Historical lessons are not accepted by everyone as warnings. This is the law of class struggle. It can not be altered by the will of man. Whenever there are people in the central government carrying on tricks and deception, I call upon the local areas to rise up and attack them, I call upon Sun Wu-k'ung to vigorously create a disturbance at the palace of the King of Heaven. It is also necessary to deal with those people who protect the "The Supreme Diety." P'eng Chen was a tiny personality who sneaked into the party, this is not so very astonishing for he can be brought down with one finger. "The West Wind Scatters Leaves Over Changan" tells our comrades that it is not necessary to worry endlessly. "Where the broom does not reach, the dust will not vanish of itself; without struggle, the class enemies will not fall."

I am in favour of the opinions expressed by Lu Hsun. One cannot do without reading books. But one must not read too much. If you do not read books, others may deceive you.

Appearance can be seen, but not essence. Essence can manifest itself through appearance. P'eng Chen's essence has been hidden for 30 years.

Is it necessary to tell our Albanian comrades? There is nothing we can't tell people.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

NOTES ON THE REPORT OF FURTHER IMPROVING THE ARMY'S AGRICULTURAL WORK BY THE REAR SERVICE DEPARTMENT OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION

May 7, 1966

Dear Comrade Lin Piao,

I have received the report from the Rear Service Department which you sent me on 6 May. I think it is an excellent plan. Is it possible to send this report to all the military districts and ask them to hold discussions of it among the cadres at the army and division levels? Their views should be reported to the Military Commission and through it to the Centre for approval. After that, suitable directives should be issued to them. Please consider this [suggestion].

In the absence of a world war, our army should be a big school. Even under conditions of the third world war, it can still serve as a big school. In addition to fighting the war, it must do other work. In the eight years of the second world war, did we not do just that in the anti-Japanese base areas? In this big school, the army should learn politics, military affairs, and culture, and engage in agricultural production. It can build up its own middle-and small-size work-shops to produce goods for its own use and the exchange of other goods of equal value. It can take part in mass work, factory work, and rural socialist education. After socialist education, there are always other kinds of mass work for it to do, to unite the army and people as one. The army should also participate in the revolutionary struggle against capitalist culture. In this way, it carries out military-educational, military-agricultural, military-industrial, and military-civilian work. Naturally, [these kinds of work] should be properly co-ordinated and a distinction should be made between major and subsidiary work. A unit can select one or two from the agricultural, industrial, and civilian combination, but not all three. In this way, the tremendous power of several million soldiers will be felt.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought,* a Red Guard Publication.

Likewise, workers should, in addition to their main industrial work, learn military affairs, politics, and culture, and take part in the socialist educational movement and in criticizing the capitalist class. Under adequate conditions, they should also engage in agricultural production, following the example of the Tach'ing Oilfield.

The communes do their main agricultural work (including forestry, fishing, animal husbandry, and subsidiary trades), but they must also learn military affairs, politics, and culture. When circumstances allow, they should collectively set up small-scale factories and take part in criticizing the capitalist class.

The students are in a similar position. Their studies are their chief work; they must also learn other things. In other words, they ought to learn industrial, agricultural, and military work in addition to class work. The school years should be shortened, education should be revolutionized, and the domination of our schools by bourgeois intellectuals should by no means be allowed to continue.

Under favourable conditions, people in commerce, service trades, and party and government offices should do likewise.

What has been said above is neither new nor original. Many people have been doing this for some time, but it has not yet become a widespread [phenomenon]. Our army has been working in this way for decades. Now it is on the threshold of new developments.

TALK TO LEADERS OF THE CENTRE

July 21, 1966

Chairman Mao said that the 'May Twenty-fifth' big character poster of Nieh Yuan-tzu[1] is a manifesto of the Chinese Paris Commune of the sixties of the twentieth century, the significance of which surpasses the Paris Commune. This kind of big-character poster, we are incapable of writing.

[Several Young Pioneers wrote big-character posters about their fathers saying that their fathers had forgotten their past, did not talk to them about Mao Tse-tung thought, but did ask them about the marks they got at school and rewarded them when they got good marks.)

Chairman Mao asked Comrade Ch'en Po-ta to pass on a message to these little friends: 'Your big-character posters are very well-written.' [He continued:]

I say to you all: youth is the great army of the Great Cultural Revolution! It must be mobilized to the full.

After my return to Peking I felt very unhappy and desolate. Some colleges even had their gates shut. There were even some which suppressed the student movement. Who is it who suppressed the student movement? Only the Pei-yang Warlords[2]. It is anti-Marxist for communists to fear the student movement. Some people talk daily about the mass line and serving the people, but instead they follow the bourgeois line and serve the bourgeoisie. The Central Committee

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SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

of the Youth League should stand on the side of the student movement. But instead it stands on the side of suppression of the student movement. Who opposes the great Cultural Revolution? The American imperialists, the Soviet revisionists, the Japanese revisionists and the reactionaries.

To use the excuse of distinguishing between 'inner' and 'outer'[3] is to fear revolution. To cover over big-character posters which have been put up, such things cannot be allowed. This is a basic error of orientation. They must immediately change direction, and smash all the old conventions.

We believe in the masses. To become teachers of the masses we must first be the students of the masses. The present great Cultural Revolution is a heaven-and-earth-shaking event. Can we, dare we, cross the pass into socialism? This pass leads to the final destruction of classes, and the reduction of the three great differences.

To oppose, especially to oppose 'authoritative' bourgeois ideology, is to destroy. Without this destruction, socialism cannot be established nor can we carry out, first struggle, second criticism, third transformation. Sitting in offices listening to reports is no good. The only way is to rely on the masses, trust the masses, struggle to the end. We must be prepared for the revolution to be turned against us. The Party and government leadership and responsible Party comrades should be prepared for this. If you now want to carry the revolution through to the end, you must discipline yourself, reform yourself in order to keep up with it. Otherwise you can only keep out of it.

There are some comrades who struggle fiercely against others, but cannot struggle with themselves. In this way, they will never be able to cross the pass.

It is up to you to lead the fire towards your own bodies, to fan the flames to make them burn. Do you dare to do this? Because it will burn your own heads.

The comrades replied thus: 'We are prepared. If we're not up to it, we will resign our jobs. We live as Communist Party members and shall die as Communist Party members. It doesn't do to live a life of sofas and electric fans.' [Chairman Mao said:]

It will not do to set rigid standards for the masses. When Peking University saw that the students were rising up, they tried to set standards. They euphemistically called it 'returning to the right track'. In fact it was 'diverting to the wrong track'.

There were some schools which labelled the students as counter-revolutionaries. (Liaison officer Chang Yen went out and labelled twenty-nine people as counter-revolutionary.) [Chairman Mao said:]

In this way you put the masses on the side of the opposition. You should not fear bad people. How many of them are there after all? The great majority of the student masses are good.

Someone raised the question of disturbances. What do we do in such cases about taking legal action? [Chairman Mao said:]

What are you afraid of? When bad people are involved you prove that they are bad. What do you fear about good people? You should replace the word 'fear' by the word 'dare'. You must demonstrate once and for all whether or not the pass into socialism has been crossed. You must put politics in command, go among the masses and be at one with them, and carry on the Great Proletarian Cultural revolution even better.

NOTES

1. A woman instructor at Peking University who was the first to write a big character poster, inaugurating the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

2. The new-style army under the control of Yuan Shih-k'ai during the last years of the Empire was known as the *Pei-yanglu-chun* or Northern Army. The term "Pei-yang Warlords" is employed both of Yuan and his subordinates during the period 1911-16, and more loosely as a collective designation for the several cliques into which his epigones split up during the decade following his death. Mao is probably thinking here in particular of the war lord-dominated government in Peking in 1919, which suppressed the May Fourth student demonstrations.

3. This distinction between 'inner' and 'outer' probably refers broadly to the drawing of rigid boundaries in a variety of contexts, ranging from Party and non-party at one extreme to Chinese and foreigners at the other. The crucial point at issue in the summer of 1966 (and indeed subsequently, throughout the whole of the Cultural Revolution) was, however, that of the status of the Communist Party as an order set apart from the rest of society.

SPEECH AT A MEETING WITH REGIONAL SECRETARIES AND MEMBERS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTIONARY GROUP OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

July 22, 1966

Now all the regional secretaries and members of the Cultural Revolution Group are present. The task of this meeting is to attend to our documents, and primarily to change the method of sending out work teams so that revolutionary teachers and students in schools, as well as some middle-of-the-road people, can organize school Cultural Revolution Groups to lead the Great Cultural Revolution. Only they understand the affairs of the schools. The work teams do not understand. There are some work teams who made a mess of things. The purpose of the Great Cultural Revolution in the schools is to carry out struggle, criticism, transformation. The work teams had the effect of obstructing the movement. Can we carry out struggle and transformation? For example, Chien Po-tsan[1] wrote a great many books, yet you still haven't read them. How can you struggle against him and transform him? Where schools are concerned it is a case of 'When the temple is small the gods seem big, and when the pool is shallow the turtles seem plentiful.' Therefore we must rely on internal forces in the schools. The work teams won't do. I won't do, you won't do.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

The provincial Party committees won't do either. If it's struggle and transformation you want, you must rely on the schools themselves and the units themselves. It is no good relying on the work teams. I wonder whether the work teams can be changed into liaison staff. If they are changed into advisers they will have too much power. Perhaps they can be called observers. The work teams obstruct the revolution, but there are some among them who don't. If they obstruct the revolution they will unavoidably become counter-revolutionary. The Communications University in Sian does not allow people to telephone, and does not allow people to be sent to the Centre. Why should they fear people going to the Centre? Let them come and besiege the State Council. We must draw up documents to the effect that they may telephone or send delegates. Will it do to get so frightened? When the newspapers in Sian and Nanking were besieged for three days, the people concerned were so afraid that their souls left their bodies. Are you afraid like this? You people! If you don't make revolution the revolution will be directed against you. Some districts do not allow people to besiege newspaper offices, go to the provincial Party committee or go to see the State Council. Why are you so afraid? When they get to the State Council all they see are little unimportant generals, and so nothing can be cleared up. Why are things like this? Even if you won't show your faces I will show mine. This word "fear" is always coming to the fore -fear of counter revolution, fear of people using knives and guns. Can there really be so many counter-revolutionaries. These past few days K'ang Sheng[2], Ch'en Pota and Chiang Ch'ing have been going down to schools to read the big-character posters. How can you get by without perceptual knowledge? None of you go down because you are busy with routine matters; but you should go down even if it means neglecting routine matters, in order to get perceptual knowledge. In Nanking they did things a bit better. They didn't stop students from coming to the Centre.

K'ang Sheng interrupted: 'Nanking had three great debates. The first debate was about whether the New China Daily was revolutionary or not; the second was about whether the Kiangsu Provincial Party Committee was revolutionary or not. The debate concluded that the Kiangsu Provincial Party Committee was after all revolutionary. The third debate was about whether K'uang Ya-ming should be paraded in the street wearing a dunce's hat.' [Chairman Mao resumed:]

In the schools the majority is revolutionary, the minority is not revolutionary. As to whether K'uang Ya-ming will parade the streets wearing a dunce's hat, the conclusion of the debate will naturally clarify this point.

During the meeting the comrades who are attending it should go to Peking University and the Broadcasting Institute to read the big character posters. You should go to the places where there is the most trouble and take a look there. Today you aren't going because we have to attend to the documents. When you read the big-character posters you can say that you are there to learn, to support their revolution; you go there to light the fire of revolution and support the revolutionary teachers and students, not to listen to counter-revolutionaries and right-wing talk. After two months you still haven't got the slightest perceptual knowledge and you are still bureaucratic. If you go there you will be surrounded by the students and should be surrounded by them, and when you start talking to a few of them they will surround you. At the Broadcasting Institute over a hundred people were beaten up. There is one good thing about our era: the left-wingers get beaten up by the right-wingers, and this toughens up the left-wingers. To send the work teams for six months or even a year won't work, only people from on the spot will do. The first thing is struggle, the second is criticism, the third is transformation. Struggle means destruction, and transformation means establishing something new. It won't do to change the teaching materials in half a year's time. The thing to do is to delete, to abandon, to condense and to simplify. Materials which are incorrect or repetitious can be cut by one third to one half.

Wang Jen-chung interrupted: 'We should cut out two thirds and study Quotations from Chairman Mao.' [Chairman Mao continued:]

Political teaching materials, central directives and newspaper editorials are guidelines for the masses; they mustn't be regarded as dogmas. The problem of beatings-up hasn't been mentioned in our circulars. This won't do. This is a matter of our basic direction and of laying down guidelines. Our general policy should be quickly established. In carrying out transformation we must rely on the revolutionary teachers and students and leftists in the schools. If doesn't matter if rightists join the cultural revolutionary committees of the schools; they can be useful as teachers by negative example, but the rightists shouldn't be concentrated together. The Peking Municipal Party Committee doesn't need so many people. When there are too many people around there will be telephoning and the issuing of orders. There should be a wholesale cut in secretaries. When I was working on the Front Committee[3] I had a secretary called Hsiang Pei. Later during our retreat we did not have secretaries any more. It's enough just to have someone to receive and dispatch documents.

K'ang Sheng interrupted: 'The Chairman has talked about four things. One is the reorganization of the Peking Municipal Party Committee. This has been done. The second is the reorganization of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, which has also been carried out. The third is the elimination of the five-man Cultural Revolution Group, which has also been done[4]. The fourth is the transformation of certain ministries into departments, which hasn't been done. *[Chairman Mao replied:]*

That's right, regarding ministers, those who can manage their work don't have to be changed. They can be called ministers, heads of departments, heads of bureaux, heads of offices, but those who don't do their jobs should be changed into the Department of Metallurgy, the Department of Coal.

Someone interrupted: 'Peking University carried out four big debates. Was the incident of 18 June[5] a counter-revolutionary affair? Some say yes, because there were riff-raff involved in it, but some say no, and that the work team made mistakes. Over forty people in the Peking University Middle School propose sacking the head of the work team, Chang Ch'eng-hsien.' *[Chairman Mao replied:]*

There are many work teams which obstruct the movement and they include Chang Ch'eng-hsien. But we mustn't arrest people indiscriminately. What constitutes counter-revolutionary activity? It's simply murder, arson, and spreading poison. Such people you can arrest. You can let those who write reactionary slogans go free for the time being so that you can have a confrontation. You can consider the matter again when you have struggled against them.

NOTES

1. Chein Po-tsan, see note 2 on p 229 of this volume.

2. K'ang Sheng (1899-) spent considerable time in the Soviet Union in the 1930s,

and was long regarded above all as a specialist in intelligence and security matters. Beginning in the mid-fifties, he began to play a role both in higher education, and in laison with foreign Communist parties, participating in several important delegations for discussions with the Soviets. He became a member of the Secretariat of the Politburo in September 1962, at the Tenth Plenum. His closeness to Mao, and his interest in cultural matters, are underlined by his participation in Mao's talks with Ch'en Po-ta about philosophy in 1964. In mid-1966 he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and he played an important role thereafter throughout the Cultural Revolution.

3. The leading Party organization in Chingkangshan days.

4. See note 4 on p 246 of this volume.

5. Three days later, Chiang Ch'ing, in a talk at Peking University, declared that in the Chairman's view this incident was not counter revolutionary, but revolutionary. He had arrived at this opinion after studying all the relevant documents in Wuhan, where he was at the time. According to the Red Guard editors, the incident arose when the students at Peking University 'brought their righteous indignation into play and spontaneously waged struggle against those in authority taking the capitalist road and other demons and monsters'; in the process, 'some people were beaten up'. Those 'in authority' obviously included both Lu Ping and the university administration, and the 'work team' sent to the university by the Party organization.

A LETTER TO THE RED GUARDS OF TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY MIDDLE SCHOOL

August 1, 1966

Red Guard comrades of Tsinghua University Middle School:

I have received both the big-character posters which you sent on 28 July as well as the letter which you sent to me, asking for an answer. The two big-character posters which you wrote on 24 June and 4 July express your anger at, and denunciation of, all landlords, bourgeois, imperialists, revisionists, and their running dogs who exploit and oppress the workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and revolutionary parties and groupings. You say it is right to rebel against reactionaries: I enthusiastically support you. I also give enthusiastic support to the big-character poster of the Red Flag Combat Group of Peking University Middle School which said that it is right to rebel against the reactionaries; and to the very good revolutionary speech given by comrade P'eng Hsiao-meng representing their Red Flag Combat Group at the big meeting attended by all the teachers, students, administration and workers of Peking University on 25 July. Here I want to say that I myself as well as my revolutionary comrades-in-arms all take the same attitude. No matter where they are, in Peking or anywhere in China, I will give enthusiastic support to all who take an attitude similar to yours in the Cultural Revolution movement. Another thing, while supporting you, at the same time we ask you to pay attention to uniting with all who can be united with. As for those who have committed serious mistakes, after their mistakes have been pointed out you should offer them a way out of their difficulties by giving them work to do, and enabling them to correct their mistakes and become new men. Marx said: the proletariat must emancipate not only itself but all mankind. If it cannot emancipate all mankind, then the proletariat itself will not be able to achieve final emancipation. Will comrades please pay attention to this truth too.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

THE ANTI-JAPANESE MILITARY AND POLITICAL UNIVERSITY

August 2, 1966

The revolutionary and progressive characteristics of this university are due to the revolutionary and progressive characteristics of its staff and its courses.

The educational principles of the university are: 'Correct political orientation, plain, hard-working style, flexible strategy and tactics'[1].

[We must] overcome difficulties, contact the masses, and heighten [our] militancy. Anyone who is corrupt and lazy does not deserve to be a student of this university, for he acts against the rules of this university.

To the second class of graduates: 'You must be brave, resolute, and tenacious. [You must] learn through struggles and be prepared to sacrifice your lives for the liberation of our nation.'

Written for the Production Drive of the university: 'Study on the one hand, produce on the other; overcome hardships and unnerve the enemies.' 'Now [you] study and produce. In future you will fight and produce.'

The style of the university: 'Unity, alertness, earnestness, and liveliness'[2].

SOURCE: *People's Daily*.

NOTES

1. The 'three' of the 'Three-eight style'

2. The 'eight' of the 'Three-eight style'

INTERJECTION AT ENLARGED MEETING OF CCPCC STANDING COMMITTEE

August 4, 1966

The Northern Warlords [early Nationalist period, 1916-1927] who came after the period of relative peace and order and the Kuomintang that followed were all repressive of students. The present Communist Party also suppresses student movements, and what difference is there between this and Lu P'ing and Chiang Nan-hsiang? The Central Committee has ordered a suspension of classes for half a year in order to engage exclusively in the Great Cultural Revolution. But once the students arose, it again repressed them. It was not because no one advanced dissenting views, but rather because no one listened to them. There is another view which is rather interesting. To put it lightly, this is a question of orientation. Actually, the question of orientation is a central question. It is a question of line which runs counter to Marxism, and is a problem which must be resolved by Marxism. I sense danger. They themselves ordered the students to make revolution, but when everybody rose up, they wanted to suppress them. The so-called orientation and line, the so-called trust in the masses, and the so-called Marxism are all false and have been for many years already. If you run into such things, they could blow up. They clearly stand on the side of the bourgeoisie and oppose the proletariat. [You] say to oppose the new municipal committee is antiparty. The new municipal committee suppresses the student movement so why not oppose it?

I have not gone down to stay at a selected basic unit. Some people stand more and more on the side of the bourgeoisie and oppose the proletariat the longer they stay at selected basic units. To stipulate that all contacts between one class and another, one department and another and one school and another is to repress the students is madness. Some people who came from the Central Committee are disaffected with the Central Committee's comments of June 18, saying that it should not be uttered. The big character poster put out by Nieh Yuan-tzu and six others of Peking University is the Paris Commune manifesto of the 1960s – the Peking Commune. It is a good thing to put out big-character poster; they should be announced to the people of the entire world! Nonetheless, in Hsueh-feng's report, it is said that the party has party discipline and the state has state law, and there must be a distinction between internal and external affairs. Big-character posters should not be posted outside the gate, so that foreigners can not see them. In fact, with the exception of secret places, such as the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Public Security which should be areas proscribed to foreigners, what's so important about other places? Even under a proletarian dictatorship, the masses should be allowed to petition, demonstrate, and litigate. Moreover, freedom of speech, assembly and publication have been inscribed in the Constitution. Judging from this act of suppressing the Great Cultural Revolution of the students, I don't believe there is genuine democracy and genuine Marxism. It is a case of standing on the side of the bourgeoisie to oppose the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Central Committee of the League has not only failed to support the young student movement, but has suppressed the student movement. I think this should be dealt with properly.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

BOMBARD THE HEADQUARTERS – MY FIRST BIG-CHARACTER POSTER

August 5, 1966

'China's first Marxist-Leninist big-character poster and Commentator's article on it in *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* are indeed superbly written! Comrades, please read them again. But in the last fifty days or so some leading comrades from the central down to the local levels have acted in a diametrically opposite way. Adopting the reactionary stand of the bourgeoisie, they have enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the surging movement of the great cultural revolution of the proletariat. They have stood facts on their head and juggled black and white, encircled and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled opinions differing from their own, imposed a white terror, and felt very pleased with themselves. They have puffed up the arrogance of the bourgeoisie and deflated the morale of the proletariat. How poisonous! Viewed in connection with the Right deviation in 1962 and the wrong tendency of 1964 which was 'Left' in form but Right in essence, shouldn't this make one wide awake?

SOURCE: *Peking Review*, no.33, 11–3–1967.

SPEECH AT THE CLOSING CEREMONY OF THE ELEVENTH PLENUM OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

August 12, 1966

With regard to the Ninth Congress, I think it's time we made some preparations. We should prepare to make a decision as to when the Ninth Congress will be held. It has been a good many years, in two year's time it will be ten years since the Second Session of the Eighth Congress. Now the Ninth Congress must be held, probably at a suitable time next year. We must now prepare for it. May I propose that we entrust the necessary preparations to the Politburo and its Standing Committee?

Whether the decisions taken by this conference are correct or incorrect will be shown by future events[1]. But it seems that our decisions are welcomed by the masses. For example one of the important decisions of the Central Committee concerns the Great Cultural Revolution. The broad masses of students and revolutionary teachers support us and resist the policies of the past. Our decision was based on their resistance to past policies. But whether this decision can be implemented will ultimately depend on the action of leaders at all levels, including those present today and those who are not. Take for example the question of reliance on the masses. One way is to implement the mass line. Another way is not to implement the mass

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SOURCE: Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought, a Red Guard Publication.

line. It must by no means be taken for granted that everything which is written down in our resolutions will be implemented by all our Party committees and all our comrades. There will always be some who are unwilling to do so. Things are perhaps better than in the past, since in the past we had no such publicly taken decisions. Furthermore, there are organizational guarantees for the implementation of these decisions. This time our organization has undergone some changes. The adjustments in the full and alternate membership of the Politburo, in the Secretariat and in the membership of the Standing Committee have guaranteed the implementation of the Decision and Communique of the Central Committee.

Comrades who have made mistakes should always be offered a way out. They should be allowed to correct their mistakes. You should not first take the view that they have made mistakes and then deny them the chance to correct them. Our policy is 'punish first offences to avoid their recurrence and cure the disease to save the patient', 'first watch and then help', and 'unity-criticism-unity'. Do we have a party outside our Party? I think that we do, and that we have factions inside the Party. We used to criticize the Kuomintang, who said: 'No party outside the Party and no factions inside the Party.' Some people put it, 'No party outside the Party is autocracy; no factions inside the Party is nonsense.' The same applies to us. You may say that there are no factions in our Party, but there are. For instance, there are two factions as regards attitude toward the mass movements. It is just a question of which faction is the majority and which is the minority. If we had delayed holding this meeting a few months longer, things would have been in much more of a mess. So it is a good thing that this meeting was held. It has produced results.

NOTES

1. The Resolutions of the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC – the sixteen Articles:

1. The great proletarian Cultural Revolution now unfolding is a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country, a deeper and more extensive stage.

At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary, first of all, to create public opinion, to do work in the ideological sphere. This is true for the revolutionary class as well as for the counter-revolutionary class. This thesis of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's has been proved entirely correct in practice.

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a come-back. The proletariat must do just the opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the re-actionary bourgeois academic 'authorities' and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, art and literature and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.

2. The masses of the workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals and revolutionary cadres form the main force in this great Cultural Revolution. Large numbers of revolutionary young people, previously unknown, have become courageous and daring pathbreakers. They are vigorous in action and intelligent. Through the media of big-character posters and great debates, they argue things out, expose and criticize thoroughly, and launch resolute attacks on the open and hidden representatives of the bourgeoisie. In such a great revolutionary movement, it is hardly avoidable that they should show shortcomings of one kind or another, but their main revolutionary orientation has been correct from the beginning. This is the main current in the great proletarian Cultural Revolution. It is the main direction along which the great proletarian Cultural Revolution continues to advance.

Since the Cultural Revolution is a revolution, it inevitably meets with resistance. This resistance comes chiefly from those in authority who have wormed their way into the party and are taking the capitalist road. It also comes from the old force of habit in society. At present, this resistance is still fairly strong and stubborn. However, the great proletarian Cultural Revolution is, after all, an irresistible general trend. There is abundant evidence that such resistance will crumble fast once the masses become fully aroused.

Because the resistance is fairly strong, there will be reversals and even repeated reversals in this struggle. There is no harm in this. It tempers the proletariat and other working people, and especially the younger generation, teaches them lessons and gives them experience, and helps them to understand that the revolutionary road is a zigzag one, and not plain sailing.

3. The outcome of this great Cultural Revolution will be determined by whether the party leadership does or does not dare boldly to arouse the masses.

Currently, there are four different situations with regard to the leadership being given to the movement of cultural revolution by party organizations at various levels:

(1) There is the situation in which the persons in charge of party organizations stand in the van of the movement and dare to arouse the masses boldly. They put daring above everything else, they are dauntless communist fighters and good pupils of Chairman Mao. They advocate the big-character posters and great debates. They encourage the masses to expose every kind of ghost and monster and also to criticize the shortcomings and errors in the work of the persons in charge. This correct kind of leadership is the result of putting proletarian politics in the forfront and Mao Tse-tung's thought in the lead.

(2) In many units, the persons in charge have a very poor understanding of the task of leadership in this great struggle, their leadership is far from being conscientious and effective, and they accordingly find themselves incompetent and in a weak position. They put fear above everything else, stick to outmoded ways and regulations, and are unwilling to break away from conventional practices and move ahead. They have been taken unawares by the new order of things, the revolutionary order of the masses, with the result that their leadership lags behind the situation, lags behind the masses.

(3) In some units, the persons in charge, who made mistakes of one kind or another in the past, are even more prone to put fear above everything else, being afraid that the masses will catch them out. Actually, if they make serious self-criticism and accept the criticism of the masses, the party and the masses will make allowances for their mistakes. But if the persons in charge don't, they will continue to make mistakes and become obstacles to the mass movement.

(4) Some units are controlled by those who have wormed their way into the party and are taking the capitalist road. Such persons in authority are extremely afraid

of being exposed by the masses and therefore seek every possible pretext to suppress the mass movement. They resort to such tactics as shifting the targets for attack and turning black into white in an attempt to lead the movement astray. When they find themselves very isolated and no longer able to carry on as before, they resort still more to intrigues, stabbing people in the back, spreading rumours, and blurring the distinction between revolution and counter-revolution as much as they can, all for the purpose of attacking the revolutionaries.

What the Central Committee of the party demands of the party committees at all levels is that they persevere in giving correct leadership, put daring above everything else, boldly arouse the masses, change the state of weakness and incompetence where it exists, encourage those comrades who have made mistakes but are willing to correct them to cast off their mental burdens and join in the struggle, and dismiss from their leading posts all those in authority who are taking the capitalist road and so make possible the recapture of the leadership for the proletarian revolutionaries.

4. In the great proletarian Cultural Revolution, the only method is for the masses to liberate themselves, and any method of doing things on their behalf must not be used.

Trust the masses, rely on them and respect their initiative. Cast out fear. Don't be afraid of disorder. Chairman Mao has often told us that revolution cannot be so very refined, so gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. Let the masses educate themselves in this great revolutionary movement and learn to distinguish between right and wrong and between correct and incorrect ways of doing things.

Make the fullest use of big-character posters and great debates to argue matters out, so that the masses can clarify the correct views, criticize the wrong views and expose all the ghosts and monsters. In this way the masses will be able to raise their political consciousness in the course of the struggle, enhance their abilities and talents, distinguish right from wrong and draw a clear line between the enemy and ourselves.

5. Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution and it is likewise a question of the first importance for the great Cultural Revolution.

Party leadership should be good at discovering the left and developing and strengthening the ranks of the left, and should firmly rely on the revolutionary left. During the movement this is the only way to isolate thoroughly the most reactionary rightists, win over the middle and unite with the great majority so that by the end of the movement we shall achieve the unity of more than 95 per cent of the masses.

Concentrate all forces to strike at the handful of ultra-reactionary bourgeois rightists and counter-revolutionary revisionists, and expose and criticize to the full their crimes against the party, against socialism and against Mao Tse-tung's thought so as to isolate them to the maximum.

The main target of the present movement is those within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road.

Care should be taken to distinguish strictly between the anti-party, anti-socialist rightists and those who support the party and socialism but have said or done something wrong or have written some bad articles or other works.

Care should be taken to distinguish strictly between the reactionary bourgeois scholar despots and 'authorities' on the one hand and people who have the ordinary bourgeois academic ideas on the other.

6. A strict distinction must be made between the two different types of contradictions: those among the people and those between ourselves and the enemy. Contradictions among the people must not be made into contradictions between ourselves and the enemy; nor must contradictions between ourselves and the enemy be regarded as those among the people.

It is normal for the masses to hold different views. Contention between different views is unavoidable, necessary and beneficial. In the course of normal and full debate, the masses will affirm what is right, correct what is wrong and gradually reach unanimity.

The method to be used in debates is to present the facts, reason things out, and persuade through reasoning. Any method of forcing a minority holding different views to submit is impermissible. The minority should be protected, because sometimes the truth is with the minority. Even if the minority is wrong, they should still be allowed to argue their case and reserve their views.

When there is a debate, it should be conducted by reasoning, not by coercion or force.

In the course of debate, every revolutionary should be good at thinking things out for himself and should develop the communist spirit of daring to think, daring to speak and daring to act. On the premise that they have the same main orientation, revolutionary comrades should, for the sake of strengthening unity, avoid endless debate over side issues.

7. In certain schools, units, and work teams of the Cultural Revolution, some of the persons in charge have organized counter-attacks against the masses who put up big-character posters against them. These people have even advanced such slogans as: opposition to the leaders of a unit or a work team means opposition to the party's Central Committee, means opposition to the party and socialism, means counter-revolution. In this way it is inevitable that their blows will fall on some really revolutionary activists. This is an error on matters of orientation, an error of line, and is absolutely impermissible.

A number of person who suffer from serious ideological errors, and particularly some of the anti-party and anti-socialist rightists, are taking advantages of certain shortcomings and mistakes in the mass movement to spread rumours and gossip, and engage in agitation, deliberately branding some of the masses as 'counter-revolutionaries.' It is necessary to beware of such 'pic-pockets' and expose their tricks in good time.

In the course of the movement, with the exception of cases of active counter-revolutionaries where there is clear evidence of crimes such as murder, arson, poisoning, sabotage or theft of state secrets, which should be handled in accordance with the law, no measures should be taken against students at universities, colleges, middle schools and primary schools because of problems that arise in the movement. To prevent the struggle from being diverted from its main objective, it is not allowed, whatever the pretext, to incite the masses to struggle against each other or the students to do likewise. Even proven rightists should be dealt with on the merits of each case at a later stage of the movement.

8. The cadres all fall roughly into the following four categories:

(1) good;

(2) comparatively good;

(3) those who have made serious mistakes but have not become anti-party, anti-socialist rightists;

(4) the small number of anti-party, anti-socialist rightists.

In ordinary situations, the first two categories (good and comparatively good) are the great majority.

The anti-party, anti-socialist rightists must be fully exposed, hit hard, pulled down and completely discredited and their influence eliminated. At the same time, they should be given a way out so that they can turn over a new leaf.

9. Many new things have begun to emerge in the great proletarian Cultural Revolution. The cultural revolutionary groups, committees and other organizational forms created by the masses in many schools and units are something new and of great historic importance.

These cultural revolutionary groups, committees and congresses are excellent new forms of organization whereby under the leadership of the Communist Party the masses are educating themselves. They are an excellent bridge to keep our party in close contact with the masses. They are organs of power of the proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The struggle of the proletariat against the old ideas, culture, customs and habits left over from all the exploiting classes over thousands of years will necessarily take a very, very long time. Therefore, the cultural revolutionary groups, committees and congresses should not be temporary organizations but permanent, standing mass organizations. They are suitable not only for colleges, schools and government and other organizations, but generally also for factories, mines, other enterprises, urban districts and villages.

It is necessary to institute a system of general elections, like that of the Paris commune, for electing members to the cultural revolutionary groups and committees and delegates to the cultural revolutionary congresses. The lists of candidates should be put forward by the revolutionary masses after full discussion, and the elections should be held after the masses have discussed the lists over and over again.

The masses are entitled at any time to criticize members of the cultural revolutionary groups and committees and delegates elected to the cultural revolutionary congresses. If these members or delegates prove incompetent, they can be replaced through election or recalled by the masses after discussion.

The cultural revolutionary groups, committees and congresses in colleges and schools should consist mainly of representatives of the revolutionary students. At the same time, they should have a certain number of representatives of the revolutionary teaching staff and workers.

10. In the great proletarian Cultural Revolution a most important task is to transform the old educational system and the old principles and methods of teaching.

In this great Cultural Revolution, the phenomenon of our schools being dominated by bourgeois intellectuals must be completely changed.

In every kind of school we must apply thoroughly the policy advanced by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, of education serving proletarian politics and education being combined with productive labour, so as to enable those receiving an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and to become labourers with socialist consciousness and culture.

The period of schooling should be shortened. Courses should be fewer and better. The teaching material should be thoroughly transformed, in some cases beginning with simplifying complicated material. While their main task is to study, students should also learn other things. That is to say, in addition to their studies they should also learn industrial work, farming and military affairs, and take part in the struggles of the Cultural Revolution as they occur to criticize the bourgeoisie.

11. In the course of the mass movement of the Cultural Revolution, the criticism of bourgeois and feudal ideology should be well combined with the dissemination of the proletarian world outlook and of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought.

Criticism should be organized of typical bourgeois representatives who have wormed their way into the party and typical reactionary bourgeois academic 'authorities', and this should include criticism of various kinds of reactionary views in philosophy, history, political economy and education, in works and theories of literature and art, in theories of natural science, and in other fields.

Criticism of anyone by name in the press should be decided after discussion by the party committee at the same level, and in some cases submitted to the party committee at a higher level for approval.

12. As regards scientists, technicians and ordinary members of working staffs, as long as they are patriotic, work energetically, are not against the party and socialism, and maintain no illicit relation with any foreign country, we should in the present movement continue to apply the policy of 'unity, criticism, unity'. Special care should be taken of those scientists and scientific and technical personnel who have made contributions. Efforts should be made to help them gradually transform their world outlook and their style of work.

13. The cultural and educational units and leading organs of the Party and government in the large and medium cities are the points of concentration of the present proletarian cultural revolution.

The great Cultural Revolution has enriched the socialist education movement in both city and countryside and raised it to a higher level. Efforts should be made to conduct these two movements in close combination. Arrangements to this effect may be made by various regions and departments in the light of the specific conditions.

The socialist education movement now going on in the countryside and in enterprises in the cities should not be upset where the original arrangements are appropriate and the movement is going well, but should continue in accordance with the original arrangements. However, the questions that are arising in the present great proletarian Cultural Revolution should be put to the masses for discussion at a proper time, so as to further foster vigorously proletarian ideology and eradicate bourgeois ideology.

In some places, the great proletarian Cultural Revolution is being used as the focus in order to add momentum to the socialist education movement and clean things up in the fields of politics, ideology, organization and economy. This may be done where the local party committee thinks it appropriate.

14. The aim of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution is to revolutionize people's ideology and as a consequence to achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in all fields of work. If the masses are fully aroused and proper arrangements are made, it is possible to carry on both the Cultural Revolution and production without one hampering the other, while guaranteeing high quality in all our work.

The great proletarian Cultural Revolution is a powerful motive force for the development of the social productive forces in our country. Any idea of counterposing the great cultural revolution against the development of production is incorrect.

15. In the armed forces, the Cultural Revolution and the socialist education movement should be carried out in accordance with the instructions of the Military Commission of the Central Committee and the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army.

16. In the great proletarian Cultural Revolution, it is imperative to hold aloft the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought and put proletarian politics in command. The movement for the creative study and application of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's works should be carried forward among the masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers, the cadres and the intellectuals, and Mao Tse-tung's thought should be taken as the guide for action in the Cultural Revolution.

In this complex great Cultural Revolution, Party committees at all levels must study and apply Chairman Mao's works all the more conscientiously and in a creative way. In particular, they must study over and over again Chairman Mao's writings on the cultural revolution and on the Party's methods of leadership, such as *On New Democracy, Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work, Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership, and Methods of Work of Party Committees.*

Party committees at all levels must abide by the directions given by Chairman Mao over the years, namely that they should thoroughly apply the mass line of 'from the masses and to the masses' and that they should be pupils before they become teachers. They should try to avoid being one-sided or narrow. They should foster materialist dialectics and oppose metaphysics and scholasticism.

The great proletarian Cultural Revolution is bound to achieve brilliant victory under the leadership of the Central Committee of the party headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

TALK AT THE WORK CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRE

August 23, 1966

The main question is what policy to adopt towards the so-called chaos at various places. In my opinion, we should let the chaos go on for a few months and just firmly believe that the majority is good and only the minority bad. It does not matter if there are no provincial [party] committees. There are still district and county [party] committees! The *People's Daily* has published an editorial, calling on the workers, peasants, and soldiers to stop interfering with students' activities, and advocating non-violent, not violent, struggles.

In my view, Peking is not all that chaotic. The students held a meeting of 100,000 and then captured the murderers. This caused some panic. Peking is too gentle. Appeals have been issued, [but after all] there are very few hooligans. Stop interfering for the time being. It is still too early to say anything definite about the reorganization of the centre of the [Youth] League; let us wait four months. Decisions taken hurriedly can do only harm. Work teams were despatched in a hurry; the left was struggled against in a hurry; meetings of 100,000 were called in a hurry; appeals were issued in a hurry; opposition to the new municipal [party] committee of Peking was said, in a hurry, to be tantamount to an opposition to the [party] Centre. Why is it impermissible to oppose it? I have issued a big character poster myself, 'Bombard the Headquarters!' Some problems have to be settled soon. For instance, the workers, peasants, and soldiers should not interfere with the students' great Cultural Revolution. Let the students go into the street. What is wrong with their writing big-character posters or going into the street? Let foreigners take pictures. They take shots to show aspects of our backward tendencies. But it does not matter. Let the imperialists make a scandal about us.

SOURCE:- *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

LETTER

September 7, 1966

Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, T'ao Chu, [Ch'en] Po-ta, [Wang] Jen-chung, and Chiang Ch'ing:

I have read the attached document. The incidents in Tsing-tao, Ch'angsha, and Sian are similar. They are caused by the opposition of organized workers and peasants against students and are all wrong. They must not be allowed to continue. Try to issue a directive from the Centre to stop them and then publish editorials to tell the workers and peasants to cease interfering with student movements. Nothing like this has happened in Peking, except that the People's Congress' drafted 600 peasants into the city to protect Kuo Ch'iu-ying. Pass the experience of Peking on to other places.

I think the views of T'an Ch'i-lung and the vice-mayor [of Tsingtao?] are correct.

SOURCE:- *Long Live MaoTse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

TALK AT THE GENERAL REPORT CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRE'S POLITICAL WORK

October 24, 1966

Teng Hsiao-ping is deaf. Whenever we are at a meeting together, he sits far away from me. For six years, since 1959, he has not made a general report of work to me. He always gets P'eng Chen to do the work of the Secretariat [of the party] for him. Do you say that he is able? Nieh Jung-chen[1] says: 'That bloke is lazy.'

My view of the situation is that it is big in the middle and small at both ends. Only Honan puts the word 'dare' ahead of all others; most people put the word 'fear' in first place; only a very few people firmly place the word 'revolt' in front of other words. Anti-party and anti-socialist people include Po I-po, Ho Ch'ang-kung, Wang Feng, and also Li Fan-wu[2].

Real 'four-kind' cadres (the rightists[3]) make up only one, two, or three per cent. (The Premier, [Chou En-lai] says: 'More than that now.') Never mind how many more. We shall suppress them *(p'ing-fan)*. Some will not be kept where they are; they should be transferred to other places.

In Honan one [party] secretary does productive work while five others receive [the revolutionaries]. In the whole country there is only Liu Chien-hsun[4] who has written a big-character poster to give support to the minority [the reactionaries]. That is a good thing.

SOURCE:- *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

What about Nieh Yuan-tzu[5]? (K'ang Sheng says: 'She must be protected.' Li Hsien-nien[6] says: 'All those who wrote the first big-character posters should be protected.') Good!

(On the question of the great 'get-together' *(ta ch'uan-lien)*[7] the Premier says: 'It should be done with proper preparation.') What preparation? Where cannot one find a bowl of rice[8].

There are different views on the [present] situation. In Tientsin half a million people went to Wan Hsiao-t'ang's funeral and they thought the situation was excellent. In fact, that was a demonstration against the party, an attempt to repress the living by using the dead.

Li Fu-ch'un[9] has been asked to rest for a year. Even I do not know who is in charge of the Planning Commission. [Li] Fu-ch'un respects the [party] discipline. He told some things to the Secretariat which were not reported to me. Teng Hsiao-p'ing respects me but keeps me at arm's length.

NOTES

1. Nieh Jung-Chen 1899-) a man of Chiangchin, Szechwan, who studied at a middle school in Chungking before going to France as a work-study student. In 1922 he joined the communist group organized by Chou En-lai and went to work in Belgium. In the next year he returned to Paris to become a communist party member, whence to Moscow to study in a military school. In 1927 he took part in the famous Nanch'ang Uprising on 1 August and the Canton Commune in December. He did not go to the Kiangsi soviet till 1931 and soon was appointed the political commissar of the 1st Army Corps. His co-operation with Lin Piao, commander of the Army Corps, was resumed in 1937 when he became the political commissar of the 115the Division of the 8th Route Army, in which capacity he was chiefly responsible for the creation of the Chin-Char-Chi border region. In 1945 he became a member of the Central Committee of the CPC, and ten years later a marshal of the PLA.

2. Po I-po (1907-) joined the CPC when he was a student at the Taiyuan Teachers' Training College in 1926. Later he studied at Peking University and led the Sacrifice League in Shansi during the Anti-Japanese war. He was elected to the Central Committee, CPC, in 1945 and made the political commissar of Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu border region. In 1959 he became one of the deputy Premiers in charge of industrial development.

Ho Ch'ang-kung (1898-) studied in France and Belgium and joined the CPC in 1921. In 1929 he was under P'eng Teh-huai and in the following year the C.O. of the 8th Red Army. He supported Chang Kuo-t'ao in 1935 and served as the head of the Organisation Department of Chang's 'Centre'. In 1952 he was the deputy Minister of the 2nd Ministry of Heavy Industries and two years later, the deputy Minister of the Ministry of Geology.

Wang Feng (1906-) was born in Shensi and studied at Peking University. Since 1949 he had been working in Northwest China and held the post of the first secretary of the CPC Kansu branch.

Li Fan-wu (1909 –), a deputy Minister of the Ministry of Forestry in 1952 and the secretary of the CPC Heilungkiang branch.

3. The wealthy, rightist, reactionary, and bad.

4. Liu Chien-hsun, at this time he was the first secretary of the CPC Honan branch, and concurrently first political commissar of the military district of Honan.

5. Neih Yuan-tzu, see note 1 on p 270 of this volume.

6. Li Hsien-nien, (1906-), born in Huengan, Hupei, and worked as a carpenter. He joined the CPC in 1927. In 1954 he was made a deputy Premier in special charge of finance. At the 8th Congress, 1956, he was elected to the Poliburo and the Secretariat of the CPC.

7. This literally means to go out and get people together.

8. This proverb means that life is much easier than one imagines.

9. Li Fu-chun (1900-) born in Ch'angsha, Hunan, studied in France as a work-study student, where he joined the communist party. He took part in the Nanch'ang Uprising of 1927. In 1945 he was a member of the Politburo and in 1950 the Minister of the Ministry of Heavy Industries. He has been in charge of the National Planning for economic construction.

TALK AT THE REPORT MEETING

October 24, 1966

The Chairman said: 'What is there to be frightened of? Have you read the brief report by Li Hsueh-feng[1]. His two children ran off and when they came back they gave Li Hsueh-feng a lecture. "Why are you old leaders so frightened of the Red Guards? They haven't beat you up and yet you just won't examine yourselves." Wu Hsiu-ch'uan has four children and they all belong to different factions and lots of their school mates go to his home, sometimes ten or more at a time. When you have had more contact with them then you realize there is nothing to be afraid of; instead you think they are quite lovable. If one wants to educate others the educationist should first be educated. You are not clear-headed and dare not face the Red Guards, nor speak the truth to the students; you act like officials and big shots. First of all you don't dare to see people and then you don't dare to speak. You have been making revolution for many decades, but the longer you do it the stupider you get. In the letter Shao-ch'i wrote to Chiang Wei-ch'ing, he criticized Chiang Wei-ch'ing[2] and said that he was stupid, but is he himself any cleverer?'

The Chairman asked Liu Lan-t'ao[3]: 'When you have gone back, what do you have in mind to do?

Liu replied: 'I first want to go back and have a look.'

The Chairman said: 'When you speak you always mince your words.'

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

Chairman Mao asked Premier Chou about the progress of the meeting. The Premier said: 'It's almost finished. We will meet for another half-day tomorrow. As for the concrete problems, we can solve them according to basic principles when we get back.'

Chairman Mao asked Li Ching-ch'uan: How's Liao Chih-kao[4] getting on?'

Li replied: 'In the beginning he wasn't very clear, but in the latter part of the meeting he was somewhat better.'

The Chairman said: 'What's all this about being consistently correct? You yourself did a bunk. You were frightened out of your wits and rushed off to stay in the military district. When you get back you must pull yourself together and work properly. It's bad to paste up big-character posters about Liu and Teng in the streets. Mustn't we allow people to make mistakes, allow people to make revolution, allow them to change? Let the Red Guards read *The True Story of Ah Q.*[5]'

The Chairman said: 'The meeting this time is somewhat better. At the last meeting it was all indoctrination and no progress. Moreover we had no experience. Now we have had two months' more experience. Altogether we have had less than five months' experience. The democratic revolution was carried on for twenty-eight years; we made many mistakes and many people died. The socialist revolution has been carried on for seventeen years, but the cultural revolution has only been carried on for five months. It will take at least five years to get some experience. One big-character poster, the Red Guards, the great exchange of revolutionary experience, and nobody – not even I – expected that all the provinces and cities would be thrown into confusion. The students also made some mistakes, but the mistakes were mainly made by us big shots.'

The Chairman asked Li Hsien-nien: 'How did your meeting go today?'

Li replied: 'The Institute of Finance and Economics held an accusation meeting, and I wanted to make a self-examination, but they wouldn't let me speak.'

The Chairman said: 'You should go there again tomorrow and make your examination, otherwise people will say you have done a bunk.'

Li said: 'Tomorrow I have to go abroad.'

The Chairman Said: 'You should also tell them that in the past it used to be San-niang who taught her son[6]. Nowadays it's the son who teaches San-niang. I think you are a bit lacking in spirit.

'If they don't want to listen to your self-examination, you must still go ahead and make one. If they accuse you, you should admit your mistakes. The trouble was stirred up by the Centre, the responsibility rests with the Centre, but the regions also have some responsibility. What I'am responsible for is the division into first and second lines. Why did we make this division into first and second lines? The first reason is that my health is not very good; the second was the lesson of the Soviet Union. Malenkov was not mature enough, and before Stalin died he had not wielded power. Every time he proposed a toast, he fawned and flattered. I wanted to establish their prestige before I died; I never imagined that things might move in the opposite direction.'

Comrade T'ao Chu[7] *said:* 'Supreme power *(ta ch'uan)* has slipped from your hands.'

The Chairman Said: 'This is because I deliberately relinquished it. Now, however, they have set up independent kingdoms; there are many things I have not been consulted about, such as the land problem, the Tientsin speeches, the cooperatives in Shansi, the rejection of investigation and study, the big fuss made of Wang Kuang-mei. All these things should really have been discussed at the Centre before decisions[3] were taken. Teng Hsiao-p'ing never came to consult me: from 1959 to the present he has never consulted me over anything at all. In 1962 suddenly the four vice-premiers, Li Fu-ch'un, T'an Chen-lin, Li Hsien-nien and Po I-po[8] came to look me up in Nanking, and afterwards went to Tientsin. I immediately gave my approval, and the four went back again, but Teng Hsiao-p'ing never came. I was not satisfied with the Wuchang Conference; I could do nothing about the high targets. So I went to Peking to hold a conference, but although you had met for six days, you wouldn't let me hold mine even for a single day. It's not so bad that I am not allowed to complete my work, but I don't like being treated as a dead ancestor.

'After the Tsunyi conference the Centre was more concentrated, but after the Sixth Plenum in 1938, Hsiang Ying and P'eng Te-huai tried to set up an independent kingdom[9]. They didn't keep me informed about any of these things. After the Seventh Congress there was nobody at the Centre. When Hu Tsung-nan marched on Yenan[10] the Centre was divided into two armies; I was in North Shensi with En-lai and Jen Pi-shih; Liu Shao-ch'i and Chu Te were in the north-east[11]. Things were still relatively centralized. But once we entered the cities, we were dispersed, each devoting himself to his own sphere. Especially when the division was made into first and second lines, there was even more dispersal. In 1953, after the financial and economic conference, I told everybody to communicate with one another, to communicate with the Centre and communicate with the regions. Liu and Teng acted openly, not in secret, they were not like P'eng Chen. In the past Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Wang Ming. Lo Lung-chang, Li Li-san all acted openly; that's not so serious. But Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, P'eng Te-huai were two-faced. P'eng Te-huai colluded with them, but I did not know it. P'eng Chen, Lo Jui-ch'ing.[12] Lu Ting-i[13] and Yang Shang-k'un[14] were acting secretly, and those who are secretive will come to no good end. Those who follow the wrong line should reform, but Ch'en, Wang and Li did not reform.'

Chou En-lai remarked: 'Li Li-san did not change his thinking.'

[Chairman Mao resumed:] 'Cliques and factions of whatever description should be strictly excluded. The essential thing is that they should reform, that their ideas should conform, and that they should unite with us. Then things will be all right. We should allow Liu and Teng to make revolution and to reform themselves. You say that I am the kind of person that mixes with thin mud. I am the kind of person that mixes with thin mud. During the Seventh Congress Ch'en Ch'i-han[15] said, one shouldn't elect people who have followed Wang Ming's line to the Central Committee. Wang Ming and several others were all elected members of the Central Committee. At present only Wang Ming has left, the others are all still here! Lo Fu [Chang Wen-tien] is no good. I have a favourable impression of Wang Chia-hsiang,[16] for he approved of the battle at Tungku[17]. During the Ningtu conference[18], Lo Fu wanted to expel me, but Chou and Chu did not agree. During the Tsunyi Conference he played a useful role, and at that time one couldn't have got by without them[19]. Lo Fu was obstinate. Comrade Shao-ch'i opposed them, and Nieh Jung-chen[20] also opposed them. We shouldn't condemn Liu Shao-ch'i out of hand. If they have made mistakes they can change, can't they? When they have changed it will be all right. Let them pull themselves together, and throw themselves courageously into their work. This meeting was held at my suggestion, but the time has been so short that I don't know whether things are clear or not. Still, it may be better than the last meeting. I had no idea that one big character poster, the Red Guards and big exchange of revolutionary experience would have stirred up such a big affair. Some of the students did not have a terribly good family back ground, but were our own family backgrounds all that good? Don't enlist deserters and turncoats. I myself have many right wing friends such as Chou Ku-ch'eng and Chang Chih-chung[21]. Will it do not to have a few right-wing contacts? How can one be so pure? To enter into contact with them is to investigate and study them, and understand their behaviour. The other day on the Tien An Men I deliberately drew Li Tsung-jen[22] over towards me It's better not to give this fellow a post; it's better for him not to have any position or power. Do we want to have democratic parties? Can't we have just one party? The Party organizations in the schools shouldn't be restored too early. After 1957, the Party added many new members; Chien Potsan, Wu Han, Li Ta were all Party members. Were they all so good? Are the democratic parties all so very bad? I think the democratic parties are better than P'eng, Lo, Lu and Yang. We still want the democratic parties, the Political Consultative Conference; we should explain this clearly to the Red Guards. The Chinese democratic revolution was started by Sun Yat-sen. At that time there was no Communist Party. Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, they fought against K'ang, Liang[23] and the imperial system. This year makes the hundredth anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth. How shall we celebrate it? We should discuss this with the Red Guards, and we should hold commemorative meetings. The division which I introduced into first and second lines has led to the opposite result.'

Comrade K'ang Sheng interrupted: 'The political report at the Eighth Congress contains the theory of the disappearance of classes.'

[Chairman Mao replied:] 'I read the report, and it was passed by the congress; we cannot make those two–Liu and Teng–solely responsible.

'Factories and villages should be dealt with by stages and in batches. Go back and clarify the thinking of your fellow students in the provinces and municipalities, and hold good meetings. Find a quiet place in Shanghai in which to meet. If the students stir things up, let them. We have met for seventeen days, and it has been worth while. As Lin Piao says, we should do careful political and ideological work among them. In 1936 Stalin talked about the elimination of class struggle, but in 1939 he carried out another purge of counter-revolutionaries. Wasn't that class struggle too?

'When you go back you should pull yourselves together and do your work well. Who then can overthrow you?'

NOTES

1. Li Hsueh-feng (c.1906-), First Secretary of the CPC North China Bureau, had replaced P'eng Chen as First Secretary of the Peking Party branch in June 1966. Mao subsequently identified him as one of Lin Piao's co-conspirators.

2. Chiang Wei-ching, first secretury of Kiangsu Provincial Committee.

3. Liu Lan-t'ao (1904-), First Secretary of the CPC Northwest Bureau, and political commissar of the Lanchow Military Region.

4. Li Ching-ch'uan, First Secretary of the CPC Southwest Bureau since 1961, was thus the direct superior of Liao Chih-kao, about whom Mao asks him here. Liao Chih-kao was first secretary of Szechuan Provincial Committee.

5. *The True Story of Ah Q*, is a famous novel by the great Chinese writer Lu Hsun.

6. San-niang refers to Wang Ch'un, the heroine of the Peking opera *San-niang chiao-tzu (San-niang Teaches her Son)*, Third wife of a Ming dynasty official wrongly thought to have died, she refused to remarry and devoted her life to educating her husband's son by his second wife, who eventually became a *chuang-yuan*.

7. Tao Chu (c. 1906-) became First Secretary of the CPC Central-South Bureau in 1961. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution he enjoyed a meteoric rise to power, becoming head of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department in July 1966, and ranking fourth, immediately after Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai, at the Eleventh Plenum in August 1966. In late December 1966, he was officially denounced.

8. Li Fu-ch'un (1899-), a Hunanese, has been a long-time close associate of Mao Tse-tung. He worked with Mao at the Peasant Movement Training Institute in 1925-6, and is married to Ts'ai Ch'ang, the sister of Mao's best friend, Ts'ai Ho-sen. He has been Chairman of the State Planning Commission since 1954.

T'an Chen-lin (1902-), Politburo member and the Party's top agricultural spokesman in 1958, had espoused radical policies in the countryside at the time of the great Leap Forward. He was made a vice-premier of the State Council in April 1959.

Po I-po (1907-). Vice-Premier and Chairman of the State Economic Commission; he was not re-elected, even to the Central Committee, in 1969, and was extensively criticized during the Cultural Revolution for espousing the type of economic policies favoured by Liu Shao-ch'i.

Li Hsien-nien (c.190), Minister of Finance, Vice-premier, and member of the politburo.

9. A refrence to the New Fourth Army Incident in Southern Anhwei, and to P'eng's Hundred Regiments Offensive.

Hsiang Ying (1898-1941), a former labour leader, and Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Soviet Republic in the early 1930s, was political commissar of the New Fourth Army in central China.

10. In the spring of 1947, obeying the fundamental principle of guerrilla tactics, as laid down by Mao, that the aim of war is to destroy the enemy's forces rather than to hold territory for its own sake, the CPC abandoned its capital of Yenan without a struggle. This resulted in the separation of the top leadership into two groups, as enumerated by Mao, which lasted from March 1947 until May 1948.

11. Jen Pi-shih (1904-50) was a member of the Politburo at the time of his death, and had been closely associated with Mao since the 1940s.

12. Lo Jui-ch'ing (c. 1906-) was Minister of Public Security from 1949 to 1959. Thereafter he was Chief-of-Staff of the PLA up to the end of 1965.

13. Lu Ting-i (c 1901-), head of the CPC Propaganda Department until March 1966.

14. Yang Shang-k'un (c. 1905-), at this time an alternate member of the CPC Secretariat.

15. Ch'en Ch'i-han (c.1898-), a member of the CPC Central Control Commission, who retained his position on the Central Committee in 1969, was active in military and intelligence work at the time of the Seventh Congress in 1945.

16. Wang Chia-hsiang (1907-74) was like the other people comrade Mao's was discussing here, a member of the 'Returned student's faction', i.e, Wang Ming faction.

17. A reference to the revolt organised by Li Li-san against comrade Mao in December 1930. This is commonly known as Futien rebellion which began in the town of Tung-ku.

18. In August 1932, at the Ningtu conference comrade Mao was stripped of his control over the Red Army. He suggests here that Lo Fu (Chang Wen-t'ien) wanted to expel him from the Party as well, but that Chou En-lai and Chu Te opposed this.

19. At the Tsunyi Conference of January 1935, where comrade Mao's line was firmly established in the CPC, Ch'in Pang-hsien was replaced as Secretary-General by Chang Wen-t'ien. Without the co-operation of some of the Moscow-oriented faction, and of Chang in particular, Mao could obviously not have achieved as much as he did on this occasion in reorganizing the leadership of the Party.

20. Nieh Jung-chen (1899-) was Lin Piao's chief political officer during the Long March; after 1949, he occupied important positions in military and scientific work. He remains a Vice-Premier, and a member of the Central Committee.

21. Chang Chih-chung (1891-), a Nationalist general who had occupied many high posts under Chiang Kai-shek, was director of the Generalissimo's north-west headquarters from 1945 to 1949, when he switched his allegiance to the communists. After helping the new regime establish its authority in Sinkiang, he was appointed in 1954 Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Council in Peking.

22. Li Tsung-jen (1890-1969), acting president of the Kuomintang regime in early 1949, who returned to China from exile in the United States in 1965.

23. i.e., the reformers K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who supported the idea of a constitutional monarchy in the early years of the twentieth century.

THE SOVIET LEADING CLIQUE IS A MERE DUST HEAP

October 25, 1966

To the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour

Dear Comrades:

The Communist Party of China and the Chinese people send their warmest congratulations to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour.

We wish your congress every success!

The glorious Albanian Party of Labour, headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha, is firmly holding aloft the revolutionary red banner of Marxism-Leninism while encircled ring upon ring by the imperialists and the modern revisionists

Heroic people's Albania has become a great beacon of socialism in Europe.

The revisionist leading clique of the Soviet Union, the Tito clique of Yugoslavia, and all the other cliques of renegades and scabs of various shades are mere dust heaps in comparison, while you, a lofty mountain, tower to the skies. They are slaves and accomplices of imperialism, before which they prostrate themselves, while you are dauntless proletarian revolutionaries who dare to fight imperialism and its running dogs, fight the world's tyrannical enemies.

The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and all those countries where the modern revisionist clique is in power have either changed colour or are in the process of doing so. Capitalism has been or is being restored there, and the dictatorship of the proletariat has been or is being transformed into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Against this adverse current of counter-revolutionary revisionism, heroic socialist Albania has stood firm. Persevering in the Marxist Leninist revolutionary line, you have adopted a series of measures of revolutionization and consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat. Taking the path of socialism, you are building your country independently and have won brilliant victories. You have contributed precious experience to the history of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

'A bosom friend afar brings a distant land near. 'China and Albania are separated by thousands of mountains and rivers but our hearts are closely linked. We are your true friends and comrades. And you are ours. We are not like those false friends and double-dealers who have honey dripping from their tongues and daggers concealed in their hearts, and neither are you. Our militant revolutionary friendship has stood the test of violent storms.

The truth of Marxism-Leninism is on our side. The international proletariat is on our side. The oppressed nations and oppressed peoples are on our side. The masses of people who constitute over ninety per cent of the world's population are on our side. We have friends all over the world. We are not afraid of being isolated, and we most certainly can never be isolated. We are invincible. The handful of pitiful insects who oppose China and Albania are doomed to failure.

We are now in a great new era of world revolution. The revolutionary storms in Asia, Africa and Latin America are sure to deal the whole of the old world a decisive and crushing blow. The great victories of the Vietnamese people's war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation are convincing proof of this. The proletariat and working people of Europe, North America and Oceania are in the midst of a new awakening. The U.S. imperialists and all other such harmful insects have already created their own grave-diggers; the day of their burial cannot be far off.

Full text of comrade Mao's message of greetings to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour, dated 25 October 1966, (Peking Review, no.46, 1966, p.5.)

Naturally, the road of our advance is by no means straight and smooth. Comrades, please rest assured that whatever may happen in the world, our two Parties and our two peoples will always be united, will always fight together and be victorious together.

Let the Parties and peoples of China and Albania unite, let the Marxist-Leninists of the whole world unite and overthrow imperialism, modern revisionism, and the reactionaries of every country! A new world without imperialism, without capitalism, and without any system of exploitation is certain to be built.

TALK AT THE CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE

October 25, 1966

I have just a few words to say about two matters.

For the past seventeen years there is one thing which in my opinion we haven't done well. Out of concern for state security and in view of the lessons of Stalin in the Soviet Union, we set up a first and second line. I have been in the second line, other comrades in the first line. Now we can see that wasn't so good; as a result our forces were dispersed. When we entered the cities we could not centralize our efforts, and there were quite a few independent kingdoms. Hence, the Eleventh plenum carried out changes. This is one matter. I am in the second line. I do not take charge of day-to day work. Many things are left to other people so that other people's prestige is built up and when I go to see God there won't be such a big upheaval in the State. . Everybody was in agreement with this idea of mine. It seems that there are some things which the comrades in the first line have not managed too well. There are some things I should have kept a grip on which I did not. So I am responsible , we cannot just blame them. Why do I say that I bear some responsibility ?

First, it was I who proposed that the Standing Committee be divided into two lines and that a secretariat be set up. Everyone agreed with this. Moreover I put too much trust in others. It was at the time of the Twenty-three articles that my vigilance was aroused[1]. I could do nothing in Peking; I could do nothing at the Centre. Last September

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SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

and October I asked, if revisionism appeared at the Centre, what could the localities do[2]? I felt that my ideas couldn't be carried out in Peking. Why was the criticism of W'u Han initiated not in Peking but in Shanghai? Because there was nobody to do it in Peking. Now the problem of Peking has been solved.

Second, the Great Cultural Revolution wreaked havoc after I approved Nieh Yuan-tzu's big-character poster in Peking University and wrote a letter to Tsinghua University Middle School,[3] as well as writing a big character poster of my own entitled 'Bombard the Headquarters'[4]. It all happened within a very short period, less than five months in June, July, August, September and October. No wonder the comrades did not understand too much. The time was so short and the events so violent. I myself had not foreseen that as soon as the Peking University poster was broadcast, the whole country would be thrown into turmoil. Even before the letter to the Red Guards had gone out, Red Guards had mobilized throughout the country, and in one rush they swept you of your feet. Since it was I who caused the havoc, it is understandable if you have some bitter words for me. Last time we met I lacked confidence and I said that our decisions would not necessarily be carried out. Indeed all that time quite a few comrades still did not understand things fully, though now after a couple of months we have had some experience, and things are a bit better. This meeting has had two stages. In the first stage the speeches were not quite normal, but during the second stage, after speeches and the exchange of experience by comrades at the Centre, things went more smoothly and the ideas were understood a bit better. It has only been five months. Perhaps the movement may last another five months, or even longer.

Our democratic revolution went on for twenty-eight years; from 1921 to 1949. At first nobody knew how to conduct the revolution or how to carry on the struggle; only later did we acquire some experience. Our path gradually emerged in the course of practice. Did we not carry on for twenty-eight years, summarizing our experience as we went along? Have we not been carrying on the socialist revolution for seventeen years, whereas the Cultural Revolution has been going on for only five months? Hence we cannot ask comrades to understand so well now. Many comrades did not read the articles criticizing Wu Han last year and did not pay much attention to them. The articles criticizing the film *The Life of Wu Hsun* and studies of the novel *Dream of the Red Chamber* could not be grasped if taken separately, but only if taken as a whole. For this I am responsible. If you take them separately it is like treating only the head when you have a headache and treating only the feet when they hurt, the problem cannot be solved. During the first several months of this Great Cultural Revolution – in January, February, March, April and May - articles were written and the Centre issued directives, but they did not arouse all that much attention. It was the big-character posters and onslaughts of the Red Guards which drew your attention, you could not avoid it because the revolution was right on top of you. You must quickly summarize your experience and properly carry out political and ideological work. Why are we meeting again after two months? It is to summarize our experience and carry out political and ideological work. You also have a great deal of political and ideological work to do after you go back. The Political Bureau, the provincial committees, the regional committees and county committees must meet for ten days or more and thrash out the problems. But they mustn't think that everything can be cleared up. Some people have said, 'We understand the principles, but when we run up against concrete problems we cannot deal with them properly.' At first I could not understand why, if the principles, were clear, the concrete problems could not be dealt with. I can see some reason for this: it may be that political and ideological work has not been done properly. When you went back after our last meeting some places did not find time to hold proper meetings. In Honan there were ten secretaries. Out of the ten there were seven or eight who were receiving people. The Red Guards rushed in and caused havoc. The students were angry, but they did not realize it and had not prepared themselves to answer questions. They thought that to make a welcoming speech lasting a quarter of an hour or so would do. But the students were thoroughly enraged. The fact that there were a number of questions which they could not immediately answer put the secretaries on the defensive. Yet this defensive attitude can be changed, can be transformed so that they take the initiative.

Hence my confidence in this meeting has increased. I don't know what you think. If when you go back you do things according to the old system, maintaining the status quo, putting yourself in opposition to one group of Red Guards and letting another group hold sway, then I think things cannot change, the situation cannot improve. But I think things can change and things can improve. Of course we shouldn't expect too much. We can't be certain that the mass of central, provincial, regional, and county cadres should all be so enlightened. There will always be some who fail to understand, and there will be a minority on the opposite side. But I think it will be possible to make the majority understand.

I have talked about two matters. The first concerns history. For seventeen years the two lines have not been united. Others have some responsibility for this, so have I. The second issue is the five months of the Great Cultural Revolution, the fire of which I kindled. It has been going on only five months, not even half a year, a very brief span compared to the twenty-eight years of democratic revolution and the seventeen years of socialist revolution. So one can see why it has not been thoroughly understood and there were obstacles. Why hasn't it been understood? In the past you have only been in charge of industry, agriculture and communications and you have never carried out a Great Cultural Revolution. You in the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Military Affairs Committee are the same. That which you never dreamed of has come to pass. What's come has come. I think that there are advantages in being assailed. For so many years you had not thought about such things, but as soon as they burst upon you, you began to think. Undoubtedly you have made some mistakes, some mistakes of line, but they can be corrected and that will be that! Whoever wants to overthrow you? I don't, and I don't think the Red Guards do either. Two Red Guards said to Li Hsueh-feng: 'Can you imagine why our elders are so frightened of the Red Guards?' Then there were Wu Hsiu-ch'uan's four children who belonged to four different factions. Some of their school-friends went to his home, several dozen at a time, and this happened quite a few times. I think that there are advantages in making contact in small groups. Another method is to have big meetings, 1,500,000 meeting for several hours. Both methods serve a purpose.

There have been quite a few brief reports presented at this meeting. I have read nearly all of them. You find it difficult to cross this pass and I don't find it easy either. You are anxious and so am I. I cannot blame you, comrades, time has been so short. Some comrades say that they did not intentionally make mistakes, but did it because they were confused. This is pardonable. Nor can we put all the blame on Comrade Shao-ch'i and Comrade Hsiao-p'ing. They have some responsibility, but so has the Centre. The Centre has not run things properly. The time was so short. We were not mentally prepared for new problems. Political and ideological work was not carried out properly. I think that after this seventeen-day conference things will be a bit better.

Does anyone else want to speak? I guess that's all for today. The meeting is adjourned.

NOTES

1. i.e., when comrade Mao put forward his new twenty-three-point directive for the Socialist Education Campaign in January 1965, and Liu Shao-ch'i refused to accept it. (See note 1 on p 191 of this volume.)

2. According to an editorial published in August 1967, on the first anniversary of the Eleventh Plenum, comrade Mao at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo in September 1965 said: 'What are you going to do if revisionism appears in the Central Committee? This is highly likely. This is the greatest danger' [*Peking Review*, No. 33, 1967, p, 7.]

3. See p 276 of this volume

4. On 1 June 1966, comrade Mao ordered that a big-character poster written by Nieh Yuan-tzu, a lecturer at Peking University, be widely published and broadcast on the radio, thus giving the signal for the real beginning of the Cultural Revolution. On 5 August 1966, he wrote a poster of his own, entitled 'Bombard the Headquarters', which turned the assault against the Party leadership. (See p 290 of this volume.)

TALK AT A MEETING OF THE CENTRAL CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP

January 9, 1967

At the *Wen-hui-pao* the leftists have now seized power[1]. They rebelled on the fourth. *The Liberation Daily* also rebelled on the sixth. This is the right direction. I have read all three editions of the *Wen-hui-pao* since the seizure of power. They reprinted some articles by Red Guards. Some of them are good and should be reprinted elsewhere. On the fifth the *Wen-hui-pao* issued 'A Letter to the People of the Whole City'. *The People's Daily* should reprint it[2], and the radio stations should broadcast it. Internal rebellions are fine. In a few days we can make a general report on them. This is one class overthrowing another. This is a great revolution. Many papers in my opinion would be better closed down. But newspapers must still come out. The question is by whom they are brought out. It is good that the *Wen-hui-pao* and the *Liberation Daily* have changed management. As soon as they come out these two papers will certainly influence East China and every province and city in the country.

Before you make a revolution, you must first create public opinion. 'June First' was when power was seized in the *People's Daily*. The Centre sent a work team and put out the editorial 'Sweep Away All Monsters and Demons'[3]. I do not agree with the wholesale replacement of the staff of the *People's Daily*, but it had to be taken over. T'ang P'ing-shu replaced Wu Leng-hsi[4]. At first the masses were distrustful

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SOURCE: Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought, a Red Guard Publication.

because the *People's Daily* had deceived people in the past, and what's more it had issued no statement. The seizure of power in two newspapers is a national question and we should support their rebellion.

Our newspapers should reprint Red Guard articles. They are very well written whereas our stuff is utterly lifeless. The Propaganda Department of the Central Committee can be done away with, though those people can continue to eat there. There are many things which the Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Culture were unable to cope with. Even you (pointing to Comrade Ch'en Po-ta) and I could not cope with them. But when the Red Guards came they were immediately brought under control.

The upsurge of revolutionary power in Shanghai has brought hope to the whole country. It cannot fail to influence the whole of East China and all provinces and cities in the country. 'A Letter to the People of the Whole City' is a rare example of a good article. It refers to the city of Shanghai but the problem it discussed is of national significance.

In making revolution these days people demand this and that. When we made revolution from 1920 onwards we set up first the Youth League and then the Communist Party. We had no funds, no printing press, no bicycles. When we ran newspapers we were very friendly with the workers and chatted with them as we edited articles.

We should establish links with all sorts of people, left, right and centre. I have never agreed with a unit being all that pure in its approach. (Someone responded: 'Wu Leng-hsi's lot are now very comfortable. They have put on weight.') We have allowed Wu Leng-hsi to become too comfortable. I am not in favour of their dismissal. Let them remain at their posts to be supervised by the masses.

When we started to make revolution it was opportunism which we met with, not Marxism-Leninism. When I was young I hadn't even read the *Communist Manifesto*.

We must speak of grasping revolution and promoting production. We must not make revolution in isolation from production. The conservative faction do not grasp production. This is a class struggle. You must not believe that 'When Chang the Butcher is dead, we'll have to eat pork bristles and all', or that we can do nothing without them. Don't believe that sort of rubbish.

NOTES

1. The 'seizure of power' at the Shanghai *Wen-hui-pao* was the first act in the 'January Strom'. Shanghai, the cradle of the Chinese Communist revolution, possessing the largest and most politically experienced working class in the nation, was the site of the Cultural Revolution's most important victory in January 1967. It was then that the Shanghai working class united to seize power from the old bureaucratic Party organization in an action that became the model for the whole country.

By October 1966 only a few thousand rebels existed out of a total of one million industrial workers in the city. Shanghai workers had always been highly politicized and were loyal to the Communist Party. It was logical, therefore, that the Shanghai workers would approach with caution any call for an attack on officials of a party which they had supported over the years with so much sacrifice and enthusiasm.

Nevertheless, by December 1966, 60,000 workers responded to Chairman Mao's call and joined the Workers' Rebel Headquarters, while an equal number of workers supported the "royalist" or conservative Workers' Red Militia, an organization built by the functionaries of the Li Shao-chi followers. Clashes between the two groups were frequent, but by the end of December a wholesale defection by the members of the conservative organizations ensued, and the collapse of the Workers' Red Militia followed.

It was at this point that the Party officials in the old Shanghai Municipal Committee, plant managers, heads of bureaus under siege by the rebels, and district Party chiefs counterattacked, using methods that caught comrade Mao and his colleagues in Peking completely unawares. First, the old entrenched cadres, who were skilled organizers, initiated a movement among their followers in the now-defunct Workers' Red Militia to demand wage increases and foment strikes throughout the city. Second, those holding power in the city opened up the municipal and industrial coffers to grant millions of yuan in wage increases, bonuses, and grants in an all-out attempt to buy off the Shanghai working class. Factories were closed, railroads and shipping were paralyzed, and serious power shortages plagued the greatest industrial city in China.

The revolutionary rebels responded to the crisis by in effect seizing power. Rank-and-file workers and students manned ticket booths at the railway stations, factory workers stood triple shifts in the industrial plants, and thousands of volunteers appeared at the docks to help unload cargo. New institutions of power were hastily created in the classic revolutionary pattern. The remarkably high level of revolutionary consciousness achieved by the masses of Shanghai was demonstrated when the hoodwinked workers voluntarily returned the money illegally dispensed by the old

Shanghai Party bureaucrats. At mass meetings organized throughout Shanghai, the guilty functionaries were forced to stand with head bowed as the workers showered them with paper money until the enemy stood knee-deep in the shameful currency.

Comrade Mao, watching the situation in Shanghai closely, recognized that the workers in Shanghai had in fact seized power: he was the first to name what had happened "a power seizure from below."

2. This was in fact done on the very day on which Comrade Mao was speaking. The text with Pepole's Daily's Editors note is given below:

[Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)] Editor's Note: The Message to All Shanghai People." published in the *Shanghai Wenhui Pao* on January 5, 1967, is an extremely important document. It holds high the great red banner of the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao and sounds a clarion call to continue the vigorous counter-offensive upon the bourgeois reactionary line. It resolutely responds to Chairman Mao's great call to take firm hold of the revolution and promote production and raises the current key question in the great proletarian cultural revolution. This question does not just concern Shanghai alone but the whole country as well.

With the growth of the revolutionary forces in Shanghai, the Wenhui Pao and *Jiefang Ribao (Liberation Daily)* have appeared as two completely new and revolutionary newspapers. They are products of the victory of the proletarian revolutionary line over the bourgeois reactionary line. This is a great event in the history of the development of the great proletarian cultural revolution in China. This is a great revolution. This great event will certainly play a tremendous role in pushing ahead the development of the movement of the great proletarian cultural revolution throughout east China and in all the cities and provinces in other parts of the country.]

MESSAGE TO ALL SHANGHAI PEPOLE

Under the guidance of the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao, the great proletarian cultural revolution has won tremendous victories in the mass movement over the last few months in the criticism of the bourgeois reactionary line. We have entered the year 1967 to the sound of militant songs of triumph. It was pointed out in the New Year's Day editorial of *Renmin Ribao* and the journal *Hongqui*: "1967 will be a year of all-round development of class struggle throughout China. It will be a year in which the proletariat, united with other sections of the revolutionary masses, will launch a general attack on the handful of Party persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, and on the ghosts and monsters in society. It will be a year of even more penetrating criticism and repudiation of the bourgeois reactionary line and elimination of its influence. It will be a year of decisive victory in carrying out the struggle [to overthrow those in authority who are taking the capitalist road], the criticism and repudiation [of the reactionary bourgeois academic `authorities' and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes] and the transformation [of education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base]." In other words, it will be a year in which the bourgeois reactionary line will totally collapse and disintegrate completely, a year in which the great proletarian cultural revolution will win a great, decisive victory.

The broad revolutionary masses of Shanghai have also won an initial victory in the struggle to criticize and repudiate the bourgeois reactionary line implemented by a handful of people within the Party in the Shanghai area and have carried the struggle to a deeper and broader new stage.

The mass movement of the great proletarian cultural revolution in our Shanghai factories is surging forward vigorously, smashing through all resistance with the might of an avalanche and the force of a thunderbolt. We, workers of the revolutionary rebel groups, follow Chairman Mao's teachings most closely and resolutely carry out the policy of ***"taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production"*** advanced by Chairman Mao himself. Chairman Mao teaches us: ***"Political work is the life-blood of all economic work."*** We of the revolutionary rebel groups clearly understand that if the great proletarian cultural revolution is not carried out well, we will lose our orientation in production and slide back in the direction of capitalism. What we ourselves have experienced in the course of the great proletarian cultural revolution has increasingly proved to us that only if the great proletarian cultural revolution is carried out well, will production develop on a still greater scale. Any idea of counterposing the great cultural revolution to the development of production is erroneous.

However, a handful of Party persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road and those who obstinately adhere to the bourgeois reactionary line have a bitter hatred for the great proletarian cultural revolution. They have been trying by every means to resist the policy of ***"taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production"*** put forward by Chairman Mao. Their schemes and devices may be summarized in the following ways:

At the beginning of the movement, they used the pretext of "taking firm hold of production" to repress the revolution and oppose taking firm hold of the revolution. When we workers of the revolutionary rebel groups wanted to rise up in revolution and criticize and repudiate the bourgeois reactionary line, they used the tasks of production to bring pressure to bear on the workers and tagged us with the label of "sabotaging production." Did they really want to "take firm hold of production"? No, they wanted to defend their own positions and attempted to obstruct our revolution. We exposed their schemes and rose up bravely in rebellion.

Then they resorted to another trick, that is, they played with high-sounding revolutionary words, giving the appearance of being exceedingly "Left" in order to incite large numbers of members of the Workers' Red Militia Detachments whom they have hoodwinked to undermine production and sabotage transport and communications under the pretext of going north to "lodge complaints." They did this to attain their aim of undermining the great proletarian cultural revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. More recently, a handful of reactionary elements were even plotting to cut off water and electricity supplies and bring public transport to a standstill. We must drag out these reactionary elements and exercise proletarian dictatorship over them, punish them severely and never allow them to succeed in their criminal schemes.

Comrade revolutionary workers! Go into action at once! Resolutely carry out the policy of ***"taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production"*** advanced by Chairman Mao! We, workers of the revolutionary rebel groups, must become models in ***"taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production."*** We must serve as the vanguards and the backbone not only in taking firm hold of the revolution, but also in promoting production. Our city of Shanghai, China's biggest industrial producer, plays an extremely important role in the overall economic life of the country. But lately, in many factories and plants, it has occurred that some or even the majority of the members of the Workers' Red Militia Detachments have suspended production and deserted their posts in production. This runs directly counter to the stipulation by the Party Central Committee on taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production and directly affects the people's livelihood and the development of national economic construction. Our revolutionary rebel workers, bearing in mind the teachings of Chairman Mao, have stood our ground in the face of this adverse current, have given proof of our high sense of revolutionary responsibility, and, under extremely difficult conditions, have shouldered all the production tasks of our factories and plants, thus dealing a telling blow against the handful of Party persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, and smashing their big plot by which they attempted to thwart the revolution through sabotaging production. The actions of these workers are correct and splendid! All of us comrades of the revolutionary rebel groups should learn from them.Chairman Mao teaches us: **"We should support whatever the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy supports."** We, workers of the revolutionary rebel groups, have the lofty aspiration, the determination and the strength to do still better in both revolution and production and to carry out

Chairman Mao's great call for ***"taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production."***

The broad sections of our class brothers of the Workers' Red Militia Detachments who want to make revolution! ***"Taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production"*** is a policy put forward by Chairman Mao, a policy stressed time and again by the Party Central Committee, an important policy which guarantees the carrying through to the end of the great proletarian cultural revolution. To support or not to support, to carry out or not to carry out this policy is itself a matter of principle, a cardinal issue of right and wrong. In allowing yourselves to be incited by those people [Party persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road-Tr.] and by deserting your posts in production, whose interests are you serving? By acting in this way, whose hearts, after all, are you gladdening and whose are you saddening? We hope that you will follow Chairman Mao's teachings, that, on this important question of principle, you will see things more clearly, make a clear distinction between right and wrong, stop being deceived, wake up quickly, return to your posts in production, and return to the proletarian revolutionary line. We, comrades of the revolutionary rebel groups, will certainly warmly welcome you back to make revolution along with us and improve production with us. We will certainly not blame you, because we are all close class brothers, and because the overwhelming majority of you are victims of the bourgeois reactionary line, are revolutionary masses who have been hoodwinked by those within the Party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road and by those who are stubbornly following the bourgeois reactionary line.

All revolutionary students and revolutionary government cadres of the city! Let us closely unite with the masses of revolutionary workers, and in order to carry out resolutely the policy of ***"taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production"*** put forward by Chairman Mao, let us undertake widespread propaganda work and struggle, open fire fiercely and with still greater resolve at the bourgeois reactionary line, crush all new counter-attacks by the bourgeois reactionary line and launch a new upsurge in the great proletarian cultural revolution in the factories and plants!

In the boundless brilliance of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung, we look towards the future and see the magnificent prospect of the revolution. We are the working class, poor and lower-middle peasants, and all working people must unite with the revolutionary students, intellectuals and cadres, must make a common effort, fight shoulder to shoulder and continue our victorious advance so as to carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end!

Long live the great proletarian cultural revolution!

Long live the red sun in our hearts, the greatest leader Chairman Mao and long life, long, long life to him!

The Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters and ten other revolutionary mass organizations, January 4, 1967.

3. *"Sweep Away All Monsters and Demons"*

(Text of the Peoples Daily Editorial)

An upsurge is occurring in the great proletarian cultural revolution in socialist China whose population accounts for one quarter of the world's total.

For the last few months, in response to the militant call of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao, hundreds of millions of workers, peasants and soldiers and vast numbers of revolutionary cadres and intellectuals, all armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought, have been sweeping away a horde of monsters that have entrenched themselves in ideological and cultural positions. With the tremendous and impetuous force of a raging storm, they have smashed the shackles imposed on their minds by the exploiting classes for so long in the past, routing the bourgeois "specialists," "scholars," "authorities" and "venerable masters" and sweeping every bit of their prestige into the dust.

Chairman Mao has taught us that class struggle does not cease in China after the socialist transformation of the system of ownership has in the main been completed. He said:

The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between different political forces, and the class struggle in the ideological field between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will continue to be long and tortuous and at times will even become very acute. The proletariat seeks to transform the world according to its own world outlook, and so does the bourgeoisie. In this respect, the question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism, is still not really settled.

The class struggle in the ideological field between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie has been very acute right through the sixteen years since China's liberation. The current great socialist cultural revolution is precisely a continuation and development of this struggle. The struggle is inevitable. The ideology of the proletariat and the ideology of all the exploiting classes are diametrically opposed to each other and cannot coexist in peace. The proletarian revolution is a revolution to abolish all exploiting classes and all systems of exploitation; it is a most thoroughgoing revolution to bring about the gradual elimination of the differences between workers and peasants, between town and country, and between mental and manual laborers. This cannot but meet with the most stubborn resistance from the exploiting classes.

In every revolution the basic question is that of state power. In all branches of the superstructure ideology, religion, art, law, state power – the central issue is state power. State power means everything, Without it, all will be lost. Therefore, no matter how many problems have to be tackled after the conquest of state power, the proletariat must never forget state power, never forget its orientation and never lose sight of the central issue. Forgetting about state power means forgetting about politics, forgetting about the basic theses of Marxism and switching to economism, anarchism and utopianism and becoming muddle-headed. In the last analysis, the class struggle in the ideological field between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a struggle for leadership. The exploiting classes have been disarmed and deprived of their authority by the people, but their reactionary ideas remain rooted in their minds. We have overthrown their rule and confiscated their property, but this does not mean that we have rid their minds of reactionary ideas as well. During the thousands of years of their rule over the working people, the exploiting classes monopolized the culture created by the working people and in turn used it to deceive, fool and benumb the working people in order to consolidate their reactionary state power. For thousands of years, theirs was the dominant ideology which inevitably exerted widespread influence in society. Not reconciled to the overthrow of their reactionary rule, they invariably try to make use of this influence of theirs surviving from the past to shape public opinion in preparation for the political and economic restoration of capitalism. The uninterrupted struggle on the ideological and cultural front in the sixteen years from liberation up to the current exposure of the black anti-Party and anti-socialist line of the "Three-Family Villages," big and small, has been a struggle between the forces attempting restoration and the forces opposing restoration.

In order to seize state power, the bourgeoisie during the period of the bourgeois revolution likewise started with ideological preparations by launching the bourgeois cultural revolution. Even the bourgeois revolution, which replaced one exploiting class by another, had to undergo repeated reversals and witness many struggles – revolution, then restoration and then the overthrow of restoration. It took many European countries hundreds of years to complete their bourgeois revolutions from the start of the ideological preparations to the final conquest of state power. Since the proletarian revolution is a revolution aimed at completely ending all systems of exploitation, it is still less permissible to imagine that the exploiting classes will meekly allow the proletariat to deprive them of all their privileges without seeking to restore their rule. The surviving members of these classes who are unreconciled will inevitably, as Lenin put it, throw themselves with a tenfold furious passion into the battle for the recovery of their lost paradise. The fact that the Khrushchev revisionist clique has usurped the leadership of the Party, army and state in the Soviet Union is an extremely serious lesson for the proletariat throughout the world. At present the representatives of the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois "scholars" and "authorities" in China are dreaming precisely of restoring capitalism. Though their political rule has been toppled, they are still desperately trying to maintain their academic "authority," mold public opinion for a comeback and win over the masses, the youth and the generations yet unborn from us.

The anti-feudal cultural revolution waged by the bourgeoisie ended as soon as it had seized power. The proletarian cultural revolution, however, is a cultural revolution against the ideology of all exploiting classes. This cultural revolution is entirely different from the bourgeois cultural revolution. It is only after the creation of the political, economic and cultural prerequisites following the capture of state power by the proletariat that the broadest road is opened up for the proletarian cultural revolution.

The proletarian cultural revolution is aimed not only at demolishing all the old ideology and culture and all the old customs and habits, which, fostered by the exploiting classes, have poisoned the minds of the people for thousands of years, but also at creating and fostering among the masses an entirely new ideology and culture and entirely new customs and habits – those of the proletariat. This great task of transforming customs and habits is without any precedent in human history. As for all the heritage, customs and habits of the feudal and bourgeois classes, the proletarian world outlook must be used to subject them to thoroughgoing criticism. It takes time to clear away the evil habits of the old society from among the people. Nevertheless, our experience since liberation proves that the transformation of customs and habits can be accelerated if the masses are fully mobilized, the mass line is implemented and the transformation is made into a genuine mass movement.

As the bourgeois cultural revolution served only a small number of people, i.e., the new exploiting class, only a small number of people could participate in it. The proletarian cultural revolution, however, serves the broad masses of the working people and is in the interests of the working people who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population. It is therefore able to attract and unite the broad masses of the working people to take part in it. The bourgeois individuals who carried out the enlightenment invariably looked down upon the masses, treated them as a mob and considered themselves as the predestined masters of the people. In sharp contrast, proletarian ideological revolutionaries serve the people heart and soul with the object of awakening them, and work for the interests of the broadest masses.

The bourgeoisie, with its base selfishness, is unable to suppress its hatred for the masses. Marx said:

> *The peculiar nature of the material it [political economy] deals with, summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the furies of private interest.*

This also holds for the bourgeoisie when it has been overthrown.

The scale and momentum of the great proletarian cultural revolution now being carried on in China have no parallel in history, and the tremendous drive and momentum and boundless wisdom of the working people manifested in the movement far exceed the imagination of the lords of the bourgeoisie. Facts have eloquently proved that Mao Tse-tung's thought becomes a moral atom bomb of colossal power once it takes hold of the masses. The current great cultural revolution is immensely advancing the socialist cause of the Chinese people and undoubtedly exerting an incalculable, far-reaching influence upon the present and future of the world.

The stormy cultural revolution now under way in our country has thrown the imperialists, the modern revisionists and the reactionaries of all countries into confusion and panic. At one moment, they indulge in wishful thinking saying that our great cultural revolution has shown that there are hopes of "a peaceful evolution" on the part of China's younger generation. A moment later, they become pessimistic, saying that all this has shown that Communist rule remains very stable. Then again, they seem to be fearfully puzzled, saying that it will never be possible to find genuine "China hands" who can promptly pass accurate judgment on what is taking place in China. Dear sirs, your wishful thinking invariably runs counter to the march of the history. The triumphant progress of this great and unparalleled cultural revolution of the proletariat is already sounding the death knell not only of the remnant capitalist forces on Chinese soil, but of imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction. Your days are numbered.

Illuminated by the great Mao Tse-tung's thought, let us carry the proletarian cultural revolution through to the end. Its victory will certainly further strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country, guarantee the completion of the socialist revolution on all fronts and ensure our successful transition from socialism to triumphant communism!

4. Wu Leng-hsi (e.1915-) had been editor of ***People's Daily*** since 1957; he had participated in the deliberations of P'eng Chengs 'Group of Five'. In late 1972, he reappeared as a 'leading member' of the editorial staff, though no longer as editor. T'ang P'ing-shu was an ultra-leftist, purged in 1968 with the Wang Li faction.

TALK AT THE ENLARGED MEETING OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION

January 27, 1967

(Transmitted by Premier Chou)

1. The armed forces' attitude towards the great Cultural Revolution. At first they chose non-involvement, but they were in fact involved in such ways as documents being sent to them for safe keeping and some cadres going [to work] among the units. In the present situation, when the struggle between the two lines has become extremely acute, they cannot stay aloof and their participation must mean their support of the left.

2. Most of the old comrades have so far failed to come to grips with the great Cultural Revolution. They have lived on their 'capital', depended on their past records. They should discipline and reform themselves in this movement and set up new records and make new contributions. (At this juncture Chairman quotes from Ch'u Che's audience with the Queen of Chao in the *Chan Kuo Ts'e.*) They must resolutely stand on the side of the left; they must not try to muddle through; they must firmly support the left. Then they must do their work well under the control and supervision of the left.

SOURCE: an anthology without a title.

3. With regard to the power struggle in the newspapers, it is a struggle for power against the capitalist 'roaders' and the faction in authority and against the die-hards of the bourgeois reactionary line. How else can [we] struggle for power? Now it seems that [we] should carefully divide... [and] take over power before other things can be done. [We] must not be metaphysical [superficial?] about it. Otherwise [we] shall be constrained. After the struggle for power [we] should examine the true nature of the faction in authority and then pass judgment on it and we should report it to the State Council for approval.

4. The old cadres before the power struggle and the [new] cadres after it should co-operate in working together and preserve the secret of the state.

TALKS AT THREE MEETINGS WITH COMRADES CHANG CH'UN-CH'IAO AND YAO WEN-YUAN[1]

February 1967

Chairman Mao invited Comrades Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan[2] to come to Peking from 12 to 18 February, and met them three times within a week. Even before they had arrived at the airport the Chairman inquired whether they had arrived or not, and when the airport comrades said they would soon be there, the Chairman waited for them in the doorway. They had no sooner arrived than the Chairman asked, 'What is this with the First, Second and Third Regiments? They have come here making accusations against you.

From February to April is a crucial period for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. During these three months, the Great Cultural Revolution ought to start taking shape.

In general, the work in Shanghai is very good. At the time of the An-t'ing incident, isn't it true that only 1,000–2,000 workers of Shanghai went there at first? Now, the number has reached one million! This illustrates that Shanghai's workers have been mobilized rather successfully.

Our present revolution – the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution– is a revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and we have launched it ourselves. This is because a portion of the structure of proletarian dictatorship has been usurped and no longer belongs to the proletariat, but to the bourgeoisie. Thus, we had to make revolution. The Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group must ponder over it and write articles. This is called "Revolution Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." This is a very important theoretical problem.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

The Chairman said that for the purpose of seizing power the 'Three-way Alliances' were essential[3]. Fukien, Kweichow and Inner Mongolia did not present big problems, though there might be a little disorder there. In Shansi at present 53 per cent were revolutionary masses, 27 per cent army, and 20 per cent cadres from various organs. Shanghai ought to learn from them. The January Revolution had succeeded, but February, March and April were more crucial, more important. The Chairman said: 'The slogan of "Doubt everything and overthrow everything" is reactionary. The Shanghai People's Committee demanded that the Premier of the State Council should do away with all heads. This is extreme anarchism, it is most reactionary. If instead of calling someone the "head" of something we call him "orderly" or "assistant", this would really be only a formal change. In reality there will still always be "heads". It is the content which matters.

'There is a slogan in Honan, "The present-day proletarian dictatorship must be completely changed." This is a reactionary slogan.'

The slogan "doubt everything and down with everything" is reactionary. Those who want to doubt everything and overthrow everything are bound to head in the opposite direction, and will be overthrown in a matter of days. (We have here some units which won't even have deputy section chiefs. People who don't want to have deputy section chiefs cannot last more than a few days.)

We must trust over 95 percent of the masses, and then over 95 percent of the cadres will follow us. China has a sizable petty bourgeoisie, and the number of middle peasants is rather large. In urban areas, the number of petty bourgeoisie, small handicraftsmen, including small business owners, is considerable. If we prove to be adept in leading, they will also follow us. We must trust the vast majority.

It would be very difficult for a college student who has just graduated, or one who hasn't yet graduated, to lead a municipality or to manage Shanghai municipality. I don't think he would be qualified to be a college president either. In the case of college president, school conditions are complex, especially to one who has just graduated or hasn't yet graduated. In my estimation, he may not even qualify to be a department head. A department head must have some scholarship! Since you haven't yet completed your academic work, or have only just graduated, you have no teaching experience and no experience in administering a department. We have already trained a number of assistants and lecturers to serve as department heads. A few persons should be selected from among the original leadership cadres. We cannot completely dispense with the old personnel. [Are you] afraid Chou Ku-ch'eng[4] is no longer any good? That Chou Ku-ch'eng will no longer be able to teach?

The Paris Commune, – did we not all say that to institute a Paris Commune is to institute a new political power? The Paris Commune was founded in 1871, almost 96 years ago. If the Paris Commune had not failed, but had been successful, then in my opinion, it would have become by now a bourgeois commune. This is because it was impossible for the French bourgeoisie to allow France's working class to have so much political power. That is the case of the Paris Commune. In regard to the form of soviet political power, as soon as it materialized, Lenin was elated, deeming it a remarkable creation by workers, peasants and soldiers, as well as a new form proletarian dictatorship. Nonetheless, Lenin had not anticipated then that although the workers, peasants and soldiers could use this form of political power, it could also be used by the bourgeoisie, and by Khrushchev. Thus, the present soviet has been transformed from Lenin's soviet to Khrushchev's soviet.

Britain is a monarchy. Doesn't it have a king? The U.S. has a presidential system. They are both the same, being bourgeois dictatorships. The puppet regime of South Vietnam has a president, and bordering it is Shanouk's Royal Kingdom of Cambodia. Which is better? I am afraid Sihanouk is somewhat better. India has a presidential system; its neighbor, Nepal, is a kingdom. Which country is better? It would seem that the kingdom is somewhat better than India. This is judging by their present performances. In the case of ancient China's three kings and five emperors, they were called kings in the Chou dynasty, emperors in the Ch'in dynasty. The First Emperor of Ch'in (Ch'in-Shih-huang) assumed all the titles of three kings and five emperors. It was called Heavenly King in the T'ai-p'ing Heavenly Kingdom, while T'ang T'ai-tsung also called himself

Heavenly Emperor. So you see, titles have changed over and over again. What we want to see is not the changing of titles, because the problem lies not with title, but with practice; not with form, but with content.

Titles must not be changed too frequently; we don't emphasize names, but emphasize practice; not form, but content. That fellow Wang Mang of the Han dynasty was addicted to changing names. As soon as he became emperor, he changed all the titles of government offices, like many of us who have a dislike for the title "chief." He also changed the names of all counties in the country. This is like our Red Guards who have changed almost all the street names of Peking, making it impossible for us to remember them. We still remember their former names. It became difficult for Wang Mang to issue edicts and orders, because the people did not know what changes had been made. This form of popular drama can be used either by China or by foreign countries, by the proletariat or by the bourgeoisie.

The principal experiences are the Paris Commune and the soviet. We can imagine that the [name] People's Republic of China can be used by both classes. If we should be overthrown and the bourgeoisie came to power, they would have no need to change the name, but would still call it the People's Republic of China... The main thing is which class seizes political power. That is the fundamental question, not what its name is.

I think we should be more stable and should not change all the names. This is because this would give rise to the question of changing the political system, to the question of the state system, and to the question of the name of the country. Would you want to change [the name] to the Chinese People's commune! Should the Chairman of the People's Republic of China be called director or commune leader? Not only this problem, but another problem would arise. That is, if there is a change, it will be followed by the question of recognition or nonrecognition by foreign countries. When the name of a country is changed, foreign ambassadors will lose their credentials, new ambassadors will be exchanged and recognition will be given anew. I surmise that the Soviet Union would not extend recognition. This is because she would not dare to recognize, since recognition might cause troubles for the soviet. How could there be a Chinese People's Commune? It would be rather embarrassing to them, but the bourgeois nations might recognize it.

If everything were changed into commune, then what about the party? Where would we place the party? Among commune committee members are both party members and non-party members. Where would we place the party committee? There must be a party somehow! There must be a nucleus, no matter what we call it. Be it called the Communist party, or social democratic party, or Kuomintang, or I-kuan-tao, it must have a party. The commune must have a party, but can the commune replace the party?

I think we had better not change the name, and not call it commune. It would be better to observe the old method. We still should have the People's Congress and elect people's councils in the future. Any change in name is a change in form, and does not solve the problem of content. When we set up temporary power structures, do we not still call them revolutionary committees? The the controlling organs in schools can become cultural revolutionary committees or cultural revolutionary leading teams. The Sixteen Articles specify this.

The people of Shanghai like the people's commune very much, and like that name very much. What should we do? Shouldn't you go back and do some consultation? There are several methods that we can use: one of them is to make no change, and go on calling it the Shanghai People's Commune. The advantage of this method is that it could safeguard the enthusiasm of Shanghai's people, since they like this commune. The shortcomings of this is that yours would be the only one in the entire country, and so won't you be rather isolated? For now don't announce in *Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily]* that everyone wants to call it People's Commune. If the Central Committee should recognize People's Commune and publish it in the Jen-min *Jih-pao*, then the name will be used throughout the country. Why should only Shanghai be allowed to call it so, and we cannot? This would make it rather difficult. Thus, there are both advantages and shortcomings in not changing the name. The second method is to change it throughout the country. This would necessitate a change in the political system and in the country's name. Some people might not recognize it, and much trouble might ensue. Moreover, it wouldn't have any meaning, and no practical significance. The third method is to go ahead and change it, thus conforming with the entire country. Of course, you could change it in the near future or later on, not necessarily right now. But if you people still say that you don't wish to change, then you may just as well call it this name for some time. What do you think? Does it make sense?

There is another series of problems which you may not have considered. Many places have now applied to the Centre to establish people's communes. A document has been issued by the Centre saying that no place apart from Shanghai may set up people's communes. The Chairman is of the opinion that Shanghai ought to make a change and transform itself into a revolutionary committee or a city committee or a city people's committee.

[Chairman Mao said:] 'I've read Liu Shao-ch'i's *How to be a Good Communist*[6] several times. It is anti-Marxist-Leninist. Our method of struggle should now be on a higher level. We shouldn't keep on saying, "Smash their dogs' heads, down with X X X." I think that university students should make a deeper study of things and choose a few passages to write some critical articles about.'

From now on, we should not advocate the slogan of "down with the diehard elements who uphold the bourgeois reactionary line," but rather "down with those in power taking the capitalist road."

Generally speaking the work of Shanghai is excellent. When you went there last time, weren't there only some 100-200 persons? By now it has reached more than one million. The workers have organized nearly one million people which illustrates that Shanghai's worker masses have been more fully mobilized.

I have seen the "Urgent Directive" of the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group on dealing with the question of the Shanghai Red Revolutionary Committee[7] It was very well written, being imbued with the spirit of the rebels. Its last point says "necessary measures shall be taken. If that meeting is held to bombard Chang Ch'un-ch'iao we will certainly take the necessary steps and arrest people.'

(The Shanghai People's) Commune has been too soft on the question of suppressing counterrevolutionaries. Someone complained to me that when people were apprehended by the bureau of public security, they would enter through the front door and be released through the back door.

There are a number of accounts still outstanding which must be settled later. First, the demand made to the Premier by the Municipal People's Committee; second, the question of the Red Revolutionaries;

third, the broadening of the revolution to oppose the military seizure of the radio stations; fourth, the opposition to military control at Lunghua Airfield[8].

There is a quotation which is currently used a great deal: 'The world is ours.' This was said by the Chairman in 1920[9]. He can't altogether remember it himself and it should not be used in future.

The Chairman asked: 'Is Tungchi University still at the stations and docks?[10] Comrade Chang Ch'un-ch'iao replied: 'They still are.' The Chairman then asked: 'Were they still there when you came?' Chang Ch'un-ch'iao replied: 'I'm not sure.' The Chairman said: 'That's excellent. In the past the students had not really united with the workers. Only now have they really united with them.'

The people in literature and the arts should return to their own units to carry out the Cultural Revolution.

[The Chairman remarked:] 'The *Wen-hui-pao* has done very well. I completely agree with their point of view on the struggle with neighbourhood cadres and I support them.' Comrade Chang Ch'un-ch'iao said: 'The *Wen-hui-pao* exerts a lot of pressure.' The Chairman said: 'We must support them.'

NOTES

1. The source states that this article was based on the tape-recorded draft of Comrade Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's speech at the Shanghai People's Square on 24 February and on some pertinent handbills. Whether every word is Chairman Mao's original word is difficult to ascertain, and so this is for reference only.

2. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, a secretary of the Shanghai Party committee, had helped to arrange for the publication of Yao Wen-yuan's attack on Wu Han in November 1965. Thereafter he rose rapidly, becoming a member of the Cultural Revolution Group in the summer of 1966, and a Politburo Member in 1969. He and Yao Wen-yuan were the two principal leaders of the 'Shanghai Commune' which had been formed on 5 February 1967.

While the general thrust of Mao's remarks on this occasion is plain enough, the rather terse record of the main points of his conversations with Chang and Yao contained in the text includes allusions to a great many details of the complex and rapidly changing situation in Shanghai in January and February 1967. The First, Second, and Third Regiments (of Workers in the Northern Expedition) were organizations loyal to Keng Chin-chang, a leader later denounced as an ultra-leftist, who was contending with Chang Ch'un ch'iao in early 1967 for control of the situation in Shanghai. Keng was said to have visited Peking in late December 1966; in early February 1967, he sent to Peking emissaries who were received by Chou En-lai and handed to him detailed accusations against Chang and his Workers' Headquarters.

3. This was the formula put forward in January 1967 for the 'seizure of power' by 'Revolutionary Committees'. Comrade Mao said: "The basis experience of revolutionary committees is this –they are threefold: they have representatives of revolutionary cadres, representatives of the armed forces, and representatives of the revolutionary masses. This forms a revolutionary "three-in-one" combination. The revolutionary committee should exercise unified leadership, eliminate redundant or overlapping administrative structures, follow the policy of better troops and simpler administration and organize a revolutionized leading group which keeps in contact with the masses."

4. For Chou Ku-cheng see note 14 on p 143 of this volume.

5. For Sixteen Articles see note 1 on p 282 of this volume.

6. Liu Shao-ch'i's work of 1939, which had been re-issued in revised form in 1962, was known under this title in English, prior to the Cultural Revolution. It was the quintessential expression of his revisionist and careerist thinking. Since that time, the title has been translated literally as *On the Self-Cultivation of Communists (Self-Cultivation* for short).

7. This refers to the urgent telegram sent to Shanghai by the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee on 29 January 1967, criticizing the Red Revolutionaries (see note below) for turning the spearhead of the struggle against Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan, rather than against the old Party leadership headed by former Mayor Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, and threatening them with 'all necessary action' if they persisted in their errors.

8. The demand by the Municipal People's Committee is presumably that criticized by Mao. 'Red Revolutionaries' is the abbreviation for the Revolutionary Committee of Red Guards from Shanghai Schools and Universities, one of the principal signatories of the 'Urgent Notice' denouncing 'economism' put out by thirty-two 'Rebel' organizations in Shanghai on 9 January 1967. This group, the

strongest of all student organizations in the city, opposed Chang Ch'un-ch'iao until ordered to desist by the telegram of 29 January from the Centre mentioned in note 7. The establishment of PLA control over broadcasting stations had been called for in the Central Committee circulars of 11 and 23 January 1967. The second of these opened the door to possible conflict by stipulating: 'When the proletarian revolutionaries are able to control the situation, military control should end.' Military control of the civil aviation system was ordered by the State Council on 26 January 1967. This apparently encountered opposition at Lunghua Airfield in Shanghai.

9. This is a quotation taken from Comrade Mao's article "To The Glory of The Hans" written in 1919 [For the article see *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* Vol.VI, pp 10-11].

10. The 'Mao Tse-tung's Thought Red Guards' "East is Red" General Headquarters of T'ungchi University', were supporters of Chang Chun-chiao.

SPEECH TO THE ALBANIAN MILITARY DELEGATION

May 1, 1967

I once said at a rally of 7,000 people in 1962[1]: "In the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism, it is yet uncertain as to which will win and which will be defeated, it being highly possible that revisionism will triumph and we will be defeated. We used the possibility of defeat to alert the public, and we found this to be highly conducive to heightening our vigilance against revisionism, as well as to preventing and opposing revisionism..." Actually, the struggle between the two classes and the two lines within the Communist party has always existed. Nobody can deny it, and being materialists ourselves, we of course should not deny it. Since that rally, the struggle between the two classes within our party has manifested itself in the forms of "left" in appearance but right in essence and the opposition to same, a denial of the existence of class struggle and emphasis on the existence of class struggle, and in compromises and accentuation of proletarian polities, etc. This has been discussed in pertinent documents that appeared prior to that occasion.

Today the military delegation of Albania has come here to understand our nation's Great Cultural Revolution. Let me first of all talk about my approaches to this problem.

China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution began with Comrade Yao Wen-yuan's criticism of *"Hai Jui Dismissed From Office"* in the

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SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

winter of 1965. At that time, certain departments and certain localities in this country of ours were dominated by revisionism. It was so tight that even water could not seep in and pins could not penetrate. I then suggested to Comrade Chiang Ch'ing that she organize some articles to criticize "*Hai Jui Dismissed From Office.*" But this was impossible to accomplish here in this Red metropolis, and there was no alternative but to go to Shanghai to organize it. Finally the article was written. I read it three times, and considered it basically all right, so I let Comrade Chiang Ch'ing bring it back for publication. I suggested that some of the leading comrades of the Central Committee be allowed to read it, but Comrade Chiang Ch'ing suggested: "The article can be published as it is, and I do not think there is any need to ask Comrade [Chou] En-lai and K'ang Sheng to read it." (Comrade Lin Piao interrupted, saying: Some people say that Comrade Mao Tse-tung used one faction to fight another faction. But now all of the central leadership comrades have prestige among the revolutionary masses, and they were all briefed beforehand by Chairman Mao on the Great Cultural Revolution, and so they did not commit any errors. I think the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is an examination without examination, and whoever follows closely Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought is a proletarian revolutionary. So I have always said that Mao Tsetung Thought must be implemented both when we understand it and when we may temporarily not understand it.) After Yao Wen-yuan's article was published, most of the newspapers in the country published it, but it was not published in Peking and Hunan. Later I suggested that a pamphlet be issued, but it was also opposed and did not go through.

Yao Wen-yuan's article was merely the signal for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Consequently, in the Central Committee, I was especially keen on drawing up the May 16 Circular.[2] Because the enemy was especially sensitive, once the signal was sounded here, we knew that he would take action. Of course, we also had to take action on our own. This circular had already been very precise in bringing out the question of line, and the question of the two lines. At that time, the majority did not agree with my view, and I was left alone for a time. They said that my views were outmoded, and so I had to present my views to the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CPC Central Committee for discussion. After some debate I gained the endorsement of a little over one-half of the

Comrades. There were still many people who would not agree with me, including Li Ching-ch'uan and Liu Lan-t'ao[3]. Comrade [Ch'en] Po-ta went to talk with them, and they said: I couldn't endorse it in Peking, and after I returned [home] I still could not endorse it." Finally I had no choice but to let practice make further examination!

After the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CPC Central Committee, the emphasis was on the criticism of the bourgeois reactionary line that had been taking place during the three months of October, November and December 1966, and this resulted in public disclosure of contradictions within the party. Here, I would like to mention another problem and that was that the broad masses of workers and peasants, and the hardcore cadres of the party and league were deceived during the process of criticizing the reactionary line. Having studied the problem what could we do with regard to those comrades who were deceived? I have always felt that the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers are good, the overwhelming majority of party members and [youth] league members are good, and that they have all been the principal forces during every stage of the proletarian revolution. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is certainly no exception. Since the broad masses of workers and peasants are involved in actual labor, they naturally know very little about conditions in the upper echelons. Moreover, the vast number of hardcore cadres of the party and league have heart-felt devotion to the party and have boundless love for the party's cadres, while the "power holders taking the capitalist road" have raised the red flag to oppose the red flag. For this reason, they were so deceived that for a relatively long period of time they could not get out from under their delusions, but there were historical factors behind all of this. As long as those who were deceived reformed themselves, it was all right! As the movement developed, they again became the main force. The "January Storm" was launched by the workers, and it is just as true for the democratic revolution and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The "May 4th" Movement[4] was launched by intellectuals, thereby fully demonstrating their foresight and awareness. However, we must depend on the masters of the time, the workers, peasants and soldiers, to serve as the main force in carrying through thoroughgoing revolutions on the order of a real Northern Expedition or Long March. In point of fact, workers, peasants and soldiers are really only workers and peasants, since soldiers are only workers and peasants dressed in army uniforms. Although it was the intellectuals and the broad masses of young students who launched the criticism of the bourgeois reactionary line, it was, nonetheless, incumbent upon the masters of the time, the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers, to serve as the main force in carrying the revolution through to completion, once the "January Strom" had seized power. Intellectuals have always been quick in altering their perception of things, but, because of the limitations of their instincts, and because they lack a thorough revolutionary character, they are sometime opportunistic.

From the standpoint of policy and strategy, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution may be generally divided into four stages. From the publication of Comrade Yao Wen-yuan's article to the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CPC Central Committee may be considered the first stage, and it was primarily a stage of mobilization. From the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CPC Central Committee to the "January Strom" may be considered the second stage. The third stage consisted of X X X's [Ch'i Pen-yu][5] "Patriotism or National Betrayal?" and "The Key Point of 'Cultivation' Is That It Betrays the Proletarian Dictatorship." The period thereafter may be considered the fourth stage. During the third and fourth stages the question of seizing power was paramount. The fourth stage was concerned with seizing the powers of revisionism and of the bourgeoisie ideologically. Consequently, this was a crucial stage in the decisive battle between the two classes, the two roads and the two lines, and this was the main and proper theme of the whole movement. After the "January Storm," the Central Committee repeatedly concerned itself with the problem of a great alliance, but it did not work out. Later, it was discovered that this subjective wish was not in keeping with the objective laws of the development of class struggle. This is because each class and political power wanted to exert itself stubbornly. Bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideologies burst forth like unbridled flood waters, thus undermining the great alliance. It was impossible to work out a great alliance, and even if it were, it would eventually be broken up. Thus, the present attitude of the Central Committee is merely to promote it, not to work it out. The method of pulling the sprout to accelerate its growth is unfeasible. This law of class struggle can not be changed by anyone's subjective will. On this question there are many examples which can be cited. In the workers' congress, the

Red Guard congress, and the peasants' congress in X X municipality, it seems that with the exception of the peasants' congress, the workers' and Red Guard congress have had many squabbles. I think the revolutionary committee of X X municipality may yet have to be reorganized.

I had originally intended to train some successors from among the intellectuals, but this would now appear to be impractical. It seems to me that the world outlook of intellectuals, including those young intellectuals who are still receiving education in schools, and those both within and outside the party, is still basically bourgeois. This is because in the more than ten years since liberation, the cultural and educational circles have been dominated by revisionism, and so bourgeois ideology has seeped into their blood. Thus, revolutionary intellectuals must carefully remold their world outlook during this crucial stage of the struggle between the two classes, the two roads and the two lines. Otherwise, they will go contrary to the revolution. Now I would like to ask you a question: What would you say is the goal of the Great Cultural Revolution? (Someone answered on the spot: It is to struggle against power holders within the party who take the capitalist road.) To struggle against power holders who take the capitalist road is the main task, but it is by no means the goal. The goal is to solve the problem of world outlook: it is the question of eradicating the roots of revisionism.

The Central Committee has emphasized time and again that the masses must educate themselves and liberate themselves. This is because world outlook cannot be imposed on them. In order to transform ideology, it is necessary for the external causes to function through inner causes, though the latter are principal. If the world outlook is not transformed, how can the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution be called a victory? If the world outlook is not transformed, then although there are 2,000 power holders taking the capitalist road in this Great Cultural Revolution, there may be 4,000 next time. The cost of this Great Cultural Revolution has been very great, and even though the question of the struggle between the two classes and the two roads cannot be resolved by one, two, three or four Great Cultural Revolutions, still, this Great Cultural Revolution, should consolidate things for a decade at least. In the course of one century, it may be possible to launch such a revolution two or three times at most. Thus we must focus our attention on eradicating the roots of revisionism in order to strengthen our ability to guard against and oppose revisionism at any time. Here I would like to ask you another question: Who would you say are the power holders taking the capitalist road? (No response from the audience.) The so-called power holders taking the capitalist road are those power holders who take the road of capitalism! What I mean by this is that during the time of the democratic revolution, these people actively participated in opposing the three big mountains but once the entire country was liberated, they were not so keen on opposing the bourgeoisie. Though they had actively participated in and endorsed the overthrow of local despots and the distribution of land, after the country's liberation when agricultural collectivization was to be implemented, they were not very keen on this either. He who would not take the socialist road and is now in power - is it not he who is a power holder taking the road of capitalism! Let's just say that it is "veteran cadres encountering new problems!" When a veteran comes face to face with a new problem, he will resolutely take the socialist road if he has the proletarian world outlook, but if he has the bourgeois world outlook, he will take the road of capitalism. This means that the bourgeoisie wants to transform the world in accordance with the bourgeois world out look, while the proletariat wants to transform the world in accordance with the proletarian world outlook. There are those who have committed errors of orientation and line in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and this has been said to be a case of "veteran cadres encountering new problems." But the fact that you have erred tells us that you veteran cadres have not yet thoroughly remolded your bourgeois world outlook. From now on, veteran cadres are bound to encounter even more new problems. To ensure that you will resolutely take the road of socialism, you will have to undergo a thorough proletarian revolutionization ideologically. Let me ask you, how can you actually proceed from socialism toward communism? This is a great event for the nation, and a great event for the world.

I say the revolutionary spirit of the revolutionary little generals is very strong, and this is excellent. But you cannot step onto the stage now, because if you step onto the stage now, you will be kicked off the stage tomorrow. But this word has been leaked out by a Vice – Premier's own mouth, and this is highly inappropriate. As far as the revolutionary little generals are concerned, it is a question of nurturing and training them. At a time when they have committed certain errors, to use such words will only dampen their spirits. Some say that elections are very good and very democratic. As far as I am concerned, election is merely a fancy word, and do not feel that there is any genuine election. I have been elected by the Peking district to serve as a representative to the National People's Congress, but how many in Peking really understood me? I feel that Chou En-lai's premiership was an appointment by the Central Committee. Others say that China is profoundly peace-loving, but I cannot see how profound that love is. I think Chinese are militant.

In regard to cadres, we must establish the belief that 95 percent or more of them are good or relatively good, and we must never depart from this class viewpoint! In regard to leading cadres who are revolutionary or want to be revolutionary, one should protect them, protect them forthrightly and bravely, and liberate them from their errors. Even though they have taken the capitalist road, we must allow them to make revolution after they have under gone long-term education and their errors have been rectified. There are not many really bad persons. Among the masses, they constitute at most 5 percent; within the party and league, 1 to 2 percent; and there are only a handful of power holders who stubbornly take the capitalist road. But we must regard this handful of power holder within the party who take the capitalist road as the principal target of attack because their influence and insidious poison are deep and far-reaching. Thus, this is the principal task of this Great Cultural Revolution. As for bad elements among the masses, they number at most 5 percent, and they are scattered, without much strength. If the 35 million of them, calculated at 5 percent, should band together to form an army and oppose us in an organized manner, that would be a problem deserving serious consideration. But since they are diffused in various localities and powerless, they cannot be the principal target of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. However, it is necessary for us to heighten our vigilance and, especially at this crucial stage of the struggle, prevent these bad elements from wreaking havoc. Thus, there should be two premises for the great alliance: one is to destroy self-interest and foster devotion to the public interest; the other is that there must be a struggle. Without struggle the great alliance will not be effective.

The fourth stage of this Great Cultural Revolution is the crucial stage of the struggle between the two classes, the two roads and the two lines. Thus, a relatively longer period of time will be needed to arrange mass criticism. It is still being discussed by the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee. Some feel that the end of this year would be an appropriate time for this, and others feel that next May would be more appropriate. However, the time must conform to the laws of class struggle.

NOTES

1. A reference to the enlarged working conference of the CC of the CPC held in January 1962. (See *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol VIII, pp 313-344).

2. May 16 circular, see note 4 on p 243 of this volume.

3. Li Ching-chuan, see note 4 on p 303 of this volume. For Liu Lan-tao, see note 3 on p 303 of this volume.

4. May fourth movement: On May 4, 1919, students in Peking demonstrated against the handing over to Japan of many of China's sovereign rights in Shantung by Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Italy and other imperialist countries then in conference in Paris. This student movement evoked an immediate response throughout the country. After June 3, it developed into a country-wide anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary movement embracing large numbers of the proletariat, the urban petty bourgeoisie and even the national bourgeoisie.

5. Chi Pen-yu, was an editor of *Hung-chi (Red Flag)* the theoretical organ of the CPC.

DIRECTIVE ON EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA WORK

June 1967

Some foreigners have offered suggestions on the external propaganda conducted by *Peking Review* and *Hsin-hua News* Agency. In the past, they did not proselytize the fact that Mao Tse-tung's thought has developed Marxism, but now after the Great Cultural Revolution, they are doing it with fanfare and there is such boasting that it is hard to swallow. Why must one say some of the words by one's self? We must be modest, especially toward outsiders. In being a little modest toward outsiders, naturally we must not lose our principles. In yesterday's communique on the hydrogen bomb, I deleted Great Leader, Great Teacher, Great Commander-in-Chief, and Great Heimsman. I also deleted "boundless flame." How could there be boundless flame in the world? There is always a "bound" and so I deleted it. I also deleted "10,000 per cent" from the phrase "mood of 10,000 percent joy and excitement." It was not 10 percent, 100 percent, or 1,000 percent, but 10,000 percent! I didn't even want to have one percent, and so I deleted it entirely.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

DIALOGUES DURING INSPECTION OF NORTH, CENTRAL – SOUTH AND EAST CHINA

July - September 1967

Dialogues in Shanghai

Within the working class, there is no basic conflict of interest. Within the working class under proletarian dictatorship, there is all the more no reason why there must be two major hostile factional organizations.

(Comments on the Report of Trade Union Headquarters)

Chang Ch'un-ch'iao: There are some organizations in Shanghai that cannot get united.

Chairman Mao: Why can't they get united?

Chang: The question as to who is going to be the nucleus has yet to be resolved.

Chairman Mao: Don't stress that point. Unity should be unconditional. Who is going to be the nucleus is a matter settled during the process of struggle. Wang Ming and Ch'en Tu-hsiu stressed that they were the nucleii. Have they not ended in failure?

Dialogues in Chekiang

Nan P'ing: We still use kneeling and dunce hat wearing as ways of punishment.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

Chairman: I have always objected to this kind of practice. You cannot deal with cadres in the same way as you deal with landlords. We have a good tradition; that is, unity-criticism-unity. "One divides into two" should be applied to cadres.

Dialogues in Kiangsi

Ch'eng Shih-ch'ing (Reported on the collection of weapons)

Chairman: Who issued these rifles? As I see it, both sides issued them. Who issued more?

Ch'eng: These rifles were issued to the conservatives by the military subdistrict and People's Militia Command.

Chairman: Oh!

(Referring to the Foochow problem)

Chairman: The Foochow problem deserves a little study. Why do they become so bold? They always call a meeting to size up the situation, convincing the people that both domestic and world situations are favorable to them, and then proceed. Their estimate of the situation is incorrect, I think.

(Referring to a Foochow faction which was in control of nine counties)

Chairman: Judging by this point, I think that they are trying to expand their influence by attacking Nan-ch'ang. What is the nature of this problem?

Ch'eng: According to the spirit of the directive of the Central Committee, this is military rebellion.

Chairman: Have you decided?

Ch'eng: Yes, we have decided.

Chairman: Has your decision been approved?

Ch'eng: Approved by the Premier.

Chairman: Oh! It is by nature a rebellion, an all-out surprise attack. It is said that there is no civil war in China, but I think this is a civil war, not a foreign war. This is an armed struggle, not a cultural struggle. In Kan-chou, Chi-an, I-ch'un and other places, rural control has been put into effect. From each production team one person is drafted. From each production brigade, ten or more than ten persons are drafted. Compulsory methods are used. The draftees are given labor points, and each draftee is paid 60 cents a day. Now the rural areas are encircling the cities; I think this situation should not be allowed to continue.

(Referring to the Central Committee's decision on the Kiangsi problem)

Chairman: I think we ought to use education to approach this problem. Bad people are always in the minority. In the people's militia commands good people are always in the majority. Many people in the military subdistrict are being kept in the dark. Some of them committed mistakes. They should be given an opportunity to correct their mistakes.

We should by all means persuade the masses of the rebellious faction without attack or retaliation. Killing is always bad. Being killed is bad; killing others is not good, either. Attack, retaliation, kneeling, dunce hat wearing, sign carrying, oh, yes, there is another way of punishment, the "jet plane type." All these are not good.

(Referring to some good articles in *Wen Hui Pao* that had some great influence)

Chang Ch'un-ch'iao: People also oppose us because we are inclining to the right, saying that we are rightists.

Chairman: This is a problem of educating the leftists, not one of our inclining to the right. For example, in the past, there were so many mountain strongholds. There were the central Soviet in Kiangsi, the Hunan-Kiangsi Soviet, the Fukien-Kiangsi Soviet, and the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Soviet. In addition, there were the Hupeh-Honan-Anhuei-Kiangsu Soviet, Tung-nan-pa, and Northern Shensi. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, there were even more bases of operation. We used a single principle to unite them all, regardless of what faction they belonged to. We cannot have just one mountain stronghold and no others. It does not work if there is only one faction.

I am still inclined to protect more people. Those who can be saved should be saved. As long as we can win over the majority, it is all right for a minority to persist in their stubbornness. Let us give them rice to eat without any grudge.

I learned from *Huo-hsien Chan-pao* (Fire Line Combat News) what is described as emergency of Nan-ch'ang, fall of Nan-kang and Lu-shan, white terror, rural control in I-ch'un, and what is known as rural areas encircling cities. Tension was at its highest point in June, July and August. In times of tension, I think, problems are unveiled, and things become easy to resolve. How can problems be resolved without tension?

Now there are people instigating the soldiers to oppose their superiors, and saying that while you are making only 6 yuan a month, the officers are making much more and enjoying the luxury of riding in automobiles. The peasants are willing to join the Liberation Army, because to be a member of the Liberation Army is glorious. They receive 6 yuan a month, and their families receive preferential treatment. The peasants are willing to be soldiers. I don't think the instigators will succeed.

(Referring to the province-wide political work conference of the rebel faction to be convened in October)

This is good. The rebel faction also needs to be lectured. They can not sit tight, and their minds are running wild.

My assessment of the present rightist faction is not that rigid. Once they are lectured, they will turn around. There are bad people, but they are very few in number. Most of them recognize the problem. Some interpret the problem of recognition as a problem of where one stands. Once we touch upon the problem of standpoint, we get into the matter of committing ourselves to a policy from which we cannot turn around for the rest of our lives. Should one's standpoint never be changed? As far as most of the people are concerned, standpoint can be changed. There are very few bad people whose standpoint cannot be changed. In short, the scope of attack should be narrowed, and the scope of education should be broadened to include the leftists, centrists and rightists. If left uneducated, the leftists will become ultra left.

Dialogues in Hunan

(Referring to the great alliance)

Everyone should do self-criticism, and talk less about other people's shortcomings. Don't direct the spearhead toward the opposition. In the past, we had some experience concerning the relationship between the soldiers and local people. The soldiers offered to support the government and cherish the people, and the local people offered to support the soldiers and treat the soldiers' families preferentially. The soldiers took the lead in conducting self-criticism. The two sides got along very well.

Both factions are workers. One faction is rebellious, and the other is conservative. Those conservatives are hoodwinked by their superiors. You cannot suppress the masses who are being hoodwinked. The more you suppress, the more they will resist. We ourselves are the product of Chiang Kai-shek's suppression. After the great revolution, we had only several tens of thousands of men. Chiang Kai-shek's suppression gave us hope. His suppression produced at once 300,000 Red Army soldiers and 300,000 party members.

Dialogues in Hupeh

(Referring to the problem of liberating cadres)

I am a fellow who has been expelled by others five times, and then invited back. Thus, the leader of the masses is not self-appointed. He attains his stature in mass struggle. What is the long march? The long march was an outcome of fighting. It was forced on us! After the long march, the quality of the cadres improved. Among these cadres today, who was not wounded on the battlefield? Who has not committed mistakes in the revolution? Nevertheless, they still established meritorious service records during the democratic revolution. Although they committed mistakes in the great cultural revolution, it is all right if they correct their mistakes. When the war comes, and as soon as I give the order, these old cadres will be as brave as ever on the battlefield. You cannot be skeptical about everything, or overthrow everything. To doubt everything or to overthrow everything is not good, unfavorable to the revolution.

In China's revolutions, according to my own personal experience, those who were most likely to succeed were those who thought, not those who cut prominent figures. Those who now make a lot of noise are not likely to be mentioned in history as men of consequence.

Dialogues in Honan

Chairman Mao: Are you Chi Teng-k'uei? Old friend.

Liu Chien-hsun: Jailed for four months; suffered four months of struggle.

Chairman Mao: (To Chi Teng-k'eui) Would you say that all this was useless?

Chi Teng-k'uei: A great deal was gained.

Chairman Mao: That was done by Wen Min-sheng, Chao Wen-fu, and Ho Yun-hung. As I stopped over at Chengchow last time, I saw a big slogan: "The situation is stabilized; 7 February will definitely win!" The situation in Honan was pretty good.

Liu Chien-hsun: (Reported on the situation of cadres)

Chairman Mao: Is Ho Yun-hung that tough! This is Ho Yun-hung's work!

(Referring to the situation in the army)

Chairman Mao: They used a few slogans in the army for a short time, but now these slogans are no longer effective. They don't support the army. As soon as they do, they will have no target.

Dialogue on Train Returning to Peking

(Referring to the good news brought to the Chairman about the conclusion of a great alliance agreement by the three factions within the railway system)

Congratulations, may I present you four characters: *"Tou-ssu Pi-hsiu"* [Struggle against private interest; criticize revisionism].

NOTES

1. The custom of parading people in dunce caps in order to humiliate them has a long history in China.

2. Li Chein-hsun, at this time he was the first secretary of CPC, Honan branch and concurrently the first political commissar of the military district of Honan.

LETTER TO LIN, CHOU AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP

December 7, 1967

Comrades Lin, Chou and Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group:

(1) The way in which absolute authority is presented is improper. There has never been any single absolute authority. All authorities are relative. All absolute things exist in relative things just as absolute truth is the total of innumerable relative truths, and that absolute truth exists only in relative truths.

(2) The talk about "establishing in a big way" and "establishing in a special way" is also improper. Authority and prestige can only be established naturally through struggle and practice. They cannot be established artificially. Prestige established artificially will inevitably collapse.

(3) The Central Committee of the Party banned birthday celebration a long time ago. The entire nation should be notified of the reaffirmation of this ban.

(4) Some other date should be chosen for the Hunan meeting.

(5) We don't need any scrolls with calligraphed messages.

(6) As to the name of the meeting, we may concur with Hunan's suggestion, using the first plan.

I hope that the above points will be discussed and adopted at a meeting.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

THE DAYS OF THE U.S. AGGRESSORS IN VIETNAM ARE NUMBERED

December 19, 1967

On behalf of the Chinese people, I extend the warmest congratulations to the fighting people of southern Vietnam on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the founding of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front.

You are putting up a good fight! Under exceptionally difficult conditions, you have, by relying on your own strength, battered U.S. imperialism, the most ferocious imperialism in the world, so that its forces are in disorder and it has no way out. This is a great victory. The Chinese people salute you.

Your victory manifests once again that a nation, big or small, can defeat any enemy, however powerful provided only that it fully mobilizes its people, relies firmly on the people, and wages a people's war. By their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation under the wise and able leadership of the great leader President Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese people have set a brilliant example for the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations the world over in their struggle for liberation.

The days of the U.S. aggressors in Vietnam are numbered. However, all reactionary forces on the verge of extinction invariably conduct desperate struggles. They are bound to resort to military adventure

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Full text of comrade Mao's message of 19 December 1967 to President Nguyen Huu Tho of the National Liberation Front (*Peking Review*, no.52, 1967, p. 5.)

and political deception in all their forms in order to save themselves from extinction. And the revolutionary peoples are bound to meet with all kinds of difficulties before final victory. Nevertheless, all these difficulties can be surmounted, and no difficulty can ever obstruct the advance of the revolutionary people. Perseverance means victory. I am deeply convinced that, by persevering in protracted war, the Vietnamese people will certainly be able to drive the U.S. aggressors out of Vietnam.

We firmly support you. We are neighbouring countries as close as the lips and the teeth. Our two peoples are brothers sharing weal and woe. The fraternal people of southern Vietnam and the entire fraternal Vietnamese people can rest assured that your struggle is our struggle. The 700 million Chinese people are the powerful rearguard of the Vietnamese people; the vast expanse of China's territory is their reliable rear area. In the face of the solid fighting unity of our two peoples, all military adventures and political deceptions by U.S. imperialism will certainly fail.

Victory will definitely belong to the heroic Vietnamese people!

CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER CHOU ON POWER STRUGGLE

1967

Chairman: 'How's the power struggle? The Public Security Bureau is an instrument of the dictatorship.'

Premier: 'It was taken over only about a day ago.'

Chairman: '[We] ought to choose the typical cases.'

Premier: 'The municipal [party] committee of the Bureau held a meeting and decided on several kinds of power struggle. Cadres belong to the faction in authority [who are]: 1. the "black gang" soaked through [with erroneous ideology] and therefore "black"; 2. the capitalist "roaders" in power; 3. those adamantly upholding the capitalist reactionary line; 4. those admitting some mistakes but leaving the rest intact; and 5. [among them] individual cases of the general mistake (the majority of the cases).'

Chairman: 'Make the first two categories smaller and isolate and attack the smallest minority. Take-over is in itself a revolution, a creation of something new. According to different circumstances, there are five different ways. 1. Complete re-organization (as Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan [have done in Shanghai]). 2. After take-over, adopt different methods in dealing with the faction in authority. Criticize them while keeping them at work under supervision (according to the work assigned to them). 3. Suspend their posts but keep them

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SOURCE: An anthology without a title.

at their work. 4. Dismiss them but keep them at their work. Or 5. cashier and punish them.'

Premier: 'That is a good way - dismiss them, keep them at their work, but struggle against them. There will then be an opposition to help [us] to enlarge and strengthen our own ranks. To take on too much work [themselves] (referring to the revolutionary rebels) can only make them "passive" [slaves of work]. Keep them [the faction in authority] at their work and struggle against them. In the Academy of Sciences, the left have grown strong. Their work of "Get Down to Revolution and Encourage Production" is done very well. [But] they let the faction in authority sweep the street and after that [the reactionaries] just go to sleep. It is really cushy. [We] must not let ourselves be bogged down by routine business. ([We] must pay attention to this problem.) To take-over is a big thing which will touch off a chain of changes. It is a revolution. [We] must be clear about the aim of the take-over, about the problems involved in it, and about how to do it. [We] must know how to tackle [those] questions and must have concrete policies (e.g. how to deal with the staff of the bureaux, Ministries, departments, and sections.) [We] have seized power, but it may be snatched away [from us] again. In some organizations this tug-of-war may be a discipline in itself. [But we] must keep the power. This depends chiefly on the strength of the left. When the strength of the left is small, power may be snatched away from it again. [Therefore] the left must be strong. I support the power struggle. After it, [we] must get down to revolution and encourage production.

A NEW STROM AGAINST IMPERIALISM

April 16, 1968

Some days ago, Martin Luther King, the Afro-American clergyman, was suddenly assassinated by the U.S. imperialists. Martin Luther King was an exponent of nonviolence. Nevertheless, the U.S. imperialists did not on that account show any tolerance toward him, but used counterrevolutionary violence and killed him in cold blood. This has taught the broad masses of the Black people in the United States a profound lesson. It has touched off a new storm in their struggle against violent repression sweeping well over a hundred cities in the United States, a storm such as has never taken place before in the history of that country. It shows that an extremely powerful revolutionary force is latent in the more than twenty million Black Americans.

The storm of Afro-American struggle taking place within the United States is a striking manifestation of the comprehensive political and economic crisis now gripping U.S. imperialism. It is dealing a telling blow to U.S. imperialism, which is beset with difficulties at home and abroad.

The Afro-American struggle is not only a struggle waged by the exploited and oppressed Black people for freedom and emancipation, it is also a new clarion call to all the exploited and oppressed people of the United States to fight against the barbarous rule of the monopoly

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SOURCE: "Statement by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression" (April 16, 1968), Peking Review, April 19, 1968, pp. 5-6.

capitalist class. It is a tremendous aid and inspiration to the struggle of the people throughout the world against U.S. imperialism and to the struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. imperialism. On behalf of the Chinese people, I hereby express resolute support for the just struggle of the Black people in the United States.

Racial discrimination in the United States is a product of the colonialist and imperialist system. The contradiction between the Black masses in the United States and the U.S. ruling circles is a class contradiction. Only by over throwing the reactionary rule of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class and destroying the colonialist and imperialist system can the Black people in the United States win complete emancipation. The Black masses and the masses of white working people in the United States have common interests and common objectives to struggle for. Therefore, the Afro-American struggle is winning sympathy and support from increasing numbers of white working people and progressives in the United States. The struggle of the Black people in the United States is bound to merge with the American workers' movement, and this will eventually end the criminal rule of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class.

In 1963, in the "Statement Supporting the Afro-Americans in Their Just Struggle Against Racial Discrimination by U.S. Imperialism," I said that the "the evil system of colonialism and imperialism arose and throve with the enslavement of Negroes and the trade in Negroes, and it will surely come to its end with the complete emancipation of the Black people." I still maintain this view.

At present, the world revolution has entered a great new era. The struggle of the Black people in the United States for emancipation is a component part of the general struggle of all the people of the world against U.S. imperialism, a component part of the contemporary world revolution. I call on the workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals of all countries and all who are willing to fight against U.S. imperialism to take action and extend strong support to the struggle of the Black people in the United States! People of the whole world, unite still more closely and launch a sustained and vigorous offensive against our common enemy, U.S. imperialism, and its accomplices! It can be said with certainty that the complete collapse of colonialism, imperialism, and all systems of exploitation, and the complete emancipation of all the oppressed peoples and nations of the world are not far off.

DIALOGUES WITH RESPONSIBLE PERSONS OF CAPITAL RED GUARDS CONGRESS

July 28, 1968

Chairman: (Nieh Yuan-tzu, T'an Hou-lan, Han A'i-ching and Wang Ta-ping walked into the room. The Chairman, standing, shook hands with each one of them) All are young!

(Shaking hands with Huang Tso-chen') Are you Huang Tso-chen? I haven't met you before. You were not killed?

Chiang Ch'ing: Haven't seen you for a long time. You didn't post big character posters.

Chairman: We met last time at Tien-an-men, but there was no chance to talk with you at that time. That was bad! You people don't come to see me unless you have important business. But I have read all of your reports. I understand your situation very well.

K'uai Ta-fu did not come. Is it because he is unable to come or unwilling to come?

Fu-chih: I am afraid that he is unwilling to come.

Han A'i-ching: No. At this moment, if he knew that there was a meeting with the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group, he would cry because he missed the chance to meet the Chairman. I am sure that he is unable to come.

Chairman: K'uai Ta-fu should capture the black hand. So many workers were sent to schools to "suppress" and "oppress" the red guards. Who is the black hand? The black hand is still not captured.

SOURCE: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, a Red Guard Publication.

The black hand is nobody else but me. K'uai did not come. He should have come to grab me. It was I who sent the Central Police Guards and the workers of the Hsin-hua Printing Plant and the General Knitwear Mill. I asked them how they would deal with the fighting in universities, and told them to go there to take a look. As a result, 30,000 of them went. Actually, they hated Peking University, but not Tsinghua. (Turned to Nieh) This was what the workers and the students did. Tens of thousands of them staged a demonstration. I heard that the reception you gave them was pretty good. Was it you, or Ching-kang-shan?[2]

(*Wen Yu-ch'eng, Huang Tso-chen:* Not them). With what unit did Peking University clash?

Nieh Yuan-tzu: With the Institute of Agricultural Science.

Chairman: Did you fight them?

Nieh Yuan-tzu: We even served tea in front of our gate.

Chairman: I did not know that. Peking University wants to arrest the black hand. This black hand is not me, but Hsieh Fu-chih.[3] I didn't have such a big ambition. I suggested only that a few people be sent over to have a discussion with them. K'uai Ta-fu said that 100,000 of them went.

Fu-chih: Less than 30,000

Chairman: How did you deal with armed fighting in universities? One way is complete withdrawal. Leave the students alone. Let everybody fight if he wants to. In the past, the revolutionary committees and the garrison commands were not afraid of the chaos caused by the fighting in universities. They refrained from control, anxiety, and suppression. In retrospect, this is right. The other way is to give them a little help. This has won the support of the workers, the peasants, and the majority of students. There are more than 50 institutions of higher learning in Peking. There are about five or six of them where the fighting was severe, and where your ability was put to the test. As to how to solve the problem, some of you live in the south, and some of you live in the north. And all of you are called new Peking University, "Ching-kang-shan," and "commune," just like the Soviet Communist party calling itself "Bolshevik." If you cannot handle the problem, we may resort to military control, and ask Lin Piao to take command. We also have Huang Yung-shen.[4] The problem has to be solved one way or the other. You people have engaged in the Great Cultural Revolution or struggle-criticism-transformation for two years. Now, in the first place, you are not struggling; in the second place, you are not criticizing; in the third place, you are not transforming. Yes, you are struggling, but it is armed struggle. The people are not happy. The workers are not happy. The peasants are not happy. Peking residents are not happy. The students in most of the schools are not happy. Most students in your school are also not happy. Even within the faction that supports you there are people who are unhappy. Can you unite the whole country this way? You belong to the new Peking University. You "Old Buddha" are in the majority. You are a philosopher. Don't tell me that there is nobody against you in the new Peking University commune and among the cultural revolutionaries in the schools. I don't believe that! They may not say anything in front of you, but they will say devilish words behind your back. Wang Ta-ping, is your work easier?

Wang Ta-ping: Those who opposed Hsieh Fu-chih fled.

Fu-chih: His second man in command wanted to seize power, and accused him of leaning toward the right.

Chairman: Is he that left?

Wang Ta-ping: They are trying to sew discord in our relationship. He is a good comrade, with a good background. He suffered greatly and has deep hatred. This man is very straight forward, and full of energy for revolution, with a strong revolutionary character. His only drawback is his impatience. He is not very tactful in uniting people. His working method is a little stiff.

Chairman: Can you unite with him? He is left; you are right. It should be easy for you two to be united! Come over here, sit by my side!

Lin Piao: Come over!

Fu-chih: Go! Go! (Wang Tu-ping sat down by the side of the Chairman.)

Chairman: Sit down, sit down. We should be flexible in these matters. After all, they are all students. They did not engage in black gang activities. Recently, struggles were conducted against black gangsters in some schools, and sketches of these black gangsters were drawn. Several tens of them were dealt with in the new Peking University. Is that all the black gangsters? I think there are more. The crucial point is that the two factions are engaged in armed struggle. They were bent on armed struggle. This kind of struggle–criticism–transformation does not work. Maybe, struggle–criticism–quit will. The students are talking about struggle–criticism–quit; or struggle–criticism–disperse. Now there are so many people who are aloof and indifferent. More and more derogatory words are heard in society about Nieh Yan–tzu and K'uai Ta–fu. Nieh Yuan–tzu's cannon fodder is limited in number; so is K'uai Ta–fu's. Sometimes 300; other times 150 men. How can that be compared with the number of troops under Lin Piao and Huang Yung–sheng. This time, in one shot, I dispatched 30,000.

Lin Piao: During the development of all significant events in the world, there is unity after long disunity, and disunity after long unity. Tear down all the defense works for armed struggle. All the hot weapons, cold weapons, knives, and rifles should be put in storage. Nieh Yuan–tzu, they call you "Old Buddha," or the "Old Nest of Buddha." Moreover, we have you Comrade T'an Hou–lan, wearing two pigtails. You asked for a transfer down to lower levels. You have spent more than 10 years studying in schools. Everybody agrees that you should be transferred down. I am afraid that you cannot leave. Once you are gone, who is going to take your place?

T'an Hou–lan: Everything has been arranged.

Chairman: Your five great generals, we support you, including K'uai Ta–fu who wants to grab the black hand. We have our prejudices. The "Peking University" 'Ching–kang–shan' and the 'April 14' Army Corps at Normal University may have adverse opinions about us. I'm not afraid of being overthrown by others. When the 'April 14' Army Corps at Tsinghua said that the 'April 14' thinking must win, I was unhappy. They also said that those who won the country cannot rule it, and that the proletariat which won the country cannot rule it. "April 14" has a theoretician by the name of Chou Ch'uan–ying. Why should we arrest a theoretician? He is a theoretician for a school of thought. He writes articles. Why should you arrest him? Release him. He has his opinion. Let him write again! Otherwise, there will be no freedom. I say, you, Old Buddha, had better be a little more generous. There are several thousand men at Peking University's 'Ching–kang–shan'. If they were released like a torrential flood, they will wash the Dragon King's Temple away. Can you take it? Otherwise, you Old Buddha, we have to impose military control. The third method is to handle

this matter according to the principles of dialectics. Don't live in one city. Separate. Either you or 'Ching–kang–shan' move to the south. If one is in the south and the other in the north, you won't see each other. You cannot fight. Each one puts his own house in order, and then the entire world will be united. Otherwise, you will be afraid. If they launch an attack on the nest of Old Buddha, you won't be able to sleep. You'll be afraid. They will be afraid, too. It is necessary to hold back a little. Why should you be so tense? You are afraid of others attacking you. If you don't reserve some strength for the future, what are you going to do when they attack? I heard that there is a man who wants to assassinate you. Even though you know who the would–be assassin is, you don't have to arrest him. Let him go. Don't say anything even if you know exactly who he is. But from now on you should pay attention to one thing. Don't go anywhere alone.

Chiang Ch'ing: She has body guards.

Nieh Yuan–tzu: No.

Chairman: Your elder brother is no good. Neither is your elder sister. In short, the Nieh family is no good. After all, a bad elder brother is still an elder brother; a bad elder sister is still an elder sister. Why should they get the younger sister involved? (Somebody reported that he could not find K'uai Ta–fu).

Chiang Ch'ing: Is K'uai Ta–Fu unwilling to come, or unable to come?

Fu–chih: We broadcast an announcement saying that K'uai Ta–fu is wanted by the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group to attend a meeting. He is just unwilling to come.

Chiang Ch'ing: Is he unwilling to come, or unable to come?

Fu–chih: I guess that he is under someone's control. It doesn't matter if he is.

Wen–yuan: Quite possible.

Chairman: I think K'uai Ta–fu is a good man. He is quite exposed. Those who control him are bad people. K'uai Ta–fu and those who are exposed are good men. I have a lot of experience in this respect. Wang Ta–ping, is there any fighting in your place?

Wang Ta–ping: No. On 23 September 1966, we had a fight with the conservative faction. It was Comrade [Ch'en] Po–ta who sent men to our rescue. Then we won.

Chairman: That's good. From then on, neither you nor Han A'i-ching have engaged in fighting. Han A'i-ching, you are very good at giving advice and are a strategist. Are you a descendant of Han Hsin?

K'ang Sheng: I heard that K'uai Ta-fu is the commander, and Han A'i-ching is the political commissar.

Han A'i-ching: K'uai Ta-fu is surrounded by a group of people with complicated backgrounds. Now, people who gained their stature by writing big character posters at the beginning of the movement are very few. The number of people who engage in armed fighting has increased. They want the headquarters reorganized. K'uai Ta-fu is unable to control any more.

K'ang Sheng: The situation may not be what you have just said!

Chairman: T'an Hou-lan, the cultural revolution has been going on for two years now. The members of your 100-200 man army corps are unable to sleep peacefully at night. For the time being, you cannot leave because you are the queen. Here among the four of you attending this meeting, two are women. It is great! I think you cannot leave for the time being. You have to provide them with food and freedom of movement. They are in a sad plight, and yet they want to seize power. Other schools have also participated. You (pointing to Han) and K'uai Ta-fu have played a role.

Han A'i-ching: I also participated.

Chiang Ch'ing: Han A'i-ching wanted to topple others.

Chairman: You played a role. Our Commander, K'uai Ta-fu, also played a part. Young People should do good things, but they are also capable of doing bad things. You said that the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group did not notify you. Comrade Lin Piao and Premier Chou spoke on 23 and 27 March, respectively, and a rally of 100,000 people was held. This time both Comrades Huang Tso-chen and Wen Yu-ch'eng spoke, but fighting still went on at the lower level, as though this was done deliberately in opposition to us. First of all, we want cultural struggle, not armed struggle. If you want to fight, it is all right. The more you fight, the bigger the fighting becomes. Both sides have native guns. What kind of fighting is yours! Your fighting is nothing. Take out the carbines, rifles, native guns, and even anti-aircraft guns like in Szechwan.

Chiang Ch'ing: Disgrace to the family.

Chairman: With so much magic power, you, Old Buddha, can only activate something like 200-300 men. Where are your troops? You still have to rely on workers and demobilized soldiers as the main force. Without them you cannot succeed. Comrade Lin Piao has lots of troops. If he gives you a few thousand, or a few tens of thousand, it should be enough for you to eliminate "Ching-kang-shan:" entirely. But this is not the answer. Let us have some discussion, or call a meeting to discuss this matter. But, first of all, you should get united.

Lin Piao: Unity comes first. The Chairman mentioned four plans. The first is military control. The second is one divides into two. The third is to follow the steps of "struggle-criticism-quit." The fourth is to fight on a big scale.

Chairman: One divides into two. Both sides are very tense and restless because of hatred. Moving and relocation is a problem. Quarrels will occur if both sides are in Peking. This auditorium is empty; *Chung-nan-hai* is a big place capable of accommodating 40,000-50,000 people. Is it not big enough for a school? Either Nieh Yuan-tzu or Hou Han-ch'ing (one of the leaders of Peking University's Ching-kang-shan) should move here.

You people were talking about "killing the cow, slaughtering the monkey and stewing the mutton." [Chinese character for cow is pronounced *niu*; Chinese character for monkey is pronounced *hou*; and Chinese characters for mutton are pronounced *yang-jou*.] The cow is Niu Hui-lin the monkey is Hou Han-ch'ing, and mutton is Yang K'o-ming. Of these three, I know only Yang K'o-ming. He is also a young man. He attended the 11th plenum of the 8th Central Committee. That big character poster was done with Yang K'o-ming's help. Your big-character poster represents two factions. This kind of social phenomenon does not change according to man's will. Nobody foresaw this kind of fighting. Suspension of classes for half a year was originally planned. It was so announced in the newspaper. Later, the suspension was extended to one year. As one year was not enough, it was extended to two years, and then, to three years. I say, if three years are still not enough, give them as many years as necessary. After all, people are growing older every year. Suppose you were a freshman three years ago, you are now a junior. The schools may be suspended for another two, four, or eight years, you get promoted all the same, so what...

Struggle-criticism-quit is also a way out. Is it true that T'an Hou-lan wanted to quit? Let everybody quit; sweep everyone out. Should we continue to run universities? Should universities continue to enroll new students? To stop enrolling new students does not work, either. I put some reservations in my remarks. I said that we should continue to run universities. I mentioned science and engineering colleges, but I did not say that all liberal arts colleges should be closed. But if liberal arts colleges are unable to show any accomplishments, they should be closed. As far as I can see, the basic courses in junior and senior middle schools and the last two years in primary school are about the same as those offered by colleges. One should only go to school for six years, at most ten years. The courses given in senior middle school repeat those in junior middle school, and those courses given in college repeat those given in senior middle school. All basic courses are repetitious. As to courses of specialization, even the teachers don't understand. Philosophers are unable to talk philosophy. What is there to learn in school? Nieh Yuan-tzu, you are a philosopher, are you?

Nieh Yuan-tzu: No, I am not a philosopher.

Chiang Ch'ing: She is an Old Buddha.

Chairman: What is the use of studying philosophy? Can one learn philosophy in college? If one has never been a worker or a peasant and goes to study philosophy, what kind of philosophy is that?

Lin Piao: The more one studies, the narrower one's mind gets. It is called *"tse-hsueh"* ("narrow study"). [Philosophy is *"che-hsueh,"* *"Tse"* and *"Che"* are almost homonyms.]

Chairman: How about studying literature? One should not study the history of literature. Instead, he should learn to write novels. Write a novel for me each week. If he is unable to produce, send him to a factory to work as an apprentice. During his apprenticeship, he should write about his experience as an apprentice. Those who study literature nowadays are unable to write. Hu Wan-ch'un of Shanghai used to write a lot, but after a while I saw little of his work.

Premier: There is also Kao Yu-pao. He also went to college. Then his brain petrified.

Chairman: Let me talk with you about Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Marx and Lenin finished their college education, but not Engels and Stalin. Lenin studied law for one year. Engels went to college for one and a half years. Before finishing high school, he was asked by his father to work as an accountant in a factory. Then the factory moved to England. It was in the factory that he came into contact with the workers. How did Engels learn natural science? He did it in a London library, where he stayed eight years. He had never gone to college. Stalin had never gone to college, either. He was a graduate of a missionary high school. Gorky had only two years of formal education in primary school, even less than Chiang Ch'ing. Chiang Ch'ing is a primary school graduate. She had six years of schooling; Gorky had only two.

Yeh Ch'un: Comrade Chiang Ch'ing studied very hard by herself...

Chairman: Don't brag for her. Knowledge is not gained in schools. When I was in school, I did not obey the rules. My principle was just to avoid getting myself dismissed. As to examinations, my marks hovered between 50 or 60 percent and 80 percent, 70 percent being my average. There were several courses that I gave up. I was unable to cope with several subjects, sometimes on purpose. During examinations in such courses, I turned in a piece of blank paper. For geometry, I drew an egg. Is it not a geometrical shape? I turned in the paper the fastest because it took only one stroke.

Lin Piao: I studied for four years in a middle school, but I left before graduation. It was a voluntary withdrawal. Without a middle school diploma, I worked as a primary school teacher. However, I liked to study by myself.

Chairman: The military schools nowadays are very harmful. Do you know how long it took one to finish at Whampoa Military Academy? Three months, six months!

Lin Piao: For the first three classes, it was three months. Starting with the fourth class, it took longer.

Chairman: All that is needed is a little training. As to knowledge, it is not much except for some military drill.

Lin Piao: The point is: as soon as you learn something, you forget. Things learned in school in several weeks can be seen clearly in the army in a few days. Hearing about something a hundred times is not as good as seeing it once.

Chairman: I have never attended any military school. Nor have I read a book on military strategy. People say I relied on *"Romance of Three Kingdoms"* and *"Military Strategy of Sun Tzu"* for my military campaigns. I said that I had never read *"Military Strategy of Sun Tzu."* Yes, I have read *"Romance of Three Kingdoms."*

Lin Piao: At one time, you asked me to get a copy [of *"Military Strategy of Sun Tzu"*]. I was unable to get it for you.

Chairman: During the meeting of Tsun–i, I debated with X X X. He asked me whether I had read *"Military Strategy of Sun Tzu."* I asked him: how many chapters are there in the *"Military Strategy of Sun Tzu"*? He did not know. I asked him: what is the title of Chapter One? He did not know, either. Later, when I wrote about what I called problems of strategy, I went over the *"Military Strategy of Sun Tzu"* roughly.

Chiang Ch'ing:....

Chairman: What is military strategy? Who studied English? *"Ah–te–mierh"* is military strategy. It is good to know English. I studied foreign languages late in my life. I suffered. One has to learn foreign languages when one is young. T'an Hou–lan, what foreign language do you study? (The Chairman asked each one present the same question. Wang Ta–ping said he is studying Russian.) One cannot study geology without a foreign language. It is good to learn English. Foreign language study should be started in primary school.

Han A'i–ching: After the cultural revolution is over, Mr Chairman, please send me to the army to be a soldier.

Chairman: It is enough to be a soldier for half a year. What is the use of being a soldier too long? Half a year is adequate. Serve as a farmer for a year, and then a worker for two years. That's real college education. The real universities are the factories and rural areas. Comrade Lin Piao may be regarded as an intellectual because he has attended middle school. What kind of intellectuals are Huang Yung–sheng and Wen Yu–ch'eng? They are country folks. Comrade Huang Yung–sheng, how many years did you attend school?

Huang Yung–sheng: One year and a half..

Chairman: What is the background of your family?

Huang Yung–sheng: Lower–middle peasant.

Chairman: Wen Yu–ch'eng, how many years did you go to school?

Wen Yu–ch'eng: Three years.

Chairman: What is the background of your family?

Wen Yu–ch'eng: Poor peasant.

Chairman: All are native folks with so little knowledge. With that little knowledge, Huang Yung–sheng can be the Chief of Staff. Can you believe it?

Lin Piao: There was an X X X from Whampoa Military Academy. Chiang Kai–shek gave him a watch as an award. Later, in Nanking, he could not give a good account of himself in fighting.

Yeh Ch'un: He was against the *Chairman:*

Chairman: What's good about it if you are not opposed by anybody in this world? Let them oppose me.

Lin Piao: X X X scored 5 in many subjects at the Nanking Military Academy, but he could not fight.

Chairman: Struggle–criticize–disband is also a way out. This is the way T'an Hou–lan is going to take. Isn't T'an Hou–lan thinking of quitting? I did not say that we should not run liberal arts colleges, but we have to change our methods. Those who study literature should be able to write novels, poems, and songs. Those who study philosophy should be able to write essays, and discuss the course of China's revolutionary struggle. As to law, I think it is better not to study it at all. I heard that the *T'ien* (sky) faction is against Hsieh Fu–chih. This matter came to an end without any conclusion. The *T'ien* faction is no longer against anybody. "Smash the public prosecution law, smash Hsieh Fu–chih." Actually, Hsieh Fu–chih was the first one who proposed the smashing of the public prosecution law. Out of 30,000 people, the Peking Public Security Bureau picked only several hundred or several tens of landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and rightists. Thus, the smashing of the public prosecution law was proposed. As a consequence, out of 30,000 people, only several tens were retained, and the rest were sent to study classes. You also used the slogan that Hsieh Fu–chih belongs to the Central Committee, and therefore must be overthrown. Then you arrested people in hurried ways. The People's Congress and the Three–Red General Headquarters kept quiet, but put up big character posters agitating for the overthrow of Hsieh Fu–chih in the name of a small combat unit. When we proceeded to investigate this matter, they said: "We of the General Headquarters did not say overthrow Hsieh Fu–chih; only a small combat unit did." They want to overthrow Chao Kuei–lin. I don't know Chao Kuei–lin, but I have read that little information you have about him. How counterrevolutionary is he? Nieh Yuan-tzu, you haven't said that Hou Han-ching is a counterrevolutionary, have you?

Nieh Yuan-tzu: They organized a reactionary bloc, viciously attacking Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin.

Chairman: It does not matter if people like us are being accused or despised by others. The Niu Hui-lin (one of the leaders of Peking University's 'Ching-kang-shan') affair was not handled right. It was not a grave political problem.

Law does not have to be negated. The Academy of Political Science and Law, the Political and Judicial Commune, and the Political and Judicial Army Corps may not be happy when they hear this. Reduce the time for legal investigation; let the workers and peasants do the job.

At An-shan Steel Mill, there was a case which needed inquiry and investigation. The case was left with the masses. They were fast in gathering information. Cases which had been pending for years were quickly brought to a solution. Before the trials, the public security bureau had no other way but to beat people. The information they obtained was inaccurate.

Members of the Military Control Commission are nothing but soldiers. Wen Yu-ch'eng does not know many people. Would it work... if we depend on their detection and investigation? We should say that we must learn from the masses. First, don't kill. Second, don't sentence people to long terms. Two to three years are enough. In the past, there was solitary confinement in the army. Do you still have this kind of punishment? Do you still arrest deserters?

Wen Yu-ch'eng: Solitary confinement is abolished. Deserters are no longer arrested.

Chairman: People want to desert. What is the use of bringing them back? Struggle-criticize-quit. If they want to quit, let them go. Why do they want to quit? Simply because they don't feel comfortable after they are targets of struggle and criticism, or they are beaten. Or they have to attend to family matters. Or they cannot endure army life. Compared with the past, the number of deserters has become smaller after we stopped arresting deserters and abolished solitary confinement. We are the People's Liberation Army. Now in schools, the arrested are treated like prisoners of war, subjected to coercion and forced to make confessions. If one refuses to confess, he is beaten until he is injured or dead. I think the intellectuals are most un-civilized. I think the unsophisticated soldiers are most civilized. Huang Yung-sheng and Wen Yu-ch'eng don't arrest deserters, nor do they punish people by solitary conferment. Now a new kind of punishment called "jet plane ride" is invented. I am the guilty one. In the "Report on An Investigation of The Peasant Movement in Honan," I talked about "parading people on the street in dunce hats," but I did not mention "jet plane ride." I am the arch-criminal with inescapable responsibilities!

How about today? Do you think that you are being arrested here to be placed in solitary conferment? The method used by 'Ching-kang-shan' is not good. I mean Commander K'uai's 'Ching-kang-shan. Four people were killed and 50 at the General Knitwear Mill were wounded. Had it not been for the social effect, the loss was a minimum, very minimum.

Lin Piao: It was worth it. the loss was at a minimum.

Premier: Vice Chairman Lin has put it very well. The loss was very minimum, and the achievement was maximum.

Chairman: In the future, if the workers go to your place, you should welcome them. Don't use K'uai Ta-fu's method.

Premier: In the second half of 1966, you went to the factories for liaison work, they welcomed you, and did not beat you up.

Chairman: Let them do their propaganda. Don't open fire. They are workers sent by the Party Central Committee. Didn't we say that the working class is the leading class? Didn't we say ours is a dictatorship by the working class? They are to dictate over a few bad people in the schools. You are well known people. You can dictate bad people in schools, but you cannot dictate the workers. This includes Commander K'uai.

Now there are many inter-group meetings going on at Tsinghua University, Peking Aeronautical Institute, and Ho-ping-li. Numerous people are from other provinces, including such units as "April 22" of Kwangsi, "Oppose to the End" of Szechuan, "August 31" of Liaoning, the "Messy" faction of Chin-chou, the "Flag" faction of Kwangtung... Stop all these.

Lin Piao: They started all these meetings before we can convene the Ninth Party Congress.

Premier: We haven't even convened the 12th plenum of the [8th] Central Committee.

Chairman: Don't mention the 12th plenum. Everything is topsy-turvy. People are saying the "social struggle is a reflection of the struggle within the Party Central Committee." It is not that social struggle is a reflection of the Party Central Committee. Rather, the struggle within the party Central Committee is a reflection of social struggle.

Premier: A national defense system meeting was held at Peking Aeronautical Institute. Is it true?

Han A'i-ching: They did not dare call that meeting.

Premier: Don't call that meeting! You know that; it is a national defense secret.

Chairman: Why didn't I invite your opponents to come here? I invited you to come over today to talk about this matter so that you will be prepared. I have never made any tape recordings before, but I am doing it today. Otherwise, you will interpret what I said today in the way you wish after you go home. If you do so, I will play this tape back. You had better discuss this. Once I play this recording, many people will be put in a defensive position.

Despite the fact that so many days were spent and so many meetings held, despite a talk with Huang Tso-chen, and despite our effort to look for K'uai Ta-fu, you insist on asking the Central Committee to express its attitude. At the beginning, the Central Committee interfered a little. Later on, it was too busy to bother about this. In Peking, we have Hsieh Fu-chih in charge. In the past when you were called in for meetings, I never attended, nor did Comrade Lin Piao. We are behaving like bureaucrats now! This time I am afraid that you will expel me from the party because of my bureaucratic behavior. Besides, I am also the black hand that suppressed the Red Guards.

Lin Piao: Yesterday, I drove around to take a look at some of the big character posters. I asked why there were no big character posters put out by Peking or Tsinghua Universities. People said that they were engaged in armed struggle. I would say that you are isolated from the masses who are clamoring for an end to your armed fighting.

Chairman: The masses just don't like civil wars.

Lin Piao: You have isolated yourselves from the workers, peasants, and soldiers.

Chairman: Some people say that public notices issued in Kwangsi are applicable only in Kwangsi, and public notices issued in Shensi are applicable only in Shensi. Now, I am issuing a nation-wide notice. If anyone continues to oppose, fight the Liberation Army, destroy means of transportation, kill people, or set fires, he is committing crimes. Those few who turn a deaf ear to persuasion and persist in their behaviour are bandits, or Kuomintang elements, subject to capture. If they continue to resist, they will be annihilated.

Lin Piao: There are real rebel groups. Some of them are bandits and Kuomintang elements who are using our flag for rebellion. In Kwangsi, 1,000 houses have been burned down.

Chairman: Make it clear in the notice and explain clearly to the students that if they persist and do not change, they are subject to arrest. This is for light cases. In serious cases, they are subject to capture and elimination.

Lin Piao: In Kwangsi, 1,000 houses were burned down, and nobody was allowed to put out the fire.

Chairman: Wasn't the Kuomintang just like this? This is the kind of desperate struggle on the part of the class enemy before his death. Burning houses is a grave error.

Lin Piao: On my expedition in Kwangsi, I fought with Pai Ch'ung-hsi. He used this tactic. He set fire to houses and tried to make believe that it was the Communists who set fire to them. The same old tactic is being used again.

Han A'i-ching: K'uai Ta-fu is riding on the back of a tiger from which he cannot get down.

Kang Sheng: It is not the kind of situation as you say.

Chairman: If he cannot get off the back of the tiger, then let me kill the tiger.

Premier: The fellows from Kwangsi are in your Peking Aeronautical Institute. How did you call members of the national defense and scientific committee to attend the meeting?

Chairman: You hide the "April 22" of Kwangsi. The students from Kwangsi are living at the Peking Aeronautical Institute.

Kang Sheng: They wish to control the movement all over the country.

Han A'i-ching: We did not call that meeting. You may investigate. It was called by Wu Chuan-pin of Kwangtung. I was sick at that time, and lived in the School of Physical Education before I was admitted to a hospital. A telephone call came from the school, asking me to greet two standing members of the provincial revolutionary committee. Others are saying: "Up there is heaven; down there is the Peking Aeronautical Institute." I did not enthusiastically receive the leaders of the 'May 4 Students' Congress', and those of the rebel factions from other provinces. We were criticized for conceit and self complacency. They also said that we are rich peasants, not revolutionaries any more. Then I started giving them better reception. When we saw them off, they wanted to call a meeting to discuss the national situation. I told them that if they call such a meeting in Peking, it would be an illegal meeting. In Peking, there is a sky faction and an earth faction. The situation is very complicated. I agreed to have a chat with a few leaders of rebel factions and the responsible persons of revolutionary committees without going into any specific measures. K'uai and I went to those talks. Then, I was admitted to the hospital. Everybody felt that things went wrong as soon as the meeting was started. The representatives from the geology college stopped attending the meeting after they attended the preparatory meeting. K'uai Ta-fu ran away from the meeting after listening for a few minutes. The representatives of 'Ching-kang-shan' were also scared, and raw away. Information from my schoolmates came to me one after another. Before we could rush in our reports, heaven knows, we were criticized.

Kang Sheng, Wen-yuan:.....

Chairman: You talk too much about Han A'i-ching. She is only 23 years old.

Chiang Ch'ing: At the beginning of the movement, both Peking University and Peking Aeronautical Institute entertained visitors from other places, and did a lot of work together. In fact, we did ask you to do so. Now the situation has changed. It must be recognized that we should not do this any more because what they are opposing are their respective provincial revolutionary committees and the People's Liberation Army. T'an Hou-lan, who saved the day for you in the "September 7" affair?

T'an Hou-lan: Chairman Mao, the Central Committee, and the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group.

Fu-chih: It was Comrade Chiang Ch'ing.

Chiang Ch'ing: I don't particularly like the army corps of Normal University. But, the weather is so hot; you cut off their water, electricity, and food supply. They were not allowed to see daylight for three months during the summer. How could you have done this? As I heard this, I could not help crying. There were hundreds or tens of them. After all, they are the masses... Han A'i-ching was wrong at the very beginning. She wanted to topple others.

Han A'i-ching: I was wrong.

Chairman: It sounds a little bit like anarchism. In this world, anarchism is relative to government. As long as there is government, anarchism cannot be eliminated. This is what we used to say: the punishment of right opportunism is punishment of right opportunism of the Central Committee.

Chiang Ch'ing: I have no friendly feelings toward your opposition. It is said that the army corps is against us. I am not talking on their behalf, but you might as well release them! Proletarians should observe proletarian humanitarianism. These several tens of counterrevolutionaries are, after all, youths. They want to strangle me to death. I am not afraid of being fried in oil. I heard that 'Ching-kang-shan' of Peking University wants to fry Chiang Ch'ing.

Wen-yuan: Frying is but a way of speech.

Chairman: There is hope.. Strangle K'uai Ta-fu to death, so they say.

Fu-chih: Niu Hui-lin is bad.

Chiang Ch'ing: Niu Hui-lin may have some problems, but he can be educated. Nieh Yuan-tzu, do I still have some right to speak? I privately feel sorry for you. You are engaged in a struggle in which the masses are pitched against the masses, and the bad people are hiding. Did I say that "April 14" believed that they are definitely going to win? "April 14" is specially against the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group. They are also against the Premier and Kang Sheng. Nevertheless, it is a mass organization!

You know where I live. If you want to strangle me, go ahead. If you want to fry me, go ahead. We went through trials and tribulations together. If you cannot tolerate others, how can you rule the country, and make peace in the world. I think you are not studying the Chairman's writings, and not learning the Chairman's working style.

The Chairman always wants to unite with those who oppose him.

Chairman: Don't mention that any more. "Kill the cow, slaughter the monkey, and stew the mutton." Why do we kill the cow? Can we keep it to help cultivate the field? All you cited are nothing but their attacks on Chiang Ch'ing and Lin Piao. All these can be stricken out in one stroke. They only talked about these things among themselves privately. They did not put up big character posters.

Chiang Ch'ing: I am not afraid even if they do put up big character posters.

Chairman: Who opposed Comrade Lin Piao the year before?

Premier, Yeh Chun: Maybe I-lin and Ti-hsi

Chairman: In addition, the leader of "June 16" Liu Kung-k'ai was against the Premier, but the Premier always protected him. People said the Premier was magnanimous. I agree with the Premier. These people should not have been arrested in the first place. Too many were arrested, because I nodded my head.

Fu-chih: This has nothing to do with the Chairman. It was I who did the arresting.

Chairman: Don't try to free me from my mistakes, or to cover up for me. I ordered the arrest; I also agreed to their release.

Fu-chih: You did not ask me to arrest so many.

Chairman: Some of those released kill their time by riding a bicycle around Pa-pao-shan and T'ien-an-men. After a couple of months, life becomes dull. Others behaved like rascals. Their purpose is nothing but to make a little money and to play with a woman. Is P'eng Hsiao-meng that reactionary?

Premier, Wen-yuan: Bad. His parents are very bad. They are associated with Wu Hsiu-ch'uan.

Chiang Ch'ing: "April 14" is especially against the Party Central Committee and the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group, but it is a mass organization.

Chairman: You cannot get rid of several thousands of them. You cannot get rid of a thousand members of Peking University's 'Ching-kang-shan'. Bad people will get rid of themselves. Don't mention "killing the cow, slaughtering the monkey, and stewing the mutton" any more. The cow can be used to cultivate the field. Why should we kill the monkey?

Chiang Ch'ing: We have political responsibilities toward you. To help you politically is not enough. You have to do it yourself – arrest the black hand and foster unity.

Nieh Yuan-tzu: More than 1,000 just left 'Ching-kang-shan'. They are holding study classes.

Chairman: Those who leave 'Ching-kang-shan' are not reliable. Most of them are on one side physically, and on the other side in their minds. Physically they are with the Old Buddha, but their mind is with 'Ching-kang-shan'. Don't interfere with Niu Hui-lin. Let him go to 'Ching-kang-shan'. Give him freedom. Don't compell or insult others. Especially don't beat people up.

Don't coerce or press for confessions. In the past we made many mistakes. You commit this mistake for the first time. We cannot blame you.

Chiang Ch'ing: How is Fan Li-ch'in?

Nieh Yuan-tzu: We did not do anything to him. He is with the counter-revolutionary group of P'eng Yen.

Chairman: Has Niu Hui-lin put him under arrest?

Nieh Yuan-tzu: He is under surveillance by his own people. Some agree to his arrest; others don't.

Chairman: Is Hou Han-ching a student or a teacher?

Nieh Yuan-tzu: A graduate student. His father was a speculator in 1963.

Chiang Ch'ing: They are not the worst. They are made up of several organizations. There are bad people protected by secret agents. They are also engaged in what is known as single-line liaison.

Chairman: This working style is bad.

Today we have two from the Heaven faction and two from the Earth faction. The Earth faction supports "April 14" of Tsinghua and 'Ching-kang-shan' of Peking University. The Heaven faction supports Commander K'uai. I am not quite clear about this Heaven and Earth faction business. There are so many schools... In short, we have experience with the five generals. They are Nieh Yuan-tzu, T'an Hou-lan (woman), K'uai Ta-fu, Han A'i-ching, and Wang Ta-pin. There are leaders from other schools, but there are only five who are famous. You have done a lot of work. No matter how many defects and mistakes are there in your work, we are going to protect you. You are also confronted with a lot of difficulties in your work. I have not experienced cultural revolution before, nor have you. The majority of schools did not engage in fighting. Only a small number of them did. They affected the workers, soldiers, and internal unity. Why are there so many non-committed people, and so few [for] cannon fodder? Have you ever thought about this?

Fu-chih: The Chairman loves you because you are small generals of the Red Guards. Vice Chairman Lin, the Premier, the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group, and especially Comrade Chiang Ch'ing are concerned about you. I have to take the major responsibility in this matter, because I did not give you enough help. I can go over this with you.

Chairman: All the institutions of higher learning in the capital are holding study classes, and no report has been made to the Central Committee. This has caused dissatisfaction to Nieh Yuan-tzu and others. You also run study classes, but you don't permit inter-group activities. So they held a big meeting for inter-group activities. To forbid inter-group activities is wrong. You are also wrong in threatening to overthrow Hsieh Fu-chih.

Fu-chih: That helped me greatly.

Chairman: There is a habit in Peking. Today we overthrow this; tomorrow we overthrow that.

Lin Piao: A big storm blows all "overthrows" away.

Chairman: Children are collecting big character posters as waste paper for sale. How many cents a *catty*?

Fu-chih: Seven cents. The children are making a fortune.

Chairman: In don't believe that. Chinese are good in one thing. When they have an opinion, they talk. It is all right to say that inter-group activities are not allowed, but absolute banning is not good. The opposition is conducting inter-factional activities. "Smash-the-Three Olds" faction is conducting inter-factional activities. The "Anti-Smash-the-Three Olds" faction is also conducting inter-factional activities. What's wrong with a little inter-factional activity? Why can't the Heaven faction and the Earth Faction have a little inter-factional activities. I say that inter-factional activities are permissible, because they are being done. If you don't permit good people to have inter-factional activities, bad people will do it. Most of the people are good people. More than 90 percent of the people are good. Bad people are extremely few.

Chiang Ch'ing: It would be a good thing to unify our viewpoints through inter-factional activities, and pluck the bad people out.

(Huang Tso-chen reported that K'uai Ta-fu was coming. K'uai cried out as soon as he entered. The Chairman stood up and went forward to shake hands with K'uai. Comrade Chiang Ch'ing laughed. K'uai presented his case as he cried. He said that Tsinghua was in danger. The workers under the control of black hand were entering Tsinghua to suppress the students. He said it was a great conspiracy.)

Chairman: Is your name Huang Tso-chen? Where are you from?

Tso-chen: X X, Kiangsi.

Chairman: Oh, cousin! I heard of you a long time ago. Comrade Huang Tso-chen's words were not taken seriously. Comrade Hsieh Fu-chih's words were not taken seriously. The Municipal Revolutionary Committee meeting was not taken seriously. I don't know whether the meeting of the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group will be taken seriously. I have become the black hand. Take me to the garrison headquarters.

Wen-yuan: Extend the red hand. Propagandize Mao Tse-tung's thought. We follow you closely.

Chairman: Four methods. What are the four methods?

Wen-yuan: Military control; one divides into two; struggle-criticize quit; fighting on a big scale, if necessary.

Chairman: The first is military control; the second is one divides into two; and the third is struggle-criticize-quit. In the first place, you don't struggle. In the second place, you don't criticize. In the third place, you don't transform. How many months have you fought?

Premier: Since last year.

Chairman: The fourth method is to fight on a big scale. Get 10,000 people involved in the fighting. Withdraw the workers. Give the rifles back to you for a big fight, just like what was done in Szechwan.

Chiang Ch'ing: Disgrace to the family.

Chairman: I'm not afraid of fighting. I'm glad as soon as I hear about fighting. What kind of fighting is it in Peking? A few cold weapons, and a few rifle shots. In Szechwan, the fighting is real war.

Each side has tens of thousands of men. They have rifles and cannons. I heard that they had radios, too.

Chiang Ch'ing: ....

Chairman: In the future, wide publicity should be given to public notices as soon as they are issued. If anyone disobeys them, he should be arrested or eliminated, because it is counterrevolutionary!

Chiang Ch'ing: Kwangsi has been under seige for almost two months.

Premier: You people did not think as to why the Kwangsi notice is Chairman Mao's great strategic plan. In regard to concern about affairs of the state, you five did not even issue a joint announcement to express your attitude, or do a little follow–up work.

Chairman: They are busy!

Premier: These are affairs of the State!

Chairman: Don't divide yourselves into factions any more.

Chiang Ch'ing: I hope you will be united. Don't divide yourselves into Heaven faction, Earth faction, Chang faction, and Li faction. You belong to the Mao Tse–tung thought faction!

Chairman: Don't create two factions. One faction is enough, why two? There are difficulties in achieving this.

X X: No headway has been made in education reform

Chairman: Education revolution cannot make any headway. Even we cannot make any headway, not to mention you. You are hurt by the old system. Why can't we make any headway?... Our Comrade Ch'en Po–ta was anxious at the Central Committee meeting. I said don't be so anxious. A few years later, they will be gone, and that will be the end. As I see it, the education revolution consists of only a few things. Why should we engage in education reform? If we fail, that's the end of it. This is what the students say. Where else can I get information except from the non–committed students! Marx was engaged in the study of philosophy... Why can't the first volume of his book, *Das Kapital* be published? To build a party is not an easy thing. The first international was divided into at least three factions – Marxism, Proudhon–ism, Blanqui–ism, Lasaille–ism... Blanqui's so–called report is nothing but anarchism. The first international was divided in four or five ways. We are not being fair in what we are doing now. To fight a little civil war is not a serious matter. Therefore, one of the four methods is to fight in a big way.

Wen–yuan: I am inclined to accept the struggle–criticize–disband, or the struggle–criticize–quit formula practised in some schools.

Chairman: When the earth makes one revolution, it is one year. When it turns 10 times, it is 10 years. With the two factions going on like this, I think they have to quit. If they want to fight, let them fight on a big scale. They should give their place in the school to novel writers for self–study. Those who study literature should write poems and drama. Those who study philosophy should write history, family history, and the process of revolution. Those who study political science and economics should not emulate the professors of Peking University. Are there any famous professors at Peking University? These subjects do not need teachers. Teaching is harmful. Organize a small group for self study, a self–study university. The students may stay half a year, one year, two years, or three years. No examination is required. Examination is not a good method. Suppose ten questions are asked about a book, which contains 100 viewpoints. The ten questions cover only one–tenth of the book. Even if you answer all the ten questions correctly in the examination, what about the other 90 percent?

Who examined Marx? Who examined Engels? Who examined Lenin? Who examined Comrade Lin Piao? Who examined Comrade Huang Tso–chen? The needs of the masses and Chiang Kai–shek are our teachers. This was the case for all of us. Teachers are needed in middle schools, but everything should be made simple.

Wen–yuan: Establish a few good libraries.

Chairman: Give workers, peasants and soldiers time to use them. To study in a library is a good method. I studied at a library in Hunan for half a year, and in the library of Peking University for half a year. I chose my own books. Who taught me? I took only one course – journalism. I can be regarded as a member of the journalism class. As to that Philosophy Research Association, the sponsors were insincere. Hu Shih signed. There were also T'an P'ing-shan and Ch'en Kung–po.

The Peking University was run in such as inflexible fashion. It should have operated with more freedom.

Chiang Ch'ing: Now the universities are engaged in armed struggle.

Chairman: There are two advantages of armed struggle. First, one obtains combat experience from fighting. Second, bad people are exposed. We must make an over all analysis of armed struggle. Social phenomena do not change according to man's will. Now that the workers are there to intervene, if they do not succeed, withdraw the workers. Let the students fight for another 10 years. The earth will be revolving as usual, and the heaven is not going to fall.

Chiang Ch'ing: We really love you. It is nonsense to say that we don't need college students. We do want you. Some of you sometimes listen to us. Some of you act in one way in our presence, and in another way behind our back. We don't know what you are holding back.

Chairman: If you don't listen to us, I have a way out. Let the workers extend the "black hand"; use the workers to intervene; use the proletariat to intervene.

(Nieh Yuan–tzu requested that the Liberation Army be sent to Peking University.)

Chairman: You want your appetite satisfied. You insist on the 63rd Army, not any other unit. How about the 38th Army? If the 38th Army really supports 'Ching–kang–shan', I will send the 63rd Army. You should work with the 38th Army.

Chiang Ch'ing: Nieh Yuan–tzu, you should work on the 38th Army. You should give it a welcome.

Chairman: Send half of the troops from the 38th Army, and the other half from the 63rd Army. The 38th Army is not as bad as you think. Their base lies with Yang Ch'eng–wu and the Peking Military Region. The Peking Military Region held two meetings. The first one was not very good, the second was better. Cheng Wei–shan was put under investigation.

T'an Hou–lan, actually your gun was always pointed at Nieh Yuan-tzu. When you, T'an Hou–lan, a woman general, fired a shot, Cheng Wei–shan became very nervous. At the time, Cheng Wei–shan was not in Peking. He went to Pao–ting and Shansi to solve his problems. We didn't see him, did we? Nobody knows whether this divisional commander is good or bad. He scared all the generals. Did he give you (pointing to T'an) any trouble?

T'an Hou–lan: No, the students don't agree with him.

Chairman: There must be historical reasons. These things don't happen accidentally. They don't come suddenly.

Po–ta: Follow the Chairman's teaching closely; resolutely carry it out.

Chairman: Don't talk about teachings.

Wen–yuan: The Chairman's words today have profound meaning.

Po–ta: The first half of 1966 was relatively good. All the colleges and universities agitated and ignited the flame of revolution. It was right to touch off the storm of revolution. Now, they have gone beyond their heads, thinking that they are great. they want to put the entire country under their control. The hands of K'uai Ta–fu and Han A'i–ching reach everywhere, but they are ignorant.

Chairman: They are only 20–odd years old. Don't take the young people lightly. Chou Yu started as a cavalryman. He was only 16 when he became the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Wu. Please don't think that you are old timers.

Chiang Ch'ing: We took part in the revolution when we were teenagers.

Chairman: Don't feel elated; elation all over the body is just like a disease.

Po–ta: Han A'i–ching, you have not given much thought to Chairman Mao's thinking and the opinion of the Central Committee. You call secret meetings on the basis of information obtained surreptitiously. You put your personal interests first. You are following a dangerous path.

Chairman: First of all, I have been bureaucratic. I have never met you. Had they not wanted to grab the black hand, I would not have asked you to come here. Let K'uai Ta–fu wake up.

Po–ta: K'uai Ta–fu, you should wake up. Stop the horse at the edge of the precipitous cliff. You are on a dangerous course.

Lin Piao: Stop the horse at the edge of the precipitous cliff. Admit your mistakes!

Chairman: Don't use the words "admit mistakes."

Po–ta: K'uai Ta–fu does not respect the worker masses. If he still refuses to listen to us, it will mean his disrespect to the Central Committee, his disrespect to Chairman Mao. That road is dangerous.

Chairman: It is pretty dangerous. Now it is time for the younger leaders to make their mistakes.

Premier: The Chairman said long time ago: now it is the younger leader's turn to make their mistakes.

Lin Piao: K'uai Ta–fu, our attitude toward you was taken after consultation with the Garrison Headquarters and the Municipal Revolutionary Committee. You said that you don't understand the attitude of the Central Committee. To–day, Chairman Mao shows his personal concern about you, and has made the most important, the most correct, the clearest, and the most timely teaching. If you turn a deaf ear to this again, you will be committing a grave mistake. You Red Guards have played an important role during the Great Cultural Revolution. Now, a great revolutionary unity has been achieved in many schools throughout the nation. As far as great unity is concerned, some of the schools are still lagging behind. You should catch up. You have failed to see what is needed at different stages of the movement.

Chairman: T'an Hou–lan's opposition has only 200 people. A year later, they are still not suppressed. The opposition force in other schools is much larger in size, how can they be conquered?

Ts'ao Ts'ao tried to use force to conquer Sun Ch'uan, and was defeated. Liu Pei used force to conquer Sun Ch'uan; he lost Chieh–t'ing and was defeated. Ssu–ma I failed to conquer Chuko Liang by force. The first battle lasted a long while, but Chang Ho had only one horse left at the end...

Yeh Chun: That's the loss of Chieh–t'ing.

Lin Piao: To fight the capitalist roaders is a good thing. It is also necessary to struggle with the freaks and monsters in literary circles. Now there are people who are not doing this. Instead, they are engaged in pitting one group of students against another group of students, and one group of masses against another group of masses. Most of them are children of workers and peasants, being utilized by bad people. Some of them are counterrevolutionaries. Others have just begun to be revolutionary. Gradually, their revolutionary spirit diminished and went in the other direction. Still others subjectively want revolution, but their objective action is just the opposite. There is a small group of people who are both subjectively and objectively counterrevolutionary. You are isolated from the masses.

Chairman: The workers and peasants constitute more than 90 percent of the population of the country. More than 90 percent of the schools are good; very few of them are engaged in civil strife. There are only six of them in Peking.

Fu–chih: Tsinghua has 20,000 students. Less than 5,000 are engaged in armed struggle.

Lin Piao: Those who do not take part in the fighting disapprove of the fighting.

Chairman: They are riding on the back of a tiger; there is no way of coming down although they wish to, K'uai Ta–fu can come down and become a government official or a plain citizen. K'uai Ta–fu should welcome the workers

Fu–chih: The workers are not armed with an ounce of iron. They carry only three weapons: (1) quotations from Chairman Mao's works; (2) Chairman Mao's latest instructions; and (3) the "July 3" notice.

K'ang Sheng: The rifles in Tsinghua were provided by the Peking Aeronautical Institute. Two car loads of rifles were given to Tsinghua. K'uai Ta–fu is the commander and Han A'i–ching is the political commissar.

Han A'i–ching: There isn't such a thing! There isn't such a thing at all! People from the Garrison Command came over to our place to check the rifles several times. Not a single rifle was missing.

Fu–chih: You are correct; you are all right again. I criticized you several times, and you objected. You don't have the self-criticism spirit at all.

Po–ta: Should we take back the rifles?

Han A'i–ching: Chairman, I have a request to make. Please assign a unit of the Liberation Army to supervise me. Many reports are at variance with facts. I love K'uai Ta–fu very much. I am also aware of the fact that as long as I am with him, I will be involved in many things. But I feel that I must do my best to protect him lest he collapse. His fate is linked with that of the Red Guards throughout the country. Assign a Liberation Army unit to me, and everything will be clarified.

Po–ta: No self–criticism spirit.

Chiang Ch'ing: I made a mistake. I spoiled you. Hsieh Fu–chih, you spoiled her more than I did. She is spoiled. Now that there is a little trouble; Chairman Mao's method is the best.

Chairman: Don't criticize all the time. Yang Ch'eng–wu is creating many centers. The National Defense Scientific Committee is engaged in the theory of many centers. Throughout the country, there are thousands, or perhaps tens of thousands of centers. If everybody considers himself No 1 in the country, will there still be any center?

Chiang Ch'ing: Han A'i–ching, I criticized you several times. You have never expressed yourself.

Chairman: Don't criticize her. You always blame others; never blame yourself.

Chiang Ch'ing: I was saying that she lacks so much in self–criticism spirit.

Chairman: Young people cannot stand criticism. Her character is some what like mine when I was young. Kids are strong in subjectivism, very strong. They only criticize others.

Chiang Ch'ing: K'uai Ta–fu is smiling now. Relax a little, don't be so tense.

(K'uai reported that Ch'en Yu–yen, a girl student at 'Ching–kang–shan' Headquarters, was arrested by the workers.)

Has Ch'en Yu–yen been released? She is a girl, and should be protected.

K'uai Ta–fu: Ch'en Yu–yen is sleeping at Peking Aeronautical Institute.

Chairman: If you want to arrest the "black hand," the "black hand" is me. What can you do to me? We are sympathetic with your side. I cannot accept "April 14's" idea of certain victory, but we must woo their masses and some of their leaders. Chou Chia–yin's main viewpoint is that those who conquered the country cannot rule it. He said that K'uai Ta–fu must turn over his authority to "April 14."

We asked the workers to do some propaganda work, you refused, knowing clearly what kind of propaganda they were to do. Huang Tso–chen and Hsieh Fu–chih explained this matter, but they failed to persuade you. The workers were unarmed. You killed or wounded five of them. Just like Peking University, we are sympathetic with Nieh Yuan–tzu, sympathetic with you five leaders. Didn't you know why tens of thousands of workers went to Tsinghua University? How dare they go without the order of the Central Committee? You are very passive. Contrary to our expectations, "April 14" welcomed the workers, while 'Ching–kang–shan' did not. You are mixed up. Nobody was invited here today from "April 14" or 'Ching–kang–shan' of Peking University because the thinking of "April 14" is not right. Although flying the red flag, 'Ching–kang–shan' has more bad people. The Nieh Yuan–tzu faction has more good people.

Nieh Yuan–tzu: Wang, Kuan, and Ch'i had a hand in it.

Chairman: You are opposed to Wang, Kuan, and Ch'i. You had inter-faction contacts, which I cannot forbid. Han A'i–ching, K'uai Ta–fu, are you good friends? You two should continue to be good friends. Han A'i–ching, you should continue to help him by making better policies.

Now, "April 14" is very happy, thinking that 'Ching–kang–shan' is going to collapse. I don't believe that. I think 'Ching–kang–shan' will continue to be 'Ching–kang–shan'. I don't mean you Old Buddha's 'Ching–kang–shan'.

Wen–yuan, Fu–chih: The real Ching–kang–shan, the base of revolution!

Chiang Ch'ing: Don't put me in a position where I cannot do anything to help you although it is my wish.

Chairman: Many of those who beat up the workers are not your men. I heard that they came from other places.

Premier: Do you still have out–of–town students in your place?

K'uai Ta–fu: Yes.

Chairman: All of you haven't slept yet. K'uai Ta–fu, if you don't have a place to sleep tonight, go to Han A'i–ching's place to sleep. Han A'i–ching should take good care of him. Han A'i–ching, you should take good care of him. When you people get together, go to Han A'i–ching's place to take a little rest, and then hold a meeting.

Premier: Han A'i–ching, you can come up with some good idea to help him.

Chairman: K'uai Ta--fu, is your action against the Central Committee? You ignored Huang Tso–chen's words, and ignored Hsieh Fu–chih's words. Even a meeting at the Municipal Revolutionary Committee did not stop you. I cannot but extend my "black hand." I mobilized the workers to stop your fighting. The fighting went on for so many days. As the workers marched in with drums and gongs, you still did not pay any attention. You are isolated from the masses, the workers, the peasants, the soldiers, the majority of the students, and your own people. Many people are saying uncomplimentary words about you. We did not tell Tsinghua University to keep quiet directly, but we did tell them indirectly.

Wu Te: I had a talk with K'uai Ta–fu yesterday. He did not listen to me.

Chairman: "April 14" welcomed the workers. You (Ching–kang–shan) people are very stupid, very passive. I am very unhappy with that "April 14."

Chiang Ch'ing: "April 14" cursed me.

Chairman: The workers carried an effigy in their demonstration, and cut the power supply cables. At this moment, "April 14" was not told anything about this demonstration, why did they welcome them? You are very foolish this time, giving "April 14" a chance to welcome the workers.

Chiang Ch'ing: Even the masses of "April 14" are saying that K'uai Ta–fu is left oriented, and Shen Ju–huai [an "April 14" leader] is right oriented. Tsinghua is engaged in a grand unity movement, but it won't work without K'uai Ta–fu.

Chairman: K'uai Ta–fu, can you be the chancellor of Tsinghua University? Let the university be run by two from 'Ching–kang–shan' and one from "April 14." Let Shen Ju–huai be the vice chancellor.

K'uai Ta–fu: No, I' can't, I am unable to ....

Chairman: Unity is needed. We need K'uai Ta–fu. Without K'uai Ta–fu, unity cannot be achieved. K'uai Ta–fu is left inclinced. Two from 'Ching–kang–shan'. "April 14" is right oriented.

Chiang Ch'ing: Now, starting with you five, stop the fighting first.

Chairman: First, military control. Second, divide into two, with "April 14" taking a half and you, K'uai Ta–fu, taking the other half. Third, struggle–criticize–quit. These are the proposals, but they are unwilling to follow.

In the first place, you don't struggle. In the second place, you don't criticise. In the third place, you don't transform. You concentrate your effort on civil war. Of course, civil war will take months. The fourth way is to withdraw the workers, return all the rifles to you for a big fight. Should we run liberal arts college? We still have to run liberal arts colleges. As to how, we have to make a study and find a method. The old method encouraged revisionism.

T'an Hou–lan: Is the Normal University going to be continued?

Chairman: If we suspend it, who is going to teach senior middle school? Who is going to teach special secondary schools? How can we go without a foreign language school? It doesn't work if only one wind prevails. But heaven is not going to fall if only one wind prevails for a few years. During World War I which lasted a number of years, not only universities were suspended, but high schools and primary schools were also suspended. Everything was chaotic.

Chiang Ch'ing: Reform is a hard task; you people cannot sit still on your rear ends.

Chairman: Knowledge is not gained in schools. Hasn't Comrade Lin Piao just said that! Where did his knowledge come from? From Whampoa Military Academy? Comrade Huang Yung–sheng went to school for one year and a half. Wen Yu–ch'eng is lucky; he went to school for three years. Wen Yu–ch'eng, you are from Ch'ang–kang; you know a few characters. Society is the biggest university. How can it work if you sit in a narrow grove? Society is the biggest university. Lenin studied in a university for a year and a half. Engels did not finish high school. Both of them were better off than Gorky, who went to primary school for only two years. I, too, haven't attended a university... [text illegible] ... The inventor of the steam engine was a worker, not a college teacher... [text illegible] ... Look at some of our children who spend more than ten years studying. They are physically ruined, and become unable to sleep. A child may study history, but he doesn't understand class struggle.

Chiang Ch'ing: They study dozens of thick books. The works of Marx, Engels, and Chairman Mao become reference material, or supplementary material. Only the books chosen by their teachers are formal teaching materials.

Chairman: Six years is too long for primary school education; six years is too long for middle school education. Too much time is wasted. Do away with examinations! What are examinations for? It would be good if no examinations were necessary for any course. All examinations should be abolished, absolutely abolished. Who examined Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin? Who examined Comrade Lin Piao? Who examined me? Comrade Hsieh Fu–chih, call all the students back to school. If some of them don't want to go back because they are angry, don't force them. It is not right that members of "April 14" are staying in school, while members of 'Ching–kang–shan' are not. Tell all members of 'Ching–kang–shan' to come to the People's Assembly Hall. Differentiation should be made in treating the leaders of "April 14."

Han A'i–ching: Chairman, I have a question. If 10 or 100 years from now, civil war should break out in China, and if one faction claims that they represent Mao Tse–tung's thought and another faction also claims that they represent Mao Tse–tung's thought, resulting in a situation where each faction occupies a piece of territory and the entire country is engulfed in war, what would we do?

Chairman: There is nothing starling about it. The war against the Ch'ing Dynasty lasted more than 20 years. We fought Chiang Kai–shek for over 10 years. Within the Chinese Communist Party, we had Ch'en Tu–hsiu, Li Li–san, Wang Ming, Po Ku, Chang Kuo–t'ao, Kao Kang, Liu Shao–ch'i, and many more. These experiences are more valuable than our knowledge about Marxism.

Lin Piao: We have Mao Tse–tung's thought.

Chairman: We are better off to have this Great Cultural Revolution than to have none. Of course, we cannot guarantee... [illegible].... I don't understand your sister Nieh Yuan–su. Why must your elder brother and elder sister align with their younger sister?

Premier: My younger brother Chou Yung likes to be associated with Wang, Kuan, Ch'i. I have grabbed him and sent him to the garrison headquarters.

Chairman: My father was bad. If he were alive today, he should be given a "jet plane ride" [a form of punishment].

Lin Piao: Lu Hsun's younger brother was a big traitor.

Chairman: I, myself, am not smart, either. I believed in everything I studied. Thereafter, I studied for another seven years, including half a year spent in studying capitalism. I was totally ignorant about Marxism. Knowing only Napoleon and Washington, I was not even aware of the existence of Marx in this world. It is much better to study in the library than attending classes. A piece of cake is enough to take care of a day's meal. The old library attendant became very well acquainted with me.

Po–ta: Han A'i–ching mentioned this problem before. With Comrade Lin Piao as Chairman Mao's successor and with Mao Tse–tung's thought, I am not afraid of the emergence of revisionism.

Chairman: Nobody can guarantee that there will be no more cultural revolutions after this one. There will still be complications. Don't talk about new stages. There are so many new stages. I mentioned the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant affair. What new stage is that? One cultural revolution may not be enough.

Wen–yuan: The Chairman has already talked about this problem.

Premier: Comrade Lin Piao has studied the Chairman's writings well. Vice Chairman Lin has also mastered Soviet affairs and the works of Marx and Lenin.

Chairman: Did the party go out of existence because of the emergence of Ch'en Tu–hsiu? Despite Li Li–san, the Wang Ming line, and Li Li–san's repeated errors, the party still survived, the revolution still went on, and the armed units still marched on... [text illegible]

Chiang Ch'ing: Han A'i–ching wrote to me several times, discussing this problem. Why did Han A'i–chin keep bringing this problem up? In the first place, she is isolated from the workers and the peasants. In the second place, she is isolated from reality. As soon as I see her, she thinks about the future. She always talks about things that might happen decades from now. She even asked me when World War III will break out.

Chairman: It is good to think far ahead. She is good! She is good! We may die in many ways. First, we may be killed by bombs. Second, we may die of diseases or germs. Third, we may be killed in a train or plane accident. Fourth, I love to swim; I may be drowned. Lastly, we may die a natural death, death caused by germs.

I heard that Liu Shao–ch'i has recovered from a serious disease. Po I–po almost died. He had kidney infection, heart disease, hypertension, and diabetes. Four or five doctors and two nurses saved him. Have you heard that?

Wen–yuan: Historical development is always progressive and has ups and downs, but the future is bright. We believe in Mao Tse–tung's thought; we believe in the masses. I think Han A'i–ching is a pessimist.

Han A'i–ching: Victory is not won in one shot. There will always be ups and downs according to dialectics. [Remaining text illegible].

NOTES

1. Neih yuan–tzu, Han A'i–ching, Wang Ta–ping, Kuai Ta–fu, Tan Ha–lan, and Huang Tso–chen were all leaders of various Red Guard factions of Peking.

2. 'Ching–kang–shan', 'April 14', 'May 16', 'April 22' were all the names of various Red guard organisations.

3. Hsieh Fu–chih, at that time vice–premier, and member of the Cultural Revolutionary group of the CC of the CPC.

4. Huang Yung–sheng, the Army Chief of staff of that time.

ADDRESS AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE NINTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

April 1, 1969

Comrades! The Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is now in session. (Long and enthusiastic applause. Delegates shout: 'Long live Chairman Mao! A long, long life to Chairman Mao!')

I hope that this will be a good congress, a congress of unity, a congress of victory (enthusiastic applause and cheers).

Since the foundation of our Party in 1921, forty-eight years have already passed by. At the First Congress there were only twelve delegates. Two of them are here. One is Old Tung [Pi-wu] and one is me (enthusiastic applause). Quite a few have sacrificed their lives: the Shantung delegates Wang Chin-mei and Teng En-ming, the Hupei delegate Ch'en T'an-ch'iu, the Hunan delegate Ho Shu-heng, the Shanghai delegate Li Han-chun – all these laid down their lives, while four others rebelled and became traitors: Ch'en Kung-po, Chou Fo-hai[1], Chang Kuo-t'ao[2] and Liu Jen-ch'ing[3]. The latter two are still alive. There was another delegate called Li Ta[4] who died two years ago. At that time there were only a few dozen party members in the whole country and the majority of these were intellectuals. Later the Party developed. The number of delegates attending the First, Second, Third

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SOURCE: *Mao Chu-hsi wen-hsun.*

and Fourth Congresses was very small, from ten to twenty or from twenty to thirty. The Fifth Congress was held in Wuhan. The number of delegates was somewhat larger, several hundred. The Sixth Congress was held in Moscow. There were several dozen delegates, Comrade En-lai and Comrade [Liu] Po-ch'eng participated. The Seventh Congress was held in Yenan. It was a congress of unity, for there were divisions in the Party then too, caused by the mistakes of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Li Li-san and Wang Ming–especially the Wang Ming Line. There were those who were against the election to the Central Committee of comrades who followed the Wang Ming Line. We did not agree and persuaded people to elect their delegates. The result? The result was that there were only a few who were no good. Wang Ming fled abroad to oppose us. Li Li-san was also no good. Chang Wen-t'ien and Wang Chia-hsiang committed mistakes. There were only these few. As for the rest of them, such as Liu Shao-ch'i. P'eng Chen and Po I-po, we did not know that they were bad. We were not clear about their political history.

From the Eighth Congress up to now we have become more clear about them. We are clearer about their political line, their organizational line, and their ideology. Therefore we hope that this Congress will become a congress of unity (enthusiastic applause and cheers). Can we win victory on the basis of this unity? Can this Congress become a congress of victory? After the Congress, can we win still greater victories throughout the country? I think we can. I think this will be a congress of unity and a congress of victory (enthusiastic applause). After the Congress we can win still greater victories throughout the country. (Prolonged enthusiastic applause and shouts of 'Long live Chairman Mao! A long, long life to Chairman Mao! May Chairman Mao live for ever!')

NOTES

1. Ch'en Kung-po (1892-1946) left the Chinese Communist Party shortly after its foundation and joined the Kuomintang, becoming a close associate of Wang Ching-wei. He participated in Wang's Japanese-sponsored puppet government during the period 1939-45 and was executed for treason in 1946. Chou Fo-hai also collaborated with the Japanese.

2. Chang Kuo-tao, see note 12 on p 80 of this volume.

3. Liu Jen-ch'ing was a delegate of the Peking Communists at the first Congress.

4. Li Ta (c.1891-1967) soon left the Chinese Communist Party, but co-operated with it episodically. In his last years, though he had not rejoined the Party, he was president of Wuhan University. He died on 24 August 1967 as a result of Red Guard persecution. According to Wuhan radio, he had sent a personal appeal to Mao to save him; Mao had responded favourably, but his message not to 'Kill Li Ta by persecution' had been intercepted by the local Party leader.

TALK AT THE FIRST PLENUM OF THE NINTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

April 28, 1969

What I am going to say is old stuff with which you are all familiar. There is nothing new. I am simply going to talk about unity. The purpose of uniting is to win still greater victories.

The Soviet revisionists now attack us. Some Tass broadcast or other, the Wang Ming material[1] and the long screed in *Kommunist* all say we are no longer a party of the proletariat, and call us a 'petit-bourgeois party'. They say we have imposed a monolithic order and have returned to the time of the bases, which means we have retrogressed. What is this thing they call becoming monolithic? They say it is a military–bureaucratic system. According to Japanese terminology it is a 'system'. In Soviet vocabulary it is a 'military–bureaucratic dictatorship'. When they see there are many military men in our lists of personnel they call us 'military'. As for the 'bureaucratic' part, I suppose they mean the batch of 'bureaucrats' comprising me, En-lai, K'ang Sheng and Ch'en Po-ta. In a word those of you who are not military are all supposed to belong to a bureaucratic network, and we are collectively called a 'military bureaucratic dictatorship'. I

SOURCE: *Mao Chu-hsi wen-hsun*. The source states that this talk was edited from a tape recording; not examined by the Chairman.

say let them talk. They can say what they want. But their words have one characteristic: they avoid branding us as a bourgeois party, instead they label us a 'party of the petit bourgeoisie'. We, on the other hand, say that they are a bourgeois dictatorship, and are restoring the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

If we are to speak of victory we must guarantee that under the leadership of the proletariat we unite the broad masses of the people to win victory. The socialist revolution must still be continued. There are still things in this revolution which have not been completed and must still be continued: for example struggle–criticism–transformation. After a few-years maybe we shall have to carry out another revolution.

Several of our old comrades have been to the factories for a while to see for themselves. I hope that in future you people will also go down to have a look when the opportunity arises. You should study the problems of various factories. It seems essential that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution should still be carried out. Our foundation has not been consolidated. According to my own observation I would say that, not in all factories, nor in an overwhelming majority of factories, but in quite a large majority of cases the leadership is not in the hands of true Marxists, nor yet in the hands of the masses of the workers. In the past the leadership in the factories was not devoid of good men: there were good men. Among the Party committee secretaries, assistant secretaries and committee members there were good men. There were good men among the branch secretaries. But they followed the old line of Liu Shao-ch'i. They were all for material incentives, they put profits in command and did not promote proletarian politics. Instead they operated a system of bonuses, etc. There are now some factories which have liberated them and have included them in the leadership based on the Triple Alliance. Some factories still have not done so. But in the factories there are indeed bad people, for example in the Seventh of February works, which is the railway locomotive and carriage repair works at Ch'ang-hsin-tien. This is a big factory with 8,000 workers and several tens of thousands if you include their families. In the past the Kuomintang had nine district branches there, the *San-min chu-i* Youth League[2] had three organizations and eight so-called special duty organs. Of course, careful analysis is called for because in those days it, wouldn't do to refuse to join the Kuomintang! Some of them are old workers. Are you going to get rid of all the old workers? That won't do! You should distinguish the serious cases from the trivial. Some were nominal Kuomintang party members. They had to join the party. It is only necessary to have a talk with them. There were others who had more responsibility, while there was a small minority who were up to their necks in it, and who have done bad things. You must distinguish between their differing circumstances. Among those who have done bad things there should also be distinctions. If they are frank then we should be more lenient. If they resist we should be severe. If they make a proper self-criticism we should let them go on working – of course we shall not give them work in the leadership. If you don't let them work, what will they do at home? What will their sons and daughters do? Besides, most of the old workers are skilled, even if their skill is not of a high order.

I have brought up this instance to illustrate that the revolution has not been completed. Therefore will all the comrades of the Central Committee including alternate members please pay attention: you should undertake very detailed work. It must be done in a detailed manner, it won't suffice to do it sketchily, that will often lead to mistakes. There are some places where too many people have been arrested. This is bad. Why arrest so many? They haven't committed homicide, arson, or poisoning. I say that provided they haven't committed any of these crimes, you shouldn't arrest them. As for those who have committed the mistake of following the capitalist road, still less should they be arrested. Those in factories should be allowed to work, to participate in mass movements. The people who made mistakes have after all made them in the past. Either they joined the Kuomintang or did some bad things – or perhaps they made mistakes in the recent period such as the capitalist roaders. But they should be allowed to join with the masses. It would be bad not to let them join with the masses. Some have been shut up for two years, shut up in 'cattle pens'. They no longer know what is going on in the world. When they come out and people talk to them, they are unable to make sensible replies. They are still speaking the language of two years ago. These people have been divorced from life for two years and they must be helped. Study classes must be organized and you must talk about history with them and tell them about the course of the Great Cultural Revolution during the past two years, and enable them gradually to awaken.

Let us unite for one purpose: to consolidate the proletarian dictatorship. You should see that this is carried out in every factory, village, office and school. At first you should n't try to do this too comprehensively. You can do it, but you shouldn't start doing it and then not bother about it. Don't just do it for half a year or even longer, and then have nobody bother with it after that. You should summarize experiences factory by factory, school by school, organ by organ. Thus Comrade Lin Piao's report says that we must do it factory by factory, school by school, commune by commune. Party branch by Party branch, unit by unit. The question of dealing with one Youth League branch after another and with the League as a whole has also been raised.

Another thing which we have talked about before is that we should be prepared for war. We should maintain our preparedness year after year. People may ask, 'Suppose they don't come?' No matter whether they come or not, we should be prepared. Don't expect the Centre to distribute materials even for the manufacture of hand grenades. Hand-grenades can be made everywhere, in every province Each province can even make rifles and light weapons. This concerns material preparation, but the most important thing is to be psychologically prepared. To be psychologically prepared means that we must be spiritually prepared to fight. Not only should we on the Central Committee have this psychological preparedness, but we should see to it that the great majority of the people have it too. Those I am talking about do not include the enemies of the dictatorship, such as those landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements, because that lot would be happy to see the imperialists and revisionists attack us. If they attacked us these people suppose that this would turn the world upside down and they would come out on top. We should also be prepared on this score; in the process of the socialist revolution we should also carry through this revolution.

Others may come and attack us but we shall not fight outside our borders. We do not fight outside our borders. I say we will not be provoked. Even if you invite us to come out we will not come out, but if you should come and attack us we will deal with you. It depends on whether you attack on a small scale or a large scale. If it is on a small scale we will fight on the border. If it is on a large scale then I am in favour of yielding some ground. China is no small country. If there is nothing in it for them I don't think they will come. We must make it clear to the whole world that we have both right and advantage on our side. If they invade our territory then I think it would be more to our advantage, and we would then have both right and advantage. They would be easy to fight since they would fall into the people's encirclement. As for things like aeroplanes, tanks and armoured cars, everywhere experience proves that they can be dealt with.

Is it not true that in order to win victory we must have more people? People from all walks of life, no matter on which mountain-top or in which province they are, whether they are in the north or the south. Which is better, to unite more people or less people? It is always better, to unite more people. Some people's opinion differs from ours, but this is not a case of relationship between us and the enemy. I do not believe, to put it in concrete terms, that the relationship between Yang Te-chih and Wang Hsiao-yu[3] is of the latter kind. Is the relationship between you two one between us and the enemy, or is it a relationship among the people? In my opinion it is merely a quarrel among the people. The Centre is also rather bureaucratic; it did not pay much attention to you. Neither did you bring it to the Centre for discussion. Such a big province as Shantung has contradictions among the people. Don't you think you should take this opportunity to talk it over? I think that in East China too there is this problem of contradictions among the people. This is also the case in Shansi. You support one faction, I support another, but what is the necessity for this incessant quarrelling? There are also problems in Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechuan. Every place has a certain number of problems, but things are much better than last year and the year before. You, comrade, aren't you called Hsu Shih-yu[4]? The year before last when we were in Shanghai things were really terrible, in July, August and September. Now life is after all a bit better. I am talking about the overall situation. In that Nanking of yours there emerged a so-called 'Red Headquarters'. Work was done and as a result they decided to cooperate, didn't they? Didn't the 'August 27th' and the 'Red Headquarters' in the end cooperate?

I believe that the main problem still concerns our work. Haven't I said these two sentences before: the answer to the problem of the localities lies in the army, the answer to the problem of the army lies in political work? You are not implacable enemies in life and death, so why bother about it? And when it comes to personal gratitude or hatred, that is not of such great consequence. In a word there is nothing from either your previous or present lives to make you mortal enemies. You simply clashed, had some difference of opinion, somebody did something like criticizing you or opposing you. You counter-attacked and as a result a contradiction arose. Those opposed to you are not necessarily bad. One of the personalities whom Peking often wanted to overthrow was Hsieh Fu-chih. He later adopted the following method: to all the bodies which wanted to overthrow him he said that there was nothing wrong with them, and those who supported him were not necessarily good.

So what I say is still the same old words, which is nothing other than unite to win greater victories. In this there is concrete content. What are we going to do? And what sort of concrete victories? And how do we go about uniting people?

I have faith in some of the old comrades who have made mistakes in the past. Originally there was a long list of thirty odd names. We thought that they should all be elected as members of the Politburo. Later someone prepared a shorter list of less than twenty. This time we thought it was too short. The majority are middle-of-the-roaders *(laughter)*. Those who oppose both the long list and the short list advocate a medium list of between twenty and thirty. so the only thing to do was to elect representatives. This is not to say that the candidate members of the Central Committee are not as good as full members or Politburo members in respect of their political level, working ability, moral and intellectual qualities; this isn't the question at all. There is something unfair here. You may say that it is quite fair; I think it is not so fair, not so just. Everyone should be both prudent and cautious, no matter whether you are alternate members of the Central Committee, Central Committee members, Politburo members, you should all be prudent and cautious. Don't be impulsive and forget what's what. Since the time of Marx we have never talked about credit. You are communists, you are that part of the masses which is more conscious, you are that part of the proletariat which is more conscious. So I agree with this slogan, 'First do not fear hardship, second do not fear death'; but not the slogan, 'Even if we get no credit, we are rewarded by hard work; if we get no credit for hard work, we have the reward of being exhausted' (laughter). This slogan is the direct opposite of 'First do not fear hardship, second do not fear death.' You can see how many of us have died. All the old comrades who remain are fortunate to be alive and have survived by chance. Comrade P'i Ting-chun[5], at that period in Hupei-Hunan-Anhwei, how many people were with you? Afterwards how many were left? At that time there were many people, now not so many remain. At that time after the Kiangsi Soviet, the Chingkangshan Soviet, North-East Kiangsi, West Hunan and Hupei, North Shensi had gone through the fighting there were very great losses, and not many of the old comrades remained. This is what is meant by 'First not fearing hardship, second not fearing death.' For years we did not have such thing as salaries. We had only fixed amount of food, three *mace* of oil and five of salt. If we got 1½ *catties* of millet, that was great. As for vegetables, how could we get vegetables everywhere the army went? Now we have entered the cities. This is a good thing. If we hadn't entered the cities Chiang Kai-shek would be occupying them. But it is also a bad thing because it caused our Party to deteriorate. So there are some foreigners and journalists who say our Party is being rebuilt. We raise this slogan too, but we call it rectification and Party-building. In fact the Party needs to be rebuilt. Every branch needs to be rectified among the masses. They must go through the masses; not just a few Party members but the masses outside the Party must participate in meetings and in criticism. Individuals who are no good should be persuaded to get out of the Party, to withdraw. A very small minority may have to be disciplined. Isn't this laid down in the Party Constitution? It also has to be passed by the Party branch congress and approved by the superior level. In a word we must use prudence. This must be done, it certainly had to be done, but it must be done prudently.

This National Congress seems to have been a very good one. In my opinion it has been a congress of unity and of victory. We use the method of issuing communiques. The foreigners can no longer fish for our news *(laughter)*. They say we hold secret meetings. In fact we are both open and secret. I think that the reporters in Peking are not much good. Perhaps we have cleared out most of the traitors and spies who had wormed their way among us. In the past whenever we held a meeting it was immediately leaked out and the Red Guard posters immediately published it. Since Wang [Li], Kuan [Feng], Ch'i [Pen-yu], Yang [Ch'eng-wu]. Yu [Li-chin] and Chuan [Ts'ung-pi] fell, they no longer have any more news about the meetings of the Central Committee.

That's more or less that. The meeting is adjourned *(long enthusiastic applause)*.

NOTES

1. This refers to Wang Ming's article, 'China: Cultural Revolution or Counter-Revolutionary Coup', originally published in the *Canadian Tribune* on 19 March 1969, and subsequently reprinted in pamphlet form in Moscow by the Novosti Press Agency Publishing House. It enumerates 'ten major crimes committed by Mao Tse-tung in China', and 'five major crimes committed by Mao Tse-tung in international affairs'.

2. The '*San-min chu-i* or 'Three People's Principles' Youth League was the youth organization of the Kuomintang.

3. Wang Hsiao-yu, a PLA political commissar, was Chairman of the Shantung Revolutionary Committee from its establishment on 3 February 1967 until October 1969. Yang Te-chih (1910-), who replaced him at that time, had been First Vice-Chairman throughout this period. Wang, at the time of his dismissal, was denounced as a member of the 'May 16th' ultra-leftist group

4. Hsu Shih-yu (1906-) was at this time Commander of Nanking Military Region and Vice-Minister of National Defence.Comrade Mao is alluding to the military rebellion in Wuhan in the summer of 1967.

5. P'i Ting-chun (1914-) became a member of the Central Committee at the Ninth Congress. At that time, he was Deputy Commander of the PLA in Fukien. He was transferred to Langchou in 1970 as Commander of the PLA there; he returned to Fukien in the reshuffle of January 1974.

DIRECTIVES REGARDING CULTURAL REVOLUTION

66-69

It is to the advantage of despots to keep people ignorant; it is to our advantage to make them intelligent. We must lead all of them gradually away from ignorance. *(11-2-1966)*

This big-character poster at Peking University is a Marxist-Leninist one which should be at once broadcast and published in the newspapers. *(1-6-1966)*

Wind will not cease even if trees want to rest *(2-6-1966)*

Without destruction there can be no construction: without blockage there can be no flow; without stoppage there can be no movement. *(8-6-1966)*.

The exploiters and reactionaries are, under any circumstance, the minority while the exploited and revolutionaries are the majority. Therefore the dictatorship of the former is un-justifiable, whereas that of the latter is fully justifiable. *(17-6-1966)*.

(Comments on the Seven Good Examples of the Manual Work of Chekiang Cadres)

Class struggle, productive struggle, and scientific experiment are three great revolutionary movements for the construction of a great socialist country, the safeguard for a communist against bureaucratism, revisionism, and dogmatism so that he can be ever victorious, and the dependable guarantee for the proletariat to unite with other broad working masses to carry out democratic dictatorship. *(26-6-1966).*

In the great proletarian Cultural Revolution, it is imperative to organize and enlarge proletarian left-wing forces, depending on them to arouse, unite, and educate the masses. *(3-7-1966).*

No need to be afraid of tidal waves; human society has been evolved out of 'tidal waves'. *(26-7-1966).*

Swimming has its rules. It is easy to learn once you know the rules. *(26-7-1966).*

My wish is to join all the comrades of our party to learn from the masses, to continue to be a school-boy.

Even the transformation from a quantitative to a qualitative change and the negation of negation are both unifications of contradictions. However you argue, they are still struggles of opposites. Dialectics can be made monistic, never pluralistic. Nature and society are full of contradictions. As soon as a contradiction is resolved, a new one emerges. There is no world or society without contradictions. Sometimes we may not be able to name a specific contradiction, but it exists all the same. Contradictions are the motivating force of the development of everything. This has been so in the past, is so at present, and will be so in future. *(30-7-1966).*

For our youth, the major subject of study is class struggle. *(2-8-1966).*

You should pay attention to state affairs and carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end!

(Statement to the crowd on 'meeting the masses' in Peking on 10 August 1966).

We must never detach ourselves from the masses, so that we may know them, understand them, be with them, and serve them well. *(17-8-1966).*

This is a movement on a vast scale. It has indeed mobilized the masses. It is of very great significance to the revolutionization of the thinking of the people throughout the country.

(Statement at first Red Guard rally; 18 August 1966)

A communist must never stay aloof from or above the masses like a bureaucrat. He ought to be like an ordinary worker in the presence of the masses, join them, and become one of them. *(20-8-1966).*

Let the rest of the country come to Peking or Peking go to the rest of the country... Let [those who live] at other places come and see. After all, the trains are free now, are they not? *(21-8-1966).*

Almost ninety per cent of the work teams throughout the whole country have committed general mistakes in their orientation. *(22-8-1966)*

It will not do to depend on the work teams coming from the Navy, Air Force, and governmental agencies. They neither teach nor learn. How can they understand the conditions in the schools? There is Chien Po-tsan at Peking University who has written many books and essays. Have you read them? You see, how do you [begin to] criticize them? The Cultural Revolution at schools must not depend on work teams; nor must it depend on you [those attending the eleventh plenum - Ed.] or me. It must depend, on the revolutionary teachers and students at schools. *(26-8-1966).*

(I [Ch'en Yi] did things like this in the past. I beat people up and put dunce caps on landlords and local ruffians.) But Chairman said: 'We must not do it this way. This is the peasants' way, not our way'.

(Reported by Ch'en Yi in a speech to the students of the Foreign Language School, 30-8-1966).

(Chairman Mao wrote these eight characters in the Sixteen Articles): *'yao yung wen-tou; pu yung wu-tou'* (wage peaceful, not violent, struggles). (These eight characters were added by Chairman Mao personally; the original draft [of the 16 Articles] did not have them... Words to the effect 'Do not beat people up' were copied from the 23 Articles and they were crossed out by the Chairman who personally wrote these eight characters.)

(Reported by the first secretary of the Hunan provincial committee of the CCP at a meeting of the staff and students of the colleges in Ch'angsha, *31-8-1966).*

None of those who repressed student movements has ended well. The Manchu government repressed them; how did it end? The Northern warlords did the same. How did they end? Chiang Kai-shek repressed them; how, did he end? Lu P'ing of Peking University and Chiang Nan-hsiang of Tsinghua University did exactly the same; how did they end? The work teams sent out later also repressed them. Now they have met their doom. Of course, we must add that the blame goes to those who sent them. *(2-9-1966).*

The great proletarian Cultural Revolution is a revolution that touches the souls of the people.

To realize [the goals of] this revolution, [we must] resort to peaceful, not violent, struggles. *(5-9-1966.)*

In any revolution, its internal causes are fundamental and its external ones are supplementary. *(7-9-1966).*

A revolution depends on an inner core. This, the bourgeois faction in authority and the faction in authority which has committed mistakes know best; [their] peripheral organizations merely add fuel to the fire. *(7-9-1966).*

The more you study, the more stupid you become. You are now at a crucial time of transition; you must learn the right way.

Young people should be permitted to make mistakes. As long as their general orientation is correct, let them make minor mistakes. I believe that they can correct themselves in practical work. *(13-9-1966).*

The basic contradiction the great proletarian Cultural Revolution is trying to resolve is the one between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the proletarian and bourgeois roads. The main point of the movement is to struggle against the capitalist roaders in authority in the party. *(24-9-1966).*

Young people can look at problems this way and that way. The like-minded of them often club together; this is nothing unusual. *(26-9-1966).*

As soon as [you] grasp the class struggle, it works [for you] *(1-10-1966).*

The peoples of the world must have courage, dare to fight, and fear no hardships. When the ones in front fall, the others behind must follow up. In this way, the world will belong to the people and all the demons will be eliminated. *(1-10-1966).*

I have read the revised draft [of your 'Summing up the Past Two Months']. It is very good. Please consider the insertion at some place of the two phrases: 'Grasp the Revolution; Promote Production.' [The 'Summing Up'] should be printed in pamphlets in large quantities and each party cell and each red guard group must have at least one copy.

(Sent direct to Comrade [Ch'en] Po-ta, (24-10-1966).

[One can] never be sure that what is written in a resolution will be carried out by all our comrades; some of them will not.

(October 1966).

You should put politics in command, go to the masses and be one with them, and carry on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution even better.

(Statement to 'some leading comrades' at seventh Red Guard Rally, 10 November 1966.)

Long live comrades!

You must let politics take command, go to the masses, and he with the masses. You must conduct the great proletarian Cultural Revolution even better.

(Spoken in front of a microphone on the rostrum of the T'ienanmen, on the occasion of the seventh review of the great armies of the Cultural Revolution, ibid. [Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, these have been the only words spoken by Mao directly to the public below the rostrum of the T'ienanmen. Ed.]

The overthrown bourgeoisie tries by hook or by crook to use literature and arts to corrupt the masses, thus paving the way for a capitalist restoration. This makes our tasks in literature and art heavier rather than lighter. Our leadership on the literary and art front should be strengthened instead of weakened. To carry out their glorious tasks, our literary and art organizations must carry the great proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end. *(28-11-1966).*

The idea of training revolutionary teachers and pupils by army cadres is a good one. The training will make a great difference. By it, [the teachers and pupils] can learn from the PLA, politics, military affairs, the four firsts, and three-eight style, the three great disciplines and eight points of attention, and strengthen the discipline of their organizations. *(31-12-1966)*

Mistaken leadership which is harmful to the cause of the revolution should not be unconditionally accepted; instead, it should be resolutely rejected.

Democracy sometimes looks like an end in itself, but in fact it is merely a means to an end. *(1-1-1967)*

The comrades of the Broadcasting Station have won the power of control. It is a good thing that power is now in the hands of proletarian revolutionaries. I have heard that the comrades there are split. This can be dealt with according to the [way] the contradictions among the people are handled: differences in opinion can be discussed and resolved. *(11-1-67)*

(The Chairman having read the document from X X of Anhwei and Comrade Lin Piao's comment on it.)

TO LIN PIAO,

You must despatch troops to support the broad left--wing revolutionary masses. Later on, whenever true revolutionaries need support from the PLA, you should do likewise. The so-called 'non-interference' is untrue. [The PLA] has been involved for some time. I think on this matter you should issue new orders; the old ones should be cancelled. *(23-11-67)*

Economize on consumption and carry on revolution. Protect the property of the country. *(26-1-67)*

To The PLA

1. I think [we] must have an order of priorities; [we] must not carry on in all the military districts simultaneously.

2. The great revolution is being ferociously developed in the regions and the struggles for power are continuing. Our armed forces should support the left-wing revolutionaries there in their power struggle, and therefore they must not be involved in local cultural revolutions.

3. Internationally, both imperialism and revisionism are making use of our great Cultural Revolution to carry on their anti-Chinese activities. For instance, the Soviet Union is suppressing [our] students; [Soviet] aeroplanes near the Sinkiang border are more active; and [Soviet] ground forces are mobilized. All the armed units stationed in the big military districts along the frontiers such as Tsinan, Nanking, Foochow, and Kunming should be alerted and made ready. Therefore the time schedule of the great Cultural Revolution must be slightly postponed on account of the general situation, but it will be carried out in future. *(27-1-67)*

The eight articles are excellent, to be issued as they are.

(Comment on the Decree of the Military Commission Issued on This Day, 28-1-1967)

The PLA should actively give support to the truly proletarian revolutionary groups and resolutely oppose the rightwing.

(February 1967)

The armed forces advance [an inch];
Production grows an inch.
Tighten the discipline [so that]
Revolution is always successful. *(6-2-67)*

In order to overthrow a regime, [we] must first of all take control of the superstructure, the ideology, by preparing public opinion.

(8-2-67)

Permit them to reform themselves and redeem their mistakes by making contributions, as long as they are not anti-party and anti-socialist elements who stubbornly refuse to correct their mistakes in spite of repeated exhortations.

(Reform the Wrong – 23-2-67)

This document (dated 8-3-2967) may be issued to the whole country. The PLA should separately and in sessions give military training to university students and children of middle schools and the upper formers of primary schools. They should also take part in the work of re-opening schools, re-adjusting school organization, setting up leadership bodies of the three-way alliance, and carrying out struggle, criticism, and reform. They should set up experimental points first and then apply the experience so acquired to a wider scope. They ought to convince students and children [to accept] what Marx taught us– 'The proletariat must emancipate mankind as a whole before it can emancipate itself.' In military training, they must not reject teachers and cadres who have made mistakes. These people must be allowed to take part so as to facilitate their reform; the only exceptions to this are the aged and sick. All this is quite easy, if it is conscientiously carried on. *(7-3-67)*

At the places and in the organizational units where power struggle is necessary, there the principle of the revolutionary three-way alliance should be applied to setting up a revolutionary, representative, and proletarian provisional power structure which may be called a revolutionary committee. *(10-3-67)*

Resume classes and carry on revolution. *(27-3-67)*

There subsist various non-proletarian ideas in the Party. This is an extremely great obstacle to the application of the Party's correct line.

(March 1967)

Was it the Chinese people who organized the Boxer groups and sent them to Europe, America, and Japan to rebel [against the governments there] and to kill and burn. Was it the imperialist powers which came to invade China and exploit the Chinese people, thus provoking the Chinese people to fight imperialism and its lackeys, to corrupt officials of China? This is a grave matter of right and wrong and should be made absolutely clear.

(On The Film 'The Secret History Of The Ching Court,' 1-4-67)

COMRADE LIN PIAO,

This is excellent.

(Comment on the Decree of the Military Commission on This Day 6-4-1967)

The recording of Comrade Lin Piao's talk on 20 March 1967 should be broadcast to all the members of the PLA and the red guards of the whole country. Comrade Lin Piao's talk is a report of the utmost importance to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought; it is highly significant in guiding the current great proletarian Cultural Revolutionary movement and in promoting further victories for the proletarian revolutionaries in their struggles at two fronts. The party committees of all the military districts, party committees at various levels revolutionary committees of all the provinces and cities, all the military control committees, and all the revolutionary mass organizations must organize themselves and study conscientiously Comrade Lin Paio's talk and must put it into practice meticulously. *(7-4-67)*

Grasp the revolution, hasten the preparation for war [defence?], speed up work, promote production, and support the army and - cherish the people. *(30-4-67)*

The masses, the army, and the cadres are the three pillars on which we rely. *(End of April or Beginning of May 1967)*

It is difficult to avoid mistakes; the point is to correct them honestly. Too many people have been arrested in Szechwan and many mass organizations are branded as reactionary. All these are wrong, but they have been quickly rectified.

(The Resolution on Szechwan adopted by the Centre of the CCP (the Ten Red Articles), (7-5-67)

With the growth of such vigour in socialist China, a country with a quarter of the world's population, we shall be able to make a great internationalist contribution.

Our goals will and certainly can be fulfilled. *(7-5-67)*

Trust and rely on the masses; trust and rely on the PLA; trust and rely on the majority of the cadres. (12-5-67)

When the army and the people unite as one,
Who in the world is their equal? *(12-5-67)*

The victory or defeat of the revolution can be determined only over a long period of time. If it is badly handled, there is always the danger of a capitalist restoration. All members of the party and all the people of our country must not think that after one, two, three, or four great cultural revolutions there will be peace and quiet. They must always be on the alert and must never relax their vigilance. *(18-5-67)*

Guard against revisionism, particularly the emergence of revisionism at the party Centre. *(11-5-67)*

Who are our enemies and who are our friends? This is the first and foremost question of a revolution and it is also the first and foremost question of the great Cultural Revolution. *(1-6-67)*

Vetaran cadres have made their contributions in the past, but they must not live on that 'capital'. They should reform themselves and make fresh contributions in the great proletarian Cultural Revolution. *(1-6-67)*

Protect the left-wing; support the left-wing; form and enlarge left-wing units. *(11–6–67)*

Everything has its major and minor reasons; all the major ones govern the minor ones. People of our country must think in terms of major reasons if they want to think and act properly. *(11–6–67)*

Everything must be handled and reasoned out from the point of view of class and class struggle and with the method of class analysis; all leading cadres should be treated in the same way. The method of simply rejecting everything and negating everything, of directing the struggle against the cadres who shoulder most of the responsibility and do most of the work or against the 'heads' [of departments] must be abandoned. *(12–6–67)*

Let people speak up. The sky will not fall and you yourself will not be deposed as a result of it. [What if you] do not let people speak up? You may be deposed one day. *(21–6–67)*

Do not stop half way and do not ever go backward. There is no way behind you. *(21–6–67)*

[We] must skillfully direct the petty bourgeois ideology in our ranks on to the path of the proletarian revolution. This is the key to the victory of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution. *(25–6–67)*

[We] must stand on the side, not on the opposing side, of the masses. This is a fundamental problem of the standpoint of a Marxist-Leninist *(27–6–67)*

Trust the majority of the cadres and the masses. This is essential. *(27–6–67)*

Popularize the work of heart-to-heart talks. It is a good method. *(29–6–67)*

We, the communists, do not want official positions; we want

revolution. We must have a thoroughly revolutionary spirit and must be with the masses every hour, every minute. As long as we are with the masses, we shall always be victorious. *(4–7–67)*

The organization of millions of people and the mobilization of a tremendous revolutionary force are what the present revolution needs in its offensive against the reactionaries. *(5–7–67)*

Whenever acute opposition exists between the mass organizations of two factions, there will be need for careful political ideological work which can help to resolve all the differences. Careful political ideological work is needed even when [we] are dealing with conservative and reactionary organizations. *(7–7–67)*

Revolution is the emancipation of productive force; it promotes the development of productive force *(3–8–67)*

Cadres who have made mistakes can re–establish themselves, provided that they do not persist with their mistakes, but reform them, and are forgiven by the revolutionary masses. *(3–8–67)*

The basic problem of a revolution is the problem of political power. The possession of political power means the possession of everything; the loss of it means the loss of everything. *(13–8–67)*

All proletarian revolutionaries unite and fight for political power against the handful of capitalist roaders in authority. *(17–8–67)*

If our country does not build up a socialist economy, what is it going to be? It will be like Yugoslavia, a capitalist country in fact. The proletarian dictatorship will be transformed into a bourgeois dictatorship, worse still, a reactionary and fascist dictatorship. This problem deserves our fullest attention and [I] hope our comrades will give it their thought. *(17–8–67)*

It is difficult not to make mistakes. The thing is to correct them conscientiously. *(21–8–67)*

They [the revisionists] deny the party and class characteristics of a newspaper; they overlook the differences in principle between proletarian and bourgeois news services; they confuse the news service which reflects the collective economy of a socialist country with that which reflects the economic anarchy and group competition of a capitalist country. *(24–8–67)*

Newspapers in a socialist country are fundamentally different from those in a capitalist country. In a socialist country, newspapers reflect the planned socialist economy based on public ownership. This is quite different from newspapers in a capitalist country which reflect economic anarchy and group competition. As long as class distinction exists in the world, newspapers are a means of class struggle. *(25–8–67)*

Although the socio–economic system has been transformed, reactionary thought, bourgeois and upper–petty–bourgeois thought inherited from the past, still exists in the minds of a considerable number of people, and cannot be transformed quickly. Its transformation needs time, a long period of time. This is the class struggle in [our] society. *(26–8–67)*

The present Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is only the first; there will inevitably be many more in the future. The issue of who will win in the revolution can only be settled over a long historical period. If things are not properly handled, it is possible for a capitalist restoration to take place at any time in the future. *(August 1967)*

Think hard! *(1–9–67)*

Throughout the socialist stage, there exist classes and class struggle. The struggle is protracted and complicated, sometimes even fierce. [Therefore] the instruments of our dictatorship must not be weakened; on the contrary, they should be strengthened. *(2–9–67)*

Develop still further the movement of supporting the army and cherishing the people. *(2–9–67)*

The four firsts are good; they are original. Since Comrade Lin Piao put forward the four firsts and the three–eight style, the PLA's political and military work has taken a giant step forward. It has become more concrete and theoretically [more advanced]. *(7–9–67)*

Reactionaries who appear in disguise show people their false image and hide away their true faces. However since they are counter–revolutionaries, they can never cover up their true faces completely. *(12–9–67)*

Within the working class, there is no basic clash of interests. Under the proletarian dictatorship, the working class has absolutely no reason to split into two hostile factional organizations. *(14–9–67)*

Some of our comrades toddle along like women with bound feet. They complain about others: 'Too fast, too fast!' *(22–9–67)*

In a few more months the entire situation will be even better. *(September, 67)*

Correct treatment of cadres is the key to creating the revolutionary 'three–in–one' combination, consolidating the revolutionary great alliance, and making a success of struggle–criticism transformation in each unit. It must definitely be handled well. *(September 1967.)*

The revolutionary red guards and revolutionary student organizations must form a grand alliance. As long as they are revolutionary mass organizations, they must form a great alliance according to revolutionary principles. *(1–10–67)*

We must preserve a high degree of alertness in all departments of our work. We must be good at distinguishing fake supporters of the revolution who are actually reactionaries and douse them away from all our battle fronts, so that we may preserve the victories which are already won and will be won. *(17-10-67)*

The form of revolutionary organization is determined by the requirements of revolutionary struggle. If an organizational form does not meet the requirements of a revolutionary struggle, it must be abandoned. *(19-10-67)*

The cadre problem must be tackled through education by widening educational work. *(20-10-67)*

Expand education and reduce attack. *(22-10-67)*

What is fake is fake. Strip off the disguise! *(26-10-67)*

To carry on the proletarian Cultural Revolution, [we] must depend on the broad masses of revolutionary students and teachers in schools and on the revolutionary workers. We must depend on the activists among them, i.e. the proletarian revolutionaries who are determined to carry the great proletarian Cultural Revolution to the end. *(4-11-67)*

Therefore the great proletarian Cultural Revolution is a great revolution that touches the souls of the people and solves the problem of a world view for the people. *(6-11-67)*

A revolutionary party and the revolutionary people must repeatedly undergo both positive and negative education. Through comparison and contrast, they become tempered and mature, thus making sure of victory. To belittle the role of the negative teacher is not to be a thorough dialectical materialist. *(6-11-67)*

The handful of capitalist roaders in power in our party are the representatives of the bourgeoisie in our party. *(6-11-67)*

The basic ideological programme of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution is 'to combat selfishness and criticize revisionism.' *(6-11-67)*

The Cultural Revolution can only be the emancipation of the masses by the masses. *(6-11-67)*

This great Cultural Revolution, using the great democratic methods of the proletarian dictatorship, has mobilized the masses from below. At the same time, it puts into practice the grand alliance of the proletarian revolutionaries, the three-way alliance between the revolutionary masses, the PLA, and the revolutionary cadres. *(6-11-67)*

The situation in the great proletarian Cultural Revolution is not just good, but excellent. The over-all situation is better than at any time in the past. The important sign of the excellent situation is that the masses have been fully aroused. Never before has a mass movement been aroused so extensively and penetratingly as it is present. *(9-11-67)*

The relationship between the levels should be properly handled; the relationship between the cadres and masses should also be handled well. In future, cadres should go individually and see what is happening below. They must hold fast to the mass line, discuss with the masses whenever a problem crops up, and be the pupils of the masses. In a certain sense, the fighters who have the richest practical experience are the most intelligent and the ablest. *(16-11-67)*

The study classes organized by the PLA must have the participation of soldiers. *(12-12-67)*

The two factions should talk less of each other's weaknesses and mistakes. Let the others talk about their own weaknesses and mistakes. Each side ought to do more self-criticism seeking general agreement and leaving minor differences intact. *(22-12-67)*

1. We must step forward to meet the masses, to accept their criticism, and to do our own self-criticism. This is to get oneself near the fire [so to speak].

2. We must step forward to explain our policies to the masses. Those who have had to wear a dunce cap or had their face blackened should take the cap off, clean their face, and go straight to work.

3. Think of long-term interests and unite the majority. The freaks and monsters are the landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, bad elements, and rightists—the minority. Even some who have made serious mistakes should be saved by letting them correct their errors. Otherwise, how can we unite more than ninety-five per cent [of the people]

4. Convince the cadres and make them understand. Do not let everyone who has been through the test [criticism] become ashen with despair. We must go out, not with the word 'fear' *(p'a)* but with the word 'dare' *(k'an)* [in our minds]. In this way we can solve questions of any magnitude. If we go out with the word 'fear', [the opponents] will make more and more demands. (Four Instructions at a Standing Committee Meeting of the Politburo, 1967)

The struggle to reshape the world by the proletariat and revolutionary peoples consists of these tasks: to reshape the objective world and also to reshaper their own subjective world. *(12-1-68)*

How do the counter-revolutionaries play their game of duplicity? How do they manage to present a false image to deceive us while clandestinely carrying on [activities] we do not even suspect? Millions of good people do not know this and therefore many counter-revolutionaries have wormed their way into our ranks. Our people do not have good eye-sight: they are unable to differentiate the upright from the crooked. They may be able to tell the good from the bad in the light of their activities under normal conditions. Nevertheless, we are rather inept at singling out certain people in the light of their activities under special conditions. *(17-1-68)*

The party organization must consist of the advanced elements of the proletariat. As a vigorous vanguard organization, it should be able to lead the proletarian revolutionary masses in their struggle against class enemies. *(19-1-68)*

Setting up study classes is a good procedure, because many problems can be solved in them. (5-2-68)

Form a strong people's air force to defend the fatherland and to prepare for the repulsion of invaders.

(Inscription for the New Chingkangshan District - originally Chian, Kiangsi *12-2-68)*

Develop the revolutionary tradition and win even greater victory. *(12-2-68)*

Resolutely overcome lack of discipline or even, in many places, anarchy.

Anarchy is detrimental to the interests of the people and against their wishes. *(1-3-68)*

The experience of the revolutionary committees is threefold:

1. they have representatives from the revolutionary cadres; 2. they have representatives from the PLA; and 3. they have representatives from the revolutionary masses. They have carried out the revolutionary three-way alliance. The revolutionary committees must achieve a unified leadership by cutting through duplicated administrative structures. [Following the principles of] eliminating incompetent soldiers and simplifying the administration, the committees should organize a revolutionized leading core to make contacts with the masses. *(30-3-68)*

The 'three-way alliance' revolutionary committee is an invention of the working class and the masses in this great Cultural Revolution.

The essential point of reforming the state agencies is to make contact with the masses. *(1-4-68)*

The great proletarian Cultural Revolution is in essence a great political revolution under socialist conditions by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes. It is the continuation of the long struggle against the Kuomintang reactionaries waged by the CPC and the broad revolutionary masses under its leadership. It is continuation of the struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. *(10-4-68)*

Except in the deserts, at every place of human habitation there is the left, the centre, and the right. This will continue to be so 10,000 years hence. *(22-4-68)*

We must believe that more than ninety per cent of our cadres are good or comparatively good. The majority of those who have made mistakes can be reformed. *(13-5-68)*

Protect or, on the contrary, repress the masses: this is the basic distinction between the CPC and the KMT, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and between the proletarian and bourgeois dictatorships. *(3-6-68)*

The old Social Democrats in the past decades, and modern revisionists in the past dozen years or so... have formed a group of anti-communist, anti-people, and counter-revolutionary elements against whom we are waging a life-and-death struggle. There is no equality between us and them. Therefore the fight against them is a fight for our preservation and their extinction. The relationship between us and them can never be one of equality; it is a relationship of one class oppressing another – i.e. proletarian dictatorship over the bourgeoisie.

The day when the people are happy will be the day when the counter-revolutionaries begin their misery. *(10-6-68)*

We must still run colleges. Here I must stress that we should still run physics and engineering colleges, but the period of schooling ought to be shortened, the education revolutionized, proletarian politics put in command, and the way of training technical personnel from the ranks of the workers advocated by the Shanghai Machine-Tool Factory adopted. Students must be selected from workers and peasants with practical experience, and after their study at school for several years they should return to practical production *(21-7-68)*

Our country has a population of 700 million people and the working class is the leading class. The leading role of the working class in the Cultural Revolution and all fields of work should be developed. The working class should also constantly raise its own political consciousness in the course of the struggle. *(14-8-68)*

Set up three-way alliance revolutionary committees, conduct thorough criticisms, purify the ranks of the class, reform the party, simplify the administration, revise unreasonable rules and regulations, send down office personnel, and carry out 'struggle-criticism-transformation' in factories. Roughly speaking, these are the stages [we shall] pass through. *(26-8-68)*

To carry out the proletarian educational revolution, it is imperative to have the leadership of the working class and its participation, together with the revolutionary three-way alliance of the soldiers of the PLA, students, and teachers, and the activists among the workers who have resolved to carry the proletarian educational revolution through to the end. Workers propaganda teams should remain at the schools for a long time to share the task of 'struggle-criticism-transformation' and to perpetuate their leadership there. In the countryside, schools are to be run by the most reliable allies of the working class – the poor, lower, and middle peasants. *(27-8-68)*

The physician who has moved from the city to the countryside proves that the majority, even overwhelming majority, of students educated in old-style schools are capable of integrating with workers, peasants, and soldiers. Some of them can even be inventive and creative. However, they must be re-educated by workers, peasants, and soldiers under the guidance of the correct line [so that] their old thinking may be reformed thoroughly. Such intellectuals are welcomed by workers, peasants, and soldiers. *(12 and 4-9-68)*

It is an excellent opportunity for the great number of cadres to learn anew by being sent down to do manual work. Only the aged and sick are exempted from taking this opportunity. Cadres who hold offices should be sent down on a rota basis. *(8-10-68)*

I. A human being has arteries and veins and his heart makes the blood circulate. He breathes through the lungs, exhaling carbon dioxide and inhaling oxygen afresh, that is, getting rid of the waste and letting in the fresh. A proletarian party must also get rid of the waste and let in the fresh, for only in this way can it be full of vigour. Without eliminating waste and getting fresh blood the party has no vigour.

II. Our power - who gives it to us? The working class gives it to us and the masses of labouring people who comprise over ninety per cent of the population give it to us. We represent the proletariat and the masses, and have overthrown the enemies of the people. The people therefore support us. One of the basic principles of the communist party is to rely directly on the revolutionary masses. *(16-10-68)*

For consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing a capitalist restoration, and constructing socialism, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been absolutely necessary and timely. *(30-10-68)*

Historical experience is noteworthy. A line or a view must be constantly and repeatedly explained. It will not do to explain it only to a few; it must be made known to the broad revolutionary masses. *(25-11-68)*

It is absolutely necessary for educated young people to go to the countryside to be re-educated by the poor and lower-middle peasants. Cadres and other city people should be persuaded to send their sons and daughters who have finished junior or senior middle school, college, or university to the countryside. Let us mobilize. Comrades throughout the countryside should welcome them. *(22-12-68)*

In purifying our class ranks, it is necessary to take a firm hold first and then pay attention to the policy.

In treating the counter-revolutionary elements and those who had made mistakes, it is necessary to pay attention to the policy. The target of attack must be narrowed and more people must be helped through education. Evidence, investigation, and study should be stressed. It is strictly forbidden to extort confessions and accept such confessions. As for good people who have made mistakes, we must give them more help through education. When they are awakened, we must liberate them without delay. *(31-12-68)*

a. Serious attention should be given to policy in this stage of the struggle-criticism-transformation in the great proletarian Cultural Revolution.

b. In formulating plans it is necessary to mobilize the masses and carefully leave some leeway. (21-2-69)

The broad masses and the majority of the party members and cadres in the Soviet Union are good and revolutionary; so revisionist domination will not long survive. (13-3-69)

It is necessary to sum up experience conscientiously.

When one goes to a unit to get to know the situation there, one must become acquainted with the whole process of the movement its inception, its development, and its present state; how the masses have acted and how the leadership has acted; what contradictions and struggles have emerged and what changes have occurred in these contradictions; and what progress people have made in their knowledge so as to find out its laws. (17-3-69)

The present is the time of spring farming. Let us hope that leading comrades, responsible personnel, and the popular masses will seize the opportunity to grasp the links in the chain of production in order to overtake last year's records. (22-3-69)

The poisonous pests have arranged their own grave-diggers. Their date of burial will not be too far away. (Russian Revisionism, 29-3-69)

The proletariat is the greatest class in human history. Ideologically, politically, and numerically it is the greatest revolutionary class. It can and must unite the overwhelming majority of people around itself in order to isolate as much as possible and attack a handful of enemies. (15-4-69)

We have won a great victory. But the defeated class will continue to struggle. Its members are still about and it still exists. Therefore we cannot speak of the final victory, not for decades. We must not lose our vigilance. From the Leninist point of view, the final victory in one socialist country not only requires the efforts of the proletariat and the broad popular masses at home, but also depends on the victory of the world revolution and the abolition of the system of exploitation of man by man on this earth so that all mankind will be emancipated. Consequently, it is wrong to talk about the final victory of the revolution in our country light-heartedly; it runs counter to Leninism and does not conform to facts. (15-4-69)

TWENTY MANIFESTATIONS OF BUREAUCRACY

February, 1970

1. At the highest level there is very little knowledge; they do not understand the opinion of the masses; they do not investigate and study; they do not grasp specific policies; they do not conduct political and ideological work; they are divorced from reality, from the masses, and from the leadership of the party; they always issue order, and the orders are usually wrong; they certainly mislead the country and the people; at the least they obstruct the consistent adherence to the party line and policies; and they cannot meet with the people.

2. They are conceited, complacent, and they aimlessly discuss politics. They do not grasp their work, they are subjective and one-sided; they are careless; they do not listen to people; they are truculent and arbitrary; they force orders; they do not care about reality; they maintain blind control. This is authoritarian bureaucracy.

3. They are very busy from morning until evening; they labour the whole year long; they do not examine people and they do not investigate matters; they do not study policies; they do not rely upon the masses; they do not prepare their statements; they do not plan their work. This is brainless, misdirected bureaucracy. In other words, it is routinism.

4. Their bureaucratic attitude is immense; they cannot have any direction; they are egoistic; they beat their gongs to blaze the way;

SOURCE: Joint Publications Research Service (Washington DC) they cause people to become afraid just by looking at them; they repeatedly hurl all kinds of abuse at people; their work style is crude; they do not treat people equally. This is the bureaucracy of the overlords.

5. They are ignorant; they are ashamed to ask anything; they exaggerate and they lie; they are very false; they attribute errors to people; they attribute merit to themselves; they swindle the central government; they deceive those above them and fool those below them; they conceal faults and gloss over wrongs. This is the dishonest bureaucracy.

6. They do not understand politics; they do not do their work; they push things off onto others; they do not meet their responsibilities; they haggle; they put things off; they are insensitive; they lose their alertness. This is the irresponsible bureaucracy.

7. They are negligent about things; they subsist as best they can; they do not have anything to do with people; they always make mistakes; they offer themselves respectfully to those above them and are idle towards those below them; they are careful in every respect; they are eight-sided and slippery as eels. This is the bureaucracy of those who work as officials and barely make a living.

8. They do not completely learn politics; they do not advance in their work; their manner of speech is tasteless; they have no direction in their leadership; they neglect the duties of their office while taking the pay; they make up things for the sake of appearances. The idlers [e.g., landlord] do not begin any matters, but concentrate mainly upon their idleness; those who work hard, are virtuous, and do not act like the officials are treated poorly. This is the deceitful, talentless bureaucracy.

9. They are stupid; they are confused; they do not have a mind of their own; they are rotten sensualists; they glut themselves for days on end; they are not diligent at all, they are inconstant and they are ignorant. This is the stupid, useless bureaucracy.

10. They want others to read documents; the others read and they sleep; they criticize without looking at things; they criticize mistakes and blame people; they have nothing to do with mistakes; they do not discuss things; they push things aside and ignore it; they are yes men to those above them; they pretend to understand those below them, when they do not; they gesticulate; and they harbour disagreements with those on their same level. This is the lazy bureaucracy.

11. Government offices grow bigger and bigger; things are more confused; there are more people than there are jobs; they go around in circles; they quarrel and bicker; people are disinclined to do extra things; they do not fulfil their specific duties. This is the bureaucracy of government offices.

12. Documents are numerous; there is red tape; instructions proliferate; there are numerous unread reports that are not criticized many tables and schedules are drawn up and are not used; meetings are numerous and nothing is passed on; and there are many close associations but nothing is learned. This is the bureaucracy of red tape and formalism.

13. They seek pleasure and fear hardships; they engage in back door deals; one person becomes an official and the entire family benefits; one person reaches *nirvana* and all his close associates rise up to heaven; there are parties and gifts are presented... This is the bureaucracy for the exceptional.

14. The greater an official becomes, the worse his temperament gets; his demands for supporting himself become higher and higher; his home and its furnishings become more and more luxurious; and his access to things becomes better and better. The upper strata gets the larger share while the lower gets high prices; there is extravagance and waste; the upper and lower and the left and right raise their hands. This is the bureaucracy of putting on official airs.

15. They are egotistical; they satisfy private ends by public means; there is embezzlement and speculation; the more they devour, the more they want; and they never step back or give in. This is egotistical bureaucracy.

16. They fight among themselves for power and money; they extend their hands into the Party; they want fame and fortune; they want positions and, if they do not get them, they are not satisfied; they choose to be fat and to be lean; they pay a great deal of attention to wages; they are cosy when it comes to their comrades but they care nothing about the masses. This is the bureaucracy that is fighting for power and money.

17. A plural leadership cannot be harmoniously united; they exert

themselves in many directions, and their work is in a state of chaos; they try to crowd each other out; the top is divorced from the bottom and there is no centralization, nor is there any democracy. This is the disunited bureaucracy.

18. There is no organization; they employ personal friends; they engage in factionalism; they maintain feudal relationships; they form cliques to further their own private interest; they protect each other; the individual stands above everything else; these petty officials harm the masses. This is sectarian bureaucracy.

19. Their revolutionary will is weak; their politics has degenerated and changed its character; they act as if they are highly qualified; they put on official airs; they do not exercise their minds or their hands. They eat their fill every day; they easily avoid hard work; they call a doctor when they are not sick; they go on excursions to the mountains and to the seashore; they do things superficially; they worry about their individual interests, but they do not worry whatsoever about the national interest. This is degenerate bureaucracy.

20. They promote erroneous tendencies and a spirit of reaction; they connive with bad persons and tolerate bad situations; they engage in villainy and transgress the law; they engage in speculation; they are a threat to the Party and the state; they suppress democracy; they fight and take revenge, they violate laws and regulations; they protect the bad; they do not differentiate between the enemy and ourselves. This is the bureaucracy of erroneous tendencies and reaction.

PEOPLE OF THE WORLD, UNITE AND DEFEAT THE U.S. AGGRESSORS AND ALL THEIR RUNNING DOGS

May 23, 1970

A new upsurge in the struggle against U.S. imperialism is now emerging throughout the world. Ever since the Second World War, U.S. imperialism and its followers have been continuously launching wars of aggression and the people in various countries have been continuously waging revolutionary wars to defeat the aggressors. The danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of all countries must get prepared. But revolution is the main trend in the world today.

Unable to win in Vietnam and Laos, the U.S. aggressors treacherously engineered the reactionary coup d'etat by the Lon Nol Sirik Matak clique, brazenly dispatched their troops to invade Cambodia and resumed the bombing of North Vietnam, and this has aroused the furious resistance of the three Indo-Chinese peoples. I warmly support the fighting spirit of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State of Cambodia, in opposing U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. I warmly support the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indo-Chinese Peoples. I warmly support the establishment of the Royal Government of National Union under the Leadership of the National United Front of Kampuchea. Strengthening their unity, supporting each other and persevering in a protracted people's war, the three Indo-Chinese peoples will certainly overcome all difficulties and win complete victory.

While massacring the people in other countries, U.S. imperialism is

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SOURCE: *Peking Review* (23 May 1970).

slaughtering the white and black people in its own country. Nixon's fascist atrocities have kindled the raging flames of the revolutionary mass movement in the United States. The Chinese people firmly support the revolutionary struggle of the American people. I am convinced that the American people who are fighting valiantly will ultimately win victory and that the fascist rule in the United States will inevitably be defeated.

The Nixon government is beset with troubles internally and externally, with utter chaos at home and extreme isolation abroad. The mass movement of protest against U.S. aggression in Cambodia has swept the globe. Less than ten days after its establishment, the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia was recognized by nearly twenty countries. The situation is getting better and better in the war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation waged by the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The revolutionary armed struggles of the people of the South-east Asian countries, the struggles of the people of Korea, Japan and other Asian countries against the revival of Japanese militarism by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries, the struggles of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors, the national-liberation struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples, and the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of North America, Europe and Oceania are all developing vigorously. The Chinese people firmly support the people of the three Indo-Chinese countries and of other countries of the world in their revolutionary struggles against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.

U.S. imperialism, which looks like a huge monster, is in essence a paper tiger, now in the throes of its deathbed struggle. In the world of today, who actually fears whom? It is not the Vietnamese people, the Laotian people, the Cambodian people, the Palestinian people, the Arab people or the people of other countries who fear U.S. imperialism; it is U.S. imperialism which fears the people of the world. It becomes panic-stricken at the mere rustle of leaves in the wind. Innumerable facts prove that a just cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust cause finds little support. a weak nation can defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a big. The people of a small country can certainly defeat aggression by a big country, if only they dare to rise in struggle, dare to take up arms and grasp in their own hands the destiny of their country. This is a law of history.

People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs!

CONVERSATIONS WITH WANG HAI-JUNG

December 21, 1970

Hai-jung[1]: Class struggle is very acute in our school. I hear that reactionary slogans have been found, some written in English on the blackboard of our English Department.

Chairman: What reactionary slogans have been written?

Hai-jung I know only one. It is, '*Chiang wan sui.*'

Chairman: How does it read in English?

Hai-jung: 'Long live Chiang.'

Chairman: What else has been written?

Hai-jung: I don't know any others. I know only that one.

Chairman: Well, let this person write more and post them outdoors for all people to see. Does he kill people?

Hai-jung: I don't know if he kills people or not. If we find out who he is, we should dismiss him from school and send him away for labour reform.

Chairman: Well, so long as he doesn't kill people, we should not dismiss him, nor should we send him away for labour reform. Let him stay in school and continue to study. You people should hold a

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SOURCE: *Mao Tse-tung, Joint Publications Research Service* (JPRS), U.S, Department of Commerce 52029 (21 December 1970).

meeting and ask him to explain in what way Chiang Kai-shek is good and what good things he has done. On our part, you may tell why Chiang Kai-shek is not good.

Chairman: How many people are there in your school?

Hai-jung: About 3,000, including faculty and staff members.

Chairman: Among the 3,000 let us say there are seven or eight counter-revolutionaries.

Hai-jung: Even one would be bad. How could we tolerate seven or eight?

Chairman: You shouldn't be all stirred up by one slogan.

Hai-jung: Why should there be seven or eight counter-revolutionaries?

Chairman: When there are many, you can set up opposition. There can be teachers in opposition. Only they should not kill.

Hai-jung: Our school has realized the class line. Among the new students 70 per cent are workers and sons and daughters of poor and lower-middle farmers. Others are sons and daughters of cadres and heroic officers and men.

Chairman: How many sons and daughters of cadres are there in your class?

Hai-jung: In addition to myself, there are two, while others are the sons and daughters of workers and poor and lower-middle farmers. They do well. I learn much from them.

Chairman: Are they on good terms with you? Do they like you?

Hai-jung: I think our relationship is good. I find it easy to associate with them and they find the same with me.

Chairman: That's good.

Hai-jung: But there is the son of a cadre who doesn't do well. In class he doesn't listen attentively to the teacher's lecture and after class, he doesn't do homework. He likes to read fiction. Sometimes he dozes off in the dormitory and sometimes he doesn't attend the Saturday afternoon meeting. On Sunday he doesn't return to school on time. Sometimes on Sunday when our class and section hold a meeting, he doesn't show up. All of us have a bad impression of him.

Chairman: Do your teachers allow the students to take a nap or read fiction in class?

We should let the students read fiction and take a nap in class, and we should look after their health. Teachers should lecture less and make the students read more. I believe the student you referred to will be very capable in the future since he had the courage to be absent from the Saturday meeting and not to return to school on time on Sunday. When you return to school, you may tell him that it is too early to return to school even at eight or nine in the evening; he may delay it until eleven or twelve. Whose fault is it that you should hold a meeting Sunday night?

Hai-jung: When I studied at the normal School, we usually had no meeting Sunday night. We were allowed to do whatever we liked that night. One day several cadres of the branch headquarters of the League (I was then a committee member of the branch headquarters) agreed to lead an organized life on Sunday night but many other League members did not favour the idea. Some of them even said to the political counsellor that Sunday was a free day and if any meeting was called at night, it would be inconvenient for us to go home. The political counsellor eventually bowed to their opinion and told us to change the date for the meeting.

Chairman: This political counsellor did the right thing.

Hai-jung: But now our school spends the whole Sunday night holding meetings - class meetings, branch headquarters committee meetings or meetings of study groups for party lessons. According to my calculation, from the beginning of the current semester to date, there has not been one Sunday or Sunday night without any meetings.

Chairman: When you return to school, you should take the lead to rebel. Don't return to school on Sunday and don't attend any meetings on that day.

Hai-jung: But I won't dare. This is the school system. All students are required to return to school on time. If I don't people will say that I violate the school system.

Chairman: Don't care about the system. Just don't return to school. Just say you want to violate the school system.

Hai-jung: I cannot do that. If I do, I will be criticized.

Chairman: I don't think you will be very capable in the future. You are afraid of being accused of violating the school system, of criticism, of a bad record, of being expelled from school, of failing to get party membership. Why should you be afraid of so many things? The worst that can come to you is expulsion from school. The school should allow the students to rebel. Rebel when you return to school.

Hai-jung: People will say that as the Chairman's relative, I fail to follow his instructions and play a leading role in upsetting the school system. They will accuse me of arrogance and self-content, and of lack of organization and discipline.

Chairman: Look at you! You are afraid of being criticized for arrogance and self-content, and for lack of organization and discipline. Why should you be afraid? You can say that just because you are Chairman Mao's relative, you should follow his instructions to rebel. I think the student you mentioned will be more capable than you for he dared to violate the school system. I think you people are too metaphysical.

2

On One Occasion Chairman Mao Discussed The Problem Of Study

Hai-jung: People now are against reading classical works. But the son of a cadre in our class devotes all his time to reading them. All of us are busy practising speaking English, but he is reading the *Hung Lou Meng [Dream of the Red Chamber]*. We are all critical of his reading this novel.

Chairman: Have you ever read *Hung Lou Meng*?

Hai-jung: Yes, I have

Chairman: Which character do you like in this novel?

Hai-jung: None.

Chairman: Hung Lou Meng is worth reading. It is a good book. We should read it not for its story but as history. It is a historical novel. Its language is the best in classical fiction. The author, Ts'ao Hsueh--ch'in, had made a lively portrayal of Feng Tzu. The characterization of Feng Tzu is excellent. You won't be able to do the same. If you don't read *Hung Lou Meng*, how could you know about feudal society? Before you read *Hung Lou Meng*, you should know these four sayings: 'The Chias are not false. They use white jade to build a hall and gold to make a horse.' [This refers to the Chia family.] 'The A Fang Palaces spread for 300 *li*, but they could not accommodate a Shih.' [This refers to the Shih family.] 'The Eastern Ocean lacks a white jade bed, but the Dragon King invites the King of Ch'en Ling to visit him.' [This refers to Feng Tzu's family or the Wang family] 'What a big snow in this year of plenty – pearls cheap like earth and gold like iron!' [This refers to Hsueh Pao-chi's family.] These four saying summarize the story of *Hung Lou Meng*.

Chairman: Have you read Tu Fu's long poem 'The Northward March?

Hai-jung: No, It is not in *T'ang Ssu San Pai Shou [Three Hundred Poems of T'ang]*.

Chairman: It is in *T'ang Ssu Pi Tsai [Another Anthology of T'ang Poetry]*. (The Chairman took out the book, turned to that poem and told me to read it over and over again.)

Hai-jung: What problems should I pay attention to when I read this poem? What precaution should I take against its influence?

Chairman: You are always metaphysical. Why should you take precaution? No, You should receive some influence. You should go deep in it and the emerge from it. Read it over and over again but not necessarily memorize it.

Chairman: Are you required to study the Holy Bible and Buddhis sutras?

Hai-jung: No, Why should we read them?

Chairman: How can you do translations or handle foreign affairs if you do not study the Holy Bible and Buddhist sutras?

Have you read *Liao Chai [Stories from the Strange Studio]*?

Hai-jung: No.

Chairman: Liao Chai is worth reading. It is well-written. The fox spirits in *Liao Chai* are kind-hearted. They voluntarily help mankind.

Chairman: How do you say *'chih shih fen tze'* [intellectual] in English?

Hai-jung: I don't know.

Chairman: You have studied English for half a year. You are a *chih shih fen tze* yourself and yet you don't know how to say it in English.

Hai-jung: Let me look it up in the *Chinese-English Dictionary*.

Chairman: Look it up. Is there such a term?

Hai-jung: (After leafing the pages of the dictionary) Too bad. There is no such term in your *Chinese-English Dictionary.* It has only the term *chih shih*, but no *chih shih fen tze.*

Chairman: Let me take a look. (I handed the dictionary to the Chairman.) You found *chih shih*, but no *chih shih fen tze.* This dictionary is useless. It is short of many words. When you return to school, ask them to compile a better *Chinese-English Dictionary.* It should have all political terms and there should be sentences to illustrate the use of each word.

Hai-jung: How can our school compile a dictionary? We have neither time not personnel to do it.

Chairman: There are many teachers and students in your school. Why should you doubt their ability to compile a dictionary? Let this dictionary be compiled by your school.

Hai-jung: All right. I will transmit your order to our leadership when I return to school. I think we can perform this task.

NOTES

1. Wang Hai-jung is a niece of comrade Mao.

TALKS WITH RESPONSIBLE COMRADES AT VARIOUS PLACES DURING PROVINCIAL TOUR

(Summary)

From the middle of August to September 12, 1971

Chairman Mao said: I hope that you will practise Marxism and not revisionism; that you will unite and not split; that you will be sincere and open and not resort to plotting and conspiracy.

The correctness or otherwise of the ideological and political line decides everything. When the Party's line is correct, then everything will come its way. If it has no followers, then it can have followers; if it has no guns, then it can have guns; if it has no political power, then it can have political power. If its line is not correct, even what it has it may lose. The line is a net rope. When it is pulled, the whole net opens out.

This Party of ours already has fifty years' history, during which time we have had ten big struggles on the question of our line. During these ten struggles there were people who wanted to split our Party, but none of them were able to do so. This is a question worth studying: such a big country, such a large population, yet no split. We can only say that this means that the Party wants what the people want, and the Party members do not want a split. In view of its past history, the future of the Party is full of hope.

SOURCE: *Mao Chu-hsi Wen-hsun.*

First came Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who went in for right opportunism. After the 'August 7th' Conference of 1927 he organized the 'Leninist left-opposition faction' together with Liu Jen-ching, P'eng Shu-chih and others, and eighty-one of them issued a statement. They aimed to split our Party but they did not succeed. They then fled to the Trotskyites.

Next Ch'u Ch'iu-pai committed mistakes of line. His people came across a pamphlet of mine in Hunan which contained my remark, 'Political power comes from the barrel of a gun.' This infuriated them. How could political power possibly come from the barrel of a gun? So they stripped me of my position as alternate member of the Politburo. Later Ch'u Ch'u-pai was captured by the Kuomintang, wrote his 'Superfluous Words', betrayed us, and went over to the other side[1].

After the Sixth Congress of the party in 1928 Li Li-san started to put on airs. From June to September 1930 he followed his Li-san Line for over three months. He advocated attacks on big cities, and first winning victory in one or several provinces. I did not agree with all this. At the Third Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee Li Li-san fell.

From 1930 to 1931 Lo Chang-lung's rightist faction set up a separate Central Committee and engaged in splitting activity[2]. But they did not succeed either.

The Wang Ming Line had the longest life-span. He had formed a faction in Moscow, and organized the '281/2 Bolsheviks'. Relying on the might of the Third International they seized power in the Party and held it for a full four years. Wang Ming called the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in Shanghai, and published his pamphlet, *Fight for the Greater Bolshevization of the Chinese Communist Party,* in which he criticized Li Li-san for not being 'left' enough. He was not satisfied until he had made a clean sweep of the bases, as in the end he practically did. During the four years from 1931 to 1934 I had no voice at all at the Centre. The Tsunyi Conference of January 1935 corrected mistakes of Wang Ming's line and he fell.

During the Long March, after the meeting of the First and Fourth Front Armies, Chang Kuo-t'ao carried out a split and set up a separate Centre, but he did not succeed. Before the Long March the Red Army had 300,000 men. On its arrival in North Shensi only 25,000 remained. In the Central Soviet Area there had been 80,000. Of these only 8,000 arrived in North shensi. Chang Kuo-t'ao did not want to go to North Shensi and carried out a split. But what way out was there at that time, other than to go to North Shensi? This was a question of political line. Our political line at that time was correct. If we had not gone to North Shensi, how could we have later gone to the North China Region, the East China Region, and the Central China Region, the North-East Region? How could we have built so many bases in the Anti-Japanese War? When we arrived in North Shensi. Chang Kuo-t'ao fled.

After nationwide victory Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih created an anti-party alliance, with the intention of seizing power, but they did not succeed either.

At the 1959 Lushan Conference P'eng Te-huai colluded with a foreign country to seize power. Huang K'e-ch'eng. Chang Wen-t'ien. Chou Hsiao-chou popped up and opposed the Party. They formed a military club, though they did not discuss military affairs, but said such things as: 'The people's communes were set up too soon.' 'Our gains do not compensate for our losses,' etc. P'eng Te-huai also wrote a letter which was an open declaration of war. His intention was to seize power, but he did not succeed.

Liu Shao-ch'i and his lot also wanted to split the Party, but they did not achieve their ambitions either.

Then came the struggle at the 1970 Lushan Conference[3].

At the 1970 Lushan Conference they made a surprise attack and carried out underground activity. Why did they not dare to act openly? Clearly they had something to hide. So they first dissembled and then made a surprise attack. they concealed things from three of the five members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. They also concealed things from the great majority of comrades on the Politburo apart from their own few big generals. These big generals included Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien. Yeh Ch'un, Li Tso-p'eng, and Ch'iu Hui-tso, as well as Li Hsueh-feng and Cheng Wei-shan[4]. Before they launched their surprise attack they did not let out a whisper. They caused trouble not merely for a day and a half, but from 23 August right through the 24th and up to midday on the 25th – altogether two days and a half. This kind of behaviour shows that they had some aim in mind! P'eng Te-huai formed a military club and issued a declaration of war. They were not even up to P'eng Te-huai's level. This only shows how low their style of work was.

In my view, behind their surprise attack and their underground activity lay purpose, organization and a programme. Their programme was to appoint a state chairman, and to extol 'genius': in other words, to oppose the line of the Ninth Congress and to defeat the three-point agenda of the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee. A certain person was anxious to become state chairman, to split the Party and to seize power. The question of genius is a theoretical question. Their theory was idealist apriorism. Someone has said that to oppose genius is to oppose me. But I am no genius. I read Confucian books for six years and capitalist books for seven. I did not read Marxist-Leninist books until 1918, so how can I be a genius? Didn't I put circles round those adverbs several times over[5]. The Party Constitution was settled at the Ninth Congress. Why not take a look at it? I wrote 'Some Opinions'[6], which specially criticizes the genius theory, only after looking up some people to talk with them, and after some investigations and research. It is not that I do not want to talk about genius. To be a genius is to be a bit more intelligent. But genius does not depend on one person or a few people. It depends on a party, the party which is the vanguard of the proletariat. Genius is dependent on the mass line, on collective wisdom.

Comrade Lin Piao did not discuss that speech of his[7] with me, nor did he show it to me. When they had something to say they did not disclose it in advance. Probably this is because they thought they had a grip on things and were likely to succeed. But as soon as they were told that their ideas were not acceptable, they became jittery. At first they were as bold as brass, giving the impression they could raze Lushan to the ground or stop the earth revolving. But after a few days they hurriedly withdrew the draft[8]. If it was right, why withdraw it? This shows that they were devoid of ideas and in a panic.

The struggle with P'eng Te-huai at the 1959 Lushan Conference was a struggle between two headquarters. The struggle with Liu Shao-ch'i was also a struggle between two headquarters. The struggle at this Lushan Conference is yet another struggle between two headquarters.

The struggle at Lushan this time was different from the nine previous struggles. On the previous nine occasions we drew some conclusions,

while this time we have shielded Vice-Chairman Lin and have not drawn conclusions concerning an individual. He must, of course, assume some responsibility. What are we to do about these people? We should still operate a policy of educating them, that is, 'learning from past mistakes to prevent future ones and curing the disease to save the patient'. We still want to protect Lin. No matter who it is who has made mistakes, it is not a good thing to forget unity and the line. After I return to Peking I must seek them out again to have a talk. If they do not come to see me I will go to see them. Some of them may be saved, others it may not be possible to save. This depends on their actions. They have two possible futures: they may reform or they may not. It is difficult for someone who has taken the lead in committing major errors of principle, errors of line or direction, to reform. Looking back, did Ch'en Tu-hsiu reform? Did Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Li Li-san, Lo Chang-lung, Wang Ming, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, P'eng Te-huai or Liu Shao-ch'i reform? They did not reform.

I spoke to Comrade Lin Piao and some of the things he said were not very accurate. For example he said that a genius only appears in the world once in a few centuries and in China once in a few millennia. This just doesn't fit the facts. Marx and Engels were contemporaries, and not one century had elapsed before we had Lenin and Stalin, so how could you say that a genius only appears once in a few centuries? In China there were Ch'en Sheng and Wu Kuang, Hung Hsiu-ch'uan and Sun Yat-sen[9], so how could you say that a genius only appears once in a few millennia? And then there is all this business about pinnacles and 'one sentence being worth ten thousand'[10]. Don't you think this is going too far? One sentence is, after all, just one sentence, how can it be worth ten thousand sentences? We should not appoint a state chairman. I don't want to be state chairman. I have said this six times already. If each time I said it I used one sentence, that is now the equivalent of sixty thousand sentences. But they never listen, so each of my sentences is not even worth half a sentence. In fact its value is nil. It's only Ch'en Po-ta's sentences that are worth ten thousand apiece to them. He talked about 'establishing in a big way', by which he gave the appearance of meaning to establish my prestige[11]. But when you get to the bottom of it, he really meant himself. They also said that the People's Liberation Army was built and led by me, and commanded personally by Lin[12]. It seems that the person who founded it cannot command it! And I did not build it all by myself either.

When it comes to questions of line, questions of principle, I take a firm hold and do not relax my grip. On major questions of principle I do not make concessions. After the Lushan Conference I employed three methods: the first was throwing stones, the second was mixing sand into soil and the third was undermining the wall. I criticized the material produced by Ch'en Po-ta which fooled a great many people. I approved the report of the Thirty-eighth Army and the report of the Tsinan Military Region which opposed arrogance and complacency[13]. Then there was the Military Affairs Committee which held such a long discussion meeting without a word of criticism of Ch'en. I inserted a few critical notes about that in a certain document[14]. My method was to pick up these stones, write a few remarks on them, and let everyone discuss them. This is what I call throwing stones. When soil is too compressed it cannot breathe. If you mix in a little sand, then it can breathe. The staff of the Military Affairs Committee was too uniform in its composition, and needed to have some new names added. This is mixing sand in the soil. The reorganization of the Peking Military Region was undermining the wall[15].

What is your opinion of the Lushan Conference? For instance is the Sixth Brief Report of the North China Group really revolutionary, semi-revolutionary or counter-revolutionary? I myself regard it as a counter-revolutionary report. You were all present at the meeting of the ninety-nine, when the Premier made the summing-up speech and the self-examinations of the five big generals were issued, as well as those of big generals Li Hsueh-feng and Cheng Wei-shan, so that everyone thought that the problem had been solved[16]. But in fact the Lushan affair had not finished, the problem had not been solved. They wanted to suppress it. They did not even let cadres of the rank of head of the General Command and the General Staff departments know about it. This would not do!

What I have been saying are my own personal opinions, which I am giving you informally. I shall not draw formal conclusions now, this must be done by the Central Committee.

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You should be prudent. First of all the army must be prudent and secondly the regions must be prudent. You must not be arrogant, if you are arrogant you will commit errors. They army must be unified; it must be rectified. I just don't believe that you, Huang Yung-sheng, could order the Liberation Army to rebel! Under [each] army are divisions and regiments and the judicial, political and support units. If you try to mobilize the army to do bad things, do you think they will obey you?

You should pay attention to military affairs. You should not only be civil officials but also military officials. Grasping army work means studying the line and rectifying incorrect styles of work. You should not go in for mountain-top-ism or sectarianism, but pay attention to unity. I approve of the army's traditional style of quick and decisive action. But this style cannot be applied to questions of ideology, for which it is necessary to make the facts known and reason with people.

I added my approval to the document of the Canton Military Region on the 'three supports and two militaries[17]'. In order to get people to give it their attention I appended the words. 'To be studied seriously', to the Central Committee's endorsement. Now that the regional Party committees have been established, they should exercise unified leadership. It would be putting the cart before the horse if the matters already decided by regional Party committees were later turned over to the army Party committees for discussion.

In the past the military training given to our armed forces included unit-by-unit coaching. From individual coaching to battalion coaching took five to six months. Now that they only go in for civil and not military matters, our army has become a cultural army.

When 'one good' leads 'three goods' perhaps that 'one good' of yours will lead correctly and perhaps it will lead incorrectly[18]. And then there are the congresses of representatives of activists. It is worth studying what their actual effect is. Some are successful, but many are not. This is primarily a question of line. If the line is mistaken then the activists' congress cannot be successful.

'In industry learn from Tach'ing, in agriculture learn from Tachai; let the people of the whole country learn from the PLA.' This is incomplete. We should add, 'Let the PLA learn from the people of the whole country.'

*

You should study the article written by Lenin on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of Eugene Pottier. Learn to sing 'The

Internationale' and 'The Three Great Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention'. Let them not only be sung but also explained and acted upon. 'The Internationale' and Lenin's article express throughout a Marxist standpoint and outlook. What they say is that slaves should arise and struggle for truth. There never has been any supreme saviour, nor can we rely on gods or emperors. We rely entirely on ourselves for our salvation. Who has created the world of men? We the labouring masses. During the Lushan Conference I wrote a 700-word article which raised the question of who created history, the heroes or the slaves[19]. 'The Internationale' says we must unite until the day comes when Communism will certainly be realized. If you study Marxism you will see that it teaches unity and not splitting. We have been singing 'The Internationale' for fifty years but people have tried to split our Party ten times. I think it possible that they will do it another ten times, or twenty times, or thirty times. You don't believe it? Maybe you don't but I do. When we reach Communism will there be no struggles? I don't believe that either. When we reach Communism there will still be struggles, but they will be between the new and the old, the correct and the incorrect, that is all. After tens of millennia have passed by, the incorrect will still be no good and will fail.

The Three Great Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention must be 'remembered clearly, each and every one' and 'the people of the whole country welcome and support them'. Yet there are a few of the rules and points for attention which are not clearly remembered, especially the first of the Three Rules and the first and fifth of the Eight Points. These are not remembered clearly. How fine it would be if they could all be clearly remembered and put into effect. The first of the Three Rules is that in all actions orders must be obeyed, for only if we march in step can we win victory. If we are not in step we cannot win victory. Then there are the first and fifth of the Eight points which say that towards the people, and towards fellow soldiers and subordinates, we should always be polite. We must not put on airs; warlord ways must be rooted out. These are the points of emphasis. If there were no points of emphasis there would be no policy. I hope that we will use the Three Great Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention to educate the army, educate the cadres, educate the masses, educate the Party members and the people.

*

The Lushan Conference called for the study of books by Marx and Lenin[20]. I hope you will read more books from now on. It just won't do if high-ranking cadres don't even know what is materialism and what is idealism. What do we do if we find the books of Marx and Lenin difficult? We can ask a teacher to help us. You are all secretaries, but you ought to be students too. I myself become a student every day. I read two volumes of *Reference Material*[21] daily, and that's why I know a little about international affairs.

I never approved of one's wife becoming the office manager in one's own work unit. Over at Lin Piao's it is Yeh Ch'un who manages his office. When the four of them want to ask Lin Piao about anything they have to go through her. In doing any work one should do it oneself and read and endorse papers oneself. One should not rely on one's secretary. One shouldn't let one's secretary wield so much power. My secretary is only responsible for receiving and dispatching papers. I select the documents myself, read them myself, and when something has to be done I do my own writing so that no mistakes are made.

*

The Cultural Revolution dragged out Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng, Lo, Lu, and Yang. This was a big achievement. There were also some losses. Some good cadres have still not been able to re-emerge. The great majority of our cadres are good. The bad ones are a very small minority. Those who have been cleared out only comprise one per cent, while those who have been suspended are less than three per cent. The bad ones must be given appropriate criticism. The good ones must be praised, though not to the skies. It does a person under thirty no good at all if you call him a 'super-genius'. At the recent Lushan Conference some comrades were deceived and hoodwinked. The problem does not lie in you but in Peking. It does not matter if you have made mistakes. Our Party has a rule that those who made mistakes should first make a self-examination, and then they should be permitted to correct their mistakes.

We must take care to educate people in our ideological and political line. Our principle must still be 'learning from past mistakes to avoid future mistakes', and 'curing the disease to save the patient'. Unite to win still greater victories.

NOTES

1. Chu Chiu-pai, see note 2 on p 97 of this volume.

2. Lo Chang-lung (1901–49) was a founding member of the Chinese Communist Party and an important labour leader in the 1920s. In late 1930 he supported Ho Meng-hsiung's bid for control of the Party. As a result he was expelled at the Fourth Plenum in January 1931, and thereafter joined Ho in setting up a rival Central Committee. Hence Mao's charge of 'splittism'. He later became a Trotskyite.

3. The Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee, held at Lushan from 23 August to 6 September 1970.

4. The five names of Mao's list of the 'big generals' making up Lin Piao's clique were all members of the Politburo. With the exception of Lin's wife, Yeh Ch'un, they were all senior military men. Huang Yuang-sheng (1906–) had been Chief of Staff since March 1968. Wu Fa-hsien (1914–) had been Commander of the Air Force since August 1965, and Deputy Chief of Staff since May 1968, Li Tso-p'eng had been First Political Commissar of the Navy since June 1967. Ch'iu Hui-tso was Director of the PLA General Logistics Department, and had been Deputy Chief of Staff since February 1969. Of the other two, Li Hsueh-feng (see above, note 2 on p 186 – of this volume) was an alternate member of the Ninth Politburo, and Political Commissar of the Peking Military Region. Cheng Wei-shan (1914–) had been Deputy Commander of the Peking Military Region from November 1959 to March 1968, and Commander since that time. He was also Vice-Chairman of the Peking Revolutionary Committee.

5. 'With genius', 'creatively', and 'comprehensively'. These adverbs, used by Lin Piao in his foreword to the December 1966 edition of *Quotations from Chairman Mao* to characterize Mao Tse-tung's contribution to the development of Marxism-Leninism, sum up the view of the subject which he had been propagating since 1960 and especially since 1966. Mao Tse-tung, who was en-deavouring in 1970 to downgrade his own cult, here attributes all the responsibility for previous excesses to Lin Piao.

6. A 700-word statement said to have been released by Comrade Mao during the Lushan Plenum. Nothing is known of its contents except for Mao's own summary here.

7. Lin Piao's speech of 23 August 1970 to the Lushan Plenum.

8. Yeh Ch'un is said to have withdrawn the minutes of her intervention before a meeting of the Central-South Group during the plenum.

9. Ch'en Sheng and Wu Kuang were contemporaries who jointly led an insurrection against the Ch'in in the third century B.C. Hung Hsiu-ch'uan (1814-64), the leader of the Taipings, was born only half a century before Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925). Mao attributes 'genius' to these men because they were all, in some sense, revolutionary precursors, who therefore drew on the wisdom of the masses.

10. Lin Piao's made this statement that what Chairman Mao says in one sentence surpasses what others say in 10,000 sentences, in his speech of 18 May 1966.

11. This referes to efforts by Ch'en Po-ta and Lin Piao to reinsert, in the draft Constitution of the Peoples's Republic of China, the provision for a Statement Chairman which Mao had decided to strike out in March 1970. They claimed that their aim in this was further to glorify Chairman Mao, but in Mao's view their real intention was to ensure that Lin Piao should succeed Mao as the head both of the Party and of the state. Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta appear to have concluded a tactical alliance at the time of the Lushan Plenum, but clearly represented different factions and different viewpoints.

12. The question raised here as to who exercised real and immediate authority over the army is obviously closely related to that of Party control over the 'gun', which had become a burning issue whithin the leadership – and between Mao and Lin – in 1969–70.

13. 'Arrogance and complacency' was, by this time, the accepted expression for referring to the errors in Lin Piao's work style.

14. This apparently refers to Mao's 'Open Letter to the Whole Party' of 15 September 1970, calling for a campaign to criticize Ch'en Po-ta.

15. 'Throwing stones' refers to Mao's action in compelling the 'big generals' supporting Lin to denounce Ch'en Po-ta. 'Mixing sand in soil' meant weakening Lin's control of the Military Affairs Committee by adding new members. The wall or cornerstone of Lin's power represented by the Peking Military Region was undermined by the dismissal of his supporters Cheng Wei-shan and Li Hsueh-feng in December 1970.

16. At a report meeting called by the Central Committee in April 1971, and attended by ninety-nine responsible cadres from the Centre, the regions and PLA units, for the purpose of discussing the progress of the campaign to criticize Ch'en Po-ta and carry out rectification, self-criticisms by the 'big generals' of the Lin Piao clique (as enumerated by Mao) were distributed.

17. This refers to the 'Summary of the Canton Military Region's Forum on Political and Ideological Work relating to the Three Supports and Two Militaries',

distributed by the Central Committee on 20 August 1971. The 'three supports' ('support the broad masses of the left, support industry and agriculture') and 'two militaries' ('military control and military training') was the slogan summing up the policy of active intervention by the PLA in all aspects of politics and society which had developed in the course of the Cultural Revolution. Mao Tse-tung, who had launched the process in January 1967 with his directive to Lin Piao to intervene in the Cultural Revolution in support of the left, had clearly regarded this as a temporary expedient, but by 1970–71 there were signs that Lin Piao and his supporters took it as setting the long-term pattern of the Chinese political system, and were using the above slogan as a standard for opposing the restoration of Party control. Presumably the Canton document adopted a more balanced position.

18. This apparently refers to Lin Piao's replacement of Mao's 'five requirements for successors' by 'three criteria' of his own, which he formulated as follows in his speech of 1 August 1966: '(1) Do they hold high the red banner of Mao Tse-tung's though? Those who fail to do so shall be dismissed from office; (2) Do they engage in political and ideological work? Those who disrupt it and the Great Cultural Revolution are to be dismissed; (3) Are they enthusiastic about the revolution? Those who are entirely devoid of such enthusiasm are to be dismissed... We must select, promote and employ cadres in accordance with Chairman Mao's five requirements and these three criteria, especially the first one'. 'One good' leading three goods' is Mao's summary of Lin's viewpoint according to which a correct under standing of Mao Tse-tung's thought in itself guaranteed that a person would be a good cadre. This criticism of Lin fits into the context of Mao's ongoing effort, since the Ninth Congress, to stress that political zeal must be complemented by a correct work style and, building on this, to denounce the 'arrogance and complacency' of Lin and his supporters in the army.

19. This refers to Mao's some Opinions' mentioned eariler. The link between Lin's glorification of the role of "genius" and the evocation here of the "Internationale," with its message, *"Iln'y a pas de sauvene supreme,"* is obvious.

20. Whereas Lin Piao had eariler put the view that "In the classical works of Marxism-Leninism, ninety-nine per cent of our studies must be from Chairman Mao's works," a movement had been under way since the Lushan Plenum of September 1970 to encourage the study of the writings of Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin.

21. A daily bulletin *(Ts'an Kai hsiun-hsi)* circulated to a fairly wide audience of cadres, containing translations from foreign news service.

APPENDIX

SOUTH OF THE MOUNTAINS TO NORTH OF THE SEAS

January Ninth, 1965: American journalist Edgar Snow's Interview with Chairman Mao Tse-tung [excerpts]

After I had been back in China more than two months, I was invited to dinner by Mao Tse-tung on the night of 9 January 1965, when we conversed together for about four hours.

……

Our talk ranged over what Mao himself called *shan nan hai pei,* or 'from south of the mountains to north of the seas'. It was *hai k'uo t'ien kung,* covering 'an expanse far and wide', and in some respects unique.

……

TIBET AND THE GODS

I said: 'China has been through difficult years since I last saw you but now has emerged on an impressive high level. In 1960 you told me that 90 per cent of the people supported the government and only 10 per cent opposed it. How does that look now?

Mao replied that some Chiang Kai-shek elements were still around but their total was small. Many had changed their thinking and there was hope for more. As for the children of such people, they could be re-educated. Anyway, one could say that about 95 per cent of the people, or even more, were united and supported socialism.

……

'Are the Panchen Lama's dificulties a matter of his feudal ties with the old lama-landlord power over the former serfs,' I asked, 'or would you say it was a conflict over his duties as a religious leader versus the new political power separated from the church?'

Mao replied that it was basically a matter of the land question, not religious freedom. The feudal lords had lost their land, their serfs had been freed and were now the masters. The Panchen Lama had been keeping company with some 'bad eggs *('Huai tan')* of the old privileged class who not only obstructed change but had organized a clique. Certain members of the clique had exposed their plans. Some people around the Panchen were not too old to reform and might yet show progress. The Panchen himself might change his ideas. He was still a member of the National People's Congress. He was now living in Peking but he could return to Lhasa whenever he desired; it was up to him.

As for lamaism as a religion, nobody was oppressing its true believers, all the temples were open and services maintained, but the trouble was the living buddhas didn't always practise what they preached and were far from indifferent to non-spiritual affairs. The Dalai Lama himself had told Mao he didn't believe he was a living god although if one said that openly the Dalai would have to deny it.

……

'Are there still some gods in China?'

Yes, of course; as I knew, the Chinese did not have only one god, but many. There were gods for everything; door gods, kitchen gods, rain gods, mountain gods, mercy gods, and so on. Could not even a stone become a god? There were still millions who believed in Islam and many millions more who were Buddhists and Taoists. There were also several million Christians, Catholics and Protestants. And some genuinely believed in the lama gods, too.

'I wonder if you have ever been to Tibet?'

No, he had never been to Tibet, except the eastern fringes which they crossed during the Long March. At that time he had travelled a great deal, but there were some areas he hadn't been able to see. They (the Nationalists) wouldn't let him see Yunnanfu (Kunming), for examlpe.They had let him see Kweichow but they wouldn't let him see Kweiyang (the capital). Now he could probably visit Yunnan but he had not done so. He also had not been to Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan).

Remembering that it was thrity years ago that he had first told me about his father's encounter with the tiger, he said at that time, towards the end of the first war with the Nationalists, their conditions were very poor. Yet that old Chinese Red Army was united and strong even if in numbers it was small. I had seen them when they had possessed only light weapons.

'Except for those heavy spears carried by the Poor Men's Militia.'

Yes, and even broomsticks. Victory or defeat was not determined by weapons at hand at the outset. What was really decisive was the will to victory and right aims. Many elements went into that. Now more than twenty years had passed, their weapons were better, but the same factors still determined victory or defeat.

'People then were thinking mainly of liberating China from Japan. Certainly I did not then foresee the full significance of revolutionary China's rise in the world.'

……

U.S.

'Some American commentators in Saigon have compred the strength of the Vietcong there with the 1947 period in China, when the People's Liberation Army began to engage in large-scale annihilations of Nationalist forces. Are the conditions relatively comparable?

The Chairman thought not. China's second revolutionary war had involved liberating the whole vast country. By 1947 the People's Liberation Army already had more than a million men, against several million troops on Chiang Kai-shek's side. The P.L.A. had then used divisional and group army strength, whereas the South Vietnamese Liberation Forces were now operating at battalion or at most regimental strength. American forces in Vietnam were still relatively small. Of course if they increased they could help speed up the arming of the people against them. But if I should tell United States leaders that they were building up a revolutionary movement which would defeat them, they would not listen. They would not let the Vietnamese decide their own affairs. Had they listened to Ngo Dinh Diem? Both Ho Chi Minh and he (Mao) thought that Ngo Dinh Diem was not so bad. They had expected the Americans to maintain him for several more years. But impatient American generals became disgusted with Diem and got rid of him. After all following his assassination, was everything between Heaven and Earth more peaceful?

'Can Vietcong forces now win victory by their own efforts alone?'

Yes, he said, he thought that they could. Their position was relatively better than that of the Communists during the first (revolutionary) civil war (1927-37) in China. At that time there was no direct foreign intervention but now already the Vietcong had the American intervention to help arm and educate the rank and file and the army officers. Those opposed to the United States were no longer confined to the Liberation Army. Diem had not wanted to take orders. Now this independence had spread to the generals. The American teachers were succeeding.

Asked whether some of these generals would soon join the Liberation Army, Mao said yes, that some would eventually follow the example of Kuomintang generals who had turned over to the Communists.

ON THE THIRD WORLD

'United States intervention in Vietnam, the Congo, and other former colonial battlefields suggests a question of some theoretical interest as seen within Marxist concepts. The question is whether the contradiction between neo-colonialism and the revolutionary forces in what the French like to call the "Third World" - the so-called under developed or ex-colonial or still colonial nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America - is today the principal political contradiction in the world? Or do you consider that the basic contradiction is still one between the capitalist countries themselves?'

Mao Tse-tung said that he had not reached an opinion about that. Perhaps I could help him? He recalled that President Kennedy had also been interested in that question. Had he not declared that as far as the United States, Canada, and Western Europe were concerned there was not much real and basic difference? The President had said that the real problem of the future was in the southern hemisphere. In advocating 'Special Forces' and training to meet 'local revolutionary wars' the late President might have had my question in mind.

On the other hand, contradictions between imperialists were what had caused two world wars in the past, and their struggles against colonial revolutions had not changed their character. Weren't those wars fought for the purpose of redividing colonies? If another big war occurred wouldn't it be for the purpose of redividing control over the so-called underdeveloped countries? In fact, the so-called developed countries were not so united today. If one looked at France one saw two reasons for de Gaulle's policies. The first was to assert independence from American domination. The second was to attempt to adjust French policies to changes occurring in the Asian-African countries and Latin America. The result was intensified contradiction between the imperialist nations. But was France part of its so-called 'Third World'? Recently he had asked some French visitors about that and they had told him no, that France was a developed country and could not be a member of the 'Third World' of undeveloped countries. It seemed that the matter was not so simple.

'Perhaps it could be said that France is in the Third World but not of it?'

Perhaps. This question which had engaged the interest of President Kennedy had led him (Mao said he had read) to study Mao's own essays on military operations. He had also learned from Algerian friends during their struggle against France that the French were reading his works and using his information against them. But at that time he had told the Algerian prime minister, Abad, that his own (Mao's) books were based on Chinese experience and would not work in reverse. They could be adpted to the waging of people's war. They did not save the French from defeat in Algeria. Chiang Kai-shek had also studied the Communists' materials but he had not been saved either.

Mao remarked that the Chinese also study American books, but that it would be bad for them to fight an anti-people's war. For instance, he had read *The Uncertain Trumpet*, by General Maxwell Taylor, the United States ambassador in Saigon. General Taylor's view was that nuclear weapons probably could not be used, therefore non-nuclear arms would decide. He favoured developing nuclear weapons but wanted priority in their development given to the army. Now he had his chance to test out his theories of special warfare. He had been in Vietnam only since last June, not as long as the duration of the Korean war. In Vietnam General Taylor would gain some valuable experience.

The Chairman had also read some articles of war on how to handle guerrillas issued by United States authorities to their troops. These instructions dealt with the shortcomings and military weaknesses of the guerrillas and held out hopes for American victory. They ignored the decisive political fact that whether it was Diem or some other puppets, no government cut off from the masses could win against wars of liberation. No good could result from helping such governments. The Americans (authorities) would not listen to him, however. They also would not listen to me.

'In South-East Asia as well as in India and certain countries of Africa and even Latin America there exist some social conditions comparable to those that brought on the Chinese revolution. Each country has its own problems and solutions will vary widely, yet I wonder if you agree that social revolutions will occur which may borrow much from the Chinese experience?'

Anti-feudal and anti-capitalist sentiments combined with opposition to imperialism and neo-colonialism, he replied, grew out of oppression and wrongs of the past. Wherever the latter existed there would be revolution but in most countries I was talking about the people were merely seeking national independence, not socialism - quite another matter. European countries had also had anti-feudal revolutions, but the United States had had no real feudal period.

'The United States had a brief period of regional feudalism during the period of slavery in the southern states. After a hundred years the ex-slaves are still fighting for social and political equality, so one can't say that feudal influences don't hang on in the United States.'

The United States, he said, had first fought a progressive war of independence from British imperialism, and then fought a civil war to establish a free labour market. Washington and Lincoln were progressive men of their time. When the United States first established a republic it was hated and dreaded by all the crowned heads of Europe. That showed that the Americans were then revolutionaries. Now the American people needed to struggle for liberation from their own monopoly capitalists. What part of the United States did I come from?

'I was bron in Missouri, the Middle West, in a geographical situation comparable to your native province, Hunan. We have produced no revolutionaries but Missouri produced Mark Twain and Harry Truman two quite different articles. Missouri was not a slave state, but it was part of the homeland of American Indians taken from them hardly two hundred years ago. Americans think they are not imperialists but the American Indians are of a different opinion. China was not quite so ruthless in despoiling the minority peoples. After 3,000 years, more than half the area of the country is theirs and you still have nearly fifty million non-Han autonomous peoples. How are relations between the Han and the minority peoples today?'

He said that they were improving. In a word, the important thing was to respect them and treat them as equals.

'Among the roughly three fifths of the earth which belongs in the Third World category very acute problems exist, as we know. The gap between the ratio of population growth and production is becoming more and more advantageous. The gap between their standard of living and that of the affluent countries is rapidly widening. Under such conditions will time wait for the Soviet Union to demonstrate the superiority of the social system – and then wait a century for parliamentarism to arise in the underdeveloped areas and peacefully establish socialism?'

Mao thought it would not wait so long.

'Does that question not perhaps touch upon the nexus of China's ideological dispute with the Soviet Union?'

He agreed that it did.

'Do you think it would be possible to complete not only the national liberation of emerging nations of the Third World but also their modernization, without another world war?'

Use of the word 'complete' must give one pause, he said. Most of the countries concerned were still very far from socialist revolutions. In some there were no Communist parties at all while in others there were only revisionists. It was said that Latin America had about twenty Communist parties; of those eighteen had issued resolutions against China. He paused and ended by saying that only one thing was certain. Wherever severe oppression existed there would be revolution.

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE CULT

'Western commentators, and especially the Italian Communists, severely criticized the Soviet leaders for the conspiratorial and undemocratic way in which Khrushchev was thrown aside. What is your view about that?'

Mao did not directly answer the question. He replied that Mr Khrushchev had not been very popular in China even before his fall. Few portraits of him were to be seen. But Khrushchev's books were for sale in the bookstores before the fall and they were still for sale here but not in Russia. The world needed Khrushchev; his ghost would linger on. There were bound to be people who liked him. China would miss him as a negative example.

'On the basis of your own 70/30 standards - that is, a man's work may be judged satisfactory if it is 70 per cent and only 30 per cent in error - how would you grade the present leadership of the Soviet Party? How far is it still below passing?'

Mao said he would not choose to discuss the present leaders in those terms.

'Is there any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations?'

Possibly some but not much. The chief difference was that the disappearance of Khrushchev had deprived them of a good target for polemical articles.

'In the Soviet Union,' I said, 'China has been criticized for fostering a "cult of personality". Is there a basis for that?'

Mao thought that perhaps there was some. It was said that Stalin had been the centre of a cult of personality, and that Khrushchev had none at all. The Chinese people, critics said, had some feelings or practices of this kind. There might be some reasons for saying that. Probably Mr Khrushchev fell because he had had no cult of personality at all...

'While you were making a revolution in China you also revolutionized foreign Sinology and now there are various schools of Maoists and Pekingologists. Not long ago I attended a conference where professors debated whether you had or had not made any original contributions to Marxism. I asked one professor, at the close of the conference, whether it would make any difference in their controversy if it could be shown that Mao himself had never claimed to have made any creative contribution. The professor impatiently replied. "No, indeed. That would be quite beside the point." '

Mao laughed. More than two thousand years ago, he said, Chuang Chou wrote his immortal essay on Lao Tzu (in *The Chuang Tzu*). A hundred schools of thought then arose to dispute the meaning of The *Chuang Tzu*.

'In 1960 when I last saw you I asked whether you ever wrote or had any intention of writing an autobiography. You replied that you had not, except as you had told me something about your life. Nevertheless, some professors have discovered "autobiographies" written by you. A question currently exercising the professors is whether you in fact wrote your celebrated philosophical essays, "On Contradiction" and "On Practice" in the summer of 1937, as asserted in your *Selected Works*, or whether they were really composed some years afterwards. I myself seem to recall having seen unpublished longhand translations of those essays in the summer of 1938. Would you give me your own opinion about when you composed those two essays?'

He replied that he had indeed written them in the summer of 1937. During the weeks preceding and immediately following the Lukouchiao incident[1] there had been a lull in his life in Yenan. The army had left for the front and Mao had found time to collect materials for some lectures on basic philosophy for use in the (Yenan) Anti-Japanese Academy. Some simple and yet fundamental text was needed for the young students being prepared, in brief three-month courses, for political guidance during the years immediately ahead. At the insistence of the Party Mao prepared 'On Contradiction' and 'On Practice' to sum up the experience of the Chinese revolution, by combining the essentials of Marxism with concrete and everyday Chinese examples. Mao said that he wrote most of the night and slept during the day. What he had written over a period of weeks he delivered in lecture from in a matter of two hours. Mao added that he himself considered 'On Practice' a more important essay than 'On Contradiction'.

'An essay called "Dialectical Materialism", not included in your *Selected Works*, has been attributed to you by Mao Tse-tung specialists in the West. Did you write any such essay?'

Mao asked for the question to be repeated. He replied that he had never written an essay entitled 'Dialectical Materialism'. He thought that he would remember it if he had.

'You were very busy learning about the art of war from 1927 onwards. Had you found time to read Hegel before 1937?'

Mao said that he had read Hegel and he had also read Engels before then. He added (thinking of his American critics, perhaps) that he had never read any American Marxist theorists. Were there any good ones? I asked whether in his youth he had heard of Thorstein Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class*. If it had been translated into Chinese Mao had not seen it. I mentioned a book which had made a big impression on nineteenth-century American utopian socialists, and was still very interesting reading for its prophetic quality. Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*. As for modern American Marxist thinkers, there was Paul Sweezy's *Theory of Capitalist Development*. Mao said he regretted that he had not read any of them.

THE BOMB

'Speaking of tigers, as we were,' I said, 'do you still believe that the bomb is a paper tiger?'

That had been just a way of talking, he said, a figure of speech. Of course the bomb could kill people. But in the end the people would destroy the bomb. Then it would truly become a paper tiger.

'You have been quoted as saying that China had less fear of the bomb than other nations becuase of her vast population. Other peoples might be totally wiped out but China would still have a few hundred millions left to begin anew. Was there ever any factual basis to such reports?'

He asked when and how he was supposed to have said that. I replied that one source was attributed to a Yugoslav diplomat who claimed that Mao had said that even if all Europeans were wiped out China would still have 300 millions left.

Mao answered that he had no recollection of saying anything like that but he might have said it. He did recall a conversation he had had with Jawaharlal Nehru when the latter visited China (in October 1954). As he remembered it he had said China did not want a war. They didn't have atom bombs, but if other countries wanted to fight there would be a catastrophe in the whole world, meaning that many people would die. As for how many, nobody could know. He was not speaking only of China. He did not believe one atom bomb would destroy all mankind, so that you would not be able to find a government to negotiate peace. He had mentioned this to Nehru during their conversation. Nehru said that he was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India and he knew about the destructiveness of atomic power. He was sure that no one could survive. Mao replied that it would probably not be as Nehru said. Existing governments might disappear but others would arise to replace them.

He had heard that Americans had made a film called *On the Beach*, which showed nuclear war bringing the world to an end. Was that a scientific film?

'It's what is called science fiction.'

Not so long ago, said Mao, Mr Khrushchev had announced that he had a deadly weapon capable of killing all living things. Then he immediately retracted his statement - not only once but many times. Mao would not deny anything he had said, nor did he wish me to deny for him this so-called rumour (about the power of survival of China's millions in a nuclear war). Americans also had said very much about the destructiveness of the atom bomb and Khrushchev had made a big noise about that. They had all surpassed him in this respect (boasting of their destructive potency), so that he was more backward than they, was not that so?' [Mao was ridiculing, by implication, those who supposed him to be an ignorant peasant unaware of the full meaning of nuclear terror.]

Yet recently he had reports of an investigation by Americans who visited the Bikini Islands six years after nuclear tests were conducted there. From 1959 onwards research workers had been in Bikini. When they first entered the main island they had had to cut open paths through the undergrowth. They had found mice scampering about and fish swimming in the streams as usual. The well water was potable, plantation foliage was flourishing, and birds were twittering in the trees. Bacteria had multiplied at the rate of 400 kilogrammes per square *mou*. Probably there had been two bad years after the tests but nature had gone on. How was it that mice had survived? Plant life was destroyed but not the seeds which lay dormant until the earth's surface was purified. For the bacteria, the birds, the mice, and the trees, the atom bomb really was a paper tiger. Possibly for man himself it was different....

The deeper implication of Mao's last remark was that even if man disappeared from the earth– committed mass suicide - *life* could not be extinguished by man's bomb.

DISARMAMENT?

All the governments were talking about complete and total disarmament. China herself had proposed disarmament since a long time past. So had the Soviet Union. The U.S.A. kept talking about it. What we were getting instead was complete and thorough rearmament.

'President Johnson may find it difficult to settle problems in the East one by one. Perhaps if he desired to expose the world to the real complexity of those problems he might do worse than to cut to the heart of the matter by accepting China's proposal to hold a summit conference to consider the total destruction of nuclear weapons'.

Mao agreed but concluded that it would be quite impossible. Even if Mr Johnson himself desired such a meeting he was after all but a bailiff *[Huang liang chuang t'ou, an estate overseer.]* — for the monopoly capitalists --- and they would never permit it. China had had only one atomic explosion and perhaps it had to be proved that one could divide into two, and so on ad infinitum. Yet China did not want a lot of bombs, which were really quite useless since probably no nation dared employ them. A few would suffice for scientific experiments. Even one bomb was not liked in China's hands.

'I remember your telling me a story about an ignorant local warlord in South China who posted a bulletin offering a reward for the capture of "Mr Soviet"[2] rumoured to be leading some bandits and causing lots of trouble. Now it is Mr China A-Bomb that is causing trouble. Why is that?'

Yes, Mao feared that his reputation was not good; the imperialists just did not like him. They didn't like Mr China A-Bomb. Yet was it really just to blame Mr China A-Bomb for everything and to start anti-Chinese movements? Did China kill Ngo Dinh Diem? And yet that had happened. When the assassination of President Kennedy occurred the Chinese (Communists) were quite surprised. They had not planned that. Once more, they were quite surprised when Khrushchev was removed in Russia. They had not ordered that.

ON THE UNITED NATIONS

'Indonesia has withdrawn from the United Nations, accompained by applause from China[3]. Do you think the move will set a precedent and that other withdrawals will follow?'

Mao said that it was the United Sates which had first set the precedent, by excluding China from the United Nations. Now that a majority of nations might favour restoring China's seat despite U.S. opposition, there was a new scheme to require a two thirds majority instead of a simple majority. But the question was, had China gained or lost by being outside the U.N. during the past fifteen years? Indonesia had left because she felt that there was not much advantage to remaining in the U.N. As for China, was it not in itself a United Nations? Any one of several of China's minority nationalities was much larger in population and territory than some states in the U.N. whose votes had helped deprive China of her seat there. China was a large country with plenty of work to keep her busy outside the U.N.

What did I think? Would China have been better off being in the U.N. during the past fifteen years?

'Yes, perhaps so, if it did not mean dividing one China into two Chinas. But some people now say that China does not want to join the U.N. under any conditions -?'

To say that would be bad. If two thirds of the U.N. invited China to join, and if the Chinese did not accept, wouldn't they be called nationalists? (That is, anti-internationalists.) But even if the U.N. decided to recognize mainland China rather than the Taiwan clique, wouldn't there still be difficulties? How could they give a seat to China while still condemning her as an aggressor? (Referring to the U.N. resolution which branded China an aggressor for intervening after American troops crossed into northern Korea.) But suppose the title of aggressor were even taken away from China? What then? Would the U.N. brand the U.S. an aggressor in Vietnam? Probably the United States would not agree to such changes. Thus there was no danger of China entering the U.N.

'Is it now practicable to consider forming a union of nations excluding the United States?'

Mao pointed out that such forums already existed. One example was the Afro-Asian Conference. Another was Ganefo - Games of the New Emerging Forces - organized after the United States excluded China from the Olympics.

(Preparations for the Afro-Asian Conference scheduled to open in Algiers in March 1965 had been plagued by many problems. These included the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute and insistence on the part of the pro-China Bandung powers that the U.S.S.R. must be excluded from the Conference, as a strictly European power. China then regarded the Afro-Asian organization as the potential centre of planned development of a Third World largely independent of neo-colonial or Western capital. Following Chinese principles of 'self-reliance' in internal development, and of mutual help between the Afro-Asian states, the process of modernization might by-pass the slow and painful methods of capital accumulation by traditional bourgeois means. Such a theoretical alternative of course would have implied more rapid and radical political evolution and an earlier arrival at pre-socialist conditions in the capital-poor Afro-Asian states. It had been obvious for some time that the Afro-Asian Conference was also viewed as a potential permanent assembly of the have-not nations to exist independently from the American-dominated United Nations from which China and her closest allies had long been excluded and from which Indonesia had recently excluded itself. Events moved in a different direction, to a great extent helped by Sino-Soviet hostility.)

HOW MANY CHINESE?

'In fact, Mr Chairman, how many people are there inside China's own United Nations,' I asked. 'Can you give me a population figure resulting from the recent census?

The Chairman replied that he really did not know. Some said that there were 680 to 690 millions but he did not believe it. How could there be so many?

When I suggested that it ought not to be difficult to calculate, on the basis of ration coupons (cotton and rice) alone, Mao indicated that the peasants had sometimes confused the picture. Before Liberation they had hidden births and kept sons off the regist. out of fear of having them conscripted. Since Liberation there had been a tendency to report greater numbers and less land, and to minimize output returns while exaggerating the effects of calamities. Nowadays a new birth was reported at once, but when someone died it might not be reported for months. (His implication seemed to be that extra ration coupons could be accumulated in that way.) No doubt there had been a real decline in the birth rate, but the peasants were still too slow to adopt family planning and birth control. The decline in the death rate was probably greater than the decline in births. Average longevity had gone up from about thirty years to close to fifty years.

THE U.S. IN VIETNAM

'Do you have any advice for the U.S.A.?'

They had already suggested, a long time ago, that the United States withdraw a bit. The United States had its hands stretched all over the world. As usual, the American rulers would not listen.

The American position was difficult, especially in Vietnam. To withdraw was not good; not to withdraw was also not good *[Pu-hao...yeh pu-hao]*. Wherever there were signs of disturbance the American imperialists must send troops, first moving here and then there.

'I have heard some people in Washington argue that the fleet and the marines might as well be in Vietnam as anywhere else. They have to be paid anyway.'

Yes, they had plenty to do. Reactionaries everywhere needed their help. In the Congo, for instance. In the end, they must all go home. In the past China had seen american troops in Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai, even Peking. They had all left. In fact they had left very rapidly.

The conditions of revolutionary anti-imperialist victory in China had been, first, that the old ruling group was weak and incompetent, led by Chiang Kai-shek, a man who was always losing battles. Second, the people's Liberation Army was strong and ably led and people believed in its cause. In places where such conditions did not prevail the Americans could intervene. Otherwise they would stay away or soon leave.

We were at dinner when Mao asked whether I considered that Mr Johnson could try a Vietnam policy any different from that of his predecessors. I said probably not; it would be easier to follow the old ruts deeper into the trap. But the war in Vietnam was not popular and Mr Johnson liked to be popular. His administration faced many internal problems which a bigger war in Asia could not really solve. In balance, however, since Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung probably would not provide Mr Johnson with 'an attractive way out', he would not leave until the costs became very great. I had already given my opinion to Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, that 'it would not surprise me to see 100,000 American troops in Vietnam before next year'.

Mao asked what kind of internal problems Mr Johnson faced.

I ticked off several obvious ones, including unemployment, especially high among blacks, which helped to increase racial tension. War could, of course, tend to cut down unemployment temporarily. Automation was a factor in unemployment, and I also mentioned the great population shift from the farms, where mechanization and capitlization had eliminated so many small proprietors and poured millions of landless people into the urban labour market. Now only about eight per cent of the total U.S. population was needed to produce more food than the country could consume.

Mao asked me to repeat the figure. When I did so he shook his head sceptically. How could that be? was all he said.

CHINA AND THE U.S.

'Naturally I personally regret that forces of history have divided and separated the American and Chinese peoples from virtually all communication during the past fifteen years. Today the gulf seems broader than ever. However, I myself do not believe it will end in war and one of history's major tragedies.'

Mao said that forces of history were also bound, eventually, to bring the two peoples together again; that day would surely come. Possibly I was right that meanwhile war could be avoided.

War could occur only if American troops came to China. They might come and they might not come. If they came they would not really benefit much. That simply would not be allowed. Probably the American leaders knew that and consequently they would not invade China. *Then there would be no war because if they did not send troops to China the Chinese certainly would never send troops to attack the United States.*

'What of the possibilities of war arising over Vietnam? I have read many newspaper stories indicating that the United States has considered expanding the war into North Vietnam.'

No, that would not happen. Mr Rusk had now made it clear that the U.S. would not do that. Mr Rusk might have earlier said something like that but now he had corrected himself and said that he had never made such a statement. Therefore, there need not be any war in North Vietnam.

'Judging from conversations I have had from time to time with a few high American officials, including Dean Rusk, I would say that the makers and administrators of United States policy, the rulers of the United States, simply do not understand you.'

Why not? *China's armies would not go beyond her borders to fight. That was clear enough. Only if the United States attacked China would the Chinese fight. Wasn't that clear? Chinese were very busy with their internal affairs. Fighting beyond one's own borders was criminal. Why should the Chinese do so? The South Vietnamese could cope with their situation.*

'American officials repeatedly say that if United States forces were withdrawn from Vietnam then all South-East Asia would be overrun.'

The question is, said Mao, 'overrun' by whom? Overrun by Chinese or overrun by the inhabitants? China was overrun but only by Chinese.

'Are there now any Chinese troops in Vietnam?'

Mao affirmed that there were no Chinese forces in Northern Vietnam or anywhere else in South-East Asia. *China had no troops outside her own frontiers.*

'Dean Rusk has said that if China would give up her aggressive policies then the United States would withdraw from Vietnam. What does he mean?'

Mao replied that China had no policies of aggression to abandon. Where was China aggressing? China had committed no acts of aggression. China supported revolutionary movements, but not by invading countries. Of course, whenever a liberation struggle existed China would publish statements and call demonstrations to support it. It was precisely that which vexed the imperialists.

Mao went on to say that on some occasions China deliberately made a loud noise, as, for example, around Quemoy and Matsu. A flurry of shots there could attract a lot of attention perhaps because the Americans were uneasy so far away from home. Consider what could be accomplished by firing some blank shells within those Chinese territorial waters. Not so long ago the United States Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits was deemed insufficient to reply to the shells. The U.S. also dispatched part of its Sixth Fleet in China's direction and brought over part of the navy from San Francisco. Arrived here, they had found nothing to do. So it seemed that China could order the American forces to march here or to march there.

It was the same with Chiang Kai-shek's army. They had been able to order Chiang to scurry this way and then to hurry off in another direction. Of course when navy men were warm and had full bellies they must be given something to do. But how was it that shooting off empty guns at home could be called aggression while those who actually intervened with arms and bombed and burned people of other lands were not considered aggressors?

Some Americans had once said that the Chinese revolution was led by Russian aggressors but in truth the Chinese revolution was armed by Americans. In the same way the Vietnamese revolution was also being aamed by Americans, not by China. The liberation forces had not only greatly improved their supplies of American weapons during recent months but had also expanded their forces by recruiting American-trained troops and officers from the puppet armies of South Vietnam. China's liberation forces had grown in numbers and strength by recruiting to their side the troops trained and armed by the Americans for Chiang Kai-shek. The movement was called the 'changing of hats'. When Nationalist soldiers changed hats in large numbers becuase they had no confidence in their officers and felt that they would be killed needlessly, that the peasants would kill them for wearing the wrong hat, then the end was near. Changing hats was becoming more popular now among the Vietnamese puppets.

'Do you mean to say that the circumstances of victory for the Liberation Front now exist in South Vietnam?'

Mao thought that the American forces were not yet ready to leave. Flighting would go on perhaps for one to two years. After that the United States troops would find it uninteresting and might go home or go somewhere else.

'In a recent interview with Premier Chou En-lai, I understood him to say that China would oppose a Geneva Conference to enforce the Treaty of 1954 unless the United States first withdrew its troops from Vietnam. Is it your policy now to insist upon the withdrawal of United States forces before participating in a Geneva Conference to discuss the international position of a unified Vietnam?'

The Chairman said that he did not know what Premier Chou had said to me. *He himself thought that several possibilities should be mentioned. First, a conference might be held and United States withdrawal would follow. Second, the conference might be deferred until after the withdrawal. Third, a conference might be held but United States troops might stay around Saigon, as in the case of South Korea. Finally, the South Vietnamese Front might drive out the Americans without any conference or international agreement.*

The 1954 Geneva Conference had provided for the withdrawal of French troops from all Indo-China and had forbidden any intervention by any other foreign troops. The United States had nevetheless violated the Geneva convention and that could happen again... Frankly, it was a good thing for the United States to keep troops in South Vietnam. That trained the people and made their Liberation Army strong. It was not enough to have a single Ngo Dinh Diem, just as in China a single Chiang Kai-shek had not been enough. There had to be a Japan to overrun the country for eight and a half years. Only then did the nation develop able leaders and a strong revolutionary army able to defeat the internal reactionaries and drive out the American imperialists.

'How would China respond if the United States adopted a peace policy, offered to withdraw its forces from South Korea, Taiwan, all South-East Asia, everywhere abroad, if China and other powers would agree not only to total destruction of nuclear weapons but to total world disarmament?'

Mao said that frankly he had never given any thought to such a notion.

'I have never met President Johnson, but I suppose that if you had any special message for him I might be able to give it to him. Is there anything you would like to say to him?'

After a pause: No, there was not. *[Simply, Pu-shih]*

'Under the circumstances,' I asked, 'do you really see any hope of an improvement in Sino-American relations?'

Yes, he thought there was hope. It would take time. Maybe there would be no improvement in his generation (lifetime). He was soon going to see God. [*In Chinise, 'Pu chiu yao chien Shang-ti', 'to be obliged to see God before long. Mao used Shang-ti, meaning the 'Emperor God', supreme over all other gods, a term less ambiguous than Tien, which can mean God as Nature or a universal primordial principle.*]

GOING TO SEE GOD

'Speaking of your health, as we were not, judging from this evening you seem to be in good condition.'

Mao Tse-tung smiled wryly and replied that there was perhaps some doubt about that. He said again that he was getting ready to see God very soon. Did I believe it?

'I wonder if you mean you are going to find out whether there is a God. Do you believe that?

No, he did not, but some people who claimed to be well informed said that there was a God. There seemed to be many gods and sometimes the same god could take all sides. In the wars of Europe the Christian God had been on the side of the British, the French, the Germans, and so on, even when they were fighting each other. At the time of the Suez Canal crisis God was united behind the British and the French but then there was Allah to back up the other side.

At dinner Mao had mentioned that both his brothers had been killed. His first wife had also been executed during the revolution (1903) and their son had been killed during the Korean war. Now, he said that it was odd that death had so far passed him by. He had been prepared for it many times but death just did not seem to want him. What could he do? On several occasions it had seemed that he would die. His personal bodyguard was killed while standing right beside him. Once he was splashed all over with the blood of another soldier but the bomb had not touched him.

'Was that in Yenan?'

In Yenan, too. His bodyguard had been killed during the Long March[4]. There had been other narrow escapes. According to laws of dialectics all struggles must finally be resolved, including man's struggle for life on this earth.

'Accidents of fate which spared you have made possible perhaps the most remarkable career in Chinese history. In all China's long annals I cannot recall any man who rose from rural obscurity not only to lead a successful social revolution but to write its history, to conceive the strategy of its military victory, to formulate an ideological doctrine which changed the traditional thought of China, and then to live out the practice of his philosophy in a new kind of civilization with broad implications for the whole world.'

After a moment of reflection Mao said that I knew he had begun life as a primary school teacher. He had then had no thought of fighting wars. Neither had he thought of becoming a Communist. He was more or less a democratic personage such as myself. Later on – he sometimes wondered by what chance combination of reasons – he had become interested in founding the Chinese Communist Party. Anyway, events did not move in accordance with the individual will. What mattered was that China had been oppressed by imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. Such were the facts....

'Youths who heard you lecture in 1937 later learned about revolution in practice, but what can be the substitute for youths in China today?'

Of course those in China now under the age of twenty had never fought a war and never seen an imperialist or known capitalism in power. They knew nothing about the old society at first hand. Parents could tell them but to hear about history and to read books was not the same thing as living it.

'Man makes his own history but he makes it in accordance with his environment. You have fundamentally changed the environment in China. Many wonder what the younger generation bred under easier conditions will do. What do you think about it?'

He also could not know, he said. He doubted that anyone could be sure. There were two possibilities. There could be a continued development of the revolution towards communism. The other possibility was that youth could negate the revolution and do bad things *(kan huai shih)*: make peace with imperialism, bring the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek clique back to the mainland, and take a stand beside the small percentage of couter-revolutionaries still in the country. I had asked his opinion. Of course he did not hope for counter-revolution but future events would be dicided by future generations, and in accordance with conditions we could not foresee. From the long-range view future generations ought to be more knowledgeable than we are, just as men of the bourgeois-democratic era were more knowledgeable than those of the feudal ages. Their judgement would prevail, not ours. The youth of today and those to come after them would assess the work of the revolution in accordance with values of their own.

Mao's voice dropped away and he half closed his eyes. Man's condition on this earth was changing with ever increasing rapidity. A thousand years from now all of us, he said, even Marx, Engels, and Lenin would probably appear rather ridiculous.

Before I rose to leave the Chairman sent his greetings to the

American people and said simply that he wished them progress. If he wished them liberation weren't some people bound to disagree? Wouldn't they say that they already had the right to vote? But to those among them who were not really liberated, and desired liberation, to them he wished his best.

Mao Tse-tung walked me through the doorway and, despite my protests, saw me to my car, where he stood alone for a moment, coatless in the sub-zero Peking night, to wave me farewell in the traditional manner of that ancient cultured city. I saw no security guards around the entrance nor can I now recall having seen even one armed body guard in our vicinity all evening..........

Mao shook hands and gave me a precautionary word, to take care, quoting a Chinese maxim: 'Unpredictable high winds and misfortunes are in the skies!'

As the car drove away I looked back and watched Mao brace his shoulders and slowly retrace his steps and re-enter the great Hall of the people.

NOTES

1. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese invading forces attacked the Chinese garrison at Lukochiao, some ten kilometers southwest of Peking. Under the influence of the ardent nationwide anti-Japanese movement, the Chinese troops put up resistence. This was an event Mao predicted; his accuaracy, enormously enhanced his presitiege both as a party and a national leader.

2. *Su-Wei-Ai*, the characters used in the phonetic transliteration of the Russian word 'Soviet', was meaningless to politically unsophisticated Chinese, so the warlord's assumption that he was dealing with a surname was quite reasonable. The Chinese Communists dropped the use of this foreign term after the Kiangsi period.

3. Indonesia returned to the U.N. in 1966, after the army overthrew Sukarno and destroyed the Indonesian Communist Party.

4. In 1935 Mao's brother Mao Tse-t'an was also killed in combat. The youngest brother, Mao Tse-min, made the Long March and was killed in 1942, in an anti-Communist purge in Sinkiang.